180 foshaugen the concept truth forum attempting a dialectical reconciliation of the concept truth in the objectivism of evangelical christianity and the relativism of postmodernism e.k. foshaugen1 abstract the church faces a number of challenges concerning the sociological impact postmodernism is having on society. one significant area that has been profoundly disputed is the epistemological content of the concept of truth. evangelical christians believe in objectivism: the conviction that there exists some ahistorical source, foundation or framework to which we can appeal to in determining the substance and nature of truth, knowledge, reality, right or wrong — and it is independent and external to personal experience or thinking. however, many no longer believe in absolute truth but in relativism. relativism is the denial that there exists such an ahistorical source or foundation that we can appeal to. truth, knowledge, reality, right and wrong are all concepts that are relative to a specific conceptual scheme, framework, or paradigm founded in a society, religion and culture. this article represents an endeavour to dialogically reunite the two perspectives by arguing for the seeking of the “truths” in both perspectives. god is objective truth and has become involved in history: in the existential; in the material setting of our relative and infallible thoughts and the slanted interpretative experiences of the triune god and life. the synthesis will be an affirmation that for christians truth is discovered and revealed in fellowship within community. and members of the body of christ are first and finally called to reveal and demonstrate truth to the world — in their unity. 1 dr. e.k. foshaugen, chaplain at king edwards school, 1 preston cottages, petworth road, witley, surrey, gu8 5sd, uk. e-mail: ekfoshaugen@hotmail.com 182 foshaugen the concept truth 5000 people were many times more than the 30 odd children listening to her story. i told her that she was a liar. to my young mind this was incomprehensible as my two brothers and i ate one loaf of bread for lunch. since i can recall it has been my nature to question things; to doubt and ask questions. and i have discovered that answers only give rise to more questions. this has resulted in me having many opinions that i hold to and a few but very important convictions that hold me. i can live (sometimes very reluctantly and painfully) with paradox and ambivalence whilst believing in the objective divine revealer and collective shared absolutes. i am a practical theologian. practical theology studies the means by which the church as the community of faith preserves and protects its identity. in one sense it is a theology of practice and a dialogue between theology and praxis. thus theology should move in a circle between theory and practice, and practice and theory, with scripture always informing and guiding the process. my opinion is that all theological thinking is in one sense essentially practical if it is to be relevant. for me theology is not only the study of the knowledge of god. it is also the study of the process of getting to know god. this process requires all the help available and as long as the social sciences can aid this endeavour and not be allowed to control the process or overrule scripture then there is an important place for them. theology’s field of study embraces all factors essential to knowing god. practical theology concerns itself with the way in which the gospel works out in practice in the world and should raise questions about what it sees, addressing them back to theology. practical theology is a discipline that must bring to bear theological criteria on contemporary situations and realms of individual and social action and beliefs, then attempt to formulate a suitable response and test the theory in practice. the challenge facing me (and perhaps some others who like me are socratic and always examining their lives and their theology: who have learnt that questions and the journey is often as important as the answers and the destination) is the sociological impact postmodernism is having on the society i live in. and one very big area 184 foshaugen the concept truth sense constructed by the mind, not simply perceived by it, and many such constructions are possible, none necessarily sovereign. i think postmodernism would define truth as “all truth is a social construct, pragmatically justified and community sourced and based”. the question facing people today is: “is there an ultimate standard by which we can judge competing concepts of truth and actions or is it all relative?” to begin to answer this let me define key terms. objectivism is the conviction that there exists some a-historical (outside of history) source, foundation or framework to which we can appeal to in determining the substance and nature of truth, knowledge, reality, right or wrong that is independent and external to personal experience or thinking. relativism is the denial that there exists such an a-historical source or foundation that we can appeal to. truth, knowledge, reality, right and wrong are all concepts that are relative to a specific conceptual scheme, framework, or paradigm founded in a society, religion and culture. truth is not fixed, universal or objective. subjective truth is defined as being dependent on a perceiving, experiencing, contemplating mind for existence, reality or validity. rationalism in the narrow sense excludes experience as a source of truth. truth is established by reason. for many christians the bible and christian teaching is objective. god is unchanging and all questions of truth, knowledge, reality, right and wrong, are ultimately decided from the divine point of view. reformed and evangelical christianity subscribes to some form of objectivism. i am not sure that i can express unqualified acceptance of objectivism. church history and my own experience reveal that many christians have confused the a-historical with the historical. they often reflect their viewpoint as if it is revelation revealed by god. fundamentalists (defined as those who reject all forms of critical scholarship), individuals and even many denominations (in their applaudible desire to promote orthodox doctrine) often have tradition or culturally determined doctrines that are presented as “the gospel”. this exclusivistic presentation has hurt many (e.g., apartheid). however, i believe in the biblical tradition that christians serve an a-historical omniscient creator who has revealed himself and his will through scripture and through the life, death and teaching of the incarnate 186 foshaugen the concept truth lopment of the productive forces can continue (communism). thus history as a whole has a dialectical movement. progress towards human mastery over nature, and eventually towards the elimination of all class relations, results from the development and resolution of contradictions. traditionally, this dimension of hegel’s thought has been analysed in terms of the categories of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. although hegel almost never used these terms, they are helpful in understanding his concept of the dialectic. the thesis, then, might be a concept that contains within itself incompleteness that gives rise to opposition, or an antithesis, a conflicting concept or form of consciousness. as a result of the conflict a third concept arises, a synthesis, which overcomes the conflict by reconciling at a higher level the truth contained in both the thesis and antithesis. this synthesis becomes a new thesis that generates another antithesis, giving rise to a new synthesis, and in such a fashion the process of metaphysical or historical development is continually generated. now let us note how some have applied this dialectical system. john hick (1980) believes that one day in the future we will have a broader world theology. hick (1980:8) comments: such a theology would consist of theories or hypothesis designed to interpret the religious experiences of mankind, as it occurs not only within christianity, but also within the great streams of religious life, and indeed, in the great non-religious faiths also, marxism and maoism and perhaps — according to one’s definition of “religion” — confucianism and buddhism. the project of a global theology is obviously vast, requiring the cooperative labours of many individuals and groups over a period of several generations. hick is saying that various interest groups, religions and individuals will present their theories and hypothesis for dialogic examination. through a dialectical process they will work towards a consensus for a “world theology”. another way of applying hegel’s dialectic process is seen in the work of knitter. knitter (1985:225) contends that all the world religions evolve out of the micro phase of religious history in which they grew. religions consolidated and established themselves in comparative seclusion from each other. now we are in a macro phase of world 188 foshaugen the concept truth son that was a relationship of love, trust, and unity of purpose. by the expression of these characteristics in the church the world will come to see the results of jesus’ activity and believe the father sent him. the manner of this unity is the interdependence between the father and son. the church is called to model this interdependence, this creative diversity within the trinity. it is not primarily an outward, physical ecumenical unity, but unity of a spiritual nature (hendriksen 1961:364). the trinity is not only the model or manner of this unity; it is the cornerstone. mitchell (1990:341) calls it “internal unity”. it is not organizational unity or man made affiliations. unity in life with god should evidence itself in unity within all christians. whilst recognizing denominations and ecclesiastical distinctions, christians are all one in christ. the spirituality of the church should reflect an internal unity in desire, in life, in purpose, and in love. this unity does not require that all christians have the same liturgy or believe precisely the same things. it is not a forced conformity. it does mean that christians must be wary of loving their own ecclesiastical organizations and traditions, their own rituals and creeds, more than they love each other. whilst most commentators might define this unity as internal, or supernatural, or spiritual, it is always to have an outward expression. the reason for this is simple. christianity cannot expect the world to believe that god sent jesus, that the claims of jesus are true; that christianity is true, unless the world sees the reality of the oneness of true christians. the postmodern world no longer believes in the objective concept of truth and is certainly not interested whether an individual’s doctrine is correct or not. the postmodernist is concerned with spirituality and experience. if the church can live and experience what sloyon (1988:198) calls a unity of “right faith”; a living organic oneness that flows from the action of god and is revealed in the church, the postmodernist is challenged to respond to and believe what it sees and experiences. the gift of god, unity, is rooted in the being of god, and manifests as love one for another (john 13:33-35). unity with god and unity with those united to god are complimentary and as beasley190 foshaugen the concept truth demonstrates’’ truth through the unity it exhibits. the holy spirit guides open-minded readers to the truth in scripture. we conform our experience to truth (through rational enquiry in community) and must be wary of the tendency to confirm truth by our experience. experience is always partial, subjective, selective, relative and subject to interpretation — it is not normative. yet, experience does matter and our truth pronouncements must take experience into account. people react to what they observe and encounter (that is one reason why jesus emphasised unity). furthermore, the christian god is presented as a living immanent loving father (and all the benefit that involves) to be encountered. however, experience without rational inquiry is not always enough to determine truth. my personal observation is that in a postmodern world experience is very important and we no longer need a water tight apologetic (100% pure deductive logic) but rather a reasonable explanation that bests suits the experience. perhaps another article is needed to clarify this. in essence i believe that the christian worldview best explains the existential questions of the day. one could say that christianity offers the most valid hypothesis. however, we need to earn the right to be heard and people need to experience the power of the gospel and the unity and love that the church has to offer. truth is objective, but our understanding of it might be partly affected by the way we look at it. let us recognise that often reality is our own perspective and presuppositions. frequently when we say “you are wrong” we are not saying it on biblical grounds (whilst we might claim so) but on the implicit subjective basis that “your view differs from mine”. i have met and read so many who claim to have the absolute complete final interpretation and meaning of all the scripture for a given existential or doctrinal issue. to me this is arrogance (which i realise you could say i am now guilty of). exegesis often becomes eisegesis as they actually read meaning into the text. i think that the text of scripture often challenge the pre-understandings brought to them. interpretation is done within the community (the church). scripture was written by individuals in communities, was canonised by individuals in communities and interpreted throughout the centuries by individuals in communities. the individual in the community presents his/her interpretation to the community to 192 foshaugen the concept truth relative nature of our story versus the objective nature of god, context, time and retrospection can often reveal deeper motifs and/or revive lost themes. (the story of martin luther and protestantism is an example. another is the story of the church during apartheid). thus i define truth with a description. “truth is g(g)ood n(n)ews that is life altering. truth has life — it can set one free”. i affirm the objectivity and the divine revealed cognitive nature of scripture whilst allowing for the possibility of my personal error in my understanding of scripture. i do not only have the revelation in a book but experience the revealer himself. it is i who am relative and he who is objective. it is very important to remember that when truth comes to us our response is not automatic. we have choices — to accept or reject, believe or disbelieve. our choices are also influenced by our presuppositions, beliefs, experiences, culture, attitudes — that make up our personhood. each of us is a unique and complex community formed being with god given freedom and so we will not necessarily respond identically to any given truth. this does not mean we are back to relativism and subjectivism as we do not have total power to shape truth (especially when we are in dialogical relationship in the church community). truth has power to shape us — to free us. our relationship with truth is two-ways. it shapes us and we shape it. having an unpresumptuous and informed concept of objective truth hopefully ensures that we are more shaped by truth than shaping truth. our experience of the objective (the triune god and the word) is relative and in the community of believers we seek to discover and apply that which is objective. sometimes we get it right and sometimes we mess up. truth is propositional yet personal; it is historical, a-historical and existential. it is factual yet relational. truth is eternal and it is life yet can be lost, forgotten or subjective in its interpretation, application or relevance. the truths about truth (objectivism and relativism) is that they are not necessarily conflicting, contradictory and irreconcilable but they are synthesisable — complimentary and enrich, supplement and deepen each other. god has revealed himself in the written word and through personal experiences. the history of the relationship between the triune god and all created humans reveals one truth. the eternal and infallible one who is objective truth has become involved in history: in the exis 194 foshaugen the concept truth tarnas r 1991. the passion of the western mind. london: pimlico. keywords trefwoorde truth waarheid objectivism objektivisme postmodernism postmodernisme evangelical christianity evangeliese christendom spirituality and mysticism: a global view what is at stake in the debate on marxism and postmodernism? yubraj aryal purdue university, usa abstract in contemporary political philosophy, marxism is often considered at odds with postmodernism. marxists often charge postmodernists with nihilism and obscurism, and a lack of commitment to society. this paper will address these charges and show the contribution which postmodernism can make to marxism and the addressing of social problems. there is currently an interesting debate occurring between the advocates of marxism and the advocates of postmodernism. these two camps often pit marxism against postmodernism in such a way that they allow no middle ground. they behave in a way that echoes george w. bush’s famous remark: “either you are with us or against us.” to rephrase this remark to the best fit of these respective advocates of marx and postmodernism: either you are marxist or a capitalist and vice versa. the paper attempts to enter into the heart of debate between the marxism and postmodernism, specifically the marxist charges against postmodernist thought. let me first try to characterize the postmodernist approach before addressing some of the charges against it by the advocates of marxism. at the heart of postmodernism is an attack on an enlightenment rationality founded upon a transcendental all-knowing subject who can bring to us secure, all-pervasive and unquestionable truth. postmodernism, on the contrary, questions the possibility of transcendental truth which exists beyond a given socio-cultural linguistic form of life. postmodernist radical skepticism, hence, smashes every vestige of the greco-roman 1 tradition that claims for a trans-historical truth and human reason attributing it a grand narrative and totalizing essentialism. it replaces the notion of truth, knowledge and reality as contingent, subjective and local. they are considered as the “'modes of subjectivity, like theories of society or versions of history, are temporary fixings in the on-going process in which any absolute meaning or truth is constantly deferred.” 1 the postmodernist project seems to challenge every authority/center who in the name of trans-historical and unquestionable truth and sovereignty dictates over its ‘other’/margin but this considers only the negative side of the authority, what about its ‘technical and positive’ side? hence forward, i will try to present a commentary on some of the marxist allegations against postmodernism. is postmodernism nothing more than neo-nietzschean nihilism? is postmodernism nothing more than neo-nietzschean nihilism and pessimist obscurism as tim hall regards it: “in the name of a nietzschean irrationality, any philosophical heritage for revolutionary thought is thrown out the window and replaced with a drunken speculation detached from history and material reality?”2 can’t postmodernism promise us something beyond what its critics often charge it as ‘apocalyptic irrationalism,’ ‘cognitive atheism,’ or ‘dogmatic relativism”? can we claim that postmodernism has no commitment to people and their politics and history, therefore, a useless nihilist attitude? perhaps we can recognize the postmodernist advocacy for plural and mutual coexistence that transformed european societies with its inclusion of various marginal voices from different social spaces during the decade of the 1970s? or the surge of various social movements of the 2 1970s in europe and the rapid ongoing social transformative movements in nonwestern societies in the recent decades are the implications of postmodernist philosophy accompanied by the unprecedented booms of capitalist technocratic mode of production. can we also not give credit to the postmodernist challenges of the west’s colonialism, genocide, anti-semitism, slavery and patriarchy under the veneer of its civilization? or do we still want to resurface totalitarianism in the name of an absolute which dictates our social life either in the church in the name of an ambassador of god, in the family in the name of the head, in school in the name of all-knowing agency? or we can even ask: does nihilism and pessimism have no function in society? can we so ignorantly disregard their humanistic contents? the radical nihilism of post-world era inspired the europeans to question every authority, and opened the new hope for liberation. for instance, kierkegaardian nihilism inspired a challenge to the inhumanity of christian religion. likewise, nihilism, thus, has its own humanist promise. we cannot term it simply as irrelevant! subversion and displacement of ‘naturalized and reified’ views of human truth and reality cannot be relegated merely to sheer nihilism and nothingness but have potential to herald a neo-humanist emancipation of human politics and history at the same time being critical to its goal itself. our questioning of foundational assumptions of european enlightenment modernity does not kill it. instead of its death, it is transformed into a new stage. maybe we can call it neo-enlightenment. does postmodernism still seem to be nihilism and ahistorical? david wood says no: it is very difficult to ask the question of derrida’s humanism without invoking the legacy of heidegger (letter on humanism) and sartre (existentialism and humanism), each of whom tried to rethink humanism in such a way that they could still claim to be 3 humanists, albeit in a deeper sense. derrida follows this path, in a way, when he goes so far in reaffirming the importance of justice as to identify deconstruction with justice (just as sartre will identify existentialism with radical freedom and responsibility). is this compatible with nihilism? surely so! if nihilism marks the recognition of the death of god, the absence of ultimate or absolute values, but rather the relocation of the excavation site, and perhaps too the attempt to wean us off a certain kind of desire for transcendence. derrida surely inherits nietzsche’s hope that we can ‘be true to the earth.’3 voes postmodernism herald the death of history, class and consciousness? postmodernism does not banish consciousness from human discourse but redefines it. for the postmodernists, no objective pre-given cartesian (or kantian) subjectivity exists in us. the ‘self’ is constructed, fabricated, weaved and interpreted fiction. it is a function not fact, a process not essence, an effect (of language), not cause. this very notion of self suspends the rousseauesque ‘self’ in natural man, the classical marxist notion of ‘self’ (manipulated by a bourgeois ‘false consciousness’) and the liberal notion of ‘self’ (which strives for and achieves self-betterment in a democratic society). there is no coherent substance that we can call ‘self’, which can be politicized by talking about its alienation, its betterment and its naturalness or innocence. there is no unchanging core ‘self’ as such to be alienated, to be kept innocent or to be made better. all that we have in postmodernity are split selves in a constant flux which both jameson and deleuze and guattari analyze in terms of a ‘schizophrenic’ self. foucault says that ‘self’ is not as independent, ‘transcendental’ subject of cartesian or kantian discourse. 4 it is as a locus of multiple, dispersed or decentred discourses. for the traditionalists, discontinuity was both “the given and the unthinkable”; the past is made up of innumerable instances: “decisions, accidents, initiatives, discoveries” which the historian must annihilate by moulding them into a continuous narrative. in contrast foucault stresses the fact that certain forms of knowledge (about the human mind and body, about biology, politics or language), after periods of stability in which the fundamental processes of a discourse remain largely unquestioned, and undergo rapid transformations4 however, our need for a coherent self to define us and our humanistic endeavors is one thing and to try to avoid the critical look over the very structure of the ‘self’ is another. the necessity of the thing should not preclude criticism of the thing. we can make a commitment to our history, class, consciousness, ‘realism’, ‘praxis’, ‘institution’, ‘organisation’, ‘revolution’ etc but we should do so without critical examination. if the postmodernist effort is meant to abolish them, i am not sure what kind of society we will have. but this is not what postmodernism means. the fact that some people try to vilify postmodernism does not mean it is a ‘monster’ out to destroy our commitment to our civilizational goals. therefore the claim below by tim hall seems to be mere malice: i found academic postmodernists (are there any other kinds?) to be smug and way too pleased with themselves. i think this is somehow connected with their rejection of almost everything that marxism commits itself to: realism, praxis, organisation, revolution. so they can pose as some kind of leftists without any of the stigma of marxism attaching. 5 5 is postmodernism textual and irrelevant to the society and its existing reality? the postmodernist rejection of meta-narrative certainly assumes the responsibility for alternative narratives. it has its commitment to the local forms of life to empower them and give voices. at the same time, it is skeptical of any authority, even its own. in the name of empowering the other, it does not attempt to prevail over the other. certainly deconstructive critics concentrate on the texts and their linguistic analysis of the texts. but this does not mean that postmodernism in general is textual. postmodernism, in its commitment to society, is in fact a “critique of the way modern societies control and discipline their populations by sanctioning the knowledge claims and practices of the human sciences: medicine, psychiatry, psychology, criminology and sociology.”6 can we separate text from society? is not it just like an impossible attempt to separate dance from dancer? a textual critique is a critique of the social because text is born out of social contents. since text is already social, the charge that postmodernism is textual and irrelevant to the society itself seems irrelevant. does postmodernism demolish humanist ideals such as truth, reality and knowledge? the answer seems to be no. it has put these values into question but does not eliminate them. there exists no such thing as unquestionable truth. truth is the “leap of logic” between the premise and the conclusion mediated through discourse. all claims for truth have equal status. there is no truth but only truth claims. or as gadamer says there is no single truth claim but there are truth claims: truth1, truth 2, truth 3, and so on. there is nothing prior to interpretation 6 or theoretical methods, and nothing that stands outside of interpretation or its methods that can be taken as a basis for judging its validity. the fact that there is no ultimate truth/reality/knowledge does not mean knowledge has no relevance. it does not mean that to gain more knowledge (even if that knowledge sometimes goes against itself) is not necessary for us. but it does mean that the conditions of the knowledge are not absolute. the conditions are contingent. is postmodernism nothing more than a meaningless neologism? does postmodernism still have a room for chomskian resentment? chomsky writes: as for the "deconstruction" that is carried out, … i can't comment, because most of it seems to me gibberish. but if this is just another sign of my incapacity to recognize profundities, the course to follow is clear: just restate the results to me in plain words that i can understand, and show why they are different from, or better than, what others had been doing long before and have continued to do since without three-syllable words, incoherent sentences, inflated rhetoric that (to me, at least) is largely meaningless, etc. that will cure my deficiencies–of course, if they are curable; maybe they are not, a possibility to which i'll return. ... in short, we seem to inhabit quite different worlds, and i find it hard to see why mine is "elitists," not theirs. the opposite seems to be transparently the case, though i won't amplify. 7 the truth is that academic space itself is an elitist space. it uses certain kinds of specialized jargon. these jargons are certainly unfamiliar to most people. academic language is different 7 from language of everyday life. chomskian jargon too may be difficult to understand for the common folk. postmodernists are not the exception. let me answer the chomskian reservation concerning postmodernism in the above remark as “theoreticians" and “elitists”. one can often view that those who cannot theorize the social contents are mediocre. we cannot excuse the chomskian silence to the question of rhetoric. on this ground many intellectuals today are reluctant to call chomsky a scholar. about the charge of elitism, let me reiterate that academic space itself is elitist space. the space in which chomsky’s works are manufactured and sold, is itself an elitist space. is postmodernism nothing more than “a mental slavery to the bourgeoisie”? is postmodernism as tim hall says “a mental slavery to the bourgeoisie”? hall in communist voice writes: postmodernism has produced diverse offshoots and projects. it poses as a radical challenge to the capitalist establishment, but in reality its philosophy undermines resistance to the ruling class. its essence is a subjective idealism which attacks human reason itself and the materialist world view of science, reserving particular vehemence for marxist revolutionary theory. its logic prevents a coherent analysis of the natural world and especially of capitalist social reality and undermines revolutionary theoretical and political struggle against capitalism. pomo claims to be a radical opponent of the "totalizing" critiques it sees embodied in rationalism and marxism, but its own positions imply a complete ("total") destruction of all but the most fragmentary opposition of the oppressed class, the proletariat, to the capitalist exploiters. in the end, only "deconstructive" word-play is considered resistance. 8 8 postmodernism is no less critical to capitalism and its blind followers who brag about the capitalism as the best of all possible system. postmodernism is more a philosophical system and capitalism a political one. they are not identical. postmodernism is even critical to capitalism. foucault, a postmodernist, regards capitalist modernity as the mindset of the dehumanizing logic of industrial capitalism. maybe some cheap so-called postmodernists used and manipulated postmodernist thought for their vested interests but a genuine postmodernist has no malice to any system of thoughts. but he/she is, of course, critical of the nature of truth, knowledge and reality that were explained by foundationalists. he/she rejects any form of totalitarianism even capitalism if it ceased to speak the language of pluralism and mutual coexistence. he/she rejects the claim that what i speak is truth and any claims against me are false. conclusion i do not want to contend that postmodernism is the best of all possible philosophies. but i believe that despite some of its seemingly nihilist (however, nihilism too has its humanist contents) assertions, its philosophical implications can pragmatically be coordinated with the findings of the research in the social sciences to achieve certain social goals. the insistence on the fusion of postmodernist philosophy with some of the core aspects of marxian humanism seems to be more plausible in the politics of the ‘new international’ today. it seems counterproductive to place marxism and postmodernism in hostility. in other words, it is very hard to see the difference of the advocacy made either by marx and derrida on behalf of the proletariat/margin. their humanism desires to liberate the oppressed, to empower them, to give voice to them. their prospective social goal is the same but the way they interpret it makes only 9 the difference. marx analyzes the condition in terms of the existing reality of nineteenth century european society; derrida interprets in terms of the ‘new international’. it is improper to say marxism and (post) modernism are opposite. both marxism and (post) modernism resist the cultural conditions of capitalist modernity. marx was already (post) modernist (because he has challenged the logic of capitalist modernity) and derrida is still under the spell of marx (see his book specters of marx). one cannot be marxist without being postmodernist (marxism anticipates radical skepticism of authority) and postmodernist without the philosophy of marx (because (post)modernism without certain kind commitment to society is an anachronism (even though anachronism has its own logic). in his book specters of marx, derrida recognizes the relevancy of marx in the new international. … communism has always been and will remain spectral: it is always still to come and is distinguished, like democracy itself, from every living present understood as plentitude of a presence-to-itself, as totality of a presence effectively identical to itself. capitalist societies can always heave a sigh of relief and say to themselves: communism is finished since the collapse of the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century and not only is it finished, but it did not take place, it was only a ghost. they do not more than disavow the undeniable itself: a ghost never dies, it remains always to come and to come-back.9 his dissatisfaction is with the orthodox marists who are reluctant to recognize a new global scenario. what is needed as far as he is concerned, a change in the thinking of dogmatic marxist pundits because so many things like the nature of capital, labour, exploitation, market value etc have changed. the increased sophistication of life world of the workers and “the egalitarian 10 distribution of income, increased workplace democracy, the end of economic exploitation and the eradication of class differences” has transformed the life world of the workers. they are not only workers but also owners of wealth and income. marxism must adjust to this new reality. and it needs to question itself: . . . how will intellectuals in the marxist tradition respond. . . to the global transformations now occurring? how has the crisis in eastern europe and the former soviet union affected the way intellectuals, scholars, and government officials in those countries and around the world reconceived their intellectual and political projects? what is to be the status of marxist social goals that informed so many marxist thinkers and social revolutionaries throughout the world–the egalitarian distribution of income, increased workplace democracy, the end of economic exploitation and the eradication of class differences–given the current rush to various forms of capitalism in eastern europe, russia, and china? does the “end of history also portend the end of marxist theory? what is living and what is dead in marxism? 10 let me point out that i cannot wholly agree with the grand claims concerning “the egalitarian distribution of income, increased workplace democracy, the end of economic exploitation and the eradication of class differences.” while it may be true for the western world, the condition of factory workers in the third world is still more or less the same as marx saw in europe in his time. yet derrida’s assertion still remains true that self-assessment is essential within marxism and perhaps within capitalism too. this means that so-called postmodernist pundits should stop bragging that the philosophy of marx has no relevance today, so-called marxists pundits should not see postmodernism “merely as [a] regressive inclination of the west, but [rather as] a new 11 reflexivity about itself that includes an acknowledgement that the west cannot define on its own ‘world history’ or even ‘western history’. rather, it must construct far more tentative, changing, and dialogic views of itself, as it accounts for the contributions and criticism of the other agents in the global arena” 11. likewise, so-called postmodernist pundits must stop claiming that there is no truth, no reality and that the disciplines of the past are ‘dead.’ to say there is no truth does not deny a room for the truth claims that human beings need to live by on the earth. they create their own local and infinitesimal forms of truth and to pass their life. postmodernism has no intention to plunder that form of truth from people and leave them in a world without truth value. to say that every interpretation is misinterpretation and everything is text does not mean that interpretation is not possible and texts are irrelevant. it means that our modes of interpretation and nature of textuality of the text are contingent and are often prone to give a mistaken views of reality. to recognize this fact is to avoid possible misinterpretation. certainly we cannot say everything is misinterpretation. we must believe and almost we have no choice not to believe in the habermasian communicative potential of human language. for as john locke has already pointed out, we have no other means to think and communicate our thoughts than through language itself. all fundamental reality is accessible to us through/in language. whether there is an independent reality beyond language is debatable. but we can agree that language brings things into intelligibility. even marx and engels in the german ideology say that language bears the immediacy of the actual of ‘thought.’ the nature of language, as john locke has shown, does not reflect reality but a translated version of reality. david hume seems to be correct when he says that the intelligibility of the world does not give us access to the reality of the world but to the habits of human mind. but all this means we should not underestimate any potential revolution 12 for the emancipation of the human beings. we should not underestimate the crude reality of exploitation of one class over the other. there is still a grim reality of exploitation and misery of the life-world of a big section of the population. we can question whether the exploitation is a cause or effect (of language). but our commitment toward the exploited cannot be withheld. commitment and cognition sometimes go unparallel. but no one should preclude the other. in other words, our postmodernist sensibility and marxist commitment to the ‘have nots’ should go parallel with the progress of society as well as its consciousness and knowledge. endnotes 1chris weedon’s feminist practice and poststructuralist theory (blackwell publishing, 1997) offers a clear and lucid interpretation of poststructuralist theory with the focus on the issues of language, subjectivity and power. 168. 2 tim hall , editor of struggle, a revolutionary working-class literary magazine accuses postmodernism of undermining the struggle of working class against capitalist ruling class in “postmodernist philosophy is old subjectivist wine in new bottles.” communist voice #15, october 25, 1997. url:> http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html 3 see tyrus miller’s interview response to me in my book the humanities at work: international exchange of ideas in philosophy, aesthetics, and literature (kathmandu: sunlight publication 2008 ) 43. 4 the quote is adopted from notes of the second session of the postmodern meeting group held on july o7, 2007. url:> http://www.newphilsoc.org.uk/postmodernisam/postmodernism.htm 5 the extract is adopted from discussion of robert day and carlos rebello about the debate between marxism and postmodernism. rober day is accusing postmodernism of being an academic bourgeois enterprise. url:> http://www.marxmail.org/archives/july99/marxism_and_postmodernism.htm 6 the quote is adopted from notes of the sixth session of the postmodern meeting group held on july o7, 2007. url:> http://www.newphilsoc.org.uk/postmodernisam/postmodernism.htm 7 the quote is adopted from the electronic version posted by one jenm289@aol.com to rec.arts.books, 13 nov 1995 where it is written: "the following was written several months ago by noam chomsky in a discussion about po-mo and its contribution to activism et al. the discussion took place on lbbs, z-magazine's left on-line bulletin board. . . .” url:> http://www.cscs.umich.edu/~crshalizi/chomsky-on-postmodernism.html 8 tim hall “postmodernist philosophy is old subjectivist wine in new bottles.” communist voice #15, october 25, 1997. url:> http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html 9 jacques derrida, specters of marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new international (new work: routledge, 2006) translated ed. by peggy kamuf. derrida says that the capitalist declaration of ‘the death of marxism’ does not mean it is dead or that it is no longer relevant to the new politics. 13 http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/toc15.html http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/15cpostmodern.html http://home.flash.net/~comvoice/toc15.html 10 bernd magnus and stephen cullenberg wrote the introduction to derrida’s book specters of marx: the state of the debt, the work of mourning and the new international (new work: routledge, 2006). the quote of their view of marxism in consistent with derrida’s view in the book. 11 see david wood’s, interview response by me in my book the humanities at work: international exchange of ideas in philosophy, aesthetics, and literature (kathmandu: sunlight publication 2008 ) 243. 14 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. 1. 1989 201 views and comments a critique of lslamization of the sciences: its philosophy and methodology aliyu usman tilde i agree that all efforts shoujd be made to deprive science as much as possible of its present materialistic philosophy because we muslims today are only dragged into sharing the evils of the struggle between science and religion which took place in europe and in which we never participated. but in so doing we must make sure that we have not committed the same blunder as the christians did when they sat down to write .. christian geography" in the middle ages, which precipitated that harsh experience of conflict between science and religion and which resulted only in creating a false but sharp dichotomy between the two. it is in view of this that i hereby forward a critique of an article titled "the lslamization of the sciences: its philosophy and methodology" by ja'far shaykh idris. 1 it is important to realize that most of what ja'far has written has been said earlier by other scholars. but the eleven-step methodology for islamization of the sciences he presented are articulated on certain points or concepts which others have earlier debated and cautioned us against. on "philosophical questions" most of what has been said under this topic in the article seems correct concernjng the components of knowledge-source, capacity. and method; acquired and inborn knowledge and their relationship, and the five listed sources of knowledge. all the statements are theoretical. so the extent to which they could be qualified as "correct" depends largely on how they were used by the author to outline the "procedure for islamization of the sciences" to which the second part of the article was dedicated. aliyu usman tilde is a research scholar at ahmadu bello university in zaria, nigeria. 1this article appeared in 11,e american joumal of islamic social sciences. (herndon, va: international lnstitute of islamic thought and the association of muslim social scientists. vol. 4, no. 2) . pp. 201-208. 202 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. i, 1989 on "procedure of the islamization of the sciences" i absolutely agree with dr. idris on steps (5), (8), (10) and (11). but propositions under steps (1) , (2) , (3), (4), (6), and (7) need to be closely re-examined and reviewed if not discarded. moreover, they directly contradict step (9). they read thus: 1 . . "accept as true all empirically or rationally discovered facts whether they be natural, physical, psychological, social, mathematical or otherwise irrespective of who discovered them. 2 . "add to this, in respective fields and relevant places, facts stated in the qur'an and authentic traditions. 3. "research the qur'an and sunnah laws under which these facts can be subsumed and explained. 4 . "discover or develop theories which explain these laws and facts. 6 . "put all these facts, laws and theories in an islamic framework. 7. "since we have two sources of knowledge, the world and wa~y (divine revelation) we must be very clear about the relationship between them." this point has been elaborated upon much further. it could be clearly read from the above statements by the author that: 1 . a tight association is sought between science and islam. 2 . that "truth" is the same no matter the source be it the "world" or revelation. 3. that verses or traditions could be used to support scientific theories and the resultant is put in an "islamic framework". and so on. what i consider as important here to clarify are two respective characteristics of science and islam which makes it impossible or not even advisable to forge a tight relationship between the two. these pertain to (1) relativity of.,ruth"in science which to me differs sharply from the categorical truth in the qur'an. (2) the relationship between reason and revelation (the former is described by the author as "world"). the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. i, 1989 203 "truth" in science is relative and unstable there is nothing like "truth" in science and it is not even possible to qualify even the most ascertained theories and observations as true. there are only "facts." but facts could be subjective and relative. this may sound exclusivist, but let us offer a close examination. science is a product of human effort to understand what surrounds us in the world. but in so doing, as dr. idris has also pointed out, man makes use of his senses, which aids his reasoning to arrive at a conclusion logical to him. in many cases, he could even convince others of the logic in his conclusion by demonstrating repeatedly his experiment to others who may also try it on their own later to confirm it further. if it is confirmed beyond "doubt;' it becomes a theory. 2 but their observation, confirmation, and theory may hold only for that period in human history or even geography due to the limitations within which human reasoning operates. in fact this may be what ja'far refers to as "the human capacity to kn(mi." the term "capacity" in my understanding is abstract and relative as much as it is dictated by factors like age, level of development in technology, abundance of resources, communication efficiency, etc. what has been accepted as "true" yesterday may totally be rejected today as "false." it was "true" yesterday because man did not then acquire the knowledge and skill he has today. students of history of science know very well the vicissitudes imposed on scientific development by technique. (2) for example, prior to the telescope of galileo, the discovery of the compass, etc., no one in europe could believe that the earth was round. in this particular example, consider the verse (51:48) that talks about god "spreading" the earth like a carpet or mat. what do you think was the conception of the ~aj:,iibah about the shape of the earth to whom this verse was revealed? of course nothing other than "flat ." the christians, even up to the 16th century, still believed the earth was flat and clearly expressed this idea in what the church published as "christian geography." at that time there was nothing more "true" than this theory, because everybody could see that the earth was flat . the same thing applies to the static position of the earth, of which some even quoted supporting verses from the qur'an. if the "truth" in science means empirical observation and scientific theory means a logic based on demonstrated and verified observations then the whole western world before the discoveries of the telescope 2it should be noted that most contemporary theories are not arrived at from verified observatio.ns but from inferences derived from no n-observable supposed occurrences. 204 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. i. 1989 and the compass was scientific in believing that the earth was flat and static. but who is foolish enough today to accept that the earth is flat? even the dogmatic church bas dropped the idea. the spherical and revolutionary nature of the earth has today been proven by astronomy, navigation , and other sciences as the "truth," and what was accepted as "true" yesterday (the earth as a static and flat planet) is today regarded by all as absolutely "false." before the middle of this century was the atom not considered the smallest indivisible portion of matter as described in bohr's theory? wasn't the entire atheistic materialistic philosophy of the west and communism built on matter as the sole source of life? but do scientists themselves accept bohr's theory as "true" today? has our conception about matter not changed sharply after the fragmentation of the atom? life itself does not exist in the atom and we stand today bewildered and confused. what therefore makes the "truth" so mutable in science? of course nothing other than time, which offers opportunities of development of technique. it is possible that with progress in technique development, tomorrow we may term as false the helical nature of ona discovered by watson and crick of which we were so sufficiently convinced to honor them with a nobel award and on which the entire field of genetic engineering is based? it is possible that someone will convince the world that our assumption today of the cell as the structural and functional unit of life is false. certainly, 'abbas al 'aqqad was right in asserting that "human sciences change with time in a progressive form . they are between something awaiting completion, or comprehension, or convergence of divergents, or mistakes awaiting correction , or a guess developing into reality. it is not rare for scientific foundation to collapse after being solid, or to shake vigorously after affinnation. researchers may question their validity after regarding them as "real" for many centuries. . ;'3 glyn ford once asserted: "developments within science and technology emerge from an adversary process in which hypotheses compete for intellectual dominance. but the judging is rigged."4 this is the "truth" in science if it ever exists. it keeps on changing. "truth" in revelation is firm truth in science changes, as we have seen above, owing to the shortcomings and weaknesses of man. but when considering anything whose divine l<abbas mal)rnud al ';6.qqad , islamiyyat, vol. 3 (beirut: dar al kitab al lubnani, 1975), pp. 19. 4 glyn ford , kliberating science with is lamic values", inquiry vol. i (2) pp, 50. the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6. no. l. 1989 205 source is affirmed, the question of contemplating its truth or otherwise does not even arise. it is true to the core. it is the truth, firm and unflinching, whether on earth or on the moon . it has come from allah who has no scholastic shortcomings. he does not need the telescopes of galileo nor the lenses of leuvenhook. he has the key to the unseen and knows what transcends human perception or observation. above all he is the creator: .. should he not know he that created? and he is the one that understands the finest mysteries (and) is well-acquainted (with them)" (qur'an, 67:14). so if the qur'an tells us that the function of the mountains is to provide topographical stability to the earth. we do not have to wait for the russians to demolish their mountains by atomic bomb and see the topographical effect. that is why matters raised by the qur'an are considered on the basis of belief not as something whose authenticity requires verification. the qur'an is different from the bible in this respect. the only thing that matters here is our interpretation of the qur'an. our understanding of any verse largely depends on the level of our knowledge of physical and natural sciences as well as scientific technique. the best example we can cite here is the verse in ;.j.nkabut which commands mankind to travel on earth to see how life was started. here, though the wisdom behind the command is clear, the method of seeing "how allah started creation" is left to the dictates of technique. does it mean mere study of morphological characters of organisms or the vestiges of past civilizations or a palaentological study of fossils? this particular ex.ample has been elaborated by sayyid qutb in ft zilal. the "truth" in the qur'an therefore varies sharply from the ~ruth" in science. oddly put, while there is one truth in the qur'an, there are many "truths" in science. reconciliation between science and the qur'an or reason and revelation does it then mean that the two, science and the qur'an , or reason and revelation are irreconcilable or mutually exclusive? as dr. idris said, much has been written on this issue. but surprisingly, instead of highjighting the most recent developments in the field and proposing a methodology of islamization based on these developments, what he has presented is an approach reflective of the approaches of ancient writers, like ibo taymiyah. though he laboriously tried to show the superiority of wahy, it is clear that his perception of the relationship between it and reason is j\.bduhist (in line with the thought of mubanunad )\bduh). the understanding is that the 206 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6. no. 1, 1989 two are not exclusive but compatible, "since the world" as he stated, "is the creation of god , and religion is the word of god, genuine empirical statements describing the world, and authentic religious statements must necessarily be true and cannot therefore contradict one another." the above statement is similar to what shaykh muammad ~bduh said: "revelation by way of divine message is a trace among the traces of allah . and human reasoning is also a trace from the traces of allah in the universe. the traces of allah should harmonize among themselves, not contradict one another."5 but where dr. idris is mistaken, as was his predecessor i\bduh, (names like taha f:lusayn could also be added to the queue), is where he showed equality or even preference of reason over revelation. he said: "give priority to what is known to be absolutely true, (the qat') irrespective of whether it is the religious or the rational or empirical." in his critique of ~bduh's stand on the relationship between revelation and reason, sayyid qutb said: "one of them (i.e., revelation) is more encompassing than the other; the former has come to be the basis which the latter can be referred to, and a yardstick for judging the other (reason) as it relates to its decisions, understanding and conception. it corrects the latter's deviations. there is, therefore, undoubtedly harmony between them but only on this basis not on the basis that they are equal opposites ... moreover a reason devoid of shortcoming and whim does not really exist, it is only 'abstract"'. 6 sayyid qutb even rejected interpreting the qur'an in a way that will conform to human reasoning, which at least is less risky than using the qur'an to support reasoning or using reasoning to dispute a possible divine source. after giving examples of the reflection of this methodology in the commentaries of ~bduh's students (ri<:la and al maghribi), qutb said, " ... the interpretation of qur'anic texts was given to conform to reason. this is the basis of the error. mentioning the word "reason" returns the issue to something unreal . ... there is my reason, and the reasons of so and so person. there is no reason which is not imbued with shortcomings, whims, desires and ignorance. if we therefore subject the interpretation to make the text conform to many 'reasons', we are then going to end up in anarchy."' imam i:jasan al banna has been reported as saying to taha husayn: "you call for religion to be in the service of science. it is an opinion based on the present civilization in the west . this is a wrong opinion because it means that if there is a conflict between science and religion on a particular issue, 5in sayyid qutb, kha~izys al t~awwur al /sl.ami wa muqawwamatilj. (beirnt: dar a l shuruq), p. 19. 6ibid. 7ibid . the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. 1, 1989 2itt religion is discarded and science takes its position. it is necessary to differentiate between science and religion. religion is firm reality whereas science is comprised of theories which undergo change. if we clothe science with the garment of religion, we make it static; and if we make religion subservient to science we then philosophize it and, by so doing, deny its nature such that it is no longer religion."8 conclusion from the foregoing discussion, the relationship between revelation and reason remains important and should be given all the attention it requires by students.of tslamization of knowledge. i am glad to state that al faruqi has made the stand clear by saying: "the separation of wal].y and 'aql is utterly unacceptable. it is inimical to the whole spirit of islam, opposed to the central appeal of the qur'an to reason, to weigh rationally all matters, to favour the more reasonable, the more median course."9 the views of dr. idris upon which he proposed his steps toward lslamization of sciences need to be strongly reviewed in light of what has been said above about the instability of science and its relationship to religion. this is necessary if we intend to save islam from the embarrassment incurred by christianity in the last four hundred years. remember the precarious situation in which the church found itself in the mid-sixteenth century. russell said: "when galileo's telescope revealed jupiter's moons, the orthodox refused to look through it, because they knew there could not be such bodies and therefore the telescope must be deceptive."k> that was the implication of rushing to forge a bond between religion and reason. i do not at all agree that we separate science from islam as it is practiced today in the world. but we have to be cautious about the dynamics of their co-existence. we must accept revelation in the qur'an as truth to the core but consider its interpretations as opinions of jurists. we must regard science as a human endeavor to understand the creation of allah and find a means of exploiting better his bounties which he put at our disposal. we may even consider scientific research as 1badah because the qur'an has always urged us to use our reasoning and energy in this direction. we can even seek direc8malµniid 'abd al j:ialim, al lkhwan al muslimim , ru.~-oh min al dakhu (dar al da'wah, vol. i), p. 232. 91sma'il raji al firiiqi, lslamiw1io1t of knowledge: general principles a11d uorkplan (herndon, va: international institute of islamic thought, 1982) pp. 18-19. '°bertrand russell, the impact of science 011 society, (london: unwin paperbacks, 1953) p. 19. 208 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 6, no. i, 1989 tion and priorities of scientific research from the qur'an. but we should not consider our findings as "absolute truth'' because the power of our judgment is restricted by our development in knowledge and the technological resources available. thus al j\qqad said: "the qur'an is sufficient for the islamic community from the perspective of belief. it does not prevent them from the path of knowledge and progress. by this virtue it has fulfilled the necessity of belief and prevents the evil which afflicted those whose beliefs blocked them from freedom of thought and conscience. . . . it is not becoming for both scientists and philosophers to seek from religion anything other than this." 11 11 'abbas ma):i.miid al ~qad, lslamiyyat, vol. 3. p. 14. the pakistan develdpment review "5h odjo t1'71 ,_ 1"1'1dm ........... .......,. -·--·-........ ,.. .. ---,._ --·-__ ... _ ..... a..a-... -·-...,.,hw/flll. om.f'( ............ 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"""" £• r..-.. ,_-' -f1l11klq-=• 67 -t,el annuol s..t>ralptldn u.s. $ 75.00, pak at 250..00 by •url,n .. and u.s. s ii0.00 . ... k a• ffl.00 by alt rnor. , ...... u .s. s 20.00. , ... at 65.00 by_,_ .... n and u.s. s zs.do. pak a1 70.00 by air rnol for 1989 only, sut,,c,lptlont "' v,r,rtd on a c:alandtt y,.,_,,. tflould ~ mode dnctly tlvough a croc!>eo110/demand draft. lstued in 1/w .._ of tho paki.on ,,..,muia of o..olopmenl eco-. pon 8ojc 1091, 1~........i "4000 lhkh,.nl. 122-dialogue on differing asian augustine and descartes on the divine light: a comparison to plato hu yeping the catholic university of america, washington, d.c. augustine and descartes are two great figures in the history of western philosophy, each having made his own major contribution in the field. in view of this aurelius augustine (354–430, a.d.) can be considered the father of christian philosophy, whereas rené descartes (1596–1650, a.d.) is called the father of the modern western philosophy. studies of the philosophy of these figures are particularly abundant. however, inspired by the book descartes and augustine1 by professor stephen menn, in this paper i would like to reexamine augustine’s confessions2 and descartes’ meditations on the first philosophy.3 we will ask why, after so many years, they promise to open new pathways between philosophers and theologians; what the two figures have in common in their search for truth, wisdom, and goodness, or the “divine light”; and where they differ in terms of its understanding and implementation. to help make this comparison i would like to employ as point of reference the commonplace of plato’s theory of the divided line and his allegory of the cave. this will make it possible to analyze the processes of inner self development as the path to truth for augustine and to knowledge for descartes, to appreciate their convergence upon the divine light, and to see what significance and meanings we can draw today from their distinctive insights for the troubled relation of faith and reason in our times. this then is a study in four parts: part i, “plato,” treats the passages in the republic on the theory of forms, the divided line and the allegory of the cave; parts ii and iii are on augustine and descartes respectively and examine the inner development of their work as it encounters the divine source of the light of the mind; and part iv compares the two great philosophers with plato’s allegory of the cave to see what they achieved, and they can contribute by their search, and what more needs to be done. prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 2, july-december, 2004, 1-21 1 © 2000 by assumption university press part i. plato plato (427–347 b.c.) is the father of western philosophy; indeed whitehead once said that the rest of western philosophy was but footnotes on plato. plato’s writings in the form of dialogues are endlessly rich and profound resources for lovers of wisdom to explore, to contemplate and so to find new meanings. his republic is certainly one of the most significant of his great dialogues; its simile of the divided line and allegory of the cave are among its high points. plato divided reality into two levels of reality, one lower and the other higher: the objects on the lower level are physical, while on the higher level they are “forms”. forms are transcendent, eternal, intelligible, and archetypal, whereas physical things are spatio-temporal, changing, changeable and sensible. the forms are more perfect and real than physical things, whereas physical objects only imitate and participate in the forms. for instance, a ball is round, a watch is round, a well is round, etc.; there is also an ideal or a form of roundness in my mind. but which of these is the more real? plato believes that all physical roundness can be changed or is changing, but the idea of the roundness in my mind is permanent and changeless. this idea or form of roundness is imprinted in my mind. the next time i see something which has similar shape, i can compare the shape with the form in my mind and identify the physical thing as round. this is plato’s theory of forms. in the republic at the end of book vi, plato describes a line divided into two unequal sections, each having two unequal subdivisions. the four parts correspond to image (eikasia), belief (pistis), thought (dianoia) and understanding (noesis). what does this mean? through socrates plato argues that there are two kinds of reality: visible and intelligible. the first two subsections, image (eikasia) and belief (dianoia), belong to the visible world, which consists of images as shadows, reflections in water and physical objects, and their originals such as animals, plants, and material things. “as regards truth and untruth, the division is in this proportion: as the opinable is to the knowable, so the likeness is to the thing that it is like?” the last two subsections, thought (dianoia) and understanding (noesis), belong to the intelligible world in which the soul uses images to reason from hypotheses not up to first principles, but down 2 prajñâ vihâra to a conclusion on the part of thought. the mind cannot go beyond its hypotheses and has to use images. however, in the last subsection the soul makes its way up to the first principle, proceeding through forms alone, moving from form to form and ending in forms. (see republic,4 book vi 508d-510b) here the subsections of divided line symbolize different levels of knowledge, truth and forms (goodness). knowledge and truth are beautiful, but not goodness itself, whereas the form is the highest good which is the source of all things. like the sun as regards sight, sight is not the sun, but receives the light from the sun; the sun is not sight, but the cause of sight and is seen by sight. in order to make the divided line more graphic and more understandable, plato uses the famous allegory of the cave to illustrate why the last section is so significant and best of all. plato invites us to imagine human beings chained in an underground cave and able to see only the images or shadows on the wall in front of them. there was fire at the mouth of the cave which cast the images or shadows. those in chains were limited to the images or shadows on the wall all their lives and believed these to be the truth or real things. this is equivalent to the visible realm corresponding to the first section of plato’s divided line which he called image (eikasia). others, freed from their chains, were able to look toward the physical objects which gave the shape or outline of the shadows and believed what they saw to be the real or true. plato called this belief (pistis) which was still on the sensible level. some managed to climb to the mouth of the cave and conceptualize what they had seen through their rational assumptions and reasoning power; this stage plato called thought (dianoia). eventually some struggled out the cave and reached the fire or source of the light. here they attained the level of understanding (noesis) and were able to experience reality beyond that encountered in the cave. beyond shadows, physical things and hypothetical reasoning, it is unchangeable, immeasurable, immutable and eternal. it is the truth and the form (goodness), the light which is the source of all things. arriving there the soul sees things ten thousand times better and enjoys the brilliant light of goodness itself. it is precisely this light, this truth and this goodness which augustine and descartes, each in their own unique or distinctive ways, discovered hu yeping 3 to be essential. we shall now proceed to explore how they made this discovery and what it can suggest for the human quest in our days. part ii. augustine brief history though there are many descriptions of the life and thought of augustine, we shall review briefly his personal history in order to situate the points of personal development relevant to our concerns. augustine was born in 354 ad in the town of thagaste in north africa. his father, patricius, who owned some property and was a small official, was not christian; his mother, monica, was a devout catholic. augustine learned rhetoric, literature, natural science, music, etc. and later taught rhetoric in thagaste, carthage, rome and milan. during his years in carthage, he became a manichean, a religion derived from many sources which claimed that it could lead to salvation. the key to its metaphysics was that there were two powers in reality, one good and the other evil. during his years in rome and milan, augustine gradually gave up this old faith and in 386 began to read some neo-platonic texts and converted to catholic. after his baptism, augustine gave up his teaching of rhetoric and concentrated on church work and biblical writings. in late 388 he returned to africa. in 391 he went to hippo, where he was ordained as priest and later became bishop of hippo till his death. augustine wrote many important works, among which his confessions is considered one of the great works of western literature. he composed this masterpiece during his first three years as bishop of hippo. this work, in the style of a prose-poem, has thirteen books with 278 chapters, directly addressed to “my god and my lord”. it covers many issues to philosophy, theology, religion, psychology, social theory, etc., but distinctively has a threefold confession: “a confession of sins, a confession of faith, and a confession of praise.”5 the first 1-9 books are about his past personal growth from infancy to his conversion. the last four books are precisely on the concerns of his converted mind in relation to memory, time and eternity, form and matter, and creation. 4 prajñâ vihâra “our heart is restless until it rests in you” the confessions is not only about wisdom which augustine desired and tried to embrace, but also about the truth which was the original source of his being. this he approached “by calling upon” and “by believing in” god through the interior development of his inner world. “if wisdom were found, to abandon all the empty hopes and all the lying follies of my vain desires.” (confessions vi, 11) “in truth, when i call upon him, i call him into myself.” (confessions i, 1) he examined his sinful infancy, evil-doing youth and the struggles of his early adulthood, but noted that throughout “i wished to mediate upon my god, but i did not know how to think of him except as a vast corporeal mass, for i thought that anything not a body was nothing whatsoever. this was the greatest and almost the sole cause of my inevitable error.” (confessions v, 10) indeed before his conversion, he was always bothered by the question of evil; he said that in his early life he enjoyed doing things sinful not out of some need, but for the wrong-doing itself. he tried different ways in order to find the answer. augustine believed that even an infant is not without sin. as a boy, he wanted to win and to show himself “not out of a desire for better things, but out of love for play.” (confessions i, 10) though his devout mother wanted him to be baptized his baptism was delayed. “for i, so small a boy and yet so great a sinner.” (confessions i, 12) he was fond of play, committed thefts, told lies and was full of greediness because “i did not see the whirlpool of filth into which i was cast away from before your eyes.” (confessions i, 19) at his early youth, he “burned to get my fill of hellish things” because of “the corruption of my soul.” (confessions ii, 1) though his mother warned him, he was blinded without seeing that her warnings “were your warnings, and i knew it not.” (confessions ii, 3) he enjoyed the association with others who committed crimes with him. in telling the famous story of stealing fruit augustine said the stealing was not out of need, but rather for the enjoyment of the actual theft. “i should be evil without purpose and that there should be no cause for my evil but evil itself. foul was the evil, and i loved it.” (confessions ii, 4) hu yeping 5 in his later youth, he said “my soul did not grow healthy” and there “was hunger within me from a lack of that inner food.” (confessions iii, 1) he was bothered by such questions as “whence is evil?” “is god confined within a corporeal form?” and “does he have hair and nails?” (confessions iii, 7) in searching for answers he first became a manichean, but later argued that the manichean view of all in material, corporeal and hence quantitative terms prevented him from knowing and loving god. “i did not know how to love you, for i knew only how to think upon gleaming corporeal things.” (confessions iv, 2) thus, he considered god to be part of the world and as a corporeal thing; he did not see that god is a spirit and “your spiritual works are above those corporeal things, bright and heavenly.” (confessions iii, 6) by reference to plato’s divided line we see that augustine was looking for an answer for his questions on evil and god in the visible subsection. he wished to conceive things whether bodily or spiritual in the same way “that seven and three make ten,” because he “did not know how to conceive except in a corporeal way.” (confessions vi, 4) he did not know that the true interior justice was not according to custom, but by the righteous law of god, and that “my body lives by my soul, and my soul lives by you.” (confessions x, 20) he loved all the bodily things and physical pleasures and looked for answers from without rather than within. such an earthly way of thinking forced him to think of god as something corporeal and measurable, having existence in space and place. he had no clear ideas about himself. like those chained in the cave he believed that shadows and physical objects were the true knowledge of the form and within that realm tried to think of something higher and beyond. he was, as it were, wandering in the cave, studying shadows on the wall and sensible things in order to conceive god. he thought of both god and evil in a measurable corporeal way and could not separate the two because in his sensible vision the infinite good, god who is everywhere, must overlap or interpenetrate evil. yet he could not be satisfied with this manichean answer and remained puzzled by the problem of evil: how to explain that god was almighty, all good and infinite, and yet recognize and resolve the problem of evil. there must be something else which transcends visible thinking. as menn points out, “augustine says that the principal reason why he had fallen into error was his inability to conceive of anything except 6 prajñâ vihâra bodies extended in space. wishing to conceive of god in the most appropriate way, he could only imagine him as an infinite body interpenetrating all other bodies.”6 reading cicero’s hortensius “changed my affections. it turned my prayers to you, lord, and caused me to have different purposes and desires.” (confessions iii, 4) during his years in rome and milan as a teacher of rhetoric, he never stopped searching for a better understanding of his questions; unsatisfied with the manichean doctrine, he looked for a new answer. in milan he met saint ambrose who had great impact on him. “i heard him, indeed, every sunday as he was rightly handling the word of truth before the people.” (confessions vi, 3) however, “not yet”: augustine was still uncertain and still searching. in the meantime he received some neo-platonist texts which liberated him from manichean notion of reality and directed his mind within to discover that his mind was measured by something higher and more perfect than what is corruptible, and that the eternal truth and the universal good were above the changing world. neo-platonist spirituality and interiority and its corresponding internal freedom from the external world drew augustine closer to the christian scriptures. neo-platonism pulled him out, as it were, from the visible and the corporeal to the third level of the divided line. he began to turn inward to his inner self to look for an answer. augustine was influenced by the thought of two neo-platonists: plotinus (204/5–270 ad) and porphyry (c.233–309 ad). plotinus developed a metaphysics founded in a dichotomy between the intelligible and the sensible. the former was real, unchanging and non-spatial, whereas the later was unreal, changeable and spatial. further he developed a hierarchy of three existents: the one, the intellect, and the soul. ‘the one’ or ‘the good’ was the ultimate cause of everything. it could not be grasped by sensible things and thought, but was connected to externals through ‘the intellect,’ which was the platonic form. ‘the intellect’ acted through the cosmic soul, which produced sensible objects and gave life to the bodily organisms. the soul, the lowest intelligible cause, was directly in contact with sensible objects. plotinus was a dualist about body and soul. human beings belonged to the sensible world through their physical life, but their soul was rooted in the divine intelligibility and contemplation hu yeping 7 and philosophy could help the soul return to its divine root. plotinus believed that the cosmic realm was a chain of forms and matter and that non-being was the cause of evil. evil was no more than a defect of being and goodness. the weakness in the soul made humans misuse their free choice and tend to material things, which was the cause of evil. porphyry was a student of plotinus and edited plotinus’ teachings with his own insights. he was also responsible for the renewal of aristotle’s philosophical thought. he possessed very broad learning from philosophy to literary criticism, from history to religion. porphyry held that reason exercised by a pure mind could lead to the true essence of things, the one god. intellectual activity detached the soul from passions and confusions, and concentrated its activity on the real things: the soul could be purged if it was away from body. he promoted abstinence such as being vegetarian, avoiding sexual activity and being devoted to the contemplation of being. god contained all things, but was contained by nothing. degrees of being were also degrees of goodness. the soul was in the median position: it could descend to evil or ascend to goodness. by ascetic acts and retrospective contemplation, the soul could achieve its true fulfillment. the neo-platonist views of evil and its immaterialism had strong impact on augustine. it liberated him from the manichean understanding of god and taught him that the soul had inherent power of self-knowledge, which could be achieved by putting aside the sensible and physical objects. thus the soul could be led to the divine light and to truth itself. by entering into himself to seek out “who i am?” augustine no longer desired honor, wealth and vanity, but looked for incorporeal truth as instructed by “the books of platonists.” he was by now certain that “you exist, that you are infinite, . . . that you are truly he who is always the same, . . . that all other things are from you . . . of these truths i was most certain, but i was too weak to find my joy in you.” (confessions vii, 20) “i knew what a thing of evil i was, but i did not know the good that i would be after but a little while.” (confessions viii, 8) but when he “enters into his own innermost parts,” he is not considering how much room his body or his soul may take up, but only his own thoughts. this reflection on himself leads him to recognize that some of his thoughts are in accordance with truth 8 prajñâ vihâra or wisdom, and that some of them run contrary to truth. he therefore recognizes that there must be some such thing as truth, which sets the standard for whether he is thinking rightly or not.7 augustine begins by intuiting his own soul, and then this first intuition somehow allows him to come to an intuition of god. augustine says that this procedure led him to a knowledge of god very different from the conjectures he had previously formed, and that with this knowledge of god he could understand whence evil arose.8 because of the influence of the neo-platonism augustine began to think of himself, his soul and god in a non-corporeal way and to conceptualize what they were and how they related to each other. but in plato’s imagery he was still inside the cave or in the third level of the divided line – thought (dianoia). he tried with his own measurable power of intellect to reason out the immeasurable and non-quantifiable god; but he was close to the fourth level and its true understanding of the divine light. thus, his inner struggle was fought “much more bitterly than ever before,” (confessions viii, 11) he confessed that it was his love of old trifles that delayed him from drawing closer to the highest good. this debate within his heart was only a fight of himself against himself, because people wished to be “light not in the lord but in themselves.” the heart was still restless because it did not know that “the true light enlightens every man that comes into this world.”9 in his confessions augustine described in detail his struggle and his encounter with the divine light, with god, face to face. when he started reading scriptures he was at first not as enthused as he later became. “my swelling pride turned away from its humble style, and my sharp gaze did not penetrate into its inner meaning.” (confessions iii, 5) with a newly intense desire, he reread the scriptures and “i saw those pure writings as having one single aspect, and i learned to exult with joy . . . whatever truths i had read in those other works i here found to be uttered along with the praise of your grace.” (confessions vii, 21) “for your teaching is true, and besides you there is no other teacher of the truth.” (confessions v, 6) he turned to himself again and again to look for the inner light in his hu yeping 9 soul and found that “i” am only a man and ‘i am not he, but he has made me!’ in particular he found that his mind was measured by truth which enabled him to know and hold to those first principles by which all areas of truth could be explored. augustine recognized that beyond corporeal objects, changing and measurable things, there was something higher and truer, something unchangeable and unmeasurable which measured all. this transcended the physical and visible world (plato’s first and second levels) where he had searched. looking within he found that as measuring of the mind it must be beyond the mind (plato’s third level). where could he find that unchangeable and unmeasurable measure of all? here, i would like to recall a story from one of the upanishads. uddalaka, the father, repeatedly asked his son, svetaketu, through what could he see; the son answered by the sun; but if there was no sun, then by the moon; if however there were no moon, then by lamp light; finally if there were no lamp light – the son was silent. then the father taught him: you could see through your heart and your inner soul. augustine did precisely the same. “i entered into my inmost being” and saw “an unchanging light” above his soul and his mind. “it was not this common light, plain to all flesh, nor a greater light, as it were, of the same kind, as though that light would shine many, many times more bright, and by its great power fill the whole universe.” (confessions vii, 10) in 386 in the garden of his house in milan, augustine made the final decision “in the shifting tides of my indecision” to surrender himself to “my light, my wealth, my salvation, my lord god.” (confessions ix, 1) it was an unconditional surrendering to “put you on the lord jesus christ.” as he recalled later in his confessions it was a child’s voice calling out “take up and read. take up and read” that led him to pick up the gospel and read the passage which came before his eyes: “go, sell what you have, and give to the poor, and you shall have treasure in heaven, and come, follow me.”10 immediately the dark shadow of doubt in his heart fell away. in 387 he was baptized a few days before his mother’s death. from then on augustine’s heart and soul rested in the city of god where he found wisdom, truth and beauty, and above all the divine light. 10 prajñâ vihâra part iii. descartes it would be too simple to say that descartes made the same search as did augustine. however, there are real similarities. both were looking for the divine light which transcends sensible things, and even indubitable thought. in his major work, mediations on first philosophy, descartes established the mind as an immaterial substance and god as an infinite and non-deceiving existence. brief history descartes was born in 1596 in touraine, france. his father was a provincial government official and landholder; his mother died when he was one year old. he studied at the collège royal de la flèche, run by the jesuit order, where he received a well-grounded education in the aristotelian-scholastic tradition, the study of languages and literature, as well as natural science. he left la flèche and later went to the university of poitiers, after which he traveled broadly across europe learning, as he put it, from the book of the world. during his travels, he met isaac beeckman to whom he promised to write down his method. after this meeting descartes had a series of three dreams which he took as divine approval of his project to found a new science which would bring mathematical clarity to all branches of knowledge. he continued to travel extensively throughout europe, and subsequently returned to paris, where he joined the intellectual elites of the time. among them were some augustinian theologians whose views on god and the will were more attractive to descartes. he was closely associated with marin mersenne who later became a central figure in the new philosophy and science in europe and descartes’ paris correspondent. at a gathering at the home of the papal nuncio in paris, in responding to an alchemical lecture descartes illustrated the methodic principles on which his new philosophy would be based. this caught the attention of cardinal de bérulle who urged descartes to develop his philosophy. as a result in 1628, descartes went into relative seclusion in holland where he wrote his major scientific and philosophical works. he hu yeping 11 concentrated finally on his mediations on metaphysics or first philosophy which he conceived as providing the foundation for the new science. for this he came to be called the father of modern western philosophy. except for a few short trips to paris, descartes remained in holland until 1649, when he was asked by the queen christina of sweden to come to stockholm. there he fell ill and died in february 1650. descartes’ earlier writings concerned method, both in his rules for the direction of the mind and his discourse on method for conducting one’s reason well and for seeking the truth in the sciences. the latter he exemplified by works in optics, geometry and meteorology. in his later writings descartes concentrated on how the method was grounded in metaphysically based truths, the cogito argument and the proof for the existence of god and the spirituality of the soul. in 1640 descartes completed his work on meditations on first philosophy but did not publish it till 1641 in latin. he dedicated this work to the faculty of sacred theology of the sorbonne and wrote synopses to introduce its six meditations. “cogito ergo sum” descartes was educated in traditional scholasticism which attempted to combine christian doctrine with aristotelian philosophy. at la flèche he studied logic, physics, cosmology, metaphysics, morals, theology, etc. after he left school, descartes rejected aristotelian philosophy which was based on sensory experience and the physical world. “i will attack straightaway those principles which supported everything i once believed.”11 however, he always held that there was a systematic coherence in knowledge and a methodological structure which one needed to follow. descartes began by attempting ambitiously in his rules for the direction of the mind to develop a method of proceeding solely by clear and distinct ideas in order to achieve mathematical certitude for all areas of knowledge. menn notes that descartes achieved great success in the mathematics section of his project. however, when he sought mathematical clarity regarding the physical order, he failed to work out a coherent set of rules based solely on pure mathematics. mathematics opened many 12 prajñâ vihâra possibilities, but in order to know which of these applied there was need for clear and distinct knowledge of the nature and structures of the physical powers of observation. but as this could not be had without a priori certification of his method he found himself in a vicious circle from which there was no escape. something more than mathematics was needed; he needed to know the extent of the capabilities of the human mind, “what human knowledge is, and how far it extends.”12 he needed knowledge especially of the foundations of knowledge which could not be doubted. as a result he never completed his rules, which was published only posthumously. instead it was at this time that he left paris and settled in holland to focus on these deeper more foundational problems and developed his works on method and metaphysics. in order to build a solid and indubitable foundation for all the sciences descartes began with a universal doubt, but how to start such a universal doubt? in part ii of the discourse on method, descartes established four scientific and methodological principles. the first was “never to accept anything as true” until it was so clear and distinct “that i had no occasion to call it in doubt”; the second was to divide the problem into as many pieces as possible in order to analyze them; the third was to synthesize the parts or put them in “an orderly fashion” in order to reconnect them clearly and distinctly; and fourth was to review them thoroughly and completely in order not to leave out anything.13 where could he start his universal doubt? in the first mediation descartes chiefly discussed those things “that can be called into doubt”, those sensible objects which were direct and immediate to us. descartes believed that the senses were deceptive, that the images of things in our mind were false, and that stories or fables, oratory and poetry, languages or books, theology and philosophy, and even medicine and mathematics were not trustworthy. hence we could not tell what was true; was it what we saw with our eyes if our dreams could be equally vivid? in order to make sure that all was clear and distinct, it was necessary to examine all these disciplines, so that we could know “their true worth and to guard against being deceived by them.”14 he suggested that people should learn not to believe “too firmly” anything given by examples and custom because they prevented us from reaching true knowledge. “thus i little by little freed myself from many hu yeping 13 errors that can darken our natural light and render us less able to listen to reason.”15 he pulled out all the old foundations, began again from what could not be doubted, and proceeded exclusively by clear and distinct ideas in order to avoid reasoning falsely. once there was nothing more that could be doubted and at the same time a new foundation was needed to start with, where could he begin? descartes started from the “i” as a thinking thing. “while i wanted thus to think that everything was false, necessarily this truth – i think, therefore i am – was so firm and so assured . . . i judged that i could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy i was seeking.”16 even though “i” was deceived, as long as “i” was thinking then “i” was something. “i am, i exist” was true in my mind whenever “i” conceived it. “i” was a thing to doubt, understand, will, affirm, deny, refuse, imagine and sense.17 in the second meditation descartes used the example of wax to assert that only the human mind or the intellect alone perceived the extended, flexible and mutable wax — not seeing, touching or imagining. descartes developed his cogito argument: ‘i am thinking, i exist’ or ‘ego cogito, sum’ to establish the self as the starting point of his search for his new philosophy and to certify the self as a thinking substance distinct from the body. however, he asked, how i knew that my thinking was not deceiving me? he wanted to see whether these reasons were powerful enough. he said “all i have in mind is that i am driven by a spontaneous impulse to believe this, and that some light of nature is showing me that it is true.”18 this “light” was not ordinary light, for he had already prescinded from or placed under doubt the physical “light” by which he perceived sensible things. what then is this light? here augustine may be helpful. as mentioned above, augustine confessed that he was caught by corporeal things, and conceived the senses, the soul and god in the first to third levels of the divided line. that is, he always sought to use a measurable instrument to try to sort out unmeasurable things, or to use ordinary light to see the divine light; hence he could not solve the problem of evil. descartes, however, was concerned with how to avoid error in knowing truth, how to build an adequate fundation for all knowledge, and where to locate the foundation. it was just at this point that descartes too recognized that the project of his rules was unrealizeable in its original terms and that some further foundation was needed. 14 prajñâ vihâra menn argues that after descartes met cardinal de bérulle who “made it an obligation of conscience for him” to work out his philosophy for the benefit of humankind rather than only for mathematics, descartes went to holland and worked on nothing but metaphysics. “from this time on descartes always regards metaphysics, not mathematics or psychology, as the basis of his science.”19 and it was also possible that cardinal de berulle suggested to descartes to study augustine as a model. “about this time descartes turned to augustine’s central metaphysical ideas,”20 that is, to augustine’s understanding of god and the soul. the “ascent from the soul to god gives the core of augustine’s method or making god intelligible to us.” this is also the core of descartes’ third meditation. menn continues his argument that descartes was drawn to augustine’s approach precisely by the way his frustration with the project of the rules showed him the need for a “standard for the truth of the soul’s thoughts that would be independent of any prior understanding of bodies.”21 hence like augustine, even after the first two meditations where descartes first began by doubting his senses, then his own thinking and finally even a god who might deceive him if imagined as an “evil genius,” he still asked such questions as where he could find that “light” which would never deceive him what metaphysical foundations and absolute sources were there for his undoubtable “thinking thing”; and whether there was a god who was immutable, infinite, unmeasureable in perfection and the source of all things. “i clearly understand that there is more reality in an infinite substance than there is in a finite one. thus the perception of the infinite is somehow prior in me to the perception of the finite, that is, my perception of god is prior to my perception of myself.”22 here descartes says something similar to plotinus. as mentioned in the above section on augustine, plotinus established a hierarchy of one, intellect and soul, among which the soul was the lowest and connected with sensible things through the cosmic world. descartes claimed “i have been so constituted as a kind of middle ground between god and nothingness, or between the supreme being and non-being.”23 in order to be certain that god was the only source for the tangible things, the only truth for the illusive images and the only standard for all sciences, descartes turned to discovering or uncovering the existence of god by noting that the idea in him about the existence of god was the most true, the most hu yeping 15 clear and distinct. this could not be found from the senses or corporeal objects. rather, he took up augustine’s approach of withdrawing into himself, the thinking thing, to “distinctively conceive god by conceiving him as the immutable standard for our mutable mind, and in proving the existence of god as the cause of this conception in our mind.”24 if we followed this divine standard and did not turn away from it, we could not go wrong. here it is no longer the earlier inference of the descartes’ method iv “cogito ergo sum,” but the direct intention that doubting is thinking, that thinking is being, and that being is at root god: cogito, sum, deus est, as would note ferdinand alquié. in meditation iii descartes employs causal theory to prove the existence of god. he grouped thought in “certain classes” and argued that something could not come from nothing, but only from what possessed equivalent reality. the ideas of corporeal things were contained in “i” formally as “i” was a thinking thing, and eminently as “i’ was a substance. “the very nature of an idea is such that of itself it needs no formal reality other than what it borrows from my thought, of which it is a mode.”25 but the objective reality of the idea of the infinite and all perfect was so great that “i” alone could not be the cause of that idea formally and eminently; there must be something else outside of “i,” which was the cause of that idea. i could not cause the idea of god which was infinite, independent, supremely intelligent and powerful, and creates everything that exists. since “i” am a finite substance, “i” could not conceive something infinite because “there is more reality in an infinite substance than there is in a finite one”.26 arguing from a cosmological point of view, descartes asks from what source “i” derive my existence: from myself, my parents, or other things which contained less perfection than god. if from myself, “i” would have all the perfections “i” needed. since “i” am nothing but a thinking thing “if such a power is in me, then i would certainly be aware of it. but i observe that there is no such power; and from this very fact i know most clearly that i depend upon some being other than myself.”27 my parents gave “me” my body, but they did not generate my thoughts or ideas or myself as a thinking thing. it is also impossible that the less perfect things created me as “i” had the idea of god in my mind and “nothing more perfect than god, or even as perfect as god, can be thought or imagined.”28 16 prajñâ vihâra in meditation v descartes argues from an ontological point of view that since pure and abstract mathematics was most certain, it could also be applied to proving the existence of god. “god’s nature that he always exists is something i understand no less clearly and distinctly than is the case when i demonstrate in regard to some figure and number . . .”29 the existence of god is one of his perfections. “i” as an imperfect and finite being am not free to think of god without existence, “a supremely perfect being without a supreme perfection, as i am to imagine a horse with or without wings.”30 further the existence and essence of god were inseparable, just like a mountain and a valley which were inseparable from each other and like a triangle which contained three angles. by nature if “i” perceived something clearly and distinctly, it could not but be true. “i” perceive clearly and distinctly that there was a god not as a deceiver, and that everything else depended on him. then “i” concluded that my perception was necessarily true. “and thus i see plainly that the certainty and truth of every science depends exclusively upon the knowledge of the true god.”31 in sum, descartes found the divine source which could assure his “cogito ergo sum” and never deceive him, but rather give him faculties of reasoning, perceiving, judging, etc., upon which he depended entirely. like augustine, descartes also started from the senses (the visible level of the divided line) and advanced to the “thinking thing” (the third level) till he found the divine light (the fourth level), which not only created him but also gave him the intellectual idea of god, as “the mark of craftsman impressed upon his work.”32 afterthought from the above analysis of augustine and descartes we learn that both go back to their inner self to search for the light, both believe that there is something higher and greater than their soul and mind, both attribute that highest to god, the infinite and eternal creator of all things, and both find the divine source for augustine’s restless heart and descartes thinking thing. augustine was primarily concerned with the question of evil whereas descartes emphasizes the problem of avoiding erroneous knowledge. one hu yeping 17 is looking for religious freedom, the other for the liberation of human reasoning. both start from senses and move to the inner self till, in terms of plato’s allegory, they both escape the cave and arrive at the fourth level where they see the truth or the divine light. by this both were enlightened with a real sense of truth and knowledge (or understanding) beyond the senses, imagination and intellect (reasoning). this ability of understanding is somehow given and embedded in the human mind. thus, augustine finds a path to religious liberation, where descartes proceeds to apply human rationality empowered by the divine light. one rests in the kingdom of god to praise the eternal and infinite; the other uses the divine light to enlighten the human mind and assure the scientific exploration of the world. the way taken by augustine directs his restless heart to the kingdom of god, where he sees the real things with real knowledge, real truth and real beauty. thereafter he continues to reside there under the brilliant sun to contemplate and praise god in a saintly manner. in some contrast, when descartes meditates upon his self he too locates it in the divine light, but he does not stay there. rather he returns to the third level in order to apply his thought and reasoning now certified by the divine light. he resides there to live his “cogito” and “sum” as an undoubted “thinking thing”. augustine and descartes have done what they could with their own understanding of truth, wisdom and the divinity in their own circumstances. each has developed his own way to reach the highest good and to bring to humanity their own brilliant contributions. menn argues that descartes used augustine’s interior approach to god to resolve his difficulties and based science on this conception of god as reflected in his meditations. the core of augustine’s approach for making god intelligible to man by ascent from the soul to god was also the core of descartes’ meditations, especially his third meditation. menn’s reading of descartes provides a new angle to look at the father of modern western philosophy and opens a new approach to the study of his works. in this light we see that something significant had been omitted in the cartesian reading of descartes and that we need to go back to reexamine the texts and bring them forward for today. it is not that descartes’ project of a universal mathesis did not continue, but that it continued not against religious vision but as based thereupon. this is most important for 18 prajñâ vihâra the contemporary concern to work out a more adequate relation, of science to religion, of reason to faith or to reasoning in faith. over a millennium has passed since augustine, and more than 400 years have gone by since descartes. through the examination of the history of modern philosophy, we learn that the thought of modernity, based on descartes’ own thinking, contributed greatly to human development and human history, especially to its scientific achievements. however, there has been also a negative impact expressed by the terms “rationalism” and “iron cage” (weber). this might be due to the error of reading descartes exclusively rather than inclusively; to selectivity rather than openness in relating man and god, thereby setting reason against religion; and to our narrowly rationalistic rather than hermeneutic understanding of the project of the father of modern philosophy i would like to end this paper by pointing to the remainder of plato’s allegory of the cave. the continuation of his account notes something of special importance. some had struggled out of the darkness of the cave and its restrictively visible and measurable understanding of truth to reach the divine light and the goodness, or the real understanding of truth. but they were obliged to return to the cave in order to bring back the light, the truth and the goodness to the ones who still lived in the darkness and believed exclusively in sensible things. this the enlightened ones did at the risk of their life. plato argues that this is because they “are better and more completely educated than the others and are better able to share in both types of life.” because “you have seen the truth about fine, just and good things, you will know each image for what it is and also that of which it is the image.” 33 it is indeed good to enjoy the sun and the divine light; it is good to strengthen human knowledge and intellect. but the most needed thing is for those who are thus enlightened to contribute to their fellow beings, to go back to the cave whence they came in order to bring light to the darkness, to educate the enslaved, and to enlighten the ignorant hearts. that is real education, real enlightenment, and the better way to be. hu yeping 19 endnotes 1 (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998). earlier he published a summary of his views on descartes and augustine as “the problem of the third meditation,” american catholic philosophical quarterly, vol. lxvii, no. 4. 2 translated, with an introduction and notes, by john k. ryan (new york: image book doubleday, 1960). 3 translated by donald a. cress, fourth edition (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1998). 4 plato, republic, trans. g.m.a. grube and revised by c.d.c. reeve (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, inc., 1992), book vi, 509e510b. 5 ryan, introduction, p. 29. 6 “the problem of the third meditation,” american catholic philosophical quarterly, vol. lxvii, no. 4, p. 545. 7 ibid., p. 545. 8 ibid., p. 544. 9 john 1:9. 10 matt, 19:21. 11 rené descartes, discourse on method and meditations on first philosophy, trans. donald a. cress (indianapolis, indian: hackett publishing company, 1998), p. 60. 12 menn, p. 540. 13 descartes, p. 11. 14 ibid., p. 4. 15 ibid., p. 6. 16 ibid., p. 18. 17 ibid., p. 66. 18 ibid., p. 72. 19 menn, p. 543. 20 ibid., p. 543. 21 ibid., p. 548. 22 descartes, p. 76. 23 ibid., p. 82. 24 menn, p. 550. 25 descartes, p. 74. 26 ibid., p. 76. 27 ibid., p. 79. 28 ibid., p. 78. 29 ibid., p. 89. 30 ibid., p. 89. 31 ibid., p. 93. 32 ibid., p. 80. 33 plato, 520c. 20 prajñâ vihâra references augustine, confessions, trans. with an introduction and notes, by john k. ryan (new york: image book doubleday, 1960). descartes, meditations on the first philosophy, trans, by donald a. cress, fourth edition (indianapolis/cambridge: hackett publishing company, 1998). descartes, discourse on method and meditations on first philosophy, trans. donald a. cress (indianapolis, indian: hackett publishing company, 1998). balz, albert g.a., descartes and the modern mind (hamden, conn.: archon books, 1967, c1952). chadwick, henry, augustine: a very short introduction (oxford : oxford university press, 2001). evans, g.r., augustine on evil (cambridge; new york: cambridge university press, 1982). lowry, walker, augustine, a secular consideration (s.l.: w. lowry, c1982). menn, stephen, descartes and augustine(cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998). menn, stephen, “the problem of the third meditation,” american catholic philosophical quarterly, vol. lxvii, no. 4, plato, republic, trans. g.m.a. grube and revised by c.d.c. reeve (indianapolis/ cambridge: hackett publishing company, inc., 1992). schouls, peter a., descartes and the enlightenment (kingston, ont.: mcgill-queen’s university press, 1989). wilson, margaret dauler, descartes (london; boston: routledge & k. paul, 1978). hu yeping 21 diana l. villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment and her reception of scripture abstract catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment represents a significant development in the history of this essential christian theme. her teaching is the fruit of personal wisdom rather than formal study as she was an uneducated lay woman in fourteenth century italy. in this article i show how scripture was central to catherine’s wisdom. first i show that she was exposed to scripture primarily orally and that she assimilated what she heard through her life of prayer and relationship with god. i describe the central biblical themes at the heart of her teaching on discernment, namely growth in charity and capacity for truth, and i show how these are related to her wisdom on discernment. i then examine how catherine applied her teaching through an analysis of a letter to pope gregory xi. in this article i will show that central new testament themes are at the heart of catherine of siena’s teaching on discernment and i will describe how the knowledge of scripture that suffused her teaching was not internalized as a result of formal study, but rather as a result of her experience of god in prayer and of her personal reflection. her oral reception of scripture became transformed through her mystical experience into wisdom that has become a major christian classic; indeed catherine is one of only three women named doctor of the church in the catholic tradition. 1. biographical and historical context the dialogue, her main work, is presented in the voice of god responding to four petitions catherine had made; she received the essential elements acta theologica 2013 suppl 17: 209-227 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/actat.v32i2s.12 issn 1015-8758 © uv/ufs <http://www.ufs.ac.za/actatheologica> diana l. villegas e-mail: diana.vil@alumni.stanford.edu. produced by sun media bloemfontein villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 210 of this response while in ecstasy and dictated what she heard to scribes.1 much of her wisdom is found in her 353 letters directed to popes, cardinals and bishops, to kings and queens and members of the nobility, to leaders of city states, to artists, to judges and physicians, to priests and religious, to friends and family; in other words, to a broad array of persons. there is also a collection of some of her prayers. the letters and prayers were also dictated; there is a possibility that she wrote a few letters herself towards the end of her life.2 catherine was born in siena in 1347 and died in rome at the age of 33. according to her hagiographers,3 at the age of six she experienced a vision of christ which stirred a powerful desire for a personal relationship with god (raymond of capua 1.1.29-30). she persuaded her family to let her remain unmarried yet not join a religious order, a choice radically opposed to the customs of the time; she did, though, became a member of a group of women, primarily widows, affiliated with the dominican order. she continued to live at home, developing a completive relationship with god until she was 20 years old when she had a vision of jesus inviting her to leave her room and serve others. this experience began her thirteen years of involvement in service and ministry. 2. catherine’s reception of scripture 2.1 education and oral reception catherine did not study scripture as did the dominican preachers who formed her or as did other patristic and medieval writers on discernment such as origen or bernard of clairvaux. rather, she was exposed to scripture through the liturgy; through the preaching of dominican friars, both the local ones from the church near her house, as well as those who visited and preached in the square of the same nearby church (noffke 1 in the introduction to the critical edition of the dialogue, giuliana cavallini discusses the different scholarly perspectives on the composition of this work and concludes that essential parts were indeed received while catherine was in ecstasy; there was also a period when she engaged in additional composition and editing (probably also with the aid of scribes). see catherine of siena (1995: xxiv-xxxvi). 2 see below for discussion and documentation regarding her ability to write. 3 the most widespread of the early hagiographies and one that remains central today is that written by raymond of capua, a dominican assigned to catherine as spiritual director. see bibliography for english, italian and original latin editions. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 211 1996:42-3; cavallini 1981:59). catherine also learned about the scriptures through discussion with her spiritual advisors and the many priests and religious who became her friends and disciples. in other words, she was primarily exposed to scripture orally. this was the case because as the female child of a merchant in a fourteenth century italian city state, she did not receive an education (some daughters of the nobility did learn to read and write). indeed, the matter of whether and when catherine learned to read and write and how well she knew latin (the language of scripture and the liturgical texts at the time) has resulted in many pages of scholarship.4 since these are significant issues when exploring catherine’s reception of scripture, i summarize them here. there is mostly consensus that she learned to read, probably sometime just before her twentieth birthday and before the beginning of her more public life.5 whether she learned to write is still debated, though she probably did so towards the last years of her life.6 there is evidence (see example below) that through daily attendance at the eucharist and the liturgy of the hours as well as some tutoring from her spiritual advisors she came to know enough latin to understand and reflect on the liturgical texts that were the main sources of her exposure to scripture, though it is unlikely she ever became proficient in latin.7 the full vulgate version of the bible in use in the fourteenth century was available almost exclusively to clerics considered capable of its correct interpretation, so it is unlikely catherine would have had direct access to this text. 8 catherine also read in the vernacular books of pious works that included references to scripture or quotes of scripture passages. 9 4 jane tylus, professor of italian literature discusses catherine of siena’s works as examples of how oral communication becomes significant written literature, especially at a time in history when the written vernacular was emerging in italy. in the process of this discussion, tylus reviews scholarship in various languages regarding catherine’s ability to read and write, her knowledge of latin and questions about editions of her works given that they were dictated. tylus (2009). 5 noffke discusses this in noffke (1996:39-42). 6 see tylus (2009:9-23) for a discussion of the scholarship and controversy on this topic. 7 see note 11 below regarding scholarship on catherine’s knowledge of latin. 8 because they are based on the vulgate some passages used by catherine have somewhat different meanings than they do in modern translations of scripture. in her translation of the letters, noffke notes when scripture passages used by catherine have a different meaning from that in contemporary translations. she discusses this in: catherine of siena (2000-2008:vol 1.xlix). 9 see discussion of this in tylus (2009:58, 127-28) which includes references to prior studies. also see noffke (1996:40-42). villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 212 suzanne noffke (translator of the most authoritative english versions of catherine’s works) believes that ultimately most of catherine’s exposure to scripture came from oral reception. it is my hunch – though this still needs systematic checking – that catherine’s biblical allusions are drawn almost entirely from the selections to which she was regularly exposed in the liturgies of mass and office. this hunch is frequently supported when a dated prayer or letter contains themes and allusions from the readings assigned in the fourteenth century sienese liturgical calendar on or very near the same dates (noffke 1996:43). giuliana cavallini, editor of the critical edition of the dialogue and prayers, makes a similar point showing references in one of catherine’s prayers to scripture texts for the days around its composition (cavallini 1991:48). the scripture catherine heard in preaching and discussions with the dominicans and other members of religious orders would have often included interpretations by these men (cavallini 1981:48-9). and yet, as we shall see, catherine prayed with and reflected on what she heard and came up with her own interpretations. she had a tenacious personality; she was persistent and unrelenting in questioning those who could help her learn about christ and about scripture, and did not hesitate to put forth her perspective. we have an example of her detailed examination of scripture and her quest to deepen her understanding from a letter written to her by tommaso caffarini, a dominican friar who became a friend and disciple. answering a question catherine had posed about psalm 131, caffarini writes, you asked me whether, in that verse of the psalm lord, my heart is not lifted up, the expression is sicut adlattatus (adlactatus) without a b, or sicut ablattatus (ablactuatus) with a b.10 caffarini then offers his research and exegesis of the passage. besides showing catherine’s interest in exploring detailed meanings of scripture, caffarini’s letter also highlights catherine’s oral reception of scripture. it suggests she did not have the official latin copy of the office, for if she did (as noffke points out) she would have looked up the actual rendering of the word herself. further it shows how well catherine absorbed and remembered what she heard (noffke 1996:41). caffarini’s letter also shows that catherine understood enough latin to be able to engage in her own 10 this example is discussed at length in noffke (1996:40-41). adlattatus and ablattatus are caffarini’s italianized versions of the latin words. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 213 informal exegesis of passages of scripture; we can then surmise that such exegesis informed her wisdom.11 2.2 internalization of scripture through mystical experience in the dialogue god advises catherine that one should relate to the breviary (the book with the office of the hours) as to a spouse and to the scriptures as to one’s children (dialogue 130:261).12 these metaphors indicate the significance for catherine of an intimate familiarity with the texts of revelation; they point to the fact that catherine assimilated scripture primarily through an affective, intuitive experience the result of prayer and union with god. this deeply internalized familiarity with scripture is reflected in her works. giuliana cavallini summarizes an article she wrote on the scriptural sources in catherine’s works by stating, from all i have discussed we can conclude the following. all of catherine’s doctrine is solidly based on sacred scripture; catherine adopted the scriptures in a very free and personal way with the authority of one who has deeply assimilated the thought of scripture and therefore does not feel bound by the letter of the text (cavallini 1991:59).13 noffke makes a similar generalization, [the scriptures] flow in and out of her sentences with such ease and integration that it is more often than not difficult to set them off with quotation marks. she so rearranges and combines passages around a single stream of thought that her own message and that of scriptures fuse into one (catherine of siena 1980:10). this incorporation of scripture so that it became part of her own wisdom is the source of catherine’s creativity and it came about through her desire to know christ and through the depth of her knowledge of god in mystical experience. catherine herself repeated many times that god was the 11 while there is debate regarding how much latin catherine knew, the foregoing example shows she knew enough to interpret familiar texts. see noffke (1996:42-43) and tylus (2009:36ff, 88ff) for discussion of catherine’s knowledge of latin. 12 english references to the dialogue include chapter and page numbers from catherine of siena (1980). italian citations are from both catherine of siena 1995 and 2002b. italian text: “e debbono tenere per sposa il breviario, e i libri della santa scrittura per figliuoli.” (dialogo, 130). 13 translation mine. villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 214 teacher of her spiritual wisdom.14 as we saw, her main work, the dialogue, is presented as god speaking to catherine, highlighting that it is god’s wisdom she is communicating. in the dialogue even thomas aquinas’ knowledge and teaching about the scriptures is described as infused by grace. the tongue cannot describe it, but the holy doctors have shown it well when, enlightened by this glorious light [grace], they explained holy scripture ... the glorious thomas aquinas ... gained his knowledge more from the study of prayer and the lifting up of his mind and the light of understanding than from human study (dialogue 96.181).15 below i analyze a passage from the dialogue which develops in greater detail how catherine viewed the connection between experience of god and understanding of scripture. 3. catherine’s wisdom on discernment 3.1 communication style given that catherine was not formally educated she communicated the wisdom developed through reflection and prayer in a unique style that was not systematic; she did not set out to create a logical treatise or a sermon composed according to a form learned during priestly formation. rather, her letters are passionate exhortations expressed in spontaneous oral forms very much her own; as one reads her letters, one can imagine her coming up with images and metaphors to communicate what she had learned in the depth of her intuitive, spiritual center. the dialogue also has intertwining images and metaphors. thus, when discussing the influence of scripture on catherine’s teaching on discernment one cannot go to one 14 at several junctions in the dialogue, the form of god speaking to catherine is interrupted by catherine’s reflections on what she is learning directly from god. see for instance, dialogue (13.48, 16.55, 87.160, 167.363) page numbers from catherine of siena (1980). raymond of capua, spiritual director, friend and hagiographer describes how catherine ascribed her spiritual wisdom directly to god, either through inspiration or through words she heard in ecstasy (raymond of capua 1.9.84) 15 “ma bene ve ‘l dimostrano i santi dottori alluminati da questo glorioso lume, che con esso spianavano la santa scrittura. unde avete del glorioso tomaso d’aquino che la scienzia sua ebbe più per studio d’orazione ed elevazione di mente e lume d’intelletto, che per studio umano; il quale fu uno lume che io ò messo nel corpo mistico della santa chiesa, spegnendo le tenebre de l’errore.” dialogo 96. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 215 place in her works and say, here is her teaching on discernment buttressed by these passages of scripture. rather, one can make the case that her works are deeply influenced by scripture, a case i have argued above. one can show that the way she articulates the goals of the spiritual journey corresponds to central new testament themes and one can then show how her teaching on discernment is intimately tied to her formulation regarding the spiritual path. 3.2 central goals of the spiritual journey catherine teaches that the christian path encompasses a journey of transformation into the images of god we were created to be so that we can grow in capacity to see as god sees and act as god acts, and therefore serve god well. this transformation involves growth in capacity for truth and for charity, where charity consists of becoming progressively able to give of self for the good of the other. the capacity for truth and love are central to the human journey because we are images of god who is truth and love. god says to catherine in the dialogue, now you have seen that i, truth, have shown you the truth and the doctrine to achieve and persevere in great perfection. [my translation] . . . this charity is attained with the light of understanding, with a heart sincere and free gazing into me as its object—for i myself am this charity (dialogue 12.45).16 so god is truth and the path to truth; and god is charity and the path to charity. thus, the capacity to see the truth means a person is able to discern what is in and of god. the capacity to desire the good as free as possible from selfishness results in wanting what god wants. discernment in catherine’s works, then, refers to these capacities to see and to desire as god would. progress in capacity for charity and truth are central topics repeated throughout catherine’s works, and at the center of her understanding of discernment. 17 16 “ora ài veduto che io, verità, t’ò mostrata la verità e la dottrina per la quale tu venga e conservi la grande perfezione ... la quale carità è acquistata col lume dell’intelletto, con cuore schietto e liberale, raguardando in me, obietto, che so’ essa carità.” (dialogo 12). 17 see especially, letters 33, 201, 213, 245, 307, 341 (numbering of letters according to tommaseo). in the dialogue see the following sections (the way of perfection, chaps. 3-12; the truth, chaps. 98-109; divine providence, chaps. 135-153). for my study of the passages in the dialogue and letters related to discernment see villegas (1997). villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 216 no scholarly arguments are needed to assert that growth in capacity to give of self for the good of the other is a central theme of most of the new testament, especially the gospels and the letters of paul, the main texts to which one finds references in catherine’s works. similarly it is clear that the theme of capacity for truth is central to the gospel of john and other new testament texts.18 indeed, catherine herself explicitly sees scripture as the source of knowledge of god as truth: “as my truth admonished you in the holy gospel ... (dialouge 121.233).” given the influence of scripture on her formation and given the centrality to her work of these central new testament themes, one can say that her teaching on discernment is ultimately influenced by her assimilation of the truths of scripture. 3.3 prayerful knowledge of scripture and discernment the excerpt below gives a detailed rendering of catherine’s view of scripture and her wisdom regarding the importance of grace to its assimilation; further, this passage shows the connection between discernment and prayerful integration of scripture. the passage is from the dialogue; as most of this work, it is written in the voice of god speaking to catherine. holy doctors, [referring to aquinas, augustine, jerome and others] enlightened by my truth, understood and knew my truth in the midst of darkness. i am referring to holy scripture, which seemed darksome because it was not understood. this was no fault of scripture, but of the listener who failed to understand. so i sent these lamps to enlighten blind and dense understandings. they raised their mind’s eye to know the truth in the midst of darkness and i the fire ... carried them off and gave them light, not naturally but beyond all nature, and in the midst of darkness they received the light and so came to know the truth ... so you see, the eye of understanding has received a light beyond any natural light, infused by grace, and in this light the doctors and the other saints came to know the truth in the midst of darkness, and from the darkness light was made. for understanding existed before scripture was formed; so learning came from understanding, for in seeing is discernment (dialogue 85.156). 19 3.3.1 light (grace) required to understand scripture throughout her works catherine repeats that true understanding of scripture depends on grace. light and supernatural light are frequent images for grace as an infused capacity to see truth. when she states that 18 “ma, come v’amonì la mia verità nel santo evangelio, [mt23/3]” (dialogo 121) 19 see appendix for italian version of this text. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 217 in the darkness light was made, she is suggesting that what could not be understood correctly without grace was made clear through infused grace. when she states that holy persons and doctors were carried off in order to receive this light she means these persons were immersed in experiences of union with god which resulted in a true understanding of scripture. in short, images for light and its reception point to the importance of god’s work in the human mind and heart if persons are to perceive the truth of scripture correctly. 3.3.2 understanding (l’intelletto) when catherine speaks in the above passage about understanding (in italian intelletto) she is referring to the medieval tripartite conception of persons as made up of memory, understanding and will. understanding or intelletto refers to much more than the intellectual capacity of a person. it refers more deeply to the intuitive understanding at the heart of person’s capacity for spiritual experience. thus what is illuminated by grace in order to reveal the meaning of scripture and truth is not primarily the capacity to understand with one’s reason, but also and more importantly, the spiritual/ intuitive capacity to see. this capacity to see is the capacity to discern, that is to distinguish correctly according to truth. let me go back to one of the sentences above that may seem somewhat mysterious: “for understanding (intelletto) existed before scripture was formed; so learning came from understanding, for in seeing is discernment.” in other words, the human capacity for spiritual, intuitive knowledge of god and truth existed before scripture was communicated. but scripture reveals truth and reveals god and god’s perspective and this perspective can be received through that human capacity for intuitive/ spiritual knowledge, when this capacity is illuminated by god. this point is reinforced when she says, “every light that comes from holy scripture has come and still comes from that light.” that is, the truth gleaned from scripture comes from the infused grace of god empowering the human capacity to see and understand and to do so accurately. this accurate seeing what is of god is discernment. 3.3.3 understanding and conversion from self-centeredness the above passage continues, what made it clear that this was the truth? the light given by grace, given to whoever wants to receive this light beyond natural light. every light that comes from holy scripture has come and still comes from that light. this is why foolish, proud, and learned people go villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 218 blind even though it is light, because their pride and the cloud of selfish love have covered and blotted out this light. so they read scripture literally rather than with understanding. they taste only its letter in their chasing after a multiplicity of books, never tasting the marrow of scripture because they have let go of the light by which scripture was formed and proclaimed (dialogue 85.157).20 in this passage we see catherine’s teaching that the accuracy of discernment depends on the level of transformation away from selfish selflove and towards charity. in this case the teaching is applied to discerning the truth in scripture. those who do not understand scripture correctly – those who do not see or discern accurately – are victims of “the cloud of selfish love” a phrase often repeated by catherine to communicate that self-centeredness or preoccupation with self-serving behaviors obscures perception and reception of the truth. in a similar vein using a wonderfully descriptive metaphor, catherine asserts that self-serving preoccupations result in failure to “taste the marrow of scripture.” turning away from the light in the last sentence above means deviating from a path of relationship with god, for it is this transforming relationship that assures persons of the light of truth. 3.4 knowledge of god and knowledge of self knowledge of god and knowledge of self are the building blocks for the journey of transformation away from self-centeredness and towards capacity to care for the good of the other. these two forms of knowledge are two sides of the same coin, and this double sided knowledge is also the foundation of discernment. referring to penance, we read in the dialogue: being done without the discerning light of the knowledge of oneself and of my goodness, it [penance] would fall short of my truth. it would be undiscerning, not loving what i most love and not hating what i most hate. for discernment is nothing else but the true knowledge a soul ought to have of herself and of me. in this knowledge is the root of discernment and discernment is an offspring of charity (dialogue 9.4).21 20 for italian text see appendix. a similar point to the one above can be found in (dialogue 124.239-40, 127.249). 21 last sentence, translation mine. “in altro modo, cioè facendo il fondamento sopra la penitenzia, impedirebbe la sua perfezione, perché non sarebbe fatta con lume di cognoscimento di sé e della mia bontà discretamente, e non pigliarebbe la verità mia, ma indiscretamente, non amando quello che io piu amo, e non odiando quello che io piu odio. ché la discrezione non è altro che un vero cognosimento che l’anima debba avere di sé e di me: in questo acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 219 the connection between discernment and knowledge of god and self is affirmed in no uncertain terms. “this knowledge is the root of discernment,” catherine asserts. as a fourteenth century person, by knowledge of self she did not mean a psychological knowledge of self. she did not have in mind introspection regarding one’s unconscious motivations or the roots of one’s behavior in early childhood history. rather, she meant understanding that we are created in the image of god, that is, that we are made for love, a concept often repeated in her works. the process of acquiring a deeply internalized conviction that we will be most fulfilled, most ourselves, most at peace when we actualize our true nature as capable of giving of ourselves is one part of the journey of acquiring knowledge of self. the other part of the journey involves experiencing god’s infinite mercy, which in part means the realization that without god’s mercy we will remain trapped in some form of self-centeredness. knowing about god’s mercy is also the process of coming to trust in and depend on god’s forgiveness and grace so that we are able to confront our sinfulness and surrender this to god. in this way we allow god to transform our tendency to be self-centered in our perceptions and actions. when our self-centeredness is transformed, we can love what god loves and hate what god hates. this is ultimately what catherine means when she says that discernment is an offspring or offshoot of charity.22 implied in the assertion that we must know ourselves and god is another of catherine’s central themes: our life must be rooted in a relationship with god for it is god, truth and charity who reveals to us the dual truth about ourselves and works within us the transformation of our capacity for truth and love.23 3.5 style the long passage analyzed in this section illustrates how much catherine’s communication is based on images and metaphors. the image of light is cognoscimento tiene le sue radici. ella è un figlioulo che è innestato e unito con la carità.” (dialogo 9.) 22 catherine also elaborates on discernment as an offshoot of charity in other texts but particularly through a metaphor about the person as a tree (dialogue, chap. 10). i discuss this metaphor in villegas (1997:30-31) where i propose light as the presiding metaphor for discernment, while s. schneiders argued that the tree is the presiding metaphor for discernment in catherine’s works. see schneiders (1982). 23 for a comparison of catherine’s teaching on discernment to that of other patristic and medieval authors and brief theological reflections on this comparison see mcintosh (2004:82-124). mcintosh (2004:54-61) also offers a summary of catherine’s teaching on discernment as part of a presentation of critical historical works on this theme. villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 220 central; having light and understanding the truth are often equivalent. truth comes up repeatedly through images for seeing clearly and understanding correctly. there are straightforward metaphors such as god is fire or discernment is the offshoot of charity; and more dense metaphors such as the eye of understanding being illuminated, or god’s grace as lamps that shed light. 4. development and application of wisdom: a letter to pope gregory xi the teachings just discussed are repeated throughout catherine’s works; with each repetition in a different context the reader glimpses a new or deeper dimension of her wisdom. to illustrate this, i will show how the essential teachings described above are applied in an individual case. the extensive illustration below comes from a letter written to pope gregory xi; in it catherine urges gregory to acquire knowledge of self and god for the sake of his own conversion and so that he might do god’s will as pope. the first part of the letter is a general exhortation, followed by a very specific condemnation of gregory’s behavior. first the exhortation: i long to see you a productive tree planted in fertile soil ... for a tree uprooted from the soil (i mean the soil of true self-knowledge) would dry up and bear no fruit. if we know ourselves we are humble ... we nourish within ourselves the sweet fruit of blazing charity, recognizing in ourselves god’s boundless goodness. and aware of our own nothingness, we attribute whatever being we have to the one who is. so it seems we have no choice but to love what god loves and to hate what he hates (letter 185.)24 24 l 185 in catherine of siena (2000, vol. 1, 244ff). english citations of the letters are from catherine f siena (2000-2008). italian citations taken from catherine of siena (2002a; 2002b). italian text of cited passage: “vedervi uno arbolo fruttifero, pieno di dolci e soavi frutti, piantato in terra fruttifera ché se fusse fuore de la terra seccarebbe e non farebbe frutto -, cioè la terra del vero cognoscimento di noi. l’anima che cognosce sé medesima s’aumilia, però che non vede di che insuperbire; notrica in sé el frutto dolce dell’ardentissima carità, cognoscendo in sé la smisurata bontà di dio; cognoscendo sé none essere, ogni essare che à retribuisce poi a colui che è. allora l’anima pare che sia costretta ad amare quello che dio ama, e a odiare quello che elli odia.” (l 185) acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 221 4.1 the problem with self-centeredness: being planted in unfertile soil the above passage shows the sort of subtle developments in catherine’s teaching that come about through different images and different emphases. in a sense, the developments in her teaching work as poetry does; that is, an image, a metaphor, a new way of using a word opens the imagination to a different way of envisioning and taking in the same truth; one could say that catherine teaches through layers of depth rather than through sequential logic. for instance, using the metaphor of a person who is like a tree planted in fertile soil catherine highlights the importance of a life that prioritizes self-knowledge. “planted in fertile soil” implies being rooted in knowledge of our goodness yet our need for god. when this is the case, we will recognize god’s will and will be empowered to act accordingly; that is, we bear good fruit. thus to bear this good fruit, fertile soil is necessary; i.e., knowledge of self. another dimension of this wisdom is highlighted as she explains that being planted in the fertile soil of self-knowledge one is able to nurture the sweet fruit of blazing charity. in italian, blazing charity is “ardentissima carità.” in this context one could also translate ardentissima as “very passionate.”25 the sentence would then read, “we nurture within ourselves the sweet fruit of very passionate love.” this passionate language functions to make clear to the reader in an affectively motivating manner the significance and benefits of a life rooted in self-knowledge. catherine continues her instruction forcefully pointing out to gregory the problem with self-centeredness, thus making urgent the need for transformation through self-knowledge. she tells gregory, for those who are isolated in their self-centeredness, loving themselves selfishly and not for god, can do nothing but evil. they are like a woman whose children are stillborn . . . because they have none of the life, the charity that is concerned only for the praise and glory of god’s name (l 185).26 here catherine utilizes another powerful image to make her point about self-centeredness. the opposite of good fruit are bad fruit; bearing bad fruit is as tragic as a woman bearing a still born child. choices made as a 25 appassionato is a synonym of ardente in contemporary italian. 26 “ché se elli è solo ed elli è amatore di sé medesimo, cioè che ami sé per sé e non sé per dio, non può fare altro che male, e ogni virtù è morta in lui. costui fa come la donna che parturisce i figliuoli morti, e così è veramente, perché in sé non à avuta la vita de la carità d’intendare solo a la loda e gloria del nome di dio.” (l 185) villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 222 result of self-centered judgments or motivations are death dealing. they are ultimately destructive. 4.2 gregory’s failure to discern and do god’s will so far, catherine is exhorting and teaching her wisdom; however, as she continues her letter she applies her teaching to gregory’s concrete situation explicitly. she tells him he is caught in self-centeredness and lacks knowledge of self and god. he is afraid of the reactions of others; he is afraid of losing power; he is too preoccupied with his own strategic preferences to see what is best for the common good. as a result, he does not see (discern) or chooses not to see the disorder under his nose and lacks the capacity to act in an ordered fashion; he does not have enough charity activated in him to offer the ordered leadership required of his office. catherine says, those who are in authority, i say, do evil when holy justice dies in them because of their selfish self-centeredness and their fear of incurring the displeasure of others. they see those under them sinning but it seems they pretend not to see ... they are forever afraid of offending and making enemies – and all this because of self-love ... blind are the shepherd-physicians who look only to their own profit and desire to please, who to preserve such refrain from using either the knife of justice or the fire of blazing charity! ... a shepherd such as this is really a hireling! and all because he loves himself apart from god. he does not follow the gentle jesus, the true shepherd who gave his life for his little sheep. how dangerous then, for oneself and for others, is this perverted love! how surely we must avoid it, since it does such harm ... hope, by god’s goodness, my venerable father, that you will snuff this out in yourself. i hope you will not love yourself selfishly, nor your neighbors selfishly, nor god selfishly ... and will love yourself and your neighbors for the honor and glory of jesus’ dear name (l 185).27 27 “dico che, se elli è prelato, fa male, però che per l’amore proprio di sé medesimo, e per non cadere in dispiacimento de le creature – nel quale elli è legato per piacimento e amore proprio di sé – muore in lui la giustizia santa: però che vede commettare i difetti e peccati a’ sudditi suoi, e pare che facci vista di non vedere, e non gli corregge ... cieco è il pastore che è medico che non vede né raguarda se none al piacere e a sua propria utilità, che, per non perdarlo, non ci usa né coltello di giustizia né fuoco d’ardentissima carità. costui è dritto pastore mercennaio ... tutto n’è cagione perché ama sé senza dio; non seguita il dolce gesù pastore vero, che à data la vita per le pecorelle sue. bene è dunque pericoloso in sé e in altrui questo perverso amore; bene è da fuggirlo, ché a ogni generazione di gente fa tanto male. spero per la bontà di dio, venerabile padre mio, che questo spegnarete in voi, e non amarete voi per acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 223 we see in this passage that together with her indictment, catherine offers the solution to gregory’s inability to see and do god’s will. he must be converted from selfish self-love to loving himself as image of god. he must experience god’s love for him, for it is this experience of being loved as sinner that will allow transformation. knowing jesus’s mercy and desire to transform him will allow gregory to love as jesus loved, making it possible for him to make choices on behalf of the common good. again, in a different context and form catherine insists on her main theme: without the transformation made possible through knowledge of self and god we are unable to see what is good and we do not have sufficient charity to be able to choose the good. 4.3 letter to gregory xi and catherine’s own experience that catherine, a lay woman, actually wrote a letter such as the above to a pope, who in the middle ages was a powerful temporal leader as well as spiritual leader, shows how catherine herself lived the wisdom she teaches. as a result of her own process of transformation through knowledge of self and god, and her deep commitment to listening to god and following god’s will, she was led to exhort a pope, to dare to teach him about conversion, and to dare to criticize his spiritual life and his actions. not only did she feel guided to take these actions, but she had the courage to do so. this courage would be an example of catherine’s teaching on discernment: discernment involves not only seeing what god wants but also having the capacity to choose the good no matter what the cost. catherine’s courage would thus be an example of charity.28 5. other teaching on discernment the material i have just presented lays out the key points of catherine’s teaching on discernment. as already mentioned, there are many passages that repeat the above themes as well as offering development.29 most voi, né ‘l prossimo per voi, né dio: ma amaretelo perché è somma etterna bontà e degno d’essare amato; voi e ‘l prossimo a onore e gloria del dolce nome di gesù.” (l 185) 28 while catherine’s choice to exhort the pope showed her own transformation and capacity to discern and act out of this discernment, scholars have also pointed out the influence of her advisors on this choice and the political meaning of her letter writing. see luongo (2006). 29 a newly published anthology with excerpts from all of catherine’s works includes a section collecting significant texts on discernment. see catherine of siena (2012:567-88). villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 224 significant are major sections of the dialogue where catherine elaborates several metaphors for progression in capacity for charity and truth. there is the famous metaphor of the bridge, which itself contains other metaphors, such as going up the side of christ’s body; there are levels of light; there are levels of tears. these metaphors for progression all include connections to the teaching on discernment elaborated above, showing how the capacity for discernment progresses. as persons are progressively transformed their capacity increases to see and act as god would. 30 there are also other strands of catherine’s teaching on discernment which ultimately refer back to the essential teaching described above. one of catherine’s letters in particular elaborates on discernment (discrezione) as the virtue of discretion following the christian tradition on this theme.31 there is also a section in the dialogue regarding discernment of providence. [this aspect of discernment] involves recognizing god’s loving action; it involves being able to see in faith the grace present in all the events and experiences of one’s life. . . . when one is able to discern god’s loving hand in all the events of one’s life, one is able to accept them with reverence, and thus to cooperate in freedom with the reality of one’s life in a manner congruent with god’s will. this also means one is able to make the right measured choices that cooperate with the salvation meaning of any life experience (villegas 1997:28-30).32 6. conclusion the above discussion illuminates catherine’s remarkable wisdom offered in a creative fashion in a unique literary style shaped by oral reception and oral communication. the depth of this wisdom comes from her immersion in the word of god as she listened to the daily recitation of the office and attended mass; the profoundness of this wisdom was made ultimately possible through her relationship with god. despite her lack of education, her wisdom has remained timeless and become a christian classic. 30 see dialogue, (the bridge chaps. 26-87; tears, chaps. 88-97; light, chaps. 98103). on the metaphor of light and discernment also see letter 201. i discuss these metaphors and discernment in villegas (1997:31-36). 31 letter 213 to sister daniella of orvieto. english version in catherine of siena (2007 vol. 3:295ff; 2012:570-75). see also villegas (1997:23-5, 27-8) and dingjan (1971); the latter reference includes a detailed history of the discretion tradition of discernment and places catherine’s teaching within this tradition. 32 see also (dialogue 141.291-293) and letter 307. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 225 appendix ... dottori santi miei, alluminati dalla mia verità, intendevano e cognoscevano nelle tenebre la mia verità, cioè che la santa scrittura, la quale pareva tenebrosa perché non era intesa – non per difetto della scrittura, ma dello ‘ntenditore che non intendeva – e però io mandai queste lucerne ad illuminare gli accecati e grossi intendimenti. levavano questi l’occhio de l’intelletto per cognoscere la verità nelle tenebre, come detto è; e io, fuoco ... gli rapivo [1re18/38] dandolo’ lume, non per natura ma sopra ogni natura, e nella tenebre ricevevano il lume cognoscendo la verità per questo modo. sì che vedi che l’occhio de l’intelletto à ricevuto lume infuso per grazia sopra del lume naturale, nel quale i dottori e gli altri santi cognobbero la luce nelle tenebre, e di tenebre si fece luce; però che l’intelletto fu prima che fosse formata la scrittura, unde dall’intelletto venne la scienzia, perché nel vedere discerse. chi la dichiarò che questa fosse la verità? il lume che fu dato per grazia ed è dato a chi lo vuole ricevere sopra al lume naturale, come detto è. sì che ogni lume che esce della santa scrittura è uscito ed esce da questo lume . e però gl’ignoranti superbi scienziati acciecano nel lume, perché la superbia e la nuvila dell’amore proprio à ricuperta e tolta questa luce, e però intendono più la scrittura litteralmente che con intendimento; unde ne gustano solo la lettera rivollendo molti libri, e non gustano il mirollo della scrittura perché s’ànno tolto il lume con che è dichiarata e formata la scrittura. (dialogo 85) bibliography catherine of siena 1980. the dialogue. translated by s. noffke, new york: paulist. 1983. the prayers of catherine of siena. translated by s. noffke, new york: paulist. 1995. il dialogo della divina provvidenza ovvero libro della divina dottrina. edited by g. cavallini, siena: cantagalli. 2000-2008. the letters of catherine of siena 4 vols. edited and translated by s. noffke, tempe, az: arizona center for medieval and renaissance studies. 2000 vol 1 2001 vol 2 2007 vol 3 2008 vol 4 villegas catherine of siena’s wisdom on discernment 226 2002a. le lettere di santa caterina da siena. edited by a.volpato. in: f. sbaffoni (ed.) santa caterina da siena: opera omnia. cd-rom. pistoia: provincia romana dei frati predicatori. 2002b. santa caterina da siena: opera omnia. edited by f. sbaffoni. cd-rom. pistoia: provincia romana dei frati predicator. [complete works in italian; includes italian critical text of the prayers] 2012. catherine of siena: an anthology 2 vols. edited by s. noffke. tempe, az: arizona center for medieval and renaissance studies. cavallini, g. 1981. fonti neotestamentarie degli scritti cateriniani. in: atti del congresso internazionale di studi cateriniani: siena-roma, 24-29 aprile 1980. rome: curia generalizia op. luongo, t.f. 2006. the saintly politics of catherine of siena. ithaca: cornell university. mcintosh, m.a. 2004. discernment and truth. new york: herder & herder. noffke, s. 1996. catherine of siena: vision through a distant eye. collegeville: liturgical. raymond of capua 1866. legenda sancti catherine senensis. in: acta sanctorum, (paris: victor palme), pp. 862-967. [original latin text] enlgish version also available online in acta sanctorum database. http://acta.chadwyck.com 1980. the life of catherine of siena by raymond of capua. translated by c. kearns, wilmington: glazier. 1982. s. caterina da siena: vita scritta dal beato raimondo da capua. translated by g. tinagli, siena: cantagalli. schneiders, s. 1982. spiritual discernment in the dialogue of saint catherine of siena. horizons 9: 47-59. tylus, j. 2009. recaliming catherine of siena: literacy, literature, and the signs of others. chicago: university of chicago. villegas, d.l. 1997. discernment in catherine of siena. theological studies 58: 19-38. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 227 keywords trefwoorde catherine of siena catherine van siena discernment onderskeiding biblical sources bybelse bronne biblical spirituality bybelse spiritualiteit 30.2bondypublicationversion ©
patrick bondy. informal logic, vol. 30, no. 2 (2010), pp. 142-158. truth and argument evaluation patrick bondy department of philosophy mcmaster university 1280 main st. w. hamilton, on l8s 4l8 email: bondypr@mcmaster.ca abstract: the aim of this paper is to defend the claim that arguments are truth-directed, and to discuss the role that truth plays in the evaluation of arguments that are truth-directed. it concludes that the proper place of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which a theory of evaluation is to be worked out, rather than in the theory of evaluation itself as a constraint on premise adequacy. resumé: les buts de cet article sont de défendre l’idée que l’objectif des arguments est la vérité des jugements et de discuter du rôle que la notion de vérité joue dans l’évaluation des arguments. on conclut que la fonction juste de cette notion se trouve dans la métathéorie qui façonne une théorie d’évaluation, plutôt que dans une théorie d’évaluation qui est elle-même une limite sur la suffisance des prémisses. keywords: argument evaluation, rational acceptability, truth 1. introduction we are all familiar with the traditional conception of what makes for a good argument: that its premises are true and that it is valid,1 i.e. that a good argument is a sound argument.2 that traditional view of the goodness of arguments has sustained serious criticism over the past few decades, so that most theorists have dropped either the validity requirement or the truth requirement or both. almost all theorists that i am aware of take it that an argument is good if it fulfills its purpose, and it is widely agreed that arguments can fulfill their purpose even when not all of their premises are true, or they are not deductively valid. still, some theorists retain a focus on the truth-directed nature of arguments, and those theorists rightly hold that, given such a focus, truth plays an important role in the evaluation of arguments. johnson (2000) goes so far as to 



























































 1 at least, that is the core of the traditional view. further constraints are typically added, such as that the argument not be question-begging. 2 hitchcock (1999) traces the concept of soundness in the textbook tradition to black (1946), and before that (but with different terminology), to cohen and nagel (1934). truth and argument evaluation 143 reintroduce truth as a constraint on premise adequacy, alongside the criterion of acceptability, and he holds that in a case where a premise is false but acceptable, truth (/falsity) outweighs acceptability. what i propose to do in this paper is to discuss the role that truth plays in the evaluation of arguments, when the purpose of arguments is understood as truth-directed in some important way. i begin with a discussion of truth as the purpose of arguments. in the second section of the paper, i give an argument to the effect that the theory of argument evaluation ought not to involve truth as a constraint on premise adequacy. the third section contains my argument for the positive claim that the proper place for the concept of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which the theory of evaluation is worked out.3 i conclude the essay with a response to the objection that deflationism about truth is incompatible with the conception of arguments as truth-directed. 2. truth as the purpose of (at least some) arguments the goodness of an argument, i take it, is a function of how well it fulfills its purpose. so, first of all, it must be admitted that there are many conceptions of the nature and purpose of arguments that do not involve persuading anyone of the truth of a conclusion: walton (1998), blair (2004), van eemeren and grootendorst (2004), hitchcock (2006), and pinto (2009), to name a few, all give accounts of argument on which truth is not the central purpose. however, there is also a respectable contingent of thinkers that takes arguments to be directed towards truth. goldman (1999, p. 156) views the “ultimate end” of good argumentation as true belief, although he admittedly restricts his position to ordinary factual arguments. biro and siegel take the “intrinsic goal, the raison d’être, of arguments” to be to “provide good reasons for belief,” and they hold that a good argument is one that “provides reasons for believing that its conclusion is true” (2006, p. 94, italics in original). finally, johnson (2000, pp. 168, 181) takes the goal of arguments to be the rational persuasion of an other (audience, interlocutor) of the truth of a claim. i am inclined to endorse the view that the internal purpose of arguments—the purpose that they have just by virtue of being arguments, independently of the various further uses to which they 



























































 3 by “theory of evaluation” i mean the set of criteria that a theory provides us with for evaluating arguments. by “the metatheory” in terms of which the theory of evaluation is worked out, i mean the broader theory of argument, including reference to what it is that the criteria for argument evaluation are supposed to accomplish, in which the theory of evaluation is articulated. patrick bondy 144 can be put—is truth-directed. more specifically, i take the goal of the rational persuasion of an interlocutor or audience of the truth of a claim to be the best candidate for the general purpose of arguments, and arguments ought to be evaluated according to how well they fulfill that purpose. that is not to say that i take the purpose of arguments to be to establish the truth of their conclusions beyond all doubt; rather, the purpose is to reach a conclusion that is most rational, from the point of view of the participants in the argument, to take to be true. my case for thinking that arguments are truth-directed, in a nutshell, is the following: premise 1. an essential part of the content of a proposition is its truth-conditions. premise 2. to assert a proposition (i.e., to assert some propositional content) is to assert that its truthconditions are satisfied. (from premise 1.) premise 3. assertions are always assertions of propositions. premise 4. arguments consist of premises asserted in support of asserted conclusions.4 conclusion: the conclusion of an argument is the assertion, on the basis of the premises, that the truth-conditions of the propositional content of the conclusion are satisfied. (from premises 2, 3, and 4.) i take it that premises 1 and 3 are uncontroversial; premise 3 is true by definition, and even arch-inferential-role-semanticist robert brandom has a place for truth-conditions and representation in his account of propositional content (see especially the discussion of the “broadly inferential” articulation of propositional content, in his (1994, ch.2)), so premise 1 looks safe. i expect that there are several objections that will come to mind, though, which i will try to answer presently. first of all, it might be urged against premise 2 that one might make an assertion without wanting to commit oneself to the claim that the truth-conditions of the asserted proposition are satisfied. for example, a scientist might make a claim about the singularity of a black hole (which is an unobservable entity—not even light can escape once it is within the black hole’s event horizon), 



























































 4 another way to put this premise is to say that arguments are asserted conjunctions of the form “p1&p2&...pn&c&(p1&p2&...pn support c).” this way of putting the premise is fine, as long as we do not think of the final conjunct in the schema as playing the role of a premise in support of c. it cannot play that role, on pain of incurring carroll’s famous regress (see carroll 1895). truth and argument evaluation 145 without wanting to commit herself to the truth of the proposition that she is asserting, because its truth-conditions cannot in principle be verified. by way of response to this objection, notice that if the scientist only means to commit herself to the claim that her assertion is consistent with the observed phenomena, then she is not in fact asserting a proposition about the singularity of the black hole itself —if she were, she would be committed to the truth of that proposition. instead, she is making the more qualified assertion that the proposition she is putting forward is consistent with the observed phenomena. that is, she is making an assertion q about a proposition p (that p is consistent with observed phenomena), not asserting p. that more qualified proposition, q, is one to which she is committing herself, and in so committing herself, she is committing herself to its truth. a different way to push the objection to premise 2, if we take the content of a proposition to be identical with its inferential role, is that someone might want to assert a proposition and only intend thereby to commit himself to those parts of the meaning of the proposition (i.e. those parts of its inferential role) that are not its truth-conditions. my response to this objection is to say that if someone wants to commit himself only to those parts of a proposition p’s inferential role that are not its truth-conditions, then he is not asserting p at all; he is making some other move in the language-game. however, if an arguer is explicit about intending to assert p, then whether he wants to be committed to the truth of p is irrelevant. assertions are public commitments; we are committed to the content of our assertions whether we like it or not, and that certain truth-conditions are satisfied is part of the content of an asserted proposition. the second objection that i expect will naturally come up is against premise 4. the objection is that not all arguments have asserted propositions as their conclusions. there are two ways to make this objection: either to hold that arguments can have conclusions that lack truth-values (for example, questions, as in (hitchcock 2006)), or to allow that even though they must have truth-values, conclusions need not be assertions of the truth of a proposition. reasons might be offered for doubting a proposition, for example, or for having some other attitude toward a proposition (as in pinto 2009). furthermore, the point of a reductio argument is not to assert the conclusion that is shown to follow from the assumed premises, but rather to reject a guilty premise or assumption. (sometimes the author of a reductio argument will explicitly conclude with the assertion of the negation of one of the premises, but sometimes not.) i admit that this objection has some force. an adequate patrick bondy 146 response to it would likely take an entire paper to itself. it will have to suffice for now to remark that arguments that appear to have conclusions that have a truth-value but are not asserted can be viewed as having implicitly asserted conclusions. for example, in a reductio where it is not explicitly asserted as the conclusion that a guilty premise or assumption is to be rejected, there is an implicit conclusion to that effect. in the case of an argument that a proposition ought to be doubted, rather than accepted, we should take the conclusion of the argument to be of the form: “assert: we should doubt that p.” and if we are presented with a case where no asserted conclusion can sensibly be taken to be implicit, then it is not clear to me that we ought to call that an argument at all. a final objection to the argument that i put forward above is that even if my argument is a good one, it does not establish what i want: i want to say that arguments are truth-directed, but all that the argument above shows is that arguments essentially involve the assertion of the truth of their conclusions. it does not show that arriving at the truth of the conclusion is the purpose of arguments. on the face of it, though, it looks to me like the argument does support the view that arguments are truth-directed. if an argument is the assertion of premises in support of an asserted conclusion, and the assertion of a proposition essentially involves the assertion of its truth, it seems to follow that what we do in giving arguments is that we give reasons to think that the conclusion is true. the only way that i can think to object to this line of reasoning is to point out cases where arguments are used for purposes other than to show that their conclusions are true (for example, to simply get an issue on the table, to prove that one is very witty, etc.). however, it does not follow from the fact that arguments can be used for many purposes that there is no central purpose of arguments. a hockey stick can be used, among other things, to defend oneself against a mugger, but that does not mean that the purpose of a hockey stick is to defend oneself against muggers, nor that the goodness of hockey sticks is to be measured by how well they can be used for that purpose. a good hockey stick is one that fulfills the particular function of hockey sticks well; even bad hockey sticks can serve other purposes well. similarly, it does not follow from the fact that arguments can be used for various purposes that there is no central purpose of arguments—and if the particular purpose of arguments is to achieve rational persuasion of the truth of a proposition, then arguments ought to be evaluated according to how well they fulfill that purpose. that concludes my case for taking arguments to be truthdirected. it is not necessary to agree with me about the general nature and purpose of arguments in order to accept the discussion of argument evaluation that appears in the following sections of the truth and argument evaluation 147 paper, though. most theorists agree that some arguments, at least, aim to give good reasons to believe that their conclusions are true, and so sometimes, at least, arguments ought to be evaluated according to how well they achieve that goal. if you accept that arguments generally are truth-directed, then you can accept that the evaluative criteria that i will discuss will be perfectly general, applying to arguments across the board. if, on the other hand, you do not accept that general claim about the purpose of arguments, still the following discussion will be of interest as long as you accept that some arguments have that purpose, so that the truthdirected evaluation of arguments discussed below will apply to the subset of arguments that aim to show that their conclusions are true. no doubt, before moving on, i owe an explanation of what i mean by “truth” when i say that arguments are truth-directed. i will not argue for the theory of truth that i have in mind, because there just is not the space to do so here (although i will respond at the end of the paper to an objection from the deflationist camp), but i want to be clear about the position i am advocating. by “true,” i do not mean either verifiable or certain. nor do i have in mind a relativist, pragmatist, or coherentist theory of truth. rather, the account of truth that i have in mind is much like goldman’s descriptive-success (ds) theory, which is a version of the correspondence theory, on which an item (belief, statement, etc.) is true if and only if it purports to describe some portion of reality, and it successfully describes that part of reality (1999, p. 59). i think that goldman’s ds-account of truth succinctly captures the ordinary concept of truth. given the ds-account of truth, the purpose of an argument is to rationally persuade an audience that the conclusion of the argument successfully describes that part of reality which it purports to describe. goldman restricts his discussion to ordinary factual argumentation (1999, p. 132), and so his theory of truth only needs to be able to accommodate truths that come up in such discourse; he neither asserts nor denies, as far as i know, that there even are truths in practical or aesthetic discourse. now, i do think that there are truths in practical discourse, but that need not complicate the descriptive-success account of truth; it looks to me as though the account can easily cover practical as well as ordinary factual discourse. for example, the proposition “s ought to φ” is true, on a descriptive-success account of truth, if and only if it successfully describes an obligation that s has. provided that there are real obligations (or, more generally, real practical imperatives), the descriptive-success account of truth can handle them, because real imperatives can be accurately or inaccurately described, just like ordinary facts can. if someone should object that there just are no patrick bondy 148 truth-makers for practical claims, the response that i will want to give is that whatever it is that generates obligations (or practical recommendations generally) is what makes the propositions about them true.5 so i take it that goldman’s descriptive-success theory can apply to both practical and factual discourse.6 3. premise adequacy: acceptability, not truth the question on the table now is what the appropriate criteria for evaluating arguments are, when we view arguments as aiming to rationally persuade an audience of the truth of a conclusion. perhaps the most natural place to start is with the requirement that an argument’s premises be true. johnson (2000) argues that premise truth ought to be included in the set of criteria that we employ for evaluating arguments, alongside of premise acceptability. he admits that there are good reasons for not employing the truth criterion in the evaluation of arguments, but he argues that there are even better reasons for employing it. the main reasons for excluding the truth requirement are that it does not appear to be necessary for an argument to be good that all of its premises be true, and that logic ought to say something about premise adequacy, but logic has nothing to say about the truth of an argument’s premises (johnson 2000, pp. 196-197). the reason johnson gives for maintaining the truth requirement is that it is difficult to see how we could develop a theory of evaluation without having some recourse to it. theorists who propose to do without the truth requirement either make use of it unofficially, or continue to rely on it by employing terms that presuppose a commitment to it, or else they use the truth requirement in their metatheory, employing it in the metalanguage in which they develop their account of argument evaluation 



























































 5 one might object here that nothing generates practical imperatives. if that is the case, so be it—but that is no problem for the descriptive-success account of truth; practical claims will simply turn out to be false, in that case, because a practical claim says that something is the case (that we ought to be charitable, for example), but what it purports to be the case, is not (we have no obligations; a fortiori, we have no obligation to be charitable, so any purported description of our obligation to be charitable is bound to be unsuccessful). 6 i have to admit that i am less certain about how well goldman’s account of truth can handle aesthetic propositions, such as “aristophanes’s plays are more entertaining than sartre’s.” however, my initial inclination is to say that it can handle them, in a manner analogous to the way that it can handle practical propositions: insofar as aesthetic propositions purport to describe something (which it seems to me that they do—to say of x that it is funnier than y is to describe their relative levels of humour, for example), and insofar as what they purport to describe can be accurately or inaccurately described, the descriptivesuccess account can handle them. truth and argument evaluation 149 (johnson 2000, p. 197). given that johnson takes the purpose of arguments to be rational persuasion of the truth of a claim, he also includes the requirement that a premise be both accepted by the audience and rationally acceptable to them. the idea here is that if a claim is not accepted by the audience, or if they do accept it but it is not rational for them to do so, then it cannot be used as a premise in an enterprise that aims to achieve rational persuasion. it might be an effective premise, if it plays to the emotions or biases of the audience, but the persuasion that ensues in that kind of case is not rational persuasion. the premises that an arguer employs must, then, either be supported themselves by a good argument, or else they must be such that it is rational for the arguer to believe that the audience will accept them, and also that it is in fact rational for the audience to accept them (johnson 2000, pp. 194-195). (i would also add that it must be rational for the arguer to accept them as well. more about this below.) in his discussion of the truth criterion, johnson often talks in terms of a requirement (e.g. p. 195), which makes it sound like he is talking about a necessary condition for premise adequacy. at one point, though, in response to the argument that the truth of a premise is neither necessary nor sufficient for the premise to be adequate (a complaint that comes up, for example, in pinto (1994) and govier (1999, ch. 7)), johnson appears to be content with considering truth to be a standard, or criterion, that is neither necessary nor sufficient for premise adequacy (2000, p. 280). the truth of an argument’s premises might be one important consideration, on this line of thought, which can be overridden by other factors, just as winning the most games in one season in major league baseball is neither necessary nor sufficient for winning the cy young award, but it is an important consideration. presenting truth as a standard or criterion is more palatable than presenting it as a requirement, because examples of false but acceptable premises do not then count as counterexamples. however, i still have some misgivings about this weaker presentation of the truth criterion. first, whether an argument’s premises are true does not seem to me to be an appropriate criterion by which to measure them, even on that weaker reading; and second, in cases where a premise is false but acceptable, johnson privileges truth over acceptability (2000, pp. 339-340), so he seems to want truth to be a necessary condition for premise adequacy after all. the reason i worry about privileging the truth of a premise over its acceptability in any kind of case is that premises that are acceptable (as opposed to merely accepted) are more suited to fulfilling the purpose of arguments: acceptable premises, patrick bondy 150 remember, are those that are rational to accept. just when a premise counts as acceptable is still an open question, i take it; johnson (2000, pp. 194-195) puts forward the requirement that either a premise must be supported with good reasons, or else it must be such that the arguer takes it to be rational for the audience to accept without support. freeman (2005) develops an account of acceptable premises, as premises for which there is a presumption in a dialectical situation. however the acceptability requirement is worked out in the end, though, it is clearly crucial for premise adequacy: if an argument is to provide rational support for the truth of its conclusion, its premises must be such that they are rational for the participants in the argument to accept, and whether the premises are true is an independent question from whether they are rational to accept, for the widely acknowledged reasons that we can have good reasons to believe false propositions, in unfortunate epistemic circumstances, and that we can have true beliefs that have little or no evidential support. admittedly, johnson sometimes gives the impression, when he is arguing that we should privilege truth over acceptability, that what is really the issue is whether an arguer ought to employ premises that she takes to be true, or premises that the audience takes to be true (2000, pp. 336-340). to scant the details, it seems that johnson sometimes (not always, but sometimes) wants to associate acceptability with the audience’s perspective, and truth with the arguer’s assessment of claims, and what he wants to avoid is the view that one may pander to an audience’s beliefs, when one takes those beliefs to be mistaken. johnson is correct, i take it, in wanting to say that an arguer may not employ premises that she believes to be false, but that requirement is better put in terms of the acceptability of a premise from the perspective of the arguer, rather than in terms of the truth of the premise. i see no reason to privilege the epistemic position of the arguer over that of the audience, by associating her perspective with the truth criterion; both arguer and audience are, in principle, equally well-placed to determine the truth of a premise. the same criterion ought to apply to each of their assessments of the truth of a claim, and the appropriate criterion (i am arguing) is acceptability.7 so, whatever we think of the status of truth in the evaluation of 



























































 7 one might wonder how this appeal to the rational acceptability of a premise to both the arguer and the audience squares with the earlier discussion of the purpose of arguments, which involved an appeal only to the arguer’s perspective. the short answer is that, because arguers (not audiences) construct arguments, it is the arguer’s perspective to which we must appeal in establishing the purpose of arguments. but if the purpose of arguments is rational persuasion, then it is necessary that the premises of an argument be rational for both the arguer and the audience to accept; if that condition is not met, then any persuasion that might ensue will not be rational. truth and argument evaluation 151 premises, acceptability ought to be seen as a necessary condition of premise adequacy. what is more, acceptability also appears to be sufficient for premise adequacy: whenever a premise is rational for the participants in an argument to accept, it is an appropriate candidate for employment in an enterprise that aims to rationally persuade the audience of the truth of the conclusion (see pinto 1994, pp. 118-119, for some similar remarks). there is nothing more that we ought to require for the adequacy of a premise than that it be rational to accept. johnson writes that he sees no reason why we should not want our premises to be true as well as acceptable (2000, p. 337), and i think that there is something to that—after all, the point of restricting permissible premises to those that are rational to accept is that those are the ones that are most likely, from the point of view of the participants in the argument, to be true. now, in an epistemically ideal world, all of the claims that are rational to accept would be true. in the actual world, what is rational to accept is not always what is true, but still the rational status of a proposition is the best indicator of whether we should take it to be true. whenever a premise is rational for the participants in an argument to accept, then, it is a good premise to employ. the upshot of all of this is that acceptability is both necessary and sufficient for premise adequacy, which means that the truth of a premise is beside the point for premise adequacy; what matters is whether it is rational for the participants in the argument to take them to be true. at this point, we might notice that to raise an objection against an argument on the grounds that its premises are false is perfectly legitimate, and the legitimacy of this kind of objection lends prima facie support to the truth requirement for premise adequacy. now, i agree that if we are participants in an argument, then of course it is legitimate for us to object to the argument on the grounds that it has false premises (assuming, of course, that it is reasonable for us to believe that it has false premises)—and that legitimacy is captured by a theory of evaluation that only emphasizes premise acceptability just as well as it is by a theory that also requires the truth of premises. for a premise to be acceptable is for it to be rational to accept; if a participant in the argument has reason to believe that the premise is false, then the premise fails to be acceptable, and so may not be used (at least, not without further argument in support of the premise). in other words, the objection “but that premise is not true” is only a legitimate objection if the objector has some reason to deny its truth, in which case the premise fails to be acceptable. the further objection that evaluative concepts like inconsistency presuppose commitment to the truth requirement (because inconsistency occurs when two or more claims cannot be patrick bondy 152 true together) is not a problem for the acceptability-account of premise adequacy either. if an argument employs inconsistent premises, then either the participants in the argument recognize it, or not. if they do, then they have excellent reason to doubt that the premises can all be true. in such a case, even if someone is willing to accept the inconsistent premises, it cannot be rational for him to do so. on the other hand, if the participants in the argument, through no fault of their own, do not recognize the inconsistency of the premises (for example, if the premises are sufficiently complex that the inconsistency would take a lot of work to expose), then it can be rational for them to accept the inconsistent premise-set. of course, if the participants do not recognize the inconsistency of the premises because of some rational failing on their part (laziness, perhaps), then it is clearly not rational for them to accept the premises. so it looks like the rejection of inconsistency does presuppose a commitment to the truth, but not to a truth criterion for premise adequacy; rational acceptability can do the job just as well. so, to sum up the case for excluding the truth criterion: acceptability is both necessary and sufficient for a premise to be adequate to employ in an argument. truth does not add anything when it is present, or take anything away when it is absent, so it ought not to be taken to be a criterion for premise adequacy. 4. where the truth properly lies: the metatheory of argument evaluation in this paper i am interested in the place of truth in the theory of argument evaluation for those arguments that are truth-directed. in the previous section i argued that we ought not to take truth to be a criterion for premise adequacy; in this section i want to argue that the proper place of truth is in the metatheory in terms of which the theory of evaluation is articulated. recall johnson’s point that theorists who claim to disavow the truth requirement still make use of it, some by making unofficial use of it, others by using terms that presuppose commitment to it, and still others by making use of it in their metatheory. i take that third strategy to be exactly the one to adopt. i will not attempt to develop a theory of argument evaluation here, via a metatheory employing the concept of truth, but i will argue that that is the best approach, and i will also argue that it does not entail a truth criterion for premise adequacy. the argument for the claim that the concept of truth must be employed in the metatheory in terms of which the theory of evaluation is articulated is very brief. first, i take it that arguments are truth-directed; they aim to rationally persuade someone of the truth and argument evaluation 153 truth of a claim. even if i am wrong, though, and that is not the goal of all arguments, still it is the goal of at least some arguments, and it is those that i am interested in. the second premise is that arguments ought to be evaluated in terms of how well they fulfill their purpose.8 so, since rational persuasion of the truth of a proposition is the purpose i am interested in, truth will necessarily figure in the metatheory in terms of which the theory of evaluation will be articulated. that argument, at least, appears to me to be both clear and cogent, so i will move on to the next point, which is that having a metatheory that employs the concept of truth does not entail that truth ought to be a constraint on premise adequacy in the theory of evaluation that is developed in the framework of that metatheory. the idea is that, given the truth-directed nature of the kind of arguments that i am interested in, the criteria of a good argument will be such that they will maximize the likelihood, from the point of view of the participants in the argument, that they will arrive at true conclusions. because it is the rational persuasion of the truth of a conclusion that is the goal, emphasis must be placed on the conditions under which an argument appears to be rational to its participants. as i have argued, when truth and rational acceptability come apart, acceptability matters more than truth, because what is rational to accept is what is most likely, from the point of view of the participants in the argument, to be true. the criteria by which arguments are to be evaluated, on this approach, gain their legitimacy by the way that they increase the likelihood9 that the argument will proceed in a rational manner from premises that are rational to accept to a conclusion that is rational to accept. so, even though the metatheory in terms of which the theory of evaluation is to be worked out is one that favours truth, it cannot place a direct constraint that the premises be true, because then it will undermine the rationality of the procedure in cases where truth and acceptability conflict.
 i do not propose to develop a full theory of evaluation here, 



























































 8 goodwin (2007) rejects the view that functions can determine norms, on the ground that functions do not determine unique sets of norms—many different sets of norms can often serve the same function. this objection is a problem for those who want to establish that a particular set of norms is correct, by way of showing that they satisfy the function of arguments. the objection does not worry me, though, since my aim here is not to determine a unique, correct set of argumentative norms. 9 both from an objective point of view, a point of view emphasizing what really promotes the rational progression of the endeavour, as well as from the point of view of the participants in the argumentative exchange, since what makes for a good argument (what makes it likely that rational persuasion takes place) must be manifest to the participants. patrick bondy 154 but i would like to note that the three criteria that johnson advocates other than truth—the familiar criteria of relevance, sufficiency and acceptability—seem to me to fit well in a metatheory that privileges the rational persuasion of the truth of a conclusion. (i take it that i have already said enough about acceptability.) relevance of a premise-set to its conclusion is clearly important for an argument to fulfill its purpose: although we are still arguably in need of a sustained theory of relevance, it is clear at least that if the premises of an argument are to persuade anyone rationally to accept the truth of a conclusion, they must bear on the truth (or acceptability) of the conclusion. that is to say, they must be relevant. sufficiency is also key, because if there is not enough support for the conclusion, then (almost by definition) it cannot be rational to accept the truth of the conclusion on the basis of the premises offered. that set of criteria is not, of course, the only candidate for a truth-oriented theory of evaluation. goldman (1999, pp. 134-144), for one, offers a set of fourteen explicitly truth-oriented criteria, and i see no prima facie reason to doubt their usefulness (except perhaps for goldman's explicit proviso that he is only concerned with factual, not practical, arguments, whereas i am interested in arguments generally). i do not mean to adjudicate between johnson's and goldman's approaches here, or to suggest that theirs are the only ones available, but only to point out that there are several kinds of approach that a truth-oriented theory of evaluation could adopt. 5. concluding remarks on deflationism the only thing left to do now is to answer an objection that comes out of a deflationary view of truth. the objection is that only a deflationary account of truth can work, and that deflationism is incompatible with viewing any arguments as truth-directed. hamblin (1970), for example, argues that truth has no role to play in argumentative situations, and his reasons for thinking so appear to be deflationist in spirit. he argues, for example, that in asserting “p is true,” a speaker s might just as well have asserted “p” or “i accept p” (p. 243). the equivalence of “p” and “p is true” is one of the central claims made by deflationists, so hamblin might be seen as lodging a deflationist objection to the claim that truth has any role to play in arguments. however, there are two things to say about hamblin’s case here. first of all, without going into any great exegetical detail, let me point out that hamblin takes truth to be an onlooker’s concept (1970, p. 242)—and onlookers presumably have something substantive in mind when they employ it—and that he gives a truth and argument evaluation 155 sustained hearing to both epistemic and alethic criteria for argument evaluation. he does not appear, therefore, to be a deflationist about truth. the second thing to say about hamblin’s claim is that, as johnson notes (2000, p. 279), “p is true” is made true by whatever p is about, whereas “i accept p” is made true by one’s propositional commitments. the truth of p does not reduce to anyone’s acceptance of p. we might still wonder, though: even if hamblin’s case here won’t work, doesn’t a thoroughgoing deflationism about truth undermine the view that arguments are truth-directed? i have to say that i am not convinced that a correspondence theory of truth cannot work, but deflationism is a serious contender among the available theories of truth, so this is an important objection to answer. fortunately, deflationism appears to me to be compatible with viewing arguments as truth-directed. it is difficult to say precisely what deflationism is, because deflationism does not have a single, or even a central, set of doctrines that all deflationists accept. characteristic of the deflationist spirit is the attempt, first, to build a theory of truth around the t-schema: “p” is true if and only if (iff) p;10 and second, to keep the theory from having any serious metaphysical commitments. beyond those foundations, theories diverge. however, i can say that i find the deflationist account of truth offered by hill (2002) appealing, and it, at least, is not threatening to the truth-directed conception of arguments. the bare bones of hill’s account are as follows: (s) for any x, x is true iff there is some p such that ((x = the thought that p) and p) (p.22); (sc) for any thought x and any state of affairs y, x semantically corresponds to y iff there is some p such that (x = the thought that p and y = the state of affairs that p) (p.49).11 (s) is the heart of hill’s substitutionalist account of truth. it is in effect a transformation of the t-schema into a universally quantified proposition. (sc) is intended to capture the semantic 



























































 10 it will be easiest here to take the left-hand side of the t-schema to refer to the proposition (rather than the sentence) that p, and the right-hand side to the state of affairs that p. 11 hill defines the quantifiers in these principles not in semantic fashion, but in terms of rules of inference (2002, pp. 18-19). that avoids the circularity that would otherwise arise in defining truth with the use of quantifiers that are themselves defined in terms of truth. (i should also note that, for ease of exposition, i am only very closely paraphrasing hill’s principles.) patrick bondy 156 correspondence between thoughts and possible states of affairs that (s) appears to require. in each of these principles, “thought” means “proposition”. hill’s account of truth is compatible with a truth-directed conception of arguments. on a descriptive-success account of truth like goldman’s, recall, the purpose of an argument is to rationally persuade the audience that its conclusion successfully describes the portion of reality that it purports to describe. on a deflationist account like hill’s, the purpose would instead be to rationally persuade the audience that the state of affairs that semantically corresponds to the argument’s conclusion is actual. if an argument succeeds in doing that, then it succeeds in rationally persuading the audience that its conclusion is true. these two ways of conceiving of the truth-directed nature of arguments are in fact quite similar, except that hill’s account makes do without the notion of a description of reality. it might seem, though, that because hill makes use of the relation of semantic correspondence, his account is not really deflationist. however, it looks to me as though what he calls “semantic correspondence” is already present in the t-schema, which is the starting-point of deflationary theories. the two sides of the biconditional in any substitution instance of the t-schema share propositional content; that shared content explains why we accept the t-schema in the first place. if the two sides of the biconditional did not share that content, we would not have any good reason to accept all normal substitution instances of the tschema. that shared content is all that the relation of semantic correspondence is meant to capture. “semantic correspondence” is perhaps an unfortunate term, as it makes the theory sound like a more traditional correspondence theory of truth—indeed, the (sc) principle is intended to capture ordinary correspondence intuitions about truth, but the principle achieves that goal without committing to a full-blown correspondence theory. the notion of semantic correspondence is quite thin; all it aims to capture is that it is the proposition that p that is true whenever the state of affairs that p obtains. the account still appears to be properly deflationist, then, so there is at least one deflationist account of truth that is compatible with the truthdirected conception of arguments. however, if the notion of semantic correspondence is still too much for a thoroughgoing deflationist to accept, then it seems to me that we could resort to recasting the remarks in this paper about the purpose of arguments as rationally persuading an audience of the truth of p into the claim that the purpose of arguments is to rationally persuade an audience of whether p, because on a deflationist account, “p” is equivalent to “p is true.” the claim that truth and argument evaluation 157 rational acceptability outweighs truth in the determination of good premises can be recast as the claim that the rational acceptability of a premise p outweighs whether p. and so on. so, to sum up: arguments are to be evaluated in terms of how well they fulfill their purpose; in at least some cases, that purpose is to achieve rational persuasion of the truth of a proposition; so in those cases, arguments are to be evaluated according to whether they achieve such persuasion. truth does not figure in the criteria that we ought to use to determine whether rational persuasion has taken place; its place is in the metatheory in terms of which the criteria for evaluating arguments are to be worked out. and the objection that the correspondence theory of truth that i prefer to work with is an untenable conception of truth—that only a deflationist account can work—is not a serious objection, because deflationism is compatible with the view of arguments as truthdirected. acknowledgments: i would like to thank david hitchcock, eric krabbe, and paul simard smith, as well as two anonymous informal logic referees, for their invaluable feedback on earlier drafts. editors’ note: this article is the revised version of a paper that was co-winner of the association for informal logic and critical thinking (ailact) essay prize for 2009. see: http://ailact.mcmaster.ca/ep_call.html references biro, john, and harvey siegel. (2006). “in defense of the objective epistemic approach to argumentation.” informal logic. vol.26, no.1, pp.91-101. black, max. (1946). critical thinking: an introduction to logic and scientific method. new york: prentice-hall. blair, j. anthony (2004). “argument and its uses.” informal logic. vol.24, no.2, pp.137-152. brandom, robert. (1994). making it explicit. cambridge, mass: harvard university press. carroll, lewis. (1895). “what the tortoise said to achilles.” mind. vol.4, no.14, pp.278-280. cohen, m.r. and ernest nagel (1934). an introduction to logic and scientific method. simon publications, inc. patrick bondy 158 eemeren, frans h. van, and rob grootendorst. (2004). a systematic theory of argumentation: the pragma-dialectical approach. cambridge, new york: cambridge university press. freeman, james b. (2005). acceptable premises: an epistemic approach to an informal logic problem. cambridge, new york: cambridge university press. goldman, alvin. (1999). knowledge in a social world. oxford: clarendon press of oxford university press. goodwin, jean. (2007). “argument has no function.” informal logic. vol.27, no.1, pp.69-90. govier, trudy. (1999). the philosophy of argument. newport news, va: vale press. hamblin, c.l. (1970). fallacies. newport news, va: vale press. hill, christopher. (2002). thought and world: an austere portrayal of truth, reference, and semantic correspondence. cambridge, uk: cambridge university press. hitchcock, david. (1999). “the origin of the technical use of ‘sound argument’: a postscript.” informal logic, vol.19, pp.213-214. hitchcock, david. (2006). “informal logic and the concept of argument.” in dale jacquette (ed.), philosophy of logic, volume 5 of dov m. gabbay, paul thagard and john woods (eds.), handbook of the philosophy of science. elsevier. pp. 101-121. johnson, ralph h. (2000). manifest rationality: a pragmatic theory of argument. mahwah, nj: erlbaum. pinto, robert c. (2009). “argumentation and the force of reasons.” informal logic. vol.29, no.3, pp.268-295. pinto, robert c. (1994). “logic, epistemology and argument appraisal.” in new essays in informal logic. windsor, on: informal logic, pp.116-124. walton, douglas. (1998). the new dialectic: conversational contexts of argument. toronto, buffalo, london: toronto university press. bown.indd s: journal of the circle for lacanian ideology critique 10 & 11 (2017-18): 63-74 a l f i e b o w n h e g e l t h e c o m e d i a n or the wink of st vitus w riting in flüchtlingsgespräche, berthold brecht says that hegel had what it takes to be one of the greatest comedians.1 this suggestion works in opposition to a whole history of philosophy that has asserted hegel’s status as the philosopher of complete and secure totality, and of seriousness. typically, hegel would be one of the last philosophers to be associated with anxiety, disorder or comedy and yet brecht sees his philosophy as embodying each of these things, writing: he was always winking in the same way that others had an insuppressible st. vitus’ dance. his sense of humor was such that he could not think, for example, of order without disorder. it was clear to him that in the immediate proximity of the greatest order, there was to be found the greatest disorder, and he even went so far as saying: in one and the same place!2 brecht refers here to the st. vitus dance, a cultural name given to bouts of mania involving infectious erratic dancing and laughter, occurrences of which were recorded from the fourteenth to seventeenth centuries. the phenomenon is sometimes called choreomania, from the greek choros, meaning dance, and mania, meaning madness. this dancing madness involves being taken over by (usually) temporary hysterical laughter, sometimes in large groups. pieter breughel the elder is among those to have famously depicted the phenomenon. when it comes to comedy, it is tempting to relate the st vitus dance to bakhtinian carnival, another kind of infectious and “insuppressible” group eruption into comic disorder, or to what has sometimes been called “relief theory” or liberation theory in laughter studies. on the contrary, i argue here for a hegelian reading of laughter which counters bakhtinian carnival and ideas of laughter as liberating, assumptions which have dominated discussions of comic theory in the fields of both literary studies and philosophy. this function of laughter is embodied by hegel’s wink: a wink carrying the insuppressible threat of st vitus. alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 64 the paper explores laughter as a process involving a kind of paradoxical relationship between order and disorder. as brecht’s comment suggests, in laughter order and disorder are not only “in closest proximity” but are “in one and the same place.” looking at hegel’s comments on comedy in the last 50 pages of aesthetics, as well as earlier comments in the logic, this paper argues for a hegelian conception of laughter as a kind of “beginning,” or what would later be termed an “event” in the work of alain badiou; a moment at which a new “order” emerges and is asserted, retroactively changing the past so that it appears as if the new order was always-already destined to be.3 laughter establishes precisely such new realities, i will show here, but it also comes with the wink of st vitus, indicating the precarity of the new orders that it brings into being. further, the article explores how lacan understood this function of humour via his reading of hegel and put it to work in his lectures to produce new realities in order to force his philosophy into being within the room of his seminars. in this paper, then, lacan is used less as a commentator on comedy than as an example of a humorist who embodied a particularly and peculiarly hegelian approach to comedy. hegel discusses comedy at length, though this part of his oeuvre is often critically neglected.4 there is discussion of comedy in several important sections of the phenomenology, and there is a much more sustained discussion at the end of his last work, the posthumously published aesthetics. here, hegel dedicates fifty pages to the topic of comedy, yet, due to their critical neglect, these final pages of his life’s work seem to recall stories surrounding aristotle’s lost book on comedy, the second part of the poetics. umberto eco speculates about these lost pages in his 1980 novel the name of the rose, somewhat comically suggesting that discovery of the text would undo the western traditions of thought that have been set on their course by aristotelian philosophy. hegel, likewise considered by many to be an embodiment of established european rationality, finished his final lecture series with a disruptive and subversive discussion of comedy that has been “lost.” hegelian comedy—if it is recovered—would be equally disruptive of a number of assumptions about hegel’s status as the philosopher of secure rationality. it would also counter assumptions about laughter’s apolitical and supplementary status, showing laughter to be of vital political power and a key feature of philosophical discourse. writing in aesthetics, hegel discusses the “comic as such,” which can be thought of as something like the pure spirit of laughter, often separate from the general things which make us laugh. hegel writes that such laughter: implies an infinite light-heartedness and confidence felt by someone raised altogether above his own inner contradiction and not bitter or miserable in it at all: this is the bliss and ease of a man who, being sure of himself, can bear the frustration of his aims and achievements.5 this idea of comedy can be read as being on the side of the subject, and on the side of a traditional reading of the hegelian dialectic and of hegel’s work as asserting totality and completeness. in such a way it could be read as asserting that laughter alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 65 helps the subject overcome its contradiction and progress in some way: there is first the subject, then the subject threatened by “its own inner contradiction,” and finally the subject “raised above” this problem via comedy. yet this reading is insufficient, and the flicker of st vitus is visible in hegel’s eye, since he is clear that the process has to do not only with the development of a pre-existing contradiction into a total and secure conclusion (as in the clichéd thesis-antithesis-synthesis reading of hegel) but with the absolute destruction of what has gone before in the emergence of something new, even if the new also, paradoxically, emerges out of the old in its very destruction or undoing. hegel returns to the definition of the comic as such and stresses the radically destructive function of the laughter it involves. for hegel, such comedy occurs: when what has no substance in itself has destroyed its show of existence by its own agency, [and] the individual makes himself master of this dissolution and remains undisturbed in himself and at ease.6 for hegel, a moment of pure comedy destroys something which “has no substance in itself” and only ever had “a show of existence.” in its place, something new emerges. this new thing may be thought of as “truth,” as if comedy abolishes appearance and reveals “true reality” underneath apparent fictions (something laughter studies and general discussion of laughter have often claimed).7 something is destroyed and “dissolved” which is shown never to have had any substance but to have been in the order of appearance only. this is an old tradition and one can think of any comedian revealing the fallacy of an eminent performer and showing the harsh and inadequate material reality underneath the show of appearance: plautus’s miles gloriosus, shakespeare’s falstaff, mel brooks’s hitler. this is a precursor to what freud would call “unmasking,” a comic moment when “such and such a person, who is admired as a demigod, is after all only human like you and me.”8 kant could also be thought of as philosophizing laughter in a comparable way when he comments that “laughter is an affection arising from the sudden transformation of a strained expectation into nothing.”9 such ideas, also a kind of “relief theory” see laughter as the transformation of an (apparent) something into nothing. the confusing difference is that in hegel’s conception of the comic this is carried out by the individual’s own agency and the individual is able to emerge in a new form as the master of the situation, making laughter at least as creative as it is destructive, at least as much the production of something as the dissolution of something. as such, the key to the complexity of hegel’s argument is found in another implication: that which is produced appears to have always-already existed; rather than appearing new, it seems to “remain” and to be “undisturbed,” even though it has been produced anew in the moment of comedy. in other words, this laughter doesn’t so much reveal the truth as produce it as preexistent. we might say that this type of laughter finishes something and starts something new, but that which it starts appears to have pre-existed, it “remains undisturbed” and “persists selfassured.” hegel implies that true comedy is not about dismantling appearance and alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 66 revealing underlying truths but that comedy functions in the service of producing truth itself. perhaps we can hypothesize that comedy turns existing truths into mere appearance and creates new truths which appear grounded in more than appearance, as indeed truth always appears to be. i will try to bear out this hypothesis in what follows. rather than the aesthetics, where hegel discussed comedy directly, brecht singles out the science of logic as the most comical of hegel’s works. in that text hegel explores the idea of a “beginning,” questioning how order comes into being. for brecht: his book “the greater logic” … is one of the great comic works of world literature. it is about the mode of a life of concepts, those slippery, unstable, unaccountable existences; how they insult each other and fight with knives, and then sit down to dinner together as if nothing had happened. they appear, so to speak, in pairs, each is married to its opposite … what order declares is immediately denied, in one and the same breath if possible, by disorder, its inseparable partner.10 but, how is it exactly that, in the hegelian schema, order and disorder can be married and sit down to dinner? to approach an answer to this we need an understanding of hegel’s conception of beginning, which is also developed in the science of logic. viewing laughter through the idea of beginning can lead to an understanding of his conception of pure comedy in which order and disorder are simultaneously and dialectically present. for hegel, when something begins it is established and presented as inevitable and secure, yet also threatened by a kind of infinite anxiety. as in brecht’s comment, hegel explores how order is produced through a paradoxical relationship with itself. he writes: there is nothing in heaven or nature or spirit or anywhere else that does not contain just as much immediacy as mediation, so that both these determinations prove to be unseparated and inseparable and the opposition between them nothing real.11 everything which appears immediate contains just as much mediation, and vice versa, anticipating a freudian concept of the unconscious. hegel considers these two things, mediation on the one hand and immediacy on the other, which have characterized all prior theorizations of the beginning, to be inseparable, although equally importantly, something falsely or apparently separates them. this process which divides the two is close to what we can think of as the beginning in hegel’s work. for hegel we can say that the beginning does not exist at the beginning, but rather, the beginning is, in hegel’s own words, “to be made” by this division.12 at the beginning there is a divider, something which precedes immediacy and mediation, cause and effect, which separates the two, producing them in relation to each other. the moment of laughter can be seen as such a divider, a rupture that produces both cause and effect, which determines both the object of laughter and alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 67 the subject laughing. it is this unsecuring sense of how truth and identity come into being which brecht found so humorous in hegel and called “those slippery, unstable, unaccountable existences [that] insult each other and fight with knives, and then sit down to dinner together as if nothing had happened.” a whole history of laughter studies has focused on the causes of laughter, seeing it as purely the effect of something else, while more recent work such as that of anca parvulescu has begun to discuss its effects and what can be caused by laughter.13 in this conception of laughter via hegel, laughter is conceived of as neither cause nor as effect but as a rupture which constitutes both. in his book event, slavoj žižek defines the event as “the effect that seems to exceed its causes.”14 an event is that which exceeds its causes, so that whilst it has political stimuli, it also establishes new causes for itself, its effects retroactively re-structuring the past into a new structure and bringing us within this re-ordered world, whether we like it or not. laughter, conceived as hegelian beginning, is exactly such an event. it brings the subjects involved (those telling the jokes, those laughing, and those targeted) into new ideological structures which are produced, entrenched, naturalized and enforced by the process of laughter, with the laugh itself (considered only as effect) appearing to serve as evidence of the existence of what caused it. instead, laughter is both cause and effect, as well as a force that falsely divides the two. it is a true hegelian beginning, which has three constituent parts that cannot exist save in relation to each other. the political effects of seeing laughter in this way are significant. rather than an effect of or response to existing political discourses, laughter must be seen as a more active participant in the establishment of and resistance to political realities. since such comic processes produce political reality, establishing order, they also leave that political reality precarious and open to being reproduced again. in other words, such laughter is order and disorder “in one and the same place.” whilst for brecht it is hegel’s logic which holds within it the greatest humour, for lacan it is the phenomenology that is “hysterically funny.” as if frustrated with his students’ failure to pick upon his suggestive comments about the humour of hegel, in seminar xvii lacan notes that “it has no kind of effect […] if i say to you that the phenomenology of spirit is hysterically funny. and yet, this is what it is.”15 pointing to a lack of attention to hegel’s humour, lacan hides his insight in a throwaway comment, himself making a joke by offering his audience the chance to ignore him and misread hegel. “hysterically funny” means not just very funny but that hegel’s comedy must be thought of in terms of the “discourse of the hysteric,” something he suggested some weeks earlier in the seminar. for lacan, hegel’s discourse goes against the history of philosophy, which has been nothing but “a fascinating enterprise for the master’s benefit.” on the contrary, with hegel’s “outrageous absolute knowledge,” we confront the fact that “what leads to knowledge […] is the hysteric’s discourse” (s17, 23). the hysteric’s discourse is a constantly questioning and never fixed sense of knowledge. as the servant to many masters, the hysteric suggests knowledge on the precipice, always capable of collapsing and being replaced by another. the st vitus dance is also “hysterical,” both in terms of humour, alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 68 and in terms of the hysteric’s discourse in a strictly psychoanalytic sense. for lacan, hegel counters the idea that knowledge is fixed (and the fixity, or ossification, of this very idea) with the fact that knowledge is always new. truths are produced, rather than being perceptions of what is “already there.” while we talk of “discovering” the truth, particularly in scientific discourse, lacan re-formulates the idea of discovery in seminar xi to argue that “the discovery is of a strange temporality.”16 recalling freudian nachträglichkeit, lacan shows that the discovery of something also brings it into being in a new form. this production of truths found in hegel is, for lacan, “hysterically funny,” with the pun fully intended. it is funny because it shows how humour itself functions like a beginning or discovery, appearing to be a blast of clarifying “unmasking” which renders what previously appeared true to be mere illusion and establishes a new truth in its place, just like the hysteric in its relationship to its masters. any classic example of unmasking laughter will serve the argument well: laughter issued at the pompous king is often thought to shatter the illusion (his performance of superiority) and reveal the truth (the common humanity of us all). on the contrary, it abolishes one truth (traditional hierarchy) only to replace it with another (equality in the eyes of god). via laughter, a new master is established, making laughter a truly hysterical affect. freud did not consider himself much indebted to hegel and it is lacan who brings hegel into psychoanalytic discourse. in seminar xvii, lacan criticizes traditional philosophy and makes hegel the absolute antithesis of this, calling him the “antiphilosopher” (23). influenced by kojève’s lectures on hegel that he attended in the 1930s,17 lacan criticizes ideas of the ego-as-origin which characterize the psychoanalysis of anna freud and other freudian schools. distancing himself from these schools, lacan writes that “one should not imagine that [psychoanalysis] is something that would be the discovery of being or of the soul.”18 lacan, like hegel, asks not what the origin of the subject is but rather how we are formed as subjects who see ourselves as originary. ian parker and david pavon-cuellar explain that “lacanian discourse analysis” is an attempt to move away from models which “attempt to go back to some reality that was expressed, represented or reflected in discourse” and instead place the emphasis on “the reality of discourse itself,” not just linguistics but the way in which real subjects are produced and constructed within those languages.19 lacan’s comment about hegel’s humour is no throw-away remark but a central point of seminar xvii to which he repeatedly returns. all the way through—take as an example what hegel is able to say about culture—the most pertinent remarks concerning the play of events and exercises of wit abound. i repeat, there is nothing more amusing. (171) lacan stresses that reason, the very thing affirmed by traditional readings of hegel, operates in his work as a cunning trick: “the cunning of reason is, he tells us, what directed the entire game.” “however,” writes lacan, “the high point of this cunning is not where one thinks it is. it is the cunning of reason, no doubt, but one has to recognize the cunning of the reasoned and take one’s hat off to him.” lacan then realfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 69 fers to the “extraordinarily dirty trick of the phenomenology of spirit” arguing that hegel’s question “which is truth?” and “what brings him into play?” are humorous ones (171). such humour—like lacanian psychoanalysis itself—would operate against the discovery of the soul, working not to unmask what is already there but to reveal the cunning trick by which we emerge as subjects who see themselves as originary or who believe in the existence of a soul-like quality to our subjectivity. lacan’s insistence that this element of hegel’s project should be seen as hysterically funny indicates that the process described by hegel is close to the heart of humour itself. we can put the hypothesis in the terms discussed above: laughter, while appearing to unmask the truth behind illusion and show what the subject really is, is in fact a process which involves bringing the subject into being while tricking it into thinking it existed to be unmasked. lacan’s own use of light humour in his seminars is an interesting case study of the function of such humour. lacan’s humour has rarely been mentioned (except perhaps by those such as noam chomsky, who mindlessly labelled lacan an arrogant charlatan). like most jokes, they are usually seen as a light aside to the serious development of his arguments. on the contrary, his use of jokes supplies illustration of how lacan understood the function of humour itself. from a certain perspective the jokes may seem arrogance, since he uses them to prove himself right, but in doing so he shows how ideologically powerful jokes can be. in short, lacan’s own use of light humour shows how the joke can establish an argument as a truth. one example is a humorous gambit aimed at his contemporary writer marie-claire boons: marie-claire boons would even give us to understand that […] in some way psychoanalysis frees us from the law. fat chance. i am well aware that this is the register in which a libertarian hook attaches itself to psychoanalysis. […] the father’s death […] does not seem to me to be of a kind to liberate us from it, far from it. (s17, 119) lacan stresses that psychoanalysis, from freud’s own work to his own, should not be thought of as on the side of liberation. rather, its interest is in the always structured movement from one “discourse” to another, with the production of new subjects and discourses out of and in place of old ones. the joke in the above quotation turns on the phrase “fat chance,” takes as its target the idea that “psychoanalysis frees us from the law.” as such, by mocking the idea of liberation, it also targets the idea that humour operates as a “liberating release,” which is often considered to characterize freud’s own theory of humour in jokes and their relation to the unconscious. his conception of humour via hegel reflects this primary interest of his work, stressing a laughter that is not so much on the side of liberation—as freudian relief theory and bakhtinian carnival have often been considered—but involved in the process of moving from one structure to another. lacan uses this small joke to make a certain event-like movement happen in the very text of his seminar. the laughter (albeit brief) that we might assume accompanied this phrase “fat chance” in the lecture theatre full of lacan fanatics, is itself an evental change; it turns alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 70 a reading of psychoanalysis (that of marie-claire boons, who thought that psychoanalysis may liberate us from the law) into a past that is now laughed at and shown to have only ever had “a show of existence,” to borrow hegel’s language from above. in relation to this past, a new present is established in which it is made clear that psychoanalysis is “far from” liberating. the process therefore establishes a new present in relation to this equally new past, both of which emerge as the joke is made. the joke has the three-part structure of a hegelian beginning. another way of putting this might be to say that lacanian psychoanalysis (like laughter) is not about truths but about myths or the truth of myth; it does not reveal the “truth” but shows us the truth of discourse itself. lacan makes more jokes to hammer home this point: bullshitting, as i have always said, is truth. they are identical. […] why is this privilege given to myth in psychoanalysis? […] claude levi-strauss states the complete myth of oedipus [but] one can see that it concerns something quite different from whether or not one is going to fuck one’s mummy. (s17, 111) this observation is not simply grounded in the argument made by many postfreudians that the oedipus myth is not to be taken literally but metaphorically. rather than being a myth which shows us something true, as metaphor can function, it is the mythic status of oedipus which makes it important. here, the joke about fucking one’s mummy actually enacts what lacan describes. the joke shows that we are wrong to see psychoanalysis as something which reaches back into childhood to find “truths,” indicating instead that it is the myths we tell ourselves (about childhood for example) which are important. these myths, in being shown for the myths that they are (or shown to be a kind of true “bullshit” which governs subjectivity) are revealed to have never had anything but a “show of existence,” to borrow hegel’s phrase once more, and a new truth is erected in its place, which then seems to have always been the truth waiting to be revealed (“unmasked”) by the abolishment of myth. which truth is demoted to the status of myth here? it is the myth that fucking our mothers is at the root of psychoanalysis, a former psychoanalytic truth. yet the joke doesn’t reveal essential truth (what psychoanalysis is really about), but it produces new truth in place of the old myth. this new equally mythic truth appears true by virtue of its comparison with the old and now abolished myth. thus lacan is able to defend freud, to get him off the hook, and re-establish his theory as a new truth: from this joke on, psychoanalysis was never just about “fucking one’s mummy,” and freud always meant something quite different. it is the same “dirty trick” played by hegel’s phenomenology and which lacan found so humorous. now playing this dirty trick on his seminar audience, lacan shows that laughter functions to turn established truths into appearance and establish new truths its place. psychoanalysis itself can be said to function comparably. alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 71 as a final example, we can consider one of lacan’s best comic moment from seminar xi, in which he uses a humorous story about an encounter with a sardine can in order to explain the function of the gaze. joan copjec noted that the humour deployed by lacan in this famous instance should be thought of in relation to hegel. lacan tells his tale of the relation of the subject to its world in the form of a humorously recondite story about a sardine can. the story is told as a kind of mock hegelian epic, a send up of the broadly expansive hegelian epic form by a deliberately “little story” that takes place in a “small boat” in a “small port” and includes a single named character, “petit jean.”20 this little story is about the gaze—not my topic here—but it is also about humour. in the tale, the young man, petit-jean, points to a sardine can floating in the ocean and comments to lacan (himself a character in the story) “you see that can? do you see it? well, it doesn’t see you!” for lacan the theorist, the non-reciprocity between the subject and the sardine can illustrates a lacanian theory of the gaze, but for lacan the character in the story, what is most disconcerting is that while petit-jean finds his own comment “highly amusing,” he had not. “why did i find it less amusing than he?” asks lacan, “it’s an interesting question.” the answer he gives is that the moment of exclusion from the humour makes it visible that the middle class lacan had no place in the picture of working life in which he finds himself, but the further implication is that the laughter establishes a new reality to the scene in which the little story is set. after the laugh, the scene is rendered in a different light, with even its history constructed anew. again, laughter is conceived as an eventual force that moves the subjects involved into a new structural reality. recognizing this power of laughter is a prerequisite to being able to use it to create such a shift in the examples discussed above. one of the most interesting comments lacan made about laughter is the suggestion in television that laughter may oppose capitalism. here lacan says, “the more saints, the more laughter; that’s my principle, to wit, the way out of capitalist discourse—which will not constitute progress, if it happens only for some.”21 the possibility of lacanian laughter working against capitalism has been brilliantly explored by samo tomšič: the association of laughter with the exit from capitalism is another surrealist moment in the citation from lacan’s television. laughter as a weapon against capitalism seems to suggest that capitalism might be structured like a joke, and the envisioned universalisation of laughter—“the more saints the more laughter”—would mean the downfall of capitalism. should psychoanalysis teach us how finally to laugh at capitalism?22 for tomšič, laughter, as something which reveals the structure of capitalism, might cause its very downfall. such an argument is comparable with the one i’ve made here, that laughter has the power to change the structure of a discourse and inaugurate new realities. yet, tomšič’s insight provides another important dimension. alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 72 laughter is not just any event, but a particular kind of event or movement which makes something structural visible to us. we can have many masters, and many beginnings, while still within the capitalist discourse and framework, but what makes laughter different is that it makes such structures visible to us, undermining their claim to inevitability. speaking of hegel and of derrida on hegel, jean-luc nancy—perhaps an unusual writer to evoke here—puts it nicely when he writes of laughter that “what makes sense about meaning is that it senses itself making sense.”23 if we can say that laughter is a beginning, or an event, that exceeds its causes and produces something which it appears to reflect, then what is specific about laughter is that it senses its role in the production of a cause which seems to have pre-existed, rather than believing in itself as an effect of already-existing objects, identities and subject-positions. laughter, with all its anxieties, knows that what it brings into being is completely unsecured and always potentially subject to complete change. it could function not only like the hysteric’s discourse, but to change the structure of the discourse itself. in such a way, this hegelian laughter could be the opponent of capitalism. like hegel’s philosophy, capitalism often presents itself as inevitable and secure totality, but if it is structured like a joke, and if jokes produce rather than reveals truths, then capitalism is shown to be based on the kind of dirty cunning trickery found in the phenomenology. describing hegel as the most anxious of men, his student heinrich heine makes the following comment which chimes with that of brecht many years later: i often saw how he anxiously looked around, fearing that people would understand him. he liked me a lot since he was certain i wouldn’t betray him; i even thought at the time that he was servile. when i was once uneasy about the saying ‘all that is, is rational,’ he smiled in a peculiar way and remarked: ‘this could also read “all that is rational must be.”’ he quickly looked around, but soon calmed down.24 as mladen dolar has written, the passage depicts hegel as “someone who must constantly attempt to hide his subversive underside.”25 this subversive underside, this article has proposed, is to do with laughter. in heine’s account, hegel’s manner is uneasy and anxious because he fears being understood, seemingly on this particular tricky point. speaking privately to heine, hegel allegedly suggests an alternate reading of the famous proposition “all that is, is rational”; whilst the first phrase implies that being is inherently rational, the alternative suggests that this is because rationality itself demands to be. hegel sees, in the very act of making rationality inevitable, the strange and powerful way in which rationality demands to be inevitable, and makes itself so, thus performatively undoing the very chain of causality and inevitability traditionally thought to bind the rational itself. this paradoxical move is the true st vitus’ dance in hegel’s viewpoint, and makes its destabilizing presence felt in what brecht called his wink, and in what heine called his “peculiar smile”—embodied, even unconscious gestures which constantly threaten to undo themselves in the very act of doing. alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 73 whilst it was georges bataille who wrote “my philosophy is a philosophy of laughter” and hegel would never have described his own work in this way, it is in fact hegel—the philosopher of rationality—whose work threatens the very logic of the order it also establishes.26 whilst bataille saw laughter as “non-knowledge” or antiknowledge, humour in hegel’s philosophy—and here he might be heard to have the last laugh—is both knowledge and non-knowledge, both philosophy and antiphilosophy at once, “in one and the same place!” the peculiar role of comedy in his work is not found in its association with any liberation from the law, but rather in making visible a process by which a new structural reality comes into being. the wink of st vitus, barely concealed in hegel’s work, is the indicator that such a reality could collapse just as easily as it emerged. notes 1. special thanks are due to mladen dolar for inspiration for the article. 2. berthold brecht, gessamelte werke 14, (frankfurt: suhrkamp, 1967) 1460-1. english translation by mladen dolar. 3. this is not something that badiou would be likely to directly agree with, since laughter is far from one of the four categories of the event. the theory is explored in full in my forthcoming book in the event of laughter: psychoanalysis, hegelianism and comedy. 4. agnes heller makes an interesting connection between hegel and the comic novel. see immortal comedy: the comic phenomenon in art, literature and life (oxford: lexington books, 2005) 93. alenka zupančič dedicates a chapter to hegelian comedy in the odd one in (london: mit press, 2008) 11-60. zupančič’s text has been crucial in reversing the trend of dissociating hegel from the comic. 5. g. w. f. hegel, aesthetics, vol ii, trans t.m. knox (oxford: clarendon press, 1975) 1200. 6. hegel, 1202. 7. see for example elder olson, the theory of comedy (bloomington, indiana, 1968) 35-6. 8. sigmund freud, “jokes and their relation to the unconscious” in the standard edition of the complete psychological works of sigmund freud, vol. viii, ed. & trans. james strachey (london: vintage, 2001) 3-238; 202. 9. immanuel kant, critique of judgement, trans. james creed meredith (oxford: oxford university press, 2007) 161. 10. brecht, gessamelte werke, vol. 14, 1401-2. 11. g. w. f. hegel, the science of logic, trans. george di giovanni (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2010) 46. 12. brecht, 1401-2. 13. anca parvulescu, laughter: notes on a passion (cambridge, mass.: mit press, 2010). 14. slavoj žižek, event: philosophy in transit (london: penguin books, 2014) 3. alfie bown: hegel the comedian s10 & 11 (2017-18): 74 15. jacques lacan, the other side of psychoanalysis, ed. jacques-alain miller and russell grigg, the seminar of jacques lacan, xvii (new york: norton, 2007) 169–70. all subsequent references to seminar xvii are to this edition, denoted by s17 (where necessary) and page number. 16. jacques lacan, the four fundamental concepts of psychoanalysis, ed. jacques alain-miller, trans. alan sheridan (london: norton, 1998) 25. 17. alexandre kojève, introduction to the reading of hegel, ed. allan bloom, trans. james h nichols, jr (new york: basic books, 1969). 18. jacques lacan, “the tokyo discourse,” journal for lacanian studies, 3.1 (2005): 129-144; 3. 19. david pavon-cuellar and ian parker, lacan, discourse, event: new psychoanalytic approaches to textual indeterminacy (london: routledge, 2013) 2. 20. joan copjec, read my desire: lacan against the historicists (london: mit press, 1994) 30. 21. jacques lacan, television: a challenge to the psychoanalytic establishment, ed. joan copjec, trans. denis hollier et al. (new york: norton, 1990) 16. 22. samo tomšič, “laughter and capitalism” in s: journal of the circle for lacanian ideology critique 8 (2015): 22-38; 29. 23. nancy, jean-luc, “elliptical sense,” research in phenomenology, 18 (1988): 175-191; 177. 24. heinrich heine, “briefe über deutschland” in sämtliche schriften, 6 vols, vol. 5 (munich: hanser, 1976) 197. i have used the translation of this passage given by mladen dolar in ‘the owl of minerva from dusk till dawn, or, two shades of gray,’ in filozofija i društvo, vol. 26, broj 4 (2015): 875-890; 882-3. 25. dolar, “the owl of minerva from dusk till dawn, or, two shades of gray,” in filozofija i društvo, vol. 26, broj 4 (2015): 883. 26. georges bataille, “nonknowledge, laughter, and tears” in the unfinished system of nonknowledge, ed. stuart kendall, trans. michelle kendall and stuart kendall (minneapolis, mn: university of minnesota, 2001) 138. towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference louay safi forging a new methodology capable of analyzing complicated social phenomena on the one hand, and facilitating the derivation of rules and concepts from divine revelation on the other, is one of the paramount concerns of contemporary islamic scholarship and the sole concern of this paper. in dealing with this concern the paper pursues two main themes. first, an attempt is made to underscore the need for reestablishing reve lation as a primary source of social theorizing. second, a primordial model of a unified methodological approach for analyzing both revealed texts and social phenomena is outlined the first difficulty confronting any attempt to develop an alternative methodological approach, especially one rooted in islamic ontology, lies in the exclusion of divine revelation from the realm of science. this ex clusion originated within the confines of western scientific traditions due to internal conflict between western religious and scientific communities. while revelation and science were never perceived as mutually exclusive in the islamic scientific tradition, modern muslim scholars cannot ignore the fact that divine revelation is out of place in contemporary scientific activities. thus we choose to begin by exploring the grounds for recog nizing revelation as a major soufie of scientific knowledge. the campaign against revealed knowledge, which led to its exclusion from western science, consisted of two phases: a) revelation was equated filst with ungrounded metaphysics and established as a rival knowledge in contrast to knowledge deemed as true by reason (locke 1977), and b) it was then asserted, a la kant (1969), that scientific activity should be confined to empirical reality, since human reason cannot ascertain tran scendental reality. we argue that scientific activity presupposes metaphy louay s d i is an assistant professor of political science at the international islamic university, selangor, malaysia. safi: towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference 465 sical knowledge and is even impossible without transcendental presuppo sitions. in addition, we contend that the truth of revelation is m t e d in empirical reality and that the quality of evidence supporting revealed truth is of no less caliber than that justifying empirical truth. metaphysical presuppositions of empirical knowledge to begin with, the effort to separate religious (metaphysical) truth from scientific truth is mistaken and untenable, for knowledge of the phy sical is rooted in the metaphysical and the latter is not altogether divorced from the former. to appreciate their interconnectedness, one has to re member that science and scientific activity are the result of a specific ontology that relates an individual's scientific endeavor to the environ ment and furnishes their motivational basis. put differently, scientific activity presupposes several assertions about the nature of existence, the truth of which must be acknowledged prior to any engagement in empiri cal studies. among these metaphysical assertions, the following three are stressed: a) the natural world is governed by laws that endow the be havior of natural objects with order and regularity; b) laws governing natural order are rational and thus discoverable by human rationality; and c) knowledge is an important human value and is superior to ignorance. these transcendental principles, presupposed by all scientific activity, form the foundation of the scientific tradition, even though they cannot be examined by those methods currently accepted by the modem western scientific tradition. however science, as a vocation, owes its existence to such transcendental principles. james rosenau, a leading scholar of international relations, contends that the seemingly disordered nature of international relations results from a failure to discover the underlying order beneath the apparent disorder of world politics. explaining his reasoning, he wrote: while it may at first seem absurd to search for order beneath the disorder of world affairs, this contradiction is resolved when it is recognized that two different concepts of order are involved. in one case, the concept denotes the presumption of causation, the idea that there is a cause for every effect, that nothing happens at random. the causes may not be presently knowable because the technology, resources, or time necessary to observe them is not available, but the premise of an underlying order springs from theoretical and not empirical possibilities. that is, when causative rather than random factors are presumed to be operative, nothing is theoretically beyond comprehension. in this sense, the world 466 the amencan journal of islamic social sciences 1 0 4 is, by an initial, unprovable (but also irrefhtable) assumption, an orderly place even though it may also be baffling and mysterious because the tools of observation a* inadequate to the tasks of ex planation. so as to avoid confusion, this underlying order that is taken on faith and that organizes inquiry will hereafter be referred to as order i. (rosenau 1990) he fails to state that it is not simply a belief in causality that justifies the postulation of order beneath observed disorder, for causality can only es tablish links between an antecedent and a consequent. rather, the postu lated order is rooted in a suppressed belief in transcendental order and the rationality of the world. in addition to constituting the basis of the metaphysical assumptions of science, belief in transcendental order is the foundation of scientific impetus. while current scientific activity can be motivated by utilitarian motives, this was hardly possible in the beginning, when scientific devo tion was rarely rewarded.' it should be noted that the emergence of the utilitarian grounding of ethical behavior in the western tradition coincided with an increased emphasis on positivistic approaches and a decline of in terest in the transcendental. throughout these formidable changes, how ever, the transcendental principles that gave rise to science continued to form the metaphysical foundation-a foundation that is widely presumed but rarely acknowledged-for scientific activity.2 thus the dependency of empirical and transcendental knowledge is not one-sided: it is reciprocal, for the truth of transcendental principles is substantiated through their empirical manifestations. in other words, al though the transcendental principles of a postulated universal order are rooted in religious beliefs, their truth is manifested in the behavior of empirical objects. the rationality of revelation we saw earlier that the undermining of revelation as a source of knowledge began by contrasting scientific with revealed knowledge and resulted in excluding the latter by associating it with mystical faith while grounding science in "rationality." it was therefore only a matter of time 'scientific pioneers in medieval europe were often harassed and persecuted as here 'exam les of works that acknowledge these pritlciples are nachmias and nachmias tics. (1990) an8buurtt (1980). safi: towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference 467 before revealed knowledge was relegated to the mdm of irrationality. the question that must be asked is: is a distinction between reason and revela tion possible? to answer this question, we must examine the internal structure of both ~eason and divine revelation. the term "revelation" refers to a body of written statements in the form of a discome making far-reaching claims about the origin, nature, and destiny of humanity and the univese in addition to prescribing a set of rules for guiding individual and col lective action. there are several such discourses, which, though having some important differences, share common features: judaism (the torah), christianity (the bible), and islam (the qur'an). the term ''reason,'' on the other hand, has two distinct references. it is sometimes used to denote a number of self-evident principles that govern the thinking process of mentally competent people, regardless of their cultural or educational backgrounds. 'ihe most basic principle, which has been widely acknowledged, is that of noncontradiction: the simulta neous assertion and denial of the same fact is imposible. reason, accord ing to the foregoing conception, is an instrument or a canon used for examining the coherence of a body of statements. this examination allows us to conclude whether the examined statements are coherent and hence in conformity with the principles of reason, or contradictory and thus in violation of teason. as such, revelation can be deemed imtional only when it pments contradictory statements. denote the capacity of rational beings to acknowledge the truth of certain assertions and deny the truth of others. at first glance, reason appears, according to this second conception, to be a human faculty, an organon possessed by all human beings. on closer examination; one can see that nreasonn in this usage is a body of knowledge that has been examined and systematized by the principles of logic. further, our examination of this systematic body of knowledge reveals that "reason" and "reasonable" consist of a) transcen dental assertions whose truth is postulated, and b) empirical assertions whose truth is based on sensory experience. in other words, "reason" pos sesses a structure that resembles very closely that of revelation. clearly, only by being a body of knowledge can reason pose itself as a rival to revelation. the term "reason" is also used frequently the above conceptualization leads to three important conclusions: 1. whether it is perceived as a mental instrument (canon) or a men tal faculty (organon), reason manifests itself through several uni versal principles (i.e., identity, noncontradiction, excluded middle, causality) and procedutes (i.e., abstraction, analysis, synthesis) 468 2. the american journal of islamic social sciences 10:4 employed by individuals for ascertaining the truth of assertions. as such, it has to be associated with the methods and mechan isms used in science and, hence, cannot be seen as a source of knowledge. the denial of revelation’s scientific validity cannot be attributed to the nature of the revealed assettions or to the structure of reve lation itself, for both reason and revelation consist of tran scendental and empirical assertions. thus it is safe to say that the complete exclusion of revelation from the realm of science is not due to any inherent contradictions between the universal elements of revelation and teason, but can be attributed to the intemal con tradictions between reason and western revelation and the internal conflict between the western scientific movement and the christian church. 3. although the western scientific tradition has postulated the i m l e vance of revelation and religion to science, it has appropriated several metaphysical assertions tooted in the worldview fumished by divine revelation, albeit without ever acknowledging this debt. revealed and empirical reality: the quality of evidence in light of the foregoing, we may define science as that activity aimed at ascertaining the truth of assettions on the nature of reality. the modem western exclusion of revelation from the realm of science is not based on a denial of the fact that divine revelation makes assertions on the nature of reality, but on the claim that only empirical reality can be ascertained. since nonempirical (metaphysical) reality is not susceptible to verification through experiment, it cannot be included in the realm of science (kant 1969). the above argument is simplistic and misleading because it ignores and obscures the nature of revealed and empirical evidence. the argument overlooks two essential facts: a) our knowledge of empirical reality is not based on knowledge received immediately from the empitical environ ment, but on theories that describe the underlying structure of reality. these structures are never immediately encountered by the senses, but are inferred through the use of categories abstracted from the sensible and mediated by purely ”rational” categories and statements. using lockean terminology, we could say that theories describing empirical reality consist of complex propositions acquired by combining several simple safi: towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference 469 propositions. for example, our understanding of the relationship between the earth and the sun is mediated by mental constructs and hence is com pletely at variance with the immediate sensory impression; and b) revela tion, at least in its final and islamic form, seeks its justification in empiri cal reality. from the viewpoint of divine revelation, empirical reality is the manifestation of a transcendental mlity and can have meaning only in relation to the ttanscendental. indeed, the qur'an is rampant with ver ses, or signs, that emphasize the interconnectedness of the empirical and the tran~cendental.~ most importantly, revelation underscotes the fact that the empirical is meaningless when severed from the whole, which, as western science is willing to admit, transcends the boundaries of empiri cal reality (ibid.). as such, revelation must be approached not as an immediately acces sible set of statements but as a given "phenomenon" consisting of signs whose understanding q u i r e s constant and recurring interpretation and systematization. i h e qur'an makes it abundantly clear that it consists of signs (dydt) whose understanding is contingent upon the processes of thinking, contemplating, and rationalizing: "verily, in these things are signs for those who understand" (13:4); "verily, in these things are signs for those who consider" (13:3); and 'we detail our signs for people who know" (6: 97). the foregoing observation underscores the fact that to understand the truth of revelation, one has to approach it as one would approach social phenomena or even natural phenomena. this is because the truth of these phenomena is contingent upon the ability of theories, which scholars and scientists construct from data generated by these phenomena, to produce consistent and "satisfactory" explanations of experienced reality. regarding revelation as a phenomenon, and hence as a source of knowledge, can be justified on the grounds that the quality of evidence used to ascertain (i.e., to demonstrate objectivity) the reality described by empirical theories is of no higher caliber than that employed to ascertain the reality described by revelation. in both cases, the existence of the phenomenon under consideration is ascertained by being borne con comitantly in the consciousness of numerous individuals who have first hand experience of its basic elements. as social or physical phenomena can be ascertained by those who have experienced their various elements, so can divine revelation be ascertained by those who have experienced the truth of its various signs. in both cases, the truth of the immediately acquired is intuitively ascertained, the only difference being that empirical 3see, for example, qur'an 3:190, 105, 45:3, 51:20, and 4153. 410 the american journal of islamic social sciences 104 reality experienced thmugh the senses is apprehended through empirical ' intuition while transcendental reality experienced through revelation is ap prehended through pure intuition. beginning with kant, western science has confined intuition, defined as the unity of a phenomenon's apprehended elements, to empirical intui tion and denied that tmnscendental elements can be apprehended. but kant, as we saw earlier, achieved this reduction by confusing the process of pure intuition. although he conceived, correctly, pure intuition as "all representations . . . in which there is nothing that belongs to sensation" (ibid.), he nonetheless insisted that the use of pure intuition should be limited to empirical reality. if pure intuition is obtained via successive ab straction from the multiple representation acquired by empirical intuition, leading to a singular representation in which all concepts are united, kant's refusal to recognize the ttanscendental reality apprehended by pure intuition is both arbitrary and dogmatic. revelation and the social sciences having concluded that revelation cannot be excluded from science, since it lies at its foundation, we can discuss this fact with regard to the social or human sciences. in these fields, it is clear that the influence of transcendental principles emanating from divine revelation is not confined to providing the basic conceptual and motivational foundations, but rather extends to the formation of their central theoretical elements. take, for instance, the important value of human equality that lies at the center of modem political theorizing. obviously, human equality is a tmnscendental principle traceable to divine revelation. in classical greek and roman traditions people were never equal. they were divided into the sons of the gods on the one hand and barbarians on the other. the same attitude existed among nomadic ambs who claimed racial superiority over others. it was islam and, to lesser extent, christianity that emphasized human equality." this principle is, however, transcendental and does not lend it self to empirical verification. in fact, the historical record shows that, for the most part, human beings have been perceived as unequal. the fact that western secularism continued to embrace principles and concepts genetated within traditions tooted in divine revelation shows that western a d h e m t s of secularism sought, in the first instance, to undermine 'the christian doctrine of the children of god, a doctrinal remnant of classical greek and roman religions, could be blamed for the liberty that christians took in persecuting non-christians. similarly, the jewish doctrine of the chosen people lent itself to even more pronounced ethnocentric tendencies, since jewish identity is not acquired through faith but inherited matrilineally. safi: towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference 471 church authority, not to repudiate religious beliefs and values. many reli gious ideas and values-freedom, equality, or the rationality of universal order-became secular "values" and "beliefs." this was not true in the case of muslim scientists, for classical islamic sciences were inspired by revealed beliefs and values: "and pursue not that of which you have no knowledge; for every act of hearing or of seeing, or of (conceiving in) the mind will be inquired into" (17:36); "many were the ways of life that have passed away before you: travel through the earth and see what was the end of those who rejected truth" (3:137); "say: travel through the earth and see how allah did originate creation" (29:20); "say: are they equal, those who know and those who do not know?" (39:9); and "allah will raise up many degrees in stature those of you who believe and who have been granted knowledge" (58: 11). the islamic scientific tradition has never experienced a crisis similar to that of its western counterpart. this shows that the conflict between science and revelation is neither imperative nor universal, but specific to the west's experience and religion. any attempt to reproduce the conflict in muslim culture is hence artificial and inspired by an irrational desire to walk in the footsteps of another culture. sources of knowledge divine revelation has always been a source-but never the sole source-of knowledge for classical muslim scholarship. early muslim scholars recognized the qur'an's general nature and realized that they needed to acquire detailed knowledge about the structure of language and reality in order to derive rules and concepts. hence the terms qarfnah hfi>uh (linguistic evidence) and qarinah bdl@uh (existential evidence) were frequently employed by scholars using linguistic and practical knowledge to explain the qur'an. early muslim scholars developed elaborate schemes for analyzing the qur'an, but their analysis of social and historical structures was never based on an articulated and well developed methodology. consequently, their knowledge of society and history was based on common sense. it was not until the time of ibn khaldiin that the islamic scientific tradition saw a serious attempt to develop theories designed to explain social inter action by identifying historical patterns. although ibn khaldiin introduced highly matured theories of society and history, he never discussed the methodological foundation of his theorizing. subsequent muslim scholars made no attempt to elaborate upon his methodological approach. the unbalanced growth of textual methods at the expense of practical and historical methods led to conceptual distortions, especially in those 472 the american journal of islamic social sciences 104 areas where a knowledge of the structures of society and sociopolitical organizations was essential. nowhere is this imbalance more apparent than in treatises intended to outline the structure of the islamic political order. for example, a1 mhwatdi (1404/1983) insisted that a ruler could designate (‘ahd) a legitimate successor based upon the precedent of abu bakt’s designation of ‘umar. this act, he argued, was suppotted by the consensus (ijmii‘) of the muslim community. yet neither al mzwardt not any other scholar who accepted this prac tice undertook a systematic and probing analysis of the companions’ actions to detetmine the rules that guided them or to ascertain their com patibility with the shari‘ah’s political principles. without mature methods to facilitate a profound analysis of the purposes and rules determining the early muslims’ actions or the social and political structures govemhg their interactions, classical scholars elevated the actions of a historically determined community to the status of universality and idealized the be havior of fallible human beings. while classical muslim scholars considered history a source of knowledge alongside revelation, they could not make full use of it for two te8so11s. first, classical muslim scholars, with the exception of ibn khaldiin, were primarily interested in identifying social and political models to be tecteated and in specifying exemplary behaviors to be emulated-not in discovering pattern of behavior or isolating general tendencies that could explain political interaction and social relations. second, this outlook made them incapable of developing a methodology for analyzing social phenomena. the example set by ibn khaldiin, despite its impressive maturity, came too late in the evolution of islamic scholar ship to attract a following. its resounding impact took place in western tradition, where the scientific and methodological imbalance took the op posite fotm: the distortion was slanted towards the social and practical at the expense of the revealed. the aim of developing a balanced scientific methodology should be twofold: a) including procedures for deriving rules (i.e., law-like state ments) from revelation and history; and b) integrating rules derived from both sources. the remainder of this paper will sketch the general frame work of a unified methodology for textual and contextual analysis. the revealed source: the rules of textual inference divine revelation has been given to us in the fotm of the qur’anic discourse and its elaboration-the hadith collections. the qur’an itself consists of statements revealed in a piecemeal fashion over a twenty-three year period. qur’anic statements provided early muslims with a universal safi towards a unified approach to the shari‘ah and social inference 473 worldview and directed their actions towards establishing a community (ummah) based on the principles of islam. the qur’anic discourse is unique in style and approach, for it is not organized in a thematic fashion whereby an issue or event is exposed at once in its entirety before the next issue is discussed. rather, one finds facets and aspects of a question or an event revealed in different chapters and verses. in order for a person to understand the qur’anic view or posi tion on a specific question, therefore, one has to treat the qur’anic dis course as a comprehensive whole. any attempt to determine the qur’anic position by contemplating isolated qur’anic statements is bound to lead to inconsistencies or outright misconceptions. take, for example, the verse: “0 you who believe! approach not prayers with a mind intoxicated until you can understand what you say” (4:43). based on this, the qur’anic p i t i o n on the consumption of intoxi cants is that they are to be avoided shortly before the performance of prayer. but this is only partially correct, as the completely correct posi tion is found in a verse revealed subsequently: “0 you who believe! intoxicants, gambling, (dedication of) stones, and (divination by) arrows are an abomination of satan’s handiwork eschew such (abomination) that you may prosper“ (590). therefore, in order to derive rules and concepts from divine revela tion, we must employ a method that is sufficiently developed to allow the derivation and systematization of these rules and concepts. the method proposed here comprise four procedural steps (see diagram 1). step one aims at identifying all qur’anic and prophetic statements that are relevant to the question at hand. for example, to determine the qur’anic position on the relationship between the ruler and the ruled, one has to compile qur’anic statements relating to the terms imam (leader), walq al amr (ruler), w u h (obedience), and n w r (support). a compre hensive survey shows that these terms appear in the following verses: im-m: (15:79), (36:12), (2:124), (11:17), (25:74), (46:12), (17:71), (9: 12), (21:73), (28:5), (28:41), and (32:24); wa@ al umr: (459) and (4:83); tii‘ah: (43:54), (24:51), (33:67), and (2552); and nayr: (9:40) and (7:157). it should be stressed that identifying relevant verses is not mechanical but involves a good deal of analysis and familiarity with semantic usages. 474 the american journal of islamic social sciences 10:4 step two involves understanding, both individually and in relation to each other, the meaning of relevant qut’anic verses. interpretations of re vealed statements require that the rules of the atabic language be ob served. any interpretation that violates these rules is bound to lead to distortion, as has happened in the cases of the liberal and unjustifiable use of metaphorical textual analysis by various scholars. for example, the shi‘i scholar ‘ali ibn al ijusayn al qimmi (1985) interpreted the verse “say: see if your stream be some moming lost (in the underground earth), who then can supply you with clear-flowing water?’’ (67:30) by saying that ”this v e m was revealed in relation to the established imam, saying if your imam disappeared one moming, who will bring a known imam?” this is a cleat violation of the first rule of metaphorical interptetation, which stipulates that such an interpretation is called for only when the text’s literal meaning is deficient. the above verse’s literal meaning is neither deficient not incoherent: it reminds people of the favors god has bestowed upon them and exhorts them to heed his waming lest he de prive them of the goods they take for gtanted. the meaning of qur’anic statements cannot be apprehended simply by analyzing the lexical usage of individual terms. rather, each one must be analyzed in three interrelated contexts: textual (siydq nayso, discur sive (siydq khitdh], and existential (siydq hdlz]. one cannot ignore the context of the chapter in which the statement appears, its place within the context of the entire qur’anic discouse, or the context of the socio historical events that accompanied its revelation. the third context, found mainly in the tufsir (qut’anic interpretation) literatm, is called usbdb al nuzzil (reasons of revelation). examining this aspect of a qut’anic statement is crucial for the derivation of a correct in terpretation. for example, how is f i i q to be understood in the following verse: “0 you who believe! if a fiiq (unprincipled) person comes to you with any news, ascertain the truth, lest you hatm people unwittingly and afterwards become full of regret for what you have done” (49:6). the tenn f i i q is used in the qut’an to denote a person who, despite his awareness of the principles of rightness, succumbs to his whims and vain desires. thus an interpretation based solely on lexical meaning in dicates the need for ascertaining the truth of the received news only when the p e m n who brought it is a known fiiq. but when the events related to the verse’s revelation ate examined, a new picture emerges. ibn kathir (1399/1979) narrates, on the authority of mujiihid and qutiidah, that the messenger of allah sent al walid ibn ‘uqbah to the bani al mustaliq to collect the zakah. (when they learnt of his arrival) they came out (to receive safi: towards a unified approach to the shari’ah and social inference 475 him at the outskirts of their town) to give him the zakah. (upon seeing their masses marching towards him) he turned back to madimah and told the prophet that the e3anii al mustaliq are ’marching to attack you and they have abandoned their com mitment to islam. the prophet then sent khzilid ibn al walid to investigate the matter, to inquire carefully (into the truth of the matter), and to avoid hasty decisions. (khiilid) arrived near their town at night and (immediately) dispatched scouts. they came back with the news that (the bani al mustaliq) were still com mitted to islam and that they have h e a d their adh-n and prayers. in the morning, =lid visited them and was pleased with what he saw. he (later) went back to the prophet and informed him about his findings. thus allah revealed the verse. the above narration gives a markedly different u n d e m d i n g of the verse, for it shows that ascertaining the report’s truth is required not only when the petson bringing it is a knownfzsiq, but even when this trait is not yet evident. had a1 walid been a known fzsiq, he would not have been entrusted with collecting the zakah on behalf of the prophet. evi dently, this was a trying mission for him, because it revealed his lack of courage, his willingness to exaggerate, and his use of imagination to cover his fear, the cause of his failure. step three deals with textual tu ‘zd (explanation)-identifying the effi cient cause (‘illah) for which the command or directive embodied in the text was ma&. another objective is ta identify the common property or attribute, possessed by different objects, that justify the use of the same term for their reference. identiffig a ruling’s ‘iuah is a first step in the endeavor to discover the universal principles regulating and goveming the shari‘ah’s pronouncements. for example, scholars have contemplated the ‘illuh of the following shari‘ah rulings: the prohibition of selling juzuf (unmeasured) for mdkil (measured) commodities and of selling an al ghi’ib (absent) commodity. they discovered that the ‘illah of these prohibitions was to protect the buyer against deception (gharir) (ibn rushd 1406/1986). by understand ing the general principles embodied in these rulings, we can apply these principles to other transactions that have not been ruled upon by eve lation and can even allow the sale of an unmeasured or absent good if the buyer can be protected from deception. for instance, if the product’s quality can be guaranteed before purchase, or if it can be returned if found defective, selling it sight-unseen can be permitted. muslim jurists have permitted ‘aqd al istisnd‘ (the contract of manufacturing) on this basis. 476 the american journal of islamic social sciences 104 since ta ‘lil frees us from social and historical contingencies, it is cn cia1 to analyze textual statements related to social and political action. the issue of the rules of peace and war is a case in point, for some verses tell muslims to fight the enemies of islam while othels encourage the establishment of peace when the enemy is inclined to stop fighting. de veloping a clear undelstanding as to when peacemaking is desirable and when war is advisable q u i r e s an elaborate process of ta ‘ld. step four seeks to bring unity and order to the rules and principles derived from the qur’an by fitting them into a comprehensive and inter nally consistent system. this can be achieved through a process of suc cessive abstraction in which rules derived from the text are subsumed under another set of rules belonging to a higher level of abstraction. this process should be repeated until a set of irreducible universal principles is obtained. it is at this level of high abstraction that the systematic order ing of rules, or law-like statements, can be attained, for now the inter relationship among a manageable number of concepts can be discovered. thus that which is impossible at the level of the immediate apprehension of reality-the underlying structure of reality-is made possible at the level of high abstraction. the process of successive abstraction, which also signifies a suc cessive induction whereby the particular is subsumed under the universal, is followed by a ptocess of successive deduction in which the intemal consistency of the universal and the particular is ascertained. the model outlined above is based on the principles (qawd‘id) ap proach, which was developed by the muslim jurist al ‘izz ibn ‘abd al sallm and became a full-fledged methodology in a1 sfitibi’s (1395/ 1975) theory of a1 maq&id. the historical sources: rules of historical inference the system of rules and concepts derived from revealed knowledge is insufficient for grounding action because a) it consists of general and universal rules, which means that its application to specific cases requites further deliberation and specification. this can be done by incorporating information about the nature of individual and collective action and inter action; and b) the application of universal rules requires knowledge of existing conditions. only when an action’s theoretical conditions corm pond with its actual conditions is a rule’s application possible. for example, to determine whether an individual should pay zakah, one must first identify the zakah payment’s theoretical conditions (i.e., possessing nisdb and being muslim) and determine whether the necessary conditions are met. similarly, when deciding whether a muslim state should sign a safi: towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference 477 peace treaty with a non-muslim state, it is not enough to know the theo retical conditions; the actual conditions have to be examined to deter mine whether they correspond with the theoretical. it may be concluded, therefore, that a) a thorough study and analysis of human actions and interactions must be undertaken before a revealed rule can be implemented, and b) an appropriate methodology for the study of action must be identified. western methodologies are unsuitable for studying human phenomena because their implicitly ptesupposed metaphysical foundations are not in accord with the ontology of reve lation. in addition, they deduced from models developed by contem plating western experience on the assumption that such experience is uni versally valid considering the ontological and ethical differences between islamic and western scientific traditions, the need for models and systems that incorporate muslim experience and islamic concerns is obvious. to achieve this objective, the "uniformity" of human purposes, motives, and goals should be rejected and social phenomena must be explained by analyzing their basic building block. human actions. in other words, the process of discovering the rules goveming the underlying structures of social phenomena must begin by analyzing the basic elements that constitute these phenomena. such an analysis may be done through four steps (see diagram 2). step one aims at analyzing the actions of an individual involved in a specific social phenomenon. this process involves uncovering an ac tion's thnx determinants: a) purpose, defined as the overall object to be realized; b) motive, or the actor's psychological impetus (the motivation to act stems from either a commitment to moral principles or self interest); and c) rule, or the technical procedure followed in order to at tain the action's purpose. to illustrate, take the example of a party election. a primary actor here is the candidate. to analyze his/her action, the three components of action must be identified. in this example, the purpose is to win the election. the motive could be either commitment to a moral principle e x p d in a stated policy, material and/or psychological benefits to be attained by the candidate and his/her supporters, or a combination of both. the technical de-the available means that must be used to achieve the objective-is then designed and used. thus winning the elec tion unites the candidate and his/her supporters into one putposive group. this group's unity of purpose is the result of shared value commitments or interests, for their suppott for the candidate may be based on the lat ter's declared intention to actualize value commitments shared by the group or from their interest in seeing certain legislation passed. 478 the american journal of islamic social sciences 104 step two deals with classifying modes or types of action on the basis of their components’ similarity or difference. actions having similar pur poses form a homogeneous group, while those having differing purposes divide the population into heterogeneous groups. differences in technical rules divide identified purposive groups into functional subgroups. this step is not completely separate from the filst one, for occa sionally the division of the population into groups and subgroups pre cedes the in-depth analysis of individual action. since it is impossible to analyze each individual’s action, we often select those individuals whose actions are considered representative of their groups. yet the early group ing is usually done intuitively and therefore must be modified and refined according to an analysis of the actions of selected individuals who are considered representatives of the various groups. step three consists of identifying universal rules that govern the inter action between the groups identified in step two. to isolate universal rules (or laws) of interaction, such patterns as cooperation and conflict, domination and submission, and growth and decline should be analyzed and compared across time and geographical space. clearly, reseatch in this area could be quite complex and hence q u i r e s further elaboration. finally, in step four, universal rules uncovered in the previous step need to be systematized in a fashion similar to that employed in textual derivation. it must seek to eliminate internal inconsistencies within the system of rules acquited through historical derivation as well as those de rived form revelation. a unified methodological approach a glance at the rules of textual and historical inference discloses a general pattern of scientific infelcnce shared by both approaches. the general pattern (see diagram 3) may be summarized as: a) analysis of the text/phenomenon into its basic componentx statements/actions; b) group ing similar statements/actions under one category; c) identification of rules that uniq the various categories; d) identification of general rules and purposes that govern the interactim/interrelation of various cate gories; and e) systematization of the body of rules obtained through the previous ptocedures (i.e., eliminating contradiction). the unity of textual and actual (historical) inference patterns is not confined to the similarity of the proposed procedures for textual and historical analysis, it is extended to the structure of action and discourse, as collective action and discourse consist of systems of rules and purposes that bring unity and coherence to each and allow comparison and contmst. by comparing the rules and purposes of the system of action sati: towards a unified approach to the shari’ah and social inference 479 (social phenomenon) and the system of text (discourse), one can examine the extent to which the two are, or are not, compatible. the significance of this is twofold: a) the system of rules derived from revelation can be used as an evaluative fmnework without confusing the ideal with the actual; and b) when actual practices depart from c o n f d rules and pur poses (divine ot otherwise), the actual rules and purposes embodied in those practices can be reconsttucted and contrasted with the ideal. theoretical framework and theory building the set of universal statements derived form revealed and historical records constitutes a theoretical framework that serves as the basis of any theorizing about social phenomena. the system of history-based and revelation-based rules is neither absolute nor closed, for it is subject to a process of constant refinement and perfection based on the efforts aimed at utilizing the available universal rules in o d e r to explain social phe nomema or guide collective action. these efforts lead to theory building, whereby specific rules and concepts are employed for explaining a spe cific phenomenon (see diagram 4). the process of theory building provides us with the opportunity to verify, clarify, and enlarge the theoretical framework. this p~ocess con sists of two phases: a) a set of universal principles is incorporated into a theory designed to explain or predict, and hence guide, the action of a specific human interaction; and b) the theory’s soundness is examined by contmsting hypotheses derived from the theory with observed actions or events. if the theory can provide a clear explanation or accurate predic tion, it should be considered sound. a repeated mismatch between the o b served behavior and the deduced hypothesis indicates the incorrectness or inaccuracy of some of the universal rules and points to the theory’s in adequacy. in such a case, it is necessary to modify the developed theory and/or the universal rules and concepts. conclusion we have attempted to provide a methodological approach that recog nizes revelation as a primary source of knowledge and k k s to use both text and action analysis techniques as necessary theory-building tools. technical procedures (i.e., methods) have not been identified. however, these can be appropriated from the textual methods of classical muslim scholarship and modem w&sm scholarship, eithet immediately ot aftet refinement and modification. 480 the american joutnal of islamic social sciences 104 the methodological approach delineated above provides a primordial model of social scientific inquiry and serves as a fitst approximation to wards developing an altemative methodology friendly to islamic ideals and aspirations. it quires, as such, further elaboration, modification, and refinement, whereby the internlationship between rules derived from revelation and those abstracted from experience is specified. this relation ship must be determined separately within each social science discipline. in addition to the important task of incorporating divine revelation into scientific research, the proposed methodology enjoys a number of ad vantages over the currently dominant western methodological approaches: 1. 2. 3. 4. while the approach allows us to generalize about a group’s character istics based on an analysis of representative members, it permits fur ther modification and refinement of our conception of group behavior by looking into the actions of previously unexamined members. the fact that the procedures provided for by the proposed methodology allows grouping individuals on the basis of the similarity and differ ence of an action’s components guards against unwarranted assump tions of uniform behavior. the proposed approach combines an action-theoretical perspective with a systems-theoretical perspective. thus, while it permits us to deal with collective interaction as a system, it regards the system as open and capable of change. the approach, therefore, avoids the static nature of pure system-theoretical approaches. the proposed approach, while accommodating change, avoids the relativist tendencies of western approaches geared towards recogniz ing differences and changes as well as absolutism and relativism. the former is avoided due to the recognition of the transient nature of the theoretical framework derived from revealed and historical records, and the latter by realizing that the framework itself is anchoted in di vinely revealed truth. in addition, this approach does not hide its ethical and ontological commitments nor lend itself to ethnocentrism, as do western methodologies. the latter is the direct result of attributing universality to western-based theory while embracing values and categories pecu liar to western experience. safi: towards a unified approach to the shari'ah and social inference diagram 1: pmcedure of textual inference 48 1 1. 2. 3. derivation of general rules/concepts i 4. i i systematization of derived rules/concepts i diagram 2: procedure of historical inference 1. 2. 3. 4. 482 w the american journal of islamic social sciences 104 diagram 3: unified procedure for textual and historical inference 1. 2. 3. 4. 5 . systematization rules obtained through text/action procedures safi: towards a unified approach to the shari’ah and social inference 483 diagram 4: proposed model of a unified approach to textual and contextual analysis records of history 7 records of revelation 7 theoretical framework (general theory) * laws derived from revelation i 484 the american journal of islamic social sciences 10:4 references butt, e. a. metaphysical foundations of modern science. atlantic high lands, ns, gina& humanities press, 1980. ibn rushd. biddyat a1 mujtahid wa nihdyat a1 muqtwid. vol. 2. beirut: d5r a1 ma'nfah, 1406/1986. kant, immanuel. critique of pure reason. translated by kemp smith. new yo& st. martin's press, 1969. locke, john. "an essay concerning human understanding." in the english philosophers, edited by edwin a. burtt. new york random house, 1977. a1 miiwardi. a1 ahktim a1 sultdnaah. cairo: dlr al fikr, 1404/1983. nachmias, chava and david nachmias. research methods in the social a1 qimm?, 'ali ibn a1 busayn. a1 zmdmah wa a1 tabsirah. beirut: d l rosenau, james. turbulence in world politics. princeton: princeton uni a1 slbh-, mubammad a. mukhtasar t a f s ~ zbn kathir. vol. 3. beirut: a1 shiiibi. a1 muwlifqlit fi usul a1 shurcuh. beirut: d k a1 ma'nfah, sciences. london: edward arnold, 1990. a1 murtag, 1985. versity press, 1990. diir a1 qur'gn a1 karim, 1399/1979. 139511975. in the introduction (p critical notice reason reclaimed. essays in honor of j. anthony blair and ralph h. johnson. edited by hans v. hansen and robert c. pinto. newport news, va: vale press, 2007. pp. xiv, 1-313. isbn:0-916475-29-8, us$ 34.95 paper. reviewing a festschrift is a rare and precious honor, allowing the reviewer to add his voice, however small, to the chorus of intellectual praise that the volume is meant to convey. this is certainly the case with this collection of nineteen cutting-edge contributions on several aspects of argumentation theory, dedicated to the career and achievements of j. anthony blair and ralph h. johnson, among the pioneers of informal logic. aside from sheer scientific excellence, the chief virtue of this volume lies in the variety of topics investigated by its contributors, who also happen to represent almost every existing approach to the study of argument. such diversity is, of course, also the main limitation of this collection. any reader looking for well-focused treatment of a single topic or extensive coverage of any specific theory will be better off looking elsewhere. on the other hand, anyone interested in braving the richly diverse landscape of argumentation theories will find here an excellent vantage point. besides, the open-ended structure of the book reflects the scope of interests addressed in their long career by the scholars to whom the volume is dedicated. the fact that some contributions are only loosely related to the works of blair and johnson just adds to the variety, without subtracting from the quality—which is, without exception, excellent. indeed, the sole person who might complain for this kaleidoscopic abundance is the reviewer of this book, who faces the arduous task of concisely presenting so many diverse contributions, with little hope of finding any systematic connection among them. however, let us try, following the thematic partition suggested by the volume editors, hansen and pinto. 1. the first six papers cover the dialectical dimension of argumentation theories, again from a variety of angles. walton and godden focus on “the historical development of blair and johnson’s views on dialectics,” as we are told in the editors’ introduction (p. xii). this description, although factually true, is a bit of an understatement, since the main concern of walton and godden in their article is in fact to contrast blair and johnson’s view of dialectics with walton’s dialogical approach to argumentation. after reviewing several different positions expressed by blair and johnson over the last thirty years, it is concluded that their © fabio paglieri. informal logic, vol. 28, no. 2 (2008), pp. 170-192. hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 171 approach seems to remain consistently dialectical, without turning dialogical. this distinction is then paralleled with the difference between argument-as-product and argument-as process. even if walton and godden concede that a focus on both aspects is legitimate, they express a marked preference for the latter view—a preference, they suggest, that is not completely shared by blair and johnson. the ultimate conclusions of this comparison are quite ecumenical, to the point that they cannot really be disagreed upon: “sometimes a product-based approach is our best bet, or our only bet, given the information we have about the situation of a particular argument. we do not deny this, and agree that several different perspectives can be taken in the study of argument. yet, we emphasize that our understanding of the nature, purpose, workings and success of argument is deeply enriched by adopting a dialogical perspective whenever possible” (p. 17). fair enough. more interesting, however, are two specific claims that walton and godden systematically use in their analysis: the idea that argument identification and classification presupposes reference to a dialogical context, so that we cannot even label a speech act as an argument without reference to the dialogue where it occurs, and the thesis according to which dialogical approaches are intrinsically richer than dialectical ones. arguments are provided in support of these claims, and both are used to cross-examine blair and johnson’s view of argumentation. while to my mind the outcome of this debate is far from being settled, walton and godden’s analysis certainly provides a useful contribution to it, and helps emphasize important differences between various conceptions of dialectics and dialogue. in his richly textured essay, freeman addresses the question whether or not johnson’s analysis of the dialectical tier is consistent with heuristics. ultimately, freeman is interested to defend johnson’s position against two criticisms raised by govier—namely, that johnson’s dialectical tier implies an infinite regress, and that we lack any practical method to distinguish what johnson calls ‘standard objections’ from nonstandard ones. as for the first objection, the problem is that the dialectical tier of an argument consists of those objections that need to be answered for that argument to be satisfactory. according to govier, this implies supplementing the original argument with sub-arguments designed to rebut such objections, and these arguments in turn will have their own dialectical tier, requiring further sub-sub-arguments with a further dialectical tier, and so on ad infinitum. as for the second criticism, known also as the discrimination problem, govier poses the question of what alternatives and objections against a given argument need to be addressed by the proponent, in order to satisfy johnson’s dialectical criteria for validity. the dilemma here is that, on the one hand, demanding all possible alternatives and objections to be met would impose an exceedingly stringent burden over the arguer, while, on the other hand, discriminating among them poses the difficult challenge of defining suitable criteria for dialectically relevant alternatives and objections. after summarizing this debate, freeman focuses on one of the fabio paglieri 172 solutions proposed by govier to the infinite regress problem, the so called ‘benign interpretation’ of the dialectical tier. this view admits that an argument is strengthened by facing its main known objections and that this process can be reiterated if needed, but does not demand such a reiteration as a precondition for the validity of the original argument. in other words, according to the benign interpretation, argumentation is in principle indefinitely extendable, but infinite regress is not needed to attest the prima facie validity of an argument. however, as freeman observes, govier was not very sanguine about her own solution, that she saw as either endorsing ad hoc restrictions to the criteria for dialectical validity, or leaving open the threat of infinite regress. on the contrary, freeman sets to show that the “benign interpretation both is closer to solving the regress problem than she gives it credit and provides a framework for solving the discrimination problem” (p. 22). in particular, freeman makes use of rescher’s analysis of formal disputation to provide an interpretation of johnson’s dialectical tier that solves the discrimination problem, at the same time avoiding the pitfall of infinite regress. without going into details on freeman’s analysis, i want to draw attention on a certain toulminian theme which somehow characterizes the whole debate. famously, toulmin mentioned the problem of recursion while describing his layout of an argument. his solution to this difficulty was, in its extreme simplicity, quite instructive: “some warrants must be accepted provisionally without further challenge, if argument is to open to us in the field in question: we should not even know what sort of data were of the slightest relevance to a conclusion, if we had not at least a provisional idea of the warrants acceptable in the situation confronting us. the existence of considerations such as would establish the acceptability of the most reliable warrants is something we are entitled to take for granted” (1958/2003, pp. 98-99). to my mind, freeman’s article provides a useful formal specification of the basic insight outlined by toulmin. in their contribution, van eemeren and houtlosser provide further developments to the pragma-dialectical analysis of strategic maneuvering, understood as the arguer’s attempt at reconciling the dialectical aims of critical discussion, i.e. settling differences of opinions in a reasonable way, with their personal rhetorical goals, i.e. having things their own way. insofar as the arguer’s rhetorical purposes change across dialectical stages and across different types of communicative activity, also the nature and aims of strategic maneuvering are sensible to these two dialectical dimensions. as for dialectical stages, van eemeren and houtlosser refer to the standard partition of pragma-dialectics: confrontation stage, opening stage, argumentation stage, and concluding stage. as for activity types, the authors first outline the general feature of argumentative discourse, and then proceed to characterize three more specific sub-cases: adjudication (attempting to terminate a dispute by an authoritative third party, instead of settling the difference of opinions among the disputants), mediation (attempting to solve a disagreement hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 173 with the help of a third party, that acts as a facilitator but has no authority to settle the dispute independently from the disputants), and negotiation (attempting to solve a conflict of interests, rather than a difference of opinions, by reaching a compromise that is considered acceptable by all parties). integrating these two criteria of dialectical variation produces a four-by-four taxonomy (p. 43), showing how dialectical considerations determine the pre-conditions for strategic maneuvering under different circumstances. here van eemeren and houtlosser build on their previous work with snoeck henkemans to show how these different dialectical predicaments can be further specified, allowing fine-grained understanding of strategic maneuvering in argumentative practice. they use the notion of dialectical profile, defined as “a configuration of sequential patterns of moves that the participants in a critical discussion are obliged or entitled to make in order to realize a specific dialectical aim in a particular stage or sub-stage of the resolution process” (p. 44). some examples are then provided, showing how this notion effectively isolates the space of possibilities where strategic maneuvering is to take place. this is meant to demonstrate how, in argumentative practice, rhetorical moves do not happen in a vacuum, but rather within the welldefined boundaries of specific dialectical rules—a fact that certainly casts a better light on the frequently misconceived opposition of dialectics and rhetoric. in his contribution, krabbe investigates the role of objections in dialogue. he starts considering two opposite fallacies discussed in the literature: the fallacy of objections, i.e. sabotaging an argument by perpetually objecting to it, and the converse fallacy of objections, i.e. showing an unjustified insensitivity to criticisms raised against one’s own position. with reference to johnson’s theory of argumentation, krabbe observes that which one of these two fallacies is given greater prominence depends on what aspect of an argument one intends to stress: if one emphasizes the illative core, then the fallacy of objections constitutes a more urgent concern; if, on the contrary, priority is given to the dialectical tier, then the converse fallacy of objections acquires special importance. however, krabbe’s aim is “to see how a reasonable and balanced system of dialogue rules may wipe out both extremes” (p. 59—thus catching two fallacious birds with one dialectical stone. in order to do so, krabbe provides a taxonomy of seven different types of critical reactions to an argument, and then argues that only two of them can be properly conceived as, respectively, mild and strong objections. the rest of his analysis is focused on the latter, since they are considered the most interesting moves for a dialectical understanding of objections. krabbe sees strong objections as exposures of flaws in the counterpart’s argument, without necessary implying full-blown rejection of it, charge of fallacy, or personal attack. the anatomy of strong objections is described as including a verdict (the negative opinion expressed against the original argument), a substance (the reasons for dissatisfaction that produced the verdict), an evaluative argument (connecting the substance fabio paglieri 174 to the verdict), and a substantive argument (showing how specific features of the original argument justify the substance). a dialectical procedure is triggered by raising an objection, in which proponent and opponent (in krabbe’s terms, protagonist and antagonist) reverse their roles. in the objection discussion, the antagonist will defend the criticism raised against the original argument, while the protagonist will be entitled to cross-examine it. at the end of this critical discussion, either the antagonist retracts her objection, or she keeps it, possibly with some modifications – in which case, the protagonist will know that his argument does not carry presumptive weight with the antagonist, hence something different has to be tried. in light of this dialectical analysis, krabbe concludes that the two aforementioned fallacies both result from faulty handling of the objection discussion: the fallacy of objections can be imputed whenever the antagonist raises an objection without being prepared to defend it in subsequent dialogue, while the protagonist incurs in the converse fallacy of objections when he rejects an objection without testing it adequately through critical discussion. notwithstanding some open problems acknowledged by krabbe (pp. 62-63), his work makes a significant contribution towards an integrated dialectical account of objections and of the fallacies connected with their use in dialogue. kauffeld carefully analyzes the checkered history and various applications of the notion of burden of proof, in order to question its usefulness for contemporary theories of argumentation. the central issue is whether the concept applies to the macro-level, i.e. with reference to the general obligations incurred by arguers in the context of dialogue, given their respective standpoints and roles, or to the micro-level, i.e. concerning probatory obligations generated by making specific dialogical moves and using certain argumentation schemes. kauffeld identifies four different positions on this issue, tracing their origins in the history of legal theory: (1) confining the burden of proof at the macro-level, (2) reserving the notion for the micro-level, (3) assuming that the concept applies at both levels in analogous ways, and finally (4) acknowledging that burden of proof plays a role at both levels, but with different degrees of importance and distinct dynamics. in relation to everyday argumentation, kauffeld strongly supports the latter view, and he uses the public debate on the ratification of the u.s. constitution to demonstrate the sophisticated interplay of probatory obligations at (and across) both levels. since similar ramifications are often obscured, rather than revealed, by unchecked use of the generic label “burden of proof”, kauffeld concludes that we might be better off abandoning the expression, in favor of a more precise terminology – in his own apt metaphor, we need start using a vast array of scalpels, rather than resorting to the old-fashioned meat ax. kauffeld’s insistence on the nuances of argumentative obligations is echoed also by pinto’s analysis of the burden of rejoinder, i.e. the obligation to criticize an argument incurred by speakers when they propose using a previously disputed proposition as a premise, or when hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 175 they object to taking a previously accepted claim as a premise. pinto aims to understand when and how a burden of rejoinder arises in similar cases, and according to what standards it should be assessed – that is, what argumentative process would successfully discharge the obligation. his analysis further develops some of his previous work, and it is very much in the vein of the design-theoretic approach to argumentation favored by goodwin and kauffeld. according to pinto, acquiring a full-blown burden of rejoinder is a two-tiered process. first, the speaker endorses an obligation to have valid reasons for supporting use of a disputed claim or for objecting against use of an accepted proposition as premise, by the very fact that these proposals are advanced in the context of a preexisting debate: thus the speaker is entangling herself in controversy or dispute, which involves the public consideration of reasons. but the fact that the speaker is pragmatically committed to having reasons for her claim or objection does not necessarily entitle the counterpart to demand such reasons to be produced and made explicit—something more is needed for a proper burden of rejoinder to emerge. namely, the speaker must freely assume such an obligation upon herself, and the only reasonable motives for doing so are strategic. in particular, pinto argues that the speaker will accept the obligation to provide “justifications on demand” in order to ensure full consideration for the argumentative move she is proposing or objecting to. in other words, the burden of rejoinder is used as currency to make sure that the counterpart takes the speaker’s position seriously. pinto then distinguishes four different forms in which a rejoinder can be produced: as a straightforward rebuttal of the controversial argument, as offering reasons for discounting that argument, as a means to neutralize it, or just as a way of bracketing it (for details, see pp. 86-87). the type of rejoinder needed to discharge the speaker’s burden in turn depends on the argumentative move that originated it: if the speaker is just objecting to using a previously accepted proposition as premise, it will be enough to neutralize or bracket the argument supporting it; if, on the other hand, the speaker is trying to use a previously disputed claim as premise, a stronger rejoinder is needed, to rebut or at least to discount the counter-arguments against such a claim. 2. the second group of essays is gathered under the heading of “the nature and scope of argument”, which gives the section a rather broad latitude— to put it mildly. indeed, this is just a useful umbrella to cover a variety of contributions on several key issues in argumentation theories. once again, such a thematic diversity does not hinder their scientific quality at all. weinstein’s chapter provides a perspective on truth as an emergent concept, inspired by inquiry in physical chemistry rather than mathematics, and intended to reconcile the enduring tension in fabio paglieri 176 argumentation theories between acceptability and truth. weinstein shows that most of the current views of argumentation, including those of blair and johnson, remain poised between these two poles. this in turn leaves them exposed to some classical concerns on the adequacy of either truth or acceptability as the sole ideal of argumentation: in a nutshell, the problem is that acceptability of a claim will never be able to ensure its factual truth regardless of how tight we make the dialectical constraints on rationality, whereas the truth of a proposition will still leave it impotent for argumentation, unless its truth is known, believed or accepted by the parties. then weinstein raises some deeper problems on the notion of truth itself, confronting three powerful intuitions that have shaped its conceptual history: truth as coherence, implying that allegedly true claims must be able of withstanding rigorous logical scrutiny and avoiding inconsistency; truth as correspondence, positing a close relation between our beliefs and the shape of things in the real world as made manifest by our experience, or with reference to the elements of some well defined model (as in tarskian semantics); truth as pragmatic adequacy, requiring that our progressive process of inquiry makes our representations of the world well attuned to our practical purposes and actions. weinstein focuses on the first two concepts, essentially to argue that both of them presuppose the availability of a well defined and coherent model or frame of reference prior to assessing the truth of our utterances. this highly idealistic requirement is given the lie by the history of our most magnificent intellectual achievements: if there is a constant element across different fields of scientific inquiry, it is the continuous evolution of the models against which the truth of theories is assessed. this being the case, “the problem of correspondence seems intractable, since, short of instrumentalism, science must await upon its own discoveries to have a picture of the world against which its claims are to be ultimately judged. this calls for a radical revision of the metamathematics of truth” (p. 96). coherently with this program, weinstein then outlines his own suggestion on how to define a model of emergent truth. leaving aside the details of weinstein’s proposal (interested readers will find them outlined on pp. 102-106, as well as in some of his previous works), i think two points deserve special emphasis: one is a criticism aimed at the view of truth endorsed in many contemporary argumentation theories, the other is a positive consideration that might well inspire future research in this area. as for the criticism, weinstein observes that “most informal logicians focused on truth in the most obvious and ordinary sense. that is, truth as conformity with the facts of the matter manifest in ordinary experience and analyzed in standard ways. the plausibility of such a common sense stand has been rarely argued for, but rather has been taken as obvious” (p. 99). aside from the inadequacy of this simple view of truth to account for scientific inquiry, there is a mild irony here, insofar as this is precisely the notion of truth commonly endorsed by modern logic—the very tradition from which many argumentation theorists and informal hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 177 logicians would like to distance themselves. weinstein suggests that the argumentative enterprise would be better off working with a different and more sophisticated understanding of truth. this leads us to the positive contribution: the take-home message that i personally extract from weinstein’s careful analysis is that, when arguing, we are not only trying to probe the truth of factual claims in view of some shared frame of reference on reality, but also negotiating what might be the most adequate frame of reference in the first place. relevant models for assessing the so called “truth of the matter” might shift during discussion, and this is part of the dialectical process as much as the evaluation of any given claim, premise, or argument. this insight might give us a slight sense of vertigo, but i think it captures a significant layer of complexity intrinsic to any argumentative process. moreover, even if mathematics is not needed to express this emergentist perspective on truth, it shows that “these notions can be given precise content and so are not to be scorned on the grounds of vacuity” (p. 104). if so, then perhaps significant attempts to integrate weinstein’s truth (no pun intended) in contemporary theories of argument would be advisable. bailin and battersby focus their contribution on reason appreciation, that is, the inclination to fulfill the normative demands of reason in one’s own conduct, given “a respect for reasoning based on an understanding of its nature, role and significance, and a recognition of its subtleties and aesthetic aspects” (p. 107). the authors argue that reason appreciation is a crucial feature both for understanding argumentation and for teaching it effectively, insofar as mere detached knowledge of the inner workings of reasons and arguments is not enough to guarantee their application in practice. bailin and battersby explain why dispositional accounts, as those outlined by siegel and ennis, are relevant but not sufficient for the analysis of reason appreciation, since dispositions remain silent on why reasoners behave (or restrain from behaving) in certain ways, therefore providing little insight for pedagogical purposes. with the aim of suggesting an alternative account, the authors conceive of reason appreciation as involving both an attitude of respect towards the practice of reasoning as a whole, and aesthetic sensitiveness to the subtleties of its concrete applications. respect for reason is based on both epistemological grounds (basically, reason commands respect as the chief means by which we foster our quest for truth) and moral considerations (as emphasized also by siegel, reason plays a crucial role in making us truly autonomous, as opposed to being stimulus-driven, impulsive, or easily manipulated agents). as for what they call “the aesthetics of reason” (p. 118), the authors insist that it is not to be confused with the rhetorical dimension of arguments, although it partially overlaps with it. more generally, aesthetic considerations on reason involves appreciating the elegance and inventiveness of a given argument, beyond and besides any rhetorical value it might possess, and they are linked with an affective response to it, usually associated with a feeling of enjoyment. finally, bailin and battersby conclude their interesting analysis with fabio paglieri 178 some tentative suggestions on how to foster reason appreciation as part of the teaching of argumentation. while i am sympathetic with their emphasis on the somehow neglected topic of reason appreciation, i find debatable the suggestion that greater reason appreciation would also result in “civilizing the discourse” in social interaction, to use their expression (p. 120). i do not see how this follows at all: being an excruciating sophist and a practiced liar does not necessarily prevents me from appreciating reason, both epistemologically and aesthetically – it just so it happens that i do not care for extending the benefits of reasonableness to my fellow arguers, given my own practical goals. the point is that, while the noble quest for truth is indeed a necessary end of my own reasoning as a rational being, it is not necessarily my goal while arguing with others. sometimes i may actually intend to lead us both to the truth of the matter, but just as often i may just want to achieve persuasion, in order to shift your conviction and/or your course of action to accommodate my own agenda, whether or not this implies any concern for truth. sure enough, such an attitude might well disqualify me as a rational arguer, depending on the theory of argumentation one endorses. however, this banishment from the community of rational arguers would not be due to any lack of reason appreciation on my part, but rather to my failure at complying with the social constraints projected by conventions of fair play in argumentation. incidentally, the need to distinguish reason appreciation from appreciation of dialogical rules descends from the need to avoid oversimplified identification between reasoning and arguing. although these two practices share many similarities and are deeply connected with each other, considering argumentation as just dialogical reasoning would fail to do justice to the multiple and frequently conflicting aims of the arguers. in his contribution, finocchiaro compares some of blair and johnson’s views of argumentation with the dialectical approach to freedom of argument developed by john stuart mill in the second chapter of on liberty. with reference to the distinction between illative and dialectical components (or tiers), finocchiaro presents three versions of dialectical accounts of argumentation: his own modest version, according to which either the illative or the dialectical tier is sufficient to produce an argument, but neither of them is necessary; the strong version, famously championed by johnson, where both the illative core and the dialectical tier are necessary to have an argument, although neither of them is sufficient without the other; and the hyper version, that, according to finocchiaro, is represented by the pragma-dialectical school, which makes the dialectical tier both necessary and sufficient. against this background, finocchiaro embarks in the analysis of mill’s argument on the liberty of thought and discussion: this constitutes a masterful analytical exercise (pp. 123-132), and a valuable asset of finocchiaro’s contribution in its own right. reasons of space prevent me from giving the specifics of his reconstruction, so let us keep to the essential core. mill aims to show that freedom of argument is desirable, hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 179 and he provides three main reasons for this claim (each supported by complex sub-arguments): “first, it enables us to determine whether an opinion is true, whereas its denial amounts to an assumption of infallibility; second, it improves our understanding and appreciation of the supporting reasons of true opinions, and our understanding and appreciation of their practical and emotional meaning; third, it enables us to understand and appreciate every side of the truth, given that opinions tend to be partly true and partly false and people tend to be one-sided” (pp. 132-133). incidentally, in the course of the analysis mill appears to be enlisted among the supporters of a moderate dialectical approach, insofar as finocchiaro is correct in interpreting mill’s definition of argument: “an argument just is an attempt to justify a conclusion by giving reasons in support of it or defending it from objections” (p. 128, my emphasis). finally, aside from its historical value and scholarly refinement, finocchiaro’s reconstruction of mill’s argument manages to touch upon important concerns of contemporary argumentation theories—among others, “it raises in a vivid and striking manner the issue of the viability of an epistemic approach to argumentation theory, but also suggests the reverse issue of the possibility of an argumenttheoretical approach to epistemology” (p. 133). in his contribution, groarke takes issue with the skepticism voiced by blair and johnson on the existence and relevance of visual arguments. after summarizing similarities and differences between blair’s and johnson’s view on this topic, groarke turns to describe what he considers two dogmas of informal logic that have “prevented informal logicians from fully embracing the visual” (p. 138), and that he imputes to both blair and johnson: namely, verbalism and reductionism. in his own words: “verbalism is the view that arguments are made up of propositions (sentences or their equivalents), and that the sentences that correspond to them are the best way to present or summarize an argument. (…) reductionism maintains that the important argumentative elements of any visual argument are verbal, or can be reduced to verbal equivalents” (p. 139). in contrast with both these claims, groarke argues in favor of the value and autonomy of visual arguments with respect to their verbal counterparts, both on rhetorical and, much more to the point, logical grounds. this leads him to consider the dogmas of verbalism and reductionism unjustified, hence concluding that “informal logic and argumentation theory (…) need to recognize visual arguments, and understand them in visual terms” (p. 152). personally, i am inclined to agree with the first part of this sentence, whereas i am not fully sure about the latter: more to the point, my perplexity rests on what i see as a potential weakness in groarke’s line of argument against blair and johnson. the point is that much (not all) of groarke’s case against verbalism and reductionism hinges on the fact that images can convey evidence in a very powerful and effective way, and that they can precisely express information that would be hard if not impossible to articulate by verbal means (maps and diagrams are good examples of this fabio paglieri 180 fact). however, here lies a confusion, i fear: while groarke’s arguments are successful in asserting the evidential value and informational perspicuity of images, this is not at all conclusive for proving that images, even those that provide us with a wealth of evidence and/or information, constitute arguments per se—which is precisely the point under dispute. to my mind, groarke is right in considering excessive some of the reservations expressed by blair and johnson on visual arguments. but we should also beware of the converse exaggeration— that is, magnifying the argumentative nature of images beyond the boundaries of common sense. groarke is well aware that not all images are visual arguments: indeed, he suggests that images “can be understood as arguments so long as they attempt to forward evidence for some conclusion” (p. 150, my emphasis). this suggests that the premiseconclusion mechanism, characteristic of the illative core of any argument, visual or otherwise, must be somehow intrinsic to an image, for it to count as a visual argument. if this constraint is relaxed, the notion of visual argument immediately becomes meaningless, since any image at all is of course liable of being used in the context of argumentation to provide evidence or to facilitate reasoning. so the fact that an image can be used to forward evidence for some conclusion is not enough: the image must have in itself some indication of the relevant premise-conclusion link that it is meant to support. unfortunately, by this standard only two of the illustrations presented by groarke in his article actually count as valid examples of visual arguments: namely, the cartoons on p. 137 and p. 141. all his other illustrations are just images, as opposed to visual arguments, that can be used (in a variety of ways, i hasten to add) as effective props to foster a process of argumentation. by way of example, let us consider the infamous pictures from the abu ghraib prison in iraq, depicting us soldiers abusing iraqi prisoners. as groarke emphasizes, these pictures have been used most effectively to provide evidence of the misbehavior of parts of the american force in iraq. nevertheless, they cannot be said to be, in and by themselves, visual arguments to that conclusion – witness the fact that the very same pictures could be used as evidence to demonstrate torture techniques to sadistic jailers, to prove some idiotic macho mystique to rookies in the force, or to ridicule the alleged superiority of so called western civilization. again, here the point is that these pictures convey information on what happened in abu ghraib in a highly reliable (not to say emotionally moving) way: as such, they can be used as good evidence in the context of argumentation for a variety of purposes. but if this was enough to turn them into visual arguments, we would then be forced to conclude that every image is a visual argument, inasmuch as it can be used to provide evidence or convey information (and of course any image can do that). so it seems to me that lumping together evidential value, informational perspicuity, and logical force ends up hindering, rather than fostering, groarke’s rightful attempt of promoting a better understanding of visual arguments. hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 181 3. the third section of the volume is devoted to fallacies, again covering a rather broad array of topics. tindale proposes a critique of blair and johnson’s account of fallacies: after framing their work in the context of previous analyses of fallacious arguments, as those offered by aristotle, whately, copi, and kahane, tindale focuses on what blair named the “injury” view of fallacy—that is, the idea that fallacies do reparable damage to arguments, rather than fatally destroying them. in particular, tindale takes a closer look at blair and johnson’s proposal of categorizing fallacies according to what standard of logical cogency they happen to violate. notoriously, blair and johnson identified three of such standards – relevance, sufficiency, and acceptability—and associated each of them to a general category of fallacies—respectively, irrelevant reason, hasty conclusion, and problematic premise. tindale questions the perspicuity of each of these categories in turn. as for irrelevant reason, the main problem lies in the positive definition (or lack thereof) of what would make a reason relevant in the first place: tindale remarks that “irrelevance is the absence of a relationship between statements, without really specifying what the correct relation should be” (p. 162). more generally, blair and johnson’s classification of subtypes of irrelevant reason (e.g. straw person, ad hominem, etc.) reveals for tindale a mixture of internal and external constraints on what determines the alleged irrelevance, making things “more murky than one would like when seeking out a clear set of identified, and identifiable, fallacies” (p. 164)—a situation not redeemed by blair and johnson’s distinction between local and global relevance. the problem with the category of hasty conclusion, according to tindale, is that it has the undesired and slightly paradoxical effect of classifying most of our argumentation as fallacious. this is because hasty conclusion is charged “whenever an arguer fails to anticipate and accommodate objections, standard or otherwise. a glance at any collection of ‘everyday’ arguments—in the media, in student papers, in advertising—would show how regular[ly] this failure occurs” (p. 168). finally, the definition of problematic premise hinges on the idea of a premise introduced in an argument without support, but which needs instead to be supported for being considered acceptable. here the problem is of course how to establish what premises are in need of support—a problem solved by blair and johnson with the notion of a community of ideal interlocutors, to be used as an imaginative frame of reference for the arguer to assess whether or not a given premise is acceptable without further support. however, as tindale suggests, this seems to reintroduce in the definition of fallacy a requirement that johnson at least wanted to expunge from it: the so called appearance condition, according to which a fallacy is not just an invalid argument, but more specifically an invalid argument that appears to the audience as valid. tindale favors including similar contextual considerations into a theory of fallacy, but he claims that doing so is at fabio paglieri 182 odds with blair and johnson’s intended aims, and that their current account is not well equipped, as it is, for dealing with these issues. reforming their approach would involve recognizing that, whenever fallacies are conceived as deviations from standards of validity, they inherit the double nature of such standards: some of them are better described as failures of reason, involving violation of logical laws, while others are rather flaws of conduct, resulting from infringement of dialectical obligations incurred in the context of dialogue. this distinction can also be mirrored in terms of internal vs. external factors determining the fallacious nature of a given argument—or its virtuous character, for that matter. this leads tindale to conclude that “some shortfalls, errors or flaws, or however we wish to describe them, are internal to the argument product as it is produced, involving a problem between the components of the argument. while other shortfalls, etc., lie outside of the argument per se and involve something of its external relations with features of the context, like the audience or the issues or previous argumentation” (p. 170). of course, the question remains on whether a broad understanding of the notion of “fallacy,” as the one suggested by tindale, would increase or rather diminish the usefulness of the concept. indeed, one may well concede that many problems in argumentation are to be imputed to the contextual use of an argument rather than to its structure, and yet insists that we should reserve the term “fallacy” only to the latter cases, regarding instead the former as instances of flawed dialectical practice. as a case in point, govier is a prominent advocate of a “deflationist” approach to fallacies, that she endorses also in her contribution to this volume, devoted to discuss the problematic uses of questions in argumentation. she focuses on two kinds of questions frequently associated with flawed arguments or fallacious moves: complex questions and rhetorical questions. a standard example of the former, also known as compound, heavy, double-bind, or many questions, is the following: “have you stopped cheating on your taxes?” however, as govier reminds us, also flattering questions fall within this category, as in “which of your three daughters is the highly talented violinist?” the characteristic of complex questions is that they are worded in such a way as to require acceptance of a statement that is not argued for, in order to answer the question—since any answer provided to such questions would imply acceptance of their unsupported premise. the only way to avoid this is by questioning the question, either asking for further clarification or directly rejecting the unsupported premise behind it. rhetorical questions, like “don’t we have the right to defend ourselves from terrorists?” are partially different, since they do not carry a real request, but rather express a statement “because of the way in which they anticipate and invite one particular kind of answer from the audience” (p. 181). what they do have in common with complex questions is their function of insinuating a given claim, without subjecting it to critical scrutiny. however, govier correctly observes that hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 183 neither all complex questions nor all rhetorical questions need to be automatically regarded as problematic for argumentation, since not all statements need to be subjected to explicit critical scrutiny. for instance, if the unsupported premise of a complex question is a well known fact to both parties, or if a rhetorical question is used to state a conclusion rather than introduce a premise, then their use is not dialectically objectionable. moreover, even when questions are argumentatively problematic, what makes them so is partially independent from their complex or rhetorical nature. to use a simile, to have a hidden partition in the trunk of your car is perfectly legitimate (indeed, that is the place where the spare wheel and the emergency kit is often stored); what is not legitimate is to stuff it with illicit goods and smuggle them across the border. similarly, whether or not a complex and/or rhetorical question is problematic depends on what argumentative material the arguer is putting in its trunk. however, govier devotes the last part of her article to discuss why insinuating claims, as opposed to explicitly debating them, is in general an objectionable policy for argumentation. she considers four different approach to reasoning and argumentation (adler’s belief ethics, pragmadialectics, walton’s dialogue types, and habermas’ dialogue ethics), and she concludes that in all of them, for partially different reasons, insinuation is regarded as a condemnable practice—with the exception of extreme situations like quarreling and adversarial negotiation, as in walton’s taxonomy of dialogue types. finally, govier reflects also on the intimidating character of complex and rhetorical questions, speculating on how it contributes to their problematic role in the context of dialogue. in his contribution, hitchcock argues against the existence of an ad hominem fallacy, starting from blair and johnson understanding of it as a fallacy of diversion, and then offering a nuanced reconstruction of the adventurous history of this notion. he disentangles four different conceptions of the ad hominem argument: as an argument ex concessis, as a case of tu quoque, as an abusive personal attack, and as a circumstantial personal attack. the first is the original meaning intended by aristotle, in which an argument is ad hominem in the sense of the proponent taking some premise accepted by the opponent (and possibly not shared by the proponent) to argue for a conclusion that the opponent is unwilling to accept. the tu quoque interpretation refers to arguments where an inconsistency between words and deeds is used to put pressure on the proponent of a thesis or criticism that does not appear consistent with her actions—on the general principle that “you should put your money where your mouth is”. the abusive ad hominem is closer to the widespread interpretation in contemporary writings, and indicates cases where the proponent of a given position is attacked on the grounds of personal qualities or past history, aiming at general discredit and with no relevant connection to the position under debate. finally, the circumstantial ad hominem is a specification of the previous case, in which the personal attack against the proponent is aimed at suggesting some bias in her assessment of the issue under consideration. given these fabio paglieri 184 different notions, the question is whether any of them should be regarded as constituting a fallacy—a question that hitchcock answers in the negative. he refers to govier’s definition of fallacy, that requires three necessary conditions: a fallacy is defined as (1) a mistake of reasoning that (2) occurs with a certain frequency in real arguments, and (3) has the characteristic of being deceptive, i.e. it disguises itself as a form of valid reasoning. by this definition, hitchcock argues that the ad hominem argument is not a fallacy, since, depending on its interpretation, either it represents a perfectly legitimate argumentative move, or it is not an argument to begin with, so it cannot be a fallacy (incidentally, here we encounter again a deflationist approach to fallacies, contra tindale’s broader conception). the details of hitchcock’s case are nicely summarized as follows: “in its original meaning, an argumentum ad hominem is a perfectly legitimate dialectical argument from the concessions or commitments of an opponent that one needs not to share. the tu quoque historically emerged from this sense as an appeal to commitments implicit in the behavior of one’s critic; it legitimately challenges the critic to explain away an apparent inconsistency. the purely abusive ad hominem can be a legitimate attack on an opponent’s ethos, a response long sanctioned in the western rhetorical tradition. otherwise, it is an objectionable diversionary tactic, but not a kind of reasoning, and so not a fallacy. the circumstantial ad hominem, in the sense of an abusive ad hominem which attributes the position of one’s opponent to self-interest or to a dogmatic bias, raises legitimate suspicion about the credibility of the opponent’s statements and arguments” (pp. 198-199). hitchcock’s reconstruction certainly puts significant pressure on accounts of the ad hominem as fallacious, like the one endorsed by blair and johnson. besides, and this is no marginal benefit, it contributes to the historical and conceptual clarification of what exactly falls under this rather ambiguous label. adler’s chapter is devoted to presuppositional blindness, that is, our tendency to accept propositions that are presupposed, rather then being explicitly focused, in a given argument or piece of discourse. the complex questions discussed by govier (see above) are a clear instance of this tendency, and adler opens his article with the following anecdotic example of the same phenomenon: “charles ii is said to have invited members of the royal society to explain to him why a fish weighs more dead than alive. various explanations were proposed. afterwards, he observed that it does not” (p. 201). adler remarks that “what is troubling about these—our—lapses is that the erroneous assumptions are hidden in plain sight” (p. 208). indeed, to presuppose is not to keep silent: rather, it is a case of manipulation of the attentional focus, one in which the audience plays the role of a willing accomplice of the arguer. imagine charles ii as having asked: “why do fish weigh more dead than alive?”—a complex question, again. here the (presupposed) claim that fish are heavier after their death is plainly stated, and yet our attention is diverted away from it: we tend to take it for granted, and move on hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 185 speculating about possible reasons for this bizarre phenomenon, complying with the focalization proposed by the questioner. moreover, the very obviousness of what is being presupposed often contributes to distract our attention from it, as something unworthy of further consideration. adler sees this tendency as dependent upon the conversational rules that tacitly regulate communication, very much in a gricean vein. this implies that presuppositional blindness can be mitigated, but not eradicated – because such a drastic cure would be far worse than the occasional illness it is meant to overcome. possible strategies for correcting presuppositional blindness include explicitness and stating the obvious: both can be warranted for critically probing vicious instances of presupposition (as a case in point, adler extensively discusses michael drosnin’s pseudo-scientific rant on the so called “bible code”; see pp. 202-208), but both would be highly disruptive for the regular course of conversation, if applied indiscriminately. quite simply (or obviously, if you like), “what is obvious is not worth saying typically because it is uninformative” (p. 210). the gist of adler’s reflections is that conversational rules create a ”weak spot” in our argumentative defenses, and we must learn to live with it. this, in turn, should inspire us a measure of intellectual humility, even stronger than the celebrated socratic avowal of ignorance. indeed, “we need to be humble and restrained, even on some matters where we do know and take ourselves to be competent. for we may still miss crucial implications, even when they are right before us and, in part, just because they are right in front of us” (p. 212). 4. the fourth and last section of the volume is entitled “other dimensions of the informal logic program,” which is tantamount to saying “everything else.” the editors will be certainly excused for this small act of thematic surrender, because by now it should be clear that this collection is meant to pile wonder upon wonder, with little care for any specific focus—and this, i hasten to add, provides a wonderful festive flavor to these festschrifts, conveying the genuine enthusiasm and deep affect surrounding the intellectual figures being celebrated. especially because the contributions in this last session do not lower at all the standard of excellence uphold by the volume as a whole, but rather add their own finishing touch to the overall composition. siegel’s contribution deals with the role of cultural variation in argument evaluation, but he gives the topic a curious twist, by ending up discussing the merits and limits of an argument on multiculturalism. however, this analysis is effective to exemplify siegel’s thesis, according to which any argument, in order to be meaningfully assessed, needs to be evaluated in light of universal principles that are independent from cultural variation—which implies that multiculturalism can have no fabio paglieri 186 authority over considerations of argument validity. siegel refers to his previous work for extensive arguments in favor of such a thesis, and here confines himself to showing how this is made apparent by dissecting a specific argument against the tenability of multiculturalism. very briefly, the argument that catches siegel’s attention is one originally provided by stanley fish, to claim that any form of multiculturalism serious enough to be worthy of the name is untenable. fish begins by opposing ‘boutique multiculturalism’ to ‘strong multiculturalism’. the first he dismisses as uninteresting in view of its superficiality: boutique multiculturalists, as defined, are avid fans of ethnic restaurants and shops, and make a show of their open-mindedness towards other cultures in academic circles and high-profile gatherings, but they remain unwilling to seriously mingle with the ‘other’ in any serious matter—children’s education, religious practice, sexual habits, moral norms, and the like. in contrast, strong multiculturalists are depicted as terminal believers in the ideal of tolerance towards other cultures—and it is this very ideal, according to fish, that leads them into an untenable position. the dilemma generates when a strong multiculturalist is faced with an intolerant culture, i.e. one that does not endorse multiculturalism (and we can certainly think of many that do not). what should dictate tolerance in these cases? if the multiculturalist embraces such a culture, valuing its character, supporting its development, and fostering its traditions, she is thereby reneging on the basic tenets of multiculturalism by approving of a culture that denies them. if, on the other hand, the multiculturalist refuses to extend tolerance to the intolerant culture, she is renouncing her credo in an even more direct way, proving that her open-mindedness was conditional since the very beginning, being subjected to some hidden supracultural considerations. either way, fish concludes, strong multiculturalism is untenable. siegel agrees with fish that strong multiculturalism is indeed flawed, but insists (and rightly so) that tertium datur, in this case—that is, it is possible to formulate a version of multiculturalism that is both meaningful and consistent, thereby avoiding the downfall of both its cosmetic cousin and its fanatic uncle. according to siegel, the correct interpretation of multiculturalism dictates that “all cultures should be valued and regarded as worthy only if they extend that value and regard to other cultures” (p. 221). the supracultural constraint presented in this definition is not, as siegel emphasizes, an expression of some hidden moral agenda, as feared by fish, but rather a strictly epistemological demand for coherence in expressing the multiculturalist position—the very same principle of rationality that makes fish’s argument, and arguments in general, cogent. the irony of this rather convoluted story is that argumentation, to be able to rescue multiculturalism from the vice of fish’s criticism, needs to be understood and assessed independently from any specific cultural perspective. this, siegel seems to suggest, is in itself a good reason to keep argument validity out of the melting pot. against this claim, and in favor of throwing back cultural considerations into the argumentative fray, is gilbert’s contribution, hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 187 which is devoted to speculate on the relevance of intersectionality for informal logic. according to gilbert, “intersectionality is just the awareness of the importance of examining the matrix of personal characteristics that belong or are applied to a group. the suggestion is that once all of the relevant characteristics have been considered, only then can the appropriate understanding, or, in our case, rules and procedures be applied. (…) the call for intersectionality is the call for letting go of a one-size-fits-all approach to the analysis of argument, and a desire to see all of the significant characteristics that color a person’s identity considered as part of the fit” (p. 230-231). in a sense, gilbert’s contribution is framed more as a manifesto than as a step-by-step demonstration, aiming at suggesting possible directions of research rather than establishing once and for all any given claim. this is not meant as a criticism, by the way: far-sighted manifestos are crucial to the development of the discipline, and therefore very much welcome. in the same vein, however, we should try to distil carefully the implications of gilbert’s call to arms for “a greater degree of flexibility” in informal logic (p. 240). this enterprise would imply considering contextual factors (including, among others, issues like gender, class, culture, and race of the arguers; see pp. 232-239) prior to the application of argument analysis and evaluation, since these factors are claimed to influence what rules and standards it is reasonable to expect the arguers to comply with. an important point here is whether this alleged cultural influence should be confined to the application of argument rules and standards, or should be conceived as changing their very nature. judging from the rich variety of examples provided by gilbert, i think he succeeds in proving the former claim, whereas i do not see much evidence of the latter. the following is one among many of gilbert’s vivid examples: “groups that have been subordinated often require argumentative methods that violate some of the canons of informal logic. these may involve the appropriate use of anger (…), or other, even more radical means” (p. 240). sadly, that is true enough – actually, some of the means that subordinated groups can and have a right to use are not argumentative at all, including taking arms and openly revolting against their oppressors. but what does this tell us, concerning the analysis of argumentation applied to public debate among subordinated and oppressing groups? i believe it reminds us that formal validity is not the same as moral value—and, conversely, formal invalidity does not always disqualify an argument as morally repugnant, therefore prohibiting its use on rational grounds. insofar as you are unjustly oppressing me, i have the right to use any means that your oppression allows me to fight back, including being as fallacious and one-sided in my arguments as current needs demand. moreover, gilbert is right in pointing out that informal logicians should not scorn as ‘irrational’ similar flawed instances of argumentation, because their rationality is rescued at a higher level, in terms of their instrumental value for fostering legitimate and urgent goals, e.g. redressing the power balance in that particular society. but here my agreement with gilbert fabio paglieri 188 ends, since i do not see what can be gained by making the stronger claim that those argumentative practices were never flawed to begin with, from the point of view of their formal validity. in other words, i fail to appreciate how similar cases suggest that the standards for argument validity are themselves influenced by cultural and, more generally, contextual considerations—while i am willing to concede that their application must be analyzed in terms of rationality from a broader perspective. in this chapter, gilbert seems to oscillate between the weaker and the stronger version of his basic claim on the relevance of intersectionality: on the one hand, he is careful in specifying that certain “laws of thought” appear to be fairly universal (e.g., “i do not intend to prove that anyone walks around believing both p and ~p in any robust manner,” p. 232); on the other hand, he repeatedly suggests that the standards for argument analysis and evaluation are themselves liable to cultural influence, and in his conclusion puts a lot of emphasis on the following statement: “if the very rules of argument preclude the free transfer of communications, then they must be changed” (p. 240). i certainly approve of this conditional (who doesn’t?), but i do not see any evidence so far that its premise is true. ennis articulates an analysis of the meaning of “probable” when used in the conclusion of stand-alone, affirming arguments—that is, when the use of “probable” is not embedded in reported speech, conditional premises, imperatives, or questions. in particular, ennis argues for a speech act interpretation of the expression, capable of capturing the difference between ‘probably p’ and ‘it is probable that p’—namely, the fact that the latter formulation implies a distancing of the speaker from the guarded commitment expressed towards p. ennis’ thesis is that “to affirm ‘it is probable that p’ (where ‘p’ is a declarative sentence) is to affirm that a guarded committing—to the view that p—is justified” (p. 246). in terms of speech acts, the difference with “probably” would be that saying ‘probably p’ is a guarded committing speech act, whereas saying ‘it is probable that p’ is a verdictive speech act about such a guarded committing speech act – that is, the speaker is saying that such act of commitment appears justified. ennis offers a detailed argument to support his thesis: first he defends the clarity and plausibility of his claim, indicating also for what other equivalent expressions it is supposed to hold (‘it is likely that’, ‘the probability is that’, ‘that p is probable’); then he considers three alternative explanations (specific numerical probability, substantial numerical probability, and subjective probability), finding them inadequate; consistency with data is also demonstrated, and some standard objections are presented and resolved (see pp. 250-254 for details). finally, this allows ennis to conclude that for his thesis “a good supporting argument has been given, though there is much more to be said” (p. 255). the wellordered structure of ennis’ argument is laudable, partly because it invites specific comments to be raised. my personal quibble concerns ennis’ dismissal of subjective probability as an alternative explanation of the hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 189 meaning of “probable” – a dismissal that i do not see as fully warranted. ennis offers three reasons of dissatisfaction: (1) subjective probability implies a numeralicalness that is not part of the dictionary definitions of “probable”; (2) the same numeralicalness was not in the speaker’s mind at the time of utterance, not even subconsciously; (3) the interpretation in terms of subjective probability dissolves the disagreement between parties with different views on what is probable, while in contrast we perceive a clear disagreement in such cases. the first argument i concede, but obviously it is far from being conclusive: dictionary definitions can be, and often are, quite remote from the actual meaning conveyed by our utterances, and the very theory of speech acts have helped proving this point. as for the second criticism, i think here ennis is misconstruing subjective probability: its core hypothesis is that, by saying ‘it is probable that p’, i express the fact that my degree of belief in p is some number in between 0.5 and 1.0— but there is no need whatsoever for me to have an explicit representation of this number, not even subconsciously. ‘believing p with degree x’ is utterly different from ‘believing that my degree of belief in p is x’—the former is what subjective probability suggests as the meaning of the utterance, whereas the latter is a kind of meta-belief that does not constitute a necessary condition of that meaning. since ennis’ second criticism applies only to the latter, i argue it does not truly affect its intended target, i.e. the subjective probability interpretation. as for the third criticism, here is how ennis formulates it: “suppose a says that it is probable that p, and b says that it is improbable that p. they are clearly in disagreement. they cannot both be right. however, the translation according to the subjective alternative destroys the conflict between what they say. in accordance with the subjective probability alternative, a might say, ‘my degree of belief that the tree will survive is 0.85,’ while b concurrently might say, ‘my belief that the tree will survive is 0.15.’ now (…) both can agree (and be right) that a’s degree of belief is 0.85 and that b’s degree of belief is 0.15” (p. 249). the problem here is that the particular disagreement that ennis regards as “disappearing” never existed in the first place—because disagreeing on the probability of uncertain outcomes implies agreeing on the possibility of such outcomes. here a claims it is likely the tree will survive, while b contests this probability: but both of them are willing to concede that it is possible for the tree either to survive (although b would regard this as improbable) or to wither and die (even if a is skeptical of this outcome). nothing of this is changed by analyzing the situation in terms of subjective probability: what the arguers can (and always could) agree upon is, to use ennis’ numbers, that a’s degree of belief is 0.85 and that b’s degree of belief is 0.15. but this just shows they still disagree on what is probable (the numbers differ), while agreeing that, since the matter is uncertain, both outcomes are possible (the numbers are neither 0.0 nor 1.0). considerations of probabilities are also central to woods’ contribution, which is devoted to discuss the application of bayes’ fabio paglieri 190 theorem to legal reasoning, in particular concerning jurors’ selection of evidence (what to accept or reject, and to what degree) and establishment of verdict (guilt or innocence, given the evidence). woods considers bayes’ theorem, and by extension bayesianism, inadequate to represent these forms of legal reasoning. in reaching a verdict of guilt g, bayes’ theorem dictates that jurors should assess the conditional probability of g given the evidence e, i.e. pr(g|e), by making use of a variety of parameters, including what are technically known as likelihoods, i.e. a number indicating how likely it is that the evidence e was produced assuming that, respectively, the accused was guilty or innocent—i.e., l(e|g) and l(e|~g). much of woods’ critique revolves around what should we make of likelihoods in the context of legal reasoning. first he observes that likelihoods cannot be used by jurors in evidence selection, because doing so would fail to make the evidence probative according to the standards of law. indeed, jurors are expected to select evidence and reach a verdict independently from any assumption on either guilt or innocence (since also the presumption of innocence acts as a default rule, not as a positive statement; see p. 261). in contrast, bayesianism required precisely this kind of assumptions for the conditional probability of a verdict to be established. this is legally untenable, woods argues: “one does not prove that an accused is guilty by accepting evidence whose reliability depends in any part on the assumption that he is guilty. (…) one does not find that the accused is not guilty by finding that the evidence is, on assumption of lego-factual innocence, not probative” (p. 261). moreover, woods shows that likelihoods cannot be rescued by assigning them a different interpretation in legal reasoning, e.g. as indicating the explanatory force, predictivity, or plausibility of different theories (or cases) built by the parties of a trial on the grounds of (possibly diverging sets of) evidence. similar interpretations of likelihood are equally untenable, for two main reasons: (1) under certain circumstances, they derange bayes’ theorem, as woods shows (p. 264) with a very simple example; (2) none of these interpretations is consistent with the basic features of probability—which is tantamount to saying that probability is not a good model of either explanatory force, predictivity, or plausibility. taking explanatory force as a case in point, woods observes that it “does not have the ‘conceptual flavor’ of probability. the kolmogorov axioms require incompatible states of affairs (or statements) not to have the same probability. but it is obvious that incompatible explanations are sometimes of equal force. the probability axioms also require that the probabilities of incompatibilities sum to 1, but the explanatory forces of incompatible explanations can easily exceed 1. the probability axioms require that probabilistic conjunction be multiplicative. but there are lots of cases in which the conjoined force of pairs of explanations is additive” (p. 265). this leads woods to conclude that “there is nothing bayesian in the logical structure of verdicts at the criminal bar. bayes’ theorem should not be legalized for this purpose” (p. 267). so woods’ analysis provides a cogent argument to support a hansen & pinto: reason reclaimed 191 claim that is somehow already suggested by the conception of proof standards in legal contexts, where “probabilistic finding is insufficient unless it is a finding of certainty, and (…) a finding of certainty is not required” (p. 266). this statement makes clear that, whatever is required for probative validity in legal contexts, it is not a matter of bayesian probability—because the minimal necessary condition refers to something which is neither probable nor certain, strongly suggesting that probability is not the real issue. the book’s final chapter by rescher is a fascinating speculation on unknowable facts, unanswerable questions, and vagrant predicates— that is, on some intrinsic limitations of the relationship between language and world. unknowable facts are, as the name implies, facts that cannot possibly be known, either locally, i.e. by some specific person or group (e.g., ‘f is a fact that i do not know’), or globally, i.e. by any kind of cognitive being (e.g., ‘f is a fact that nobody knows’). when used in the context of inquiry, they immediately produce unanswerable questions, like “what is an example of a fact that you do not know?” the question is unanswerable in the sense that any genuine answer would be false, due to the very nature of the question—in the example above, providing any fact to answer the question would show that such a fact is known to you, therefore your claim that it is not is false. obviously, similar questions can be easily and truthfully answered by saying “i do not know,” but this is an answer only in a pragmatic sense, which is not what interests rescher here. unknowable facts also determine the existence of noninstantiable properties, that are expressed by what rescher calls vagrant predicates: “f is a vagrant predicate iff (∃u)fu is true nevertheless fu0 is false for each and every specifically identified u0. such predicates are ‘vagrant’ in the sense of having no known address or fixed abode” (p. 271). all these curious propositional beasts share a common origin in terms of general principles, that rescher illustrates using the musical chairs perplex, named after the famous game: “here there will be no player who is unseatable: individually considered, any player could be seated. but matters stand otherwise collectively. it is not possible—and impossible as a matter of necessity—that every player can be seated. while seatability is universal among the individual involved, the fact of unseated individuals is inescapable” (p. 273). the analogy with the game makes clear that the issue at stake here is one of numerical discrepancy between linguistic tools and ontological facts. the rest of the chapter is devoted to show that, from what we know of language and reality, it is reasonable to assume that there are quantitatively more facts than truths, where ‘truths’ are understood as linguistic/symbolic representations that happen to match the facts to which they refer. as a consequence, “when reality and language play their game of musical chairs, some facts are bound to be left in the lurch when the music of language stops” (p. 279). unknowable facts, unanswerable questions, and vagrant predicates are just the offspring of such a numerical disparity. rescher, however, does not explicitly link this conclusion with the fabio paglieri 192 enterprise of informal logic and argumentation theory, leaving the reader with the (hopefully answerable) question: “so what?” to my mind, it would be mistaken to think of rescher’s unknowable facts as “setting the boundaries” of argumentative inquiry, since it is hard to put an unknowable fact to any positive use, including drawing boundaries, for the very fact that it is unknowable—that is, a concrete instance of it cannot be produced. instead, the boundaries itself are likely to be unknowable, as in “the claim nobody will ever think” or “the argument none will ever conceive”, and this may be seen of a reminder that argumentation and inquiry are open-ended enterprises—not just because of our poor argumentative abilities, but rather out of necessity, if rescher is right. this, i submit, is nothing but jolly good news. 5. finally, this remarkable collection is completed by a selective bibliography of publications by blair and johnson in informal logic. this provides a valuable bird-eye view on their intellectual and scholarly achievements, the very reason that prompted so many of their distinguished colleagues to pay them tribute in this book. a book that, as i hope these notes would have shown by now, is both broad in its scope and deep in its insight, providing a refreshing experience for any scholar interested in the study of argumentation. reference toulmin, stephen (1958/2003). the uses of argument. cambridge: cambridge university press. fabio paglieri istituto di scienze e tecnologie della cognizione cnr roma mihi quaestio factus sum (“i have become a question to myself”, augustine: confessions x. xxxiii): fiction and truth-seeking in theology. abstract this article explores a suggested radical instability of knowing human persons – selves and others – and the perennial undecidability of claims about what may be true with respect to them, by employing the novels of philip roth and e. l. doctorow. if persons fundamentally are construed as questions to themselves, as augustine says, then definitive assertions of what is true about being human are profoundly problematic. within the history of both philosophy and theology, declarations of an or the irrefutable truth about inceptive and final purpose and ultimate meaning often have been asserted. a reflection upon lambert zuidervaart’s (2017) recent “critical retrieval of truth” prompts invoking shakespeare’s lear to intimate that, at least within theology, oracular and peremptory pronouncements upon the conclusive and objective intention and telos of f. england dr. f. england, honorary research associate, university of cape town e-mail: frank@cott.co.za http://orcid.org/00000001-5903-8087 doi: http://dx.doi. org/10.18820/23099089/ actat.v39i1.4 issn 1015-8758 (print) issn 2309-9089 (online) acta theologica 2019 39(1):74-93 date published: 24 june 2019 74 published by the ufs http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/at © creative commons with attribution (cc-by) mailto:frank@cott.co.za http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5903-8087 http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5903-8087 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/23099089/actat.v39i1.4 http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/23099089/actat.v39i1.4 http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/at https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/za/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/za/ acta theologica 39(1) 2019 75 being human and of the created order, may themselves undermine the essential vocation of christian theology. 1. introduction: fiction’s question in his critique of “the american dream” and, especially of the standard portrait of its complacent, satisfied, and comfortable suburbia, philip roth, in his novel, american pastoral (1997),1 records the fragmentation of the putative ideal “all-american family”. the detonation of a bomb at the old rimrock post office in 1968, in protest against the usa’s participation in the vietnam war, by the nascently politicised teenage daughter of seymour levov, a former high school athlete, and now an affluent and successful businessman, and his wife, dawn, once a miss new jersey (roth 1997:15), the regional beauty queen, batters their suburban perfection, and ultimately shatters their coherent world. the local doctor is killed (roth 1997:68), and meredith, the daughter and perpetrator of the tragedy, becomes a fugitive. wanted by the fbi, her young life becomes one of vigilance and hidden refuge, of constant movement, of homeless wanderings. the norman rockwell (1894–1978) realism of suburban life, of school attendance, of sport and homework, of employment and regular office hours, of birthday celebrations and family vacations, all the quotidian, weekly, and annual patterned norms of structured intimacy that advertise the privilege of citizenship in “the land of the free and the home of the brave” are shown to be illusions. the story unfolds as “[t]he brutality of the destruction of this indestructible man” (roth 1997:83), and reveals the dream of the enclosed and secure space of regional america as a mask of deception that conceal nightmarish truths. indeed, the novel records the end of “pastoral america”. as he begins to record these events, nathan zuckerman, roth’s not infrequent narrator, reflects upon understanding and knowing others, and the prior or attendant implications of understanding and knowing oneself. what he thought he knew of his boyhood hero, seymour, who, as he says, “starred as end in football, centre in basketball, and first baseman in baseball” (roth 1997:3), and of his family, requires radical revision. but, likewise, he observes that what seymour himself believed he knew about those closest to him and about his community, and, significantly, of himself, had unravelled and disintegrated. for the glowing images of a daughter, for whom he had thought he was providing what was needful for a stable and secure home; of a wife, whose love he had believed was unassailable and without question; of a local community, whose respect 1 this novel won the pulitzer prize in 1998 for the best work of fiction. england mihi quaestio factus sum 76 he had earned and had long-since taken for granted, now are shown to be thin deceptions in his failures of knowing and loving, and of an assumed self-esteem. idyllic, politically-sanitised suburbia initially is interrogated crassly and then opposed fatally by his daughter, the indissoluble “till death us do part” marriage-bond breaks, and the respectful deference of neighbours and acquaintances become frowns of disapproval and eyes turned elsewhere. in the wake of these events – a bomb, a death, a childless home, a departed wife, deserted friends and colleagues – what is supposed to be “known” of oneself and of those to whom one relates daily, together with the unquestioned belief in the singular groundedness of one’s own self-identity, disintegrates. the gilded portrayals of evenings of shared lives at family meals, of pleasantries exchanged in sitting-rooms overlooking the oak-shaded street lights that are assumed to be portraits of the “true likenesses” of self and others, are replaced with images of refracted and shadowed selves, perceived, now more honestly, in the sliding mirrors of chromatic human portrayals. the assumptions about selves and others – definitively distinguishable, of self-identities simply “there” and tangible, and instantly recognisable and understood – radically are destabilised. as nathan zuckerman (roth, 1997: 35) ponders these now blurred lineaments, which have darkened into less decipherable vignettes, so he observes that you fight your superficiality, your shallowness, so as to try to come at people without unreal expectations, without an overload of bias or hope or arrogance ... sans cannon and machine guns, and steel plating half a foot thick; you come at them unmenacingly on your own ten toes ... [to] take them on with an open mind, as equals, man to man, as we used to say, and yet your never fail to get them wrong. ... you get them wrong before you meet them, while you’re anticipating meeting them; you get them wrong while you’re with them; and then you go home to tell somebody else about the meeting and you get them all wrong again. since the same generally goes for them with you, the whole thing is really a dazzling illusion ... an astonishing farce of misperception. 2. epistemic fracture such a bleak and graphic depiction of the lack in human epistemic proficiency with respect to the lives of others and of one’s own life, profoundly interrogates the interpretations of one’s own perceptions, and of what one, as a result of deliberating upon what one has looked at and listened to and touched, claims to know of oneself, of others, and of one’s position in a particular place and at a particular time in history; and of the grounds acta theologica 39(1) 2019 77 upon which one’s knowledge of its occupants, its geography and politics, its cultural and sacred forms that generate and sustain some modestly recognisable narrative self, are justified. the pressing consequence of nathan zuckerman’s observation is that it engenders a foundational uncertainty about the considered reflections that engender, sophistify, and maintain one’s beliefs about meaning in a human world of self and others: its coherence, and the inaugural intentions and telic destinations of self and others, and the narrative of events in which one participates and to which one contributes. this, probably, traumatic realisation may well inflict upon the corpus of that set of decided convictions that one holds, and the beliefs by which one shapes and orders one’s life, a wound so fatal in its derisive mockery of the earnest, reverent, and resonantly sure tones with which one confidently utters one’s deeply held, so called, incontrovertible truths, so as to recast one’s statements into stutters, one’s sentences into stammers of incoherence. when these tremors of doubt and of deep uncertainty shift and crack the foundations upon which one’s life has been constructed, so the unquestioned security of dutiful, quotidian domesticity and its established constancy, with its protective carapace of shelter and preservation, is substituted by at least some intimation of the fragility and corrigibility of being human, and the powerlessness to do no more in a lifetime than merely “shore up one’s paltry fragments against one’s ruin”, to adapt t. s. eliot’s (1998) lines from the waste land;2 indeed, only “fragments” remain. the implications of this maimed instability of who one is and of what one knows – or thinks one knows – of both self and others, perhaps is more fatally wounding to those who rely upon divine sanction for their ultimate meaning; those who turn to revealed truths and holy words in sacred books, and who appeal to the gods or to god. but when the mosaic stone tablets of the divine commandments have been smashed at the sight of human self-confidence and hubris, so no other route may be chartered than that of entering a wilderness of disorientating errancy, of vagrant wanderings, and of homeless migrations. in such circumstances of frightening vertigo, a return to selfpreservation, to conserving sealed identities, is tempting, but it may be deeply, even schismatically, deceptive. having peered over the edge of unknowingness, it may be difficult to convince oneself that an unequivocal return to unshakable sacred stability is possible. if god has become indecipherable in every more definite formulation of the divine nature, then it is with and in the undecidability of ultimate truth that one must live. is 2 “these fragments i have shored against my ruins” (“what the thunder said”, l. 430). england mihi quaestio factus sum 78 there a way back to absolute certainty, if, doubtful as it may be, there ever was a period of an ineradicable and definitively justifiable confidence in the existence and presence of a being of beings? is there a past of unassailable confidence in a personal volitional act of creaturely inception that is indisputably valid? or, are pasts, like futures, challenging in their openness, searching in their provisional findings, reaching towards an ever-receding horizon of answers that, so disconcertingly, as one accepts them as “true”, they simply become new questions? is there a final and stable site, an abiding “heavenly jerusalem”, an eternal augustinian “city of god” that will replace this tectonically shifting earthly citadel and environs of growth and decay, of achievements and disappointments, of friendships and betrayals? in his radical recasting of the “two cities” in the aftermath of wittgenstein’s (1922) tractatus, of the representational function of language, the limits of speech, and of the silence of mysterious otherness, and in the smoky tefillin marking the end of poetry (adorno 1982:34), consumed in the “black milk of morning, noon, and nightfall”3 in the death camps of the shoah, to advert to celan, in that “calamity” of the nazi genocide during the second world war, e. l. doctorow’s augustinian entitled novel, city of god (doctorow, 2000), finds its central character, father thomas pemberton, an american anglican (episcopalian) priest of an attenuating faith, pleading with, and yet more so for, a god who may re-establish an invulnerable foundation upon which, once again, the aleatory predicament of being human may be recast anew. the novel was published in 2000, the threshold of a new millennium, which, in religious imaginaries, so often marks the liminal zones of danger and hope presented in apocalyptic visions of destruction and unprecedented promises of fresh beginnings. fr pem, as he is known, living in this precarious climate of disorientation and defenceless exposure, returns to the call of the christian gospel to undergo metanoia – a change of mind or mind-set – and cries out: if we are to remake ourselves, we must remake you, lord. we need a place to stand. we are weak, and puny, and totter here in our civilization. we have only our love for each other for our footing, our marriages, the children we hold in our arms, it is only this wavery sensation, flowing and ebbing, that justifies our consciousness and keeps us from plunging out of the universe. not enough. it’s not enough. we need a place to stand. i ask for reason to hope that this travail of our souls will find its resolution in you, lord, you of the blessed name (doctorow 2000:304). 3 see paul celan’s poem, todesfuge (deathfugue), 1944. translated in felstiner (1995). acta theologica 39(1) 2019 79 if in this precarious and often menacing world, there may remain a residue of ultimate self-purpose, of an intimation of an intention to life’s trajectory, even of an allusive and fractured narrative arc of partial continuity from archē to telos, so as to conjecture that there is some sense of meaning to one’s own life, and, hence, to the lives of others, then, when the beingness of being human is the subject, the most acute inquiry may reside in the penetrating scrutiny of the meaning of meaning in its widest and most threatening terms. undoubtedly, the human need of explanations, and, possibly, an almost ubiquitous hope of a sure and certain foundation upon which to stand, have produced utopian projects from those of drastically scathed simplicity to the most generously polymorphic complexity, and, within a universal arena, have licenced peremptory declarations of eternity, of heavenly dwellings, and of everlasting bliss. specifically, the christian faith has minted doctrinaire creeds about a being who calls beings to a final, stable, and inviolable home, and returns them to a prelapsarian state of edenic perfection. but, all too often, the stridency with which such orthodox dicta are affirmed merely belies the probity entailed in, and the honesty of, such assertions, and, in their stead, demonstrates an unattractively dogmatic, yet (oxymoronically) deeply shallow, sincerity that frets fitfully from beneath plato’s long and bedimmed shadow. if nathan zuckerman’s (roth, 1997: 35) observations are not without substance, so that, as he says: [t]he fact remains that getting people right is not what living is all about anyway. it’s getting them wrong that is living, getting them wrong and wrong and wrong and then, on careful reconsideration, getting them wrong again. that’s how we know we’re alive: we’re wrong[,] then must the search for truth, for truths about persons, and, within theology, the truth about a being behind beings, and truths about this being, called “god”, and, as a consequence, truthful convictions about this god’s presence with human persons and in a created world, finally be discarded? does the thomistic state of doubt about selves, others, and god – “unless i see the mark of the nails in his hands and place my finger into the place where the nails were, and put my hand into his side, i shall not believe” (ἐὰν μὴ ἴδω ἐν ταῖς χερσὶν αὐτοῦ τὸν τύπον τῶν ἥλων καὶ βάλω τὸν δάκτυλόν μου εἰς τὸν τύπον τῶν ἥλων καὶ βάλω ⸂μου τὴν χεῖρα⸃ εἰς τὴν πλευρὰν αὐτοῦ, οὐ μὴ πιστεύσω, john 20: 25) – or the tenebrous finality that, at the final meal, follows the earlier judas kiss of betrayal – “then, straight after having taken the bread, he went out. and it was night” (λαβὼν οὖν τὸ ψωμίον ἐκεῖνος ⸂ἐξῆλθεν εὐθύς⸃. ἦν δὲ νύξ, john 13: 30) – conclusively erase the possibility of truth-seeking or of truth-needing? england mihi quaestio factus sum 80 for to admit the difficulty of speaking knowingly and truthfully about persons,4 about other persons and oneself – persons as material centres of consciousness,5 with the ability of reflective and reflexive thought, of possessing counter-factual and imaginative conceptions and their expressive language tenses and moods of hope and of possibility,6 and of being responsible for deliberation and therefore accountable for subsequent actions7 – so as to interrogate truth and knowledge only in partial, dispersed, even relatively incoherent modes, may solicit a tremor of intraand inter-active human alienation and restless displacement so profound that one appropriately may question the worth of what one may call the human experiment. if one allows such searching challenges, not merely to emerge, but, more courageously, to be one’s critical companions in self-responsiveness and other-relatedness, then repeatedly one would hear in one’s voice the plaintive fragility of being human, which itself would disclose the fugal counterpoint to the desperate tenacity with which one clings to one’s definitive convictions and beliefs about the condition of being human. furthermore, to disenchant one’s meaningful world and to haunt one’s narrative orthodoxy with such a tragic melancholia contests not only the fundamental implications of holding beliefs and convictions about theology’s god and how these convictions shape meaning, but may well dislodge the “truthful truth” of the beliefs and convictions themselves. 4 johnson (2015: 775: 2; original emphasis): “personhood has been thought to involve various traits, including (moral) agency; reason or rationality; language or the cognitive skills language may support (such as intentionality and selfconsciousness); and the ability to enter into suitable relations with other persons ...”. 5 strawson (1959: 104; original emphasis) argues that “the concept of a person is to be understood as the concept of a type of entity such that both predicates ascribing states of consciousness and predicates ascribing corporeal characteristics ... are equally applicable to an individual entity of that type”. 6 to employ predicates of persons, it is necessary, in strawson’s (1959:106) view, to be able to do so of others, because conceptions of one’s own state would not be known, and, therefore, with respect to language and its possibilities, cannot be articulated. 7 taylor (1981) issues some challenges to strawson’s views (see notes 5 & 6, above); finally asking whether “we take language-using ability as such, as the criterion for personhood” (135), which, of course, would require more exactitude as to both the definition of language and also what would constitute its usage. as in taylor’s (1981:133-134) ascription to his dog of strawson’s “p” and “m” predicates, so the ability of his dog to communicate would need to exclude the use of “language”, or, at least, his definition of it and how it is used. acta theologica 39(1) 2019 81 3. truthful searchings but one must observe that not to be able to speak knowingly and, in that sense, truthfully, about persons, is not the same as not being able to speak truthfully and yet unknowingly, about persons. first, and fairly obviously, if the truth is that oneself and others, ultimately, are unknowable, then one may speak truthfully about oneself and others as unknowable, and also one may know oneself and others truthfully as unknowable. second, and as a consequence, if the truth about the human knowledge of persons is present in the absence of the true knowledge of them, then it is this absence of their knowability that constitutes the truth of the human knowledge of persons. third, degrees of predictability about others – their speech and their silences, their actions and their gestures – do appear to support some knowledge of others, as, indeed, of oneself. as acceptable – probably, as truthful – as this third claim may be, it is not unlikely that, on occasions, after listening to a supposedly “well-known” friend’s words or actions, one may well find oneself saying: “but i did not think that you would have subscribed to such views”; or “i could not conceive of you as behaving in that way”. similarly, the retrospective examination of one’s own life may well elicit some surprises, even unpleasant shocks, so that one may ask: “why did i say that? i have never before used such forthright terms”; or “for what possible reason did i act in that way in that situation? it really was so out of character”. these kinds of questions do not merely ask: “did i mean what i said?”; or “did i mean this or did i mean that?”, but “what did i mean?”; or, more troublesomely, “what could i possibly have meant, when i made that statement?” with regard to actions, the questions appear to probe somewhat deeper: “what reasoning facilitated that action?” – that is, “how am i to apply sensible speech to what i did?”, and “how am i to account for that action of mine with words that convey, at least, some degree of coherent meaning?” therefore, although one may concede that there are some recognisable traits of speech and action, traits that engender a sense of continuity in selfand other-recognition nevertheless, the perplexing issue of predictive inaccuracy, and of self and other-misrecognitions, merely emphasises the anxiety of not really knowing oneself and others – of getting it wrong, again and again. thus, what these troublesome notions about the unknowability of selves and others may suggest is that human persons, less so, are self and other-knowable revealers of themselves; and, rather more so, are unselfconscious concealers of who they are in the supposed clarity of their selfand otherreflected images. and if, at present, it may be too precipitate to assert that a more secure narrative continuity of persons entitles a greater confidence in the predictive futures of the speech and england mihi quaestio factus sum 82 the behaviour of oneself and of others, as is being suggested, it is because this desired confidence may, on reflection, appear rather self-invested and self-projective; and also, more dispassionately, may be quite unwarranted, which, as nathan zuckerman (roth 1997:35; original emphasis) phrases it, leads to an uncongenial and questioning realisation: what are we to do about this terribly significant business of other people, which gets bled of the significance we think it has and takes on instead a significance that is ludicrous, so ill-equipped are we to envision one another’s interior working and invisible aims. if this forbidding notion may be entertained, then in the absence of a clearly charted course to a founding entailment that informs an expressed inner core of decidable convictions, the difficulties of being human, of attempting to “read” others and to know oneself with a veridical accuracy, to some extent at least, fractures selfand other-identity. without some degree of implicit trust in an interpretive veracity of the informing creedal constraints to which persons subscribe, and in the absence of a modest reliance upon a genuine and discernible probity in the ability to account – and, consequently, to be held responsible – for purposeful human actions, the accords of human self-identity appear to rely upon a spectrum of undecidable and shifting conjectures and interpretations, and where greater or lesser degrees of inner epistemic coherence largely is unverifiable. if one admits such an instability of being human, then these deeply disconsolate thoughts bruise, if not break, the self-betraying – yet noble – charms of “authenticity” and “honesty”, of the reality of a veritable “true self”, with which, inter alia, philosophers and theologians perennially, and more recently, psychoanalysts and psychotherapists, have enticed, and continue to entice, aporetic humanity, and who, as a result, have sanctioned the production of disingenuous human selves, who, probably all too often, are quite unaware that the palpable emotional sincerity with which they defend their newly grasped or rediscovered “selves” merely betrays its own deceptive shallowness. thus, even when one may accept that the illusions of human transparency may be less opaque than evinced in nathan zuckerman’s stark portrayal, the problematics of certainty do appear to place one, at the very least on occasions, in serious self-reflective interpretive quandaries. as a consequence, one may well harbour an abiding suspicion that there are times when one may be deeply mistaken about the meaning of one’s own verbal assertions, about one’s gestures of assent to the words of others, and about the trust that supposedly builds human relations and community, especially when it is founded upon words, smiles, frowns, and gestures that seem to convey acta theologica 39(1) 2019 83 a mutual understanding of, and an assent to, the words spoken and the actions performed. these thoughts of an agitated and inconstant human condition may replace father pem’s “place to stand” (doctorow 2000:304) with a dispersed and destabilised sense of, at best, a “wavery” self-presence. even ameliorating the boldly stated directness of nathan zuckerman’s views, a more searing, and, perhaps, less emotionally enamoured, scrutiny of this created world may evince an inhospitable avid rawness about it, even a fickle and “ludicrous” malignity, that may compel one to acknowledge “the baseless fabric of this vision”, so that, when entering into the theatre of this human experiment of becoming persons, one accepts that it is peopled with “such stuff/as dreams are made on” (the tempest, iv. i) – an arena of imaginative and unsubstantiated tragic hopes. for a confidence in the biblical created “image and likeness” of humanity (genesis 1: 26-27) to a creator, founded upon a resolute fidelity to this being as the unshakable and determinative “refuge and strength” (psalm 46: 1; 71; 7; 94: 22), “shelter” (psalm 57: 1; 61: 4; 71: 1), “strong tower” (psalm 61: 3; 62: 2, 6), “strong rock” (psalm 62: 2, 6, 7), “fortress ... and ... stronghold” (psalm 71: 3), as the psalmist repeatedly affirms, may generate instead despondence, dejection, and, not improbably, a mood of hopeless and solicitous anxiety, of mere human shadows donned in “inky cloak[s and] customary suits of solemn black ... the trappings and the suits of woe”, as hamlet (hamlet, i. ii.) says. but it is “[n]ot enough. it’s not enough”, cries father pem. and if it is not enough, then perhaps before despairing too disconsolately and before capitulating too prematurely to the blackened residue of the ever-changing and decaying human charnel house, may one speculate that this “ludicrous” drama of an, admittedly, tragic human condition, may be recast into one containing a deeply etched earnest of ineradicable hopeless hope, if one were to “take upon’s the mystery of things/as if we were god’s spies” (king lear, v. iii)? the context of this quote “take upon’s the mystery of things/as if we were god’s spies” (king lear, v. iii) from shakespeare’s king lear, finds lear and his youngest daughter, cordelia, the one who, finally he has realised, really does love him, captured in their battle to right the injustices of lear’s other two daughters, cordelia’s older sisters. now defeated, lear says to cordelia: ... come let’s away to prison: we two alone will sing like birds i’ th’ cage. when thou dost ask me blessing, i’ll kneel down, england mihi quaestio factus sum 84 and ask of thee forgiveness. so we’ll live, and pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh at gilded butterflies; and hear poor rogues talk of court news, and we’ll talk with them too, who loses, and who wins, who’s in, who’s out; and take upon’s the mystery of things, as if we were god’s spies ... (king lear, v. iii.). to look down upon this world as “god’s spies” is to be aware of its mystery in the context of the final mystery of being: to acknowledge the mystery of existence, simultaneously, in its bewildering brutality and its yielding compassion; and to experience the mystery of being human through being and becoming persons, concomitantly, in its despairing and unsettling bewilderment and its emplaced local habitation. to adopt this perspective is to live in, or into truth, rather than for truth to live in one (see caputo, 2013: 29-38). this is not to name this truth, but it is to accept that one’s own unknown, unauthorised, and unasked for existence is conditioned by the awareness of its ending – that, in contrast to one’s inception, one knows one’s end: that one is a “being-towards-death” (heidegger 1962:§§ 240-241; 249-250; 258-259; 263; 266), ineluctably moving into the nothingness of a truth that meets one as the final horizon or limit that marks the remit within which one lives (see mackey 1987:18-21; 185-189).8 to appropriate this sense of existence, as an inquiring being who seeks to understand one’s life in terms of one’s “end and the number of one’s days”, to invoke the psalmist (39: 4), resists a conception of truth that only permits logical and justifiable propositions that are verified by human reason, that, ubiquitously, are applicable, and that, consequently, imposes a cataleptic silence upon of all else. but this is not necessarily to jettison propositional truth, or to deny it a place – and a place not without importance – within a more comprehensive notion of truth. rather, it may be to suggest that the end – the finality of one’s ending – may condition being human in a way that desists from depending exclusively either upon the founding of meaning upon some inaugural narrative, or upon empirical and verifiable proven truths of experiential existence. for it is to admit mystery – to, in lear’s words: ... take upon’s the mystery of things, as if we were god’s spies ... (king lear, v. iii.). 8 mackey offers an instructive “modern” – or, possibly, postmodern – theological appropriation of heidegger, especially with respect to death and resurrection and the eucharist. acta theologica 39(1) 2019 85 4. searching truths recently, lambert zuidervaart (2017) has sought to extend the assertions and conclusions of husserl, heidegger, and the frankfurt school in the cause of such a more expansive definition of truth that incorporates both non-propositional and propositional claims, although not quite to the mystery of one’s end. returning to thomas’s definition, veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus in de veritate,9 the summa, 10 and elsewhere,11 zuidervaart notes husserl’s approval of the necessity of some sense of adaequatio – “equality”, or, as mcdermott (1989:45) translates it, “conformity” – for the possibility of true knowledge which generates two forms of adequation. in the endeavour to know truth as the “conformity of mind and thing” (mcdermott 1989:45), both intuitive and synthetic activities operate, and the evidence that is required for the assertion of true propositions comprise both truth-makers – facts, states of affairs, objective existence – and truth-bearers – the mental and linguistic conveyances and articulations of the “intuitive fullness”, the “objective identity”, of a perceived object (see simons 2000). in this sense, true propositions are asserted of intentional objects that provide an ideal compositional fullness (see zuidervaart 2017:32-38). zuidervaart’s (2017) appropriation of husserl’s schema of attributing “truth” in such instances, is qualified by a “critical retrieval” of truth as less subject related, and where selfdisclosive (both to adaptively appropriate and anticipate heidegger) predications of objects arise in a mode in which the objects available for knowing offer themselves for predicative claims. such a rendering of the objects of knowledge is existentiell,12 which, necessarily, interpolates the 9 de veritate 1.1: “dicit isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus; et anselmus in lib. de veritate: veritas est rectitudo sola mente perceptibilis”. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdv01.html [accessed: 23 august 2018] 10 summa theologiae 1a. 16. 2 obj. 2. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1015. html [accessed: 23 august 2018]. see also, heidegger (1962: § 214). 11 see, vnuk (2013: 31, n. 2). 12 inwood (1999:61 & 62): “the ‘existential’ [heidegger’s] concept of existence means the selfhood of man in so far as it is related not to the individual self but to being and the relationship to being ... . existenziell ... with a frenchderived ending: existenziell, ‘existentiell’ ... applies to the range of possibilities open to dasein, its understanding of them and the choice it makes (or evades) among them. if dasein does what they are doing, or alternatively chooses to choose and decides to become a soldier or a philosopher, these are existentiell matters. the distinction between ‘existential’ and ‘existentiell’ is parallel to that between ‘ontological’ and ‘ontical’”. http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/qdv01.html http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1015.html http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/sth1015.html england mihi quaestio factus sum 86 primary condition of heidegger’s (1962:§ 219; original emphasis) dasein as “being-in-the-world”, and which, helpfully, he explains: if a logos [a statement or explanation] as apophansis [“predication”] is to be true, its being-true is alētheuein [literally, “to truth” – the use of the verb here one takes to be implicit in the act of stating truth, that is, it asserts truth] in the manner of apophainesthai [the middle form of the infinitive indicates “its own appearing” or “its showing of itself”] – of taking entities out of their hiddenness and letting them be seen in their unhiddenness (their uncoveredness). the alētheia [truth], which aristotle equates with pragma [something, some “fact”] and phainomena [its “appearing” or “showing” of itself] ... signifies the ‘things themselves’; it signifies what shows itself – entities in the “how” of their uncoveredness.13 here, then, appears a less subjectively constrained notion of truth, but one that worries zuidervaart owing to the seamless acceptance of a pragma phainomena as true, and as true to the subject who then knows that it is true. what test is employed, as zuidervaart (2017:68) asks, in order to claim that “the entities discovered are truly discovered and that their discoveredness itself is true”? heidegger’s answer that “what helps distinguish true disclosure from false is ... the authenticity with which human beings face the possibility of their own death” (zuidervaart 2017:72-73), is, for zuidervaart, even more so than with husserl, too individualistic.14 thus, heidegger too is chastised, less so for the subject-centred location of verifying what is true, and more so for the individualistic manner in which dasein fathoms the self and the givenness of truth. for zuidervaart, what is required for truth – truthful assertions that are both propositional and non-propositional – are not hermetic subjects who self-consciously know, whether with self-confident assurance (in the case of husserl) or in a state of anxious trepidation (in the case of heidegger), but subjects in their openness to other subjects, precisely because what is said and 13 the greek in this quotation has been transliterated. 14 somewhat forthrightly, zuidervaart (2017:90) states later that “his [heidegger’s] account reduces authenticity to a formal state of self-relation, transfigures historical ruptures in modern society into an ontological state of alienation, and turns the truth of dasein into a denial of mediation. because of the pivotal role ‘authenticity’ plays in heidegger’s general conception, his idea of truth become internally untenable: despite the emphasis on interdependence and intersubjectivity in this notions of ‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘being-with’, the most primordial truth of dasein, whose own disclosedness is itself truth in the most primordial sense, lacks interdependence and intersubjectivity. or, rather, authenticity displays interdependence and intersubjectivity only in a privative way, as that from which dasein must distance itself in order to be authentic”. acta theologica 39(1) 2019 87 what is claimed to be known, include the reception of what is offered up for knowledge, and hence available for truth. and if this is so, then, if one may inflect the argument, the objects of knowledge in their givenness not only are available to human selves, but human selves also are participant knowers as other givens of what may be known, as well as fellow participant inquirers as to what is true. therefore, it is in the existentiell experience of human persons, not merely as self-enclosed human subjects who may know, but also as subjects and objects in their relational interaction and sociality as knowers and known, that claims about truth are made. one would suppose that adorno would be helpful in this respect, but, for zuidervaart, he too fails in a manner not dissimilar to husserl and heidegger, because an élitism pervades adorno’s project. those who discern “the truth” about being human in the world are “self-nominated and self-elected” (zuidervaart 2017:95), a notable hubris that is not casually introduced by adorno. and the reason for this selfassertive presence is that society imposes an ideological blindness upon its participants that renders the overwhelming majority of people incapable of observing the truth of its deceptions. one may have suspected that habermas, zuidervaart’s final visitor in his “critical retrieval of truth”, would forge the societal link after which zuidervaart reaches. however, because habermas has retained an “early” conviction “that truth ‘is not a property of assertions’ and rather only ... claim[ed of] the propositions or statements we assert” (zuidervaart 2017:115), zuidervaart’s requirement that, to appropriate an earlier remark, the “truth-makers” are implicit in the “truth-bearers” – that “truth-makers” predicatively are entailed in “truthbearers” – has not been satisfied. that truth is interactive, dialogic, and justifiable through contextual authentication is central to zuidervaart’s thesis, and yet, propositional truths also are integral to this thesis (also see, caputo 2013:59). how, then, is truth to be retrieved, when these dominant thinkers either retreat into forms of solipsism, and/or arrogate to themselves the truthful perspective, or impose a chasm between, perhaps what one may express as, truths known and truths experienced in their knownness? zuidervaart returns to heidegger’s “on the essence of truth” (1930) to state that it is in history that freedom is experienced, with the result that being a person is to live within the remit of the givenness of freedom; or, to adopt heideggerian speech: the essential nature of freedom is an experience of being “let be” within the history of a being who is open and is availed of what is encountered in being human and free (heidegger 1993:125). the awkwardness here is attempting to convey the dual nature of knowing truths to claim; truths that, in their duality of experience and deliberation england mihi quaestio factus sum 88 upon experience, and in their self-reflexive counter-factual and imaginative construal, let beings be in their openness to the promise of unconcealment. this partial opaqueness, not simply in these expressions, but also in their attempt to mean, evokes the space of being human, as human space of penumbral loss. and it is within the terminal sadness of this human condition of not knowing that which one wishes to know, and yet of possessing the giftedness both of the tense of hope, and more so – perhaps, almost annoyingly – of the subjunctive mood of possibility, that the tragedy of being human most acutely may be acknowledged. in the acceptance that all that will remain will be one’s dusty fragments and, as father pem has stated, that there is “no place to stand”, one may concur with zuidervaart’s proposal and critical retrieval of truth: that truth requires non-propositional and propositional warrants within the on-going agōn of communal and societal engagement, adversarial debate, fractured dissentience, and perennial negotiation. zuidervaart’s proposal to widen a conception of truth, not merely that it may hold propositions, existential givenness, discursive exchange, and contextual formulations within its remit, but also that it may empower relational interactions between these frequently segregated aspects of what comports truth and the descending degrees of disparagement with which they often are ranked, is attractive. within this proposal, the experiential interaction of subjects with a variety of kinds of truth-makers facilitates their own predicative self-disclosure to the truth-bearers within a social context that offers the promise of living humanly – of the advancement of human flourishing. if aristotle’s voice is heard in the last phrase, then the single citation by zuidervaart of the one whom thomas called “the philosopher”, does not refer to this notion. zuidervaart’s (2017:98) alliance of “bearing witness to the truth” and “authentication” – the former, participatory of oneself and invitational of others to do likewise; the latter, the locative specifics of participation, which may be diverse – does not prevent him from inserting his own perspectival witness-bearing about, precisely, human flourishing, but one that, in his recasting of this threaded and intertwined retrieval of truth, is a particular view from somewhere with respect to justice, equality, and ecological responsibility (zuidervaart 2017:7071; 98-99; 179). but views from elsewhere – of the implicitness of engaging with “truthmakers” and their presence in the “bearers of the truths” of a way of living – may well demand an openness to this world – a “letting beings be” – in all of its indeterminate capriciousness, and in all of its, perhaps, regrettably, corrigible epistemic fragility; in its variegated conceptions of what is just, in how authority ought to be ordered, in the approbation of different acta theologica 39(1) 2019 89 modes of ecological engagement, in communal rather than individualistic justifications, and in the diverse ends – the telē – of being human meaningfully. and it is this “somewhere” sub specie humanitatis that may recall an alternative, subjunctive perspective sub specie aeternitatis15 in the imagined cell of lear and cordelia, so as to ... take upon’s the mystery of things, as if we were god’s spies ... (king lear, v. iii.). 5. conclusion: theology’s question what contribution, then, if any, may theology – christian theology – make to “bearing witness” to the truth? unfortunately, theologians – in the plural, and therefore, somewhat bewilderingly – continue to announce the christian truth as a singularly definitive, and incontrovertible claim – with a seemingly selective amnesia that they do so in their many voices from plural “somewheres” – and yet, setting aside the propositional problematics of these “proofs”, perhaps upon deeper reflection, such a claim, or claims, may well constitute as profound a contradiction as the central claim of christianity which they summarily declare. for what one may suggest – neither in the cause of propositional proof nor in the cause of historical veracity – is that the central claim of christianity–that god is both human and divine – is not an answer or the answer, but a question; it is not a truth or the truth, but, at best, a truthful question to a humanity that questions itself as to which truths by which to live (see williams 1990:1-2). in the cause of this argument, the interpretation of lear’s words, that to ... take upon’s the mystery of things, as if we were god’s spies ... (king lear, v. iii.). suggests less a sudden “understanding” or “divine revelation” of “the mystery” (wells 2000:257, n. 16), with the implication that it has been resolved; and rather that, precisely because one, as a human person, 15 see sutherland’s (1984) philosophically nuanced and elegantly presented articulation of sub specie aeternitatis. with respect to zuidervaart’s (2017: 70-71; 98-99; 179) “interest” in particular views about justice, racism, and the ecology noted above, sutherland (1984: 100) observes that sub specie aeternitatis “cannot be just like elaborating any other view of the world. for example, the world viewed under the aspect of economic development, or of the maximization of pleasure, or of the political supremacy of this race or that, or even of distributing material benefit as equally as possible, in each case is the world understood under some limited and, to that extent, manageable aspect”. england mihi quaestio factus sum 90 possesses god’s view as “god’s spies”,16 so one now knowingly bears the burden that the mystery of being human is to live within the remit of knowing unknownness.17 for, if god is both human and divine, it allows for the view that to be “god’s spies” requires no statement to be uttered and no incontrovertible creedal formula to be acknowledged upon the pains of excommunication or everlasting damnation. rather, “god’s spies” – those who see from that perspective – speak to, call to, humanity. but this hail to humanity may be less so murdoch’s (1970) notion of “perfection” and the “good”; or even sutherland’s (1984:102) carefully established proposal of the “possibility of the intelligibility” of such a viewpoint, addressing humanity. in an inflected contrast, it may constitute a more demanding summons to humanity to its unsettling vocation, which is that being human entails being confronted by the question about being let be in the presence of self and other unknownness, and of the final, unyielding, and unavoidable mystery that will meet one.18 perhaps one may suggest that, possibly in its most lapidary form, all that christian theology offers in its contradictory central claim is so to destabilise the human categories of speech and sight – of saying knowingly and seeing clearly – that the primary resistance to dogmatic truth claims is to become “god’s spies”. for this vantage point, sub specie aeternitatis, calls a person to look upon, and to ponder, what it is to see and to know unknowingly, and that being a human person means 16 the setting of king lear, supposedly in a pre-christian era, ought not to preclude observing christian views, images, and allusions within the play. nuttall (2007: 307), who has “long argued that the savage ending ... makes it an anti-christian play”, found himself “shaken in this view” by the argument of medcalf (2007; cited by nuttall, 2007: 307-308) and the christ figure, cordelia, and, subsequently, more sympathetic to the earlier religious reading of the play by bradley (1965; cited by nuttall, 2007: 307-308). similarly, kermode’s (2000: 237) analysis of timon of athens, supposedly of the peloponnesian war period (431-404 bce), observes fairly clear references to the institution of the eucharist in the play (i. ii. 46-49; iii. ii. 65-66; i. ii. 40-41). 17 in this regard, ioppolo (2008:103, n. 17) may be more helpful than wells (2000) cited above, in the sense that “god’s spies” may be “doing divine service” on behalf of humanity. 18 for the christian, for whom communication with god enacts the human– divine responsive relationship, jean-louis chrétien’s notion of “prayer” as a “wounded word” (cited by caputo 2013:83), provides a way of conceptualising the ultimate woundedness of being human in precisely the ways observed in this article: the capacity to imagine, and to use language and imagery about, completion, perfection, utopia; but the awareness of being unable to achieve it. thus, in this sense, au fond, prayer for the christian believer may be said to communicate one’s incompleteness in the face of a commitment to god who completes and perfects one. acta theologica 39(1) 2019 91 to be confronted by, not a truth to which assent must be given, but by unsettling questions that interrogate the self about the inceptive and final purposes of being human, and of the meaning of the meaning of being for the being who is human. to see humanity under the view of eternity is to acknowledge that eternity may be no more than the time and space of one’s life that is lived zetetically in the presence of a horizon of mystery. in the human stain, philip roth’s (2000: 52) later novel, his narrator, again nathan zuckerman, considers the seemingly incongruous relationship between the seventy-one-year-old, former professor of classics, coleman silk, and the thirty-four-year-old, janitor and farmhand, faunia farley, and zuckerman recognises my own fascination with their extensive disparity as human types, with the non-uniformity, the variability, the teeming irregularity of the ... arrangements – and with the injunction upon us ... the highly differentiated and the all but undifferentiated, to live, not merely to endure but to live, to go on talking, giving, feeding, milking, acknowledging wholeheartedly, as the enigma that it is, the pointless meaningfulness of living[,] and so of living without the provision of a definitive answer to the human experiment in which one participates unaskingly, and, as augustine realised, “with the sheer incompleteness of the endeavour of self-knowing” (williams 2016:22). therefore, “to live”, as roth emphasises, may well constitute the very subversion of the initial and unrequested condition of existence – the brute fact that, without request, one is; and one is here and now. rather, “to live” is to exist interrogatively, not merely as one who asks about being and meaning, but as one whose own unknownness questioningly probes the conditions of the possibility of being human in this present time and this locative space, and of living within the horizon of what ultimately confronts one – whether it is named, “mystery”, “god”, or “nothingness”. bibliography adorno, t. w. 1982. prisms. cambridge, ma: mit press. https://doi.org/10.7551/ mitpress/5570.001.0001 aquinas. 1989. summa theologiae. a concise translation. edited by timothy mcdermott. westminster, ma: christian classics. caputo, j. d. 2013. truth. london: penguin. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5570.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/5570.001.0001 england mihi quaestio factus sum 92 doctorow, e. l. 2000. city of god. london: abacus. eliot, t. s. 1998. the waste land and other poems. edited by frank kermode. london: penguin. felstiner, j. 1995. paul celan: poet, survivor, jew. new haven: yale university press. heidegger, m. 1962. being and time. translated by john macquarrie and edward robinson. oxford: blackwell. 1993. on the essence of truth. basic writings: martin heidegger. revised and expanded edition. translated by d. f. krell. london: routledge. inwood, m. 1999. a heidegger dictionary. oxford: blackwell. https://doi. org/10.1111/b.9780631190950.1999.x ioppolo, g. 2008. william shakespeare. king lear. new york; 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(ed.) 2008. william shakespeare. king lear. edited by stanley wells. on the basis of a text prepared by gary taylor. oxford: clarendon. williams, r. d. 1990. the wound of knowledge. second revised edition. london: darton, longman and todd. 2016. on augustine. london: bloomsbury. wittgenstein, l. 1922. tractatus logico-philosophicus. translated from the german by c. k. ogden. london: kegan paul. zuidervaart, l. 2017. truth in husserl, heidegger, and the frankfurt school. cambridge, ma: mit press. https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11186.001.0001 keywords trefwoorde fiction fiksie truth waarheid self self unknowingness onwetendheid https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/11186.001.0001 article caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2 no. 1 pp. 30–46 april 2021 issn 2639-4928 doi: 10.26812/caste.v2i1.265 © 2021 snehashish das. this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. brandeis.edu/j-caste fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest for personhood of shudras snehashish das1 abstract anti-caste traditions in india work to understand and examine the idea of personhood which the majority in india is deprived of by virtue of being born in the lower rungs of the caste hierarchy. this paper examines the historical continuity in brahminism and the rupture jotiba phule presents to it through his art and activism which serves to disturb the regular flow of singular continuity of what is perceived as history and historiography. jotiba’s quest is for finding the essence / personhood of, what butler calls, a ‘precarious subject’ and recognizing that precarious subject – the shudra, as a subject of history. but the personhood of this precarious subject is never a complete personhood. therefore, jotiba attempts to unveil the path towards achieving complete personhood which is embedded in reaffirming the lost or concealed truth – by discontinuing the historical flow of the social structure of caste and establishing a new subject rising out of crisis in social structure in history. i have chosen two works from jotiba’s works as new methodological tools for history writing and historical criticism, and made hermeneutical and phenomenological readings of the both. the works are his poem kulambin (a peasant woman), and the satyashodhak (truth-seeker) marriage as the public performance of protestas they are both the essential and the mundane to his life, which exemplifies the truth jotiba followed and established an organization satyashodhak samaj (society of truth seekers) as a testament to it. keywords jotiba phule, personhood, precarity, performativity, continuity, satyashodhak, shudra. 1ph.d scholar, centre for the study of social systems, jawaharlal nehru university, new delhi e-mail: mx.snehashish@gmail.com fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 31 introduction jotirao govindrao phule, alias jotiba phule, is associated with the renaissance in indian history; considered to be the father of modern india, and endearingly called mahatma (great soul) within anti-caste traditions. this paper does not wish to and cannot introduce jotiba to academia. for in the politics of introduction, i encounter three dilemmas: one, who shall i introduce jotiba to; second, what is the relevance of ‘i’ to introduce jotiba; and third, when do i know what is truly and justifiably introducing such a figure who challenges the course of continuity? introducing jotiba to masses in words means creating a readership of massesas jotiba phule (1991b, pp. 22-23) advocated a system of ‘mass education’ wherein the state must encourage mass education from the primary level to engender quality education of the masses at higher levels. but living the life of ‘contradiction’, as ambedkar (round table india, 2016) puts it, between political equality and inequality in social and economic life in india, mass education or even enrolment in higher education remains a distant dream.1 introducing jotiba through the text essentially means introducing him to those who have access to education and interest in anti-caste scholarships. among the masses, some have known, read, and educated themselves with his works, many have lived the life jotiba lived and represented, and experienced the truth that he had experienced and sought. but to introduce jotiba to them begets the second question: who am ‘i’ to introduce? several activists and academics have read or, are familiar with jotiba’s text slavery (1991), but a major part of his texts remains unread and unexplored, and much more is untranslated. reading jotiba has made me think that he stands as an epitome of truth in the kind of history or the social matrix we are eager to read about. jotiba himself, and only himself can be the entry point to introducing jotiba. as a reader and a researcher, i can only introduce my thoughts on jotiba or his specific works, rather than the vastness of jotiba, his life, works and thoughts that are hitherto unexplored widely. it would be an injustice to jotiba to write about him and call it an introduction to him. this leads to my third point: that is, to introduce someone, one needs to know where to enter their life and work, only then can one follow the truth of their personhood thereafter. one may argue that the entry point to jotiba’s life can be the event, in 1848, when he was humiliated and abused at his brahmin friend’s marriage (phule, 1991a, p. xvi) and experienced the truth of his birth and life, of brahminism,2 in that very moment, and the truth followed. but that is somehow untrue because the experience of truth in his life precedes that event as much as it follows it. one can pick any moment of his life and work and find out that the truth is happening; truth, one can say, in simpler sense, is the essence of one’s being. for a 1official record states that the scheduled castes (scs), scheduled tribes (sts) and other backward classes (obcs) are represented in 14.9 percent, 5.5 percent and 36.3 percent, respectively, of total enrolment in higher education as against 15 percent, 7.5 percent, and 27 percent reservation, respectively, mandated by the constitution of india. only 5.2 percent of total enrolment belongs to muslim minority, and 2.3 percent belongs to other minority communities. out of the total enrolment 51.36 percent are male, and rest 48.64 percent are female students. see the report of all india survey on higher education 2018-19, department of higher education, ministry of human resources development, government of india, 2019. 2dr. b.r. ambedkar defines brahminism as ‘the negation of the spirit of liberty, equality and fraternity. in that sense it is rampant in all classes and is not confined to the brahmins alone, though they have been the originators of it’ (reported in times of india, february 14, 1938). 32 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 person, it can be argued, that the truth is the purpose of living happens in the very moment a person experiences and realizes what they are supposed to do or become, and that moment is unique. one can pick any such moment from his life and begin understanding jotiba there onwards. he was admiringly called the ‘embodiment of truth’ by his wife savitribai.3 his quest for truth translated into the satyashodhak samaj or the truth seekers’ society4 that he created. thus, instead of introducing jotiba, what my scholarship will essentially do is analyze two of his works: one, a poem kulambin5 or a peasant woman; second, the satyashodhak marriage that he pioneered. these will help me and others understand both the simplicity and vastness of truth. this paper, throughout its length, tries to explore the concepts of ‘truth’, ‘history’ and ‘personhood’, from my hermeneutical and phenomenological readings of and from the works of jotiba. such scholarship, beyond mere introduction, is essential as it challenges the continuity of indian scholarship which is predominantly brahminical, and hegemonized by the brahmins and other twice-born6 castes. art, methodology of history and the subject of recognizability i have given some time to think over jotiba’s poem kulambin, a peasant woman, (damle, 2014) which i read as one of those moments in jotiba’s life and work which not only has an encounter with truth but also brings forth that truth to the public through art. the poem is based on a peasant woman, who is essentially a shudra7 and utterly anonymous. this namelessness or anonymity of the subject makes the poem seem a work of fiction, around a fictional character, as it is neither a case study nor a biography. it leaves us with the methodological questions can fiction be a form of historiography? can fictitious subjects be a subject of history? can an event which might not have actually occurred in the past but carries an idea or sense about and from the past, hold truth value in writing history? history is often understood to be not just an idea about the past, but a systematic record of the past; a verifiable record that appears in form of annals and chronicles. this is the essential line that traditionally segregates history from myth. thus, the established idea of history and historiography 3see sabrang (2016), to jyotiba, from savitribai phule: these aren’t love letters, but tell you what love is all about, scroll. retrieved 16 september, 2020, from http://scroll.in/article/801848/tojyotiba-from-savitribai-phule-these-arent-love-letters-but-tell-you-what-love-is-all-about. 4satyashodhak samaj was established in 1827 having jotirao phule as its first president and treasurer. the main objectives of the organization were to liberate the shudras and ati-shudras, and to prevent exploitation by brahmins and other ‘upper-castes’. 5kulambin, that refers to a peasant woman in this poem, also can mean a female domestic help. the word is a rude and scornful term. the poem was published in a periodical titled ‘dinbandhu’ which was founded by krishnarao pandurang bhalekar in 1877, to serve as the mouthpiece of satyashodhak samaj. 6castes those fall under brahmin, kshatriya and vaishya varnas are considered to be the twiceborn or dvija castes in varna hierarchy, as they perform a ceremony called upanayana where they enter into the life of hinduism which is considered to be the rebirth. shudras even though fall under varna hierarchy, still are not considered to be the twice-born. 7shudra constitutes the lowest rung in the varna hierarchy. they are traditionally linked to the service castes, such as peasantry, artisanship, etc. majority population in india falls under shudra varna, and most of the caste groups under shudra varna are officially (in the constitution) categorized as other backward classes (obc) in india. fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 33 pushes ambiguous subjects from the past to the periphery. so, can jotiba’s poem be considered history? here, i shall argue that his poem should not be considered just any form of history writing, but a challenge to the course of continuity of history writing, in other words, a historical criticism; a ‘fracture.’ to explore that, we shall analyze the relationship between history and truth here onwards. what was it that made jotiba have a peasant woman in his work of arta character who was never thought of being worthy of being recorded as a subject in the history of india? if one looks into the nineteenth or early twentieth century, art had a religious (read caste) and royal value. but by saying this i do not mean that the ‘lower castes’ did not have any art form of their own; rather those cultural or artistic forms did not have the recognizability to be introduced as pious and royal as ‘art’ and ‘aesthetic’ to be worthy of being written down, documented, or presented to the secular public. but jotiba was one of the very first of those few ‘lower caste’ artists whose art is not just an oral tradition, but breached his caste groups to reach the secular public. at a time when recognizable artwork was reduced to artworks on kings, queens, and the hindu deities, how could a subject of stigma; an embodiment of pollution; a subject marked by humiliation and violence; a wretched and undesirable body break the chains of piousness (caste purity) of artwork. thinking through butler’s (2009) idea of ‘subject of recognizability’, the subject is someone who is placed within the established norms of being of a thinking being; the embodiment of ideal personhood. the agency of personhood and thought are produced within the social structure through the historical allocation of power. we can think of another artist around the same time as jotiba, and think about the truth of the very subject of his artworks and the truth it established or presented to the masses, i.e., raja ravi verma. he was a brahmin, a royal painter who also gradually became a hindu spiritual painter, painting the everydayness of an ‘upper caste’ woman as subject. the subjects of many of his paintings are kings and queens, including maharaja sayaji rao of baroda (1881), maharani chimnabai of baroda (1881), rai pannalal mehta who was the dewan of udaipur (1901), maharani karthika thirunal lakshmi bayi of travancore (1887), alongside others. verma even recorded historical events; painted the 3rd duke of buckingham being greeted by maharaja ayilyam thirunal and visakham thirunal of travancore (1880). these are considered to be history because they are not nameless; they present a systematic record of historythe sort we can term as annals on the canvases. this leaves us an inquiry in the nature of a history that makes such figures the subject of that history; the true subject thus linking history to truth. the subject of history always emerges within history, and then history is written around that subject which marks the arrival of a history and subjects a cyclical process, wherein subject and history remain the product of power within the social, political and historical landscape. but jotiba, i argue, is the one who turns that power relation upside down. historiography and the precarious body if we examine the indian history, it is not an idea of india as merely a form or an entity or a state being a thing/‘something’ that we aim to understand. it is the very subject within the premise of the indian history that constitutes the history of india and the subject is not any subject, but the subject of essence that gives us an idea of india. what is essential or unique about india that constitutes history (of india) rather 34 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 than the nominal idea of india or a mere description of india without essence / value of india which makes history (of india) about the truth (about india). what we understand from raja ravi verma’s artworks, it is the kings and queens or the hindu mythical figures arriving in history which constitute the truth in history, that define the essence of history through his paintings. drawing from hayden white’s (1980) critiques of annals against proper history, where he inquires into and critiques annals of saint gall, we can argue that even verma’s annals do not essentially say anything about the prevailing social system, legal boundaries and subjects, and the moral codes of the state and society. yet, the mere situating of kings, queens and deities in the course of time as essential reflects the truth about india in verma’s artworks. the same applies to certain historical events painted by him, which are as relevant as if they never happened, as they have no description of them, and no transgression of the political-moral code attached to them. they are made essential by merely situating in a certain time in the past. jotiba’s poem on the peasant woman essentially questions this continuity on truth in writing history employing the form of writing as white (1980, p. 27) proposes ‘value attached to narrativity’. reading jotiba, we understand that such truth is either a partial-truth or truth as falsehood in history making. a peasant was never thought worthy of being a subject. she who had been invisible from the popular imagination of artwork became the primary subject in jotiba’s art. the peasant woman was invisible especially because of her being on the earth, her epistemic position, and the banality of her life. especially because she lives a banal life, her mere presence on earth, her mere appearance are the reasons for her ‘invisibility’ and not being considered as a subject. she was considered to be a being without an essence; where essence is found only in the being and artworks of kings and queens, temples and the hindu figures, which are essential because they are marked differently. this is precisely resonant in the contemporary merit debate that ignores how caste governs people’s lives. but in choosing the subject of his poem, kulambin, jotiba reaches to the specifics; from nation to region, region to local, and finally from local to caste. that is what i call the moment of truth happening; truth, when you bring it out from its invisibility, reveal that it is happening. indeed, for jotiba, her being is invisible because her merit or essence is invisible as she is rendered banal by the force of history. by this force of history, as jotiba narrates, the bodily violence and humiliation she has undergone establishes her as a sexually / bodily insignificant or governed being. if we see raja ravi verma’s paintings of the maharashtrian lady (1893) or lady with a fruit (1880) or the bombay strongstress (1893), etc., these can fundamentally be distinguished as ‘upper-caste’ women by their mere appearance from the saree they wear, the ornaments they adorn, the palaces they reside in, and other cultural markers which the subjects and portraits are inscribed with they are deemed sexually significant. but a shudra woman, as jotiba writes, cannot afford to deck her house with the sacred tulsi (basil) leaves, plait her hair, or adorn herself beyond her coarse saree and the sweat of her toils. a brahmin woman, flaunting her ornaments, has never applied fragrant scrub to a shudra woman, does not bathe her, does not comb her hair, does not make her face up, so jotiba writes in the poem. a brahmin woman, despite being another oppressed subject of the brahminical patriarchy,8 had no sympathy or care for a shudra woman. 8brahminical patriarchy is based on the idea that the mechanism of caste is based on and thrives upon the patriarchal system. ambedkar theorizes how endogamy, sati, mandatory widowhood, fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 35 in several chapters in the collected works of mahatma jotirao phule vol ii translated by barrister p. g. patil (1991), he mentions that jotiba writes about the punishment a shudra has to go through at the hands of brahmins. the condemned have to face severe physical injuries they are whipped, maimed, mutilated, have had pincers applied to their genitals and yet the punishment does not stop. while injured, they are treated with pain by having saline water, often boiling, poured over their wounds, until finally many succumb to the injuries. the women are forced to inhale the smoke of chillies burnt under their faces; many times, the brahmins violate their modesty, molest, torture, and rape them to manifest their authority over the shudras bodies. jotiba writes that many shudras were semi-naked most of the time, barefooted or forced to hide their naked bodies with tattered cloth throughout the year. but at the same time the ‘upper castes’, from marwari to brahmins, lived ‘respectable lives’, wore good clothes, turbans on head, draped their bodies with new sarees and gold ornaments. what does the violence imprinted on a shudra body make of her? can she be a subject of recognizability under such condition of, what butler (2009) calls, ‘precarity’? can her body be considered worth of essence, of grace, of beauty, of desirability, of respectability, of sexualness which can mark her as a being within the norms of personhood, of thought and agency? the questions of who has the right and accessibility to justice, who is criminalized for their mere being, who is stigmatized, how their body appears to the secular public, on what limits of normative body and personhood the person exists historically serves to decide who can become a recognizable subject of politics and art. reaffirmation of (shudra) personhood in precarious body jotiba, portrays the everydayness of the peasant woman, how she collects cow dung and carries it in a basket, how she cooks, goes to the field, works relentlessly, gives food to beggars and ascetic brahmins, fetches water, makes cow-dung cakes for cooking, mows and sells grass and weeds, feeds cattle, and harvests, collects and sells crops. in addition to that, jotiba describes that she is a singer, who sings in the morning and wakes her husband up. at that moment of realizing the truth about the shudra peasant woman, jotiba reveres her as an industrious woman; a meritorious woman; a hardworking woman of worth, who the brahmins stigmatize, call ignoble, and humiliate ignoring her merit. even amidst violence, pain and precarities which dehumanize a shudra woman and delegitimize her personhood and life-possibilities, jotiba discovers merit in her. he finds the essence for her subject-hood, which is truly unique. jotiba reaffirms the personhood she has been robbed off through his poem. he asks if a brahmin woman is worth such merit; can she do the labour that a shudra woman does, can she nurture without discrimination, can she have such productive power, such essence, and thus, personhood? so, this poem brings forth the essence of the peasant woman to the world. it is similar to how heidegger (1977) sees van etc. which are the reason for women’s oppression in india are meant to maintain caste purity and lineage. ambedkar and other anti-caste thinkers also highlight how manu smriti and other hindu scriptures are by essence patriarchal. see dr. b.r. ambedkar (1979), castes in india: their mechanism, genesis and development. in dr. babasaheb ambedkar writings and speeches vol. 01, (v. moon, ed.). 36 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 gogh’s painting of the shoes of the farmer. through jotiba’s poem the peasant woman moves from her house to the muddy field and the market, through all hurdles and problems, with starvation, without care, with humiliation, and stigma, and still finally produces merit or essence from what is deemed a banal life. jotiba asserts that despite these precarities she still has a personhood which merits a subject of recognizability. he avers that without all luxuries, that are allowed to a brahmin woman and which make her a visible and recognizable subject, a shudra woman still nurtures nature and society unlike her brahmin counterpart. through the poem, the truth of the shudra woman moves from invisibility to visibility, from earth to world. and this moment where the peasant woman becomes the subject of the poem, i consider a historical moment happening within historya moment when truth is revealed the truth of the peasant woman herself and the truth of history, of india, of maharashtra, and of caste. such subjectivation is not just mere essentialization of presence of a person or an event in history, but an attempt to tell a story around it that explains the social system, ethical and moral codes about the prevailing society. discontinuity in history and the recognizability of the precarious subject returning to the question i asked if the fictional nameless peasant woman can be a historical figure; i believe the nameless subject being contested with the name-affirmed subjects like kings and queens marks a historical change or movement in the continuity of writing of history. the peasant woman is not just ‘a woman’; she is every, or most, peasant women. thus, kulambin presents a collective resistance against the norms of history writing; against norms that make one eligible to be recognized as subject of art, history and politics. the peasant woman might appear to be fictional, but there is a ‘truth’ value to her, especially because jotiba, as the poet and a real person from history, is the witness to her (and of all / most peasant women’s) truth. in this way the subject transcends from the appearance of being fictional to being a truly historically constituted subject. this new sense of history writing where we situate jotiba’s work is very similar to hayden white’s (1978) proposition of structuring history in literary forms, through different types ‘emplotments’ like tragedy, comedy and romance, for better understanding and comprehension of the past. while white proposed a type of history writing through literature in which one can distinguish ‘reality’ from imaginations or ideological prejudices for better sense of the past, through the use of figurative languages. today, if our understanding of historiography can accommodate jotiba’s works, it will be of a kind wherein truth shall be distinguishable and achievable. in a way, jotiba’s works lead us towards historical criticism, by asserting that history and historiography goes beyond ‘ordered facts’, and is complexly associated with literature produced within a historical landscape. the truth represented through the royal painting is only a partial truth especially because the truth of royal members, or of the ‘upper castes’ cannot be truly revealed in the absence of the truth of the peasant woman. jotiba (phule, 1991a, p. 76) has also written ballads of royal persons like chhatrapati shivaji raje bhonsle, but such songs of glory have been written with the presence of the shudras and the atishudras as subjects. one such ballad is especially about the good work shivaji has done for the shudras and the ati-shudras; and thus, the king becomes the nominal subject and the masses under his rule are primary. both kulambini and the ballads of fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 37 chhatrapati shivaji raje bhonsle are firmly opposite to how the truth is represented in other royal artworks like those of raja ravi verma, in normative history; where jotiba takes a moral and political stand about the narrative, where story gets a closure, about his central subject while essentializing unlike raja ravi verma. a reaffirmation of personhood to a precarious body, as a politicalmoral stand, challenged how one saw a subject and subject-hood in art, history, and politics. yet, the peasant woman is a precarious body, her personhood is not at its full potential. so, what jotiba does to challenge these conditions of precarity of a shudra subject, i discuss in the subsequent section by analyzing his brainchild, i.e., the satyashodhak marriage. rejecting the ‘brahmin oedipus’, so precarious subjecthood earlier, i proposed that truth in history is also falsehood in history making, as another idea of truth (of india, ilk) is represented through artworks of the hindu mythical figures turning into historical ones which jotiba believes to be falsehoods and deceptions. if the idea of india or essence or truth of india is represented through the hindu mythological figures, then there is a need to revisit how jotiba understands history. in gulamgiri or slavery (1991b), through examples of the hindu mythological figures, like parashurama, brahma, vamana, varaha, narasimha, and so on, jotiba argues that these figures are essentially the brahmin oedipus9; historical personas of proud, cunning, and cruel aryan brahmins, who took over the majesty of one true god conquering this land (kshetras) and massacring, oppressing, and enslaving the protectors of the land (kshatriyas / rakshaks) and turning them into kshudras or shudras (insignificant) (1991a, p. 132) turned into appearingly real and glorious personalities as earth-gods eventually. in his books, jotiba uses rationality as a method to subject the brahminical texts to rational questions, and then insults them as the texts are rooted in lies and in violence, discrimination, and subjugation of the shudras and the ati-shudras, based on conquest of their homeland, and as something can be reasoned as deceptions or lies far from being truth or close to it; this method is termed by soumyabrata choudhury (2017) as the ‘rational insult’. if they represent what is essential in history, then history will always condemn or invisibilize the shudras and the ati-shudras who are the ‘original inhabitants’ of india and the subject themselves will be constituted of falsehood as the earth-gods are the construction of false myths, blasphemy, wrong idea about god, deception created by the brahmins and the brahmin oedipus. for jotiba the idea of earth-gods is, as we can interpret, of no higher moral beings to represent truth, but a supernatural and mythical manifestation of the brahminical human society itselfis born out of the brahmin treachery; pompousness is the main reason for the enslavement of the shudras, it is the main reason for the violence they are subjected to and why they even fail to revolt against because of mental enslavement. here, jotiba does not try to reaffirm the personhood of a precarious body unlike in the first instance, rather he moves a step ahead to change the course of history and tries to 9oedipus rex, is a character from greek mythology, popularly referred in freudian psychoanalytic concept. ‘oedipus complex’ is a psychosexual stage of development where a child experiences desires towards their opposite sex-parent and envy for the same-sex parent, as oedipus killed his father lauis and married his mother jocasta by ignoring and trying to escape the prophecy. but here, i am using the term ‘oedipus’ as a reference to ignorance, or wilful divergence from truth, and the sense of pride and superiority of knowledge, of selfhood, not just over the rest of humanity, but also over god. 38 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 reject the very entity that causes the shudras’ precarity, so that they can achieve their personhood with full potential. and for him truth cannot be something unjust, it cannot be the reason of slavery. if it is, then it is manipulated by falsehood. thus, what he demanded is a peasant cultural revolution to bring out the true potential of the truth. through cultural education of the peasants, when they regain a sense of pride attached to their past identity, to the land, and reject the brahmin’s treacherous and deceptive myths and godly figures that will bring the truth to fore. the peasant becomes a new subject in formation, a counter affirmation of identity, and a sense of truth occurs with the arrival of this identity into history and politics, and also justice is done to the historical wrongs. thus, it is not merely the act of history writing that is linked to the truth, but it is the ideology of history that has to do with the truth. his whole work is about passing correctness to continuing truth, to save it from falsehood, and as jotiba passes correctness to the truth, not just seeing, apprehending, reasoning and (dis)confirming it, this transforms him into a philosopher. for i and the readers, to recognize jotiba as a philosopher is also discontinuing the history of philosophy which is rooted in the bias towards plato’s philosopher-king.10 the truth question and the full potential of personhood jotiba’s attempt of liberating the shudras from caste slavery to achieve full potential of their personhood, which is intimately linked to their being the subject of recognizability, was not just limited to highlight and reject the untruth and deception affirmed by the idea of earth-gods in hinduism, but to understand and submit to the truth to mark a sense of emancipation. he believed that if falsehood or manipulation of truth is the reason for slavery, then the real truth would lead to liberation. the method he used to find out the truth is reason. he reasoned and believed that god cannot be multiple, but one; formless, and omnipresent. he reasoned that there exists an intimate relationship between god and humans; like that of parents and children since god is the creator of all beings in the world (phule, 1991a, p. xix). and this reason brought a fight against priestcraft, as he believed one does not need any intermediary to reach to god, a practice fundamental to brahminism. he believed, ‘it is a universal truth that fraternal religion has no place for mutual oppression’ (phule, 1991b, p. 24). for jotiba, the brahmins have kept the depressed and downtrodden ignorant of their human rights and god has bestowed freedom to all people to enjoy equitably all the things created on the earth. a truly liberated human being cannot hesitate to demand these (ibid., p. 25). we can unarguably say that jotiba was the first person in modern india to theorize an anti-caste liberation theology within the monotheistic traditions that developed across the world, as he critically thought of the idea of theos in terms of liberation of the shudra and the ati-shudras, similar to what has developed in the context of the oppressed people across the world. he has compared jesus christ with baliraja (ibid., pp. 60-62), who he considers as the glorious indigenous king of india who has appeared in the hindu myth. he also wrote a na`at (praise of prophet muhammad) 10in plato’s (1968) republic, he asserts that a king must be a philosopher as against the tradespersons, crafts-persons, who were slaves in the ancient greek society, and must be tricked into believing that they are naturally assigned their role in the social hierarchy in order to maintain the social order. they must be followers of the philosopher-king as they have naturally no time and role for doing philosophy. fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 39 (omvedt, 2011), and praised buddhism alongside christianity and islam as potent means to emancipate humanity from social inequality (kale, 2020). satyashodhak samaj and activism jotiba did not limit this philosophy to just himself or his personal beliefs; he institutionalized it into a movement, in building a truly emancipated community whose quest for truth opens ways to achieve their lost or invaded personhood. thus, satyashodhak samaj bloomed in 1873 and all members had faith in the philosophy jotiba espoused equality, freedom and fraternity (phule, 1991a, p. xix). the preachers of satyashodhaks wore a turban, dhoti11 and a blanket, paired with drums in hand (bhadru, 2002, p. 852) which signified how they tried to subvert the norms of body through visibility, by wearing the respectable clothe those entitled to only the ‘upper castes’ against the half-naked body they were supposed to bear. of course, it would be possible to unconceal and reaffirm the unacknowledged merit or essence or personhood of precarious body(ies) and reallocate the recognizability through an artwork, but to reject the precarity in toto needs more than artwork; it needs activism, an organized movement and an institution – an interpersonal engagement. one of the significant works the satyashodhaks did was revolutionizing the idea of marriage. jotiba (phule, 1991a, p. 67) advises in one of his abhangas12 not to rely on the brahmin priests and instead to choose referees from one’s caste; from among juniors, seniors, and friends of both the parties in a marriage. jotiba advocated simple and inexpensive marriages between two parties having mutual affection, examining essential points, such as age and temperament. the couples should offer prayer to the only truth, i.e., god, the creator, garland each other and celebrate their marriage. jotiba also opposed child marriages and supported widow remarriages and inter-caste marriages. but what was the significance of the satyashodhak marriage? the brahminical marriage or partnership was not essentially about love or affection or celebration, or else it would not be limited by the boundary of endogamy. marriage under brahminism was about production of caste and caste lineage, and to maintain its historical continuity. marriage was another, yet most essential way, of reinforcing caste slavery on the shudras since it was only recognized as legitimate with the presence of priestcraft and remained a burden to the poor as it was conducted in the most expensive manner possible. jotiba phule (ibid., pp. 115-116) in his opinion, on a note by mr. b.m. malabari, on infant marriages wrote about the suffering of an infant girl in the process of marriage as she has no place which belongs to her, and is burdened with work and responsibilities from a young age, never taken care of, abused, deprived of education and employment, and vulnerable to premature deaths or forced to commit suicide a condition jotiba compared with the american slaves. jotiba phule (ibid., pp. 117118) also comments on enforced widowhood where a woman is again de-humanized, desexualized, forced to shave her head, improperly clothed and fed, not allowed to join any celebrations, marriages and religious ceremonies, stripped off ornaments, and also at times raped, and consequently shamed for having children. this targeted violence on women’s lives, sexuality, and personhood happens as part of custom, for the benefit, 11traditional indian men’s wearunstitched cloth wrapped round the legs in various styles. 12devotional poetry or hymns, literally translates as ‘non-ending’ or ‘flawless’. 40 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 pleasure, and the lust of the brahmins, and preserves the power of brahmin men over the sexuality of both ‘upper-caste’ women, as well as ‘lower-caste’ men and women, to perpetuate caste in every aspect of life, sexualness, and marriage. satyashodhak marriage was revolutionary as it offered choice to people to marry; it introduced the concept of love and affection into their lives, thus gave them an agency to express their personhood independently. they believed a true partnership could not be established upon the foundation of violence and subordination. and to achieve that jotiba influenced and made associations of the oppressed across castes and genders to help liberate them from compelled servitude to the brahmins / upper castes and brahminical causes, as written in dharmasutras and manusmriti that ambedkar (1990, pp. 52-54) has exposed, which was the only way shudrahood was constituted. for example, satyashodhak couples educated and organized a protest of the nai (barbers) caste against shaving heads of women who lost their husbands (bhadru, 2002, pp. 849-850). jotiba’s son, yashwant, was also married the satyashodhak way. when we can think through friedrich engels’s (1902) origin of family, institutionalized relationships, vis-à-vis marriage, and also through feminist discourses and scholarships around the same, we can understand how these very institutions have been imagined upon women’s subordination and accumulation of private property. but within the hierarchy of caste, the ‘lower castes’ are majorly and traditionally deprived of superfluous wealth, and the social and religious rights to achieve it (phule, 1991b, p. 20). while jotiba to ambedkar and present feminist scholarships are in consensus that within the brahminical social system marriage is a tool of women’s oppression, still on the solution line, their paths diverge. a minority voice, especially of trans*-queer persons, has called for abolition of the institution of marriage which the mainstream discourse has failed to recognize. on the other hand, while the right to love, the right to desire is not allowed to ‘lower castes’ and other marginalized sections, even in today’s time, we remember many couples, like shankar and kausalya, pranay and amrutha, who endeavoured to marry of their choice outside their castes and were brutally murdered or subjected to brutal violence (bbc, 2018), while many others waged legal battles to achieve their right to love and marry, like hadiya and shafin (chandrachud, 2018). many have called for inter-caste, inter-faith marriages, and alternative institutionalized forms of marriages like the ‘self-respect marriage movement’ of e. v. ramasamy periyar, and ‘satyashodhak marriages’ which were materialized to dismantle the brahminical form of marriage that is rooted in the idea of oppression. the question stands: could individual and autonomous partnerships based on love, choice, and freedom without having the institution of and around marriage be as revolutionary in achieving the personhood of the shudras? can we do away with institutions altogether, as some have argued in today’s time? could jotiba have done so? to find an answer to this, one must revisit the historical discontinuity that happened to the truth-value of marriage by the satyashodhaks and how they achieved it. historical discontinuity and the emergence of the new performative marriage is essentially an ontological truth a truth in itself. it is an ontological truth especially because it is not a physical truth; one cannot prove through their body or through their sensory motors that they are married. yet by pronouncing fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 41 words / mantras, which are called mangalashtake, making promises one actually lives the life of a married person, obligated to fulfil all the promises they made during the marriage ceremony, bound by the fundamental ideology and norms of it, even without any corporeal transformation. looking through the lens of austin’s (1962) ‘performativity’, a marriage even though unverifiable, is an ontological truth because through the ceremony and rituals the truth of marriage happens in essence. however, in the brahminical form of marriage there is a ritual coercion; it did not have absolute participation and thus it lacked the very essence or truth value. brahminic form of marriage was based on the idea of a certain kind of survivability in the brahminical social structure which actually faced a historical challenge and discontinuity by the satyashodhak marriage where truth was perceived as beyond survivability; in participation. the satyashodhak marriage can be considered a new performative if not a unique performative as it does not exist in the singularity of the event, even if the first marriage is unique in history, it is still part of ‘iterability’, as derrida (1988) puts it, of the very event. even the first satyashodhak marriage belongs to the structural repetition of it, thus it is not unique, but new as it brings a novelty to the idea of marriage and a new identity around that discourse. the satyashodhak marriage happened as a new performative due to both historical crisis in the social structure and loss of personhood under brahminism; also, with the need and scope for creating a new exceptional identity, a conscious identity which is historically specific marking a discontinuity in the flow of history. and this is the derridean notion that ‘iteration’/ repetition produces legitimacy to the exceptional identity through the discourse of that identity as it suggests the production of a range of the same act, and, thus, the continuity of the discourse of the identity from where the identity was produced through the historical discontinuity. this discourse against the brahminical norms and a solid exceptional anti-brahminic identity would be impossible without the institution of marriage, without its structural repetition without it being performative. performativity of marriage and shudra personhood despite lacking the essence of truth, the brahminic form of marriage survived because of the institutional force backing the foundation of the marriage and the promises made during the ceremony. be it priest-craft, institutions like family, temple, and panchayat,13 which embodied the brahminical ideology, enacted promises, the utterances. similarly, there are certain wishes and promises14 made by the bride and groom during a satyashodhak marriage by making certain performative utterances, such as to show love and devotion to each other, to honour, respect and care for each other and everything created by god, to not discriminate on the basis of caste, race, religion or gender, to respect the dignity of labour and hard work, to not be superstitious, and pursue health, wealth and wisdom with the use of rationality to beget a new generation. the bride demands love, partnership and equality in status from the groom, and the groom, in turn, promises to educate his wife, to be sweet, loving and calm in his behaviour. he also promises honour, dignity and respect for her and to the society and country, and with such utterances of these promises a marriage is solemnised. 13village governing structure 14see simple marriages, in maharashtra andhashraddha nirmoolan samiti. retrieved september 18, 2020, from https://antisuperstition.org/simple-marriages/ 42 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 if we think closely, these promises and wishes are fundamental in achieving the personhood of the shudras. these promises and wishes are essential as they hold an obligation to truth. how would one and the community subvert brahminical norms and values, if they were not guided by the principles and obligation to those principles? it is especially the obligation to live to the ontological truth that is marriage, which guides the shudras to act despite the age long slavery and precarity, wherein women are the most vulnerable. these are the performative promises and wishes, producing a sense of obligation, that make marriage an action truth. the bride and groom must actualize the promises and wishes if not immediately throughout their lives. and this is where the body goes through an intangible, incorporeal transformation giving rise to a new sense of personhood. and that very event marks the socio-political transformation of the subject-hood of the shudras, as it creates a new relationship between the person and the world. on achieving collective personhood to continue this argument, even though the performative promises and wishes stand as an obligation to the truth of marriage, it does not have any truth value to itself. they do not have any verifiability; if anything goes wrong with the performatives, the marriage does not falsify; instead, it turns into an unpleasant marriage or, as austin (1962) observes, an ‘infelicitous act’. thus, marriage is not merely a communication, between both parties, or between subjects and the world, but it is an institutional form of communication where there exists a mastery over that communication through the process of structural repetition. this is the derridean notion of structural repetition which gives meaning to marriage and guides or intentionally controls the performative promises and wishes through institutions. the institutions are essential to persuade others through communication to make a collective to continue the structural repetition. for example, chhatrapati shahu ji maharaj of kolhapur reportedly organized 200 satyashodhak marriages without brahmin priests in 1912, 266 in 1913, and 299 in 1914 (omvedt, 1976). the institutions of and around marriages turn individual actions and marriages into a collective action give birth to a collective responsibility and a collective voice. thus, a collective personhood can also be achieved through that singularized moment of truth between two individuals. so, the collective force is rudimentary in guiding through the incorporeal transformation that happens through the singularized act; to enact the speech of promises and wishes rather than leaving it to the possibility of being rhetoric. this is why i assert that satyashodhak marriage by the satyashodhak samaj was not an unthoughtful choice, instead it was an essential condition in achieving the shudra personhood as a collective in the most possible sense. among one of the satyashodhak marriages, is the marriage of balaji kusaji patil’s son of junar village: the brahmin priest denied recognizing the marriage and declared it void as it happened in his absence (joshi, 1992). in another instance a barber family in talegaon village was socially boycotted for performing satyashodhak marriage (ibid, pp. 53-54). in yet another instance, jotiba’s friend gyanoba sasane wished to marry kasabi the satyashodhak way, but faced threats and abuses from his immediate family, and the shudra villagers (hanlon, 1985, pp. 241-42). in all of the three instances, we can understand that satyashodhak marriages brought to the fore a sense of visibility of the anti-brahminic movement. the satyashodhak marriage is fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 43 essentially a public performance of subverted act to assert the right to autonomous personhood of people who have been denied it. it is an act of self-visibility by those who historically had appearance, but not visibility. it is not about having mere speech, but a voice of those who were socially silenced. it is about asserting sexual rights by people who were either desexualized / hypersexualized or sexually governed. the satyashodhak marriage, which argued previously to bring some incorporeal transformation, now appears to have brought also some bodily change or movement like the sexual rights and freedom of the shudras, right to desires and its governance, independent performance rights and their voice. this is why i call it a historical discontinuity on truth to liberate truth from the deception or untruth of the brahmins; a new truth about the body and self. people discovered and performed such alliances by discontinuing themselves from the historical (un)truth about themselves. the rejection of precarity through performance, visibility, voice and essentialization of rights to autonomous personhood has a risk of heightened precarity. as we see, in all these given cases the claim for autonomous personhood constantly faces the threat of violence. this is why institutions and collectives are an essential part of such performance of protest. in the first case the brahmins had filed a court case against patil for impinging on their rights. the lower court ruled against patil initially, but subsequently the higher court ruled in his favour. in the second case, jotiba advised the barber to discontinue his services to the brahmins, and in the third case, jotiba wrote to ranjan lingu, a lawyer from pune and a satyashodhak member for his help. with lingu’s help police protection was given to sasane to conduct his marriage. this leads us to wonder how institutions of law and police enter the sphere of marriage, what is their value or authority over marriage, what is their role in subversion? this also raises another question: if marriage without priest-craft is invalid as the brahmins assert, does marriage without legal institutions and police become invalid too? we have both yes and no as answers. yes, because without the law ruling in favour of patil, the significance of marriage would be questioned as it would be challenged and threatened by violence from forces which are external to law and police. no, because many marriages also happened without facing legal judgments, thus it makes a statement that even if a court ruled against it, the collective force and institutions backing the marriage would still protest for the rights even without having rights to bring subversion in the norms of law. law and police as external institutions could only defend and justify the act of marriage as authorities, but the otherwise would make law another entity against shudra personhood, and the protest would continue. thus, the public performance of independent marriage appears as a protest, i.e., marrying to have the right to be married independently. if we correctly analyze the situation where brahmins expected law to be governing and restrictive of the shudra freedom and personhood, still the law entered the satyashodhak marriages in a different way. we will understand how, through the movement, the satyashodhak redefined law as not something to govern and restrict, but to change and protect the marginalized sections and their interests. such an idea moves law towards a new definition, away from how law is understood as something rigid, bounding, governing, dictating within brahminism (e.g., manu’s law) towards something where law enters into the discursive realm. it is also very interesting to note how these subversive acts enter into the discursive flow of law, policy and politics, and challenge the normative due to the iterability of the performance this is where the path for the structural subversion begins and jotiba and the satyashodhaks must 44 caste: a global journal on social exclusion vol. 2, no. 1 be credited for leading the path for subversion in structure. such an idea about law and politics later materialized and has been manifested in the works of anti-caste thinkers and activists like ambedkar and kanshiram. numerous marriages with the help of chhatrapati shahu ji maharaj and all other satyashodhaks across maharashtra stand as evidence of how the subversion of hegemonic brahminical norms can reproduce new norms, new institutions to achieve the collective personhood. conclusion i took two events from the art and activism of jotiba and tried to understand how his work brought about a form of historical discontinuity in truth by first, reaffirming essence and personhood to a precarious body; and second, rejecting precarity in achieving full potential of personhood as a collective. while both goals are opposite to each other, still they are in congruence. and this paradox of opposite goals being in continuity, simultaneously brings out the essence of jotiba’s life: the certain truth about it, his own precarious life for being born as a shudra and rejection of precarity, and how the second followed the first one, yet it was simultaneous. this paradox can only happen to certain bodies or subjects as their identity and life is produced in the moment of a structural crisis in history an exceptional moment when one lives both the life of precarity and quest for truth and emancipation at once simultaneously and together. that moment itself we can think of as the moment of truth happening because no other moment in history can make such a paradox in life happen where life continues within the social structure and challenges it at the same time. in that very historical moment because that moment is a rupture, a discontinuity and breakthrough – in that moment truth emerges from its invisibility into visibility, to be unconcealed to its full potential, it makes the world aware about its existence and essence, it makes way to enhance the full potential of personhood of human beings. these are merely two events from jotiba’s life and work, but his work of personhood goes beyond these events. one can analyze from any moment of his life and truth will follow thereafter. this method of research is necessary to save social sciences from the binary between banality and essence, which jotiba himself advocated through his poem on the peasant woman we discussed. in this paper, i have tried to use jotiba’s methodology of discovering essence in the banal life of the peasant woman to argue, similarly, that the banality about jotiba’s life is also what is essential about him. not because he is an essential figure in our history already, but because our ability to look through the banality or everydayness of his life and find essence in them is what makes him, in turn, an essential figure in history. jotiba’s everyday, yet exceptional work on education of women, the shudras and the ati-shudras, work against child marriage, female infanticide, widow remarriage, and opening of infanticide prevention centre, widow homes, etc., are other examples of his relentless work towards making liveable the lives of those who were not considered as human as others. the idea of personhood is linked to many rights, such as right to live one’s gender, right to sexual freedom, right to education, right to love and to be loved, and the right to achieve full potential as a human being. jotiba created a collective consciousness through cultural education, the legacy which was taken up by ambedkar and many other anti-caste philosophers and activists. i must say, jotiba himself is a fracture in the movement of historical continuity of brahminism. fracturing the historical continuity on truth: jotiba phule in the quest 45 references ambedkar, b. r. 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(2016, november 26). babasaheb dr. b. r. ambedkar’s speech in the constituent assembly on 25th november 1949, round table india. retrieved september 16, 2020, from https://roundtableindia.co.in/index.php?option=com_content&view=artic le&id=8876:babasaheb-dr-b-r-ambedkar-s-speech-in-the-constituent-assembly-on-25thnovember-1949&catid=116&itemid=128 white, h. (1978). tropics of discourse: essays in cultural criticism. baltimore: johns hopkins university press, pp. 81-100. — (1980). the value of narrativity in the representation of reality. critical inquiry, 7(1). chicago, il: university of chicago press, pp. 5-27. acta theologica 2015 35(2): 154‑172 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/actat.v35i2.10 issn 1015‑8758 © uv/ufs <http://www.ufs.ac.za/actatheologica> produced by sun media bloemfontein j. urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order abstract would it be fair to say that religious people in general are more suspicious of the believers of other religions than of those who claim to have no faith at all? if the pivotal role of religiosity consists in bringing meaning and order to human life, why should different religions see their respective “orders” as threatening one another? isn’t it possible to trust in the midst of the multi-ordered reality of world faiths while acknowledging the presence (in all religions) of the untruth despite all the truth? this paper seeks to explore those and similar questions by means of elaborating on religions as potential contributors to a global ecumenism. building upon insights of charles taylor and hans küng, i show in what sense the world religions can be considered the source of order as well as disorder and how the plurality of religiouslybased “orders” can be accepted and embraced with trust rather than suspicion. i make a brief against the ‘closure’ of the confessional faiths, against allowing them to close the circle of faith, to slam shut the doors of faith from the intrusions of other faiths… to keep faith behind closed doors, safe and secure (caputo 2001: 35-36). this “manifesto” by john caputo may galvanise the believers of all faiths into a thorough examination of conscience. would it be fair to say that religious people in general are more suspicious of the believers of other religions than of those who claim to have no faith at all? i asked myself this puzzling question while having witnessed a conversation between my friend’s younger sister and her grandmother, a practising dutch-reformed christian. once it became apparent that the girl has a new boyfriend whose dr. jakub urbaniak, research fellow: dept systematic theology, university of the free state, south africa. st augustine college. e‑mail: j.urbaniak@staugustine.ac.za acta theologica 2015: 2 155 name is ahmed, the granny screamed with terror: “don’t you dare to bring a muslim under this roof! over my dead body!” when the girl explained that ahmed, though of arab origins, is not a muslim but an atheist, the older woman said with relief: “well, i hope he is a good boy.” another case in point are christian protests in secular europe or australia against transforming churches into mosques, which do not find a parallel when the same churches are to be changed into museums or art galleries. isolated examples of religious intolerance based on a deep-rooted prejudice or perhaps traces of something more, namely a cross-cultural tendency among religious believers to approach the representatives of other traditions with an a priori mistrust? but if the latter is true, then what does it say about our understanding of religion qua religion? these initial questions led me to pondering the paradox of religious (dis)order. if the pivotal role of religiosity consists in providing a basic orientation, in bringing meaning and order to human life, why should different religions see their respective ‘orders’ as competing or even as threatening one another? isn’t it possible to trust in the midst of the multi-ordered reality of world faiths while acknowledging the presence (in all religions) of the untruth despite all the truth? (küng, van ess, von stietencron & bechert 1986: xix) this paper seeks to explore that question by means of elaborating on religions as potential contributors to a global ecumenism, which – as i will argue – the present already suggests and the future definitely demands. building upon insights of charles taylor and hans küng, i intend to show in what sense the world religions can be considered the source of order as well as disorder and how the plurality of religiously-based “orders” can be accepted and embraced with trust rather than suspicion. i first describe religiosity as a challenge to the modern “immanent frame” (taylor). secondly, i reflect on the potential functions of religion (both desired and undesired) in terms of bringing (dis)order. thirdly – and that is the very core of my analysis – i look at (dis)order stemming from religions conceived of in their plurality. lastly, in conclusion, the dialectics of (mis)trust and (dis)order in the religious context is examined through the lens of küng’s notion of “fundamental (mis)trust”. my overall intention underlying this study is to contribute to the conversation on the conditions of interfaith encounter in the (post)modern context that could prevent the growth of religious fundamentalisms (and often resulting terrorism), or at least minimalise their extent. i join this ongoing interreligious dialogue as a christian theologian, rooted in the catholic intellectual tradition, who every day experiences both the blessings and the challenges related to the religious pluralism inherent in the south african society. i will argue that engaging in a genuine interfaith urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 156 dialogue depends, among other things, upon the believers’ capacity to embrace the multi-ordered reality of the world religions trustingly.1 1. bound to be free: religiosity as a challenge to the immanent frame for the purposes of this study, i’d like to set forth the quasi-definitions of a “religious believer” and a “theologian”. respectively, a religious believer is the one who internalises (i.e., discovers, accepts, and interprets) as well as externalises (i.e., gives outward existential shape to) the divine order and a theologian is the one who brings about both order and disorder in god. the latter can be understood radically, with reference to god’s very nature.2 however, here i interpret it more modestly, namely in terms of theological hermeneutics: the exercise of “chasing the meaning” of the divine – to use hans frei’s expression (1992: 16) – wherein “(dis)ordering” refers merely to the human notion of god. in this sense, a religious believer may be compared to a primitive man who by watching wild animals starts hunting himself or to a physicist who experimentally proves the waveparticle complementarity and based on that principle formulates the thesis that no sharp line can be drawn between the process of observation and what is observed. a theologian, in turn, may be compared to the designer and builder of an aqueduct or the constructor of a thermonuclear weapon. the demarcation line between the two is subtle yet graspable. the divine order, while being internalised and externalised by the believer, becomes the dynamic principle of both one’s own spiritual life as well as one’s own way of being in and for the world. thus religious faith appears as the “believer’s absolute disposition toward the world, which shapes an entire ‘form of life’” (keightley 1976: 73). as insisted by küng, such faith constitutes at once “an act of knowing, willing and feeling, a trust which includes an acceptance of message and person as true” (küng 2008: 162). being a personal commitment, faith binds the 1 in this paper, i refer mainly to christianity. i believe, however, that my considerations can be applied in principle to the three great monotheistic religions. applying them to other religious traditions (including a non-theistic buddhism and confucianism) would require a much broader and more nuanced theological approach. 2 for example, in the light of dipolar theism developed by process thinkers such as charles hartshorne, by making free rational choices human beings are believed to bring actual change in the very life of god who is eternal in character and purpose (abstract pole) but changing in the content of experience (concrete pole) (barbour 1998: 294). acta theologica 2015: 2 157 person; or rather the person binds herself through faith. in contrast to what the etymological meaning of the latin religare might suggest, from the christian point of view the personal “bond” which religion is meant to bring about, protect, develop, and express in social and cultural terms does not serve to restrain or tie back the believer, but rather to set him or her free. even though, negatively speaking, this specific form of adhering involves “being devoid of something”, the positive aspect of “being freed to embrace the divine order” mustn’t be overlooked. put simply, instead of imposing “limits” (grenzen), faith internalises and externalises the divine order by offering “boundaries” (schranken) (kant 2002:142). charles taylor defines religious faith in a strong sense by a double criterion: the belief in transcendent reality, on one hand, and the connected aspiration to a transformation which goes beyond ordinary human flourishing on the other (taylor 2007: 510). in our secular age, we have come to understand our lives as taking place within a self-sufficient immanent order, i.e., an order which can be (though certainly doesn’t have to be) understood in its own terms, without reference to the “supernatural” or “transcendent”. this is our “immanent frame”, the modern picture which – to paraphrase wittgenstein – holds us captive.3 it generates a background, the sensed context in which we develop our beliefs, within whose terms our thinking is carried on, but which is often largely unformulated, and to which we can frequently, just for this reason, imagine no alternative (taylor 2007: 549). with no doubt, the different structures we live in (scientific, social, technological, and so on) constitute such a frame in that they are part of a “natural”, or “this-worldly” order which can be understood as a self-sufficing order. all these forms of impersonal order: the natural, the political, and the ethical can be made to speak together against religious faith in god as personal agent (taylor 2007: 283). however, as taylor insists, …this order of itself leaves the issue open whether, for purposes of ultimate explanation, or spiritual transformation, or final sensemaking, we might have to invoke something transcendent. it is only when the order is ‘spun’ in a certain way that it seems to dictate a ‘closed’ interpretation (taylor 2007: 594). this modern, impersonal and disengaged, concept of reality as the constellation of immanent orders – cosmic, social, and moral – is radically challenged by a religious, personal and engaged, understanding of order as being ultimately grounded in a “transformative transcendence” (taylor 2007: 543). 3 ‘ein bild hielt uns gefangen’ (wittgenstein 1958: para. 115). urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 158 the entire history of humankind can be read through the lens of a navigation between these two standpoints: an “engaged” one in which we live as best we can the reality our standpoint opens to us; and a “disengaged” one in which we are able to see ourselves as occupying one standpoint among a range of possible ones, with which we have in various ways to coexist (taylor 2007: 12). one of the far-reaching implications of the modern secular disengagement, which is correlative to what taylor names “objectification” (taylor 1989: 159-64), is that reality conceived of as the constellation of immanent self-sufficient orders is deprived of its normative force for us, or at least the meanings it has for us in our lives are bracketed (taylor 2007: 283). 2. religion as an agent of (dis)order, for good or ill against such a background, two apparently contradictory sets of understandings of religion as an agent of (dis)order can be propounded. to underscore their dialectical character i label them as “blessed” and “cursed”.4 ia. religion can be seen as an agent of a “blessed order” if and insofar as it involves the objective categoricity of moral commands. the latter requires reference to the unconditioned which alone can impose an unconditional obligation, and to the absolute which alone can be absolutely binding (küng 1980: 468-72). those who see our modern “god-forsaken”, “man-made” world (no need for an inclusive language in this case) in terms of immanence that admits of no beyond, those who think of “natural” order as self-sufficing and thus exclusive of a “supernatural” one, have no grounds to see reality as ethically ordered in an absolutely binding manner (taylor 2007: 550-53). such objective categoricity of moral commands can be warranted but through the religious claims being oriented to something putatively transcendent. ib. on the contrary, religion can be seen as an agent of a “cursed order” if and insofar as it renders possible and furthers the “domesticating” of god (the sacred) as a means of power and control or a cheap comfort. the dehumanising impact of religious fanaticism and fundamentalism is often due to the political entanglements of religion which betrays its 4 this dialectical character of religious (dis)order is pointedly reflected in the title of the one of david tracy’s books, namely blessed rage for order (1975). acta theologica 2015: 2 159 inherent existential mission of providing a basic orientation and order to human life and starts serving to manoeuvre various horizontal orders.5 it will be no exaggeration to say that whenever religion is used by rulers as a political instrument instead of being lived out as faith and ethics, it ends up being abused and eventually degenerates into a tool of oppression. it was precisely such a perverted, “marketable” religion to which bonhoeffer opposed his nonreligious interpretation. one of the somewhat unobvious aspects of his notion of “religionless christianity” had to do with the necessity to protect the mysteries of the christian faith against profanation (bonhoeffer 1971: 286), i.e., against sliding into either other-worldliness or inwardness and thus becoming banal and shallow. in this sense, religious institutions should be responsible for preventing god (the sacred) from becoming “too available” and too entangled in worldly orders, that is to say, too commercialised, too self-evident and too amenable to the “evangelistic sales pitch” (urbaniak 2014a: 479). iia. on the other hand, religion can be seen as an agent of a “cursed disorder” if and insofar as it legitimates and fosters self-centredness instead of other-centredness. internalising and externalising the divine order – what i have defined as the essence of religiosity – requires selfemptying (kenosis) for the sake of the other, whether it expresses itself through sharing in the redemptive suffering of christ whose own sacrifice stemmed from and reflected the self-giving nature of the triune god, or through growing in a universal sympathy and peaceful benevolence towards every sentient being which is an essential aspect of following the buddhist dharma. john hick is right to argue that all great traditions seem to occasion a radical turn from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness (1989: 240). if religion does not lead to such a turn, it de facto replaces the personal and engaged order of transforming relation with a disengaged egocentrism which doesn’t allow the human person to grow through communion, be it vertical or horizontal. such perversion of religiosity not only hinders one from going beyond ordinary human flourishing, but also condemns the self to the chaos of its own finitude, experienced as being at odds with its infinite longings. hence, it brings about a ‘cursed disorder’ within the apparently self-sufficing self. iib. on the contrary, religion can be seen as an agent of a “blessed disorder” if and insofar as it performs a function of the zen “fact” which, “whatever it may be, always lands across our road like a fallen tree beyond which we cannot pass” (merton 1995: 40). one of the expressions 5 of course, as numerous authors point out, various forms of fundamentalisms most likely derive from a complex mix of demographic, political, and historical factors (cf. armstrong 2001). urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 160 of this “positively disruptive” role of religion is the anti-idolatrous use of theological language. when gregory of nyssa apophatically describes the true knowledge of god as “the seeing that consists in not seeing”, when karl barth refers to god as the “wholly other”, or when john caputo uses the term “weakness of god” so as to untie the divine name from the “order of being” and thus release its true evental force, the paradoxical and liberating nature of theological discourse appears in abundance. a productive tension between the dogmatic and the mystical facets of religion provides another case in point. to use buber’s famous distinction (1937), while the dogmatic formulae operate on the disengaged level of “it”, the accounts of mystical experiences are capable of energising and fertilising believers’ connection with the transcendence addressed as “thou”, and thereby infect – as it were – the order of knowledge with the transforming chaos of love. interestingly enough, the dialectical character of religion as an agent of (dis)order becomes most tangible at the two intersections: that of a “blessed order” (ia) and a “cursed disorder” (iia) as well as that of a “cursed order” (ib) and a “blessed disorder” (iib). on the one hand, the objective categoricity of religiously-based principles enables a genuine religiosity to foster other-centredness in spite of the persistent threat of religious faith lapsing into a self-centred concern. on the other hand, the “domesticating” of god (the sacred) aimed at gaining power or finding a superficial comfort can be avoided due to a “zenic function” of religious theory and praxis which positively disrupts various quasi-orders within which humans are vainly trying to confine the infinite. 3. religious plurality as a source of order, for good or ill in terms of the religious landscape of our global world, we are living in a “spiritual super-nova”, a kind of galloping pluralism on the religious plane. what is essentially new about our cultural context is not the mere co-existence of many religions within modern societies (plurality), but its fragilising effects on the believers of all the world religions (pluralism) (taylor 2007: 300; 304; 595). the multiplicity of faiths has little effect as long as it is neutralised by the sense that being like the “others” is not really – to use james’s language – a “living option” for me. today we are witnessing the massive change in the whole background of religious beliefs, i.e., the passing of the earlier “naïve” frameworks, and the rise of the “reflective” ones. the modern homo religiosus has moved from a condition where almost everyone lived “naïvely” within his or her religious and confessional framework, to one in which we all shunt between acta theologica 2015: 2 161 numerous spiritual traditions, in which everyone’s construal tends to be considered more and more “reflectively” (taylor 2007: 14). thus reflection on the conditions and implications, opportunities and threats of religious pluralism, which appears to be a distinguishing mark of the (post)modern thought, must continue to broaden our understanding of religiosity as such. in analogy to the previous point, let’s then explore the positive and negative aspects of religious plurality, first in terms of world religions conceived of as a source of order. ia. religions, in their plurality, can be seen as a source of a “blessed order” if and insofar as they honestly engage in interfaith dialogue aimed at promoting global ethics which is impossible without a global ecumenism. even though there is no consensus formula for the unity of different world religions – nor is there likely to be one in the near future – “toleration, mutual respect, dialogue, and freedom for diverse testimony should be the foundation for interreligious relations” (masciulli 2010: 68). the interfaith encounter in our age remains close to impossible unless its actors seek the way of a solidary presence rather than authoritative and pretentious proclamation, of “witness work” rather than the historical “mission work”, often based on the sense of self-righteousness and exclusivity. to advance what küng names “global ethics” – i.e., the set of values shared by people of various faiths who are committed to cooperate for the common good of all human beings, regardless of their race, gender, sexuality and beliefs – religious believers of all creeds and denominations must first engage in a transforming dialogue, directed both ad intra and ad extra, in the pursuit of what i call here a “global ecumenism”. what i mean by “global ecumenism” is, in brief, a new consciousness, primarily among believers of different religions, that stems from their shared responsibility for the future of humanity and earth as well as from their particular faith-perspectives, as lived and interpreted in a myriad of cultural-social contexts. global ecumenism may enable believers to contribute towards a new world order6 based upon an “interfaith ethic”. such an ethic, which is being developed by küng, knitter and others, constitutes the pivotal aspect of the world religions’ contribution to that new world order. however, for that great theory to permeate the praxis of the religious believers around the globe a new “mind-set”, a “global ecumenism”, is needed as an extension of interfaith dialogue and collaboration. by building on the transformative achievements of the 6 following masciulli, by “world order” i mean the actualisation of human rights and responsibilities worldwide, the attainment of social and economic justice for our era of globalisation and the institutionalisation of global governance through the united nations (2010: 64). urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 162 peace movement, the women’s rights movement, the environmental movement, and the ecumenical movement, world religions – as diverse in their theory and practice as they are – have a chance to successfully build the global sense of unity‑in‑difference (masciulli 2010: 73). whether it will be the catholic principle of subsidiarity, the muslim teaching on the human person as the allah’s khalifah (i.e. god’s “successor”, “representative on earth”), or the buddhist doctrine of the three “roots of evil” (akusalamūla): greed, anger and delusion – what matters is that religions have rich resources to provide the guiding vision for a new world order. it is critical, however, to understand that in our global context marked by a galloping religious pluralism a sense of unity can be fostered only in a way which is self-consciously not founded on any particular religion (2010: 73). put differently, humankind can only build and maintain the common ethical and political order if religious believers representing various faiths converge on it from different points.7 ib. on the contrary, religions, in their plurality, can be seen as a source of a “cursed order” if and insofar as they deteriorate into some sort of fundamentalism – be it based on the “fortress strategy” (exclusivism) or on “conquest through embrace” (inclusivism). while religious exclusivism leads to a ghetto mentality and eventual isolation of a religious group from the wider society and the believers of other traditions, a politically correct inclusivism is more likely to preserve the appearances of dialogical openness and tolerance. however, küng insists that what looks like tolerance often proves in practice to be “a kind of conquest by embracing, a co-optation by admission of validity, and integration through relativization and loss of identity” (1988: 236). thus both exclusivist and inclusivist approaches may potentially harden into some kind of religious fundamentalism or fanaticism. the common denominator of these two perversions of religious order is that each of them in one way or another deems human rationality, and especially the capacity to discern, untrustworthy. ironically, at the same time, in all the cases god (the sacred) is rendered subject to some sort of reductionist rationalisation. religious fundamentalists and fanatics preclude hermeneutic effort aimed at critically discerning the will of god in a given situation. understood in a rigid and heteronomous manner, sacred texts tend to paralyse their minds, instead of stimulating them. the truth on which they claim to have a monopoly sets them free from the world but never for its sake. established rules and codes of behaviour, which by no means dispense with the need to think of what is good and what is evil, when followed blindly, can lapse into excuses for judging and condemning 7 john rawls’ idea of an “overlapping consensus” provides a useful theoretical background for reflecting on that prospect (1999: 340). acta theologica 2015: 2 163 others and become a means of achieving absolute control over the religious subjects. doctrine, which should serve the purpose of elucidating divine revelation here and now, tends to be reduced to a set of propositions formulated in such a way as to end all discussion and maximise certainty. and god becomes nothing more than a license to realise a particular religious (and often political) agenda. since everything which potentially transcends the ‘rigid order’ is regarded with deep suspicion and puts the quasi-believers on the defensive, god must also fit into their schema or is not considered god anymore. gamaliel’s wisdom is irrelevant to religion fed by and generating such a cursed order: reading and discerning the signs of time is baseless if one knows a priori what is god’s will. you cannot fill the cup that is already full. 4. religious plurality as a source of disorder, for good or ill now, i turn to the negative and positive aspects of religious plurality in terms of world religions considered as a source of disorder. iia. religions, in their plurality, can be seen as a source of a “cursed disorder” if and insofar as they foster conflicts, persecutions, and discrimination on the one hand, or a “cheap tolerance” (which is nothing but “indifference in disguise”) on the other. while the divisive and militant chaos brought about by those realising pseudo-religious agendas undermines the common grounds of social life and sets people against one another, a “lazy pluralism” not only has nothing to contribute to human culture, but also condemns believers to some sort of spiritual anonymity. on the surface, treating these two phenomena jointly as expressions of the cursed disorder propelled by religions may appear illegitimate. what underlies a religiously-based violence seems to sit uneasily with the ideals preached by the proponents of what tracy labels a “relaxed pluralism of privacies” (1981: 451). however, i want to argue that at bottom these two sorts of attitudes are congruent in that each of them stems ultimately from self-centredness which results in a failure to reach out to the hard concreteness of other religious believers. terrorists who instrumentalise religious teachings in order to create a mood of fear for political (and ideological) reasons have absolutely no regard for the “other” who becomes an often completely innocent victim of their “deadly combination of war and theatre” (combs 2003: 10). the hippies-like religious pluralists who uncritically approve and endorse without differentiation all the religions – though usually they have universal love and peace on their lips – de facto contribute to what herbert marcuse encapsulated as a urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 164 “repressive tolerance” (1969: 95-137), wherein anyone can say anything because no one, finally, is taken seriously. interestingly, also here god is sacrificed at the altar of a concept (such as hick’s “ultimate reality”), this time a concept which is inclusivist to the point of becoming abstract and unapproachable. to paraphrase the famous heideggerian expression, before such a nameless god we can neither fall to our knees in awe nor can we play music and dance (heidegger 2002: 72). of course, one ought to acknowledge that the immediate consequences of a “lazy pluralism” are not even closely as detrimental as those of religious conflicts and violence. but the establishment of peace among the world’s religions cannot be reduced to the avoidance of religious wars or clashes of civilizations. the former (and unfortunately still present) military confrontation, aggression and revenge must make way for reciprocal economic and cultural cooperation, compromise and integration (küng 2005). for that to happen, world religions ought to oppose the self-oriented “cursed disorder” which – either through open violence or through diffusing religious identity in a truth-less indifferentism – removes all grounds for an authentic dialogue and unity based on accepting the real differences and making them source of mutual growth. iib. on the contrary, religions, in their plurality, can be seen as a source of a “blessed disorder” if and insofar as they boldly undertake the venture of self-exposure to the other while seeking unity-indifference. to capture the full meaning of that point, in continuity with the previous one, we can refer to the historical effects of deism on the modern paradigm (immanent frame). according to the ordered and purified religion founded on reality alone (nature and reason) that has been introduced by deists, god reveals godself through creation, making demands on us which this creation itself reveals to our rational scrutiny, and also making otiose all the forms of personal relation between creator and creatures (taylor 2007: 292). in this context, differences between traditional religions (as opposed to the “new religion of humankind”) are reduced to the accretions brought about by the “priestcraft” and accounted for by sinister forces which profited from darkness and ignorance. being seen as essentially false, all these differences must be denied for the sake of returning to the simple underlying common truth (2007: 292-3). such univocity was vainly sought by deism and, ever since, has been promoted by its modern and contemporary variations that envision a world without religion or a world of a religious syncretism based on a purported reductionist overarching principle of unity between religions. all such endeavours have been (and still are being) radically challenged by the factual plurality of religions which in our societies takes the shape acta theologica 2015: 2 165 of religious pluralism sensu stricto, with all its fragilising effects on the believers. based on our present level of understanding, no plausible generalisation – on either commonality or complementarity or dialectical relationships between different faiths – can be made (tracy 1991: 100; masciulli 2010: 65). to consider the great world religions as varying conceptions of, and responses to, the one ultimate, mysterious divine reality (as in pluralism à la john hick) is feasible only at the cost of playing down the actual and essential differences between them, which leads to what i described above as a “lazy pluralism” and thus, ultimately, relativizes all the religious truth-claims. as tracy argues, there is no one who stands so far above all religions as to be able to judge the religious truth “objectively”. whoever thinks he can float above everything and judge it, will easily melt his waxen wings, as icarus once did, in the sun of truth (küng 1988: 249-50). world religions – as long as they are allowed to speak with their own diverse voices – bring a “blessed disorder” into any such attempt and thus make it clear that our real target should be not univocity, but unity‑in‑difference enabled by the genuine self-exposure to the other. in such perspective, the parallel “pluralism of truths” emerges, none of which is more complete than (or superior to) others, but all of which are problematic and hence open to criticism and further development in a variety of ways (masciulli 2010: 68). again, we cannot fail to notice that at the intersections of a “blessed order” (ia) and a “cursed disorder” (iia) as well as a “cursed order” (ib) and a “blessed disorder” (iib), the complementarity of the suggested dimensions of religious plurality reveals itself at its maximum. on the one hand, the other-centred global ecumenism can embody what schillebeeckx called “the cry for the humane” (1989: 318) and thus contribute to a new world order in a way as to prevent religiously-based violence and discrimination. it also has a function to perform in terms of opposing a “repressive tolerance” through reaching out to the hard concreteness of the other and allowing his/her différance (derrida) to be what it is and to play the role it has to play. on the other hand, fundamentalist tendencies present in all world religions can be overcome by self-exposure to other religious believers which is capable of opening up the confessional teachings to their inherent possibilities and bringing out those possibilities anew in our pluralistic context by “grooving” with the other, by finding a rhythm with the other in genuine dia‑logue (crawford 2010: 308). urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 166 5. to trust in the midst of multi ordered reality even today religion can be conceived as an answer to the deepest human craving and a path of fulfilling the highest good. and yet when we think of the long line that runs from aztec sacrifice, through torquemada, to bin laden and the most recent atrocities committed by isis, religion that used to be seen as a natural vehicle of faith appears – perhaps today more than ever – as “a threat, a dangerous temptation, a distraction, or an obstacle to our greatest good” (taylor 2007: 548). besides, the multiplicity of religions, confessions and denominations, of religious sects, groups and movements in the world today, as well as their combination, intermingling, and opposition which can hardly be surveyed – all that is so confusing, indeed disquieting, that in the end religion often seems to contribute to what knight labels a “new world disorder” (2010: 4; cf. also küng 2001: 127). consequently more people are asking where an orientation can be found in the modern disorientation, as insecurity increases with the profusion of information about diverse religions and theologies, which seem to relatizise radically one”s own religious identity (küng 1980: 466). thus on the one hand religion has shaped and continues to shape the ideas that undergird world order(s), but on the other it is likely to add to the overwhelming sense of chaos. crosspressured between the open and closed perspectives on the immanent frame in which we live, humanity faces today a fundamental choice regarding the role and the meaning that religiosity will be granted in shaping a new world (dis)order. in the last analysis, whether a person is capable of seeing religion only as a menace or also as a promise seems to depend on something more primordial than the prevailing cultural expressions of a given religious tradition (taylor 2007: 548-9). i want to suggest that this “more primordial thing” can be identified with what küng refers to as “fundamental trust” and “fundamental mistrust” in reality as a whole. as human beings, we are emerged in (existentially) and presented with (cognitively) uncertain reality to which we can, in principle, adopt a positive or negative attitude. this reality is identical with all that constitutes the world in space and time including other human beings and, in a special way, myself: “i” who as subject can become object to myself. because the world is broken and the human person is all too human, we find ourselves threatened by the nothingness, transitoriness, and finiteness of all that is human and earthly. at the same time, we are somewhat inclined to say “yes” to this uncertain reality which, when accepted trustfully, reveals to us its identity, meaning, and value. since reality is not self-evident, an essentially free and always risky decision vis-à-vis everything that exists must be made, in which a person stakes herself without any security or acta theologica 2015: 2 167 guarantee. thus is the basically existentialist account of what kierkegaard named the great “either/or”, what ignatius loyola in the exercises called “electio”, and what sartre meant by “choix originel” (urbaniak 2014a: 453; cf. also urbaniak 2014b). the mutual correlation between order and trust becomes evident first on the epistemological plane. since there is no empirical method by which one’s ‘‘trust in order’’ can be tested, to assert it is itself an act of trust, of ‘anticipatory confidence’ (taylor 2007: 550). from here one may move to the ontological dimension. berger interprets human propensity for order as one of the ‘signs of transcendence’ in the midst of the world and he rightly notices that it is grounded in a trust that, ultimately, reality is meaningful, i.e., ‘‘in order’’, ‘‘all right’’, ‘‘as it should be’’: ‘‘faith in order is closely related to man’s [sic] fundamental trust in reality’’ – berger points out (1969: 71-2). my argument is that through such fundamental trust religious believers can be rescued not only from a deep disorder in their own lives, but also from suspicion towards the other believers whose interpretation of that ultimate ‘orderliness’ of reality, accepted in trust, differs from their own. therefore, fundamental trust appears as a condition of the possibility of a trustful interfaith encounter, of ecumenism capable of producing an ‘interreligious contribution’ to a global order. in the face of the crisis of “global trust”, evident in the international political and social arenas (soderberg 2006: 235-240), world religions may either challenge the growing climate of mistrust or contribute to it. when the universal propensity for order is approached by religious believers with fundamental mistrust, it is almost doomed to give birth to some kinds of “cursed (dis)order”. the intensification of religious fundamentalisms that we observe in our day witnesses to a serious rupture in world order which rival religious actors driven by the same fundamental mistrust are vainly attempting to fill: while status quo actors (“conservatives”) seek to “fortify the system’s pedigree”, the more radical actors (“revolutionaries”) aim at revealing the system’s “flawed foundations” (philpott 2000: 206). minorities of fundamentalist extremists present in most world religions, including different types of christianity, who seek conflict, war and victory over other religions, render a “clash of civilizations” a fearful possibility (huntington 1996). of course, one can account for such phenomena by referring to historical enmity, the effects of eurocentric colonialism, the growing globalisation which causes moderates to shrink in size (at least in some world religions), and so on. but we must not fail to notice that their ultimate reason and common denominator lies in the solidifying “culture of suspicion” (masciulli 2010: 65). for instance, war on terrorism that for many has become “the defining paradigm in the struggle for global order” (booth & dunne 2002: ix), is rooted in the religious rhetoric of mutual mistrust urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 168 that seems to be fuelling both terrorist and counter-terrorist positioning (knight 2010: 14-15). in such a context, knight wonders whether organised religions – given their long history of strained and often confrontational relationships with the secular world – are still capable of promoting progress toward a peaceful world order, or will they simply “serve to aggravate global division and confrontation in an already divided world” (knight 2010: 18). the fact that fundamental trust constitutes one of the keys to global ecumenism, by no means implies that believers should treat their respective religions with a naïve trust. both unconditional trust and mistrust in religion qua religion are potentially dangerous. mistrust can easily deteriorate into a blind secularism which forces a “closed interpretation” on the modern immanent frame. trust, in turn, is likely to lapse into either fundamentalism (if it has one particular religion, in itself, as its object) or indifferentism/ syncretism (if it concerns all the religions without any differentiation). the great monotheistic traditions share the understanding that ultimate trust cannot be put in any sort of “religious truth”, but only in the divine revealer of that truth. put more radically, there is absolutely nothing in the world to which a person might completely entrust herself. inherent in both judeo-christian and muslim revelation is the belief that god alone has the whole truth for god alone is the absolute truth (küng 1988: 251). in this sense, jews, christians and muslims can have confidence in their religions and yet remain protected from religious fundamentalisms only insofar as they trust ultimately not in judaism, christianity or islam but in “god with a name” (yahweh for jews, the triune god of jesus christ for christians, allah for muslims). only in such a way, they can trust in the midst of the multi-ordered reality of world religions while remaining genuinely religious as jews, christians or muslims. it also means that religious believers are challenged to rethink the question of truth in the spirit of freedom and responsibility rooted in their respective religious “orders”, while resisting the temptation to trivialise that question and sacrifice it to the utopia of the future universal “religion of humankind”. unlike arbitrariness, freedom in religious context is not just freedom from all ties and obligations, something purely negative, but also freedom for new responsibility – toward the earth, toward one’s fellow men and women, toward oneself and toward god. the freedom, therefore, as seen by world religions, is always freedom for the truth (küng 1988: 237). the difficult via media leads as always between the extreme of a narrowminded, conceited dogmatism which sees its own truth as detached from the truth of the others, and that of an arbitrary and irresponsible eclecticism which relativizes all truth and nonchalantly equates all values and standards (küng 1986: xix). the only space for the growth of an authentic religiosity, acta theologica 2015: 2 169 capable of respecting the truth of others and yet faithful to its own, lies between fanaticism for truth and forgetfulness of truth. “blind fanaticism for the truth” – küng says – “has at all times and in all… religions brought unbridled violation and murder. conversely, forgetfulness of the truth, lack of orientation, and loss of norms have meant that many people no longer believe in anything” (2001: 78). this question of understanding “truth” in the context of religious plurality and pluralism is likely to play a decisive role in shaping a future global ecumenism. in this paper, i presented the myriad of interpretations of religion(s) as a source of a blessed and a cursed (dis)order with the purpose of accounting for my central thesis that world religions in their ecumenical unity‑in‑ difference (i.e., as long as they reach to each other’s hard concreteness in a genuine dialogue) can be entrusted with the role of contributor to a new, more just and humane global order. for that to happen, fundamental mistrust must give way to fundamental trust and naïve trust in religion to ever-challenging trust in god. this entails both freedom and responsibility for truth as well as critical discernment of how a religious truth should be embraced in action for the sake of humanity and earth. i am aware that my interpretation of world religions as a source of (dis) order may at times appear to be heavily theoretical, not to say abstract. however, my point is to show that, within the conceptual framework based on taylor’s account of religiosity as a challenge to immanent frame, the notion of (dis)order, in its correlation with that of fundamental (mis)trust (küng), can be employed as a hermeneutic key in the ecumenical and interfaith discourse, relevant to the challenges of our radically pluralistic reality. a more historically and culturally grounded reflection on how the plurality of religiously-based “orders” can be accepted and embraced with trust rather than suspicion must follow. let me recapitulate my reflection with masciulli’s insight on an interfaith dialoguing in the pursuit of a global responsibility: if believers… attempt to question and answer with other (potentially) self-transcending knowers and doers in today’s world context of collective practicality and co-responsibility, we need not fear the fragmentation and wars of a clash of civilizations, for we can be reasonably confident that our common transcendental cognitive and moral being will provide ample opportunities for unity, despite the human proclivity to alienation through hatred and resentment, and to rigid ideology for fear of dialogue (2010: 78). urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 170 bibliography armstrong, k. 2001. the battle for god: a history of fundamentalism. new york: ballantine books. barbour, i.g. 1998. religion and science: historical and contemporary issues. london: scm press ltd. berger, p.l. 1969. a rumour of angels: modern society and the rediscovery of the supernatural. garden city, n.y.: doubleday. bonhoeffer, d. 1971. letters and papers from prison. the enlarged ed. ed. e. bethge. new york: the macmillan company. booth, k. & dunne, t. 2002. worlds in collision: terror and the future of global order. new york: palgrave macmillan. buber, m. 1937. i and thou. transl. r.g. smith. edinburgh: t.&t. clark. caputo, j.d. 2001. on religion. new york: routledge. combs, c. 2003. terrorism in the twenty‑first century. 3rd ed. new jersey: prentice hall. crawford, n. 2010. theology as improvisation: seeking the unstructured form of theology with david tracy. irish theological quarterly 75(3): 300-312. frei, h.w. 1992. types of christian theology. ed. g. hunsinger & w.c. placher. london: yale university press. heidegger, h. 2002. identity and difference: the onto‑theo‑logical constitution of metaphysics. transl. j. stambaugh. chicago: university of chicago press. hick, j. 1989. an interpretation of religion: human responses to the transcendent. new haven: yale university press. huntington, s.p. 1996. the clash of civilizations and the remaking of world order. new york: simon & schuster. acta theologica 2015: 2 171 kant, i. 2002. theoretical philosophy after 1781. ed. h.e. allison, p.l. heath. transl. g.c. hatfield, m. friedman, h.e. allison, p.l. heath. cambridge: cambridge university press [ebook]. keightley, a. 1976. wittgenstein, grammar and god. london: epworth press. knight, a.w. 2010. eschatology, religion and world order. religious studies and theology 29(1): 1-24. küng, h. 1980. does god exist?: an answer for today. transl. e. quinn. new york: doubleday. 1988. theology for the third millennium: an ecumenical view. transl. p. heinegg. new york: doubleday. 2001. global responsibility: in search of a new world ethic. new york: continuum. 2005. ‘in search of a global ethics’. a talk delivered at the markkula center for applied ethics at santa clara university, 31 march 2005 [online] retrieved from: [http://www.scu.edu/ethics/practicing/focusareas/global_ethics/laughlinlectures/kung-world-religions.html [2015, 26 january]. 2008. on being a christian. transl. e. quinn. new york: continuum. küng, h., van ess, j., von stietencron, h., bechert, h. 1986 christianity and world religions: paths of dialogue with islam, hinduism, and buddhism. transl. p. heinegg. garden city, n.y.: doubleday. marcuse, h. 1969. repressive tolerance. in: r.p. wolff, b. moore jr., h. marcuse (eds.). a critique of pure tolerance (boston: beacon press), pp. 95-137. masciulli, j. 2010. catholic christianity and world order: a political-religious analysis. religious studies and theology 29(1): 63-80. merton, t. 1995. thoughts on the east. new york: new directions bibelot. philpott, d. 2000. the religious roots of modern international relations. world politics 52(2): 206-245. rawls, j. 1999. a theory of justice. revised ed. cambridge, mass.: belknap press of harvard university press. urbaniak religions as a source of (dis)order 172 schillebeeckx, e. 1989. the role of history in what is called the new paradigm. in: h. küng, d. tracy (eds.). paradigm change in theology. transl. m. köhl (edinburgh: t.&t. clark), pp. 307-319. soderberg, n.e. 2006. the crisis of global trust and the failure of the 2005 world summit. ethics & international affairs 20(2): 235-240. taylor, c. 1989. sources of the self. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press. 2007. a secular age. cambridge, mass.: belknap press of harvard university press. tracy, d. 1975. blessed rage for order. new york: seabury press. 1981. the analogical imagination: christian theology and the culture of pluralism. grand rapids, mi.: w.b. eerdmans. 1991. dialogue with the other: the inter‑religious dialogue. grand rapids, mich.: w.b. eerdmans. urbaniak, j. 2014a. ‘from religionless christianity to immanent grace: bonhoeffer’s legacy in badiou’. journal of religion 94(4): 457-484. urbaniak, j. 2014b. ‘freed by trust, to believe together: pursuing global ecumenism with küng and tracy’. hts teologiese studies / theological studies 70(1), art. #2047, 9 pages. http://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/2047. wittgenstein, l. 1958. philosophische untersuchungen. oxford: b. blackwell. keywords sleutelwoorde religion godsdiens disorder wanorde order orde 286 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 the asian renaissance by anwar ibrahim.malaysia: times books interna1ional, 1996, l 59pp. it is not my habit to make public statements on political leaders and i usuahy prefer to hold my views private. but with my close friend and brother, anwar ibrahim, the deputy prime minister and finance minister of malaysia, i have no hesitation. i have known him for over 20 years and he has always been a model of virtue because he combines truthfulness with sincerity. thi shows in his actions both personally and professionally. from being an idealistic young man he grew into one of the most important political leaders of malaysia. the good qualities he had when he was a promising young leader have not left him, in pite of the whithering effect politics can have on one's character. anwar is now just as honest and sincere, humble and charitable as he was when i first met him over 20 year ago. throughout this time, he has been strict with him elf and gener­ ous with others. demonstrating a true nobility. above all, he has striven accord­ ing to the dictum that "there is no right superior to the right of truth." unfortunately, too few people have striven for the truth which anwar has pur­ sued, leading us to the crisis in the world today. in the east, failure to think has lead to passive decay wmle in the west, thinking too much and often wrongly book reviews 287 has lead to active decay. anwar is neither willing to sleep over the truth, nor live in error, and he strives against both in his new book, the asian renaissance. in it, he argues for action based on wisdom and sets out many of his visions and policy positions in a finely composed and edited collection of speeches and arti cles that he has delivered over the last few years. anwar argues against replac ing the passive decay of the east with another ideology that is full of errors and leads to false activity. anwar is unique in seeking to oppose these false ideolo gies with the wisdom of the east. to the proponents of dynamism for its own sake, anwar responds that dynamism can never be meaningful or effective out side the truth “pure and simple.” he recognizes that it is senseless to substitute one error for another, whether it is “dynamic” or not. the first thing he does when he arrives at any new post is intensive study and comework from both traditional and contemporary sources, following the wisdom to “seek knowl edge even if it be in china.” one must strive for the truth before strength and efficacy, and must apply knowledge sincerely. he knows that if a truth does not give strength, one has not really grasped it. anwar recognizes that it is neces sary to be dynamic in the light of the truth, not to change the truth to justify inac tion. in the opening chapter, anwar argues that eternal truths guide action. he points out that the “renaissance” referred to in the book‘s title does not imply imitation of the european renaissance; rather, it refers to the spiritual reawak ening of the eternal truths lying dormant in the east. in fact, the asian renaissance opposes the european renaissance, which attempted to resurrect the promethean man in his rebellion against heaven “as an agent independent of the theological and natural order” (p. 18). anwar argues that this is an inversion of the islamic concept of man as god’s vicegerent on earth (khafifat allahfi af-ard), as well as the confucianjen and the christian “imugo dei or ponrifex, the bridge between heaven and earth” (p. 18). as his broad range of references from different religious traditions demonstrates, anwar believes that the theosophies of asia, such as confucianism, taoism, hinduism, buddhism, and the wisdom therein, as well as the impact of islam in the region give the asian renaissance a strong spiritual foundation on which to build civilization. he recognizes that the truth uniting all religions is god, the absolute, and that everything relative is attached to the absolute--corre sponding to the two fundamental witnesses in islam: “there is no divinity but allah” and muhammad is the messenger of allah.’’ in this sense, anwar dis cerns that more than one civilization has approached the “mountain of truth,” and that it has more than one side to be seen. some people may cynically argue that anwar’s position is politically motivated; however, i know that he has held the same position since has was a young idealist when he asserted that god has sent prophets to every nation. according to anwar, asia’s spiritual foundation is intrinsic to the renais sance now underway. it stands in direct opposition to the secular view that the asian renaissance is based upon a rejection of spiritual principles and that the “mountain of truth” uniting the religions must be denied to make the east “dynamic.” anwar opposes this proposal for active decay by arguing that the asian renaissance is sustainable only by the application of truth, not error, to a new environment. he applies this vision to the social, political, and eco nomic realms in the follow chapters. the guiding principle from which anwar 288 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 4 2 derives policy for all meas of life is the truth that man is homo viaror, or “a being m a t e d for a higher pwpose.” in the second chapter, anwar describes the dialogue and symbiosis between the east and the west. in this regard, anwar strives not to compromise the truth in his criticism of both. indeed, any act of criticism based on spiritual principles is an act of charity in the profoundest sense, and anwar seeks to deliver it here. some muslims are afraid to tell the m t h out of fear of appear mg discourteous, or showing p r d u b . however, the prophet had perfect odab and asserted the truth in a direct and open manner. he never sadiced truth for the sake of udab and i believe anwar endeavors to follow the ethics of prophethood in this matter. he points out the weaknesses of both the east and the west and the need for one to learn from the other. anwar suggests that the west can benefit from the traditional wisdom of the east to replace its false activity with a true rest. he also suggests that the east should replace its false rest with a true activity guided by spiritual principles, and calls for a dia logue between east and west. however, a dialogue requires two parties who believe they can learn something from the other. while many believers from the different faiths are ready for constructive dialogue, i do not believe the secularists are humble enough yet to learn from the people of traditional wis dom. there is little mom for dialogue when one party is full of itself. in the third and fourth chapters, @war moves to the political and legal domains, respectively, where he has served so admirably. concerning politics, anwar maintains that one cannot postpone or avoid the question of man’s ulti mate aim and purpose. indeed, politics regulates man’s common or social life, and man is dependent upon support from the community. it follows that either one recognizes god as the absolute and pursues politics mindful of the eter nal destiny of man or one believes that there are no higher obligations, lead ing one to fall under the attraction of machiavellianism in which politics is the art of taking and maintaining power for private gain. there is no supportable middle position as the secular humanists claim because there is no good-will without god. anwar, therefore, argues for democracy and justice based on spiritual principles. he suggests that these principles require one to fulfill one’s duties, not simply to insist on rights, and that the secular argument for unconditional rights without responsibility leads to the destruction of society and the loss of authentic democracy. “he who does not observe the rights of god is bound to abuse the rights of the people.” anwar envisions that a democracy based on spiritual realities will look quite different from its senti mental, secular counterpart. a brief cautionary note is in order here regarding anwar’s selection of quotes from various western sources which are included in the english edi tion. the reader should not interpret anwar’s favorable quotation of a given individual as an endorsement of the person’s argument. for example, anwar quotes john lock favorably regarding the “inviolability of human life and property” @. 52). however, loch was also the father british empiricism and denied the epistemological basis of knowing the traditional mths which guide anwar‘s spiritual approach to policy. starting with a passional error, lock pnwxeds logically to conclusions on politics that are nevertheless passional opiniorrp and may accidentally coincide with reality. in quoting such opinions. anwar endorses the conclusion based on spiritual realities, not the flawed argument leading to the quoted conclusion. in this sense, it would be pre book reviews 289 ferrable to qualify favorable quotations from these sources to avoid confusing readers who are not familiar with the arguments behind them. in chapters five and six, anwar moves to the economic domain in which he has achieved so much success. he argues that the separation of ethics and eco nomics is false, and that all activities should be integrated around a “sacred center.” anwar denies that economic choices can be reduced to quantitative considerations, and that different ends exist qualitatively. secular economics abstracts from god and attaches all things to utility, making the relative absolute and limiting economics to quantitative considerations of “more” or “less” utility while denying the qualitative existence of intrinsic “good“ and “evil.” anwar opposes this, arguing that economics is applied ethics that addresses the qualitative choices man must face as homo viafur, and as repre sentative of god whose choices conform to his design for the world. while chapter five focuses on c o m p t i v e economics, chapter six focuses on specific areas of concern for social welfare, such as productivity, taxation, and privatization. anwar has an impressive track record in this area. serving as finance minister during a period in which malaysia grew dramatically, he instituted policies that ensured that the poor were not left out of this prosper ity. he introduced low-cost housing and worked with businesses to arrange for interest-free loans to ensure that the needy had suitable homes. his concern with ethics and his unwillingness to neglect those who were not powerful enough to stand up for themselves prove his sincerity. his stellar performance earned anwar the confidence of western leaders. former prime minister of great britain, margaret thatcher, noted, that if britain wants a solution to its economic problems, then britain should borrow anwar. finally, anwar concludes his book with chapters on culture, islam in southeast asia, and asia in the future. throughout these chapters, he applies the spiritual principles set forward at the beginning of the book to resolve problems and answer questions in each area. although believers may sincere ly draw different implications from the truth that god is the absolute and all things are attached to god, no sincere believer can dispute that this is the right approach to respond to the passive and active decay of both the east and the west. anwar argues that this is the only basis on which the asian renaissance can be sustained. perhaps the main lesson of the asian renuissunce is that there should be no activity outside the truth. although this may not guarantee success, it is the first principle of action. i know anwar has always striven to fulfill his duty without asking whether he would be successful or not-his faithfulness to principles has its own intrinsic value. the logically and spiritually correct activity which anwar smves for can have incalculable effects in the spiritual reawakening of the east. it can also provide a truly spiritual model for the west. one of my friends said that anwar’s book is the region’s manifesto for the 20th century. i think he was right. taha jabir al-‘alwani president, school of islamic and social sciences leesburg, virginia rosen the philosophy of error and liberty of thought js mill on logical fallacies j.s. mill on logical fallacies 121 the philosophy of error and liberty of thought: j.s. mill on logical fallacies university college london frederick rosen © informal logic vol. 26, no. 2 (2006): pp. 121-147. keywords: john stuart mill, philosophy of error, fallacies, liberty of thought, truth, history of logic, bacon, socrates, aristotle abstract: most recent discussions of john stuart mill’s system of logic (1843) neglect the fifth book concerned with logical fallacies. mill not only follows the revival of interest in the traditional aristotelian doctrine of fallacies in richard whately and augustus de morgan, but he also develops new categories and an original analysis which enhance the study of fallacies within the context of what he calls ‘the philosophy of error’. after an exploration of this approach, the essay relates the philosophy of error to the discussion of truth and error in chapter two of on liberty (1859) concerned with freedom of thought and discussion. drawing on socratic and baconian perspectives, mill defends both the traditional study of logic against jevons, boole, de morgan, and others, as well as the study of fallacies as the key to maintaining truth and its dissemination in numerous fields, such as science, morality, politics, and religion. in mill’s view the study of fallacies also liberates ordinary people to explore the truth and falsity of ideas and, as such, to participate in society and politics and develop themselves as progressive beings. i logic lays down the general principles and laws of the search after truth; the conditions which, whether recognised or not, must actually have been observed if the mind has done its work rightly. logic is the intellectual résumé: les discussions les plus récentes sur le systems of logic (1843) de john stuart mill négligent le cinquième livre, qui traite des sophismes. mill suit non seulement la reprise d’intérêt dans la doctrine aristotélicienne traditionnelle de richard whately et d’augustus demor gan, mais développe aussi des nouvelles catégories et une analyse originale qui améliore l’étude des sophismes dans le contexte de ce qu’il appelle «la philosophie de l’erreur». j’explore cette approche, et ensuite je relie la philosophie de l’erreur à la discussion de la vérité et de l’erreur dans le deuxième chapitre de on liberty (1859) qui traite de la liberté de pensée et de discussion. mill s’inspire des perspec-tives de socrate et de bacon pour défendre l’étude traditionnelle de la logique contre jevons, boole, demorgan, et d’autres, ainsi que l’étude des sophismes comme moyen clé pour maintenir la vérité et sa dissémination dans plusieurs champs, tels que la science, la moralité, la politique, et la religion. selon mill, l’étude des sophismes libère les gens ordinaires à explorer la vérité et la fausseté des idées, à participer dans la société et la politique, et à s’instruire. 122 frederick rosen complement of mathematics and physics. those sciences give the practice, of which logic is the theory. it declares the principles, rules, and precepts, of which they exemplify the observance. ——— of logic i venture to say, even if limited to that of mere ratiocination, the theory of names, propositions, and the syllogism, that there is no part of intellectual education which is of greater value, or whose place can so ill be supplied by anything else. its uses, it is true, are chiefly negative; its function is, not so much to teach us to go right, as to keep us from going wrong. but in the operations of the intellect it is so much easier to go wrong than right; . . . logic points out all the possible ways in which, starting from true premises, we may draw false conclusions. ——— logic is the great disperser of hazy and confused thinking: it clears up the fogs which hide from us our own ignorance, and make us believe that we understand a subject when we do not. ——— to those who think lightly of school logic, i say, take the trouble to learn it. you will easily do so in a few weeks, and you will see whether it is of no use to you in making your mind clear, and keeping you from stumbling in the dark over the most outrageous fallacies (cw xxi: 238, 239). these brief passages have been taken from a discussion of logic in j.s. mill’s inaugural address delivered to the university of st. andrews (1867) (cw xxi: 215-57). they contain not only advice to young students as to how to pursue their studies but also allusions to his own intellectual development.1 here we find a restatement of his belief in the role of logic in the search for truth, the relationship between logic and other sciences like mathematics and physics, his socratic belief in looking into and through ‘the fogs which hide us from our own ignorance’, and his acceptance of aristotelian scholastic logic with its emphasis on avoiding ‘stumbling in the dark over the most outrageous fallacies’. mill’s major work on logic, a system of logic, ratiocinative and inductive (1843) (cw vii, viii) is not as carefully studied nowadays as are his more accessible works, on liberty (1859) (cw xviii: 213-310) and utilitarianism (1861) (cw x: 203-39). despite this recent neglect, there is a considerable body of philosophical literature which concentrates on the logic, as, for example, in the work of jackson, anschutz, ryan, skorupski, and scarre, to name a few.2 unfortunately, none of these commentators have taken much, if any, notice of the fifth book of the logic, which is a substantial essay concerned with fallacies (cw viii: 733-830). yet, as we have seen in the passages quoted above, mill seemed to place the detection of fallacies at the heart of the study of logic. at the time mill wrote the logic, the inclusion of material on fallacies was somewhat contentious. that the study of fallacies (though often rejected in the j.s. mill on logical fallacies 123 modern period) persisted in the early part of the nineteenth century was due to the influence of aristotelian logic, and, particularly, the influence of aristotle’s on sophistical refutations (aristotle 1955: 10-155). that this study of dialectical argument should accompany the main demonstrative or didactic arguments centred on the syllogism ensured forever, it seemed, that the study of fallacies should form part of logic generally. the scholastic tradition in logic, still followed in english universities in the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries and enshrined in the textbooks of robert sanderson and henry aldrich, faithfully repeated the aristotelian list of thirteen fallacies.3 instruction in fallacies was doubtless regarded as light and often amusing relief from the otherwise tedious study of the syllogism. many modern philosophers, however, had followed their rejection of aristotelian philosophy generally with a rejection or severe curtailment of the usual treatment of fallacies. locke’s essay concerning human understanding, for example, not only failed to consider the traditional list of fallacies, but also contained a critique of aristotle and of the relevance of the syllogism as the instrument of reason and source of knowledge (locke 1975: 671 [iv.xvii.4]). traditional logic, for locke, was regarded as productive only of useless disputes, which were of little benefit to society. ‘for notwithstanding these learned disputants, these all-knowing doctors’, he wrote, ‘it was to the unscholastick statesman that the governments of the world owed their peace, defence, and liberties; and from the illiterate and contemned mechanic (a name of disgrace) that they received the improvements of useful arts’ (locke 1975: 495 [iii.x.9]). for locke, and for others in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the study of problems in logic, and, particularly, those that concentrated on the syllogism, tended to be translated into the study of language and/or psychology. in this development (and locke’s essay is a good example) the traditional exposition of fallacies was omitted, as contributing more to disputes and their enjoyment than to the acquisition of knowledge. in contrast with the example of modern philosophers rejecting aristotelian logic and the study of fallacies, as derived from the sophistical refutations, mill, as we have seen, fully embraced the traditional study of fallacies. this somewhat unusual starting point for a nineteenth-century philosopher with thoroughly progressive views owed a good deal to richard whately’s elements of logic (1826) (see whately 1975). whately sought to revitalize the study of logic at oxford by restating aristotelian logic in a new context, and, in the process, abandoned what seemed to be the list of aristotelian fallacies in favour of a new schema. the underlying momentum for the new context might be described as coleridgean. whately’s elements of logic and companion work, elements of rhetoric (1827) (see whately 1828), were first published in the encyclopaedia metropolitana, a work inspired by coleridge to advance progressive views which could be seen as emerging out of traditional thought and institutions (see encyclopaedia metropolitana 1845: i.1 43, 193-240, 241-303).whately’s return to aristotelian logic, set forth in a contemporary context with modern examples and without the baggage of 124 frederick rosen scholasticism, seemed to be an ideal expression of this vision.4 i have discussed mill’s encounter with whately’s elements of logic and his essays on ‘bentham’ (1838) (cw x: 75-115) and ‘coleridge’ (1840) (cw x: 117-63) elsewhere (see rosen 2006, 2007a, 2007b), and will simply note here that mill’s two essays on the leading british thinkers of the age were written and published at the same time (between 1838 and 1840) as the book on fallacies in the logic was drafted and completed (cw vii: xcviii-xcix). mill’s retention and development of the study of logical fallacies was linked to his enthusiasm for the belief that the contrary ideas of bentham and coleridge might be successfully combined in thought and debate. there were other factors which might have led mill to turn to and develop the traditional study of logical fallacies. jeremy bentham’s book of fallacies was published in 1824, and bentham claimed that he was in certain respects the first person since aristotle to reconsider the forms of logical fallacies (bentham 1824: 2). although bentham was strongly criticized by whately for the one-sidedness of his radicalism (rather than for his treatment of fallacies), mill thought that whately was ‘unnecessarily severe’ in his criticisms (see whately 1975: 194n-5n; cw xi: 31). as we shall see, mill also adopted one category from bentham’s work. however, mill never fully endorsed bentham’s study of fallacies and tended to ignore it, as well as george bentham’s elaborate discussion of fallacies based on it (see g. bentham 1827: 220ff). a more general and pervasive influence of bentham on mill’s treatment of fallacies might be found in the conceptions of evidence developed by bentham in the rationale of judicial evidence (1827), edited by mill (see bentham 1827; kubitz 1932: 51-2). mill also might have claimed the authority of francis bacon for his approach to traditional logic. although many philosophers believed that bacon was the champion of the rejection of the syllogism and of aristotelian logic generally in favour of a rigorous inductive approach, mill saw in bacon a forerunner of his own position that sought to combine induction with syllogistic logic (cw xi: 12-13). bacon argued that, even though traditional logic ‘has done more to fix errors than to reveal truth’, there was no reason to attack traditional logic or even to challenge the ancient view of logic, as the new inductive system could easily exist side by side with the aristotelian system (bacon 1994: 38). ‘let there be therefore, as a boon and blessing for each side, two sources of knowledge and two ways of organizing it; and likewise two tribes of thinkers and philosophers, two clans as it were, not in any way hostile or alien to each other, but linked in mutual support .. ..’ (bacon 1994: 40). furthermore, mill’s discussion of error, as we shall see, owed a good deal to bacon’s analysis of ‘idols’, and, particularly, to ‘idols of the theatre’ in the novum organum. another factor that lay behind mill’s study of fallacies was his commitment to a socratic method in philosophy (see urbinati 2002: 142-3). mill had been attracted to socrates, his hero and mentor, from his earliest days. ‘the socratic method’, he wrote in the ‘early draft’ of the autobiography, ‘. . . is unsurpassed as a j.s. mill on logical fallacies 125 discipline for abstract thought on the most difficult subjects. nothing in modern life and education, in the smallest degree supplies its place’ (cw i: 24). after a brief account of the socratic elenchus, he concluded that, even as a boy, the socratic method ‘took such hold on me that it became part of my own mind; and i have ever felt myself, beyond any modern that i know of except my father and perhaps beyond even him, a pupil of plato, and cast in the mould of his dialectics’ (cw i: 24). mill wrote his translations and brief comments on nine platonic dialogues for the monthly repository in 1834-5 (see cw xi: 37-238), just prior to his writing the essays on bentham and coleridge and the fifth book of the logic. he also would have known that in the sophistical refutations aristotle was reflecting and consolidating the earlier debates between socrates and the sophists and others, which appear in these dialogues. mill was strongly impressed by plato’s picture in the gorgias and republic ‘of the solitary and despised position of the philosopher in every existing society, and the universal impression against him, as at best an useless person, but more frequently an eminently wicked one’. . . (cw xi: 399). he adopted grote’s arguments that while plato might have despised the sophists, because they were more concerned with appearances than with reality, and took money for their services, they were not the real enemy.the real corruptors of the young were not the sophists, but society itself: . . . their families, their associates, all whom they see and converse with, the applauses and hootings of the public assembly, the sentences of the court of justice. these are what pervert young men, by holding up to them a false standard of good and evil, and giving an entirely wrong direction to their desires. as for the sophists, they merely repeat the people’s own opinions. (cw xi:400) mill not only adopted grote’s view of the importance of the sophists to public debate and the role of socrates in this debate, but, in a review of grote’s posthumously published study of aristotle, he also acknowledged the importance of the sophistical refutations in the development of an important aspect of logic and in the pursuit of truth. even though aristotle’s work was a study of the art of arguing for victory rather than for truth, mill saw nothing wrong with such public debates so long as they took place within established rules. furthermore, he believed that aristotle regarded such exercises in dialectical argument to be valuable in the pursuit of truth. quoting from grote, mill gave three reasons for this belief (cw xi: 508). first, the debates constituted a kind of mental exercise that was valuable and stimulating. second, the debates put one in touch with the ordinary opinions held by society, and hence led the philosopher to attempt to understand and modify them. third, such dialectical debate influenced science and philosophy, encouraging one to look at both sides of questions and to determine which answers were true or false. mill believed that aristotle’s method in dialectical argument ‘was greatly in advance not only of his own time, but of ours’: 126 frederick rosen his general advice for exercise and practice in dialectic is admirably adapted to the training of one’s own mind for the pursuit of truth. “you ought to test every thesis by first assuming it to be true, then assuming it to be false, and following out the consequences on both sides.” this was already the practice of the eleatic dialecticians, as we see in the parmenides. (cw xi: 508) mill’s study of fallacies was based on the lonely philosophical mission of socrates and the framework of aristotle’s various categories of fallacies provided by generations of logicians. he proposed a major revision of the aristotelian categories without rejecting aristotle’s achievement and without abandoning the perspective of the socratic dialectician on which it was based. ii mill’s analysis of fallacies was intended to form part of what he called the ‘philosophy of error’ (cw viii: 737 [v i §3]5). this phrase may seem strange to us, though it would not have been odd for mill to use it. at the beginning of the book on fallacies, mill quoted briefly from malebranche and hobbes, both of whom wrote on the theme of error (see cw viii: 734; intro. quotation). malebranche, for example, began his the search after truth as follows: error is the cause of men’s misery; it is the sinister principle that has produced the evil in the world; it generates and maintains in our soul all the evils that afflict us, and we may hope for sound and genuine happiness only by seriously laboring to avoid it. (malebranche 1997:1) for malebranche, the main source of error was not one that lay outside the individual, but was closely connected with the misuse of freedom. this misuse of freedom consisted of a failure to regulate the will in its eagerness to embrace the truth. such eagerness led one to embrace the appearance of truth and to go beyond the understanding to judge of matters and give consent to the truth of propositions about which one had no clear perception (malebranche 1997: 16). according to hobbes, we might distinguish between falsity and error. falsity arose from ‘pronouncing rashly’, as when in seeing the sun in the sky and its reflection in the water we say that both are the sun and then conclude that there are two suns. such a false conclusion was represented by hobbes as a departure from the agreed conventions of names and not the commission of error. error arose from our senses and thinking, as, for example, when we saw the sun’s reflection in the water, we imagined that it was actually there (hobbes 1997: i.55 6). the deception here, as in malebranche, proceeded from within the individual, even though hobbes did not subscribe to the doctrine of freedom of the will. for hobbes, error was a deception, to which we consented, that proceeded from reasoning itself. such an error was further distinguished from absurdity (‘senseless speech’), as when one referred to a round triangle, etc., which was nonsense rather than error (though often commonly referred to as error) (see hobbes 1997: iii.32). j.s. mill on logical fallacies 127 for both malebranche and hobbes, error could be combated by the individual through the exercise of freedom of thought and the use of reason. however, not all philosophers accepted this position. locke, for example, included a chapter ‘of wrong assent, or error’ (iv.xx) in the essay, which seemed to diminish the scope of freedom and the occasions for error, leading him to the paradoxical conclusion that ‘there are not so many men in errours and wrong opinions, as is commonly supposed’ (locke 1975: 719). the conclusion was paradoxical not because locke believed that we generally knew the truth, but despite our ignorance, we did not actually make erroneous judgments. for most ordinary people the need to labour left them unable to consider the validity of the proofs of arguments to establish whether or not they were erroneous or true (locke 1975: 706ff). for those who had leisure, locke found them ‘confined to narrowness of thought, and enslaved in that which should be the freest part of man, their understandings.’ required religious observance, it seemed, supplied the opinions of the leisured few, and filled up the minds of those who had only a little leisure from the drudgeries of labour. locke referred to this phenomenon as the propagation of ‘truth without knowledge’, ‘where men are forced, at a venture, to be of the religion of the country; and must therefore swallow down opinions, as silly people do empiric’s pills, without knowing what they are made of, or how they will work, and have nothing to do, but believe that they will do the cure. . .’ (locke 1975: 708-9). furthermore, most people could not follow a syllogism or other process of reasoning and in this respect ‘there is a greater distance between some men, and others. . . than between some men and some beasts’ (locke 1975: 709). others did not wish to cultivate the understanding due to weakness of will, the ‘hot pursuit of pleasure’, drudgery in their business and domestic lives, laziness, oscitancy, an aversion to books and study, and simply took on trust what they found convenient and ‘in fashion’. they also tended to care for their bodies but not for their souls (locke 1975: 710). logic and hence fallacies, for locke, thus played a small role in the lives of most people. as locke wrote: ‘tis enough for him to obey his leaders, to have his hand and his tongue ready for the support of the common cause, and thereby approve himself to those, who can give him credit, preferment, or protection in that society. thus men become professors of, and combatants for, those opinions, they were never convinced of, nor proselytes to; no, nor even had so much as floating in their heads: and though one cannot say, there are fewer improbable or erroneous opinions in the world than there are; yet this is certain, there are fewer, that actually assent to them, and mistake them for truths, than is imagined. (locke 1975: 719) if locke seemed to provide little scope for the work of the individual logician, and no estimation of that interior freedom apparently necessary to detect errors in reasoning, mill certainly did. for mill, however, not all errors were relevant to the study of fallacies. he would not include casual mistakes, such as the incorrect 128 frederick rosen addition of a sum, the remedies for which would be simply paying greater attention and further practice (cw viii: 736-7 [v i §2]). nor did he include moral (as opposed to intellectual) sources of erroneous opinions, which were due to indifference to attaining truth on the one hand and bias on the other. both of these were highly powerful and influential, but, in mill’s opinion, they could not operate on their own. they predisposed one to erroneous opinions, but did not actually determine them. indifference to the truth led to error, because it prevented the mind from collecting evidence and making careful inductions. bias would dispose the mind towards accepting erroneous theories, but would not in itself lead to errors (cw viii: 737-8 [v i §3]). this analysis of the human condition led mill to an apparently gloomy conclusion regarding philosophical theories: the natural or acquired partialities of mankind are continually throwing up philosophical theories, the sole recommendation of which consists in the premises they afford for proving cherished doctrines, or justifying favourite feelings: and when any one of these theories has been so thoroughly discredited as no longer to serve the purpose, another is always ready to take its place. (cw viii: 738 [v i §3]) this apparently endless succession of false and misleading philosophical theories is bad enough, but to make matters worse, those who attempted to use their intelligence to gather and assess evidence and make inferences from such evidence were often ‘stigmatised’ with names like ‘scepticism, immorality, coldness, hard heartedness, and similar expressions’ (cw viii: 738 [v i §3]). in spite of this view of the human condition mill believed that whenever bias operated successfully, it was first necessary to undermine the understanding. anyone sufficiently on guard regarding evidence and inference would be able to resist such subverting pressures of bias. as he wrote: there are minds so strongly fortified on the intellectual side, that they could not blind themselves to the light of truth, however really desirous of doing so; they could not, with all the inclination in the world, pass off upon themselves bad arguments for good ones. (cw viii: 739 [v i §3]) mill thus proposed an opposing force of the incorruptible intellect that could withstand the presence and influence of bias. there were a few people who could resist the appeal of bias and both the illusions and enticements of fashionable philosophical theories. ‘if the sophistry of the intellect could be rendered impossible’, mill wrote, ‘that of the feelings, having no instrument to work with, would be powerless’ (cw viii: 739 [v i §3]). he did not propose a campaign to eliminate bias; that would have been impossible. bias was derived from human nature itself. one might have concluded that the inevitability of the succession of one false but fashionable theory after another meant that we were condemned to live wholly in a world of false consciousness. but, as we have seen, mill allowed full scope for the search for truth in all fields where the intellect might bring enlightenment. j.s. mill on logical fallacies 129 logic itself would enable truth to be discovered and maintained across all subjects, but the study of fallacies had a special role. it not only supported the pursuit of truth, but it equally could be used to undermine this apparently endless succession of bogus philosophy based on bias and an indifference to truth. even though new theories might be waiting in the wings to succeed those discredited by philosophical analysis, the philosophy of error itself might develop and become more widespread, thus limiting the effect of these fashionable theories. for mill, then, the study of fallacies provided an important ally for philosophical analysis in preparing the mind and assisting in the development of mental habits that protected the individual and enabled one more easily to detect error. although mill’s contribution to the ‘philosophy of error’ is striking, it is not necessarily original. his depiction of the succession of erroneous philosophical theories might well have been taken from bacon’s ‘idols of the theatre’ in the novum organum (bacon 1994: 55-6; see urbach 1987: 105-6). bacon’s depiction of the ‘various dogmas of philosophies’ as ‘so many stage plays creating fictitious and imaginary worlds’ must surely have been mill’s source for his own striking vision of the endless succession of false philosophical theories. in addition to bacon, one should also mention the port-royal logic of arnauld and nicole, which mill generally regarded favourably (see arnauld and nicole 1996: 135, 189-203ff). here one can find an account of fallacies that included, but also looked beyond, the aristotelian list. the discussion of error sought to account for how one acquired false principles as much as, following aristotle, how one reasoned incorrectly from these principles. like arnauld and nicole, mill was also concerned with how self-love, interest, or passion might lead one to adopt various principles, and he was also willing to take up the challenge of understanding such influences or thought from the perspective of fallacious reasoning. mill’s discussion of the philosophy of error fed into his other writings on numerous levels. to take one example, it enables us to appreciate more fully his analysis of ‘of the liberty of thought and discussion’—the title and topic of chapter 2 of on liberty (cw xviii: 228). this chapter, usually referred to in terms of freedom of expression or freedom of opinion, contains two elements with which freedom is concerned: thought and discussion. it is clear from the opening paragraphs that mill’s philosophy of error was lurking in the background. the pursuit of truth, which liberty would facilitate, was inconceivable for mill without the presence and beneficial use of error. if liberty was denied, an erroneous opinion could not be exchanged for a true one; but if an original opinion was true, the denial of liberty meant that one could not benefit from ‘the clearer perception and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with error’ (cw xviii: 229 [l ii para.1]). the study of fallacies was one important way of encouraging the beneficial dialogue between truth and error, which enabled truth ultimately to replace error in inference, deduction, and in argument generally. 130 frederick rosen mill also repeated in on liberty his belief that error could be corrected (cw xviii: 231 [l ii para.7]), but there were new elements in his argument that were not present in the logic. on the one hand, consistently with the logic, he could write: it is a piece of idle sentimentality that truth, merely as truth, has any inherent power denied to error, of prevailing against the dungeon and the stake. men are not more zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or even social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either (cw xviii: 238-9 [l ii para.17]). although mill continued by qualifying his remarks, he provided here, as in the logic, no assurance that truth would triumph over error. at one point he also alluded to the tiny minority concerned with truth in any society and the near impossibility of struggling against error among this elite: . . . for, on any matter not self-evident, there are ninety-nine persons totally incapable of judging of it, for one who is capable; and the capacity of the hundredth person is only comparative; for the majority of the eminent men of every past generation held many opinions now known to be erroneous, and did or approved numerous things which no one will now justify. (cw xviii: 231 [l ii para.7]) not only do we see in this material an allusion to bacon’s ‘idols of the theatre’ and mill’s own use of it, but also to such great figures as socrates and jesus who, as individuals, died for truth (cw xviii: 235-6 [l ii paras.12,13]). one might have expected mill to endorse the position in the logic regarding the struggle against the endless procession of false philosophical theories and to confirm his ringing statement in the introduction to the logic that logic was concerned with the cultivation and development of one’s own thoughts: ‘if there were but one rational being in the universe, that being might be a perfect logician; and the science and art of logic would be the same for that one person as for the whole human race’ (cw vii: 6 [intro. §3]). nevertheless, just following the passage quoted above concerning ninety-nine out of a hundred people, mill posed a different question and gave to it a very different and apparently more optimistic answer: why is it, then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among mankind of rational opinions and rational conduct? if there really is this preponderance —which there must be unless human affairs are, and have always been, in an almost desperate state—it is owing to a quality of the human mind, the source of everything respectable in man either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely that his errors are corrigible. (cw xviii: 231 [l ii para.7]) one might admit that mill’s assertion of the preponderance of rational opinion and conduct was set forth somewhat tentatively, but still wonder how his belief that error was correctable (a belief at the heart of the philosophy of error and linked to the very idea of liberty of thought) could sustain the thesis that mankind j.s. mill on logical fallacies 131 was mainly rational in opinions and conduct. what happened to the moral causes of error, i.e., indifference to truth and bias that led so many to accept error? mill’s sudden ascription of rationality to mankind reveals an important duality in on liberty that fits together only tentatively or, we might even say, hypothetically. on the one hand, to overcome error, the great thinker must be free to follow his intellect wherever it led. the person who thought for himself or herself, and despite errors, did not give up, was superior to those who held only true opinions due to an indifference to the truth. on the other hand, mill was not satisfied with the social consequences of what the great thinker might achieve, because this achievement might take place in a society where most people suffered mental enslavement. as mill wrote: not that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thinkers, that freedom of thinking is required. on the contrary, it is as much and even more indispensable, to enable average human beings to attain the mental stature which they are capable of. there have been, and may again be, great individual thinkers, in a general atmosphere of mental slavery. but there never has been, nor ever will be, in that atmosphere, an intellectually active people. (cw xviii: 243 [l ii para.20]) clearly, for mill, in on liberty an ‘intellectually active people’ was as important as that ‘one rational being in the universe’ of the logic. but in on liberty mill also attempted to bring them together. it is important to be clear about what mill sought to bring together. o’rourke has argued correctly against himmelfarb, skorupski, and others, who see different and conflicting principles of liberty in on liberty, with freedom of expression being primarily other-regarding, while liberty generally is mainly concerned with self-regarding acts (o’rourke 2001: 107ff). he has also emphasized not only that freedom of thought is primarily self-regarding, but also that it is the driving force behind freedom of expression generally (o’rourke 2001: 77ff, 96 and n). thus, for o’rourke, there is no conflict or inconsistency between the liberty of expression emphasized in chapter 2 of on liberty and the discussion of liberty generally in that work. my problem with on liberty is of a different kind. the development of the philosophy of error in the logic clearly adds to and supports o’rourke’s thesis in showing what mill meant by the very idea of liberty of thought. my problem arises from mill’s clear acceptance of the role of the great individual thinker, like socrates, in a world that despises or rejects such a person. how then did mill shift the argument from the great thinker to the ‘average human being’? he did so by again invoking the philosophy of error. all human beings have the capacity to correct error. indeed, if freedom of thought, and this aspect of it, provides the dynamic for the whole of on liberty, and if such liberty is the only bulwark against the tyranny of the majority, it is no wonder that mill remained, as we have seen from the quotations from his inaugural address, the great advocate of the study of logic. this study, and particularly that of fallacies, is one important way for the 132 frederick rosen logic of a socrates to become that of an average human being. even if only a few can aspire to greatness in philosophy, everyone is capable of searching out and correcting error. for mill, therefore, as evident in the inaugural address, the study of logic is the bedrock of the search for truth generally in any society that values liberty. iii if some of mill’s contemporaries, like whately and de morgan, were content to expound, more or less, the original aristotelian list of fallacies (see whately 1975: 131-203; de morgan 1926: 276ff), mill set out an entirely new classification (cw viii: 743 [v ii §2]). this classification ultimately created five categories with many forms illustrated within each category. most of the aristotelian list reappear in mill’s discussion in various ways, but mill’s aims and treatment of the fallacies were original and distinctive. a full survey of all of the fallacies might be somewhat tedious, so i shall confine myself to a general survey of his main categories and some estimation of his achievement. mill reached his five categories by making a series of distinctions between various kinds of belief and argument. the first category was based on a distinction between beliefs held to be true simply and without evidence and those based on inferences from evidence. fallacies, related to the former, were called fallacies of simple inspection or a priori fallacies which were held without direct evidence or experience, but created a presumption in favour of a proposition which allowed the holder to discard rules of induction (cw viii: 741 [v ii §2]). the six examples given by mill covered an enormous amount of ground, and alexander bain thought that the category might be included in a separate treatise on its own, and, additionally, need not be the special province of the logician (bain 1870: ii.375). let us look briefly at some of the fallacies mill discussed. the first consisted of mistaking subjective laws for objective ones. this category is somewhat reminiscent of bentham’s dramatic account in an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation, much admired by mill, of the way most previous philosophers had used subjective ideas as objective principles and foundations for their systems. bentham mentioned, for example, such common ideas in philosophy and theology, as moral sense, common sense, understanding, rule of right, fitness of things, law of nature, law of reason, natural justice, natural equity, good order, truth, and the doctrine of election (bentham 1996: 21ff, 26n-7n; see rosen 2003: 221ff). mill had a similar object in mind at the level of logic in seeking to dismiss much of what he called ‘intuitionism’ in favour of his own empiricism. but he believed, and expressed this belief at a number of points in the logic (e.g. cw vii: 8-9, 14 [intro. §4]; viii: 644 [iv i §2], 746-7 [v iii §1]), that logic could not and need not resolve metaphysical issues or determine fundamental philosophical positions. nevertheless, the exposure of logical fallacies might undermine such positions and require those who took them to restate or abandon their arguments. j.s. mill on logical fallacies 133 although mill fully appreciated this way of thinking among intuitionist philosophers, he turned instead to illustrate the fallacy by considering several popular beliefs where subjective thoughts were wrongly given objective status. for example, he took the common remark, ‘talk of the devil and he will appear’, to illustrate how an idea was supposed to establish a reality (cw viii: 748 [v iii §2]). the work of alchemists to make gold potable and exploit its miraculous properties, mill believed, was based on the idea that because gold was considered something precious and to be marvelled at, it must have marvellous properties as a physical substance. the fallacy that wonderful events must have wonderful properties was illustrated by the example of showers of objects falling mysteriously in northern italy being regarded as manna from heaven and eaten avidly by the local population, even though analysis revealed such manna to consist of the excrement of insects. so eagerly was the so-called manna consumed that it was difficult to obtain samples for analysis (cw viii: 750 [v iii §3]). mill then went on to consider how this fallacy infected scientific and philosophical thinking. the fallacy consisted in the belief that ‘our ideas of things must be true of the things themselves’ (cw viii: 751 [v iii §3]). at the level of philosophy one example was the tendency to believe that things that we think of together must exist together, and a second example: that which is inconceivable must be false (cw viii: 750 [v iii §3]). the first part of this fallacy (that a must accompany b because it is involved in the idea of b) was first exhibited, he believed, by descartes, but was later taken up by spinoza, leibniz, and was widespread in modern german philosophy. mill then wrote: i am indeed disposed to think that the fallacy now under consideration has been the cause of two-thirds of the bad philosophy, and especially of the bad metaphysics, which the human mind has never ceased to produce. our general ideas contain nothing but what has been put into them, either by our passive experience, or by our active habits of thought; and the metaphysicians in all ages, who have attempted to construct the laws of the universe by reasoning from our supposed necessities of thought, have always proceeded, and only could proceed, by laboriously finding in their own minds what they themselves had formerly put there, and evolving from their ideas of things what they had first involved in those ideas. in this way all deeply-rooted opinions and feelings are enabled to create apparent demonstrations of their truth and reasonableness, as it were out of their own substance. (cw viii: 752 [v iii §3]) this passage has been quoted at length to show that mill regarded any philosophy that did not engage with a rigorous empiricism as being fundamentally flawed. although a work on metaphysics might be necessary to dispatch that particular doctrine, the analysis of fallacies was intended to undermine particular aspects of it. 134 frederick rosen mill illustrated the second part of this fallacy, that things that cannot be conceived together cannot exist together, by using an example taken from isaac newton. newton responded to descartes’ attack on the theory of gravitation on the grounds that the sun could not act upon the earth as it was not on the earth, by supposing that there must exist an ether that filled up the void between sun and earth and enabled gravity to operate. mill quoted newton, himself, as writing: that gravity should be innate, inherent, and essential to matter, so that one body may act on another, at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else, by and through which their action and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity, that i believe no man, who in philosophical matters has a competent faculty of thinking, can ever fall into it. (cw viii: 754 [v iii §3]) ‘this passage’, mill continued after the quotation from newton, ‘should be hung up in the cabinet of every cultivator of science who is ever tempted to pronounce a fact impossible because it appears to him inconceivable’ (cw viii: 754 [v iii §3]). mill then dealt with a string of a priori propositions that did not depend on evidence, e.g.: matter cannot think; space or extension is infinite; nothing can be made out of nothing. his point was that we do not know if these maxims are true or false, but that they are often presumed to be true merely because we think that they must be so. ‘a large proportion of all the errors ever committed in the investigation of the laws of nature’, he wrote, ‘have arisen from the assumption that the most familiar explanation or hypothesis must be the truest’ (cw viii: 756 [v iii §3]). mill’s discussion of the remaining five fallacies in the category of simple inspection ranged widely from common beliefs to scientific and philosophical theories. he criticized such beliefs as that the lungs of a fox would relieve or cure asthma and that turmeric (which is yellow) was good for jaundice; he rejected the view that some substances bore the ‘signatures’ of the humours, e.g., red roses of the blood and flowers of saffron for the bile. there were also extensive criticisms of philosophical doctrines associated with ‘mysticism’ (the hindu scriptures, platonism, and hegelianism), and also with the epicureans and bacon (cw viii: 757ff. [v iii §4]). bain was clearly impressed with mill’s exposition. he regarded mill as the direct successor to socrates and bacon. ‘socrates’, he wrote, ‘was the first person to urge strongly the natural corruption of the human intellect, and the need of a very severe remedial discipline, which, in the shape of personal cross-examination, he was wont to apply to his fellow athenians’ (bain 1870: ii.375). from socrates, bain moved directly to bacon, whose discussion of the ‘idols’ in the novum organum he thought bore a striking resemblance to mill’s discussion of a priori fallacies. j.s. mill on logical fallacies 135 iv mill’s second major distinction was between those fallacies that arose where evidence was distinctly conceived (categories 2-4) and those (category 5) where evidence was indistinctly conceived. he took the name of this last category, ‘fallacies of confusion’, from bentham’s book of fallacies (cw viii: 742 [v ii §2]; bentham 1824: 213-58).6 mill stated that this class of fallacy occurred where ‘. . .the source of error is not so much a false estimate of the probative force of known evidence, as an indistinct, indefinite, and fluctuating conception of what the evidence is’ (cw viii: 809 [v vii §1]). bain considered this category as ‘boundless and indefinable’. ‘no man’, he wrote, ‘can foreshadow the intricacies, the incoherences, the perplexities, the entanglements, possible to the human understanding’ (bain 1870: ii.376). what was considered under this category by mill was ‘extra-logical’ and the fallacies could not be absorbed into the main principles of induction and deduction. for bain, ‘a considerable stretch of the logician’s province is implied in the taking up of this class of errors’ (bain 1870: ii.375). as with the first category bain also proposed to consider this one separately, as not wholly part of inductive and deductive logic (bain 1870: ii.376). the three classes of examples—ambiguous terms, petitio principii, and ignoratio elenchi—were familiar parts of aristotle’s schema of fallacies in thought (extra dictionem). but mill’s grouping them in this larger category of fallacies of confusion gave them an additional importance, not all of which was captured by bain’s suggestion that they could be separated from the ‘boundless and indefinable’ mass of fallacies in this category, because they occurred most frequently. nevertheless, by examining these categories, we shall be able to assess mill’s own objects with this material. the first of the fallacies was that of ambiguous terms (cw viii: 809ff. [v vii §1]). this fallacy occurred in reasoning either when there was an ambiguity in the middle term or when terms were used in different ways in premises and conclusions. to illustrate the range of fallacies under this heading, mill quoted at length from whately who provided numerous examples of the fallacy. one was the assumption that words coming from the same root necessarily had the same meaning. hence, the argument—projectors (entrepreneurs) are unfit to be trusted; this man has formed a project; therefore, he is unfit to be trusted—was fallacious because not everyone who developed a project was a projector. another fallacy displaying ambiguity in the premise and conclusion might be: to be acquainted with the guilty is a presumption of guilt; this man is so acquainted; therefore, we may presume that he is guilty. here, there was a difference in the meaning of ‘presumption’ and ‘presume’. mill devoted a good deal of attention to numerous confusions in philosophy. one was connected with the term ‘theory’, whose meanings ranged from ‘a completed philosophical induction from experience’, which was put into a form 136 frederick rosen related to practice so that theory was the explanation of practice. in another and ‘more vulgar’ sense, theory ‘means any mere fiction of the imagination’, which attempted to explain how a thing might have been produced rather than explaining how it was produced. when an attempt was made to discredit philosophy, theory and theorists in this latter sense were usually the objects of discussion (cw viii: 812; [v vii §1]). the second fallacy was that of petitio principii, begging the question, including reasoning in a circle (cw viii: 819ff. [v vii §2]). mill quoted whately’s definition of the fallacy—‘in which the premise either appears manifestly to be the same as the conclusion, or is actually proved from the conclusion, or is such as would naturally and properly be so proved’ (cw viii: 820 [v vii §2]). one example, which mill took from scholasticism, was that the mind always thinks, because it is the essence of the mind to think (cw viii: 822-3 [v vii §2]). the conclusion here was the same as the premise and was fallacious also because of the ambiguity in the term ‘essence’. of the examples where one assumed what was to be proved, mill drew directly on bentham’s conception of ‘question-begging appellatives’ in the book of fallacies. bentham argued that although petitio principii was well known to aristotle, aristotle had not appreciated how such a fallacy could be committed with the use of a single term (bentham 1824: 213; cw viii: 823 [v vii §2]). mill (and bentham) used the example of ‘innovation’ which, when applied to a practice, meant not only novel, but also bad (as opposed to ‘improvement’ which also meant novel but good) (bentham 1824: 218). a defender of a new practice could not object to its being called an innovation, but in the process was forced by the use of the term to accept that it was a bad practice and not worthy of defence. hence, the use of a single word was made to overrule all of the facts and force a major concession from those who defended a practice.7 a final example connected with petitio principii was the justification of the doctrine of the social compact or contract in hobbes and rousseau, which mill believed involved reasoning in a circle (cw viii: 827 [v vii §2]). the social compact was supposedly based on a promise made by one’s ancestors. hence, to the question, why obey the government formed via the social compact, the answer was given that we should do so because of our promise to obey. but mill argued that the promise to obey was only based on and was enforceable by the social compact itself. thus, the argument was circular: why obey the social compact? because we must keep our promise. why keep our promise? because we have agreed to the compact (see also hume 1985: 480ff). mill pointed out that the argument might have escaped such circularity by the additional argument that the compact was enforceable because of its utility, i.e., it led to happiness and a better life. the third fallacy was ignoratio elenchi, which consisted of reaching the wrong conclusions from the premises (cw viii: 827-30 [v vii §3]). this differed from the fallacy of ambiguity, where the meaning of the premises was misconceived, or j.s. mill on logical fallacies 137 from petitio principii, where the conclusion was mistaken for what was to be proved. mill again turned to lengthy quotations from whately to illustrate the fallacy, which used numerous but irrelevant means to defeat an opponent and thereby establish one’s own thesis. in his own examples, mill was more concerned with arguments in philosophy, which he took from malthus, berkeley, and others. for example, the argument, that berkeley’s theory of the non-existence of matter could be defeated by knocking one’s head against a post, ignored or mistook the fact that berkeley did not deny the experience of the senses, but that he was sceptical of the underlying cause of the appearances suggested by the senses. the fallacies of confusion thus ranged widely from public debate to philosophical argument, and from a number of propositions to the deft employment of a single term. in spite of bain’s remark that the number of fallacies of confusion was endless, he believed that the study of logic could provide some discipline to understand and resist them, and the exposure of some of the most obvious categories might have ‘a slightly fortifying influence’ (bain 1870: ii.386). v mill’s third distinction among fallacies occurred where evidence was distinctly conceived, as opposed to the category of fallacies of confusion where the evidence was indistinctly conceived. within this heading he distinguished between inductive and deductive fallacies. for the former (inductive fallacies) he included two categories: fallacies of observation (category 2) and fallacies of generalization (category 3). under the heading of fallacies of observation mill included those arising from non-observation and mis-observation. for the former he distinguished between non-observation arising from overlooking instances and non-observation arising from overlooking circumstances (cw viii: 773 [v iv §1]). an example of a fallacy arising from overlooking instances was the use of almanacs for predicting the weather. even though there were many erroneous predictions each year, there were a few correct ones that sustained the faith in almanacs. the false ones were ignored and people continued to stick to the false prophet through the elimination of chance (cw viii: 774 [v iv §3]). mill emphasized that the greatest cause of this fallacy was ‘preconceived opinion’, which led people not to see pertinent and relevant facts. he surveyed a variety of common opinions and scientific theories to demonstrate the widespread use of this fallacy. he pointed to its employment in religious disputes, where texts, which could not be reconciled with one’s views, were simply overlooked, and among historians where various events were seen through preconceived opinions to favour protestants or roman catholics, royalists or republicans, etc. (see cw viii: 776-8 [v iv §3]). the non-observation of circumstances was also shown by mill to be the source of much fallacious thinking. he showed how the false belief in the phlogistic theory of combustion persisted, because no one looked carefully at the gaseous 138 frederick rosen products of combustion. eventually, chemists were led to the correct explanation that, instead of a substance (phlogiston) being separated and released through combustion, a substance was actually being absorbed. another example was the widespread use of powders and ointments to effect often miraculous cures when other factors were actually responsible for the cure. mill mentioned the example of john wesley who believed he had been cured of a malady by the application of a brown paper plaster of egg and brimstone, and omitted to reckon the importance of four months’ rest, with country air, repose, ass’s milk, and exercise, also prescribed by his doctor. another example was the widespread use of mercury in america to cure yellow fever, when those to whom it was applied were already cured of the disease (cw viii: 778-80 [v iv §4]). fallacies based on mal-observation (as opposed to non-observation) arose not from something not seen or ignored, but from something seen wrongly (cw viii: 782-4 [v iv §5]). it occurred primarily where one mistook perception for inference. one important example was the opposition to the copernican system which was based on the common perception of the sun rising and setting and the stars revolving in the heavens. mill linked to this fallacy the tendency to mistake inferences for intuitions. a visionary might think that god had spoken directly to him or her, and that this was known by intuition. what was at stake, however, was most likely a number of inferences based on mal-observation. in making this assertion mill was careful to add: ‘a caution, therefore, against this class of errors, is not only needful but indispensable; though to determine whether, on any of the great questions of metaphysics, such errors are actually committed, belongs not to this place, but as i have so often said, to a different science’ (cw viii: 784 [v iv §5]). if mill was reluctant to consider here the great questions of metaphysics and theology, concerned with the existence of god or other supreme principle, he clearly cast doubt on the logical standing of those mystics who claimed direct contact with god on the basis of legitimate inferences from experience. fallacies of generalization constituted the second kind of inductive fallacy and the third category in mill’s schema. he stated that these are ‘the most extensive of all’ fallacies, but if the earlier books of the logic were followed, the fallacies should not occur and in this category there would only be mistakes and blunders (cw viii: 785 [v v §1]). he then depicted a number of common examples of types of fallacies that have arisen from a failure to understand and apply the rules of induction. he began by asserting that certain kinds of generalization must be groundless, because ‘experience cannot afford the necessary conditions for establishing them by a correct induction’ (cw viii: 785 [v v §2]). inferences based on conditions on earth or in the solar system could not be assumed to extend everywhere in the universe. similarly, despite some exceptions, propositions that asserted a universal impossibility could not be established by induction. j.s. mill on logical fallacies 139 among particular fallacies he listed that of mistaking empirical for causal laws (cw viii: 788-91 [v v §4]). for example, two widely-held beliefs in mill’s day were: as blacks have never been as civilized as whites sometimes were, they shall never be so; and as women were supposed to be inferior to men in intellect, they will necessarily be inferior. these beliefs contained several errors, such as the absence of a comparison of instances or the ascertainment of material facts and the recognition that such instances could not be the basis of causal laws. another example of this fallacy was that made by ‘common-sense’ people of a ‘practical’ disposition who believed that human beings would continue to act as they did at present. these ‘common-sense’ people wrongly denied the doctrine of the progressiveness of the human species which, despite numerous errors associated with this doctrine, did not assume wrongly that certain behaviour could not occur because it had not previously been exhibited. mill believed that the doctrine of the progressiveness of the species was an important constituent of social science and though not a cause of anything, it stood as ‘a summary expression for the general result of all the causes’ (cw viii: 791 [v v §4]). another fallacy consisted of the confusion of sequence with consequence (post hoc, ergo propter hoc—‘after this and therefore owing to this’) (cw viii: 792-4 [v v §5]). as examples mill listed the following: (1) england owed her industrial pre-eminence to restrictions on commerce; (2) the national debt was a cause of national prosperity; (3) england owed her prosperity to the excellence of the church, houses of parliament, legal procedure, etc. in these examples historical sequences were fallaciously transformed into causal sequences. the fallacy was based on bad generalization a posteriori but could exist a priori with the latter attempting to explain a complicated phenomenon by a simpler theory than its nature admitted. for example, the belief that all disease depended on a hostile acid or alkali in the chemical composition of the body committed this fallacy. in politics there were doctrines that ascribed absolute goodness to particular forms of government, social arrangements, and even to particular modes of education without any reference to stages of civilization and the character of the societies for which they were intended. this became an important theme later in the logic concerned with the social sciences, but here he discussed aspects of the issues in terms of fallacies. the remainder of this section was concerned with fallacies associated with analogies and metaphors (cw viii: 794-801 [v v §§6-7]). these fallacies did not deal with attempts to establish inductions, but operated where a full proof was not a possibility. mill depicted an argument from analogy as ‘an inference that what is true in a certain case, is true in a case known to be somewhat similar, but not known to be exactly parallel, that is, to be similar in all material circumstances’ (cw viii: 794 [v v §6]). all that could be expected from analogies was a small increase in probability, and there were ample opportunities for fallacies. 140 frederick rosen metaphors tended to ‘assume the proposition which they are brought to prove. . . . for an apt metaphor, though it cannot prove, often suggests the proof’ (cw viii: 800 [v v §7]). after considering a number of examples, mill concluded: a metaphor, then is not to be considered as an argument, but an assertion that an argument exists; that a parity subsists between the case from which the metaphor is drawn and that to which it is applied. this parity may exist though the two cases be apparently very remote from one another . . . . (cw viii: 801 [v v §7]) the final category (category 4) contained the fallacies of ratiocination and was derived from the distinction between inductive and deductive fallacies (cw viii: 803-8 [v vi §§1-4]). if inductive fallacies led to fallacies of observation and generalization, deductive fallacies led to fallacies of ratiocination. mill granted that in the ordinary textbooks of logic fallacies were mainly confined to this category. he, however, devoted only five pages to the topic, referred the reader mainly to discussions in whately and demorgan, and claimed that the rules of the syllogism provided almost complete protection against many of the traditional fallacies (cw viii: 803 [v vi §1]).8 thus, in a curious way mill managed to agree with those who rejected the separate study of traditional fallacies on the grounds that one needed to study the rules of logic rather than ways of breaking the rules, while at the same time he developed an extensive and novel treatise on fallacies. vi in the autobiography mill characteristically referred to the logic as supplying the ‘opposite doctrine’ to the german or a priori school of human knowledge. his doctrine ‘derives all knowledge from experience, and all moral and intellectual qualities principally from the direction given to the associations’. the a priori doctrine, ‘that truths external to the mind may be known by intuition or consciousness, independently of observation and experience’, was considered by mill ‘as the great intellectual support of false doctrines and bad institutions’ (cw i: 233). in the logic mill particularly sought to clarify the foundations of mathematics and physical science in order to dislodge the a priori school from its supposed foundations. given his belief that intuitionist philosophy had deleterious effects in ‘morals, politics, and religion’ (cw i: 233), there may be some justification for anschutz’s remark to the effect that mill was fighting a political battle through his logical and metaphysical writings (see anschutz 1953: 61-2; cf. scarre 1989: 13 14). but, as we have seen, there was a second theme in the logic, amply illustrated in the fifth book, which suggested that logic served truth rather than one doctrine as opposed to another. indeed, the material on fallacies established how, between opposing doctrines, the truth might be ascertained, presented, and defended.9 mill’s subtle and comprehensive study of logical fallacies took the subject away from the realm of deceitful tricks and a source of amusement for students in an otherwise dull subject to oppose false thinking in philosophy, science, morality, j.s. mill on logical fallacies 141 politics, and many aspects of ordinary life. but such false thinking might also be restated in more valid forms, and, as mill argued against whately, the detection of fallacies should be but one aspect of the use of fallacies in logic. the other aspect was an attempt to restate the argument without fallacies, to clarify the argument, and further assess its validity. if, in the essays on bentham and coleridge, mill attempted to bring together the opposing doctrines of the two supposedly leading thinkers of the age, in the logic he provided the philosophical reader with some of the equipment necessary to restate, clarify, and assess such opposed ideas. one need not accept passmore’s view that ‘there could be no lasting compromise between mill and the coleridge school; coleridge and his followers’, he wrote, ‘were beyond the pale as “intuitionists”—mill’s favourite term of all-encompassing abuse. . .’ (passmore 1966: 13). although mill consistently rejected intuitionism in philosophy, he found much to admire in coleridge’s ideas: the emphasis on the history of countries and institutions as keys to understanding their character, the admiration of bacon, placing the pursuit of truth above a blind adherence to religious or philosophical creeds, and a willingness to explore opposing poles in thought and politics to determine the truth. this use of opposing points of view enabled mill to advance what he called in a letter to the coleridgean, john sterling, ‘a catholic spirit in philosophy’ which he felt under ‘a special obligation to preach’ (cw xiii: 411). although one might be somewhat puzzled as to how an emphasis on polarities could generate catholicity or universality in philosophy, mill probably meant simply that by appreciating opposing sides of issues, one could approach more closely to a universal perspective than if one saw the world simply from one perspective. to take a practical example, mill dealt with the opposing poles in politics of cosmopolitanism on the one hand and nationalism on the other by arguing for a principle of cohesion within society, which did not embrace a hatred of foreigners, an indifference to humanity, or the preference of the national interest over the human race in general. mill thus attempted to draw from the polarities a new perspective—what has been called ‘universalist cosmopolitan patriotism’, which was uniquely his and arguably closer to the truth than either cosmopolitanism or nationalism (see varouxakis 2002: 126). mill’s account of fallacies and, indeed, the study of logical fallacies generally are not now in fashion. as a faithful follower, bain, with some exceptions, treated mill’s approach to fallacies in his own study of logic with great respect (see bain 1870: i. pp. iv-v, ii. 374ff; 1904: 299-300). nevertheless, many others who followed mill were not as dutiful. in spite of their widespread critique of mill’s logic, idealist philosophers wholly ignored the material on fallacies. for f.h. bradley, bosanquet, and green, the truth seemed to dwell in the realm of metaphysics, for which the study of fallacies in mill’s version (and apparently in any other version) was not appropriate (see bradley 2002, bosanquet 1895, green 1886: ii). when h.w.b. joseph wrote his introduction to logic early in the twentieth century, he was not convinced that the study of fallacies should be part of logic. he argued that logic 142 frederick rosen was like mathematics and that there were not two ways of thinking about mathematics. if logic was an empirical science, like psychology, one might argue that the study of fallacies was like studying mental illness as a distinct phenomenon within a larger science of psychology (joseph 1916: 566-7). nevertheless, joseph decided to include an ‘appendix’ on fallacies and to repeat the traditional thirteen fallacies originally set forth by aristotle. he justified this move on the grounds that it had tradition in its favour, and would enable students to understand the language of fallacies which remained in common use. ‘and if we consider not the enumeration of types of fallacy, but their classification’, he wrote, ‘ it will appear, i think, that there is no such merit in any alternative scheme as justifies us in sacrificing the advantage of keeping to the standard and traditional scheme of aristotle.’ mill’s scheme was consigned to a brief footnote, where a question was raised as to whether or not the a priori fallacies were actually fallacies at all (joseph 1916: 574 and n). the main opposition to mill’s approach to fallacies, however, came from a different source, which was more indifferent than hostile. this was the development of symbolic logic, and, particularly, the application of algebra to logic. in a recent edition of george boole’s the mathematical analysis of logic, originally published in 1847, just four years after mill’s logic, the editor has written: boole’s work freed logicians, once and for all, from the endless repetition of a few principles, mostly derived from aristotle, and, by example, challenged them to develop their subject in new directions. many gifted thinkers, among them john venn, william stanley jevons, charles sanders peirce, ernst schröder, alfred north whitehead, and bertrand russell, rose to the challenge, and the vast and autonomous subject of modern logic gradually emerged from their combined efforts. it is a glorious success story. (boole 1998: xi) mill is excluded from this illustrious list of logicians. and few recent textbooks on logic either mention mill or discuss fallacies generally (see, for example, tomassi 1999). it is fair to say that modern symbolic logic has moved in new directions. boole, himself, knew mill’s logic and quoted from him at the beginning of his own work to the effect that where possible the mechanical side of logic might employ a technical notation and where logic did not involve mechanical reasoning, such a technical language should not be employed. boole accepted this view and wrote that ‘to supersede the employment of common reason, or to subject it to the rigour of technical forms, would be the last desire of one who knows the value of that intellectual toil and warfare which imparts to the mind an athletic vigour, and teaches it to contend with difficulties and to rely upon itself in emergencies’ (boole 1998: 2). mill, however, did not appear to accept boole’s comment. when he was asked to respond to the work of jevons, he replied in a letter that, like boole and demorgan, ‘he [jevons] seems to me to have a mania for encumbering questions j.s. mill on logical fallacies 143 with useless complications, and with a notation implying the existence of greater precision in the data than the questions admit of’. mill called it ‘a vice’—a failure, one supposes, of intellectual virtue. he depicted this vice as ‘one preeminently at variance with the wants of the time, which demand that scientific deductions should be made as simple and as easily intelligible as they can be made without ceasing to be scientific’ (cw xvii: 1862-3). in a note added in 1856 to the logic, commenting on the work of de morgan (cw vii: 171n-3n [ii ii §1 note]]), mill also criticized the use of technical forms in logic as ruling out the study of fallacies, which were concerned with ‘the incautious use of the common forms of language’. the consequence was to leave ‘the enemy . . . in possession of the only ground on which he [the logician] can be formidable’ (cw vii: 172n). mill’s brief comments raise as many questions as they answer (see scarre 1989: 1ff). it is arguable that the development of symbolic logic, particularly using algebra and grounded in mathematics generally, was more closely linked to modern science than mill’s own approach. from another perspective, however, modern symbolic logic may be regarded as more conventional and traditional than the logic developed by mill. arguably, it replaced mill’s logic of truth with the older view of logic as an art aimed at consistency in reasoning. furthermore, boole’s somewhat stoical comments about logic training the mind, though not foreign to mill, were more appropriate to the teaching of traditional aristotelian logic. in place of ‘athletic vigour’, mill (in his inaugural address) emphasised ‘making your mind clear and keeping you from stumbling in the dark over the most outrageous fallacies’. his metaphors evoke socratic and platonic themes concerned with illumination and truth. his object was never to develop a gymnasium of the mind but to suggest that logic was the key to truth in science, morality, politics, and religion, and without logic, we were condemned to dwell in error forever. so strongly was he committed to this socratic doctrine that he extended it, as we have seen, to his defence of liberty generally in society. he frequently invoked the importance of public debate and the study of fallacies as the best way to keep truth alive and opposed to the parade of false philosophical theories. for mill, the abandonment of the study of fallacies would not only impoverish the mind but also would diminish the concern with truth. in politics one is left with competing ideologies, but with little ambition to transcend them. mill’s account of fallacies restated such socratic ambitions in a modern idiom.10 notes 1 see the autobiography (cw i: 287), where he wrote concerning the inaugural address: ‘. . . i gave expression to many thoughts and opinions which had been accumulating in me through life . . .’. 2 see jackson 1941; anschutz 1953; ryan 1987; skorupski 1989; scarre 1989. for a discussion of mill on fallacies, see hansen 1997: 125-43. 144 frederick rosen 3 see sanderson 1618; aldrich 1691. the aristotelian and scholastic fallacies are: i. fallacies in language (in dictione): a) homonymy (equivocation): double meaning in a single term. b) amphiboly: double meaning in a combination of words or sentences. c) conjunction: e.g. because 3 and 2 are 5, it does not follow that 5 is two numbers d) disjunction: e.g. 3 and 2 are 5, but one cannot then say that 5 is both an odd and even number. e) accentuation: changing the meaning of a sentence by changing the accent on a word, e.g. incense and incense. f) figura dictionis: similar inflections in unlike things, e.g. an african has white teeth and black skin; therefore, he is black and white. ii. fallacies in thought (extra dictionem): g) fallacia accidentis or a dicto simpliciter ad dictum secundum quid: assuming that subject and predicate have their attributes in common; taking a predicate as coextensive with a subject when it is not. h) fallacia a dicto secundem quid ad dictum simpliciter: confusion of an absolute statement with a statement limited in manner, place, time, or relation, e.g. what you bought yesterday, you eat today; you bought raw meat yesterday; you eat raw meat today. i) ignoratio elenchi: proceeding to argue a different position from that under consideration. j) fallacia consequentis, non sequitur: numerous cases of non-sequitur, e.g. rain wets the ground; therefore, wet ground implies that it has rained. k) petitio principii: arguing in a circle and begging the question. l) non causa pro causa (also post hoc, ergo propter hoc): an inductive fallacy wrongly attributing to causation what merely occurs in sequence. m) fallacia plurium interrogationum: asking several questions at once in order to confuse. see bain 1870: i.275-8; grote 1880: 385ff; aristotle 1955; hamblin 1970: 52ff. 4 coleridge concluded his ‘general introduction, or preliminary treatise on method’ which introduced the encyclopaedia metropolitana 1845: i.43, as follows: ‘without advocating the exploded doctrine of perfectibility, we cannot but regard all that is human in human nature, and all that in nature is above herself, as together working forward that far deeper and more permanent revolution in the moral world, of which the recent changes in the political world may be regarded as the pioneering whirlwind and storm. but woe to that revolution which is not guided by the historic sense; by the pure and unsophisticated knowledge of the past: and to convey this methodically, so as to aid the progress of the future, has been already announced as the distinguishing claim of the encyclopaedia metropolitana.’ 5 the editors have inserted, following references to the collected works of mill, edition-neutral references, as follows: for the logic, e.g., “v i §3” means “book v, chaper 1, section 3” and for on liberty, e.g., “l ii para. 7” means “on liberty, chapter 2, paragraph 7.” 6 the name of this class of fallacy had actually been devised by étienne dumont for the earlier french edition of this work. see bentham 1816: ii.132ff; bentham 1824: 10. 7 bentham’s theme here reflected his earlier distinction between eulogistic, dyslogistic, and neutral terminology in a table of the springs of action (1817), where he argued that the estimation of objects, practices, and theories depended in part on the choice and use of terminology. see bentham 1983: 1-115, esp. 95ff. j.s. mill on logical fallacies 145 8 nevertheless, mill did consider individually a small number of fallacies of ratiocination. the first was called ‘fallacies in the conversion and aequipollency of propositions’. a second was the erroneous conversion of a hypothetical proposition. a third was concerned with changing the premises from one argument to another, and was called in scholastic philosophy ‘a dicto secundum quid ad dictum simpliciter’. 9 for an example of how fallacies might be applied successfully to metaphysics without challenging any ultimate foundations of an opposing school, see cw ix: 424-7. 10 on socrates, see further: urbinati 2002; 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(2007a, forthcoming). ‘from jeremy bentham’s radical philosophy to j.s. mill’s philosophic radicalism’ in g. stedman jones and g. claeys (eds.), cambridge history of nineteenth century political thought. cambridge: cambridge university press. rosen, f. (2007b, forthcoming). ‘parallel lives in logic: the benthams and the mills’. volume of essays from the london mill conference, april 2006. j.s. mill on logical fallacies 147 ryan, a. (1987). the philosophy of john stuart mill, 2nd ed. basingstoke: macmillan. sanderson, r. (1618). logicae artis compendium, 2nd ed. oxford: j. lichfield. scarre, g. (1989). logic and reality in the philosophy of john stuart mill, dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers. skorupski, j. (1989). john stuart mill. london and new york: routledge. tomassi, p. (1999). logic. london and new york: routledge. urbach, p. (1987). francis bacon’s philosophy of science: an account and reappraisal. chicago and la salle: open court. urbinati, n. (2002). mill on democracy, from the athenian polis to representative government. chicago and london: university of chicago press. varouxakis, g. (2002). mill on nationality. london and new york: routledge. whately, r. (1828). elements of rhetoric, 2nd ed. oxford and london: j. parker and john murray. whately, r. (1975). elements of logic (2nd ed., 1927). ray e. mckerrow (ed.). delmar, ny: scholars’ facsimiles and reprints. frederick rosen 40 priory gardens highgate london n6 5qs united kingdom f.rosen@acl.uc.uk pluralism out of the sources of judaism: religious pluralism without relativism studies in christian-jewish relations a peer-reviewed e-journal of the council of centers on jewish-christian relations published by the center for christian-jewish learning at boston college p l u r a l i s m o u t o f t h e s o u r c e s o f j u d a i s m : r e l i g i o u s p l u r a l i s m w i t h o u t r e l a t i v i s m r a p h a e l j o s p e רפאל ישפה b a r i l a n u n i v e r s i t y volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92113 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 92 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 preface: christian challenges for some years the subject of religious pluralism has intrigued me, and has been the subject of several articles dealing with the concept of chosenness, exclusivity vs. inclusivity, and the compatibility of chosenness with pluralism.1 my thesis is that the jewish concept of the chosen people, correctly understood, is not externally directed, implying that jews in fact are better than other people, but is, rather, internally directed, challenging jews to become better people. such a concept, i maintain, is compatible with religious pluralism, based on the paradigm of the jewish obligation to live in accordance with the commandments of the torah while accepting the legitimacy of other ways of life in accordance with the paradigm of the universal “seven commandments of the children of noah.” what i propose is a reversal of traditional claims. instead of spiritual exclusivity (the notion that there is only one truth, and that one group has exclusive possession of the truth, and thus of the keys to salvation, however understood), which logically leads to ritual inclusivity (the impulse to proselytize and include others in one’s own religious community with its ritual obligations), we should attempt to work for spiritual inclusivity (recognition that different groups are capable of understanding the truth, albeit frequently in diverse ways), which logically leads to ritual exclusivity (or pluralism, namely that the existence of different religious 1 see my articles: “the concept of the chosen people: an interpretation” in judaism: a quarterly journal 170, vol. 43, no. 2 (spring, 1994): 127148; “educating for interreligious responsibility: ritual exclusivity vs. spiritual inclusivity” in caring for future generations: jewish, christian and islamic perspectives, ed. emmanuel agius and lionel chircop (twickenham: admantime press, 1998), 20-41; “chosenness in judaism: exclusivity vs. inclusivity”, in covenant and chosenness in judaism and mormonism, eds. raphael jospe, truman madsen and seth ward (madison & teaneck: fairleigh dickinson university press / associated university presses, 2001), 173-194. approaches and ritual practices is both legitimate and desirable, and that there is no reason to seek to proselytize others). as i readily acknowledge, my thoughts on these questions were prompted and enriched by two roman catholic thinkers. radical catholic scholar hans küng has said that without peace among the world’s religions, there will be no peace among the nations,2 a proposition that strikes me as self-evidently true, especially in this era of the “global village” and growing world-wide religious fanaticism, strife and terror.3 in our part of the world, it is unfortunately a fact that 2 hans küng, “world peace – world religions – world ethic” in eds., agius and chircop, caring for future generations, 69-81, especially 74. 3 while modern weapons of mass destruction obviously render the problem more urgent, the concern that religions not create or exacerbate deadly conflict is not new. küng’s call for peace among the religions is reminiscent, for example, of “on the peace of faith” (“de pace fidei”) of nicolaus of cusa (1401-1464), which opens with the prayer that god “might moderate the persecution, which raged more than usual on account of diverse religious rites.” (nicolaus of cusa, toward a new council of florence, trans. william wertz, jr. [washington, d.c., 1993], 231). “many turn their weapons against each other for the sake of religion and in their power compel men to renounce long observed doctrines or kill them. . .it is a condition of earthly human nature to defend as truth lengthy custom, which is regarded as part of nature. and thus no small dissensions arise, when any community prefers its beliefs over another’s.” (ibid, 232-233) in turn, we find remarkable similarity between some of the arguments in “on the peace of faith” and positions expressed in the “letters of the brethren of purity” (rasa’il ikhwan al-safa), a collection of 51 or 52 letters (depending on the numbering) of a tenth-century group of isma’ili muslim intellectuals in baṣra. (see i.r. netton, muslim neoplatonists: an introduction to the thought of the brethren of purity [london: george allen & unwin, 1982] and lenn evan goodman, the case of the animals versus man before the king of the jinn [boston: twayne publishers, 1978]). for example, in the letter “on the generation of animals and their kinds,” we find that the king of the jinn asks the persian spokesman why do people “slay one another if all their faiths have the same goal of encounter with god?” the persian replies: “this does not arise from faith, for ‘there is no compulsion in faith,’ rather, it comes from the institution of faith, that is from the state. . .religion cannot do jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 93 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 religion is rarely a force for peace and is usually used (or abused) to exacerbate conflicts that are basically national and political, not theological, in nature. on the other hand, in 1994, in an interreligious conference in jerusalem, then cardinal joseph ratzinger (now pope benedict xvi), who is generally known for his conservative approach, and who was at the time the prefect of the congregation for the propagation of the faith, asked whether we can move from mere toleration to mutual acceptance.4 this question had a profound influence on the development of my own thought, as i have attempted to develop a jewish paradigm for pluralism.5 however, as is often the case with thinkers, the question posing an intellectual challenge is far more important than the specific answer proposed by the thinker himself. for as became clear in his subsequent official declaration dominus iesus, ratzinger’s call for mutual acceptance means only respect for the personal equality of the other, and not acceptance of the other’s doctrinal position per se. such acceptance can at best be only de facto and not de iure, according to ratzinger: “the church’s constant missionary proclamation is endangered today by relativistic theories which seek to justify religious pluralism, not only de facto but also de iure.” without a ruler to command the people to uphold his institutions out of allegiance or by force. this is the cause of the adherents’ of different religions slaying one another – the quest for primacy and power in the state. each desires that all people should follow his own faith or sect and the laws of his own religion.” (translation by lenn evan goodman in the case of the animals versus man before the king of the jinn, p. 194). the quote “there is no compulsion in faith” (or: “let there be no compulsion in religion”) is from the qur’an, sura 2:256, “la ikraha fi’l din.” 4 ratzinger posed this challenge in the international jewish-christian conference on religious leadership in a secular society in jerusalem (february, 1994). 5 in this age of wide-spread, murderous religious fanaticism and terror, mere toleration would frequently be a great improvement. this paper attempts to develop, in response to ratzinger’s challenge, a jewish paradigm for moving beyond toleration to pluralism. irving “yitz” greenberg argues for going beyond pluralism to jewish-christian partnership. (for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity [philadelphia, 2004], 42). later in the book (p. 119), however, he refers to “the possibility of true pluralism, i.e., a love pluralism of passionate people, not the tolerance of apathy.” 6 this roman catholic concern about relativism, and the equation of religious pluralism with relativism, were reflected several years later, when i was sent by the israeli ministry of foreign affairs to lecture at the vatican (in september, 2001), and presented my pluralistic thesis at the urbaniana pontifical university in rome. the rettore magnifico abrogio spreafico asked me whether the pluralism i propose is not, in fact, tantamount to relativism. i replied that i don’t equate pluralism with relativism, and then said that even if my epistemology is wrong, i am morally certain that relativism has not killed people the way absolutism has. my reply received horrorful confirmation exactly 24 hours later. unknown to me, while i was flying back to israel from rome, the murderous 9/11 attacks of al-qa’idah in america were taking place. a jewish challenge: menachem kellner shifting from roman catholic influences on the development of my thought to the context of contemporary constructive jewish philosophy, my position on pluralism stands in theoretical contrast to the thought of my friend and esteemed colleague menachem kellner, professor of jewish philosophy at the university of haifa. although in practical terms of traditional religious lifestyle, zionist commitment, 6 “declaration dominus iesus on the unicity and salvific universality of jesus christ and the church” (august 6, 2000). jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 94 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 and moral and political values kellner and i aren’t far apart, in theory we differ sharply, and our two papers in the volume on covenant and chosenness in judaism and mormonism represent clearly contrasting views.7 i have called kellner’s approach “an enlightened and sophisticated form of traditional triumphalism,”8 because in kellner’s view, “in the messianic future” the dichotomy between jews and gentiles “will be overcome, and all human beings will share the same relationship with god. in the messianic world, there will be no jews and gentiles, only worshippers of the one true god.”9 the distinction between jews and gentiles will be “overcome” not because all gentiles will convert to judaism in its current, particularistic form, but because (in kellner’s reading of maimonides, with whom he identifies), judaism is really a matter of affirming the truth and not merely an ethnic identity, and, therefore, by accepting the truth the gentiles, in effect, will become jewish in a universal sense: “the messianic age will witness not so much a triumph of judaism so much as the triumph of truth.”10 kellner concludes: i must express my sympathy for maimonides. to my mind the “postmodern” approach takes an unfortunate reality – that we cannot agree on what is true, or even on what truth is – and turns it into an ideal. this position is, i think, self-refuting to the extent that it makes real communication 7 kellner’s paper, “overcoming chosenness”, pp. 147-172 maintains a universalistic understanding of the truth, and proposes a maimonidean universal “religion of truth” for the future. 8 “chosenness in judaism: exclusivity vs. inclusivity”, p. 193 note 28. irving “yitz” greenberg (for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity, p. 134) writes: “surrendering religious exclusivism or triumphalism is a crucial moral step.” 9 kellner, “overcoming chosenness”, 152. 10 ibid., 160. among human beings impossible. it is also based upon a rejection of the idea of revelation, at least as it has been historically understood in judaism, according to which the torah is truth. this truth may be misunderstood, it may be viewed differently in different times, it may be better or worse understood as we get further from sinai and closer to the messiah, it may exist only in heaven, here being approximated, but truth there is. in short, maimonides’ vision of a universalist, not pluralist, messianic future was unusual in his day, consistent with his basic beliefs, necessitated by the understanding that revelation teaches truth, and thoroughly admirable.11 kellner’s position is clear: pluralism is at best an “unfortunate reality” in our current condition, and is, moreover, “self-refuting.” what we must strive for is the ultimate triumph in messianic times of universal truth, a truth that kellner believes is taught in historic jewish revelation. this view is reiterated and reinforced in an important recent book, must a jew believe anything?:12 “judaism teaches truth, and. . .orthodoxy understands that truth more completely than competing versions of judaism. these competing versions are wrong and mistaken.” nevertheless, on several theoretical and pragmatic grounds kellner argues that calling these versions “heretical is simply not helpful.”13 but kellner cautions us: although he rejects “maimonides’ dogmatic version of judaism”, he does not “wish at the same time to reject the. . .claims that judaism teaches truth and 11 ibid, 160. 12 menachem kellner, must a jew believe anything? (london: littman library of jewish civilization, 1999); second edition with new afterword (2006), 125. 13 ibid, 125. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 95 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 that there is one absolute truth – for these are claims that i am in no way willing to give up.”14 in his new afterword to the second edition, kellner adds that there is a problem inherent in the concept of religious pluralism itself: why not extend the bounds of pluralism beyond the bounds of judaism? if one relativizes truth within judaism, on what grounds can one refuse to relativize it outside judaism?15 kellner’s argument here – that internal jewish pluralism is unacceptable because one could then no longer oppose external religious pluralism – strikes me as a peculiar adoption of the logic employed by peter stuyvesant, the governor of the dutch colony of new amsterdam (what would later become new york), who in 1654 attempted unsuccessfully to keep jews out of the colony, arguing that “giving them liberty, we cannot refuse the lutherans and papists.”16 kellner’s objection to recognition of jewish dissenting opinion is thus justified on the grounds that it might lead, god forbid, to recognition of christian dissenting opinion. kellner’s logic is the opposite of that employed by moses mendelssohn. in his preface (written in march, 1782) to the german translation of manassah ben israel’s vindiciae judaeorum,17 mendelssohn argued that the jews could scarcely expect to be tolerated by christians, from whom they differ so fundamentally, so long as they are themselves intolerant of much less significant internal, jewish dissent: “if you wish to be shown concern, tolerance and forebearance by others, show concern, tolerance and forebearance to each other.” 14 ibid, 113. 15 ibid. 140. 16 cited by jonathan sarna, american judaism: a history (new haven: yale university press, 2004), 2. 17 manassah ben israel wrote vindiciae judaeorum to oliver cromwell, arguing for the readmission of the jews to england. 18 mendelssohn’s argument, that external, interreligious toleration, should lead to internal, intra-religious toleration, strikes me as far more persuasive than kellner’s argument against internal jewish pluralism on the grounds that it might lead to external religious pluralism. kellner’s argument also fails to deal with what i regard as empirically true, certainly of many jews and christians, and probably also of many muslims: it is often far easier to attain external, interreligious toleration or pluralism than it is to attain internal toleration or pluralism within the religious community. most of my thesis in this paper relates to pluralism in general, without specific regard for important questions pertaining to possible differences between internal and external forms of pluralism. at this point, on the level of internal pluralism (or at least toleration), i would note that kellner’s statement, “judaism teaches truth, and… orthodoxy understands that truth more completely than competing versions of judaism” strikes me as counterfactual, or at best as wishful thinking. jewish orthodoxy (and it is ironic that the ideology adopts an explicitly christian name), in its modern, enlightened and moderate form – as typified by people like kellner – is today an endangered species, and has been completely outflanked and overwhelmed by ḥaredi ultra-orthodoxy, which is largely fundamentalist (another christian term), literalist in its traditional, rabbinic reading of the bible and the talmud, 18 english translation in eva jospe (ed. and trans.), moses mendelssohn: selections from his writings (new york: viking press, 1975), 99-100. a complete translation by m. samuels was published in his english translation of mendelssohn’s jerusalem (london, 1838), vol. 1. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 96 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 suspicious of science, and opposed to much of modern culture.19 such orthodoxy, as kellner well knows, affirms as absolute truths many traditional assumptions which, when taken literally, are patently false, for example, some of the astronomical assumptions which are the basis of jewish calendrical calculations; biblical and rabbinic statements regarding the age of the universe, or regarding medicine, or precluding the evidence of evolution, archeology and bible criticism. had kellner expressed admiration for the disciplined traditional jewish way of life, and appreciation of observant jews’ dedication and commitment to the torah and to study, often entailing personal hardship and demanding sacrifice, he would have been on far safer ground than his attribution of absolute truth to orthodoxy in a book devoted, in no small measure, to an admirable attack on false contemporary orthodox dogmatics. finally, at the world congress of jewish studies in jerusalem (july-august, 2005), kellner devoted much of his lecture to a critique of my thesis of pluralism, on two grounds: first (as we have seen above), he regards pluralism as inherently absurd, theoretically self-refuting, and essentially relativistic; second, he maintains that there are no precedents for such pluralism in traditional jewish thought, since in his view “judaism teaches truth and…there is one absolute truth” (cited above). what follows, then, is my response to these challenges. first, however, it is important to note that pluralism is frequently equated with relativism, as it is in ratzinger’s dominus iesus, in the question posed to me in rome, and in statements by kellner. in my understanding, pluralism cannot be equated with relativism. plural understandings of the truth, or even plural truths, are not the same as no truth, and they are certainly not the same as no moral standards. as maimonides pointed out (in the guide of the perplexed 1:2 and in his treatise on logic, ch. 8), moral judgments do not deal with what is theoretically true and false (which he regarded as intelligibles, arabic: ma`qulat; hebrew: muskalot), but with practical determinations (which he regarded as conventional or “generally accepted” propositions, arabic: mashhurat; hebrew: mefursamot) of what is good and proper or evil and improper. to confuse theoretical pluralism with moral (and other) relativism is thus to blur this important distinction. 19 by “literalist” i do not mean corporealist, i.e. that they take biblical anthropomorphisms literally, but rather that their reading of the bible is shaped exclusively by an exclusive reliance on rabbinic tradition (or on certain aspects of that tradition), and in turn that their reading of the rabbis is literalist and uncritical, even when the rabbis’ own non-literal and midrashic reading of scripture or other views are implausible. such literalist reading of the rabbis is strongly criticized by maimonides in his commentary to the mishnah, “pereq ḥeleq” (sanhedrin, ch. 10). 20 irving “yitz” greenberg also argues admirably for maintaining this distinction: pluralism means more than accepting or even affirming the other. it entails recognizing the blessings in the other’s existence, because it balances one’s own position and brings all of us closer to the ultimate goal. even when we are right in our own position, the other who contradicts our position may be our corrective or our check against going to excess…pluralism is not relativism, for we hold on to 20 irving “yitz” greenberg has written: “to my great frustration, the orthodox failed to distinguish between pluralism and relativism; to my failure, i could not persuade them of the essential difference between these positions – in other words, that one could uphold the authority of tradition while making room for other religious systems.” (for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity), 11. i share greenberg’s frustration, but it’s not only the orthodox jews who fail to make this important distinction. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 97 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 our absolutes; however, we make room for others’ as well.21 relativism…is the loss of capacity to affirm any standards. but the deepest religious response is pluralism – the recognition that there are plural absolute standards that can live and function together, even when they conflict. the deepest insight of pluralism is that dignity, truth and power function best when they are pluralized, e.g., divided and distributed, rather than centralized or absolutized . . . the essential difference between pluralism and relativism is that pluralism is based on the principle that there still is an absolute truth…pluralism is an absolutism that has come to recognize its limitations.22 unfortunately, greenberg’s merely stating that “we hold on to our absolutes” does not explain how to reconcile claims to absolute truth with pluralism. if one’s own position is held to be absolutely true, it may need a moral “check” against practical excess, but why should absolute truth require theoretical correction? pluralism is not relativism, on that greenberg and i agree – but how can it be compatible with absolutist claims? does not greenberg’s vision of “divided and distributed, rather than centralized or absolutized” truth contradict the “absolute truth” which he affirms? how are we to understand greenberg’s assertion that “pluralism is an absolutism that recognizes that an absolute truth/value need not be absolutely right to be absolute”?23 21 greenberg, for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity, 196. 22 ibid, 201-203. 23 ibid, 205. this tension (which i regard as unresolved) in greenberg’s thought between pluralism and absolutism, which may prove inevitable in much of progressive yet faithful religious thought, also characterizes much of nicolaus of cusa’s “on the peace of faith” (“de pace fidei”), referred to above, note 3. a consistent theme in the essay is the need to avoid conflict and to respect religious diversity, which “may bring an increase in as we shall see below, over two centuries ago moses mendelssohn advocated a clearer and more consistent and progressive form of pluralism that avoided such problematical claims to absolute truth, or that judaism is “absolutely the best” religion.24 i shall, therefore, argue that claims to absolute truth are not merely morally dangerous, but theoretically meaningless. returning to allegations of relativism, however, the truly meaningful question for me is not whether pluralism may necessarily entail some degree of relativism in general, but what kind of relativism. i cannot imagine that anyone is bothered by a pluralism of flavors of ice cream, if it should prove to be the case that one’s favorite taste is both subjective and relative. as a jew, what concerns me most is moral relativism, which implies that there are no meaningfully binding standards (however derived) on all people. the experience of 20th century totalitarianism, and the shoah in particular, should teach us the obvious dangers of such a position, and the nuremburg trials correctly, from my perspective (as the child of a german jewish family, many of whose members were murdered by the nazis), established international recognition that there are certain norms to which all people can and should be held, regardless of whether they were following what their country posited to be legal orders. therefore, it seems to me that if, despite what i think, it should prove correct that pluralism inevitably entails some devotion” (p. 233), and to tolerate different rites (p. 268). at the same time, since all the diverse religions “presuppose” a common, single religion and wisdom (pp. 236-237; 272), ultimately “all diversity of religion ought to be brought into one orthodox faith…the lord has taken pity on his people and agreed to the plan to lead all diversity of religions through mutual agreement of all men harmoniously back to a single, henceforth inviolable religon.” (p. 235) 24 see the discussion below, and note 69. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 98 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 degree of relativism, we would then be obliged to differentiate between moral relativism, which may entail clear and immediate practical dangers, and various kinds of epistemological relativism, especially in terms of what people think about god, which may have its theoretical errors, but does not present an existential danger. moral relativism affects interpersonal matters (bein adam le-ḥ avero), whereas epistemological relativism (if it be relativism at all, rather than pluralism) regarding diverse understandings of god refers to extremely personal and subjective questions between the individual and god (bein adam la-maqom). as a jew, i am, therefore, far less troubled by at least some degree of epistemological relativism, since even people who claim revelation can readily admit that their human understanding of divine truth is limited and partial, and reflects cultural and other influences, thus acknowledging a limited epistemological relativism. nevertheless, i recognize that my position may be easier for a jew to affirm than for a christian, given the relatively greater emphasis in judaism on deed, which does not necessarily entail abstract truth claims, and the relatively greater emphasis in christianity on creed, which necessarily forces one to deal with truth claims. whatever “salvation” or “justification” mean, the traditional jewish notions that israel must live according to the 613 commandments of the torah, and that the righteous gentiles who also, like israel, have “a portion in the world to come,” are those who observe the universal “seven commandments of the children of noah,”25 clearly have a behavioral emphasis, with truth claims playing at most a minor role in the scheme of jewish attitudes towards non-jews. conversely, the classical pauline notion of justification by 25 see the discussion of these points in my “chosenness in judaism: exclusivity vs. inclusivity,” 178-180 and the references in notes 15-19, and in “the concept of the chosen people: an interpretation,” 130-131, and the references in notes 15-20. faith clearly places truth claims at the focal point of christian theological concern, and together with belief in “one way” may well make it far more difficult for a christian to relegate epistemological relativism to the back rows of the debate on pluralism. as for kellner’s argument that there are no precedents for pluralism in jewish thought, even if that were correct, the lack of precedent would not invalidate pluralism in principle. kellner surely would not reject democracy on the grounds that it is derived from athenian and not from biblical or later jewish thought. as i shall show, however, there are in fact ample precedents for pluralism in jewish sources. as i attempt to respond to kellner’s challenges, that pluralism makes no inherent sense and is self-refuting, and that there are no precedents in traditional jewish thought for my position, i am guided by a twofold belief: on a theoretical level, that claims to “one absolute truth” are inherently meaningless; and on a practical level, that such spiritual exclusivity constitutes an existential danger to the peace of the world, especially in the era of the “global village” and increasingly widespread weapons of mass destruction. so long as religions continue to compete with each other in their exclusivistic claims, they will not be able serve as an effective force for peace and cooperation, but rather will perpetuate their all too frequent desecration of god’s name and affront to human dignity. toleration versus pluralism: alexander altman and avi sagi in his 1957 lecture before the council of christians and jews in london, my teacher alexander altmann discussed jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 99 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 “tolerance and the jewish tradition.”26 in altmann’s analysis, historically jews in the biblical and rabbinic periods found ways to tolerate non-jews, while rejecting internal toleration of jewish dissent. he then argued that jews and christians today meet on secular ground, while their theologies remain mutually exclusive. therefore, he concludes, although theologically jews and christians cannot tolerate each other, they need each other for a common stand in the face of contemporary “virulent paganism.” while theology thus divides, religion, which is broader than theology, can bring the two groups together by emulating god’s love.27 altmann’s essay, of course, was written prior to the radical changes in christian-jewish relationships since vatican ii, and could not take into account later developments. he questioned the possibility of theological toleration; fifty years later, we face the question of whether we can move from mere toleration to a pluralistic acceptance of each other. more recently, avi sagi of bar ilan university has characterized different grades of toleration and pluralism.28 we tolerate what we reject, and view the tolerated position as error. in short, we tolerate the person, not the idea. by contrast, in pluralism we see the other position as valid and possessing value. a “weak pluralism” is based on the skeptical view that there is one truth, but that, because of our fallibility, we have no way to discover it except through the confrontation of opposing ideas. the weak pluralist is thus 26 alexander altmann, “tolerance and the jewish tradition”, the 1957 robert waley cohen memorial lecture (london: the council of christians and jews); hebrew trans. david singer in a. altmann, panim shel yahadut (tel aviv: am oved, 1983), 217-232. 27 ibid, 19. 28 avi sagi, “ha-dat ha-yehudit: sovlanut ve-efsharut ha-pluralism” in `iyyun 43 (1994), 175-200. not sure that he has the truth, as opposed to the person who tolerates dissent, because he is certain of his truth.29 “strong pluralism,” on the other hand, does not affirm only a temporary value of opposing views leading to ultimate truth, but regards different views as having inherent value of their own. such pluralism thus adopts a measure of relativism.30 in sagi’s analysis, weak pluralism can coexist with religious authority, because it adopts only a hypothetical epistemological relativism, but strong pluralism has generally been understood as presenting an impossible challenge to religion, by requiring that it give up its claims to religious truth, which it cannot do.31 sagi concludes, nevertheless, by calling for a revolution of attitudes, if not of halakhic practice. there is a need for pluralism in western society; in practical terms, most of western society is already pluralistic; and pluralism follows from the subjectivity of the religious experience. sagi therefore calls for an “intellectual golden rule”: let others have their own experience and recognize its value.32 it seems to me that the opponents of pluralism fail to take into account the subjective nature of faith and the religious experience, to which sagi points. the difference between faith and knowledge lies precisely in the fact that we know something which we can demonstrate and for which we have evidence, whereas we believe, rather than know, something to be true precisely when we lack such demonstration and evidence and yet affirm it as true.33 since faith therefore 29 ibid, 184. 30 ibid, 185-186. 31 ibid, 194-195. 32 ibid, 198-200. 33 kellner’s approach to faith is that faith involves trust, which should find expression in behavior, whereas knowledge involves the acquiescence to the truth of certain claims, which do not necessitate any specific behavior. kellner identifies his approach with that of maimonides. regardless of whether kellner is correct that this is maimonides’ understanding of the jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 100 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 deals with affirmations which are unproven and unprovable (as opposed to knowledge), it is inherently subjective, not objective, and culturally relative. at least a weak form of pluralism would seem inevitably to follow from such subjectivity and cultural relativity. subjectivity and cultural relativity in revelation on the face of it, revelation would appear to preclude pluralism. the rabbis, however, understood the revelation at sinai to be adjusted to the subjective capacity of each person, and to the relative cultures of the seventy nations of the world. commenting on the peculiar phrase, “all the people saw the voices” of the revelation at sinai (ex 20:15), the midrash rabba on exodus34 picks up on the plural qolot (“voices” or “sounds”): it says “all the people saw the voices.” it does not say “voice” here but “voices.” rabbi yoḥanan said, the [divine] voice went out and was divided into seventy voices, into seventy languages, so that all the nations could hear, each nation hearing it in its own national language...come and see how the voice would go out to each israelite according to his capacity (koaḥ, literally “power”), the elders according to their capacity, the youth according to their capacity, the children according to their capacity, infants according to their capacity, and the women according to their capacity, and even moses according to his capacity...therefore it says, “the voice of the lord is in power (koaḥ). it does not say “in his power” but “in power,” in the power [i.e., capacity] of each individual. nature of faith (and kellner’s reading is not necessarily supported by maimonides’ insistence in guide of the perplexed 1:35 that the common people should accept on authority certain basic beliefs), kellner’s approach reflects that of martin buber, who contrasted two types of faith: jewish faith, “the fact that i trust someone, without being able to offer sufficient reasons for my trust in him;” and christian faith, “likewise, without being able to give a sufficient reason, i acknowledge a thing to be true.” (martin buber, two types of faith, trans. n. goldhawk [new york, 1961]), foreword, p. 7. moses mendelssohn makes a similar point, that emunah means trust, in jerusalem and other jewish writings, trans. and ed. by alfred jospe (new york, 1969), 71; cf. the translation by allan arkush, with introduction and commentary by a. altmann (hanover, 1983), 100. in any event, as buber admits more candidly than does kellner, even a behavioral, rather than cognitive understanding of emunah still involves an attitude “without being able to offer sufficient reasons for my trust,” i.e., there is no demonstrative evidence to justify the trust. 34 midrash exodus rabba 5:9. my english translation. in the english translation by s.m. lehrman (london: soncino press, 1939) this passage is found on pp. 86-88. revelation, in short, according to this rabbinic view, was not absolute or monolithic; it had to be adjusted to the subjective capacity of each individual to understand, and to the relative cultures of the various nations.35 abraham ibn ezra and the limitations of revelation abraham ibn ezra (1089-1164), a prominent bible exegete, grammarian, poet and philosopher argued36 against the traditional rabbinic view that both versions of the 35 kellner argues that i’m reading into the text views its authors would have rejected, because all they meant was that the same text can be understood on different levels, just as the same geometry can be taught to graduate students or to school children on different levels. but is graduate-level, advanced non-euclidean geometry really the same geometry as that taught in elementary or middle schools? at what point is a critical understanding of scripture or other religious sources merely quantitatively more advanced than what children are taught, as opposed to qualitatively different? 36 ibn ezra, long (i.e. standard) commentary to ex 20:1. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 101 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 decalogue (ex 20 and dt 5) were revealed simultaneously.37 after listing in detail all the differences between the two versions, ibn ezra explained that many of these differences (especially in the commandment regarding the sabbath) are substantive, not merely stylistic. no person is capable of understanding two different notions spoken simultaneously, and in such a case would understand neither of them. a simultaneous revelation of both versions would thus have been incomprehensible and meaningless.38 it is impossible that “remember” and “observe” [the sabbath] were spoken simultaneously, even by a miracle...how could many verses be miraculously spoken simultaneously, when they do not have the same meaning?... reason cannot tolerate these notions... and if we were to say that god’s speech is not like human speech, how could israel have understood what god said? for if a person would hear “remember” and “observe” simultaneously, he would not understand either one. for ibn ezra, the limitations on revelation are thus imposed not from above, namely on god as the speaker, but from below, namely by the limited capacity of the people hearing it. in other words, it is meaningless to discuss the absolute nature of revealed truth because of its divine origin. successful communication – whether divine revelation or a radio broadcast – must be effectively received as well as 37 b.t. rosh ha-shanah 27a (inter alia), zakhor ve-shamor be-dibbur eḥad ne’emru, “‘remember’ and ‘observe’ [the sabbath] were said as one statement.” 38 my english translation. ibn ezra concludes that the version in exodus, where it says that “god spoke all of these things” (ex 20:1) is the actual record of the revelation, whereas the version in deuteronomy, where moses says “i stood between god and you at that time, to tell you the word of the lord” (dt 5:5) is the paraphrase by moses, 40 years later. broadcast, and the limited capacity of the human receiver is what necessarily subjectivizes and relativizes revelation. al-farabi: religious versus philosophical language abu naṣr muḥammad al-farabi (870-950), one of the greatest early islamic philosophers, who had an immense influence on maimonides,39 applied platonic political philosophy to revealed religion, and identified the philosopherking with the prophet. in his political regime, al-farabi argued that there is one reality, but that there are many images or reflections of reality. therefore, there can be many religions, because each nation has its own ways to represent these images of reality, although not all the ways are equally excellent.40 because it is difficult for the multitude to comprehend these things themselves as they are, the attempt was made to teach them these things in other ways, which are the ways of imitation. hence these things are imitated for each group or nation through the matters that are best known to them; and it may very well be that what is best known to the one may not be the best known to the other.41 similarly, in his attainment of happiness, al-farabi suggested that philosophy deals with demonstrative 39 for a discussion of al-farabi’s influence on maimonides, see shlomo pines, “translator’s introduction: the philosophical sources of the guide of the perplexed” in pines’ english translation of maimonides’ guide of the perplexed (chicago: university of chicago press, 1963), lvii-cxxxiv. 40 al-farabi, the political regime. english translation by f.m. najjar in ralph lerner and muhsin mahdi, medieval political philosophy (ithaca: cornell university press, 1978), 31-57. 41 ibid., 40-41. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 102 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 knowledge of beings, whereas religion entails assent, secured through persuasion, to images of things. if he perceives their ideas themselves with his intellect, and his assent to them is by means of certain demonstration, then the science that comprises their cognitions is philosophy. but if they are known through similitudes that imitate them, and assent to what is imagined of them is caused by persuasive methods, then the ancients call what comprises those cognitions religion ...therefore, according to the ancients, religion is an imitation of philosophy... in everything of which philosophy gives an account based on intellectual perception or conception, religion gives an account based on imagination.42 to translate al-farabi’s theory into our contemporary terminology, the language of science is discursive, whereas the language of religion is mythological. in such language, which is a function of imagination, not of reason, we have the possibility of multiple images, reflections or imitations of reality, once again raising the possibility of religious pluralism.43 42 al-farabi, the attainment of happiness. english translation by muhsin mahdi in medieval political philosophy, #55, 44-45. 43 this does not mean that al-farabi is positing a “double truth” theory, in the sense of thirteenth-century latin averroists at the university of paris, namely that reason and revelation are two separate and autonomous realms of truth. al-farabi is suggesting that the truth can be expressed scientifically, in discursive, rational terms for intellectuals. this is the realm of philosophy. the same truths need to be expressed, for the common people, in terms they are capable of understanding, namely by “similitudes” deriving from the imagination, which “imitate” those truths; this is the realm of religion. on the “double truth” theory, see the discussion and references in my “faith and reason: the controversy over philosophy in jewish history,” in la storia della filosofia ebraica, ed. irene kajon (milan: archivio di filosofia, 1993), 99-135. maimonides: “the torah speaks according to human language moses maimonides (1135-1204) was profoundly indebted to al-farabi, especially his identification of the prophet of revealed religion with the platonic philosopher-king. whereas the philosopher has a perfected intellect and the politician has a perfected imagination (which enables him to lead effectively, by appealing to popular emotion), the prophet is perfect in both respects.44 although maimonides emphasizes the unique rank of the prophecy of moses, which did not entail imagination,45 he also insists that “the torah speaks according to human language” ( דברה תורה in other words, that the torah had to 46,( כלשון בני אדם employ anthropomorphic and anthropopathic language to accommodate the primitive understanding of the ancient israelites. these two positions, that the prophecy of moses did not entail imagination, but that the torah had to use primitive language and mythological imagery, are not necessarily contradictory. in the first case, maimonides is referring to moses’ own experience of revelation, in which there was no involvement of imagination, whereas in the second case he is referring to how moses subsequently conveyed those abstract truths to the people in imaginative terms they could understand. 44 cf. guide of the perplexed 2:37. 45 cf. guide of the perplexed 2:36, 2:45. 46 guide of the perplexed 1:26. the phrase occurs, inter alia, in b.t. berakhot 31b. whereas rabbi akiva would interpret (darash) the significance of every word, and even letters, of torah as significant, rabbi yishma’el’s hermeneutic was based on the principle that the torah speaks according to human language. maimonides was not the first medieval philosopher to apply this hermeneutic principle philosophically, in the sense that the torah had to adapt itself to the primitive understanding of the masses. cf. baḥya ibn paqudah, duties of the hearts 1:10. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 103 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 maimonides’ political theory thus again forces us to separate historical revelation from claims of absolute truth, since even the torah had to adapt its method of expression to limited and primitive human understanding. the torah’s corporealist method of expression is not only frequently misleading – thus the “perplexed” student for whom maimonides’ wrote his guide of the perplexed – but actually dangerous, when people take literally corporealist attributes which are themselves false, because in maimonides’ view, a person who believes in a corporeal god is worse than an idolator.47 the possibility of multiple revelations: netanel ibn al-fayyumi maimonides, in several places, most notably in the ninth of his “thirteen principles,” rejected the possibility that any subsequent revelation could abrogate the torah.48 but what of revelations to other nations that would not abrogate the torah? joseph albo’s book of principles (sefer ha`iqqarim) (c. 1425) discusses “divine laws” besides the torah that were revealed to prophets, reflecting changing human needs (like a patient whose changing condition requires revised prescriptions), but these revelations were all to pre-sinaitic prophets, such as adam, noah and abraham, 47 guide of the perplexed 1:36. 48 the arabic term maimonides uses, naskh (abrogation), is a technical term in islam. since the qur’an was given over a period of years, a later revelation to muḥ̣ammad could abrogate an earlier revelation (cf. qur’an, sura 2:106), just as in general, muḥ̣ammad, as the last and greatest prophets, and as the “seal of the prophets” (cf. qur’an, sura 33:40), could abrogate prior revelations to earlier prophets. maimonides’ use of the islamic term as a polemic against islam is thus not accidental. and albo did not regard christianity and islam to be divinely revealed religions.49 conversely, the garden of the intellects (bustan al-`uqul) of netanel ibn al-fayyumi (yemen, c. 1165)50 explicitly discusses multiple revelations both before and after the revelation of the torah. these post-sinaitic revelations, however, do not abrogate the torah, which will not be abrogated even in the messianic era: nothing prevents god from sending unto his world whomsoever he wishes, whenever he wishes, since the world of holiness sends forth emanations unceasingly from the light world to the coarse world, to liberate the souls from the sea of matter – in the world of nature – and from destruction in the fires of hell. even before the revelation of the law he sent prophets to the nations, as our sages of blessed memory explain, “seven prophets prophesied to the nations of the world before the giving of the torah: laban, jethro, balaam, job, eliphaz, bildad and zophar.”51 and even after its revelation nothing prevented him from sending to them whom he wished, that the world might not remain without religion. the prophets declared that the other nations would serve him from the rising of the sun to the setting thereof: “for from 49 irving “yitz” greenberg (for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity, p. 57) refers to what he understands to be divine revelations and other nations’ access to god, in gn 14:18-20; nm 22-24; am 9:7; mi 4:5). 50 cf. david levine, the bustan al-ukul by nathanel ibn al-fayyumi (new york: columbia university press, 1908), judeo-arabic text and english translation. judeo-arabic text with hebrew translation by yosef kafiḥ̣ (jerusalem, 1954). 51 the reference is to t.b. bava batra 15a, where, however, the list differs slightly: balaam, his father, job, eliphaz, bildad, zophar, elihu. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 104 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 the rising of the sun to the setting thereof great is my name among the nations.” (mal 1:11).52 this leads netanel to explicit religious pluralism: know that god commanded that all the people should serve according to the law; and he permitted to every people something which he forbade to others, and he forbade to them something which he permitted to others, for he knoweth what is best for his creatures and what is adapted to them, as the skilled physician understands his patients.53 netanel then cites the qur’an (sura ibrahim 14:4): “he sends a prophet to every people according to their language.”54 we thus have in netanel’s garden of the intellects what is probably the clearest statement of religious pluralism in 52 bustan al-`uqul, ch. 6, levine ed., 103-104; kafi ḥ̣ ed., 114-115. 53 bustan al-`uqul, ch. 6, levine ed., 107; kafi ḥ̣ ed., 118-119. netanel’s arguments have sometimes been called relativistic, by y. tzvi langermann and others (see below), although langermann clearly refers to it as “religious relativism” and not as moral relativism. it seems to me that what our text is referring to is not relativism in the moral sense, i.e., that there are no moral standards however derived, but pluralism in the religious sense, that different groups have diverse ritual requirements which only apply within that group, because of their particular conditions. it is only in the sense that the rituals differ according to particular conditions that one can suggest some kind of “relativism” in the ritual practices, just as the physician’s prescriptions are “relative” to patients’ conditions and needs, but we do not usually regard a diabetic’s need for insulin, which would endanger a non-diabetic, as constituting “relativism.” similarly, the ritual dietary restrictions of kashrut in the torah apply only to jews, and those of the book of mormon apply only to latter day saints, just as in a civil context citizens of one country salute only the flag of their country, and not of other countries. this is how i understand netanel’s text, as referring to such pluralism and not to relativism. 54 bustan al-`uqul, ch. 6, levine ed., 109; kafi ḥ̣ ed., 121. medieval jewish thought, reflecting pluralistic trends in the isma’ili thought of the “brethren of purity” (ikhwan al-ṣafa).55 sa`adiah gaon and “the community of monotheists” one might, of course, dismiss netanel ibn al-fayyumi as a relatively insignificant and exceptional figure in medieval jewish thought. one cannot thus dismiss sa`adiah gaon (882-942), the first medieval jewish philosopher, whose book of beliefs and opinions (kitab al-amanat w’al-i`tiqadat; sefer ha-emunot veha-de`ot) established a whole tradition of jewish philosophizing. sa`adiah does not discuss multiple revelations, but he does discuss a type of religious truth transcending judaism. in the introduction (#5) to his book, after discussing empirical, rational and deductive sources of knowledge, which are all clearly universal, he states: as for ourselves, the community of monotheists (jama`at al-muwa ḥ̣adin), we hold these three sources of knowledge to be genuine. to them, however, we add a fourth source …the validity of authentic tradition (al-khabar al-ṣadiq)… 55 cf. s.m. stern, “fatimid propaganda among the jews”, pp. 85-86, cited by y. tzvi langermann, “some astrological themes in the thought of abraham ibn ezra”, in i. twersky and j. harris, eds., rabbi abraham ibn ezra: studies in the writings of a twelfth-century jewish polymath (cambridge: harvard university press, 1993), 72 and note 121. langermann refers here to netanel’s “religious relativism”. on the brethren of purity, see note 3, above. for an example of religious pluralism in the ikhwan al-ṣafa, see lenn evan goodman, the case of the animals versus man before the king of the jinn, p. 194: in response to the king of the jinn’s question, “why do you disagree in your notions, sects and creeds if your lord is one?” the persian spokesman says: “because religions, doctrines, sects are only different paths of approach, different means and avenues, but the goal we seek is one. from whatever quarter we seek to encounter him, god is there.” jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 105 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 this type of knowledge…corroborates for us the validity of the first three sources of knowledge.56 this type of knowledge (which can also be translated as “reliable report” or “reliable tradition”) has generally been understood by scholars, such as my teacher shlomo pines, as “drawn only from the jewish prophetic books” and as “intended solely for the benefit of the jewish community.” pines also interprets “the community of monotheists” exclusively as the jews.57 this view, however, needs to be modified. sa`adiah cannot have denied the monotheistic nature at least of islam (if not of christianity), since he follows the mu`tazilah kalam arguments for creation and the existence and unity of god. his argument with christian trinitarianism, which follows his discussion of essential attributes,58 and not his refutation of dualism and polytheism, and therefore contextually implies that christianity is an erroneous form of monotheism and not polytheism. moreover, sa`adiah later refers in the plural to “the communities of the monotheists” (ma`ashir al-muwa ḥ̣adin)59 when discussing christian trinitarianism. so sa`adiah’s understanding of “the community of monotheists” cannot be limited to the jewish 56 book of beliefs and opinions, trans. samuel rosenblatt (new haven: yale university press, 1948), 16; arabic text with hebrew trans. by yosef kafi ḥ̣ (jerusalem: sura, 1970), 14. for a complete discussion of this issue, cf. my “sa`adiah gaon and moses mendelssohn: pioneers of jewish philosophy” in raphael jospe, ed., paradigms in jewish philosophy (madison and teaneck: fairleigh dickinson university press and associated university presses, 1997), 37-59; and my “ha-hagadah hane’emenet shel rabbi sa`adiah gaon: mi hem qehal ha-meya ḥ̣adim?” in da`at 41 (summer, 1998) 5-17; and “additional note” in da`at 42 (winter, 1999), ix. 57 s. pines, “a study of the impact of indian, mainly buddhist, thought on some aspects of kalam doctrines” in jerusalem studies in arabic and islam 17 (1994): 182-203. 58 book of doctrines and beliefs 2:4. 59 ibid. 2:5. people, and must have a broader connotation. the fourth type of knowledge, authentic tradition, which is possessed by the “community of monotheists,” must also, therefore, be shared by non-jews (as becomes even more obvious by his example, that without such knowledge a person would not even be able to know who his father is). in sa`adiah’s usage, authentic tradition is by no means identical with revelation, although at least in the case of the jews it is based on and related to revelation. nevertheless, we have here at least an implicit, if not explicit, pluralistic conception of religious truth in the thought of one of the most influential of the jewish philosophers of the middle ages. this universalistic reading of sa`adiah’s “community of monotheists” is further reinforced in the usage of later jewish philosophers. for example, ba ḥ̣ya ibn paqudah’s duties of the hearts 1:1-2 refers to “the people of monotheism,” where the distinction is not between jew and non-jew but between varying degrees of comprehension of people who affirm god’s unity. judah ha-levi’s kuzari 1:4 also refers to “monotheists” in a non-jewish context, when the christian spokesman says to the khazar king: “for we are truly monotheists, although the trinity appears on our tongues.” maimonides’ guide of the perplexed 1:53 has: “we, the community of true monotheists”, where the category is philosophical, not parochial, and refers to those who have a correct philosophical understanding of the divine attributes; a similar usage is found in guide of the perplexed 1:75. if my universalistic understanding of “the community of monotheists” in sa`adiah gaon, ba ḥ̣ya ibn paqudah, judah ha-levi and maimonides is correct, the universal nature of this type of truth implies at least a degree of pluralism, for the simple reason that the truth takes different forms in jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 106 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 diverse cultures, all of which are, nevertheless, acknowledged to be true monotheism. all of these cases support my claim, in response to kellner, that there are ample precedents in jewish thought, both rabbinic and philosophic, for pluralistic and inclusive understanding of religious truth, and that the concept of revelation need not, and indeed cannot, be understood to mean exclusive possession of absolute truth, since even the revelation of the torah at sinai had to be adjusted to subjective human understanding and relatively to diverse national cultures. on cultural relativism in conceiving of god the insight that our very conceptions of god and the universe are culturally relativistic is not new. the presocratic philosopher xenophanes of colophone (570 bce – 475 bce) already made the point:60 170. but mortals consider that the gods are born, and that they have clothes and speech and bodies like their own. 171. the ethiopians says that their gods are snubnosed and black; the thracians that theirs have light blue eyes and red hair. 172. but if cattle and horses or lions had hands, or were able to draw with their hands and do the work that men do, horses would draw the forms [greek: ideas] of the gods like horses, and cattle like cattle, and they would make their bodies such as they each had themselves. 60 greek fragments and english trans. in g.s. kirk and j.e. raven, the presocratic philosophers (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1964), 168-169. franz rosenzweig refers to xenophanes and spinoza in his article “anthropomorphism” written in 1928-1929 for the original german encyclopaedia judaica. the hebrew translation by yehosua amir may be found in rosenzweig’s naharayim (jerusalem: mosad bialik, 1960), 3140; the specific reference is on p. 38. in the seventeenth century, baruch (benedict de) spinoza continued in the same humorous vein: let us imagine…a little worm, living in the blood…this little worm would live in the blood, in the same way as we live in a part of the universe, and would consider each part of blood, not as a part, but as a whole.61 some years later, spinoza went even further: i believe that, if a triangle could speak, it would say, in like manner, that god is eminently triangular, while a circle would say that the divine nature is eminently circular. thus each would ascribe to god its own attributes, would assume itself to be like god, and look on everything else as ill-shaped.62 moses mendelssohn and religious pluralism moses mendelssohn (1729-1786), on whose thought spinoza exercised a decided, albeit frequently negative influence, was the first jewish philosopher to address the question of the compatibility of a traditional loyalty to the torah (which spinoza had rejected), with a modern, pluralistic vision of religious cooperation in the liberal state.63 mendelssohn 61 letter #15 (1665?) to oldenburg, in r.h.m. elwes english trans. of the chief works of benedict de spinoza (new york: dover, 1955), vol. 2, p. 291. 62 letter #60, to hugo boxel (1674), in the chief works of benedict de spinoza, vol. 2, p. 386. 63 i discuss mendelssohn’s theories at length in “moses mendelssohn: a medieval modernist”, in sepharad in ashkenaz: medieval knowledge and 18th century jewish enlightened discourse, ed. r. fontaine, a. schatz, i. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 107 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 objected to classical christian exclusivity of salvation and to locke’s theory of toleration on both philosophic and jewish grounds, and proposed, rather, religious pluralism. on the first issue, christian claims of exclusivity of salvation, mendelssohn wrote in favor of greater respect for dissenting opinion:64 it is my good fortune to count among my friends many an excellent man who is not of my faith…i enjoy the pleasure of his company and feel enriched by it. but at no time has my heart whispered to me, “what a pity that this beautiful soul should be lost.”…only that man will be troubled by such regrets who believes that there is no salvation outside his church…some of my countrymen hold views and convictions which, although i consider them wrong, do belong to a higher order of theoretical principles. they are not harmful, because they have little or no relationship to the practical concerns of daily life. yet they frequently constitute the foundation on which people have erected their systems of morality and social order and are of great importance to them. to question such notions publicly merely because we consider them biased or erroneous would be like removing the foundation stones of a building in order to examine the soundness of its structure. such religious exclusivism, in mendelssohn’s view, is thus both theoretically wrong and practically dangerous. locke’s theory of toleration differentiates between the respective realms of state (which is interested in the temporal zwiep (amsterdam: royal netherlands academy of arts and sciences, 2007), 107-140. 64 open letter to lavater, 12 december 1769, in alfred jospe, ed. and trans., jerusalem and other jewish writings by moses mendelssohn (new york: schocken books, 1969), 118-119. affairs of this world) and religion (which is interested in the eternal affairs of the world to come). such a differentiation between the temporal and the eternal, mendelssohn argues, simply does not hold up either theoretically or practically. it fails theoretically because the temporal is part of the eternal and the eternal is an extension of the temporal. it fails practically because people’s behavior in this world is predicated, at least to some extent, on their beliefs regarding the world to come. instead, mendelssohn applies the traditional rabbinic differentiation between those matters which are between a person and another person (bein adam leḥ̣avero), which he assigns to the state, and those matters which are purely between a person and god (bein adam lamaqom) and do not involve other people, which he assigns to religion. furthermore, locke had argued pragmatically that the state is incapable of determining which religion is true, and must, therefore, tolerate dissent and variety. mendelssohn goes beyond such a pragmatic view of toleration and affirms the inherent value and desirability of religious pluralism. diversity is part of the divine plan for humanity. addressing christian rulers, he concludes his jerusalem: or on religious power and judaism:65 dear brothers, you are well-meaning. but do not let yourselves be deceived. to belong to this omnipresent shepherd, it is not necessary for the entire flock to graze on one pasture or to enter and leave the master’s house through just one door. it would be neither in accord with the shepherd’s wishes nor conducive to the growth of his flock.66 65 mendelssohn, jerusalem and other jewish writings, ed. and trans. alfred jospe, 107-110. 66 although the claim of jesus to be israel’s shepherd can be seen as referring back to ez 37:24, it seems to me that mendelssohn here deliberately employs the image of multiple doors for the sheep, to counter jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 108 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 … a union of faiths, if it were ever to come about, could have only the most disastrous consequences for reason and freedom of conscience…if the goal of this universal delusion were to be realized, i am afraid man’s barely liberated mind would once again be confined behind bars…brothers, if you care for true godliness, let us not pretend that conformity exists where diversity is obviously the plan and goal of providence. not one among us thinks and feels exactly like his fellowman. why, then, should we deceive each other with lies? it is sad enough that we are doing this in our daily relations, in conversations that are of no particular importance. but why also in matters which concern our temporal and eternal welfare, our very destiny? why should we use masks to make ourselves unrecognizable to each other in the most important concerns of life, when god has given each of us his own distinctive face for some good reason?...a union of faiths is not tolerance. it is the very opposite. mendelssohn had long and consistently held to such pluralistic views, rejecting the exclusivistic claims made by any religion. early in 1770 he wrote to prince karl-wilhelm about liberal christian reformers:67 they must not base their system… on the hypothesis that judaism and, even more so, natural religion, are inadequate means to ensure man’s salvation. since all men must have been destined by the creator to attain eternal bliss, no particular religion can have an exclusive claim to truth. this thesis, i dare to submit, might serve as a criterion of truth in all religious matters. a revelation claiming to show the exclusivism of jesus’ statements: “i am the door of the sheep…i am the door, if anyone enters by me, he will be saved.” (jn 10:7-9). 67 english trans. by eva jospe in moses mendelssohn: selections from his writings (new york: viking press, 1975), 116-117. man the only way to salvation cannot be true, for it is not in harmony with the intent of the all-merciful creator. mendelssohn’s consistency in this regard is evident in his explicit application of his pluralistic principles to judaism, not only to christianity and to other religions. in another letter written in 1770 he differentiated between internal, natural religion, which is universal, and involves basic, demonstrable truths all people should accept on a rational basis, and a pluralistic variety of external positive religions:68 worship, however, as everyone knows, can be private as well as public, internal as well as external, and one does well to differentiate between the two. the internal worship of the jew is not based on any principles except those of natural religion. to spread these is, indeed, incumbent upon us…our external worship, however, is in no way meant to address itself to others, since it consists of rules and prescriptions that are related to specific persons, times and circumstances. i grant that we believe that our religion is the best, because we believe it to be divinely inspired. nevertheless, it does not follow from this premise that it is absolutely the best. it is the best religion for ourselves and our descendants, the best for certain times, circumstances and conditions.69 68 english trans. by alfred jospe in jerusalem and other jewish writings, p. 134. 69 mendelssohn thus anticipates by over two centuries what irving “yitz” greenberg states: “thus any truth may speak absolutely to me and others, yet it is not intended for others who may be spoken to by other revelations and chosen for another sector of service.” (for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity, p. 204). mendelssohn wisely avoids, however, the trap into which greenberg falls, because mendelssohn denies that judaism “is absolutely the best,” whereas greenberg still claims absolute truth. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 109 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 for mendelssohn, pluralism of positive religions is thus a theoretical desideratum and a practical necessity. kant’s unknowable “ding as sich” and heisenberg’s “uncertainty principle” kellner claims that pluralism is inherently meaningless and self-refuting. it seems to me that we are forced to conclude, to the contrary, that any claims of objective knowledge of absolute truth are inherently meaningless and self-refuting, or, to put it simply, absurd, when even divine revelation (the purported basis for claims of objective knowledge of absolute truth) is subject to the limits imposed by subjective human understanding and cultural relativism, as freely acknowledged by the talmudic rabbis. pluralistic understandings of the truth thus become inevitable and inescapable. an additional nail in the coffin of absolutist epistemology was provided by immanuel kant (1724-1804). by definition, whatever we cognize and experience is the phenomenon, the form and order of which depend on the human synthetic forms of sensibility and categories of understanding. these synthetic principles and categories, such as space and time, are prior to and transcend sense data – but they are the necessary and a priori conditions for human experience of the phenomena, by which we synthesize the sense data, or forms which mind imposes on the sense data – and are not objective properties of things in themselves. the noumenon, the “real” world, as opposed to the phenomenon, cannot be known, and its existence is postulated by practical reason. the “thing in itself” (das ding als sich) can thus never be known. for kant, the necessary synthetic principles and categories of understanding are transcendental and a priori. he could, therefore, still affirm universal, objective knowledge, and i do not suggest that kant should be construed to be a cultural relativist let alone deconstructionist. nevertheless, since in his view the categories of understanding are not objective properties of things in themselves, but are the forms and order the human mind imposes on the sense data it synthesizes, kant’s insight at least opens up the possibility that human cognition reflects inescapable cultural relativism and individual subjectivism, and not (or not just) universal human ways of cognizing, whatever the phenomena in question. in light of abraham ibn ezra’s insight, that the problem comes from below, i.e., from the human capacity to comprehend, rather than from above, i.e., from revelation’s divine source, even the phenomenon of what is alleged to be divine revelation would have to reflect these limiting factors. in other words, if kant is correct regarding the synthetic principles and categories, namely that they are characteristics of the way we cognize and not objective properties of the things in themselves, then he is wrong in ignoring the cultural relativity and individual subjectivity, which also seem to be fundamental components of cognition. although kant is by no means the last word in philosophy, which has developed considerably since his day, and even if his epistemology is at best only partially correct in light of more recent developments, it seems to me to be helpful in getting us away from thinking that whatever we cognize is the ding als sich or absolute truth. whatever we know is as much a reflection of our own processes of cognition, which necessarily introduce at least some elements of individual subjectivity and cultural relativism, as it is a reflection of some kind of external reality. therefore, kant’s insights, however obsolete, are an important step in freeing us from the error of absolutism, that somehow any of us and all of us can claim possession of absolute truth. jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 110 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 a final (for the moment, at least) nail in the coffin of epistemological absolutism is provided by werner heisenberg (1901-1976), who argued that the theory of relativity undermines kant’s a priori categories of space and time, as separate and objective categories, because they don’t take into account the notion that space (extension) and time (energy) are actually interchangeable. therefore, the common words “space” and “time” refer to a structure of space and time that is actually an idealization and oversimplification of the real structure.70 according to heisenberg, kant’s arguments for the a priori character of causality no longer apply, and synthetic judgments are relative truth: the a priori concepts which kant considered an undisputable truth are no longer contained in the scientific system of modern physics…what kant had not foreseen was that these a priori concepts can be the conditions for science and at the same time can have only a limited range of applicability…classical physics and causality have only a limited range of applicability. it was the fundamental paradox of quantum theory that could not be foreseen by kant. modern physics has changed kant’s statement about the possibility of synthetic judgments a priori from a metaphysical one into a practical one. the synthetic judgments a priori thereby have the character of relative truth…any concepts or words which have been formed in the past through the interplay between the world and ourselves are not really sharply defined…we do not know exactly how far they will help us in finding our way in the world…we practically never know precisely the limits 70 werner heisenberg, physics and philosophy: the revolution in modern science (new york: harper and row, 1958), 114. of their applicability. this is true even of the simplest and most general concepts like “existence” and “space and time.” therefore, it will never be possible by pure reason to arrive at some absolute truth.71 according to heisenberg’s 1926 “uncertainty principle” of quantum mechanics, the minimum quantum of light needed to measure the position and velocity of a particle will disturb the particle and change its velocity in unpredictable ways; the more accurately one measures the particle’s position (requiring a shorter wavelength of light and therefore greater energy), the more one disturbs its velocity, and therefore the less accurately one can measure its velocity; and the more accurately one measures its velocity, the less accurately one can measure its position. in other words, the very act of observing affects the observed phenomena. in stephen hawking’s words: this limit does not depend on the way in which one tries to measure the position or velocity of the particle, or on the type of particle: heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is a fundamental, inescapable property of the world…the uncertainty principle signaled an end the laplace’s dream of a theory of science, a model of the universe that would be completely deterministic: one certainly cannot predict future events exactly if one cannot even measure the present state of the universe precisely!72 so what is the “absolute” truth? is light to be understood as particles or as waves, or simply to be treated, depending 71 werner heisenberg, physics and philosophy: the revolution in modern science, 90-92. 72 stephen hawking, a brief history of time (new york: bantam books, 1988), 55. cf. “the uncertainty principle is a fundamental feature of the universe we live in. a successful unified theory must therefore necessarily incorporate this principle.” (pp. 155-156) jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 111 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 on the needs of the experiment, as both? there is, at least as yet, no “unified theory” combining quantum mechanics on the sub-atomic level, and gravity on the astronomic level of general relativity.73 if, then, we are forced to acknowledge fundamental uncertainty in physics, how can we continue to insist on certainty and absolute truth in metaphysics? on a different level, the insights of quantum mechanics, in which the primary “substance” of the world is energy,74 force us to think in terms of process and relation more than in the classical terms of substance. in this regard, it is interesting to note that the audacious shift proposed by mordecai kaplan (1881-1983) away from “substantive nouns” to “functional” or “relational” nouns, and therefore to god in terms of process rather than being,75 not only reflects maimonides’ insistence that the only positive statements of god that we can make are attributes of action, and nothing essential (i.e., we can only know what god does, not what god is), but also parallels the shifts taking place in physics at around the same time. “the lord is close . . . to all who call him in truth” how, then, can one continue today to be certain that any individual, or any particular group, has attained perfect and 73 stephen hawking, a brief history of time, 133, 155-156. 74 werner heisenberg, physics and philosophy: the revolution in modern science, 70-71: “in the philosophy of democritus all atoms consist of the same substance…the elementary particles in modern physics carry a mass in the same limited sense in which they have other properties. since mass and energy are, according to the theory of relativity, essentially the same concepts, we may say that all elementary particles consist of energy. this could be interpreted as defining energy as the primary substance of the world.” 75 mordecai kaplan, the future of the american jew (new york: macmillan company, 1948), 183; the meaning of god in modern jewish religion (new york: reconstructionist press, 1962), 325. objective knowledge of absolute truth? are not such claims and self-confidence epistemologically empty, spiritually smug, and perhaps even morally offensive? what, furthermore, shall we make of the verse in ps 145:18, “the lord is close to all who call him, to all who call him in truth (be-emet)”? we often misunderstand the qualifier “in truth,” which was translated literally by the targum as biqeshot, by the septuagint as en aleitheia and by the vulgate as in veritate. luther correctly avoided translating the qualifier cognitively, and instead rendered it as die ihn mit ernst anrufen, although i don’t think the psalmist meant “earnestly.” moses mendelssohn was more on the mark when he translated it as die aufrichtig ihn anrufen. this rendition of be-emet as “sincerely” reflects the comment of the medieval rationalist bible exegete, grammarian and philosopher radak (rabbi david kim h ̣̣i, c. 1160-1235), with whose commentaries mendelssohn was familiar (as were christian hebraists at the time of the reformation). kim ḥ̣i, whose exegetical works are replete with anti-christian polemic, nevertheless interprets “the lord is close to all who call him” as meaning from whatever nation he may be, so long as he calls him in truth, that his mouth and heart be the same.76 conclusion: pluralism as the way of torah i believe, therefore, that i have replied to kellner’s two challenges, namely that pluralism makes no sense, and that 76 irving “yitz” greenberg (for the sake of heaven and earth: the new encounter between judaism and christianity, pp. 66-67) similarly writes on this verse: “god is close to those who call god’s name, whose yearning born out of love and fidelity calls out truthfully and sincerely to the lord.” jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 112 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 2, issue 2 (2007): 92-113 there are no precedents for it in jewish literature and thought. as for the christian challenge, equating pluralism with relativism, i believe i have succeeded in constructing a paradigm of religious pluralism which avoids moral relativism (which is what concerns me most), while at the same time avoiding the kind of extreme epistemological relativism of radical deconstructionism. if, in the process, we have arrived at a degree of moderate epistemological relativism, i will happily plead guilty, because if my understanding of the rabbis, of the jewish philosophers, of kant, and of heisenberg’s uncertainty principle is correct, the shoe is really on the other foot: the burden of proof shifts to those who still, despite all the evidence, wish to maintain absolutist epistemological claims which i regard as intellectually untenable and even potentially morally dangerous to our religious coexistence. as for jewish precedents, there is ample evidence for both internal and external pluralism in the sources. for example, we find both internal and external pluralism supported by rabbinic interpretation of jer 23:29, “is not my word like fire, says the lord, and like a hammer smashing a rock?” in his commentary to gen 33:20 and ex 6:9, rashi cites this verse to justify diverse, internal pluralistic interpretations, like the sparks set off by the hammer smashing the rock into pieces. rabbi yishma’el interpreted this verse as alluding to both internal and external pluralism. internally, the talmud (sanhedrin 34a) records his statement that “as this hammer is divided into several sparks, so does a single biblical text contain several meanings.” elsewhere, the talmud (shabbat 88b) also records rabbi yishma’el interpreting our verse in support of external pluralism, that “as this hammer is divided into sparks, so was every single commandment that god spoke divided into seventy languages.” such pluralism, even if it entails a degree of moderate epistemological relativism, does not imply a strong relativistic conception of multiple truths, but of multiple perspectives on the truth, or what the rabbis called the “seventy facets of the torah” (shiv`im panim la-torah).77 i think it is not coincidental that the “seventy facets” of the torah’s internal pluralism are identical in number to the “seventy languages” of its external pluralism. it is this rabbinic commitment to pluralism, i believe, which underlies their apparently paradoxical statement that an argument which is not for the sake of heaven will not endure, but an argument which is for the sake of heaven will endure (sofah le-hitqayyem).78 one might think that an argument which is for the sake of heaven should lead to a peaceful resolution. but that is not, as i understand it, the rabbis’ intention. an argument which is not for the sake of heaven, for example, when a person sues another person for a debt, has to be resolved by the court; closure must be attained and justice must be served. but when the argument is for the sake of heaven, there is no winner and there is no loser. the truth can never be closed; it must always continue to be sought through the open exchange of diverse views. therefore, “the argument which is for the sake of heaven will endure,” that is to say, will continue without end, because it can be said of both sides, “these and those are the living words of god (elu va-elu divrei elohim ḥ̣ ̣ ayyim).”79 77 midrash numbers rabba 13:15, inter alia. 78 mishnah avot 5:17. 79 babylonian talmud `eruvin 13b; gittin 6b. the phrase can also be translated: “these and those are the words of the living god.” jospe, “pluralism out of the sources of judaism” 113 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol2/iss2/ preface: christian challenges a jewish challenge: menachem kellner weinstein 3 naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 63 three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument* montclair state university mark weinstein © informal logic vol. 26, no. 1 (2006): pp. 63-89. keywords: epistemology, argument, truth, inquiry, naturalistic epistemology, philosophy of science, metamathematics, logic, physical science, james freeman, robert pinto abstract: three contrasting approaches to the epistemology of argument are presented. each one is naturalistic, drawing upon successful practices as the basis for epistemological virtue. but each looks at very different sorts of practices and they differ greatly as to the manner with which relevant practices may be described. my own contribution relies on a metamathematical reconstruction of mature science, and as such, is a radical break with the usual approaches within the theory of argument. whatever the purpose of particular arguments and the contexts within which they occur, epistemic virtue is, arguably, one of the prerequisites for the goal being achieved. whether the purpose is something akin to truth as in critical inquiry or, by contrast, the determination of a best compromise between competing positions, accurate information that reflects the determinants for the issues at contention is a requirement. and so the question, from whence the epistemic adequacy of arguments. in what follows i will look at three recent attempts to answer the question, they are all naturalist in the broad sense that they rely heavily on what is in order to ground what ought to be. but beyond that shared commitment they differ radically as to what epistemic virtue can be attributed and from whence this essential property is to be derived. the first of these, james freeman in his recent book acceptable premises (2005) draws upon the core intuition of the common sense tradition in empiricism. this takes us quite a ways into the understanding of the epistemological virtue of many non-controversial arguments, and an indication of how controversy is to be analyzed and explored. but, as we shall see, such a stance gives little more than a beginning. for we will argue that epistemological virtue is better understood when résumé: on décrit trois différentes approche sur l’épistémologie naturaliste des arguments. chacune utilise les pratiques réussies, qui sont la base de la vertu épistémologique pour chaque approche. mais chacune emploie des pratiques qui diffèrent largement dans leur façon de décrire les pratiques pertinentes. ma propre contribution repose sur une reconstruction mathématique de la science mûre, et donc se dégage radicalement des approches typiques. 64 mark weinstein the stakes are high. commonsense justifications will lead to critical inquiry, where the relative merits of an epistemological stance is evaluated in the light of our doxastic needs. the second, robert pinto, in a recent compilation of essays (2001) and in an unpublished paper, “reasons, warrants and premisses,” offers an account of epistemic virtue, which relies heavily on critical practices in context, that is relative to the variety of purposes for which reliable information is sought and the correlative epistemic demands put on the information, our ‘doxastic attitudes.’ this position, as pinto readily acknowledges, tends toward relativism, which whether acceptable in practice, given our epistemic needs, is manifestly inadequate in theory, for as harvey siegel (1987) has forcefully argued, relativism is powerless in just the regard that epistemological virtue is demanded, that is a practice and its standards for argumentation must be grounded in a robust epistemology, that is one that serves to justify the practice. third, my contribution will give a sense of how such a robust point view can be developed within a naturalist epistemology grounded in critical practice within disciplined inquiry, looking at the most successful critical practice of all, physical science. my choice focuses on what sellars (1963) has called the ‘scientific image,’ that is the world as seen through scientific theories and their instruments, in contrast to the ‘manifest image,’ the world as available to ordinary understanding and perception, the obvious concern of both freeman and pinto. in both cases, the limits of their positions will point to the relevance of the scientific image. my contribution, a model of truth modeled on scientific inquiry shows the possibility of articulating a rigorous account of such illusive properties as increasing informational and explanatory adequacy, and depth and breadth of connectedness. whatever the judgment as to the adequacy of the three approaches, each in its way shifts the theory of argument towards what i have called ‘applied epistemology,’ that is, looking to successful epistemic practices in order to identify the logic of their success (weinstein, 1994). that is, as applied epistemologies they are rooted in successful practice. the issues that such a naturalist approach faces can be distinguished between, first, practical questions of which sorts of practice are most productive in terms of our epistemological ends in argumentation, and second, the theoretical question of which practice is most illuminative of epistemological principles. once distinguished this squares nicely with root concerns in the theory of argument in so far as an essential role of argument is supporting judgments of epistemological relevance, that is applying conditions of adequacy to judgments in particular cases and, as essential, the development of some normative understanding of the principles as correctly used. the standards for argument need to reflect the epistemic goals, and arguments, particularly within the context of critical inquiry, are valuable in so far as they have epistemic warrant appropriate to the context in which they are offered. and as pinto shows us, these are essentially tied to the three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 65 purposes for which the inquiry has been undertaken. but epistemic standards have to be grounded in something deeper than practice on pain of relativistic impotence (siegel, 1987), and the practice of philosophy calls for very deep grounding indeed. that explains that foundational nature of my own contribution and my search for an approximation to traditional epistemic ideals by attempting to construct a model of truth. but if truth is to be relevant to argument and in particular to critical inquiry truth must be construed as an outcome of inquiry, rather than something external to it. this is obvious to plato in the meno, and it should be apparent to argumentation theorists as well. for unlike, for example, the study of arithmetic on the one hand and commonsensical problems in ordinary life on the other, truth in many substantive contexts is not available independent of inquiry. this should be apparent, for the utility of inquiry is that it permits the truth to emerge. 1. freeman: commonsense foundationalism james freeman, in acceptable premises (2005), reflects what can easily be seen as the founding intuition of informal logic. that is, that a normative account of argument can be developed focusing on the realm in which the overwhelming majority of arguments occur; that is, in non-specialized contexts in ordinary life, and using no more technical apparatus than is readily available to an educated person. it is this core that supports its vaunted utility as the basis for critical thinking and other good things. freeman draws heavily upon this tradition citing thomas reid more than any other single author. like pierce and plantinga, freeman sees the efficiency of epistemologically relevant mental functions as based on a naturalist account of their necessity for successful human functioning (planning, ordinary problem solving and the like). but genetic speculations aside, the essential nature of our faculties, reasoning, sense, memory and the like supports freeman’s acceptance of what he calls ‘commonsense foundationalism,’ which he sees as furnishing the rejection of ‘skepticism’ (freeman, 2005, p. 367ff.). freeman combines a logical concept ‘presumption,’ familiar in discussions of premise acceptability, with a concept he gets from plantinga, ‘belief generating mechanisms.’ this gives him his analysis, stated boldly: a statement is acceptable as a premise iff there is a presumption in its favor. (p. 20). and it has presumption in its favor when it is the result of a suitable belief-generating mechanism, with appropriate hedges about challenges, malfunctions and utility (p. 42ff). “we shall be arguing that the principles of presumption connect beliefs with the sources that generate those beliefs. “‘consider the source’ could be our motto for determining presumption” (p. 44). belief-generating mechanisms are of a variety of sorts. these psycho/social constructs are presented in what might be seen as a philosophical anthropology, that is, a theory of persons seen in their most obvious light. belief-generating mechanisms need to be adequate to the four-fold analysis of statements: analytic, 66 mark weinstein descriptive, interpretative and evaluative (p. 97ff); and they need to engage with three sorts of beliefs: basic, inferred and received (p. 109). descriptions, for example, rely on the belief-generating mechanisms of perception, which includes perception of qualities, natural and learned signs, introspection, and memory (p. 124ff). perceptions are of three sorts, physical, personal and institutional. institutional perceptions are presented on the model of “learned constitutive rules” (p. 136). this last is crucial for the modern condition: once mastered, systems of cognitive organization are manifested through mediated perception and enormously increase the range and relevance of sense perceptions, natural signs, and classifications. how far the notion of constitutive rule takes us into this broad and fascinating realm remains to be seen. whatever concerns are to be raised, however, we have to grant freeman’s main thesis. that is, we can account for many of our acceptable premises by virtue of their genesis. for if, as seems obvious upon reflection, we argue often and argue well on countless occasions, it should come as no surprise that the various mechanisms by which we come to our premises can be articulated in defensible ways. we should grant freeman’s point immediately. there are mental (and social) structures of many sorts that are reliable as the basis for judgments ranging as freeman sees, from the logical to the evaluative and including essentially, perceptual judgments and modest generalizations based on memory and other aspects of common sense. and of course, judgments that rely on the testimony or expertise of others. all of the kinds of belief generators have clear instances with presumptive status in contexts that permit easy resolution. as freeman shows by examples, there are contexts for each one of them that yield acceptable premises. the key to the adequacy of belief generating mechanisms is that they are reliable. we can begin our discussion of freeman by immediately conceding that if the target is radical skepticism, freeman has won the day. we just accept as obvious that we argue from acceptable premises all of the time, because in whatever relevant sense of mechanism, there are things about us and about how we operate epistemically, that, for all practical and many theoretical purposes, work just fine in enumerable instances. the issue becomes interesting for me when there are questions to be asked. although i will look at the three most basic belief generating mechanisms, a prior intuition, individual reports (based on sense perception) and memories, the challenges i will raise will be readily seen to apply even more severely to the more complex ‘mechanisms’ including institutional intuitions and other intuitions that support causal and other general claims. freeman asserts ‘some premises are straightforwardly acceptable as basic premises without argument…. however suppose one is faced with a ‘hard ‘case… here the requirement is to justify the judgment that a particular premise is or is not acceptable as a basic premise…we call making such a determination an exercise in epistemic casuistry’ (p. 319). for a priori intuition, freeman requires that it certify three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 67 a basic premise as both true and necessarily true (p. 323). the issue as freeman sees it requires a challenge; that is, unless a challenger is aware of improper functioning, the presumption for the reliability of her faculty of a priori intuition remains as does the presumption for the statements for which it vouches (ibid.). the decision is made more complex because of the possibility of ‘pragmatic consideration’ that is ‘that cost of accepting the claim if mistaken is higher than the expected cost of gaining further evidence’ (ibid. and elsewhere). this caveat is included in all of the discussions of belief generating mechanisms, but will be sidestepped here. freeman’s account of a priori intuition, like his other forms of belief generating mechanisms requires that it not be malfunctioning. with sensory intuition this is more readily fleshed out. a prior intuition is another thing entirely. when does an a priori intuition malfunction? is this the same as logical error? but then identifying malfunctioning intuitions depends upon a prior commitment to logical adequacy. this is, of course, what we have available to us, we call it ‘logic.’ and although in dispute in areas, the basic outline is available in logical theory. but one does not comprehend logic theory by intuition alone. one must understand logic, that is, the correctness of the intuition is a function of the informed intuitions of logicians and others who study the field. this of course is a far cry from what various native abilities permit the job to get off the ground. and where is this basis? students of logic who fail to get modus ponens may certainly be seen to have a failure of logical intuition, but what of students who are skeptical of the various complex logically true statements typified by tautologies such as ‘if a then, if b then a.’ the idea of a ‘malady’ of the a priori intuition presumably could be exemplified by a variety of examples, some rather simple and others quite deep. simple cases include students who tend to confuse conditional with biconditionals, or better, someone who fails the wason test, that is, not taking into account ft instances of conditionals when checking all cases. these are telling examples; many sorts of people fail at identifying the a priori status of such items on many sorts of occasions, including those trained in logic. it frequently has to be clearly explained for even people with experience in the field. so clearly, it is not the intuitive nature of the underlying logic that is at stake. rather, and obviously, it is the underlying coherence of the theoretic understanding of logic that marks the error. the acceptability flows not from its genesis in a priori intuition but from its genesis (and constant reconstruction) in logical theory. and these are quite different things, for the status of the later is, as in all theory, provisional and open to the advance of inquiry, and so its birthright as an intuition is at best the beginning of the story. although we may ultimately rely on something like a priori intuition, it is deployed in conjunction with an apparatus (the ‘institution’ of first order logic), which in this case is fairly clear, and which includes a meta-theory that permits of the deepest intuitions, both obvious and surprising to be expressed, discovered and 68 mark weinstein abandoned. the problems of completeness of sub-theories of first order logic; the equivalence of alternative systems of proof, not to mention real problems for intuition such as russell’s paradoxes, lowenheim-skolem and gödel incompleteness all play havoc with our intuitions, and logic is richer for the havoc they play. for all of these test intuition by the complex constructions of logical inquiry, that even if ultimately ‘intuitive’ to those in the know, remain far from the attempts to grapple with logical inference that we find in students and in the everyday application for even propositional arguments. this is seen in a priori sciences other than logic as well. the notorious problem of the square root of 2, the well known story of hobbes and his rejection of a counter-intuitive theorem in geometry, cantor’s problem and many others all point to the fundamental irrelevance of strong intuitions in the face of theoretic advance. that is not to deny that there are necessary a priori intuitions: failure to get modus ponens stops logic in its tracks. it is to say that which intuitions these are remains unknowable until the advance of inquiry, which, while using these very intuitions, sees them as defeasible as the inquiry progresses. this does not result in a challenge to the notion of a priori intuition, but rather makes any one of them suspect. such fallibilism is generally healthy, but it precludes the sort of generative story that freeman tells from being more than the beginning of the story. for me the story gets interesting when we start to talk about revision of our intuition. that is, when we engage with inference. freeman draws the line in roughly the place i do and sees inference as another issue. but my point is that being acceptable as a premise ultimately relies on inference, although all inferences do start with some, putatively acceptable premises. and so for me the epistemological interest of presumption is not when it succeeds but when it fails. this can be seen easily in his next class of statements kinds, descriptions. freeman construes these as sense perceptual but sees their scope to extend to the identification of summary and even non-projective generalizations (pp. 126-7 and pp. 345-6). freeman offers a similar account here as well. he begins by asserting a presumption for first-person reports of perceptions unless the challenger is ‘aware of evidence that her perceptual mechanism is not functioning properly or that the environment in which this perception is occurring is anomalous’ (p.326). again, if his point is there are perceptions that have presumption, he is correct. but how far does this point take us? again, we look at the most basic case. visual perception is both highly reliable and a mechanism in the clearest possible sense. the physiology of sight is well understood including the neurological basis in the brain. and so malfunction is easily diagnosed and accounted for in terms of the mechanism. that, of course, is not what freeman has in mind. rather it is the functioning of vision that is the ‘mechanism’ he is interested in. we know we are malfunctioning when we have issues, and when we have issues we go to the eye doctor. short of very simple tests, response of the retina to light, eye charts and the like, the identification and remediation of a visual malfunction is a complex combination of phenomenology (what you say is taken seriously), long experience with coherent three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 69 symptoms, and focused and frequently efficient choices of test-sequences as when the doctor changes lenses back and forth asking, ‘which is clearer, this or this?’ but all of this, even the eye charts, rely not on the quality of the visual intuition of the patient, but on this intuition in combination with a long experience, codified in ‘institutional’ (professional practice) the technology the supports the examination and underlying understanding of how deformities in the visual mechanism is to be compensated for by choice of lens shape. and so again, whatever the presumption, that for example, a first person report is correct, it is the interaction with a mode of inquiry that settles the case. having seen well in the past is no argument against needing glasses, although it is a sufficiently reliable index of function that new patients frequently complain when confronted with the need to remediate. the same is clearly true for all sensory reports. we don’t have to have a history of auditory delusions for our reports to be delusional. the reports just have to be sincere and out of sync with the understanding of others. the distinction between perceptions and, for example, dreams is not vividness but continuity and coherence. eyewitness testimony relies on corroboration not eye tests. another major source of beliefs is memory and of course freeman is correct to write that we remember all sorts of things and rely upon them extensively: ‘memory, as long as what is remembered is distinct and not vague, again is a presumptively reliable belief-generating mechanism’ (p. 329). but when we look at memory we notice first that much of it is dispositional in the sense of knowing how, and so the issue of functioning is clearly tied to performance rather then some internal vividness or other phenomenological marker (p. 141). for propositional memory it would be, perhaps, rude to question someone’s vivid memory of events etc. except when they prove incoherent with another narrative. but politeness aside and looking at the phenomena in general, we now know that whether or not accompanied by phenomenological states that support conviction, even within the agent, memories are tied to coherent networks of other memories, peculiarly connected, with all sorts of other affective and classificatory bundles in the mechanism that supports them, the knowing brain. this is manifest in behavior in well-known ways and accounts for memory bias of all sorts. (brainard and reyna, 2005) memories that enter into public narrative are even more fraught with difficulty as all sorts of biasing choices of centrality and focus distorts memories in ways that are well known within cognitive psychology. this alters the perspective on what makes memory reliable. to ask if someone remembers (except in the context of first-person interviews that do no more than report opinions) is to engage with an inquiry into the memories’ surround. whether internally in terms of introspective narratives or more importantly externally in reports of first-person experiences for the purpose of offering useful information, our acceptable memories are those that can serve as premises because of their coherence with other things we remember, which in turn are judged by their coherence and so on. i won’t go through freeman’s other belief mechanisms for i believe my point to be made. the remaining belief generating mechanism all having to do with 70 mark weinstein generalities including ‘subjunctives’ that support counterfactuals whether empirical or ‘institutional,’ that is, codified by experts in light of the best evidence and firmest opinions (p. 171ff. and p. 347ff.). i leave it to the reader to provide examples of similar complaints to those just raised, which i believe to be all too available in the history of science and in common affairs. generalities of whatever sort rely on their persistence as inquiry advances, the founding intuition rarely even affords a clue as to their reliability. even so truncated a discussion gives us a clue as to another way of looking at things, moving from the genesis of a belief, to how it fares when scrutinized in light of various doxastic ends. 2. pinto: critical contextualist robert pinto in a recent compilation of his efforts presents an interesting contrast with freeman’s view. as we shall see pinto’s work engages with the crucial notion of ‘critical practice,’ thereby placing the source of epistemic virtue outside of psychological belief generators and into the sociological. but this is no mere shift of foundation, it carries consequences for the problems that freeman’s view bring to fore, and deeply challenges the root notion that it is intuition that is the source of our beliefs. the concern with critical practice grows out of pinto’s logical concerns, the relation of argument to persuasion (pinto, 2001, chapters 1 through 3) and most essentially, the relation of inference to argument (op. cit., chapter 4 and elsewhere). as he puts it ‘arguments are invitations to inference’ (idem, p. 36ff.). the move has many virtues. pinto contrasts his view with the more standard view seeing argument as a relationship between premise and conclusion. his recommendation has immediate fruitful consequences. as is well known, the standard view of inference makes looking at the truth of premise secondary to the ascertaining of the relationship of support from among the premises. and the adequacy of argument is seen on some analogue to validity. although informal logicians express similar concerns offering variations on the truth of premises— acceptability and the like, pinto’s move towards inference consolidates such concerns by seeing premises in light of the inference to be drawn. this shifts the discussion to an interesting complex of issues and outcomes. the focus on inference enables him to make significant contributions to the notion of argument appraisal. argument seen as ‘an invitation to inference’ calls for assessment in terms of the reasonableness of the premises and the inference seen in respect of a range of doxastic attitudes, construed to be broader than belief (idem, chapters 2 and 3). unwilling to commit to the task of a general theory, pinto sees himself as offering reminders in the sense of wittgenstein rather than an alternative theory (idem., p. 129) pinto is concerned with how particular arguments function. such a naturalistic approach leads to general issue of non-deductive inference in a very broad sense and yields insight in relation to problems of relativism. pinto opts for what he calls ‘sophisticated epistemic relativism’ which he expresses three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 71 as: ‘there is no set of epistemic standards or criteria of which it can be said that it is uniquely correct or correct sans phrase’ (idem., p. 54). he distinguishes inferences from the their argumentational outcomes, e.g. persuasion in the standard view. he had already argued (chapter 2) that a range of doxastic attitudes, indicating six levels of conviction including such modifications as ‘being inclined to believe and suspecting’ are all possible outcomes of argument (idem., p. 12). he expands the conception from differing levels of conviction to qualitatively distinct outcomes such as desiring, hoping, and intending, fearing etc. arguments that support such a range of doxastic and non-doxastic outcomes are judged in light of particular outcomes as indicated by the relevant attitude. this is an important move for it moves the issue to the substance of the propositional (or even a non-propositional, p. 17ff.) attitude rather than to a ubiquitous notion of belief, to which other doxastic attitudes tend to be reduced. he summarizes this provocative line of thought as the very general claim that ‘argumentation is the attempt to modify conscious attitudes through rational means’ (idem., p. 19, italics in the original). pinto’s intuition is that it is the attitude that is the argumentational goal that determines the criteria by which supporting inferences should be evaluated. the import of this move to a qualified and contextualized image of inference will be at the center of his reformulated theory in ‘reasons, warrants and premises,’ offering both the direction that the study of inference should move, and a crucial test for such a point of view. pinto’s arguments and my own predilections prompt me to move in similar directions. but that does not alter the key question for argument evaluation: whether to accept the invitation to inference in support of the outcome, whatever its doxastic nature. pinto sets his position in relation to the positions he rejects. the strategy here, and in later essays, is to argue that the range of inferences that need to be evaluated can not be characterized in the terms of formal logic or the alternatives that informal logic provides. not surprisingly he rejects the idea that the inferences need be as strong as entailment in the classical sense (op. cit., p. 38) and sees his earlier concerns with the range of doxastic and non-doxastic attitudes in terms of peirce’s notions of habits of mind and guiding principles (idem., p. 40). this raises a version of what will be an essential critical question. can habits of mind and guiding principles be articulated in a fashion sufficient for the normative constraints needed if an invitation to inference is be accepted on, roughly, epistemological grounds—that is, because it moves the cognitive purposes of argument forward? early on, pinto indicates an underlying normative substructure—and this will become a major theme in his reformulation of his point of view—‘a practice of criticism’ (idem., pp. 43-4). as we shall see, pinto will eventually see the appeal to critical practice to be as a good as we can get, something short of a full theory of inference, but yet strong enough to ground our normative endeavors. looked at generally, pinto’s strategy is to broaden the purview from the logical to the contextual. so, in the discussion of coherence as a basis for belief (idem., chapters 7 and 8) he 72 mark weinstein begins with a narrow logical view of coherence and quickly shows it to be inadequate (p. 64ff.). the discussion, driven by a range of examples and with reference to relevant philosophical positions, moves the discussion of coherence to the context. viewed psychologically, in terms of coherence as a hallmark of the validity of inferencing, pinto looks to an overview that will offer a sense of the subjects ‘understanding’ that could furnish a psychological surrogate for the reasoning process, something akin to a narrative whole, but which, unfortunately, does not seem to be available (idem., p. 71, see also chapter 12). coherence is viewed as the ‘objective correlate’ of such nuanced understanding and requires that a critical overview of the domain to be available to understanding (idem., pp.70-1). reasoning ‘takes place on the basis of understanding that involves an overview of the domain we are reasoning about’ (idem., p.67). he offers a number of constraints, including: (a) to make intelligent nondeductive inferences from any body of data we need a grasp of what the plausible alternative are to the hypothesis we are adopting and we cannot have that without some general understanding of the ideas we are reasoning about (b) to make intelligent deductive inferences from any set of assumptions or premises, it is not enough to assure ourselves that our conclusions follow from the premises we have strong reasons to accept; we also need assurance that our conclusion doesn’t run counter to propositions that are more entrenched than the premises from which our inferences begin; and to have such assurance we need a general understanding of the field we are reasoning about. (idem., p. 67.) he continues: when we learn to engage in argumentation, and when we learn to make all but the most rudimentary inferences, we are initiated into an intersubjective practice of criticism that enables us to appraise inferences on the basis of certain broadly or commonly recognized features and/or standards… that this practice of criticism in its developed form cannot be reduced to that application of any simple or straightforward sets of rules… 20th century epistemology—and in particular, 20th century philosophy of science—has made us aware that the goodness of our most fateful and highly prized inferences does not yield to any simple analysis in terms of patterns or guiding principles. and yet the value of those inferences, is not something that is arbitrarily accepted; rather it is something that is open to discussion and rational evaluation. (op.cit., p. 81.) but this, of course, creates an enormous problem for pinto, for once the complexity is known, a theory of inference looks further away rather than closer. this may not daunt pinto who eschews contributing a theory of inference, but it should concern us. for if inference in the complex sense of critical practice and with all of the modifications across the range of appropriate doxastic attitudes is to lead to an account of epistemic virtue, something much worse than relativism raises its head, that is vacuity or anarchy. if we are to have a normative theory of argumentative virtue we need a theory of how arguments are made good. but pinto’s relativism three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 73 has an enormous yield. it focuses us on differences and should make us agnostic about the possibility of getting a general theory, all at once. the downfall of the theory of argument may very well be the drive to come up with a unified account too soon. but whether unified or not, some general account is required if we are to have a theory of virtue in argument at all. but where to begin? in “reasons, warrants and premisses”, pinto sees a deep general structure supporting the myriad of argumentation contexts that his work’s insight forces us to accommodate. although he works from ordinary examples, choosing apples is the most detailed, the generality he provides can be easily extended to all sorts of arguments. what pinto sees in the work of david hitchcock is a refocusing of the problem of warrant through the notion of enthymeme and an elegant solution to the problem of from whence premises that are required if an argument is to be warranted. epistemology moves forward from premise acceptability to the acceptability of those crucial premises that serve as warrants for inferences. hitchcock’s solution is deceptively simple (hitchcock, 1998). a missing premise that can serve as a warrant can be generated from the other premises and the conclusion by generalizing across content expressions. if done with appropriate care, the generalization indicates a substantial connection between the other premises and the conclusion, and so the solution does not suffer from the triviality of seemingly similar suggestions such as the construction of the minimal conditional, ‘if premises then conclusion’ added to the premise set. generalizing on non-logical variables is of course an ancient insight. pinto sees hitchcock needing to admit generalizations with scope less than the standard requirement, universality across a class. generalizing need not be universally quantifying, but only requires sufficient generality to get the job done. this rather obvious move has profound consequences for logic, for if the quality of generalization is a property of the generalized predicates rather than of the quantifiers and connectives we can’t possibly have a formal logic, for formal logic is just an account of the architecture we have moved beyond. naturally there will be a formal logic associated with such inferences, some version of non-monotonic logic no doubt. and thanks to an essential contribution of arnold koslow (2000) we do not have to deal with traditional logicians task of defining connectives and the like. koslow shows that any logic can be described just in terms of its inference structure. that puts the focus just where it is required, for hitchcock and pinto tell us what an inference structure adequate to substantive argument needs to look like. an inference structure has to be sensitive to the substantive relations between extra-logical terms and to the restrictions on power in the entailment relationships (the strength of the ‘inference ticket’ or alternatively that depth of commitment to the warrant). that is, entailments range from very weak to almost as strong as you can get. pinto’s rule for choosing apples relies on an inference that is super-weak, you are always ready to except exceptions both in terms of outcomes and in terms of circumstances, yet it happily satisfies his 74 mark weinstein wife’s demands. on the other end of the spectrum chemical formulas support inferences of the most robust sort, although the history of science warns us to always be ready to accept modifications in light of deep theoretical restructuring of their surround. but although such a logic cannot possibly be formal, its very complexity points to the need for it to be mathematical. the use of mathematics (in logic, metamathematics) to describe complex symptoms is hoary with age and unparalleled in practical application. logicians should not confuse formal and mathematical logic, although historically such confusion is understandable. a metamathematical account need be no more than a mathematical description of any logical system and does not prejudice the substantive properties of the system. to confuse the two is to open up the doors to logical chaos, paradox and even worse, bad analogies, for the properties of mathematical description are not the same as the properties of the object described and vice versa. metamathematics as a descriptive language has enormous power, for the understanding of the tools of metamathematics is among the most rigorous in the intellectual repertoire, while it permits of the consolidation of vast domains through concise abstract formulations. so it is to metamathematics that i will turn but only after some rather extensive preliminaries. 3. weinstein: truth through inquiry the complexity inherent in pinto’s account, both by virtue of the ranges of doxastic attitudes and the enormous complexity that the notion of generalizing on substantive predicates with all of the rich variety of the underling strength of generalizations across concept types, might make us despair of ever getting a handle on how arguments work, except in some crude outline of heuristics or perhaps by relinquishing normative epistemology and focusing on broad general principles of the sort that pragma-dialecticians propose. that is, rules governing dialogue indifferent to the internal complexity of the subject matter being discussed and focusing on the dialogic interactions instead. this has proved very helpful in understanding the over-all architecture of argument. but as long as the argument stage is left unresolved, and there is no reason to share in the optimist view, sometimes present in pragma-dialectics, that logic can take care of itself, there is little insight to be got from pragma-dialectics into the deep epistemologies that support the role of acceptable because true(ish) premises in furnishing warranted conclusions. freeman at the end of his book sees the possibility of an alternative account, that he equates with the metaphor of a network drawn from quine (pp. 374-5). he rightly laments that this is no more than a metaphor. one way of looking at my work in critical thinking and applied epistemology is as an attempt to make sense of this metaphor. previously, i focused on what i saw were the crucial aspects of disciplined discourse as a prototype of adequate argument. i too was very general, identifying the language of the disciplinary frame with special concepts, substantive three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 75 rules of inference and paradigmatic practices (weinstein 1990). although i think all of that is correct and perhaps useful it doesn’t touch on the logical issues. it wasn’t until i began to reconsider my work begun some time ago on the notion of reduction in science that i realized that i had the beginning of a solution. in my earlier discussions of applied epistemology (weinstein, 1994) as well as my ‘ecological approach’ to critical thinking i relied heavily on the availability of powerful modes of inquiry that were no less likely candidates for an epistemological foundation than common sense, in that they represented enormous amounts of warranted and useful knowledge. it seemed to me that epistemologically, in the scientific era, the special disciplines were more appropriate as a paradigm than common sense. which, although rooted in our success in knowing many ordinary things, was riddled with error. and moreover, that the logical lessons available from the exploration of such a range of successful inquiry would be more valuable than those learned from the success of individuals arguing about ordinary affairs. the reason was that my candidate for the most successful inquiry i knew, physical chemistry, could be seen to have the sort of structure that mirrors some of the deep intuitions of philosophers as to the unity of the known. i saw the epistemological effectiveness of physical chemistry to be drawn from three obvious and powerful desiderata for any inquiry clearly exemplified by the history of the discipline. that is, that over time, physical chemistry showed, on average, an increase in the breadth of its application to a range of cases, increasing depth in the levels of explanatory frameworks that accounted for the increase in range because of the great increase in explanatory yield when a heretofore unrelated explanatory frame (set of laws) enables whole hosts of phenomena to be given chemical or physical models, that is, explained by the same or analogous principles, themselves connected by increasingly deep chains of explanation: the grand reductions, organic chemistry and material science (metallurgy, crystallography, etc.) and all of this with increasing refinement both in the ability to measure and compute. this was a difficult story to tell but yet seemed readily amenable to mathematical expression because all of the criteria are scalar, at least roughly, that is depth, breadth and articulatability all permitted of rough linear order. the rational reconstruction that results has metamathematical interest and permits of elaboration in a way that may very well support its application in artificial intelligence and the creation of expert systems since it, in principle, enables weights to be assigned and calculated for the warrant of items and thus their power in sustaining inferences. but more important it seems to me to furnish a structure in terms of which interesting logical concepts can be saliently explicated, including the three that i see as central to logical theory, truth, entailment and relevance. this moves me away from the weak entailments of ordinary inference to the strong entailments of mature scientific theories. for informal logicians, however, an immediate question arises: why mimic the mathematical by looking for strong substantive entailment measures? i am interested in very strong entailment relations because i am interested in truth. i won’t argue for that interest, rather rely on the work of harvey siegel (1987) to 76 mark weinstein support the untenability of the alternatives. so the problem for me is how to define a notion of truth adequate to inferences in the complex sense of pinto and hitchcock, that approaches the power of the traditional model of inference. freeman tells us is that we have many unexceptional beliefs generated by a variety of mechanisms and reflecting a broad range of abilities, both individual and corporate. pinto adds that these beliefs, or in his happy phrase ‘entitlements,’ include a broad range of creedal kinds, what he calls ‘doxastic attitudes’ nicely suited to the enormous variety of interests and concerns that require reasonable argument. pinto’s examples of micro arguments that exemplify the range of purposes and epistemic contexts set a standard for adequacy of any account. an account of the epistemology of argument must speak to the range of epistemic entitlements across the range of context and of epistemic need. warrants, as inference tickets require only as most robustness as the epistemic demands put on conclusion requires and have only as much logical power as the quality of the background knowledge affords. this is an embarrassment of riches. such a welter of small things offers a dizzying variety of kinds and concerns. so we take a page from plato’s republic; not daring to address the small in its particularity, we look to the large and seek some structural principles. rather than look at the dizzying variety of epistemic tasks for which argument is required, let us look at the largest and most imposing of the knowledge structures available in the last century, that is physical chemistry. and in doing so, instead of working from weak ordinary entailments we start at the other end with the strongest substantive relationships among terms. this leaves open the possibility of weakening the model to make it applicable to less epistemologically demanding concerns. taking our clue from the history of logic we construct an ideal model and put off worrying about approximations that capture more ordinary cases. as indicated, the choice of chemistry has long standing in my work, where, for a period of time my main focus in thinking about informal logic and argumentation was the role of disciplined knowledge, what i called ‘applied epistemology’ (weinstein, 1994). more recently i have moved from such pragmatic interests to the logical foundations of such a view, both to afford a secure foundation for the theory of argument and for its promise as an aid to constructing knowledge structures with the study of artificial intelligence. the first of these pursuits may give informal logicians pause, for informal logicians, until recently, have rarely engaged with foundational concerns, taking a more wittgensteinian approach that looks to successful practice rather than deep foundations. informal logic may not need a foundation, but a wrong foundation is a positive evil leading to deep errors, and tarski’s foundation is just the wrong one. for a theory that supports the equivalence ‘‘snow is white’ iff snow is white’ presupposes model relations in which mappings are clear and defined in terms of stable model structures. that is clearly the case in arithmetic, but there is much too argue about that cannot be captured in arithmetic constructions. that of course is not to deny the importance of arithmetic or the pragmatic importance of the theoretic fact that once we have three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 77 a model it will have a model in arithmetic. and if my view is consistent there is an arithmetic model of changing inquiry as well. that is trivial, since it follows from the first if we have a model of such change. what is decidedly not trivial is whether we have a model of change (weinstein, 2006). hitchcock’s work has immediate yield for it shows us how to do away with extensional interpretations by dealing with content expressions in a direct way. but of course that leaves open the aspect of generalization that the extensional model provided. that is to say an account of what generalization (logically) comes to and an indication of the strength with which the generalizations hold. the traditional account (all, some, none) was fine as far as it went and formal logic had much to say about it, but unfortunately it told us very little about how generalizations function in an enormous range of essential cases where they are neither extensional (universal) nor statistical. extensionality gives us a clear view of entailment, here seeing probabilistic entailment as a species of the genus. but our reasoning with warrants goes far beyond this. hitchcock gives us the clue to continue, but it is pinto who begins to see what the stakes are. for generalizations play many roles and fit many purposes, and the extensional model with its standard theory of truth tells us very little about much of what we want to do. pinto’s general use of entitlement points us in the right direction. the many things we require demand correlative degrees of robustness. his example of a rule of thumb for buying sweet apples indicates the sorts of arguments both he and freeman explore, that is ordinary arguments at relatively low stakes for which ordinary information and common sense are adequate. but, as indicated, we have bigger fish to fry. there are two philosophical intuitions that support the choice of physical chemistry as the paradigm for epistemology. the first is as old as plato’s love affair with geometry. we can get no better than our best available knowledge structures if we want a model from which epistemologists might draw their understanding. like kant and newtonian physics, the philosopher will do well to heed the call of the most effective practice, lessons are to be learned from the most successful human engagement with coming to know. the second is that physical chemistry forms a coherent structure that sufficient logical complexity to offer exemplifications of how our ideas hang together. like all human knowledge, including the logical, physical chemistry begins in intuition. two of freeman’s belief generating mechanisms are at the beginning of the process. sense perceptions (including such relatively recondite sense percepts as taste: acids were initially defined in terms of their feel on the tongue) are essential as well as the ability to identify natural kinds. of course, contrary to freeman and his reading of peirce, the identification of natural kinds in chemistry was fraught with error and was subjected to extensive revision as the field progressed. as essential were the early discoveries of deep principles, such as the conservation of mass as determinative of the key procedure of weighing carefully, and of course, various primitive ideas about atomic theory. these higher-order intuitions, as applied to the weighing and sorting of physical objects offered the beginning of an 78 mark weinstein interesting layer of chemical models. ranging from the crude models of dalton to the sophisticated models in organic chemistry. some of these are found fairly early as the result of the application of new concepts, procedures and technology, and the result, over a century, intervening layers of practical applications understood both in terms of their experimental outcomes and their success, forming a roughly stable body of generalizations that permitted analogical application to similar cases as chemistry advanced. thus, not only are there levels of description, but accepted descriptions at a particular level reach out to neighboring phenomenon on the same level creating nests of similar chemical knowledge, for example the differentiation of acids and bases, the distinction of metals, the analysis of the family of substances formed by carbon rings, the structure of crystals and the like. major theoretic advance, however, occurs when these nests of analogous chemical generalizations are subsumed under higher levels of laws and models as began with the development of physical chemistry. this started moving rapidly in the nineteenth century with enormous advances in chemical knowledge, but the power of unification is best seen with the periodic table of elements at the core. it offers powerful substantive model that is the engine that has driven chemistry from its creation until now, for it opens the door to the deeper connection between chemistry and the maturing physics of the molecule, that atom and ultimately theories of elementary particles (langford and beebe, 1969). the yield, modern physical science with all of its riches. the image should be clear. a knowledge structure, its end points in experience (or other sorts of intuitions as in mathematics) increases in depth as higher order explanations capture (generally, only in part) aspects of the lower order generalizations as explananda. it expands laterally in breadth both through analogy as similar discoveries form nests of similar classifications and through common causal and other functional connections. this breadth is substantive (that is, more than additive) when a nest of similar generalities are subsumed under a higher order explanatory theory and these create the major advance in both theory and practice. these are the grand unifications, as classes of similar and even apparently dissimilar phenomena are seen to be the result of the same underlying forces and geometry. in addition to all of these, across the range of different components of the structure, understanding, frequently manifested in measurements, are expected to increase in precision. chemical understanding requires the relationship be better borne out in the details of the process, driven by deep principles such as the conservation laws that set ideal values to which experiments are to increasingly approximate. chemistry as a knowledge structure can be seen to yield three essential criteria of epistemic adequacy: breadth of applicability (at all theoretic levels); depth of theoretic understanding; and progressive improvements of measurement and other relevant describabilia as understanding improves. this can be seen in the physical sciences construed as the roughly unified structure with the periodic table of elements at the core and the array of supporting and supported knowledge structures understandable in its terms. uses of physical three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 79 knowledge whether in explanations, or practical application draw upon data (actually models of data) that are reconstructed through theoretic vocabularies according to appropriate inference procedures (subsumption under laws; performance of acceptable transformation as in balancing chemical equations and the like). but most important, the physical sciences are constructed around core theories and procedures, even given the discontinuities (cartwright, 1983). the discontinuities, once the concern of radical philosophers of science (notoriously, feyerabend, 1975) are clearly only problematic if our ideal is the sort of model relations drawn from the mathematical paradigm, that is to say, explanation and reduction as requiring deduction in the standard sense. a more adequate account of scientific truth shows how discontinuities are well managed and how progress towards greater coherence is assessed. setting too high a standard for coherence robs us of the epistemic richness of the dynamics of knowledge production and assessment. a standard as high as deductive certainty freezes the dynamics into the useless statics of all or nothing confirmation, a situation rarely if ever encountered outside of the contrived worlds of textbook examples and philosophers’ discussions. in the appendix below i include a meta-mathematical model of emerging truth that attempts to capture these intuitions. as in many non-standard analyses of truth, the model offered here is sensitive to the preponderance of evidence and changes in the evidence. in contrast to the standard mathematical construal of truth, truth based on the paradigm of mature physical science requires ambiguity in evolving model relations. truth, in the final analysis, is identified with the progressive appearance of a model that deserves to be chosen (so both the intuitions of correspondence and coherence are saved) but the model, not unlike in peirce, evolves as inquiry persists. it is the substance of how judgments of epistemic adequacy are made antecedent to the truth predicate being defined that is the main contribution of the construction below. in place of strict implication contrasted with induction in its various senses, the construction permits of degrees of necessity reflective of the extent of model relations, that is, it permits inferences within models (that are relatively strict) to be reassessed in terms of the depth and breadth of the field of reducing theories from which models are obtained. that is to say the theory of truth yields a theory of entailment that permits of degree (weinstein, 2006). it affords a systematic way to organize, articulate and evaluate changes in the field of theories in terms of which the evidence is interpreted and explained. this is accomplished by the identification of two different sorts of functions. first, fairly standard functions that map from a theory (construed as a coherent and explanatory set of sentences) onto models, that is, interpretations of theories in a domain (appendix, 3-3.3) and a second, much more powerful set of functions, that map from other theories onto the theory, thereby enormously enriching the evidentiary base and furnishing a reinterpretation now construed in relation to a broader domain (appendix 4-4.3). this is the insight that reflects the choice of physical science as the governing paradigm. mature physical science is characterized by deeply theoretical reconstruals of experimental evidence, laws and theories in 80 mark weinstein light of higher order theories as they are seen to unify here-to-fore independent domains of physical inquiry. these unifications, or ‘reductions’ offer a massive reevaluation of evidentiary strength and theoretic likelihood. it is the weight of such reconstruals in identifying the ontology that grounds the truth predicate that the construction attempts to capture. and in so far as the formalism captures what is salient in physical theory it affords a vision of emerging truth that may have significant implications for the computation of epistemic adequacy in systems that include a rich and theoretically structured data-base as in medical diagnostic systems. mature physical science is also characterized by the open textures of its models and the approximations within which surrogates for deductions occurs (in the standard account idealizations and other simplifications). the construction here attempts to make sense of the need for approximations and other divergences among models at different levels of analysis and articulation by offering intuitive criteria for assessing the epistemic function of the approximation in light of emerging data and the theoretic surround (appendix, 1-2). the yield is a notion of truth as a function of the history of theoretic adequacy (appendix, 5-6.33). the construction enables us to distinguish particular models and their history across the field, giving us criteria for preference among them. it is this ex post facto selection from among the intended models in light of their history that affords ontological commitment and the related notions of reference and truth. the main contribution of the formal model is how it elucidates the criteria for model choice in terms of the history of a scientific theory embedded within a complex scientific structure of evidence and related theories. we define plausible desiderata, not only upon the theory and its consequences, but also in terms of the history of related theories that donate models to the theory under appropriately selected reduction relations. reductive inferences are theoretic connectors that donate sets of models down a chain (appendix, 4-4.4) and in doing so subsume inferences within another conceptual framework. epistemically, they transform the understanding of the micro inference in terms of broader and more pervasive vocabularies and inferential procedures drawn from here-to-fore unrelated domains of understanding. computationally they add whatever weight the reducing theory has to the reduced. and to the extent that the reducing theory has power of its own, increases the epistemic adequacy of the reduced theory in a manner that ‘swamps the posteriors’. that is we don’t have to wait for instance confirmation over time to readjust our priors. our priors are always being readjusted as a function of the effectiveness of our theories across the board. and we search for our posteriors accordingly. reductions offer the large unifications that support reconstruals of empirical understanding. such ‘seeings as’ are rife in modern physical science and constitute the major advances in the domain. they include, but are not limited to seeing minerals as crystals, seeing chemical substances as molecules, seeing biological functions as organic chemical interactions, seeing mental events as neuro physiological etc. it is the structure of the field under these reduction relations, three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 81 and in particular the breadth and depth of the model chains donated by interlocking reducing theories that determine the epistemic force and ultimately the ontology of the theory. the intuitive appeal of the construction is first, based on accepting the brute fact that mature physical science is the most effective epistemic enterprise available, and thus a likely paradigm for a theory of truth; second, on the construction having captured what is essential in mature physical science, in this case the elaboration of how a theory takes weight from the epistemic surround, rather than merely in light of confirming evidence; and third, in terms of the novelty and richness of the formal construction. its prima facie novelty is readily seen when contrasted with truth drawn from standard account. rather than seeing truth as true in a model that is available independent of the truth seeking process, truth is an emergent property that becomes clearer as our truth gathering practices converge on a model. the construction here attempts to give mathematical substance to views that see epistemic adequacy tied to a web of theories as in quine, and see truth as inherently tied to inquiry, as in peirce, in a manner that both calls for and hopefully supports computation. 4. consequences for epistemology the intuition my view reflects may be stated boldly: true theories ramify. a theory, whatever its initial intended models, takes its ontological commitment in light of how the theory fares in relationship to other theories whose models it incorporates under reduction. that is, we fix reference in light of the facts of the matter, the relevant facts being how the theory is redefined in the light of its place in inquiry as inquiry progresses. the awareness by inquirers of the history of success of scientific structures enables them to set standards for model choice rationally, in terms of plausible criteria based on successful practice. the formal model enables us to look at the history of approximations to the original interpretations of the theory (intended models) in terms of their goodness-of-fit, and most crucially the relations between ontologically relevant models donated from above (from reducing theories) reinterpreting or even replacing intended models. that is, it enables us to look at how intended models fare under the impress of higher-order reducing theories. finally, it permits a natural definition of truth internal to the scientific structure (weinstein, 2002). truth is defined as an ideal outcome as in peirce but with mathematical content as in tarski. truthlikeness becomes a quantifiable metric as the theories in the structure move towards truth. that is, as the intended models of reducing theories substitute for intended models of reduced theories, increasing the confirmatory basis and the depth of explanatory adequacy. the confirmatory basis is increased since under reductions, confirming evidence of theories connected via reduction indirectly confirms the reduced theory as well. if my intuitions could be modeled with actual assignments of physical properties and relations, the model 82 mark weinstein chains and their relations could be displayed, weighted and evaluated. designing such an array would require a period of testing and adjustment, possibly through computer simulations of fragments of physical theory. the yield would be a rational reconstruction of argumentation in a substantive field of inquiry. and it offers an available formal metaphor for increasing truthlikeness as the outcome of inquiry of the sort found in physical chemistry, our presumptive candidate for a naturalist ontology, that is realist within a theoretic framework, which as putnam has shown us is the most we can hope for (putnam, 1983). the deep epistemic intuition should be clear. a theory, whatever its intended interpretation, makes its ultimate commitments in light of how the theory fairs in relationship to other theories whose models it incorporates under reduction. that is, we fix reference and therefore truth in light of the facts of the matter, the relevant facts being how the theory is redefined in light of its place in inquiry as inquiry progresses. it is the awareness on the part of inquirers of the history of success of scientific structures that enables participants in the inquiry to rationally set standards for model choice in terms of plausible criteria, based on successful practice. crucially, the formal model enables us to look at the history of approximations, and most essentially, goodness-of-fit relations between models donated from above, from reducing theories, and the original interpretations of the theory. truthlikeness becomes a quantifiable metric as the theories in the structure move towards truth, that is, as the intended model of strong reducing theories substitute as intended models for reduced theories. finally, it permits of a natural definition of truth internal to the scientific structure. truth is defined in an ideal outcome. (appendix, 6-6.33; weinstein 2002 offers an elaborated discussion). even given all of these virtues, why should argumentation theorists and informal logic tolerate such an idiosyncratic extension of their methods, especially with its resonance with just those methods against which informal logicians inveighed so heavily? its value is first to show that it can be done. that is, complex knowledge structures can be described mathematically in a manner that supports weighting and connectivity, both obvious criteria in natural argument. second, like tarski, it gives an abstract metaphor that then supports the elaboration of particular less global and even non-mathematical intuitions. it is a truism of ordinary argument that interlocutors come to argumentation with belief stores. it is a travesty to think argumentation can disregard levels of commitment in the name of simple tests like consistency. we give up items in our belief stores with more or less difficulty and good arguers strike at available targets. this requires the structure of commitments to be, at least in principle, theoretized if we are to have a theory of argument at all. consulting an oracle is evidence of despair both in logic as in life. a test of the structure is to take a range of examples we seem to understand and see to what extent the criteria of breadth, depth and articulatability can confirm and give substance to our intuitions. but that is to call for a research agenda. all a paper of this sort can hope to do is to intrigue future participants in the agenda. three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 83 appendix scientific structures: a model of emerging truth i have attempted to make the formalism more available by forgoing the usual array of greek letters, italics and the like. lower case letters name individual functions, models or sentences; upper case letters are (ordered) sets of such items; double upper case letters are (ordered) sets of such (ordered) sets. ordered sets are indicated by angle brackets. all indices, asterisks etc. are written on the line. an item is often used as its name; use/mention should always be clear in context. i use ‘|-’ to mark implication; ‘||-’ for semantic entailment; ‘|-e’ is our defined restriction on implication appropriate to explanations in mature physical science. i use ‘u’ for set theoretic union. a ‘field’ is a structured set of sets, with various elements ordered in a variety of ways. ordered sets enable us to keep track of items and discuss relations among them. 1. a scientific theory, t, is a set of sentences, {t 1 ,...,tm}. the explanandum, s, is a sentence. the explanans, tc is the longest sequence, tc 1 ,...,tc n , of truth functional components of t and |(tc iff t). we say that t explains s, in symbols, t|-e s, just when: a) tc implies s, b) tc does not imply not-s, c) for some tc i in tc, tc i is a nomic generalization, d) for any tc i in tc, neither tc i implies s, nor s implies tc i , and e) there is no sequence of sentences r 1 ,...,r k , available within the set of sentences accepted by the discourse community that accepts t, such that, for some sequence of tc 1 ,..., tcj in tc i) tc 1 ,...,tc j implies r 1 &,...,&r k , ii) r 1 ,...,r k does not imply tc 1 &,...,&tc j , iii) upon replacing tc 1 ,...,tc j in tc by r 1 ,...,r k , in symbols tc r , tc r implies s. since our concern is with physical science there is an obvious constraint that a substantial number of the tc i ’s will describe experimental or other empirical phenomena. as required by condition (c), some of these are nomic generalizations. condition (d) prohibits explanatory ‘bushes’ (circularity). condition (e) is the ground for relevance. 2. the basis for the construction is a scientific structure defined as an ordered triple, tt = <t, ff, rr>, where: a) t is a theory closed under an appropriate consequence relation, con, where con(t) = {s: t|-e s}. b) ff is a field of sets, f, such that for all f in ff, and f in f, f(t’) = m for some model, m, where either: 84 mark weinstein i) m ||-t, or ii) m is a near isomorph of some model, n, and n||-t. iii) ff is closed under set theoretic union: for sets x and y, if x and y are in ff, so is x u y. c) rr is a field of sets of functions, r, such that for all r in rr and every r in r, there is some theory t* and r represents t in t*, in respect of some subset of t, k(t). we close rr under set-theoretic union as well. ff includes primary evidence based on what t predicts or explains. rr includes secondary evidence based on the ‘reduction’ of t to another theory t*. the notion of reduction relies on the availability of ‘effective representing functions,’ a purely syntactic operator that maps formulas and variables of some theory, one to one, onto formulas and variables of another theory, and, in addition, preserves identity. an effective representing function, r, represents t in t* in respect of a non-empty subset k(t), of expressions of t, such that for every expression e of k(t), if e is in k(t) then r(e) is an expression e* in (t*). an important property of such representing function is: r reduces t to t* is equivalent to, for every model m of t there exists a model m* of t* such that, for every sentence s of k(t), s is true in m if and only if r(s) is true in m* (eberle, 1971). this enables us to define key notions, articulating the history of t under the functions in f and r of ff and rr respectively. an example of the sorts of construction is the basic notion of model chain. the intuition of a model chain permits us to formalize the intuition that a progressive theory expands its domain of application by furnishing theoretic interpretations to an increasingly wide range of phenomena. the basic interpretation is the intended model. thus, theories have epistemic virtue when all models are substantially interpretable in terms of the intended model, or are getting closer to the intended model over time. 3. we define a model chain, c, for theory, t, as an ordered n-tuple <m1,…,mn>, such that for each mi in the chain, m i = <d i , f i ,> for domain d i , and function f i , d i = d j , and where for each i and j, i< j< n, m j is a realization of t later in time than mi. a realization can be thought of as an experimental array or other set of data acceptable in the light of the standards in the field of inquiry that t sits. we say ‘realization’ because the various mi’s may not be models of t, rather, near enough approximations. this is a consequence of the pragmatic turn that pervades the construction. 3.1. let m* be an intended model of t, making sure that f(t) = m for some f in f, and that m||-t. we then say that c is a progressive model chain if: a) for every m i in c, m i is isomorphic to m*, or b) for most pairs m i , m j in c, i,j, i<j<n, m j is a nearer isomorph to m* than m i . three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 85 the notion of a progressive model chain permits us to formalize the intuition that a progressive theory furnishes closer theoretic interpretations to the range of phenomena within its domain of application. the basic interpretation is the intended model. thus, theories have epistemic virtue when all models are substantially interpretable in terms of the intended model, or are getting closer to the intended model over time. we say ‘most’ since we cannot assume that theoretic advances are uniformly progressive. frequently, theories move backwards without being, thereby, rejected. we are looking for a preponderance of evidence or perhaps, where possible, a statistic. we do not define this a priori. what counts as an acceptable rate of advance is a judgment in respect of a particular enterprise over time. this is another instance of the pragmatic turn. a related, but distinguishable notion, a theory being model progressive, begins with the intuition that theories transcend their initial domain of applications as they move from limited conjectures to effective explanatory theories. this notion defines a sequence of models that capture increasingly many aspects of the theory. 3.2. let t´ be a subtheory of t in the sense that t´ is the restriction of the relational symbols of t to some sub-set of these. let f´ be subset of some f in f, in some realization of tt. let <t´ 1 ,...,t´ n > be an ordered n-tuple such that for each i,j, i<j<n, t´j reflects a subset of t modeled under f´ at some time later than t´ i . we say the t is model progressive under f´ if: a) t´k is identical to t for all indices k, or b) the ordered n-tuple <t´ 1 ,...,t’ n > is well ordered in time by the subset relation. 3.3. let <c 1 ,...,c n > be a well ordering of the progressive model chains of tt, such that for all i,j, i<j<n, c j is a later model chain than c i . tt is model chain progressive if the n-tuple <c 1 ,...,c n > is well ordered in time by the subset relation. the intuition should be clear. a theory’s models in the sense of the sets of phenomena to which it is applied must confront the logical expectations the theory provides. that is to say, as the range of application of a theory moves forward in time and across a range of phenomena, the fit between the actual models and the ideal theoretic model defined by the intended model is getting better or is as good as it can get in terms of its articulation. the model history of a theory t, enable us to evaluate the theory as it stands. by examining t under rr we add the dimension of theoretic reduction. the key intuition here is that, under rr, models are donated from higher-order theories. theories under rr form a strict partial order (transitive, irreflexive and asymmetric) but with constraints on transitivity since we are dealing with approximations. the models (or near models) of t donated under functions in r are differentiated from models of t under functions in f by their derivational history and by the particulars of the members of rr. similar constructions offer a precise sense of progressiveness under rr. this will enable us to offer essential definitions resulting in a principled ontological commitment in terms of the history of the theory and its relations to other essential theories with which it comports. 86 mark weinstein we can distinguish particular models and their history across the field, giving us criteria for preference among them. the ex post facto selection of an ontologically significant model from among the intended models in light of their history will be seen to ultimately yield a truth predicate in a tarskian sense. more importantly, it yields an image of how judgments of epistemic adequacy are made before such a truth predicate is defined. it elucidates the criteria for model choice in terms of the history of the scientific structure, tt, within which a theory sits. that is, plausible desiderata are defined, not only upon the theory and its consequences (its models under functions in f), but also in terms of the history of related theories that donate models to the theory under appropriately selected reduction relations (sets of functions in r). it is the structure of the field under these reduction relations, and in particular the breadth and depth of the model chains donated by interlocking reducing theories, that determines the epistemic power of the theory. 4. we now turn our attention to the members of rr. recall that the members of r represent t in t* in respect of some non-empty subset of t, k(t). let <k 1 (t),...,k n (t)> be an n-tuple of representations of t over time, that is, for i < j, k j (t) is a representation of t in t* at a time later that k i (t). we say that tt is reduction progressive if, a) k(t) is identical to con(t) for all indices, or b) the n-tuple is well-ordered by the subset relation. 4.1. we call an n-tuple of theories, rc = <t 1 ,...,t n > a reduction chain, if for all i,j there is a r i in r i such that r i represents t i in t j in respect of k(t)for all i<j< n. rc = <t 1 ,...,t n > a deeper reduction chain than rc´ = <t´ 1 ,...,t´ j >, if t i is identical to t´ j for all i< j and j< n. 4.2. we call a theory reduction chain progressive if t is a member of a series of reduction chains, <rc 1 ,…,rc n > and for each rc i+1 , rc i+1 is a deeper reduction chain than t 1 . this leads to an even more profound extension under rr. 4.3. t# is a branching reducer if there is a pair (at least) t´ and t* such that there is some r´ and r* in r´ and r*, respectively, such that r´ represents t´ in t# and r* represents t* in t# and neither t´ is represented in t* nor conversely. 4.31. b = <tt 1 ,tt 2 ,...,tt n > = < <t 1 , f 1 , r 1 >, <t 2 , f 2 , r 2 >,..., <t n , f n ,r n >> is a reduction branch of ttn if tn is a branching reducer in respect of t i and t j , i, j > 2; j < n 4.4. we say that a branching reducer, t is a progressively branching reducer if the n-tuple of reduction branches <b 1 ,...,b n > is well ordered in time by the subset relation. 5. let tt# = <tt 1 ,...,tt n > be an ordering of scientific structures seriously proposed at a time. let <<t 1 ,f 1 ,r 1 >,...,<t n ,f n ,r n >> be their respective realizations at a time. we say that a set of models m, m = <m 1 , m 2 ,...,m n > is a persistent model set if for domains, d, three naturalistic accounts of the epistemology of argument 87 a) m = <<m 1 =<d 1 ,f 1 >, m 2 = <d 2 ,f 2 >,..., m n = <d n ,f n >> and for all i, j d i = d j , or b) m is a persistent model set in a set of ordered subsets of tt#, such that the sequence is well ordered in time by the subset relation. intuitively, m contains the ordered models that define what the theory can be seen to really be about. at each level in the ordering a model of what the theory is about has shown itself to be adequate over time and available for reinterpretation and integration with other adequate models. physical chemistry tells the tale. we live in a world of substances, which are indicative of chemical processes, which are indicative of molecular structure, which are indicative of atomic structure, which is what chemistry may be seen to be about in reality. if particle physic ever gets truly sorted out, there will be another layer. i stop with the periodic table of elements as the most coherent and pragmatically effective picture of the ‘architecture of matter’ that we have. that is, i take the periodic table of elements to be true, in the sense elaborated below (6-6.33) even though changing and evolving. 5. let tt# = <tt 1 ,...,tt n > be an ordering of scientific structures seriously proposed at a time. let <<t 1 ,f 1 ,r 1 >,...,<t n ,f n ,r n >> be their respective realizations at a time. we say that a set of models m, m = <m 1 , m 2 ,…,m n > is a persistent model set if for domains, d, if, a) m = <<m 1 =<d 1 ,f 1 >, m 2 = <d 2 ,f 2 >,..., m n = <d n ,f n >> and for all i, j d i = d j , or b) m is a persistent model set in a set of ordered subsets of tt#, such that the sequence is well ordered in time by the subset relation. 5.1. m is an ontic set for tt#. 5.2. we say that a ontic set, o, is a favored ontic set if: a) o is the set of intended models of a theory, t, standing at the head of a progressive reduction chain. (notice, o is thus the ontic set of all ` of the theories in the chain.) b) the members of the reduction chain are themselves reduction progressive. c) t is a progressively branching reducer. notice that the set consisting of an ontic set and the sets that it generates (the set of sets under the reduction relation) form a persistent model set. an interesting yield of the notion of persistent model set is that it explains instrumentalism in theoretically primitive or dubious contexts. without a theory that donates models the most persistent models are models of the data, whence instrumentalism or other brands of positivism. of course, working with mature physical science our concern is with theoretic coherence. which, although requiring that functions map onto models of data or other empirical models, takes its ontology from the deeper theoretic commitments as a function of reduction. for the scientifically informed the world is really made up of atoms and molecules, even though exactly what atoms and molecules will come to be seen as waits on the progress of science. 88 mark weinstein we now define the ideal of truth emergent. 6. tt is progressive if: a) tt is model progressive (3.2). b) tt is model chain progressive (3.3). c) tt is reduction progressive. (4). 6.1. we call t a progressive reducer if: a) t is reduction chain progressive (4.2). b) t is a progressively branching reducer (4.4). 6.2. we say t is a favored reducer, if: a) tt is progressive (6). b) t is a progressive reducer (6.1). 6.3. t is a most favored reducer if t is a maximally progressive reducer, that is, t is the nth member of a reduction chain such that for all ti, <ti…,tn> i<n, t is a favored reducer. (notice, tn is not reduction progressive, since it stands at the head of the longest reduction chain.) 6.31. the set, o, of ontic models of tn, is thus, a favored ontic set in respect of every ti in the reduction chain. 6.32. if tn is a most favored reducer, and o is its favored ontic set than o is the ontology of scientific structure tt. 6.33. an ideal truth predicate for tt can then be constructed in fairly standard tarskian as ‘s is true’ for s in tn in tt, iff o||-s where o is the ontology of tt and tn is the most basic theory of all. notes * acknowledgement is owed to christoph lumer for his thoughtful criticism. references brainerd, c. j. and v. f. reyna, eds.: (2005). the science of false memory. oxford: oxford university press. cartwright, n. (1983). how the laws of physics lie. oxford: oxford university press. eberle, r. 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(1987). relativism refuted. dordrecht, holland: d. reidel toulmin, s. (1969). the uses of argument. cambridge: cambridge university press. weinstein, m. (1990).”towards a research agenda for informal logic and critical thinking.” informal logic, 12 (1), 121-143. weinstein, m. (1994). “informal logic and applied epistemology,” in johnson, r.h., and blair, j.a. (eds.) new essays in informal logic. windsor, canada: informal logic. weinstein, m. (1995). “relevance in context,” in van eemeren, f.h. , grootendorst, r., blair, j.a. and willard, c.a. (eds). proceedings of the third international conference on argumentation. amsterdam: sicsat, vol. ii, 233-244. weinstein, m. (1999). “truth and argument.” eemeren, f.h. van, grootendorst, r., blair. j.a. and willard, c.a. (eds). proceedings of the fourth international conference on argumentation. amsterdam:sicsat, 168-171. weinstein, m. (2002). exemplifying and internal realist theory of truth, philosophica, 69:2002(1), 11-40. weinstein, m. (2006). “a metamathematical extension of the toulmin agenda.” hitchcock, d. and b. verheij, arguing on the toulmin model. dordrecht: holland, springer. pp. 45-62. mark weinstein educational foundations montclair state university upper montclair, nj 07043 weinsteinm@mail.montclair.edu pinto evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 287 evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants university of windsor robert c. pinto abstract: résumé: cet article suit les traces de david hitchcock et de stephen toulmin pour avancer que les lois de passages (des raisons données à leur conclusion) sont des règles d’inférence matérielle. il décrit la forme que de telles règles devraient prendre pour (a) appliquer l’idée qu’un argument est valide seulement s’il préserve le droit d’inférer, et pour (b) soutenir une version qualitative d’ appui proportionnel. cet article tente de décrire ce qui donne aux lois de passage leur force normative en examinant un concept de fiabilité adapté à l’explication de la forme que de telles règles devraient prendre. © informal logic vol. 26, no. 3 (2006): pp. 287-317. keywords: warrant; inference rule; material inference; evidence proportionalism; entitlement preserving inference; inferential practice; reliability; david hitchcock; stephen toulmin 1. introduction following david hitchcock and stephen toulmin, this paper takes warrants to be material inference rules. it offers an account of the form such rules should take that is designed (a) to implement the idea that an argument/inference is valid only if it is entitlement preserving and (b) to support a qualitative version of evidence proportionalism. it attempts to capture what gives warrants their normative force by elaborating a concept of reliability tailored to its account of the form such rules should take. this paper1 explores two ideas: (a) that there are material inferences—i.e. inferences whose “validity” does not depend on logical form 2 (b) that rationality is a matter of making our attitudes toward propositions or propositional contents appropriate to the evidence which shapes them—developed in what might be called a qualitative version of evidence proportionalism.3 though i think this conception of rationality can be applied in a very general way to illuminate the rationality of decisions and of such things as preferences, this paper will consider only how it can be worked out with respect to cognitive attitudes, and more specifically with reference to doxastic attitudes.4 the discussion that follows will be framed by an examination of two closely related versions of the proposal that we take certain generalizations which are not 288 robert c. pinto “logical truths” to be rules of inference (where ‘logical truth’ is unpacked after the manner of quine 1953: 22-23)—versions offered by david hitchcock and stephen toulmin, respectively. for the most part, i will ignore other attempts to deploy the idea of material inferences—in c. s. peirce,5 wilfrid sellars6 or robert brandom,7 for example. there are three questions that arise when one attempts to deploy the notion of “rules of inference” which are not logical truths, questions whose significance becomes salient when hitchcock’s and toulmin’s accounts are compared: (a) what form should the statements that express such rules take? for example, in hitchcock’s account, they typically have the form of a certain kind of “covering generalization” which contains no explicitly normative expressions. in toulmin, when warrants are “made more explicit” (toulmin 2003/1958: 91) they contain normative expressions. this question is addressed in part 2 of this paper, and reconsidered in part 5. (b) what virtues must arguments and inferences8 have if they are to be considered valid? should we say that they must be truth-preserving? but then what about good arguments that aren’t deductively valid and which have true premisses and a false conclusion? can we say that they must at least be such that it’s unlikely that their conclusions are false given that their premisses are true? but what about the possibility of “practical” arguments and inferences whose conclusions are intentions or prescriptions—things whose “propriety” does not consist in their being true? or perhaps we can accommodate both defeasible inferences and practical inferences by saying, with brandom,9 that what matters about inferences is whether they preserve “normative statuses”—for example, whether they are entitlement-preserving. but then what sorts of “entitlement” must be preserved by inferences that are valid and how is such an idea to be implemented? these questions are addressed in parts 3 and 4 below. (c) what virtues must rule statements have if they are to have normative force, if they are to be fit to serve as norms for arguments and inferences? this question is addressed in part 6 below, though its significance will begin to emerge in part 3. 2. what form ought warrants to take? hitchcock’s account building on work by rolf george (1972, 1983) and beginning with his 1985 paper “enthymematic arguments,” hitchcock has been developing a “general theory of inference appraisal” (hitchcock 2001: 1): according to a current version of this theory, a conclusion follows (conclusively, provisionally, etc.) from premisses adduced in its support if evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 289 and only if some covering generalization of the argument is non-trivially acceptable (always, provisionally, etc.). hitchcock himself has come to identify “the covering generalization of the argument” with toulmin warrants quite explicitly (hitchcock 1998: 27 and hitchcock 2003).10 key features of hitchcock’s theory the core of hitchcock’s theory—carefully articulated and argued for in hitchcock 1985 and 1998—offers an account of what it is for a conclusion to follow “conclusively” from its premisses.11 the general theory arises from the core theory by relaxing the requirement that the covering generalizations described in the core theory must be universal generalizations. the theory has two components. (a) the first component is a method for identifying, in the case of arguments that would typically be considered enthymemes, “the assumption” which the argument requires or presupposes (what has often been called its “missing premiss” or “implicit premiss”). (b) the second component is the claim that the identified assumption should not be considered a premiss of the argument, but should be considered a rule of inference that licenses the move from the explicit premiss or premisses to the conclusion. the method for identifying “the assumption” of an argument is roughly as follows: (i) form the argument’s associated conditional (a conditional statement whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument’s premisses and whose consequent is its conclusion) (ii) form a universal generalization with respect to at least one “repeated content expression”—where a “content expression” is defined in such a way that the standard logical particles are not content expressions and where a content expression is “repeated” if and only if it occurs more than once in premisses and/or conclusion. at least one of the content expressions over which one generalizes must occur in both premisses and conclusion12—though not every content expression over which one generalizes need occur in both premisses and conclusion.13 hitchcock calls a proposition formed in this way a covering generalization of the argument. for example, to use a stock example, the argument a1 socrates is a man therefore socrates is mortal has just one covering generalization, and it may be expressed as follows: for any value of x, if x is a man then x is mortal. hitchcock formulates (1985: 89) a universal generalization thesis to the effect that: 290 robert c. pinto an enthymematic argument implicitly assumes the truth of a universal generalization of its associated conditional with respect to at least one repeated content expression. but of course if there is more than one repeated content expressions in an argument, there will be several propositions that count as covering generalizations. moreover, in some cases there can be concerns about the class over which we are generalizing.14 accordingly hitchcock (1985: 93-94) formulates a “fully qualified” version of the universal generalization thesis which provides guidance in picking out a universal generalization that might be called the generalization which an argument assumes. hitchcock suggests that the universal generalization thesis is confirmed by the fact that, to a considerable extent, the propositions it picks out as an argument’s “assumption” coincide with or are logically equivalent to the propositions that we would intuitively pick out as its assumption. thus it is significant that if asked for the assumption on which a1 depends almost nobody would offer the “logical minimum” (“if socrates is a man, then socrates is mortal”), and almost everybody would choose “all men are mortal” or something close to it. later presentations diverge from the 1985 paper with respect to covering generalizations in at least three respects. (i) they do not attempt to pick out one of the possible covering generalizations and call it the assumption of the argument. there is no need to do this if our aim is evaluation, especially if we construe the covering generalization as a rule of inference rather than as a premiss. for we can say that an argument is valid (or that its conclusion follows from its premisses) whenever it has at least one covering generalization which is true or acceptable. (ii) later presentations include an important restriction on covering generalizations not included in the 1985 paper (or in the 1994 paper)— that the truth or acceptability of the covering generalization must be non-trivial.15 roughly, some substitution of repeated content expressions in the argument with which we started produces true premisses, and some substitution produces a false conclusion. see for example 1998: 24-26. (iii) finally, although the core theory presented in hitchcock 1985 and 1998 requires or assumes that covering generalizations are universal generalizations, less restrictive accounts are offered in hitchcock 1992 (esp. p. 112), 2003 (esp. p. 80) and 2005, p. 205, which states, “the requirement that the warrant be general is not a requirement that it be universal” (italics mine). hitchcock 1985: 94-95 offers two lines of argument for construing the covering generalizations as rules rather than as premisses: evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 291 (a) he points out problems that arise if we construe them as premisses and we also say that a premiss is either (a) a statement an arguer offers in support of her conclusion or (b) a proposition which the arguer “had in mind” in offering her argument. for there are enthymemes that appear to be perfectly good arguments, and in many cases the arguer doesn’t actually have the covering generalization in mind. (b) he points to the method of criticizing an argument by counter-example as evidence that we can evaluate an enthymematic argument without stating an implicit assumption. in (1998: 31) he lists five benefits to be derived from regarding them as inference licenses rather than as premisses. significance of hitchcock’s theory hitchcock’s theory is worthy of note for three reasons: (a) it provides a principled way to identify a small list of potential rules (or warrants) for any argument or inference in which there is at least one content term that occurs in both premisses and conclusion; (b) its generality and (if i may call it that) austerity enable hitchcock to formulate clearly the question of whether certain “assumptions” are best conceived of as premisses or as inference rules (warrants), and to do so in a way that permits him to develop plausible arguments for conceiving of them as warrants; (c) its generality and austerity will enable us to highlight issues i want to raise in this paper about the virtues arguments should possess, about the virtues inference rules should possess and about the form we should expect warrants or rules of inference to take. to see both the appeal of hitchcock’s proposal, as well as the questions that arise concerning the virtues arguments should possess, consider the way hitchcock formulates his “revised generic16 conception of consequence” (1998: 26): there is some general feature of the argument which is incompatible with the argument’s having true premisses and a false conclusion, even though that feature is compatible with the argument’s having true premisses and compatible with the argument’s having a false conclusion [italics mine]. suppose for a moment that the principal virtue to be prized in arguments is that they be truth-preserving (i.e., that they do not lead from true premisses to a conclusion that’s not true). a universal covering generalization which is true picks out a “general feature” of an argument on account of which it will have that virtue. thus an evaluator, who wants to know whether an argument is truth-preserving, can assure herself that it is if she can find a universal covering generalization for that argument which is true. notice also that, if an evaluator is in a position to know—of some covering generalization for the argument—that it is true, she can 292 robert c. pinto make this determination without having first to determine the truth of the conclusion.17 3. what virtues should arguments and rules of inference have? but now let’s ask what virtue such covering generalizations (cgs) should possess. begin by considering the cgs of the core theory, which are universal generalizations and which accordingly will be truth-preserving. covering generalizations of the core theory notice that there are different “variants” on the idea that the principal virtue of arguments and inferences is truth-preservation. thus we might say that to qualify as a rule of inference it suffices (i) that a universal cg be true with respect to the actual world. or, alternatively, we might demand some more stringent requirement. thus, availing ourselves of “possible worlds” talk, we might opt for one or another of the following requirements: (ii) that a universal cg be true in all “logically” possible worlds (i.e., worlds whose description would not be inconsistent with any logically true statement—where ‘logical truth’ is defined after the manner of quine). (iii) that a universal cg be true in all “semantically” possible worlds (i.e., worlds in describing which no “meaning postulate”—e.g., that ‘colored’ applies to everything to which ‘red’ applies—is violated). (iv) that a universal cg be true in all members of some interesting subset of semantically possible worlds—for example, the possible worlds in which what we currently believe to be laws of nature obtain.18 thus on one occasion hitchcock held that for an argument to be valid, its cg must be “lawlike” (1994: 59)—a view which we might take to commit him to something like (iv). one motive for opting for something like (iv) might be this: we want our principles of inference to include principles we can employ in reasoning from suppositions that are, or may turn out to be, contrary to fact. and generalizations that aren’t lawlike don’t “support” contrary-to-fact conditionals.19 a quite different approach to the virtue that inference rules should have can be found in toulmin, who typically says that warrants must be reliable and that they derive their “authority” from backing which shows that they are reliable. it may well turn out to be the case that not all rules which are truth-preserving are fit to be relied upon, and that not all inferences which are fit to be relied upon are truth preserving. part 6 of this paper will offer a sketch of what we might take such reliability to consist in. evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 293 covering generalizations of the general theory but notice that none of (i)-(iv) in the preceding section is going to work for good arguments/inferences that are not “conclusive”—inferences of the sort sometimes called “inductive” or (in a happier phrase) inferences in which the support that premisses lend to a conclusion is recognized as defeasible. the norms by which such inferences are assessed ought not to be rules that are truth-preserving, since such inferences can be good even when their premisses are true and their conclusions false. hitchcock extends his core theory to handle such cases by loosening the requirement that covering generalizations be universal, and suggesting that a cg may be “possibly qualified as holding ‘generally’ or ‘presumably’” (2003: 80), or that it is “non-trivially acceptable (always, provisionally, etc.),” or that it “can be modally qualified, as holding for the most part, or ceteris paribus, or even just sometimes” (2005: 205). perhaps the clearest example of what he has in mind by such qualifications is to be found in hitchcock 1992: 112, where he formulates a “conception of good inference” in the following terms (italics added): the argument contains one or more repeated content expressions on which uniform substitutions within a category or subcategory some-times make the premises true, sometimes make the conclusion false, and either always, mostly, or provisionally make the conclusion true when they make the premises true. the virtue which good arguments exhibit on this account is formulated with reference to truth, and we might say such arguments are good just when the truth of their premisses is indicative of the truth of their conclusions. 20 but such formulations raise several questions which hitchcock himself has not attempted to answer. (a) it is not clear exactly what it means to say that of a set of substitutions that they “provisionally make the conclusion true” (hitchcock 1992) or that a covering generalization can be qualified as “holding presumably” (hitchcock 2003). this is something that needs to be spelled out in greater detail.21 (b) though what it means to settle for “mostly” instead of “always” in the formulation of a covering generalization is clear enough, the implications of doing so need to be assessed. (1) such “weakening” of criteria for the acceptability of a conclusion might well give rise to the sorts of problems associated with the attempt to formulate a purely probabilistic criterion of acceptance, such as the lottery paradox (see pinto 2001: 106-107, especially footnote 5). and (2) chaining together a series of inferences that are not truth-preserving can lead to “untoward” results, and as a result it may turn out to be necessary to introduce epistemic operators into the consequent of covering generalisations (see the second of the two considerations presented in point (b) on p. 254 below). 294 robert c. pinto in part 6 of this paper, following up on ideas suggested by toulmin which hitchcock himself doesn’t draw on, i will attempt to work out a way of conceiving exactly how a cg may be qualified as holding only generally or presumably or provisionally, doing so in a way that addresses the issues just raised in points (a) and (b). practical arguments and inferences finally, we should note that even the more relaxed idea that arguments and inferences need only be truth-indicative isn’t going to shed light on forms of argument that culminate in prescriptions or on forms of inference that culminate in a decision or an intention, since prescriptions, decisions and intentions don’t have truth-values (i.e., their “direction of fit” is not word-to-world, but is world-to-word—see searle 1979: 3-4 and section 32 of anscombe 1957). epistemic status in recent years hitchcock has come to insist that cgs possess an additional sort of virtue. in (2001:1) he says that an argument’s conclusion follows from its premisses if and only if it has some covering generalization that is “non-trivially acceptable (always, provisionally, etc.),” adding that a cg is acceptable if and only if it “deserves to be accepted by the appraiser.” in (2003: 80) he says that an argument’s conclusion or claim follows from its ground if and only if there is some justified covering generalization of the argument, possibly qualified as holding “generally” or “presumably” [italics added]. see also the discussion of “justified applicable warrant” in hitchcock 2005. these texts all imply that a warrant must meet some sort of epistemic criterion. i want to distinguish between the content of a rule or warrant, and the epistemic status which that content has for a particular person at a particular time. and, as i’ve already indicated in note 3 above, i want to set aside (or abstract from) questions about the epistemic status rules of inference must have—either for persons making an argument or drawing an inference, or for those appealing to the rule in the course of evaluating an argument or inference. i propose to deal here only with questions about the “content” of warrants—both (a) the form the content should take and (b) material features the content must have if it is to be fit to serve as a rule. and i want to press such questions especially in connection with cases in which the support licensed by such rules is defeasible. 4. an alternative conception of argument virtue a common idea about arguments and inferences is that they provide justification for their conclusions. of course bad arguments and inferences don’t justify their conclusions, only good arguments do. it’s possible to think of the justificatory potential of good arguments as simply a by-product of their meeting the criteria for evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 295 being good.22 but it’s also open to us to think that what makes an argument good is precisely its having justificatory potential. let’s try to make sense of the justificatory potential of arguments and inferences along the following lines: a argument justifies its conclusion if and only if it shows—i.e., makes it apparent—that it is reasonable to embrace (perhaps to assert) that conclusion, given its premisses. an inference justifies its conclusion if and only if it makes it reasonable to embrace (perhaps to accept) that conclusion, given its premisses. if we follow up on these thoughts, we’re led to a conception of argument virtue quite different from the conceptions just considered in part 3. let us endorse the idea that an argument is good only if it is reasonable to embrace its premisses.23 then arguments or inferences with justificatory potential will be those in which premisses which it is reasonable to embrace render a conclusion reasonable to embrace. such arguments need not be truth-preserving, but they will be entitlement preserving. in part 6 of this paper, i am going to try to extract from toulmin’s account of arguments a rudimentary way of conceiving rules of inference consonant with the idea that the principal virtue of arguments is some sort of entitlement-preservation. but before attempting to do that, i want to provide motivation for the shift from truth-preserving norms to entitlement-preserving norms. why shift from a truth-preservation conception of argument virtue to an entitlement-preservation conception? such a shift has potentially radical consequences, since it invites a move away from an approach to arguments and inferences that reduces to logic as traditionally conceived, toward an approach that will have to be grounded in epistemology. ‘reasonable’ is not a word that belongs to the vocabulary of logic as traditionally conceived; it is a term whose elaboration will, almost inevitably, have to take place within an epistemological perspective. in the case of good arguments which are “conclusive” and have “factual” premisses and conclusions, the shift to an epistemological perspective might turn out to be optional. but i want to suggest two reasons why such a shift may well be inevitable for any satisfactory treatment of defeasible arguments and inferences. (a) contemporary discussions of good arguments that aren’t deductively valid highlight the fact that they are defeasible and attempt to conceptualize the relationship of such arguments to the considerations that “defeat” them—to the defeaters. but the notion of a defeater is, i submit, an ineluctably epistemic notion. let r be a consideration which can play the role of a defeater in connection with an inference from p to q. r does not defeat the inference from p to q by being true.24 rather a defeater defeats an inference only in virtue of having a certain epistemic status— paradigmatically, by being or becoming known to be true––or what 296 robert c. pinto amounts to an epistemic status (e.g. being “in the database” or being derivable from what’s “in the database”). defeasible support for a conclusion is undermined or overridden by defeaters that have come to light. (b) even though we “accept” the conclusions of defeasible inferences, we must have some way of marking the fact that they are conclusions of defeasible inference—that they are, to put it crudely, “less than completely certain.” otherwise, we run the risk of stringing together a series of defeasible inferences with “untoward” results. suppose we let p lead to the acceptance of q, where propositions like q are true 60% of the times at which propositions like p are true; and suppose we also let q lead to the acceptance of r where propositions like r are true 60% of the times at which propositions like q are true. then we will let p lead to the acceptance of r, when the probability of r given p may be no more than .36—and that is an untoward result. the problem that threatens is not avoided by increasing the percentages—no matter how high the percentages get, stringing together such inferences “degrades” the support our initial premiss gives to our terminal conclusion and raises the possibility that a sufficiently long chain of such inferences will have an “untoward” outcome. it becomes essential therefore to mark the conclusions of defeasible inferences as such—which is, i think, what words like ‘probably,’ ‘presumably,’ ‘possibly,’ or ‘almost certainly’ are in fact doing when they’re used to qualify our conclusions. the presence or absence of such markers will indicate when and how it is reasonable to use those conclusions as the premisses of further arguments. but to do that is just to perform the function which the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation performs. these considerations are by no means conclusive. but i think they are enough to make it worthwhile to elaborate the idea of entitlement-preservation in greater detail. that’s what i’ll try to do in the remainder of this paper. 5. the form of warrants revisited: an alternative account based on features of toulmin’s treatment of arguments one place we might look for examples of entitlement-preserving principles is in the accounts chisholm used to give of epistemic principles. for reasons i won’t pursue here,25 i think it will prove more instructive to extract explicitly entitlement preserving principles from ideas and suggestions sketched in toulmin 2003/1958 and toulmin, rieke and janik (hereafter toulmin et al.) 1984/1979. accordingly, i’m going to construct an account of the form of warrants by picking and choosing from among elements of toulmin’s story. i take full responsibility for the result, but i acknowledge toulmin as the source or inspiration of much (though clearly not all) of what i say. evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 297 key features of toulmin’s account there are six features of toulmin’s account of arguments that i think any account of the form of warrants should incorporate or make provision for. they are as follows: (i)toulmin often formulates warrants as straightforward statements about objects (“scarcely any swedes are roman catholics”) and says they may be written in the form “if d, then c.” but he says that “they can profitably be expanded, and made more explicit” by putting them in a form such as “data such as d entitle one to draw conclusions, or make claims, such as c” (2003/1958: 91—underlining is mine). note two things about the second of the forms just quoted: (a) it quite explicitly takes the form of granting an entitlement, as does another “expanded” statement form suggested in the very same passage: “given data d, you may take it that c” 26 (b) it construes warranting statements as general statements—it is data such as d that entitle one to make a claim such as c (see hitchcock 2003: 73-74). (ii) toulmin clearly distinguishes warrants from the “backing” which gives them authority by pointing to the normative and action-guiding force or function of warrants. explaining the relation of backing to warrant with an example turning on a british statute, he says about the example: though the facts about the statute may provide all the backing required by this warrant, the explicit statement of the warrant itself is more than a repetition of these facts: it is a general moral of a practical character, about the ways in which we can safely argue in view of these facts (2003/1958: 98—italics mine). (iii) he recognizes a crucial role for modal qualifiers (‘probably’, ‘possibly,’ ‘certainly, ‘presumably’) in the presentation of arguments (2003/1958: 93ff). more importantly, he offers what i would call a functional interpretation of those qualifiers (2003/1958: chapters 1 and 2)—his insistence that the “field-invariant” force27 of such qualifiers is to be found “in the practical implications of their use” (p. 28). 28 thus on his interpretation, the force of saying “possibly p” is to accord to p the “right to be considered.” and the force of saying “s is probably p” is to “commit myself guardedly, tentatively or with reservations to the view that s is p, and (likewise guardedly) lend my authority to that view”29 and he observes that the addition of the modal qualifiers “has the effect of indicating what sort of reliance the supporting material entitles us to place on the claim, c” (toulmin et al. 1984/ 1979: 87). (iv) in the toulmin model, modals occur principally as qualifying the conclusion of an argument. however, toulmin occasionally includes elements that correspond to such modal qualifiers in his formulation of warrants themselves. on the few occasions he does so, he uses expressions which convey explicitly that we are entitled to adopt a particular cognitive or doxastic attitude toward a propositional 298 robert c. pinto content. for example, in formulating a warrant whose backing consists of information about statutes, he chooses the following form of words: “if a man was born in a british colony, he may be presumed to be british” (2003/1958: 98). so phrased, the warrant recognizes an entitlement to adopt one particular cognitive attitude—presuming—toward a propositional content.30 there is a range of such attitudes—presuming that p, expecting that p and being certain that p, for example—and i believe that each can be type-identified by reference to the functional role in our cognitive lives that it bestows on their contents. for example, an expectation that x will occur or has occurred provides a basis of inferences and actions that would normally be successful only if x will occur or has occurred. someone who expects, but is not fully certain, that x has occurred or will occur can base actions or inferences on that expectation, but if she’s not fully certain she will make backup plans to cover the eventuality that x might turn out not to be (or to have been) the case. thus a reasonable person can expect (indeed be quite confident) that her lottery ticket won’t win, and will make plans and undertake commitments on the assumption that it won’t win, but can still hold on to the ticket because she knows it might be a winning ticket after all. (v) under the heading of “rebuttals” toulmin recognizes the role of defeaters in argument and inference. he seldom if ever includes a reference to rebuttals in his formulation of warrants, but rather treats them as matters which affect the applicability of warrants (2003/1958: 94-95; see also toulmin et al., chapters 10, 11 and especially 13).31 the existence of defeaters needs to be acknowledged in the formulation of warrants, and though i won’t purse the matter in this paper, a full account of warrants will have to shed light on the relationship of defeaters to the warrants whose force they defeat. (vi) toulmin treats the issue of whether a particular warrant has “authority” as (i) an issue whose resolution typically involves appeal to matters of fact (which make up the backing of the warrant) but also as (ii) an issue that must be addressed in light of the goals and purposes alive in the context of the reasonings that are to be assessed on the basis of that warrant.32 an alternative account of the general form of warrants i want to make the idea of warrants for entitlement-preserving arguments and inferences more concrete. in order to do so, i offer a first sketch of the form such warrants might take. the sketch is a preliminary one, since it leaves a number of loose ends unresolved. but here are instructions for how to create a warrant of the sort i’m interested in. the process has five steps. (1) given an argument or inference, construct a covering generalization for it after the manner of hitchcock. for simplicity’s sake, assume the result is of the form h1 (x) if x is f then x is g evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 299 of course, if there were more than one “repeated content expression” in the argument with which we started, we might chose to replace more than one of them with variables and prepend more than one universal quantifier. (2) next enhance h1 by inserting the phrase ‘it is reasonable to suppose that’ as follows: w1 (x) if it is reasonable to suppose that x is f then it is reasonable to suppose that x is g. i am using supposing as a generic concept in relation to which believing, being almost certain, presuming, expecting, etc., stand as species. notice that for quantification to work here, we have to be talking about de re supposing, not de dicto supposing. this should pose no problem, since supposing is something like believing, and we know how to manage with the distinction between de re and de dicto ascriptions of belief. (3) but of course if supposing is anything like believing, what it’s reasonable for one person to suppose can be quite different from what it’s reasonable for another to suppose. so we need to complicate things a bit further, and include a reference to the person for whom a supposing might or might not be reasonable, and the time at which it is reasonable: w2 (s) (t) (x) if it is reasonable at t for s to suppose that x is f then it is reasonable at t for s to suppose that x is g.33 (4) since we’re taking supposing to be a generic expression of which presuming, expecting, being certain, etc., are forms or species, let us write our formula in such a way that it can accommodate a variety of different “species” of supposing, by introducing subscripts as follows w3 (s) (t) (x) if it is reasonable at t for s to suppose i that x is f then it is reasonable at t for s to suppose j that x is g.34 the intent is that in formulating a potential warrant for a particular argument or inference, we may specify one form of supposing in the antecedent of the warrant and specify either the same or a different form of supposing in the consequent of the warrant. this provision will enable us to provide what i earlier called a “qualitative” equivalent to the idea that belief should be proportioned to the evidence. (5) finally, we need to include a qualification that recognizes the role that defeaters play in our reasoning about most matters. i propose to do that by including such a qualification, as follows w3a (s) (t) (x) if it is reasonable at t for s to suppose i that x is f then, in the absence at t of undermining or overriding evidence, it is reasonable at t for s to suppose j that x is g. 300 robert c. pinto the underlined phrase is a “dummy” clause that, in effect, recognizes the existence of a set of problems which need to be solved. significance of the alternative account the result is a form of warrant which (a) is consistent with the idea that good arguments are entitlement preserving; (b) construes the entitlements in question as epistemic entitlements; (c) incorporates a qualitative version of “evidence proportionalism” by enabling us to licence only doxastic attitudes toward conclusions that are appropriate to the evidence on which those conclusions are based; (d) makes explicit provision for defeasible arguments and inferences. w3 and w3a are of course elaborations of an idea originally drawn from hitchcock. but elaborating hitchcock’s idea in the way that i have brings us to something that’s closer to the way toulmin sometimes expresses his warrants. recall for instance the example quoted in the previous section: if a man was born in a british colony, he may be presumed to be british. to recast that in the form of w3 we need only construe the word “may” as granting epistemic permission, and make it explicit that what creates the epistemic permission to presume is the knowledge that a man was born in a british colony. rules like these are quite different from the sorts of rules that logicians formulate. to understand their significance, i suggest we recall the “maxim of shallow analysis” that quine (1960: 160) says should govern our paraphrases into “canonical systems of logical notation”: ... expose no more logical structure than seems useful for the deduction or other inquiry at hand. if rules whose form is captured by w1 through w3a are to be commended, it is because often not enough structure is exposed in the canonical notations of more traditional logics to enable us to offer nuanced evaluations of the arguments and inferences that interest us. indeed, we might want to observe a modified version of quine’s maxim: move up from rules of the form of h1 toward rules of the form of w3a only when, and to the extent that, it is useful to expose more structure in order to achieve an appropriately nuanced evaluation. two final notes about the “general form of warrant” that w3 and w3a represent. (a) observe that warrants in which the “species of supposing” referenced in the antecedent and the consequent are the same will form a special case of this more general form—they will be “entitlement-preserving” in a narrow sense. where a single premiss is known to entail its conclusion, for example, warrants will usually be entitlement-preserving evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 301 in that narrow sense. but arguments and inferences that are not “deductively valid” will usually require warrants which are entitlement preserving only in a broader sense captured by the general form of w3. what is preserved is these cases is reasonableness—but the kind of “doing” which is pronounced reasonable in the antecedent (e.g, being sure that) is a different kind of “doing” from that pronounced reasonable in the consequent (e.g., expecting). (b) notice also that we could make the form of warrant i’m proposing more general still by recasting it to accommodate propositional attitudes other than (but in addition to) doxastic attitudes—e.g., conative and evaluative attitudes such as desiring it to be the case that, intending that, fearing that, etc. see for example my 1990 paper “generalizing the notion of argument,” reprinted as chapter 2 of pinto 2001. doing so would yield an even more powerful tool, one which would enable us to conceptualize the role of reasons in the constitution of emotions, in the formation of values and of intentions, and in the deliberation that issues in our practical choices. 6. what virtues should warrants have? taking my cue from toulmin’s frequent reference to the reliability of warrants, i want to offer a sketch of the virtue such warrants should have by offering an account of what we might take the reliability of a warrant to consist in. though i think the account that follows is consistent with many of the things toulmin says about how warrants acquire their authority, the account is quite specific to the conception of warrants sketched in part 5 of this paper and in its details is almost certainly not anything which toulmin himself ever actually had in mind. rules and practices i’ll use an example of a type of inference my spouse taught me to make. she’s fond of courtland apples, and often asks me to pick up a few when i shop for groceries. the first time i did, she complained that the apples i brought home were sour—she only likes the sweet ones. when i asked how i could tell whether a courtland is sweet, she said something like following, pointing to a courtland apple she’d just taken out of the refrigerator: look at the coloring of the skin. if it there’s a fair amount of red in its skin, as there is in this one, you can assume that it’s sweet. she warned me that although this works with courtland apples, it doesn’t work for every kind of apple. a bit of probing revealed that she had discovered this technique herself by trial and error, and that she continues to use the technique because it works for her. probing also revealed that, although she is aware that not 302 robert c. pinto all courtland apples with this sort of coloring are sweet, she has no idea what proportion of them are sweet. moreover, she doesn’t know whether this technique works with courtland apples generally; she only knows that it works in the places where she shops for apples. it’s also worth noting that although she uses this technique in deciding which courtlands to buy, before she’d serve courtland slices to guests, she would actually taste a slice from each apple to “make sure” that slices from that apple aren’t sour. in other words, she treats the expectation arising from her inference as sufficient for some purposes (buying) but not for others (serving to guests). my spouse had supplied me with a rudimentary “rule of inference” which, at the risk of pedantry, we can formulate as follows: if you know (i.e., have the right to be sure) that the skin of a courtland apple has a coloring similar to a particular sample, then it is reasonable for you to expect that it will be sweet. notice the following things about this “rule” (a) it endorses an inferential practice in which my wife engages, and which she has taught me to engage in. (b) that practice is sustained or reinforced because it regularly gets my spouse and me where we want to go, and it would be extinguished if it ceased regularly getting us where we want to go—if we started to find more than occasionally that the courtlands we brought home weren’t sweet. (c) the possibility of such reinforcement and extinction depends on the fact that we have other ways of finding out whether an apple is sweet— by biting into them, etc. but those other ways of finding out also have an “inferential dimension” (does this apple taste sour because it actually is sour, or am i coming down with a bug in virtue of which nothing would taste sweet to me)—that is to say, those other ways of finding out are sustained by other inferential practices. inferential practices face the tribunal of experience not singly but as corporate bodies, somebody might say. (d) the rule which endorses our inferential practice is not a rule that my spouse or i need to formulate explicitly or to follow consciously when we draw conclusions about the sweetness of courtland apples in the store. in sellars’ happy phrase (1968: 75-77), it is not a rule for doing, it’s a rule for criticizing. in cases like this, the practices may come first, the rules may get formulated in our attempt to get a “reflective hold” on them—perhaps for purposes of evaluating the practice or some instance of the practice. (e) in cases like this one, finding a rule involves finding a description which fits one or another of our inferential practices—which is something evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 303 that hitchcock’s technique for generating covering generalizations enables us to do, and which my elaboration on hitchcock’s technique also enables us to do. but acknowledging such a description as a rule involves, in addition, a decision to endorse one or another of our practices and to endorse it under some such description. we can begin to understand the authority of such norms—and the virtues to be expected of them when they are formulated as rules—by reflecting on the considerations that should lead us to endorse one or another of our practices under a rule-like description of it. the context of rules: critical practice i suggested in the preceding section that inferential practices like those in my example are reinforced or extinguished depending on whether they regularly “get us where we want to go.” now reinforcement and extinction may be reasons why we engage in or cease to engage in inferential practices, but they are not reasons for engaging in such practices. reasons for engaging or not engaging in a practice begin to emerge only when we start to reason about our practices. to reason about our inferential practices, we need to get some kind of “reflective hold” on what they are. and formulating a rule-like description is one way of doing that—we can say, for instance, that we often behave as though we were following a rule that permits us to do x when y obtains. but then the decision to endorse a practice can take the form of deciding (or perhaps finding out) whether following (or conforming to) such a rule would be a good thing to do. even though we may never have had any such rule actually in mind when engaging in an inferential practice—and even if we never start having it in mind at such times—the rules we reflectively endorse can become rules of criticism to which we can revert when evaluating what an actual person does on a particular occasion. the emergence of a practice of reasoning about our inferences and our inferential practices changes things in important ways (see sosa for a similar point35). it institutes a new kind of practice—a critical practice36—in which we evaluate individual performances by measuring them against rules we’ve reflectively endorsed. moreover, and perhaps most importantly, it permits us—as brandom points out37—to discuss the merits of the practices we engage in and to ask for and give reasons for endorsing them. finally, the reflective practice of reasoning about our inferential practices introduces a new kind of “reinforcement” and “extinction”: the realization that our practice would be better if it were changed in a certain way gives us reasons for changing our practices that can become reasons why they change. 304 robert c. pinto reliabilty so we find ourselves staring at the question: what would reasons for endorsing an inferential practice have to look like? or—and this is not quite the same question— what would make an inferential practice a good one? the issues here are very much like the issues raised in parts 3 and 4 about the virtues of arguments and inferences, but we’re now playing in a slightly different key—we’re asking about the virtues of inferential practices. shifting into this key, two sorts of consideration now become possible: a what role does one or another practice play in the broader scheme of things? b how well do the “outputs” of a practice serve the role or roles which that practice plays? identifying the role of a practice provides an objective basis or criterion for making a value judgement about the outputs of the practice—in light of something like the principle that it’s good when something serves its purpose and bad when it fails to serve its purpose.38 the purposes served by the sorts of inferential practices i’m considering in this paper must, in the nature of the case, be purposes which require the adoption of a doxastic attitude toward a propositional content. they must be purposes which require the fixation of belief about some matter, as it were. now some purposes served by the adoption of doxastic attitudes are insensitive to whether the propositional content of the doxastic attitudes serving them are true or close to the truth—for example, loyalty to a friend may perhaps require i believe him to be innocent of some charge irrespective of whether or not he is. such purposes can indeed give rise to “reasons for belief” of a special sort—which i have elsewhere called pragmatic reasons39—but they are not the sorts of purposes in relation to which the reliability of inferential practices ought to be judged. accordingly, i assume that any purpose in light of which the reliability of an inferential practice is properly judged must be a purpose (1) which requires the adoption of a cognitive (e.g., doxastic) attitude, and (2) whose realization is sensitive to whether the propositional content of the required cognitive attitude is true or close to the truth. thus, for any inferential practice whose outputs belong to a particular series of doxastic attitudes (being certain that p, presuming that p, expecting that p, for example), typical purposes won’t be served unless there is a substantial likelihood that p is true or close to the truth in the range of occasions in which the practice is appropriate.40 for inferential practices whose outputs belong to a different series of doxastic attitudes (for example, suspecting that p, treating p as a “live option”), typical purposes will require only that there be a non-negligible likelihood that p is true or close to the truth in the range of occasions in which the practice is appropriate. evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 305 in pinto 2003b i argued for the claim that rational decisions about whether to accept a proposition as a basis for further inferences, though made in light of evidence, are also dependent on epistemic and non-epistemic goals and purposes— since (among other things) the “strength” of evidence needed to warrant acceptance of a premiss will depend in part on what’s at stake in the reasoning which will be based on that premiss.41 something similar is true with respect the rationality of adopting doxastic attitudes toward propositional contents. the purposes requiring the fixation of belief on a given matter can be either “practical” or “theoretical,” and in either case are relevant to determining whether a given constellation of evidence warrants adoption of a given doxastic attitude. moreover, when the purposes served by an inferential practice require a substantial likelihood of truth or verisimilitude, the doxastic attitude issuing from the practice should also serve the purposes of the practice even when truth or verisimilitude is not achieved. suppose that the output of an inference is an expectation or a presumption in which what is expected or presumed proves false. in many (perhaps all) such cases in which the expectation or presumption is reasonable, it will still have served my broader purposes well despite its content having proved false. if i plan a picnic because i expect it will be sunny, but make backup provisions for the eventuality that it might rain (because i only expect it will be sunny and am not certain of it), my doxastic attitude will have served me well even when it rains. without an expectation of some sort concerning the weather i would have made no plans at all. even in matters theoretical, a presumption—for example, the presumption that the gauges i’m employing in my experimentation are functioning properly—can serve me well even if it “fails” (e.g., if the gauges don’t function properly). for the variation in the type of reliance i place on different elements of my experimental design gives me a “plan of attack” when the results i’m getting don’t add up (i check the gauges first, before i start questioning the second law of thermodynamics). and without some such presumption there would have been no experiment in the first place, and hence no second iteration in which the problem with the gauges has been taken care of. but if considerations like these put us in a position to make objectively based, nuanced assessments of inferential outputs, they put us in the position to ask the following question about an inferential practice: c how reliably does the practice yield outputs that serve the role that it is playing? this question must be interpreted as equivalent to something like the following: c′ what is the objective likelihood that the output of the practice will be a good output, where goodness is judged in light of the role that the practice is playing? the very idea that a practice is reliable—is fit to be relied upon—already contains the idea of the objective likelihood of a good output. 306 robert c. pinto now it is important to note that an objective likelihood can only be calculated with respect to a reference class.42 i submit that the appropriate reference class for determining the objective likelihood of successful outcome for an inferential practice must be fixed by reference to the typical circumstances in which that practice has been or will be relied upon. as a result, the reliability of an inferential practice—for example, of expecting a courtland to be sweet when we know that its skin exhibits a certain color pattern— will depend on an objective likelihood. but the objective likelihood on which it depends will not be identical with the objective likelihood that a courtland is sweet given that its skin exhibits a certain color pattern. rather it will be the objective likelihood of (i) arriving at an appropriate doxastic attitude when (ii) relying on the practice in the typical circumstances in which it has been or will be relied upon. a reliable warrant can be defined as one which licences a reliable inferential practice.43 significance of this account the upshot of these points is an account which makes the “fitness” of a rule to serve as a warrant depend in part on the non-epistemic values of those whose reasoning is to be evaluated by reference to them, as well as on the sorts of situations in which the inferential practices it licences will actually be exercised. the account therefore makes the reliability of warrants highly context-sensitive. for these two reasons it might be called a pragmatic account of the virtue of rules of inference. but the position i’m defending is not a “subjectivism” about warrants, since it makes the authority of warrants depend on the objective likelihood of good outcomes and it makes the evaluation of outcomes depend on objective considerations. moreover, even though it makes the authority of warrants depend in part on the non-epistemic values served by inferential practices, it does not do so in a way that runs afoul of siegel’s critique of the “means-ends conception of rationality”,44 nor is it subject to siegel’s arguments against those who construe epistemic normativity as a crude form of instrumental rationality.45 finally, because the position carefully distinguishes between entitlement-preserving rules and truth preserving rules, it can embrace a pragmatism about rules without embracing a pragmatist account of truth and without foreswearing a realist account of the contents of our doxastic commitments. 7. conclusion: direction of further research what i’ve presented here is an initial sketch of a possible way of doing things. there are at least three respects in which this way of doing things needs to be elaborated by offering much more detailed accounts of elements that it invokes. (a) the account depends crucially on the concept of functionally type identified doxastic attitudes, and i haven’t done much more than hint at evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 307 how attitudes like expecting, presuming, being certain, suspecting, etc., can be characterized and differentiated from each other in functional terms. until i show that such a characterization is realizable in sufficient and compelling detail, it will remain unclear whether the variant on “evidence proportionalism” i’m attempting to float here fares any better than the more traditional forms of evidence proportionalism which require us to assign numeric values to degrees of support and degrees of belief. (b) in trying to sketch the form that warrants should take, i wave my hand in the direction of defeaters by including the clause “in the absence of undermining or overriding evidence” in w3a. that’s a little better than saying “other things being equal,” but not much! it remains to be demonstrated that this clause can be unpacked in a coherent manner that is both consistent with the overall story i’m telling and is not objectionably circular. (c) my discussion of the authority and reliability of warrants offers no more than a very preliminary sketch of a complicated topic. my principal example was of an inferential practice that is quite local, does not exhibit “field dependence” as that term has come to be widely understood, and is known to be reliable because it has worked in practice for a few individuals (and not by appeal to the sort of backing which toulmin typically cites as lending warrants their authority). in those respects, my example is far from typical. moreover, in appealing to the purposes served by inferential practices, i have left it open whether the standard appealed to should be the purposes which, on one or another occasion, motivate individuals to rely on an inferential practice or whether it should be the purposes which motivate a cognitive community46 to institute or endorse an inferential practice. a fully satisfactory account of the authority and reliability of warrants would need (i) to consider the differences between the “casual” or “occasional” sort of warrant that served as my example and the “standing warrants” which tend to be “field dependent,” (ii) to examine carefully the variety of specific ways in which warrants are and should be scrutinized when doubts are raised about their authority, and finally (iii) to address the question of when the output of an “objectively” reliable inferential practice is “subjectively” justified. 308 robert c. pinto conviction that what it is reasonable to aim for in many if not most situations is something other than literal truth—it is closeness to the truth (popper famously called it verisimilitude)—and that rationality requires that our doxastic attitudes reflect this fact. goldman 1988: 89-93 challenges the centrality of the idea that “credal states” must be appropriate to the strength of evidence—a view he calls “evidence proportionalism.” he principally has in mind the view that the “degree of belief” one has in a proposition ought to be proportioned to the strength of the evidence which supports that proposition—usually with the assumption that numeric values can be assigned both to degrees of belief and to strength of evidentiary support. the idea i am interested in might be described as a qualitative variant on evidence proportionalism— the idea is that the sort of doxastic attitude one adopts toward a proposition should be appropriate to the evident reasons which favor it (where doxastic attitudes are assumed to be type-identified by the functions they allow propositions to play in our cognitive lives). goldman’s criticism of evidence proportionalism is quite explicitly framed so as to apply to views like the one i am interested in, views which don’t involve assigning numeric values to belief and to support (he says on p. 90 that he will “assume whatever repertoire of credal states the evidence proportionalist wishes to postulate…”). goldman’s criticisms turn on the claim that “proportioning” belief to evidence is not a sufficient condition of epistemic justification, since either (i) the proportioning may have occurred by accident or else (ii) the belief may have been arrived at by a valid method which the believer has no reason to suppose is a valid method. in the exposition that follows, i attempt to sidestep the issues goldman raises by simply bracketing the question of when an individual is “subjectively justified” in adopting a conclusion or a particular attitude toward it. my rationale for this strategy is that in this paper i am trying to address the following two issues: (i) what should a rule of inference look like and (ii) when is such a rule “objectively” a good rule. 4 in my paper “generalizing the notion of argument” (reprinted as chapter 2 of pinto 2001), i urged that the study of argument should be broadened to include, not just reasons for adopting doxastic attitudes, but reasons for adopting conscious attitudes generally. in pinto 2003c i proposed classifying conscious attitudes as cognitive, conative and evaluative—a classification which reflects rescher’s recognition (rescher 1988: 3) of three types of rationality: cognitive rationality (whose “product” is factual contentions or beliefs), practical rationality (whose “product” is action recommendations or injunctions), and evaluative rationality (whose product is evaluation or appraisal). in pinto 2003c: 6-7, i recognized three distinct categories of cognitive attitude toward propositions: (a) doxastic attitudes (belief and belief-like states such as presuming, expecting, etc.), (b) acceptance attitudes (which concern whether one is prepared to use a proposition as a notes 1 this is a significantly revised version of a paper originally presented at a a conference of the ontario society for studies in argumentation, held at mcmaster university in may of 2005. i’m indebted to david hitchcock, harvey siegel, ralph johnson, tony blair and david godden for critical comments on earlier versions of this paper. their comments have occasioned substantive changes in the paper. 2 trudy govier (1987: 178) distinguishes between formal validity, deductive validity and what she calls umbrella validity. she defines umbrella validity as follows: “an argument is valid if and only if its premisses are properly connected to its conclusion and provide adequate reasons for it. it is invalid otherwise.” when in this paper i refer without qualification to validity, it is umbrella validity that i am referring to. 3 i am particularly interested in this idea as an alternative to the approach to argument in goldman 1999: chapter 5—an approach dominated by the idea that the social value of argument lies principally in its potential for disseminating true beliefs. (goldman defends the primacy of truth as an epistemic virtue in goldman 2002.) my dissent is motivated in part by my popperian evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 309 premiss from which to draw conclusions in a given context) and (c) degrees of confidence (perhaps as measured by the odds at which we are willing to bet on the truth of a proposition). acceptance attitudes (and maybe degrees of confidence as well) are context-dependent, but doxastic attitudes are not (see appendix b of 2003c). 5 see for example the notion of a “guiding principle” in “the fixation of belief”(peirce 1955: 8ff.) and the entry entitled “what is a leading principle?” in peirce 1955, 129-34. 6 most notably see sellars discussion of “material inferences” in 1953 (“inference and meaning”) and in “some reflections on language games” (which originally appeared in 1954, but is reprinted as chapter 11 of sellars 1963). 7 see brandom’s insistence, following sellars, on the importance of “material inferences” in chapter 2 of brandom 1994 and chapter 1 of brandom 2000. note his suggestion that: “the notion of formally valid inferences is definable in a natural way from materially correct ones, but there is no converse route” (2000: 55). though brandom’s discussion of material inferences is quite explicitly derivative from sellars, and though material inferences play an essential role in brandom’s project, he does not follow sellars in associating them with lawlike statements and subjunctive conditionals. brandom 1994: 634 observes that although “the difference between inferential connections among concepts that are counterfactually robust and those that are not is an important one….nothing is made of it here. this is partly because the notion of nomologicality and counterfactual reasoning, important though they are in other contexts, has not been reconstructed in scorekeeping terms as part of this project….” on p. 635 he explains in greater detail why he chooses not to do so. 8 following pinto 2001: 36-37, i take arguments to be invitations to inference and i take the “logical appraisal” of an argument to consist in the appraisal of the inference it invites. the arguments and inferences whose virtues i’m asking about are limited to what blair 2003: 1-2 calls atomic arguments and to the sorts of inference that are invited by atomic arguments. 9 brandom 1994: chapter 3 introduces commitment and entitlement as normative or deontic statuses (p. 159), and distinguishes between inferences which are commitment-preserving and those which are entitlement-preserving (pp. 168ff.). in chapter 4, entitlement gets linked to the “being justified” that makes for knowledge as opposed to mere belief—p. 201, but see all of section i of chapter 4 (pp. 199-206). the concept of an entitlement-preserving inference came into focus for me from my reading of brandom. however, brandom’s views are controversial, and i am certainly not in full agreement with everything he says. accordingly, nothing in this paper presupposes the truth of any of brandom’s views, and i’ve written the paper so that it does not presuppose familiarity with his views. 10 as i see it, the key papers in this series are hitchcock 1985, 1992, 1994, 1998 and 2003. in addition, hitchcock 2001 and hitchcock 2005 contribute additional perspectives on the issues in the five papers that constitute the main series. it is worth noting that even in the first paper in this series, toulmin is mentioned several times as holding a view similar to the view that hitchcock is developing (see especially 1985: 94). the identification of covering generalizations with toulmin warrants becomes most explicit and most prominent in the 1998 and 2003 papers. 11 hitchcock (1992: 112) says that “arguments where we look for truth preservation between premisses and conclusion” may be called “conclusive arguments.” see also hitchcock 1994: 58 59, where he says that such arguments exhibit ‘conclusive validity.’ it is worth noting that the official topic of hitchcock 1985 is “enthymematic arguments” and in its opening paragraphs it explicitly exempts from consideration arguments “appropriately appraised by a non-deductive standard”. hitchcock 1998 does not explicitly exclude such arguments from consideration, but it is clear that so-called “non-deductive arguments” would not qualify as arguments in which the conclusion follows from the premisses on the “revised generic conception of consequence” formulated on p. 26 of that paper. 310 robert c. pinto 12 hitchcock offers two reasons why the “assumption” of an enthymematic argument must generalize over a content expression occurring in both premisses and conclusion. (1) according to 1985: 87, unless there is a repeated content expression common to premisses and conclusion, the premisses will not be “topically relevant” to the conclusion and the argument will be a non sequitur. (2) according to hitchcock 1992: 111-112, we ought (following bolzano) to rule out “trivial cases in which there is no counter-example because no substitution could make the premisses true or no substitution could make the conclusion false.” so he adds the requirement that at least one substitution on the variable content makes the premisses true and at least one substitution makes the conclusion false. “a consequence of these added requirements is that an argument with a good inference has a content expression repeated in a premise and the conclusion” (1992: 112). 13 hitchcock envisages cases where we would also want to generalize over additional content expressions that occur only in the premises—see the marijuana/alcohol example that occurs in hitchcock 1985: 92-93. 14 with reference to an example on 1985: 93, hitchcock says, “the context of utterance of the … argument indicates that we should generalize the associated conditional only over the class of words ending in ‘-ing’. doing so we get the sentence, ‘for any word ending in ‘-ing’, if it is the subject of the sentence then it is a gerund’ or, in more standard english, ‘every word ending in ‘ ing’ which is the subject of a sentence is a gerund.’” that is to say, formulating a covering generalization for an argument may require making certain considerations explicit which are not explicit in the text with which we are working but whose bearing may be inferred from features of the context from which that text is drawn. 15 hitchcock has communicated to me that he considers the omission of this point from the published version of the 1985 paper to have been an unfortunate oversight. 16 the phrase “generic theory of consequence” appears only in the 1998 paper. that paper recognizes five conceptions of logical consequence (the deducibility conception, the modal conception, the substitutional conception, the formal conception and the model-theoretic conception). in previous papers (e.g., 1985 or, in part, 1994), hitchcock had tended to couch his points in substitutional terms. the “official” formulation in hitchcock 1998: 26 is phrased so as to be applicable to three of the five conceptions (the substitutional, the formal and the model theoretic)—hence the phrase “generic conception of consequence.” 17 hitchcock (1985:86-87) had suggested that an argument is a non-sequitur if the only way to show that its associated conditional is true is by showing that its conclusion is true. 18 if we make the kinds of moves made in sellars 1953 and especially chapter 11 of sellars 1963, the possible worlds in which our laws of nature hold will coincide with the set of semantically possible worlds (where the “meaning postulates” or p-rules that pick them out are the meaning postulates of our language). in a very early paper (“concepts as involving laws and inconceivable without them,” sellars 1948), he had considered and rejected the possibility of making sense of nomically necessary conditionals by construing them as true in some subset of possible worlds. the alternative that emerged 10 years later is the sort of view set out in sellars 1953 and in chapter 11 of sellars 1963 (which had first appeared as a paper in philosophy of science in 1954). 19 see for example the arguments for the need to recognize “material inferences” in sellars 1953— those arguments rest on the need for subjunctive conditionals in empirical science. 20 in another context, mark weinstein (2002: 166-67) has proposed, for example, that we recognize a “range of entailment kinds” from logical entailments to “weak entailments that are no more than suggestive,” and that “we might expect for each entailment kind a linked implication relation based either on an appropriately modalized warrant, or alternatively, on appropriately characterized inference tickets.” he has, he says, “explored in detail how such a relationship could be given rigorous metamathematical content for entailments that depend on theoretic depth and breadth, modeled on the entailments within mature physical sciences.” weinstein 2002 only broaches evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 311 these ideas in summary fashion, but see the references there to five of weinstein’s papers where they are developed more fully. 21 consider, for example, the claim that a cg (for example, of the form: for any x if fx then gx) holds only presumably or presumptively. that can’t be taken to mean that we may presume that for any x if fx then gx. as soon as one discovered an object that was f but not g, one would no longer be entitled to make such a presumption. presuming cannot be “applied to” the cg as a whole—the universal quantifier cannot occur within the scope of the presumption. rather, the reference to presumption must fall within the scope of the universal quantifier. one must modify the cg to say something like: for any x, if fx then x is presumably a g. but that, i think, will come down to saying: if you know something is an f, then you may presume it to be a g—in which case, one’s cg will turn out to be the sort of warrant that i describe in part 5 of this paper. 22 e.g., one might hold that good arguments are the ones that are truth-preserving and that arguments can justify their conclusions just because they are truth-preserving. 23 i take it to be relatively uncontroversial that “acceptability” epistemically understood is a necessary condition of premiss adequacy. for a defense of the idea that it is also a sufficient condition of premiss adequacy, see pinto 2001: 23-26 and pinto 2003a. 24 at least if we’re thinking of what pollock (2001: 235) calls rebutting defeaters and what i (2001: 28) call overriding defeaters. for whenever an argument has true premisses and a false conclusion, there will be a host of true propositions which “rebut” its conclusion—i.e., from which the negation of its conclusion follows or could be inferred. hence, on the assumption that the mere truth of a rebutter defeats a defeasible inference, virtually every defeasible inference with a false conclusion will turn out to be defeated. 25 for one thing, chisholm (1957, 1966 and 1977) works with a small number of such principles, few of which throw much light on the “material” inferences i’m interested in, whereas toulmin warrants—as hitchcock has recognized—hold out the promise of illuminating such inferences. for another, chisholm’s account of the authority of such principles leads either to the claim that they are synthetic a priori propositions (see the hint of this in chisholm 1957: 112 ) or to something that resembles moore’s various attempts to defend common sense (see chisholm on the “problem of the criterion” in chapter 4 of 1966 and chapter 7 of 1977). 26 in fact this last form of words echoes the way in which rules of inference are standardly formulated in expositions of classical formal logic—as far back, at least, as the preface to the second edition of the principia mathematica. 27 toulmin wants to distinguish between the force of such terms, which is “field invariant,” and the criteria for their use, which varies from field to field. since there are notorious difficulties in pinning down the meaning of the “field” (toulmin’s definition in terms of “logical types” (2003 /1958: 14) isn’t much help, and moreover doesn’t fit what he often seems to have in mind when he himself uses the term – namely disciplines.) one might do better to say that the force of such terms is context independent, while the criteria for their use will vary from context to context. 28 note especially his remark that the modal operators “are best understood…by examining the functions they have when we come to set out our arguments” (2003/1958: 17). 29 lurking in the background here is the account austin gives in “other minds” of what we do when we say ‘i know’. (austin 1970: 99): “when i say ‘i know’, i give others my word: i give others my authority for saying that ‘s is p.’” by virtue of lending my authority unguardedly, i make myself liable for criticism should what i lent my authority to prove false—in that event i am “liable to be rounded on by others” (austin, p. 100). but if i lend my authority guardedly—if i say only “i am sure” and do not say “i know”, then according to austin i’m not liable to be “rounded on.” something analogous is true in toulmin’s account of “probably s is p”—see 2003/ 1958: 53-57. though i don’t endorse toulmin’s account of ‘probably’ in all its details, i do hold a view that is similar to it (see the final sentence in note 30 below.) 312 robert c. pinto 30 when discussing the modal qualifiers, toulmin makes it quite clear that employing them does not yield sentences which refer to doxastic attitudes: “saying ‘s is probably p’ is not saying ‘i am fairly confident, but less than certain, that s is p’, for ‘probably’ does not belong to this series of words…. when i say ‘s is probably p’, i commit myself guardedly, tentatively or with reservations to the view that s is p, and (likewise guardedly) lend my authority to that view” (2003/1958: 49). however, he concedes (to the proponent of the “subjective” interpretation of probability) that “he [the subjectivist] has noticed one thing (perhaps the only one) which is always the case whenever the word ‘probably’, or one of its derivatives, is used correctly: everyone who says and means ‘probably p’ does believe confidently that p” (p. 59). in this regard, he is adopting a view about ‘probably’ that my co-authors and i adopted in pinto, blair and parr 1993: 95-97—that ‘probably’ is an “assertion qualifier” and that, although in saying ‘probably p’ we may in some sense be expressing our “belief attitude” toward what we are claiming, the claim we are putting forward or asserting is p. 31 section 4 of hitchcock 2005 accommodates defeaters in essentially the same way. 32 in toulmin’s account, the authority of warrants—considered as “general morals of a practical character” (2003/1958: 98) – arises from their backing. but—as i read toulmin—that authority is also rooted in the goals they are to serve (see toulmin et al. 1984/1979: 274-276 and at various junctures in chapters 26-30 of that work). 33 the idea that the principles in terms of which we evaluate arguments and inferences should be relative to persons (and also to times) is consistent with the views about argument appraisal defended in my early paper “logic, epistemology and argument appraisal,” first presented in 1989 and reprinted as chapter 3 of pinto 2001. notice also that the form i’m proposing would leave us the option of restricting the domain of values which the quantificational variables might take. we might, for example, restrict the applicability of a warrant to the members of one or another professional community. 34 it is not difficult to see how to enhance this preliminary account of the form of warrants to make provision for arguments and inferences with two or more premisses towards which an individual might have different doxastic attitudes—for example, someone drawing an inference about whether reilly is married might be quite sure that reilly is a catholic priest, but only presume that he is not an eastern rite priest. the need for antecedents with more than one “it is reasonable for s to …” clauses will also arise if we should want to have warrants that take us from a desire and a belief to an intention. see point (b) on p. 259. 35 sosa’s insistence on the importance of “reflective knowledge” can be seen as a partial recognition of this point, or a first step in its direction. see “knowledge and intellectual virtue” in sosa 1991: 225-244. (esp. pp. 239-242) and also “intellectual virtue in perspective” in sosa 1991: 270-93 (esp. p. 290) . 36 in “the relation of argument to inference,” i attempt to trace a possible evolution of the concept of inference through a series of 6 steps (pinto 2001: 42-43). what i’ve just pointed out corresponds to steps 2 and 3 of that process. that paper recognizes further stages in the evolution of critical practice and in our concept of inference—most importantly, a step in which “[w]e move … to a broadened conception of criticism, one not tied quite so closely to logical rules or material principles of inference, but modelled in part on the discussions of the probative value of evidence that occur in contexts where articulable rules are not available.” i’m still inclined to think that our critical practice extends beyond the realm for which we are able to formulate anything like rules of inference—a realm in which nevertheless “the value of [our] inferences is not something that is just arbitrarily accepted; rather it is something open to discussion and rational evaluation.” quotations are from page 43 of pinto 2001. 37 brandom has insisted on the “expressive” role of logical vocabulary. thus he has recently said: “instead of seeing conformity with logical truths as what rationality consists in, one can see evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 313 logical vocabulary as making possible the explicit codification of meaning-constitutive inferential relations. on such an expressive view of the function of logic, the task characteristic of logical locutions as such is to let us say, in the form of explicit claims, what otherwise we could only do— namely, endorse some material inferential relations and reject others. prior to the introduction of the conditional, for instance, one can implicitly take or treat the material inference (in any of the three senses botanized above [commitment-preserving, entitlement-preserving, and inferences reflecting incompatibility relations] from p to q as a good or bad one, endorsing or rejecting it in practice. once a suitable conditional is available, though, one can explicitly claim that p entails q. and explicit claims are the sort of thing we can reason about, ask for evidence or arguments for. the expressive job of specifically logical locutions is to make inferential relations explicit, to bring them into the game of giving and asking for reasons as things whose own rational credentials are available for inspection and criticism.” brandom 2002: 9. the view is developed more fully in chapter 1 of brandom 2000 and chapter 2 of brandom 1994. however, the conditionals that brandom appears to have in mind differ in a crucial respect from the sort of warrant statements i have in mind. my conditionals render explicit both the entitlement to a propositional attitude and the specific type of propositional attitude to which the entitlement applies. there is no indication that the conditionals brandom has in mind render explicit anything beyond the relationships holding between the propositional contents of those attitudes. this is rooted, i think, in the nature of brandom’s overall project, which is—to put it crudely—to model all intentional states and statuses on what is required to make sense of linguistic performances, while taking assertion to be the prototypical speech act. the content of an assertion is to be understood in terms of (a) what other assertions it commits us to (downstream, in his terms) and (b) what other assertions (upstream, in his terms) can entitle us to it (i.e. can be offered as reasons for it). since assertion is an on/off concept, his account does not lend itself to “reconstructing” the functionally type-identified variations in doxastic attitude that are central to my account. at this point, it is not at all clear to me what the effect would be on brandom’s project if you tried to include in it the recognition of functionally type-identified varieties of “guarded” assertion. it might amount to a fairly minor addition or emendation; but then again, it might upset the applecart. 38 since i’m not about to claim that any such principle is “true by definition,” no “naturalistic fallacy” lurks in the bushes here. moreover, my view is that using the word ‘good’ without scare quotes to characterize something which serves a purpose is appropriate only if one endorses the purpose which it serves. it is only in virtue of a positive evaluative attitude toward a purpose that characterizing the “means” to it as ‘good’ has genuine normative force. this is, i think, the fundamental insight of prescriptivism—though the point need not be developed in quite the same terms as those in which prescriptivists have developed it. moreover, one’s evaluation of a means as good is reasonable only if one’s evaluative attitude toward the purpose it serves is itself reasonable. it is a component of my view of reasons that there can be reasons for such evaluative attitudes—see pinto 2003c for this point—and that therefore such attitudes can be, or fail to be, reasonable. 39 in the paper ‘reasons’ (pinto 2003b: 7-8), i distinguished between reasons for believing or accepting something and grounds on which we do or might accept it. i called attention to “pragmatic reasons” for believing (represented, for example, by the argument in pascal’s wager), and suggested that the mark of such pragmatic reasons is that they don’t contain grounds for belief or evidence for what is to be believed. although i contrasted pragmatic reasons with reasons containing grounds for believing, in that paper i did not explain the basis of the distinction between the two sorts of reasons. i will say here that “pragmatic reasons” for a belief are reasons which serve purposes that don’t require that what is believed to be true, close to the truth, or likely to be true. 40 i.e., the occasions on which the antecedent of the “rule” which captures the practice would apply. 41 see the examples in pinto 2003b: 5-6 and 13-14. for a similar or related point, see freeman 2003 314 robert c. pinto (which draws on ideas to be found in clarke 1989) and freeman 2005: 62. 42 compare brandom’s use of a similar point in his assessment of reliability theories of perceptual knowledge—for example in chapter 3 of brandom 2000. 43 i am trying to characterize what the “objective virtue” of a rule of inference consists in. i am not attempting here to give an account of how we know—or how we can have reason to believe—that a proposed rule is reliable in the sense defined. but let me point out that, if this account of the “objective virtue” of warrants is correct, we are in a position to know that a proposed warrant is reliable only if we are in a position to estimate the order of magnitude of certain objective likelihoods. one way of getting in a position to do that is to carefully tally the relative frequency of success resulting from the application of the rule (and to infer that the relative frequency in our sample reveals the order of magnitude of the objective likelihood required for reliability). it is my impression, however, that we seldom base our estimates of objective likelihood on careful tallies of relative frequencies, and that we almost never do so when deciding which inferential practices or strategies are good ones. it is essential to remember, therefore, that although having a careful tally of a relative frequency may be a sufficient condition for having a reason for adopting an estimate of objective likelihood, it is not a necessary condition for having such a reason. 44 see the postscript to siegel 1988 (127-137), which develops two principal objections to a means-ends conception of rationality: (i) that it is unable “to assess the rationality of ends” (p. 130) and (ii) that it “threatens to rule out some sorts of reasons in favor of prudential or efficiency considerations” (p. 131). i agree with siegel on both these points. however, they do not apply to the position i am defending here. with regard to (i), see note 38 above concerning the position i take with respect to means-end evaluations. with regard to (ii), my current position is that ends are indeed constitutive for the existence of reasons (the existence of reliable rules of inference is a necessary condition for the existence of reasons, and rules can be judged reliable only in relationship to the ends that inferential practices serve). however, it does not follow from that position that every reason is of the means-end variety—i.e., it does not follow that the propositional content of the antecedent of every rule of inference concerns a means-end relationship. 45 siegel 1996 deals with attempts by giere and laudan to reduce specifically epistemic normativity to instrumental rationality. my view is not subject to the arguments siegel advances against laudan and giere in that paper. for one thing, my view recognizes rules of inference which take the form of “categorical” epistemic norms, and is therefore not subject to the central argument siegel advances, which turns on whether all epistemic norms take the form of “instrumental” reasons. for another, the view propounded here simply does not reduce to a “crude” or “whatever works” pragmatism with respect to epistemic goodness, since the goal or purposes which ground the reliability of inferential practices are to consist in purposes which (a) require the adoption of doxastic attitudes to propositional contents and which (b) are sensitive to whether those propositional contents are true. 46 weinstein (2002: 178-79) has raised important questions about the use i tried to make of the notion of cognitive communities, and their relation to critical practice, in chapter 13 of pinto 2001. a satisfactory account of the purposes served by inferential practices would require me to address those questions in a systematic way. it would also require me to deal with the relationship of the norms that hold sway within the cognitive communities associated with specific disciplines both (a) to individual practical reasoning outside those disciplines and (b) to argumentative discourse in the public sphere. evaluating inferences: the nature and role of warrants 315 references anscombe, g. e. m. 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(1996). instrumental rationality and naturalized philosophy of science. philosophy of science 63 (proceedings): s116-s124. sosa, earnest. (1991). knowledge in perspective: selected essays in epistemology. cambridge: cambridge university press. toulmin, stephen. (2003). the uses of argument, updated edition cambridge: cambridge university press. the first edition of this work was published in 1958. toulmin, stephen, richard rieke and allan janik. (1984). an introduction to reasoning, second edition. new york: macmillan. first edition was published in 1979. weinstein, mark. (2002). critical review of robert c. pinto’s argument, inference and dialectic. informal logic 22: 161-180. robert c. pinto centre for research in reasoning, argumentation and rhetoric department of philosophy university of windsor windsor, on, n9b 3p4 pinto@uwindsor.ca maket_n_verjin.qxp literature and medicine: asperger syndrome in mark haddon’s novel “the curious incident of the dog in the night-time” there are various meanings one can assign toliterature. one of them is dealing with truth. but truth is the most difficult thing to deal with, simply because we do not know what ultimate truth and ultimate reality are. we can only see the top of truth’s iceberg which is above the water, but its main bulk is hidden underneath. we can only focus on one or just a few of its aspects at a time, although it simultaneously contains all aspects there are. still, we have our guesses at truth all the time. we analyze and synthesize, use reason and intuition, and come a little bit closer to the truth, or a little bit further away from it. but we actually never get to the heart of it, because then there would be no mystery of human existence, and without this mystery the world as we know it would not exist. there would only be bliss. knowing more is thus the essential mission of our lives, and literature is one of the most powerful spurs in this mission, for it treasures an abundance of impulses of coming closer to the truth. the only thing is to be able to recognize them, to find the way to pick them up, and most certainly one of the ways for this is never to stop building bridges between literature and all other sides of human life literature contains within its mighty lore. human brain is normally lacking the ability to comprehend the simultaneous multifaceted quality of truth, but it is probably evolving in this direction. one of the ways of approximation to deeper truth is certainly the analysis of single elements and aspects. however, analyses are just compromises with our restricted mental potentials, for it is much easier for us to research one thing a time, unencumbered with all corresponding relations it contains. so, the necessary step to be taken after analysis is to get the achieved results in touch with as many aspects of the phenomenon in question as possible. this paper is a very humble attempt hinting at the relationship between literature and medicine, and although it is simply impossible to be equally well versed in various sides of reality, such bridge-building approach at least points to the direction where literature can help us understand our lives a little bit better, which is, probably, one of its great goals. being healthy has always been one of our main preoccupations. being ill, on the other side, is a very hard experience, although different people experience it in different ways. 226 armenian folia anglistika literature janko andrijaseviæ however, one of the most difficult things is to understand those who suffer from certain illnesses which we have never had. how to be emphatic and see the world from the perspective of another body with certain dysfunctions alien to us? can detailed scientific descriptions and medical records make us feel what certain patents feel? or can literary accounts provide us with all necessary information about an illness? and which of the two is more important? this paper will try to deal with the above question, taking as the example the novel the curious incident of the dog in the night-time, written by mark haddon. mark haddon is a british author who wrote a lot for children, and his first novel the curious incident was published both for young adults and as a literary novel, although the writer says that it is “definitely for adults” (weich 2003). the novel won the whitbread book of the year 2004. it is a story of a fifteen-year-old boy christopher boone who suffers from a mental disability. the name of his syndrome is never mentioned in the book, although it is most likely that he has a kind of autism called asperger syndrome. christopher finds a dead dog in his neighbour’s garden, and since he is a fan of sherlock holmes and mystery novels, he sets off to find out who the murderer is, which he eventually accomplishes. the quest for the criminal gradually starts to involve the story of christopher’s parents, so the dog is not the main point in the end, when all the pieces of the puzzle fall into their place. it is both an outer and an inner adventure in which we get to know how a disordered mind functions, and in which we follow the minds of those who are officially mentally sane. haddon had worked with children with disabilities for a while, which can be perceived in the book, because he vividly and realistically depicts many situations in the life of christopher boone. although he does not associate christopher’s condition with any particular diagnosis, it can for the large part fit into asperger syndrome. it is a neurobiological disorder named for a viennese physician, hans asperger, who in 1944 published a paper which described a pattern of behaviours in several young boys who had normal intelligence and language development, but who also exhibited autistic-like behaviours and marked deficiencies in social and communicative skills. in spite of the publication of his paper in the 1940s, it wasn’t until 1994 that asperger syndrome was added to the dsm iv and only in the past few years has as been recognized by professionals and parents. (kirby) that christopher most likely has this syndrome can best be shown by comparing particular symptoms of this disability with his own behaviour. as already stated, individuals with as have normal intelligence and language development. however, although they can know an outstanding number of words, they do not “truly understand the nuances of language and have difficulty with language pragmatics” (freisleben-cook). this is why christopher doesn’t understand idioms, metaphors, allusions, or jokes. he understands only the most literal meaning of words, and, he says, “if i don’t know what someone is saying i ask them what they mean or i walk away” (haddon 2004:3). it is for the same reason that he cannot understand jokes, because they are frequently based on multiple meanings of words, and for christopher 227 literature armenian folia anglistika “making the word mean three different things at the same time […] is like hearing three different pieces of music at the same time which is uncomfortable and confusing” (haddon 2004: 10). and although christopher knows the definition of metaphor, and its etymology, he fails to comprehend it, but he is ok with similes, he even uses some: the inspector “had a very hairy nose […] as if there were two very small mice hiding in his nostrils” (haddon 2004:22). the reason he understands similes is that “it really did look like there were two very small mice hiding in his nostrils” (haddon 2004:22). it was not like, for example, the metaphor “they had a skeleton in the cupboard” (haddon 2004:19) because “people do not have skeletons in their cupboards” (haddon 2004:20). christopher calls metaphors lies, and there is nothing he hates more than any kind of lies. truth is the principal cult in christopher’s system of values. once he hit a policeman because the policeman wanted to touch him (christopher hates being touched). the interrogation with the police officer went like this: ‘i have spoken to your father and he says that you didn’t mean to hit the policeman.’ i didn’t say anything because this wasn’t a question. he said, ‘did you mean to hit the policeman?’ i said, ‘yes.’ he squeezed his face and said, ‘but you didn’t mean to hurt the policeman?’ i thought about this and said, ‘no. i didn’t mean to hurt the policeman. i just wanted him to stop touching me.’ then he said, ‘you know that it is wrong to hit a policeman, don’t you?’ i said, ‘i do.’ he was quiet for a few seconds, then he asked, ‘did you kill the dog, christopher?’ i said, ‘i didn’t kill the dog.’ he said, ‘do you know that it is wrong to lie to a policeman and that you can get into a very great deal of trouble if you do?’ i said, ‘yes.’ he said, ‘so, do you know who killed the dog?’ i said, ‘no.’ he said, ‘are you telling the truth?’ i said, ‘yes. i always tell the truth.’ (haddon 2004: 22-23) when christopher finds out that his father lied to him, he runs away from home, which is a terrifying experience for him, because he has great difficulties to be in new places and among strange people. however, even such a horrible experience is better for him than to live with someone who tells lies. he always knows his priorities. truth is unquestionably the main prerequisite for christopher to function. besides, “if you don’t tell the truth now, then later on … later on it hurts even more” (haddon 2004: 150). still, christopher sometimes tells white lies, when he has a good reason, and we can hardly blame him for that. this is how he justifies the use of white lies: 228 armenian folia anglistika literature a white lie is not a lie at all. it is where you tell the truth but you do not tell all of the truth. this means that everything you say is a white lie because when someone says, for example, ‘what do you want to do today?’ you say, ‘i want to do painting with mrs peters,’ but you don’t say ‘i want to have my lunch and i want to go to the toilet and i want to go home after school and i want to play with toby and i want my to have supper and i want to play on my computer and i want to go to bed.’ (haddon 2004:62.) people with asperger syndrome are said to “have difficulties with transitions or changes and prefer sameness” (kirby). one of the reasons they do not like new places is that they get too many impressions from them. when ordinary people travel through countryside, for example, they see “some cows in the fields” (haddon 2004:174). when christopher travels in the countryside he sees “19 cows in the field, 15 of which are black and white and 4 of which are brown and white” (haddon 2004:175), and he can also draw the particular pattern of every single cow. so, he says: “when i am in a new place, because i see everything, it is like when a computer is doing too many things at the same time and the central processor unit is blocked up and there isn’t any space left to think about other things” (haddon 2004:177). and this is how he felt when he was travelling alone from swindon to london: “i could feel my heart beating very hard and i could hear a noise like the sea in my ears” (haddon 2004:210). one of the basic problems christopher has is his inability to understand human emotions. instead of feeling them instinctively, he has to use his reason and make his rational conclusions about how somebody else might feel. for example, he knows his father is angry by the volume of his voice, not by its tone or his facial expression or body gestures. this is why he prefers dogs to people: “you always know what a dog is thinking. it has four moods. happy, sad, cross and concentrating. also, dogs are faithful and do not tell lies because they cannot speak” (haddon 2004:4). on the other hand, he finds people confusing because “people often talk using metaphors” (haddon 2004:19) and “do a lot of talking without using any words” (haddon 2004: 19), which he doesn’t understand. for christopher, “loving someone is helping them when they get into trouble, and looking after them, and telling them the truth” (haddon 2004:109). this is the extent to which he can stretch his emotional intelligence, but still his sense of morality and justice is impeccable, regardless of the fact that he cannot understand emotions. this also does not mean that he is rid of emotions – they are sometimes so strong that he has to fight them hard. “the narrator may not recognize them, but emotions lurk behind virtually every clue he uncovers” (weich 2003). christopher is emotionally upset when people shout at him, when they try to touch him, when he is in a new place, when he is in a crowd, when he talks to strangers. in order to restore his peace, he finds many ways to fence himself off from the sources of unrest. “i put my hands over my ears and closed my eyes and rolled forward till i was hunched up with my forehead pressed onto the grass. the grass was wet and cold. it was nice” (haddon 2004:4). sometimes he makes 229 literature armenian folia anglistika the noise that father calls groaning. i make this noise when there is too much information coming into my head from the outside world. it is like when you are upset and you hold the radio against your ear and you tune it halfway between two stations so that all you get is white noise and then you turn the volume right up so that this is all you can hear and then you know you are safe because you cannot hear anything else (haddon 2004: 8). in other situations he performs mathematical operations in his head: “i doubled 2s in my head because it made me feel calmer. i got to 33,554,432 which is 225, which was not very much because i’ve got to 245 before, but my brain wasn’t working well” (haddon 2004:149). is this something he does instinctively, or does he use his intelligence to protect himself from negative emotions? if the latter is true, is this not something the mentally acceptable masses should learn from christopher? besides, he also knows which things make him uneasy and which calm him down. it is always knowledge about things that brings him peace – to know where he is, what time it is, what he is going to do, what is going to happen, briefly – order, routine, certainty. he knows what is good for him, and he always helps himself and tries to find his peace. another lesson from christopher? “the individual [with as] exhibits an unusually intense circumscribed interest or restricted, repetitive and stereotyped behaviour, interest and activities” (slater-walker 2002: 46).1 christopher has several strong interests: science fiction, ocean depths, mathematics. he even passes the a level in mathematics with an a grade, because he is a math genius. it is generally believed that all people with as are exceptionally gifted for certain areas, but the truth is that it applies to only a fraction of them. still, those who are gifted can really reach enormously high achievements in their fields of interest. ioan james offers an interesting idea in his book asperger’s syndrome and high achievement. he states that some famous personalities (including michelangelo, isaac newton, jonathan swift, van gogh, albert einstein, andy warhol) had “strange idiosyncrasies, of the kind associated with the mild form of autism known as asperger’s syndrome” (james 2006:7). is this too daring a statement? or is as still so unfamiliar as to be accepted to such a scale? the perception of people with as is very different from average people. they are “often overly sensitive to sounds, tastes, smells, and sights […] may prefer soft clothing, certain foods, and be bothered by sounds or lights no one else seems to hear or see” (kirby). different foodstuffs on christopher’s plate must not touch each other, because if they do – he does not eat them any more. he never eats yellow and brown things, or at the best he puts red food colouring into them if he really likes something which is yellow or brown. he states his own reasons for hating yellow (custard, bananas, double yellow lines, yellow fever, yellow flowers, sweetcorn – “because it comes out in your poo,” haddon 2004:105) and brown (dirt, gravy, poo, wood, melissa brown – “who is a girl at school who is not actually brown like anil or mohammed, it’s just her name, but she tore my big astronaut painting into two pieces and i threw it away even after mrs 230 armenian folia anglistika literature peters sellotaped it together again because it looked broken,” haddon 2004:106). such tastes and behaviour are “not the result of intentional rudeness” (kirby) and people dealing with as patients have to be aware of that. the reaction of mr shears, who is christopher’s mother’s lover, is thus so out of place: you think you’re so fucking clever, don’t you? don’t you ever, ever think about other people for one second, eh? well, i bet you’re really pleased with yourself now, aren’t you?” (haddon 2004:252). is there any need now to repeat how much reconsideration many so-called mentally sane people need? there are other symptoms of as, too, such as “failure adequately to use eye-to-eye gaze, facial expression, body posture and gesture to regulate social interaction” (slaterwalker 2002:43), “a tendency to be clumsy” (freisleben-cook 2), “failure to develop […] peer relationships” (slater-walker 2002: 44), “rarely seeking and using other people for comfort and affection at times of stress and distress” (slater-walker 2002:44), “apparently compulsive adherence to specific, non-functional routines or rituals” (slater-walker 2002: 47), etc., all of which can, in one way or another, be associated with christopher’s behaviour. in this novel written in a very simple, “clipped” (weich 2003) style, mark haddon has managed to make the reader “slip inside his [christopher’s] head, and it seems like the most natural thing in the world” (weich 2003).2 while i was reading the book i started worrying a bit, because christopher’s reasoning and ‘non-functional rituals’ became quite usual to me, and i started to ask myself whether i was completely mentally healthy. then, to my relief, i read that many readers “found themselves walking around thinking like christopher” (weich 2003). even the author’s father “discovered that three yellow cars were habitually parked in the street in a row [which is a very bad sign for christopher], so he had to go round the block” (weich 2003).3 however, it is probably not that all of us who identified with christopher tend to have anything similar to as, it is just that all of us have been in situations of great tension like christopher, and because, apparently, “there is something more wrong with the people around christopher than with him” (weich 2003).4 and had we met christopher face to face, or read the detailed medical accounts of as, we certainly would not have got such an emphatic understanding of a person suffering from this disability as we do reading haddon’s book. which is to be thanked to the magic of literature. in the end, it is probably redundant to repeat the question mentioned previously – whether it is medicine or literature that are more valuable for our understanding of various illnesses. medicine is a science, precise and objective, literature is art, imprecise and subjective, but both are unavoidable, because they cast light on the truth from different perspectives, both of which are inherent in us. this paper could, as well, have brought in other perspectives, such as philosophical, spiritual, historical ones, etc., but it is a rather formidable task i shall refrain from, but i hope this tiny bridge that i tried to build in this paper at least exposes the direction i am pointing to. 231 literature armenian folia anglistika notes: 1. quoted from who icd-10 (1993) (world health organization, international classification of diseases) 2. mark haddon, quoted in weich 2003. 3. ibid. 4. ibid. references: 1. freisleben-cook, l. a more down-to-earth description // o.a.s.i.s. http://www.udel.edy/bkirby/asperger/aswhatisit.html, accessed at 3 april 2007. 2. haddon, m. (2004) the curious incident of the dog in the night-time. london: vintage books. 3. james, i. (2006) asperger’s syndrome and high achievement. london and philadelphia: jessica kingsley publications. 4. kirby, b. l. what is asperger syndrome // o.a.s.i.s. online asperger syndrome information and support. http://www.udel.edy/bkirby/asperger/aswhatisit.html, accessed at 3 april 2007. 5. slater-walker, g. & c. (2002) an asperger marrige. london and philadelphia: jessica kingsley publications. 6. weich, d. (2003) the curiously irresistible literary debut of mark haddon // powells.com interviews – mark haddon. http://www.powells.com/authors/haddon.html, accessed at 3 april 2007. ¶ñ³ï³ýáõãûáõý ¨ µåßï³·çïáõãûáõý. ²ëå»ñ·»ñç ëçý¹ñáùá ø³ñù ð³¹¹áýç “þ³ý ·çß»ñ³ûçý ï³ñûñçý³ï ùçç³¹»åá” í»åáõù ä³ù³ý³ï³ïçó ´ñçï³ý³óç ·ñáõ ø³ñù ð³¹¹áýç “þ³ý ·çß»ñ³ûçý ï³ñûñçý³ï ùçç³¹»åá” µ³ý³í»×-í»åç ·éë³íáñ ñ»ñáëá` 15-³ùû³ øñçëïáý»ñá, áõýç ñá·»ï³ý ß»õáõù (²ëå»ñ·»ñç ëçý¹ñáù), áñç ù³ëçý çýùá ï»õû³ï ã¿: ð³¹¹áýá ññ³ß³éç ³ý·é»ñ»ýáí ³ûýù³ý ñ³çáõ ¿ ý»ñï³û³óýáõù ñá·»ï³ý ß»õáõù áõý»óáõ ù³ñ¹áõ ³ßë³ññáýï³éáõùá, áñ áýã»ñóáõá ³ï³ù³ûçó ýù³ýáõãûáõý ¿ ï»ëýáõù çñ ¨ ³û¹ ïõ³ûç ùçç¨: âý³û³í ñçí³ý¹áõãû³ý ³ýáõýá í»åáõù ãç ýßíáõù, ¨ ýñ³ýáõù ãï³ý µåßï³ï³ý ýï³ï³éáõùý»ñ, ³ûý í»åáõù ³í»éç í³é ¿ ³ñï³ñ³ûïíáõù ¨ ³í»éç ³ñ¹ûáõý³í»ï ¿ ýï³ñ³·ñíáõù, ù³ý áñ¨¿ µåßï³·çï³ï³ý ½»ïáõóù³ý ù»ç: ðá¹í³íáõù ùýýíáõù ¿ ·ñ³ï³ýáõãû³ý ¨ µåßï³·çïáõãû³ý ñ³ñ³µ»ñ³ïóáõãûáõýá, áñáýù ý»ñï³û³óýáõù »ý ù³ñ¹áõ ùç³ëýáõãû³ý »ñïáõ ïáõù»ñá ¨ ³û¹ å³ï׳éáí å»ïù ¿ ñý³ñ³íáñçýë û·ï³·áñí»ý ùçùû³ýó ýí³×áõùý»ñá, áñå»ë½ç éáõûë ë÷é»ý ù³ñ¹ïáõãû³ý ·áûáõãû³ý ³é»õíí³íç íñ³: 232 armenian folia anglistika literature psychology in the post-truth era editorial psychology in the post-truth era vlad petre glăveanu* a [a] webster university geneva, geneva, switzerland. europe's journal of psychology, 2017, vol. 13(3), 375–377, doi:10.5964/ejop.v13i3.1509 published (vor): 2017-08-31. *corresponding author at: webster university geneva, 15 route de collex, 1293 bellevue, switzerland. e-mail: glaveanu@webster.ch this is an open access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (http://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/3.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. it is always difficult to define a historical period while being part of it; such work of classification is usually done afterwards with the benefit of hindsight. and yet, following the rise of nationalism and xenophobia in the west, and other places around the world, aided by the spread of lies through populist propaganda, some distinctive ways of referring to current events emerged. ‘post-truth’ is chief among them. in fact, the notion of ‘post-truth politics’ even entered the dictionaries recently, a term used to define a period in which “objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief”i. the existence of propaganda and its mission to conquer ‘hearts’ over ‘heads’ is not new here. neither is the fact that public opinion is shaped by emotions and personal meaning-making. if anything, it would be hard to be otherwise. what is particularly important – and particularly troubling – about this new era is the dismissal of or disregard for “objective facts”. and, more than this, the fact that we live in a completely different informational and technological landscape than a few decades ago. the use of the internet and social media as main sources of information and arenas of socialisation had consequences few could foresee. the great hopes of the founders of such projects were that they would serve as spaces of free dialogue and exchange, increase communication and, with it, mutual respect and tolerance. the reverse has often been the case. ‘social media bubbles’ in which ‘alternative facts’, including alternative histories, circulate as true, are of concern today for policy makers, media experts, educators and psychologists alike. the latter, i argue, have a fundamental contribution to make in the current context. it is not only the case that psychology – at least its social, cultural, cognitive and political branches – deals with public opinion and the emergence and transformation of (social) knowledge. what matters most is that psychology cannot stop at simply discovering new biases and errors in thinking processes, new dynamics within inter-group relations, or listing new forms of manipulation. it is imperative, now more than ever, that psychologists use their expertise to devise practical tools for cultivating critical thinking and reflexivity in relation to a number of areas of social life – e.g., history, politics, economics – and in relation to the distinction between personal beliefs and objective facts. this is not to say that the former are not to be trusted or should be eradicated in the quest for “perfect europe's journal of psychology ejop.psychopen.eu | 1841-0413 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ http://ejop.psychopen.eu/ http://ejop.psychopen.eu/ http://www.psychopen.eu/ objectivity”. far from it, psychology’s key role in this post-truth era should be to help people distinguish between beliefs and facts and understand the strengths and limitations associated with each. this is all the more important in relation to social media and in view of the kind of informational literacy that should be developed in new (and old) generations of users. being able to appreciate the soundness of the information found on social media is a crucial skill that needs to be educated from early on. unlike a legal or political approach, that might focus on criminalising the spreading of falsehoods on the internet, psychologists should be concerned with studying and developing the meta-cognitive skills required to search for, evaluate and make use of information in online or offline environment. it is this kind of literacy that needs both increased research attention and the efforts of practitioners to translate theory into concrete tools and motivate people to make good use of them. it is a well-known fact that psychology is one of the first disciplines to be shut down under authoritarian or totalitarian regimes. more than this, the accusations usually brought against psychologists are those of intellectualism and of trying to undermine the state (typically the single or dominant party). one of the worrying signs of this dynamic in the ‘post-truth era’ takes the form of contempt for experts and expertise. psychological expertise is often disregarded on the basis that it serves a particular agenda and that it misconstrues human behaviour. while a close scrutiny of the validity of research is certainly needed and the discipline itself has in place a series of institutional practices dedicated to this exercise, we must resist as a community the temptation of isolating ourselves to the ivory tower of science and failing to reach out to the various groups of people we ultimately aim to understand and to help. in addition, we need to find new ways to disseminate psychological information, to increase awareness about its utility and its multiple practical applications. in the end, it is by demonstrating the value of one’s research (whether psychology or multidisciplinary) that we can hope to make an impact outside of the academic world and of our own ‘bubble’ populated by colleagues who hold similar beliefs and values. this is not a call to turn psychologists into activists but rather one encouraging colleagues to reflect more on the practical implications of their research – whatever field of psychology it belongs to – and the ways in which they contribute, through their work, to current debates. what is at stake in defining a new role for psychology within the post-truth era is not only the future of the discipline, faced with the double challenge of anti-intellectualism and increased authoritarianism, but also the way we understand and foster democratic values and civic participation. a psychological science aimed at strengthening the foundations of open and tolerant societies, based on ideals of social justice and embracing diversity is essential for the development of societies that are resilient to nationalism, populism, and discriminatory practices. this effort needs to be reflected in the quality of the work done by psychologists as well as its wider dissemination, including through making it more accessible for a general public. in this context, the development and growth of open access sources of credible, high-quality psychological information plays a special part. europe’s journal of psychology (ejop) has been at the forefront of this trend for almost 13 years and we continuously strive to improve our content and to reach wider audiences. given the particular challenges associated with living and working in an age of ‘post-truth politics’, we have been and continue to welcome manuscripts – including the proposal of special editions – that address pressing societal issues such as current uses of social media, inequality and social justice, migration and multiculturalism, terrorism, democracy and democratic values, protest and civic participation, climate change and environmental concerns, political behaviour and the psychology of human rights, among others. we are also searching for innovative ways to make psychological information available to non-expert audiences without compromising on the scientific standards of conducting and reporting research. these ways could include the psychology in the post-truth era 376 europe's journal of psychology 2017, vol. 13(3), 375–377 doi:10.5964/ejop.v13i3.1509 http://www.psychopen.eu/ option of writing non-technical abstracts or article summaries for lay people as well as asking authors to include more substantial sections on the implications and practical uses of their research, written with a wider audience in mind. in the end, the ‘post-truth era’ of today might very well be a momentary, negative development soon overcome and even forgotten. this is a rather optimistic view given the fact that its consequences are already being felt by various communities around the world: refugees unable to find shelter from war, protesters detained for expressing their dissatisfaction, people being displaced or losing their livelihood due to climate change, those who feel powerless in the face of growing inequality or afraid they might be killed or evacuated due to imminent conflicts. these are all part of the realities of today even more so than a decade ago given the increasing scorn for and dismissal of evidence coupled with embracing more or less unfounded views just because they suit one’s interests and reflect one’s emotions. a thorough psychological analysis of these phenomena is timely and necessary, as is the creation of practical tools to counter ‘post-truth’ mentalities. our hope at ejop is to make a positive contribution in this regard by opening the journal even more to critical inquiries about social issues. there is still a possibility that the notion of ‘post-truth’ will be remembered in a few years as a short-lived historical anomaly. for this to be the case, though, psychologists need to play a more active part in their society as scientists, practitioners and, above all else, as agents of change. notes i) https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth funding the author has no funding to report. competing interests the author has declared that no competing interests exist. acknowledgments i am grateful to constance de saint laurent for long and fruitful discussions on the topic of this editorial. a bout the a uthor vlad petre glăveanu is associate professor and head of the department of psychology at webster university geneva in switzerland, and associate professor ii at the centre for the science of learning and technology at the university of bergen in norway. his research interests include creativity and culture, perspective taking, political imagination and social representations. he has recently edited the palgrave handbook of creativity and culture research (2016, palgrave) and coeditor, with james c. kaufman and john baer, of the upcoming cambridge handbook of creativity across domains (cambridge university press) and co-editor with tania zittoun of the handbook of imagination and culture (oxford university press). vlad has also been editor of europe’s journal of psychology for a decade. glăveanu 377 europe's journal of psychology 2017, vol. 13(3), 375–377 doi:10.5964/ejop.v13i3.1509 psychopen is a publishing service by leibniz institute for psychology information (zpid), trier, germany. www.zpid.de/en https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth http://www.zpid.de/en http://www.psychopen.eu/ psychology in the post-truth era (article body) notes (additional information) funding competing interests acknowledgments about the author forum not truth but tolerance: a (much belated) response to atif khalil sherman a. jackson i should like to begin this essay with a sincere apology. more than five years have passed since professor atif khalil penned his scholarly critique of some of my suggestive ruminations on intra-islamic theological ecumenism in the introduction to my translation of abū ḥāmid al-ghâzalî’s fayṣal al-tafriqa.1 while scholarly convention – not to mention etiquette ‒ would certainly demand a much more timely response than i have been able to manage, i am afraid that i can plead no better than to throw myself on the understanding of those who have insight into and appreciation for the various ways in which the horrific attacks of september 11, 2001 have skewed the scholarly agenda of many an islamicist. i sincerely hope that this delay will not be construed as some kind of veiled or surreptitiously snide dismissal of professor khalil’s thoughtful analysis. i also hope that it will not have gone so far as to suggest any inability on my part to respond to what i shall argue amounts to a clever but ultimately wrong-minded critique. according to professor khalil, despite the ingenuity with which i approach the issue of muslim theological diversity, many of my central ________________________________________________________________________ sherman a. jackson is the king faisal chair of islamic thought and culture, professor of religion and professor of american studies and ethnicity at the university of southern california. jackson: not truth but tolerance 147 arguments are beset with “‘internal contradictions and incongruencies’ that might otherwise evade the casual reader” (85). at bottom, these can be summarized as: (1) the lack of an objective criterion for distinguishing “legitimate [interpretive] traditions from illegitimate ones”; (2) an inescapable relativism, especially given my apparent assertion that the true meaning of historically transcendent scripture remains hopelessly closed to historically embedded, contingent human beings; (3) the notion that we can have ‘aqīdah (sustained belief about god) independent of a systematic rational method to produce and sustain it; (4) the false dichotomy i assert between eisegesis and tafsīr (qur’ānic exegesis); and (5) my failure to consider what the likes of the famed if controversial muḥyī al-dîn ībn ‘arabī might contribute to a project of theological ecumenism. there are a number of other minor issues and extrapolations tucked in the interstices of all of this. but what i have enumerated here constitutes the backbone of khalil’s critique. i should like to begin my response by noting that, despite my recognition of the utility of al-ghâzalî’s work for a contemporary program of theological ecumenism, the main point of my introduction was to empower the reader to arrive at a more informed understanding of the translated text. throughout professor khalil’s critique, however, it is not always clear whether his issue is with me or al-ghâzalî, or both. in the end, it turns out to make little difference. for, as we shall see, khalil’s critique is ultimately grounded in a fundamental and consistent misunderstanding of both al-ghâzalî and me. both al-ghâzalî and i are clear and explicit about the objective of his (and by extension my) project ‒ to establish a criterion for theological tolerance. the title of the book is on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam. and the opening pages of the introduction explicitly state that al-ghâzalî’s aim is, “not to establish who among the theological schools is ‘right,’ but to demonstrate the folly and unfairness of the practice of condemning a doctrine as heresy simply because it goes against one’s own theology.”2 khalil, on the other hand, seems bent on converting al-ghâzalî’s (and my) aim into one of pursuing and policing theological truth ‒ of establishing the means via which correct doctrine might be arrived at and of laying down a criterion on the basis of which true beliefs might be objectively differentiated from false ones. this is why, for example, he takes me to task for not spelling out an objective criterion for distinguishing “legitimate” from “illegitimate” interpretive backdrops against which scripture might be read. for on this omission, i (and here he explicitly targets me) am ultimately bound to accept as valid “all possible doctrine,” since a boundless array of equally legitimate interpretive the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4148 backdrops must yield a boundless array of equally legitimate interpretations. as he put it, “this … opens the door to an acceptance of not only process theologian hanbalites and aristotelian-neoplatonic ash‘arites, but anyone who simply claims to speak on behalf of islamic revelation, no matter how convoluted their logic might seem” (87). this lack of a criterion for separating true from false backdrops cum-doctrine is a particularly glaring oversight on my part, given that al-ghâzalî, according to professor khalil, “suggests the exact opposite in fayṣal al-tafriqa, when he argues for the need of a common and agreed upon methodology to eliminate flawed interpretations (pp. 93‒96)” (87, emphasis mine). to be sure, both al-ghâzalî and i have an obvious interest in truth cumcorrect theological doctrine.3 but, contrary to professor khalil’s reading, fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-islam wa al-zandaqa is simply and emphatically not about the pursuit of truth, at least not as a primary, first order concern; nor is it, precisely for this reason, ultimately about accommodating multiple expressions of truth; nor is it even about distinguishing truth per se from falsehood per se. rather fayṣal al-tafriqa is about sharpening and policing the definition of unbelief and affirming that not all untruth necessarily amounts to kufr (formal unbelief)! in this light, professor khalil’s focus on what is substantively valid, correct, or legitimate simply misses the point. for the very crux of al-ghāzalī’s argument is that any number of views that are substantively invalid ‒ indeed, demonstrably false, untrue or incorrect ‒ may be tolerated inasmuch as they do not constitute kufr! again, al-ghâzalî’s aim is to distinguish who is a muslim – theologically speaking – and who is not and to confirm, much to the chagrin of those he characterizes as “extremists,” that one can be a muslim despite one’s subscription to any number of substantively wrong theological views.4 as for professor khalil’s assertion that al-ghâzalî aspired to lay down a “universal principle” to serve as “a common and agreed upon methodology to eliminate flawed interpretations,” this too reflects a basic misunderstanding of al-ghâzalî’s project. for in fayṣal, he is not at all interested in establishing correct or eliminating flawed doctrine per se. rather, in fayṣal, his concern lies with the tyranny of the universal and the exclusivist claims of those ‒ for example, ‘abd al-qāhir al-baghdādī ‒ who believe themselves, rightly or wrongly, to be in possession of correct theological doctrine and that the resulting “incorrect” doctrines of their theological adversaries necessarily amounts to unbelief. two examples from fayṣal itself should help to throw my argument into relief. the first comes with al-ghâzalî’s treatment of twelver shiism.5 speaking of the imāmī doctrine of occultation (ghaybah), he states explicitly: jackson: not truth but tolerance 149 this is a false, clearly absurd and extremely abominable doctrine. but it poses no threat to religion. in fact, the only threat it poses is to the fool who believes in it…. the point here is that not everyone who embraces senseless hallucinations must be branded an unbeliever, even if his doctrines are clearly absurd.6 al-ghâzalî clearly believes the twelver shiite doctrine of occultation to be neither valid nor legitimate, certainly not in the sense that khalil uses these terms. and yet, it is precisely his aim in fayṣal to refute and interdict such practices as branding twelver shiites as unbelievers simply because they hold this substantively incorrect belief. indeed, twelver shiites, despite their “wayward doctrine,” fall perfectly within the parameters of islam that al-ghâzalî articulates and defends in fayṣal. again, pace professor khalil, al-ghâzalî’s (and my) aim is simply not to rid the market of all wrong ideas and replace these with substantively correct ones. rather, the only idea that al-ghâzalî (or i) wants to rout from the field is the idea that all wrong theological views invariably take one outside the pale of the faith. the second example speaks to professor khalil’s understanding of alghâzalî’s “common and agreed upon methodology” as being for the purpose of determining which traditions are valid and which are not. again, khalil’s point here is that without an objective criterion for determining which traditions can be legitimately relied upon in interpreting scripture and which cannot, we have no way of distinguishing the true from the false among the interpretations generated thereby. on this inability, all interpretations must be recognized as correct, since no tradition or interpretive backdrop can rightfully claim a status that it denies to all the rest. again, however, a careful reading of al-ghâzalî reveals that his preoccupation is not at all with determining which traditions are legitimate and which are not. rather, his point of departure is the simple and undeniable fact that muslim scriptural interpretations are informed by a variety of competing interpretive backdrops. to see him as focusing on (and to see me as having to focus on) which of these is legitimate and which is not is simply to miss his (and my) point.7 for even where a tradition is deemed “illegitimate,” this alone does not doom the status of the views it engenders. speaking, for example, of the widely diffused tradition of rationalist kalām (speculative theology) as an interpretive backdrop and “methodology,” al-ghâzalî states: [w]ere we ourselves to put aside all pretensions of deference and decorum, we would declare outright that delving into speculative theology [kalām] is religiously forbidden (ḥarām)… (123). to avoid misunderstanding here, i should note this was a judgment made by al-ghâzalî in passing in fayṣal, as any fair reading the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4150 of the text will plainly bear out.8 still, he explicitly negates kalām’s status as a, or the, normative backdrop or methodology against or via which to read or vindicate scripture. and yet, al-ghâzalî clearly does not intend to proscribe all doctrines that recline upon kalām. this is because the legitimacy or validity of the interpretive tradition from which an interpretation draws its substance is for him largely a moot point. the operative issue is, rather, how the interpretation itself relates to his criterion for tolerance ‒ that is, not whether it is substantively right or wrong but whether or not it constitutes kufr. in many ways, and with a number of obvious qualifications, fayṣal al-tafriqa might be more profitably understood not as a theological tract but as a political one ‒ far more akin in spirit and intent with, say, john locke’s a letter concerning toleration than with augustine’s on christian doctrine.9 its aim is neither to affirm, establish, or police the concrete substance of theological truth but to referee and impose a semblance of discipline upon competing pronouncements of theological infidelity. understanding this subtlety is key to understanding the role and function of reason in fayṣal. and understanding al-ghâzalî’s deployment of reason in this text is the key to understanding that ‒ pace professor khalil, neither al-ghâzalî nor i are advocates of theological relativism. for al-ghâzalî, reason is not the primary – and certainly not the exclusive ‒ means to religious truth; indeed, for him ‒ pace modern liberalism ‒ reason is emphatically not the only means of knowing. rather, truth and knowing for al-ghâzalî are often far more subtle and subjective indulgences. this epistemological insight is clearly reflected in his critique of rationalist kalām, in which he scoffs at the claim that speculative theology (deemed by many at the time to be reason par excellence) is the only way to truth: [a]nyone who believes that the way to faith (îmân) is speculative theology, abstract proofs, and systematic categorization is himself guilty of unsanctioned innovation. for faith in god comes rather of a light which god casts into the hearts of his servants, as a gift and gratuity from him. sometimes this comes in the form of a proof that appears to one internally but which one cannot explain to others; sometimes it comes through visions in one’s sleep; sometimes it comes by witnessing the ways of a religious man whose light is transferred to one upon befriending and spending time with him; and sometimes it comes by way of circumstantial considerations…. (121)10 now, while systematic reason may not be the means via which one arrives at all of one’s religious convictions, reason remains, ceteris pajackson: not truth but tolerance 151 ribus, the most likely if not only ostensibly objective11 medium through which such views can be publicly negotiated cum-validated. the aim of fayṣal is to enlist reason as a public medium for negotiation by laying down the “rules of engagement.” these rules, however, are neither calibrated nor bound to preempt the emergence of any and all substantively wrong views. rather, the whole point of al-ghâzalî’s fayṣal, literally, “decisive criterion”; it is to determine how wrong a recognizably wrong view must be if its proponent is to be legitimately branded an infidel. professor khalil seems to think that this kind of accommodation amounts to theological relativism. but this, again, bespeaks a serious misunderstanding of al-ghâzalî’s (and my) project, as well as the very nature and pluralistic sensibilities of islam as a “religion.” in a word, “tolerated” is simply not the same as “correct,” “endorsed,” or “agreed with.” nor does the fact that i tolerate a wrong view in others mean that i have no interest – or even a reduced interest ‒ in ensuring that my own views are substantively correct.12 since, however, the true ground of so much theological belief is demonstrably subjective and closed to the dictates13 of reason, i must accept the fact that i may not be able to communicate my beliefs faithfully to others or enlist their assent. again, however, such recognition should not be mistaken for a lack of conviction regarding my own views. rather, for me, absolute truth exists ‒ and i know what it is! i also know, however, that you “know” too and that i may not be able to convince you of my truth.14 at its essence, al-ghâzalî’s (and my) project is about allowing each of us to look upon our own truth as absolute without having to look upon what we deem to be the falsehoods of our coreligionists as absolute in the sense of constituting kufr. this is hardly an exercise in theological relativism. for, assuming due-diligence, it neither entails nor necessitates the slightest hesitation in judging one’s own or others’ views to be absolutely true or false.15 if i had to guess, i would hazard that professor khalil’s reading of alghâzalî (and of me) owes much to the intellectual liberalism enshrined by the western academy, where closed, subjective conduits of knowledge ‒ the heart (qalb), the self/soul (nafs), the primordial disposition (fiṭrah), guidance from god (hudā) ‒ have no epistemological value at all. this in turn prompts him to superimpose upon al-ghâzalî (and me) an enlightenment understanding of the relationship between knowledge, truth, and reason. what we know, we know only through reason; and our claims to knowledge/ truth can be validated only by rational arguments.16 on this understanding, what al-ghâzalî must be seeking to negotiate through his patently rational approach in fayṣal is the substantive content of truth. for not only is truth the business of reason; it is the latter’s inevitable and inextricable result. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/fitrah the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4152 again, however, a careful reading of al-ghâzalî reveals that not only is he opposed to this kind of rationalist fundamentalism,17 fayṣal is dedicated to negotiating not truth but tolerance. the role and function of reason in this text is to promote not the religious truth but the secular peace! whether or not this or that muslim group or individual ultimately ends up in possession of the actual religious truth is a matter to be left to god in the life to come.18 in the here and now, the issue is how competing claims to truth and judgments of falsehood can be accommodated – not endorsed! – without threatening or undermining the integrity of islam and the muslim community. this is the actual ideational context and utilitarian intent of fayṣal. in its light, not only does the bulk of professor khalil’s major criticisms begin to fade, his more minor criticisms are also revealed to be problematic. take, for example, the claim that i argue that “revelation qua revelation, insofar as its source is ahistoric, remains forever inaccessible to the historically contingent theologian (of any school) and that the most people can do is engage in limited, fallible attempts to interpret and understand the divine intention behind scripture…” (87). again, having misdiagnosed the main objective of fayṣal, professor khalil goes on to confuse the question of what we can know with that of what we can prove. i never said (or implied) that because humans are embedded in history they can never know the intended meaning of scripture. how could i, when islam’s very creation narrative includes transcendent god teaching contingent adam the names of all things? and for the post-creation period of secular history, the qur’ān repeatedly refers to god’s gifting humans – that is, not just prophets – direct knowledge of truth. pharaoh, for example, and his people, are said to have received god’s signs but to have, “rejected them, out of impudence and arrogance, despite the certainty of their truth that had settled in their souls” (27:14). and if “signs” here is too ambiguous to dispose of the matter, we need only note the case of a segment of the children of israel who are explicitly credited with having an accurate reading of scripture: “they hear the speech of god and then knowingly distort its meaning after they had clearly understood it” (2:75). in none of these cases is there any question but that historically embedded humans can know the intent of scripture. what they cannot do – and this was the point that professor khalil seems to have misconstrued – is impose their historically embedded understandings on others, who do not share their interpretive background, as self-authenticating, unassailable, universally valid truth. another minor criticism leveled by professor khalil is his apparent attribution to me of a rather curious strain of antirationalism, according to which reason is deemed incapable of knowing anything. i never said jackson: not truth but tolerance 153 or implied this (nor did al-ghāzalī).19 what i suggested, rather, following the lead of al-ghâzalî, was that systematic reason has its epistemological limits. of course, reason can know, certainly from the perspective of the reasoner himor herself. but we should be clear here that theology reclines not simply upon the natural faculty of reason but upon specific regimes or systems of reason. and while these regimes or systems can produce metacognitive, internally self-authenticating knowledge or truth, what they cannot do is sustain universal claims to this truth and knowledge across boundaries that separate them from other regimes or systems of reasoning.20 again, professor khalil finds this to be highly problematic. for, for him, this denies the possibility of arriving at universal truth that can be independently validated as such. as he put it, “if no school can claim comprehensive [read, “universal”] doctrinal truth, then are we not forced to accept that all schools can, in the absence of an agreed upon method, claim it at the relative level?” (87). my response to this would be, “no, all schools can claim – and actually believe! ‒ it at the absolute level!” what al-ghâzalî wants to do is simply keep these mutually competing and contradictory claims to absolute truth and falsehood from leading to a national pastime spent at the gallows. related to this point is professor khalil’s criticism of my claim that one can have ‘aqīdah without relying on theology as a systematic means of arriving at and validating it. here, however, he appears to stare reality in the face but to misapprehend it by dint of the rationalist fundamentalism he seems to have embraced. he notes explicitly (though he deems it misleading for me to note it) that the prophet (ṣaas) could have “direct access to transcendent truth by virtue of his prophethood,” and that “he had no need for a theological method to understand revelation because he was in a state of constant communion with god” (89).the reality, however, is that the prophet had no need for theology (or fiqh, for that matter) not because he was in communion with god (after all, muslims believe that god can inspire (yulhim) or guide (yahdī) any of us). the prophet had no need for theology because his authority and status as prophet relieved him of any and all necessity of validating his views to others. in other words, he could claim for his theological views ‒ by sheer, undemocratic, prophetic fiat ‒ an authority that no one else could either claim or challenge. at the bottom, however, the real issue here is, again, the difference between “arriving at” and “validating” a belief. as a matter of private, individual belief, anyone could give assent to his or her understanding of what the prophet handed down and hold that as their theological belief, with no effort or even ability to validate this. the moment, however, they ventured into the public and claimed (or implied) that this belief was normative for others; they, unlike the prophet, would have to point to something beyond the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4154 that belief itself ‒ for example, rational argument, historical precedent, their recognized status as a person of gnosis, or supersensory knowledge ‒ in order to endow it with enough authority to validate it. clearly, however, this process of validation would be separate and distinct from the actual instantiation of the belief itself. professor khalil’s understanding of the role of reason, however ‒ that is, as the necessary basis of both the instantiation and the validation of beliefs ‒ seems to blind him to this distinction. but, unless we are talking about correct doctrine (as determined, that is, by some specific criterion), it seems to me merely to state the obvious to say that one can have all kinds of beliefs about god without systematic ways of arriving at or validating them. professor khalil’s obsession, however, with doctrinal correctness ‒ in tandem with the almost mechanically causal relationship he seems to posit between reason and truth ‒ leads him to impose this obsession on al-ghâzalî (and me). reason and only reason can produce and judge truth. otherwise, “all we could attain in regards to … [our] truths would be a kind of mindless assent to a very small and specific set of assertions about god that are explicitly spelled out in revelation” (89). now, even if we leave aside the question of what, then, judges reason, and even if we ignore the implications of acknowledging that some things can be known directly by virtue of how explicitly they are laid out in revelation, we are inexorably brought back to the fact that measuring the concrete correctness of competing doctrines is simply not al-ghâzalî’s program, at least not in fayṣal. on the contrary, al-ghâzalî’s concern lies, again, not with doctrinal correctness but with tolerance. this misapprehension of the distinction between truth or doctrinal correctness and tolerance also informs professor khalil’s critique of my reference to process theologian charles hartshorne. khalil suggests that i am disingenuous when i invoke hartshorne’s logic but do not subscribe to it. again, however, this is based on a misapprehension of the meta-context of my and al-ghâzalî’s project and the role that these references to hartshorne play in it. professor khalil starts out by noting correctly that i adduce hartshorne to back the argument that traditionalist hanbalites could make an equal claim to being rational, since, on hartshorne’s logic, “settling” on the throne, for example, could not be deemed irrational.21 but then he goes on to claim that by using hartshorne to argue for equal “legitimacy” between traditionalists and rationalists, i run into the problem of not having a criterion for distinguishing “legitimate traditions from illegitimate ones” (87). i have already dealt with this above. here, however, i would simply add that my reference to hartshorne was not at all an effort to identify an alternative backdrop (or logic) that might lead to correct doctrine; it was jackson: not truth but tolerance 155 simply to argue for the existence, pace the muslim rationalists, of multiple regimes of reason (‘aql), and to point up the fact that if the criterion for acceptance of a doctrine was simply that it be reasonable, traditionalist doctrine should pass muster. again, this was an effort to enlist hartshorne into the cause of al-ghâzalî’s campaign for tolerance, not, as professor khalil seems to see the matter, of co-opting him into the cause of truth. there are two final points that professor khalil raises that are actually, in my view, rather marginal to the main argument but still deserve perhaps some comment. the first of these is his critique of the distinction i draw between eisegesis and tafsīr. here, let me state openly that if i were to rewrite this section ten years later, i would word it more carefully. i would not, however, change the basic substance of what i said. what i said was that as a discipline, tafsīr is supposed to amount to a simple exercise in exegesis ‒ that is, of extracting the meanings of words in simple dictionary fashion. khalil challenges this and argues that in point of fact tafsīr routinely if not necessarily entails some level of eisegesis. now, in the main, i agree with khalil. but i think he rather exaggerates (and in so doing distorts) my point. i was not arguing that tafsīr never entails eisegesis; in fact, the example i gave of imām ahmad clearly demonstrated that it does.22 my point was simply that because tafsīr is supposed to be a simple matter of extracting meaning in simple dictionary fashion ‒ that is, with no formal, ideological presuppositions informing this process ‒ every theologian would want to pretend that he or she was involved precisely and only in this enterprise when doing theology. but theology, i argued, being grounded as it is in the attempt to make sense of revelation in the context of some formal or quasi-formal regime of reason, cannot dispense with eisegesis, even if it is not always willing to admit this.23 now, khalil points to the fact that al-ṭabarī contradicts the definition of tafsīr i attributed to him (91). in a sense, however, this actually confirms the point that i was trying to make: eisegesis routinely invades the domain of exegesis. but khalil takes al-ṭabarī’s contradiction of the definition of tafsīr i adduced and attributed to him to be a contradiction of the definition itself. yet, when we consult such authoritative classical lexicons as lisân al-‘arab, we find precisely the definition of tafsīr i cited: “fsr … and tafsîr is to uncover the meaning of a difficult expression (wa al-tafsîr kashf al-murâd ‘an al-ḷafz al-mushkil).”24 again, my point was not that tafsīr never entailed eisegesis. my point was rather that, properly speaking, it is not supposed to ‒ even if, especially in the service of theology, it routinely does. finally, there is the suggestion that i was remiss in not mentioning the famed sufi muḥyī al-dîn ibn ‘arabī in the context of explicating my (and the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4156 al-ghâzalî’s) project. there is much to be said about this, but let me limit myself here to the following. it seems to me that ibn ‘arabī in particular would be a problematic figure to integrate into a discussion of al-ghâzalî’s project, inasmuch as the entirety of ibn ‘arabī’s thought, as i understand him, proceeds on the basis of a cosmology fundamentally at odds with that of alghâzalî. for al-ghâzalî – certainly in the context of the theological universe and interlocutors he assumes in fayṣal 25 ‒ the creator-created dichotomy and distinction is both vertical (that is, hierarchical) and absolute. for ibn ‘arabī, on the other hand, and his waḥdat al-wujūd (unity of existence), this distinction might be said to be neither vertical nor entirely absolute. as one of my teachers (a master and proponent of ibn ‘arabī’s thought) used to explain it, one can say, “god is this chair,” even if one cannot say, “this chair is god.” now, i am not sure about how all of this might or might not be reconciled with al-ghâzalî. but i fail to see how caution and prudence in this regard can be turned into a charge of gratuitous, unwarranted omission. there are numerous lesser issues in professor khalil’s critique on which one might wish to comment.26 in closing, however, i would like to take the opportunity to address a broader problem informing the study of islam in the west of which i think professor khalil’s analysis might be a reflection. given the power and prestige of the western academy – including the rise and incursion into islamic studies of the social sciences, according to whose approach the foundational texts and tradition of islam are often marginal to a determination of the normative parameters of the religion ‒ it seems that muslims who write out of a classical idiom are increasingly less understood on their own terms. instead, the interpretive prisms of the western academy and its intellectual liberalism routinely impose meanings and implications that distort if not subvert the integrity of classical and neo-classical islamic thought. beyond their substance, moreover, these interpretive interventions routinely go on to imply a finality that all but raises them beyond critique. this is not always the case; but it seems to be increasingly so. we see it, for example, in the superimposition of fundamentalist/literalist interpretations onto the muslim legal tradition by scholars who avoid any serious engagement of islamic law itself. on this approach, muslims cannot honestly extract a pluralistic political theory from the qur’ān, sunnah or shari‘ah tradition, because those writing in the powerful western academy cannot.27 we see it as well in the tendency to graft the legal monism of the western nationstate onto islam, in which light muslims must take it to be their duty to impose a uniform body of rules indiscriminately across all segments of society, because this is what modern western states purport to do. shari‘ah jackson: not truth but tolerance 157 in this context, whether it really is or not, comes to be seen as a mortal threat to all non-muslims and even muslims who might dare to dissent.28 and now, with professor khalil, one wonders if we are witnessing yet another incursion of western liberalism in the form of imposing the pursuit, if not imposition, of truth as the only real and legitimate concern of religion, to the exclusion ‒ in our case, of tolerance, but more generally of order, efficiency, and a host of other secular concerns. viewed through this prism, islam can only commit to tolerance as an apology, a pale substitute for its failure to live up to its normative ideal. this ultimately derives from and perpetuates the myth that only modern, secular orders can accommodate falsehood and that tolerance and critique must remain modern, secular monopolies. islam being neither modern nor secular, we should not even seriously expect it to rise to such a challenge. to be fair, i sincerely doubt that this is professor khalil’s consciously held position. but if a religiously grounded program as explicit in its commitment to tolerance as is al-ghâzalî’s fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-islam wa al-zandaqa can be so thoroughly misapprehended and seamlessly appropriated to the lone cause of pursuing and policing truth, one can only wonder how conscious one’s commitments to liberalism have to be for the storied prisms and historically driven presuppositions of the modern west to inform ‒ and inform thoroughly – one’s scholarly perspectives and interpretive thrusts. endnotes 1. atif khalil, “is an intra-islamic theological ecumenism possible? a response to sherman jackson,” the american journal of islamic social sciences 22:4 (2005): 84‒95. 2. sherman a. jackson, on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam: abū ḥāmid al-ghāzalīʼs fayṣal al-tafriqa bayna al-islam wa al-zandaqa. (karachi, india: oxford university press, 2002), 5. emphasis added here. 3. nowhere is this perhaps more vividly demonstrated than in his moving autobiographical testimony in al-munqidh min al-ḍālal (deliverance from error). 4. see, incidentally, jackson, on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam, 54, where none other than the reputedly puritanical traditionalist ibn taymîya expresses a similar ecumenical attitude: “[a]nyone who considers this carefully will know that many of the people of undisciplined passions and unsanctioned innovation (bida‘/s. bid‘a) may be ignorant, wrong-minded believers who have simply veered away from some aspect of what the prophet brought (mu’min mukhti’ dâll ‘an the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4158 ba‘d mâ jâ’a bihi al-rasûl) just as they may be hypocrites and cryptoinfidels who pretend to be other than what they are.” 5. i must beg the indulgence of contemporary twelver shiites here, as my aim is neither to endorse nor advertise al-ghâzalîʼs invective but simply to highlight his deeper and more important point in the context of the present discussion. 6. jackson, on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam, 119‒29. 7. in a modern context, in other words, fayṣal would not see it as its task to make a blanket judgment on whether or not modern science is a “legitimate” tradition or interpretive backdrop. nor would its primary interest be in pronouncing which of the interpretations spawned by modern science was substantively correct. rather, fayṣal’s focus would be on which interpretations generated by modern science is substantively wrong enough to take its proponent outside the fold of islam. and in this context, any number of wrong scientifically based views might be tolerated even if not endorsed. 8. see jackson, on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam, 123. i do not wish to put too sharp a point on al-ghâzalî’scritique of kalām. after all, he makes exceptions for those who need it to clear up doubt and for those who wish to learn it either to treat those beset with doubts or to beat back the attempts of adversaries who seek to undermine the doctrinal integrity of the faith. still, he sees kalām as far from the ideal, normative or necessary backdrop or methodology for a proper let alone exclusively true reading of scripture. 9. of course, notable differences in the historical, political and institutional context in which they wrote underwrite obvious differences between the outlook, concerns, and approach of al-ghāzalī and locke. 10. shockingly, khalil states that the second part of my introduction merely deals with “the historical background of the work,” and that, as such, “this article is only a response to the first introduction” (94n3). given that any number of issues directly germane to his critique are dealt with in the second part of the introduction (for example, al-ghâzalî’s critique of kalām, his view on the role and function of reason and its relationship to truth, the fact that theologians routinely disguise their eisegesis, etc.). i will leave it to the reader to determine the cost of this omission on khalil’s part. 11. by “objective,” i mean simply equally available and accessible to all. 12. speaking inter-religiously, this insight might go some way in explaining, at least in part, why islam did not produce a treaty of westphalia and all that came in its train. whereas european kings, magistrates and prelates may have been less willing or able to recognize any difference between tolerating and endorsing heresy or infidelity, this distinction jackson: not truth but tolerance 159 was woven into the very warp and woof of islam, from the (now much maligned) accommodation of dhimmīs, to al-ghāzalī’s’s fayṣal, to the ottoman capitulations. 13. which is not to say that belief is beyond the analytical function of reason. reason, in other words, can look back on belief, but it cannot get fully behind it in order to push it into place. on this point, see, for example, r. m. unger, knowledge and politics (new york: the free press, 1975), esp., 29‒62. 14. this is a paraphrase of stanley fish, “postmodern welfare: the ignorance of our warrior intellectuals” harper’s magazine, july 2002. 15. as we saw, for example, with his depiction of the shiite doctrine of occultation. again, for al-ghâzalî, this doctrine was not relatively wrong; it was absolutely wrong, as he put it, “ a false, clearly absurd and extremely abominable doctrine.” yet, it did not constitute kufr and was thus not a justifiable basis for excluding shiites from the pale of the faith. 16. this is what routinely dogs religious students in the secular western academy. there they are taught, directly or indirectly, that they can only know what they can prove; and the only acceptable proof of anything is rational proof! compare, this, however, with the myriad sources of valid knowledge and belief adumbrated by al-ghâzalî above (and elsewhere in fayṣal). of course, even al-ghâzalî would agree that reason is the only (or most likely means) of negotiating the validity of one’s beliefs in the public square. but a more honest and sympathetic position for the academy to assume would be to acknowledge more explicitly the difference between what we can know (or justifiably believe) and what we can prove rationally ‒ and that one’s inability to prove the existence of x on rational grounds is not the same as proving that x does not exist. 17. speaking against the pretensions of such rationalist fundamentalism, al-ghâzalî insists in another context: “you have erred in stating that reason (al-‘aql) is a motivator (dâ‘in). nay reason is only a guide (hâdin), while impulses and motives (al-bawâ‘ith wa al-dawâ‘î) issue from the self (al-nafs) based on information provided by reason.” al-mustasfâ min ‘ilm al-usûl , 2 vols. (cairo, egypt: al-amîrîyah press, 1322/1904), 1: 61. for a fuller treatment of this point, see my, “the alchemy of domination? some ash‘arite responses to mu‘tazilite ethics,” international journal of middle east studies, no. 31 (1999): 185‒201. 18. indeed, among the oft-repeated themes in the qur’ān is that reflected in such verses as, “then you will be returned to the knower of the seen and the unseen, whereupon he will inform you concerning that about which you differed” (9:94). see also: 3:55, 5:48, 6:164, 16: 92, and passim. the american journal of islamic social sciences 28:4160 19. nor did i say, or imply, pace khalil, that, just because a doctrine is grounded in human thought and is thus not historically transcendent, it can never be true. 20. again, khalil thoroughly misses the point when he argues that, “mindless assent” “may have been the position of a small number of muslims in history, the ‘we-believe-without-asking-how’ group, but this is not al-ghâzalî’s position as he articulates it, for example, while defending the theological enterprise in the second section of qawâ‘id al-‘aqâ’id (the principles of the creed), the second book of his iḥyâ’ ‘ulûm aldîn” (89). first, the issue is not at all one of assent but of the degree to which such assent can be imposed on others as a normative duty. second, al-ghazâlî’s iḥyâ’ is a very different book from his fayṣal. richard m. frank in al-ghazālī and the ash‘arite school (durham, nc: duke university press, 1994) and others have noted the palpable evolution in al-ghâzalî’s thought, which should warn us against assuming that all of his works are tied together by a common aim. third, in fayṣal, al-ghâzalî directly – at least in part ‒ contradicts this view of khalil: “[i]t had to occur to them that there were groups of uncivilized arabs during the time of the prophet* and the companions, may god be pleased with them, who were steeped in idol-worship and who devoted no attention at all to systematic proofs (‘ilm al-daîl) – and even if they had devoted attention to this they would have not understood it – who in the end were adjudged (by the prophet and the companions) to be muslims.” jackson, on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam , 120‒21. see also p. 122 for a similar statement. 21. i never said, incidentally, pace khalil, that the hanbalites were “process theologians” (87). 22. jackson, on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam, 12‒13. 23. see, for example, the conclusion in the second part of the introduction to on the boundaries of theological tolerance in islam, 66‒68 for a confirmation of this. 24. ibn manẓūr, lisân al-‘arab, 6 vols. (cairo, egypt: dâr al-ma‘ârif, n.d.), vol. 5, 3412‒13. 25. and we might recall that the falāsifah (muslim neoplatonic philosophers) are the only ones he explicitly places outside the boundaries of tolerance that he defines in this text. 26. most notably perhaps the assertion that: “some of the dilemmas he [jackson] encounters in his attempt to formulate a coherent theory of theological diversity seem to lie in his use of diverse and conflicting strains of thought, which range from al-ghazâlî and african studies to christian theology and postmodernism. it was perhaps only inevitable that a project that synthesized ideas from such a wide range of disparate sources would encounter its own incoherencies – interestingly, the same jackson: not truth but tolerance 161 dilemma al-ghazâlî’s own writings face” (92). let me just add here that it seems strange then that khalil would criticize me for not adding yet another “strain of thought” in the person no less of muḥyī al-dīn ibn ‘arabī! on another note, i would also address, inter alia, khalil’s tendency toward what appears to be an unstoried, sola scriptura of sorts that all but ignores the spontaneous understandings of the prophet’s generation and their (real or purported) ideological heirs ‒ leaving reason as the sole determinant of the kinds of normative meanings that can be legitimately derived from or read into scripture. 27. in this regard, see, for example, my “jihad: between law, fact and orientalism,” mélanges de l’université saint-joseph 62 (2009): 133‒48, where i discuss the views of patricia crone on jihad as a legal institution. 28. on this point see my, “the beginning of history? between islamic law and the nation-state,” oxford handbook of islam and politics, ed. j. esposito and e. shahin (new york: oxford university press, forthcoming), where i discuss the views of abdullahi an-na‘īm on islam and the secular state; see also my “legal pluralism between islam and the nation-state: between medieval romanticism and modern pragmatism,” fordham international law journal, vol. 24 (2007), 101‒109. 7 maket 2010 nor_n:layout 1.qxd stylistic peculiarities of contextual hyperbole in sherwood anderson’s “the book of the grotesque” and “godliness” the study of hyperbole in sherwood anderson’s shortstories is of great importance as hyperbole is a very powerful stylistic means which favors the formation of the writer’s individual style at the same time emphasizing its peculiarities. it is a trope which consists of a deliberate and intentional exaggeration of an action, feature or quality which is accompanied by a specific prosodic pattern. as any other trope it allows to say more than is readily seen on the surface. 1 hyperbole is a means through which literary personages are created. it helps to make the world of literature “colorful”, becoming one of the most powerful and effective means of impact, stirring the reader’s imagination and mind. hyperbole is not only a way of writing but also speaking. it makes the speech sound more exciting, more dangerous, better or worse than it really is (hornby 2005:63). it is the result of a kind of intoxication by emotions which prevents a person from seeing things in their true dimensions. if the reader or the listener is not carried away by the emotion of the writer or the speaker, hyperbole becomes a mere lie. in this connection v.v. vinogradov adds that hyperbole is the law of art which brings phenomena of life, diffused as they are, to the point of maximum clarity and conciseness (vinogradov 1953:74). hyperbole is an irreplaceable stylistic means through which the most ridiculous, negative and sarcastic sides of life are expressed, hence it is often used for humorous or ironic effect. it is also one of the best stylistic means for describing characters and their individuality. the creative use of hyperbole in verbal art requires careful study and artistic effort. the choice of sherwood anderson’s short stories for evaluating hyperbole is not accidental: his literary prose abounds in different stylistic means, among which hyperbole has its peculiar place. a literary text is considered a totality in which different stylistic means and allusive elements are embraced. because of this the reader has to go into the depth of the text, observe its imagery thoroughly, find out those elements which are taken from another text, in this way assimilating the two texts together. the choice of sherwood anderson’s short stories is attractive in this sense too. anderson’s literary prose is important for its stylistic value, and as anderson’s stories mostly reflect biblical elements, it is possible to observe the intertextual links through biblical allusion. what we have especially focused on in the present paper by applying the notions of background knowledge and vertical context is the stylistic peculiarities of contextual hyperbole and its types in anderson’s short stories, particularly in “the book of the armenian folia anglistikalinguistics 95 ani kojoyan grotesque” and “godliness” and, in the case of allusive hyperbole, the cognitive and aesthetic significance of the phenomenon. observing instances, when hyperbole is combined with other stylistic devices in the context of anderson’s short stories, the following types have been distinguished: mixed hyperbole (hyperbole combined with other stylistic means, shaped as instances of simile, pun, antonomasia, irony, personification, etc.), non-mixed hyperbole (hyperbole which is not combined with any other stylistic device) and biblical allusive hyperbole. anderson’s renowned novel “winesburg, ohio” was written in an old house in chicago in a couple of months. while reading the short stories, readers can find glimpses of truth about rural american life. through the stories anderson expresses his disappointment with town life. his stories and what he describes in them are all grotesque and extravagant. he employs grotesque notions very nicely and skillfully, while his material is freighted with a sense of reality. the grotesques are those people whose humanity has been outraged and who had to suppress their wishes to love in order to survive in winesburg. anderson himself mentions that all the characters of “winesburg, ohio” are grotesques themselves. he defines “grotesque” in this way: “truths are beautiful but when truths become fixed in people’s lives they turn people into grotesques – lonely, isolated distortions of people” (anderson 1981). hence, grotesqueness implies both deformity and failure of dreams and emotions. the use of grotesque as a method by anderson is not accidental. the opening story entitled “the book of the grotesque” is somehow symbolic in the sense that all the other stories are centered around it. it serves as a key to understanding the other stories because the latter are the thematic continuation of the former, i.e. the opening story. giving the story such a title anderson points to the possibility that all the ideas in his book should be interpreted in terms of grotesque and exaggeration. “the book of the grotesque” is about an old writer, his feelings, emotions and thoughts. one of the central thoughts of his book is: in the beginning when the world was young there were a great many thoughts but not such thing as a truth. man made the truths himself and each truth was a composite of a great many vague thoughts. all about in the world were the truths and they were all beautiful… there was the truth of virginity and the truth of passion, the truth of wealth and of poverty, of thrift and of profligacy, of carelessness and abandon. hundreds and hundreds were the truths and they were all beautiful. and then people came along. each as he appeared snatched up one of the truths and some who were quite strong snatched up a dozen of them. (anderson 27) here the whole extract bears an allegorical meaning, but in addition to this, the underlined part expresses hyperbolic meaning as well. 2 the word truth is an abstract and uncountable noun on the semantic level (in the meaning of the quality or state of being based on fact), while on the metasemiotic level; in the context of the present story, being used in the plural form, it becomes countable. still retaining its abstract character it armenian folia anglistika linguistics 96 acquires additional overtones: the truth is only one but when each person creates his own truth, the so-called subjective truth, the truth stops to be a general notion, it rather indicates falsehood, which is not truth at all. so, the use of an uncountable noun in the plural form brings about an obvious intentional exaggeration, which, in its turn, has an aesthetic impact on the reader. moreover, in the word-combination a dozen of truths we have not only exaggeration but also contrast because the word dozen indicates a group of twelve of the same things, while in the context a group of different things is presented. thus, for instance: there was the truth of virginity, the truth of passion, the truth of wealth and poverty, the truth of thrift and profligacy, of carelessness and abandon. so, it is here that not only hyperbolic shades, but also the author’s ironical attitude become even more obvious. in the following sentence – who were quite strong snatched up a dozen of them – the hyperbole becomes more effective; the primary meaning of the verb snatch is itself very expressive: “to take something quickly and often rudely and roughly, by force” (hornby 2005). in fact truth is not visible and because of this it cannot be taken. so, at this level the metaphoric and hyperbolic meanings are merged, combined with each other. in another sentence we read: man made the truths. the verb made is used in the meaning of “create”, whereas the truth cannot be made or created and a man, correspondingly, cannot be a truth-maker. this usage enhances the metaphorical and ironical aspect of the utterance. considering that in the context the truths created by men are vicious, the word truth has acquired its opposite meaning, that of untruth or falsehood. the use of hyperbole interpreted in terms of irony helps to understand the whole meaning of the story; through the use of hyperbole and irony anderson expresses his disappointment with the town and people living in it. in the following extract taken from the same story, another example of hyperbole is found. it is formed in a very peculiar way – by bringing together words which are not semantic synonyms, but rather function as contextual synonyms: in his bed the writer rolled over on his side and lay quite still. for years he had been beset with notions concerning his heart. he was a hard smoker and his heart fluttered. the idea had got into his mind that he would some time die unexpectedly and always when he got into bed he thought of that. it did not alarm him. the effect in fact was quite a special thing and not easily explained. it made him more alive, there in bed, than at any other time. perfectly still he lay and his body was old and not of much use any more but something inside him was altogether young. he was like a pregnant woman, only that the thing inside him was not a baby but a youth. no, it wasn’t a youth; it was a woman, young, wearing a coat of male like a knight. it is absurd, you see, to try to tell what was inside the old writer as he lay on his high bed and listened to the fluttering of his heart. the thing to get at is what the writer, or the young thing within the writer, was thinking about. (anderson 1981:25) armenian folia anglistikalinguistics 97 here we have an example of simile based on hyperbole. the old writer is beset with different kinds of notions and thoughts which disturb him all the time. to show the writer’s excited emotional state the hyperbole emphasizes the troubling condition in which the writer is. the contrast between the sick and old writer’s physical state and his young spirit is revealed through the notion of young thing – youth expressed by the lexical units baby, youth and young woman. the exaggeration is formed by the change of the word baby into the word youth, and the word youth into the word woman, which, in fact, turns into synonymic condensation. the word baby means a very young child. we also know that briskness, liveliness, quickness and vivacity are typical features of babies, as well as of young men and women. the word youth indicates the time of life when a person is young, especially the time before a child becomes an adult. as if trying to find the right definition of his inner state, his ego, the writer finally, through gradation, arrives at the notion of a young woman wearing a coat of male like a knight. interestingly, the writer chooses young woman instead of young man, thus pointing to another contrast in the image (male person with a female soul), and enhancing the hyperbolic simile – he was like a pregnant woman. on the other hand, the three words baby, youth, and the word woman in combination with the adjective young become synonyms on the metasemiotic level as all of them are contrasted to the notion of old dying man. the synonymic condensation gives not only extra emphasis, a kind of meta-effect to the utterance, but also secures the gradual formation of hyperbole. an example of hyperbole combined with another trope may be observed in the following sentence: winesburg had forgotten the old man, but in doctor reefy there were the seeds of something very fine. (anderson 1981:33) this is an example of antonomasia plus an exaggerative meaning. instead of saying people living in winesburg had forgotten the old man the writer uses the place name winesburg but, of course, he does not mean the town itself. through the name of the place he refers to its people. on the other hand, however, we should take into consideration that not all the people living there had forgotten the old man, but perhaps only a part of them, and this is where hyperbole lies. moreover, this example of hyperbole may also be regarded as a case of metonymy based on some kind of association connecting the two concepts: people and winesbug. additionally, there is an element of personification: the human quality of forgetting is ascribed to a city which is an inanimate object and is deprived of such a quality. the following extract presents an example of a non-mixed hyperbole: on that night when he had run through the fields crying for a son he became excited to the edge of insanity. (anderson 1981:62) armenian folia anglistika linguistics 98 the edge of insanity is a hyperbole. the dictionary definition for the word edge is: “the outside limit of an object” (hornby 2005). as for the word insanity, it is “the state of being mad” (hornby 2005). the nominal phrase edge of insanity acquires adjectival meaning in the context, denoting the ultimate degree of madness. so, the noun edge gives exaggerative overtones to the word-combination and shows jesse’s inner and tense mental emotional state. one of the stories entitled “godliness” presents many interesting examples of allusive hyperbole and here is one of them: i am a new kind of man come into possession of these fields,” he declared. “look upon me, o god, and look thou also upon my neighbors and all the man who have gone before me here! o god, create in me another jesse, like that one of old, to rule over men and to be the father of sons who shall be rulers! (anderson 1981:52) the proper noun jesse is a biblical allusive name. it is the name of a biblical king – david’s father who was the king of israel. according to the bible, god orders samuel to anoint david as king of israel. the name of the biblical prototype is used in a complex way. firstly, it coincides with the protagonist’s name. secondly, it indicates antonomasia: create in me another jesse. in this way the proper name jesse becomes a common noun. anderson’s jesse begs god to create in him the biblical jesse, through whom to rule on earth. the selection of the name jesse creates a contrast between the two jesses. and by this contrast anderson not only shows his ironical attitude but also secures the interpretation of irony. moreover, the fictional jesse obviously exaggerates his role, seeing himself as a patriarch. jesse works tirelessly on his farm and he also makes his employees, including his delicate wife, katherine work all day long even when they are not able to bear it any more. but at the same time he is afraid that someone like philistine goliath will take his lands from him. he strongly believes he is chosen by god and it is god’s work that he has come to the land. he wants god to notice and to talk to him. jesse also asks god to send him a son to be called david who will help him to pluck all of his lands out of the hands of the philistines. he compares all people around him with goliath. the above narration of the story embraces a sarcastic tone and is interpreted as irony, simultaneously being combined with hyperbole. the hyperbolic meaning is expressed when the contrast between the two jesses – the biblical jesse and the fictional one becomes obvious. moreover, jesse’s farm is not comparable to the biblical valley of elah, however earnestly he desires it to be. it is obvious that without sufficient background knowledge the biblical allusions and respectively the story could be misunderstood and misinterpreted. the following passage also includes biblical allusive elements with hyperbolic shades: a fantastic impulse half fear, half greediness, took possession of jesse bentley. he remembered how in the old bible story the lord had appeared to that other jesse and told him to send his son david to where saul and the men of armenian folia anglistikalinguistics 99 israel were fighting the philistines in the valley of elah. into jesse’s mind came the conviction that all of the ohio farmers who owned land in the valley of wine creek were philistines and enemies of god. “suppose,” he whispered to himself, “there should come from among them one who, like goliath, the philistine of gath, could defeat me and take from me my possessions. jehovah of hosts,” cried he, “send to me a son. let thy grace alight upon me. send me a son called david who shall help me to pluck at last all of these lands out of the hands of the philistines and turn them to thy service and to the building of thy kingdom on earth. (anderson 1981:54) anderson’s irony toward his character jesse (jesse is sure that he is the only person chosen by lord) is expressed through jesse’s exaggerated self-respect, egotism and selfesteem. hyperbole and irony are created through the introduction of the two controversial characters and hence, the grotesqueness of the situation. the identification with the biblical episodes continues in the next two parts of the story, where jesse wants to sacrifice a lamb – a similar episode is found in the bible when god orders abraham to sacrifice his only son – isaac, in order to test abraham loyalty to him. abraham obeys, and when he wants to sacrifice isaac, the angel stops him and says that god is pleased with him and that now he ascertains that abraham is faithful to him. instead of isaac abraham sacrifices a lamb that was sent by god. after the feeling of exaltation that had come to the farmer as a result of his successful year, another mood had taken possession of him. for a long time he had been going about feeling very humble and prayful. again he walked alone at night thinking of god and as he walked he again connected his own figure with the figures of old days. under the stars he knelt on the wet grass and rose up his voice in prayer. now he had decided that like the men whose stories filled the pages of the bible, he would make a sacrifice to god. (anderson 1981:73) in the passage taken from the story there is a hyperbole based on simile: like the men whose stories filled the pages of the bible. the following biblical allusion combined with two other stylistic means – hyperbole and simile, is a means of characterization. the obvious hyperbole is; jesse identifies himself with the biblical character but evidently he is not, and particularly he is not chosen by god. interestingly enough, when jesse wants to sacrifice a lamb, he destroys his relations with the grandson while in the original (in the bible) abraham who is going to sacrifice his son, sacrifices a lamb, in this way keeping and re-establishing his relations with the son. so, this fact once more intensifies the contradiction and contrast between the episodes of the story and the bible. thus, taking into consideration the study of the theoretical material and the results of the analysis of the above examples we may conclude that the use of hyperbole by sherwood armenian folia anglistika linguistics 100 anderson in his short stories serves as a means of characterization of his complex images and personages. moreover, it is directly connected with the author’s interpretation of the grotesque and the aesthetic. besides, in the context of sherwood anderson’s short stories hyperbole is often fused with other stylistic devices: simile, irony, personification, pun, etc. and finally, the notions of background knowledge and vertical context are essential for the stylistic evaluation of hyperbole based on allusion, namely biblical allusion. notes: 1. hyperbole is a device that is used to evoke strong feelings or to create a strong impression and emphasis. 2. the linguostylistic study of the hyperbole ensures a correct interpretation of the general semantic content and connotative meanings. thus the study goes both along the lines of semantic and metasemiotic levels of investigation. the latter allows to evaluate all the additional overtones that the linguistic units have acquired in the context. references: 1. delahaunty, a. (2001) oxford dictionary of allusions. oxford: oxford university press. 2. hornby, a.s. (2005) oxford advanced learner’s dictionary. oxford: oxford university press. 3. pucci, j. (1998) the full-knowing reader. allusion and the power of the reader in the western literary tradition. usa: yale university press. 4. vinogradov, v.v. (1953) voprosy yazikoznaniya. m.: mgu publishers. literature: 1. anderson, sh. (1981) selected short stories. m.: progress publishers. ð³ù³ï»ùëï³ûçý ã³÷³½³ýóáõãû³ý á׳ï³ý ³é³ýóý³ñ³ïïáõãûáõýý»ñá ðá¹ í³ íç ýå³ ï³ïý ¿ áõ ëáõù ý³ ëç ñ»é ã³ ÷³ ½³ý óáõã û³ý á ׳ ï³ý ³ é³ýó ý³ ñ³ï ïáõã ûáõý ý» ñá þ. ²ý ¹»ñ ëá ýç å³ïù í³íù ý» ñç ñ³ ù³ ï»ùë ïáõù: îíû³é ýûáõ ãç ï» ë³ ï³ý ù³ ëç áõ ëáõù ý³ ëç ñáõã û³ý, çýã å»ë ý³¨ û ñç ý³ï ý» ñç í»ñ éáõ íáõã û³ý ßýáñ ñçí ñý³ ñ³ íáñ ¿ ¹³é ýáõù å³ïù í³íù ý» ñáõù ³ é³ýó ý³ó ý»é ñ³ ù³ ï»ùë ï³ ûçý ã³ ÷³ ½³ý óáõã û³ý » ñ»ù ñç ý³ ï³ý ï» ë³ï: ¸ñ³ýù »ýª §ë³ éá ã³ ÷³ ½³ý óáõã ûáõý¦, §áã ë³ éá ã³ ÷³ ½³ý óáõã ûáõý¦ ¨ §·ñ³ ï³ý ³ý¹ ñ³ ¹³ñó ñ³ý ¹ç ë³ óáõ ã³ ÷³ ½³ý óáõã ûáõý¦ ï» ë³ï ý» ñá: armenian folia anglistikalinguistics 101 mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives 1 (2021) 1-2 pierpaolo limone editorial 7 first section slavoj žižek the vagaries of the superego 13 ricardo espinoza lolas nature and pandemic 33 paolo ponzio mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: 47 notes on the self and the you daniela savino “liquid” identity and otherness in the phenomenon 61 of religious alienation: the loss of critical thinking and the “barter” of the self in the system of communion francesca r. recchia luciani the sexistential vulnerability of bodies in contact 85 in the philosophy of jean-luc nancy elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 5 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives second section martina rossi universal design for learning and inclusive teaching: 103 future perspectives marco ceccarelli a historical account on italian mechanism models 115 giusi antonia toto alessia scarinci cyberfeminism: a relationship between cyberspace, 135 technology, and the internet luigi traetta federica doronzo super-ego after freud: a lesson not to be forgotten 153 federica doronzo gianvito calabrese functioning of declarative memory: intersection 163 between neuropsychology and mathematics giuliana nardacchione guendalina peconio peer tutoring and scaffolding principle for inclusive teaching 181 elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 6 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 47 mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you paolo ponzio università degli studi di bari (italy) doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.7358/elem-2021-0102-ponz paolo.ponzio@uniba.it abstract from martin heidegger to emmanuel lévinas, from hannah arendt to paul ricouer: the continental tradition of twentieth-century thought has built its narrative around the themes of otherness, crossing the theme of the mask that fulfills its function precisely in the dialectic identity/otherness (idem/alter to put it in technical terms). it is also true that when one thinks about what is a “mask” it could only be possible to wonder what lies behind it, what stands in the way. the mask itself is divisive and defensive, yet, at the same time, it exposes itself, acts (like an actor who moves freely on stage and, nevertheless, is forced to stick to the development of the script). and also about the “otherness” it could be said that it hides and reveals itself at the same time; it is the totally other and, at the same time, the overturned self (almost an “i” which is more and “other than” me, of ricouerian memory). it is the foreigner, but also the welcome guest, as lévinas attests; it is at the same time the refugee, the immigrant, the pilgrim or the wanderer (to use the nietzsche of “human too much human”). keywords: heidegger; lévinas; mask; otherness; self. 1. the mask as a paradigm of existence to highlights some of the outlines, however, i would like to begin this intervention with some passages from a well-known novella by pirandello, the train has whistled, in which one of the many pirandellian masks – https://www.ledonline.it/elementa https://dx.doi.org/10.7358/elem-2021-0102-ponz paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 48 mr. belluca – for many years lived the unhappy condition of a “meek and submissive” employee to his boss, “circumscribed”, as some work colleagues called him. circumscribed, poor belluca, within the very narrow limits of his arid job as a computist, with no other memory than open items, simple or double items or reversals, and deductions and withdrawals and settlements; notes, ledgers, rags and so on. mobile filing cabinet: or rather, old donkey, who pulled the cart silently, always in one step, always along the same road, complete with blinders. well, one evening belluca had fiercely rebelled against his head of office, and then, at the bitter reproach of this, he almost hurled himself at him, giving everyone “a serious argument to the supposition that it was a real and own mental alienatio”. it seemed that his face, all of a sudden, had widened. it seemed that the blinders had suddenly fallen off, and the spectacle of life had suddenly opened up around him. it seemed that all of a sudden his ears were unclogged and he perceived voices for the first time, sounds never heard before. […] what does it mean? – then exclaimed the head of the office, approaching him and taking him by the shoulder and shaking him. – ohé, belluca! nothing, – belluca replied, always with that smile between impudence and imbecility on his lips. the train, mr. cavaliere. the train? what train? he whistled. what the hell are you saying? tonight, mr. knight. he whistled. i heard it whistle… – the train? yes sir. what if he knew where i got! in siberia… or or… in the forests of the congo… it’s done in an instant, mr. knight! […] the other clerks, at the shouts of the furious head of office, had entered the room and, hearing belluca speak like this, had mad laughter. then the head of the office – who must have been in a bad mood that evening – shocked by those laughter, was on a rampage and had beaten up the meek victim of so many cruel jokes of his. except that, this time, the victim, to the amazement and almost to the terror of everyone, had rebelled, had railed, always shouting that madness of the train that he had whistled, and that, by god, now no longer now that he had heard the train whistle, he could no longer, no longer wanted to be treated like that. they had grabbed him by force, harnessed him and dragged him to the madhouse. https://www.ledonline.it/elementa mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 49 here he still went on talking about that train. he imitated the whistle. oh, a very plaintive whistle, how far away, in the night; heartfelt. and, immediately after, he added: – let’s go, let’s go… gentlemen, where to? for where? and he looked at everyone with eyes that were no longer his own. those eyes, usually dark, without luster, frowned, now laughed at him very lucidly, like those of a child or a happy man; and phrases without construct came out of his lips. unheard-of things, poetic, imaginative, bizarre expressions, which astonished all the more, since it could not in any way be explained how, by what miracle, they flourished in the mouth of him, that is to one who had never dealt with anything else until now. than of figures and registers and catalogs, remaining as if blind and deaf to life: a computer machine. now he spoke of blue fronts of snowy mountains, raised to the sky; he spoke of slimy cetaceans which, voluminous, on the bottom of the seas, made a comma with their tails. things, i repeat, unheard of. […] gentlemen, belluca, he had forgotten for many and many years – but just forgotten – that the world existed. absorbed in the constant torment of that unfortunate existence of his, absorbed all day in the accounts of his office, never a moment’s respite, like a blindfolded beast, yoked to the rod of a nòria or a mill, yes sir, he had forgotten for years and years – but really forgotten – that the world existed. two evenings before, he threw himself to sleep exhausted on that sofa, perhaps due to excessive tiredness, unusually, he was unable to fall asleep immediately. and, suddenly, in the deep silence of the night, he had heard a train whistle from afar. it seemed to him that his ears, after so many years, who knows how, suddenly became unclogged. the whistle of that train had torn him apart and suddenly carried away the misery of all those horrible distresses of his, and almost from an uncovered tomb he found himself wandering yearning in the airy void of the world that opened enormously all around him. he instinctively held on to the blankets that he threw on himself every night, and he ran with his thoughts behind that train that went off into the night. there was, ah! there was, outside that horrible house, outside of all its torments, there was the world, so much, so far away, to which that train was going… florence, bologna, turin, venice… so many city, in which he had been as a young man and which still, certainly, that night sparkled with lights on the earth. yes, he knew the life that was lived there! the life he once lived there too! and that life went on; he had always followed, while here, https://www.ledonline.it/elementa paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 50 like a blindfolded beast, he turned the shaft of the mill. he hadn’t thought about it anymore! the world had closed for him, in the torment of his home, in the arid, bristly anguish of his computisteria… but now, behold, he was returning, as if by violent pouring, into his spirit. the moment, which struck for him, here, in this prison of his, flowed like an electric thrill through the whole world, and with his imagination suddenly awakened he could, behold, he could follow it through known and unknown cities, lands, mountains, forests, seas… this same thrill, this same heartbeat of time. there were, while he lived this “impossible” life here, many and many millions of men scattered all over the earth, who lived differently. now, in the very moment that he was suffering here, there were the solitary snowy mountains that raised their blue foreheads to the night sky… yes, yes, he saw them, he saw them, he saw them like this… there were the oceans… the forests… and, therefore, he – now that the world had returned to his spirit – could somehow console himself! yes, occasionally rising from his torment, to take a breath of fresh air into the world with the imagination. (pirandello, 19561987, pp. 588-594) here: reality happens and, in its occurrence, it imposes itself on the conscience of man who opens up to it. and with the reality that happens, the mask falls and the stature of the man who becomes aware of himself stands out clearly: a consciousness that is only possible in front of others. but what does it mean “reality happens”? what is the meaning of a such an event as the one described by pirandello in his novella? the imposition of reality manifests, on the one hand, the inescapability of what happens – its character as an event, or event – on the other hand, the need for attention with respect to the experienced event: the magnificence and exceptionality of the experience. luigi pirandello is echoed by jean-paul sartre, the existentialist philosopher and great writer. he reflects the experience of everyday life in the metropolis, with its subways, its buses, the loneliness of individuals in the crowd, the disintegration of the individual accelerated in the years between the two wars and his being “abandoned under millions of looks”. one could say, like one of the protagonists of the novel il rinvio, that the gaze of the other, as well as being disturbing, is also a guarantee for my existence, the proof that i am not a nullity, that i am a “value” and i “am” worth something. the “humanistic” turning point of the postwar period will be in sartre’s opinion based on the consideration that it is precisely the absence of foundations or values that encourages man to build his own ends by himself. and this necessity that engages the individuality of every man will no longer see the individual “alone in the face of his choices, isolated in an https://www.ledonline.it/elementa mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 51 essentially hostile social universe”: his choice will be in the sign of a social relationship, albeit not necessarily harmonious. you have certainly experienced, in the subway, in the foyer of a theater, on the train, that sudden sensation is unbearable of being spied on from behind. you turn around, but the curious one has already lowered his nose to the book […]. it is very easy for me to tell you what that gaze is: because it is nothing, it is an absence (and not a presence); here, imagine the darkest night imaginable. it is the night that looks at you. but a dazzling night; the night in full light, the secret night of daylight. i am bathed in black light […]. what anguish to suddenly discover that gaze as a universal center from which i cannot escape. but what a rest, too! i finally know that i am. i transform to my use and to your greatest indignation the word imbecile criminal of your prophet, that “i think, therefore i am” that made me suffer so much – and i say: you can see me, therefore i am. i no longer have to bear the responsibility of my sticky dissolving: he who sees me badly makes me be, i am as he sees me. (sartre, 1977, pp. 384-385) for j.-p. sartre, the consciousness thrown into the world is structurally conditioned by everything that surrounds it: the other, the world, is the antagonist, the danger, the being-in-itself. my conscience (being-for-itself ) lives in it, however, it would be empty and vain without that (bodei, 1997, p. 134): the gaze of the other, as well as disturbing, is therefore a guarantee that my existence exists. with the “i think”, in opposition to descartes’s philosophy, as well as kant’s philosophy, we reach ourselves in front of the other and the other is as certain for us as we are certain of ourselves. in this way man, who grasps himself directly with the “cogito”, also discovers all the others, and discovers them as the condition of his own existence. he realizes that he cannot be anything (in the sense that a man is said to be witty, or that he is bad, or that he is jealous), if others do not recognize him as such. to obtain any truth about me, i must obtain it through the other. the other is essential to my existence, as well as the knowledge i have of myself. in these conditions, the discovery of my intimacy reveals to me, at the same time, the other as a freedom placed in front of me, which thinks and wants only for me or against me. thus, we immediately discover a world that we call “inter subjectivity” and it is in this world that man decides what he is and what others are. choice is possible in a certain sense, but what is absolutely not possible is not to choose […] man finds himself in an organized situation, in which he himself is engaged; he engages the whole of humanity with his choice and cannot avoid choosing […]. in any case, whatever he does, it is impossible that he does not take full responsibility in the face of this problem […] he chooses himself in the presence of others and you choose yourself in the presence of others. (sartre, 1993, pp. 64-65, 68-69) https://www.ledonline.it/elementa paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 52 the philosophical references that could be suggested are many, starting from the considerations of hannah arendt, of the origin of totalitarianism, to the lévinas of totality and infinity. yet it seems significant, once again, to have recourse to literature. in her novel la storia di lei, elsa morante inserts “a real story, indeed a sort of fairy tale or parable”, which is tremendously significant of the dramatic possibility that man has to frustrate himself and reality in a single shot. in the artistic field, de chirico’s metaphysical painting appears as evidence of the impossibility for men to escape the absurdity of existence. i will bring you “l’énigme d’une journée” one of these days; for the painting by m.lle laurencin i thought today of the title of “mystère d’un moment” because the various things represented there appear in all the unexpected of certain moments in which the intimate essence of the objects appears to us in all the meta-physical reality. the similarity that exists between these imaginations that i have and the things as they appear in life can be compared to the similarity that exists between the physiognomy of a person, who sees himself in a dream, and the physiognomy of the same person in his reality; and at the same time it is not the same person. i am therefore convinced that i have shown a new path in art. (de chirico, 2008, p. 601) 2. the mask of totalitarianism, or the denial of otherness the twentieth century was crossed by an era – the consequences of which, perhaps, have not yet completely disappeared – in which what becomes distinctive is the loss of reality and the other, the cancellation of difference as a factor of perturbation with respect to the affirmation of a absolute self. totalitarianisms are – to quote adorno – a system in which the law of unity applies, of the “programmed” elimination of the different, of the non-convergent in power (adorno, 1994, pp. 62-63). the penalization of deviations, the manipulation of consciences, as well as the forced cultural leveling, are clear indications of how the nazi-fascist and communist totalitarianisms and the american-style social conformism have reduced the plurality of men to mere gender difference. there was an esse esse who, for his horrendous crimes, one day, at dawn, was taken to the gallows. he still had about fifty steps left to the point of execution, which took place in the same courtyard as the prison. and in this crossing, his eye by chance landed on the crumbling wall of the courtyard, where one of those wind-sown flowers had sprung up, which grow where https://www.ledonline.it/elementa mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 53 it happens and feed, it would seem, on air and rubble. it was a miserable little flower, made up of four purple petals and a pair of pale leaflets; but, in that first rising light, the esse esse saw, to her amazement, all the beauty and happiness of the universe. and he thought: if i could go back, and stop time, i would be ready to spend my entire life in the adoration of that little flower. then, as if doubling, he heard his own voice within himself, but joyful, clear and yet distant, coming from who knows where, shouting at him: truly i tell you: for this last thought you had about death, you will be safe from hell! all this, to tell you, took me a certain interval of time, but there it lasted half a second. between the esse esse that passed among the guards, and the flower that appeared on the wall, there was still, more or less, the same initial distance: just a step. “no!”. esse shouted to herself, turning back furiously, “i don’t fall back, no, in certain tricks”. and since he had both hands hindered, he crushed that flower with his teeth. then he threw it to the ground, stamped it underfoot. and he spat on it. here, the story is over. (morante, 1974, pp. 604-605) beyond the effectiveness of this text, what emerges is the denial of what happens, as mario luzi said, in some verses of his book of hypatia: “from ignorance to certainty there is an intermediate moment of foreknowledge in which it is still possible for the mind to deny what happened” (luzi, 1978, p. 79). prescience, as luzi understands it, is the prejudice that is constituted as the hermeneutic principle of every event. for this reason, in the face of the event of reality (what happens as unexpected, as unplanned), what urges is a sort of simplicity which can allow us not to put anything between us and what happens. 3. mask and otherness, between veiling and recognition the thematic couple, mask and otherness, finds in one of the most important thinkers of the twentieth century, martin heidegger, the one who, perhaps more than any other – fully grasping the nihilistic spirit of our age – has rethought the being of man and the meaning of being in terms of an absolute finitude: absolute because it characterizes the being that we are and the very truth of being as a permanent difference from the entities present in the world and, therefore, as impossibility, hiding and oblivion. the giving of being and the fulfillment of man, in fact, lie precisely in this event of retraction, which would then be the mysterious root of nihilism, by virtue of which, in the meantime the truth of being is “lost” (as nietzsche, upon others, would have described it speaking of our age as a https://www.ledonline.it/elementa paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 54 final outcome of the long history of an error); in reality it is preserved and given as the very mystery of “nothing”. in the heideggerian perspective, this movement takes place in wandering – or rather wandering, as the german philosopher himself calls it – an absolutely insuperable condition for man in his relationship with being and, ultimately, as the event of “to be himself ”. to “err” or “wander” is not just the opposite of the truth, but it constitutes its secret heart. and in fact for heidegger if we intended the truth as it was attested in the course of the classical-christian tradition, that is to say as an “adaptation” of the intellect to the thing, we would risk to miss its original ontological dimension; we would reduce it to the comparison and correspondence of two already pre-determined entities (the intellect and the thing) – precisely missing or forgetting the truth as the truth of being itself, which always differs from the entity. if, on the other hand, we go back to the primitive greek sense of aletheia, that is to the unveiling of entities (thinking this sense even more radically than the greeks themselves did, at least starting from plato), then we will show the mysterious sense for which the unveiling of entities (truth as adaptation) necessarily implies and is permanently based on a “veiling” of being, which as veiled must remain as it is in order to safe its own truth, and which can never be adequate by an intellect. here lies the original ontological meaning of the error: ultimately it coincides with the fact that being, withdrawing into concealment with respect to the revealed entity – that is, according to traditional language, with respect to the “true” entity – is thought of as an essential “non-truth”. but it is a non-truth that should in no way be mistaken with a deception or a falsehood, but must be interpreted as that veil that allows the genuine custody of being. let’s hear it from heidegger’s own words, taken from a conference dating back to 1930 and entitled precisely on the essence of truth: conceived from the point of view of truth as revealing [something that comes out of concealment and manifests itself as an entity], the veil is then non-disclosure [the very being that withdraws from the entity] and therefore is non-truth authentic and more appropriate to the essence of truth. (heidegger, 1987, p. 149) this means that, while man, with his own ontological behavior, leaves the entity from time to time – which always manifests itself within a horizon of calculability and worldly concerns – at the same time is to veil the totality of being, that is to say, the giving of being itself as the incalculable, the indeterminable and the elusive. and it should be noted that according to https://www.ledonline.it/elementa mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 55 heidegger these two movements are not simply opposite and alternative to each other, but they belong to each other. heidegger continues: the veiling of the entity in its totality, the authentic non-truth, is older than any evidence of this or that entity. it is even older than the very letting-be [the being], which, while it reveals, already holds veiled and behaves in relation to the veil. what does letting be guarded by this reference to veiling? nothing less than the veiling of what is veiled in its totality, of the entity as such, that is to say: the mystery. it is not a particular mystery relating to this or that thing, but the only fact that in general the mystery (the veiling of the veiled) pervades and dominates as such the being of man. (heidegger, 1987, p. 149) here is the greatness, but also the “stop” of the heideggerian gaze: on the one hand he pays attention to the mystery as that which is not part of our calculation, that is, to that dimension of truth that coincides with being itself; but on the other hand he identifies the mystery only with the veiling of what is veiled, without being able to see that, together with this, indeed even more than this, the mystery lies precisely in the unveiling of the veiled (which instead for him means the entry into the realm of the calculable), that is, in the manifestation of being that hides itself precisely in the entity that shows itself. being-there [that is, the being of man], as it exists, preserves the first and broadest non-disclosure, the authentic non-truth. the authentic nonessence of truth is the mystery. […] but speaking in this way of non-essence and non-truth impacts beyond measure the usual way of thinking and gives the impression of a forced juxtaposition of imaginary “paradoxes”. since it is difficult to eliminate this impression, it is necessary to give up this way of speaking, which is paradoxical only for the common doxa (opinion). for those who know, however, the “non” of the original non-essence of truth as non-truth refers to the not yet experienced context of the truth of being (and not only of being). (heidegger, 1987, pp. 149-150) if the essence of truth is the manifestation of the entity, the permanent remaining hidden of the being is in turn veiled – it is “mystery” –, and therefore it will also withdraw with respect to essence (as non-essence) and with respect to truth (as non-truth). this is precisely the ambiguous domain of erring or wandering: getting lost in the calculable being forgetting the being that remains veiled, but also ensuring that non-essence and non-truth continue to precede, hidden and forgotten, every essence and every truth. but in its taking measures, humanity is diverted from the mystery. that insistent turning to practicable reality and this persistent turning away from https://www.ledonline.it/elementa paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 56 the mystery mutually imply each other. indeed, they are the same thing. […] man’s restlessness, which pushes him to move away from the mystery to turn to practicable reality, and which makes him pass gradually from one object to another of current reality, without noticing the mystery, is wandering [ irren]. man errs. it is not that man falls into wandering [irre], but he is already always moving in wandering […]. the wandering, for which man goes, is not something that, so to speak, passes close to man and into which he sometimes falls, as in a hole; on the contrary, wandering is part of the intrinsic constitution of being-there in which historical man is involved. (heidegger, 1987, p. 151) these are the same terms of the great jewish tradition, for which erring as a sin means severing the relationship with the mystery. but here the mystery itself is no longer a presence because it too withdraws from our existence, so much so that a few lines further down heidegger will say that erring, which he had previously said to be not noticing the mystery, is precisely “the domination of the mystery in wandering” (heidegger, 1987, p. 153). from this alone, according to heidegger, freedom can be born: a lettingbeing that is always, at the same time, a letting-being veiled. with respect to this position, contemporary thought wonders if and what could be a different path: if there is, that is, the possibility of recognition and where is the place where such recognition takes place. it takes place in the relationship with otherness, since is precisely the relationship that constitutes the place where truth dwells and it is possible to find the other and find oneself, a place where one can meet with the other-fromoneself and the other-of-itself. this inseparable circularity between truth and relationship is part of the imprinting that constitute the foundation of our being, for which a decisive paradigm shift is required: from a truth conceived and transmitted as a-temporal and a-spatial content (dogmatic paradigm) or as intimately oriented to praxis (moralistic paradigm) to a truth perceived and transmitted “within a relationship”. (salonia, 2007, pp. 152-153) it is martin buber who in 1923, in an essay entitled me and you, identifies the answer to overcoming loneliness – the existential condition of modern man – in the interpersonal and community relationship: “man becomes i in contact with you”, and again, paraphrasing the johannine prologue “in the beginning is the relationship” to indicate how the relationship is at the origin, it is the you that constitutes the i, is the encounter that gives meaning to his humanity (buber, 1993, pp. 79, 72). the relationship, in fact, is not a mere psychological-sentimental attitude, but “an original ontological structure”, as poma writes in the introductory essay to buber’s work (poma, 2004, p. 15). https://www.ledonline.it/elementa mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 57 in confirmation of this originality of the relationship, the bible, in the text of genesis we read as follows: “and the lord god said: ‘it is not good for man to be alone: i want to make him a corresponding help’” (genesi 2,18). it is extraordinary to think how the relationship is precisely a thought of god who recognizes in the solitude of man a non-good and how it is the initiative of god to create the woman, to invent the relationship that is companionship, comparison, help, conflict and dialogue. it is in the mature surrender to the other that one grows in the relationship, and in surrendering oneself there is always both the risk of not being understood, of not being listened to, of being used, and the possibility of finding a you willing to understand, to feel as leghein, to dialogue, to enhance, to confront. of all the affairs of existence, it is the relationship that is the most difficult and tiring, especially when, wanting it to remain over time, it requires care, attention, a healthy dose of transfers and self-affirmations. certainly, there is the danger that the dyadic relationship expires into relativism, a fact that occurs precisely when the triadic dimension of the relationship is forgotten or overlooked, a dimension made up of diversity, novelty, storytelling, interpretation (stern, 1987). daniel stern, speaking of the development of the child, writes that around the age of 2-3 the self-narrative (or verbal) arises, a necessary phase of the child’s development, because it is in knowing how to speak that he begins to differentiate himself from the other. the language of an individual, the way he speaks, the way he uses grammar say a lot about that individual’s identity and relational competence. stern, speaking of the triadic dimension of the relationship, argues that the story without the other becomes narcisism; you and i without a story is symbiosis; me, you and story is maturity, precisely because telling yourself to another means not only talking about yourself, but also about something else and about others. stern seems to echo jacques derrida who writes on the importance of the mediation of the third, which is co-original, because it does not belong to either the i or the you, and is necessary for the maintenance of the relationship itself. without this mediation one would fall into fusion and solipsism (derrida, 2008). the third cannot and must not be reduced to either the you or the i. the tertium in the relationship becomes an unavoidable word, indispensable for the relationship to remain or become healthy. as buber says, man is always relational and, if you want to understand his specificity, you need to be able to grasp the relational texture. if it can no longer be relational, it means that something in its development has not worked. it may not be intentional, in the sense that it is not aware of what it feels and what it wants, but our being in relationship always has https://www.ledonline.it/elementa paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 58 our intentionality in itself, that is, what we want and where we want to go. but the awareness of one’s intentionality is an even higher step. emmanuel lévinas, in totality and infinity, shifts the focus from simple relationality, identifying the key word of his philosophy in the idea of visage. the face is a question, an appeal, an epiphany of the other, recalling an ethic of responsibility and value. whoever is willing to welcome the face renounces possession and accumulation. the subject who welcomes the total otherness of the face is not aimed at himself and his knowledge, he is consecrated to service. and, however, unlike modern thought, here there is no dialectic but mere delivery to the event: an event that is relationship with others, in which the ego and the other do not remain linked in their relationship but are self-absolving, so as to free themselves from any objectivistic claim. the fundamental question of existence is man-with-man, that is, relationship, mutual belonging, reciprocity. the latter is a fact that has no equal in nature and leads to the affirmation that the root of all reciprocity is in the recognition of otherness: no longer, therefore, the “we symbiotic” typical of the totalitarianisms of the twentieth century, but of the “we relational”, a new dialogic reality that in many respects still needs to be thought, constructed and lived. in this fluid society of ours, there is a real back and forth between the identity of us and the heterogeneity of the ego and the alter-ego, the irrepressible root of all reciprocity. and it is on this dimension of interrelation that belonging is based, as a contemporary declination of belonging and belonging to the world, as belonging to oneself and belonging to the other. the relationship in reciprocity presupposes a decision and is born in the movement of welcoming the other, it grows by opening itself to the you and to the infinity of the other: this first possibility of opening establishes every other opening, including the gnoseological one, since the experience of the other, and therefore of the infinite, is irreducible: it is the experience par excellence. absolute experience is not a revelation: a privileged manifestation of the other, a manifestation of a face beyond form. ambiguous form of a supreme presence that dominates those who welcome, that comes from above, unexpected, and therefore teaches its newness. the face is a living presence, is an expression, every moment undoes the form it offers, an adequate form to present oneself as the other to signify and have a meaning; it is meaning without context. (lévinas, 1977, pp. 64-65) however, this dialectic today risks to be not productive, since the man of “nowadays” lives as if he were threatened by the dominance of his own selfhood and the tyranny of otherness. https://www.ledonline.it/elementa mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 59 the dialogical we of the encounter risks being translated into a useless and equivocal sentimentality, into compensatory paternalisms, into spiritualistic, sensualistic or hedonistic encroachments. the attempt to let the “we” live is not in itself a guarantee of a true encounter. there is always the possibility of the meeting’s fall, its setback, its failure. when “my” world has to become “our” world at all costs and the other is reified, we arrive at a decline in narcissistic egoity, which is a symptom that never sleeps in our societies, which welcomes more monolithic certainty than a dialogic truth. as bauman recalled in an interview on identity in 2002, taking up a poster posted on the walls of berlin after the war, there is a mosaic that characterizes our daily life: your christ is a jew. your car is japanese. your pizza is italian. your democracy greek. your coffee brazilian. your vacation turkish. your numbers arabic. your alphabet latin. only your neighbor is a foreigner. (bauman, 2003, p. 20) references adorno, t. w. (1994). contro l’antisemitismo. manifestolibri. bodei, r. (1997). la filosofia nel novecento (e oltre). feltrinelli. buber, m. (1993). il principio dialogico e altri saggi. edizioni san paolo. de chirico, g. (1914-1916). lettere di giorgio de chirico a guillaume apollinaire. in metafisica b (2008, n. 7-8). letter addressed to guillaume apollinaire dated january 31, 1914 (the date is presumed from the indication of the day in the header of the same letter). the letters by giorgio de chirico are conserved at the bibliothèque nationale de france, site richelieulouvois, département de manuscrits occidentaux: naf 27148 and naf 27158. we follow the transcription made by silvia tusi and published by k. robinson. derrida, j. (2008). psyché. invenzioni dell’altro, vol. 836. editoriale jaca book. heidegger, m. (1987). dell’essenza della verità. in segnavia. adelphi. lévinas, e. (1977). totalità e infinito. saggio sull’esteriorità, vol. 92. editoriale jaca book. luzi, m. (1978). libro di ipazia, vol. 195. rizzoli. morante, e. (1974). la storia. einaudi. pirandello, l. (1956-1987). novelle per un anno, vol. i. mondadori. published for the first time in the columns of the corriere della sera in february 1914, the novel il treno ha fischiato was included by the author in the volume la trappola in 1915, published by treves. https://www.ledonline.it/elementa paolo ponzio elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives – 1 (2021) 1-2 https://www.ledonline.it/elementa 60 poma, a. (a cura di). (2004). martin buber. la parola rivolta all’uomo occidentale, saggio introduttivo. in il principio dialogico e altri saggi. edizioni san paolo. salonia, g. (2007). odòs. la via della vita. genesi e guarigione dei legami fraterni. edb edizioni dehoniane. sartre, j.-p. (1977). il rinvio. mondadori. sartre, j.-p. (1993). l’esistenzialismo è un umanismo. mursia. stern, n. (1987). il mondo interpersonale del bambino. trad. it. di a. biocca e l. marghieri biocca. bollati boringhieri. vecchi, b. (2003). zygmut bauman. intervista sull’identità. laterza. riassunto da martin heidegger a emmanuel lévinas, da hannah arendt a paul ricouer: la tradizione continentale del pensiero novecentesco ha costruito la sua narrazione intorno ai temi dell’alterità, attraversando il tema della maschera che svolge la sua funzione proprio nella dialettica identità/alterità (idem/alter per dirla in termini tecnici). è anche vero che quando si pensa a cosa sia una “maschera” non si può che chiedersi cosa ci sia dietro, e cosa si “frappone”. la maschera stessa è divisiva e difensiva, eppure, allo stesso tempo, si espone, agisce (come un attore che si muove liberamente sulla scena e, tuttavia, è costretto ad attenersi allo sviluppo del copione). e anche dell’“alterità” si potrebbe dire che si nasconde e si rivela allo stesso tempo; è il totalmente altro e, allo stesso tempo, l’io rovesciato (quasi un “io” che è più e “altro da” me, di ricoueriana memoria). è lo straniero, ma anche l’ospite gradito, come attesta lévinas; è allo stesso tempo il rifugiato, l’immigrato, il pellegrino o l’errante (per usare il nietzsche di “umano troppo umano”). copyright (©) 2021 paolo ponzio editorial format and graphical layout: copyright (©) led edizioni universitarie this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-noderivatives 4.0 international license. how to cite this paper: ponzio, p. (2021). mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you. elementa. intersections between philosophy, epistemology and empirical perspectives, 1(1-2), 47-60. doi: https://dx.doi.org/10.7358/elem-2021-0102-ponz https://www.ledonline.it/elementa https://dx.doi.org/10.7358/elem-2021-0102-ponz elementa_1-2021-1-2_00b_sommario.pdf editorial pierpaolo limone first section the vagaries of the superego slavoj žižek nature and pandemic ricardo espinoza lolas mask and otherness between recognition and concealment: notes on the self and the you paolo ponzio “liquid” identity and otherness in the phenomenon of religious alienation: the loss of critical thinking and the “barter” of the self in the system of communion daniela savino the sexistential vulnerability of bodies in contact in the philosophy of jean-luc nancy francesca r. recchia luciani second section universal design for learning and inclusive teaching: future perspectives martina rossi a historical account on italian mechanism models marco ceccarelli cyberfeminism: a relationship between cyberspace, technology, and the internet giusi antonia toto 1 alessia scarinci 2 super-ego after freud: a lesson not to be forgotten luigi traetta 1 federica doronzo 2 functioning of declarative memory: intersection between neuropsychology and mathematics federica doronzo 1 gianvito calabrese 2 peer tutoring and scaffolding principle for inclusive teaching giuliana nardacchione guendalina peconio the southern aflllcan joullnal of hiv medicine ----------hhllually 2003 remarks a broken landscape crucially, these deniers also reject the most signal truth in the aids epidemic. this is that the destructive activity of the virus within the human body can be completely contained by carefully administered and properly monitored antiretroviral medications. the deniers revile those speaking the truth about aids for engaging in 'scare-mongering: they attack them as agents of an 'omnipotent apparatus' engaged in 'a massive political-commercial campaign to promote antiretroviral drugs: they condemn those speaking the truth about aids for a supposed campaign 'to medicalise poverty and underdevelopment:' this third crisis in aids had been engendered by those in our country who deny the facts about aids. there are those who deny that aids has introduced disturbingly new patterns of disease and dying to our sub-continent. they deny that these new patterns are the result of an infectious agent a virus, one that is mostly sexually transmitted; one that enters the human body, and attacks the immune system, and destroys it through retroviral activity, rendering it vulnerable to attack by a host of infections. the cost is immeasurable. the acts and words of the deniers have at every level paralysed our national response to the epidemic. they have confused our planning and befuddled our strategies. they have con ounded our known for more than six centuries. on the other hand that crisis is one of leadership and management a challenge to every person with power and resources and skills to use them to alleviate and obviate suffering and death on this scale. they depict the facts about aids as a monstrous plot against africans because they are black. in this the denial of aids represents the ultimate relic of apartheid's racially imposed consciousness, and the deniers achieve the ultimate victory of the apartheid mindset. but most importantly, and most tragically, in our nation that crisis is also one of truth-telling. the most fundamental crisis in the aids epidemic is our nation's struggle to identify and confront and act on the truth about aids. his depiction of that reality is astonishing in its power, in its graphic truth, in its respectful distance and in its searing intimacy. what does it mean to say that an artist (or an art gallery) 'shows commitment'7 it means that he or she brings not only an engagement to the subject of the display, but an involvement in it that transcends mere observation or representation. 'a broken landscape', an exhibition of photographs by gideon mendel at the south african national gallery, cape town, closed on saturday 13 april 2002. mr justice edwin cameron, of the supreme court of appeal, gave the following address. this is plain from gideon mendel's 'a broken landscape: the photographer has shown an imaginative and respectful engagement with his topic. but he has done infinitely more than that. he has aligned himself unmistakably with the reality that confronts his subjects and those around them. this exhibition has been a remarkable event its presence here represents a major commitment by the south african national gallery to people living with hiv and aids. the work on display itself shows deep commitment. in achieving this, neither the artist nor his exhibition has been static. as events have moved, he has included them the court battle about the provision of antiretroviral medication to pregnant mothers, the claim to life of those who for the first time are now gaining access to longerterm drug therapy. in all of this the artist is depicting a truth. but his work also makes a call to action. the exhibition challenges those who view it to take a position on the lives and the deaths of those it represents. he places before us images that shock us with their force and closeness. the reason is that he has involved himself with the extremity of his subjects' struggle, who are at the very edge of life. he shows us the inexpressible complexity, the terrible simplicity, and the dignity of that state. that call to action echoes the most urgent current question in our national life. it is true that we have a 'crisis of aids' in our country. on the one hand that crisis is one of illness and suffering and dying dying on a larger scale and in conspicuously different patterns from before; on a scale globally that dwarfs any disease or epidemic the world has focus hiv/aids profile in the provinces of south mrica, 2002 insights, sapped our energies and dispirited our determination to act. and, most significantly, they have silenced all too many voices among those who are experiencing the epidemic in their own bodies and their own families and in their own communities. the deniers have re-created shame, and reimposed silence, in an epidemic where the struggle for twenty years has been to create voices and to defeat shame. the denial of the facts about aids is not only an outrage against the truth. it is a profound insult to those south africans who are living with and dying from the effects of the virus. they deny us the dignity of our suffering. they deny us the dignity of our struggle for life against the workings of a viral agent. most importantly, they deny us the dignity of the truth, and the power and hope, and the opportunities for action, that acceptance of the truth brings. in countless villages and townships and cities and settlements in south africa, where the virus is taking its toll a booklet entitled hiv/aids profile in the provinces of south africa: indicators for 2002 has recently been released. it makes provincial trends and statistics on the hiv/aids epidemic available to government officials at all levels, as well as to business people, non-governmental organisations (ngos) and the public the report gives readers a sense of the magnitude of the numbers involved, and will allow them to benchmark other information about the epidemic as it becomes available. the booklet can be down loaded from www.mrc.ac.za or www.assa.org.za/aidsmodel.asp or www.commerce.uct. ac.za/care, and is also available from the university of cape town (uct)'s centre for actuarial research at r30 per copy (tel. (021) 650-2475). the estimates provided are not new in fact. they have been available for the last year on the actuarial society of south africa's website but it is the first time they have been compiled into one publication for ease of access. the indicators are based on a model constructed by the actuarial society of south africa (assa). while there is ~ehruaily 2003 -----------of health and life among our people, the terrible truth about aids is being born and lived and died. our people are being born, are living with, and dying from that truth. they are living that truth in the rising fevers, the wasting of flesh and the slow, agonised cessation of bodily functions that result from the virus. their suffering is being increased and is being prolonged incalculably by the deniers. but, as we have seen today, from the terrible grief of those affected by the virus a terrible determination arises: a determination to defeat untruth and misrepresentation and distortion, and to assert hope. that is the ultimate significance of the unforgettable images of this exhibition: that untruth and inaction are the greatest crimes of all. let us take an angry inspiration, and a deep determination, from that. reference 1. hlongwan(" c. caravans, ears, g~st', foot & mouth ana srarisrics hn/alds and the struggle for the humani~tioi1 of the african. anc document, distributed april 2002 always a degree of uncertainty surrounding such estimates, models can provide an invaluable tool for giving a sense of possible future scenarios. the assa model is continuously being improved as more data become available and our understanding of the dynamics of the epidemic improve. some of the information available in the report • the extent of the epidemic, with 6,5 million people (14,2'1'0 of the population) infected with hiv by july 2002. • of these, over 95% (6.1 million) are in the age group 18 64 years (labour force age). • the prevalence is highest [25.9%) among young women of childbearing age this, in turn, has implications in terms of numbers of orphans. • the prevalence of hiv/aids (among all ages) in each of the provinces is as follows: kwazulu-natal 18.4% eastern cape 11.3% free state 16.7% limpopo 11.0% mpumalanga 16.5'1'0 northern cape 7.9% gauteng 16.qoio western cape 4.2'1'0 north west 15.1 % the southern african journal of hiv medicine 43issue v f spring 2018 δι αν οι α the representational fallacy and the ontology of time jazlyn cartaya i. introduction in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, heather dyke, notices that while most work in contemporary metaphysics takes itself to be an enquiry into the fundamental nature and structure of reality, a flawed methodology has been used in pursuit of this aim. philosophers have been examining language in order to try to uncover ontological truths about reality. as a result, their arguments move from facts about language to facts about reality. the debate concerning the ontological status of tense1 in the philosophy of time brings this flawed methodology to light. in order to argue for their respective ontological positions, the a-theorist and the b-theorist2 place an unusual amount of emphasis on our temporal language. in this paper, i will call this methodology into question. i will argue that it is fallacious to argue from claims about language to conclusions about reality; it is committing a fallacy called the representational fallacy.3 i will use the argument from tense in the philosophy of 1 tense in language is when a speaker talks about or refers to a moment in time, relative to the moment in time from which he or she is speaking. most languages include phrases that suggest past, present and future with respect to the moment of time from which the utterer is speaking. i.e. if i say “it is raining now,” this is a (present) tensed phrase because “is” and “now” indicate the moment of time that i am uttering it (which is the present, it is raining now). thus, these phrases depend on context. this will be addressed further in sections 4 and 5. 2 a-theory and b-theory are two different ways of thinking about time and how it works. 3 a term coined by heather dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 1. london: routledge. 44 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college time to betray this fallacy, and to argue that both a-theorists, who think that tensed language demonstrates the existence of tensed facts, and b-theorists, who think that they can demonstrate the existence of tenseless facts by translating tensed sentences, commit the representational fallacy. in each of their respective arguments, they move from facts about language to facts about reality. next, i will argue that both a-theorists and b-theorists end up committing this fallacy due to a flawed assumption about the relationship between language and reality. i will argue that this assumption is false, and i will write about how the possibility of moving past the debate from language depends on rejecting this flawed assumption. lastly, i will present two new responses the b-theorist can give to the original a-theory argument from tense, thus proposing a new way of doing metaphysics.4 ii. what is the representational fallacy? before i demonstrate the representational fallacy in the ontology of time, i will first introduce it and talk about why it is fallacious to move from premises about language to conclusions about reality. “the term ‘representational fallacy’ refers to a general philosophical tendency to place too much emphasis on the significance of language when doing ontology” (dyke 2007:14). this fallacy does not refer to one invalid argument, or form of argument; instead, it indicates a fallacious strategy of reading metaphysics off of language (dyke 2007:7). reading metaphysics off of language makes language, rather than reality, the starting point in our investigations. what does it mean to read metaphysics off of language? take the sentence “asking two girls to the prom left bill in a quandary.” let us suppose it is a true sentence. if a philosopher argues that reality includes the existence of entities called quandaries, based on the fact that a quandary occurs in this true sentence, then the philosopher is reading ontological facts off of language. in this case, he is reading a true sentence and deciding that, based on the fact that this sentence is true, there must exist entities called quandaries. but this is absurd. there is nothing about this sentence that tells us the sentence is made true because there are entities called quandaries that exist (or that we must posit entities such as quandaries). the truth of this sentence does not entail the existence of entities called quandaries. thus, the philosopher who makes this move is reasoning fallaciously. in this case, the philosopher is committing the representational fallacy. dyke believes that philosophers who commit this fallacy are either implicitly or explicitly assuming that there is only one way in which our world can be based on our true sentences about it, and that examining these sentences will reveal the nature of reality to us. (dyke 2007: 63) however, this is a mistake. a single language is compatible with many opposing ontologies, so it cannot be the case that a close 4 this paper and its arguments are largely inspired by heather dyke. 45issue v f spring 2018 the representational fallacy and the ontology of time examination of that language would reveal to us the true nature of reality. let us consider, for example, a simple language that consists of just proper names and predicates, and suppose that some of the sentences in this language are true. one interpretation of such a language might be immanent realism, where proper names refer only to particulars and predicates refer only to the universals of immanent realism.5 another interpretation of such a language might be platonism, where proper names refer only to objects in the world of appearances and predicates refer only to the forms.6 additionally, trope theory, resemblance, nominalism, class nominalism, and any other variant of nominalism all can be plausible modes of interpreting such a language. (dyke 2007: 64) moreover, nothing about this language decides which of these interpretations is the right interpretation. all we can say, if backed with metaphysical and/or scientific arguments, is that one of these interpretations is right, and that we can use our simple language to help describe our true ontology. to illustrate this point further, i will consider an example adapted from john heil. if we take a billiard ball, there are many true ways of describing it. you may say that “the billiard ball is spherical,” or that “the billiard ball is red.” many predicates hold true of it. but “to imagine that to every significant predicate there corresponds a property, [for instance,] is to let language call the shots ontologically.”7 for instance, to imagine that there must exist a property that corresponds to the significant predicate “is spherical,” because it occurs in a true sentence, is to let language dictate ontology. it could be the case that there is a property corresponding to the predicate “is spherical,” but language cannot tell us this. language cannot tell us what makes the statement the billiard ball is spherical” true. and inferring that there must be a property “is spherical” or “is red” simply because we know that these properties are true of the billiard ball (that it is spherical and red) is committing the representational fallacy. the truth of the sentence does not entail the existence of these properties—this is reading ontology off of language. instead, what makes these truths true could be because they “participate in the form of redness, belongs to a resemblance class of red things, has a red trope.” but “knowing that [the sentence] is true, even knowing what its truth-condition is, does not tell us what it is about the world that makes it true.” (dyke 2007: 65) for this reason, dyke suggests that instead of looking at sentences we take to be true and deducing metaphysical conclusions from them, we should to the world to explain how our true sentences become true. i have just introduced the representational fallacy, explained how it is committed, and suggested a new form of metaphysical enquiry. i will now address immediate, and potential objections to this new methodology. 5 dyke suggests “universals are tied to particulars by the relation of inheritance, whereby a universal inheres in a particular” in this case. (dyke 2007: 64) 6 dyke suggests “the relation that ties objects to the forms is that of participation” for this example. (dyke 2007: 64) 7 john heil. philosophy of mind: a contemporary introduction, 204. new york: routledge. 2013. 46 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college iii. objections to the new methodology a philosopher might object to the new methodology by claiming that we cannot say that our true sentences, such as “the billiard ball is spherical,” tell us something about reality if we claim that facts about language can tell us nothing about reality. after all, “the billiard ball is spherical” is a linguistic claim (insofar as it is a linguistic entity; a sentence), and it is one we take to be true. the philosopher might add, “your recommendation is that we attend to reality itself, rather than to language, when doing metaphysics. but how do we do this? we come up with theories that we express in sets of sentences that we take to be true.” based on this, the philosopher might conclude, with respect to these sentences, that we are either being inconsistent (and must deny these sentences can tell us anything about reality), or that we are committing the representational fallacy ourselves when attending to these sentences.8 this objection misunderstands the nature of the representational fallacy. simply using language to say what the world is like is not committing the fallacy. we must, of course, use language to articulate our theories. that is not a problem. the problem appears when we use language to defend our ontological claims (i.e., when we claim that there must exist a property corresponding to “is spherical” because it is a significant predicate and because “the billiard ball is spherical” is a true sentence). as long as the reasons we use to support our claims are metaphysical and/or scientific, for instance, and do not have to do with language, the fallacy has not been committed. thus, i do not commit the fallacy by merely stating that “the billiard ball is spherical” is true, as i am not using the truth of the sentence to argue for the existence of a property that corresponds with its significant predicate. “the representational fallacy occurs when claims about descriptions of reality are taken to generate a metaphysics, not when claims about reality itself (which, of course, are couched in language) are taken to do so.” (dyke 2007: 5) the philosopher may concede that it is fallacious to draw ontological conclusions from descriptions about reality9, but he may insist that it cannot be fallacious to draw ontological facts from true descriptions of reality. the philosopher might add that the fact that ontological conclusions do follow from true descriptions is a consequence of the truth schema. for example, “the billiard ball is spherical” is true if and only if the billiard ball is spherical.10 this objection cannot mean that the truth schema itself entails the billiard ball is 8 this objection and its response can be found in dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 4. 9 descriptions about reality are descriptions created using language, sentences or linguistic entities to illustrate reality (they may try to show or capture how reality is). 10 this objection and its response can be found in dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 5. 47issue v f spring 2018 the representational fallacy and the ontology of time spherical. otherwise, “phoenixes exist” is true if and only if phoenixes exist would entail the existence of phoenixes. the objection must instead mean that (1) the truth schema, (2) together with the claim that the sentence in question is true, (3) entails the ontological conclusion in question.11 but then, what ontological conclusions are we to derive from the following instances of the truth schema, together with the claim that the sentence on the left-hand side is true? ‘eating people is wrong’ is true if and only if eating people is wrong; ‘there are prime numbers greater than a million’ is true if and only if there are prime numbers greater than a million, and even ‘the teacher’s resignation left the students in a lurch’ is true if and only if the teacher's resignation left the students in a lurch. are we to take the truth of these sentences, together with these instances of the truth schema, to entail to existence of, respectively, moral properties, numbers and lurches? surely not (musgrave 1993: 266-7).12 additionally, it is plausible that someone admit to the truth of these sentences without also admitting to the existence of moral properties, numbers and lurches, so it cannot be the case that semantics alone gives us metaphysics. again, knowing that a sentence is true does not tell you what makes the sentence true; what makes a sentence true we may call its truth-maker. 13 when i talk about the argument from tense in philosophy of time, i will argue that it is possible for two or more non-synonymous sentences to be made true by the same truth-maker. sentences such as “it is raining now” and “it is raining at 5:44pm,” supposing now is 5:44pm, are both made true in virtue of the same truth-maker, even though they are non-synonymous.14 and if it is possible for two or more nonsynonymous sentences to have the same truth-maker (i.e., the same thing that makes them true), then it does not suffice to focus on a true sentence in order to find what makes it true. in order to find the thing that makes both non-synonymous sentences true, we must appeal to metaphysical and/or scientific considerations, not linguistic ones. the truth-maker that makes both “it is raining now” and “it is raining at 5:44pm” true is a fact about the world, not a fact about either of the two sentences. one implication of admitting that it is possible for two or more non-synonymous 11 e.g. (1) “phoenixes exist” is true if and only if phoenixes exist, (2) together with the sentence “phoenixes exist” being true, (3) entails the ontological existence of phoenixes. (this example is not meant to suggest phoenixes exist, it is only meant to clarify the objection.) 12 dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 5. 13 truth-makers are supposed to be the facts in the world that make certain sentences true. truth-maker and fact are used interchangeably in this paper. i will not be providing an account of truth-makers in this paper, as it is a separate dispute. mentioning truth-makers is meant to suggest an alternative approach to certain metaphysical questions that have been using the fallacious strategy of reading metaphysics off of language as arguments or in response to arguments. (dyke 2007: 81) 14 and i as explained in an introductory footnote above, “it is raining now” is a sentence with tense, or a tensed sentence, since it refers to the moment of time that it is uttered (the present). “it is raining at 5:44pm” is not a tensed sentence, since it does not take the moment of time that it is uttered (the present) into consideration. when i talk about different ways of thinking about time in section 5, i will argue that these two sentences are non-synonymous sentences. 48 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college sentences to have the same truth-maker is that it is not the case that there is exactly one, but, rather, many ways to truly describe the world.15 hence, “it is raining now” and “it is raining at 5:44pm” are both true ways to describe the world. i will now talk about the argument from tense in the ontology of time and show how the representational fallacy has been committed in this metaphysical dispute. iv. a-theory versus b-theory for the remainder of my paper, i would like to draw upon a case-study that shows the representational fallacy in practice. it is the argument from tense in the a-theory versus b-theory debate in the ontology of time. first, i will define the a-series and b-series, and give key terms associated with them. then, i will write about the argument from tense. john mctaggart distinguished two ways of thinking about time.16 one way is the a-series, which is the series that takes our common-sense distinction between past, present and future to be true, and says that there is a real ontological distinction between them. the other way is the b-series, which is the series that accepts that all time is real, and posits that there is no ontological distinction between the past, present and future. b-theorists believe the fact that we draw a distinction between past, present and future in ordinary life is reflective of our perspective on temporal reality.17 time is seen as dynamic for the a-series, since what was future is now present, what was present is now past, and not for the b-series, since time does not flow in the way just described. along with their respective ontological views of time, key terms are associated with each of them. the a-series is typically associated with the terms pastness, presentness, and futureness. phrases such as, “today”, “yesterday”, “five weeks ago” and “three hundred years from now” are part of the a-series conception of time and are called tensed phrases. the b-series is associated with the terms simultaneous with, earlier than and later than. that is, event 1 is simultaneous with event 2 in time, for instance, or event 1 is earlier than event 2. phrases such as, “two months after september 11th, 2001” or “on april 5th, 1688” are consistent with the b-theory of time, and are called tenseless phrases.18 in the debate from tense, the a-theorist takes phrases with tense such as “tomorrow i will get my hair cut” or “today was a good day” to represent facts about reality. the a-theorist believes that the fact that we say things like today and tomorrow, which correspond with our true sentences, means that there must exist some ontological 15 this claim does not need to commit a philosopher to antirealism, dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 89-90. for the purposes of my paper, it is not important that i show why. 16 mctaggart. the nature of existence, vol. ii. cambridge: cambridge university press. 1927. 17 b-theorists are also generally eternalists, or accept the block view of time. imagine time as a big block, and if you move along the block you will see different moments of time. in this way, time is viewed similarly to space. 18 distinction between a-series and b-series is also found in dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 37-8. 49issue v f spring 2018 the representational fallacy and the ontology of time properties such as today and tomorrow. hence, the philosopher who accepts a-theory would argue that since the b-series cannot account for these phrases in their ontology of time, it must be false. the old b-theorist response to this argument would be to say that it is incorrect, because they could provide the a-theorist with synonymous paraphrases that capture those a-series phrases. without moving any further, it is obvious this “debate takes as its starting point our ordinary temporal language and asks what this tells us about the nature of time itself.” (dyke 2007: 9) the debate moves from facts about language to facts about reality. in the next part of my essay, i will argue that both a-theorists, who believe tensed language demonstrates the existence of tensed facts, and b-theorists, who think they can demonstrate the existence of tenseless facts by translating tensed sentences, commit the representational fallacy. they both assume that we can read ontological conclusions off of our temporal language. v. the representational fallacy in the ontology of time much of early a-theory work argued that tense could not be eliminated from natural language without loss of meaning. from this, the a-theorists concluded that temporal reality itself must be tensed. this argument moves from premises about temporal language to conclusions about reality. they argued that tense was not eliminable because no tenseless sentence conveys as much information as a tensed sentence. in his “tensed statements,” richard gale gives an example to highlight this. suppose joe’s job is to inform his military company when the enemy are within 100 yards of their post. if joe yells (the tensed sentence) “the enemy are now within 100 yards,” his company will be warned of the enemy’s position and can take appropriate action. if joe, instead, yells (the tenseless sentence) “the enemy are within 100 yards at 2:15pm,” his company will not be warned unless they know that now is 2:15pm.19 for this reason, a-theorists have concluded that “since tensed expressions convey more information than tenseless sentences, there must exist something in reality that corresponds to this additional information conveyed.” (dyke 2007: 40) there must exist properties in reality that correspond to the tense in our sentences, they say. this example successfully shows that we cannot translate tensed sentences into tenseless sentences without loss of meaning. however, the example does not warrant drawing the conclusion that reality must thereby be tensed, as that commits the representational fallacy. after all, someone could accept that tensed sentences cannot be translated without loss of meaning, while also believing that reality is actually tenseless. william lane craig (2000) is an a-theorist who has recently made this fallacious move. his argument is as follows: p1: tensed sentences ostensibly ascribe ontological tenses. 19 gale: 1962; dyke 2007: 40 50 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college p2: unless tensed sentences are shown to be reducible without loss of meaning to tenseless sentences or ontological tense is shown to be superfluous to human thought and action, the ostensible ascription of ontological tenses by tensed sentences ought to be accepted as veridical. p3: tensed sentences have not been shown to be reducible without loss of meaning to tenseless sentences. p4: ontological tense has not been shown to be superfluous to human thought and action. c: therefore, the ostensible ascription of ontological tenses by tensed sentences ought to be accepted as veridical. (craig 2000: 22; numbering of premises changed)20 he moves from the claim that tensed sentences are not reducible, without loss of meaning, to tenseless sentences to the conclusion that we ought to accept that the tense given by our tensed sentences is true of reality. craig believes that in order to refute his argument, the b-theorist must either refute p3 and show that tensed sentences can be translated into tenseless sentences, or refute p4, and show that tensed facts are not required for human thought or action. this, nonetheless, is a false dilemma. the b-theorist could maintain both p3 and p4 and, instead, reject p2. he thinks p2 “has offered the b-theorist her only escape route from the conclusion of his argument.” (dyke 2007: 43) yet, this is not true. the b-theorist could agree with both p3 and p4—that tense cannot be eliminated and is needed for human thought and action—and believe that these true tensed sentences are made true by tenseless facts. i have just shown how the a-theorist moves from premises about temporal language to facts about reality in the debate from tense and suggested an alternative response for the b-theorist. i will now discuss an old b-theorist response to this debate. b-theorists believe that there are no tensed facts and no tensed properties—the fact that we say things like today and tomorrow, for instance, is reflective of how we perceive time, not of time itself. the old b-theorists tried to prove this by rejecting p3, or by showing that tensed expressions can be eliminated from natural language. (russell 1915; goodman 1951: 287-301; quine 1960: 36; smart 1963: 132-42).21 b-theorists tried to appeal to parsimony or ockham’s razor to support their claim that tenseless sentences displayed the true nature of reality, since tenseless sentences on their own imply the existence of fewer entities than tensed sentences (and are thus preferred) (dyke 2007: 43). b-theorists concluded from this that tensed sentences are eliminable, since there is no feature of reality they actually describe, and tried to translate tensed sentences into tenseless sentences. these b-theorists believed 20 (dyke 2007: 42) 21 (dyke 2007: 43) 51issue v f spring 2018 the representational fallacy and the ontology of time that their translation project was successful, having demonstrated the existence of only tenseless facts, and that there was no ontological distinction between past, present and future. their translation project was unsuccessful, however. as we saw in gale’s example above, it is not possible to translate tensed sentences into tenseless sentences without some loss in meaning (see joe’s informing the military company example). tense in language is a context-dependent phenomenon, since whether or not a sentence is true depends on the time it was uttered.22 not only was his translation project unsuccessful, but the b-theorist who argues that translating tensed sentences into tenseless sentences shows there are only tenseless facts, commits the representational fallacy. their argument is no different from the a-theorist’s, as both move from facts about language to facts about reality. why do both the a-theorist and b-theorist make this move? dyke suggests that there must be a hidden assumption that they both accept, which is informing the move from making purely linguistic claims to concluding ontological ones. it is my, and heather dyke’s, view that these philosophers are assenting to the assumption that there must be “a privileged, true description of reality, which can inform us about the ontological nature of reality.” (dyke 2007: 44) this makes up part of a thesis called the strong linguistic thesis (slt). in the next section of my paper, i will show why the a-theorist and the b-theorist must assume slt for their debate to make sense, and then, i will subsequently refute slt. vi. strong linguistic thesis (slt) the strong linguistic thesis (slt) says that “there is one privileged, true description of reality, the sentences of which (a) stand in a one-to-one correspondence with facts in the world, and (b) are structurally isomorphic to the facts with which they correspond.” (dyke 2007: 46) there are a couple of ways of understanding “one true description of reality.” i believe the a-theorists and b-theorists are understanding it to mean that “there is one true description of reality which contains a subset of all the truths that there are. this subset of truths is ontologically perspicuous, in that each truth in it reveals the nature of the fact that it describes, and that makes it true.” (dyke 2007: 45-46) in other words, they must accept (1) with each true proposition there corresponds a single truth, and (2) each true proposition tells of the nature of its truth. for this reason, there can only be one fact per linguistic utterance, one truth-maker per sentence. if there were more than one, a choice would have to be made between them. slt thus involves a commitment to the claim that there is a one-to-one correspondence between truths in the one true description of reality and truths in the facts about the world. (dyke 2007: 46) 22 “this conclusion was originally arrived at by philosophers working in the philosophy of language, on the linguistic phenomena of indexicals and demonstratives. these philosophers established that no sentence containing a context-dependent expression, like an indexical or a demonstrative, could be translated by any sentence that was wholly context dependent (castañeda 1967; perry 1979).” (dyke 2007, 44) 52 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college i will now argue that philosophers must either knowingly or unknowingly accept slt in order for certain metaphysical debates, like the debate from tense in the ontology of time, to make sense. in order for a-theorists to reach the conclusion that reality must be tensed because language is tensed, they must think (1) there is a fact corresponding to every truth in that description, and, (2) that the truths are structurally isomorphic to facts. (dyke 2007: 46) without (1) a-theorists could not infer there are any facts in reality that correspond to their true tensed phrases, and without (2) a-theorists could not infer that these corresponding facts must be tensed.23 the same applies for old b-theorists of time. without (1) b-theorists could not infer there are any facts in reality that correspond to their true tenseless phrases, and without (2) b-theorists could not infer that those corresponding facts must be tenseless.24 now, it may be that if presented with slt, most philosophers would reject it. regardless of whether or not philosophers think it is false on its own merits, it needs to be assumed in order for certain arguments, such as the argument from tense, to make sense. “once we make it explicit, and then reject it we can see that those disputes are by and large, fruitless.” (dyke 2007: 47) i will now argue against slt. the component of slt that i am arguing against is that there is one privileged, true description of reality, “where that description is taken to be a subset of all the truths that there are, and where the sense in which it is ‘privileged’ is that it contains ineliminable kinds of term.” (dyke 2007: 72) slt is false because the fact that true sentences contain property terms does not entail the existence of these properties. (dyke 2007: 72) as i argued in section 2, nothing about our language tells us what makes our sentences true, and the truth of certain sentences does not entail the existence of certain properties. since i am denying that there is one privileged, true description of reality, in this sense, i am also denying that there is a one-to-one correspondence between truths and facts. the ratio of truths to facts is many-to-one, as i showed in section 3. there are many ways to truly state a fact, since two or more non-synonymous sentences can be made true by the same truth-maker. both “it is raining now” and “it is raining at 5:44pm” are made true by the same truth-maker, the same fact in the world, and, thus, they are both accurate ways of describing that fact. the fact that there is a many-to-one ratio allows for there to be better or worse descriptions of any fact. for instance, “it is raining at 5:44pm” would be a better way to most accurately describe its truth-maker if you are a b-theorist, and “it is raining now” would be a worse way. but what it does not allow is the inference that since a sentence cannot be paraphrased, there must exist a fact that can only be described by that truth. thus, i reject that there need be any isomorphism between truths 23 “without (1), the a-theorist would not be able to infer that there are any ontological counterparts to her tensed truths. without (2) she would not be able to infer that those ontological counterparts are tensed.” (dyke 2007: 46) 24 “without (1), she would not be able to infer that there are any ontological counterparts to her tenseless truths. without (2) she would not be able to infer that those ontological counterparts are tenseless.” (dyke 2007: 46) 53issue v f spring 2018 the representational fallacy and the ontology of time and the facts that they describe. there may be isomorphism between truths and the facts that they describe, but we cannot rely on this possibility in all cases. hence, we cannot draw conclusions about the ontological nature and structure of our reality from claims about the nature and structure of reality of our true sentences. (dyke 2007: 72-3) i have just shown how the a-theorist and old b-theorist must accept slt in order for the argument from tense to make sense, delineated slt, and argued against it. i will now give a couple of new b-theorist responses to the argument from tense— one is the truth-condition variant of the new b-theory, and the other is the truthmaker variant of the new b-theory. then, i will argue against the truth-condition variant, since it also places too much emphasis on language, and support the truthmaker variant of the b-theory of time on the grounds that it is in line with our new metaphysical enquiry. vii. truth-condition vs. truth-maker variant new b-theorist responses emerged because of the failure of the old translation project. these b-theorists realized that they needed new ways to respond to the a-theorist’s argument from tense. the first way in which the new b-theorist responded was by the truth-condition variant of the b-theory. the second was by the truth-maker variant of the b-theory. i will first show how the truth-condition variant is also prone to committing the representational fallacy, and then i will advocate for the truth-maker variant of the b-theory of time as an alternative approach. proponents of the new b-theory of time agree that tense cannot be eliminated from language, but disagree whether this means that reality is itself tensed. “proponents of the truth-condition variant argue that, while it is not possible to translate any tensed sentence into a tenseless sentence, it is possible to state the truth-condition of any tensed sentence in entirely tenseless terms.” (dyke 2007: 47-48) in other words, they believe that it is possible to state the conditions in which the world must be for the sentence to be true. for instance, if we take the utterance “the enemy is now approaching,” then the truth-condition b-theorist would say “the enemy is now approaching” is true, if and only if the enemy’s approach is tenselessly simultaneous with the sentence “the enemy is now approaching.” that is to say, the condition in the world it takes for “the enemy is now approaching” to be true, is that the enemy approaches at 2:15pm, when “now” is uttered it is 2:15pm. there are a couple of ways to construct this approach. one is to say that they argue that since tensed sentences can be given tenseless truth-conditionals, reality is tenseless. another way is to say that the new b-theorist has separate arguments for the b-theory account of time, and that he offers the tenseless conditional alternative, not as an argument for b-theory, but as a way to show how the semantics of tensed sentences are compatible 54 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college with b-theory. (dyke 2007: 48) the latter approach is fine; the former is fallacious. some philosophers believe that if we know the conditions it takes for a sentence to be true, then we know what the world must be like in order to make that sentence true: “so, if a sentence is true, we know what the world, as described by that sentence, is like.” (dyke 2007: 73) however, it is a mistake to think that knowing the conditions it takes for a sentence to be true can generate ontology, since that is just another way of trying to read ontological facts off of language. arguing from the claim that tensed sentences can be given tenseless truth-conditionals, to the claim that reality is tenseless, commits the representational fallacy. “this suggests that we are able to determine whether a sentence is true or false just by examining its truth-condition, but this is not true. examining its truth-condition will tell us what must be the case for the sentence to be true.” (dyke 2007: 50) stating the truth-condition of a sentence is specifying what the world must be like in order for that sentence to be true—it does not tell us whether the truth-condition is actually upheld by reality. in order to know this, we must appeal to metaphysical and/or scientific considerations. if truthcondition b-theorists argue from the claim that we give our tensed sentences tenseless truth-conditionals, to the conclusion that reality is thereby tenseless, then they seem to use the same fallacious strategy that the a-theorist and the old b-theorist of time used. this strategy accepts slt, which i argued is false in section 6. i have just argued against using tenseless truth-conditionals as an argument for the b-theory of time. i will now introduce the truth-maker variant of the b-theory of time. the significance of the truth-condition project was to state what the world must be like in order to make our sentences true. however, “by focusing on this notion of how the world makes a true sentence true instead of on how to state the truthcondition of a tensed sentence, one arrives at the truth-maker variant of the new b-theory.” (dyke 2007: 54) what distinguishes the truth-condition variant from the truth-maker variant of the b-theory is that the truth-maker variant is a purely ontological thesis. the truth-maker variant of the b-theory makes the world, instead of language, our starting point. it takes ontological facts about time, and uses them to explain the semantics of our temporal language. the truth-maker variant of the b-theory also holds that tense cannot be eliminated from language, but denies this means temporal reality is tensed. thus, it rejects slt—that sentences of that description stand in a one-to-one correspondence with the facts in the world, or that those sentences need be structurally isomorphic to the facts that make them true. (dyke 2007: 55) though they believe that tensed sentences cannot be eliminated or reduced to tenseless sentences, this belief does not entail that there exist some extralinguistic25 tensed fact that corresponds to the tensed sentence. what makes these tensed sentences true are truth-makers—scientific and/or metaphysical reasons, and not linguistic ones. 25 extra-linguistic simply means beyond linguistics, or something that is not language. 55issue v f spring 2018 the representational fallacy and the ontology of time what should be taken away from all of this? philosophers should stop looking at our language in order to discover facts about reality. as i have shown in my paper, our language cannot reveal ontological facts to us, for there is nothing about a sentence that tells us what makes it true (see section 2). there are also additional reasons to believe that sentences do not reveal their truth-makers to us. competent language speakers may understand the sentence “the ball is red,” and see that it is a true sentence under the right conditions, without understanding what makes this sentence true. what makes the sentence true could be that the ball exemplifies universal redness, or has a red trope. but nothing about this sentence could tell a competent languagespeaker that.26 in order to know this fact—how the sentence comes to be true—we need to attend to metaphysical and/or scientific considerations. for this reason, we should attend to reality itself while doing metaphysics, the parts of reality that are the truthmakers of our sentences, and, from there, see how our sentences get to be true. viii. conclusion in this paper, i criticized a fallacious methodology by introducing the representational fallacy. i explained that this fallacy is committed when philosophers place too much emphasis on language while doing metaphysics. i gave immediate objections to the new methodology, and then displayed, and betrayed, the fallacy in the argument from tense in the philosophy of time. i argued that philosophers must either implicitly or explicitly accept the strong linguistic thesis (slt) in order to warrant the move from language to reality and for certain metaphysical disputes to make sense. my paper argued that a-theorists and b-theorists assent to slt in their argument from tense, and then proceeded to refute slt. i concluded by providing some new b-theorist responses to the argument and suggested a new way of doing metaphysics. “a fallacy is just an invalid argument and recognizing that an argument is invalid does not permit the inference that its conclusion is false.” (dyke 2007: 60) this paper is not meant to disprove the a-theory of time and does not entitle us to conclude the a-theory of time is false. it is meant to show that it is erroneous to argue from language to reality. hence, a-theorists are not entitled to use this argument when arguing for their position. if the a-theory is correct, then they must use other arguments to justify their ontological stance on time. this paper also did not argue that the b-theory changed their stance on time. both the old and new b-theorists maintain the same metaphysical views, this has not changed. what has changed is their methodology. the old b-theorists thought when presented with the argument from tense their job was to offer translations to show how facts about the world were actually tenseless. but as i have argued for in my paper, this move commits the representational fallacy. the new b-theorists agreed with the a-theorists that tense was not eliminable from natural language; however, they rejected the translation project and maintained reality was still tenseless. two responses emerged from this, the truth-condition and 26 example inspired by dyke (2007). in metaphysics and the representational fallacy, 73-4. 56 dianoia: the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college truth-maker variant of the b-theory of time. ultimately, the truth-condition variant, if used as an argument for the b-theory of time, also committed the representational fallacy. for this reason, i advocated for the truth-maker variant of the b-theory of time in order to avoid reasoning fallaciously. the truth-maker variant of the b-theory relies on metaphysical and/or scientific considerations in order to reach metaphysical conclusions. it starts from reality and uses it to explain language. at the end of the day, i believe, we should reject the view that there is a certain privileged language or description of reality that we can read off of, which will tell us the way the world is. f bibliography dyke, heather. metaphysics and the representational fallacy. london: routledge, 2007. heil, john. philosophy of mind: a contemporary introduction. new york: routledge, 2013. musgrave, alan. common sense, science and scepticism: a historical introduction to the theory of knowledge. cambridge: cambridge university press. 1993. mctaggart, john m.e. the nature of existence, vol. ii. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1927. gale, richard m. “tensed statements,” philosophical quarterly. 1962. craig, william l. the tensed theory of time: a critical examination. dordrecht: kluwer academic publishers, 2000. castañeda, h.-n. “indicators and quasi-indicators,” american philosophical quarterly. 1967. perry, john. “the problem of the essential indexical,” noûs. 1979. russell, bertrand. “on the experience of time.” the monist. 1915. goodman, nelson. the structure of appearance. cambridge, mass.: harvard university press. 1951. quine, willard v.o. word and object. cambridge, mass.: mit press. 1960. smart, john j.c. philosophy and scientific realism. london: routledge & kegan paul. 1963. bookreview informal logic xvi.2, spring 1994 the fragmentation of reason: preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation by stephen stiehl miriam solomon temple university stich, stephen (1990). the fragmentation of reason: preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation. cambridge, ma: mit press. pp. x, 1-181. isbn 0-26219293-4. cloth. us $25.00. naturalistic epistemologists often draw on various traditional epistemological techniques and presuppositions. usually, they make some use of analysis of ordinary concepts such as "knowledge" and "justification," and hold that the goal of inquiry in some way involves truth (as approximate truths or significant truths) or accurate representation (which is a close ally of correspondence truth).2 the fragmentation of reason is one of the few attempts at a more radical break with these epistemological traditions. 3 much of the book is concerned with witnessing and abetting the dissolution of traditional views about reason. a pragmatic4, pluralistic5 and relativistic6 view intended to replace the traditional frameworks is sketched out at the end. all of the discussion is focussed on, and fuelled by, the implications of experimental work on human reasoning (some early work is collected in nisbett and ross 1980 and kahneman, slovic and tversky 1982) which show that humans frequently reason with heuristics that lead to conclusions other than those reached by doing formal logic, statistics or confirmation theory. salience and availability heuristics cause investigators to assign inappropriate weight to a subset of the relevant data; the representativeness heuristic results in neglect of base rate statistical information, as well as inappropriate analogical reasoning. this experimental work, in its current stage of development7, challenges any easy assumption that human reasoning is generally veridical. stich argues that the usual philosophical ways of responding to these experimental results on human reasoning minimal rationality arguments (e.g. davidson 1973, dennett 1977, and quine 1960), arguments from evolutionary design (e.g. dennett 1977), and reflective equilibrium arguments (e.g. cohen 1981) fail. in failing, they also show the poverty of traditional techniques of philosophical analysis and the implausibility of general views about the nature of human reasoning (including naturalized views, such as those from evolutionary perspectives). these considerations, which take up over half of the book, are developments of stich 1985. they are a provocative and often convincing set of responses to the philosophical literature on human reasoning. the fragmentation of reason also has two new proposals. first, that reason no longer be evaluated for its truth-conduciveness because truth is not a worthwhile goal. second, that reason be evaluated with respect to other goals such as health, happi138 miriam solomon ness and the welfare of one's children, which are, in stich's view, intrinsically valued and therefore genuine goals. the first proposal sounds like sour grapes. stich accepts that experiments on human reasoning show that truth is not a regularly obtainable goal; then he argues through philosophical reflection that it is not a worthy goal to have. the argument he gives in chapter 5 has a structure similar to putnam's use of the skolem-lowenheim theorem for internal realism and reminiscent of quine's arguments for the inscrutability of reference; it concludes that truth is no more a goal than truth *, truth* * or other verific properties which each mark off different sets of propositions. (truth, truth*, truth** ... have in common that each is based on a corresponding reference relation reference, reference*, reference** ... that accomodates the casual/functional relations which map mental states to truth conditions.) stich asserts that this destroys the appeal of truth, since there is no good reason to prefer true beliefs to true* beliefs or true** ... beliefs. the underlying assumption is that anyone who starts out really caring about truth will not find it acceptable that there is no unique set of interpreted sentences that satisfies; then the rational response is to give up caring about truth altogether. i am not the only one to find this argument implausible (see, for example, goldman 1991, harman 1991 and lycan 1991). i add a criticism that is close to the one lycan gives: even if stich has proven that there is more than one acceptable concept of truth, it does not follow that we should give up caring about truth. we need only give up the view that a unique set of sentences is veridical. this does not mean giving up much of the usual understanding of truth.s stich nowhere shows that quite arbitrary sets of sentences are veridical: in particular, he does not show that the complete sets of propositions marked off as true, true* or true** ... can differ so greatly that they are wholly interchangeable with the complete sets of propositions marked off as false, false* or false** .... all stich shows is that occasional true (or true*, true** ... ) sentences could be regarded as false* (or false**, false ... ). the second new proposal of the fragmentation of reason is, fortunately for stich, more independent of the discussion of truth than his presentation suggests. he argues that cognitive evaluation be done with respect to goals other than truth. this is of interest, whether or not truth is a genuine goal. the goals he suggests emphasize human goals such as health, happiness, and the welfare of one's children, which he thinks we are "probably biologically predisposed to value" (p. 131). in addition, these human goals include other goals also intrinsically valued, about which people can differ. stich's implied view is that it is likelier that humans attain these shared or variable goals than that they attain truth. the subtitle of the book, preface to a pragmatic theory of cognitive evaluation, tells the reader that an explicit theory of cognitive evaluation, as well as the normative judgments such a theory can produce, will be a later project. indeed, stich's remarks about this positive project are sketchy. however, he says enough that the difficulties such a project will face are revealed. experimental work on human reasoning does not, at this time, show that humans are any better at realizing goals other than truth. the heuristics (salience, availability, representativeness) that humans use are not obviously directed towards goals other than truth even goals such as health, happiness and the well-being of one's children. there is, for example, some experimental work indicating that humans fall into error in estimating future utilities9 and hence reason to think that humans are as handicapped in their pursuits of happiness as they are in their pursuits of truth. stich also does not engage in debate over appropriateness and relative importance of goals themselves; it may be that he thinks, with hume, that reason cannot set human ends, and he goes no further than the remark . that it is "no easy task" (p. 134) to compare intrinsic goals. yet there are certainly local debates over appropriateness of goals that epistemologists can and should address: for example, the debate over which goals are appropriate ends of scientific inquiry. epistemologists are concerned about all the domains in which humans reason, and the occasional domestic domain guided by the trio "health, happiness and the well-being of one's children" (p. 131) has no special importance, whether or not this cluster of goals is biologically determined. stich's passing remarks about assessment of scientific reasoning are inconsistent with the rest of the book: he allows scientists to have "discovering and coming to accept important truths of nature" (p. review of stephen stich 139 138) as goals. if truth is not a genuine goal, yet scientific work a genuine enterprise, another account of scientific reasoning is needed. the fragmentation of reason is important because it adds to the small number of epistemological views which claim that normative evaluation is still possible and appropriate in a naturalistic context that eschews truth as the goal of inquiry. lending voice to such more radical and minority positions makes them more available for fair consideration by the philosophical community. when the theory of cognitive evaluation that stich is prefacing is presented, more definitive discussion of it will be possible. notes 1 i am grateful to jonathan adler, alan richardson and jerry vision for discussion of this material. 2 giere (1988). goldman (1986.1992), harman (1986). kitcher (1993), and kornblith (1993) are examples of these views. 3 paul churchland (1989), dennett (1977), and hacking (1983) are some others who adopt more radical epistemological views. 4 i take it that the view is pragmatic in a sense that derives from james (rather than, for example, peirce) truth is eschewed as a goal, in favor of "human" goals. 5 the pluralism comes from the reflection that if reasoning strategies are assessed instrumentally, more than one strategy may turn out to be effective, and also from the reflection that different people have different goals of reasoning and instrumental assessments of reasoning practices vary in tandem. 6 "relativistic", as used by stich in this book, means that good reasoning is relative to context because different reasoning strategies are effective in different contexts (see, for example, p. 139). stich is not allying himself with those relativistic views which claim that rationality is relative to social context because rationally is socially constructed. 7 it is conceivable that further experimental work will help answer the epistemological questions raised. in fact, i take stich to be making this point. s it is doubtful that there is a "usual understanding", uncorrupted by prior work in philosophy of language, anyway. 9 talk, d. kahneman, university of pennsylvania, spring 1992. bibliography churchland, paul (1989) a neurocomputational perspective: the nature of mind and the structure of science. cambridge. ma: mit press. cohen, j. (1981) "can human irrationality be experimentally demonstrated?" behavioral and brain sciences 4. pp. 317-370. davidson, d. (1973) "radical interpretation" dialectica 4, reprinted in davidson, d., inquiries into truth and interpretation (1984). oxford: oxford university press. pp. 125-139. dennett, d. (1977) the intentional stance. cambridge, ma: mit press. 140 miriam solomon giere, r. (1988) explaining science: a cognitive approach. chicago: university of chicago press. goldman, a. (1986) epistemology and cognition. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. goldman, a. (1991) "stephen p. stich: the fragmentation of reason". in: philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. li, no i. pp. 189-193. goldman. a. (1992) liaisons: philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences. cambridge, ma: mit press. hacking, i. (1983) representing and intervening: introductory topics in the philosophy of natural science. cambridge: cambridge university press. harman. g. (1986) change in view: principles of reasoning. cambridge, ma: mit press. harman, g. (1991) "justification, truth, goals. and pragmatism: comments on stich's fragmentation of reason." in: philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. li. no i, pp. 195-199. kahneman. d .• siovic, p. and tversky, a. (1982) judgment under uncertainty: heuristics and biases. cambridge: cambridge university press. kitcher. p. (1993) the advancement of science: science withaut legend, objectivity without illusions. oxford: oxford university press. kornblith. h. (1993) inductive inference and its natural ground: an essay in naturalistic epistemology. cambridge, ma: mit press. lycan, w. (1991) "why we should care whether our beliefs are true". in: philosophy and phenomenological research, vol. li, no i, pp. 201-205. nisbett, r. and ross, l. (1980) human inference: strategies and shortcomings of social judgement. englewood cliffs, nj: prentice-hall. quine, w. (1960) word and object. cambridge, ma: mit press. stich, s. (1985) "could man be an irrational animal?" synthese 64( 1). reprinted in: hilary kornblith (ed.), naturalizing epistemology (2nd ed., 1993). cambridge, ma: mit press. miriam solomon department of philosophy temple unnersity philadelphia, pa 19122 o journal of medical ethics and history of medicine the challenge of truth telling across cultures: a case study farzaneh zahedi md, endocrinology and metabolism research centre, medical ethics and history of medicine research centre, tehran university of medical sciences, tehran, iran. *corresponding author: farzaneh zahedi address: 5th floor, shariati hospital, north kargar avenue, tehran, iran. postal box: 14114-13137 tel: (+98) 21 88 22 00 37-8 fax: (+98) 21 88 22 00 52 e-mail: fzahedi@sina.tums.ac.ir received: 09 feb 2011 accepted: 01 nov 2011 published: 27 dec 2011 j med ethics hist med, 2011; 4:11. http://journals.tums.ac.ir/abs/20244 © 2012 farzaneh zahedi; licensee tehran univ. med. sci. abstract keywords: truth telling, ethics consultation, autonomy, informed consent, culture, clinical ethics. introduction physician-patient communication has changed significantly in recent decades in most countries throughout the world. before the era of contempo rary bioethics, the key decision makers in medical practice were physicians. they visited patients, prescribed drugs and their main duty was to save life and avoid death. information about the disease and the treatment was often not shared with patients, and they were rarely included in the decision making as to how the treatment should proceed. sometimes physicians even concealed the diagnosis from patients. some people even died without knowing what their disease was. accompanied with various opinions across cultures, truth telling is a major debate in bioethics. many studies have focused on attitudes toward truth disclosure. we intend to review several relevant research studies, and discuss the issue through a clinical case consultation. it seems that while "the right to know" is emphasized in bioethics, in some cultural contexts, health professionals fear communicating bad news. the patients may not receive information directly, because it is believed that the truth may make the patient feel hopeless and unable to cope with the problem. nevertheless, some believe that sharing information may strengthen a trusting relationship between patients and medical professionals. extensive efforts are in process in some societies to make patient rights to know the truth as a natural part of medical practice. however, in some cases, the principles of respect for patient autonomy require us to accept patient's refusal to know the truth, with the provision that he assigns someone to receive information and make medical decisions on his behalf. in conclusion, it is suggested that healthcare professionals should not act on a unique presumption in all cases and they should explore what the real interest of patient is, in order to respect individual autonomy. j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 2 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) however, there has been a rapid change from a paternalistic approach to an individualistic one. telling the patient the truth is now a common practice in many western countries and is also more acceptable than in the last decades in the eastern cultures. different interpretations of respect for autonomy and a greater emphasis on the role of the family and the community in patient care have resulted in a different approach in caring for patients in the east. patient’s capacity is a main element of autonomy-based decision making which may be influenced by different internal (e.g. mental capacity, stress, and level of understanding of medical information) and external (e.g. culture, and socioeconomic class) factors (1). interpersonal relationships have also a significant effect on the sense of autonomy in various cultural contexts. although family request of “do not tell” the truth and their strong resistance to informing patients about their diseases may confuse healthcare professionals in some societies (2), it may also reflect divergence in patients’ interests in people. many research studies in recent years have focused on the attitude and practice of health care teams about whether and how to disclose diagnoses to patients with cancer or terminal illness. this has been the subject of many resear ches in recent years. in this paper, we intend to review the relevant studies and address the following questions: 1. is truth-telling acceptable in different cul tures? 2. is there objective evidence that patients, regardless of their country, want to know the truth about their diseases? 3. what is the moral force of the family or the physician claiming that telling the truth is harmful to the patient? 4. are there justifiable cases in which the physi cian is permitted not to tell the truth? the aim of this paper is to clarify these ques tions through a comprehensive assessment of one clinical case. the case mrs. b, 34 years old, comes to the emergency department for dressing a small ulcer on her forehead. previously in a good health, she has fallen on the ground after a sense of lightheadedness. it seems to you, as a physician, that the patient is pale. so you ask her to do some laboratory studies including cbc for evaluation of anemia. she agrees and does the work-ups. when you receive the results, you realize that the patient has leukemia. in each of the following situations, what is your ethical duty? 1. the patient herself does not come back to receive the lab results. instead, her husband comes to you to consult about the results. should the physician disclose this information to the husband? 2. in fact the information is disclosed to him and he asks you not to tell his wife the truth and to tell her only that she has anemia and needs hospitalization and treatment. he explains that informing her might cause her to lose hope. 3. in the course of events, mrs. b sees the results and asks you not to tell the diagnosis anyone, including her family. she thinks this news may put a strain on the family members and make them worried. they are going to go to a 10-day trip together and she promises you that she will begin her treatment as soon as they come back home. telling the truth physician paternalism is no longer acceptable to many people because of the dramatic shift toward individual autonomy in the recent decades. informed about their diseases and therapeutic approaches, many patients prefer to participate actively in the decision making process. the role of family and friends as spokespersons is reduced considerably in autonomy-centered systems if the patient has capacity to speak for herself. however, the attitudes of patients and doctors towards the disclosure of information can still vary from culture to culture. in some countries, family members make decisions for patients, and they sometimes fail to follow the patients' interests and priorities. since such patients are psychosocially dependent on the family, they permit their family members to decide on their behalf and seldom defy their decisions. table 1 summarizes data from some research studies in different countries (3-9). in western countries, overall approximately 80– 90% of patients are given the truth about their diagnosis, whereas in other cultures, figures can range from 0 to 50% (10). two surveys conducted in the usa shows that clinicians' practices have changed significantly over recent decades. in one study conducted in 1961, 88% of physicians did not routinely discuss a diagnosis of cancer with their patients, whereas almost 20 years later in 1979, 98% of those surveyed generally did discuss the diagnosis (10-12). however, as hanssen says 'disclosure of diagnosis and prognosis, and discussions of for instance termination of treatment reflect mainstream j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 3 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) liberal western cultural values, and are not even necessarily supported everywhere in europe. (13)'. hanssen discusses examples from italy, japan, asian arabs, and hispanics. italy is one european country where 'the opportunity not to reveal to the patient or to mitigate a serious or lethal prognosis' is evaluated by physicians (13, 14). in spite of persistent cultural resistance, truthtelling attitudes have evolved in italy in recent decades too (15). in contrast to western individualistic cultures, most traditional eastern cultures place more emphasis on the collective role of family in decision-making. in china, for instance, the longstanding influence of confucian philosophy has established “harmony” as an essential and im portant social value, as lai states (16). individual and family harmony is believed to be essential for both the prosperity of a family and a nation. the essential role of these values in chinese society is captured in a well-known chinese proverb: 'family harmony makes everything successful and prosperous' (16). lai also emphasizes that 'truth telling in taiwan may also be influenced by four major socialcultural and ethical factors: family as a key player in medical[ly]-related decision making, harmony as an essential value for both the individual and family, taboo about discussing death and related issues, and ethical concerns in truth telling: the predominant value of nonmaleficence (do no harm) leads to not telling the truth'. in the following we may find a definition of harm which may be accompanied with telling the truth. as a central point, death is a taboo subject in some traditional societies. chinese believe that discussing or thinking about death or death-related concepts or approaching a dead body will hasten death. for example, hospitals rarely have a floor numbered '4' since the pronunciation of '4' in both mandarin and taiwanese is similar to that of 'death' (16). a nationwide survey of 229 palliative care workers (72.5% nurses and 16.6% physicians) in taiwan suggested that several factors made family members reluctant to tell patients the truth; first, the family did not know how to tell the truth, second, the family did not think it was necessary to tell the truth to elderly patients, and three, patients would be better or happier if they didn't know the truth (16). however, the question remains that whether the truth about the diagnosis should be concealed from a patient or not. die trill and kovalcik argue that it is difficult to prevent a patient (a child) from being informed about her/his illness (17). they say that: 'his interactions with other patients in the hospital, his increased exposure to the media, where cancer is frequently discussed, and the responses of those around him to his disease will increase his awareness of the seriousness of his condition'. it means that many patients will know their diagnosis without direct disclosure by the physician or their family. a comparison between japanese and american physicians' and patients' attitudes towards telling the diagnosis of cancer to a child (6) is demonstrated in table 1. in japan, historically it was not common to tell patients their diagnosis of cancer as it was traditionally believed that knowledge of cancer would dash hope (6,18). this probably was related with the lack of treatment options and inevitable death in the past decades, which is not true anymore. most japanese believed that a doctor should inform the patient’s family of the diagnosis (not the patient) at first and should let them decide whether the patient should be told or not (5). ornek buken states that in the physician-patient relationships in turkey, the one who is primarily responsible for making decisions about the patient’s treatment is not the patient but the patient’s next of kin, and sometimes the diagnosis is known by everyone except the patient (19). data from a limited research study done on 58 physicians and 150 medical students at ankara university medical faculty ibn sına (avicenna) hospital showed that 52% of the physicians and medical students had a “protector, guardian” approach to the cancer patients (19). in iran, kazemiyan has carried out in-depth interviews with 20 specialists about terminal diseases (20). all of the physicians said that considering cultural issues and negative psycholog ical effects, they would tell the diagnosis to the family members first. although they believed the patient has a right to know the truth, the specialists preferred not to tell the diagnosis directly before consultation with the family members (20). this is a situation where culture strongly influences medical decisions. table 1 also shows the results of another study (7) in iran. also, in an investigation on 71 health professionals (physicians and nurses), most respondents (54%) said that they told the true diagnosis to less than 20% of their patients. when respondents were asked about the barriers or reasons, they mentioned families' request (18%) and time limitations (16%) as the reasons. seven percent said that they do not inform patients because of the patients' own reluctance to know (21). it is also plausible if we conclude that this could be as a result of a lack of confidence of the physicians in terms of talking about such issues. physicians in different cultural contexts may face this problem, and this could indicate their lack of skills in communicating bad news in a health care settings. as mentioned before, according to the major j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 4 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) studies in the us regarding the disclosure of terminal illness to cancer patients, there was a dramatic change from 1960 to 1979, from not disclosing the truth, to full disclosure. by the late 1970s only 2% of surveyed us physicians did not reveal the cancer diagnosis to their patients (22). nevertheless, the united states is becoming a multicultural society and physicians may encounter patients who have divergent ideas on this notion. for example, as glass and cluxton have written, in traditional latino families, it is considered the husband’s duty to hear the bad news and then to tell his wife what he thinks she would want to know (23). if the spouse is deceased, the adult children assume this role to honor their mother and to protect her from the unpleasantness of the bad news. and, because the patient may not be fully informed of the illness, the spouse or the children are expected to make decisions about the care that the patient would want to receive (23). there is still a main question here of 'do patients really want to know the truth?'. patients’ attitudes toward disclosure can vary from one cultural context to another. in the us, several studies indicate that people do want to know the truth about their illness and prognosis, even when the news is not good (23). surveys in western populations have found that 83–99% of those surveyed would like to be informed of their diagnosis, with a somewhat lower figure in nonwestern countries of 24–74% (10). many predictors of the desire for information have been identified, including age, level of education, ethnicity, a religious locus of control and in some studies, gender (10). a survey conducted by the us president's commission in 1982 indicated that 94% of patients wanted to know everything about their condition, 96% wanted to be informed of a diagnosis of cancer and 85% wanted to be given a realistic estimate of their time to live, even if this were less than 1 year (11). however, in one study a greater percentage of korean-born patients preferred to be given less information than did usborn patients (4,11). in taiwan, researchers in one study in 1982 found that more half (58.6%) of family caregivers opposed telling patients the truth, and only 39.7% agreed to tell the truth (16). the author states that 'major reasons for not telling the truth about cancer consisted of: worry that patients could not take the emotional impact, concern about not being able to manage the patients' emotional reaction after learning the truth, and protecting patients from harm' (16). however, there have been changes in truth telling in cancer diagnosis over the past 20 years. a self-report survey of 195 people admitted to a medical center in southern taiwan for a 3-day health examination showed that 92.3% of participants preferred being informed of the truth about their cancer diagnosis and 7.7% did not (16,24). case consultation the issues raised so far in the research studies can now be analyzed in regards with the presented case. some practical approaches for ethical decision making on case consultation process will be used (25,26). mrs. b's physician accidentally makes a diagno sis of leukemia in this relatively young patient. the ethical question is whether the physician has the right to reveal the diagnosis to her husband or anybody else before informing the patient. what is his ethical duty, as a physician, when the patient or her husband asks him to conceal the diagnosis? systematic description of the case 1. medical indications: considering the primary diagnosis, some complementary paraclinical evaluations are necessary. more specific blood examinations, bone marrow biopsy, and sometimes lumbar puncture are needed. whether it affects granulocytes, lymphocytes, or monocytes determines the type of leukemia and its prognosis. the physician's decision may be different based on the type of leukemia and the fact that it is acute or chronic, but his duty is the same: seeking the welfare and interest of the patient. the treatment then should be started promptly. the patient should be referred to an oncologist for scoring and staging of the disease. under supervision of an oncologist, a combination of chemotherapy and other approaches such as drug therapy and radiotherapy may be administered. the physician should also consider cell therapy. so, the patient and her family need to be prepared for complicated therapeutic approaches fairly quickly. 2. patient preferences: she is a legally competent woman, and she has the capacity to make decisions about the medical process. moreover, she has the right to clearly state if she wants her husband or other family members to be informed about her disease, but she is reluctant to let her family know about her disease. 3. quality of life: although she has had a good quality of life so far, her life will be complicated with physical and psychological problems as the result of the severe and painful side effects of therapeutic approaches. in addition, receiving a cancer diagnosis may be seen as a death sentence by her and perhaps by her family. unfortunately, without treatments, her life will be in danger, and delay will make a bad outcome more likely. the prognosis for j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 5 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) various forms of leukemia varies widely. the 5year survival may be less than 50% to more than 80% in different types of leukemia. in most cases the patient would have the best chance for survival if the leukemia is diagnosed and cured in early stages. 4. contextual features: her cultural context is an important issue. bad news such as a cancer diagnosis may be considered as a critical condition for her and the family. as mentioned before, in some cultures, the family members prefer to conceal the diagnosis to preserve the patient's hope and protect her from further distress. all previous discussions about characteristics of different cultures may be applicable in this case. in some cases difference in the attitudes might be important and should be considered and discussed by the health care team and the patient. for instance, the approaches would be completely different in a chinese couple and an american one. we may also consider a situation in which one spouse has an eastern culture and the other spouse is an american. expectations and interests are different, and conflicts may arise. physicians can play a distinguished role which may seem beyond their general duty. the physician should take into account this point that some decisions may be medically appropriate but not ethically sound. sometimes there are psychosocial adverse effects which limit the options. besides, other issues such as treatment cost, outcome, her personal values and goals influence on the decision. assessment it seems that she has good familial relationships and their trip is so important for her since she may think this will be the last opportunity for her to enjoy life. but, the patient is in a critical situation and she should receive medical treatment as soon as possible. the physician is faced with the conflict between how to respect her autonomy, preserving family unity and providing appropriate medical care for her serious condition. discussion any plausible solution in this case will need ethical justification based on wellestablished ethical principles and values. how to best respect for patient autonomy while acting in manner consistent with beneficence in medical practice, and their various interpretations under the influence of cultural variables, are the main issues to be discussed. patient autonomy could be a key notion in this argument. in western bioethics, the sick person has a right to self-governance (21), so she has a definite right to know the diagnosis. also, her information cannot be revealed to other people without prior consent, and she is the key decision maker about sharing information with the family or anybody else. however, as surbone says, autonomy is a complex concept, which refers both to the one's capacity to choose and the ability to implement one's choices (21). autonomy is a necessary attribute of rational human beings and it is universally valid. however, both internal and external factors and resources contribute to one's autonomy and from the beginning to the end of our lives, we are embedded in a context of social relations, which shape us and sustain us. thus, autonomy is always relational and situated, rather than simply a matter of individual choice (21). understanding “relational autonomy” helps framing the ethics of truth telling and understand ing those many unsolved aspects of truth telling that go beyond cultural differences (21). surbone adds to this interesting notion by suggesting that imposing the truth on an unprepared patient whose cultural expectation is to be shielded from painful medical truths is not necessarily an act of respect for autonomy. the notions of cultural sensitivity and of cultural competence are also essential to the discourse on truth telling (21). in some cases, the patient may not wish to receive information directly, and select someone as a surrogate decision maker. usually this means just to accept the family as the decision makers. in honoring a capable patient’s wish not be told healthcare information, the team respects the patient’s autonomy to determine what he or she wants to know. this approach is not only culturally sensitive; it is also legally sound as long as the patient’s wishes and chosen surrogate(s) are documented in the medical record (23). no doubt, quality of patientphysician communication is a pivotal point which helps physician to realize that s/he should communicate the information and the care plan with the family. beneficence and non-maleficence are also close ly linked to the notion of truth telling. some people may believe that the sick should be protected from harm by withholding the truth. as a case in point, as lai states, for many chinese, not telling a patient his/her cancer diagnosis is a way for the family to protect the patient from further hurt by the diagnosis and to preserve both individual and family harmony (16). also, the predominant values of non-maleficence and family harmony in taiwanese society determined truth-telling approach in cancer care (16). physicians in the past have voiced concerns that revealing a cancer diagnosis would result in the loss of j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 6 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) hope. families are still often fearful that knowledge of cancer will result in despair, depression or result in increased suffering. few studies have directly examined this question but it is likely that any increase in anxiety is transient. there is some evidence to support the notion that informing patients truthfully about a life-threatening disease does not result in a greater incidence of anxiety, despair, sadness, depression, insomnia or fear (10,27). it should be mentioned that ever-increasing knowledge and technological advancements have increased hope for all patients including cancer patients. so cancer diagnosis is no longer as scary as it was in the past decades. one study design based on the utrecht school of phenomenology in 9 cancer patients showed eight core themes describing the participants' lived experience: living with fears and uncertainty, loss of happiness, feeling of added responsibility, living in a state of emergency, sharing the pain, living the dilemma of truth telling, being disturbed by being pitied, and reliance on god (28). furthermore, one study on 142 iranian patients which has compared the quality of life between patients who were aware of cancer diagnosis and patients who were not, indicated that those who knew their diagnosis had a significantly lower degree of physical (p=0.001), emotional (p=0.01) and social functioning (p<0.001), but the global quality of life and other functional scales including role functioning and cognitive functioning did not show any significant differences (7). there were no statistically significant differences in symptoms scores between two groups, except for fatigue which scored more frequently in patients who knew their diagnosis. the financial difficulties were also significantly higher in patients who knew their cancer diagnosis (7). conversely, many believe that informed patients have better communication with relatives and with their treating staff as well as greater trust in the care provided (10), and not telling the truth can harm patients in many ways (11). many negative ramifications can result from not telling the truth to patients and families; for instance, it is predictably difficult to make treatment decisions that are consistent with personal goals in the absence of accurate and complete information. this may result in adverse physical and emotional suffering, as well as increased family expenses (23). patients who remain uninformed about their condition may fail to seek medical attention when they should. they may also make decisions affecting their lives that they would not make if they were aware of their condition (11). additionally, not telling patients the truth about their condition may entail deceiving them (11). many patients feel frustrated because they sense they are not being included in their treatment plan. this frustration is especially true when family members are given more information than the patient without the patient’s consent. finally, when bad news is withheld from patients, they are denied the opportunity to get their affairs in order and may miss the opportunity to live meaningfully before their death (23). lack of candor or outright deception, even when well intentioned, can undermine the public’s confidence in the medical profession (11). in addition, the benefits accompanying patients’ adapting to their illness are frequently spiritual and emotional. for example, many people focus on preparing themselves and their loved ones for the imminent death. for those with religious beliefs and spiritual sensitivities, making peace with god, others, and oneself is essential for achieving a sense of closure and integration (23). however, there can be a socio-cultural differ ence in the prioritizing and weighting of the principles. for example, as ornek buken states, the principles of “do no harm and beneficence” sometimes take priority for turkish patients over the principles of “respect for autonomy and justice” because of the structure of society, their customs and traditions and their sociocultural structure (19). the goal of the good physician, particularly in a cosmopolitan society, is to discern what the patient's preferences are and how s/he feels about the relationship between the triangle of patient, physician and the family. the third angle may not be acceptable in making decision in some societies, but it may be as important as other angels in some other cultures. the physicians' communication skills and the manner with which he or she gives bad news is an important issue. as glass and cluxton point out (23), most healthcare professionals would not intentionally do anything to harm a patient or family. however, if healthcare professionals fail to become skilled in giving bad news honestly and sensitively, they may severely impede patients’ and families’ ability to deal with serious illness and/or prepare for death. if we accept that the physician should tell the patient the truth, there are still some decisions to be made including determining to whom and to what extent the truth should be shared, and how the truth should be told. some elements would be important in dealing with this issue including: the person who discloses the information, the manner of telling news, available supports (such as family, spiritual and social support), and the methods of coping with difficulties and stress in different cultures (29). gold believes that the doctor alone should not make the decision about how much to tell an individual patient, even if j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 7 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) s/he is well informed about the likely cultural preferences of the person seeking care (11). the needs of each person must be evaluated individually because illness is, in the first instance, a subjective experience, influenced by cultural, personal and religious beliefs and traditions (11). the doctors do not have any right to lie to the patient but they are not obliged to tell the whole truth (30). gold states 'too much information can be overwhelming and most physiciansl will recall instances of patients abandoning a successful treatment after hearing of a rare potential adverse effect' (10). a sincere dialogue is required. cultural differences between patients and health care professionals are potentially inevitable. involvement of families in information and decision making processes is also a concern, even within western societies where individualism is prized. putting these points together, it is obvious that physician cannot act based on a fixed default in all patients and s/he should take cultural context into account to decide how to communicate the information to the patient, her husband, and her family. as a default in western culture, mrs. b has the right to be informed about the diagnosis of her disease unless she is incompatible and someone else is her spokesperson and decision maker. the physician is not permitted to share the information with other people without her permission, including her family members. she is a competent woman and is capable of deciding whether to share the information. however, in an eastern culture, family members have a caring role and they may be informed in order to help patient to cope with the problems of the diseases. she is going to travel with her family for 10 days, but the complementary work-ups and treatments should be started immediately. family members in cancer patients may play a very important supportive role. it seems that for an effective and timely treatment, it is necessary that her close family members know about her disease, but if she is clearly reluctant the physician is ethically obliged to hide the patient's secrets. it is the physician's duty to clearly explain the harms and benefits of different decisions, but mrs. b will make the final decision by her own. anyway, the physician should be respectful for all patients; those who insist on an absolute autonomy or those who refuse to know. recommendations mrs. b's desires and preferences should be respected and her confidentiality should be protected as far as possible. without treatments, her life would be in danger; but if she wants to take this potentially last trip with her family, the physician should not oblige her to stay and follow his recommendations. no doubt, it is better that the physician not to be neutral. he/she should evaluate the situation; consider the different aspects of the disease and what will happen in coming weeks and months. benefiting from psychosocial supports of family in patients struggling with the malignant disease may be of a key importance in many cases. the physician should evaluate the personality and psychological status of the patient and use appropriate language and skills to alleviate fear and possible hopelessness of the patient. speaking about the new generations of anti-cancer drugs with high efficacy would be useful. physician should also emphasize to her the importance of beginning the therapeutic process as soon as possible. in the case when the patient's husband requests information about her wife's disease, the principle of confidentiality and privacy require the physician not to tell him the information except when there is a presumed consent for disclosure as a cultural ruling. for making the best decision, there should be a discussion with the patient, the physician and health care team, and the close family. prior to any decision, the physician and the ethics consultant if he or she is involved, should get familiar with the patient's goals, values, religious and cultural beliefs. a clear and sincere conversation is necessary. it should be clarified whether the patient wants to be the key decision maker, and/or to what extent she wishes the family to play a role. conclusion physicians and nurses in some cultures fear communicating bad news because they may make the patient feel hopeless and unable to cope with the problem. words like 'cancer' may create a sense of death and despair in patients. sometimes a diagnosis of a malignant disease results in the deterioration of patient's quality of life. advocates of truth telling believe that sharing information strengthens a trusting relationship between patients and medical professionals and also permits patients to make informed decisions. many patients will know their diagnosis without direct disclosure by the physician or their family, so not telling the truth may ruin the trust between patient and physician. in addition, without disclosure of diagnosis and proper information about disease, the patient's choices would not be autonomous. patients may also deny their diseases or be j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 8 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) reluctant to receive full information. the patients' own reluctance to know should also be respected. it is obvious that many internal and external factors may have an influence on individual capacity and self-determination. however, it seems that interpersonal relationships have a significant effect on the sense of autonomy in various cultural contexts. excessive advocacy of autonomy is mostly based on the accepted interpersonal relationships in some western societies; while different familial connect edness may give various meanings to autonomy; bearing in mind the social nature of human being. finding a balance between appropriate medical decision and patient’s preference is the physician’s duty. in other words, deontological approach which considers truth-telling a moral duty in all situations is not in accordance with respect for autonomy in principlism. in a paternalistic interpretation of principles of autonomy and beneficence, all people from all various cultures may be treated equally. however, as an obligation, medical professionals ought to consider the variations in different cultural contexts and interpret these principles in any clinical cases according to their patients’ cultural backgrounds. the right approach should be discussed through interactive consultation sessions among healthcare professionals, patients and the relatives. in conclusion, a new perspective on the principle of autonomy is needed. it is so clear that respect for autonomy means that different people should be treated differently according to their ideas and beliefs. so, physicians should certainly have and use excellent skills in the areas of cultural sensitivity, and the decisions should be shaped by the patients' values and preferences. they should work to develop better skills in handling these difficult conversations, and consider various cultural differences as a key part of the essential skill set. acknowledgments this research has been supported by tehran university of medical sciences by the use of the research grant (contract no. 8938). i appreciate prof. wayne shelton for his invaluable comments and sincere support through the course of "online practicum in clinical ethicsambi 603". i also thank ms. christine simons for her kind assistance and dr. shellie asher for her valuable suggestion. i confirm that there is no conflict of interest relevant to this article. j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 9 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) table 1some research studies about truth telling in different countries. references research sample results mosconi et al. 1991 (3) 1171 italian breast cancer patients and their physicians only 47% of the patients reported having been told that they had cancer. 25% of their physicians stated they had not given accurate information. blackhall et al. 1995 (4) 800 people with different ethnicity, los angeles county, california korean americans (47%), mexican americans (65%), european americans (87%), and african americans (88%) believed that a patient should be told the diagnosis of metastatic cancer. korean americans (35%), mexican americans (48%), african americans (63%), and european americans (69%) believed that a patient should be told of a terminal prognosis. ruhnke et al. 2000 (5) 400 japanese physicians, 65 patients; and 120 us physicians, 60 patients few japanese physicians (17%), but 42% of patients agreed that a doctor should inform the patient of a cancer diagnosis. but at least 80% of us physicians and patients agreed. 80% of japanese physicians and 65% patients agreed that a doctor should inform the patient’s family of the diagnosis. a minority of us physicians (6%) and patients (22%) agreed. mayer et al. 2005 (6) 362 japanese and 350 us pediatric oncologists japanese physicians (61.8%) did not explicitly tell the child the diagnosis; only 9.5% always told. 65% of the us physicians always explicitly told the child the diagnosis. tavoli et al. 2007 (7) 142 iranian patients, tehran, iran only 48% of hospitalized patients with gastrointestinal cancers were aware that they had cancer and the rest did not know their diagnosis. (the researchers asked patients and their families in the separate sessions about the disease and the reason of hospitalization.) erer et al. 2008 (8) 104 cancer patients, medical oncology department of uludag˘university, turkey 86.5% positive response to the items that the patients have the right to be informed, 92.3% agreed that the physician should inform the patient on the diagnosis and the treatment, 76.9% believed that the physician is obliged to inform the patient kazemi et al. 2010 (9) 200 iranian clinical practitioners, tabriz university of medical sciences, iran twenty percent of physicians believed that a patient should be told the diagnosis of a serious terminal disease. but 8% stated that they won't tell the patient the truth. most respondents (72%) believed that the decision may be different in different conditions and various socio-cultural contexts. j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 10 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) references 1. surbone a. telling the truth to patients with cancer: what is truth? lancet oncol 2006; 7: 944-50. 2. shahidi j. not telling the truth: circumstances leading to concealment of diagnosis and prognosis from cancer patients. eur j cancer care 2010; 19: 589–93. 3. mosconi p, meyerowitz be, liberati mc, liberati a. disclosure of breast cancer diagnosis: patient and physician reports. ann oncol 1991; 2: 273-80. 4. blackhall lj, murphy s, frank g, michel v, azen s. ethnicity and attitudes toward patient autonomy. jama 1995; 274: 820–5. 5. ruhnke gw, wilson sr, akamatsu t, et al. ethical decision making and patient autonomy. chest 2000; 118; 117282. 6. mayer dk, parsons sk, terrin n, et al. school re-entry after a cancer diagnosis: physician attitudes about truth telling and information sharing. child care health dev 2005; 31: 355–63. 7. tavoli a, montazeri a, mohagheghi ma, roshan r, tavoli z, melyani m. knowledge of cancer diagnosis and quality of life in patients with gastrointestinal cancer. payesh 2007; 6: 257-64. (in persian) 8. erer s, atici e, erdemir ad. the views of cancer patients on patient rights in the context of information and autonomy. j med ethics 2008; 34; 384-88. 9. kazemi a, poursuleimani ar, fakhari a, mada'en k. evaluation of truth-telling aspects: the perspectives of medical faculty of tabriz university of medical sciences. j med ethics hist med 2010, 3(2): 54-63. 10. gold m. ethics in medicine: is honesty always the best policy? ethical aspects of truth telling. intern med j 2004; 34: 578–80. 11. hebert pc, hoffmaster b, glass kc, singer pa. bioethics for clinicians: 7. truth telling. can med assoc j 1997; 156: 225-8. 12. novack dh, plumer r, smith rl, ochitill h, morrow gr, bennett jm. changes in physicians’ attitudes toward telling the cancer patient. jama 1979; 241: 897–900. 13. hanssen i. from human ability to ethical principle: an intercultural perspective on autonomy. med health care philos 2004; 7: p. 274. 14. surbone a. truth telling to the patient. jama 1992; 268, 1661-2. 15. surbone a, ritossa c, spagnolo ag. evolution of truth-telling attitudes and practices in italy. crit rev oncol hematol 2004; 52: 165–72. 16. lai y. views from asia: truth telling in cancer diagnosis and prognosis in taiwan. proceeding of the uicc world cancer congress 2006: bridging the gap: transforming knowledge into action, july 8-12, 2006, washington, dc, usa, 89-4. 17. die trill m, kovalcik r. the child with cancer influence of culture on truth-telling and patient care. ann n y acad sci 1997; 809: 197-210. 18. uchitomi y, yamawaki s. truth-telling practice in cancer care in japan. ann n y acad sci 1997; 809, 290– 9. 19. ornek buken n. truth-telling information and communication with cancer patients in turkey. j int soc hist islamic med 2003, 2: 31-6. 20. kazemiyan a. evaluating physicians' points of view about terminally ill patients. j med ethics hist med 2008; 1: 61-7. (in persian) 21. vahdaninia ms, montazeri a. cancer patient education in iran: attitudes of health professionals. payesh 2003; 2: 259-65. (in persian) 22. surbone a. truth telling and ethical issues: an overview. proceeding of the uicc world cancer congress 2006: bridging the gap: transforming knowledge into action july 8-12, 2006, washington, dc, usa, 89-1. 23. glass e, cluxton d. truth-telling: ethical issues in clinical practice. j hosp palliat nurs 2004; 6, 232-42. 24. wang st, chen ch, chen yh, huang hl. the attitude toward truth telling of cancer in taiwan. j psychosom res 2004; 57: 53-8. 25. jonsen ar, siegler m, winslade wj. clinical ethics: a practical approach to ethical decisions in clinical medicine. new york, ny: mcgraw-hill, medical publishing devision; 2002. 26. orr rd, shelton w. a process and format for clinical ethics consultation. j clin ethics 2009; 20: 1-11. j med ethics hist med 2011, 4:11 farzaneh zahedi page 11 | 11 (page number not for citation purposes) 27. centeno-cortés c, núñez-olarte jm. questioning diagnosis disclosure in terminal cancer patients: a prospective study evaluating patients’ responses. palliat med 1994; 8: 39–44. 28. doumit m, huijer h, kelley j, nassar n. the lived experience of lebanese family caregivers of cancer patients. cancer nurs 2008; 31(4): e36-e42. 29. zahedi f, larijani b. common principles and multiculturalism. j med ethics hist med 2009; 2: 6 (online). available at: http://journals.tums.ac.ir/upload_files/pdf/13464.pdf (accessed in 2010) 30. zahedi f, larijani b. cancer ethics from the islamic point of view. iran j allergy asthma immunol 2007; 6: 17-24. ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 international journal of humanity studies http://e-journal.usd.ac.id/index.php/ijhs sanata dharma university, yogyakarta, indonesia 120 the power of truth of parrhesia and parrhesiasist in the poetry collection of arakian ballad maria matildis banda udayana university mbanda574@gmail.com doi: https://doi.org/10.24071/ijhs.2019.030111 received 19 march 2019; revised 31 june 2019; accepted 27 august 2019 abstract according to “power” of their “truth”, poets have a responsibility in expressing the truth through their works. therefore, the personal relationship between poets and their works is an absolute thing that can be examined from both personal and cultural point of view. this paper analyzes it through the poetry collection of ballada arakian (arakian ballad) (2014) written by yoseph yapi taum (yapi) with the main issue of how are the actual forms of personal relationship between yapi and arakian ballad? this paper was written by using expressive approach to answer the issue. the theory used was the theory of power and truth by emphasizing parrhesia (fearless speech) and parrhesiasist (the one who uses parrhesia) according to m. foucault. the method used was literature review and written interview to the poet. the result shows that the power and the truth owned by yapi in the parrhesia implementation in his poetry collection, arakian ballad, express general themes about humanisms, religious, and reflection based on parrhesia: the poet’s personal relationship and the truth, the risk he faced in conveying the truth, and the poet’s responsibility as the parrhesiasist. keywords: parrhesia, parrhesiasist, expressive approach introduction in poetry writing, the concept of licentia poetica is known, which means the freedom of poets to use words, dictions, and even violate the language structure rules for the sake of the aesthetic purposes of poetry. do poets (and writers in general) also have the freedom to decide and express the meaning of their works? the answer is yes! in fact, it is not only freedom but also responsibility because their authority is the full “power” to convey various realities of life and values of truth offered through their works even though the criteria of truth itself is never be the same. the criteria of truth are determined by connoisseurs of literature that generally connect various conflicts and series of events in literary works with realities of daily life. literary works will deal with various interpretations especially about the truth. the interpretation of truth according to a is not necessarily the same as the interpretation of truth according to b. there are various interpretations of similar literary work. different interpretations indicate ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 121 different point of view about values of truth expressed by poets through their works (banda, 2016:...). responding multiple interpretations about the power of truth in literary works is an interesting thing because it is related to responsibility. according to the “power” the poets have, they are responsible to reveal the truth through their works. focault states the concept of truth with parrhesia (frankness speech) and parrhesiastes or parrhesiasist which means the person who practices parrhesia; the person who speaks the truth or truth teller (banda, 2016:...). the poem of ballada arakian (arakian ballad) from buku satu ballada arakian (book one: arakian ballad), in the poetry collection of arakian ballad, for example, reveals the pride inherited “ama lera wulan ina tana ekan” (lord of heaven and earth in lamaholot language) which has signaled before the murder of oa dona, arakian’s wife, occurred. by the diction of ama lera wulan ina tana ekan, yapi taum expresses a deep understanding and belief about signs of nature and an existence of ancestors through the implementation of parrhesia expressed by the poet who is the parrhesiasist (the one who use parrhesia) in his poems. there are 82 poems distributed through three different books, buku satu balada arakian (book one: arakian ballad), buku dua kota perbatasan (book two: border city), and buku tiga sang pencari lobster (book three: the lobster seeker) in the poetry collections of arakian ballad (taum, 2014). yapi’s parrhesia ability can be identified by how he clearly states the reasons of writing related to his past that is familiar with fairy tales, legends, fables, and myths defined as human endeavors in responding questions about nature as an effort to give the meaning to life. in the poetry creation process, this kind of point of view is one of the important parts of yapi’s personal side who understands local genius as the spirit of modern literature. yapi believes that in the creation of poetry, personal identity and cultural identity are integrated in the poem itself, created by the poet. personal identity, such as preference to diction, metrum, syntax and semantic constructions, language style, theme choices, and message to be conveyed. cultural identity expresses dreams, hopes, goals, values, and local genius (taum, 2014). cultural identity adopts various themes that are the manifestation of cultural values (local genius) as baker explained that an identity is entirely born (exist) based on its cultural representation or acculturation (barker, 2005:170-171). both of these identities are the aspect of parrhesia in which the practical form is in the work written, while the aspect of parrhesiasist is yapi as the poet. the implementation of parrhesia in this case is all the experience and knowledge owned by poets revealed or written through their poems. with courage and freedom, poets convey the truth born within themselves as the parrhesiasist. in a nutshell, the implementation of parrhesia is the poetry collection of arakian ballad and the parrhesiasist is the poet. the implementation of parrhesia in the poetry collection of arakian ballad and its relationship with the poet as the parrhesiasist is interesting to study further with the following problem formulations. first, what are the themes and the meanings of parrhesia implemented in the arakian ballad poetry? second, how is ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 122 the relationship between the power of truth of parrhesia and the poet as the parrhesiasist? literature review theory used in this paper is the power of truth theory according to michel foucault, specifically related to parrhesia and parrhesiasist. things related to both theoretical concepts and methods are explained as follows. definition parrhesia is frankness speech. meanwhile, parrhesiastes or parrhesiasist is the one who uses parrhesia; the person who speaks the truth or truth teller (kebung, 1997: banda, 2016:....). the two concepts of this theory stated by foucault are related to issues concerning ethics. parrhesia is a verbal activity in which the speakers express their personal relationship with the truth and they are ready to take the risk because they are realize that telling the truth is a kind of duty to develop and help others (or themselves). in parrhesia, the speakers use their freedom. it means that they prefer frank over persuasive, truth over falsehood or silence, risk of death over live and security, critic over lies, and moral virtues over self-interest and moral apathy (foucault, as cited in kebung, 1997:13). according to focault, there are three main things to consider in the implementation of parrhesia in conveying the truth. first, personal relationship with the truth. second, risks faced in conveying the truth. third, responsibility of parrhesia toward truth, frankness, accepting risks, facing criticism, and moral virtues. therefore, there are three main themes of focault that can be separated each other, namely: 1) truth; 2) power, knowledge, and authority; 3) moral virtues (banda, 2016:...). poets implement parrhesia through their works. therefore, they should have personal relationship with truth; dare to take risks; be responsible for their freedom in telling about the truth through their works. as the parrhesiasist, they have the power of truth expressed through works they write. they have knowledge, power, conviction and authority as the truth teller expressed through their works as the form of parrhesia implementation. poets are the parrhesiasist who represent the truth through their works, involving the relationship of power and knowledge in which the form of power is involved with the production of subjectivity (barker, 2010 153). poets subjectively have knowledge, power, belief, and authority as the truth teller expressed through their works. expressive approach “the power of truth of parrhesia and parrhesiasist in of poetry collection of arakian ballad” underlines the relationship of the poet and his works. this paper used expressive approach emphasizing the poet’s point of view of aesthetic moments in his life: a) moments (obedience, time), when the mentality is in the aesthetic scope of ‘beauty’; b) cognitive (thought) or morality; c) a power in touching situations (based on sensory perception); and d) intellectualism which is ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 123 reflected through art works and academic works. these four things are believed to lead us to knowledge or practical follow-up efforts (krieger, 1976:11). in an expressive approach, local genius is one of the poets’ main strengths in character building of their poems from the point of view of setting of place, time, and socio-cultural background. aesthetic moments have huge influence on creative follow-up such as poetry, short stories, novels or other literary works. aesthetic moments are related to the imagination and the strength or creativity of the subject (poet) and his work through mentality processes. in the creation of poetry, mentality processes depend on what yapi calls “a pleasant or unpleasant event of life, that has thrilled the heart, either through deep thought, restless contemplation, wild desire, or peaceful feeling that combines into feeling” (taum, 2015:6). this argument was also stated by yapi previously in which poetry is a combination of the meaning of life that comes from experiences and encounter of humans with themselves, others, the universe, and the god (taum, 2014:2). this perspective is in line with the implementation of parrhesia mentioned before: 1) personal relationship with the truth, 2) risks faced in conveying the truth, 3) responsibility of parrhesia toward truth, frankness, accepting risks, facing criticism, and moral virtues. reading process the poetry collections of arakian ballad (2015) consist of three parts namely: buku satu balada arakian (book one: arakian ballad); page 1-66, buku dua kota perbatasan (book two: border city); page 67-106, and buku tiga sang pencari lobster (book three: the lobster seeker); page 107-149. this poetry collections are studied trough reading process of decontextualization and re-contextualization, determining themes, and comprehension (interpretation) meanings. decontextualization treats texts autonomously to understand the meaning of texts freely through sociological or psychological point of view. meanwhile, re-contextualization is about returning texts to its contexts and open up to it (sumaryono, 1999:108-109). decontextualization process in the poetry collections of arakian ballad occurs when each poem is associated with the implementation of parrhesia interpreted based on the poet’s intention, cultural situations and social conditions of creations (text creations), as well as for whom the text was written (idem, 2019). the comprehension of decontextualization of poems in arakian ballad is the recording of the poet’s memories of aesthetic moments in life; life events that become poetry; in order to give the meaning to life. furthermore, re-contextualization process occurs when placing texts toward the possibility to be widely read. it means that the comprehension done is not an absolute closed comprehension but an opened comprehension to be interpreted to find themes as a series of meanings. decontextualization and re-contextualization reading are carried out simultaneously by using three steps of meaning comprehension according to racoeur, namely: denotative comprehension, reflective comprehension, and connotative comprehension. ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 124 the implementation of parrhesia and parrhesiasist in the poetry collection of arakian ballad parrhesia and parrhesiasist were explained specifically by mikhel foucault in his last six lectures in university of california, berkeley, in october until november 1983. the six foucault lectures were edited by joseph pearson in 1985 based on notes made by his auditor (banda, 2016:...). in those lectures, foucault talked about “discourse and truth” as the problematization of parrhesia. the truth is perceived as an activity or an action. for this purpose, sufficient requirements must be prepared to show that we are justified in believing in a preposition (or a sentences or belief, etc.) (kirkham, 2013:38-39). in the main framework of parrhesia, it is explained that the truth is not found in ideas, but it is found in opened implementation toward new problems that stimulate actions and others’ attitude (kebung, 2015: 85; banda, 2016:....) that explain poets’ responsibilities: 1) knowledge and comprehension that explain the harmony between parrhesia and parrhesiasist; 2) moral and spiritual responsibilities that explain personal relationship and works; 3) responsibility for the universe (macro and micro); 4) responsibility for ancestors; and 5) responsibility for god almighty. in the process of creation, writers implement parrhesia through their works, such as poems, short stories, novels, romance, drama, scenarios, and others. the writers’ responsibility and intervention greatly influence the works they create (banda, 2016:....); the reality narrated in literary works is determined by writers’ thought (junus, 1986:8). there are three kinds of relationship among people in the implementation of parrhesia, namely: living together in a community, life of common society, and personal relationship among people (kebung, 1997:31). characters of the relationship are related to 1) relationship with ourselves; 2) relationship with others; 3) relationship with the universe (banda, 2015). these three characters of relationship convince writers (poets) who have the power to convey the truth as the parrhesiasist in the implementation of parrhesia as follows: the implementation of parrhesia in book one: arakian ballad book one: arakian ballad consists of 30 poetry titles which in total reveal the implementation of parrhesia about humanism. the theme of this poetry is directly readable in the title (as the content) of arakian ballad. ballad can be perceived as heroism stories of ordinary people who are also greater than the epic stories of world’s great figures (manneke, 2015:xi). yapi (the poet) describes it through his belief in ancestral power, social justice, and historical memories. 1. ancestral power arakian is willing to face death for the sake of his wife’s dignity, oa dona. this ballad is intended for fabianus tibo who was shot in the poso tragedy several years ago. by the diction “ama lera wulan ina tana ekan” (lord of heaven and earth in lamaholot language), yapi taum expresses his belief in signs of nature, lia wato cave, and the existence of ancestors who thrilled the entire arakian’s soul with the courage to defend the dignity. the first sign, “a flock of crows is crossing the village”, which means that bad news or something bad will happen. a herd of cursed people sent by the ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 125 landlord enter the village to grab oa dona’s dignity. she lay dead on the bed beside her husband. “challenging injustice” that was what arakian, oa dona’s husband, done with the belief that the ancestors give him that faith. arakian challenged the herd in front of lia wato cave, the hiding place for killing the whole herd. they snatched and tortured arakian until she is battered and bleeding. however, arakian’s face kept raised. “by puffing out his chest, arakian welcomed a bullet that tore his heart”. in the fragment “this is the celebration of my body and blood – the blood of the new war covenant till the trumpets sound.” the poet explains how arakian returns to his ancestors. the innocent man, who defended his wife’s dignity, was willing to die with blood pouring from his heart. the setting of local genius about ama lera wulan ina tana ekan ensures that one thousand and one of oa dona and one thousand and one of arakian who remain upright rely on the strength of all the contents of nature, the ancestors, and the god almighty. the body may die with the ground, but the spirit of life will rise again and remain forever. 2. social justice the spirit of local genius was also revealed in tidak ada mimpi di negeri ini (there are no dreams in this country) is intended for sondang hutagalung. seonggok tubuh renta (a vulnerable body) is intended for indra azwan, perempuan bermata dendam (woman with vengeful eye), ia membuat tungku di kaki merapi (she makes fireplace in merapi’s foothills), and maut merah di km lambelu (red death in km lambelu) are intended for fasikum, purbalingga. in these five poems, external factors become yapi’s aesthetic moments that cannot be hidden. sondang hutagalung, a young man who died burning himself in..... as a form of protest against various injustices in this country. as the nation that often loses historical memories, who cares for sondang? what does it mean to kill yourself? what for? for whose sake? even there is no place for dreaming in this country? is sondang’s effort important to make this country realize about the ongoing injustice? this poem tries to convey sadness without hope. however, “the tone contained is not entirely grim, because this poem also conveys the power and belief (manneke, 2015:ix) as implied in “...at the horizon, raindrops fall on the ferris wheel-give her a little dream...(p. 3) similar to maut merah di km lambelu (red death in km lambelu) (p. 5253). the tears of a miserable man who hurt by injustice. already fight! already survive! finally give up! but giving up doesn’t mean losing. “the heart of his man beats – the dagger removed, the power of an arrogant is broken down – his spirit is challenging the sky” (p. 53). it takes confidence to make fireplace in merapi’s foothills. it takes faith to keep passionate to survive for indra azwan who keep walking to “the end of the world” for the sake of justice for his child who killed by security force’s motorcycle. similarly, perempuan bermata dendam (woman with vengeful eye) who sobbed in the dark with her six children in her arms. she mourns the loss of his husband, the honor of the family who died because trying to defend injustice. the spirit must exist in order to survive and escape from fear “here, at merapi’s foothills, fire and magma keep heating the restless soul” (p. 41). ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 126 3. historical memories book one also presents the poetry with g30s pki story background. ballada mawar putih (white rose ballad) (pp. 10-11), di tepi kali brantas (at the edge of brantas river) (pp. 24-45), ... “just remember, our grandchildren have recorded it” (pp. 25). di persimpangan jalan (at the crossroads) (pp. 36-37). lampu minyak masih menyala (oil lamp is still on) (pp. 56-57). tembang gadis pari (the song of pari girl) (pp. 26-27) intended for umar kayam (he also wrote sri sumarah and bawuk with the g30s pki story background). pram (08), pantai namlea (namlea beach) (09). misery in “don’t go home yet”... and don’t go yet in munir. koloni lepra (leprosy colonies) (pp. 38-39) intended for pramodya ananta toer. the way the poet thinks as the parrhesiasist is read in this book one. the history has moving feeling demanding an answer. in the novel entitled rabet, runtuhnya jerman timur (rabet, the collapse of east germany) (jamkovsky, 2009), for example, it is explained that feeling is “a person” who know the most about tragic history of ben (the protagonist in the novel) who lost his wife gesa, his daughter sophie and his country east germany (banda, 2019:204-205). jamkovsky has deep knowledge and understanding about east germany as well as yapi also conducted in-depth research for his dissertation entitled sastra dan politik representasi tragedi 1965 dalam negara orde baru (literary and political representation of the 1965 tragedy in the new order state) (taum, 2015). in the implementation of parrhesia, the spirit has an explicit life through its presence in jejak langkah (footsteps) and rumah kaca (glass house) is “a ferris wheel that blooms more fragrant through place, space, and time in bumi manusia (human earth), which was born from a shady soul” (pp. 39). things underlying yapi’s religious attitude is in di tepi danau kelimutu (at the edge of kelimutu lake), ratapan di batas kota (lamentations at the outskirt) (pp. 58-61), perjamuan darah (supper of blood) (pp. 62-63) and dismas di puncak kalvari (dismas at the summit of calavary) (pp. 64-65). the poetry that is able to have the whole theme and meaning in the implementation of parrhesia of buku satu ballada arakian (book one: arakian ballad), which is about a belief in ancestors, social justice, and historical memories is the poem of jangan pulang dulu (don’t go home yet) (pp. 16-17). this poem is filled with questions, fear, anxiety, prayer, hope, and tears that never stop dripping from the motherland, homeland, and spilled blood in which in the end, we must be sincere (not surrender) to break up the grandchildren of this country. the implementation of parrhesia in the form of prayer, hope, and local genius about a country that is safe and peaceful, have social justice and before that country’s hope exists; and the courage of the parrhesiasist in jangan pulang dulu (don’t go home yet). anakku, jangan pulang dulu! sudah cukupkah para ibu kehilangan anaknya pertaruhan nyawanya untuk kebenaran negeri ini. biarlah dukaku teronggok dalam relung doa! ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 127 biakah ketakutanku menjadi mazmur pujian! biarlah gelisahku membubung ke langit malam, menjadi persembahan bagi keselamatan jiwamu di bumi dan di akhirat (jangan pulang dulu (don’t go home yet, p. 17)). the series of meanings of humanism themes are in ancestral power, social justice, and historical memories. as the parrhesiasist, yapi succeeds in managing the implementation of parrhesia in this book one. it is not easy to dare to speak the truth intended at the same time to commemorate tibo, et al., sondang hutagalung, fasikum, and indra azwan. although yapi has never been compared to wiji tukul in the implementation of parrhesia, history can always bring together a communal relationship to the substance of humanism voiced, even though no one pretends not to hear. the aspect of parrhesia and parrhesiasist in book two: border city buku dua kota perbatasan (book two: border city) consists of 25 poems which in total reveal the implementation of parrhesia about religiosity. the theme of book two is directly read in the title (as the content) kota perbatasan (border city). border means an imaginary line that separates one region from another. the poet, yapi, as the parrhesiasist, describes it through his belief in meeting and separation, loss and longing, as well as agape (love). 1. meeting and separation in this poetry, the border is divider, the border city is the last meeting area that can no longer be crossed by each other as implied in the following implementation of parrhesia. “on the other side, the boat is waiting for you. although there is a tent at the crossroads waiting patiently, it has meaningless wait, because “when i leave the tent, you will have no time to wave.” manneke explains that the city that becomes the border city is never really clear, therefore, yapi’ emotion is more personal, abstract, controlled (manneke, 2015: xv). this is easy to understand because of the poet’s agreement as a parrhesiasist with himself to build awareness that how wild people’s imagination are, they must have their own limit to stop it. this poetry is reminiscent of a fragment of the song senja di batas kota (twilight in the border city): senja di batas kota selalu teringat padamu saat kita kan berisah entah untuk berapa lama. walau senja telah berganti wajahmu selalu terbayang waktu engkau kulepaskan berdebar hati di dada (twilight in the border city – always remembering you – when we were apart – for some time. even though the twilight has changed – your face is always imagined – when you let go – throbbing in my chest) (the lyrics are popularized by erni djohan in 1970 -1980s). kota perbatasan is a kind of temporary stop to return or to be left behind again. kota perbatasan is a symbol to sincerely let something go or have something or even have nothing. ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 128 2. loss and longing is the border city ataili, yapi’s hometown? (pp. 95-95). there is a painting about a village located in a height. lamarera sea beneath, labalekan mountain, large boulders, kesambi branch near the abyss where the placenta of newborn babies are hung. the local genius setting explains a strong foundation of birth, life (including emigration), and the universe. kota perbatasan also covers yogyakarta dalam hujan pertama (yogyakarta in the first rain) (pp. 68), laut parangtritis (paragtritis sea) (p. 69), kaliurang (p. 70), malam pantai karang (karang beach night) (p. 73), senandung anak rantau (emigrants’ humming) (pp. 80-81), sarangan (pp.92-93), canbera (p. 103). in the border city and whenever we are and try to grasp the signs, feel them with the accuracy of the ethical moments that occur due to external and internal touches, leading to the fact that time passes and throughout this life journey, there will always be a limit. until in kutambatkan hatiku (i tethered my heart) (pp. 90-91) as well as kota pebatasan in which how strong the ownership of everything will end up in loss or longing. the boundary between being and nothing can only be left by the deepest sense of the start of journey from ataili to yogyakarta and other imaginary places that make the poetry exist. 3. agape (love) as written in ratapan di batas kota (lamentations at the outskirt) (pp. 5861), perjamuan darah (the supper of blood), dismas di puncak kalvari (dismas at the summit of kalvari) (pp. 64-65) in buku satu ballada arakian and buku dua kota perbatasan also contain connotative words and dictions with symbols explained in ile ape dalam meditasi (ile ape in meditation) (pp. 98-99). there is an internal vibration related to personal aesthetic moments those who have a deep devotion about the virgin mary maria "salve, regina, mater misericordiae vita dulcedo, et spes nostra, salve... o clemens, o pia, o dulcis virgo maria." also, a strong belief in jesus christ in the history of his salvation as a proclaimer of eternal truth. aesthetic moments, about faith that is personal and can be owned together, are expressed in kunamakan puisi, seruling, dan, malam pantai karang (i call them poem, flute and karang beach night) (pp.71-74); kulihat ia bersujud (i saw him lying down) (pp.82), perjalanan malam (night journey) (pp.83), pertanyaan ilalang (thatch’s questions) (pp.84-85), sebuah doa larut malam (a late night prayer) (pp. ) apel di firdaus, kutambatkan perahu (apple in paradise, i tethered the boat (pp.88-91), dan sajak bumi (poetry of earth) (pp.104). the poet’s attitude as the parrhesiasist is read in this book two. religiosity is the imagery language of religion (mangun wijaya, 1984) connected to dogmas and expressions of dogmas. religion as dogma is written by tradition and how the tradition is implemented as religiosity. the poem that can contain the whole implementation of parrhesia in buku dua kota perbatasan about meeting and separation, loss and longing, and agape is menutup musim (closing the season) (pp. 96). this poem is the culmination of humans’ life who do the implementation of parrhesia. the culmination of the ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 129 journey is death and final rest “makam yang sunyi begitu rikuh menyambutmu” (the silent tomb so awkwardly welcomes you) a place where everyone will go. love and longing come together and only time gives the limits for those who comes first and next, in the implementation of parrhesia and the responsibility of the parrhesiasist as follows. hari jadi malam, langit pun meredup jalanan berkelok menghilang di balik semak makam yang sunyi begitu rikuh menyambutmu ratapan perpisahan mendirikan bulu roma dua sayapmu terentang antara kangit dan bumi di situ semua kenangan masih tersimpan sepertinya aku masih punya janji denganmu sebelum musim yang terlalu cepat menutup (menutup musim (closing the season), p. 96). the series of meanings of religious themes are in the struggle for life, expression of gratitude, and hometown. as the parrhesiasist, yapi also succeed in managing the implementation of parrhesia in this book two. religion and religious things are things that often “collide” when someone who has religion has not been able to implement his/her religion in a religious life (religiosity). religious attitude is not infrequently polluted by aspects of political interests and goals that disturb communal relationship at the local, national or global. the series of meanings in this book two emphasize the substance of life to the similar ending for everyone! the aspect of parrhesia and parrhesiasist in book three: the lobsters seeker buku tiga sang pencari lobster (book three: the lobsters seeker) consist of 27 poems which in total reveal the implementation of parrhesia about reflection (go back to hometown) which means search and effort to always find spiritual motivation born in family and tradition. the theme of book three is directly read in the title (as the content) sang pencari lobster (the lobster seeker) (pp. 139). the poet, yapi, as the parrhesiasist, describes it through his belief in struggle for life, expressions of gratitude, and hometown. 1. struggle for life why did yapi, as the parrhesiasist, choose this poem as the title of book three? in terms of denotative meaning, this poem tells about getting lobsters after going through the waves and corals challenges. meanwhile, in terms of connotative meaning, this poem emphasize the spirit of struggle to arrive at the final destination of a long journey to go home. “senyum dingin diarahkan pada debur yang membuih lobster dijerat dan ditawarkan ke cukong” (cold smile is directed to sounds of bubbling wave – lobster is snared and offered to the capitalists) (pp. 139), next is income and welfare if it is enough. nothing is achieved so easily, therefore, it is not easy to ignore the way to be successful. the other poems in book three explain yapi as the parrhesiasist literally. this can be read in sajak sepotong bulan (a piece of moon’s poem) (pp. 108 ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 130 109) which falls on the porch while the other pieces fall in the starving lion’s den, sajak kerinduan (the rhyme of longing) (pp.116) about bumi tahu betapa rindunya bulan (the earth know how the moon miss), then semesta alam pun berkidung: penyair tergetar menarikkan penanya (even the universe sing a song: the poet thrilled to dance the questioner) (p. 116), sindoro and sumbing (pp. 118119) about the desire that must be fulfilled although the soul is the risk. personal struggle for life also exist in the jejak malam (night trail) yang bakal menghapus jejaknya sendiri sebelum fajar keabadian tiba dengan tergesa (which will erase its own trail – before the dawn of eternity arrives hastily) (pp. 134-135), sajak seikat mawar (the poem of a rose) (pp. 136-137) the shortest poem expressing the rose as a symbol of love, but in this poem, the love is left behind. the poem of makam argolayu (argolayu tomb) (p. 143) which also merely emphasizes longing to go home after such a long adventure. kucing (cat) (p. 143) tearing the full moon. aquarium bulan juli (aquarium of july) intended for sapardi djoko damono (pp. 144-145), and kereta terakhir (the last train) (pp. 144-145), and bougenville (p. 111) which gives faith to survive although have various imperfections. 2. expression of gratitude in this book three: the lobster seekers, represents yapi’s complete aesthetic feeling about expression of gratitude based on his personal experience of faith. similar to ile ape dalam meditasi (ile ape dalam meditasi) (p....), laut bumi dan langit (sea of earth and sky) (p. 117), perjalanan 1 (journey 1), perjalanan 2, (journey 2), and perjalanan 3 (journey 3), lelaki malam (a night man) (pp. 130-131), telah kubangun penjara (the prison that i have built) (p. 137), pesan ibu (mother’s message) (p. 142) are able to move the soul in the similar appreciation of faith and devotion. di tepi danau kelimutu (at the edge of kelimutu lake) 24 (50-51: read the signs revealed by the mystery of kelimutu lake. dari kedalaman perut bumi pesanmu terbaca di permukaan tiga warna dengan tiga langit tangga terakhir menuju-mu (from the deepest part of the earth – your message is read on the surface – three colors with three skies – the last stairway to you). the poet understands well traditional belief, society’s local genius in around kelimutu lake in which they believe that spirits of dead people end their immortality in kelimutu lake. ratapan di batas kota (lamentations at the outskirt) (28: 58 – 61) and perjamuan darah (supper of blood) 29 (62-63): a deep appreciation of the crucifixion tragedy, blood is the symbol of sacrifice. both of these poems are reminiscent of the poem balada penyalipan (crucifixion ballad) by ws rendra. there are religious spiritual things about parrhesia expressed here: 1) his arrival brings good news, joy, and peace; 2) his arrival as a threat to the authorities who are worried about being left behind by their loyal followers; 3) false accusations directed against him who is considered to conduct suspicious rituals; 4) his disappointment to the authorities who do not want his presence; 5) his service in washing the feet; 6) he must suffer....sincerely accept the history of journey for the sake of human safety; and 7) he died in the cross. ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 131 the implementation of parrhesia is read in rosary, cross, and the blood that has become an integral part of the spirituality that the poet believes. as the parrhesiasist, the poet knows exactly that “there is no greater sacrifice than the sacrifice of one’s blood and life” to save others. yapi’ adventure as the parrhesiasist in expressing meaning of life related to memories, life process, and serious life choices. more than half of the poems in the poetry collection of arakian ballad present the aspect of “go back to hometown” as parrhesia that is personal, communal, and universal. when it is connected to aesthetic moments revealed by yapi as the parrhesiasist, “go back to hometown” is one of the poems that is successful in conveying adventurers’ intimate memories in their life journey. 3. memories of hometown it’s not only about ordinary memories, but also about memories that give direction to life through important decisions expressed in dia yang pertama (the first one) (pp. 132-133), ritual peraduan (rituals of conflict) (p. 138), and a place that is quite decisive for yapi’s journey as a lecturer, poet, critic, educator, and researcher in kembali ke lembah hokeng (go back to hokeng valley) (p. 141). it is not only me (yapi) who kembali ke lembah hokeng (go back to hokeng valley) but literature is universal. hokeng valley is an oasis for yapi’s adventure. with the similar substance, each people can return to the place, space, and time, whenever and wherever they rediscover the essence of life, new motivations to keep moving further. similarly, lyra who goes away, finding her identity as ina lamalera and arakian who goes deep to his heart to find his identity as lamafa (whale hunter) in suara samudra (the sound of the ocean) (banda, 2017). actually, people as anything will find themselves, in their own journey. the implementation of parrhesia that is believed to the parrhesiasist by the poet is read in this book three. pulang ke kedalaman (go back to hometown) is an attempt to rediscover new motivations in for those who go away from their hometown (especially flores children). parrhesia things about work as the dignity that need to be upheld with gratitude. yapi’s arguments as the parrhesiasist is expressed in the three books in arakian ballad in which become living oasis in sajak kenangan (rhyme of memories) below. kami saling memandang di pelabuhan tua ini jejak masa kanak-kanak terkelupas di tembok dermaga dan bata merah yang dulu karib mengerdip sepasang remaja duduk bersisian memandang elang laut di kejauhan di batas cakrawala senyum sang gadis terabaikan lalu kubawa ke tanah rantau berpuluh-puluh tahun di pelabhan tua ini ada bagian jiwaku yang masih tertinggal tertambat bersama perahu yang tak sempat melaut ombak-ombak kecil dengan semangat mencumbuinya kerinduan masih tersimpan di kota kecil ini ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 132 ketika hidup tinggal hitungan mata uang aku tahu betapa mahalnya kenangan kami saling berpegangan tangan di pelabuhan tua ini ketika kutatap jauh ke kolam matamu kutahu jejak-jejak kita masih tinggal di sana meskipun hari sudah berangsur senja ombak-ombak kecil itu pun masih bergairah aku telah kembali ke sini sebagai orang asing aneh, ruang kusam itu masih tersedia bagiku yogyakarta, july 21, 2013 the series of religious meanings are in the struggle for life, expressions of gratitude and memories of hometown. as the parrhesiasist, yapi is successful in implementing parrhesia in this book three. go back to hometown is similar to digging, discovery, re-enlightenment of new motivations for the future. expressions of gratitude is not just expression of everyone who “go back to” hometown. success or failure of living in different town, go back to hometown is an effort to meet and live the roots for the formation of dignity. “i know exactly how expensive the memories are” the hometown, the way back home, and the feeling of “still having the place” in the hometown. the relationship of the power of truth in the implementation of parrhesia and the poet’s position as the parrhesiasist does yapi have the ability to implement parrhesia? is he responsible as the parrhesiasist? there is an interesting quote chosen by yosep yapi taum (yapi) to strengthen his arguments in his book entitled studi sastra lisan sejarah, teori, metode, dan pendekatan disertai contoh penerapannya (oral literature studies of history, theory, method, and approach with the implementation examples) (2011). the quote is taken from pengantar: pengalaman manusia tentang keindahan (introduction: human experiences about beauty) by mudji sutrisno (1993:13-24) revealing that the process of creating pure art, is basically a recording of humans in experiencing ekstase (a state of unconsciousness) in which they feel they are “outside of everyday life” (taum, 2011:7). this point is expressed in the section sastra lisan sebagai seni dan ilmu (oral literature as art and science). according to yapi, speakers or oral literature are similar to novelists or poets who arrange stories with their complex imagination and special sensitivity (taum, 2011:8). imagination and sensitivity come from understanding of experiences, knowledge, local genius sciences as the sources of literary creation, both oral and written. this is called the implementation of parrhesia based on deep comprehension and duty performance as the parrhesiasist when the parrhesia aspect is realized in the form of arakian ballad poetry intended for fabianus tibo (he is executed in the sara issues in poso, central sulawesi). ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 133 yapi’s parrhesia ability can be read by how he clearly states the reason for writing. it is related to his past which is familiar with fairy tales, legends, fables, and myths that are considered as human endeavors to answer questions about nature as the effort to give meanings to life. in the process of creating poetry, that point of view is one of the important parts of yapi’s personal side who understands local genius as the spirit of modern literature. yapi believe that in creating poetry, personal and cultural identity are integrated into the poetry created. personal identity consists of preference to dictions, metrum, syntax and semantic construction, language style, theme choice, and message to be conveyed. while cultural identity expresses dreams, hopes, ideals, values, and local genius (taum, 2014). cultural identity adopts various themes which are manifestations of cultural values (local genius) as explained by barker that the identity is entirely born (exist) based on cultural representation or acculturation (barker, 2005:170-171). both of these identities are the aspect of parrhesia while the aspect of parrhesiasist is yapi as the poet. poets or writers are people who have the authority to convey the truth. therefore, they are responsible to state true things in the implementation of parrhesia through their works. they are the parrhesiasist, if their works are truly responsible in the implementation of parrhesia. important references can be noted from the history of journey and implementation of parrhesia through various literary works published by balai pustaka like siti nurabaya (marah rusli, 1922), new poet like layar terkembang (with sails unfurled) (sutan takdir alisjahbana, 1933), batch of 45 like the poetry collection of deru campur debu (noise mixed with dust) (chairil anwar), batch of 66 like sri sumarah (umar kayam...), as well as batch of 80 like burung-burung manyar (manyar birds) (1995), etc. after conducting in-depth study through interview and literature research with the poet, yapi, it shows that as the parrhesiasist, this entire book is the recording of memories through poetry containing about: 1) heroism and hypocrisy; 2) life and death; and 3) love and betrayal (yapi, 2014:....) which must be received reflectively. the three eulogies are distributed through the implementation of parrhesia. the capacity of the implementation of parrhesia by the poet is furthermore expressed and implied through sajak kenangan (rhyme of memories) (pp. 114115) which becomes the key to all poetries in book one, book two, and book three. kami saling memandang di pelabuhan tua itu...jejak masa kanak-kanak terkelupas di tembok dermaga (we look at each other in that old port... the steps of childhood peeling off the pier wall). this line is the line in the implementation of parrhesia in the form of memories for all children in flores who leave their hometown to study in primary school, junior high school, or senior high school (who do not enrolled in school, the school is far away from the hometown) in flores since the colonial period until the early 1980s. boats moored on the shore and motorboats anchored on the coast or the shore are the main transportations in flores. yapi might take a boat (bero) from his village to lewoleba (a small port in lembata island) or to waibalun (ferry port in larantuka, east flores) and travel to ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 134 jogya through busung bui port in maumere. at the end of 1970s, 1980s, and the early 1990s, maritime transport is the favourite transportation for children in flores who go to different cities to study in java, bali, sulawesi island or another island. when air transport is developed in ruteng, labuan bajo, ende, and maumere, traveling by plane is a special choice. however, maritime transport is suitable for students or families who do long journey. this type of transport still becomes the favorite one because the cost is relatively cheap, although there are airports in almost all regencies in flores (lembata, flotim, sikka, ende, ngada, manggarai, dan west manggarai) except nageko and east manggarai. thus, sajak kenangan (rhyme of memories) becomes something deep in the implementation of parrhesia or parrhesiasist when it is related to the port, the pier wall, the eagle, and the horizon abandoned or brought though memories to go to the new city. the port is old and dull, seems like the journey to go to the new city and all of the things left in the hometown except the trace. it’s been a long time being old with the old-time journey. the twilight is not only felt in the port but also in the life journey. everyone who go away from their hometown will go back only as a stranger. “aneh, ruang kusam itu masih tersedia bagiku” (it’s weird, that dull room is still available to me). in this line that kind of memory has its place. it is similar to "ke masa silam yang tidak seorang pun sanggup menggantikannya" (in the past, no one can replace it) (ws rendra). sajak kenangan (rhyme of memories) is yapi’s poem as the parrhesiasist who was born personally and was able to express the hearts of children of flores who go to different city in indonesia or even outside indonesia as parrhesia. therefore, sajak kenangan (rhyme of memories) which is personal becomes universal. longing will find its place when the time goes on in different city. "kita anak-anak rantau yang dilahirkan untuk merantau sepanjang hidup" (we are the children who far away from the hometown were born to migrate throughout life) in surat-surat dari dili (letters from dili) (banda, 2005). conclusion the article entitled “power and truth in the implementation of parrhesia and parrhesiasist of the poetry collection of arakian ballad by yoseph yapi taum” is a relatively new article which is about the writer’s sociology by using expressive approach. the argument is that the implementation of parrhesia is related to deep knowledge and understanding of the poet who has the power to tell the truth as the parrhesiasist. foucault believes that people who implement parrhesia (telling the truth), explain their personal relationship with the truth, take risk in conveying the truth, and has to be responsible as the truth teller (kebung, 1997 melalui banda, 2016: ...). the ability to think makes humans able to develop their knowledge seriously, quickly and steadily which is the secret of their powers (soemantri, 1993: 39) which is also obtained through sources of knowledge, beliefs, and authorities (banda, 2016:...). the power to convey the truth is related to the poet’s personal relationship as the parrhesiasist and the implementation of parrhesia formulated in: humanism, religiosity, and reflection. humanism contained in the poems of book one: arakian ballad expressed through themes: believe in ancestors, social ijhs, e-issn 2597-4718, p-issn 2597-470x, vol. 3, no. 1, september 2019, pp. 120-136 135 justices, and historical memories. religiosity contained in the poems of book two: the border city expressed through themes: loss and longing; agape (love). reflection theme (go back to hometown) expressed through struggle for life, expressions of gratitude, and memories of hometown. this article also explains that the series of meanings of themes expressed through poems in the poetry collection of arakian ballad are the implementation of parrhesia by the poet, yapi, as the parrhesiasist. therefore, he is responsible to convey true things in the implementation of parrhesia that is realized through his works. he is the parrhesiasist if his work is truly responsible in the implementation of parrhesia. the theory concept of parrhesia and parrhesiasist in literature study with expressive approach still needs to be further developed. references abdullah, i. 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(1994). teori sastra (trans. sapardi djoko damono). jakarta: gramedia the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 39 the approved and disapproved varieties of ra’y (personal opinion) in islam moharnrnud hashirn k i m a l i while islam emphasizes conformity to the directives of the qur’an and sunnah, one finds in the same sources a parallel emphasis on rational inquiry, exercise of personal opinion, and judgment. this essay looks into the evidence in support of this statement and the extent to which islam validates the freedom to formulate and express an opinioq. it also examines the methodology and criteria that ascertain the validity of personal opinion and distinguishs the acceptable ru’y from that which is not tolerated. this essay also highlights how the detailed classification of ru’y by the ‘ulama reflects a concern for latitude and tolerance on the one hand, balanced on the other by respect for recognized authority and values which are deemed essential to islam. freedom to express an opinion is probably the most important aspect of the freedom of speech, which also comprises such other varieties of speech as a simple narration of facts, comedy, and fiction. to express an opinion on a matter implies a level of involvement, commitment, and competence which may or may not be present in the factual narration of an event. this may partly explain why the phrase hurrsyah ul-m), (literally, freedom of opinion) is used in the islamic scholastic tradition for freedom of speech, in preference to hurriyuh al-quwl, the more precise equivalent of “freedom of speech.” that scholars and jurists have consistently used hurriyh ul-my for freedom of speech perhaps signifies that ray, or personal opinion, is the most important aspect of this freedom. ra ’y has three main classifications -praiseworthy, blameworthy, and doubtful personal opinion-which are further subdivided. the main varieties of praiseworthy opinion to be discussed here are m), that elaborates the qur‘an and sunnah, the opinions of the companions, m), that consists of ijtihiid, and ru’y that is arrived at as a result of consultation. blameworthy opinion is also divided into three types, namely bid‘uh (pernicious innovation), h w i i (caprice), and bughy (transgression). and, lastly, ru), that is the subject of doubt (ray ji mawdi‘ ul-ishtibiih) does not lend itself to classification or ~~ mohammad hashim kamali is an associate professor in the faculty of law at the international islamic university, selangor, malaysia. 40 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 evaluation in advance, and it is this type of my which often gives rise to disagreement (ikhtihj) . excluded from the scope of this discussion are certain subjects such as $mah (sedition) and such other instances of the violation of the freedom of speech such as libel, slander, and contempt. these may have some bearing on the abuses of my, yet they are not directly related to the main focus of this inquiry-the extent to which freedom of speech relates to the exercise of personal opinion in islam. r a y is defined as opinion on a matter which has not been regulated by the qur’an or the sum&. it is a considered opinion arrived at as a result of thinking and self-exertion on the part of the individual who explores and searches for knowledge of something, about which there may exist only signs or indications. but the existing signs are such that may lead the investigator to different conclusions. there is an element of arbitrariness attached to ruy, in the sense that it is self-inspired and unrelated to the text of the qur’an, the sum&, and definitive ijm3 (consensus of opinion). in the usage of the arabs, ray is applied to things which are not seen but are known through the application of reason, intuitive judgment and the light of one’s heart. matters which are regulated by definitive factual or rational knowledge and matters on which all the signs are bound to concur such as the number of days in a week, or the virtue of telling the truth, are thus excluded from the proper application of ray. no one is thus expected to give or formulate an opinion over factual or rational matters which require no deliberation and thought. it is also clear from the foregoing that my is founded on signs and indications (amiiriit) . hence when a person pronounces an opinion concerning a matter pertaining to the realm of the unseen on which there are no signs whatsoever, what he or she says is not to be regarded as ruy. in this sense, ru5) is a preliminary to knowledge in that it must take its lead from signs which are open to investigation and rational conclusions.’ a person may express an opinion, arbitrary or otherwise. so long as he does not violate the law concerning blasphemy, sedition, etc., he is free to advance an opinion. just as the law tolerates an arbitrary opinion, the latter has a role to play in the development of ideas and the quest for knowledge and truth. often a sound opinion is invoked and stimulated by a weak, provocative, or misguided one. the juris corpus of fiqh, is, in fact, the embodiment of both my and authoritative tradition, but only the latter is deemed to provide criteria on which to judge the propriety or otherwise of my. as already noted, rayahas a limited role vis-a-vis the clear ordinances of divine revelation. but when no such guidance is available in the sources, ‘cf. ibn qayyim al-jawziyah, i‘liim al-muwaqqi‘iin ‘an rabb al‘alamln, ed. muhammad munir al-dimashqi, (cairo: id&ah al-?b$ah al-munirtyah), 4 vols, n.d., i, 55. m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of ray 41 or when the existing guidance is no more than a sign which is open to interpretation and inference, then the matter is open to my. the veracity of m), is always judged by its proximity to the letter and spirit of the (qur’an and hadith) consensus of opinion (ijml is the only recognized method for establishing the validity of my. apart from i j d , which is usually slow to materialize and retrospective, there is no method for a prompt evaluation of ru), other than r a y itself. the sound m), in this case declares the arbitrary ru), as invalid or weak. this process of sifting through the accuracy and veracity of ra), is integral to decision-making and ijtihad. the weak and erroneous opinion has thus a role to play in the evolution of correct ijtihad. it was perhaps in view of this truism that the beloved prophet of islam declared the mere effort of a competent scholar or mujtuhid at attaining the truth to be worthy of reward, whether or not he or she actually succeeds in attaining it. this is the purport of a well-known hadith which proclaims: “when a rnujfuhid make exertions and fails to attain the truth, it merits one reward, but when a correct decision is reached, then it merits a double reward.”2 in the scholarly context of early juristic thought, my became increasingly associafed with liberality and extrapolation in personal preferences. this was the main charge which the partisans of hadith (i.e., ahl uz-hadith) laid against their counterparts, the partisans of opinion, or the ahz al-k),. this somewhat negative connotation of m),, however, underwent a gradual change due mainly to sustained efforts by the ahz uz-ray, the hanafis in particular, who maintained that islam never discouraged recourse to reason and personal opinion, provided that such did not violate any of its principles and objectives. to substantiate their efforts, the proponents of m), devised methodologies and guidelines on the correct use of m), in the forms of analogical reasoning (qiyiis), juristic preference (istibiin), blocking the means (smj uz-dhurii’i), and presumption of continuity (isfi&b). these and other principles of usul uz-fiqh, such as the priority given to the companions’ opinions @wii uz-&iibih) in preference to the opinion of other mujtuhidiin, aimed at establishing a closer identity between ru), and the laws and principles of the qur’an and s ~ n n a h . ~ there is ample evidence in the sources which validate recourse to personal opinion. the qur’an (al-shiir5, 42:38) thus authorizes consultation (shirii) in public affairs, which consists essentially of the personal opinion of its participants. the qur’an also enjoins muslims to refer matters upon which they disagree for decision-making to the izu uz-umr (al-nisa’, 458). these are persons of knowledge and authority who are capable of forming an opinion and judgment. this is confirmed further in al-nisa’ (4:83), which validates *abu dawud al-sijistani, s u m abu d u d , eng. trans. ahmad hasan, (lahore: ashraf press, 1984), iii, 1013, hadith no. 3567. 3the reader might be interested to know that a chapter is devoted to each of these topics in my book principles o f l s h i c jurisprudence (kuala lumpur: fklanduk publications, 1989). 42 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 inferenee and deduction of the rules of law from the sources by recourse to reasoning and my. firthennore, the hadith of mu‘adh b. jabal (q.v., below) provides specific authority for my in juridcal matters and the settlement of disputes. the sunnah of the prophet and the precedent of his companions leave no doubt on the point that judges and governors were appointed to distant places with the understanding that they would rely on their personal ray and ijtihad in matters on which they could not find any guidance in the sources.4 but beyond the scope of specific evidence in support of ray, it will be noted that many a principle and institution of the shari‘ah takes for granted the individual freedom to formulate and express an opinion. the right/duty of the citizen to promote good and prevent evil (amr bil-mu‘ruf wa w h y ‘an al-munkar), his or her right to give sincere advice (nasihuh) to persons in authority or to anyone else, the right to monitor government activities, the right to a vote in electing a leader, and the right to be consulted in public affairs could only materialize when a citizen enjoys the freedom to formulate and express an opinion. according to one observer, “it would be totally in vain and would make no sense to say that the government in islam is bound by the principle of consultation and yet it should have the liberty to deny the participants of shiirii (ah1 a1 shiirii), the freedom to express an ~pinion.”~ similarly, it would be impossible to discharge the qur’anic obligation of commandng good and forbidding evil without the freedom of speech and the liberty to formulate and voice an opinion. on numerous occasions we note that the qur’an invites people to investigate and explore the world around them and to draw rational conclusions, not in the manner of blind imitators who follow and accept what others have said, but through intelligent analysis and judgment. “this would not be possible,” as abu zahrah observes, “without the freedom to express one’s opinion and thought.”6 to this we may add the rider that the qur’an values rational endeavor which is accompanied by sincerity in the quest for truth and justice. no intellectual inquiry may begin on the premise of denying the fundamental truth of monotheism (tawhid) and clear guidance enunciated in divine re~elation.~ provided that these values are observed, rational inquiry and the quest for truth must be maintained even in the face of hostility from the masses. for the masses may be uninformed and may themselves be in 4cf. malpud shaltut, al-islam, ‘aqldah wa shan’ah (kuwait: matjbi’ dir al-qalam, s‘abd al-karim zaydin majmu‘ah buhiith fiqhiyah (baghdad: maktabah al-quds, 6muhammad abu zahrah, tan.& al-islam li al-mujtama‘(cairo: matba‘ah mukhaymar, ’cf. muhammad al-bahi, a l d h wa al-dawluh (beirut: dir al-fikr, 1391/1971) p. 376. c. 1966), p. 555. 1407/1986), p. 128. n.d.), p. 194. m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of r a y 43 need of enlightenment. this is the purport of the qur‘anic ayah which proclaims that once clear guidance has been given, a mere conjecture, even if promoted by the masses, should not be allowed to obstruct it (al-an‘h, 6:116). notwithstanding the fact that obedience to lawful government is a qur‘anic obligation, the very text which prescribes this duty (al-nisa’, 4:59) follows on to provide in an address to the believers “should you dispute over a matter, then refer it to god and to the messenger.” the qur’an here anticipates the possibility of disputes arising between the ruler and ruled and it affirms that the duty of obedience does not overrule the right of the citizens to take issue with their leaders and government. disputation or jidiil is clearly permitted in the qur’an. indeed it is one of the major themes, as there are 25 occasions where the sacred text is expressive of a human being’s inclination as a rational being toward argumentation.8’on one such?occasion, the qur’an refers to the narrative of a woman, khawlah bint tha‘labah, wife of aws b. thabit, who complained to the prophet of abuse and insult she suffered at the hands of her husband. the following qur’anic passage was consequently revealed: ‘allah heard the speech of the woman who disputed with you concerning her husband; she complained to allah and allah heard your conversation.” (al-mujsdalah, 58:l). the woman was consequently granted the right to separate from her husband by a form of separation which is referred to as zihiir. in the meantime, this iiyuh recognized the right of the individual, a woman in this case, to argue her case with the prophetam-head of state. there are words in this iiyuh, such as tujiidiluku (disputes with you), tushtuki (complains), and ta?ziiwurukumii (your conversation) which suggest that the plaintiff expressed herself forcefully on the occasion. this is perhaps borne out by the fact that the whole of the surah which begins with this passage bears the title, al-mujsdalah (disputation). the qur’an also contains declarations which confirm differences of opinion or ikhtihf to be an inescapable fact of social life: “if god had willed, he would have created the people as one nation, but they cease not disagreeing among themselves.” (hiid, 11:118) the qur’an is also expressive of the limits within which freedom of speech and ikhtiliif must operate. one such limit is to avoid hurting others, as the text declares: allah ioves not public utterance of hurtful speech except by one who has been wronged (al-nid, 4:148). but even this limit is dropped, as the text itself provides, in the case of an aggrieved person whose cry for justice must not be hindered in any way. hurtfid speech may thus be uttered in public, or in the court of law, ya%hab ‘abd al-rahr& bint al-shitj‘, ai-qurzn wa q @ y i al-insin (fkirut: dar al ‘itm li d-hlat&-~~, 1982), p. 116. 44 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 by the defendant if it would help the cause of justice, which must in the final analysis take precedence over the avoidance of hurtful speech. this is confirmed further by the hadith which provides that “one who has a right has the privilege to speak.”9 thus a person who has something to say, or has a cause or a grievance, is entitled to speak out and his or her effort to eliminate injustice may never be obstructed. in the political sphere, freedom of speech is also upheld by the hadith which declares that “the best form of jihad (holy struggle) is to utter a word of truth to a tyrannical ruler.”l0 this hadith obviously goes further than merely affimmg the freedom of speech, in that it elevates the exercise of such freedom for the right cause to the best form of jihad. the precedent of companions is most instructive on the use of this right. upon his election to office, the first caliph, abu bakr, addressed the public in his inaugural sermon: “0 people, i have been given authority over you but i am not the best of you. support me if i am right and rectify me when i fall in error.”ll this is a clear affirmation of the right of individuals to oppose or criticize their political leaders when they deviate from the right path. it also indicates that constructive criticism and freedom to express an opinion are a source of healthy gmwth and enrichment?* abu baws successor, ‘umar b. al-khattab, is also on record as asking people, in his inaugural speech, to “m%fy any aberration” they might see in him. a man in the audience responded: “if we see aberration on your part, we shall rectify it by our swords.” the caliph reacted with magnanimity and said “praise be to god that there is someone who will rectify ‘umar by his sword (in the cause of righteousness) .”13 according to yet another report, a man addressed the caliph, ‘umar b. al-khattab, somewhat impudently by telling him “fear god, 0 ‘umar!” someone who was present on the occasion reminded the man that he was 91n its arabic version, the principle is stated as “inna l i & z i b al-?mqq maqil.” s e e muhammad abu zahrah, al-juritnah wa al‘uq‘ibahfi al-fiqh al-islam (cairo: dar al-fikr, n.d.), p. 158. ‘oh& reported by abu dawud, tirmidhi, and ibn mzijah, recorded in muhammad b. ‘abd allah al-khatji al-’hbrizi, mismist al-mq&ih, ed. muhammad n+ir al-din al-alw, 2nd edn. (beirut: al-maktab a l i s h i , l399/197!3), 11, lo94, hadith no. j705. %bu muhammad ‘abd al-malik ibn h i s k , al-simh al-nabawiyah icairo: maktabah al-kulliyyzit al-azhsriyah, l392hm) iv, 262. wf. sa’di abu habib. darcisah fi minzj al-islam al-siygsi (beirut: mu’assisah al laabu zahrah, al-janmah, p. 160; m u s w al-siba’i, ishtid-yzh al-islam, 2nd edn., (damascus: dar al-qamtyah, 137p/€960), p. 50; muhammad faruq alnab&, n i q m al hukmfi al-islam (kuwait: matba’iih jgmi’ah al-kuwait, 1974), p. 245. ~isalah, i406n935), p. m. m. h. kamali the approvaband disapproved varieties of ray 45 being impudent, but the caliph intervened and said, “it will be no good if they did not say so, and no good if we did not listen.”14 the qur’an and sunnah are replete with moral encouragement and guidance on the proper use of freedom of speech. while the qur‘an compares pleasant or righteous speech & l i d &@buh) with a benevolent tree which is firm and healthy in both foundation and foliage (ibriihim, 14:24), the sunnah compares it to charity that every one can afford to give.15 and then the recurrent qur‘anic theme which encourages the uttemnce of courteous and elegant speech (quwlun mu‘nifun) to one’s parents (al-isrz, 17:23), to the indigent (al-nisz, 4:8), to the ignorant (al-nisz, 4:5), and to the people at large (al-baqarah, 2:83; al-isrz, 17:53; al-nw, 16:l25; al-‘ankabiit, 29:46) all in all confirm the truism that the law can at best penalize blatant abuse of the freedom of speech. nurturing the proper use of this freedom and attaining beauty and excellence in speech in largely a matter of developing good moral and cultural standards. the qur’an calls upon the wisdom and good judgment of the believer when he speaks (al-al@b, 33:7). there may be, for example, instances where telling the truth may fail to achieve a good purpose. the speaker is therefore urged to be mindful of the end result that his speech is likely to obtain.’6 there are in fact instances where the sunnah permits silence in regard to truth or even telling a white lie if it would serve a higher objective, such as saving an innocent life from imminent danger. and lastly the freedom of speech is subservient to the general principles of justice: “and when you speak, then speak with justice, even if it be against those who are close to you” (al-an‘h, 6:152). the qur‘anic guidance here applies equally to a witness in the court, to the judge, to the head of the family, and to the people at large who are asked to be honest and fair when they speak to, or about, one another. varieties of ra’y although the potential scope and subject matter of my defies the idea of a predetermined framework, the ‘ulama have nevertheless attempted to divide ray into various types. to begin with, my is divided into four types, namely valid or praiseworthy opinion (ul-ru y ul-&ib), void opinion (ul-m y ~~ ~ “abu yuuf ya‘qub b. ibrtwn, kit& al-khatgj, 2nd edn., (cairo: al-matba’ah al salafiyah, l352/1933), p. 13. 15thus we read in a hadith that ”righteous speech-al-kalimah al-qyibah-is a form of charity.” see mulpyy al-din al-nawawi, riy$ af-*i$n, 2nd ed., muhammad &ir al din al-aiba;ni (beirut: a l h k t a b al-idami; 1404/1984), p. 284, had& no. 699. i61he hoiy q u r h , t a , t m w m and c o r n w r y by ‘abdullah yusuf ‘mi, footnote no. 9 7 5 . .46 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 al-biitil), blameworthy or objectionable opinion (al-ra > al-madhmiim), and opinion whose validity is in doubt ( a h > ji mawdi‘ alishtibiih)?’ the first, valid ray, is what is in accord with authoritative precedent and approved opinion of the ‘ulama of the past, who have acted in harmony with it and accepted it in principle in their awn fatw8 and ijtihad?s in other words, its harmony with the accepted norms of shari‘ah is not in question. the test here is necessarily retrospective, in that past authorities of proven validity are taken as the criteria on which to evaluate a fresh opinion. it is to be noted, however, that an opinion of this type may initially be uncertain and doubtful. only when all doubt as to its p q r i e t y is eliminated and resolved can it be classified as valid. the main process for this form of refinement known to the classical methodology of thought in islam is ijmz once an opinion is accepted and supported by i j d , it becomes authoritative and valid beyond question. ijmii‘ puts the final seal of approval on an opinion which might have been disputed but which no longer remains open to it. legislation and judicial decisions of htgher courts in modem times provide for a similar process in that once a proposal or opinion is adopted by proper legislative/judical authorities, its validity is, for practical purposes at least, no longer debatable. collective and consultative resolutions by professional and representative bodies also enhance the authority and wight of an otherwise isolated opinion. public opinion and the press in modem societies may likewise serve the purpose of identifying the direction of a possible consensus in favor or against a doubtful opinion whose validity cannot be readily ascertained by reference to the or ijmif. according to a well-known saying of the leading companion, ‘abd allah b. mas‘ud, ”what the muslims deem to be good is good in the sight of god.”19 should there be consultation among experts or public and representative bodies, and the opinion which emerges incorporates the views of the community leaders and the uhl ul-shiirii, the weight and authority of that opinion would be enhanced and in line with the qur’anic principle of consultation. at the opposite pole of valid opinion stands the void opinion (al-my al-biigl), one which carries no authority at all. once again ibn qayyim wrote on a somewhat retrospective note that void opinion is clearly in discord with the approved precedent of past ‘ulama. they would have denounced it in “cf. ibn qayyim, rkim, i, 55. ’%id. 19this is often quoted to be a hadith of the prophet. both sayf al-din al-&nidi ( a l w m i, p. 214, and abu islpiq ibrihim a l s w b i , al-l’tisiim, (cairo: matba‘ah al-manir, l332/1914), ii,319 refer to it as such. it is, however, more likely to be a saying of the famous companion, ‘abd allah ibn mdiid (see ahmad hasan, ihe doctrine 0fijmi‘in islam, (islamabad: islamic research institute, 1984), p. 37. a u@l d e , 2nd &., d. ‘abd al-razziiq ‘afifi, (beit: al-maktab al-islami, 1402/1982), m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of ra’y 41 principle and refused to give it any recognition in their juridicial decisions and fatwilzo ibn qayyim ai-jawziyah divides the valid ru), into four types, namely the ru), of a companion gfatawii al-&iibih) m), which interprets and clarifies the nu& (ul-m), ul-&$in); consultative my; and m), which consists of ijtihad (ul-ru), al-ijtihiidi). the ‘ulama are on the whole in agreement with the special status and authority that the fatwl of a companion enjoys in religious and juridicial matters. the companions are generally held in high esteem as they were most knowledgeable of the qur’an and of the teachugs of the prophet. opinions that they have formulated and advanced are on the whole considered to come close, in order of authority, to the sunnah of the prophet. ibn qayyim quotes imam al-shifi‘rs statement in support of his own view to the effect that “the ra), of a companion commands greater merit and is preferable to our own opinion.”21 ibn qayyim then goes on to cite several examples where the m), of a companion on certain issues was upheld and comborated by the welation of the qur‘an, “a blessing and a privilege that is unparalleled and unique.” the conclusion is thus drawn that the fatwh or opinion of a companion is sui generis and any attempt to equate it with that of the generality of ‘ulama is “devoid of substance and ill-conceived.”22 the second type of valid ru), is one which seeks to interpret the nusky, clarify their meaning, and facilitate the deduction of legal rules from them. this type of ru), is designed to promote clear understanding of the qur’an and sunnah and seeks to derive guidance from them on matters affecting the life of the community. the hallmark of such opinion is the sincerity, knowledge, and devotion of its author to the promotion and understanding of the qur’an and s ~ n n a h . ~ ~ the third variety of valid or praiseworthy opinion is the consultative ray, which is arrived at not by a single individual, but through consultation among people, especially those who are competent to give counsel. god almighty has praised “this ummah for their diligence at consultation in community affairs; the messenger of god has practiced it, and it is one of the best forms of m ) , . ’ ’ ~ ~ the fourth type of praiseworthy opinion is arrived at through correct procedures which are characteristic of ijtihad. the proper procedm for anyone who attempts to give an opinion on a matter is to look into the book of *oibn qayyim, i‘l?m, i, 55. zlibid., i, 67. zzibid., i, 68. z31bid., i, 69. 241bid., i, 70. 48 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 god first, and if he or she hils to fmd the necessary guidance, then they look into the sunnah of the prophet and the precedent of his companions. but if guidance sought still cannot be found then he or she formulates his or her own opinion and judgment in the same way as the companions are known to have attempted on many issues. this is, in fact, the proc&ure laid down in the hadith of mu‘5dh b. jabal, which is a standard authority on ijtihad. an opinion so formulated and expressed may be correct or otherwise, or it may appear at the time to be correct but the contrary emerges over time. the principle to apply here is that which is expounded in a letter from the caliph ‘umar b. al-khattab, when he instructed his judges that “the mere fact that you have made a certain decision must not deter you from changing it, if it becomes clear to you that it was erroneous in the first place. for truth is timeless; nothing must overrule it and it is far better to return to the truth rather than persist in falsehood.”25 this principle would seem to be of general application to all decisions, judicial or otherwise, and it clearly rejects the notions of sacrificing truth at the altar of consistency and the so called credibility of judicial office. but the point that is most emphasized in all of this is sincerity and devotion to the cause of truth and justice, the essence of beneficience in any praiseworthy opinion. “anyone who exerts himself with the intention of gaining the pleasure of god and benefit to the people will be counted as one of the m&iniin, as goodwill and sincerity in telling the truth embodies the highest value in t a q ~ i i . ’ ~ ~ as for m4, whose validity is open to doubt, it is equivalent to a conjecture (zunn) . this type of ray is accepted as a basis for judicial decision and legal opinion (fatwa) in cases of emergency or where no better alternative may be known to exist. unless it is adopted into a court decision, a doubtful opinion or a conjecture does not bind anyone. the ‘ulama have neither approved it nor have they denounced it, but have left open the choice between acceptance or rejection.z7 but since we do not always have the necessary knowledge of or access to truth, a considered opinion, which may amount to no more than a probability or a conjecture, is accepted as a basis of decision making so as to avoid indefinite suspension and delay that the quest for knowledge and truth may entail. in the sphere of judicial decisions, however, there are checks and balances, especially with regard to the rules that govern admissibility of witnesses, which are designed to minimize the possibility of error. decisions and opinions which are formed in conformity with correct procedures are therefore deemed to be valid, even if they partake in a measure of speculation or individual’bias of a tolerable sort. z5jbid., i, 72. ybid., 11, 120. z71bid., i, 55: m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of ray 49 from the viewpoint of its subject matter and relative value, m4, is once again divided into three types. firstly, ru4, on a juridicial, or shur'i, matter which is validated and accepted only on the strength of the shur'i proof on which it is founded, regardless as to whether it is advanced by one person or by a multitude. secondly, m4, concerning specialized matters which require technical knowledge, where the people at learge are not expected to be in a position to form an enlightened opinion on them. only the expert opinion is to be taken into account on such matters and the value of that opinion is determined on an informed basis. and thirdly, ru4, on matters of practical nature which require public participation and compliance, such as election of the head of state and opinion on public, constitutional, and municipal affairs which concern the community as a whole. on matters of this nature, the preferred opinion is that of the majority of the people whose action and participation is of central importance to the opinion abuses of rap the blameworthy opinion (uz-ru4, uz-madhmiim) is a type of ru4, which is neither completely false nor totally invalid and yet it is misguided and reprehensible. it may occur in the form of a deviant innovation (bid'ah), transgression (bughy), or self-seeking desire (hawii). there is yet a fourth variety of reprehensible rub which is referred to as juhl (ignorance), as it is deemed to be no more than an unfounded extrapolation that originates in ignorance. all of these hll under restrictions on freedom of opinion primarily because the right to free speech and expression does not extend to these areas. the term "restrictions" here does not necessarily mean prohibition. for as we shall see, the whole of this field is governed not by legal prohibitions as such but by moral sanctions-sincere and persuasive advice. although the precise legal position is not always clear on some forms of bid'& and hawii, these are, broadly speaking, nonjustifiable violations of the freedom of speech. it will be noted at the outset that the whole of this classification is somewhat overlapping and scholars have sometimes used these terms almost interchangeably, presumably because the concepts of, for example, ignorance or transgression are often deemed to be present in some measure in the case of a carpricious opinion (hawii) and a pernicious innavation (bid'&). the main difference between the last two would appear to be that hwzi consists of a strong element of selfishness and pursuit of one's desire in disregard of clear guidance. bid'uh, on the other hand, is distinguished by an attempt *tf. mahmud 'am al-majid a l m i d i , az-shgrc, (beirut: drlr al-jil, 1404/1984), p. 91. 50 the american journal of iskamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 at distoring the principles of islam or misinterpreting them out of good intention and the desire to explore the unexplored. the word "bid'ah" is generally used in contradistinction with "sunnah," that is the normative and familiar practice. in this sense, bid'ah signifies a deviation from, or superimposition on, the sunnah of the prophet. an opinion which amountk to bid'ah may or may not be motivated by self-seeking interest, and as such, it is not always distinguishable from hawii. note, for example, the distinction between the two forms of divorce in islamic law, known as tuliiq al-sunnah and <ahq ul-bid'ah respectively. the hrmer signifies the type of divorce which conforms with the law and established precedent. the latter is labeled as tuliiq al bid'ah primarily because of its departure from the legal norm which requires that the maximum of three pronouncements of @ z & q are each uttered within a clean period (@hr);t that is the period between two menstruations. ghq ul-bid'uh ignores this and combines the three pronouncements of @zuq to be uttered all at once. as for the question, however, whether this form of laluq also partakes in a measure of self-seeking desire (huwii) on the part of the husband, the answer is not always clear but is likely to be in the affirmative. hence the distinction between the concepts under discussion is expected to be in broad outline and not necessarily exclusive. bughy may be distinguished from both bidah and huwii in that it indulges in self-righteousness and an attempt at imposing one's own opinion on others, often denouncing all those who oppose it. beyond these shades of differences, however, the concepts under discussion have much in common between them and are often used interchangeably. the qur'an uses the term haw5 in a somewhat generic sense which could include both bid'uh and bughy. we also find that mapy scholars have used the term bid'ah so widely as to include all varieties of reprehensible opinion. furthermore, none of these are confined to the realm of opinion but apply equally to acts which may quallfy the attendant description and attributes of each. bid'ah and hawe literally, bid'ah means innovation that could not be vindicated by authoritative precedent, a pernicious innovation which is far removed from the norm and its established practice. 29 it is defined as innovation in religion, resembling that which'the shari'ah has expressly approved, and is intended to fulfdl the proclaimed objectives of sha~?ah.~o it will be goted in'this 29cf. c.a.q. nieuenhuijze, 7he lifestyles of islam, (leiden: e. j. brill, 1985), p. 155. 30al-sha;tibi, al-l'ti@m, i, 29. the arabic definition of bid'ah reads as follows: al-bid'ah [ a r i q d f i al-din mukhtari'ah t+hi al-shari'ah, yuqjid bi a l s u u 'ahyhii m i yuqsid bi al [ariqh al-shar'iyah. m. h. &ali the appmval and disapproved varieties of ra'y 51 definition that the resemblance between bid'uh violates the established norms of shari'ali. the defurtion also indicates that the intention behind bid'ah does not deviate fkom the norms of shari'ah in the sense that the rules of shari'ah are generally intended to achieve benefits (mu@il@) and this is precisely what the innovator intends to do. the good intentions behind bid'ah are, however, of no account, as al-shfttjbi explains, because the innovator amgates to himself the authority of the lawgiver in such a manner as to frustrate the objectives of the law.31 bid'ah is divided into two types, namely genuine bid'ah (al-bid'ah al k i q i y a h ) , for which no justification or support could be found in the qur'an, s-, or ijma', nor in any precedent or opinion of the learned, neither wholly nor in part. it is in other words an innovation in the true sense of the word. the second type of bid'ah is known as al-bid'ah al-@fiyah, or partial innovation, which has tvm facets, one being identical with the genuine bid'ah in that it is unprecedented and indefensible. but there is another side to this type of bid'uh for which support can be fbund in the established m m . that is, bid'ah as an ambivalent innovation which can be accepted as part of the authoritative sunnah or rejected completely, depending on how it is viewed. 32 bid'ah i s once again divided into two types, namely bid'& of abandonment (al-bid'ah al-tarkiyah), which consists of abandoning something, such as, for example, when a person abandons, or advises others to abandon, somethrng which is lawful under the rules of shari'ah. the opposite of this is al-bid'ah ghayr al-tarkiyh, that is innovation, "which does not consist of abandoning anything; it may involve a change or advance a different perspective which amounts to innovation but not a b a n d ~ n m e n t . ~ ~ the hallmark of bid'uh is the pursuit of capricious and whimsical opinion (hawii) in preference to divine guidance. thus we read in the qur'an in an address to prophet david: 0 david, we &we made you a virr?gerent in the earth, so rule mng people righteously and follcrw not the dictates of haw6 which lead you astray from the path of god. (!$%i, 38:26). and who is more misguided than one who follows his own h w i i in disregard of the guidance that god has revealed? (al-qws, 28:50) '%id., i, 50. 32ibid., i, 54. 3 3 b i d . , i, 38. 52 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 and then a person who chooses to follow the vagaries of haw5 is not to be obeyed by others, as the qur‘an proclaims: obey not the one whose heart is negligent of our remembrance (‘an dhikrinii), one who follows his haw& and one who has exceeded all limits. (al-kahf, 18:28) while quoting the foregoing, al-shiiubi points out that in all of the three the matter is confined to two things, namely following the guidance (h&, dhikr), or following caprice (haw5). the innovator (mubtadi’) has chosen the latter; hence he or she is utterly misguided while thinking otherwise of their personal intent. the same author goes on to quote another qur’anic passage which denounces those who attempt to confuse the meaning of the qur’an through misguided and self-styled interpretation: he it is who has sent down to thee the book. in it are iiyiit which are perspicuous; they are the foundation of the book: others are allegorical. but those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part which is allegorical, seeking discord fltnah) and searching for its hidden meanings . . . (al-‘imriin, 3:7) it is reported from ‘a’ishah that the prophet read this ayah and then said: “when you see those who argue and dispute about the qur‘an these are the ones that god has meant, and they should be shunned.” to this al-shiigbi adds: “the disputation that the prophet has referred to concerns the pursuit of the mutashiibih (intricate) in the qur’an.” disputation of this kind leads to disunity and deviation from the guidance of the qur’an, in which we read further: this is my way, leading straight, so follow it and follow not the paths which will scatter you away from it (al-an‘am, 6:w3) the phrase “follow not the paths,” according to qur’an commentators, refers to the ways of those who have deviated from the straight path and these are the innovators and the skeptics, the ah1 al-bida‘ wa al-shubhiit). 34 .while elaborating on some of these statements, al-shiiubi adds: “the innovators distort the shari‘ah in various ways, such as by upholding the manifest or appamt ( q z d t i r ) in the qur’an without looking into the objectives and intentions of the lawgiver.” in a reference to the kharijites, the same 341bid., ii, 54. m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of ra'y 53 author notes that they upheld the intricate portions (mutashiibihiit) of the qur'an in preference to the perspicuous ( m w ) thmin; that they declared as infidel most of the companions of the prophet; they also held the view that in the event the imam becomes an infidel, all of his subjects automatically become infidels; that the adulterer is not liable to the punishment of mjm (stoning to death); that the prescribed punishment of qudhf (slanderous accusation) applies to those who accuse women of non-chastity but not to those who charge men of similar conduct; that ignorance of theficm' (detailed rules of fiqh) is an excuse; that god will send a prophet from among the ' u j m (i.e. non-arabs), who will bring a book and the shari'ah of mulpmmad will then be abandoned; that the s i i f i yusuf (i.e., chapter xii of the standard text) is not a part of the qur'an; and so on; views which are contrary to the principles and established tenets of islam.35 while commenting on the subject of mutushiibih (intricate portions) ibn qayyim al-jawziyah writes that a particular form of huwii in connection with the qur'an is to uphold the mutashiibih in preference to the mu&m (perspicuous) so as to advance and substantiate a particular point of view. what is even more hideous, he notes, is that when the morbid attempt to find a mutushiibih with which to reject the muhkum fails, attempts are then made to find some weakness in the mz.&kum itself and thereby downgrade it to the level of mutushiibih and in this way try to suspend its definitive import. ibn qayyim also makes references to the jahm-yah and qadariyah (subdivisions of the mu'tazilah) and their views on the meaning of certain portions of the qur'an. the author concludes his discussion by saying that the c o m t approach which the companions and the leading jurists and scholars have adopted is precisely the opposite: the mutushiibih must be read in light of the m u & z m , not vice versa, so as to maintain internal harmony and consistency in interpreting the qur'an. 36 references are also made in this context to the views and beliefs of the biitiniyah (also known as isma'iliyah), in particular the meaning they have given to some of the key words of the qur'an, such as qaliih, zakiih, eawm, etc., meanings which are very different from what is normally understood by the majority of 'ulama. they have thus interpreted salah to be referring to the prophet, for example in the qur'anic ayah that "surely $uliih keeps one away from indecency and evil" (al'ankabiit, 29:44). since it is the prophet who forbids evil not the ~aliih as such. similarly zakih (legal alms) according to the biitiniyah means purification of the soul, and s u m (fasting) means abstaining from evil; junnuh (paradise) is held to mean the sweet smell of 35abu ism ibrahim al-shitjbi, al-muwiijhqiitfi vqd al-m, ed., mdpmmad hasanayn 361bn qayyim, z'kzm, ii, 230. the author discusses the sectarian views of the jahmtyah mmd, (cairo: a l m w a h al-sal&iyyah, l34m923 a.h.), iv, #x) i d a . , d-z'ti@n, 240-80. etc., and their tamperings with the qur'in in some detail at pp. 220-31. 54 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 the human body; wudu'(ab1ution) is said to mean following the awaited imam, and tayammum (ablution with clean earth where no water could be found) is held to mean obedience to the deputy of the imam in the absence of the imam himself; whereas ghusl (bathe) is held to mean renewal of one's pledge of allegiance to the imam.a7 it is perhaps due to thw and similar remote and allegorical interpretations they have given to the qur'an that the biitjdyah (proponents of the esoteric and the hidden) have derived their name. a more recent form of bid'ah, embraced by some muslims, is to deny the authority of sunnah and to take the view that the qur'an, being self contained, authentic, and comprehensive, is the only source of shari'ah. this is the view taken by a faction calling itself al-firqah al-qur'm-yah (partisans of the qur'an) whose views are known to have spread and found adherents in some arab countries like egypt and libya.s8 whereas some scholars have accepted the notion of a good bid'uh, ibn taym-yah refutes the division of bid'ah into good and evil, as he maintains that all bid'ah is evil. people have held different views on bid'& and some have divided it into two types, namely bid'uh qubiw and bid'uh &sun&, saying that not all bid'ah is evil, that when a bid'ah is accepted and generally approved by the community of believers it is no longer bid'uh. ibn taym-yah then goes on to refute this by saying that these views came into being only after the 3rd/loth century; that all bid'uh is evil and that the sunnah is completely clear on this point. the author then quotes three e t h which are: "all bid'& is misguided-kull bid'uh &diilah," "every innovation is bid'ah-kull ?m&hthuh bid'",'' and "the worst of things are the novel among them innu shunal%mi;rr n u . & h t w ." the examples which ibn bym-yah has given of bid'uh in this context pertain mainly to rituals of the faith, such and festive celebrations (u'yiid) other thm those which are commonly the view that some bid'ah is good originates in the precedent of 'umar b. al-khathb, who is on record to have welcomed s&t al-tamwilz during ramadan and r e f e e d to it as nf'inul bid'uh (what a good bid'ah!). to this ibn taym-yah responds that tamw$z was not an innovation at all; rhat it originated in the sunnah of the prophet and the companions had practiced it, but that the prophet abandoned it after awhile k r fear of it lxxmnhg obligatory. hence what 'umar ibn al-khattab is quoted to have said does not at all contradict the hdith that "all bid'uh is misguided." ibn 'bym-yah as h t h g on certain days of the year, unaubrized prayer (@ al-), recognized.39 37ahmad b. hajar al-bu$rni al-ban", zbmhir al-muslimin 'an al-ibtdci' wa al-bid'ah 3*ibid., p. 41. 'taqi al-din ibn m y a b , iqti&'al-sinit al-milstaqm li-mukhla&h &?gb al-ja?im, ji al-dsn, (doha, qatar): matjib? 'ali b. ' m , ?402fi983), pp. 3738. ed., n&ir b. 'abd a l b i m d'aql, ( r i y a , 1404 a.h.), i, 55. i % m. h. kamali the approval a n d ' d i s a p p d varieties of ray 55 concludes that 'umar must have used the word bid'& in its linguistic sense of welcoming something that was forgotten; that he did not use the word in the sense of a bid'uh sh~r'iyah.~o i a l g h d i divides the mubtadi' into tvm types: one who invites others to bid'uh, and the other who remains silent out of fear or personal choice. the first type of mubkdi'may be propagating somethmg which does not amount to infidelity (ht) in which caie the matter rests between him or her and god (fu umruh buynah wq b u y allah). but if that person invites the people to what may amount to hp, he or she can be even more harmful than the ka$r ub initio. for the evil of the latter is not contagious in the sense that the person is known as a n0n;believer and as such the believers are not likely to pay aitention. but the mubradi'who actively propagates bid'uh has a claim to righteousness and tries to spread corruption under the guise of truth and that kind of evil is contagious. this kind of mubfudi' must be denounced, his or her evil exposed, and people shopld openly show their disapproval; they should turn away from him and refuse to respond to his greeting (salam) in public and should m i d helping or cooperating with that person. as for the commoner who indulges in bid'uh (ul-mubfudi' al'zuni) but is unable to persuade others and is unlikely to command any folluwing, he or she should, instead of stem treatmefit and humiliation, be given good 1 counsel (nuqi?zuh) and kind advice. but if ~ i ( u z h proves futile and shunning i'raci) is called for, then this should be done. for if bid'uh is not denounced, it is likely to spread and give rise to evil in society.41 al-shiitibi advises reticence vis-a-vis b i d i t whose truth or falsehood is not known: "we are commanded not to disseminate such views until the truth emerges.42 in response to the suggestions by some 'ulama that mubtadi'ibt who propagage bid'uh should be severely p ~ s h e d , al-shitibi observes that they should be treated in accordance with the enormity of their conduct. if the bid'uh is a minor one, they should be punished lightly, but if it amounts to a grave violation, the punishment should be proportionately increased. al-sh5tjbi also records the hint that the early scholars (rm&qa&&) divided bid'uh into two types: that which is reprehensible (malauh) and bid'ah which falls under the category of h a m (forbidden). the author then concludes that bid'uh is not a monolithic concept, nor is it a singular offense; that each bid'uh should be viewed and evaluated individually; and that treatment or \ i( 401bid., i, 56; idem, malmu' ah ipltgwci shaywl al-islam ibrt taymlyah, ed., 'am al m n b. qkim, (beirut: mu'assisah al-ridah, 1398 a.h.), x, 37l. 41abu himid mulpmmad a l g h d i , kitab &b a1-swa al-mu'rsshamh ma' &&if al-khalq, ed. msa'udal-mu'ini, (bagmad: matba'ah al'h, 1984), pp. 201-4. 4zal-shi%.ibi, al-muw2faqgt, iv, 104. 56 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 reprimand accorded to its perpetrator must strictly be determined on this basis.43 although in its literal sense, huwii can mean a passing whim, inclination, or desire without necessarily leading to either the formulation or expression of an opinion, the ‘ulama have nevertheless used it to imply an opinion which originates in these impules. this usage, which is basically a metaphor using the cause for the effect, is probably motivated by the frequent recurrenc of the word huwii and its derivatives in the qur’an. huwii has been defined as “the pleasure seeking inclination of the soul (nafs) toward that which is not permitted by the sha~tah.”~~ as already indicated, the qur’an refers to huwii in contradistinction to guidance (m, dhikr), and deviation from the truth which the qur’an itself has expounded. it is in this sense that the qur’an warns the believers, on no less than 25 occasions, against the dangers, incitement, and temptations of huwii and the hold that it can have on the hearts and minds of people.45 the phrase uhl ul-haw6 typically refers to those who say what they please, who violate the truth by indulging in corrupt and distorted interpretations which are unacceptable to the mind and heart of the believer. whenever opinion is allowed to follow personal prejudice and desire, it leads to divergence from truth and even outright falsehood. among the instances of haw6 one is the personal desire to be the winner at all costs regardless of the merit of one’s case or concern for the well-being of others. one of the worst forms of haw6 is when such presonal craving for superiority and power is masqueraded with specious reasoning and plausible argumentation in the name of justice, piety, and truth. the hold that huwii can have on the minds and lives of people is depicted in the qur’an, where the believers are asked the question, “did you see the fate of one who took as his god his own vain desire-huwii-and his god led him astray! (al jithiyah, 45:23). elsewhere we find evidence in the qur‘an which clearly forbids the pursuit of haw6 and indulgence in sensuous and hedonistic desires: “follow not the huwii as it would lead you astray from the path of god (sad, 38:26).” huwii occurs in the qur’an in contradistinction to shari’ah, as in the following passage: thus we gave you a shari‘ah (i.e., a path) in religion, so follow it, and follow not the desire (ahwg) of those who know not. (al-jithiyah, 45:18) 431bid. 44‘adnin darwish and muhammad al-misri, al-kulliyyiit, mu‘jam fi al-mus[alahiit wa 4sabu habib, darasah, p. 454. al-furuq al-lughawiyah, (damascus: wizirah al-irshid, 1974), v, 38. m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved wieties of ra’y 57 a-zamakhshari elaborates the meaning of this ijah: follow the shari’ah which is founded in proof and evidence and let not yourself be tempted by the views and arguments of the ignorant which are founded in caprice and pernicious innovation (hawii wu bid‘~h).~~ furthermore, the prophet is on record to have addressed his followers that “none of you can be a true believer unless your desire (hawii) is made subservient to (the guidance) i have brought forth.” according to another hadith, “nothing that is worshipped on this earth is hated by god more intensely than h ~ w i i . ” ~ ~ another instance ofhawa that is clearly forbidden is when a person believes in the legality or prohibition of something, and then ignores it when it applies to himelf or his friends. to illustrate this, a person may be demanding his right of preemption (shun while believing in its validity, but when someone else demands the same right of him, he ignores it and claims that it is unproven and advances an opinion to that effect.48 on a similar note, a person may denounce another for a certain activity such as listening to music, but when his friends do the same, he claims that the prohibition of such activity is not proven and that the subject remains open to ijtihad.49 the jurists have not specified any punitive measures for hawii and no particular punishment for the perpetrator of bid‘uh either, except for a form of social boycott (u2-hijr, also referred to as i‘m that is signified by refusing to greet, speak to, or approve of the views of such a person. the ‘ulama have spoken of hijr as a moral obligation of the community regardless as to whether the perpetrator of bid‘uh is a relative, a neighbor, or a stranger, especially when the bid‘uh concerns the community at large and violates what is referred to as the right of god (huqq allah). but if the bid‘uh relates to private rights (such as consisting of a form of slander or libel), then greeting is permitted and hijr is not required. there is no maximum limit on the duration of hijr and it continues until the person repents and corrects him or herself. the community is under moral obligation to denounce the bid’uh; those who are able to produce evidence for its refutation, and those who are in possession of authority and able to put an end to it, must do the ‘ulama have held it to be a duty of the head of state to prevent bid‘uh and hawii in the business of government. this is a part of the general obligation of the head of state to hcilitate transmission and dissemination 4 6 j i r allah mahmud al-zamakhshari, al-kashshrf ‘an haqi’iq al-tan& (beirut: d i r al-ma‘rifah, n.d.), iii, 511. (’both hadiths are quoted by abu ‘abd allah muhammad al-qurtubi in his ta$ir al q u v u b i , (cairo: dar al-kutub al‘arabiyah, 1387/1967), xvi, 167. 4szaydan, majmu‘ah, p. 298; al-sibi‘i, zshtiraklyah, p. 54. 49shams al-din b. ‘ a m allah muhammad b. malfal! al-maqdisi al-hanbali, a l k i i b al-shar‘iyah wa a l m i d al-mar‘iyah, 2 vols., (cairo: matba‘ah a l m e , 1348 a.h.), i, 183. tbid., pp. 237, 269. 58 the american jaurnal of islamic social sciences wl. 7, no. 1, 1990 of knowledge whenever necessary or when it is in the intemt (muqal&zh) of the community. dissemination of knowledge, as a duty of the head of state, comprises the following: (a) propagation of the hith by dekndmg it , against doubts and bid'uh and offering an adequate response to the promoters of bid'& and huwii. (b) inviting the disbelievers and the misguided to righteousness and truth. (c) investigating and bringing together the various views concerning bid'ah and huwii and trying to resolve disputes over them by validating or authorizing a view that seems best. whenever the imam exercises this form of ijtihad, or when he selects the ijtihad of others for the purpose of general practice, even if that ijtihad is of disputed validity, it becomes authoritative nevertheless and action upon it becomes obligatory. 51 baghy (transgression) and zkhtiiiif (disagreement) bughy means lawlessness, refusing to acknowledge the truth, and exceedmg the limits of things with corrupt intention, dishonesty, and arrogance.52 bughy is also the opposite of obedience (@'ah) to lawful government. in this sense, bughy is defined as refusing to obey the lawful imam who is not indulging in sin (ma>iyzh), whether or not such disobedience is based on an interpxetation or a particular point of view which is believed to be the truth.53 an instance of bughy which is frequently encountered is when a person or group of persons are engaged in a lawful pursuit but they are denounced for wrongdoing by their opponents. in the sphere of religious rituals such as the call to prayer (iidhiin), standing to prayer (iqiimah) , and even the contents of the ritual prayer, the followers of different madhiihib observe them with shght variations. basically all the variations are permissible as they all subscribe to the tenet of 'ibiidah; a mere difference of form does not justify any claim of superiority or preference of one over the other. and yet, owing to bughy, the follwers of some rmdhidzib have denounced and abused their counterparts in others for not following the rituals that they have themselves adopted. this is not even confined to rituals: in certain other spheres we know, for example, that the mystic has often criticized the jurist for the latter's zeal over the externalities of religion. the jurist has, in turn, criticized the mystic "yahyi ism$& manhaj 61-sunnahfi a l 'akiqah bay al-h&im wa a l m & k h , (cairo: dar al-waf2, 1406/1986), pp. 330-32. 52zaydk, majmu'ah, p. 295. 53while the hanbali definition of baghy includes disobedience to an unjust ruler, the hanafi's define it as disobedience to a just or lawful imam only. see mu&mmad am-n ibn 'abidin, radd al-mukhtgr ;41a al-durml al-mukhtir (also known as hgshiyah ibn 'abidn, 2nd edn., (cairo: matbdah al-biibbi al-halabi, 1386/1966), 111, 426; y@yi i s d i l , manhaj al-swvlahfi alw i a q a h bayn al-h&m wa al-m-, (cairo: dir al-wafi', 1406/1986), p. 147. m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved wetics of ra’y 59 for his esoteric approach to religion and to some of the rules and doctrines of shari‘ah. each has thus denounced the other in disregard of their respective merits. their views partake in transgression, as they both indulge in self righteousness and unwarranted denunciation of the views of their o p n e n t s . the correct approach in such cases wuld be for both sides to assess the merit and demerit of each view and acknowledge them accordingly without transgression and prejudice. all other considerations which are external to the essence of the matter such as the desire to expose the ignorance of one’s opponent or establish one’s own superiority and power, etc., must be excluded from the quest for truth and assessment or criticism of the opinion of others. 54 disagreement (iwltififi over the rituals of ‘ibsrdiit, including variation in the forms of the call to prayer (iidhiin and iqzimah), the ‘id prayer, and prayer at times of fear for one’s safety (sazur az-khawjo and other such rituals which vary in form but unite in the essence of worship are, according to ibn taym-yah, a variety of ikhziziif al-tanawwu: that is variation which is devoid of substance. as opposed to ifitifif az-ru&d (disagreement over substance amounting to contradiction), tkhtifif u1-tanawwu‘ consists basically of preference for one of the two or many of equally valid views over others, which should be presented and evaluated as such. the essence of preference (rarph), according to ibn taym-yah, is in the recognition of the basic validity of two views, one of which may be recommended while the other is neither denounced nor f a € ~ i f i e d . ~ ~ the author then quotes the fdlowing hadith, reported by ‘abd allah b. mas‘ud: “i heard a man reciting an iiyuh (of the qur’an) which differed with what i had heard the prophet reciting. so i took his hand and we went to the prophet and reported the matter. then i noticed signs of displeasure on his face and the prophet said: “both of you are right-kiliikumii rnz&in-and neither of you should disagree over this. for, many a ’people who came before you met with destruction because of disagreement over trivialitie~.”~~ ibn tqm-yah continues: the prophet forbade disagreement which consisted of jum, that is, denial of the truth and veracity of the opinion or conduct of the other party. this was the case in the foregoing hadith where the prophet explained that disagreement which was devoid of substance was basically destructive. the parties were both reciting the qur’an in different dialects, which was why the prophet declared them both to be &in (doing somegood or beautiful) but they fell in error when they denounced and denied the validity of each other’s %f. zaydb, majm‘ah, pp. 2l1, 295. 551bn taym-yah, iqti+i; p. 130. 9 b i d . , p. 123; ai-tabrizi, mishkiir, ed,’al-aibiini, i, 677; hadith no. 2212. 571bid., pp. 124-5. 60 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 as for ikhtilijf uz-@iiid, which amounts to contradiction, the two views at issue are diametrically opposed to one another in regards to either essentials or subsidiary detail or both. the majority opinion on this type of disagreement is that only one of the opposing views could be right and declared as such, but not both. examples of this type of ikhtilijfamong the scholars are found over the issue of free will and determination, on the attributes of companions, and in the views and beliefs of the different faction's of the jurists and the m m q u w @ (mystics). the matter is different in ikhtihf ul-tanawwu: where each of the two parties are undoubtedly right but blame falls on one who exceeds the limits and resorts to bughy over the in ibn taym-yah's assessment, by far the greatest part of the differences of opinion among the ummah is of this type: they consist of mere variations and amount to no more than a difference of perspective or a way of looking at reality and truth, and yet they still lead to hostility and conflict. this is because neither of the disputing parties acknowledge the merit in the views of the opponent and both persist in pursuing self-righteousness and superiority over the other. 5 9 religious and sectarian fanaticism of the type that lays exclusive claim to righteousness is, as one observer explains, a deviation from the valid precedent of companions and a form of bid'uh/bughy, which is found among the followers of different m u d h b s . the exponents of such transgression among the hanafis are often people who lay claim to piety and knowledge and yet they propagate fanaticism in such ways as to proclaim invalid the juhh of one who performs it behind a non-hanafi imam; they also vehemently denounce the raising of hands during ritual prayer upon descending to ruku' (bowing), which is normal practice among the shaflis. there are, in fact, fanatics of this type in every mudhhab, including the shafi'i, miiliki, and hanbali, who see the truth as a prerogative of the school or their own following only. even outside the sphere of 'iblidiit, in matrimonial matters, for example, they engage in transgression and bid'uh when they forbid their daughters from marrying a muslim who is not a follower of their own d h h a b . 6 0 they are indeed deviating from the consensus of all the leading imams, who have urged their followers to adhere to the teachings of the qur'an and sunnah and abandon individual or scholastic opinions which do not conform to the authority of these sources. al-shahristani has held that istibdiid bi ul-ray, or imposing one's own opinion over others without clear authority, is transgression and a bid'uh which contradicts the precedent of the pious and upright 'ulama of the past. the same author adds that isribdiid bi uz-my is not a bid'& when it is founded 581bid., pp. 130-1. 591bid., p. 134. 60al-ban'ali, ezh&r, p. 61. m. h . kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of ray 61 on knowledge and reason; it is only so when views of doubtful provenance and validity are inflicted on others.61 one of the manifestations of istibdiid bi uz-ru), which often partakes in transgression and ignorance is the assumption that one’s own knowledge, opinion, and belief is all that counts; that everyone must follow it; and that anyone who differs with it should be denounced. the person who persists in such an attitude has little regard for knowledge and truth and tends to ignore merit and reason in the opinion of others. this could only lead to hostility and abuse, and no benefit can be expected as a result.62 and finally ibn qayyim al-jawziyah includes under the category of reprehensible opinion, over-indulgence in personal preference (istihsiin) , advancement of analogies, and speculative argumentation which verge on haw6 and seek to circumvent the shari‘ah. this kind of my pays little attention to the origin and proper causes of the u&im of shari‘ah and often deviates from their objectives. over-indulgence in this type of m), leads to “suspension of the sunnah, to ignorance and confusion in the correct meaning of the book of god, and to their ultimate neglect.63 the author includes in this category argumentation and opinion which originate in excessive questioning and highly theoretical issues which have little bearing on reality and practical experience. there is evidence that the qur’an and sunnah discourage over indulgence in such questions. ibn qayyim then quotes the relevant evidence and draws the conclusion that islam is basically a religion of authority which encourages humility and submission on the part of the believer and shuns over-indulgence in opinions and questions that smack of a libertine attitude toward the authority of divine revelation. this is borne out, the same author adds, by the accepted principles of usiiz uz-$qh on which the various schools are in agreement: even a weak hadith is to be given priority over both m), and analogy (qiyiis). but this only refers, ibn qayyim hastens to observe, to “that type of m), and qiyas which the generality of ‘ulama have discouraged because they diverge from the qur’an and sum&.” as for ru), whose conformity to, or divergence from, the book of god and the sunnah are not known, this type of ru), may be adopted as basis of action only when necessary but it carries no binding authority on anyone.64 6’abu al-fath muhammad b. ‘abd al-karb al-shahrisdni, al-milal wa al-ni&l, ed., ‘abd al‘azk muhammad, al-walul, (cairo: mu’assisah al-halabi, 1378/1%8), p. 1045; yahyi ismgil, manhaj alalcsqah bay al-hdcim wa al-ma?diim, (cairo: d~ir al-wafs, 1406/1986), p. 106. 6zibn taymiyah, iqtiqii: p. 127, zaydin, mahmu‘ah, p. 299. 631bn qayyim, i‘lim, i, 57. 641bid., i, 64. 62 the american journal of islamic social sciences vol. 7, no. 1, 1990 conclusion while juristic doctrine and scholarly opinion will continue to influence the outlook and attitude of contemporary muslim individuals and societies, it is always instructive to refer back to the qur‘an and sunnah: not only because these are the locus of recognized authority but also because m), is often subjective and circumstantial so much so that its author may derive a fresh message from these sources that would relate to his own point of view. this is also true because of society’s changeable perception of reality and outlook over time and the bearing it might have on its standards of acceptability and tolerance. what the society and ‘ulama of the middle ages perceived as unacceptable may today fall within tolerable limits and vice-versa. the tradition of muslim scholarship in relation to freedom of opinion and ijtihad is, on the whole, indicative of latitude and tolerance. this is borne out by their reluctance to bring pernicious innovation (bid‘uh) into the sphere of punishable offenses. despite some difference of opinion on this point the dominant view is that bid‘uh or any innovation and idea for which no support could be found in the sources should be tolerated until the truth emerges. or else that it should be discouraged only through persuasive measures, unless it is manifestly harmful, in which case the harm must be prevented. there is some disagreement as to the veracity of the so-called closure of the door of ijtihad. it seems true nevertheless that independent ijtihad of the type which was practiced by the companions and leading imams was severely restricted, if not totally halted, following the crystallization of the d m b at around the beginning of the 4th century hijrah. in view of the overwhelming diversity of juristic and theological thought and the emergence of schools, sects, and groups h u g h o u t the islamic lands, a climate of opinion began to prevail that fresh inquiry, ray, and ijtihad were to be discouraged. it seems that the primary motive behind the so-called closure of the door of ijtihad was not so much to deny others the freedom of expression and opinion as to protect the unity of the ummah, to prevent confusion, and to defend the purity of islamic heritage. but whatever explanation that one might be able to offer, closure of the door of ijtihad could hardly be justified in principle. it was basically a situational response that the ‘ulama gave to a certain development and it ought to have been regarded as such. however it soon became dominant practice and the tide of taqrrd (imitation) carried many so far as to say that there was no further need to interpret the qur’an and sunnah after the closure of the door of ijtihad. ‘ulama and scholars, including al-shawkani, abu zahrah, and muhammad iqbal, among others, have rejected the validity in principle of the closure of the door of ijtihad. abu zahrah makes the point m. h. kamali the approval and disapproved varieties of ru’y 63 clearly that god almighty granted human beings the gift of reason and has encouraged rational inquiry into his creation. how is it possible that only the ‘ulama of the first three centuries of islam were entitled to the formulation of opinion and ijtihad and the rest were deprived of this freedom? in abu zahrah‘s phrase “nothing is farther from the truth and we seek refuge in god from such e~aggerations.”~~ in modern times, constitutional provisions and statutory legislation on the freedom of speech, press, and assembly in muslim countries have granted this freedom to the citizens, often without discrimination on grounds of language, race, or religion. statutory legislation in many muslim countries has in the meantime specified the various violations of the freedom of speech and their legal consequences.66 the substance and broad outline of such legislation is, i believe, in harmony with the objectives of islam and its principal message of human dignity, equality, and freedom. the realities of day-to-day life in many muslim countries are, however, a far cry from the guidelines that are found in the shari‘ah or their own statutory legislation. freedom of speech, opinion, and expression is yet to become a reality of social and political life in many present-day muslim s~cieties.~’ but the issue can only partially be tackled on legislative grounds. social tolerance and the capacity of a community to enable those of its members to speak when they have something to say without fear of calling upon themselves the wrath of society or government is largely related to healthy public opinion and progress in the spheres of education and culture. it will be borne in mind in the meantime that no total and unrestricted freedom of expression could be expected in any society. but the attempt to balance and refine the use of this freedom against its possible abuses qitomim society‘s educational and cultural achievement. only in an atmosphere of security and tolerance, coupled with the tacit assurance that sincere and constructive contribution and criticism by individuals and groups are gracefully received and tolerated, could such contribution be positively encouraged. 6smuhammad abu zahrah, u$ al-fiqh, (cairo: dir al-fikr al‘arabi, 1377/1958), p. 318. see also muiymmad b. ‘ali al-shawkaini, zrsw al-f&lil min t4qiq al-haqq ilii ‘ilm al-u$, (cairo: dir al-fikr, n.d.), p. 254; bluhammad iqbal, r e reconstruction of reiigious thought in islam, (lahore: the book house, n.d.), p. 178. 66for information on the freedom of speech in malaysia see john a. lent, tocial change and the human rights of freedom of expression in malaysia,” universal h w ~ n rights, iiii (l979), 51-56); ahmad ibrahim, ’freedom of speech and expression under the federal constitution-sedition and contempt of court,” law znfb (a law society publication of the international islamic university, malaysia), september b89, pp. 7-20 67for information on civil liberties in saudi arabia, jordan, egypt, and iraq see james dudley, “human rights practices in the arab states: the modem impact of shari’ah values,” georgia journal of international and comparative law i2 (1982), 55-93. the first international conference of the association of muslim social scientists (amss theme: “social sciences in the 20th century and beyond: an islamic perspective” sponsored by: the association of muslim social scientists; the international institute of islamic thought; hamdard university; madinat-ul-mat; and the international islamic university, islamabad jurnada a/ akhirah 1410ljan. 8-15, 1991 karachi and islamabad, pakistan abstracts july 1, 199o/full papers august 30, 1990 general president of the conference hakim muhammad said of the hamdard foundation committees the islamabad committee: dr. anwar siddiqi, vice-president. planning and development, international islamic university (iiu) ’ islamabad (convener); dr. zafar ishaq ansari, iiu; dr. anis ahmad, iiu; director, hamdard center, islamabad; dr. fateh mohammad, quaid-i-azam university, islamabad. the karachi committee: dr. rashida said, vice president, hamdard foundation. karachi (convener); dr. ehsan rashid, former vice-chancellor, university of kamchi; dr. rashid a. shah, vice-chancellor, sind university, jamshom; dr. manzoor ahmad, dean of arts, university of karachi; mr. sohail shamsi, director of programs, hamdard foundation, karachi; mr. air hassan, director of planning and development, hamdard foundation, karachi. abstracts & papers dr. mushtaqur rahman 2817 pinehurst circle ames, ia 50010, usa (515) 292-9398 (hm) (515) 294-6145 (wk) the first international conference of the association of muslim social scientists (amss theme: “social sciences in the 20th century and beyond: an islamic perspective” sponsored by: the association of muslim social scientists; the international institute of islamic thought; hamdard university; madinat-ul-mat; and the international islamic university, islamabad jurnada a/ akhirah 1410ljan. 8-15, 1991 karachi and islamabad, pakistan abstracts july 1, 199o/full papers august 30, 1990 general president of the conference hakim muhammad said of the hamdard foundation committees the islamabad committee: dr. anwar siddiqi, vice-president. planning and development, international islamic university (iiu) ’ islamabad (convener); dr. zafar ishaq ansari, iiu; dr. anis ahmad, iiu; director, hamdard center, islamabad; dr. fateh mohammad, quaid-i-azam university, islamabad. the karachi committee: dr. rashida said, vice president, hamdard foundation. karachi (convener); dr. ehsan rashid, former vice-chancellor, university of kamchi; dr. rashid a. shah, vice-chancellor, sind university, jamshom; dr. manzoor ahmad, dean of arts, university of karachi; mr. sohail shamsi, director of programs, hamdard foundation, karachi; mr. air hassan, director of planning and development, hamdard foundation, karachi. abstracts & papers dr. mushtaqur rahman 2817 pinehurst circle ames, ia 50010, usa (515) 292-9398 (hm) (515) 294-6145 (wk) the first international conference of the association of muslim social scientists (amss theme: “social sciences in the 20th century and beyond: an islamic perspective” sponsored by: the association of muslim social scientists; the international institute of islamic thought; hamdard university; madinat-ul-mat; and the international islamic university, islamabad jurnada a/ akhirah 1410ljan. 8-15, 1991 karachi and islamabad, pakistan abstracts july 1, 199o/full papers august 30, 1990 general president of the conference hakim muhammad said of the hamdard foundation committees the islamabad committee: dr. anwar siddiqi, vice-president. planning and development, international islamic university (iiu) ’ islamabad (convener); dr. zafar ishaq ansari, iiu; dr. anis ahmad, iiu; director, hamdard center, islamabad; dr. fateh mohammad, quaid-i-azam university, islamabad. the karachi committee: dr. rashida said, vice president, hamdard foundation. karachi (convener); dr. ehsan rashid, former vice-chancellor, university of kamchi; dr. rashid a. shah, vice-chancellor, sind university, jamshom; dr. manzoor ahmad, dean of arts, university of karachi; mr. sohail shamsi, director of programs, hamdard foundation, karachi; mr. air hassan, director of planning and development, hamdard foundation, karachi. abstracts & papers dr. mushtaqur rahman 2817 pinehurst circle ames, ia 50010, usa (515) 292-9398 (hm) (515) 294-6145 (wk) the first international conference of the association of muslim social scientists (amss theme: “social sciences in the 20th century and beyond: an islamic perspective” sponsored by: the association of muslim social scientists; the international institute of islamic thought; hamdard university; madinat-ul-mat; and the international islamic university, islamabad jurnada a/ akhirah 1410ljan. 8-15, 1991 karachi and islamabad, pakistan abstracts july 1, 199o/full papers august 30, 1990 general president of the conference hakim muhammad said of the hamdard foundation committees the islamabad committee: dr. anwar siddiqi, vice-president. planning and development, international islamic university (iiu) ’ islamabad (convener); dr. zafar ishaq ansari, iiu; dr. anis ahmad, iiu; director, hamdard center, islamabad; dr. fateh mohammad, quaid-i-azam university, islamabad. the karachi committee: dr. rashida said, vice president, hamdard foundation. karachi (convener); dr. ehsan rashid, former vice-chancellor, university of kamchi; dr. rashid a. shah, vice-chancellor, sind university, jamshom; dr. manzoor ahmad, dean of arts, university of karachi; mr. sohail shamsi, director of programs, hamdard foundation, karachi; mr. air hassan, director of planning and development, hamdard foundation, karachi. abstracts & papers dr. mushtaqur rahman 2817 pinehurst circle ames, ia 50010, usa (515) 292-9398 (hm) (515) 294-6145 (wk) 176 published by the ufs http://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/at © creative commons with attribution (cc-by) d.j. smit prof. d.j. smit, rimmer and ruth de vries, professor of reformed theology and public life, princeton theological seminary, united states of america; extraordinary professor of systematic theology, faculty of theology, stellenbosch university. e-mail: djs1@sun.ac.za doi: http://dx.doi. org/10.18820/23099089/actat. v41i2.10 issn: 1015-8758 (print) issn: 2309-9089 (online) acta theologica 2021 41(2):176-195 date received: 6 august 2021 date accepted: 9 november 2021 date published: 15 december 2021 schism – and reformed theology? abstract the article deals with the question of schism in the reformed faith and ecclesiology, by focusing on four fundamental issues developed in the form of five theses each. these fundamental issues involve, first, the wellknown reformed passion for the unity and catholicity of the church; secondly, the equally widely known traditional reformed problems and troubling experiences with questions of unity and catholicity; thirdly, some typically reformed theological perspectives on unity and catholicity as their contribution to ecumenical thought and practice, and, finally, some concrete and urgent practical challenges currently facing the reformed faith and world community regarding unity and catholicity. 1. introduction: reformed faith and schism by way of introduction, i would like to offer twenty brief theses, divided into four groups of five theses each. they deal respectively with the reformed passion for unity and catholicity; with traditionally reformed problems with unity and catholicity; with some typically reformed perspectives on unity and catholicity, and with practical questions facing the reformed faith regarding unity and catholicity. nearly every single thesis may be contested and thus calls for more argument and discussion. it is hoped that they may together serve to suggest sufficient different angles into, and issues related https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/za/ https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/2.0/za/ mailto:djs1@sun.ac.za mailto:http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/23099089/actat.v41i2.10?subject= mailto:http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/23099089/actat.v41i2.10?subject= mailto:http://dx.doi.org/10.18820/23099089/actat.v41i2.10?subject= smit schism – and reformed theology? 177 to the broad theme of schism within the reformed faith for the purposes of our discussion.1 2. passion the reformed tradition is known for its expressed passion for the unity of the church. this was true of calvin – in his ecclesiology, in his unwavering attempts to solve disputes and conflicts, in his deep sadness about divisions in the church, and in his moving references to the unity which he, on occasion, described as pia conspiratio.2 this passion for the unity of the church was also present in many of the confessional documents of the reformed tradition, despite contrary claims that the confessions divided the churches, because of the conflicts in which they mostly arose; because of their contextual and historical nature, and because of the deliberate multiplicity of reformed confessional documents.3 during the struggle against apartheid in south africa, those reformed theologians who argued for the visible unity of the church often appealed in their key arguments to the ecclesiology of the heidelberg catechism and the confessio belgica, for example.4 this passion for the unity of the church was theological in origin. it flowed from the claim of reformed ecclesiology to be “an ecclesiology of the word”, since, for the new testament, there can clearly be only one body, and christ 1 this paper was the plenary lecture during a consultation of the reformed church center, new brunswick theological seminary, new brunswick, new jersey, usa, on 5 november 2018, on the theme “schism – and reformed theology?”. several speakers were invited to respond to these theses in additional papers, leading to an interdisciplinary discussion on the theme, also available on the web. 2 for calvin’s understanding of the unity of the church, see, for example, locher (2004) thönissen (2012) zachmann (2008). see the moving original material in vischer (2000). more general on calvin’s ecclesiology, see, for example, busch (1997) freudenberg (2011) george (1990). 3 for the controversial question as to whether the confessions were intended and functioned as instruments of division or unity, see smit (2010a). 4 see, for example, boesak (1984) smit (2012). when the belhar confession was drafted in response to the status confessionis, a moment of truth in which the gospel itself was seen to be at stake, the confessio belgica (and this confessional document’s explicit appeal to the words in 1 peter 3 that the church should always be ready to give a public apology of the hope within them, while honouring christ as lord) played a crucial role in the self-understanding of what the synod was doing. 178 acta theologica 2021:41(2) cannot be divided (vischer 2002; 2010). for calvin, the unity of the church was deeply christological and so central in his understanding of the lord’s supper and its implications. for the confessional tradition, it was deeply trinitarian such as, for example, still present in the introduction of the confession of belhar, with direct allusion to 16th-century confessions.5 one may even argue for a reformed passion for the catholicity of the church – in all the many different senses of the term, whether geographical and referring to many places; or referring to the fullness of truth; or referring to the comprehensiveness of the sovereignty of god, the lordship of christ, and the common grace of the spirit, or referring to the call to discipleship and the claim to sanctification upon all spheres of life, as in kuyper’s well-known “every square inch”.6 during the 20th century, in particular, the reformed faith became known – for many different and convincing reasons – for its remarkable ecumenical passion.7 3. problems in reality, however, reformed history was very different from this oftenexpressed reformed passion.8 according to oberman (2003:116-168), 5 for calvin, see, for example, opitz (2011) faber (2009; 2011). from a south african context, see the studies by durand (1961; 1964). for calvin’s later views on the lord’s supper, which played an important informative and inspiring role in the south african debates, see smit (2009). 6 for kuyper, see, for example, heslam (1998). for the reformation and catholicity more generally, see bavinck (1968) berkhof (1962) berkouwer (1976) birmelé (2003) jonker (1992) mudge (1963) oberdorfer (2001) blei (2005) braaten & jenson (1996). arguments and motifs from these well-known contributions will be presented in what follows in these theses. kuyper’s claim about all spheres of life and every square inch deeply inspired black south african theologians such as allan boesak and russel botman. 7 literature on the ecumenical passion of the reformed faith is overwhelming – whether historical, doctrinal, practical, ethical, missional, or biographical. see, for example, beintker (2011) birmelé (2011; 2012) birmelé & thönissen (2012) brinkman (2006; 2016) douglass (2004; 2005) heron (2002) hesselink (2010) hofheinz et al. (2011) koffemann (2009) the classic study of nijenhuis (1959) tylenda (1981), as well as the many works by the reformed theologian weinrich deeply involved in several ecumenical dialogues over many years, including 1995, 1998, 2002, 2005, 2011, 2012, as well as the collected essays during the calvin commemoration, edited by weinrich et al. (2011). 8 once again, critical and self-critical literature on the many ways in which the reformed tradition has failed the unity of the church and in practice contradicted and betrayed its own self-understanding is readily available. see, for example, leithart (2016) smit (2004; 2010b) van de beek (2002; 2012) van der borght (2010), with several instructive contributions. smit schism – and reformed theology? 179 the reformed tradition failed tragically to remain true to calvin’s two major insights, namely the gracious election and the church’s catholicity. according to vischer (2000) (after a survey of 750 reformed churches), the reality of the reformed tradition is a “sorry state of affairs”. according to kromminga, “reformed churches have upgraded secession at the expense of unity”.9 this dates back to calvin’s own horror at the divisions and schisms in the church of his time, but it dramatically intensified over the centuries of further division and schism in and between the churches of the reformed tradition.10 in july 2017, during the 500-year commemoration of the reformation in wittenberg, the lutheran world federation and the world communion of reformed churches together signed the wittenberg witness during the ecumenical worship service in wittenberg. in this document, they together “acknowledge, confess and lament that divisions still obscure our unity and hamper our witness”. they explained: we regret that through our history we have too often formed divisive habits and structures, failing to discern the body of christ. injustice and conflict scar and scandalise our one body. we are implicated in colonialism and exploitation that have marked our history. we are saddened by the ways we have allowed race and ethnicity; class and inequality; patriarchy and gender bias; and arrogance of nation, language and culture to become divisive and oppressive in our churches and in our world. 9 for kromminga, see his preface in schrotenboer (1992). the reformed passion, including the sense of self-critique, is obvious from a fuller quote of kromminga’s (1992:7-9) words: “throughout the history of the church there has been tension between the ideal of unity and the practice of separation in the name of purity of doctrine (and one may add purity of life, djs) … where that tension has reached the point of agonizing decision, it has more often than not resulted in at least a partial victory for separation. the resulting rifts, once created, tend only to widen until they are beyond repair … (t)he existence of a countless host of competing denominations, all claiming adequate justification for their separate existence, is loud testimony to the prevalence of defeats endured by catholicity … vigor and initiative are more prominently displayed on the side of separation than on the side of catholicity. in almost every instance, separation is pictured as separation from unbelief; seldom if ever is it thought of by the seceders as a rending of the church … reformed churches have not lagged behind … in this regard … (t)hey have divided frequently and easily, with well-developed arguments to support their actions. there can be little question that it is time to be honestly facing this situation … there is a need for … the power of the reformed confession of catholicity to break into and challenge the reformed tradition of secession … (i)t is time to recommit the reformed churches to catholicity … reformed churches have upgraded secession at the expense of unity,”. 10 see many powerful expressions of this feeling of horror at disunity and division in vischer (2000). 180 acta theologica 2021:41(2) they then together witnessed that they hear god’s call and christ’s claim (in many voices and in diverse ways, from the voices of their forebears to the pain on the faces of others all around us nowadays) that this should become different through continuous reform; they pleaded together for “renewed imagination” of what being the church in communion could mean, and they committed themselves to concrete actions, in order to explore new forms of life together, to resist the forces of injustice and exclusion together, and to make their unity more visible in all local contexts (the lutheran world federation & the world communion of reformed churches 2017). the wittenberg witness itself was based on their seven-year joint study (2006-2012) and their shared report called communion: on being the church.11 this report is one of many in the contemporary ecumenical world that consider the expression koinonia or communion as description of the nature of the one and catholic church. in the development of this particular report, it became increasingly clear that protestantism initially suffered from an “ecclesiological deficit”. in having to justify their own existence while still confessing the one and catholic church of the creeds, protestant churches suffered from an insufficient appreciation of the communion of the one body of christ.12 instead, over the centuries, protestant churches rather took their real and existing differences as points of departure and developed a variety of ecclesiologies to justify these differences, instead of acknowledging and lamenting them as scars, as shameful divisions and schisms, scandalising 11 some of the members of the commission were birmelé, locher, and weinrich, who all wrote extensively on questions of unity, catholicity, ecumenism – and divisions. for similar studies from the ecumenical movement on the nature of the church, including its unity and catholicity, see, for example, faith and order papers 181, 198, 214, as well as the canberra and porto alegra statements; the study on communion by the protestant churches of europe, and the catholic report on fifty years of ecumenical dialogues since vatican ii, by cardinal kasper (2009). 12 in this same spirit, noordmans (1935:75) already wrote that “de locus de ecclesia is de zwakste plaats in de dogmatiek, vooral in die der reformatoren en ’t allermeest in die der gereformeerden”. long before, bavinck already wrote to his friend snouck hurgronje regarding his inaugural lecture in kampen on the catholicity of christianity and the church that it was intended “as medicine against our narrow-mindedness and meanness”, literally “als eenige medicijn voor de separatistische en sectarische neigingen, die soms in onze kerk zich vertoonen. er is zooveel enghartigheid, zooveel bekrompenheid onder ons en ’t ergste is, dat dat nog voor vroomheid geldt”, in puchinger’s introduction to the dutch reprint of de katholicitieit van christendom en kerk, v. smit schism – and reformed theology? 181 the one body of christ.13 all kinds of so-called “social sources” (niebuhr14) and so-called “non-theological factors” – including ethnicity and culture – 13 see, for example, the reformed ecclesiology in alston (2002). van de beek (2012:146-150), for example, warns strongly against schism as the rendering apart of the one body of christ and of the spirit – which should be unthinkable and impossible, according to him, following the rhetoric of the new testament. “een schism verschilt van een ketterij daarin dat een ketterij een afwijking van de leer van de kerk is, terwijl een schisma voorkomt uit andere oorzaken … er is blijkbaar ook onder protestanten een besef overgebleven van de eenheid van de kerk, dat hen ongemakkelijk met schisma’s doet omgaan … het schisma moet ook maar ongemakkelijk blijven. het schisma is immers een onmogelijk iets. ‘is christus gedeeld?’ is reeds de rhetorische vraag van paulus aan die mensen in korinte. het ene lichaam van christus kan niet verscheurd worden … door hun schisma geven zij er blijk van niet te delen in de liefde van christus, niet te willen dienen, niet te willen dulden, niet de minste te willen zijn. tertullianus schrijft al dat de belangrijkste oorzaak van schisma’s het haantjesgedrag is van mensen … mensen die macht willen hebben, veroorzaken de conflicten en zulke mensen bederven de kerk. zij zijn antichristelijk. als zij weggaan, dan geven zij er inderdaad blijk van niet bij de kerk te horen. het is verdrietig dat ze gaan, maar het is onvermijdelik … [r]ede tot aarzeling is dat het niet altijd duidelijk is wie de schismatici zijn … als twee groepen uit elkaar gaan en de kerk scheurt, welk deel is dan de kerk en wat is een schisma? … schisma’s zijn een familieruzie in de ene kerk en die moet leiden tot verzoening en niet tot uitsluiting … beide delen zijn dus een gescheurd lichaam. juist daarom is de schisma zo erg. het risico is steeds weer dat we de familieruzie gewoon gaan vinden en ons er niet meer om bekommeren … juist omdat schisma’s niet leiden tot herziening van de grenzen van de kerk, maar breuken zijn in het ene lichaam van de kerk zijn ze onverdraaglijk. ketterij is erg … [m]aar een schisma is een breuk in ons eigen lichaam, dat het lichaam van christus is. het is een verdeling van de geest over twee entiteiten en hoe kan de geest ooit gedeeld zijn?”. 14 according to niebuhr (1929:25), “denominationalism represents the moral failure of christianity”. in his very clear and informative discussion of catholicity, unity and truth, jonker (1992:16) is equally critical of the failures of reformed ecclesiology in this regard. “[s]omehow it seemed possible to interpret [‘the great new testament texts on the unity of the church’] in such a way that the visible disunity of the church was not experienced as something totally unacceptable. especially the trend to understand these words as referring to the invisible unity of the church in christ played a decisive role in this respect. it seemed possible to believe the biblical message on the unity of the church without being disturbed too much by the existing disunity. theories about the multior pluriformity of the churches were developed … to explain the disunity in such a way, that it seemed quite acceptable, yes, even as the will of god.” according to jonker (1992:23, his italics), such developments contradict the intentions of the reformers, including calvin: “[t]he idea of different denominations existing side by side, recognizing each other as true churches of god and fostering friendly relations with one another but without any desire to seek and realize the visible unity of the church would have been totally unacceptable to them.” 182 acta theologica 2021:41(2) became normal, taken for granted,15 and defended theologically.16 all kinds of theological arguments had to justify volkskerke, national churches, denominations, and the continuous schisms further fragmenting these already fragmented churches.17 very often, walls that had been broken down were built up once again – with theological and ecclesiological arguments justifying these new divisions and schisms.18 15 berggren (2015:307) concluded his recent doctoral dissertation, entitled catholicity challenging ethnicity, on congregations and churches in post-apartheid south africa, by claiming that “these issues of catholicity not only challenge the south african context, but every society where barriers occur in the christian community”. according to the south african black theologian maimela (1982:1), denominationalism is “an embarrassment for the church”. indeed, “denominationalism thrives on the fact that the church has miserably failed to become the church … denominations exist as creatures of sinful disobedience to the expressive will of god for the church, and it is therefore with profound sorrow and penitence that we should talk about the so-called denominations rather than the church.” 16 in his essay, entitled “‘is christ divided?’ – an analysis of the theological justification of a church schism”, the south african reformed theologian, j.h. (amie) van wyk (2010a), also laments the many ways in which theological arguments are used to justify scandalous schisms. he concludes: “it is a long road on which we have travelled with the troubled church of christ, troubled by division, disunity, dissension, separation, fragmentation, and schism. it is a very shameful route. it is a route where in the beginning, no disunity whatsoever was tolerable (augustine), to a situation of disunity in extraordinary circumstances (calvin), to disunity as an accepted principle (post-reformation), to recurring schism as an almost unavoidable necessity (modern times). the last view represents a sectarian ecclesiology, totally foreign to and in contradiction with what the bible teaches.” in this regard, van wyk (2010a:66) concludes that reformed theology, in general, has distanced itself a longer way from the slogan sola scriptura in ecclesiology than anywhere else. 17 the fact is that many theologies have been used to justify this sectarian ecclesiology. sometimes, we argue that truth is more important than unity. sometimes, we claim that visible unity only has to do with the well-being of the church and not with its being. sometimes, we appeal to our own ethical convictions and long to distance ourselves from so-called moral disobedience that may not be allowed in the true church. sometimes, our claims about the authority of scripture, therefore, justify our divisions and separations. sometimes, we are thus convinced that it is sufficient that the so-called invisible church is one, which means that our visible divisions and conflicts do not really matter. sometimes, we rejoice in the wonderful blessing of pluriformity in the church, which, in our opinion, justifies all kinds of differences and separations. we develop theories about the importance of separate churches for each nation, for each volk, for each culture. we speak about the need for immigrant churches to maintain and cultivate their cultural ties with their homelands. we appeal theologically to the ancient wisdom that grace never destroys nature but makes it perfect. this implies that the visible church will never be different from the natural diversity. sometimes, we proudly confess that we believe in congregations and interpret that to mean rather than in the church, one and catholic. of course, these and many other ecclesiologies all appeal to elements of truth, but their consequences for the life and witness and self-understanding of the church are often harmful and disastrous. smit schism – and reformed theology? 183 4. perspectives18 of course, the unity (or communion) of the church does not imply uniformity. this is after all what catholicity or fullness means. according to the wittenberg witness, “[t]he gift of unity does not require uniformity but can be found and celebrated also in diversity … so that we are united, not divided by our diversity”. in the same spirit, the belhar confession states that the unity of the people of god is manifested and active in a variety of ways, especially in that we love one another – which includes many other expressions (with allusions to the bible and to reformed confessions) – which together imply that this unity can take form only in freedom and not under constraint; that the variety of spiritual gifts, opportunities, backgrounds, convictions, as well as the diversity of languages and cultures, are by virtue of the reconciliation in christ, opportunities for mutual service and enrichment within the one visible people of god.19 in ecumenical theology and life, the so-called “copernican revolution” (proposed by schlink20) made it increasingly possible to recognise, respect, and even celebrate diversity and differences of spirituality, liturgy and worship, doctrine (including views on baptism and the lord’s supper), church order, ministry, witness, service, and christian life. confessing the apostolic faith together and growing together towards koinonia in faith, life and witness increasingly became not only ecumenical longings, but also ecumenical realities, although these strivings still have a long way to go.21 many reformed churches are also realising how important it is to celebrate a diversity of geloofsmanieren, of diverse ways of living and embodying the faith, and of 18 in his discussion of “the meaning of catholicity”, berkouwer (1976:107) refers to “the associations inherent in catholicity” and mentions as examples “boundaries and walls that have been broken, open windows, wideness, and universality”. the south african church historian johannes adonis (1982) deliberately called his doctoral dissertation, an analysis of the mission policy of the dutch reformed church in south africa, “the broken down wall built up once again”, as a reference to ephesians 2. 19 for the text, see, for example, plaatjies-van huffel & modise (2017:489-495) botha & naudé (2011:19-23) naudé (2010:219-224) cloete & smit (1984). 20 schlink (2005) famously developed this notion in his ecumenical dogmatics and applied it as method together with his equally famous analysis of the structure of doctrinal statements, which also had its origins in his attempts to serve the ecumenical movement and to overcome what seemed like divisions. for the ripened fruit of these methodological moves his systematic theology, see schlink (2005). for discussion and interpretation, see smit (2008). 21 see, for example, the ecumenical documents with these titles, as well as many other documents and statements that resulted from the same study processes. 184 acta theologica 2021:41(2) providing opportunities and room for many and deeply diverse ways of being congregations and disciples.22 in this growing together, it has often been important to acknowledge explicitly that many remaining differences, including central doctrinal convictions and claims, are no longer church dividing. in inspiring historical cases, churches have officially “declared communion”, which meant that they “mutually recognized one another as true expressions of the one church of jesus christ”, thereby confirming their agreement in their understanding of the gospel (despite different confessional documents and remaining doctrinal differences of formulation and emphasis), granting one another pulpit and table fellowship, recognising one another’s ministry, acknowledging one another’s ordination, providing for orderly exchange of ministers, and committing themselves to common witness and service in the world. since so many differences remain between and within churches on moral issues and ethical questions, faith and order (1979; 2013a) is still engaged in an ongoing process of study and consultation on why this is the case, attempting to understand better how authority functions in diverse ways in different moral communities, between and even within churches. although the study process is still ongoing, the intention is not to allow such moral differences to divide churches to the point of separation and schism. this clearly remains an urgent challenge in many churches nowadays, and the commitment not to allow these moral differences to “scar and scandalise” the one body even further remains a crucially important “call and claim”. considering the respective processes of ethical decision-making more closely indeed helps everyone appreciate that the causes for our divisions do not always lie where we may claim them to be. this may again help open us to one another, while we continue to struggle with our differences. within protestant, including reformed churches, in particular, the claims to authority are often claims to the authority of scripture, which makes these conflicts particularly serious and difficult. once again, however, several developments in so-called ecumenical hermeneutics during the 20th century – documented, for example, in the studies a treasure in earthen vessels and interpreting together (bouteneff & heller 2001; smit 2003a) – may help 22 already during the 1970s, the vrije universiteit in amsterdam launched an interdisciplinary research project of several years on the so-called plurality of the church; see, for example, the volume of the gereformeerd theologisch tijdschrift, later also published as pluraliteit in de kerk, edited by firet et al. (1977), with several essays from the perspectives of a variety of academic disciplines, as well as the comprehensive collection of theological essays, geloofsmanieren. studies over pluraliteit in de kerk, edited by vlijm (1981). this volume includes an informative essay by brinkman, in which he engages noordmans’ (1935) wellknown and challenging comment on ecclesiology as the “weak spot” of the reformation. smit schism – and reformed theology? 185 churches appreciate the many factors that do play a role in such appeals to “the bible says”. whenever appeals to the bible (and the accompanying assumptions and accusations that others do not respect the authority of the bible) become the causes of conflict and potential division, the commitment not to allow such differences to scar and scandalise the body of christ with further schisms may once again help believers stay together while they struggle together for ways forward. augustine’s reminder that the bible can only properly be read with a hermeneutics of love, an agapic reading, an interpretive rule of charity, can only further assist and inspire in this regard.23 5. practice these struggles together for ways forward very obviously do not exclude, but rather invite and necessitate very serious engagement of one another, including admonition, reprimand, critique, argument, and attempts to persuade, convince, and change. the fullness of the catholicity most certainly includes serious engagement with one another about the way, the truth, and the life.24 many within the reformed tradition have, over centuries, taken these responsibilities very seriously. once again, however, in the reformed understanding, such struggles and such serious engagement of one another (even in the form of discipline) should itself always take place in the spirit of love and in order to convince and keep the others, never in order to exclude and leave the others. the final purpose is always to keep and to hold, to love and to save.25 23 for the influential history of reception of these hermeneutical convictions of augustine, see, for example, smit (2018). 24 one is reminded of bonhoeffer’s well-known warning against the false and dangerous assumption of ecumenism that all positions and viewpoints, all convictions and practices are equally valid and legitimate and that truth in ecumenism is, therefore, simply another name for the totality of all perspectives and backgrounds. 25 in this spirit, jonker (1992:23-26) argues for the importance of staying together as long as possible, in spite of deep differences even about the truth. “of course the unity of the church is broken when the truth of the gospel is denied. but we should not easily let one another go because differences arise. the truth itself is catholic and unifying (eph. 4:11-16). the truth is grasped ‘together with all the saints’ (eph. 3:18) … [w]e need other christians to assist us in knowing the truth. differences of opinion may often lead to a clearer vision of the truth. we may not simply identify our own interpretation of the bible with the truth of god, nor our own denomination with the true church of god and make a high-handed decision to maintain our isolation from others. the lines of communication among the churches must increasingly be opened. the communion of the saints is not a luxury that one may opt not to practice, because love for our brothers and sisters and our zeal for the truth should urge us to seek the unity of the church. when our zeal for the truth tends to become divisive in the sense that it continually threatens the unity of the church and fosters a spirit of withdrawal from the fellowship with other 186 acta theologica 2021:41(2) of course, the reformed tradition also knows extreme situations of status confessionis, moments of truth, when the truth of the gospel and the credibility of the witness and life of the church truly seem to be at stake. they may seem to be moments when the indifferent (adiaphora) is no longer indifferent (adiaphora), when the differences are no longer acceptable, when the divergences have become too much, when it is necessary to take a stand and confess. they may seem to be moments of truth.26 sometimes, the word “heresy” has even been used.27 the judgement that such moments have arrived is always in itself a risk, without any guarantees. the gospel indeed “seems to be” at stake – for some, according to some. these are moments that cannot be calculated and easily determined; they come by “neither calendar nor clock”.28 they arrive when some are convinced that they can do no other; they have been struck on the mouth (barth); they have no other choice but to say “no” to what they view as betrayal and denial of the gospel itself. even then, however, the “no” is still inspired by a deeper “yes”; the cry is a cry from the heart and an appeal for conversion and renewal and for a way forward together. this was, for example, the case with the theological declaration of barmen, just as it was the case with the confession of belhar.29 in the history of the reformed tradition, moments of separation and schism have often been framed in terms of moments of truth. the habits of the reformed mind have often made it easy for many to give truth (and, therefore, separation) primacy over unity (and, therefore, love and belonging and staying together despite struggles). reformed scholars have described churches, we may have reason for some caution. at least we will have to ascertain whether the differences in question are of such a nature that we have no choice but to withdraw ourselves. we may well ask whether our concept of the truth is not perhaps lacking in depth, and whether we are sensitive enough as far as the unity and catholicity of the church are concerned. the truth of the gospel is obviously more than our formulation of it … [t]he church has a calling to manifest the catholicity which it confesses. no church should ever settle for an exclusive view of the church by becoming a church for a specific nation or class, race or colo[u]r … a church that feels no hurt because of the disunity and fragmentation of the total church of god on earth is simply lacking in its understanding of catholicity as a gift and a challenge that is given to the church in christ.” 26 for the south african experience during the struggle against apartheid and the way in which moments of confession were understood, see cloete & smit (1984) smit (1984). 27 on the role of heresy in the church struggle in south africa, see the essays collected in de gruchy & villa-vicencio (1983), as well as gaybba (1984). 28 naudé (2010), with direct reference to karl barth and his views of confessions. 29 in the case of the confession of belhar, the official accompanying letter expressed these intentions and longings. see, for example, smit (2003b). the synod of the mission church decided at the time that the accompanying letter belongs officially with the belhar confession and should always be published and distributed together with belhar, to serve as a reminder of the historical context, intention and hopes. smit schism – and reformed theology? 187 this typical attitude as “bound to differ”.30 given the passion of the reformed tradition for unity, catholicity, and ecumenicity, being so “bound to differ” is no reason for self-assurance and pride, but rather for lament and shame. schism should never be viewed as a solution. schism is never positive. schism is never a legitimate and preferable strategy to deal with tensions, conflicts and struggles within or between churches.31 still, the potential conflict and tension between (our understanding of) truth and (our willingness to work for) unity cannot be denied. the confession of the catholicity of the church necessarily raises the question of “the boundaries of the church”.32 the question of truth and community is indeed the question of “diversity and its limits” in the ecumenical church, according to kinnamon (1988). diversity is, of course, of extreme importance in any understanding of the catholicity – and community and unity and ecumenicity – of the church, for many reasons, of many kinds, and in many concrete ways. but are there also boundaries to these many ways of enriching diversity? could what is called “legitimate diversity” not actually mask shameful separation and schism? could what is called “reconciled diversity” not actually cover deep divisions and lack of reconciliation? for kinnamon (1988), there are indeed such boundaries. he distinguishes two principles that could help discern the limits of legitimate diversity. the first unacceptable expression of diversity, for him, would be the absence of love (for which he mentions as examples the german christians of the 1930s or the afrikaner churches of apartheid south africa). the second unacceptable diversity would be an idolatrous allegiance to things that are less than ultimate (for which he mentions as example to give ultimate allegiance to anything else, whether that be nationality or economic ideology or personal ego or visions of earthly achievement, and especially to justify that allegiance theologically) (kinnamon 1988:115). 30 kort (1988:viii) describes his own cultural background in these terms: “(my) topic arises from my exposure from youth on to theology. i grew up in an environment where theology divided people, at times even ending relationships within families. theological hostility and conflict were touted as inevitable, even virtuous. ‘rotten wood won’t split’ was the excuse. people who did not hold and articulate sharp and non-negotiable theological distinctiveness were judged as lacking conviction. tentativeness and tolerance were identified with indifference.” 31 for valuable contributions, see the collection of essays, edited by van der borght, on schism and reformed faith edited by schrotenboer (1992); see also van wyk (2010b), in a volume of essays on the unity of the church according to reformed understanding. 32 in his discussion of catholicity as one of the characteristics of the church according to the creeds, berkouwer (1976:105-198) first deals with “the meaning” of catholicity and then with “the boundaries” and “the continuity” of the church. 188 acta theologica 2021:41(2) even if one finds his two principles attractive and helpful (perhaps because they exclude all other justifications that are so often and so easily used to claim that some “have moved outside the circle of acceptable christian diversity”), his examples themselves make clear how extraordinarily difficult it still remains to apply these principles in real life and to discern and determine that such moments of truth (and, therefore, exclusion and the end of community) have indeed arrived (kinnamon 1988:108-118). with good reason the word “risk” is often used to describe the difficulty of what is at stake in such processes and moments of discernment.33 ecumenical spirituality has often been described as a spirituality of encounter, (wainwright 1986, quoting cardinal mercier; kasper 2007) as the refusal to let go of one another, as the willingness and desire to welcome one another like christ also welcomed and accepted us, to the glory of god, in the spirit of romans 15:7. for those who understand that romans 15:7 closes the circle of romans 1:16-17, that the welcome we are called to extend to one another flows from the justice of god which justified us all out of radical free grace, welcomed us and accepted us, such a spirituality excludes any positive consideration of separation, schism, and exclusion, as if such spiritualities were visible embodiments of the gospel of free grace. bibliography adonis, j. 1982. die afgebreekte skeidsmuur weer opgebou. nederland: brill. alston, w. 2002. the church of the living god. a reformed perspective. louisville, ky: westminster john knox. bavinck, h. 1968. de katholiciteit van christendom en kerk (ingeleidt door g. puchinger). 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(eds) 2017. belhar confession. the embracing confession of faith for church and society. stellenbosch: sun press. https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928357599 schlink, e. 2005. ökumenische dogmatik. grundzüge. göttingen: vandenhoeck & ruprecht. smit, d.j. 1984. what does status confessionis mean? in: g.d. cloete & d.j. smit (eds), a moment of truth (grand rapids, mi: wm b. eerdmans), pp. 7-32. 2003a. ecumenical hermeneutics? historical benchmarks and current challenges of a concept. in: a. fröchtling & n. phaswana (eds), being (the church) beyond the south-north-divide: identities, othernesses and embodied hermeneutics in partnership discourses south africa-germany (münster: lit), pp. 23-48. 2003b. no other motives would give us the right – reflections on contextuality from a reformed perspective. in: m.e. brinkman & d. van keulen (eds), studies in reformed theology 8. christian identity in cross-cultural perspective (zoetermeer: meinema), pp. 130-159. 2004. protestantism and the future of the ecumenical movement? a reformed perspective. in: o.p. matteus (ed.), lutheran and reformed churches in times of global transformation (geneva: lwf & warc), pp. 72-76. 2008. confessional and ecumenical? revisiting edmund schlink on the hermeneutics of doctrine. verbum et ecclesia 29(2):446-474. https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v29i2.43 2010a. confessions as instruments of (dis)unity? in: e. van der borght (ed.), the unity of the church. a theological state of the art and beyond (leiden: brill), pp. 137-156. 2010b. what kind of unity do we want (and need)? – progress (and failures) of the reformed churches in south africa on their way towards full communion. in: die gemeinschaft evangelischer kirchen in europa (geke) als gemeinschaft von kirchen (the community of protestant churches in europe as a fellowship of churches), epd dokumentation 50/51, pp.69-76. https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300098686.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.12987/yale/9780300098686.001.0001 https://doi.org/10.18820/9781928357599 https://doi.org/10.4102/ve.v29i2.43 194 acta theologica 2021:41(2) 2012. the confessio belgica as liberating truth today? in: p.j. tomson (ed.), the belgic confession at 450 (analecta bruxellensia 15) (maastricht: shaker media), pp. 77-88. 2018. reading rightly? on hermeneutics of trust, hope and commitment. in: j. punt & m. nel (eds), reading writing right, essays presented in honour of prof. a.e.j. (elna) mouton (stellenbosch: africa sunmedia), pp. 19-39. the lutheran world federation & world communion of reformed churches 2012. communion: on being the church. report of the lutheran-reformed joint commission between the lutheran world federation (lwf) and the world communion of reformed churches (wcrc), 2006-2012. geneva: lwf/warc. 2017. wittenberg witness. geneva: lutheran world federation and world communion of reformed churches. thönissen, w. 2012. einheit der kirche bei calvin. in: a. birmelé & w. thönissen (eds), johannes calvin ökumenisch gelesen (leipzig: evangelische verlagsanstalt), pp. 213-226. tylenda, j.n. 1981. the ecumenical intention of calvin’s early eucharistic teaching. in: b. gerrish (ed), reformation perennis (pittsburgh: pickwick), pp. 27-47. van de beek, a. 2002. the dis-unity of the reformed church. in: l. vischer (ed), the church in reformed perspective (geneva:john knox center) pp.109-234. 2012. lichaam en geest van christus. de theologie van de kerk en de heilige geest. zoetermeer :meinema. van wyk, j.h. 2010a. “is christ divided?” – an analysis of the theological justification of a church schism. in: e. van der borght (ed.), the unity of the church. a theological state of the art and beyond (leiden: brill), pp. 51-68. https://doi.org/10.1163/ ej.9789004179684.i-350.25 2010b. communion – responding to god’s gift. in: e. van der borght, the unity of the church. a theological state of the art and beyond (leiden: brill), pp. 19-32. vischer, l. (ed.) 2000 pia conspiratio. calvin on the unity of christ’s church. geneva: john knox center. wainwright, g. 1986. ecumenical spirituality. in: g. wainwright, c. jones & e. yarnold (eds), the study of spirituality (new york: oxford university press), pp. 540-548. https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004179684.i-350.25 https://doi.org/10.1163/ej.9789004179684.i-350.25 smit schism – and reformed theology? 195 weinrich, m. 1995. őkumene am ende? neukirchen: neukirchener verlag. 1998. kirche glauben. evangelische annäherungen an eine ökumenische ekklesiologie. wuppertal: foedus verlag. 2005. die einheit der kirche aus reformatorischer perspektive. ein beitrag zum protestantischen őkumeneverständnis. evangelische theologie 65(3):196-210. https://doi.org/10.14315/evth-2005-0305 2011. calvins őkumeneverständnis und die ökumenische bewegung des 19. und 20. jahrhunderts. in: m. hofheinz, w. lienemann & m. sallmann (hrsg), calvins erbe. beiträge zur wirkungsgeschichte johannes calvins (göttingen:v andenhoeck & ruprecht), pp. 76-99. 2012. calvin als ökumenisches ereignis. in: a. birmelé & w. thönissen (hrsg), johannes calvin ökumenisch gelesen (leipzig: evangelische verlagsanstalt), pp. 175-196. weinrich, m. (ed.) 2002. einheit bekennen. auf der suche nach ökumenischer verbindlichkeit. wuppertal: foedus verlag. zachmann, r.c. 2008. communio cum christo. in: h.j. selderhuis (ed.), calvijn. handboek (kampen: kok), pp. 409-417. keywords trefwoorde schism skeuring reformed ecclesiology gereformeerde ekklesiologie church unity kerkeenheid ecumenism ekumenisme https://doi.org/10.14315/evth-2005-0305 the spiritual significance of jihad in economics* waleed el-ansary to the question of what are the foremost things a man should do, situated as he is in this world of enigmas and fluctuations, the reply must be made that there are four things to be done or four jewels never to be lost sight of: first, he should accept the truth; second, bear it continually in mind; third, avoid whatever is con trary to truth and the permanent consciousness of truth; and fourth, accomplish whatever is in conformity therewith. all reli gion and all wisdom is reducible, extrinsically and from the human standpoint, to these four laws: enshrined in every tradi tion is to be observed an immutable truth, then a law of “attach ment to the real,” of “remembrance” or “love” of god, and f d y prohibitions and injunctions. the ultimate motivating cause for homo zslumicus is not happiness or “utility,” but the truth. for although happiness accompanies confomity to the truth, it is an effect rather than a motivating cause. as frithjof schuon states, “our willing is not insphd by our desires alone, funda mentally it is inspired by the truth, and this is independent of our imme diate interests.”* islamic economics recognizes the need for homo zslumicus to conform to the truth that god is the absolute and that all that is relative is attached to the absolute by integrating all of life around a sacred center. accordingly, this realizes the meaning of the funda * it is important to immediately point out that jihad has a very broad meaning in islam, one which relates to any effort for the sake of god. as the article explains, the spiritu al significance of jihad has been obscured by various factors, but it nonetheless applies to the whole life in which one strives to integrate all things around a sacred center. the recognition of the existence of the effort to strive against one’s passions is an essential element which distinguishes islamic economics from neoclassical economics. waleed el-ansary is a research analyst in islamic economics at (he s c h 1 of!shmic and social sciences (siss) it! lueshurg, va. 232 the american journal of islamic social sciences 142 mental witnesses (smt&htayrz)-‘’there is no divinity but allah” and “muhammad is the messenger of allah.’” neoclassical economics, on the other hand, abstracts from god and attaches all things to utility rather than to god, thereby malcing the rela tive absolute. the theory is based on the doctrine that the only thing any one is capable of desiring or pursuing as an end in itself is ow’s own self inttmst or utility. neoclassical economics does not d a y that people sometimes do desire ihe happiness of others, but insists that people are capable of desiring @he happiness of others only as a means to their own happiness. p m l y altruistic and benevolent actions and desires, therefoe, do not exist. the theory thereby falsifies the noble actions of a prophet or saint by reducing those actions to disguised forms of self-sehg behavior at the idol of utility, rather than understanding them as mdels of conformity to the truth. neoclassical economics asserfs not merely that all men “put ehsir own hmsts fhst,” but also that they are capable of nothing else. the sole motivating cause for brrw economicus is utility, for the the ory even s-es @he truth to utility. it does not between “the mental stabcs inwlvad in believing t i a n e e g that really is tnc and a successful decqtim.’4 ~ c c o n i i q to neocletsslcal theoay, s t u d y d izing tht mevling of & m a a d being flay deluded that oae has done so can be dre same. it is, thtxefa, irnlevmt if perocivod utility or hap piness is false as to its object or levek “the object can be good, but hap piness can be wmng if it cuts it(se@ off fiorn its ~ i v i n e mtext’b homislanricusmust,ontheotherhand,combat~ionandinema~ his will and sentiment which tempt him to forget or betray dre truth tht insatiable voices of competing passions which lead the individual to internal disintegration and the community into social chaos must not overcome the intcgmthg voice of truth. above all, the will of hm islamicia should keep in view the sovereign good and view all things in their connection with this good. his senthmnt should be objective in loving all things in their divine context. it would be illogical and against tmth for homo zslamicus to will or love things outside their divine cause, for that would constitute the sin of idolatry and is “to hate indirectly the cause from which all perfection and all love derive.’* against this disorder arising from the idolafry of the passions, religion binds man to the t ~ t h and declares “holy exertion.” indeed, “the essen tial reason for war, whatever the point of view and domain in which it is envisaged, is to end a disorder and re-establish order.. . it is in this sense, and in this sense alone, that war can be consided legitimate.”’ within christianity, the need for this spiritual struggle is indicated by christ’s stateme* ‘think not that 18111 come to send peace on earth; i came not to send peace, h a sworct”8the same spiiitd sig&kme @ i s to el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 233 the islamic concept of jih&i, which “is derived from the root jhd, whose primary meaning is “to strive” or “to exert oncsew.’* unfortunately, the spiritual significance of jihad has been obscured by the erroneous western image of is^ as the ‘‘religion of the sword.”’o although jihad in its outer meaning relates to the defense of the islamic world from invasion by non-islamic forces, it was upon rehunina, from the battle of badr, which threatened the existence of the islamic com munity, that the prophet of islam said, “you have returned from the less er jihad to the greater jihad.” this greater battle, which describes the inner meaning of jihad, is the struggle against the forces that prevent man from living by and for the truth, living a life of virtue by integrating his will and sentiment into his knowledge of the absolute. the ultimate spiritual weapon in this inner jihad is the truth itself, for without truth man can do nothing. when the shhdaizh is written in arabic calligraphy, “the very fonn of the first witness (la i l a h izla allah in arabic) . . . is like a bent sword with which all othemess is removed from the supreme reality, while everything that is positive in manifes tation is retumed to that reality.”’ ’ the inner j w is victorious and order is restored when homo zslamicus contemplates the truth with the whole of his b e i n g 4 intel ligence, will, and sentiment. and the totality of this contemplation results in virtue, or beauty of soul. because beauty and the love of beauty give the soul happiness, the soul is happy only in virtue. indeed, “sensible beauties me situated outside the soul, and their meeting with it is more or less accidental, if the soul wishes to be happy in an unconditional and permanent fashion, it must cany the beautiful within ~appiness is, therefore, an effect which constantly accompanies virtue as the inner jihad succeeds to confonn the soul to the t ~ t h . but happiness is not the motivating cause. instead, it is a result, which springs from the state of inner conformity to the tmth and from which flow good works and actions in outward effort or jihad. because nothing exists without a divine context and the spiritual jih&l is real, there is no science of man without spiritual principles. consequently, islamic economics should be seen as applied cthics, an examination of policies and institutions in tenns of homo zslamicus’ inner and outer jih&lhis effort to integrate the economic aspects of life ammd a s a d center. this a-h, which recognizes the cenaality of qualitative choice, stands against any science of man based on igno rance of the truth and its resulting intemal disoder, for “of ignorance there is no science; and of caprice no 1aw.”’3 indetd, slam comes to abolish “both error and sin: e m r in holding that the absolute is not, or that it is relative, or that t h e me two ablutes, or that the relative is absolute; sin p k e s these errors on the level of the will or of a~tion.~’~~ 234 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 neoclassical economics, on the other hand, promotes the error that the relative is absolute in the form of utility and converts this into sin. collapsing man’s hierarchy of needs into one type of utility introduces tmde-offs between spiritual and other needs rather than recognizing them as simultaneous qualitatively different complements; and it sets the stage for the sacrifice of man’s spiritual needs for the “utility of thenafs,” or the passionate ego. because objectivity, or conformity to truth, requixcs relating everything to god, neoclassical economics repsents “jwd in reverse.” indeed, neoclassical theory maintains that a spiritual j m is not only unnecessary but impossible. it argues that j m is absurd because everydung is reducible to utility, thus eliminating any conflict ing criteria to struggle between. any internal conflict between qualita tively different motives, it is held, would be erroneous because man’s choice is limited to utility and a choice between qualitatively different ends does not exist. ws denial implies that all the prophets, saints, and sages of history, who espouse the qualitative choices between god and the world, are inherently irrelevant. clearly, the inner jh&l is both ontologically possible and necessary because honest introspection reveals that there are always competing “voices” within ordinary man engaged in a battle for control. otherwise, one could never say, “i wish i didn’t eat so much chocolate.” when mul tiple voices compete and the voice of truth does not rule, the process of choice can be circular or rudderless; i.e., there is no so-called neoclassi cal law of caprice to guide. the ordinary man is thus adrift, only the prophet or saint is rational. their choices depend only on truth. neoclassical theory, then, denies the spiritual jihi?td in favor of this “jwd in reverse,” subordinating all goods to utility rather than to god. the theory falsifies every good by subordinating “it to an end which is contrary to it, thus to vitiate it by an inferior intenti~n.”’~ it likewise fal sifies virtue, considering it only in relation to a utility which perverts its meaning. betraying the truth for the utility idol leads to unhappiness and an ugliness of soul, which neoclassical theory justifies unconditionally by declaring man to be insatiable. the utility idol falsifies even transient happiness, cutting things off from their divine context and taking man away from god rather than leading toward him. as frithjof schuon explains, “every bliss is in some manner bliss as such, however morbid the individual circumstances. the diabolical illusion could not reside in the positive nature of the facts; it is by detaching symbols from god, that is, by turning them aside, not from their nature or their content but from their positive function in relation to us, that the devil makes them illuso ry and satani~.”’~ neoclassical economics, therefore, is not spiritually neutral. most true believers in neoclassical dogma feel that the theory can accommodate any religious beliefs within its theory of choice. to them, the term el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 235 “islamic economics” means incorporating islamic preferences and insti tutions within the standard neoclassical theory, reducing islamic eco nomics to a special case of neoclassical economics. they fail to under stand the essential difference between utility as a cause and an effect in relation to truth, and thus the difference between qualitative and quanti tative choices, which separates neoclassical and islamic economics. the next section of this paper, therefore, addresses the question of the irreducibility of islamic economics to neoclassical theory. this segment examines the basis on which neoclassical theory erroneously denies qualitative choice, attempting to demonstrate that the hierarchy of needs and spiritual virtues of homo zslumkus are metaphysically impossible within neoclassical theory. the problem is not that homo zslumicus must have islamic preferences within neoclassical theory, but that there can be no homo zslumicus within neoclassical theory. moreover, this section will attempt to show that in relating virtues to utility rather than to god, neoclassical theory inverts them, making homo economicus a complete inversion of homo zslumicus or of faithful adherents to other revelations. the section also examines how this inversion is related to the atheism of jeremy bentham, the father of utilitarianism, who attacked religion in the name of utility and dreamed that his book on secular utilitarian legisla tion was a revelation presented to him by an angel. given the dubious “inspiration” of modem utilitarianism, the second section of the paper examines the objectivity of neoclassical theory. this segment will attempt to show that the prima facie arguments advanced to support the thesis that utility is the sole motivating cause are logically invalid. true believers in neoclassical theory, however, rely on a tauto logical argument to falsify even the most noble actions as self-interested. they hold this theory in a privileged position of immunity to evidence, “that they would allow no ‘conceivable’ behavior to count as evidence against it.”’ the second section attempts to break this privileged position with empirical evidence on the internal struggle between qualitatively differ ent ends in the form of circular preferences, proving that more than one “voice” is at work internally. this negates the neoclassical law of equal izing marginal utilities, clarifying that internal order is possible only if one voice rules through the spiritual jm to conform to the truth. because neoclassical theory takes one intention to be the only intention possible, it takes a part to be the whole and is not objective with regard to motivation or internal order. the theory is, therefore, sentimental in that it “contradicts a rational attitude and usurps its place.”18 islamic eco nomics provides an objective theory of choice centered on the inner j w , explaining paradoxes neoclassical theory cannot account for. in light of the analysis on spiritual neutrality and objectivity, the paper con 236 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 4 2 cludes by addressing the question of which theory of economics offers homo zslamicza the true remedy for economic ills. spiritual neutrality islamic economics is based on two axiomatic certainties, one concem ing the supreme principle and the other concerning manifestation. these are the two fundamental witnesses: “there is no divinity but allah” and “muhammad is the messenger of allah.’’ as firthjof schuon explains: the first of these certainties is that “god alone is” and the sec ond is that “all things are attached to god.” in other words: “nothing is absolutely evident save the absolute”; then, follow ing from this huh “all manifestation, and so all that is relative, is attached to the absolute.” the world is linked to gob-or the relative to the absolute-both in respect of its cause and of its end.’9 accordingly, every aspect of life is sacred in islam because nothing is outside of the absolute, and no aspect of life is profane because every thing is attached to god. indeed, ‘‘islam envisages religion as not just a part of life but as the whole of it.”m it incorporates what one does, makes, thinks and feels, sanctifying the whole of life in addition to answering questions of man’s origin and return. what would appear to be the most mundane of activities has religious significance in islam, ful filling man’s spiritual needs by integrating all of life around a sacred cen ter. for the faithful, there is no question of allocating resources between the sacred and profane or between spiritual and other needs because everything has a spiritual context. they find the ultimate purpose of any action in god because no end is beyond him and no end has sufficient reason if it stops short of him. this unity of purpose is reflected in a saying from the prophet of islam that a man working to feed his family is performing “an act of worship as if he were praying.’”’ such a statement may be very difficun to under stand in the west where a large domain of human life has been secular ized and it is not possible to find religious meaning in most actions. however, the divine law in islam makes the effort to earn one’s daily bread a religious act as obligatory as specifically religious duties, and which a muslim should perfonn with the awareness that it is pleasing in the sight of god. in fact, the divine law gives religious meaning to all acts which are necessary for human life, but not those which are simply luxuries. the quran, the word of god in islam, implies that to struggle for a living is tantamount to defending the faithz the prophet stressed this fact when a young man with a strong physique was running to his shop through the arez~ where the rophet was marshah . g h i s m e n t o repel an assault, someone remarked that he wished the youth would use el-ansary: the spiriulal significance of jihad 237 his body and health to m in the way of god by enlisting to defend the faith. the prophet responded, “i€ this young man runs with the intention of not depending on others and xfrainhg from begging, he is in the way of god. if he strives for the livelihood of his weak parents or weak chil dren, he is in the way of god. if he tries to show his health out of pride, he is in the way of the devil.”23 egoistic and passionate desires which lead man to will and love things outside their divine contexk therefore, conflict with mm’s spiritual need whereas other needs complement it. many religious scholars, therefore, criticize neoclassical economic theory as being materialistic and a “utilitarianism of al-nafs al ammcs.rah.” neoclassical economists feel this is unfair, and argue that economics is spiritually neutral because it allows for spiritual prefer ences as well. they maintain that those who criticize neoclassical theo ry simply misunderstand it. for example, neoclassical theory suggests @t a spiritually inclined individual should allocate his time between prayer, eating, and working such that the utility of the last moment spent in each of these activities is equal. this would, after all, maximize utili ty since any discrepancy would mean the individual could increase util ity by reallocating his time. the same principle applies to allocating time to different questions on an exam. the objection of traditional scholars is that the two situations are dif ferent because the former involves qualitatively different needs whereas the latter does not. lumping “spiritual utility,” “eating utility,” and “working utility” into one utility incomtly requi.es substitutability between spiritual and other needs, creating tension between them. this makes no sense if eating and working have a spiritual dimension in which a dif’ferent type of “spiritual utility” accompanies both activities. man’s l i e can be integrated only if qualitatively different types of utili ty exist simultaneously, explaining how the sacred is ever-present with out conflicting with man’s other needs. collapsing everything into one utility creates me-offs which do not exist. islamic economics, there fore, recognizes the existence of qualitatively different types of utilities corresponding to a hierarchy of needs. this implies a qualitative rather thatl quantitative “union of complements.” indeed, neoclassical theory sets the stage for the sacrifice of spiritual needs h u g h this quantitative neduction, as the pewem litemtu~~ on the economics of crime, fertility, marriage, the environment, and other moral issues indicates. this reduction is especially important in development economics which neglects man’s spiritual needs for quantitative progress. “witness to this that, while (christ). . . healed the lame, gave speech to the dumb and made the blind to see, he never once made a poor man wealth~.’’~ as will be explained shody, neoclassical theory denies how the internal beauty of spiritual virtue makes a pious man with few means far happi er than an impiok man of p a t wealth. neglecting this spiritual reality 238 the american journal of islamic social sciences 142 in the face of a false trade-off between spiritual and other needs leads to tragic consequences. similarly, neoclassical theory denies the possibility that a person may want to be moved by one desire and not by another, and may win or lose the struggle. if everything is quantitatively comparable, this possibility is meaningless because a person would simply compare utility without a d e s k for one side to win over the other. there is no qualitative struggle in choosing a greater quantity. only if qualitatively different types of ends are under consideration can there be a real intemal struggle in which one hopes that one set of preferences prevails. islamic economics recognizes that winning or losing an internal struggle is a real possibili ty depending on whether “the d e s k by which . . . [a man] is moved is either the will he wants or a will he wants to be without.”z it is in this sense that a man may not always have the will he wants. this is not a question of freedom to do as one pleases. an unwilling addict, for exam ple, is free to act but does not exercise freedom of will in the sense of having the will he wants. in islam, the divine law gives homo zslumicus the ultimate freedom of will by making it possible for him to integrate all of life around a sacred center. in this way, man “avoids many unseen catastrophes and assures himself a life of wholeness and meaning.”26 neoclassical theory denies the possibility that homo zszumicus could have a need for the divine law to have the will he wants, thereby setting the stage for its rejection in favor of “jw in reverse.” while some may object that accepting the divine law completely destroys human initiative, this crit icism “fails to understand the inner workings of the divine law.”27 indeed, the law places many paths before man which he chooses h m according to his mw and needs. “initiative does not come only in rebelling against the truth which is an easy task since stones fall by m-; initiative and creativity come most of all in seeking to live in con formity with the truth and in applying its principles to the conditions which destiny has placed before man.”28 because neoclassical theory does not allow for qualitatively different intentions on different “levels,” it requires a quantitative “resolution of opposites” rather than a qualita tive one. the neoclassical chain of reasoning leads from the denial of dif ferent intentions to the denial of qualitative choices between them-to the denial of man’s need for the truth to make a ch0ice-t.o the denial of man’s confodty to the truth, or virtue. islam rejects the premise of this chain of reasoning. by recognizing that god is the a b l ~ t e , islamic ec~flofnic~ k d i ately recognizes the existence of qualitatively different intentions. man has a free will to do good by willing and loving things for god, or to do evil by willing and loving things against him or apart from him--the latter constituting the sin of idolatry. one and the same action may, there el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 239 fore, have opposite intentions, with good and evil being qualitatively incomparable and irreducible to a common purpose. evil is a privation of good and is not independent of the existence of good, for “the defini tion of vice derives from virtue: goodness is the measure of evil.”29 the same applies to error, which is an ignorance or a privation of knowledge or truth, for “it is not through the agency of stupidity that we know stu pidity, but through the agency of intelligence, which makes recognition of this privation possible.”3o error and evil cannot even exist without truth and good, respectively, and there is no qualitative compambility between them. thus, the components of each pair cannot be aggregated to serve a common end, for evil and falsehood cannot lead to god, who is the sovereign good and the truth. neoclassical theory, on the other hand, makes the relative absolute in the form of utility, thereby denying the existence of qualitatively differ ent intentions. instead of facing a qualitative choice between good and evil, man can only choose utility. two actions, no matter how different, always have the same intention. good and evil alternatives axe, therefore, qualitatively comparable since both are reducible to utility. but those same alternatives may differ quantitatively. in islamic economics, evil and falsehood lack sufficient reason for action since they axe privations of good and truth, and homo islamicus can discern them without referring to desire. one can always challenge evil or error with further questions to prove they have no justification, but one cannot do so with good or truth. although the= is sufficient rea son to act for god, there is no sufficient reason to act against or apart from him. the truth is, therefore, on the side of the good and is inde pendent of desire or emotion since “objectivity is independent of the presence or absence of a sentimental element,” and emotion can be a consequence rather than a cause of the ultimate motivating cause for homo islamicus is therefore truth, whereas evil is only moti vated by passion and the absence of truth, or error. however, neoclassical theory maintains that since man cannot intend to act against utility, the intelligence cannot discern good and evil inde pendent of desire, and every action potentially has sufficient reason there is no need for truth to judge between quahtatively incomparable and opposing intentions, because good and evil are no longer meaning ful terms. there is only more or less utility. an egoistic illusion may therefore be preferable to truth, which is subordinate to utility as the sole motivating cause of homo economicus. by recognizing that god is the absolute, islamic economics recog nizes the unavoidability of conflict and the need for truth to make a qual itative choice before any quantitative choice is possible. falsehood and evil, whether inward or outward, have no sufficient justification, and it is absurd to attempt to equate their mafginal utilities with truth and good, 240 the american joumai of islamic social sciences 142 not because the utility of the latter are always higher than that of the for mer, but because no underlying commensurabieity exists between them. the quantitative allocation is meaningless if it abstracts from qualitative questions of auth and falsehood, good and evil. there is no ecotlomics in islam in the modem sense of dk term because there is nuutility idol to make ah things commensmble. islamic economics is therefore applied ethics, which does not seek to erroneously aggrepreferences arithmetically, but to qualitatively adjudicate between them. this involves taking the reasons for these preferences into accot.int. neoclassical theory, on the other hand, makes the ethical question m e a n i n e s s apart from the allocation. since utility is absolute, “nothing is ‘good‘ or ‘evil’ in itself, there is only ‘mo~’ or ‘ie~s.”’3~ tie answer to the allocation question therefore defines the good, eliminating the moral question since moral truth is relative and truth cannot be the ultimate motivating cause because the intelligence is inoperative without desires to inform it. frithjof schuon answers this a b s d proposition in the open ing p a r a g r a p h of logic and transcendence, which is important to quote relativism sets out to reduce every element of absoluteness to a relativity, while making a quite illogical exception in favor of this reduction itself. in effect, relativism consists in declaring it to be true that there is no such thing as truth, or in declaring it to be absolutely true that nothing but the relatively true exists; one might just as well say that language does not exist, or write that there is no such things as writing. in short, every idea is reduced to a relativity of some sort, whether psychological, historical, or social; but the assertion nullifies itself by the fact that it too pre sents itself as a psychologrcal, historical, or social relativity. the assertion nullifies itself if it is true, and by nullifyrng itself logi cally proves thereby that it is false; its initial absurdity lies in the imphcit claim to be unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a relativity that is declared alone to be p0ssible.3~ fully: thus, the relativist denial of qualitative choice is absurd. although quantitative choices also exist, they only have logical meaning when they am “embedded” in a qualitative chice; they am never prior to and do not necessarily accompany qualitative choices. by denying qualita tive differences, xmctheory takes the quantitative part of reality to be the whole of reality, and is therefore mobjective. this question will bediscussed in the next section. islamic economics is, therefore, clearly not a special case of neoclassi cal theory. they are, in fact, mutually exclusive. without qualitative choice, there is m truth to conform to; the= is no inner j w between good and evil, and truth is not, therefoe, the ultimate spiritual weapon el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 241 in the inner struggle between sentiments “which can either veil. . . (man’s) intelligence or abet his quest for his own o r i g i a . ” m his can be seen most saikingly by considering the implications of neoclassical the ory as they apply to virtue as “preferences.” indeed, if qualitative choic es do not exist, then man is not capable of authentic virtm. there is no intemal battle between “love and hatred, generosity and covetousness, compassion and aggression”35 if utility is the sole motivating cause, then homo zslamicus is not capable of moral heroism as well as dishter ested compassion and generosity. yet, the prophets and saints are the most perfect models of these virtues, for their souls are c o n f o d to the truth. far from making islamic preferences and the virtues of the faith ful a special case, neoclassical theory denies they even exist. since virtue is always a disguised form of self-serving behavior, neoclassical theory makes its inversion unavoidable. this section will, therefore, fmt exam ine the fundamental virtues of homo zszumicus which result from the inner j w with truth as its weapon and then examine its neoclassical parody of “jw in reverse” with error as its cause. virtue is possible in islamic economics because man can have differ ent intentions, making qualitative choices either for or against god. virtue is a necessary part of man’s total attachment to the truth, for man has a will to act in addition to an intelligence which knows. frithjof schuon explains the necessary connection between metaphysical truth and virtue as follows: a spiritual virtue is nothing other than consciousness of a reali ty. it is natural-but immaterial-if it is accompanied by feel ing. . . . the key to understanding the spiritual necessity of the virtues is that metaphysical truths are also reflected in the will and not only in the intellect and reason. to a given principal mth there corresponds a volitional attitude. this is a necessary aspect-r a consequence-of the principle that “to know is to be.9936 to the discernment of the truth and concenaation upon it ate attached the fmt two “jewels never to be lost sight of,” namely, that man should accept the truth and bear it continually in mind. discernment of the absolute is related to the fmt “jewel” of truthfulness and is objective in the sense that “mental knowledge implies the confrontation of a subject with an ~bject.”~’ concenbation with the absolute in view is related to the second “jewel” of sincerity and represents a sanctity or heart knowl edge as “the experience of being and not of thought” in homo zslamicus, veracity is then the first of the virtues “for without mth we can do drawing the consequences of what one knows to be true is the second virtue of sincerity, for “truth excludes heedlessness ad hypocrisy as much as error and lying.’”9 whereas 242 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 veracity acknowledges the truth objectively in thought, sincerity assumes the truth subjectively in outward and inward acts. in this sense, sincerity is a “subjective veracity just as veracity is an objective sincerity.”@ in homo zslumicus, the virtues of veracity and sincerity are, therefore, reflections in his will of the metaphysical certainties contained in the fun damental “witnesses.” the principle of veracity is best expressed in the motto, “there is no right superior to that of truth.” similarly, the princi ple of sincerity is expressed in the legal formula: “‘the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,’ but applied in moral mode.”41 sincerity in homo zslum’cus, therefore, implies relating everything to god. no jus tification can stop short of him without either forgetting or betraying him. and obviously no justification can go beyond him, because there is nothing outside the absolute and thereby mite. the legal formula could therefore be paraphrased: “‘“he good, the whole good, and noth ing but the good‘; namely, the movement of approach to god.”42 thus, sincerity implies all the other virtues. sincerity obliges one to humility, which “as one knows or ought to know, has its source in our total dependence on god; from this awareness there normally results a sense of proportion which is always awake, and which prevents us from overestimating ourselves as well as underestimating humility is not, therefore, a sentimental desire lacking in sufficient reason, but is based on the metaphysical certainty of one’s total dependence on god and is the window to the other virtues. indeed, without humility, “there are false virtues whose motives are basically to demonstrate to oneself that one has no need of god; the sin of pride consists here in believing that our virtues are our property and not a gift of heaven; which is all the more wrong in that, in this case, the virtues are imaginary, since pride perverts them.”” neoclassical theory, on the other hand, begins with the error that the relative is absolute in the form of utility and advances “jihiid in reverse.” rather than leading to the virtue of veracity that “there is no right supe rior to that of truth,” it subordinates truth to utility. an egoistic illusion may be preferable to the truth, and veracity has a contingent rather than ontological basis. neoclassical theory thereby relegates the “divine gift of the intelligence to the rank of the superfluous,” whereas islamic eco nomics does not erroneously reduce the meaning of existence to a capac ity for ~tility.4~ neoclassical theory replaces veracity that god is the absolute with impiety that utility is the absolute, substituting a false thought for a true knowledge. concentration on the error of the utility idol instead of the truth of the absolute leads to cynicism, the neoclassical parody of sincerity. drawing the implications of the error that utility is the sole motivating cause, virtue becomes a disguised form of self-serving behavior instead of conformity to truth. this cynical neoclassical approach subordinates el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 243 virtue to utility both directly and indirectly. in the direct approach, milton friedman declared in his nobel acceptance address, “the great saints of history have served their ‘private interest’ just as the most money grubbing miser has served his interest.’& in the indirect approach, neoclassical theory reduces virtue to “reputation effects” which are useful for engaging in profitable trade, making virtue a means to external goods. this inverts the islamic economic hierarchy in which external goods such as wealth and honor are means to goods of the body such as health and beauty which are, in turn, the physical support for the spiritual work which manifests itself in intrinsic virtue, the “goods of the soul.” regarding this inversion, frithjof schuon writes: man must beware of two things: first, of replacing god, in prac tice if not in theory, by the functions and products of the intel lect, or of considering him only in connection with this faculty; and second, of putting the “mechanical” factors of spirituality in the place of human values, the virtues, or of considering virtues only in relation to their “technical” utility and not in relation to their bea~ty.4~ by subordinating truth and beauty to the utility idol, neoclassical the ory denies the truth and beauty of virtue. many virtuous business prac tices, the sufficient reason for which “is not in the first place their extrin sic utility but their beauty,” are, therefore, inexplicable according to the neoclassical industrial organization literature and are explained as irra tional or at best as “bounded rationality.” indeed, most game theory models simply label players who do not maximize gains as “irrational,” and analyze how to best exploit their weakness. the cynical neoclassical approach to virtue is perhaps best reflected in an article by marwell entitled “economists free-ride-does anybody else?”48 in it, thaler reviews the results of a game in which players were given five dollars each and offered the choice on how much to contribute to a collective fund, which would be doubled and then divided evenly among the players. if everyone contributed to the collective fund, all players would receive ten dollars. however, the players must face the temptation to “free-ride,” or withhold the five dollars and wish for every one else to contribute in order to collect nearly fifteen dollars. similarly, the players must face the fear of exploitation that other players will free ride even if they do not. most players resolved this dilemma by con tributing half the money to the collective fund and keeping half them selves, thereby fulfilling their sense of duty while protecting themselves from exploitation. the only group of players who consistently con tributed less were economists, who averaged only 20 percent. moreover, they were motivated to contribute this specific percentage because this 244 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 fraction maximized the expected personal gain, given the number of players and game design. as marwell noted, what was most surprising was the attitude of the economists in playing the game and analyzing the results. they were most interested in c o n f i i g that 20 percent was the expected revenue maximizing percentage and viewed other players who gave more as too ignorant to determine the “rational” contribution. this inverts the spiri tual perspective that it is better to bear an injustice than to commit one, although neither is desirable. in bearing an injustice, one loses an exter nal good or a good of the body, whereas by committing an injustice, one loses goods of the soul, or virtue. but neoclassical theory cannot tell the qualitative difference between goods of the body and goods of the soul because it reduces them only to utility and concludes cynically that vir tuous behavior is irrational. neoclassical economists, therefore, learn to be ignorant about rational choice. of course, islamic economics does not suggest that homo zslumicus should make himself vulnerable to repeated economic injustice but maintains that it is not rational for him to initiate it. as the reactions of the economists of marwell’s experiment illustrate, cynicism is a form of pride, inverting humility in its relation to sincerity. neoclassical theory thereby substitutes vain thought for a manner of being. frithjof schuon eloquently explains the relationship between cyn icism and pride on the one hand and sincerity and humility on the other as follows: cynics believe that sincerity consists in exhibiting short-com ings and passions and that to hide them is to be a hypocrite; they do not master themselves and still less do they seek to transcend themselves; and the fact that they take their fault for a virtue is the clear proof of their pride. . . . moreover, to present a vice as a virtue and, correspondingly, to accuse virtues of being vices, as is done by cynicism passing as sincerity, is nothing but hypocrisy, and it is a particularly perverse hypocri~y?~ sincerity does not consist in showing oneself as one is, in order to oppose the struggle to be what one should. and since this inversion of sincerity is a perverse form of pride, “the mother of all sins,” neoclassi cal economics opens the door to all the other vices and consecrates them in the name of the utility idol. frithjof schuon continues: as for pride, it was defined very well by boethius: “all the other vices flee from god, and only pride sets itself up against him”; and by st. augustine: “other vices attach themselves to evil, that evil may be accomplished; pride alone attaches itself to good, that good may perish.” when god is absent, pride neces el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 245 sarily fills the emptiness: it cannot but appear in the soul when there is nothing there to relate it to the sovereign good>o in islamic economics, on the other hand, veracity and sincerity which relate to the objective and subjective modes of the intelligence imply humility and lead to the other fundamental virtues relating to the active and passive modes of the will and sentiment. in terms of the will, islamic economics recognizes that it is free because god is the absolute and qualitative choice is possible with truth as the motivating cause. this introduces the possibilities of detachment and vigilance if homo lslamicus adheres sincerely to the truth. indeed, the will “is divided in a certain sense into an affirmative mode and a negative mode, for it can only accomplish or abstain: it must either do ‘good‘ or avoid ‘evil.”’51 however, the negative attitude necessarily comes before the affirmative act in spiritual life because “the will is a priori entrenched in its state natural since the fall-of passional and blind a f f i i t i ~ n . ” ~ ~ abstaining from evil is an indirect movement toward god and as the third “jewel” is the virtue of detachment. what must be overcome is “desire, passion al attachment, idolatry of ephemeral things.”53 because of qualitative choice, objectivity at the level of the will requires that man’s attachment to anything be based on truth and therefore related to god, that its object be worthy of love, that is, that it should communicate to us something of god, and even more importantly, should not sepa rate us from him; if a thing or a creature is worthy of love and does not alienate us from god-in which case it indirectly brings us close to its divine model-it may be said that we love it “in god” and “towards god,” and thus in keeping with platonic “remembrance” and without idolatry and centrifugal passion. to be detached means not loving anything outside of god or q fortiori against god; it is thus to love god ex toto corde.% this detachment is the opposite of passion, which draws one blindly to an object in defiance of god. this leads to excess and in islam “every excess is an evil and. . . the good is simted between two excesses.”55 in the face of qualitative choice, detachment guarantees the freedom of the will for homo zslamicus, allowing the soul to “keep its distance with neoclassical theory, on the other hand, enslaves man to his egoistic passions with “jwd in reverse,” and denies the ontological possibility of self-ttanscendence, s a d i c e , and ascesis because it denies qualitative choice, refusing to distinguish man from the animals. rather than &fin ing the desirability of an object by its goodness, neoclassical theory defines the goodness of the object by its desirability. neoclassical theo regard to things.”” 246 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 4 2 ry, therefore, sees all things in utility rather than all things in god. rather than recognizing god as the sovereign good who alone is the source of true freedom (since only god is infinite), neoclassical theory makes util ity the infinite good, guaranteeing the wurst kind of imprisonment by binding man to a finite ego in a finite world. by denying the ontological possibility of detachment and the avoidability of passion, neoclassical theory substitutes a true death with a false life. while detachment relates to the negative mode of the will, islamic eco nomics also recognizes that man’s wil€ is capable of moral heroism in positive mode. because truth can be the motivating cause in qualitative choice, homo zslumicus is not only capable of the virtue of detachment, but also of vigilance. the will must “ a f f i i by reason of its positive char acter. . . against the lures of the world or of the soul which seek to engross and corrupt the will.”57 it is the internal struggle between high er order truths and lower order passions which must be resolved so that “each thing is in its rightful place according to the laws of hiemchy, equilibriums, proportions, rhythms.”58 otherwise, the soul falls into a state of disorder, with a multiplicity of passionate voices leading to irra tional, circular, and path-dependent decisions. it is the internal struggle to actively remove obstacles to the voice of truth being rightfully in con trol. this “involves the combative virtues: decision, vigilance, persever ance . . . what has to be actively conquered is natural and habitual pas sivity towards the world and towards the images and impulsions of the soul, spiritual laziness, inattention, dreaming, all have to be over come.”59 the symbols of this combat are “lightning and the sword . . . (it is) in man, holy anger or holy ~ a r f a r e . ’ ~ it is the inner struggle to restore and maintain order and to be disciplined, which is “intrinsically, to dominate oneself and, extrinsically, to do things correctly; to do noth ing by halves or against the logic of things, in short, to be neither negli gent nor disordered, nor, one must add, extravagant.”61 the essential rea son for the inner jihstd is, therefore, to restore order with the spirit (ruh) victorious over the passionate soul (ul-rqfs ul-unznz&uh) in the battle for control of the heart (qulb). as frithjof schuon explains: vigilance is the a f f i i t i v e and combative virtue that prevents us from forgetting or betraying the “one thing needful”; it is the presence of mind which ceaselessly calls us back to the remem brance of god, and which thereby keeps us attentive with regard to anythmg that might separate us from it. this virtue excludes all negligence and all carelessness-in little things as well as big ones-since it is founded on awareness of the present moment of this ceaselessly renewed instant that belongs to gad and not to the world, to reality and not to el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 241 neoclassical theory, on the other hand, declares that every moment necessarily belongs to the utility idol to reverse the spiritual jihiid. it therefore denies that any internal combat exists, since it insists qualita tively different ends do not exist. trying to integrate all things ‘‘from below,” neoclassical theory simply defines any evidence of internal struggle as “irrational” behavior. neoclassical economics denies the ontological possibility of the virtue of vigilance and makes internal sloth unavoidable. it thereby substitutes true activity with a false rest. regarding the “affective life of the soul,” the last fundamental faculty is sentiment, and islamic economics recognizes that homo islamicur is capable of goodness, disinterested generosity, and compassion. because god is the absolute, the virtues of peace or gratitude and fervor or gen erosity are the result of sincere concentration on the truth, correspond ing to the active and passive modes of the sentiment. as frithjof schuon explains, “passive virtue is made of contemplative contentment, hence also of patience; it is the calm of that which rests in itself, in its own virtue.”63 because only god is infinite, complete satisfaction or content ment can come only through god. all other satisfactions are finite, and only god can provide the “living water” after which one will never thirst. it is contentment in god and the gratitude of “holy monotony in the midst of inevitable distractions and complex organizations.”64 this con tentment is reflected in gratitude, which is both a “holy childhood” which makes one content with little things and an appreciation or respect for “little things or big things because they come from god.’65 gratitude is, therefore, the consciousness to discern that which is precious, to draw the consequences which that demands, and to be happy in its possession. this begins “with the beauty and gifts of nature; one must be sensitive to the innocence and mystery of the divine works.’a moreover, “one must respect the potential sanctity that is in every man . . . and this excludes all triviality in social behavi0r.”6~ neoclassical theory denies the possibility of satiation with ‘‘jihiid in reverse.” while there is peace and contentment in conformity to truth, there is only frustration and dissatisfaction in conformity to error. indeed, the “truth is infinitely real and precious and its absence must con sequently imply a sort of inverted man can, therefore, never find peace and happiness in the error of the utility idol. by constraining man to a quantitative end without a qualitative choice to make, neoclas sical theory concludes there is always a “positive marginal utility” and a “new need” to be filled even when old ones are already met. such a view fosters ingratitude since one is never content with anything and “more is always better.” but man is insatiable only when he is in spiritual dise quilibrium, which leads to a throwaway society of waste and environ mental destruction. indeed, neoclassical theory even cynically i n t e p t s the gratitude ind respect for nature demonstrated by the american 248 the american journal of islamic social sciences 142 indians, arguing that they had a “lower discount rate” with which to value nature rather than recognizing the qualitative choice--abusing nature is a sign of ingratitude to god. neoclassical theory replaces a true rest with false activity. islamic economics reserves activity for the virtue of generosity or fer vor, corresponding to the active mode of the sentiment. besides the repose of peace and contentment, “there is a positive tendency that is converse, a “going out of oneself” in active mode; this is fervor, codi dent and charitable faith.’69 trust in god‘s mercy leads to confidence and generosity, and to love mercy “is to some degree to wish to be what one loves, or to become what one loves; it is thus to imitate what one loves.”7o confident generosity is, therefore, “the opposite of egoism, avarice and meanness; nevertheless, let us be clear that it is evil that is opposed to good and not in~ersely.”~’ charity proves the sincerity of the love of the neighbor, which is a part of the love of god, just as humility proves the sincerity of self-knowledge, which is a part of the knowledge of god. as frithjof schuon explains: most of our contemporaries seem to forget that in true charity, god is “served fmt,” as joan of arc used to say: in other words they forget that charity is, in essence, to love god more than our selves, to love our neighbor as ourselves, thus to love ourselves, but less than god; not to love our neighbor more than ourselves, and not to feel ourselves obliged to give him what, in our opin ion, we would not deserve if we were in his place?2 generosity implies likewise the capacity to put oneself in the place of others, and thus to be “oneself” in others. . . . what we owe god, we owe also, in appropriate fashion, to our neighbor; and if we believe that we owe something a priori to our neigh bor, this is because we owe it fundamentally to the confident generosity of homo islamicus is not, therefore, based on a sentiment which goes against the truth. love for the cause also requires love for the effects, not for their sake or our own, but out of love for the cause. passion for the creature removes from love its real object and sufficient reason, it constitutes therefore no part of charity; he who loves the effect for itself, loves it precisely not as an effect, but as a cause, and that is to take the creature for what it is not, and to hate indirectly the cause from which all perfection and all love d e r i ~ e . 7 ~ el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 249 ‘“love thy neighbor as thyself’ means that one must love oneself, but in accordance with god.”75 that idea rejects both altruism lacking in suf ficient reason and egoism. it exalts an idea of self-love that “results sim ply from the right to exist and the duty to realize the meaning of exis t e n ~ e . ” ~ ~ disproportionate charity is the result of either hrpocrisy or pas sional attachment since it is not charitable to “squander oneself without di~crimination.”~~ indeed, in this type of good works and virtue which is not based on god, there is “a poison which is eliminated only by the con viction that god has no need of all this, and that they must be given freely like the flowers of the fields.”78 what god wants is man’s soul, and frithjof schuon explains that to be able to give the best, one must know that the best comes only from god . . . the saints alone dissolve evil at its roots . . . the charity of the ordmary man is never wholly charitable . . . like a gift given by a thief . . . the fmt act of charity is to rid the soul of illusions and passions and thus rid the world of a maleficent being; it is to make a void so that god may fill it and, by this fullness, give himself. a saint is a void open for the pas sage of ~ 0 d . 7 ~ rather than basing generosity on objectivity and the love of god, neo classical economics bases generosity on sentimentality and the love of utility to reverse the inner j m . by denying that truth is a motivating cause in qualitative choice, neoclassical theory confines man to an ego ism which makes it impossible for true generosity to exist. neoclassical “charity” is for utility, not for god. taking others’ utility as an input into one’s own utility function becomes a parody of the “loving of others as oneself.” this neoclassical “generosity” is based on an indirect hatred of the true cause of the effect and is therefore not real charity based on humility. on the contrary, it is based on the poison which tries to undo the effect of good works and virtue through pride. by replacing generos ity for the love of god with egoism for the love of utility, neoclassical economics replaces a true life with a false death. happiness, at a basic level, consists of gratitude and confident gen erosity. but all the virtues are necessarily interconnected, and all of them give the soul happiness because they are beautiful, allowing man to “cany the beautiful within himself.” believers in neoclassical theory then reason that happiness is, therefore, the motivating cause of virtue. to repeat, this is an erroneous argument because a “spiritual virtue is nothing other than consciousness of a reality. it is natural-but immate rial-if it is accompanied by feeling,” and, in any case, neoclassical the ory denies that any of them is possible.8o similarly, neoclassical economists argue that homo lslamicus is not motivated by truth for its own sake, but, in fact, is motivated by utili 250 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 t y h e “wills heaven” rather than god seeking the assurance of the after life. the response to this objection is that islamic exotericism does, in fact, emphasize the law rather than inward realization, and “is centered on heaven rather than on god, which amounts to saying that this differ ence has for it no meaning; the absolute is conceived only with respect to the relative.”8’ conceiving of the absolute only with respect to the relative is not the same as making the relative absolute, which neoclassi cal theory is guilty of. the exoteric conception of the absolute does not eliminate qualitative differences and the possibility of qualitative choice, whereas utility as the absolute does. indeed, exotericism would never argue that god is a means to heaven, and heaven is the real purpose of human existence. it is not logical to love god for the sake of something else, because there is nothing more worthy of love than the sovereign good-proving that the difference between god and heaven has no meaning from the point of view of the law. as frithjof schuon points out, “we do not love truth and the good just because we want to gain something. if, loving them, we gain something, that shows we were right to love them.”82 finally, the difference between god and heaven has great meaning in islamic esotericism, as the writings of al-ghazzali beautifully demonstrate. for the saints or the muqarrahzin (intimates), who are the models of homo zslamicus, every action or desire is centered on god, with truth as the motivating cause. hence, neoclassical economics can be seen as a false religion based on the crucial error that the relative is absolute in the form of utility. it is a parody and inversion of revelation, and is diametrically opposed to islamic economics. homo zslarnicus attaches himself to the absolute by first attaching his intelligence to the truth, then his will to the good, and finally his soul to the peace that is given by the truth and the good. by subordinating truth to utility and denying that truth is a motivating cause in qualitative choice, neoclassical theory denies the possibility of the fun damental virtues of veracity and sincerity in objective and subjective modes of the intelligence and detachment and vigilance in passive and active modes of the will. neoclassical economics substitutes error and cynical pride for the intelligence and passion and sloth for the will. thus, neoclassical theory denies all four “jewels” quoted earlier and common to all religions; namely, that man should accept the truth with veracity, concentrate on it with sincerity, abstain from evil with detachment, and accomplish the good with vigilance. consequently, it denies the effect of the four “jewels” which attach the soul of homo zslamicus to the peace with gratitude and generosity in the passive and active modes of the sen timent. in neoclassical theory, there is only insatiable dissipation and egoistic indifference. by replacing god with utility, neoclassical theory makes true virtue impossible and its inversion into vice unavoidable. this “ j m in el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 251 reverse” makes the active passive and the passive active, and it inverts the true into the false. the founding father of modem utilitarianism is jeremy bentham, who hated god and religion and vehemently attacked both. john colls, a for mer disciple of bentham who turned against him, described bentham’s volumes on religion as “volumes of blasphemy and slander . . . against the author of christianity and his bentham attacked the church’s teachings in the name of the utility idol, arguing that bans against practices which did not “harm others,” such as sexual indulgence, homosexuality, and others, actually decreased utility. for bentham, the question on the truth of religion was irrelevant and relegated to a second order consideration, if it was divorced from its justification in utility. even if religious truths could be established, “utility as to affairs of this life being the sole object . . . any argument founded on the will of the founder of religion, or on any other part of scripture, cannot be in place here.”84 completely disregarding the status of religious beliefs, he wrote, “when instead of proving that their tenets are more conducive to peace and utility than their opposites, men betake themselves to declamations on the (beauty and) necessity of religion in general, i desire them to take notice, that they have abandon’d the cause for which they are contend i r ~ g . ” ~ ~ for bentham, questions about the nature of ultimate reality are unresolvable and their solution is unimportant: it is one thing for a proposition to be true, and another for its being [sic] necessary for us to concern ourselves about it-the dwelling upon a mystery tho’ true from whence no practical con sequences are deducible, may . . . weaken a religion, and the passing it by unnoticed though true, can be productive of no bad consequences.86 his book an introduction to the principles of moral legislation estab lished the utilitarian principles on which the state should discard reli gious laws goveming society and replace them with a secular science of legislation based on utilitarianism. in trying to influence others after writing the book and before its publication, bentham dreamed that he was “a founder of a sect, of course a personage of great sanctity and importan~e.”~~ bentham viewed himself in the dream as the savior of england and quite possibly the world, and when he was asked by “a great man” what he should do “to save the nation,” bentham replied, “take up my book, 8z follow me.” bentham clearly implied his book should replace scripture as the best plan for the salvation of the world. according to bentham, it is a book with “the true flavour of the fruit of the tree of knowledge,” and the angel who delivered it to him said that bentham “had no occasion to eat it. . . as sl john did his: all i had to do was cram it as‘ well as i could down the throats of other people . . .”88 252 the american joimal of islamic social sciences 142 accompanied by “the great man” who was now bentham’s apostle, they find a man “who had been afflicted with an incurable blindness and dis ease for many years.”*9 bentham instructs his apostle to “give him a page of my book that he may tead mark [?i learn [?] and inwardly digest it.’m after the man struggled “and made a good many faces as much as to say this is some of the nastiest stuff i ever tasted in my life,” as soon as it was down “up came forth/came out of his bosom seven devils black er than the blackest of the three crows.’91 immediately afterwards, “the man heard every thing that a man should hear and there fell the [?i scales from his eyes,’and not seeing what better he could do with himself he also followed us.”92 as bentham and his disciples proceeded, they came upon “a woman named britannia lying by the water side all in rags with a sleeping lion at her feet: she looked very pale, and upon enquiry we found she had an issue of blood upon her for many years.”% upon con tact with bentham, “she started up fresher faster and more alive than ever,” indicative of the healing power of bentham’s utilitarian religion for britain. one is reminded of frithjof schuon’s waming not to replace god with products of the intellect, and considering virtues in relation to their util ity. neoclassical theory is obviously not spiritually neutral, as its true believers claim, but is a false religion. as such, the arguments used to advance it are not objective, as is demonstrated below. objectivity the prima facie case for utility as the sole motivating agent for human behavior is based on invalid arguments, and the internal order it implies is false. however, true believers in neoclassical theory hold it in a privi leged position of immunity to argument., choosing to falsify any con ceivable evidence in a way which is consistent with their theory. empirical evidence exists, however, which proves that neoclassical the ory is false and which supplements the metaphysical argument made in the previous section. this section will, therefore, first examine the prima facie case for utility and then analyze evidence which refutes its privi leged position. the prima facie case that utility is the essential motivating force is built around four arguments. the fmt is that one can act only out of one’s own motives or desires and, therefore, one pursues one’s own ends. this argument is “a good example of logical confusion.’% it begins with a tautology that all of one’s motives and desires are one’s own motives and desires and not somebody else’s. but from this simple tautology, feinberg notes that nothing concerning the nature of “one’s motives or the objective of one’s desires can possibly what the neoclas sical economist must prove is not merely that every action is prompted by a motive of the agent’s own, but rather that every voluntary action is el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 253 prompted by a selfish kind of motive. the source of confusion in the argument is that it is not the origin of a motive “which makes an action selfish, but rather the purpose of the act or the objective of its motives.”% as feinberg points out, ‘there is certainly a valid distinction between voluntary behavior, in which the agent’s action is motivated by purposes of his own, and selfish behavior in which the agent’s motives are of one exclusive ~ o r t . ’ ~ by assimilating all voluntary action into the class of selfish action, the neoclassical argument requires that an “unselfish action be one which is not really motivated at alr9*-hence, the neo classical derision of many ,virtuous actions as “irrational.” the argument is false in confusing the location of the motive with the type of motive. if the distinction did not exist, god would not judge men according to their intentions on the day of judgment. a second argurhent advanced to make neoclassical theory plausible is as follows: when one gets what one wants, one feels pleasure, and there fore what one really wants in every case is one’s own pleasure, and one pursues other things only as means. from the fact that getting what one is after “is accompanied or followed by pleasure, it does not follow that the objective of every action is to get pleasure for oneself.’@ in fact, the premise of the argument is not even necessarily me. the problem for many people today is “the dissatisfaction that attends the fulfiillment of . . . [their] most powerful desires.”’o0 if one grants, for the sake of argu ment, that getting what one wants usually yields satisfaction, the neo classical economists go further to conclude that the only thing one desires is one’s own satisfaction. the fact that pleasure may constantly accompany getting what one wants implies only that pleaswe is always an effect, but not necessarily a motivating cause. to argue otherwise is like arguing, in william james’s example, that the purpose of an ocean liner which constantly consumes coal’ on its transatlantic passage is to consume coal. the inference from constant accompaniment to purpose or motive is a non sequitur. as gamin puts it, the fallacy of the argument then consists “in the s u p position that the apparently unselfish desire to benefit others is trans formed into a selfiih one by the fact that we derive pleasure from cany ing it out.”lol this argument is fallacious because the presence of plea sure or satisfaction as a byproduct of action is no proof that the action was selfishly motivated. feinberg points out that in “special cases the fact that we get pleasure from a particular action presupposes that we desired something else-something other than our own pleasure-as an end in itself and not merely as a means to our own pleasant state of mind.”lm because the object of desire is not always pleasure, pleasure can be the consequence of a preexisting desire for something else. the neoclassical economist’s argument can, therefore, be turned back upon 254 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 4 2 him by distinguishing between pleasure as an object of desire and plea sure as an object or consequence of satisfaction of another desire. although much of neoclassical theory focusses on undermining benevolent motives, it also has the effect of upgrading malevolent motives by simply entering them as forms of self-interest. but just as a benevolent person may be concerned with the happiness of others as an end in itself, the injury of another is often an end in itself to the malevo lent person. economists, therefore, find war to be irrational because their neoclassical theory denies the ontological existence of good and evil. as the anglican bishop and moral philosopher john butler noted, it is regrettable that malevolent people are not more self-interested than they are. lo3 the third typical argument for neoclassical economics is based on self deception. true believers in neoclassical theory believe men deceive themselves into thinking that they desire something fine or noble when “what we really want is to be thought well of by others, or to congmtu late ourselves, or to be able to enjoy the pleasures of good con science.”’@’ men conceal their true motives from themselves “by cam ouflaging them with words like ‘virtue,’ ‘duty,’ etc.”lo5 however, this argument is inconclusive-the fact that some or even most people are hypocritical in some ways cannot be universalized to mean all people are hypocritical in every way. the neoclassical economist cannot argue that because a case of altruistic behavior might be selfish, appearance to the contrary, it must be selfish. purity of intention is one of the objectives of the inward struggle of homo zslurnicus, since all things should be related to god. the fact that everyone (except the prophets and saints) is not completely victorious in this struggle does not mean that no one is capa ble of even a pamal victory. if anyone can be accused of self-deception, it is the cynical neoclassical economists who pose as armchair psychol ogists and philosophers. this is especially true in the case of the fourth argument advanced for neoclassical theory, which suggests that because morality and other virtues are taught through the “sanctions of pleasure and pain,” people will behave well only when it is made plain to them that “there is some thing in it for them.” ironically, if a child comes to believe that the only -on for being moral is that he will escape punishment and/or gain the pleasure of a good reputation, he is the most likely to be unhappy as an adult because such an attitude destroys gratitude and confident generos ity. if everything is evaluated as a means to one’s own pleasant states of mind, then that pleasure can never come. paradoxically, the way to achieve happiness is to pursue something else, namely truth, conformi ty to which leads to the fundamental virtues and beauty of soul. hence, while the argument that people must be coerced and educated to do the el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 255 right thing for their self-interest may be true for children and worldly adults, it cannot be universalized to apply to all people at all times. despite the fact that the prima facie arguments for utility as the sole motivating cause are either logically invalid or inconclusive, true believ ers in neoclassical theory remain undeterred. the neoclassical argument is not even an empirical hypothesis because it is not falsifiable in princi ple. no matter how difficult a case one presents for neoclassical theory from saints and martyrs who have sacrificed themselves for god, the true believers in neoclassical theory are likely to remain unconvinced. indeed, they hold their theory in a “privileged position” of immunity to evidence, “that they would allow no ‘conceivable’ behavior to count as evidence against it.”’& as chesterton remarks, it is indeed an exmordi nary extension of the meaning of the word “self-indulgent” which allows one “to say that a man is self-indulgent when he wants to be burned at the stake.”’07 yet, as pointed out in the previous section, good is the measure of evil, and unless one knows the good, one cannot know the meaning of evil. unless one knows what it would be like for an action to be unselfish, one cannot understand the statement that people act selfishly. it is, therefore, logically absurd to argue that man is only capable of selfish action. it is logically possible, but empirically incorrect, to argue the reverse. one can apply the same neoclassical single-capability logic to show that all behavior is altruistic. people may appear at times to behave selfishly, but their real purpose is altruistic. when splitting a pie, for example, one may choose the larger piece so that one’s beloved brother can have the joy of seeing one with more; as another example, the real reason people seek wealth is in order to be philanthropic. any single capability argument is unobjective because it takes a part to be the whole and rules out other possibilities through definitional circularity. it therefore explains every thing and proves nothing. fortunately, there is undeniable empirical evidence of the ineducibili ty of motives to a common denominator. this evidence breaks the “priv ileged position” of the neoclassical theory of choice. it also shows that there is no internal order unless “one voice” rules, the individual ana logue to arrow’s impossibility theorem. just as plato’s philosopher-king must rule for there to be external order in society, the intellect represent ing the voice of truth must rule within man for there to be internal order. the evidence proves that not only is the inner j&d possible, it is neces sary it is an everyday experience to feel the conflicting forces of the inner jihiid, whether those conflicts be trivial or of great significance. neoclassical economists are familiar with this possibility in the political macrocosm where multiple and, therefore, irreducible voters make intransitive choices. in a path-breaking 1954 econometricu article, 256 the american journal of islamic social sciences 142 kenneth may first applied this public choice approach within the indi vidual.’@ in it, he points out that transitive preferences are a necessary condition for the neoclassical theory of choice to be true. if there is only one criteria by which to judge alternatives a, b, and c, then choosing a over b and b over c requires choosing a over c. on the other hand, if there are multiple criteria, then it is possible to have circular preferences, choosing a over b, b over c, and c over a instead of a over c. this is the individual analogue to the condorcet paradox, in which there is no majority preference for an option, leading to circular votes and no deci sion. of three voters, two may favor a over b, two may favor b over c, and two may favor c over a, leato circular voting. the final choice depends only on the stopping point and is, therefore, path dependent. this is an arbitrary decision, and there is “no law of caprice.” neoclassical theory, however, is based on the premise that utility is the sole criteria, to which all other criteria can be reduced. evidence of cir cular preferences would therefore break the “privileged position” of neo classical theory because no single-criteria theory of motivation can explain intransitive preferences. these preferences requk the existence of conflicting criteria, which neoclassical theory ontologically denies. may presents evidence from several sources demonstrating that “intran sitivity is a natural result of the necessity of choosing among alternatives according to conflicting criteria.”’@ he first presents the results of an experiment with college students, who were given alternatives for hypothetical marriage partners with dif ferent rankings of intelligence, beauty, and wealth. the results showed that preferences were often circular, implying a conflict between irre ducible criteria. similarly, studies of pilots’ preference cycles in burning planes during world war i1 showed an intransitive ranking “in a way exactly similar to the patterns in the paradox of voting and the marriage partner experiment.”’ lo in addition, may cites a rand study which shows that circular preferences apply to individual commodities where the components are ranked in certain conflicting ways. may points out that “the question is no longer ‘are preferences transi tive?’ but rather ‘under what conditions does transitivity fail?”’ moreover, may notes that the existence of transitive preferences does not prove that utility is the sole motivating cause any more than an election with transitive outcomes is proof that there is only one voter. transitivity is a logical consequence of the assumption of a utility function, not a suf ficient condition for utility. although may focussed his research on three-criteria situations or more, there are many other paradoxes which can be explained by two criteria models. rather than the inner jwd emerging externally as circu lar preferences, it emerges in unexpected divergences between what a person would be willing to pay and to accept to avoid or receive the same el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 257 thing. theoretically, these should be identical, since utility reduces the points to a qualitatively and quantitatively identical indifference curve. in an ethical choice with two voices, however, empirical evidence shows that there are enormous variations between willingness to accept and willingness to pay. many people are willing to pay a large amount of money to avoid a toxic waste dump in their back yard but will not accept any amount to receive it. hence, there is overwhelming evidence that utility is not the sole motivating cause and that the neoclassical law of caprice equating marginal utilities is unobjective because it takes a part to be the whole-it confuses situations in which things are qualitatively comparable with situations in which they are not. the islamic theory of choice does not make this reduction and is based on the qualitative integration of a hierarchy of spiritual and other needs which is possible only after the successful resolution of an inner strug gle. the spiritual jdcid is cenaal to the islamic theory of choice and islamic economics, and is discussed by all the major islamic philosophers and mystics ranging from ibn sina to nasir ad-din tusi to alghazzali.lll it explains intransitive preferences, which neo classical theory cannot, through a qualitative resolution of opposites while at the same time rejecting a purely quantitative union of comple ments. according to the islamic tradition, internal struggle occurs between the spirit (al-ruh) and the soul or psyche (ul-nafs) in the battle for possession of the heart (al-qalh).’ l 2 the ruh is the spiritual “intellec tual principle which transcends the individual,” whereas the nafs is the “self-centered compulsive tendencies which are responsible for the dif fuse and changeable nature of the ‘i’.”l l3 these two contraries attempt to capture the heart or qalh, “the point of intersection of the ‘vertical’ ray, which is al-ruh, with the horizontal plane, which is ~ l n a f s . ” ~ ~ ~ at stake is man’s covenant with god to be his servant (‘ahd) and to act as his vicegerent on earth~(khu1ifat aikzhfr ul-urd. if the nafs wins the battle, passion and inertia “veil” the heart and lead man to will and love things outside their divine context, constituting the sin of idolatry. the nafs dissipates man across insatiable desires and denies man’s spiritual need, attaching all things to utility rather than to god and thereby making the relative absolute. because utility is the motivating cause rather than truth, preferences can be irrational not only in relation to ends, but in the strictly economic sense of being intransi tive or circular. multiple passions such as greed, pride, and lust, for example, may compete with one another for control and lead to intransi tive preferences depending upon which passion(s) happen to prevail at the moment. the final choice depends only on the stopping point, and leads to arbitrary decisions typical of the nafs. thus, while indifference curves which compare alternatives may exist within a passion, they may not exist across passions. although the allocation between alternatives 258 the american journal of islamic social sciences 142 within the budget share of a given passion may be “optimal,” budget shares between passions can be random or depend on the order of choice. hence, if the nafs wins the battle for the heart, competing passions v i e late the requirement for transitive preferences upon which neoclassical economic theory is built. although utility is the motivating cause, hap piness is false. if the ruh wins the inner battle, on the other hand, the heart becomes the house of god and is transformed into spirit while the nafs is trans muted “with spiritual light.”’ l5 preferences are rational and decisions are no longer path dependent because truth is the motivating cause. the ruh ultimately transforms the soul from al-nafs al-ammiirah, the egoistic, passionate soul which “commands,” to al-nafs al-mutma’innah, “‘the soul at peace,’ the soul reintegrated in the spirit and at rest in certain ty.”l16 the transformation of the nafs occurs in stages in which man increasingly comes to know, will, and love all things for and by god. thus, there is a qualitative resolution of opposites when the ruh trans forms the nafs, and a union of complements since man fulfiis both spir itual and earthly needs. in this sense, truth as the motivating cause of homo islamicur leads to both vertical and horizontal equilibrium, the intersection of which symbolizes the integration of all of life around a sacred center. given this equilibrium in which satiable needs are ordered with respect to a spiritual end, the problem of how to allocate scarce means across insatiable desires, or “constrained optimization,” is no longer relevant. instead, “restrained optimization” on how to use resources in conformi ty with man’s spiritual and other needs is relevant. since islamic eco nomics maintains that indifference curves exist only within needs and not between them, restrained optimization applies within each need cat egory. as the mathematical economist georgescu-roegen argues, no amount of food can save a man dying from thirst and no jewelry can sub stitute for food: “the ‘principle of the irreducibility of wants’, although the most crucial of all, has received little attenti~n.””~ since the two extremes of deprivation and indulgence are evil, constrained optimiza tion, the organizing principle of neoclassical theory, applies to the insa tiability of the nafs. restrained optimization, on the other hand, applies to the ruh and is consistent with man’s spiritual duties. as seyyed vali nasr argues, “it can be concluded that individual economic action in islam does not hinge on ‘optimality constraint,’ but rather on ‘optimality in between the two extremes of the saint and the sinner, the third pos sibility is an on-going battle between the ruh and the nafs. an individual may wish his ruh were in control, but may give-in to temptations from the nafs. (for classification purposes, the reverse case in which an indi vidual perversely wishes for his nafs to be in charge while experiencing restrainl,’,l 18 el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 259 interference from the ruh corresponds to divine intervention in the move ment from the first case of control by the nafs to this third possibility.) this also generates the possibility of intransitive preferences and path dependent decisions depending on which element dominates. in none of these cases does neoclassical theory apply in the way economists claim, for the theory combines the rationality of the ruh with the insatiability of the nafs to create an economic agent who does not exist. the only way to establish internal order, therefore, is for “one voice” to rule. within the person, this voice can only be the voice of truth because only truth provides a stable “core,” to use a game theory anal ogy. as plato argued in the republic, the intelligence, will, and senti ment can only be in harmony when there is conformity to truth. as frithjof schuon explains: the good is a possibility of action; the true is not a possibility of knowledge, it is knowledge itself. evil is a “willing”; but error is not a “knowing,” it is an ignorance. in other words, evil is an act of the will, but error is not an act of the intelligence. intelligence is not, like will, free through its possible action; it is free through its very substance and so through the necessity of its perfection.119 if the intelligence is not obscured by the passions, the voice of truth always has an advocate in the intelligence which cannot choose error as the will can choose evil. although the intelligence can be wrong by the falseness of its content, “then it is wrong as thought and not as knowl edge; to speak of a false knowledge would be as absurd as to speak of a blind vision or a dark light.”12o the will and the sentiment, on the other hand, can will and love evil, which is evil. knowledge of evil in the intel ligence is not evil, “it is even good, since this enables us to situate evil and ovexome it.”121 therefore, the intelligence is not corruptible in the way that the will and the sentiment are. but if the latter are reintegrated in knowledge, they become infallible as well. frithjof schuon explains how all three faculties work in harmony as follows: the good that man is capable of knowing he must also will inso far as this good can be the object of the will; in addition he must love this good and at the same time the knowledge of it as well as the will towards it; just as he must will and love the earthly and contingent reflections of this good according to what is required or permitted by their nature. one cannot devote oneself to knowledge without loving it and willing it, any more than one can will something without knowing it and loving its realization; and one cannot love without knowing an object and without wishing to love it.122 260 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 this is true equilibrium, which is only possible when the intelligence is attached to the truth and the will and sentiment are integrated in knowledge through the inner jihiid against passion and inertia with truth as its weapon. conclusion in light of the preceding sections on the lack of spiritual neutrality and objectivity of neoclassical theory, one can now address the question of which theory of economics offers homo islumicus the “true remedy” to economic ills. according to islam, “the cause of suffering in the world is the decadence of man and not a simple lack of knowledge and organiza tion.”123 progress or tyranny cannot succeed in ending suffering, a result which can only be attained if everyone were holy. and this depends on the inner jihiid to confonn to the truth, for the prophet always empha sized the qualitative nature of choice to guide the ummah. when prices in madinah increased and the community asked the prophet to fix the prices, he responded, “prices are fixed by allah. he contracts and expands the sources of livelihood. and i hope to meet my sustainer in a state that no one may raise a claim of injustice against me in respect of blood or money.”12q because neoclassical theory makes utility absolute and denies the spir itual jw, it falsifies economic policy just as it falsifies goods and virtue. when neoclassical economics argues that a free market maxi mizes utility, it becomes a parody of the prophet’s ethical guidance based on god as the absolute. starting with a passional error, neoclassical the ory proceeds logically to policy conclusions which are nevertheless pas sional and “may accidentally coincide with reality.”lz when the policies do not accidentally coincide with reality, the remedy of neoclassical eco nomics implies the negation of homo islumicus as well as followers of other revelations, and thus their inversion into homo economicus. the theory, therefore, attempts to eliminate an effect by introducing a far worse cause. indeed, macroeconomic policy has no need for neoclassi cal microeconomic foundations. islamic economics offers the true rem edy to these ills through knowledge of man’s spiritual needs which give meaning to life, and not a remedy limited to “an immediate welfare which is p a r d and ephemed and conceived as an end in itself.”’26 notes 1. frithjof schuon, logic and transcendence (middlesex: perennial books, 1984), p. 265. 2. frithjof schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts (middlesex: perennial books, 1987), p. 93. 3. frithjof schuon, understanding islam (bloomington: world wisdom books, 1994). p. 5. 4. james griffin, well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance (oxford. clarendon press, 1986). p. 13. el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 26 1 5. frithjof schuon, esotericism as principle and way (middlesex: perennial 6. frithjof schuon, stations of wisdom (bloomington: world wisdom books, 7. quoted from whitall perry, a treasury cf traditional wisdom (cambridge: 8. matthew, 10:34. 9. york: k p t , 1987), p. 28. 10. ibid. 11. ibid, p. 31. 12. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 94. 13. john ruskin, munera pulveris (new york: john wiley, 1890). p. 30. 14. schuon, understanding islam, p. 2. 15. frithjof schuon, survey of metaphysics and esotericism (bloomington: world wisdom books, 1986). p. 113. 16. schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts, p. 92. 17. joel feinberg, “psychological egoism,” in louis pojman (ed.), ethical theory: classical and contemporary readings (belmont: wadsworth publishing company, 1995). p. 71. books, 1981). p. 102. 1995), p. 94. quinta essentia, 1971), p. 391. seyyed hossein nasr, traditional islam in the modern world (london and new 18. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 119. 19. schuon, understanding islam, p. 5 . 20. seyyed hossein nasr, a young muslim’s guide to the modern world. chicago: 21. seyyed hossein nasr, ideals m d realities oflslam. san francisco: the aquarian 22. muhammad abdul-rauf, a muslim’s refections o n democratic capitalism. 23. al-ghazzali, lhya ulum id-din. new delhi: kitab bhavan, vol. 2, p. 54. 24. rama coomaraswamy, “traditional economics and liberation theology,” in the foundation for 25. harry frankfurt, the importance of what we care about. cambridge: 26. nasr, ideals and realities. p. 98. kazi publications, 1994, p.3. press, 1994, p. 98. washington, d.c.: american enterprise institute, p. 5 . seyyed hossein nasr (ed.) in quest of the sacred. traditional studies, p. 117. cambridge university press, 1988, p. 19. oakton: 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. p. 35. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. ibid. ibid. schuon, logic and transcendence, p. 23. [bid. schuon, survey of metaphysics and esotericism, p. 189. frithjof schuon, the play cfmasks (bloomington: world wisdom books, 1992), schuon, logic and transcendence, p. 1. nasr, traditional islam in the modern world, p. 29. ibid. schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts, p. 183. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 112. frithiof schuon, roots of the human condition (bloomington: world wisdom books, 199i), p. 113. 39. ibid. 40. ibid. 41. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 112. 42. ibid. 43. ibid., p. 113. 44. schuon, the play ofmasks, p. 65. 45. schuon, understanding islam, p. 145. 46. quoted from t i h r machan, “reason in economics versus ethics,” international 47. schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts, p. 140. 48. g e d d marwell and ruth ames, “economists free ride-does anybody else?” .lournal of social economics, 1996, p. 21. .lournu1 ofpublic economics 15 (1981), pp. 295-310. 262 the american journal of islamic social sciences 142 49. schuon, esotericism as ptfnciple and way, p. 123. 50. ibid., p. 124. 51. schuon, stations of wisdom. p. 147. 52. ibid. 53. ibid. 54. schuon. esotericism as principle and way, p. 107 55. ibid., p. 106. 56. ibid., p. 107. 57. schuon, statwns ofwisdom, p. 148. 58. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 108. . 59. schuon, stations of wisdom, p. 148. 60. ibid. 61. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 108. 62. ibid., p. 109. 63. schuon. stations of wisdom, p. 149. 64. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 109. 65. ibid. 66. ibid. 67. ibid., p. 110. 68. schuon. spiritual perspectives and human facts, p. 56. 69. schuon. stations of wisdom, p. 150. 70. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 108. 71. ibid. 72. schuon, stations of wisdom, p. 93. 73. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 104. 74. schuon, stations of wisdom, p. 94. 75. schuon, survey of metaphysics and esotericism, p. 43, footnote 5. 76. lbid this is the e m r adam smith makes in his often quoted passage that implies egoism, not altruism, is the motivating cause of the butcher and baker to trade. because smith’s theory of sentiments was based on pasion rather than truth, he wrongly con trasted egoism with an altruism lacking in sufficient reason rather than with a legitimate self-love. 77. schuon, stations of wisdom, p. %. 78. ibid., p. 119. 79. ibid., p. 120. 80. schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts, p. 183. 81. ibid., p. 80. 82. ibid, p. 56. 83. quoted from james crimmins, secular utilitarianism: social science and the critique of religion in the thought of jeremy bentham (oxford: clarendon press, 1990). p. 148. 84. ibid., p. 278. 85. ibid., p. 279. 86. ibid. 87. ibid., p. 287. 88. ibid., p. 315. 89. ibid. 90. ibid. 91. ibid. 92. ibid., p. 316. 93. ibid. 94. joel feinberg. “psychological egoism” in ethical theory, p. 64. 95. ibid., p. 62. %. ibid., p. 64. 97. ibid. 98. ibid. 99. ibid. 100. ibid. 101. ibid., p. 65. 102. ibid. 103. ibid., p. 66. el-ansary: the spiritual significance of jihad 263 104. ibid., p. 63. 105. ibid. 106. ibid., p. 71. 107. ibid. 108. kenneth may, “intransitivity, utility, and the aggregation of preference patterns,” econometrica, january 1954, p. 1. 109. ibid. 110. ibid., p. 7. 1 1 1. for ghazzali, see the alchemy of happiness, for tusi .see the nasirean ethics, and for ibn sina see history of islamic philosophy, seyyed hossein nasr (ed.). 112. mohamrnad ajmal, “sufi science of the soul,” in seyyed hossein nasr (4.) islamic spirituality: foundations. new york: crossroad publishing company, 1991, p. 2%. 113. ibid. 114. ibid. 115. ibid., p. 297. 116. ibid., p. 295. 1 17. nicholas georgescu-roegen, “utility,” international encyclopedia of the social sciences 16 (1%8): 264. 1 18. seyyed vali nasr, islamization of knowledge: a critical overview, (herndon, va: international institute of islamic thought, 1992), p. 17. 119. schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts, p. 212. 120. ibid., p. 102. 121. ibid. 122. ibid., p. 95. 123. schuon, esotericism as principle and way, p. 159. 124. muhammad akram khan, economk teachings of prophet muhammad (pbuh) (delhi: noor publishing house, 1992). p. 126. 125. schuon, survey of metaphysics and esotericism, p. 189. 126. frithjof schuon, castes and races (middlesex: perennial books, 1982), p. 26. mohammad syifa a. widigdo completed his degree in the department of religious studies, indiana university, bloomington, with a dissertation on imam al-ḥaramayn al-juwaynī’s theory of jadal (dialectic) and its relation to sunnī orthodoxy formation in medieval islam. currently he is a faculty member in the magister program of islamic studies at universitas muhammadiyah yogyakarta (umy), indonesia. the author would like to thank dr. r. kevin jaques (indiana university bloomington) and dr. carrie e. swanson (the university of iowa) for their feedback on the early draft of this article. he would further like to thank the department of religious studies of indiana university, bloomington, and iiit for the support and fellowship during his research and writing. aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal, and medieval scholastic disputation mohammad syifa amin widigdo abstract this article argues that medieval christian and muslim scholarship employed greek dialectic to differing purposes. greek dialectic aims to defeat an opponent by exposing logical contradictions; christian scholarship claims to use the dialectic to search for the truth in a pedagogical setting; and muslim scholarship employs it to arrive at the truth with a degree of certainty. as a result, this article further argues, greek dialectic in christian and muslim contexts undergoes some modifications. in the christian context, dialectic serves a didactical purpose, which is to find the truth that resides in the mind of the teacher. in the islamic context, greek dialectic is employed to find epistemological (qaṭʿī) or psychological (ghalabat al-ẓann) certainty in religious knowledge. debate, disputation, and argumentation are of course as old as humanity; each culture and civilization has its own argumentative tradition that employs certain rules and rhetorical expressions and serves its various purposes. although medieval christian and muslim traditions had their own 2 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 history of argumentative practices, their encounter with greek dialectical scholarship provided them each a new dimension and direction. yet analysis of the muslim and christian reception of greek dialectic and of how it shapes their scholarship has never been comprehensively conducted. the existing literature tends to focus on the medieval muslim or medieval christian context of reception of greek dialectic.1 for example, existing studies on jadal (muslim dialectic) discuss among others the origin of jadal and dialectical concepts used in greek dialectic and jadal literature. then, they argue either for a distinct arab-islamic character of jadal, which is considered free from greek influence,2 or for a heavily greek character of jadal,3 or for parallelism and coincident similarities between muslim jadal and greek dialectic.4 however, they discuss greek or aristotelian dialectic in general, not specifying what kind of greek or aristotelian dialectic has such influences or similarities with jadal literature (whether eristic, dialectic, didactic, or peirastic). furthermore, regarding the search for truth that becomes the central concern of medieval muslim jadal and christian scholastic disputation, such studies tend not to elaborate how truth itself is perceived in greek dialectic, then to undergo a certain alteration and appropriation when taken up by the later traditions. in short, current studies do not underscore how a shared greek dialectical root is adopted, appropriated, and modified by medieval muslim and christian scholars to address their own problems and to meet their respective needs and aspirations. therefore, this article aims not only to examine the foundation and goal of greek dialectical theory but also to elaborate the reception and appropriation of greek dialectic in both medieval muslim and christian contexts. this comparative study will enable us to understand the extent of muslim and christian contributions to the development of the dialectical art and their distinctive features as compared to the greek dialectical root. aristotelian dialectic: from eristic to an examinational capacity of dialectic the socratic method of argumentation in the form of dialogue (question and answer) may provide an important foundation for the development of dialectic. socratic dialogue, which was famously later perfected by plato, employs a conversational method in order to reveal logical weaknesses of an opposing argument, expose the ignorance of an opponent, or find the truth. this dialogic method in turn developed into two important modes of 3 argumentation, namely rhetoric and dialectic. inspired by socratic method, marcus tullius cicero (106-43 bce) introduced a structure into his theory of rhetoric. for him (according to novikoff ’s account), in order to have a sound persuasive argument, the practitioner of rhetoric needs attend the following components: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery.5 however, the real shift from socratic and platonic dialogue (in the mode of self-reflective conversation) to argumentation between two opposed parties occurred at the hands of aristotle. aristotle introduced a practice of debate in which opposing views are contested between two opponents (disputation in utramque partem). he developed this practice in two supplemental books of dialectic that marked his departure from socratic and platonic methods of dialogue and dialectic, namely topics and sophistical refutations. since the later development of dialectic in both the medieval christian and muslim contexts is indebted to the above dialectical works of aristotle, we need to elaborate the main characteristics and features of aristotelian dialectic before further discussion on its reception in these contexts. in topics, aristotle discusses “dialectic” under the umbrella of “deduction,” differentiating dialectical deduction from demonstrative deduction. he defines demonstrative deduction as a deduction from “true and primary” premises and dialectical deduction as the deduction from “what is acceptable” (endoxon).6 a similar definition is also given in sophistical refutation, where he writes, “dialectical arguments are those that deduce from reputable premises (endoxa), to the contradictory of a given thesis” (se 2 165b34).7 these two definitions make clear that the main feature of aristotelian dialectic rests on its premises. in contrast to the premises of demonstration, which have to be “true and primary” and usually operate in philosophical and scientific contexts, the premises of dialectic are endoxa, opinions which are measured by their acceptability and reputability and mainly operate in a dialectical context. in this regard, aristotle explains further in topics 1.10 that the dialectical premises are articulated in the form of questions that have a different degree of acceptability. he says, “a dialectical premise is a question that is acceptable (endoxos) to everyone, or to most people, or to the wise” (104a810). when the premises of dialectic are conveyed in the form of a question, it implies that there must be two opposing parties involved in the dialectical argument, the questioner and the answerer. one of them presents an argument in the form of questions and another party answers the queswidigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 4 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 tions with either an affirmation or a negation. the question in aristotelian dialectic is not open, that is, but is a restrictive question requiring either acceptance or rejection.8 since the degree of acceptability of the premises helps to determine the success of the dialectical argument, the concession of the answerer to the questioner’s premises is important, if not necessary.9 the acceptability and reputability of the premises will be stronger if they are accepted by the wise (e.g. philosophers), by a majority of people, or (even stronger) by all people. aristotle also elucidates how the art of dialectic along with its endoxa premises applies in a practical setting. at first, there must be a dialectical problem (problēma or aporia). this problem is the central issue of the dialectical argumentation. aristotle defines the dialectical problem as “a point of speculation”10 that can be articulated in the form of a thesis held by an individual,11 a sophistical argument constructed by a person,12 or a puzzle that needs to be resolved.13 however, according to aristotle, all forms of these dialectical problems can simply be called “theses.”14 thesis (sing. of “theses”) in a dialectical setting is understood as the belief held by a respondent that contradicts an “opinion held by someone famous for philosophy” or a claim of the respondent that is contrary to the questioner’s opinions.15 interestingly, the thesis of the respondent at the same time becomes “a point at which answerer’s position may be probed for attack.”16 at this point, the questioner finds a right location where he can launch a contra-argument. he equips himself with a series of attacking premises, which are called topos, to refute the answerer’s thesis.17 while the respondent’s thesis is actually a result of a deductive process, the refutation against a thesis is actually a deduction as well, albeit “a deduction to the contradictory.” aristotle writes, “a refutation is a deduction to the contradictory of the given conclusion.”18 deduction in this regard should be a valid deduction that derives a sound contradictory conclusion. this cannot be obtained if the deduction does not meet the requirements of valid syllogism. marko malink, based on his reading of sophistical refutations, comprehensively summarizes requirements of a valid aristotelian syllogism in the following eight conditions: first, the conclusion follows necessarily from the premises…second, the conclusion is not identical with any of the premises…third, the conclusion follows through the premises…fourth, the predicate of the refutation’s conclusion is the same linguistic expression as the predicate of the opponent’s thesis—and likewise for the subject…fifth, the predicate of 5widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal the refutation’s conclusion signifies the same object as the predicate of the opponent’s thesis—likewise for the subject…sixth, the refutation’s conclusion and the opponent’s thesis affirm and deny the predicate of the subject in the same respect, and relative to same thing, and in the same manner, and at the same time…seventh, the premises of every deduction are simple predicative questions or simple declarative sentences… eighth, any deduction can be obtained from a schema of deduction by replacing every occurrence of a given schematic letter by the same linguistic expression.19 based on the above conditions, aristotle differentiates a refutation that is merely an apparent refutation from a refutation that is considered a genuine one. the apparent refutation may seem to have a valid syllogism but actually contains some fallacies. this kind of refutation fails to meet one or more requirements of valid syllogism. meanwhile, the genuine refutation is that kind which meets all such conditions, including its sound premises. although these two types of refutation are each successful in the sense that they can draw a conclusion contradictory to the respondent’s thesis, the dialectical refutation, which can expose the inconsistencies, ignorance, or wrong beliefs of the opponent, is the only genuine refutation, since the apparent refutation has its own problems of coherence and consistency. in this respect, aristotle formulates thirteen forms of logical fallacies that commonly occur in the context of apparent refutations and deductive arguments. six of these fallacies are due to language: homonymy, amphiboly/ambiguity, combination/composition, division, accent, and form of expression. the fallacies that are independent of language are seven: accident, consequent, secundum quid, ignoration elenchi, begging the question, non-cause as cause, and many questions.20 these fallacies can be exposed by a genuine refutation in the respondent’s argument and also can be found in the questioner’s apparent refutation. in addition, as can be seen from the conditions of valid deduction, premises play a crucial role in determining whether a certain deduction is valid or invalid. unlike the premises of demonstrative deduction, which must be “true and primary,” the premises of dialectic deduction are endoxa premises, whose validity is measured by their acceptability and reputability. based on the kinds of endoxa premises that are used in the refutation, the attitude of the questioner toward those premises, or the purpose of the questioner in using those premises, aristotle mentions four types of dialectical refutation in se2 165a38-39. he writes, “of arguments used in discus6 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 sion there are four classes: didactic, dialectic, examinational (peirastic), and contentious (eristic).” in se2 165b7-8, aristotle defines eristic arguments as “those that deduce or appear to deduce to a conclusion from premises that appear to be reputable (endoxa) but are not so.” in eristic dialectical refutation, the dialectician may reason syllogistically (or appear to reason syllogistically) from what appears to be endoxa premises to derive a certain conclusion that contradicts the respondent’s thesis. however, since the premises are not genuinely reputable and accepted (endoxa), the conclusion drawn from this kind of deduction must be invalid. for example, if the thesis of the respondent is “it is not possible for a man to give away what he does not have,” the dialectician may employ the following apparent endoxa premises and apparent refutation: “(1) a man having ten dice does not have only one. (2) a man having ten dice may give away only one. (3) therefore, it is possible for a man to give away what he does not have.”21 this refutation may be successful in terms of having a conclusion that is contradictory to the respondent’s thesis. however, there is a problem with the validity and endoxicality (i.e. acceptability and reputability) of its premises, which makes the conclusion problematic as well. the dialectician who utilizes this eristic refutation does not differentiate substance from a relative quality: for “only” does not signify a particular thing, some quality, or some quantity, but how someone has it relative to something, i.e., that he does not have it with another.22 second, aristotle explains in se 2.165b3-4 that dialectical arguments are “those that deduce from reputable premises to the contradictory of a given thesis.” in other words, as long as premises of the refutation are endoxa and the conclusion is in opposition to the opponent’s thesis, the refutation is dialectical. the minimum requirement of the endoxicality of premises is the acceptance of the opponent, although such acceptance may not be based on his own convictions.23 for instance, the respondent holds a thesis that “some robe is not useful.” the questioner then refutes this thesis by using the following reasoning: “every robe is cloak. every cloak is useful. therefore, every robe is useful.” this is considered both genuine deduction and refutation.24 third, if premises of the refutation are obtained from first principles of a given subject of learning and not from real convictions held by the answerer, aristotle classifies this kind of refutation as didactic argumenta 7 tion. the teacher plays the role of the questioner in this didactic argumentation while the student functions as the answerer. the premises presented by the teacher, which are first principles of a given science, should be heuristically accepted by the learner regardless of their own convictions. therefore, in addition to premises that are obtained from principles of a science, one main feature of dialectic in this didactic argumentation is that the thesis which will be refuted is not necessarily rooted in the convictions of the respondent. aristotle elucidates the concept of didactic arguments in se2.165b1-3: “didactic arguments are those that deduce from the principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions held by the answerer.” unfortunately, aristotle does not provide examples and further explanations about didactic arguments. what we can understand from the above definition of didactic arguments is that these arguments are analogous to peirastic arguments in terms of forms and technics, but also that they differ from them in two regards. first, the didactic argument does not require that the thesis and premises actually reflect the dialectician’s real belief, whereas the peirastic argument (the fourth type of argument in aristotelian dialectic) does. second, in a didactical setting, the goal of didactic refutation is to attain certain subjects of learning, while in the peirastical context, the aim of the refutation is to show the ignorance of the opponent and to correct his false belief. fourth, if premises of the refutation are accepted by the respondent (endoxa) based on his own convictions and are bound to be known by anyone who claims to be an expert, aristotle categorizes this kind of refutation as peirastic or examinational arguments. he defines such arguments in se2 165b4-6 as “those that deduce from premises which are accepted by the answerer and which anyone who claims to possess knowledge of the subject is bound to know.” in this regard, there are three important components of peirastic arguments: the premises must be conceded by the answerer based on his actual belief, the answerer should have a claim that he is knowledgeable or an expert in the subject being disputed, and the conclusion should be contradictory of the answerer’s actual belief. aristotle provides an example of an eristic or sophistical argument in order to illustrate how the peirastic refutation might operate and function. he mentions that one may cite an apparent principle in physics or medicine to refute the thesis “it is better to take a walk (than a nap) after dinner.” the sophistic argument goes in this order: widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 8 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 1. motion is impossible. 2. if motion is impossible then it is not better to take a walk (than a nap) after dinner. 3. therefore, it is not better to take a walk (than a nap) after dinner. the first premise is zeno’s thesis, which seems to be in accordance with a principle in physics but in reality is not. the actual accepted principle is “to go a given distance one must first go half way.”25 zeno’s conclusion, which tweaks and modifies the principle into the premise “motion is impossible”, is false. in this situation, the peirastic refutation is able to identify such sophistic (apparent valid) premises, show the invalidity of the argument that is based on it, and eventually reveal the ignorance of the opposing party in the subject at stake.26 in addition to the above four types of dialectical refutation, aristotle also explains five goals that those forms of dialectic aim to achieve. the first goal is merely a refutation; the second is to show that the opponent’s argument is false (i.e. demonstrated falsity); the third is to make an opponent say something paradoxical; the fourth is to lead the opponent to agree with inconsistent views (i.e. solecism); and the fifth is to lead the opponent to “babbling,” or repeating oneself.27 another goal that aristotle mentions, especially in the case of refutation by reductio ad impossible,28 is to demolish the respondent’s premises that are used to derive an impossible conclusion.29 all these goals are applied especially in the context of eristic and dialectic, although they may also be occasionally applied in the context of didactic and peirastic refutations. the latter types of argument are supposed to have premises in accordance with a certain subject of science. furthermore, didactic arguments have educational purposes (learning a subject of science instead of merely exposing a contradiction in the opponent’s argument) while peirastic refutations seek to to expose the respondent’s ignorance of a subject.30 when the respondent claims to be an expert in a given scientific or philosophical subject, peirastic dialectic is able to test (peirastike), examine (exestastike), and expose false claims and the ignorance of the respondent. aristotle writes in sophistical refutations 11.4 171b4-6, “for the art of examining is a branch of dialectic and has in view not the man who has knowledge, but the ignorant pretender (i.e. the one who pretends to know but does not).” furthermore, in the context of science and philosophy, aristotle states in topics i2 101a36-b4 that peirastic dialectic has an examinational capacity by means of which it provides a way (hodon) to the first principles. his 9 account in the metaphysics gives us a clue as to how dialectic would operate in this way: those who wish to be free of aporiai (euporesai) must first go through the aporiai (diaporesai) well; for the subsequent aporiai-free condition (euporia) is reached by untying the knots produced by the aporiai raised in advanced, and it is not possible for someone who is unaware of a knot to untie it. an aporiai in thought, however, reveals a knot in its subject matter. for thought caught in aporiai is like people who don’t know where they have to go, and in addition, don’t even know whether they have found what they are inquiring about, since the end is not clear to them. but to someone who has first gone through the puzzles it is clear. besides one is necessary in a better position to discern (krinai) things when one has heard all the competing arguments, like opposing parties in courtroom (met. b1 995a27-b4).31 in this regard, the main task of examinational dialectic is to solve puzzles, or to untie the knots, that hinder a dialectician from reaching first principles. there are two kinds of puzzles that have been recognized by aristotle’s interpreters: those raised by empirical observations of facts and those resulting from logical or philosophical reasoning.32 the first kind of puzzle emerges when there is a new empirical finding that challenges an existing scientific theory, which has been claimed to be true. the second appears when there is a sound argument that suspects or finds fallacies and contradictions in an existing widely accepted opinion (endoxa). it is true that empirical puzzles can only be solved through further empirical observations or inductive reasoning.33 that is, peirastic dialectic plays no role in empirical sciences. yet it can play a significant role in a philosophical and logical context. peirastic can address philosophical and logical puzzles through further scrutiny of accepted opinions (endoxa) and their propositions by reference to rules of refutation. the examinational capacity of dialectic is not only designed for the purpose of refutation itself (as robin smith claims34) but is also a prelude for finding the first principles. medieval jadal: praiseworthy dialectic in islamic context arabs and muslims practiced debate and disagreement centuries before their encounter with aristotle’s dialectical works. they utilized different concepts to refer to this argumentative tradition, such as al-hijā’ (satire) and al-naqā’iḍ (flytings) in poetry, mujādalah (polemic) in qur’anic conwidigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 10 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 text, a genre of khilāf (disagreement) literature as well as jadal (dialectic) in legal and theological scholarship. pre-islamic arab poets were accustomed to composing satirical poems to lampoon their adversaries. arab-muslim poets during the umayyad dynasty used to write flyting poetry to attack their opponents. various concepts and forms are used in the qur’an to refer to religious debates, dialogues, and polemics, including jadal, jidāl, mujādalah, or mujādilah, and their cognates.35 in a later period, muslim jurists and theologians wrote scholarly books that recorded disagreements among scholars or expressed their disagreements towards opposing scholars under the genre of khilāf (disagreement) literature. then, after the encounter of muslim scholars with greek dialectical scholarship, they started to formulate their own theory of jadal (dialectic) in the fourth/eleventh century. the first encounter of muslim scholars with aristotelian dialectical works is through the hands of muslim theologians (mutakallimūn). after caliph al-mahdī (d. 169/785) ordered a translation of aristotle’s book topics in 165/782, he then asked muslim theologians to refute arguments of heretics and skeptics by incorporating dialectic (jadal) into their scholarly practices and works.36 the main purpose was to defend islamic faith. the theologian yaḥyā b. muḥammad b. isḥāq b. rīwandī (d. 298/910), better known as ibn rīwandī (or ibn rāwandī), wrote a treatise on a theoretical jadal entitled ādāb al-jadal (the rules of debate) at the end of the third/ninth century or the beginning of the fourth/tenth century. later theological jadal writings emerged with the purpose of either criticizing or defending ibn rīwandī, as in the case of al-kaʿbī al-balkhī (d. 319/931) and al-ashʿarī (d. 319/931). other jadal theological works focused more on developing jadal theory, which aimed to attain truth, defeat an opponent, or defend certain theological positions from external challenges (i.e. apologetic purposes). the theologians who wrote on jadal include abū manṣūr al-māturīdī (d. 332-6/944-8), ibn wahb al-kātib (fl. ca. 335/946), al-muṭahhar b. ṭāhir al-maqdisī (fl. ca. 355/966), abū bakr muḥammad ibn furāk (d. 406/1015), ibn ḥazm (d. 456/1064), and al-khātib al-baghdādī (d. 463/1071).37 although the purpose of their jadal works includes apologetics (i.e. defending the faith and defeating the opponent), the normative claim of these theologians is that they could attain the truth through their work and the practice of jadal. in this respect, islamic theologians tried to differentiate their dialectic purposes from that of aristotelian dialectic. if the purpose of aristotelian dialectic is to show the contradictions of an opponent’s rea 11 soning so that one could win a debate, islamic theologians claim that their purpose through advancing jadal practice and theory is to attain the truth. in order to attain the truth, muslim theologians modified aristotelian dialectical questions, namely restrictive “yes” or “no” questions (erotema), into more open questions (pusma) that require a longer reply; and, from logical questions that assess logical validity of an opponent to epistemic questions that seek knowledge and its proofs.38 for example, al-maqdisī formulated a series of dialectical questions to reveal what is considered the truth. according to al-maqdisī, the four dialectical questions in theology should contain a question about the opinion of the answerer (ma’īyāt al-madhhab), about the evidence (dalīl) brought by the answerer, about the cause or reason (ʿilla) contained in the evidence, and a question verifying the soundness of the ʿilla (taṣḥīḥ al-ʿillah).39 the formulation of these questions, in fact, was the first appropriation of aristotelian dialectic in islamic scholarship that engendered a more systematized approach to jadal. the muslim dialectician is then encouraged to build coherent and systematic reasoning to support a claim or argument. muslim philosophers, who follow closely aristotelian dialectic, are critical of theologians for their misinterpretations and for confusing scientific and dialectical questions. for the former, questions about the nature of an opinion, evidence, or causes (ʿillah) used by theologians are essentially not dialectical questions but scientific questions. dialectical questions, the philosophers argued, are those questions that start from accepted premises (endoxa) and aim to make the opponent fall into an inconsistent argument. therefore, ibn sīnā (d. 428/1037), a leading muslim philosopher, defines jadal in the aristotelian sense. he states that jadal is “an art which enables us to prove a thesis by an argument proceeding from generally accepted premises, and when answering we do not give anything contradicting our thesis.”40 logical consistency and coherence are considered dialectical truth; therefore, if the opponent makes an incoherent or inconsistent statement, it means that he/she is defeated. muslim theologians, according to philosophers, do not understand this concept correctly.41 they apply scientific questions with an intention of finding a “scientific truth,” which means a sound conclusion derived from a proper induction, deduction, or demonstration, to defeat their opponents.42 for philosophers, this is impossible since dialectic and scientific premises are different, and therefore cannot produce the same “truth.” the premises of dialectic are endoxa premises whose validity is viewed from their acceptability and reputability, whereas widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 12 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 the premises of science are “true and primary” premises whose validity is assessed from first principles of a given science. in this regard, muslim legal theorists want to demonstrate that attaining “scientific truth” through the series of questions utilized by theologians is possible, namely through so-called “praiseworthy jadal.” one of the leading legal theorists, abū bakr muḥammad b. ʿalī b. ismāʿīl al-qaffāl alshāshī (d. 365/976), started to differentiate between “praiseworthy jadal” and “reprehensible jadal.” 43 the former is associated with the spirit of finding the truth whereas the latter is linked with the purpose of only winning the debate or defeating the opponent.44 the legal theorists would regard the jadal of theologians and of philosophers as “reprehensible jadal,” since it is designed only to defeat their opponents by making them to say something contradictory or inconsistent (something to which these legal theorists would impute the desire for personal fame or even wealth). in turn, they attempt to demonstrate that arriving at the truth through the practice of jadal is possible so long as a dialectician employs “praisworthy jadal” with its correct rules and procedures. after the name of al-qaffāl al-shāshī (d. 365/976) was linked with the initial development of “praiseworthy dialectic,” some other jadal works were written. abū ʿabd allāh al-ḥusayn b. ʿalī al-ṣaymirī (d. 436/1044) wrote masā’il al-khilāf fī uṣūl al-fiqh. ibn ḥazm (d. 456/1063) published his jadal work entitled al-taqrīb li ḥadd al-manṭiq wa al-madkhal ilayhi bi al-alfāẓ al-ʿāmmīyah wa al-amthilah al-fiqhīyah. abū al-walīd al-bājī (d. 474/1081) systematized dialectical practices in al-minhāj fī tartīb al-ḥijāj. abū bakr al-khaffāf (circa 4th/10th century) wrote al-aqsām wa al-khiṣāl, which among other things discussed the order of questions and ethics in jadal setting.45 according to miller, the early period of jadal theory in legal tradition started when abū isḥāq al-shīrāzī (d. 476/1083) wrote a book entitled al-maʿūnah fī al-jadal.46 his student, abū al-wafā’ b. ʿaqīl (d. 513/1119), also followed in his footsteps by writing a jadal book entitled kitāb al-jadal ʿalā ṭarīqat al-fuqahā’. the development of jadal theory in this period reached its culmination, according to hallaq, at the hands of imam al-ḥaramayn al-juwaynī (d. 478/1085).47 however, imam al-ḥaramayn al-juwaynī was not only a jurist (faqīh), as miller and hallaq classify his scholarship. he was in fact also a theologian (mutakallim) who wrote influential theological treatises such as kitāb al-irshād48 and al-shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn.49 he followed the shāfiʿī school in fiqh (law) and the ashʿarī school in kalām (theology). he formulated a 13 full-systemized dialectical theory in al-kāfīyah fī al-jadal, which was then also applied in his kalām and fiqh works. in this regard, as a jurist and theologian, imam al-ḥaramayn employed “praiseworthy jadal” (al-jadal al-maḥmūd) in both legal and theological settings, not in legal discourse alone. he defined jadal (in both juridical and theological discourses) as “jadal that aims to find truth and discloses falsehood, aspires to obtain a divine guidance, along with those who want to return to the truth from the falsehood.”50 the truth, according to imam al-ḥaramayn, is al-thubūt (fixedness or certainty).51 he explains that the meaning of truth (in this sense) can differ: as pertaining to a report (khabr), truth means “truthful or reliable” (ṣidq). it means “the commanded act” if the word is used in relation to religious laws, and means “correctness” (ṣawāb) and “soundness” (ṣiḥḥah) in various contexts. if the term “truth” is utilized in relation to a legal qualification, command, creation, or an attribute of the divine attributes, it means “god the exalted.” 52 in a principle, the term “truth” (bearing the meaning of al-thubūt) is always used in a positive sense, not in a pejorative one. for example, imam al-ḥaramayn clarified, one cannot say “injustice is truth,” because the term “truth” here is attached to a pejorative term.53 in turn, the attempt to search for the truth (with the meaning of “certainty” or “fixedness”) is not only limited to dialectic (jadal) in the study of islamic legal tradition (al-sharīʿah) but also in the study of theology (al-tawḥīd).54 in general, the truth (as al-thubūt) in both law and theology is attainable through univocal texts (nuṣūṣ) of religious scriptures, writes imam al-ḥaramayn. in this regard, the level of al-thubūt reaches the degree of epistemological certainty (qaṭʿī) or the level of psychological certainty (al-yaqīn). however, the level of al-thubūt in matters that are not addressed univocally by religious texts is not as high as the previous ones. rather, they need scholarly discretion (ijtihād) either through regular deductive reasoning (istidlāl) or through dialectic (jadal). the level of al-thubūt resulting from istidlāl is probable (ẓannī), while that from the jadal process is “preponderant conviction” (ghalabat al-ẓann), which yields psychological certainty (yaqīn).55 medieval scholastic disputation: searching for the truth in medieval europe alex j. novikoff and olga wieijers elucidate how scholars and religious figures developed their own tradition of debate and dialogue that became widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 14 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 rudimentary forms of dialectical tradition in the medieval western context. novikoff explains that augustine, who refuted manichean doctrines through public disputations and inner dialogical reflection, laid a strong foundation for the tradition of dialectic in the medieval monastic world. especially through his early book soliloquia, augustine introduced a form of meditative and contemplative inner dialogue for seeking the truth to his late antique audience. this method, soliloquia, literally means “talking to ourselves alone.”56 the later scholar who inherited augustine’s meditative method, novikoff writes, was anicius manlius boethius (481-524). in his masterpiece, consolatio philosophiae, he used augustine’s “inner dialogue” in addition to incorporating the literary forms of other philosophers, including cicero, the stoics, and the neoplatonists. the contribution of boethius to dialectical scholarship extended to his works of translation, including of aristotle’s categories and de interpretatione. boethius marked a first wave of such translation and became a bridge between late antiquity and the early medieval development of the art of disputation.57 the pre-aristotelian form of disputation in medieval europe continued to thrive, especially with the revival of pedagogical dialogue and dialectic during the carolingian renaissance in the eighth and ninth century. even charlemagne (768-814) used dialogue and dialectic in his court sessions. in the eleventh century, peter damian (1007-1072) harnessed a method of disputation to argue against jews and to promote a reform in the church. lanfranc of pavia (1005-1089) too employed dialogue and disputation in the classroom, allowing a student like anselm of bec (1033-1109) to master these arts in pedagogy, philosophy, and theology. anselm used the socratic debate with his students, incorporated disputation into his intellectual methodology and philosophy, disputed with pagans, heretics, and jews using dialectic, and employed rational investigation and dialectical argumentation to arrive at christian truth.58 in the twelfth century, with the emergence of monastic schools, cathedral schools, and private schools, the art of dialogue and dialectic became even more important. novikoff reports that the works of plato and aristotle in dialectic were generally not translated and were only known through secondary sources,59 but the method of dialectic (as part of the trivium, alongside rhetoric and grammar) was already incorporated in the curriculum of those schools, especially for the study of theology. the most notable figure in the early twelfth century was peter abelard (1079-1142), 15 who in his collationes invoked augustine but also aristotle, referring to the (still unavailable) sophistical refutations through a second-hand source. he furthermore started to differentiate between dialectic, which is considered truth-oriented, and sophistry, which is considered oriented toward an apparent truth.60 in his account, however, novikoff does not mention how abelard and other medieval european scholars accessed the aristotelian dialectical tradition, considering that the original greek texts were then unavailable in the west. in this regard, george makdisi and christopher beckwith provide an important observation of how the dialectical argument was transmitted from greek sources through arabic texts and scholarly practices to latin audiences in europe. makdisi mentions a scholar named photius whose book, amphilochia (quaestiones amphilochianae), contains a collection of questions and answers on various religious and philosophical issues and formulates foundational rules of how to reconcile apparent contradictions in religious scriptures, which later peter abelard (1079-1142) and other scholars used in their works.61 according to makdisi, photius served as ambassador to the court of an abbasid caliph, al-mutawakkil, in 855, when he was 35 years old. he most likely encountered the khilāf (disputation) tradition at that court; indeed, as a reputable scholar, photius might well have been invited to participate in that disputation.62 in turn, through photius, the practice and literature of disputation—including the aristotelian forms that had then been translated into arabic—reached european audiences. another possible mode of the transmission of dialectic is through the translation movement from arabic to latin in toledo, spain. after al-andalus was conquered by alphonse vi in 1085, toledo became “the most important center of translation from arabic to latin, under the patronage of archbishop raymond (1126-1153).”63 two important translators in toledo at that time were constantine the african (d.c. 1087) and adelard of bath (d. after 1142), who were contemporaries of peter abelard.64 however, according to beckwith, the first arabic book using aristotelian dialectical method that appeared in western europe was ibn sīnā’s work, de anima, which was translated from a chapter on al-nafs (the soul) from his kitāb al-shifā’ (the book of healing). the project of translating ibn sīnā’s work into latin, especially his discussions of aristotelian dialectic, was carried out by two translators from toledo, the jewish philosopher avendauth (ibn dā’ūd) and dominicus the archdeacon. they presented their translation widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 16 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 works to archbishop john of toledo (r. 1152-1166), the successor of archbishop raymond who initiated the translation movement.65 there are thus two possible routes of the transmission of aristotelian dialectic from arab-muslim scholarship to latin europe. it may have occurred through oral disputations witnessed and practiced by europeans like photius in their contact with arab-muslim scholars. or it may have happened through a direct translation of aristotle’s dialectical works (along with arabic commentaries) from arabic into latin in toledo. the most obvious evidence of transmission via translation was the twelfth-century latin rendition of ibn sīnā’s de anima. the book contains recursive or dialectical arguments that involved two opposing parties, using the model of aristotelian dialectic.66 novikoff seems to overlook the role of such arabic sources in the transmission of greek knowledge into latin scholarship. he only lists a series of translations of aristotle’s works, starting from the first wave of translation in the time of boethius in the sixth century to the second wave of translation in the twelfth century and the third wave of translation in the late fifteenth century.67 this account implies that there is nothing happening between these waves, between the sixth century and twelfth century. in fact, as described above, that is the period when the majority of aristotle’s works was translated into arabic and medieval european scholars engaged the arabic intellectual tradition either through direct contacts or through arabic translations of greek texts. the first serious, first-hand encounter of european scholars with aristotle’s works took place in the second half of the twelfth century. these scholars received them in various forms, either through glossed manuscripts, university documents, surviving commentaries, or actual copies of aristotle’s texts.68 the direct encounter and interaction with the aristotelian dialectic shaped the scholastic practice of disputation in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. the early witness of aristotle’s new logic was adam of balsham, who discussed aristotelian fallacies, while the most comprehensive and engaging discussion of aristotelian dialectical works was conducted by a student of peter abelard, named john of salisbury (d. 1180). john of salisbury defended the use of the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic) in his masterpiece, metalogicon. furthermore, he showed the importance of aristotle’s newly translated dialectical works, namely topics and sophistical refutations, and utilized it to argue against his opponents, such as the pseudonymous cornificius and his fellows. the recovery of 17 aristotele’s dialectical works marked, in novikoff ’s terms, “a significant moment of formative development of scholastic dialectic,”69 as became apparent in the thirteenth century. novikoff notes how in this period the art of disputation entered the university curriculum and monastic orders. the fully developed scholastic disputation emerged and was practiced in universities and mendicant learning institutions, especially within dominican orders. in their universities, students and teachers employed two forms of disputation: the disputatio ordinaria, which is an ordinary disputation held in the morning in a certain subject of learning for the benefit of bachelors and students; and the disputatio de quolibet, which is a disputation of any subject and discipline held for the benefit of students and faculty members. meanwhile, in the dominican order, the art of disputation was able to push boundaries of speculative thought and to shape cultural practices of the order. one of the most influential dominican scholars was thomas aquinas, who used the dialectical method in his summa theologiae. he also categorized disputation into ordinary disputation, which aims to remove doubt and logical errors, and disputatio marginalis in scholis, which aims for understanding the truth that a master has in mind.70 in the golden period of european disputation, namely the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the art of dialectic became a method of teaching, training, and research in european universities. among other forms of dialectic, two were typically practiced in the university settings. the first type of dialectic is eristic disputation, which functions as an intellectual exercise for students and is usually applied in the study of grammar and logic. this form of dialectic develops into a more refined genre called ars obligatoria or obligationes. in obligationes, olga weijers writes, “the opponent tries to lead the respondent to accept propositions that are contrary to the thesis the respondent has ‘obliged’ himself to defend.”71 the second type of dialectic is the scholastic disputation, which usually takes place in a university setting between students and a teacher. there are three participants in this form: the teacher, the respondent, and the opponent. first, the teacher will pose a question that should be answered in an affirmative or negative way. then the respondent gives a preliminary answer to this question. if his answer is affirmative, the opponent will attack the respondent’s answer while at the same time making an argument or defending the negative answer. similarly, if the respondent’s answer is negative, the opponent will attack the respondent’s argument and defend the opposing view. in the end, the teacher will provide the solution (i.e. widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 18 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 the right answer to the question) and discard the wrong answer. unlike the eristic disputation, which generally arises not from a textual reading, the scholastic disputation is usually triggered by a conflicting interpretation of texts, especially in the faculty of arts and theology. then, the teacher and students will hold a disputation and evaluate which of two possible interpretations is right. in the end, the goal of scholastic disputation is to arrive at the truth, to teach the truth, or to find the right answer to the question posed by the teacher.72 conclusion medieval muslims and european christians had their own culture of debate and disputation prior to the arrival of greek philosophical treatises in their respective lands. the medieval muslim scholars had genres of satirical (al-hijā’) and critical (al-naqā’iḍ) poetry, khilāf (disagreement) practices and literature in law and theology, as well as mujādalah (polemic), munāẓarah (disputation), and jadal (dialectic) in the qur’anic and scholastic context. meanwhile, medieval european christian scholars practiced reflective or meditative dialogue since the time of augustine and boethius in the fifth-sixth century. however, muslim and christian encounters and interaction with aristotle’s treatises on dialectic brought a new dimension to their respective cultures of debate and disputation. in aristotle’s concept, the main purpose is not to find the truth in a scientific sense, which is the truth derived from “true and primary” premises through a process of induction or deductive-demonstrative reasoning. dialectic, whose premises are endoxa (i.e. determined by its reputability and acceptability), can be used to serve different objectives. it can be used for the sake of refutation itself. it can be employed to defeat opponents by exposing the weaknesses of their argument, or forcing them to say something paradoxical, inconsistent, or self-repeating. it can also be utilized to destroy opponents’ premises so that they will draw an impossible conclusion from such premises. two kinds of dialectic (namely didactic and peirastic dialectic) seek more than a mere refutation and winning debate. the former is used to learn a certain science or subject through a dialectical process while the latter is used to examine the opponents’ argument in order to show their ignorance in a given subject or to remove “scientific” puzzles so that one can arrive at first principles of a given science. 19 when aristotle’s concept of the dialectic reached muslim lands through translation, medieval muslim scholars, who had their own problems to address (such as legal and theological uncertainties that convened sectarian conflicts), adopted modified elements of the aristotelian dialectic in order to solve those problems. the legal theoretical scholars (uṣūlīyūn), for example, would not use the eristic type of aristotle’s dialectic in their works and practices because it would not help them to solve legal problems. instead, they harnessed the examinational capacity of aristotelian peirastic dialectic in order to achieve a certain level of credibility and certainty in religious knowledge (either in the form of ʿilm or ghalabat al-ẓann). they examined their opponents’ arguments through a series of dialectical questions that were different from that of aristotle. meanwhile, after being exposed to aristotle’s theory of dialectic through arabic (secondary) sources, then through greek (original) texts, medieval european scholars also adopted some elements of aristotelian dialectic in their scholarly practices and work. while the eristic dialectic might be used for religious debates against internal opponents (“heretical” christians) and external adversaries (mainly jews), the main dialectic that was practiced in a scholarly setting is the didactic type. therefore, when the medieval scholastic disputation aimed to find “the truth” through dialectical practices, “the truth” here is not related to showing the ignorance of the opponent in a certain subject (like aristotelian peirastic dialectic) or to arrive at a certain level of certainty (like medieval jadal). the truth in the context of the medieval scholastic disputation was finding the correct answer from questions posed by a teacher in order to learn a certain subject. in other words, although greek dialectic has an influence over both medieval muslim and christian scholarship, each of them employs and modifies aristotelian dialectic in order to serve their own purposes. medieval muslim scholars practiced a “praiseworthy dialectic” (al-jadal almaḥmūd) that was not directed at defeating opposing parties rhetorically with the aim of gaining fame, wealth, or prestige. compared to aristotelian dialectic, imam al-ḥaramayn’s jadal (as surveyed above) is also more analogous and closer to the peirastic form than to eristic, regular, or didactic forms: his jadal is believed capable of leading someone to obtain certainty in juridical and theological realms. meanwhile, medieval christian scholars named their dialectical practices “the scholastic disputation,” which was designed to study a certain subject of learning through finding the correct answer, as stored in the mind of the teacher. widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 20 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 endnotes 1. the reception of dialectic in medieval christian scholarship is discussed by alex j. novikoff, the medieval culture of disputation: pedagogy, practice, and performance (philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press, 2013) and olga wieijers, in search of the truth: a history of disputation techniques from antiquity to early modern times (belgium: brepols, 2013). for the reception of dialectic in medieval muslim scholarship, see larry b. miller, “islamic disputation theory: a study of the development of dialectic in islam from the tenth through fourteenth centuries” (phd diss., princeton university, 1984) and mehmet kadri karabela, “the development of dialectic and argumentation theory in post-classical islamic intellectual history” (phd diss., mcgill university, 2010). 2. see muḥammad abū zahrah, tārīkh al-jadal (egypt: dār al-fikr al-ʿarabī, 1980); barakāt muḥammad murād, manhaj al-jadal wa al-munāẓarah fī alfikr al-islāmī (cairo: al-ṣadr li khidmāt al-ṭibāʿah, 1990). 3. see josef van ess, “the logical structure of islamic theology,” in logic in islamic culture, ed. gustave e. von grunebaum (germany: otto harrassowitz, 1970). 4. see walter edward young, “the dialectical forge part i: proto-system ju\ ridical disputation in the kitāb ikhtilāf al-ʽirāqiyyīn” (phd diss., mcgill university, 2012); miller, “islamic disputation theory.” 5. novikoff, the medieval culture of disputation, 12. 6. see topics, 100a27-31 in aristotle, topics book i and viii, trans. robin smith (oxford: oxford university press, 1997), 1. 7. aristotle, “sophistical refutation,” in aristotle: the complete works (virginia: intelex past masters corporation, 1992). 8. aristotle, topics book i and viii, 45. 9. ibid. 10. topics i.11, 104b1-6. 11. in topics i.11, 104b30-36, aristotle writes, “a thesis, then, is also a problem, but not every problem is a thesis, since some problems are the sort of thing about which we think nothing either way. but that a thesis is problem is clear. for it is necessary from what has been said either the public disagrees with the wise about the position, or that one or the other group disagrees among themselves, since a thesis is some belief contrary to opinion.” 12. “the sophistical argument (against incontinence) is an aporia. for because they want to refute (elengchein) people in contradoxical ways, so that they will be clever in ordinary discussions (epituchôsin), the deduction they construct gives rise to an aporia; for thought is tied up in knot, since it does not want to stand still because it dislikes the conclusion, but it cannot move forward because it cannot undo the argument” (ne vii.2 1146a21-7). 21 13. “as in other cases, we must set out the appearances; first of all go through the puzzles. in this way, we must prove the common beliefs about these ways of being affected—ideally, all the common beliefs, but if not all, most of them and the most compelling. for if the objections are solved, the common beliefs are left, it will be an adequate proof ” (ne, vii.1, 1145b2-7). 14. he writes, “in practice, all dialectical problems probably called theses. but let make no difference whatever it is called.” see topics i.11, 104b35-37. 15. topics i.11, 104b19-25. 16. this is sometimes called topos, but i reserve the term topos for another meaning, which is a series of premises that are used to attack the opponent’s thesis. see r. smith, “introduction,” in aristotle, topics book i and viii, xxvii. 17. in smith’s interpretation, the term topos is also used to denote “a location under which a large number of arguments can be stored for ready recall.” it means that in addition to the meaning of topos as “a point of attack in adversary’s position,” it also refers to “a location under which to file arguments,” which contains a list of premises than be used to launch an argument against the respondent’s thesis. see ibid., xxviii. 18. se6, 165a3-4. 19. marko malink, “deduction in sophistici elenchi 6,” in strategies of argument: essays in ancient ethics, epistemology, and logic, ed. mi-kyoung lee (new york: oxford university press, 2014), 149-174. 20. aristotle, sophistical refutations 4 165b23-166b27. 21. see se22 78a29-31. 22. see the reading and the translation of aristotle’s explanation of fallacies in refutation in scott g. schreiber, aristotle on false reasoning: language and the world in the sophistical refutations (albany: state university of new york press, 2003), 40. 23. robert bolton, “the aristotelian elenchus,” in the development of dialectic from plato to aristotle, ed. jakob l. fink (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2012), 273. 24. malink, “deduction in sophistici elenchi 6,” 162. 25. see aristotle, physics 8.8.263a4ff. 26. see the discussion of this example in bolton, “the aristotelian elenchus,” 286-287. 27. he writes in se3 165b13-22: “first we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who argue as competitors and rivals. these are five numbers: refutation, falsity, paradox, solecism, and fifthly to reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling (i.e. to constrain him to repeat himself a number of times); or it is to produce the appearance of each of these things without the reality. for they choose if possible plainly to refute the other party, or the second best to show that he is saying something false, or as a third best to lead him into paradox, or fourthly to reduce him into solecism, i.e. to make widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 22 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 the answerer, in consequence of the argument, use some barbarous mode of expression; or, as a last resort, to make him repeat himself.” 28. aristotle explains that reductio ad impossible occurs when the argument considers “what is not a cause” as a cause and is inserted into an argument, as though a conclusion is derived from such “not a cause” premise. see se5.167b21-25. bolton, a prominent aristotelian scholar, interprets that this reductio ad impossible argument happens in the context “where the opponent’s thesis is taken as one of the premises of the purported refutation and from it, together with other premises, a conclusion which is impossible is deduced with the result that the opponent’s thesis is destroyed.” see bolton, “the aristotelian elenchus,” 277. 29. aristotle se5.167b23-25 states, “this kind of thing happens in deductions ad impossible; for in these we are bound to demolish one of the premises.” 30. see bolton, “the aristotelian elenchus,” 281. 31. this passage as translated by carrie e. swanson, an assistant professor at department of philosophy, university of iowa. 32. t.h irwin, “ways to first principles: aristotle’s method of discovery,” philosophical topics 15, no. 2 (fall 1987): 123-124. 33. ibid. 34. robin smith, “dialectic and method in aristotle,” in from puzzles to principles, essay on aristotle’s dialectic, ed. may sim (oxford: lexington books, 1999), 52. 35. see abdulla el tayeb, “pre-islamic poetry,” in arabic literature to the end of the umayyad period, ed. a.f.l beeston, t.m. johnstone, r.b. serjeant, and g.r. smith (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1983); hussain abulfaraj, “umayyad poetry as verbal duel” (phd diss., indiana university-bloomington, 2012); rosalind ward gwynne, logic, rethoric, and legal reasoning in the the qur’ān: god's argument (london: routledge, 2004); young, “the dialectical forge.” 36. see abū al-ḥasan al-masʿūdī, murūj al-dhahab wa maʿādin al-jawhar, ed. charles pellat (beirut: manshūrāt al-jāmiʿah al-lubnānīyah, 1974), 5:212. this is different from the claim made by christopher i. beckwith who argues that the first muslim scholar using a dialectical method in the scholarship is ibn sīnā (370/980-428/1037). he argues that ibn sīnā learns and inherits the dialectical tradition from people and teachers in madrasas in central asia who converted from buddhism to islam. see beckwith, warriors of the cloisters: the central asian origins of science in the medieval world (princeton: princeton university press, 2012), 87-94. 37. young, “the dialectical forge,” 22; miller, “islamic disputation theory,” 5-8. 38. miller, “islamic disputation theory,” 24. 39. ibid., 15-16. 23 40. ibn sīnā, al-shifā’: al-manṭiq, ed. aḥmad fu’ād al-ahwānī (cairo: al-hay’ah al-ʻāmmah li shu’ūn al-maṭabiʻ al-amīrīyah, 1965), 6:21. 41. miller, “islamic disputation theory,” 31-32. 42. see miller’s discussion of philosophers’ possible critiques of theological jadal in ibid., 24-26 and 31-32. 43. wael b. hallaq, a history of islamic legal theories: an introduction to sunnī uṣūl al-fiqh (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997), 136. 44. karabela, “the development and dialectic and argumentation theory,” 124. 45. cf. the edition of al-khaffāf ’s work in ahmed elshamsy’s discussion of “bridging the gap: two early texts of islamic legal theory,” journal of the american oriental society 137, no. 3 (july-sept 2017): 505-536, which belong to ibn surayj and abū bakr al-khaffāf. see anna-karina hermkens and jaap timmer, “conflicting states: violent politics in north maluku, indonesia,” etnofoor 23 no. 2 (2011): 532-536. 46. miller, “islamic disputation theory,” 88-89. other periods of jadal theory that miller discusses are a “middle period,” which includes jurists such as abū yusr muḥammad al-pazdawī (ḥanafī, d. 482/1089) and rukn al-dīn alʿamīdī (ḥanafī, 615/1218), and a “final period,” which starts to incorporate aristotelian logic in the hands of scholars such as burhān al-dīn al-nasafī (ḥanafī, d. 686/1288) and shams al-dīn al-samarqandī (d. 702/1302). see ibid., 142-195. 47. hallaq, history of islamic legal theories, 136. 48. imam al-ḥaramayn al-juwaynī, kitāb al-irshād, ed. muḥammad yūsuf and ʿalī ʿabd al-munʿim ʿabd al-ḥamīd mūsa (egypt: maṭbaʿa al-saʿāda, 1950). 49. imam al-ḥaramayn al-juwaynī, al-shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn, ed. helmut kloepfer (cairo: dār al-ʿarab). 50. imam al-ḥaramayn al-juwaynī, al-kāfīya fī al-jadal, ed. fawqīyah ḥusayn maḥmūd (cairo: dār al-iḥyā' al-kutub al-ʽarabīya, 1979), 23. 51. ibid., 43. 52. ibid., 43-44. 53. ibid., 44. 54. ibid., 24. 55. ibid., 32. see also the discussion of the relationship between jadal and yaqīn in the introduction written by maḥmūd f. ḥusayn in al-juwaynī, al-kāfiyya fī al-jadal, 26-30. 56. novikoff, the medieval culture of disputation, 23. 57. ibid., 22-26. 58. ibid., 33-61. 59. ibid., 67-68 and 87. 60. ibid., 87. widigdo: aristotelian dialectic, medieval jadal 24 the american journal of islamic social sciences 35:4 61. george makdisi, the rise of colleges (edinburgh: edinburgh university press, 1981), 259. 62. ibid. 63. ibid., 260. 64 ibid. 65. beckwith, warriors of the cloisters, 100. 66 see ibid., 118. 67. novikoff, the medieval culture of disputation, 106-107. 68. ibid., 107. most probably, the surviving commentaries are written in arabic, since the medieval european scholars received aristotle’s original mainly from their arabic counterparts. 69. ibid., 113. 70. ibid., 165-166. 71. wieijers, in search of the truth, 149. 72. ibid., 122. inconsistency, rationality and relativism robert c. pinto university o/windsor key words: deductive closure, doxastic commitment, epistemic appraisal, epistemic faults, epistemic relativism, inconsistency, maximizing truth and minimizing falsehood, rationality, relativism, self-contradiction. abstract: in section i, i argue that the principal reason why inconsistency is a fault is that it involves having at least one false belief. in section 2, i argue that inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic fault. the argument in section 2 is based on the notion that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on attaining the goal of truth. in section 3 i describe two cases in which it is best from an epistemic point of view to knowingly retain inconsistent beliefs. in section 4 my goal is to put into perspective the charge that relativism ought to be rejected because it involves one in inconsistency. 1. why is inconsistency a fault? do i contradict myself? very well then i contradict myself, (1 am large, i contain multitudes). walt whitman, "song of mysejf," set. 51, in leaves a/grass (\855). poets, apparently, are issued licenses to do things the rest of us are forbidden to do. assume for the moment that as a poet whitman is permitted to wallow in self-contradiction. what about the rest of us? since we are talking here about persons contradicting themselves or being inconsistent, i submit the following definition as useful for our purposes (' ac' stands for 'absence of consistency'): ac s is guilty of inconsistency if and only if there is a set k of propositions such that (i) s believes every member of k and (ii) it is impossible that all the members of k are true (i.e., necessarily at least one member of k is false). can think of three reasons logicians might offer for saying that inconsistency so defined is a bad thing, le., is something to be avoided. two of the three don't seem to me very good reasons; the third seems to me quite solid. the first two reasons invoke the principle that a contradiction entails every proposition, that is to say (,efq' stands for ex/also quodlibit), efq if k is a set of propositions and if it is impossible that all the members of k are true, then for any proposition p, k entails p (or again, the argument from k to p is deductively valid). though a few logicians would dispute the truth of efq, i have no desire to dispute it here. reason #1. with efq in mind, someone might argue that if it is permissible to have inconsistent beliefs, then it is possible (or permissible) to prove anything. for persons with inconsistent beliefs can always form an argument whose premisses consist of some inconsistent subset of what they believe and whose conclusion is any arbitrarily chosen proposition. given efq, such an argument would be deductively valid. and, as long as inconsistency is not a fault, its informal logic vol. 17, no.2 (spring 1995): 279-288 © informal logic 1995 280 robert c. pinto premisses would have to be judged acceptable, and so the argument would have to be judged a good one. but the reasoning behind this objection is seriously flawed. for from the assumption that inconsistency as such is not a fault, it does not follow that we can't object to the use of inconsistent premisses in an argument. if a premiss set is demonstrably inconsistent, we can condemn any argument from that set as unsound, since it can be demonstrated that not all its premisses are true. in other words, from the thesis that it isn't a fault for a person to be inconsistent it doesn't follow that arguments with demonstrably inconsistent premiss sets are ok. i and therefore it doesn't follow that anything and everything can be proved (where a proof is a deductively valid argument that does not beg the question and that has acceptable premisses). reason #2. consider the suggestion that if p entails q then any person who believes p also believes q-the suggestion, in other words, that a person's beliefs are closed under entailment. virtually everybody concedes that application of deductive closure in such bald form is an implausible constraint on belief: people often don't see what the consequences of their current beliefs are and hence don't always embrace them. 2 nevertheless, there is a weaker version of the deductive closure principle that's not so obviously implausible: dc if (i) k is a set of propositions and if (ii) s believes every member of k and if (iii) k entails q, then s is committed to the truth ofq. in other words, even if! don't see (or even care) what the deductive consequences of my current beliefs are, i am "doxastically committed" to those consequences nonetheless. now it follows from our definition of inconsistency (ac) and the principle dc, that people who are guilty of inconsistency are committed to the truth of every proposition-we might call this the acidc principle. and if we suppose that it's a mistake to balk at a proposition one is doxastically committed to, it will follow that people guilty of inconsistency are like the character in the musical oklahoma who described herself as a "gal who can't say no." no matter what proposition they balk at, they are balking at a proposition they are doxastically committed to and which, therefore, they are not entitled to balk at. i concede that there's something wrong with balking at a proposition that you are doxastically committed to. but that very concession leads me to question the acceptability of dc. consider this. if a necessary proposition is entailed by every proposition (a counterpart if not a consequence ofefq), then by dc every believer is committed to the truth of every necessary proposition. from this it follows that it's always a mistake to balk at a necessary proposition. but surely that can't be right. reasonable mathematicians standardly refuse to accept mathematical truths until they can see that they are in fact mathematical truths. let me suggest an alternative way of formulating a principle for doxastic commitment: inconsistency, rationality and relativism 281 dc'" if 0) k is a set of propositions and if (ii) s believes every member ofk and if (iii) the inference from k to q is one that s ought to accept, then s is committed to the truth ofq. dc· is, in part, an attempt to capture the idea that we are committed to the more or less obvious consequences of what we already believe. this principle leaves mathematicians with the right to withhold assent from mathematical theorems whose truth hasn't been shown. but it also makes it easy for us to avoid the conclusion that a person guilty of inconsistency is committed to the truth of any andevery proposition. to avoid that conclusion, we need only maintain that inferences with inconsistent premisses (or, perhaps, with demonstrably inconsistent premisses) are not inferences that ought to be accepted.3 reason #3. there is, nevertheless, what i take to be a conclusive reason for saying that inconsistency is a bad thing. for it follows from ac, our definition of inconsistency, that necessarily anyone who is guilty of inconsistency believes at least one proposition which is not true. and if it is, as i believe, a bad thing to believe a proposition that is not true and if, moreover, whatever necessarily involves a bad thing is a bad thing, then inconsistency is a bad thing. q.e.d. the moral i want to draw from these considerations is a moral about why inconsistency is a fault. it is a fault because, and principally because, inconsistency requires having at least one belief that is false. 2. how serious a fault is inconsistency? i want to maintain that inconsistency as such is not a serious epistemic fault. it does not follow from this that every case of inconsistency is relatively harmless, but only that a case of inconsistency need not be a serious epistemic flaw. my motive in making this claim is to pave the way for the idea that some epistemic faults are worse than inconsistency and that therefore in some cases the price of avoiding inconsistency will be too high. in such cases, it will be reasonable to rest, though perhaps not to wallow, in inconsistent beliefs; this will be the subject of section 3 below. first, a word or two about epistemic "faults" and how we might judge their seriousness. i assume that in the epistemic as well as the ethical order, right and wrong (and virtue and vice) are to be assessed in the light of goals or aims.4 i also assume that in the epistemic order a prime goal is, to put it crudely, maximizing truth while minimizing falsehood. other things being equal, from the epistemic point of view one should aim at increasing the "number" of one's true beliefs while decreasing the "number" of false ones. this is, at best, a very rough way of putting it, since (1) there's no unproblematic way of counting beliefs,s (2) it leaves out of account the fact that some truths are a lot more important than others,6 and (3) it offers no guidance on how to balance the subgoal of acquiring truth against the subgoal of avoiding error. let us call this goal, however we ultimately refine our account of it, the "truth goal." we can suppose that epistemic appraisal of what a person does or 282 robert c. pinto thinks will be appraisal in light of the truth goal. there is a variety of ways this idea might be unpacked. here's one way of doing it. epistemic virtues and vices are those character traits that facilitate or inhibit attaining the truth goal. 7 actions and omissions' are epistemically right or wrong depending on how they affect the attainment of the truth goal-using a test that's likely to give an erroneous result is epistemically wrong in this regard; spending a lot of time on an inquiry that can only generate a lot of correct but insignificant detail will be epistemically wrong if the time could have been spent on an inquiry likely to unearth a few very important facts. a particular belief is epistemically ok (i.e., justified) if and only if acquiring and/or maintaining it is in accordance with sound epistemic strategies, and sound epistemic strategies are those which promote the attainment of the truth goal. (the latter would amount to something like rule utilitarianism with respect to the epistemic rightness ofbeliefs.)9 in the preceding paragraph i was trying only to make the idea of appraisal in light of the truth goal more concrete by illustrating one way in which that idea could be developed. the details of that development are not essential to my purposes here. what comes next is, however, essential to my purposes. epistemic faults will be more or less serious relative to each other, depending on the degree to which they inhibit the attainment of the truth goal. other things being equal, a fault which deprives me of more truth, or involves me in more error, is worse than a fault which deprives me of less truth or involves me in fewer errors. in addition, a fault which deprives me of a more important truth will be worse than a fault that deprives me of a less important truth and also perhaps worse than a fault which involves me in a less significant error. an example or two might help. suppose uncle harry constantly pronounces on matters he knows nothing about, usually getting them wrong, but despite this i'm a sucker for what he says. (this is a bit like the habit of believing what you read in the newspapers: we all know that a good chunk of what's printed there is false, but most of us are strongly inclined to believe whatever the papers say anyway). the inclination to believe uncle harry's uncorroborated testimony is an epistemic fault (more specifically, an epistemic vice). it is, moreover, a more serious fault than the inclination to believe aunt rachel's uncorroborated testimony if rachel, who believes just about everything harry says but otherwise has sound and carefully c.onsidered opinions, only infrequently repeats what harry has told her. or again, suppose i have a totally incompetent psychotherapist whose opinions i'm addicted to and i'm also a gullible reader of the national enquirer. my addiction to the opinions of my psychotherapist is an epistemically more serious fault than is my addiction to the national enquirer-at least if the erroneous beliefs i acquire from my therapist are more serious errors than are those which fill the pages of the enquirer. now i maintain in light of this account of epistemic fault that inconsistency is not, as such, a serious fault. that i'm guilty of inconsistency means only that i have at least one false belief. it does not require that i have many false beliefs or that any of the false beliefs i have constitute serious errors. moreover, it's pretty clear that even if none of us is guilty of inconsistency, all of us have some beliefs inconsistency, rationality and relativism 283 that are both false and unjustified. so a person who is guilty of inconsistency need not be any further from the truth goal than every one of us is already. i believe that this argument is a very strong argument for the conclusion that inconsistency as such is not a serious epistemic fault. i concede that the argument is not conclusive, since it depends on the assumption (a) that what matters epistemically is always in the final analysis an item's effect on the attainment of the truth goal, and also on the assumption (b) that inconsistency need not deprive us of many or important truths and is not likely to lead us into more errors or more serious errors than plain falsehoods are. i maintain that these assumptions are plausible, but concede that they may both be challenged. first, "epistemic deontologists" might challenge assumption (a) by claiming there are standards of epistemic appraisal which don't tum on the attainment of the truth goal, which are always violated by inconsistency, and whose violation is always serious. both deontologists and teleologists might challenge assumption (b) by claiming that inconsistency is in fact likely to lead us away from many or important truths or likely to lead us into more errors or more serious errors than plain falsehoods are. nevertheless, i submit that since the assumptions of my argument are plausible, anyone who would dissent from its conclusion must challenge assumption (a) or assumption (b) by mounting a case for one or both of the counterclaims i've sketched in the preceding two paragraphs. 3. when is it reasonable to tolerate inconsistency? a foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little statesmen and philosophers and divines. ralph waldo emerson in essays, "self·reliance" (first series, 1841). some faults are reprehensible; some are not. a person who reasons from a false premiss is guilty of some sort of epistemic fault; but where the person had every reason to believe the premiss true, and where the premiss provides strong support for the conclusion, that person has done nothing epistemically reprehensible. indeed, the argument corresponding to her inference is cogent and in drawing her conclusion she does something epistemically praiseworthy. a person who reasons from inconsistent premisses certainly is guilty of some sort of epistemic fault. and where premisses are demonstrably inconsistent-where the person knows, or ought to know, that the premisses are inconsistent-that person's inference is epistemically reprehensible. 1o (when people cannot be expected to realise that their premisses are inconsistent, their guilt is not so clear-see note 10 above.) what concerns me here, however, is not the use of inconsistent premisses in arguments and inferences, but rather the mere fact of holding inconsistent views. moreover, i want to zero in on what i take to be the interesting cases, which are the cases where a person holds the views knowing them to be inconsistent. for i 284 robert c. pinto want to argue that it need not be reprehensible to hold views which one knows are inconsistent-that indeed it can be quite reasonable to do so. let me begin with a simple sort of case in which, if i'm right, it's reasonable to be knowingly guilty of inconsistency. suppose jones believes the following five propositions: i) his friend smith is a certified professional engineer (p. eng.) ii) one is a professional engineer only if duly certified by the society of professional engineers (spe) iii) the bylaws of the spe specify what the requirements for certification are iv) the bylaws stipulate that no one can be certified who does not have a degree from an accredited school of engineering, and that there are no exceptions to this rule v) smith's only degree is from a school which is not an accredited school of engineering it is easy to imagine jones having strong reason to believe each of these propositions (he's seen smith's certification papers and knows that smith carries out the duties of a certified p.eng. in a reputable firm; he's actually read the bylaws of the spe and researched government regulations concerning the practice of engineering; he's known smith since childhood and therefore knows which schools smith has attended, and personally researched the accreditation of the school from which smith has his degree). it's now pointed out to jones that it's impossible that (i)-(v) are all true. jones has made a mistake somewhere-but where? suppose there is no ready way for jones to determine which of the five propositions is false. what is it then reasonable for him to do? there seem to be only three choices. (a) stop believing all five propositions until he finds out-if he ever does-which one is wrong? (b) arbitrarily select some proper subset and stop believing the members of that subset? ( c) continue to believe all five propositions, even though he realises they can't all be true?1i intuitions about what jones should do may vary. to me, alternative (b) seems clearly unreasonable-it would make jones' belief set depend on an arbitrary choice. and alternative (a) doesn't do much better-to me it seems unwise to turn agnostic on five matters over a problem like this. as a result, my intuitions lead me to suppose that (c) is the reasonable course for jones to take. moreover, if we look at this situation in terms of the truth goal, that intuition is quite defensible. assuming only one of the five propositions is false, dropping four truths in order to avoid one falsehood does not get you closer to the truth goal, and arbitrarily dropping, say, one of the five gives only a one in five chance of avoiding a falsehood and a four in five chance of losing a truth. if truth is our goal, retaining the inconsistency under these circumstances is the best thing to do. i claim that this is a situation in which it is reasonable for someone to retain an inconsistent set of beliefs. of course, if jones has a quick easy and way to determine which of the five propositions is the culprit, then it's no longer reasonable for him to tolerate the inconsistency: the reasonable thing then is to find out which of the five is false and thereby remove the inconsistency. inconsistency, rationality and relativism 285 let me move to a second sort of case, much discussed in the literature under the title of the preface paradox. 12 jones carefully researches and writes a book on the native cultures of the american southwest, and in the preface writes: though i've done everything possible to assure that the information which follows is correct, undoubtedly it still contains a few errors, and for this i apologise. if jones believes the proposition affirmed in the middle clause of this sentence, and also believes every other proposition affirmed in the book, then she will be guilty of inconsistency, since it is impossible that the set of propositions which contains this proposition and all the other propositions affirmed in the book contains only true propositionsy yet surely adding the disclaimer that gives rise to the inconsistency makes jones more reasonable, not less reasonable. and though jones clearly will, if reasonable, stop believing any proposition affirmed in the book when she discovers it is false, there's no proposition which she epistemically ought to stop believing before she unearths its falsehood. moreover, it would be utterly unreasonable to give up on the entire book on the grounds that it contains a few errors. in cases like these, it seems to me, retaining an inconsistency is the most reasonable thing to do. 4. what about relativism? what bearing, if any, do these considerations have on the charge that relativism is unacceptable because (1) relativism is an inconsistent philosophical view and (2) any inconsistent view is unacceptable. if the story i'm telling is right, then the second assumption behind this charge is false. that, however, doesn't get us terribly far, since in some cases retaining an inconsistency is indeed unreasonable. but my story does shift the nature and focus of the attack: it will now be necessary to show that relativism involves an unacceptable form of inconsistency. in the space of a short paper i can't do much to advance discussion of what is, i hope you now agree, a complicated issue. i want, however, to offer a few remarks about the bearing of my story on what i take to be interesting varieties of relativism. first, let me locate what i think are the interesting varieties. begin by distinguishing between relativism regarding truth and relativism regarding epistemic values. 14 relativism regarding truth is, roughly, the idea that what's true for one person or system can be false for another, and there just isn't any question about what's true simpliciter. this not an interesting form of relativism because it provides no space in which competing "truths" can actually compete. relativism regarding epistemic standards or values is the view that something which is reasonable given one set of epistemic standards can fail to be reasonable given an alternative set of standards, coupled with the denial that there is any right set of epistemic values. epistemic relativism comes, i maintain, in two flavours: flat-out (or naive) epistemic relativism and sophisticated epistemic relativism. flat-out epistemic relativists say there can be no basis for the claim that one set of epistemic standards is better than any other set of epistemic 286 robert c. pinto standards: all are on a par. which set any person (or perhaps any culture) adopts is simply a matter of personal preference or of historical accident, and there can be no reasonable grounds for approving or disapproving the adoption of one rather than another set of such values. flat-out epistemic relativism is not, as far as i'm concerned, an interesting flavour. for it provides no space in which competing epistemologies can compete in a rational way, no room for human persons of different cultures and epistemic persuasions to seek a rational accommodation of their differences. the core idea of sophisticated epistemic relativism (which by now you've guessed is going to encompass the interesting flavours) can be expressed in the following principle: ser there is no set of epistemic standards or criteria of which it can be said that it is uniquely correct or correct sans phrase. on this view, one set of standards can be better or worse than another, and two differing sets can have counterbalancing strengths and weaknesses. in short, on this view, the differences between differing sets of epistemic standards are supposed to matter, even though there's no such thing as the right set. better and worse, but no best of all. now it seems to me that sophisticated epistemic relativists are threatened by an inconsistency problem. for to form opinions about the relative strengths and weaknesses of differing epistemic systems, one must apply some set of evaluative standards. and, i would maintain, when one uses a particular set of evaluative standards one must assume it to be correct sans phrase. if one assumed merely that the standards one employs are correct "in one's own view" (avec phrase, at it were), one would lapse into flat-out relativism: "on my standards statement p is justified, but of course on your standards it is not; and on my view my standards are correct (or are better than yours), but on your view they are no1."15 but the assumption that the standards one is using are correct sans phrase is inconsistent with ser. in short, the practice of sophisticated epistemic relativists on any given occasion requires them to accept some proposition inconsistent with a thesis (ser) to which, as sophisticated epistemic relativists, they are committed. or so i would argue. the question with which i want to leave you, then, is the question of whether such inconsistency is of a reprehensible sort. i it is clear to me that any argument whose premiss set is demonstrably inconsistent is a bad argument. i am not sure what to say about cases in which the premisses of an argument contain an inconsistency that has not been detected, and especially the cases in which such inconsistency is very difficult to detect and where each premiss appears plausible when taken singly. my inclination is to judge this last sort of argument cogent but unsound. z those who construe the objects of belief as sets of possible worlds have a problem avoiding the conclusion that deductive closure is a constraint upon belief. see for example robert stalnaker's discussion of the deduction problem in inquiry (cambridge, mass.: mit press, 1984), chapter 5. stalnaker's contention is that deductive closure is a rationality condition but not a defining condition of acceptance states (where belief states constitute one variety of acceptance states). compare also the lengths to which hintikka must go to avoid the inconsistency, rationality and relativism 287 conclusion that deductive closure applies to beliefs; see jaako hintikka, "impossible possible worlds vindicated," journal of philosophical logic 4 (1975), pp. 475-484. earlier, in knowledge and belief an introduction to the logic of the two notions (ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 1962), hintikka had explicitly embraced deductive closure as a condition on knowledge (see pp. 30-32). 3 james freeman has pointed out that l. jonathan cohen proposes a somewhat different solution to a similar problem in l. j. cohen, an essay on belief and acceptance (oxford: oxford university press, 1992), pp. 27-32. freeman prefers cohen's solution to the one i propose here. 4 i do not intend by this remark to endorse a "teleological" as opposed to a "deontic" approach to ethics. as i see it, what marks an approach as "deontic" is not the denial that goals are relevant to ethical evaluation, but the denial that maximizing the attainment of goals is all there is to ethical evaluation. s it would, indeed, be better to do the thing without reference to beliefs at all. thus one might say that the goal is to have as complete a picture as one can of the way things are, while reducing as much as possible the inaccuracies in the picture. and the completeness of the picture could be said to be measured along two dimensions: breadth and detail. i stay with belief talk in this paper mainly because it is easy to explain inconsistency in terms of beliefs, not easy to explain it in terms of pictures. 6 to some degree the importance of a truth (or seriousness of error) can be gauged on the basis of the number of other truths it makes accessible to us (or the number of other errors it leads us into); but it is not clear to me whether these are the only sorts of differences that bear on the importance of a truth or the seriousness of a falsehood, even when such things are judged from an epistemic point of view. (for one thing, every proposition entails an infinite number of other propositions, so learning the truth of any contingent proposition gives us access to the truth of an infinite number of other contingent propositions to which we would not otherwise have access [e.g., for any q, p entails either p or q]; yet i would not want to say that every contingent truth is just as important from the epistemic point of view as every other contingent truth.) if the relative importance of truths and errors can't be settled by simply appealing to their potential for generating further truths or errors, then we probably won't be able to deal with epistemic goals in isolation or abstraction from other sorts of goals. 7 inquisitiveness might be an epistemic virtue (but then many have seen curiosity as a vice); a lack of concern for detail might be an epistemic vice (but then getting bogged down in the details often leads people to lose sight of the important points). perhaps here, as in aristotle's account of the moral virtues, we need something like the idea of a mean between extremes. 8 e.g., inquiring into the accused's financial records (an action), ignoring the question of what the accused did on her last vacation (an omission). 9 anti-realists, who think (as putnam does) that truth comes down to warranted assertability (that a proposition is true just in case belief in it would be justified under certain idealised conditions), are likely to find this account singularly un illuminating. that is because on their view this account of justification is trivially true. i note, however, that what is trivially true is nevertheless true. 10 assessing the degree of "guilt" in such cases gets complicated where the conclusion follows from, or is strongly supported by, a proper subset of the premisses which is consistent. i, for one, don't know how to sort the complications out in these cases. ii i assume that the well-known problems having to do with belief and will can be either solved or waived for purposes olthis example. 12 first presented in d. c. makinson, "the paradox of the preface," analysis 25 (1965): 205207. for some references to the subsequent. literature, see sharon ryan, "the preface paradox," phil. stud. 64 (91): 293-307. a defence of the claim that the preface paradox 288 robert c. pinto constitutes a genuine example of reasonable inconsistency can be found in peter klein, "the virtue ofinconsistency," monist 68 (1985): 105-135. ij one can quibble about what kind of impossibility this is. i doubt that it is strict logical impossibility: what creates the impossibility or inconsistency is the addition of the sentence in the preface, yet the negation of the proposition affinned in the preface is not syntactically derivable just from the other statements in the book. nevertheless, without appeal to any additional factual infonnation, jones can readily be brought to see that it's impossible that the set containing the proposition affinned in the preface together with all and only the other propositions affinned in the book is a set which contains only true propositions. 14 see chapter 1 of harvey siegel's relativism refuted: a critique of contemporary epistemological relativism (boston: d. reidel pub. co.; 1987). siegel distinguishes clearly between the sort of relativism defended by hartry field (and discussed on pp. 25-31) from the varieties of relativism involving the notion of relative truth (and discussed earlier in siegel's chapter). 15 for a more careful exploration of some of the issues raised in this paragraph, see siegel's criticism of hartry field's epistemic relativism, and note siegel's judgement on field's version: "relativism without relative truth seems to be just as untenable as the more typical sort of relativism which incorporates some conception of relative truth. so long as evidential systems cannot themselves be neutrally or non-relatively evaluated, the incoherence problems attending relative-truth versions of relativism apply to field's version as well" (siegel, op. cit. p. 29). robert c. pinto departmentofphuosophy university of windsor windsor, ontario n9b 3p4 d 5. fsb145_stettler book review © matteo johannes stettler issn: 1832-5203 doi: https://doi.org/10.22439/fs.vi33.6806 foucault studies, no. 33, 90-94, december 2022 article reuse guidelines: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ review marta faustino and gianfranco ferraro (eds.), the late foucault: ethical and political questions. london and new york: bloomsbury publishing, 2020. pp. 304. isbn: 9781350134355 (hardback). this remarkable collection of essays, now available in paperback, brings together fifteen contributions by both well-established and also promising, early career scholars on the ethical and political questions at stake in foucault’s late works – a period of his oeuvre that keeps generating a rich commentary to this day.1 most of these contributions were originally presented on the occasion of the international conference ‘government of self, government of others: ethical and political questions in the late foucault’ hosted by the nova institute of philosophy (ifilnova) of lisbon in 2017. by the titular late foucault, the editors of this volume intend to refer to that body of work that foucault developed during his lecturing years at the collège de france – from 1979 (on the government of the living) until 1984 (the courage of truth), the year of his premature passing –, with the notable (but certainly not reprehensible) exception of the latest or last foucault of the posthumously and only recently translated fourth volume of the history of sexuality, confessions of the flesh (2022), with which none of the contributors of this volume could significantly engage, given that the french edition by gallimard appeared only in 2018. even if that had not been the case, however, the lack of attention that this volume pays to this posthumous publication would certainly have squared well with its editors’ approach to foucault’s exit lines, as it were. far from being themselves ‘in search of foucault’s final words’ – like those scholars who “wanted foucault’s last word on christian sexuality to solve a mystery,” very much “like a retired detective finally revealing a notorious murderer’s name”2 –, faustino and ferraro would probably agree that there cannot be a final foucault,3 nor should we evidently expect to find ‘the final “final foucault”’4 in the confessions of the flesh, if by ‘final’ we understand anything like the ‘definitive.’ their introduction to the collection (‘another word on foucault’s final words’), which stands out 1 see, more recently, for instance, paul allen miller, foucault’s seminars on antiquity: learning to speak the truth (2022). 2 mark d. jordan, "in search of foucault's last words," boston review, 19 january, 2022. 3 james bernauer and david rasmussen, the final foucault (1988). 4 joseph tanke, "the final 'final foucault'?," los angeles review of books, august 1, 2018. review foucault studies, no. 33, 90-94. 91 as an important contribution in its own right, is explicative in this regard: “it is important to be aware that the only reasonable approach to foucault’s work is not to crystalize those last words,” the two write, “but to let them remain infinitely other in the endless task of permeating and transforming present lives.”5 the declared aim of the volume becomes thus that of providing ‘a cartography’ of this last stage of foucault’s work and explore the contribution that its core concepts and ideas (‘care of the self,’ ‘technologies of the self, ‘truth-telling,’ etc.) might provide either for a more coherent reconstruction of his intellectual trajectory or for approaching contemporarily significant ethical and political issues, which the several contributions of this collection taken together achieve brilliantly. the overall architecture of the collection is solid, well-structured, and rigorously thought-through. the volume is organized into five thematic sections, each containing three contributions dedicated to either an ethical, a political, or an ethical-political question connected to foucault’s late works and lectures, thus implicitly calling into question that assumption of a purely ‘ethical turn’ in foucault’s late thought that has for so long baffled scholars trying to square his last works with the more clearly ‘political’ ones preceding them – this is arguably the most distinctive contribution of this collection as a whole to contemporary foucault studies. the first section (‘philosophical practices, philosophy as practice’) is dedicated to exploring the influence that the writings of pierre hadot exercised on foucault’s late thought and re-evaluating their oftentimes divergent understandings of ancient spirituality. as flagged by the editors themselves, this section occupies a place of honor in the entire collection, given that the latter appeared as part of the series ‘re-inventing philosophy as a way of life’ edited by keith ansell-pearson, matthew sharpe and michael ure for bloomsbury. we shall thus pay special attention to it, starting from its second and third contributions in order of appearance. differently from ure’s, both sellars’ and testa’s essays – ‘self or cosmos: foucault versus hadot’ and ‘the great cycle of the world: foucault and hadot on the cosmic perspective and the care of the self’ – advance important reserves with respect to hadot’s criticism of foucault’s interpretation of ancient philosophy. it is worth noting that both scholars do exactly so, at least in part, by relying on the recent (and rather contestable)6 intervention in the hadotfoucault querelle by giorgio agamben in the conclusive volume of his homo sacer series, the use of bodies (2016). as agamben himself puts it in an interview, summarizing his main line of argument: the idea that one should make his life a work of art is attributed mostly today to foucault and to his idea of the care of the self. pierre hadot, the great historian of ancient philosophy, reproached foucault that the care of the self of the ancient philosophers did not mean the construction of life as a work of art, but on the contrary a sort of dispossession of the self. what hadot could not understand is that for foucault, the two things coincide. you must remember foucault’s criticism of the 5 marta faustino and gianfranco ferraro, ‘another word on foucault’s final words,’ in the late foucault: ethical and political questions, ed. marta faustino and gianfranco ferraro (2020), 7. 6 see on this matthew j sharpe and matteo j stettler, "pushing against an open door: agamben on hadot and foucault," classical receptions journal 14:1 (2022). review foucault studies, no. 33, 388-392. 92 notion of author, his radical dismissal of authorship. in this sense, a philosophical life, a good and beautiful life, is something else: when your life becomes a work of art, you are not the cause of it. i mean that at this point you feel your own life and yourself as something “thought,” but the subject, the author, is no longer there. the construction of life coincides with what foucault referred to as “se déprendre de soi.” and this is also nietzsche’s idea of a work of art without the artist.7 it does not really take much to dismantle agamben’s take on this coincidence between the paradigm of an aesthetics of existence and a dynamic of self-dispossession that would putatively hold in the case of foucault’s reading of the ancients. suffice it here to note the contrast that foucault himself acknowledges between the two “models of the rapport subjectivation-writing” that are discernable, respectively, in his own philosophical practice and in the philosophical practices he himself studied in the ancient philosophers: that is, to use lorenzini’s terminology, the model of a “writing-experience” and that of a “writing-exercise,” the former being essentially a practice of de-subjectivation, the latter one of subjectivation.8 importantly, the first model – the one that foucault declaredly inherited from authors the likes of nietzsche, blanchot, and bataille – will find its first theoretical elaboration precisely in his 1969 essay ‘what is an author?,’ to which agamben appeals. according to this model, the activity of writing is a “limit experience [experience limite], which tears the subject away from itself” and ensures that the “[subject/writer] is no longer itself or that it is brought to his annihilation or dissolution.”9 whence foucault’s later recurring motto, of which agamben is fond: “to get free of oneself [se dépendre de soimême].”10 a contrario, the second model, as foucault retraces it in the first two centuries a.d., conceives the writing of hypomnémata, for instance, as the “long process which turns the taught, learned, repeated and assimilated logos into the spontaneous form of the acting subject.”11 significantly, in this ‘writing-experience’ whereby one “make[s] oneself permanently capable of detaching oneself from oneself,” foucault himself recognizes elsewhere “the opposite of the attitude of conversion”12: namely, that fundamental attitude the he found characteristic of the entire apparatus of the techniques of the self, including the art of selfwriting (the ‘writing-exercise’ par excellence), in effect in the imperial era and that had precisely in the constitution of the subject its overarching endgame.13 to reduce the writingsubjectivation model that foucault himself practiced (‘writing-experience’) to that which, according to foucault, hellenistic-roman philosophers practiced almost two millennia 7 ulrich raulff, "an interview with giorgio agamben," german law journal 5:5 (2004), 613. 8 daniele lorenzini, "michel foucault: scrittura di sé e sperimentazione," le parole e le cose, april 8 2016. translation mine. 9 daniel defert, françois ewald, and jacques lagrange, michel foucault, dits et écrits, 1954-1988, vol. ii (2017), 862. translation mine. 10 michel foucault, the use of pleasure: volume 2 of the history of sexuality (1990), 8. 11 michel foucault, the hermeneutics of the subject: lectures at the collège de france, 1981-82 (2005), 529. deemphasis mine. 12 michel foucault, "the concern for truth," in michel foucault: politics, philosophy, culture. interview and other writings 1977-1984, ed. lawrence kritzman (1990), 263. emphasis mine. 13 michel foucault, the care of the self: volume 3 of the history of sexuality (1990), 64. review foucault studies, no. 33, 90-94. 93 earlier (‘writing-exercise’), as agamben does, helplessly trying to defend foucault from hadot’s accusations, amounts to rendering either foucault a stoic (as far as foucault’s own understanding of stoicism goes) – and he most surely was not one of those! – or (foucault’s) seneca a nietzsche, a blanchot or a bataille, which is possibly an even more absurd proposition. importantly, for the purposes of the present review, the distinction between foucault’s own philosophical practice as a genealogist and the philosophical practices that he himself studied in the ancients is what stands out as the single most relevant contribution of the excellent opening essay of the collection by michael ure (‘foucault’s reinvention of philosophy as a way of life: genealogy as a spiritual exercise’). strictly connected to those of the first section, the essays contained in the second (‘care of the self, care of others’) explore new interesting possibilities opened by foucault’s isolation of the greek epimeleia heautou (‘care of the self’) as the cardinal principle of ancient spirituality, either by comparing it with the notion of ‘technics’ of bernard stiegler (‘foucault according to stiegler: technics of the self’ by amélie berger soraruff) or by applying it to thematic domains that were undeservedly neglected or only superficially treated by foucault himself, such as music (‘notes towards a critical history of “musicalities”: philodemus on the use of musical pleasures and the care of the self’ by élise escalle) and time (‘foucault’s ultimate technology’ by luca lupo). the latter might well have deserved a more systematic engagement with heidegger. after all, it is starting precisely from heidegger that, by his own admission, foucault set up the question of truth and its relationship with the subject in his late period, especially in the 1981-82 lecture course the hermeneutics of the subject,14 with which all contributions of this section deal. the third section (‘ontology of the present, politics of truth’) attempts to reshape our understanding of foucault’s late trip to greco-roman antiquity in light of perhaps two of the most distinctive themes of his entire oeuvre: that of an ‘ontology of the present’ (‘the care of the present: on foucault’s ontological machine’ by gianfranco ferraro) and the triad truth-power-subject (‘agonistic truth: the issue of power between the will to knowledge and government by truth’ by antonio moretti and ‘from jurisdiction to veridiction: the late foucault’s shift to subjectivity’ by laurence barry’). the section titled ‘government of self, government of others’ moves to discussing the more properly political ramifications of foucault’s final thinking on the notions of power, government and governmentality (‘understanding power through governmentality’ by karim barakat), especially by bringing it in dialogue with other prominent, contemporary political theorists, such as hannah arendt (‘on authority: a discussion between michel foucault and hannah arendt’ by edgar straehle) and ernesto laclau (‘neoliberal subjectivity at the political frontier’ by matko krce-ivančić). following the trajectory of foucault’s thought in his lecture courses, the fifth and concluding section of the collection (‘truth-telling, truth-living’) deals with the greek notion of parrhesia and the associated one of truthful living, as explored by foucault in his last lecture course, the courage of truth (1983-84). in keeping with the general approach of the collection, the contributions of this sections either re-read these notions in perspective of other types of truth-telling unearthed by 14 the hermeneutics of the subject: lectures at the collège de france, 1981-82, 189. review foucault studies, no. 33, 388-392. 94 foucault in his earlier studies, such as the ‘confession’ or ‘avowal’ (‘rethinking confession’ by andrea teti), or evaluate their relevance for understanding and tackling contemporary ethical and political challenges, whether these be constituted by the recent developments of the psychotherapeutic sciences (‘truth-telling as therapeutic practice: on the tension between psychiatric subjectivation and parrhesiastic self-cultivation’ by marta faustino) or the narratives of trauma survivors (‘foucault, the politics of ourselves, and the subversive truth-telling of trauma: survivors as parrhesiasts’ by kurt borg). all in all, faustino and ferraro’s attempt with this volume to present foucault’s last words not as final but as irreducibly other – words thus capable of penetrating into our present lives and the belief systems that sustain them to radically transform them both – proves a highly felicitous one. this is a welcome and important addition to the existing literature on the last season of foucault’s thought and a valuable point of reference for anyone interested either in building a coherent understanding of the arch of foucault’s long and productive intellectual career or in approaching the ethical and political challenges of our present. references bernauer, james and david rasmussen, the final foucault. cambridge: mit press, 1988. defert, daniel, françois ewald, and jacques lagrange, michel foucault, dits et écrits, 19541988, vol. ii. paris: gallimard, 2017. foucault, michel, the use of pleasure: volume 2 of the history of sexuality. new york: vintage books, 1990. michel foucault, the care of the self: volume 3 of the history of sexuality. new york: vintage books, 1990. foucault, michel, the hermeneutics of the subject: lectures at the collège de france, 1981-82. new york: picador, 2005. foucault, michel, “the concern for truth,” in michel foucault: politics, philosophy, culture. interview and other writings 1977-1984, ed. lawrence kritzman, 255-271. london: routledge, 1988. jordan, mark d.,"in search of foucault's last words," boston review, 19 january, 2022. https://www.bostonreview.net/articles/in-search-of-foucaults-last-words/. raulff, ulrich, “an interview with giorgio agamben,” german law journal 5:5 (2004), 609-614. https://doi.org/10.1017/s2071832200012724. author info matteo johannes stettler mstettler@deakin.edu.au ph.d. candidate in philosophy department of philosophy deakin university melbourne, australia dianoia the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college foucault and mad men pascal and the reasonable heart kant on judgments of taste spring 2012 issue i d ia n o ia t h e u n d e r g r a d u a t e p h il o so p h y jo u r n a l o f b o st o n c o l l e g e sp r in g 2012 issu e i διaνοιa the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college spring 2012 issue i ´dianoia διaνοιa the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college 3 διaνοιa´ mission statement dianoia fosters open philosophical discussion and writing among undergraduate students at boston college. the journal provides a necessary venue for sharing creative, philosophy-based papers that bridge academic disciplines. what does ‘dianoia’ mean? the ancient greek word ‘dianoia’ translates as ‘thought’ but connotes a discursive direction or search for a higher form of knowledge. sponsored by the institute for the liberal arts and the philosophy department of boston college the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college dianoia ` ιδthank youthe editors of dianoia would like to express their gratitude to the following individuals for their generous support: staffeditor-in-chief lucia kimmanaging editors kyle kavanaugh nathaniel sanderseditors karen kovaka gunnar lund james parkington neil patch minje shin andrew skaras edwin torrescopy editor jennifer hayeslayout design nicholas cokonis jasmine rebadaviafaculty advisor ronald tacelli, s.j. cover friedrich, caspar david. wanderer above the sea of fog. oil-on-canvas. 1818. (kunsthalle hamburg, hamburg, germany) questions & contributions if you have any questions or would like to submit your work for review, please contact the journal at bcdianoia@gmail.com. mary crane, department of english and institute for the liberal arts susan dunn, center for centers arthur madigan, s.j., department of philosophy yasmin nunez, institute for the liberal arts the materials presented represent the personal opinions of the individual authors and do not necessarily represent the views of dianoia or the boston college community. dianoia, the undergraduate philosophy journal of boston college, issue i, spring 2012 boston college 140 commonwealth avenue chestnut hill, ma 02467 printed by collegiate press (eagleprint) copyright © 2012 by the trustees of boston college 5 ιδ editors’ notea man in a dark green overcoat stands perched on a towering rock precipice, gazing into a sea of fog. as we too fix our gazes onto this vast landscape, we begin to make out immense mountains in the background. since wanderer above the sea of fog was painted at the height of romanticism and flourishing kantian philosophy in europe, we may see the white, formless haze as a metaphor for the landscape of knowledge. we ask: is the fog becoming murkier or clearer? what does the fog hide? what does the road ahead look like?boston college is a community of thinkers seeking to discern what lies behind the fog. as a liberal arts institution that has one of the largest philosophy departments nationwide, we certainly have a strong drive toward the examined life. in such a life, the sharing of ideas plays a crucial role. no student here is an isolated student, but relies on constant discourse with a flourishing community of great authors, professors, and fellow students.the final component, learning from our classmates, is what we want to emphasize. it provides a fundamental basis for our education, and one that extends beyond the classroom into dining halls, libraries, and dorm rooms. it is in this spirit of the boston college philosophy community that this journal has come together. our goal is to provide students with a venue to exchange ideas, a way to publish original and scholarly work in philosophy. whether it means engaging heidegger with eastern philosophies or connecting foucault’s thinking with mad men, the popular tv series, we hope to foster thought-provoking writing and discussion among bc undergraduates.we were surprised and humbled to receive over 70 submissions for our first issue. this made the selection process extremely difficult, as we realized in the countless hours of reading, discussion, and editing. we would like to thank all undergraduates who submitted their work, without which this journal would not have been possible. we also want to thank the philosophy department and the institute for the liberal arts for their generous support, especially fr. ronald tacelli, s.j., fr. arthur madigan, s.j., and prof. mary crane. last but certainly not least, we thank our editors for their hard work and commitment in bringing this journal to completion.we hope that you all enjoy this inaugural issue of dianoia. we look forward to your continued support for the start of what we hope will be a staple on campus for years to come. sincerely, lucia kim, editor-in-chief kyle kavanaugh, managing editor nathaniel sanders, managing editor α “ “the shock of draper’s character reveals the hypocrisy our society still contains today. the telescope through which we see the universe cannot be made to see itself. if we attempt to shine no such light, we see no chrysanthemums. we are moved to reach out and grab those aspects of our experience that are most unstable and wildly erratic. love causes people to do irrational things – to open themselves up to the chance of pain. when we make a particular judgment of taste that something is beautiful, our claim is not merely subjective. any action for the sake of bettering loses significance. 7 α contents foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure neil patch the reasonable heart bart celie experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies clay venetis plato’s condemnation of imagination in a clockwork orange michael wangen “i have lived”: nietzsche and the symposium dan friedman how we decide what is beautiful: kant on judgments of taste william adamowicz entertainment ethics of waiting for godot kara bradley 9 19 25 37 53 47 61 “ “ ” draper’s inner duality, the careful balance between family man and hedonist, implies that the notion of repressive sexuality and sexual freedom are two sides of the same coin in the vision of mad men. foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure neil patch set in new york city’s high-powered advertising world of the early 1960s, the television program mad men has captivated viewers and critics since its inception in 2007. the series’ protagonist, don draper, is the creative director at the fictional sterling cooper advertising agency, and his life exudes the ideals of the american dream: he is handsome, successful, and owns a suburban home with two children and a beautiful blonde wife. however, it is the secret half of draper that contains his countless sexual affairs and hidden past that fascinates viewers, and a considerable portion of mad men’s appeal is the tightrope draper constantly walks between clean-cut family man and unabashed hedonist. he attempts to create within and rebel against a system of societal conformity, while at the same time working to propagate this cultural passivity and acceptance of the structures of power. the subject’s striving for freedom, a central theme of foucault’s life work, is at the dramatic heart of mad men’s plot, and the program explores the difficulty of creating new value systems of the self and pleasure while retaining a sense of balance. the study of draper’s character becomes one that incorporates the foucaultian areas of the self, sexuality, and pleasure. in mad men’s first season, draper is portrayed as being caught between the myriad of extremes that weave the ethical snare of modern life: the restricting powers of society and personal desire, want and need, asceticism and pleasure, reason and madness. draper struggles with his position between the aforementioned poles, and in doing so represents the greater hypocrisy of a western society that seems to readily believe that life cannot be a work of art, sexual desire is repressed, and pleasure must be restricted. thus, mad men serves to establish a history of the present by engaging the foucaultian topics of creating the self as a work of art, critiquing ο10 ν foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure the repressive hypothesis, and exploring the ethics of pleasure. these three areas of foucaultian inquiry reflect how draper’s struggle embodies foucault’s own goal of establishing a means to the subject’s freedom, and the resulting difficulty of such an attempt while still being subject to the realities of one’s existence in modern society. by focusing on the personal and professional struggles of don draper, mad men effectively deconstructs the modern capitalistic society and analyses the contradictions and tensions that lie underneath the surface of such a system. foucault and draper promote different paths of life, but draper’s issues arise from taking foucaultian concepts too far. creating an aesthetic identity the penultimate episode of mad men’s first season explains who don draper really is—the short answer being not really “don draper”. born dick whitman, draper assumed the identity of fallen comrade donald draper at the age of nineteen following an attack on their position during the korean war. reinforcements subsequently believed whitman to have died, thus allowing him to live as don draper and escape a past filled with poverty and abuse. under this new alias, draper moves to new york city as a salesman and crafts his new alias into a stereotypical image of post-war success: upper middle-class white male. draper imbues himself with a mélange of previously unattainable ideals, and he becomes handsome, confident, professional, debonair, and respected: a symbol of masculine power. such a drastic transformation invokes the foucaultian concept of creating the self into a work of art and evolving one’s aesthetic identity. foucault describes how much of nineteenth century history may be viewed as a “series of difficult attempts, to reconstitute an ethics and an aesthetics of the self ”.1 draper may thus be viewed as a follower of this tradition, and the struggle between the effort to reconstitute his ethical and aesthetic self is dramatized by mad men via the literal split between who he was (dick whitman) and who he has become. foucault supported the idea of creating the self into a work of art, and his elucidation of the concept may be applied to draper’s own attempt to create himself in an artistic manner: “we have hardly any remnant of the idea in our society that the principle work of art which one must take care of, the main area 1 foucault, the hermeneutics of the subject, 251. ο 11 ν to which one must apply aesthetic values, is oneself, one’s life, one’s existence”.2 in following foucault’s analysis, draper acts “so as to give to [his] life certain values,” and so draper creates his persona of power in order to attribute various characteristics to his existence and turn himself into an “object for a sort of knowledge”.3 however, draper does not appear to engage in practices of caring for the self, and thus his own sense of creating the self into a work of art differs from foucault’s. one crucial difference between the philosophies of foucault and draper is foucault’s view of living as if death is constantly present in life and every individual day is the individual’s last.4 draper proclaims that he is “living like there’s no tomorrow, because there isn’t one,” but this perspective is seemingly used as an excuse for his affairs.5 instead, foucault’s goal is to lead the individual toward a sense of fullness in one’s life, and he quotes marcus aurelius’ judgment that living each day as if it is the last leads to “moral perfection”.6 in accordance with this foucaultian interpretation, draper’s job plays particular importance. draper is the head creative director at sterling cooper, and his main responsibility is to manipulate consumers for the benefit of his clients: “advertising is based on happiness. we make the lie, we invent want”.7 this notion of inventing want, and by association desire, reflects upon draper’s own self creation. draper finds himself able to rely upon this form of invention because he sees no overarching system of morality: “i hate to break it to you, but there is no big lie, there is no system, the universe is indifferent”.8 while draper believes in the mantra of “art for art’s sake” and does not bring morality into the art of his persona, foucault stresses the importance of defeating one’s vices, gaining self control, and “resisting the temptations of pleasures and the flesh”.9 this struggle is the major point of contention within draper, and his relation to sex and pleasure take on dominating importance. 2 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 271. 3 ibid. 4 foucault, the hermeneutics of the subject, 478. 5 weiner, “smoke gets in your eyes,” mad men. 6 foucault, the hermeneutics of the subject, 271. 7 weiner, “smoke gets in your eyes,” mad men. 8 provenzano, “the hobo code,” mad men. 9 foucault, the hermeneutics of the subject, 265. dianoia : issue i δ 12 αquestioning sexual repressionthroughout mad men’s evolving drama, one component remains constant: the empowering and dominating powers of desire. while the common advertising trope is that “sex sells,” draper instead focuses on the commercialization of desire. draper thus views sexuality as merely a manifestation of the greater power of desire. upon being told by peggy olson, the agency’s only female copywriter, that her advertising proposal intends to use the apparently universal truth that “sex sells,” draper responds with his explanation of using the power of desire:says who? just so you know, the people who talk that way think that monkeys can do this. they take all this monkey crap and just stick it in a briefcase completely unaware that their success depends on something more than their shoeshine. you are the product. you—feeling something. that’s what sells. not them. not sex. they can’t do what we do, and they hate us for it.10draper thus sees the true power of advertising as the ability to tap into the underlying forces against the christian doctrine of renunciation that has permeated the west, particularly america. foucault sees the paradox of such a societal position as one of the key components to his analysis in the history of sexuality: vol. 1: “briefly, my aim is to examine the case of a society which has been loudly castigating itself for its hypocrisy for more than a century, which […] promises to liberate itself from the very laws that have made it function”.11 mad men as a whole also seeks to reestablish a view of the “sexual liberation” of the late 60s, as draper exists in a corporate culture that thinks nothing of transgressing the moral tenets of sexuality. regarding foucault’s challenges to the repressive hypothesis, mad men provides a portrait of a society that goes against the accepted norm. firstly, sexual repression is not portrayed as an historical fact given draper’s place outside of the moral bounds of sexuality; his seductions are frequent and deliberate.12 it is important to note that mad men thus shows that the apparent “sexual liberation” never occurred as people (most notably men, as they are 10 weiner, “for those who think young,” mad men. 11 foucault, the history of sexuality: vol. 1., 8. 12 ibid., 10. foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure δ αportrayed in the series) have always acted upon sexual desire, but foucault’s notion of “silence” on this matter has made this fact seem more like a shadow or mist.13 the common notion is that the eruption of sexual freedom came in the latter half of the decade, but the first season of mad men occurs throughout 1960 in a culture very much attached to the 50s. thus, men such as don draper have always existed and will continue to exist. the issue arises when the prevailing ethical position of modern society on sexuality deems that draper is “bad” and transgresses society.mad men addresses the historico-theoretical question of whether the “workings of power […] belong primarily to the category of repression” through the aspect of advertising. draper is essentially a captain of industry, and as an advertising executive he appeals to what the public desires; advertising is an open admission that such powers are not repressed. in the first episode of the series, draper explains how happiness affects the consumer:advertising is based on one thing, happiness. and you know what happiness is? happiness is the smell of a new car. it’s freedom from fear. it’s a billboard on the side of the road that screams reassurance that whatever you are doing is okay.14 happiness is the goal of desire, and so happiness takes on any sort of meaning for the individual. draper’s job entails revealing and playing upon what people commonly consider to be repressed, and then putting it up on a billboard for all of the world to see. thus, draper is simply communicating with what is natural within the individual, and not playing into the myth of sexual repression.the third and final prong of foucault’s attack against sexual repression is the historico-political question which entails discerning if the critical discourse against repression is part of the “same historical network as the thing it denounces”.15 to approach this question through mad men, one must return to the scenario in which draper’s copywriter peggy seems to not only accept the repressive hypothesis of sexuality, but also assume that its mythology should be played upon in their advertising. while draper does not share this view, the immediate connection peggy makes reveals that an industry such as advertising may be interpreted as paradoxical according to foucault’s question. while 13 ibid., 5. 14 weiner, “smoke gets in your eyes,” mad men. 15 foucault, the history of sexuality: vol. 1, 10. 13 dianoia : issue i ι14ο draper rejects the notion of the repressive hypothesis, his line of business plays upon sexuality even today; ads and commercials are filled with sexual images. thus, mad men portrays the questioning and the proliferation of the repressive hypothesis to be encompassed by the greater forces of industry present in the advertising business. draper’s inner duality, the careful balance between family man and hedonist, further implies that the notion of repressive sexuality and sexual freedom are two sides of the same coin in at least the vision of mad men. throughout the first season of mad men, draper’s secret affairs are only discovered by two female secretaries who determine that they must keep his infidelity hidden out of the sense of some kind of duty to draper as their superior. the concealment of sexual affairs and the concurrent proliferation of the knowledge of their existence are sentiments reminiscent of foucault’s take on modern society’s attitude toward sex: “what is peculiar to modern societies […] is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it ad infinitum while exploiting it as the secret”.16 peggy, the woman who initially stumbled upon a phone conversation between draper and a lover, felt the compulsion to share it with her colleague joan. instead of keeping the knowledge to herself, she exploits this information, while still treating it as the secret; the power of such knowledge comes from its very existence as a “secret” within modern society. this level of secrecy regarding draper’s affairs reveals the greater power draper possesses upon comparing it to what foucault writes about power and secrecy: “[power’s] success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanisms […] for it, secrecy is not in the nature of an abuse; it is indispensable to its operation”.17 draper thus defines his notion of power in terms of its relationship to secrecy, given the nature of his own “secret” identity and the secrecy of his affairs. the struggle of redefining pleasure by representing a structure of power within himself, the adulterous side of draper embodies an almost weaponization of sex and strays away from foucault’s vision of moderating pleasures. like foucault, part of draper sees sexuality as an instrument that has been conceived as an instrument of power, 16 ibid., 35. 17 ibid., 86. foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure ι 15 dianoia : issue i ο and his main conflict emerges out of his simultaneous support of capitalism and rebellion against the greater structure of bio-power that controls him: the adjustment and accumulation of men to that of capital, the joining of the growth of human groups to the expansion of productive forces and the differential allocation of profit, were made possible in part by the exercise of bio-power in its many forms and modes of application.18 draper’s rejection of sexuality as a moral containment of sexual desire leads him to the other extreme of seeking pleasure and away from foucault, a thirst for power via pleasure reminiscent of foucault’s analysis of greek sexual ethics. this further classifies draper as a man struggling with a split within his self: one foot in greek sexual ethics, while the other remains in the widespread moral system of marriage. it would seem that draper finds himself in the realm of greek aphrodesia, “the acts, gestures, and contacts that produce a certain form of pleasure”.19 foucault describes aphrodesia as not “an ontology of deficiency or desire” or a “nature setting the standard for acts,” but rather an “ontology of a force that linked together acts, pleasures, and desires”; draper also seems to make no distinction between these three categories.20 the greeks viewed this doctrine of desire and pleasure to be freeing rather than restricting, and foucault makes the distinction between it and the later christian system: [the greeks] might take great pains to fix the optimal age to marry and have children, and the best season for having sexual relations, but they would never say, like a christian spiritual director, which gestures to make or avoid making, which preliminary caresses were allowed, which position to take, or in which conditions one could interrupt the act.21 draper the family man lives in a christian society concerned with hiding sex away in the parent’s bedroom, while draper the transgressor of sexual morality engages in seduction out in the open: music clubs, expensive restaurants, bars. the hidden aspect of sexuality is thus revealed in the public forum, and it is in 18 ibid., 141. 19 foucault, the history of sexuality. vol. 2: the use of pleasure, 40. 20 ibid., 43. 21 ibid., 39. α ν this setting that his power emerges; draper’s confidence in his power ignores any concern over which gestures to make or the allowance of caresses. within the realm of draper’s affairs, two female characters represent the struggle draper faces between excess and a moderate approach to extramarital pleasure. the character of midge daniels, a proto-hippie painter with whom draper engages in an affair, serves as the embodiment of draper’s extreme pursuit of pleasure. their encounters are sudden and passionate, even occurring in the middle of the workday—two creative beings indulging in pleasure. however, draper becomes offended upon learning of her other lovers, and he ceases their relationship.22 even in the throes of a wild affair based upon pleasure, draper’s association of pleasure to ethical commitment shows through the don juan persona. on the opposing side of this spectrum is rachel menken, the owner of a department store and one of draper’s customers. the two engage in an affair, during which draper muses on the reality of love: the reason you haven’t felt it is because it doesn’t exist. what you call love was invented by guys like me to sell nylons. you’re born alone and you die alone and this world just drops a bunch of rules on top of you to make you forget those facts.23 menken believes in the reality of love, even if draper claims not to, and thus her participation in their affair is not due to bestial pleasure seeking, but rather an attempt to find love. draper’s sexual “immorality” perhaps even challenges the limits of aphrodesia and moves into the realm of the don juan character foucault analyzes in the history of sexuality vol. 1: underneath the great violator of the rules of marriage—stealer of wives, seducer of virgins, the shame of families, and an insult to husbands and fathers—another personage can be glimpsed: the individual driven, in spite of himself, by the somber madness of sex.24 foucault continues to write that the character of don juan overturned both “the law of marriage and the order of desires,” and in doing so he rebels against the “two great systems conceived by the west for governing sex”.25 the connection 22 albert, jacquemetton, and jacquemetton. “nixon vs. kennedy,” mad men. 23 weiner, “smoke gets in your eyes,” mad men. 24 foucault, the history of sexuality: vol. 1, 39. 25 ibid., 39-40. 16 foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure α ν between don draper and don juan, in both name and ethical ambivalence, appears to be quite clear. foucault’s analysis of the favored role within greek sexual ethics serves to effectively describe the role draper creates within his society: [i]n sexual behavior there was one role that was intrinsically honorable and valorized without question: the one that consisted in being active, in dominating, in penetrating, in asserting one’s superiority.26 foucault repeats this sentiment in “on the genealogy of ethics” in which he describes how “the greek ethics of pleasure is linked to a virile society, to dissymmetry, exclusion of the other, an obsession with penetration, and a kind of threat of being dispossessed of your own energy”.27 foucault finds all of this “quite disgusting,” and it would seem that he would think the same of draper’s insatiable desire for pleasure.28 conclusion as mad men has sparked a revival of interest in 1960s culture among its viewership and beyond, spawning everything from a clothing line at retailer banana republic to character-specific “barbie” dolls, its self-reflective intention has come full circle. much in the same way that the history of madness intends to comment on foucault’s own society through the analysis of the history preceding it, mad men seeks to comment on the state of current america. some viewers naturally find draper’s actions disgusting, and yet countless other shows, films, and books portray the drama surrounding infidelity as a major interest point. the shock of draper’s character reveals the hypocrisy our society still contains today, and the taboo association with anyone who goes against the “norm” of society’s ethical structure. one who commits adultery is thus forever an “adulterer,” and the viewer permanently sees draper as he relates to this label. while future seasons of mad men deal with the repercussions of draper’s actions and his journey to return to a more balanced life, the first season displays him to the viewer as a man in the throes of the “somber madness of sex”.29 foucault and the audience may find draper disgusting, it would seem that 26 foucault, the history of sexuality. vol. 2, 214. 27 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth. 258. 28 ibid. 29 foucault, the history of sexuality: vol. 1, 39. 17 dianoia : issue i δfoucault would appreciate or support the character’s ongoing search for personal truth.while the opening moments of mad men explains its title became short hand for the advertising men of madison avenue, its implicit meaning begs the question: is a man like don draper “mad”? foucault’s answer is deceptively simple: “where there is a work of art, there is no madness”.30 if this is madness, if don draper is a “mad man”, then our society is based upon madness in at least the personal and professional realms that we hide from others. mad men ultimately becomes a piece of art conveying the difficulties and complexities the individual encounters upon applying areas of foucaultian thought to their own lives. draper’s portrayal as a 1960s american analogue to the superman conveys the false sense of self-unity society imagines the individual to have; we live in extremes, not the more balanced view foucault intends. even so, the shock and secretive pleasure viewers find in watching draper’s exploits in mad men unearths our capacity to be just like him, and alerts us, the audience, to the likelihood that we are. bibliographyalbert, lisa, andre jacquemetton, and maria jacquemetton. “nixon vs. kennedy.” mad men. directed by alan taylor. amc. 11 oct. 2007. television.foucault, michel. ethics: subjectivity and truth. edited by paul rabinow. new york: new, 1997. print.foucault, michel. the hermeneutics of the subject: lectures at the collège de france,1981-1982. translated by graham burchell. new york: picador, 2006. print.foucault, michel. the history of sexuality: vol. 1. translated by robert hurley. new york: vintage, 1990. print.foucault, michel. the history of sexuality. vol. 2: the use of pleasure. new york: penguin, 1992. print.foucault, michel. madness and civilization: a history of insanity in the age of reason. translated by richard howard. new york: vintage, 1988. print.provenzano, chris. “the hobo code.” mad men. directed by phil abraham. amc. 6 sept. 2007. television. weiner, matthew. “for those who think young” mad men. directed by tim hunter. amc. 27 july 2008. television. weiner, matthew. “smoke gets in your eyes” mad men. directed by alan taylor. amc. 19 july 2007. television. 30 foucault, madness and civilization: a history of insanity in the age of reason, 298. 18 foucault and mad men: the self, sexuality, and pleasure δ ever since rousseau, we seem to be incorrigibly insistent on being sentimental. our age values feeling more than any age that has preceded it. though it did not survive the disillusionment of the 20th century entirely, romanticism has managed to retain some hold on the modern mind; the stoic attitude that dismissed emotion, in any case, seems to be gone. opinion carries phenomenal weight, and the word “reason” is subliminally associated with the “cold,” the “drab,” and the “mathematical.” it is therefore not very surprising that blaise pascal is frequently quoted when he writes: “the heart has its reasons of which reason knows nothing…”1 the sentence comes straight from pascal’s pensées (or “thoughts”) and is the 423rd of almost 1000 ponderings. frequently paraphrased as “the heart has reasons which reason does not know,” it is used to emphasize the modern notion that there is some deeper meaning to feeling that trumps reason: that intuitive feeling leads the individual to truth by dark, winding paths that are foreign and alien to reason. we have misunderstood pascal, however, if we take this contemporary hermeneutic to be his. this misunderstanding, in turn, is based largely on our cartesian definition of reason. the first obstacle to such an interpretation of pascal is that he writes that the heart has reasons not some vague, ambiguous, subjective intuition of the sort that we often ascribe to feeling. pascal intends to say that the heart is rationally grounded in the same manner that the intellect is rationally grounded when it knows that 2+2 is equal to 4. he points out that reason cannot always know the rational grounds of the heart, but pascal’s observation does not change the nature of rational grounds themselves: it is based upon it. an additional problem is that the heart and reason (or the intellect) find themselves juxtaposed, and they must therefore be related in some way. the word reasons must relate 1 pascal, pensées, 127. bart celie the reasonable heart α 20 the reasonable heart the heart and “reason,” otherwise it would be a pointless statement. to say that, “a chicken has feathers which a monkey cannot have” would be to say nothing, because having feathers is a property specific to only one of the two juxtaposed creatures. on the other hand, to say that, “a chicken makes sounds that a monkey cannot make” would be to relate the two by the word sounds. in like manner, both the heart and reason must be capable of having reasons; the word must, therefore, retain the same meaning whether it is applied to the intellect or to the heart. it may seem odd then, that pascal attributed something so distinctly rational to the heart. yet, he was not the first philosopher to recognize that there was an element of reason that could not be grasped by the intellect as clearly as, say, geometry could be. in book vi of the republic, plato categorizes different levels of understanding in his famous divided line analogy. of the four categories, the highest is an intuitive understanding of the forms; what plato calls the “exercise of reason.”2 what the contemporary person commonly calls reason—the mathematical, analytical type of thinking—was classified by plato as “understanding” that was “something between opinion and reason.”3 it was therefore only third in the divided line, with the wisdom that grasped ideals such as goodness, beauty, and justice being directly superior to it. thus, dialectic consisted of an intuitive understanding, and the reasoning of the scientific method was a step below it. likewise, aristotle draws a distinction between intuitive reason and scientific knowledge in the sixth book of his nicomachean ethics. the argument is that scientific knowledge is demonstrable; inductive in nature, scientific knowledge is derived from that which can be clearly demonstrated. aristotle points out, however, that the first principle from which we begin our investigation of scientific knowledge cannot itself be demonstrated. he writes: “the first principle from which what is scientifically known follows cannot be an object of scientific knowledge… for that which can be scientifically known can be demonstrated.”4 it often escapes us that even the sciences, which are (rightly) taken for indisputable truth once they have withstood the rigorous test of the 2 plato, the republic, cited in great dialogues of plato, 311. 3 ibid. 4 aristotle, nicomachean ethics, 107. ο α 21 dianoia : issue i scientific method, depend upon assumed principles. these principles cannot be proved themselves by the scientific method, for they are the constituent parts of that very method. we are thus unable to prove with mathematical certainty the principles upon which mathematics as a whole is based; the telescope through which we see the universe cannot be made to see itself. the three laws of logic are good examples of assumed first principles that play a role in any argument, be it scientific or not. first, there is the principle of non-contradiction, which summarizes the idea that “x does not equal non-x.” to say that a “black bird is white” is quite clearly meaningless. second, there is the principle of excluded middle, which states that something must be either “x or non-x.” the answer must be either-or (think back to taking your sats, and how difficult multiple-choice answers would have been without this principle). last, there is the principle of identity, which makes the simple but crucial assumption that “x equals x.” together, these three laws provide a basic scaffold upon which we build with certainty; something as simple as solving a basic algebra equation points to the necessity of all three implicit assumptions. without them, argument would be unstructured chaos. yet these principles cannot themselves be proved: the principles that allow you to use the variable “x” in a mathematical equation to prove that its identity equals a certain number cannot themselves be proved by that same mathematical equation (or any, for that matter). they are simply assumed. pascal himself points to this phenomenon elsewhere in the pensées. when discussing the skeptics (who deny the dogmatists’ claim to any absolute knowledge) he writes, “the strongest of the skeptics’ arguments, to say nothing of minor points, is that we cannot be sure that these principles are truth (faith and revelation apart) except through some natural intuition.”5 we cannot prove with certainty that any of the universally assumed first principles are true. even the famous cartesian starting point, “cogito ergo sum” (“i think therefore i am”), falls apart when the laws of logic are questioned, to say nothing of the argument even if the laws of logic are left intact. these first principles and laws cannot be subjected to reason, if all we mean by reason is mathematical analysis. that is why pascal writes that they can only be known as truth by some natural intuition—in doing so he hints at the very same idea that plato and aristotle 5 pascal, pensées, 33. δ ι 22 the reasonable heart tried to get across by the notion of “intuitive reason.” it follows, however, that, if man is capable of this intuitive understanding, then the skeptic’s argument cannot be entirely correct either. pascal writes, “i pause at the dogmatists’ only strong point, which is that we cannot doubt natural principles if we speak sincerely and in all good faith.”6 these natural principles are subjectively and psychologically certain; they may not have a mathematical proof, but it would be dishonest to say that we doubted them. the laws of logic are universally accepted and hardly ever doubted. so we are presented, then, with a seeming paradox: we cannot deny nature and dismiss these first principles in favor of the skeptics, and yet we cannot deny scientific reason and admit to the dogmatist’s claim of absolute certainty. as pascal phrases it, “nature confounds the skeptics and the platonists, and reason confounds the dogmatists.”7 the answer to this riddle is the synthesis of faith and reason. the medieval period was quite good at this; statues of st. augustine, for example, depict the saint holding a flaming heart in the one hand and a book in the other. pascal was simply reminding us of this synthesis: the kind that neither claimed absolute intellectual certainty, yet did not deny the veracity of reason. but why did he have to remind anyone of this? to answer this question, one can look at a contemporary (and friend) of pascal: descartes. in the midst of enlightenment success, descartes sought to prove the skeptic wrong by applying the seemingly infallible scientific method to philosophy. in discourse on method, descartes marvels over the certainty of mathematical reasoning and wonders at its rather meager application to philosophy (up to that point). he writes, “i delighted most of all in mathematics because of the certainty and the evidence of its reasonings… i was astonished by the fact that no one had built anything more noble upon its foundations, given that they were so solid and firm.”8 what descartes proceeded to do, then, was precisely that — attempt to build a philosophy based upon the foundations of mathematical and scientific reasoning. indeed, the second of descartes’ four steps of the “method” required him to “divide each of the difficulties i would examine into as many parts as possible and as was required in order better to resolve them.”9 this type of 6 ibid., 34. 7 ibid., 35. 8 descartes, discourse on method, 4. 9 ibid., 11. δ ι 23 dianoia : issue i division is analysis, as opposed to synthesis, and it effectively redefined reason to mean “a mathematical sum of its parts.” yet to reduce reason as a whole to “scientific reason” is to ignore aristotle’s warning that scientific knowledge is by definition demonstrable, whereas the principles upon which this knowledge is obtained cannot themselves be demonstrable. somewhere, somehow, a leap of faith is required. descartes himself seemed to be aware of this, when he wrote, “i judged that i could take as a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true…”10 to make “clear and distinct ideas” the criterion for truth is to appeal, implicitly, to the “natural intuition” mentioned by pascal, for there is no other reasonable ground to assume that what we see as clear and distinct is necessarily true. thus, the post-descartes man began to equate reason with scientific analysis and soon forgot the ancient picture, which held that reason, as a whole, was more than the mathematical sum of its parts. reason meant the synthesis of that which was assumed by faith and that which could be deduced with certainty. modern conceptions of reason emphasize the latter but neglect the former almost entirely. the third section of plato’s divided line — namely, understanding such as that used in mathematics and geometry — has become the highest and truest definition of reason. no longer do we validate “natural intuition” (though we by no means cease to use it) and no longer does the “exercise of reason” mean the intuitive understanding of ideals. it was in the midst of this changing understanding of reason that pascal lived, and it was with the old synthesis in mind that he wrote that the “heart has reasons of which reason knows nothing.” for pascal, man was a puzzle — being at once kept from certainty, yet intuitively rational — and the answer lay in the synthesis of reasons which only the heart could perceive (and could therefore only be accepted by faith) with the knowledge of the intellect. in turn, pascal painted a picture of reason that presents it as a whole that is greater than a mathematical sum of its parts. 10 ibid., 19. 24 ν the reasonable heart bibliography aristotle. nicomachean ethics. edited by david ross. new york: oxford university press inc., 2009. print. descartes, rené. discourse on method. edited by donald a. cress. indianapolis: hackett publishing company, 1998. print. pascal, blaise. pensées. edited by j krailsheimer. new york: penguin putnam, inc., 1995. print. plato. the republic. in great dialogues of plato, edited by w. h.d. rouse. new york: penguin group, 1999. print. ν clay venetis experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies lighting the lantern– the yellow chrysanthemums lose their color.1 yosa buson in his haiku translated above approaches the fundamental problem both martin heidegger and the philosophies of taoism and buddhism attempt to expose between man and art. how does one use the light of his lantern to see the work of art before him without having the very same light obstruct the truth of that work? heidegger, in the origin of the work of art, and various teachings of these eastern philosophies, arrive at quite similar resolutions to this question. both systems of thought seek to approach the truth hidden in art by standing away from the work in order to truly be with it. we must attempt a radical suspension in experiencing the work by first stripping ourselves of the preconceptions inherent in that very experience we are so accustomed to. i begin my analysis of this transformation in aesthetics by outlining heidegger’s use of the skeptic suspension, or epokhé, as adopted by german phenomenologist edmund husserl, and its application in experiencing the work of art. this leads to a reevaluation of what gives art its ‘thingness’, or concrete being. each step will be viewed as a necessary means to moving closer to an original truth within the work that could not disclose itself otherwise. i find that this epokhé in approaching truth is quite analogous to the intention of avoiding delusion in buddhism and taoism. given these similar motives, i will show that heidegger’s thought and method emerges in east asian examples of 1) the artistic event of the japanese wabi tea ceremony, 2) buddhist artist and scholar 1 hass, the essential haiku: versions of basho, buson, and issa, 112. νο26 experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies hisamatsu hoseki shin’ichi’s own comparisons presented at his conference with heidegger in freiburg, and 3) the zen question and answer paradoxes, or instructional koan. to remain in the philosophical light, i must first address a presupposition taken in the title with eastern philosophies and with buddhism and taoism mentioned above. here i mean various interpretations of taoism from the tao te ching and primarily japanese zen buddhist practices and parables, many of which were made available by the influential translator and writer d.t. suzuki. though rooted in theological rites, aspects of such traditions are profoundly applicable to western progressions in phenomenology, metaphysics, aesthetics, and ethics, to name a few. but stripping taoist and buddhist teachings of their origins in search of ‘western philosophy’ would render them baseless and unfounded. i rather wish to find pieces of their essential nature that can be illuminated by heidegger’s own philosophical thought. this traversing is meant to parallel the practice of skillful means by which buddhist scholars of china sought to transcend cultural limits and boundaries in their teachings. monks employing this principle revealed the same eternal truths through foreign languages and conflicting religious systems, ultimately facilitating buddhism’s spread to japan alongside confucianism and taoism alike. admittedly, one finds stark divergences in disclosing hidden buddhist and taoist truths in a single figure of 20th century german phenomenology and existentialism. we thus keep our focus on the similarities in their attempts to move beyond a traditional aesthetical experience of art, and raise it to an ontological level of unconcealing a hidden truth of the being. heidegger’s epokhé heidegger often borrowed the concept of epokhé that husserl adapted from the skeptics (though heidegger does not use the actual term) to express the necessity of stepping back from things we wish to experience in order to be truly near them.2 taking from the ancient skeptic tradition, epokhé typically describes an equanimity and passivity in the philosopher’s arguments that renders them solely defensive, keeping him clear of any positive truth assertions. this stemmed from the general skeptic belief that there is, in fact, no certain, immutable truth to be known, as all things change ceaselessly. husserl, however, 2 heidegger, “the thing” in poetry, language, thought, 175-179. νο 27 dianoia : issue i did not reassert aspects of the skeptic viewpoint to stay away from truth claims. he wished only to embrace the spirit of the preliminary position one achieves in epokhé, from which the philosopher can then let the phenomenon of the thing itself come forth. in regard to this experiential position, heidegger himself notes in the thing that “we ought to turn toward the being, think about it in regard to its being, but by means of this thinking at the same time let it rest upon itself in its very own being.”3 the difficulties in this are obvious. epokhé describes a turning away to only then truly see, letting the work in front of us be in a way that disengages our limiting structures and evaluations. because heidegger’s epokhé is not clearly designated as a passive or active state, we are consistently faced with buson’s initial problem. if we wish to see the color of the chrysanthemums, we must shine our light of forming experience. but if we attempt to shine no such light, we see no chrysanthemums. heidegger elucidates this predicament in his essay the thing by noting that humans have not gained a universal nearness by the forward-moving powers of technology, but instead have only lost an essential farness.4 surely video-conferencing helps with connecting humanity, but we forget that a video projection cannot stand in for the real person. remembering the essential farness between others and ourselves actually brings us closer to the truth of that rapport. in regard to art, then, we still must understand that a distance in our attitude is required to see the work as it is. art cannot be degraded to a stimulation of our senses and does not depend on our interpretive attempts to become closer to it. the work is neither appreciated for the state of mind it produces within us, nor the pleasure that its beauty might provide.5 the goal of epokhé is to let art, and everything involved therein, continue without our experience aiming at it, thereby obstructing what we aim for. the way towards enacting epokhé, however, is much less clear. yet a lack of clarity is expected if we are to reform the western aesthetic conception that has long been buried in the sediment of self-reflective thought. for heidegger, art is not a representation of ideas in the platonic sense nor even of nature and the external world in the aristotelian sense. the shortcomings of 3 heidegger, “the origin of the work of art” in poetry, language, thought, 31. 4 heidegger, “the thing,” 175-179. 5 heidegger, “the origin,” 66, 79. δ α 28 experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies traditional aesthetics stem from looking at the work with what heidegger calls ‘inadequate thing-structures’, such as a substance with attributes, the unity of the manifold of sensations, or formed matter.6 using these in our conversation on art, we forget that the work is far more than a thing in traditional terms, as we will see in the next section. it is not necessary for art to copy the existing world, nor is it to be valued as a piece of equipment.7 heidegger will thus use a greek temple to exemplify a work of art not merely representative and not defined by its usefulness.8 the description of the temple sets the reader’s focus on art in and for itself. truth in art the work of art, being more than a mere thing, is the site of the happening and revealing of original truth. leaving behind the common definition of truth as a correct connection of thought to the external world, heidegger reinterprets the greek word for truth, alethia, as an unconcealment. (he draws from the word’s negativity (a-lethia) and direct meaning, which can be translated as un-forgetting). there is something at work in the art that is brought out, unconcealed, from its refusing nature. the work embodies truth in its own workbeing, where the conflict of what heidegger calls ‘earth’ and ‘world’ happens. earth is not to be seen in its literal or physical definition; rather, it is the ontological ground from which all things arise and to which they all return. it is the yet unformed building blocks of art: the words, notes, and sculpture shapes before they are created as beings and evaluated by man. world, as an opposite, is the setting up of the historical/cultural aspect of the work that can be known by humans. it pulls earth into what heidegger calls the open of our understanding for the first time. paint strokes, for example, are first seen as they truly are when the world sets them into place in the work. that is, the specific lines and hues of a painting are first revealed for what they are when they become indispensable pieces to reproducing the essence of an otherwise indescribable moment. the essential conflict between world and earth makes the two inseparable. both define the other in that “the world grounds itself on the earth and the 6 ibid., 37-8. 7 ibid., 37. 8 ibid., 40. δ α 29 dianoia : issue i earth juts through the world.”9 this conflict is not meant to eventually establish a victor or lead to mutual destruction, though. the striving of one over and through the other lets each rise to their self-asserting natures.10 a word comes into the open for the first time in the poem because the world of this work gives it a value, thrusts it into culture. it also conceals itself in that very same moment (earth pulling world down) because to bring an indescribable thing (an unformed word) into value-laden history is to limit it to man’s value-laden experience. we have lost the formless earth just as it seemed to protrude, but this is its nature, and only its difference to world reveals it as such. outlining this dichotomy gives us a picture of what is necessary for truth to establish itself in a being (or a work) in such a way that this being occupies the aforementioned open of truth.11 if this is the case, one cannot understand truth as some core or jewel at the center of the work to be dug out. when we view a work of art, we experience both the truth of that work and the event of truth itself. aligning ourselves with this open is an unconcealment of heidegger’s ontological notion of being in general, not just the particular work in front of us. this condition or clearing that art must occupy in revealing being and in setting truth to work is also the site of the founding of an original history. it defines humans as those who have the techne, or artistic knowledge and crafting competence, to create it. yet even with such implications, one begins to see the person gradually stripped away in favor of what is happening in the work. the origin of the work of art is distinct in this shift of emphasis, which is indicative of the movement of epokhé itself. allusions to the creator or the creative process often serve as detours to the original question of “ask[ing] the work what and how it is.”12 heidegger does not completely disregard those involved in making and experiencing art. he understands their necessity, but defines their roles in such a way that leaves them subservient to letting the truth happen on its own. this radical point is brought to the foreground in heidegger’s description of the work of art’s preservers. creators and witnesses or art are not curators keeping art in 9 ibid., 47. 10 ibid. 11 heidegger, “the origin,” 61. 12 ibid., 18. 30ο proper condition for viewing or trade, but those who successfully stand within the open of the being before them. as heidegger appeals to art’s audience, he states that “the more solitary the work, fixed in the figure, stands on its own and the more cleanly it seems to cut all ties to human beings, the more simply does the thrust come into the open that such a work is…”13 following this, we find that the preserver, or person experiencing art in the correct way, is he who can best restrain his judgment and let its truth be. at this point, we have not lost the artist and his audience; each is necessary to give the very cultural definition of art that heidegger outlines. but we have, in fact, broken from traditional aesthetics by putting the independent truth setting-itself-to-work in art on a more equal and essential footing. buddhist and taoist delusion i believe heidegger’s need to completely restructure our basic modes of approaching the work of art stems from a comparable impetus seen in buddhism and taoism in terms of avoiding delusion in our experience of the world. being one of the three fires or passions to resist, along with hating and wanting, delusion is the most prominent and difficult to break. we find ourselves submitting to delusion when we do not see reality as it is, imposing our own judgments on it even before sensation.  each thing or phenomenon before us is inherently empty of a separate, autonomous existence it seems to have in the external world. it is a staple of buddhist living to recognize the emptiness of the various representations we use to communicate the world to others and to ourselves.  our constructions and names we give to reality cannot be taken for the things themselves; such representations are full of nothing substantial. our experience of art, then, falls into the same confusion. too often do secondary aspects of a piece, (its price, the époque it belongs to), draw our attention away from the work’s independent nature. knowing the truth of the work of art coincides with knowing the limits of such contextual qualities, though they are unavoidable in our existential condition. while we have a specific name for this suspended attitude in western philosophy, the avoidance of delusion in buddhism and taoism is less easily reduced. the continual transcendence of our varying modes of experience and world-views describes a lifetime of disciplined study, action, and reformation. 13 ibid., 64. experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies ι 31 dianoia : issue i ο learned buddhist monks dissatisfied with scholastic conservatives in the early centuries c.e. put this theoretical goal to practice when adopting skillful means, exposing the universal applicability of their thought as well as falsehoods of other doctrines in the process. they brought to new cultures and theological sects the holy truths through languages that most suited each new geographical and ideological region.14 believing that a nepalese dialect dissembles the buddhist realization that all life is suffering is to delude oneself with the strangeness of the dialect and miss the truth that always remains. adopting a distance from the particular form of expression is required to be near the formless form that rests below, or prior to, all representations. in the reticent haiku poem, for example, we are challenged not to deceive ourselves by the face value of the sparse poetry. reading haikus lets us practice finding truths with very few words and representations at the surface to guide us. we condition ourselves to see all aspects of life in the same distant but penetrating way. lao tzu, the father of taoism, found this experiential trade-off necessary as well. in the tao te ching, the true sage is one who “… steps back but remains in front, the outsider always within.”15 only in this stepping back can we avoid delusion and let truths emerge in all artistic mediums. wabi tea ceremony d.t. suzuki, a critical figure in introducing eastern philosophy to the west, reveals in zen and japanese culture the problems of delusion and truth in art in the pouring, drinking, and cleaning up of tea. not merely intended for sensational enjoyment by an audience, the art of wabi tea consists of seemingly simple but precise acts. cleansing oneself of delusion or contamination is essential to correctly practice the ceremony.16 similar to our focus on epokhé, the associations we pin to the daily experiences in drinking tea must be cleansed in order to know the truth that is going on. each motion allows the tea drinker and pourer to actively participate in zen, thereby founding them in their own original artistic and religious culture. the most renowned tea-master, sen no rikyu of the 16th century, declared that to become a master of this art form one must first perfect oneself in the practice of buddha law, though the ceremony is 14 makransky, “buddhist perspectives on truth in other religions: past and present” in theological studies, 3-4. 15 lao tzu, tao te ching, 10. 16 suzuki, zen and japanese culture, 281. α ν32 not solely a representation of the doctrine.17 we find here an example of skillful means operating through art. one can write a parable in sanskrit or one can prepare tea with simplicity and perfection in japanese society; each can reveal the way, or tao, towards the cessation of suffering. but there is no secondary telos here. like the greek temple, the truth that is happening in the ceremony is not used as a token towards finding salvation or nirvana. the truth of the work of art is its own end, though our alignment with the formless form or being when experiencing it is certainly a positive consequence. for heidegger, one way in which art is distinguished from other created things, such as equipment, is the importance we put on the fact that it is made, i.e. on its createdness. the more useful a piece of equipment is to our purposes, the less attention we give to the fact that someone made it. the fact of art’s creation, however, is brought to the foreground.18 i believe tea that is poured to quench our thirst is a piece of equipment if seen in this light. its createdness is subsumed by its usefulness. but wabi tea pouring places all of its focus and attention on the fact that it is made because it must be made or done in a specifically rigorous way to retain its artistic value. heidegger also explains that in the work of art both the creator and the preserver are equally necessary, even if their roles have been limited in favor of the work. i find that the ceremony can exemplify this trade off in necessity, equality, and subservience if we view the participants of wabi tea as both its creators and preservers, each attempting to be subsumed by the event itself. heidegger’s use of the concept of standingwithin the work when describing the preserver’s role implies a positioning of one’s self and one’s ability to know into the presence of original truth laid out by its creator. what better way of positioning ourselves into the presence of original truth, and hopefully losing that very self to the action as a whole, than by physically and mentally enacting the art of the tea ceremony? the participant is simultaneously creating art, (by pouring, drinking, and cleaning in the correct fashion), and preserving it, (by standing within and experiencing the art happening in and around him). heidegger often describes the truth of the work of art being thrown at the coming preservers in the way that humans are thrust 17 graham, “art, language, and truth in heidegger’s radical zen” in journal of chinese philosophy, vol. 27, 507. 18 heidegger, “the origin,” 62. experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies α ν 33 dianoia : issue i into history as explained in his text being and time. it is in this interaction of creator and preserver, pourer and drinker, that man’s uniquely artistic history can be re-experienced again and again. freiburg conference a direct discourse between heidegger and the eastern philosophies of art occurred in may 1958, through a colloquium chaired by heidegger at the university in freiburg with professor hisamatsu hoseki shin’ichi as the main interlocutor. hisamatsu, exalted as a zen scholar and tea master himself, contributed two philosophical poems as well as calligraphy to the occasion. when asked by heidegger how east asian art understands itself, he explained that the modern japanese term for art, gei-jiz, best translates the western metaphysical/aesthetic notion of art and the skillful mastery involved therein; whereas the way of art, or geido, “understands art as an itinerary toward the empty origin of manifestation, and back again from the originary emptiness to the richness of phenomenal presencing.”19 hisamatsu then alludes to the origin of the work of art by explaining that this double movement is the very “working, the setting-itself-into a work, of zen truth itself.”20 understanding geido may allow us to penetrate beneath our representations towards the empty origin or formless form. we may then return and experience the phenomenon of the piece in a more enlightened way. the empty origin and formless form are therefore akin to heidegger’s earth. they remain concealed in all beings, yet may spontaneously spring forth in the work of art if the creator and preserver let them. and the phenomenal presencing relates to the setting up of a world as understandable by the audience. the movement to and from each, in which the empty origin is reached and pulled away from by way of art, is the happening and condition of truth within the conflict. it is important to note, however, that hisamatsu understands geido as having no historical dimensions, while the difference of world and earth marks a unique cultural beginning and founding of a people. we see this distinction in hisamatsu’s poem (one of the two submitted for this occasion) a sheltering empty sea. the sea, understood here as the empty origin, is formless and tranquil, unable to be touched by the dimensions of time and cultural 19 fóti, “heidegger and ‘the way of art’” in the continental philosophy review, vol. 31, 339. 20 fóti, “heidegger and ‘the way of art,’” 339. δ ι 34 formation.21 for heidegger, art creates a founding of a people as it leaps to the truth of what is. it is a beginning that already contains its historical track to a final end.22 even with this divergence, both heidegger and hisamatsu agree that art is not an aesthetic screen behind which signification exists and on which evaluations are made. if this were the case, buson’s lantern would seem to cast light upon some meaning in the work and leave its truth, or zen truth, concealed and deluded. the work of art, the poem, the play is rather that which can express truthfully the formless form and earth without describing it into dissolution. japanese koan what, then, of the style and method used by heidegger and the east asian masters to show us how to align ourselves with the concealed truth in the work? how do they teach us to avoid a description into dissolution? we have seen in heidegger’s texts and in scattered teachings of buddhism and taoism a use of paradox moving beyond conventional logic or linguistic sense to do just this. it is their answer to the question of how one teaches others to reach a truth behind representations and language when such modes are all one has available. instead of resorting to unending silence, heidegger and the zen buddhist masters used language to deconstruct its own rules and necessities. the koans, or brief question-and-answer constructions between zen master and student, exemplify this lesson by entangling our conventional modes of thought and expression in such a way that renders them arbitrary. it is this arbitrariness that allowed the buddhist scholars to traverse nations and states with the same foundational truths. skillful means thus reveals that there is no rigid and necessary medium, only rigid and necessary truth. a popular koan between a questioning student (q) and an answering master (a) that exemplifies this deliberate dialectical entanglement goes as follows: q: what is the truth of buddhism? a: ask the post standing there. q: i fail to understand. a: my ignorance exceeds yours.23 21 ibid., 340. 22 heidegger, “the origin,” 73-74. 23 cited in d.t. suzuki, “studies in zen”, 58, 113. experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies δ ι 35 dianoia : issue i at this point, the student realizes how limited language is in allowing his master to teach him an essential truth. heidegger too recognizes a willing or seeing of truth that comes only from similar paradoxes in established customs of language. the opposition of world and earth, for example, breeds a language that allows us to equate clearing with concealing, truth with untruth. the work of art is seen as something that rests in itself, yet is the sight of a happening. as with the wabi tea ceremony, breaking from what is customary and comfortable is necessary for letting truth in art happen freely before us: “the setting-into-work of truth thrusts up the unfamiliar and extraordinary and at the same time thrusts down the ordinary and what we believe to be such.”24 as we observed, heidegger comes closest to describing earth to the reader only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. these near-poetic enigmas provide us only glimpses into the indescribable. entering the circle of thought, the paradox of language, is ultimately an exposition of our limitations. it helps us prepare for the wholly unsayable experience with truth in the work. seeing the riddle heidegger and the lessons of buddhism and taoism understand that a work embodies an essential truth, one that we may be transported to and experience for ourselves without the ability to describe it in traditional terms. i have shown that their radical systems of thought see a suspended experience of art as more primal than any sensible amusement. we find that truth in the work naturally refuses itself to us yet can come into the open for the first time by our epokhé and avoidance of delusion. in my direct comparison, heidegger’s conception of experiencing art can be applied to the wabi tea ceremony to reveal how participants are able to engage in truth by their own immersive yet disengaging activity. hisamatsu hoseki shin’ichi’s thesis of geido at the freiburg conference equated the movement from the formless form to phenomenal presence with heidegger’s own experience of the ontological conflict of earth and world. and the anti-dialectical methods of koan, mirroring the deconstructive language of heidegger’s texts, were shown to be the chosen forms for guiding us from a paradoxical experience to its equally paradoxical target. neither heidegger nor the buddhist or taoist teachings provide a clear, inclusive solution to these open systems, then, but only draw our attention to 24 heidegger, “the origin,” 72. 36 αthe dilemma. heidegger notes in his epilogue that the task is not to solve the riddle, only to see it as it is.25 even aristotle ended his nicomachean ethics with an aporia, or a no-way, to show that only now, after the entire work is read, do we face a puzzle ripe for investigation. notice that buson too does not have a solution for experiencing the chrysanthemums while holding the lantern. he simply chooses art to point out this problem of being near yet far, simply points out that this problem exists at all. bibliography hass, robert. the essential haiku: versions of basho, buson, and issa. new york, ny: harpercollins publishers inc., 1994. print. heidegger, martin, “the thing” in poetry, language, thought, trans. albert hofstadter. new york, ny: harpercollins publishers inc., 1971. print. heidegger, martin. “the origin of the work of art” in poetry, language, thought, trans. albert hofstadter. new york, ny: harpercollins publishers inc., 1971. print. makransky, john. “buddhist perspectives on truth in other religions: past and present” in theological studies. milwaukee, wi: marquette university, 2003. accessed http://www. johnmakransky.org/article_04.html. tzu, lao. tao te ching, trans. sam hamill. boston, ma: shambhala publications, 2005. print. suzuki, d.t. zen and japanese culture. princeton, nj: princeton university press, 1970. print. graham, archie. “art, language, and truth in heidegger’s radical zen” in journal of chinese philosophy. malden, ma: blackwell publishers inc., 2000. print. fóti, véronique “heidegger and ‘the way of art’” in the continental philosophy review. dordrecht, netherlands: kluwer academic publishers, 1998. print. 25 heidegger, “the origin,” 77. experiencing art for heidegger and the eastern philosophies michael wangen plato’s condemnation of imagination in a clockwork orangeα according to plato, a philosopher enters the realm of universal knowledge when his understanding is purely an abstract science. at this stage, the philosopher is in touch with the ultimate “form of the good,” and knows what is best for man. imagination plays an integral role in reaching the form of good, because it serves as a means to which students can understand abstract ideas and eventually reach universal thought. in his pre-modern narrative the republic, however, plato finds that society can be easily consumed by the mimetic imagination, in which people are tricked into believing that the imaginary is reality. plato’s condemnation of the mimetic imagination alludes to stanley kubrick’s postmodern film, a clockwork orange (1971), which features a youth gang driven by images of sex, violence, and drugs, set in a dystopian future britain. furthermore, kubrick’s film resembles plato’s allegory of the cave, as the prisoners of the imaginary are introduced to new realities. in book vi of the republic, plato prefaces his allegory of the cave with his concept of the “theory of the forms.” this view asserts that each thing existing on earth has a corresponding “form,” or perfect idea in the form of the good, the highest form of all. those things existing on earth are part of the lower material realms, known as the form of intelligible and the form of the visible. socrates, the main character in the dialogues of the republic, cannot find a succinct definition of the highest good, so he provides an analogy which stretches into the allegory of the cave found in book vii. the metaphor begins with the sun, which illuminates the visible realm, just as the good illuminates the intelligible realm. the sun is the source of visibility, sight, and is responsible all life, and thus the existence of the intelligible realm. likewise, the good is the source of intelligibility, capacity for knowledge, and is responsible ν δ38 for the forms, or the existence of the intelligible realm itself. just as the sun is beyond our physical being, socrates says that the form of the good is beyond our intelligible being, and is the cause of all knowledge and truth. because it is the cause in the intelligible realm, it must too then be the source of all that is beauty in the visible realm. we can than imagine the structure of the three realms, in which the form of the good is overarching provider, with the form of the intelligible positioned beneath it, and the form of the visible at the bottom. through an interpretation of socrates’ analogy, we find that the “good” is identical with unity, harmony, order, and balance in both the soul and society. socrates concludes that philosophers embark on the journey through the visible and intelligible forms in order to reach the good, and they are the most fit to rule society as philosopher-kings. the question that arises then is how we can best accumulate knowledge through the lower realms. socrates addresses his problem through the analogy of the divided line, which separates the correct vision of knowledge (epistēmē) from the false vision of opinion (doxa). 1 plato places reason (nous) and thought (dianoia) in the higher section. thought is the use of sensible particulars to aid in reasoning. reason has the ability to contemplate truth as an abstract science using purely forms. universal propositions can be formed and unproven hypothesis are unnecessary – universals are referents of general terms such as “manhood,” instead of particular referents such as the name, “john.” ultimately, reason allows one to access transcendental ideas. belief (pistis) and imagination (eikasia) are relegated to the inferior form of opinion. belief is a state where one correlates perceptions, but only looks for explanations in particular terms, as opposed to universal ones. imagination lies below belief. it is a state of mind in which our perceptions of the world are completely uncritical and we fail to differentiate reflections of objects from the objects themselves. given that the objects are copies of transcendental ideas themselves, the imagination is no more than a copy of a copy. plato finds this as a sufficient reason to denounce it as “an agency of falsehood.” 2 1 kearney, the wake of imagination , 90. 2 ibid., 91. plato’s condemnation of imagination in a clockwork orange ν δ39 dianoia : issue i plato condemns imagination in book x of the republic, plato condemns imagination because it prevents the soul from ascending to the reality of nous (spiritual being). he claims that poets should be banished from the city because their works create a fundamental problem between reality and images. plato accuses poets of being ignorant, nondidactic, immoral, irrational, and idolatrous. these allegations are derived from the five fundamental dualisms that characterize platonic philosophy; truth vs. falsehood, political praxis vs. artistic uselessness, good vs. evil, rational soul vs. material body, and diving being vs. human becoming. with the abolition of the artist, plato fears that the fundamental dualisms will collapse due to rampant contradiction, and society will dispel the divine as the ultimate form of the good. plato uses the example of a bed to illustrate ignorance; the first degree of existence comes out of the divine form of the good, the second by a carpenter, and the third by a painter. 3 the painter’s creation is three degrees removed from reality because it imitates the other two. the maker of images is ignorant because they pretend to know all sorts of tricks of the trade, but they know nothing at all, as socrates states, “the painter, we say, will paint for us a shoemaker, a carpenter, and the other craftsmen, although he doesn’t understand the arts of any one of them.”4 plato finds this to be dangerous because if the painter is skillful enough, his portrait can deceive children and other people into thinking he is a real carpenter. this muddles the difference between knowledge and opinion, and thus the ability to discern between truth and falsehood. plato accuses the artist of being non-didactic because they teach us nothing about reality. plato cites the trial against homer and the poets, as they can name no city or state which owes it legal system, successes in war, inventions of practical devices, or schools where children came to live the “homeric way of life.” 5 homer has created images that are three degrees removed from reality, and plato believes they are in all purposes, useless. by saying “useless,” plato is denouncing the experience of aesthetic beauty, reflecting the priority of the 3 plato, the republic of plato, 279. 4 ibid., 281. 5 ibid., 283. 40ο plato’s condemnation of imagination in a clockwork orange public over the private in greek society. plato believes that art should remain in the private realm, so that it does not reduce the political praxis of his ideal polis. plato’s third critique of imagination accuses the artist of being irrational. plato finds the greatest power of images, “by virtue of their appeal to our erotic and animal desires.” 6 these desires are found in places in the soul that are opposite of reason. as the opposite of reason, which serves to create unity in the soul, the imagination creates contradiction. we are moved to reach out and grab those aspects of our experience that are most unstable and wildly erratic. we are so far removed from reality that we find it difficult to use the reason of our soul to calm the desires of our material bodies. confusion overwhelms us, and we are left plunging back into the eikasia through more irrational behavior. in line with irrational behavior, plato believes that art is immoral and has “terrible power to corrupt even the best characters.” 7 to this point, plato has limited the discussion of art as three degrees removed from reality; however, he finds that immoral behavior has a tendency to propagate already false imitations. plato introduces the irrational pathos, claiming that we become emotionally attached to the immoral characters displayed in art. 8 such immoral characters fuel desires for things such as drugs, sex, and violence, which in turn control us. we are no longer to discern between good and evil, and we allow instinct eventually to rule over reason. the final reason plato condemns imagination is because it leads us into idolatry. the artist mimics the surrounding world, thus imitating the divine demiurge, or creator. this creates a man-made order of non-being, because art is taken to be the original form of the divine being. thus, the imagination is both a crime against truth and being, because the imaginer worships what he believes is divine being in the form of artistic imitations. plato describes the mimetic image as a “poor child of foster parents,” such that the child, or image, is illegitimate. idolatry is the ultimate fault that transgresses between divine being and imaginary becoming. the artist represents the invisible form of good with visible images. art displaces the “paternal logos” and assumes a life of its own. people then are no longer pursuing the ultimate truth, which impedes 6 kearney, the wake of imagination, 93. 7 plato, the republic of plato, 289. 8 kearney, the wake of imagination, 94. ι 41 dianoia : issue i ο any possibility of entering the realm of transcendental being. all of the five fundamental dualisms collapse and society is left bewildered by contradiction. 9 thus, plato finds it necessary to reject the mimetic imagination, because this is the only way to protect his ultimate principle of identity. societal problems of imagination in a clockwork orange the society in a clockwork orange features a wretched society in futuristic britain that is consumed by violence, rape, and political corruption. the main character, alex, is a psychopathic delinquent, who fancies rape, and what he deems “ultra-violence.” alex especially enjoys idolizing classical compositions by beethoven, even to the point that he incorporates some sort of music or art in every one of his crimes. alex is not the only culprit, however, as we see that much of society has been consumed by immoral artwork, such as sexual paintings and sculptures. paralleling plato’s condemnation of the imagination in book x of the republic, these pieces of art prove to blur the fundamental dualisms of good vs. evil, the rational soul vs. the material body, and the divine being vs. human becoming. this has led society, along with alex, to be stuck in the stage of the imaginary, with seemingly no ability to ascend upwards to a state of reason. as the film begins, alex and his small gang of thugs, whom he calls droogs, are sitting in the korova milk bar intoxicating themselves with what they call “milk plus.” this is essentially milk laced with drugs, which come in the flavors of drencrom, vellocet, and synthemesc. these hallucinogens allow the user to experience “thingness,” or the ability to withdraw from the reality around them. when the opportunity arises, milk is served nowhere else in the film, giving reason for us to believe that “milk plus” is now taking to the real form of “milk.” plato would deem this to be an artistic act of ignorance, because the distinction of milk as a substance to nourish the young is confounded by “milk plus,” which is now the choice drink of many teenagers. “milk plus” glorifies the droogs immoral imaginations, as alex states, “[milk plus] would sharpen you up and make you ready for a bit of the old ultra-violence.” 10 in the milk bar, the tables and chairs are not those normally found in a 9 ibid., 95. 10 a clockwork orange, dir. stanley kubrick. νο42 plato’s condemnation of imagination in a clockwork orange bar; they are made of sculptures of naked women, which feature bright colored wigs, and the same bright colored hair in their pubic regions. these images harshly objectify women as sex symbols, and as the droogs calmly sit in the bar, it is clear that these types of images have influenced them heavily. such immoral characters have fueled the droogs to desire their fantasies of sex and violence. references to sex are found in many other parts of the film, including the cat woman’s (alex’s murder victim) large sculptures of penises – which she calls “works of art,” pornographic content possessed by alex’s parents, and later when alex awakes from a coma in the hospital to a doctor and nurse having sex. society has allowed sexual images to redirect its moral compass away from the good in which instincts rule over reason. alex’s crime spree begins when he and his fellow droogs see a homeless man singing beneath a bridge. at first the homeless man believes the droogs are approaching to help him, however, he soon realizes that they are only there to beat him to a pulp. as the droogs wreak havoc on the helpless man, he shouts, “there is no law anymore!”11 the cry of the homeless man alludes to plato’s effect of the imagination as non-didactic. blinded by infusion of art into the public realm, the political system can no longer define justice or administer it to its citizens. next, the droogs find themselves interrupting the rape of a rival gang led by billyboy. this is our first real view of the desolate wasteland that is the society in futuristic britain; wreckage of street signs, benches, and garbage is littered about in every direction. the state of society is, of course, a result of immoral values that are construed through images. billyboy’s gang lets the rape victim free as if she was merely an afterthought. they are wearing army outfits and challenge the droogs to a duel. given the lack of truth in society, who is to say that billyboy’s gang couldn’t be the army of britain? the fight is an exotic, near artistic, choreography of playful battle. in this case, plato’s critique of the artistic imagination concerns its irrational character. the fighting represents disunity and the “unstable and irritable” elements of human behavior. 12 thus, the mimetic imagination has lured the human psyche of the gangs so far away from 11 ibid. 12 kearney, the wake of imagination, 93. νο 43 dianoia : issue i reality that conflict and contradiction consume the realm of vision. 13 alex’s next crime occurs when he and his droogs drive out to the countryside. they see a house with a sign that says “home” out front, and decide to break in. the image of this sign is very peculiar, because we no longer know what “home” actually means. surely it may be a reference to a place where one’s family is always welcome; however, how can we know this in a society filled with ignorance? the droogs break in and proceed to rape a woman while her husband watches. soon after, alex and the droogs are back at the milk bar, where alex tells everyone to “shut up” as a woman in the bar sings beethoven’s 9th symphony, ode to joy, in its original german. at this juncture, we are made aware of alex’s obsession of music, specifically the works of ludwig van beethoven, of whom alex refers to simply as “ludwig van.” as the droogs return home and alex goes to bed, there is a large image of beethoven’s face printed on a window shade in alex’s room. the camera then pans downward to reveal four statues of jesus. each statue of jesus is bloodied in a way that resembles his crucifixion, but the statues are positioned in a line so that they appear to be doing a routine as a part of a dance team. later, when alex is imprisoned, he imagines himself as a roman officer whipping jesus’ back as he carries the cross. as alex stares intently at beethoven, a rapid series of violent images floods his brain. these images include a woman being hanged, a train blowing up, men being crushed by boulders, multiple fiery explosions, and alex imagining himself as dracula with fangs and blooding running down his cheeks. plato would show his greatest hostility towards alex’s fascination with beethoven, because the imagination has led him towards idolatry and the complete rejection of the form of the good. this ultimately transgresses the platonic dualisms of western metaphysics, which leaves the futuristic society of britain in a completely contradictory state. a clockwork orange – ludovico treatment alex is caught by the police after murdering the cat woman, and is sentenced to fourteen years in prison. when he arrives at the prison, alex is stripped of all of his belongings from the outside world, including his name, which becomes “inmate 655321.” this serves to dehumanize him to the mere subject of a prisoner, as those who existed from birth in plato’s allegory 13 plato, the republic of plato, 286. δ α 44 of the cave. after two years of serving his prison sentence, the minister of the interior arrives and presents alex with the opportunity to undergo the ludovico treatment. the new experimental form of aversion therapy is famed to cure criminals of their evil tendencies in only two weeks time. from plato’s perspective, this would mean elevating alex’s soul into the realm of the intelligible, where reason commands his decision making process. alex discusses whether or not he should undergo treatment with the prison chaplain. the chaplain explains to alex that the ludovico treatment will impose behavioral modification on his psychological processes, rendering him incapable of performing evil deeds. the chaplain finds the treatment to be quite dangerous, but alex responds, “i don’t care about the dangers father; i just want to be good.” the chaplain responds, “the question is whether or not this technique really makes a man good…goodness comes from within, goodness is chosen, when a man cannot choose, he ceases to be a man.” alex fails to understand the chaplain’s definition, which illustrates the sizable discrepancy between the two character’s ways of thinking. alex, who is submersed in the realm of the visible, cannot define what good is because his immoral acts prevent him from distinguishing good from evil. eikasia, or imagination, which is the lowest level of opinion, would lead alex to make cultural references to define “good,” such as beethoven’s 9th symphony. the priest, on the other hand, recognizes moral oppositions of good and evil, and that without the option of evil, good is an empty, meaningless gesture. the chaplain is able to make such a distinction because he is thinks in the realm of the intelligible, likely moving between the divisions of thought and reason. the chaplain, perhaps, is the only one who can bring alex out of his illusionary world. alex decides to undergo the ludovico treatment. alex is first drugged with a serum, and then bound up in a straitjacket, with his head strapped to a headrest and eyes clamped open. he is forced to watch violent movies. alex’s inability to turn his head or even close his eyes strongly resembles plato’s prisoners in the allegory of the cave. alex feels deep pains when seeing the violent images, especially when he hears beethoven’s music playing in the background. after two weeks of treatment, alex is “cured,” in that he is physically incapable of committing violent or sexual acts. after a private demonstration of alex’s inability to do evil, the minister of the interior plato’s condemnation of imagination in a clockwork orange δ α 45 dianoia : issue i concludes that “there will be law and order, the streets will be safe, this is about to be a reality.” 14 alex’s transformation from a gangster to a “good” man seems to represent the ascension of the soul in the allegory of the cave, however, the process is extremely different. in the allegory, the prisoner’s soul ascends through the realms of the visible and intelligible to reach the form of the good. in a clockwork orange, alex merely shifts to an equally detached world; rather than being free and ignorant, he becomes unwillingly socially acceptable. thus he becomes a clockwork orange; organic as an orange on the outside, but mechanical as a clock on the inside. this horizontal shift prevents alex from ascending into the intellectual world and illustrates that the minister of the interior is only concerned with the realm of the visible, as he hopes to fill society with clockwork oranges so that reality appears to be “good.” after the ludovico treatment, alex is released from society and returns to his past reality. he finds himself at the places where he committed his previous crimes, and he is brutally beaten up and tortured because he is unable to defend himself. alex wants to change back into his old violent self, but he is unable to because of the treatment. similar to plato’s allegory, the spiritually elevated soul wants to descend back into his world of illusions when entering the cave. they are able to do this, however, because their free will is intact. a clockwork orange illustrates plato’s critique of imagination, as it showcases a youth gang driven consumed by images of sex, violence, and drugs. while plato admits that imagination plays an important role in reaching his ultimate form of the good, the film demonstrates the tendency of humanity to become confused between the imaginary and reality. one can imitate the form of the good for a short time by making something like a clockwork orange; however, according to plato, the highest good is the providing source for everything, and a dystopian society becomes inevitable when the true source of good is compromised. bibliography a clockwork orange. directed by stanley kubrick. 1971. burbank, ca: warner home video, 2007. dvd. kearney, richard. the wake of imagination. london: routledge, 1988. print. plato. the republic of plato. trans. allan bloom. new york: basic books, 1968. print. 14 a clockwork orange ”“ the value of life cannot be assessed because it must be lived. dan friedman “i have lived”: nietzsche and the symposium “we need to see ourselves more clearly before we can say whether we would like to become this other sort of being, excellent and deaf.”1 let us begin with a thought experiment. an attractive young man in fourth century athens has been harboring a love he feels for another man. whenever he listens to this older man, his “heart pounds and tears flood out when he speaks…. [no one else] produced this kind of effect.”2 the young lover attempts to seduce this man, only to be rebuffed. does he choose to accept his misfortune, and attempt to find the true form of beauty in all things, or does he instead open himself up to his emotions? in other words, does he become a philosopher, or does he try to cope with simultaneous feelings of shame and lust, failure and longing? it seems far more natural that this young man would choose the latter. to side with the former would be to commit the cardinal sin that in the german philosopher friedrich nietzsche’s opinion, all philosophers prior to himself had committed. as scholars charles guignon and derk pereboom point out, for nietzsche, “it is philosophers’ hatred of any form of becoming and process…that leads to their contempt for the constantly changing material world in which we actually live.”3 nietzsche, ever for the affirmation of the present, for the vitality of the will and instinct, felt that “whatever has to get itself proved in advance is not worth much.”4 but is nietzsche’s essential overturning of plato’s and socrates’ philosophy – one that would become the foundations of western thought fair? with regards to his criticism of plato’s symposium, the evidence suggests so. 1 nussbaum, the fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in greek tragedy and philosophy, 184. 2 plato, symposium, 215e. 3 guignon and pereboom, existentialism: basic writings, 115. 4 ibid., 174. α ν48 what is the in-between nature of love? as socrates explains, love is the child of resource and poverty. socrates recounts a tale told by diotima, in which love is “a formidable hunter, always weaving tricks; he desires knowledge and is resourceful in getting it; a lifelong lover of wisdom; clever at using magic, drugs and sophistry.”5 pierre hadot elaborates on this in-between nature: “in socratic eros, we find the same basic structure as in socratic irony: a divided consciousness, passionately aware that it is not what it ought to be. it is from this feeling of separation and lack that love is born.”6 it is true that love is indeed an in-between. one finds oneself infatuated with a person or thing, only to be revolted by the feeling of infatuation. but love is also a desire to fill a void. socrates is mistaken, then, when he confines love to the desire only for the beautiful. diotima claims “love is love of beauty,” but i wonder what she would say to the marquis de sade.7 he had a compulsive need for the ugly underbelly of society but his love of sodomy emerged from a void he needed to fill in the absence of an outlet. that his pursuits were not beautiful should not diminish his experience of love. nevertheless, the observation that love is the desire for something that one lacks is remarkably profound. socrates then recounts diotima’s description of the staircase of love though it is fairer to say that this discussion is truly plato’s discussion. as hadot points out, “socrates became the prosopon, or mask, of personalities who felt the need to take shelter behind him. it was from him that they got the idea both to mask themselves, and to use socratic irony as a mask.”8 diotima describes her staircase of love: one must start with love of one other body, followed by love of all bodies, and finally move on to realize the beauty “in practices and laws.”9 then, diotima claims, one will realize two things. first, beauty cannot be created or destroyed but simply is. second, “it’s not beautiful in one respect but ugly in another, or beautiful at one time but not at another, or beautiful in relation to this but ugly in relation to that; nor beautiful here and ugly there because it is beautiful for some people but ugly for others.”10 she says in four separate ways 5 plato, symposium, 203d. 6 hadot, “the figure of socrates,” in philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from socrates to foucault, 163. 7 plato, symposium, 204b. 8 hadot, “the figure of socrates,” 149. 9 plato, symposium, 210c. 10 ibid., 211a. “i have lived ”: nietzsche and the symposium α ν 49 dianoia : issue i the same thing – beauty is not relativistic, but rather is an ideal, something that has a true form. because love’s function is to give birth to beauty both in body and in mind, it becomes crucial to master the identity of beauty in order for love to function properly. martha nussbaum provides a useful discussion of this complex idea in her essay “the speech of alcibiades: a reading of the symposium.” as nussbaum points out, “just try to think it seriously: this body of this wonderful beloved person is exactly the same in quality as that person’s mind and inner life. both in turn, the same in quality as the value of athenian democracy; of pythagorean geometry.”11 but what does any of this have to do with living the good life? according to diotima, once one is able to see the ideal of beauty, one can in turn give birth to true virtue as opposed to a mere image of virtue, and only through true virtue can one hope to be loved by the gods and to be immortal. although it is hard to deny the appeal of a so-called stairway of love, this explanation is rife with problems. nussbaum inadvertently discovers one when trying to explain this concept. she writes, “the lover, seeing a flat uniform landscape of value…will have few motivations for moving here rather than there on that landscape. a contemplative life is a natural choice.”12 but the idea of a contemplative life is chilling. aside from the sheer inability for one to even comprehend what a flat world of virtue would look like, plato, through socrates, “in order to avoid dealing with the ever-changing material world… [focuses] not on the concrete objects we discover through sensory perception, but on [his] own abstract concept of things.”13 socrates’ speech asks us not to react. it favors the passive idealism of a utopian existence in place of the wondrous if frightening realities of the physical world. this line of thinking emerges in nietzsche’s harsh criticism of socrates’ view on love. for nietzsche, there once was a society that represented purity and swift action. oscar wilde was able to articulate this view of the pre-socratic greeks in de profundis. he writes: i discern great sanity in the greek attitude. they never chattered about sunsets, or discussed whether the shadows on the grass were really mauve or not. but they saw 11 nussbaum, fragility, 180. 12 nussbaum, fragility, 181. 13 guignon and pereboom, existentialism, 115. δ ι 50 that the sea was for the swimmer, and the sand for the feet of the runner… we call ourselves a utilitarian age, and we do not know the uses of any single thing. we have forgotten that water can cleanse, and fire purify, and that the earth is mother to us all. as a consequence our art is of the moon and plays with shadows, while greek art is of the sun and deals directly with things.14 wilde’s views on art seem equally applicable to nietzsche’s criticism of the ideal. humans, in religion, in pretension, in centuries of thoughtless thought, have been caught in a web of elaborate impotency. this idea seems to be the basis of nietzsche’s combination of shock and disgust in his tone when assigning the blame in this shift to socrates. he describes how he “recognized socrates and plato as symptoms of decay, as instruments of the greek dissolution, as pseudo-greek, as anti-greek.”15 he goes on to make an amusing observation regarding socrates philosophy: “i am trying to grasp from what idiosyncrasy that socratic equation – reason = virtue = happiness – stems, the most bizarre equation that there is, and one which in particular has all the instincts of the older hellenes against it.”16 by older hellenes, nietzsche means either the homeric greeks or the dionysian man. guignon and pereboom explain, “the mystical sense of life as a unified flux of energy, experienced in the rapture and intoxication of the ancient celebration of dionysus, is called the “’dionysian.’”17 reason is bright light; it dulls the instincts. in frustration nietzsche warns, “one absolutely must reach out and try to grasp this astounding finesse, that the value of life cannot be assessed.”18 achilles chose death for a cause rather than immortality for the sake of breathing – there is something deeply attractive in that. the value of life cannot be assessed because it must be lived. nietzsche excoriates socrates and plato, writing in twilight of the idols, “the dialectician lays on his opponent the burden of proving that he is not an idiot. he infuriates, and at the same time paralyzes.”19 the teleology of this technique leads only to fear and hatred of man. and yet, nietzsche could not help an undeniable fascination with these founders of western philosophy, so much so that pierre hadot convincingly argues: 14 wilde, de profundis, 114. 15 nietzsche, basic writings of nietzsche, 172. 16 ibid., 173-174 17 guignon and pereboom, existentialism, 95. 18 nietzsche, basic writings, 173. 19 ibid., 174. “i have lived ”: nietzsche and the symposium δ ι 51 dianoia : issue i might not socrates’ illness be the same as that of nietzsche himself ? this mythdissolving lucidity, this pitiless consciousness; are they not those of nietzsche himself ? nietzsche’s amorous hatred for socrates was, in the last analysis, identical with the amorous hatred nietzsche felt for himself.20 this view, while thought provoking, should not detract from the very real criticism nietzsche leveled at the two thinkers. the psychology of nietzsche himself aside, the question of love remains, likely as it always will. in the end, nietzsche’s problems with socrates and plato are too profound to ignore. socrates turned an event whose function was to get prosperous greek citizens drunk into a discussion group about love. not only does alcibiades interrupt the symposium because he is handsome and drunk and noisy, but because he barges in on the discussion. it seems that plato the observer could not help but include a climactic human event, at the very least as juxtaposition to a philosophy that likely bored or frustrated him most of the time. love causes people to do irrational things – to open themselves up to the chance of pain. but love and pain are emotions; they are felt and experienced. the danger to humanity is above all idealism. the contemplative nature of plato’s philosophy, in addition to its influence on western culture, led nietzsche to lament in ecce homo “the consequences of this ‘idealism’ provide my explanation of all blunders, all great instinctual aberrations and ‘modesties’ that led me away from the task of my life.”21 in this vein, harold bloom identifies the problem with idealism regarding the task of interpreting shakespeare’s plays. in his book shakespeare: the invention of the human, he writes, “allegorizing or ironizing shakespeare by privileging cultural anthropology or theatrical history or religion or psychoanalysis or politics or foucault or marx or feminism works only in limited ways.”22 the danger of idealism is that it detaches one from the willfulness and vitality inherent in humanity – to the fundamental truths of living that all humans share, regardless of their supposed brainpower. reminding us of this truth was one of nietzsche’s greatest gifts, but was also his greatest challenge. 20 hadot, “figure of socrates,” 169. 21 nietzsche, basic writings, 697. 22 bloom, shakespeare: the invention of the human, 718-719. 52 α“i have lived ”: nietzsche and the symposiumbibliographybloom, harold. shakespeare: the invention of the human (new york: riverhead/penguin, 1998). print. guignon, charles and pereboom, derek. existentialism: basic writings (indianapolis: hackett, 2001). print. hadot, pierre. “the figure of socrates,” in philosophy as a way of life: spiritual exercises from socrates to foucault, trans. michael chase (malden: blackwell, 1995). print. nietzsche, friedrich. basic writings of nietzsche, ed. and trans. walter kaufman, (new york: modern library, 2000). print. nussbaum, martha c. the fragility of goodness: luck and ethics in greek tragedy and philosophy (united kingdom: cambridge university press, 2001). print. plato, symposium (new york: penguin, 1999). print. wilde, oscar. de profundis, (new york: the modern library, 2000). print. william adamowicz how we decide what is beautiful: kant on judgments of tasteα we travel miles to stand before victoria falls, we practice relentlessly to play chopin’s études, we examine with scrutiny the swirling clouds of van gogh; and we find ourselves aroused. when we are confronted by these objects of our existence, whether in nature or in art, we exalt their beauty. we claim that such a thing is beautiful and we expect others to recognize the validity of our claim, and furthermore, we expect them to recognize its beauty on the basis that they will be affected in the same way. while there is no doubt that such a claim to beauty is subjective, upon further reflection, we cannot help but to acknowledge the underlying suspicion that the claim demands more than just subjectivity. in fact, we realize this claim also corresponds to a seemingly objective benchmark, namely, the notion of taste—the ability to distinguish things of a high aesthetic standard. when we recognize that there is something called taste and that some people have this faculty while others lack it, it follows that we must be adhering to an objective standard of some sort. for objectivity, by definition, must be structured in some way or other. these ‘opinions’ of ours, then, are more than just that—they are judgments of taste, and they define our individual and collective principles of aesthetics. if i say that a particular sunset is beautiful, and you disagree, am i allowed to say that you are wrong because you lack taste? am i allowed to claim that anyone who sees this sunset will also be inclined to say that it is beautiful? immanuel kant—and most of us—would say that yes, you are entitled to demand other peoples’ agreement. but when i say that my chicken sandwich is beautiful, am i still allowed to demand your agreement? can i be right or wrong about what i deem beautiful? this brings us to our central question: why are we entitled to demand agreement with a particular judgment of taste? in order δ54 ν how we decide what is beautiful: kant on judgments of taste to answer this question, we turn to kant’s “analytic of the beautiful” from his critique of judgment. by coming up with a way to define these judgments of taste, kant became known as the father of modern aesthetics. he strayed away from rational or empirical models for a system of aesthetics; he believed that it was impossible to create a science of taste. he came to this conclusion in realizing that there is no discernible link between the qualities that make an object beautiful and beauty itself. as renowned kant scholar, paul guyer, notes, for kant “no determinate relation holds between being beautiful and any specific properties of empirical objects analogous to that which holds between being gold and such properties as being yellow, ductile, malleable, and soluble,”1 yet we find that gold is beautiful. it follows that beauty is not intrinsic to the beautiful object, but rather depends on our perception of it. in that sense, a judgment of taste is subjective. but kant maintains that, although subjective, the notion of judgment of taste has a “peculiar claim to validity” and this particular characteristic is what “differentiates it from mere avowals.”2 in other words, when we make a particular judgment of taste that something is beautiful, our claim is not merely subjective; we presume that other people would also recognize the validity of our claim. however, this still does not tell us when we are entitled to claim that we are correct in a particular judgment. kant defines two types of judgments: determinant and reflective. for determinant judgments, the universal is given and the particular is “subsumed.” for reflective judgments, “only the particular is given and the universal has to be found for it.”3 while judgments from the faculty of reason are determinant, judgments of taste, kant claims, are reflective. such a judgment “is not a matter of reflecting on a determinate concept but [of reflecting] in general only on a rule of perception.”4 while it is easy to get lost in kant’s complex lexicon, he is essentially saying that judgments of taste correspond to a certain objective reality. in other words, a determinant judgment would be something like einstein’s mass-energy equivalence, or e=mc2. such a judgment would determine 1 guyer, kant and the claims of taste, 121 2 schaper, “taste, sublimity, and genius,” in the cambridge companion to kant, 371. 3 kant, the critique of judgment, §iv. 4 ibid., §vii. δ55 dianoia : issue i ν something about the external world. kant says that judgments of taste, on the other hand, are not “a matter of reflecting on a determinate concept,” like the fact that energy equals mass times the speed of light squared, but rather of reflecting “in general only on a rule of perception.”5 in the case of judgments of taste, we can interpret this ‘rule’ as that which defines what is beautiful and what is not. it is merely our correlation with this rule of perception that leads to taste. claiming that an object is beautiful does not make the object beautiful—it is not determinant—it simply reflects on the fact that the object can already be perceived as beautiful. how does this fit in with our discussion thus far? it provides us with an explanation for why judgments of taste have this “peculiar claim to validity.” if we can imagine that there is an objective standard for everything that is beautiful in the world, it seems that a judgment of taste is purely objective. but we know from our own experience that this is not the case, since it is our own faculty of judgment that leads to decide whether something like a piece of gold is beautiful. it is this seemingly paradoxical combination of objective and subjective qualities that makes judgments of taste unique, and we will see how it constantly reappears in kant’s discussion of aesthetics. essentially, the core of kant’s theory of taste is as follows: a beautiful object creates a balance between the imagination and the understanding, which leads to a state known as the harmony of the faculties. this harmony, in turn, evokes a feeling of pleasure, and the consciousness of that pleasure allows us to form a judgment of taste. again, it is easy to get lost in kant’s technical language. but what is important to retain for our purposes is kant’s fundamental claim that the feeling of pleasure is behind what determines judgments of taste. there are four central components to kant’s formulation of judgments of taste. he refers to these as the “four moments,” namely: quality, quantity, relation, and modality. while many scholars dismiss these ‘moments’ on the grounds that they are overly confusing, guyer reformulates them in a way that clearly describes four characteristics: 1st moment: quality –> disinterestedness 2nd moment: quantity –> universality 3rd moment: relation –> form of finality 4th moment: modality –> necessity 5 ibid. νο56 how we decide what is beautiful: kant on judgments of taste the first moment describes the quality of a judgment of taste as lacking personal interest. this disinterestedness to which kant refers is explained by his differentiation of the ‘pleasant’ from the ‘good.’ he claims, “that which pleases the senses in sensation is pleasant” while that which “by means of reason pleases through the mere concept is good.”6 judgments of taste stand between the subjective nature of the pleasant and the objective nature of the good. the pleasant would be something like a cool breeze. when we decide that the breeze is pleasant, that particular judgment has interest, since the reason we enjoy it is because it feels good. the good is more like an ethical judgment; it would be something like the feeling of helping an old lady cross the street. it makes us feel good because, “by means of reason,” we arrive at the concept that helping people in need is good. kant claims that both the pleasant and the good are bound up with interest, since they are objects of satisfaction, but things that are beautiful can “have no meaning” and “depend on no definite concept, and yet they please.”7 for example, a beautiful sunset gives us visual pleasure, but it does not please in sensation like the pleasant. while one could make the argument that visual pleasure is a form of sensation, it still would not explain why seeing a beautiful sunset is arousing. we can explain how a breeze feels nice through the reactions of the nervous system, but there is no way to explain why the combinations of certain colors in a particular setting make the difference between a plain sunset and a beautiful one. since the second and fourth moments go hand in hand, for now, we skip the second moment, and move on to the third. with regards to the third moment, the form of finality, kant believes that the goal of the understanding is rooted in the purposiveness of nature. in other words, kant maintained that nature has an agenda; it is not accidental. the faculty of human understanding coincides with nature’s design. while the first moment leads us to think that it is the individual who is responsible for making a judgment that a sunset is beautiful, kant believed that nature predetermines how much the faculty of human understanding will judge. it is important to keep in mind that this shared ability to recognize the beautiful is not an invariably accurate scientific tool, but rather “the ability to ‘estimate’ what is beautiful, and the exercise of this 6 ibid., §3-4. 7 ibid., §4. νο 57 dianoia : issue i ability is the judgment of taste.”8 if one does not find that a beautiful sunset is, in fact, beautiful, it does not change the fact that nature allowed for the possibility to make the judgment that the sunset is beautiful. one could also make a judgment that the sunset is nice, but this would simply be a poor estimation— one that does not measure up to the potential of one’s faculty of understanding in that particular case. to return to our central question, at this point, we can say that we are entitled to demand agreement with a judgment, and this is precisely because nature has allowed for the possibility to judge a particular object as beautiful. thus far, the first and third moments provide us with observations that judgments of taste have both a certain disinterestedness and a way of coinciding with the form of finality in nature. but it is the second and fourth moments that are required for a judgment to be a judgment of taste, namely, universality and necessity. with regards to universality, kant claims that a judgment of taste is not just the ability to individually gain pleasure from beauty in nature and art, but also the ability to share it with others who have a similar insight. with regards to necessity, in order for a judgment to be a judgment of taste, one must make the judgment in a deliberate manner. that is, it does not suffice to merely think about how something is beautiful. instead, there must be an action for the judgment to come into existence in order for it to be presented to others. we are entitled to make a judgment of taste only if we are able to make this subjective conviction universally valid, through “intersubjectivity.” in other words, “kant’s view is that in making an aesthetic judgment—not just responding to an object with pleasure, but calling that object beautiful—one is not merely reporting an experience of pleasure; one is claiming that the pleasure one has felt is intersubjectively valid, or reasonably imputed to other persons.”9 as guyer notes, it is not merely enough that the beauty of the object necessarily gives the individual a sensation of pleasure; one must also be convinced that other persons will feel the same way and actually express his or her conviction that something is beautiful. 8 schaper, “taste, sublimity, and genius,” 372. 9 guyer, kant and the claims of taste, 120. δ ι 58 how we decide what is beautiful: kant on judgments of taste yet what happens when we make judgments of taste on a medium as polemical as art? since people tend to fundamentally disagree on what makes art beautiful, subjectivity becomes more problematic. for this, we turn to kant’s “deduction of aesthetic judgments,” in which he defines “genius” as “the talent (or natural gift) which gives the rule to art.”10 while nature provides its own rule, according to kant, the rule for art, is manifested through the individuals’ talent in so far as “beautiful art is only possible as a product of genius.” this definition allows kant to bridge the gap between beauty in nature and beauty in art, for it is clear that beauty in art is often less recognizable to the untrained eye. when we think of the surrealist movement, of rodin’s drawings of prostitutes, of interpretive dance, or of certain works of modern art, many of us find nothing beautiful on the surface, and we even feel discomfort rather than pleasure upon viewing it. but once we come to relish the fact that it can disorient us and shed light on the human condition, we value it all the more. with regards to the difference between art and nature, kant claims that “a beauty of nature is a beautiful thing; beauty of art is a beautiful representation of a thing.”11 as eva schaper astutely notes in her essay, taste, sublimity, and genius, “this is one of kant’s memorable formulations of the contrast between nature and art, and it allows him, in a brief but important aside, to comment on the power of the art of genius to present as beautiful what is actually ugly in nature.”12 upon further reflection on this point, we find that for kant, we ought to concern ourselves not only with outer appearances, but also—for lack of a less cliché-prone term—a sort of inner beauty. as a final anecdote, in coming to recognize the value of kant’s differentiation between mere opinions and judgments of taste, i think back to my demonic childhood complaints, and i am reminded of my father’s persistence that i say “i think” before i exclaimed something like “my food is terrible!” the difference is subtle but notable; when i say, “my food is terrible,” i am making a claim about the food itself; i am assuming that anyone who tastes the food will also inevitably deem that it is terrible. if i am sitting in front of someone who finds the same dish delightful, they would surely take offense 10 kant, the critique of judgment, §46. 11 ibid., §48. 12 schaper, “taste, sublimity, and genius,” 392. δ ι 59 dianoia : issue i since i am inherently assuming that they lack taste. but if i say “i think…etc.,” i am merely sharing my opinion about the food. while i doubt that my father had kant’s aesthetics in mind, his incentive came from a desire to have me recognize the consequences and the responsibility that is inherently assumed from making a subjectively ontological claim rather than a purely subjective claim. interestingly enough, at the simplest level, his incentive was merely to teach me manners, which leads us to conclude that there is a connection between limiting one’s claim to universality by approaching such manners in a discretionary fashion, and what people generally regard as being raised well. this makes obvious sense considering that the notion of good manners is already a product of intersubjectivity; it is a product of universal validity and necessity in the same way that judgments of taste are. although kant gives us an outline of how judgments of taste follow specific laws, when we see a good-looking bc student on the comm. ave. bus, we do not (most of us, anyway) actively think about whether such a judgment will be “reasonably imputed” to the person next to us, or whether the pleasure it provides is interested or disinterested. we simply make our judgment, as it comes to us naturally. in the same way that our human nature guides us without any deliberate effort on our part, the intersubjectivity and universality that are inherent to our manners are inherent to the judgments that we make from day to day. in that sense, kant’s critique is itself reflective rather than determinant; he does not change the way we go about making judgments; he merely shows us how we make them. while kant did not show signs of artistic genius in his lifetime, it is clear that he certainly had a type of genius that he himself did not identify. bibliography guyer, paul. kant and the claims of taste. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1997. print. kant, immanuel. the critique of judgment. translated by james creed meredith. oxford: oxford university press, 2008. print. schaper, eva. “taste, sublimity, and genius.” in the cambridge companion to kant, edited by paul guyer, 367-393. cambridge: cambridge university press, 1992. print. “ ” beckett successfully sidesteps taking a stand on the existence of god, and, in avoiding assumptions about the unknown, he provides the audience with what is known: god is not necessarily an active player in humans’ daily life. kara bradley entertainment ethics of waiting for godot “interviewer: how can you be so preoccupied with salvation when you don’t believe in it? beckett: i am interested in the shape of ideas, even if i do not believe in them. there is a wonderful sentence in augustine…‘do not despair; one of the thieves was saved. do not presume; one of the thieves was damned.’ that sentence has a wonderful shape. it is the shape that matters.”1 disillusioned by the harsh realities of the great war, thinkers of the modern era wage a war on authority, questioning not only the political systems that gave way to such suffering, but also traditional systems of belief as a source of meaning. the main trends of modern thought thus break into two branches, one that completely rejects any external source of meaning and one that merely shifts the responsible party in the traditional system from god to the individual. epitomizing the first trend, sartre takes on the assumption that there is no god, claiming that “existence precedes essence,” and that humans must find meaning through action in the face of abandonment, despair, and anguish.2 frankl, on the other hand, clings to the notion of god, as demonstrated by his efforts to keep people alive by helping them pinpoint meaning in their lives.3 this indicates that, though he gives man the responsibility for maintaining his own well-being, he presumes an inherent value in life, one that springs from an external source. in either case, the initial assumption of whether or not god exists lies central to the thinker’s vector of thought as it determines the origin of meaning and subsequent course of action. samuel beckett, however, chooses to ignore this central god question and still 1 gordon, reading godot, 112. 2 sartre, existentialism is a humanism, 20-35. 3 frankl, man’s search for meaning, 98-111. 62ο manages to substantiate his prescription for action. in fact, beckett avoids the inherent flaw in both sartre and frankl’s arguments by doing so—his thought is not dependent on an assumption that can never be proven. in evading the god question, beckett manages to delineate an ethical framework void of meaning but grounded in the knowable and full of entertainment. as waiting for godot’s title implies, vladimir and estragon await the arrival of “godot,” allegorically representing god, for the entirety of the play, but beckett does not take a firm stand on whether or not that figure actually exists. on the one hand, a messenger boy claims that godot “won’t come this evening but surely to-morrow,”4 reaffirming didi and gogo’s belief in godot’s existence and in his promise to meet them. however, the fact that the boy delivers the same message two days in a row,5 in combination with godot’s persistent absence from the stage, leads the audience to question godot’s existence. plus, though the audience only witnesses two days of waiting for godot, vladimir’s “so there you are again”6 illustrates that the waiting game has possibly been going on for a while. as the audience questions the certainty of godot’s being, vladimir and estragon are seen as fools wasting their days awaiting the unknown. beckett successfully sidesteps taking a stand on the existence of god, and, in avoiding assumptions about the unknown, he provides the audience with what is known: god is not necessarily an active player in humans’ daily life. by steering away from a stance in regards to whether or not god exists, beckett not only provides a stronger foundation for his ethics, but he also avoids the determinism that flows from both christian (god-based) and existential thought. as an individual’s course of action depends on the situation in which he finds himself, a set of ethics founded on the presence or lack of god gives way to a range of actions tethered to either assumption. thus, beckett’s ‘who knows?’ response maximizes human freedom by allowing humans to act as they see fit, regardless of whether or not god exists. the notion of detachment from sources of meaning arises when estragon asks vladimir if they are “tied” to godot, and vladimir responds: “to godot? tied to godot! what an idea! 4 beckett, waiting for godot, 55. 5 ibid., 105. 6 ibid., 2. entertainment ethics of waiting for godot ι 63 dianoia : issue i ο no question of it. (pause.) for the moment.”7 beckett’s claim that man is free from the constraints of both god and no god holds true despite vladimir and estragon’s failure to act in the face of freedom. though maximizing human freedom, beckett’s ethics in waiting for godot by no means give meaning to human life. as described for the cases of sartre and frankl, in the modern era, the existence of god provides an external standard of importance, whereas a lack of god prompts humans to derive an existential value from choices and action. however, godot does not exist in the realm of the stage, but beckett also does not allow for self-validation. in godot’s absence, vladimir and estragon do not yet know what role they play under his instruction and are rendered inert as they await his assumed arrival. estragon: don’t let’s do anything. it’s safer. vladimir: let’s wait and see what he says. estragon: who? vladimir: godot. estragon: good idea. vladimir: let’s wait till we know exactly how we stand.8 as vladimir and estragon passively wait for an external godot, they ignore the possibility of creating their lives’ own meaning. “godot is also virtually a contraction of their nicknames, gogo and didi, the inner self that might alternatively give cohesion to their lives,”9 transforming godot from a external set of ethics into one in which gogo and didi take responsibility for rooting their lives in something substantial. godot represents the potential meaning that could arise from either god or self-determination, but he appears in neither form. in fact, the mere notion of an external source of meaning prompts them to relinquish control of their actions: as beckett claims that the existence or nonexistence of god cannot be certain, he finds humans caught in a bind, not wanting to reject a potentially existing god for the sake of humanly derived meaning but also not receiving any external subsistence. the absence of a validating source, either in the form of god or an individual source of affirmation, makes human action seem futile and purposeless. vladimir and 7 ibid., 17. 8 beckett, waiting for godot, 13. 9 gordon, reading godot, 61. α ν64 estragon serve as examples that man tends to avoid action for the sake of waiting. beckett also eliminates any notion of progress as a source of meaning by introducing the fluidity of time. for one, vladimir and estragon cannot remember what they did the day before, nor do they have a grasp on what comes in the future.10 prior actions have no consequences for the current situation, and one cannot prepare for an unknowable or unpredictable future, which lays “bare the nature of life without real hope of improvement or change.”11 any action for the sake of bettering loses significance. in addition to memory’s effect on the nature of time, the silences that beckett adds within his dialogue alter the apparent speed of time: “if we are active, we tend to forget the passage of time, we pass the time, but if we are merely passively waiting, we are confronted with the action of time itself.”12 as the apparent speed and passage of time alters with mans’ focus on it, the structured, linear nature of time vanishes. rather, individual units of time can stretch and contract in response to human conditions, undermining the steady beat of time, thereby eliminating any concept of forward progression. beckett even undermines the ‘other’ as a source of value, demonstrating that human interaction cannot provide meaning. primarily, the characters’ faulty memories hinder dealings with the ‘other,’ for human relationships are not instantaneous but formed over periods of time. exemplified by estragon’s interactions with pozzo, valuable human relationships cannot form when estragon does not even recognize pozzo from the day before.13 even when characters remember each other, as in the case with estragon and vladimir, they find no value in human interaction. vladimir: you’re a hard man to get on with, gogo. estragon: it’d be better if we parted. vladimir: you always say that and you always come crawling back. estragon: the best thing would be to kill me, like the other. 10 beckett, waiting for godot, 9-10. 11 fletcher, “bailing out the silence,” in modern critical interpretations: samuel beckett’s waiting for godot, 1987), 13. 12 esslin, “the search for the self,” in modern critical interpretations: samuel beckett’s waiting for godot, 1987), 31. 13 beckett, waiting for godot, 88. entertainment ethics of waiting for godot α ν 65 dianoia : issue i vladimir: what other? (pause.) what other? estragon: like billions of others. vladimir: (sententious). to every man his little cross. (he sighs.) till he dies. (afterthought.) and is forgotten.14 most clearly, gogo and didi directly claim that they gain nothing from interacting with each other. beckett even alludes to the ‘other,’ claiming that the ‘other’ is dead and that human interaction is futile because relationships are as transitory as life. the constant miscommunications between gogo and didi also illustrate that the ‘other’ cannot act as a source of intellectual stimulus because dialogue serves as a moment in which two characters are both speaking about similar subjects, but “the different participants tend to pursue a line of thought independently of each other”15 (see gogo and didi’s ‘discussion’ of thinking).16 beckett thus eliminates the three traditional sources of man’s value as externally prescribed or self-determined meaning, improvement through time, and human interactions are void of meaning in waiting for godot. despite the clear lack of meaning in gogo and didi’s present situation, beckett critiques their inaction. one critic describes the apparent reality of waiting for godot as “nothing happens, twice.”17 the hyperbole of human inaction pins vladimir and estragon as foils to humanity, a species deeply rooted in action, and challenges those who only act for the sake of fulfilling meaning or upholding a value. however, beckett illustrates that action has value in itself, since “en attendant godot is not so much ‘waiting for godot’ as ‘while waiting for godot’…the primary dramatic action is thus the waiting itself…but what the characters actually do, even when they talk about waiting, is not waiting but something else.”18 leaving humanity with a meaningless existence and shunning passivity, beckett commands mankind to entertain itself. in one sense, the value of entertainment first naturally flows from the fluidity of time in waiting for godot, in which the beginning and end lose their significance and the focus shifts 14 ibid., 68. 15 fletcher, “bailing out the silence,” 16. 16 ibid., 71-2. 17 fletcher, “bailing out the silence,” 12. 18 gans, “beckett and the problem of modern culture,” in modern critical interpretations: samuel beckett’s waiting for godot, 96-7. δ α 66 entertainment ethics of waiting for godot to individual moments: what carries the weight is what lies in the middle. beckett, however, takes the significance of the moment one step further by denoting two potential courses of action: boldness and comedy. the first branch of potential views every action as a noble and bold response to meaningless existence. beckett best portrays this mentality through gogo and didi’s contemplations of suicide. in both of the play’s acts, gogo and didi emotionlessly discuss if and how they will kill themselves, not dwelling on whether or not suicide is good or bad, but merely noting the practicalities of the act. estragon: (with effort). gogo light—bough not break—gogo dead. didi heavy— bough break—didi alone. whereas— vladimir: i hadn’t thought of that. estragon: if it’ll hang you it’ll hang anything.19 in light of a meaningless existence, the decision to kill oneself has just as much significance, or lack thereof, as any other course of action. suicide is simply one of the various choices that man can make, and taking action despite its futility echoes the persistent marching forward in camus’ the myth of sisyphus, wherein “sisyphus’s perseverance, in literal spite or contempt of the meaninglessness of his task, defined his superiority…he could exult in his defiance of fate.”20 in fact, “beckett’s people also lack sisyphus’s most minimal assurances…that the rock or the mountain will be present the next day or that time and space are as they appear…they lack the most basic certainties upon which defiance depends,”21 giving greater nobility to any action they take. especially in the case of suicide, action avoids the ultimate determinism of death, leaving gogo and didi the opportunity to seize and courageously determine the condition of their lives or deaths. the other course of action stems from the belief that “‘nothing is funnier than unhappiness…it’s the most comical thing in the world,’ since to laugh at our misery is the only way we have found of coming to terms with it.”22 on the stage, gogo and didi spend their time “blathering about nothing in particular,”23 19 beckett, waiting for godot, 13. 20 gordon, reading godot, 57. 21 ibid., 58. 22 fletcher, “bailing out the silence,” 13. 23 beckett, waiting for godot, 73. δ α 67 dianoia : issue i entertaining themselves, while beckett constructs a play which acts as a comedic diversion for the audience: “whatever the nature of the action on stage, its ultimate effect is to take up the time.”24 in fact, beckett employs traditional comedic structures, such as vaudeville, cross-talk routines, mirrored repetition, music hall monologues, circus clowning, and round songs as “the most popular and unpretentious forms of entertainment”25 and as a means of entertaining the audience in light of its meaningless existence. with no foundation of meaning and the impossibility of true passivity, man falls onto a path of action centered on nobility or comedy. though the two types of action seem very different, beckett melds the two by putting out a serious publication with intentional comedic effects, writing despite the futility of human action and for the sake of entertaining the audience, actors on a meaningless, earthly stage. as a source of action and a subsequent source of purpose, despite life’s inherent lack of value, beckett’s ethics in waiting for godot, by eliminating any assumptions about god, at least give man solid ground on which he can either march boldly forward or stand and laugh. bibliography beckett, samuel. waiting for godot. new york: grove press inc., 1982. print. esslin, martin. “the search for the self.” in modern critical interpretations: samuel beckett’s waiting for godot, edited by harold bloom, 23-40. new york: chelsea house publishers, 1987. print. fletcher, john. “bailing out the silence.” in modern critical interpretations: samuel beckett’s waiting for godot, edited by harold bloom, 11-22. new york: chelsea house publishers, 1987. print. frankl, viktor e. man’s search for meaning. boston: beacon press, 2006. print. gans, eric. “beckett and the problem of modern culture.” in modern critical interpretations: samuel beckett’s waiting for godot, edited by harold bloom, 95-110. new york: chelsea house publishers, 1987. print. gordon, lois. reading godot. new haven: yale university press, 2002. print. sartre, jean-paul. existentialism is a humanism. new haven: yale university press, 2007. print. 24 gans, “beckett and the problem of modern culture,” 98. 25 fletcher, “bailing out the silence,” 16-8. ο ν68 ο ν69 authors’ biographies neil patch is a senior english and philosophy student in the a&s honors program currently completing a thesis on franz kafka’s approach to faith. in addition to being a writing tutor, he has also worked as a music director at wzbc and continues to be an on-air dj. he will continue his studies at boston college this fall as a master’s student in english literature with an interest in modernism. bart celie is a member of the class of 2014, and is currently enrolled in the pre-med program as well as pursuing a major in philosophy and a minor in chemistry. he hopes to attend medical school upon completion of his undergraduate studies. clay venetis is a philosophy major graduating from boston college in 2013. he is interested in the intersections of ethics, aesthetics, and history. michael wangen is a senior in the carroll school of management majoring in finance and accounting. upon graduation, he is working as an audit associate for pricewaterhousecoopers llp. beyond business, he has academic interests in philosophy and theology. as a philosophy minor, he has tailored his courses to focus primarily on metaphysics but also on imagination, through which his essay was inspired. dan friedman is a history major with a philosophy minor. he will be graduating in the spring of 2013. he is interested in ancient civilizations like greece and rome, though he is more interested in roman history than greek. he is not yet sure what he wants to do after college, though he is considering law school. william adamowicz is a perspectives major in the class of 2013. he is currently doing philosophy, politics, and logic at worcester college in oxford, enjoying the sunshine, which comes about once every 10 days. he plans on giving back to the community through his investment banking internship. kara bradley is an economics major in boston college’s graduating class of 2013. after her time at boston college, she plans to pursue a graduate degree in either economics or public policy and find a career in research or academia, hoping to focus on dissecting and improving public education policy. δ final dianoia cover.pdf final dianoia body jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 on memory and post-truth: through the family album marta pinto machado universidade católica portuguesa, school of arts martagpmachado@gmail.com abstract facing an idea of post-truth — “post” as meaning to be beyond something, that signifies spatial distance, to go beyond the unrepresentable — and taking family history as a starting point, this article intends to understand and pluralize the eurocentric regime of truth over non-western narratives during the colonial period. through the only existing photography of my portuguese colonial priest and great-grandfather, it is meant to rethink and reformulate the problem of the western modern though and its application as a global model to understand memory, history and truth over the nonwestern knowledge as two co-producers and complementing models of modernity. keywords: colonialism; representation; memory; history; regime of truth. https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5615-3140 30 ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . 30 “in some cultural contexts, interpretation is a liberating act. it is a means of revising, of transvaluing, of escaping the dead past. in other cultural contexts, it is reactionary, impertinent, cowardly, stifling.” (sontag, 2001, p. 20) on constructing memory until today, my family incessantly shares photos of my great-grandfather exclaiming his beauty or the excellence of having dedicated himself to the church, absorbed in a truth that they choose not to repeat: my greatgrandfather was a portuguese priest sent on a religious mission to cape verde. i never knew my great-grandfather; my mother and her brothers never knew him either. my great-grandfather, joaquim pinto, was in cape verde between 1900 and 1920, sent by portugal and it was in cape verde that he met ludovina, a local woman with whom he had four children, one of them lino, who he never saw growing up. they didn’t marry under the catholic church, they never followed any norm, from the deviation from the priest’s role to the deviation as a christian. my great-grandfather returned to portugal when the portuguese state removed him from ribeira grande in cape verde. he fulfilled his role. my grandparents lino and engrácia got married at the age of 65, nine children raised. they got married late, perhaps because of grandfather lino’s rejection of his father’s catholic beliefs, who although he didn’t know much about, he knew had abandoned his mother. cape verde is a state of slave origin, initially populated by a white elite dedicated to the commercial trade that brought their black slaves, and portrait of pe. joaquim pinto, circa 1900 © pinto family 31 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 31 which, being the country geographically on the slave trade route, made it an important trading post for both goods (like sugar cane and cotton) and human slaves. as is “historically” known, the european expansion process began with two main events: the portuguese explorations of the african coast (1430 – 1498), and columbus voyages to the “new world” (1492 – 1502). the pretext for such expansion was based on the search for wealth and new trade routes and on the mission to christianize the “wild world”. bringing the faith to the subjugated other under the pretext of enlightening and civilizing, makes the division of africa under the purview of western “civilized” countries feasible. the slaves who remained in cape verde were forcibly converted to christianity, the faith was used as a way of “civilizing” the other, disregarding other ideas and equally valid civilizational backgrounds; the names were changed to portuguese names that were easier for the colonizers to pronounce. this is how a nation is formed, made up of a plebs of black bodies forced into “civilized” procedures, stripped of their identities and histories, non-subjects for centuries, imposed by the white masters who ruled this country now part of the portuguese empire period. history, interpretation, representation my great-grandfather met my great-grandmother sometime in the first decade of the 20th century, when cape verde belonged to portugal, also when, for the republican colonialists, it was at the “time of affirmation of the empire, of the values of the race (a supposed portuguese race) (alexandre, 1979) to impose on almost savage peoples. cláudia castelo states that “miscegenation was considered to have negative consequences and that mestizos were biologically inferior” (castelo, 1998, p. 84) and that the solution laid in ethnic colonization, that is, in the “settlement of african colonies by a large white population, from both sexes, to avoid racial mixing” (alexandre, 1979, pp. 7 – 8). portugal had, at the time, the historical duty of imposing on the “inferior races” the values of western civilization and christianity in an immaculate way. it is difficult to say when ludovina (she did not have a surname) and father joaquim pinto met. it’s information that no one, family member or friend, can give; a subject that, when questioned, is translated into almost nothing, it’s a taboo. colonial space is a place of ontological shock, full of indigenous meaning that competes with a foreign semiotics that does not accommodate class and gender distinctions in the same way, and that must be rewritten in order to admit colonial appropriation. “the archeology of the human sciences has to be established through studying the mechanisms of power which have invested human bodies, acts and forms of behavior. and this investigation enables us to rediscover one of the conditions of the emergence of 32 ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . 32 the human sciences: the great nineteenth century effort in discipline and normalization.” (foucault, 1988, p. 61) in this quote, foucault refers to the constitution of a disciplinary system in post-industrial societies that allowed separating the “normal” from the “abnormal” and that defines power relations and, consequently, the history of what happens from the 19th century onwards. the essential role of “history” in these centuries is to represent a past that induces a perception of the present in order to create what paul ricoeur refers to as “social frameworks of memory” (ricouer, 2006), in the sense of normalizing a path that leads to the success of that historical time. history is a representation of the past which, as a representation, implies an interpretation of facts. the word “representation” is applied in the sense that ricoeur understands in chapter 3 of the book “memory, history, forgetting”, i.e., as an indicator of a continuity between the explanatory problematic of writing or of the literary; representation translates into an explanatory object of formation of social bonds and identities through these connections, in the way social agents understand them through the way historians represent (through their own view and social formation) the relationship between the represented object and social action. in short, representation ceases to constitute two phases of the historiographical process, emerging as the connecting plane between history and memory (ricouer, 2006). “it is in terms of representation that the phenomenology of memory, following plato and aristotle, described the mnemonic phenomenon in that what is remembered is given as an image of what was previously seen, heard, experienced, learned, acquired. furthermore, it is in terms of representation that what memory intends can be formulated insofar as it is said to be about the past.” (ricoeur, 2006, p. 235) representation can also be understood as an interpretation of a subject. interpretation, and consequently, representation, must be evaluated under “the historical view of human consciousness” (sontag, 2001, p. 20), that means that any subject, before becoming an object of historical knowledge, is object of a narrative, a facilitator, a means, a representation of an event that implies a narrator. a narrator’s descriptive capacity is limited by the story’s inability to absorb the entirety of versions of an event; since the narrator is not an apolitical subject, this figure has a position fostered in a certain period of time and space, the narrator is, unapologetically, a historical and political subject. in fact, this narrator acts under a regime of truth, in the case of the nation-state, an actor under a rhetoric that claims a statute of truth for his speech, which will negotiate the meaning of social relations and their meaning in order to ensure a national identity. the state recreates the meaning of nationality not only through authoritarianism, but through the 33 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 33 creation of relationships of dependence and consent between the various actors that constitute these social and political relationships. therefore, representation contributes in part to the creation of rules that would discipline the nation’s constituent bodies, positioning them in the social hierarchy, in a self-regulated system by the political axis of representation (tagg, 1988). as homi bhabha said, “nations like narratives lose their origins in the myths of time and only fully realize their horizons in the mind’s eye. such an image of the nation — or narration — might seem impossibly romantic and excessively metaphorical, but it is from those traditions of political though and literary language that the nation emerges as a powerful historical idea in the west. an idea whose cultural compulsion lies in the impossible unity of the nation as a symbolic force.” (bhabha, 2014, p. 1) one could argue that the success of the eurocentric modernity could only be achieved by the exclusion of the non-west world, and that “the narrative of the emergence of modernity does not, in itself, compromise the eurocentrism of the conventional narrative. this narrative can be modified in order to recognize a ‘co-production’ of modernity, while continuing to assign the central role to europe.” (seth, 2022, p. 153). this co-production of modernity in europe means the integration of the non-west in the history of modernity — linked to the colonial expansion process — could be, as sanjay seth defends, an intellectual strategy to comprehend a west/ non-west model as complementary because it seeks to disassociate the modernity from europe alleging historical and empirical questions, turning this strategy into a global one (not universal one). it’s proposed to rethink and reframe the western model of though as a way to understand non-western possibilities of narrative, knowing that both models are intrinsically correlated and are constructed through the strict relation to the other. in terms of representation through visual means, the ocular-centric regime put in place by the western world as a means of producing truth in a certain “regime of truth”, crystallized through photography, a series of policies of belonging and exclusion, producing parallel categories for the body, truth and knowledge, and for identity and power. this categorization generated by western visual culture, in imperialist regimes “of reconstituting the world in circumscribed spaces for control and exhibition, functioned as a dramatic (and traumatic) extension of a process of affirmation of the sovereignty of the subject (of humanism). in this context, the creation of botanical and zoological gardens in the urban environment transferred the elements of a primitive arcadia to the city, causing the exotic and wild to be framed today as locus amoenos or as havens of pleasure and fun. integrating new representations in which exoticism was rescued to a comfortable domesticity (to the viewer).” (azevedo, 2008, p. 15) 34 ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . 34 according to foucault, the regime that a society establishes as a “regime of truth” (foucault, 1988) formulates a type of discourse that harbors mechanisms based on a certain “truth”, mechanisms that allow us to distinguish true and false within a “social framework”, a status of obtaining “truth” from those in power to dictate what is “true”. a regime of truth, a discourse in favor of a strategy of power. a narrative that becomes history, a memory that becomes historicized. we can introduce pierre nora’s concept of “memory-nation” (nora, 1984), about the need to create symbols to consolidate an idea of history, an idea of a dead memory that is still present, signs on the statutory form, on a hymn, or in the form of a national holiday and exaltation of remote deeds as constitutive of national identity. indeed, we can infer that the state’s ability to define and carry out its “projects”, as well as its ability to authorize official narratives of historical memory, depend on the state’s claim to power, i.e., power defines the terms of its representation and the ability to exercise it over those whose authority is claimed under those terms. to paraphrase paul ricoeur (2006), it is through the nation as a regulatory entity that memory-history acquires the same space of meaning as memory. ricouer, also mentions “memory grasped by history”, a memory grounded in history, through the archive and writing, the moment in which hypomnesis (remembrance, written memory, dead, belonging to the past) replaces mnemé (living memory). the rising nationalisms of the 19th and 20th centuries place modern states involved in the reproduction of a national identity, in a homogenization of the population and in the clear identification of what the idea of nation is and of a representation and stratification of societies by national subjects based on an idea of juis sanguinis as opposed to the other members of the nation, the inferior other. the discontinuity of the nation created by imperialism and by the rupture between history and memory, creating a closed history of the nation and historicized memory produced by institutionalized mechanisms, although it allows to make visible the mechanisms that involve the history imposed until then, it also promotes an opportunity to rewrite the conscience of the nation. this discontinuity is louder when oral testimony is silenced, and memory and history break down, not because of the loss of meaning of the mnemé, but by the imposition of hypomnesis imposed on the meaning of archive and rewriting of the collective narratives of the other in its insertion into the collective memory of the western-self. the voice of the subaltern in the experience of history, in the narrative outside the political narrative, is the space of silence of the main narrative. my great-grandfather is much more present on the memory of our family history, crystallized by this picture, the only one we own of him, than my great-grandmother, of whom we have no photographic record. it is her absence i specially notice while looking at this photography of father joaquim pinto. 35 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 35 the role of narrative in the construction of identity identity is deeply rooted in process and representation. in this way, the modeling of space-time relationships in different representation systems has profound effects on the way identities are located and represented. the white male normative subject, represented in the 18th century’s paintings, or in his vision in the 17th century, in which the woman and the landscape constituted elements of the same sedentarization territory in a topographical imaginary that fit the masculine sensibilities, has a different meaning. cultural identity of the subject who sees himself/herself mirrored in the fragmented and fractured “faces” that look from the planes of the broken surfaces of one of picasso’s paintings. all identities are located in a symbolic space and time, they have what edward said calls “imaginary geographies”, their characteristic “landscapes”, their sense of “place”, of “home”, as well as their locations in the time (said, 2003), in invented traditions that link past and present, in origin myths that project the present in reference to the past, in narratives of nation that connect individual memory to broader national historical events. “that space within oneself where resistance is possible remains. it is different than to talk about becoming subjects. that process emerges as one comes to understand how structures of domination work in one’s own life, as one develops critical thinking and critical consciousness, as one invents new, alternative habits of being, and resist from that marginal space of difference inwardly defined.” (hooks, 1990, p. 15) the desire to belong to an idea of the west, admiring what is of the west in our family, through a manichean idea of progress, an internal narrative, not so much political but emotional, is an impediment to the construction of the “historical” narrative of the family, of mine and so many other cape verdean families with similar origins. cape verde is a particular case on the colonial scenario, as it was something of a laboratory of miscegenation by the time gilberto freyre was developing the lusotropicalist theory that would consolidate the portuguese narrative of a kind colonialism, the perfect african/european population. especially after the reviewing of the colonial act, introduced on the legislation so to respond to the external political pressures after the end of the second world war and consequent proclaiming of the right to self-determination of the colonized territories consecrated by the united nations in 1945. at least since the last quarter of the 19th century, facing external pressure and attacks, the idea of a particular adaptation of the portuguese to the tropical climate and a special relationship with the colonized indigenous peoples permeated the national political and ideological discourse. (alexandre, 2000, p. 393) 36 ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . 36 that ideology has had an effect on the identity, or sense of belonging, of the cape verdean population, that do not see themselves as europeans or africans. although that is less felt between the younger population as time goes by and the colonial period gets further back in the living memory, in a path to affirm their african heritage. in the imperial system of dominance, photographies took an important role in creating history. the process of large dissemination (in paper journals, postcards, or even familiar correspondence…) provided an environment of repeated viewing, crystallizing concepts such as social hierarchies, foreign and domestic citizens, and other tropes, as barthes noted “the photograph mechanically repeats what could never be repeated existentially” (barthes, 2018, p.12). the status of truth that photographies in the imperial apparatus claimed, is something that is a problem of “realism”. a photography is a result of a context — historical, political and social — and of a regime of truth which foucault argues as a political, economic and institutional analysis of the social production of such truth. as john tagg mentions “realism” is not a universal and a-historical conception, nor a pre-given recipe for practice (tagg, 1988). realism presumes an idea on endurance through time of a certain “truth”, when any “truth” is historically and ideologically definable. we must actually question that any representation of a subject can endure in any sense, for every product is defined within a social, political, ideological context. we may imply that it is in the in between ontological spaces of signification, that a narrative can be built, between the marginal spaces of history and the central construct of the written/ official history of the nations, in a cultural and political authority negotiation. it’s time to reject the imperialism’s conceptual apparatus altogether and give room to the silence in the archive to take part of history as ariella azoulay defends (azoulay, 2019). maybe not reject, but to confront the history making tools with a janus type method, investigating the nation’s history in the process of the articulation of elements: “where meanings may be partial because they are in media res; and history may be halfmade because it is in the process of being made; and the image of cultural authority may be ambivalent because it is caught, uncertainly, in the act of ‘composing’ its powerful image.” (bhabha, 2018, p. 3) writing and consequently the archive, libraries, dictionaries, etc., are symbolic objects of memory made available as instruments of the historical process. pierre nora argues in “lieux de mémoire” that these places of memory (which include holidays, monuments, commemorations, museums…), due to the patrimonial metamorphosis of a national identity, do not exist in the service of memory, but in the service of history (nora, 1984). we can make a parallel with the idea of pharmakon, in plato, between the place of memory and the place of writing. derrida mentions “(…) the pharmakon, or if you will, writing, can only go around in circles: writing is only apparently good for memory, seemingly able to help it from 37 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 37 within, through its own motion, to know what is true. but in truth, writing is essentially bad, external to memory, productive not of science but of belief, not of truth but of appearances. the pharmakon produces a play of appearances which enable it to pass for truth, etc.” (derrida, 1983, p. 99)1 plato’s philosophy is partly reflected in this duality, in the division of reality into the sphere of appearances and phenomenon and the sphere of truth, namely in the allegory of the cave in “the republic”, in which in a cave there are people chained to walls without being able to see the light of day, only being able to see shadows of what happens outside reflected on the walls of the cave. following this metaphor, plato in “phaedrus” claims that writing is included in the sphere of appearance, of a belief or false reality, a non-truth, the illusion of knowledge (platão, 2019). writing is external to (internal) memory. “i can tell you what our forefathers have said about it, but the truth of it is only know by tradition. however, if we could discover that truth for ourselves, should we still be concerned with the fancies of mankind?” (platão, 2019, p. 119) of phaedrus’ dialogue in the story about king thamus and the god theuth, derrida writes: “confident of the permanence and independence of its types (tupoi), memory will fall asleep, will not keep itself up, will no longer keep to keeping itself alert, present, as close as possible to the truth of what it is. letting itself get stoned (médusée) by its own signs…” much like writing is a representation of the oral speech, “its own guardians, by the types committed to the keeping and surveillance of knowledge…”, such as institutions and other places of memory “it will sink down into léthé, overcome by non-knowledge and forgetfulness. memory and truth cannot be separated”. (derrida, 1983, p. 99) the relationship between writing and oral speech is a mechanism developed by the western tradition. national identity is corroborated by writing, by an official language, by the supremacy of the document and the ability to write that confirm the superior civilization of the west, by the signed document that validates the distribution of african territory by the western powers. the concept of the west and its identity, although formed by internal processes that shape this set of european countries as a distinct group (during the european imperial period), is reinforced by the opposition to the non-west (hall, 2018). it is represented and created by its opposite and by its sense of difference from other cultures, as the word west acquires meaning and is represented in relation to the other. binary constructions become fundamental in linguistic systems for the production of meaning, in written discourse and in western oral discourse. extending the argument over the construction of meaning and the written word, saussure, establishes that for the construction of a term’s meaning, it is required to form a relationship with other existing terms in a linguistic system (saussure, 1966). in this way, the construction of meaning depends on the difference of two opposing terms that, being 1. about derrida and the “plato’s pharmacy”, it is important to mention his skepticism towards the concept of pharmakon. “this association between writing and the pharmakon still seems external; it could be judge artificial and purely coincidental. but the intention and intonation are recognizably the same: one and the same suspicion envelops in a single embrace the book and the drug, writing and whatever works in an occult, ambiguous manner open to empiricism and chance, governed by the ways of magic and not the laws of necessity. books, the dead and rigid knowledge shut up in biblia, piles of histories, nomenclatures, recipes and formulas learned by heart, all this is foreign to living knowledge and dialectics as the pharmakon is to medical science.” (derrida, 1983, pp. 72 – 73) this not being a philosophical paper, it isn’t meant to expand the theme exhaustively for the sake of the argument, although it is important to mention that derrida’s position towards the concept of pharmakon is more extensive and complex than what is argued in this excerpt. 38 ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . 38 different, are co-dependent in the creation of their individual meanings, for example, “the night” does not exist without its opposite “the day”. “at a certain moment, the fates of what had been for many centuries separate and distinct worlds became – some would say, fatally harnessed together in the same historical time frame. they became related elements in the same discourse, or way of speaking. they became different parts of one global social, economic, and cultural system, one interdependent world, one language.” (hall, 2018, p. 145) the truth constructed over the photography of joaquim pinto, about his western beauty, is constructed in opposition to the african greatgrandmother, daughter of a badia – which is the term used for slaves who fled their master’s to santo antão or to the mountains of santiago island. the dichotomic language, or the prevalence of one figure over the absence of the other, might be read as a produce of the colonial project, of a colonial system of representation through the absence of the subaltern voices. the process of colonialism is a project of establishing the creation of discursive strategies in order to legitimize the dominion of one over the other, through the construction of representations of the other through the use of stereotypes that operate mainly on the combination of adjectives that establish certain characteristics. like truths. stuart hall refers to hulme with regard to the idea of the other’s discourse namely on “stereotypical dualism”: “1. first, several characteristics are collapsed into one simplified figure which stands for or represents the essence of the people; this is stereotyping. 2. second, the stereotype is split into two halves — its “good” and “bad” sides; this is “splitting” or ‘dualism’. far from the discourse of the west and the rest being unified and monolithic, ‘splitting’ is a regular feature of it. the world is first divided, symbolically, into good/bad, us/them, attractive/disgusting, civilize/uncivilized, the west/ and the rest. (…) by this strategy, the rest becomes defined as everything that the west is not — its mirror image.” (hall, 2018, p. 171) colonialism is, in addition to the occupation and territory of others, the creation of a policy of difference between colonists/indigenous, human/subhuman, it is a project of western supremacy, it is a project of economic, political and geographical domination. it is mastery over history in western narrative. if one of my great-grandfathers (from my maternal grandfather’s lineage) was a portuguese priest and it is possible to trace his family back to the 18th century, the other great-grandfather (from my maternal grandmother’s lineage) is, on file, non-existent. we only know who 39 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 39 the great-grandmother was and from there only one more generation is known, a woman maria ana da graça (maria ana da graça had no surname), towards the past there were no registered names, only property titles. the way i found to understand ludovina (my great-grandmother) and to get closer to her is by understanding her absence through the presence of father joaquim pinto (my great-grandfather) and the only photography that renders him “real”. “the world, our world, is depleted, impoverished enough. away with all duplicates of it, until we again experience more immediately what we have.” (sontag, 2001, p. 21) references alexandre, v. 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(1984). les lieux de mémoire, la nation, vol.2. gallimard. 40 ht tp s: //d oi .o rg /1 0. 34 63 2/ js ta .2 02 2. 11 62 0 jo ur na l o f s ci en ce a nd t ec hn ol og y of th e a rt s, v ol . 1 4, n . 2 (2 02 2) : p p. 2 940 . 40 platão (2019). fedro. edições 70. ricoeur, p. (2006). memory, history, forgetting. university of chicago press. said, e. (2003). orientalism. penguin classics. saussure, f. (1966). course in general linguistic. mcgraw-hill book co. seth, s. (2021). história e pós-colonialismo: ensaios sobre conhecimento ocidental, eurocentrismo e ciências sociais. imprensa de história contemporânea. sontag, s. (2001). against interpretation. st. martin’s press. tagg, j. (1988). the burden of representation, essays on photographies and histories. university of minnesota press. article received on 17/06/2022 and accepted on 21/07/2022. creative commons attribution license | this is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the creative commons attribution license (cc by). the use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) and the copyright owner(s) are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. no use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms. j.s. vos paul and sophistic rhetoric: a perspective on his argumentation in the letter to the galatians abstract in this article paul’s argumentation is analysed from the perspective of sophistic rhetoric. in the first section the question is discussed what it means to label paul’s rhetoric in his letter to the galatians ‘sophistic.’ to that end, an attempt is made to reconstruct the view of a contemporary critical reader who did not share paul’s presuppositions and who was well acquainted with the discussions in the philosophical and rhetorical schools about acceptable and non-acceptable rhetorical methods. this approach is compared with other approaches to analysing paul’s argumentation. the second section investigates more closely what it means when ‘sophistic rhetoric’ is used as a key to analyse paul’s theology. to that end, some models which start from a ‘platonic’ view of rhetoric are compared with a model which combines a ‘(neo-) sophistic’ or constructionist view with a ‘rhetoric of power.’ 1. introduction the purpose of this paper is to explore the extent to which it is helpful to analyse paul’s argumentation from the perspective of sophistic rhetoric. in the first section i will take up the question of what it means to label paul’s rhetoric in his letter to the galatians ‘sophistic.’ i shall try to define my position by comparing it with some older and some more recent approaches. in the second section i will investigate more closely what it means when ‘sophistic rhetoric’ is used as a key to analyse paul’s theology. i will do this by comparing ‘platonic’ and ‘(neo-)sophistic’ perspectives. acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 dr. j.s. vos, vrije universiteit amsterdam & visiting scholar, department of new testament, university of the free state, bloemfontein. vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 30 2. perspectives on paul’s argumentation 2.1 historical and modern perspectives the analysis of paul’s argumentation has always played an important role in the history of the interpretation of his letters. it was, however, hans dieter betz (1976:101, 108-111) who placed the analysis of his way of arguing — as part of a comprehensive rhetorical analysis — in a historical context. this historical perspective is characteristic of betz’s approach: he does not make use of modern rhetorical theories but analyses the letter in terms of the classical system of rhetoric. this approach has consequences for his evaluation of paul’s rhetoric. a clear example of this can be seen in his assessment of the rational character of paul’s arguments. betz views the letter to the galatians as an apologetic one. the use of rational arguments and the appeal to reason are characteristic of such a letter. according to betz (1979:30), “[t]he body of the letter contains nothing but one strictly rational argument.” there are, however, limitations concerning its rationality from the perspective of the modern reader: “of course one must keep in mind that paul’s rationality is conditioned by his time and its intellectual traditions and conventions. ‘logic’ is certainly not above historical relativity!” (betz 1979:30). what this means for the concrete evaluation of paul’s argumentation becomes visible in betz’s treatment of galatians 3:6-14: to the readers of today ... paul’s way of arguing appears arbitrary in the highest degree .... as a matter of methodological principle, however, one will have to analyze both the quotations from scripture and the meaning paul finds in terms of his, and not simply our modern, methodology .... we cannot expect more from paul’s method than what was expected in his own time .... if we keep this methodology in mind, it can be shown that paul’s argument is consistent (betz 1979:137-138). after betz published his commentary, there was a great deal of discussion on the value of ancient and modern systems of rhetoric as critical tools for analysing paul’s method of arguing. as francois tolmie (2005:1-3, 10-23) in his book persuading the galatians has already presented a survey of the discussion, i will confine myself to comparing three recent approaches. in his book argumentiert paulus logisch? moisés mayordomo analyses paul’s way of arguing from the perspective of ancient logic. the subtitle of his book is eine analyse vor dem hintergrund antiker logik. his motives for this choice of ancient instead of modern logic show a certain ambivalence. one argument is the state of exegetical research: in current research the historical context is the privileged basis for understanding the biblical texts. accordingly, it is advisable to take this context as a starting point for an analysis of paul’s argumentation (2005:21-22). a second argument is the universality of the ancient system of logic. according to mayordomo, hat die antike logik wesentliche formen sprachlichen argumentierens formal korrekt erfasst und ist darin noch bis heute gültig. sie ist durch die moderne logik nicht einfach ersetzt, sondern darin ... integriert und präzisiert worden (mayordomo 2005:22). as there is no research tradition in which modern logic is used as a tool for analysing paul’s way of arguing, mayordomo finds it safer to begin with the first steps of logic. in my view, however, there is a tension between both arguments: if ancient logic is relatively timeless insofar as there is no essential difference between ancient and modern logic, than it is hard to see why one should follow the exegetical tradition of studying paul’s letters in their historical context. as a whole, mayordomo’s choice for ancient logic as a starting point seems to be inspired more by pragmatic motives than by ones of principle. a position opposite to approaches such as those of betz and mayordomo is taken by mika hietanen in his book paul’s argumentation in galatians. he uses a modern approach, the pragma-dialectical method, developed by frans van eemeren and rob grootendorst, as a tool for analysing paul’s argumentation in the letter to the galatians. his objection to the classical rhetorical approach is that it can become an anachronism. in the classical period, there was no single uniform rhetorical approach but various ones. thus, the theory that is actually used is either a modern synthesis or an analysis according to a specific classical tradition whose connection with paul is weak (hietanen 2005:31). against those interpreters who claim that classical rhetoric is actually ‘universal rhetoric,’ hietanen argues that if one is analysing rhetoric from a universal perspective, modern ‘universal’ methods would be more accurate. rather than attempting to make the approach itself historical, he suggests that historical considerations should be included in a modern sophisticated approach (hietanen 2005:32). my main question with regard to this approach concerns the relationship between modern and ancient methods. if i used a modern approach such as the pragma-dialectical method for analysing paul’s argumentation, i would nevertheless be interested in the relationship of the criteria used by this method and the criteria with which paul’s contemporary readers would have confronted him. i missed a chapter on this subject in his book. a different line is taken by francois tolmie in his book persuading the galatians. he does not choose a specific rhetorical model — ancient or modern — to apply to the letter; rather, he attempts “to reconstruct paul’s rhetorical strategy from the text itself, using the letter itself as the starting point” (tolmie 2005:27). in his book he not only describes paul’s rhetorical acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 31 vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 32 strategies but also attempts to evaluate them. thus, he identifies ‘weak points’ in paul’s rhetorical strategy. it may be clear that such an evaluation is not derived from the text itself. as we will see in the next section, the quality of paul’s argumentation can be evaluated in different ways. the difference here from mayordomo’s and hietanen’s approaches lies in the fact that the latter identify precisely the set of standards they use to evaluate paul’s argumentation. my question would be: what is tolmie’s point of departure when evaluating some points in paul’s argumentation to be weak and others strong? tolmie’s analysis invites the reader to look behind the unconscious rhetorical theory underlying his approach. i myself advocate a plurality of methods. a basic condition is that the method should be clear and well defined. the tools the interpreter chooses should depend on the goal he sets. in my book die kunst der argumentation bei paulus, i do not use the same tools for analysing as i do for evaluating paul’s way of arguing. in the analysis, i do not restrict myself to the tools of ancient rhetoric but also make use of the rhetorical theories of chaim perelman and lucy olbrechts-tyteca. in my view, they offer tools that are not developed in the same way in the ancient rhetorical literature. in analysis every tool that helps me to get a grip on the intricate argumentative strategies of paul is welcome. as far as the evaluation of these strategies is concerned, however, my aim is different. i am interested in the question of the extent to which paul’s argumentative moves were acceptable for the readers in his time. to be sure, opinions about the persuasive power of paul’s arguments were extremely varied from the very beginning. i have chosen to shed light on one particular point of view to which too little attention has been paid in the history of research. i attempt to reconstruct the view of a critical reader who did not share paul’s presuppositions and who was both thoroughly versed in jewish scripture and well acquainted with the discussions in the philosophical and rhetorical schools about acceptable and non-acceptable rhetorical methods. we could compare the competence of such a reader with that of philo of alexandria. from this perspective, i hope to be able to answer questions about the continuity and discontinuity between modern and ancient criteria for what is acceptable with regard to argumentation. 2.2 rhetoric and truth according to betz (1979:30), the limitations of the rationality of paul’s argumentation do not end with the different methodology of the apostle in its historical context. another limitation has to do with the tension between the art of rhetoric and the truth. in antiquity “‘the art of rhetoric’ was considered to be irreconcilably opposed to the discussion of theological ‘truth’ questions.” to quote betz at length: acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 33 as antiquity saw it, lawcourt rhetoric, like any rhetoric, has little in common with ‘truth.’ rhetoric is the exercise of those skills that make people believe something to be true. for that reason it is interested in demonstration, in persuasion, in talking people into something, but it is not interested in finding out what the truth is. how can one be concerned with defending something as the truth and, at the same time, be disinterested in that truth? one cannot. it is, therefore, not a surprise that apologetics has never shown much respect for what one calls ‘the facts.’ it is only the defense strategy which determines what the facts are allowed to be. quite understandably, apologetics was always associated with intellectual manipulation, dishonesty, and cynicism. it was always regarded as a handy tool of power-politics (betz 1976:100; cf. 1979:24, 30). according to betz (1979:30), however, paul was aware of this limitation and had found ways to overcome it. characteristic of betz’s analysis is that he avoids describing paul’s argumentation in terms of manipulation, dishonesty or disrespect for the facts. incidentally, he can say that paul discredits his adversaries by using “the language of demagoguery” (betz 1979:44-45), but generally betz describes paul’s argumentation as reasonable and acceptable within the historical context. i am of the opinion that interpreters of paul’s letters should pursue this point of view as far as possible. at the same time, however, they should explore alternative perspectives. one of these perspectives is to see a much closer connection between paul’s argumentation and the ‘art of rhetoric’ as described by betz.this line of interpretation goes back to eduard norden. almost a century ago norden (1918:499 n.1) wrote that a classical scholar who reads the letters of paul is reminded of the argumentation of the sophists. he refers to jerome who, in his letter to pammachius (ep. 49 [48], 13), describes the difference between the polemical and the didactic sections in the letters of paul. characteristic of the polemical genre as described by aristotle and gorgias is that the orator uses the most diverse — even seemingly contradictory — strategies to gain victory. according to jerome, paul does exactly the same in the polemical sections of his letters. more recently, michael goulder characterized the argument of galatians as “a sequence of preposterous sophistries.” according to him, the countermission in galatia had the bible, the church, and reason entirely on its side: paul won the fight against all the odds by a dazzling display of intellectual pyrotechnics, reinforced by his own saintliness and force of character and his converts’ loyalty and distaste for the knife .... we may be grateful to him for this outrageous logic and for so enabling christianity to become a world religion; but we should concede that theology deserves a bad name if an acceptable universalism has to be brought at such a price (goulder 1987:489-90). janet fairweather, herself a classical scholar, who refers to goulder’s judgement, adds: ... it is certainly not a foolish question to ask how much paul’s argumentative procedures owe, directly or indirectly, to the greek sophistic movement ... the fact that he argues one side of the case so forcibly, without even feeling it necessary, out of politeness, to concede that his opponents have at least the weight of tradition on their side, suggests heavy indebtedness to a tradition of adversarial debating, maybe even one in which people learnt to make ‘the weaker argument seem the stronger’, like the sophists of fifth-century greece (fairweather 1994:216). she also reckons with the possibility that practice in arguing for both sides belonged to paul’s pharisaic upbringing. she refers to the early rabbinic saying that “no one is to be appointed a member of the sanhedrin unless he is able to prove from biblical texts the ritual cleanliness of a reptile” (fairweather 1994:217).1 as we shall see in the next section, for fairweather, paul’s letter to the galatians shows a certain amount of indebtedness to the sophistic manner only at a superficial level. at a more fundamental level she sees some clear differences from it (fairweather 1994:230-243). in my die kunst der argumentation bei paulus, i defend the thesis that paul is a master in the art of “making the weaker argument the stronger” or — from the perspective of his opponents — “making the weaker argument seem the stronger.”2 according to their opponents, sophists taught “the ability to adopt the worse argument and yet win the disputation” (aristophanes, nubes 1042) or “the ability to make just things appear unjust and the unjust just” (sextus empiricus, adv. mathematicos 2.46). from the perspective of jewish tradition, the apostle defends a very weak position in the letter to the galatians. from a conventional point of view, it is an extremely weak position to maintain, on the one hand, the authority of scripture and to proclaim, on the other, that characteristic rules of the law of sinai are not binding, while denying, moreover, that the law has been given to give life to those who fulfil its commandments. nevertheless, paul succeeded in convincing the great majority of christians of his position. on the one hand, it is true that most of his rhetorical and hermeneutical strategies and techniques were common in his world; on the other, many of these strategies and techniques could, from the perspective of opponents, be labelled sophistic trickery. in the ancient world vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 34 1 she refers to lieberman (1977:305 [63]), who quotes tb sanhedrin 17a and tp sanhedrin 4.1 (22a). 2 for the meaning and the possible translations of this phrase, see vos (2002:3-6). acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 35 people knew very well that it was possible to evade the law by manipulating words and interpretations. this was termed sofivzesqai to;n novmon (cf. philostratus, vita apollonii 2.40). to give but one example, i will quote a passage from sextus empiricus’ polemic against the rhetoricians: and that rhetoric is against the laws is already plain from the statements they make in their mal-artful arts. for at one time they advise us to attend to the ordinance and words of the lawgiver as being clear and needing no explanation, at another time they turn round and advise us to follow neither the ordinance nor the words but the intention ... and sometimes they bid us cut out bits as we read the law, and construct a different sense from what remains. often, too, they make distinctions in ambiguous phrases and support the signification which suits themselves; and they do thousands of other things which tend to the upsetting of the laws. hence also, the byzantine orator, when asked ‘how goes the byzantines’ law?’ replied ‘as i choose.’ for just as jugglers deceive the eyes of the beholders by their sleight of hand, so the orators by their low cunning blind the minds of the judges to the law and steal the votes” (adv. mathematicos 2.36-39; transl. r. g. bury). paul’s opponents in galatia would regard every text used by paul in chapters 3-4 of his letter as an endorsement of their own point of view. they would use the story of abraham to defend the necessity of circumcision for gentile believers, they would not separate faith from obedience to the law, and they would use leviticus 18:5 and deuteronomy 27:26 to convince the galatians that it is impossible to have a share in the blessings of the covenant, the gifts of righteousness, life and sonship, without obedience to the law. for a critical reader who is well versed in the classical discussions on the criteria for sound and unsound argumentation (cf. vos 2002:14-24) and who would use criteria similar to those used by sextus empiricus, paul’s argumentation in galatians 3-4 would have all the characteristics of rhetorical manipulation: • the apostle uses arguments — to use aristotelian terminology (cf. aristoteles, de sophisticis elenchis 1 164a20) — that seem to be logical but are not truly so. in 3:10 the alleged logical link between the first and the second part of the verse does not exist.3 3 cf. betz (1979:45): “on the surface, deut 27:26 says the opposite of what he (sc. paul) claims it says.” mayordomo (2005:164-166): im konkreten fall von gal. 3,6-12 lässt sich eine logische argumentation nur mit unausgesprochenen hilfsprämissen rekonstruieren … die prämisse in v. 10, dass kein gesetzesmensch alle gebote erfüllt, ist gerade im rahmen allgemeiner jüdischer vorstellungen über den bund und den segen der vergebung kaum einsichtig. • he uses false premisses, arguing from scripture but at the same time separating what always belongs together in scripture: the covenant of abraham and the covenant of sinai, faith in god and works of the law. • he omits relevant texts: he refers to abraham’s faith without mentioning his obedience to the law and the commandment of circumcision (genesis 17:1-27; 26:4-5). • he uses exegetical techniques that can be seen as extreme opposites: on the one hand, in his interpretation of the word spevrma he uses the technique of understanding a term in its strict sense (3:16-17); on the other hand, he gives a daring allegorical interpretation of the story of hagar and sarah and their children, which displays the greatest discrepancy between the letter and the intention of the text (4:2-31).4 • he ascribes an intention of the lawgiver that contrasts radically with the letter of the law.5 whereas the letter of law reads: “whoever does the works of the law will live by them,” paul denies that the intention of the lawgiver had ever been to make alive people through the law (3:21-22). • he distorts accepted legislation creating self-invented rules that suit his argument. the rule that nobody can change a person’s will, once it has been ratified, is contrary to legal practice. • he adapts accepted legal traditions to suit his argument. whereas, in the case of conflicting laws, it is generally accepted that later laws and promulgations have more weight because they imply the abrogation of the earlier ones (cf. cicero, de inventione 2.145; hebrews 7:18-19, 28; 8:13), paul starts from the reverse principle, arguing that the law of sinai has less validity because it came later than the promise to abraham. • by speaking in veiled terms and using obscure arguments he suggests a deeper scriptural meaning, which he has actually invented himself (3:19-22).6 if a critical reader would have had the traditional anti-sophistic arsenal at his disposal he would have attributed to paul all the characteristics of a sophist: an impostor who had deviated from the truth, deceiving the galatians with human inventions, bewitching them with dark arguments and spurious vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 36 4 cf. the first argument in the above quoted passage from sextus empiricus, adv. mathematicos 2.36-39. 5 on the relationship of scriptum and sententia, cf. cicero, de inventione 2.121b-143. 6 on obscuritas as a characteristic of sophistic speech, cf. philo, quis rerum divinarum heres? 302-303. logic, juggling texts and distorting law. he would have depicted him as a flatterer, who is always moulding and adapting himself to suit another, trying to please the gentiles. he would have characterized his argumentation as an attempt to make the weaker argument seem the stronger with one single aim: sofivzesqai to;n novmon.7 in the most recent works on the argumentation in the letter to the galatians mentioned above,8 the category ‘sophistic rhetoric’ does not occur.9 there are, however, points of contact. this applies in the first place to hietanen’s study. he uses a set of ten rules developed by van eemeren and grootendorst to evaluate paul’s argumentation in the letter to the galatians. comparing his evaluation of galatians 3-4 on the basis of this set of rules with the one proposed above on the basis of ancient criteria, my impression is that apart from the typical anti-sophistic categories used by the critical reader in my analysis, there is much in common. as i understand hietanen, he finds paul’s argumentation wanting with respect to principles. i emphasise four points that are similar to those mentioned above: • fallacious reasoning: many reasonings are based on problematic premisses, and conclusions are presented as self-evident, even when they are not (e.g., 2005:105-106, 111-116; cf. also the ‘abstract’ of the book). • manipulation of the scriptural evidence: paul adapts biblical texts to suit his own theology and ascribes intentions to texts other than their original ones (e.g., 2005:106). • improper use of legal arguments: some arguments seem to be that of misplaced expertise (e.g., 2005:117-118). • unclarity: paul’s argumentation is at points unclear and confusingly ambiguous (e.g., 2005:193). this similarity can easily be explained when we realise that the rules for a critical discussion used in the modern pragma-dialectial approach are not essentially different from the criteria for a fair dialectical discussion as we find them in the works of plato and aristotle. the basic rules of such a discussion are (cf. vos 2002:14-21): • discussion partners should take each other seriously. they should not treat each other as enemies who have to be defeated. they should search candidly for the truth. acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 37 7 in a similar vein: given (2001: passim). 8 cf. section 1.1. 9 for the problematic of this category, see vos (2002:1-3; 2002b:217-220). • their reasoning should be logically sound and coherent, avoiding fallacies. there should be full agreement about the premisses. • the argumentation should be clear without ambivalence and vagueness. the relevance of this comparison between the basics of modern and ancient rules is that the use of modern criteria for an analysis of argumentation as developed in the pragma-dialectical approach is not necessarily an anachronism. the competence of an ancient critical reader could have been very similar to that of a modern reader. this, however, does not mean that paul or his readers in galatia were familiar with these rules. nor does it mean that paul had the intention to engage in a dialogue with the galatians similar to the discussions in the philosophical schools — i will come back to this in the next section. it means only that it is not an anachronism to imagine a critical reader with this competence at the time of paul. tolmie regards the letter to the galatians as a whole as “a masterpiece of persuasive strategy.” he identifies, however, some ‘weak points’ in paul’s rhetorical strategy: there are some instances in paul’s argument where he does not express himself clearly or where he says things that do not fit or even could have undermined his argumentative strategy (tolmie 2005:234). as far as i can see, this does not concern the essence of the argumentation but only some minor points. in his summary he gives a list of six texts of which three belong to galatians 3 (tolmie 2005:234). whereas my critical reader from his anti-sophistic perspective and hietanen from his pragmadialectical perspective find paul’s argumentation wanting at essential points, tolmie seems to adopt a less critical stance (tolmie 2005:234).10 to use a term he himself applies in another context, his critical analysis of paul’s argumentation can be characterised as a ‘milder approach.’ this raises the question of the criteria behind his system. compared with the view of my critical reader and that of tolmie, hietanen’s approach seems to be the most detached one. the category ‘sophistic rhetoric’ is a polemical one. just as in antiquity the label ‘sophist’ often functioned as a negative label for a group of opponents, my critical reader expresses, with the category ‘sophistic rhetoric,’ his total disapproval of the method and vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 38 10 a more critical position is also taken by dieter mitternacht (1999), who makes an attempt to provide a defence for the accused recipients and designated opponents of paul’s letter to the galatians. he tries to unravel the strategy of persuasion from the angles of authorial intent and reader expectation. from this perspective he comes to the following conclusion: the message of paul in galatians 3. his criticism is open to objectification: it is possible, as aristotle attempted in his treatise de sophisticis elenchis, to describe the techniques of sophistic rhetoric. at the same time, however, his criticism is partial: it does not restrict itself to an analysis of these techniques as such but evokes a total picture of a sophist with all the negative connotations it has acquired since plato.11 my critical reader is not really interested in counterarguments. tolmie’s analysis, on the other hand, seems to be the result of an interpreter who has a more positive relationship to the method and message of the apostle. because he, unlike hietanen, does not identify his standards of evaluation, the reader has the freedom to make guesses about the partiality factors in his analysis.12 2.3 rhetoric and revelation in the view of hans dieter betz a third limitation with reference to the rationality of paul’s argumentation has to do with the kind of truth the apostle is defending. actually, “no kind of rational argument can be adequate with regard to the defense paul must make” (betz 1979:25; 1975:378). characteristic of judaism as well as of christianity is the claim that what they regard as the ‘truth’ cannot, by definition, be demonstrated or defended. from this perspective the christian claim to reason is “a deflected one” (betz 1976:99-101). according to betz, paul deviates from common-sense rationality on three points: acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 39 für den nachweis der richtigkeit seiner meinung scheute er sich nicht vor pauschalierenden urteilen und rhetorisch manipulierenden implikationen zurück. im direkten bezug auf die situation in galatien, versuchte er, ohne genauere kenntnis, verhaltensweisen von galatern und gegnern mit affekten, drohungen und verurteilungen entgegenzuwirken. obwohl die implikationen den galatern (und vielen andern) als absurde übertreibungen der gemeinsamen vereinbarungen vorgekommen sein müssen, meint paulus, ihnen vom ersten tage ihrer begegnung an, alles wesentliche klar dargestellt zu haben. gegensätzliche perzeptionen der sachlage werden von ihm in unvereinbarer weise gegeneinander gestellt, massive, kognitive dissonanzen hervorgerufen (1999:314-315). 11 cf., e.g., the onomasticon of julius pollux, s.v. sofisthv~. 12 as mayordomo’s analysis is focused on paul’s syllogistic reasoning, its scope is more limited. according to him, the logical analysis of galatians 3:6-14 by means of aristotelian reasoning is faced with difficulties. the main problem lies in the premises on which paul’s reasoning is based: das problem liegt nicht so sehr darin, dass prämissen als zusatzannahmen rekonstruiert werden müssen, sondern darin, dass annahmen nötig sind, die sich nicht ohne weiteres als enzyklopädische basiseinträge verstehen lassen, die ein autor mit seinen realen rezipienten und rezipientinnen ganz natürlich teilt (2005:230). • first, his arguments are designed to demonstrate a supernatural auctoritas. not only does he use proofs from scripture which were accepted in a primitive christian context with a very high degree of authority, he also uses the gift of the spirit as evidence of supernatural origin and character (betz 1975:370-71, 378). • secondly, paul addresses the galatians as people “who are endowed with the spirit” (betz 1975:378). this has a bearing on the understanding of ‘reason’: by speaking in terms of the spirit, paul can appeal to reason — not only the common-sense reason basic to all arguments, but to that ‘reason’ which is especially endowed by the spirit (betz 1979:29-30). • thirdly, the apostle uses curses and blessings as a defensive weapon, thus introducing the dimension of magic (betz 1975:378-79; 1976:111; 1979:25). this tension between authoritative proclamation and rational persuasion is described by george a. kennedy as that between ‘sacred language’ or ‘radical christian rhetoric’ and logical arguments. one of the characteristics of ‘sacred language’ is the “deliberate rejection of worldly reason.” a feature of ‘radical christian rhetoric’ is the doctrine that the speaker is a vehicle of god’s will and that his teachings are inspired by the holy spirit and by the grace of god (kennedy 1984:6-8). according to kennedy, it is striking to see the extent to which logical forms are used in the new testament: though sacred language stands behind this ... and though a tradition of radical, nonlogical discourse survived in the church ... even in the first century a process was underway of recasting expressions in enthymematic form, thus making sacred language into premisses which are supported, at least in a formal sense, by human reasoning (kennedy 1984:159). applied to the letter to the galatians, especially to its use of scriptural proof, this means: the whole labored argument essentially rests not on the scriptural passages cited nor on the logical acceptance of paul’s premises by his opponents – a necessary condition in true dialectic — but on the galatians’ acceptance of his authority in making these proclamations and their experience of paul’s teachings (kennedy 1984:149). according to janet fairweather, this appeal to a divinely sanctioned apostolic authority distinguishes paul fundamentally from pagan sophistic rhetoric: one thing that sets paul firmly apart from this tradition is his assumption of an other-worldly authority on the basis of what he calls pivsti~ ... vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 40 acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 41 to paul, pivsti~ was not a matter of opinion as it was for the sophists, but an absolute reality, deducible from his conversion experience (fairweather 1994:237). according to fairweather, in paul’s time hearing an other-worldly voice would have been seen as an unusual type of evidence on which to base any sort of argumentation. sceptics like sextus empiricus would not accept such evidence at all. they would object that proof cannot be revealed by a sign because the sign itself requires proof. paul’s first reply, however, to any who cast doubt on the validity of his pivsti~ was to recount the story of his conversion and to any in his congregations who would be sceptical about this kind of proof, he could appeal to the evidence of their own past experience of receiving the spirit. that is why for fairweather (1994:238) it is only at a superficial level that paul’s letter to the galatians shows indebtedness to the sophistic rhetoric: “[i]t emerges that at the most fundamental level, notably in the bases of his argumentation, his approach was genuinely quite distinct from pagan sophistic” (fairweather 1994:1). the relationship between argumentation and revelation is also an important topic in j. louis martyn’s commentary on the letter to the galatians. martyn discusses the two central aspects of paul’s rhetoric: on the one hand, the letter shows us an author who is a rather sophisticated rhetorician. on the other hand, paul is consistent in his certainty that it is not his powers of persuasion that elicit faith. the power to kindle faith resides solely with god’s gospel. but that means that the gospel paul preaches — bringing its own criteria of perception and plausibility — is not and cannot be a message by which he seeks in the rhetorical sense to persuade (martyn 1997: 145-46). consequently, there are definite limits to the pertinence of rhetorical analysis: paul’s oral sermon would have been a reproclamation of the gospel in the form of an evangelistic argument. at several junctures that argument proves to be very peculiar, however, because of paul’s conviction that he can proclaim the gospel only in the presence of god who makes the gospel occur, being its always-contemporary author. rhetoric, then, can serve the gospel, but the gospel itself is not fundamentally a matter of rhetorical persuasion (1:10-12). for the gospel has the effect of placing at issue the nature of argument itself. that is to say, since the gospel is god’s own utterance, it is not and can never be subject to ratiocinative criteria that have been developed apart from it (martyn 1997:22). a similar position is defended by hans hübner with regard to paul’s argumentation as a whole. hübner makes a distinction between paul’s arguvos paul and sophistic rhetoric 42 mentation and its theological underpinnings. in a review of folkert siegert’s book, argumentation bei paulus, he poses some fundamental theological questions concerning the relationship between theology and secular science. can theology arrive at the essence of pauline theological thinking by means of the concept of argumentation? where does paul’s argumentation originate? how do argumentation and the understanding of faith inspired by the holy spirit belong together theologically? in this context, hübner does not give explicit answers. rather, he leaves the reader to infer from his approach that his answer to the first question is negative: theology cannot arrive at the essence of pauline theological thinking by means of the concept of argumentation, at least not with a secular concept of argumentation. hübner views paul’s rhetoric as the “rhetoric of faith argumentation.” that means: it is based on an understanding of faith inspired by the holy spirit and on the authority of scripture (hübner 1987:173-175). characteristic of martyn’s and hübner’s interpretation is that they identify themselves with paul. they do not describe paul’s view merely from a historical point of view, but their findings have a normative character (cf. given 2001a). i am not quite sure whether fairweather’s conclusions are meant to be merely historical or also normative. concerning her analysis of the relationship between argumentation and revelation i agree and disagree with her conclusion that at the most fundamental level paul’s argumentation was “genuinely quite distinct from pagan sophistic rhetoric.” it is undoubtedly true that it is not a characteristic of pagan sophism to use experiences of revelation or the gift of a divine spirit as an argument. if one looks, however, with the eye of my ‘critical reader’ at paul’s way of using these kinds of arguments, it can be said that it is genuinely sophistic. to make the weaker argument the stronger paul uses every available means arbitrarily. while his opponents would have appealed to an experience of revelation, paul would certainly have dismissed the argument. right at the beginning of his argument in the letter to the galatians, he makes clear in no uncertain terms that an appeal to a revelation from heaven in no way can legitimise the gospel of his opponents: “but even if we or an angel from heaven should proclaim to you a gospel contrary to what we proclaimed to you, let that one be accursed!” (1:8). to legitimise the truth of his own gospel, however, paul, without batting an eye, appeals to his own revelation experience: the gospel proclaimed by him is not of human origin, because he received it through a revelation of jesus christ (1:11-12). paul proves himself time and again an expert in the antilogistic art, the art in utramque partem disputare. he is able to defend one point of view as convincingly as its opposite. the only criterion for him is the utilitas causae, the question of whether it suits his cause. from this perspective paul’s argumentation in galatians 1-2 can be termed ‘pneumatic sophistry.’ when one looks at the content of the arguments, there is a fundamental difference from pagan sophistic rhetoric; when one, however, considers the formal aspect of the rhetorical strategy, paul’s argument can be regarded as typically sophistic rhetoric. an essential element of pneumatic sophistry is the ability to immunise oneself against any form of criticism based in rational arguments: “the spiritual man makes judgments about all things, but he himself is not subject to any man’s judgment” (1 corinthians 2:15). what betz says is true, namely, that paul, by speaking in terms of the spirit, can appeal to reason. at the same time it is true that paul, if it suits his case, would dismiss every rational objection against his theological and scriptural proof as being ‘wisdom of this world.’ interpreters like martyn and hübner basically accept this immunisation strategy, whereas my ‘critical reader’ would expose it as a sophistic strategy, as the ability to adopt the worse argument and yet win the disputation. in my opinion, paul would be open to following the standard criteria for a dialectical discussion only — and only then — if this would further his interests. hietanen realises that this is a critical point. in my view, his statements on this subject reveal the tension that is inherent to the matter. on the one hand, he claims that the pragma-dialectical method is an adequate tool for analysing paul’s argumentation because the spiritual nature of paul’s message does not exclude the rational aspect: i suggest that the spiritual nature of paul’s matters do not relieve him of rationality, and that paul himself does not argue as if it did. even though the ultimate argument is spiritual, being based on revelation, the intermediate steps need not be .... paul clearly makes an effort to be convincing to reason (hietanen 2005:71). at the same time, however, he realises that there are different rationalities: “[i]n religious reasoning we must accept that the final argument is spiritual. this gives biblical argumentation a character which may not agree with standard notions of rationality” (hietanen 2005:72). in my opinion, it is legitimate to judge paul’s argumentation according to our own standards of rationality. we should realise, however, that paul, as a pneumatic sophist, would accept these standards only if it would help him win the disputation. acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 43 vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 44 3. sophistic rhetoric as a hermeneutical key 3.1 platonic and (neo-)sophistic perspectives in rhetorical criticism broadly speaking, two antipodal positions can be found in rhetorical criticism. the first one is the ‘platonic’ view, which is characterised by binary oppositions like inner/outer, deep/surface, essential/peripheral, necessary/contingent, things/words, realities/illusions, fact/opinion, neutral/partisan (fish 1995:205). in this view, rhetoric is associated with the second part of these oppositions. the verba are the contingent representations of the res. rhetoric is subordinate to content and concerns only the way this content is presented. platonists believe that ‘truth’ exists independently of human opinions about it and the variety of words in which these opinions are expressed. they also assume that there are criteria for the distinction of truth from falsity that are independent of linguistic statements. the second one is the ‘(neo-)sophistic’13 or ‘social-constructivist’ view,14 which does not accept such a separation between res and verba. from this perspective, “rhetoric may be viewed not as a matter of giving effectiveness to truth but of creating truth” (scott 1967:13; cf. idem 1993:126). it is “speech that constructs and shapes reality, rather than reflecting it.” (schüssler fiorenza 1999:177) ‘truth’ itself is a contingent affair. it is not found but “created moment by moment in the circumstances in which (man) finds himself and with which he has to cope” (scott 1967:17). it is conceived as what communities are persuaded of at any particular time (guthrie 1971:51; fish 1995:207). arguments are the materials of such a construction of truth. the orator is able to “make the weaker argument the stronger.” from a platonic perspective he does this ‘seemingly’ (valesio 1980:92). from a sophistic perspective, however, rhetoric has the power to create and transform realities. stronger arguments mean a stronger cause. lawyers use every means available to reach their goals, such as obtaining an acquittal for a client. to that end they create realities and truths. in this case, the content is subordinate to the rhetorical goal. in the same way, in philosophy and theology symbolic universes are created with a view to influencing people’s behaviour. from this perspective, (neo-)sophists are moving “rhetoric from the disreputable periphery to the necessary center” (fish, in olson 2002:95). 13 on the relationship between modern neo-sophistic theory and the historical reconstruction of sophistic doctrines, cf. schiappa (1990) and mccomiskey (2002). 14 on the relationship between neo-sophism and social constructivism, cf. fish (in: olson 2002:85-87, 94-96). 3.2 pauline rhetoric from a platonic and a (neo-)sophistic perspective 3.2.1 a platonic perspective as far as i can see, this platonic view of rhetoric underlies j. christaan beker’s attempt to find “paul’s abiding message” in the contingency of its various expressions. in his book, paul the apostle, beker proposes a method by which he attempts to maintain both the coherence or inner consistency of paul’s thought and the contingency of its different expressions. while his book devotes hardly any attention to rhetorical analysis, beker does broach the subject in his article, “paul’s theology: consistent or inconsistent?” here he defends his coherence-contingency method as a via media between two extremes: a purely sociological and rhetorical analysis and a dogmatic imposition of a specific focus in paul’s thought. he welcomes the attention recent research devotes to the contingency of paul’s thought, the diversity of his letters with their multiple sociological contents, and the variety of rhetorical devices paul employed in different ‘rhetorical situations.’ he puts forth a warning, however, about a danger this entails: “[t]he contingent situations of the letters threaten to eclipse the abiding message of paul, i.e. ‘the truth of the gospel’” (beker 1988:365). if we were to regard paul’s gospel as an entirely contingent structure, paul would degenerate into “a purely opportunistic theologian, who, with the help of various rhetorical skills adapts the gospel to whatever the sociological situation demands” (beker 1988:367-68). beker (1988:368) reminds the reader of “the legitimate value of the reformers’ search for a mitte in paul’s gospel, which was for them a search to clarify the truth of the gospel.” beker’s treatment of rhetoric and rhetorical analysis concentrates only on the contingent aspect of paul’s gospel, not on its coherent core. i agree entirely with paul meyer’s observation regarding such attempts to distinguish between the ‘contingent’ form and the ‘coherent’ elements in paul’s theology: [w]hat is at stake is to identify not only what controls or shapes the apostle’s argument at any given moment but also what can so transcend the limitations of historical contingency as to supply warrant for its truth and reliability (meyer 1997:147). a much more elaborate form of a platonic view of rhetoric is lauri thurén’s book derhetorizing paul. thurén sees rhetoric as the contingent expression of coherent content. he seeks to steer a course between two outlooks: 1) the dogmatic interpretation that views the theology in paul’s letters as timeless and universal, and 2) the ‘contextual’ alternative that depicts paul not so much as a systematic theologian but, rather, as a pragmatic writer who wrote each acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 45 of his letters for a specific purpose and a specific audience. thurén admits that paul “wrote his texts in complex, many-sided tensions of starting-points and goals.” he is adamant, however, that the apostle had an indisputably “organized, coherent theological system of thoughts, which is partly reflected in his texts” (thurén 2000:13, 17). his book aims to clarify the theology “behind” or “beyond” the texts and the actual expressions, and to uncover the system of religious thoughts “beneath the surface level” (thurén 2000:17, 26, 28, 93, 181). this approach requires a “derhetorized” text. to achieve that, thurén tries “to identify the persuasive devices in the text and to filter out their effect on the ideas expressed” (thurén 2000:28). his starting point is what he terms a “dynamic view” of paul’s text. in this view, the author does not use the text solely to inform the readers about his opinions. instead, his goal is to affect them and to influence their thoughts and actions. we must take into account the fact that in paul’s letters, “strategic goals and tactical moves confuse and exaggerate the thoughts presented, as compared with neutral description” (thurén 2000:25). it is doubtful, therefore, whether we can take his expressions at face value. if paul’s ideas appear to the reader to be different, sometimes even within the same letter, we have to assume that he expressed himself in a one-sided and exaggerated manner and operated “with radical images instead of well-balanced, neutral descriptions of reality, though for the sake of rhetoric” (thurén 2000:88). throughout thurén’s book, the reader receives the impression that ‘theology’ refers to the coherent system of religious thoughts behind the actual expressions and that ‘rhetoric’ is mainly a matter of communicating these thoughts in a one-sided and exaggerated manner for the sake of affecting the addressees in their specific situation. thurén makes little — if any — mention of the rhetorical character of the ‘coherent’ system of thoughts. he looks behind paul’s words, not only for his belief system but apparently also for the truth. he is eager to deny that paul is “a sophist without any firm stance,” “an opportunist” or “a situational thinker” (thurén 2000:20, 38). paul may — like other theologians or adherents of any particular ideology — simplify his concepts, but thurén is adamant that this does not involve “compromising the truth” (thurén 2000:182).this ‘truth’ can be found beyond the texts and the actual expressions. i agree entirely with j. david hester (2004:175), who in his review of thurén’s book, states that his description of ‘derhetorization’ suggests “a near platonic view of rhetoric.” thurén embraces “what perelman/olbrechts-tyteca describe as the philosophical pair ‘appearance/reality,’ where ‘rhetoric’ is the ‘apparent’ performance of a ‘real’ truth.” according to hester (2004:175), this description of ‘derhetorization’ suggests “that rhetoric is something that is tenuous, contextual, an afterthought that strategizes upon an already present theological truth. ‘rhetoric’ is contingent, theology fundamental.” vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 46 all interpreters who take the platonic view of rhetoric as a starting point for their interpretation of paul’s argumentation are convinced that the apostle is not a sophist, an opportunist or an orator who tries “to make the weaker argument the stronger.” 3.2.2 a (neo-)sophistic perspective those with a (neo-)sophistic view of paul’s rhetoric are very reluctant to make a distinction between the res, the content or the true core of his theology, and the verba, the rhetorical means the apostle uses to reach his goal. in this perception, paul is an expert very skilled in the art of “making the weaker argument the stronger.” depending on his goal, he creates realities and constructs symbolic worlds. basically, his theological arguments are means that serve a higher aim. i will present a model here which combines a constructionist view of paul’s theology with a ‘rhetoric of power’ which raises the question: what systems of power are at work in systems of thought? (cf. hester amador 1999:passim). paul introduces himself in the letter to the galatians as an apostle sent through jesus christ and god the father. the aim of his mission was to proclaim to the gentiles that jesus is the son of god. from his other letters we know that paul perceived jesus christ, the heavenly son of god, as god’s viceroy, who was assigned to destroy his enemies and to establish the universal kingdom of god, “so that god may be all in all” (1 corinthians 15:24-28). it was paul’s mission as an apostle of jesus christ to win “obedience from the gentiles” (romans 15:18; 1:5). we can say that the driving force behind paul’s theology is the expansion of power, the elementary imperialistic drive that determines most of world history. he is an apostle of a national deity, the god of israel, who has the ambition of conquering the world. paul’s rhetoric is the most powerful weapon of his warfare (2 corinthians 10:4-5). the apostle uses every argument that serves this goal. with this goal in mind, he creates a new symbolic universe with its characteristic power structure, building on existing symbolic worlds. from this perspective in the letter to the galatians the whole world is divided into two parts. whereas the kingdom of god is characterised by spirit, power, truth, sonship, knowledge, freedom, righteousness, life and blessing, the present evil age is typified by flesh, weakness, perversion of the truth, slavery, folly, sin, death and curse. whatever fits paul’s purpose is assigned to the first category, whatever does not fit this purpose is relegated to the latter category. these categories were common in paul’s world, but the apostle applies them in a manner that serves his aim. they do not describe existing realities but are tools for shaping and moulding reality. they are means of persuasion used by paul to convince his readers of his point of view. acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 47 from the same perspective paul pictures the reality of both jews and gentiles as an existence under sin and curse (2:15-17; 3:13-14, 22). his concept of the sinfulness of jews and gentiles is a construction that fits into the power structure of his symbolic universe; declaring them all guilty is part of the rhetorical strategy that aims at their subjection. as nietzsche (2002:197 [§ 26]) saw very clearly, the message of sin and atonement is a powerful instrument in the hands of priests to make people subjected to them. threatening people with the curse of god is a very effective means in the rhetoric of power. paul’s message is that jews and gentiles can be redeemed only by christ. in his letters, the apostle uses a variety of soteriological symbols. he presents these symbols as a matter of course, whereas a reader who wants to understand the logic of it will face a great many problems. it seems as if for paul every symbol is welcome insofar as it helps to convince his readers of the fact that belief in christ is the only way to salvation. in the letter to the galatians, he gives the work of christ a new meaning: christ became a curse for us, in order that in him the blessing of abraham might come to the gentiles (3:13). god sent his son to redeem those who were under the law (4:4-5). no one before paul ever attributed such a soteriological meaning to the work of christ, let alone that jesus himself would have understood his mission in this way, but paul creates a new soteriological reality to win “obedience from the gentiles.” crucial for him is that they no longer live their own lives, but that christ lives in them with the effect that their lives are dedicated to god (2:19-20). since salvation is possible only through christ, paul has to deny any salvific power to all rival instances, primarily the jewish law. as forgiveness of sin, justice and life come solely through the death and resurrection of christ, paul depicts the law as the origin of sin and death. in his letters to the galatians, the philippians, the corinthians and the romans he constructs a variety of models to that end. apart from the fact that the model he develops in the letter to the galatians is difficult to understand, it is at various points at odds with the models of the other letters (cf. räisänen 1983: passim; vos 2002a:306-309). the aim of all these constructions, however, is the same: to convince his readers that salvation is possible only through christ. it seems as though the apostle has a bag of arguments and chooses whatever he needs to that end. in all these cases, he is creating theological realities as rhetorical means with the aim of subjecting his readers to the power of god and christ. the other side of paul’s theology of the law in the letter to the galatians is his conviction that jews and gentiles are justified solely through faith in christ. in lutheran exegesis, paul’s gospel of the justification through faith is often seen as the centre of his theology, thus belonging outside the realm of rhetoric. according to hans hübner (1992:168-69), who enters at length into the relationship of ‘theology’ and ‘rhetoric’ in the letters of paul, the iustificatio impii is vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 48 paul’s theological essential and, as such, this ‘fundamental conviction’ is not a part of paul’s rhetoric. this point of view is, however, not shared by everyone. according to krister stendahl, for example, [t]he doctrine of justification by faith was hammered out by paul for the very specific and limited purpose of defending the rights of gentile converts to be full and genuine heirs to the promise of god to israel (stendahl 1977:2).15 if one accepts this view, the doctrine of the justification by faith alone is a rhetorical means to a higher end, to make the gentiles obedient to the god of israel. it is possible to give other elements of paul’s theology a place in this structure of power. as an illustration of the combination of a neo-sophistic or constructionist view of paul’s theology with a ‘rhetoric of power,’ however, this sketch may suffice. in this view, there is no fundamental distinction between the ‘coherent’ and the ‘contingent’ elements, because the so-called ‘coherent’ elements or ‘essentials’ themselves belong to the contingent theological construction. they were not found as eternal truths, but created in the specific circumstances with which paul had to cope. in this view, rhetoric lies at the very heart of paul’s theology as a whole. bibliography beker, j.c. 1980. paul the apostle. the triumph of god in life and thought. edinburgh: t. & t. clark. 1988. paul’s theology: consistent or inconsistent? nts 34:364-377. betz, h.d. 1975. the literary composition and function of paul’s letter to the galatians. nts 21:352–379. 1976. in defense of the spirit: paul’s letter to the galatians as a document of early christian apologetics. in: e. schlüssler fiorenza (ed.), aspects of religious propaganda in judaism and early christianity (notre dame & london: university of notre dame press), pp. 98-114. 1979. galatians. philadelphia: fortress. hermeneia. acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 49 15 cf. also w. wrede (1904 [repr. 1964]:69). fairweather, j. 1994. the epistle to the galatians and classical rhetoric. tynbul 45:1-38, 213-243. fish, s. 1995. rhetoric. in: f. lentricchia & th. mclaughlin (eds.), critical terms for literary study (2nd ed., chicago & london: university of chicago press), pp. 203-222. given, m.d. 2001. paul’s true rhetoric. ambiguity, cunning and deception in greece and rome. harrisburg p.a.: trinity. emory studies in early christianity 7. 2001a. how new is new creation rhetoric? a response to j. louis martyn’s concept of paul’s apocalyptic discourse. [online.] retrieved from: http://courses. missouristate.edu/mdg421f/new%20creation%20rhetoric.htm [2005, 2 march]. goulder, m. 1987. the pauline epistles. in: r. alter & f. kermode (eds.), the literary guide to the bible (cambridge ma: belknap/harvard university press), pp. 479-502. guthrie, w.k.c. 1971. the sophists. cambridge: cambridge university press. hester amador, j.d. 2004. review l. thüren, derhetorizing paul. jbl 123:171-177. 1999. academic constraints in rhetorical criticism of the new testament. an introduction to a rhetoric of power. sheffield: sheffield academic press. jsnt.s 174. hietanen, m. 2005. paul’s argumentation in galatians. a pragma-dialectical analysis of gal. 3.1-5.12. helsingfors: mika hietanen. diss. åbo. hübner, h. 1987. methodologie und theologie i. kud 33:150-175. 1992. die rhetorik und die theologie. in: c. j. classen & h.-j. müllenbrock (hrsg.), die macht des wortes. aspekte gegenwärtiger rhetorikforschung (münchen: hitzeroth, ars rhetorica 4), pp. 165-179. kennedy, g.a. 1984. new testament interpretation through rhetorical criticism. chapel hill & london: the university of north carolina press. lieberman, s. 1977. rabbinic interpretation of scripture. in: h.a. fischel (ed.), essays in grecoroman and related talmudic literature (new york: ktav), pp. 289-324 [47-82]. martyn, j.l. 1998. galatians. a new translation with introduction and commentary. new york, etc.: doubleday. ab 33a. vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 50 acta theologica supplementum 9 2007 51 mayordomo, m. 2005. argumentiert paulus logisch? eine analyse vor dem hintergrund antiker logik. tübingen: mohr siebeck. wunt 188. mccomiskey, b. 2002. gorgias and the new sophistic rhetoric. carbondale & edwardsville: southern illinois university press. meyer, p. 1997. pauline theology. a proposal for a pause in its pursuit. in: e.e. johnson & d.m. hay (eds.) pauline theology. vol. iv: looking back, pressing on (atlanta ga: scholars press, sbl symposium series 4), pp. 140-160. mitternacht, d. 1999. forum für sprachlose. eine kommunikationspsychologische und epistolärrhetorische untersuchung des galaterbriefes. stockholm: almquist & wiksell. cb ntseries 30. nietzsche, f. 2002. der antichrist. in: f. nietzsche, kritische studienausgabe bd. 6, hg. v. g. colli & m. montinari (münchen: deutscher taschenbuchverlag. dtv 30156), pp. 165-254. norden, e. 1918. die antike kunstprosa vom 6. jh. v. chr. bis in die zeit der renaissance. bd. ii. 3e aufl. leipzig: teubner. olson, g.a. 2002. fish tales: a conversation with ‘the contemporary sophist.’ in: g.a. olson, justifying belief. stanley fish and the work of rhetoric (albany: state university of new york press), pp. 85-113. räisänen, h. 1983. paul and the law. tübingen: mohr siebeck. wunt 28. schiappa, e. 1990. neo-sophistic criticism or the historical reconstruction of sophistic doctrines? philosophy and rhetoric 23(3):192-217. schüssler fiorenza, e. 1999. rhetoric and ethic. minneapolis: fortress. scott, r.l. 1967. on viewing rhetoric as epistemic. central states speech journal 18:9-17. 1993. rhetoric is epistemic: what difference does that make? in: th. enos & s.c. brown (eds.), defining the new rhetorics (newbury park etc.: sage publications, sage series in written communication 7), pp. 120-136. stendahl, k. 1977. paul among jews and gentiles and other essays. london: scm. thurén, l. 2000. derhetorizing paul. a dynamic perspective on pauline theology and the law. tübingen: mohr siebeck. wunt 124. tolmie, d.f. 2005. persuading the galatians. a text-centred rhetorical analysis of a pauline letter. tübingen: mohr siebeck. wunt 2.190. valesio, p. 1980. novantiqua. rhetorics as a contemporary theory. bloomington in: indiana university press. advances in semiotics. vos, j.s. 2002. die kunst der argumentation bei paulus. studien zur antiken rhetorik. tübingen: mohr siebeck. wunt 149. 2002a. die schattenseite der auferstehung im evangelium des paulus. in: r. bieringer et alii (eds.), resurrection in the new testament. fs j. lambrecht (leuven: university press/peeters, betl 165), pp. 301-313. 2002b. “to make the weaker argument defeat the stronger”: sophistical argumentation in paul’s letter to the romans. in: a. eriksson et alii (eds.), rhetorical argumentation in biblical texts. essays from the lund 2000 conference (harrisburg pa: trinity press. emory studies in early christianity 8), pp. 217-231. wrede, w. 1904. paulus. reprint 1964. in: k.h. rengstorf & u. luck (hrsg.), das paulusbild in der neueren deutschen forschung (darmstadt: wissenschaftliche buchgesellschaft, wdf 24), pp. 1-97. keywords trefwoorde rhetorical analysis retoriese analise pauline letters pauliniese briewe letter to the galatians brief aan die galasiërs argumentation argumentasie sophistic rhetoric sofistiese retoriek pauline theology pauliniese teologie vos paul and sophistic rhetoric 52 editorial this issue coincides with several momentous events and trends in the world at large and muslim nations. the heads or top representatives of the 57 muslimmajority nations have held an extraordinary meeting at makkah under the organization of islamic conferences’ (oic) aegis. a major goal is to reactivate and empower the oic so that it can actively help the ummah deal with its huge opportunities and challenges. several salient issues were stressed: the need for closer interaction, collaboration, and internal reform leading to a peaceful, pluralistic, and moderate disposition of islam and muslims. muslim nations are trying to address their internal weaknesses and build upon their strengths. in terms of human and material resources, the muslim world is composed of three kinds of countries: those with large populations and poor economies, small populations and rich economies, and with both fairly large populations backed by rich economic resources. they seem to believe that iraq and iran, the very backbone of the third category, are currently targeted for long-term occupation. they are exploring how to compensate for one another’s drawbacks and reinforcing their assets. the oic declaration, hailed as a historic turning point, stresses that muslims take responsibility for their present plight and stop blaming others. in addition, the organization will be renamed, get a new charter, and be run by mandatory contributions from member nations. it will also feature conflict-resolution and consensus-building mechanisms to resolve both minor and major conflicts, such as palestine and kashmir. the ummah and the world now wait to see whether such statements are more than rhetoric. concurrently, there is an increasing awareness of the futility of cardinaldirectional conflicts and the “clash of civilizations” between the west and the east, or between the north and the south. ever more muslim and other intellectuals realize that the real confrontation is between powerful global forces of greed and exploitative profiteering on the one hand, and people of candor, conscience, and moral orientation on the other. among the individuals and organizations in the latter camp, there is growing realization of the need for societal reform toward pluralism, learning from each other, collective and consultative decision making, basic freedoms for all, peace with justice, and institution building that is compatible with the speed, complexity, and magnitude of the emerging globalized world. serious efforts are afoot at the united nations to fight “islamophobia,” and we observe a powerful surge of inter-faith deliberations and activities all over the world, which continues to be miniaturized through the telecommunication revolution, globalized consumerism, commerce, climate concerns, democratization, and privatization. our own nation, prodded by the neo-cons who have landed it in a deep quagmire, now shows signs of appreciating the value of other alternatives to using starkly hard power to obtain its strategic objectives. in an attempt to utilize its soft power, it has launched a public relations pitch to improve its sinking image, especially among arabs and muslims. let there be substantive policy changes to back up these image-making attempts! professional organizations of muslims, like the association of muslim social scientists (amss), need to reflect on their mission, goals, and objectives with a view to really contributing to the ummah’s efforts to relieve its situation. also, they must evaluate the extent of their involvement by determining how many scholars, whether tangentially or directly associated with amss, have been consulted by those engaged in these deliberations. it is gratifying that most of the recent amss conferences and issues of this journal have reflected these concerns. worth mentioning are the special issues on “islam & women” and “debating moderate islam.” both the international institute of islamic thought (iiit) and amss join the readers in commending the excellent efforts of drs. jasmin zine and katherine bullock for the former, and of dr. muqtedar khan for the latter. these civil discourses have gone a long way in initiating civilizational dialogues on vital global concerns and in allaying people’s unfounded fears. where blind and naked ignorance delivers brawling judgments, unashamed, on all things all day long. (alfred tennyson: “merlin vivien”) coincidentally, the above-mentioned quote seems to foretell the impact of both the dysfunctional aspect of the monopolist and propagandist media and of the corporatization of the post-modern academe. we might recall the influence on our own isolationist tendencies and ignorance of other regions and their cultures, of the social science and humanities literatures produced during the european colonial times, which highlighted intercultural differences more than the real commonalties of the entire human family. our contemporary academia is too preoccupied with post-modern overrelativism, where the serious search for truth seems to have been comproii the american journal of islamic social sciences 22:4 mised and rhetoric prevails. as a result, deconstructing discourses in terms of power words has assumed a hyperbolic significance instead of the comparative analysis of validity among contending perspectives. muslim social scientists need to appreciate that more information and misinformation do not necessarily lead to knowledge. deriving wisdom from a plethora of facts is becoming more challenging than ever before. hence, the need for illuminating knowledge with valid wisdom (considering the whole truth and nothing but the truth) and universal principles of fairness and justice for all; avoiding extreme and desperate measures in all affairs; and acquiring an acute sense of personal accountability for one's treatment of self, fellow human beings, all other life forms, and the physical environment. contrast this with perspectives based on the caricatures of reality in john locke’s empiricism; rené descartes’ separation of mind and body, and the absoluteness of mathematics (cf. gödel’s incompleteness theorem); adam smith’s promotion of the evil of selfishness as a self-curing disease; charles darwin’s smashing of a special human mission in life; karl marx’s assassination of the human desire to own and the suppression of individual initiative; sigmund freud’s total freedom from guilt; ferdinand de saussure’s overemphasis on the role of symbols and language structures in capturing the truth; and roland garthe’s, jacques derrida’s, michel foucault’s (following nietzsche’s deicide: death of god), and julia kristeva’s declaration of the author’s death. obviously, each of these paradigms exaggerates only one dimension of truth, instead of capturing the whole truth. the occurrence of so many “isms” of modernity in three centuries, and as many in the post-modern decades, indicates a confusing void in the intellectual scene as well as a continued subconscious search for the truth, for human nature cannot remain content without stable core values for too long. let the balanced and comprehensive tawhidi perspective applied to various disciplines fill the void with such values. we need to undertake, much more seriously, the task of re-activating and implementing the islamization of knowledge (iok) project, one of the original missions of amss and iiit. regrettably, its implementation has been slow and spotty because muslim governments either could not understand its significance or had other priorities. this educational movement is now more vital than ever in view of the high level of seriousness within the ruling muslim elites, democratic or otherwise. in view of the oic’s extraordinary meetings in rapid succession, we believe that muslim governments and intellectuals are now sincerely trying to address the dualism of educational institutions in their societies. this duality caused the iok’s founding editorial iii fathers (viz., ismail al-faruqi, taha j. al-alwani, adulhamid abu-sulayman, and others) to see it as both the cause and the effect of the ummah’s decline. they suggested tackling this problem with tremendous urgency. who can deny the need for new curricular and instructional resources to meet the objectives of ummah’s new reform movements? undoubtedly, theoretical discussions in times of crises are usually postponed or take a back seat to immediate problems of survival through defensive and apologetic literature. however, various ongoing projects are cut out for even crises-ridden professional organizations, for there is a constant need for demographic and psychographic data on their sponsoring and beneficiary communities to enable the latter to plan, design, develop, and evaluate their activities for further growth and development. therefore, instead of remaining mired in image laundering, muslims must help the ummah solve its problems and develop its organizations and institutions. they must balance the ivory tower research with collection, collation, and application of valid data in order to contribute to societal justice. this issue includes johannes grundmann’s translated article on “shari`ah, brain death, and organtransplantation: the context and effect of two islamic legal decisions in the near and middle east.” grundmann analyzes the muslim world’s differential acceptance of decisions made by the islamic fiqh academies of the oic and the muslim world league. the paper is quite timely, for with the rapidly developing fields of medical sciences, new issues are calling for collective ummatic ijtihad. md. mahmudul hasan, in his “the orientalization of gender,” shows how western feminists have promoted am orientalist-imperialist agenda of cultural onslaught directed against colonized people. he illustrates this assertion with the writings of many female authors of indian origin. he thus exposes the hidden agenda of the so-called "sisters from the colonial communities, who are subtly trying to dilute muslim women’s commitment to their faith values. also included is david perley’s “vagueness: an additional nuance in the interpretation of ibn ̀ arabi’s mystical language.” perley asserts that the vagueness of sufi terminology truly reflects the complexity of the metaphysical phenomena themselves and that sufi dictions and modes of expression differ from those of analytic philosophers. the former is synthetic and experiential in nature, whereas those of philosophers are analytical. dilnawaz a. siddiqui guest editor iv the american journal of islamic social sciences 22:4 134 the american journal of islamic social sciences 16:1 paradise lost by c.a.o. van nieuwenhuijze, leiden: brill, 1997, 421 pp. in paradise lost, a collection of rewritten and updated articles spanning a period of twenty-five years, c.a.o. van nieuwenhuijze attempts to tackle issues of identity and interaction in the arab-islamic world. together they con­ stitute phenomena of virtual reality, reifying concepts as instruments of intelli­ gibility, being at once the product and frame of human intellect and action (p. book reviews 135 3). both components, as the common thread which ties and pervades his work, comprise the conceptual himework within which the “forever problematic” relationship between the middle east and a revitalizing islam on the one hand, and a western europe undergoing a post-christian, postmodem phase, on the other, is probed. this nexus of collective identity and interaction manifests a “logical com plementarity” inasfar as both presuppose and negate each other (p. 1). identity evokes an a l l encompassing eclectic representation of an individual‘s or col lectivity’s cosmos, be it in the form of s o m e p s pro toto (nation, polity, econ omy, or culture; u r n or din) or an intentional comprehensive indication (lifestyle; patrimoine; htruth). in recognizing no other beyond its cosmic domain, identity connotes a seemingly timeless and placeless unicity which frequently bestows upon it an impressive though mistaken aura of static per manence and absoluteness @. 2). interaction conversely represents the “prac tice of identity as a plural phenomenon” (p. 405) and thus incorporates all the complexities which emanate from the dynamics of a highly variable reality. the formulae it gives rise to purs pro toto are correspondingly much more fluid (communication, harmony, strife, domination) or reflective of inherent, large ly imbalanced ambiguities (mission civilisatrice; development aid or, euphemistically, cooperation; ddwuh). in contradistinction to identity signifi cations asserting the positive aspects of constituency (i.e., what one is), these interactional code words are summary evocations arrived at by the intervening perception of a counteridentity of the “other” (i.e., what one is not). hence, it gives rise to polar images of binary opposites of such orders as greek vs. bar barian; islam vs. jahiliyuh; or &zr ul-islam vs. dar al-harb. in and of them selves, interactional identifications bear limited significations to those con cerned except in tacit conjunction with each term’s opposition (p. 2). in other words, self-identification is arrived at by detour. consequently, interaction is relegated to an instrumental role on behalf of a pre-established and, in most cases as ambdslamic-european historical experience has shown, dominating self-centered structure. as a result, “the fundamental complementarity bemeen identity and interaction is neglected, and with it the contingency inherent in identity” (pp. 2-3). entrenchment in the face of an aggressive ethnocentrism, henceforth, becomes the order of the day. intellectual exploits of western enlightenment elevated objectification to the highly esteemed means toward ethnocentrically motivated mastery over “real ity.” its basic mode of analysis combined empirical observation with critical rigor and methodological empathy and an overwhelming penchant to univer salize conclusions--method being confused for truth. in the process, social sci ences and oriental studies came to reflect national categories contrived by an 136 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 6 1 assertive modem west in a self-perpetuating subject-object relationship. global changes associated with the world wars, decolonization, and skepticism about the relevance of alien methodologies to the arab/islamic context, in addition to the failure of presumptions underlying objectification to be ade quately validated, threw the whole field into disarray, subjecting concomitant identifiem to the forces of wear and tear. this process did not leave either side unscathed, engulfing both in an identity crisis. to a empean civilization com mitted to a modem nonfoundational secular world, beyond a limit currently being experienced in random yet disturbing symptoms, modernity has increas ingly proven less valid and may actually be on its way out (pp. 7-8). this cri sis is experienced in the form of a “half-way house” postmodern condition of “indefinite duration,” reflecting the unsustainability of one paradigm, western modernity, coupled to the unforseeability of its successor (pp. 389, 392), i.e., no alternative as of yet seems to be on the horizon. on the arab side, islam is currently proving the only viable frame of reference, especially in light of the failure of imported alternatives. the challenge, however, is to re-effectuate the timeless and ubiquitous truth of islam while accounting for historical and cur rent westem impact. at heart is the identification of a point of departure r e p resenting absolute truth, toward rethinking the lifestyle and making a fresh start. yet in such a search for “sustainable authenticity,” western “imponder ables” as have gained global sway stand to be accommodated even as they r e p resent irrelevant premises (pp. 9-10). a stable identity structure remains a necessary condition and a prerequisite to a viable dialogue between any two civilizations. dialogue as a voluntary conciliatory input into an interactive process presupposes the actual or virtual existence of nonconflictual common grounds this implies that controversial basics will have to be eschewed if such interaction is to occur in the first place. in essence, this means that dialogue is “noncommittal.” its benefit, however, lies in the hope that through enhancing reciprocal empathy, overriding gains may accrue from conflict avoidance (p. 10). in ignoring basics, however, one is left to wonder as to whether much could be commonly built upon beyond nonconflictive coexistence; especially so, should a moment of truth strike at heart. one such instance, discussed rather extensively by van nieuwenhuijze, is the “development” policies adopted by many arab/muslim countries, which in their subsequently exposed irrelevance turned out to reflect nothing more than a westem worldview of economism, a view which ignores the “noneco nomic” realities of the recipient societies (p. 11). under such conditions, where one side-in this case, the arabs-is admittedly incapable of producing knowledge whether through a traditional system of education or a modem one, dialogue can only collapse into a monologue. this compromises the identity book reviews 1 37 structure of one party to the dialogue, especially when there is no reward for sticking one’s neck out by raising the deeper questions to which there are no ready or available answers. fundamentalists, according to van nieuwenhuijze, are no solution to this problem. essentially, the above is how van nieuwenhuijze articulates the dilemmas facing a civilizational dialogue and constructs his conceptual framework (ch. 1). the rest of the book, henceforth, builds on this theme. however, the fact that the subsequent chapters constitute a collection of articles rather than a sequential order of breakdowns leads frequently to some repetitiveness and redundancies which unnecessarily extend the length of the book. the compila tion is divided into three parts. part 1 (chs. 2-9) probes the dynamics of the arab/lslamic civilization and the alternate perceptions of development and change. this includes the implications of modem science in a non-western context and the ambiguities which arise in crisis form due to external western impingements. islamic revitalization is also examined in this part, as a means of repelling alien forces while reasserting and safeguarding a collective identi ty facing the threat of absorption into that of an aggressive “other.” chapter 2 introduces the cosmic distinctions between the “self-directedness” of western man steeped in hubris and the “other-directedness” of the muslim, embedded in a universe of creation, revelation, and ultimate judgment (pp. 34; 19-21). change, in the framework of these alternative welfunschuungs, reflects differ ent understandings, which not infrequently lead many to project a static repre sentation of the middle east (the suitability of this term as applied to the bbfislamic world is subject to ethnocentric controversy; van nieuwenhuijze, while using the term is aware of its ethnocentric implications, p. 5 1) as a place where progressive change does not occur. thus, van nieuwenhuijze makes a corrective distinction between the western conception of change as a unidi rectional and irreversible process, instrumentalized by man to shape the world to his own projected image, and that of muslims as an occasionalistic “act” of restoration. routinization is perceived as having a deviant effect on islam, which calls for a mujuddid, a renewer, to arise, act, and redress. thus, while western man, with time as his alleged instrument, is an innovator and planner, the muslim is a restorer. under the apparent stability of islam, a hidden dynam ic of change as act, not process, is underscored. consequently, the crucial ques tion is whether there can be any common ground between the two (pp. 24,34). chapters 3 and 4 proceed to highlight the contemporary historical specifici ties of rhe middle east region compared to the rest of the third world (a term falling out of current use) (ch. 3), and where islam is a particular determinant of culture and civilization (ch. 4). unlike other colonized societies and an important factor in the nature of the hbfislamic-western colonial experience 138 the american joumal of islamic social sciences 1 6 1 is that the imbalanced interaction had occurred between two competing yet kin dred civilizations. hence, the superimposition of western historical experit ences and structures, such as “development” and “states,” on a unique and dis tinct civilizational identity can produce only disappointing outcomes. the western development paradigm remains worlds apart from arab-mudim experiences and understandings. to the extent that it is essentially economistic and ignores its own relative and particularistic idiosyncrasies, it has been doomed to failure. as van nieuwenhuijze puts it, “ethnocentrism on either side informs a permanently competitive match” @. 35). this calls for an “exercise in clarification” in order to render information per taining to one setting intelligible and manageable to those belonging to mth er. thus, chapter 5 attempts to provide an understanding for terms like secu larization and seculurism in their proper western context, and from thereon to mark the difference between christian or post-christian civilization and the islamic civilization. after reviewing some of the major current trends in islam, van nieuwenhuijze hypothesizes that the real conflict in contemporary middle eastern civilization is not between “reactionary” fundamentalists and “pro gressive” westemizers, but rather an identity conflict comprising essentialism versus secularization, the latter pair constituting the ambiguity that marks a potentially fertile third position squeezed between the former two (pp. 81-82). a convergence approach suggested by van nieuwenhuijze (ch. 6 ) envisages the combined images of self and other on either side as the instruments for both interaction proper and its scholarly description and analysis. this is meant to avoid distortions frequently besetting description and thwarting dialogue (pp. 12625). according to him, notions of “islam” and “west” raise more prob lems than they solve. self-reinforcing perceptions, simplifications, and stereo typing in addition to media influences have rendered encounter situations between the two civilizations problematic. at the heart of the confusion is “conceptual access” as a necessary condition for mutual understanding (p. w). common rationality thus is necessary in order to guard against hostile oppos rationality inevitably brings up the issue of science (ch. 7). van nieuwenhuijze makes the important point that it was not science per se which led to secularism and seculaflza * tion rather, the main culprit was the presup posing view of man as a demiurge which, owing its roots to the christian notion of “creature,” gained in sigmficance during the renaissance and even @y culminated in modernity (i-e., humanism). thus, while in the western historical perception science owed its flowering to the liberation from the shackles of religion and dogma, one must be more circumspect when raising ing representations @. 124). the issue o f i s l a m a n d science. thoughin some respects pmblt?m&, therela book reviews i 39 tionship between the two is not what it has been in the occident. in the islamic historical experience science may have been neglected, but it was not opposed. inasfar as there has been a “tectonic fault” in the islamic civilization, it was largely between orthodoxy and mysticism rather than science. the problemat ic question remains, however, as to whether islam can grapple with modem science-if not in its outlook then at least in its secular inspiration (pp. the final chapter in part 1 (ch. 9) is a follow-up on chapter 8, where van nieuwenhuijze discusses in some length the distinctions between “islamism” and mainstream islam. chapter 9 is basically a review of the extensive multi volumed study of fundamentalism, sponsored by the american academy of a r t s and science and edited by martin marty and r. scott appleby. he under goes the exercise within a postmodem framework and argues that as a broad phenomenon witnessed among members of different faiths, “fundamentalism” as a term is simply a “totalizing figment by means of which westerners try to come to terms . . . ethnocentrically, with what is seen as a range of specific instances of non-westerners’ response to the western impact” (p. 186). part 2 of the book (chs. 10-15) concentrates on the intercultural relations between the middle east and europe. chapter 10 offers a presentation of what is meant by “sociocultural identity” or authenticity and its role in intercultural processes, particularly during the western colonial period, together with a summary presentation of the arab case in an attempt to assess interactive potential. according to van nieuwenhuijze, the nature of the relationship between the arab and european sociocultwal identities is characterized by a basic affinity appearing as an ambiguity of convergence and divergence-a sort of love-hate relationship (p. 196). chapter 1 1 looks at the e m a r a b symposium which had been held in hamburg in april 1983, within the per spective of the long-standing relationship between europeans and arabs as a case of enduring cultural interaction. his purpose, as he identifies it, is to fos ter understanding of the constraints and prospects of cultural encounters as a main feature of global interdependence. chapters 12 and 13 present the phe nomenon of interculturality as an experience which challenges the premise that one’s own culture is unique and looks at long-standing cross-mediterranean transaction as a case in point (ch. 12). this is followed by a discussion of the factors obstructing or facilitating sociocultural intercourse (ch. 13). in the same vein, chapter 14 follows up on the issue but more so from a religious muslim-christian historical encounter perspective. finally, chapter 15 delves into the prospects for a euro-arab dialogue. the author concludes that much remains to be done in this regards, especially when clear goal-setting (compli cated by both sides trying to avoid or impose certain issues, e.g., the 127-35). 140 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 6 1 arab-israeli conflict, or not being able to identify what is hoped to be achieved) remains illusive. part 3 of the book (chs. 16-21) attempts to consider the implications for oriental and development studies and the new demands arising from the per ceptual and methodological retooling needed to meet them. in chapter 16, the author observes that there is a good measure of reciprocity in the processing of information and in the ensuing image-making of the other on both sides. however, they do not constitute symmetrical formations. vital interests are more at play in the arab world in their contestation of the image of the west than vice versa; no doubt this is due to the power asymmetry. symmetry as a point of departure for a dialogue reflects, therefore, a simplistic representation of the matter (p. 138). chapter 17 assesses the significance of the “irreversible” trend toward one world interaction and interdependence on one hand and the natural and ineradicable ethnocentrism informing any group or collectivity on the other, for work being and to be done in humanities and social sciences. education and curricular adjustments are to play an important role in allowing scholarship to become more effectively interactive. finally, chapters 18 through 20 bring up the controversial issue of oriental studies. the main difficulty facing oriental studies is not merely that it repre sents a purposeful and systematic attempt at deceit and falsification, as edward said has charged, but more so that it incorporates the problem of double frame of reference (p. 348). while there may have been sincere attempts at under standing and representing the “other,” the fact that such knowledge had to be translated into and for a different context with its own frame of reference has contributed more rather than less to misunderstandings. overcoming these pit falls calls for a move toward intersubjectivity where arabs are not simply objects of study but actual participants in the effort at understanding. furthermore, the author stresses the importance of developing a field of occidental studies to match that of the oriental counterpart. in an interactive one world system, it is well nigh for non-westerners to develop the vital inter est in knowing “the 0ther”‘f.p west @. 354). in this effort, western claims to a universality of understanding are to give grounds to intercultural commu nication and regional studies (not in the military-strategic sense adopted by american academic institutions) which account for the persistence among mankind of multiple and various ways of gaining and expressing understand ing (ch. 19; p. 362). in this respect, the inherent ethnocentrism of cross-cultur al studies must be overshadowed by a “forward looking” agenda arising from the concern that in a global village, intercultural transactions and their instru ment, cultural studies, are bound to acquire increasingly vital significance for the survival of mankind (ch. 20, p. 365). in the rest of the chapter, the author book reviews 141 proceeds to suggest methods by which this may be achieved. finally, chapter 21 re-examines the concept of development while stressing the si@cance of culture to the understanding and practice of development. van nieuwenhuijze also looks at why previous developmental projects had failed in light of their reductive and economistic impulses and concludes by listing a group of entries (in an annex) to be studied by interdisciplinary teams of researchers and poli cy-makers. van nieuwenhuijze’s work raises important and interesting issues, particu larly as pertaining to intercivilizational relations, and is quite realistic in point ing out problems facing a fruitful dialogue between arabs/muslims and europe. however, for all the apparent and (one may add) sincere endeavor exhibited by the author at tackling sensitive and controversial issues in as neu tral a fashion as possible, it remains clear that he cannot maintain a mental dis tance between his knowledge structure or system of intelligence and the issues he raises or approaches. this is not meant to criticize but to highlight the nat ural limitations caused by the problem that van nieuwenhuijze actually recog nizes but cannot avoid-the double frame of reference. conceptual, defini tional, procedural, and substantive difficulties arise as a consequence, which serve in many cases to undermine serious efforts and waste significant ener gies. frustration builds up when this culminates in a vicious circle of mutual recriminations as both sides end up where they had started from. van nieuwenhuijze’s approach suffers several limitations, the most serious of which is reductionism. from such a methodological base follow the rest of the faults. for instance, universality in islamic terms connotes revelation (i.e., from outside of history and sociocultml formations); supreme and unadulter ated truth (i.e., no tampering with it has taken place over time and space); and finality (last revelation, seal of prophets doctrine, and perfection). from this follows islam’s claim to absolute truth. in this sense, universality is a closed, not an open, system. van nieuwenhuijze’s definition of universalism as a “wishful claim to uniqueness,” in grudging accommodation with manifest plu rality of entities @. 99), and as such constitutes an open sociocultural system, may perhaps be only partially, though reductively, true as far as the ummu as a cognitive sociocultural body is concerned. however, a holistic view of islam must always consider its universality (normative closure) and derived univer salism (cognitive openness) as two components of a unity. otherwise, simply considering the latter on its own would very well lead to reductive fallacies. the cultural approach which van nieuwenhuijze adopts .and applies to islam and muslims’ conception of themselves inevitably superimposes social theory as the frame of reference. consequently, arabs and muslims end up being r e p 142 the american journal of islamic social sciences 16: 1 resented rather than representing themselves. could this be more of the same orientalism? in different ways, more could be said about other controversial concepts such as secularism and secularization. as van nieuwenhuijze observes, these concepts find their mots not only in the pagan history of europe, but also in the ambiguous christian view of man as god-oriented and, through the doctrine of original sin, as turning away from god. in these terms, they are completely alien to islam. yet many tend to associate worldly concerns of muslims with manifestations of those concepts rather than with the innate worldly aspects of the faith. after all, in addition to being otherworldly, islam takes pride in being a worldly religion as well (din wa dunya). perhaps a more suitable conceptual usage in dealing with muslims’ sociocultural concerns would be “worldliness” (dunya; as an otherworldly derivative manifest and embodied in the ummah) as opposed to secularism and its materialistic derivatives. van nieuwenhuijze’s reductionism further leads him to fall into procedural and substantive pitfalls. in arguing for a “workable” truth as a necessary req uisite for interaction, he seems to be calling for good old-fashioned pragma tism. religious truth, in this case, is subordinated to practical requirements with (mis)interpretations serving as religious sanctioning for a cognitive-nor mative hiemrchy, i.e., rationality. moreover, he suggests, as a means of civi lizational convergence, that claims against the existence of any truth on the one hand, and claims to truth on the other, be dropped, both being a posture of hubris @. 124). but dropping the former claims would beg the question: where then lies the truth? dropping the latter claims would beg the opposite question: what then does revelation constitute? while it may be true that to make a claim to truth as interpretation is one thing, and to make a claim to truth as revela tion is another, both, however, are symbiotically linked and can only be defmed in respect to each other. thus, if the answer to the first question is that “truth” is out there but that no one has access to it, then this is tantamount to saying there is no truth, opinion consequently and inevitably being held in secular supremacy. by detour, we are back to a situation in which claims to the absence of truth are asserted though deceptively so, while claims to the existence of a foundational truth are undermined. in essence, such seeming mutual and pr+ cedural fairness hides substantive injustices. a paradox seems to be inherent in social theory’s self-referential approach to religion, and is an additional mani festation of its dominative idiosyncrasies. this may shed new light on the qur’anic verse: never will the jews or the christians be satisfied with thee unless thou fol low their form of religion. ( 2 120) book reviews 143 ‘in addition to being a qufanic cautioning, this verse offers methodological insights into the self-referential, self-propelling identity structure of the ”‘other.” this is not necessarily due to the existence of malice, but rather despite $the absence of any. as such there may be no reason to attribute self-conscious malicious motives to the author himself who could only be limited by his own civilizational horizons. furthemore, while van nieuwenhuijze’s observation that both arabbslamic and european civilizations face a crisis may carry some truth in it, a problem lies in what is not being said. if the historical dynamics of both civilizations, judged by past experiences, is any indication of the opposite directions both encounter, then it is very possible that the current crisis is a continuous reflec tion of opposing dynamics. on the one hand, a nonfoundational postmodern civilization desperately seeking anchorage, may be experiencing the pains of old age. on the other hand, a foundational civilization seeking the restoration af its dynamic impulse may be undergoing the pangs of rebirth. while both are in pairdcrisis, in and of itself, this does not tell much. this contention may raise highly speculative issues beyond the scope of this review. however, the point to be made is that a sense of mutual crises need not, by itself, justify an inter actional approach and in some cases may provoke the obverse. for instance, despite all the globalization rhetoric that is instrumentalized as justification for lone world interaction, t h i s “emerging” phenomenon may be nothing more than the developmental discourse in a new guise, reflecting the supershuctur a3/ideological manifestation of an economistic infrastructure-in short, an advanced and final stage of western technological economism. global inter actionism may end up only reproducing the promises and failures of develop ment theory. condescending calls for the participation of the “other” are like ly to conjure up results no different than those of earlier calls for joining the western “modern” experience. one si@icant catch with the proposition of intercultural exchange is that as an open cognitive exercise it cannot take place in the absence of a normative closure. for meaningful communication to occur, problems of legitimacy in the arab/muslim world will have to be initially addressed and resolved. to both their people and the “other,” arab regimes stand on shaky grounds. this p h i b i t s them from making credible claims to authentic representations of fhemselves. with the exception of iran, no other arab or muslim state has acquired the normative-cognitive preconditions for an equitable dialogue-not in the sense that a dialogue has to await a symmetrical relationship, but that at least some basic domestic homework needs to be done before meaningful interaction may be possible. this is mainly an arabmuslim substantive p m b lem which does not exonerate arabs and muslims from blame. 144 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 4 1 a final point to add with regards to the current state of oriental studies, at least at the academic level, has to do with its ordering of variables. whereas the study of the east necessitates that “qualified” easterners speak for themselves (independent variable), while the westerners try to leam and understand (dependent variable), with the western educated easterners set as facilitators (intervening variable), this order has not as of yet been effectuated. the latter two continue to act as explanatoryhdependent variables. by the same token, this order may be reversed if an occidental field of study is to develop. a meaningful interaction could take place only subsequent to this pair of initial stages. being latecomers, however, arabs/muslims may still have to undergo the process of observing the west on their own, so that at a more advanced stage, when receiving self-representative information by the occident about the “west,” they may be able to compare their own findings with that which is incoming, i.e., developing a discipline of empirical comparative studies. if one may suggest an initial step in this direction, the occident need not be perceived, as many arabs/muslims do and as many occidentals represent themselves, solely as a monolith. for purposes of precision and observation, it may be of benefit to classify the west along some qualifying attributes, for instance, among other current pos sibilities: the imperial west (e.g., the united states); the semi-imperial west (e.g., the united kingdom and france); and the nonirnperial west (e.g., germany and most other european countries). such classifications must remain fluid as actor and thought roles and patterns change over time. however, they may reflect a kind of constraint on intellectual simplicity while introducing elements of analytical complexity and sophistication. the idea behind the exercise is to identify historical antecedents to imperialism and then move backward, through the medium of western thought, to observe its impact on the concept of “europe” or “the west’’ as manifestations of an evolutionary dynamic, and contrariwise speculate about alternative outcomes had the occident been deprived of its imperial historical fragment, pointing out what this could mean or imply (both in the past and present). in short, what would the west have metamorphized into without the colonial experience and the circumstantial discovery of the new world, and could it shed its imperial impulse without being true to itself? is imperialism (intellec tual and/or physical) a cause or effect of western reality? the speculative bur den of such questions may render them less amenable to emphatic conclusions, yet it remains important as an heuristic and promising device toward a better understanding of the west. how these questions are answered could shed new perspectives on the inherent and self-propelling dynamics at play in the book reviews 145 occident and which arabs/muslims will have to tackle beyond imitation, wishful thinking, and proposed dialogues. amr g. e. sabet university of calgary, calgary, alberta canada f journal of international trade, logistics and law, vol. 6, num. 2, 2020, 153-167 153 the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision furkan bi̇çer istanbul commerce university, turkey received: 18 nov, 2020 accepted: 08 dec, 2020 published: 10 dec, 2020 abstract: with the advent of the internet, consumer buying process has changed dramatically. consumer’s buying habits are influenced by digital medium to a large extent. online peer reviews, which are also known as zero moment of truth (zmot) play a significant role in deciding whether to buy or not buy from a particular brand. this study investigates the consumer buying decision process in smartphone purchase decision. triggered by stimulus, zmot and the subsequent stages are analyzed to find out relative importance of each stage in consumer buying decision in now always-connected digitized world. the survey was conducted against 241 turkish smartphone owners residing in istanbul, who have made a purchase in the last six months. an analysis is made to assess the relative importance of each stage in the buying process according to different demographic factors. the results indicate the key role of zmot among all stages in consumer buying process. the results also demonstrate zmot is more influential in some of the demographic factors. keywords: consumer buying process, zero moment of truth, stimulus. 1. introduction in the 21st century marketing environment, brands try to design their products according to consumer’s needs and wishes. today, brands not only try to convince consumers to buy their products, but also, they try to build their brand equity in customer’s mind. in the scope of customer, understanding of consumer buying decision process has great importance. thanks to the internet medium and social media revolution, consumers have increased power over the brands. furthermore, smartphones enable consumers to access internet everywhere on a 7/24 basis. smartphones enabled people to fulfill their needs like paying the bill, ordering food or even buying a new smartphone. so, consumer’s buying decision process is changed as compared to the conventional means. consumer buying process typically has five elements, namely; problem recognition, information search, choosing among alternatives, purchase decision and post-purchase behavior. it’s very important to understand of buying decision process for winning at zmot. the research indicated the effect of zero moment of truth (zmot) on customer purchase decision and delivers an explanatory research on smartphone in turkey. according to google, zmot is new added member for three-step process of stimulus, shelf (fmot) and experience (smot) (2011, google). first moment of truth (fmot) is consumer’s decision moment at shelf which brand to purchase and second moment of truth (smot) is the consumer faces at home whether products deliver on the brand promise defined by p&g (2006, annual report). zmot is the new and powerful step in these days, because consumers are searching online via smartphone or laptop before the purchase decision. in the next section literature review regarding buying decision process, stimuli and moments of truth are discussed. 2. literature review 2.1. buying decision process marketers studied many years to understand consumer buying process and finally it is a categorized as five steps, namely; diagnosis of the problem, seeking details, choosing among alternatives, buying decision and attitudes after the buying. it’s clearly seen that purchase process starts way before actual purchase and has outcomes long afterward (kotler, 2006). sometimes it can be skipped some of process, such as maybe consumer is satisfied with one product furkan bi̇çer 154 and buys it always, so there is no problem recognition or information search but still consumer may write online about the product or tell friends with face to face or via message, that is named word of mouth or/and electronic word of mouth. since it is possible to search online and after purchase to write a blog about the product, buying decision process should be examined prospect of zmot. it can be defined the steps of buying decision process as figure 1. figure 1. the buying decision process (maria, 2014). to achieve playing role at problem recognition phase, demographic factors should be taken into consideration included, age, sex, race, income, race, education status and marital status (kinnear, 1986). there are two types of demand which are primary and secondary. for primary demand, marketers encourage the customer experience the product or service ignoring of the brand they select such as when they first introduced. secondary demand is occurred only if primary demand is existing, and marketers try to convince consumer for best solution which is a specific brand’s product (pearson, 2006). consumers not always make search rationally, especially consumers who have low income make less external search even they will lose more when they made bad purchase compare to the wealthy ones (pearson, 2006). every purchase decision has some risks perceived by customer, in other term, there is a belief that product may has negative consequences. if the product of a brand is unfamiliar to consumer, perceived risk gets higher, so consumers tend to search more in that kind of situation (alexander, 2004). moreover, while each group of the search customers more likely to use many sources of information’(tulin and erdem, 2004). the number of brands which exist on consumer’s top of minds are varies product to product or for one product it varies country to country. for example, according to research, for autos category, american consumers have eight brands their top of minds to evaluation, and canadians have only two brands for average however canadians have seven beer brands in their top of minds while americans have three (hauser, 1990). in consumer’s top of mind there are many brand names and their qualifications and especially most liked one or most hated one. to understand the concept of alternatives evaluation, consumer’s thinking method which also can be seen on marketplace websites, is categorization should be known. according to jim lecinski, a classical zmot process would be like this, searching online for more information about the product, checking other consumers who had the product before, comments about the product and checking for coupons, offers, and discounts (google, 2012). the consumer has judgments and preferences towards different brands through an attribute evaluation procedure (hinsdale, il: dryden, 1973). kotler and keller (2006) expressed that customers assess products and services by incorporating their positive and negative brand beliefs according to significance and the expectancy-value model of attitude formation advances it. according to taylor, j. (1974) since consequences of a buying decision can be seen in the future, at purchasing moment, consumers are forced to decide in other words take risk, and a consumer's decision to adjust, postpone, or avoid a purchase decision is highly affected by perceived risk. those risks are defined by kotler and keller (2004) as: 1. functional risk the product expectation is not satisfied. 2. physical risk-the product may harmful to consumer’s health. 3. financial risk-price of the product is high to its value. the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 155 4. social riskthe product can cause shameful by other people. 5. psychological riskthe product can be harmful to mental health well-being of the user. 6. time risk -unsatisfied product can cause an opportunity cost of finding another adequate product. it’s normal to expect that, buyer decision process ends at purchase decision phase. boulding. et al. (1993), spreng and dixon (1992), zeithaml et al. (1993) mentioned that predictive will be suppositions represent customer’s belief about the level of service to occur in consumer’s future contact with the brand. miller (1977) defined the expected standard as normal stems from past incidents with a product from a consumer’s perception of standard product quality. the assumed belief is based on averaged performance what the respondent feels performance will be (miller, 1977, p. 76). woodruff et al. (1983) mentioned those beliefs based on usual experience since they catch the ideal and realistic aspects of expectations. santos and boote (2003) mentioned that as well as attempting to manage prepurchase expectations, marketers should understand the nature of customer’s post-purchase affective states and resultant affective behavior. four post-purchase affective states have been suggested: delight, satisfaction (positive unimportance), acceptance (negative unimportance) and dissatisfaction. 2.2. moments of truth moment of truths are critical moments in which a brand encounter attracts, pleasures or indifferences potential consumers. procter & gamble noticed the crucial importance of three to seven seconds after a customer first encounters a store shelf. for this reason, they described this at the shelf decision moment as the first moment of truth (fmot) (nelson, ellison, 2005). löfgren et al. (2008) noted that at the moment of buying, or the fmot, the aim of the cover is to attract to consumers and works as a silent salesman that assists sell the product. as a marketing term, moment of truth is the incident when customers contact with a service, brand, or product to form an impression about that specific brand, service or product, it’s mentioned by ertemel and başçı (2015), ertemel and köksal (2017) and ertemel and peyk (2018). in the second moment of truth, products are used or consumed. according the löfgren (2005) the fmot is a used for defining consumer’s decision at moment of buying, however the second moment of truth defines the part of the consumption process that deals with use, handling, and actual consumption after purchase. the third moment of truth is that consumer's feedback or reaction towards a brand, product or service, consumer becomes brand advocate and gives back via word of mouth or social media publishing. the third moment is that powerful point where the product experience stimulates an emotion, curiosity, passion, or even anger to talk about the brand. according to moran et. al. (2014), by assisting the sharing of favorable consumer experience at third moment of truth, brands can exploit the network effects of social media marketing to build stronger, more sustainable customer-engagement relationships. figure 2. stimulus and moments of truth (moran et al., 2014). according to lecinski (2011), zmot is that moment when consumers use their laptop, smart phone or some other devices which can connect to internet and start learning about a product or service they are thinking about trying or furkan bi̇çer 156 buying. zmot is the moment when customer is exposed by stimuli, they immediately start searching for information about product or brand online via smartphones, tablets and computers. according to ertemel and başçı (2015), zmot’s primary defining features are:  zmot occurs in online habitat, for example search engines.  it occurs in real time, at any time of day and progressively on the go with smartphones when consumer is exposed by a stimulus. the conversation is occurring between consumers and experts, friends, strangers, brands and the purpose is getting attention by customer. it can be seen in the figure below that one customer’s experiences about product turns out to be another customer’s zmot. figure 3. stimulus, zmot, fmot and smot (lecinski, 2011). 2.3. word of mouth people are exposed massive amount of marketing messages and consumers are exposed these messages via tv channels, radio stations, magazines, newspapers, online advertisements (cakim, 2010). word of mouth is passing of information from person to person using oral communication. there is an argument about word of mouth which is spreading more when customer is dissatisfied or satisfied and anderson (1998) mentioned that extremely dissatisfied customers engage greater word of mouth than high-satisfied customers. marketers should be careful about satisfaction level of consumers but they should be more careful about dissatisfaction level of customers. thanks to internet and technology, word of mouth still active and powerful at online medium. gremler et al. (2004) mentioned that, internet makes possible consumers to share their ideas about products, brands and services, through web-based consumer opinion platforms, and this is how electronic word of mouth (ewom) exist. since internet has developed, consumers can reach unbiased information about product from other consumers and it also enables to consumers can share their experiences and satisfaction level after purchase, so it can be seen that consumers engage with electronic word of mouth both ways which they exploit from it and contribute to it. smartphone market in turkey the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 157 turkey’s population is 82.44 million people in 2020. according to research which examined by hootsuite and we are social (2019), 77% of the adults have a smartphone and 84 of them are using internet daily. it can be seen that, there is a big market in turkey and it’s worth to research. 3. research model now consumers can reach information about the product, experiences about the product which has been bought and written comment online about it by another customer and that is happening in very short time thanks to smartphones which connect internet any second. consumers are more active more than ever in buying process. the research examines the effects of zero moment of truth on consumer buying decision in turkey on smartphone products in the following aspects: 1. investigate zero moment of truth (zmot) based on the different demographic variables such as gender, age, marital status, income level, education level etc. 2. analyze zero moment of truth against stimulus and first moment of truth in smartphone sector. 3.1. research methods and limitations in this research, survey questions which can be found on appendix-1, and questions are obtained from similar study which has been studied by google at 2011. in that survey, the first question is asked surveyors whether they bought a new smartphone for last six months or not. if they did not, the survey has ended for them. the survey has delivered online, and 396 surveyors are joined. 155 surveyors said that they did not buy any smartphone in last six months and they did not see other questions so in this research, 241 surveyors completed the whole survey questions and it’s analyzed. the questions are translated turkish before sent to the surveyors from original study which is english. 4. result the results show that zmot is the most important phase among the surveyors and distributions can be found in figure below. figure 4. distribution of stimulus, zmot, fmot and smot according to survey. in zmot phase, distribution of source used by surveyors shown in the figure below. furkan bi̇çer 158 figure 5. distribution of source used in zmot. as it can be seen on the figure 5, most of the surveyors searched online and second place is belonging to word of mouth, they talked with their friends and family about the smartphone while they are in buying decision process. according to the survey results, gender, age and marital status of the surveyors are not affected on zmot process, they have similar attributes, they used sources on zmot with similar rates. the results show that, educational status of the surveyors were affected, according to ratio of the source used in their zmot process. it can be seen on figure 6. according to results, zmot is shown by 50% of the employee, 45% of the student, 40% of unemployed, 38% of private sector, 36% public sector and less zmot percentage belongs to freelance. it can be seen on the figure 7. figure 6. distribution of source used in stimulus, zmot and fmot according to education level. the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 159 figure 7. distribution of source used in stimulus, zmot and fmot according to occupation. in order to define, the relationship between participants’ time spent on internet daily with fmot, zmot and stimulus are investigated with using chi-square analysis. the results are shown in the table below. according to chis square test, time spent on the internet has relationship with process of buying decision as stimulus, fmot and zmot. table 1. chi-square analysis results according to time spent on internet at stimulus, zmot and fmot. time spent on internet â stimulus zmot fmot 0-2 hours n 6 6 6 % %33 %33 %33 2-4 hours n 56 56 40 % %37 %37 %26 4-6 hours n 70 71 39 % %39 %39 %22 6-8 hours n 56 62 27 % %39 %43 %19 8+ hours n 29 40 23 % %32 %43 %25 â x^2 p â furkan bi̇çer 160 stimulus 20,654 0,0001 fmot 17,6 0,004 zmot 6,4 0,019 it can be seen on the graph that the distribution of fmot, stimulus and zmot according to time spent on internet. the graph below shows that, stimulus and zmot are increasing with time spent on internet. figure 8. distribution of source used in stimulus, zmot and fmot according to time spent on internet 5. discussion based on the survey results, zero moment of truth is most important phenomenon and step at buying decision process, on smartphone in turkey. according to survey, surveyors who all age groups, whether they are single or married, and whether they are female or male, they distributed with similar rates on zmot phase. but educational status, occupation and daily time spent on internet were affected on distribution of the surveyors engaged with zero moment of truth. 6. conclusion and implications for future research technology and smartphones have developed so usage of internet is also increased with these developments. before, customer’s buying decision process is occurred with stimulus, fmot and smot but there is a new step now which called zmot. now, zmot at least as much as important with other steps. sales are not directly dependent with the performance of sales person and sales are not restricted with time or store, since there is great usage of e-commerce and consumers can reach products, brands whenever they want and stores are open 24 hours in a day. customers are trying to make more smart choices now, and they are using online sources, e-woms more than ever. brands need to be more transparent and must be there all the time while consumers at buying decision process. winning at zmot is the new key of success but it cannot be ignored that stimulus and fmot are still important. after the purchase, there is a moment called third moment of truth, it is defined as customer make comments online or contact with brands directly and it’s open to all other customers for reaching information and experiences. word of mouth was important and it is still important at customers buying decision process but now there is ewom and it’s more powerful and more reachable more than ever. the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 161 in this research, it's been analyzed that, the factors affective on customer’s behavior at smartphone buying decision process in turkey. it’s also analyzed that, according to demographic factors, how consumer behavior is affected and which sources are used more in smartphone buying decision process. the research can be developed with running other sectors or other nations, so in that way, it can be comparable with each other, and big picture can be seen more clearly. as a further research idea, how brand loyalty is affected by stimulus, fmot and zmot according to demographic variables. references anderson, e. w. 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(2004). consumer search in high technology markets: exploring the use of traditional information channels. journal of consumer psychology, 14(1-2), 96-104. furkan bi̇çer 162 taylor, j. w.(1974). the role of risk in consumer behavior. journal of marketing, 38(2), 54-60. doi:10.1177/002224297403800211. woodruff, r. b., clemons, s. d., schumann, d. w., gardial, s. f. and burns, m. j. (1991). the standards issue in consumer (dis)satisfaction research: a historical perspective, journal of consumer satisfaction/dissatisfaction and complaining behavior, 4, 103-109. zeithaml, v. a., berry, l. a. and parasuraman a. (1993).the nature and determinants of customer expectations of service, journal of the academy of marketing science, 21(1), winter, 1-12. appendix – 1: survey questions in english the following survey is designed to analyze how zero moment of truth effects turkish consumers’ smartphonbuying behavior. q1. what is your gender? 1 male 2 female q2. what is your marital statues? 1 married 2 single q3. please specify your age. 1 age 18 ≦ 25 2 age 26 ≦ 34 3 age > 35 ≦ 44 4 age > 45 ≦ 54 q4. what is your educational level? 1 elementary school 2 high school 3 university 4 master 5 phd q5. what is your income status? 1 no income 2 less than 2500tl 3 2500tl less than 5000tl 4 5000tl less than 7500tl 5 7500tl less than 10000tl the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 163 6 10000tl and more q6. what is your occupation? 1 student 2 private sector 3 housewife 4 employee 5 other 6 public sector 7 retired 8 self-employment 9 unemployed q7/a. time spent planning a product purchase 1 1 year and more 2 7 months less than 12 months 3 4 months less than 6 months 4 2 months less than 3 months 5 1 month 6 3 weeks 7 2 weeks 8 1 week 9 4 days less than 6 days 1 0 2 days less than 3 days 1 1 1 day 1 2 9 hours less than 12 hours 1 3 4 hours less than 9 hours 1 4 1 hour less than 4 hours 1 5 1 hour 1 6 a few seconds q7/b. time spent on internet daily 1 0-2 hours furkan bi̇çer 164 2 2-4 hours 3 4-6 hours 4 6-8 hours 5 8+ hours q7/c. when did you buy a product like that? 1 never 2 2 years less than 5 years ago 3 1 year less than 2 years ago 4 1 year ago 5 9 months less than 12 months ago 6 3 months less than 9 months ago 7 1 month less than 3 months ago 8 1 month ago 9 1 week less than 4 weeks ago 1 0 1 week ago 1 1 4 days less than 7 days ago 1 2 1 day less than 4 days ago 1 3 1 day ago 1 4 a few hours ago q7/d. on the last occasion, where did you purchase this product? 1 online 2 store stimulus y n 1 noticed advertising while browsing online 2 saw/tried product at the house of a friend/family member 3 this is a brand i grew up with the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 165 4 looked at/read magazine advertisements 5 saw an ad on an outdoor billboard 6 read magazine articles/reviews/information 7 saw an ad in a newspaper/newspaper insert 8 read newspaper articles/reviews/information 9 looked up brands/retailers in the yellow pages 1 0 attended a show or event where product were featured 1 1 received mail at home from a brand/manufacturer (e.g., catalogue, brochure) 1 2 received mail at home from a store/retailer (e.g., catalogue, brochure) 1 3 read information in an email received from a brand/manufacturer 1 4 read information in an email received from a retailer/store 1 5 tried a sample/experienced the product at a special event 1 6 heard it discussed on the radio 1 7 saw advertisements on television 1 8 watched a tv show that featured the product zmot – zero moment of truth y n 1 talked with friends/family about the product 2 searched online, used a search engine 3 comparison shopped products online furkan bi̇çer 166 4 sought information from a product brand/manufacturer website 5 read product reviews or endorsements online 6 sought information from a retailer/store website 7 read comments following an article/opinion piece online 8 became a friend/follower/”liked” a brand 9 watched videos about product online 1 0 read/visited a blog that discussed product 1 1 searched the web for information with my mobile phone before shopping 1 2 talked to a customer service representative online 1 3 searched the web for information with my mobile phone in the store 1 4 saw product mentioned on a social networking website like facebook 1 5 received a referral notice from a friend online 1 6 commented on a product mentioned on a social networking website like facebook 1 7 received a coupon or pricing information from someone on a social networking site 1 8 commented on a blog that discussed product 1 9 searched for a coupon with my mobile phone before shopping 2 0 saw an ad/coupon sent to my mobile phone 2 1 looked for coupons on a retailer/store website 2 2 received a text from a brand/manufacturer on my mobile phone 2 3 searched for a coupon with my mobile phone in the store 2 4 looked for coupons on a product brand/manufacturer website 2 5 participated in a chat or discussion online about product 2 6 used my mobile phone to scan 2d barcode/qr code in the store the impact of zero moment of truth (zmot) on smartphone buying decision 167 2 7 read/visited a forum/message board about product 2 8 talked to a customer service rep/salesperson via email 2 9 commented on a forum/message board about product fmot – first moment of truth y n 1 tried a sample/experienced the product in a store 2 talked with a salesperson or associate in the store 3 talked with a customer service representative on the phone 4 looked at the product package in the store 5 read brochure/pamphlet about the product in the store 6 used product coupon i got at the store 7 used computer in the store to look up information on product 8 used a loyalty card/frequent buyer card 9 redeemed a gift card/rewards card smot – second moment of truth y n 1 mentioned it to friends/family 2 mentioned it to a co-worker 3 took a survey 4 wrote a customer review on a website 5 wrote about it on a facebook page 6 posted tweets about it 7 wrote about it in a blog editorial 63 sajsm vol. 28 no. 3 2016 post-truth era and impact on the science associated with sport and exercise medicine we have entered an era in public life where truth has lost its status. truth is no longer the pinnacle that we strive for to settle debates, make decisions and drive policy. facts are conveniently twisted, shaped, and even created. this is most evident when we see politicians disregarding the truth in the determination of important decisions. they also draw upon their followers’ emotions to deceive them to push their political agendas. any challenge to the factual basis of their argument is met with an aggressive response, which often includes the words such as “fake news”a deliberate spread of misinformation. this is well characterised in all sectors of society, not only in politics, and is known as the “post-truth” era. the term ’post-truth‘was the oxford dictionaries word of the year in 2016. [1] the awards for word of the year are reserved for words that have attracted a great deal of interest in that particular year. ’posttruth’ is an adjective defined as ‘relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief’.[1] it is concerning that the new term, ’post-truth’ that describes this negative trend in society was recognised with this international award. compare this to the word of the year for 2015 (emoji, a pictograph, also known as the face with tears of joy) or 2013 (selfie, a picture taken of oneself typically with a smartphone or webcam) – both innocuous in comparison to ’post-truth’. scholars have tried to explain the factors that have caused this phenomenon of post-truth. the easy access to social media, blogs and internet stories are largely to blame. we have seen this strategy used in the presidential campaigns in america. there are also examples of post-truth propaganda in south africa where groups with a political agenda are sponsored to tweet untrue stories in support of this agenda.[ 2] are scientists protected from this trend? it seems so because there are many checks and balances built into the propagation of knowledge through the scientific process. studies have to go through an institutional review board for ethical clearance, and research findings have to be reviewed before they get published. once papers are published they are open to scrutiny by the scientific community. these points alone convey some checks and balances to the distribution of facts that are not entirely true. however, despite this system that is designed to self-correct, scientists should not sit back and assume that the post-truth era is not going to influence the well-established scientific process. a problem threatening this process is the emergence of predatory journals. [3] the business model of predatory journal use contributes to the short circuiting of the established scientific process. predatory journals make authors pay for having their papers published. the submitted papers may undergo peer review, but the process is accelerated and the acceptance rate is high compared to that of the more legitimate journals, which reject about 80-90% of the submitted papers. predatory journals can be easily identified because they usually canvas for papers in an aggressive manner. the predatory journal often has a title that is similar to an established journal. they have editorial boards (some members have fake names) to provide some authenticity. sometimes academics are listed on the editorial board without ever having been formally invited or notified. the business model works for some, particularly the scientists who are under pressure from their academic institutions to publish. they are prepared to pay this price. others publish their material in these journals not realising that the journal is dubious. the increase of predatory journals is not a passing trend. their publication volumes increased from 53000 in 2010 to an estimated 420000 articles in 2014. [4] there are about 8 000 active predatory journals at present, with many of these in the health, exercise and sports medicine disciplines. [4] scientists need to guard against the abuse of the scientific process which occurs when they publish in predatory journals. there also needs to be a concerted effort to educate nonscientists on how to understand scientific claims. this has been attempted by the authors of a paper which lists 20 points which non-scientists should understand.[5] examples of these points in the paper include: differences and chance cause variation, bias is rife, controls are important, correlation does not imply causation, extrapolating beyond the data is risky and data can be dredged or cherry-picked. a better understanding of these and the other points mentioned in the paper, will make a contribution to the preservation of the scientific process. consumers of scientific papers, whether they be scientists, journalists, politicians, or members of the public will be better equipped to interpret the quality of the information if they have these basic skills. another way of protecting the scientific process is to disregard papers that represent poorly designed experiments. this includes studies with a low sample size, inadequate control and poor ecological validity. sometimes good journals let low quality studies slip through the review process – these poor quality papers should not be cited in other research, unless they are being used as an example of poor research. papers from predatory journals should be treated with caution and not cited unless the paper has been scrutinised for quality. without these filters we will rapidly head towards a post-truth era, with fake data polluting real data. the outcome of this scenario is gloomy. mike lambert editor-in-chief s afr j sports med 2016;28(3):63. doi: 10.17159/2078-516x/2016/v28i3a1838 references 1. word of the year 2016 is... https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-theyear/word-of-the-year-2016 (accessed 26th february, 2017) 2. justice malala: the truth behind the 'white monopoly capital' propaganda assault. https://www.businesslive.co.za/rdm/politics/2017-0123-justice-malala-the-truth-behind-the-white-monopoly-capital-propagandaassault (accessed 26th february, 2017) 3. beall j. predatory publishers are corrupting open access. nature 2012; 489(7415):179. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/489179a] 4. shen c, björk b-c. ‘predatory’ open access: a longitudinal study of article volumes and market characteristics. bmc med 2015; 13:230 [.doi.org/10.1186/s12916-015-0469-2] 5. sutherland wj, spiegelhalter d, burgman ma. policy: twenty tips for interpreting scientific claims. nature 2013; 503(7476), 335–337. [doi.org/10.1038/503335a] http://dx.doi.org/10.17159/2078-516x/2016/v28i3a1838 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/word-of-the-year/word-of-the-year-2016 toward a n islamic aesthetic. theory omar w . nasim i n troduction science has become a very narrow and qualified study of the universe. its descriptions of reality are restricted to objective, publicly extended and impersonal notions. this characterization of reality is, in the goethean sense, an utterly oppressive impasse to the subjective human condition.’ thus did nietzsche exclaim, “the nihilistic consequences of our natural sciences from its pursuits . . . there follows ultimately a self decomposition, a turning against itself.”2 one sees a disunited system of thought, where objective designs are studied using objective methods and tools, thereby leaving out many of the subjective and private char acteristics of reality. how then can science claim to be a study of reality and the universe, when it does not have the tools to study even the most fundamental component of reality, the self? the gap between the subject and object was partly created by the empiricist tradition and by kant with his discussions on the “noumena” and “phen~rnena.”~ this dualism within the western world-view has culminated in a very disunited and incoherent description of reality. in physics, efforts are being made to create a “theory of everything” (toe), but it has been quite a task, because of the inherent dualism and lack of connection between ideas, both in the natural sciences and the social sciences. as far as western art, it claims to be of an “absolute” and “universal” nature, so general as to include the whole universe, and beyond, within a single preview.4 art relates to the subjective and inner feelings of an individual or a society at a particular time. as posited by the german idealists, it actually submerges the object and the subject into but this bridge between the objective and the subjective is only an illusion whose disastrous effects can be seen in the modem conception of aes thetic autonomy. the negative production of an autonomous art form is a direct and implicit result of kantian dualisms$ which pervades the h na~im is a philosophy student at the university of manitoba. canada 72 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15: 1 western scheme and forms the basis of many of the dominant knowledge structures. the islamic paradigm, in contrast, is based upon tuwhid (the absolute unity of god), a unifying thread that pervades all natural and social sci ences. art does not stand apart from science, as in the western notion of autonomous art. islamic aesthetic theory does not have to contend with the autonomy of art because of its homogenous foundations, as we shall see below. i shall discuss the kantian aesthetic theory and how, from its awkward sense of the self, the theory of autonomous art was derived. i then con trast it with the islamic point of view. the presentation will take on the form of a general survey of the implications of aesthetic autonomy and how the islamic aesthete may respond. contexts will be provided by the study itself, in that it will not be historical but rather more of an ideolog ical contrast. in addition, we shall use islamic epistemology and aes thetics as a critique of kantian aesthetics. that is, we shall attempt to reconstruct the kantian aesthetic and demonstrate how it negatively influenced the concept of aesthetic autonomy, which further influenced many abstractions, ideals, and contexts, such as identity of the self, morality, and epistemological and ontological concerns. i did not claim that kant was the sole origin of many of our modem ideas concerning the aesthetic-that would be absurd-however, he is an important figure in the study of westem aesthetics. many western abstractions and concepts of an aesthetic theory either were developed by kant, were derived and inspired from his works, or were a negative reac tion to kant’s aesthetic theories, as in the case of nietzschean aesthetics. consequently, for the development and study of islamic aesthetics in relation to western concepts, one must take into consideration kantian positions on many issues presented in aesthetic theory. ”he primary focus of this paper will be the concept of aesthetic autonomy and how it developed out of kantian dualisms, especially of the self in relation to nature. i also show that aesthetic autonomy and its implications in the field of the subject and the self are not islamic notions. finally, i present an islamic solution to the problem, and identify some of the salient fea tures of an islamic aesthetic theory, which would then be used as a cri tique of the western ideas of aesthetics and philosophy of art. in this paper i will not explicitly or directly argue against aesthetic autonomy, mainly because the issues and elements of this paper are of a different nature. however i do refer the reader to noel caroll’s excellent, paper, “moderate m~ralism,”~ which discusses the arguments against autonomism. rather, i argue that autonomy is morally dangerous to the self when contrasted with the islamic aesthetic system. from an analysis of kantian aesthetic theories, i move to a short genealogical study of how descartes’s cogito revolutionized aesthetic nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 1 3 theories throughout history, including kantian theories, which were directly affected in their dualistic grasp of phenomena. along with these considerations, i deliberate upon islamic aesthetics and epistemology and show how it differs or agrees with western theories. this entire con trast is premised on the belief that all civilizations consist of different worldviews that affect their conceptions and perceptions of truth and reality. art is a universal configuration of certain pre-established and presupposed worldviews. these worldviews are developed and mediat ed by civilizations.8 thus, the west has a valid and immensely devel oped concept of art, which is, in some regards, quite different from the islamic form of art. the topic of this paper was inspired by lamya al-faruqi’s identifica tion of an islamic aesthetic theory in her article, “islamizing the a q t s disciplines,” wherein she exhorts muslim intellectuals to envisage the beginning of an islamic philosophy of art (tiuzsafah ul-funun). here is a modest effort to realize a part of her dream of a philosophy of islamic art. this paper will attempt to identify and distinguish many of the unique and particular functions of an islamic aesthetic theory, from which oth ers may build upon in the future. kantian inceptions of an aesthetic autonomy let us move to kant’s transcendental aesthetic theory and show how it relates to the islamic notions of aesthetics. there have been many inter pretations and expositions of kant’s critiquedo and explanations of his aesthetic theory; but very few give a general and a broader significance to kant’s transcendental aesthetic theory. this paper will not deal with all the aspects of kant’s theory. nevertheless, difficult as it is to summa rize without assuming prior knowledge of his overall philosophical pro ject, i intend to look at the aspects of the kantian theory that will help us develop and understand how the islamic aesthetic theory differs from the kantian and western. then, i shall relate kantian aesthetic theory and the development of aesthetic autonomy. thus, i shall restrict my discussion of kant to the following important articulations: kant’s divisions of the objective and subjective and pleasurable and disagreeable art forms, in turn considering its implications in the spheres of music and color, which kant believes to be the most inferior of the arts. then, i show how music’s inferior status, in the eyes of kant, leads to aesthetic autonomy. the problem that brings kant to the shores of the aesthetic domain is the problem that was created by his separation of the world into the noumenal and phenomenal. the division of the object from the subject brought forth a dichotomy between the free and independent human indi vidual and that of a determined and mechanically restricted existence of nature, in the purely newtonian sense.” this gap was to be bridged 74 the american journal of islamic social sciences 151 somehow, because without a connection, nature and man were never to converge upon the paths of existence and truth. if any science or knowl edge scheme were ever to subsist, then this one fissure would have to be filled. without a solution, kant’s entire philosophy would be redundant because no possible answer could then be found to his initial question: is knowledge (science) possible? kant’s struggle to bridge this rift brought him to the abyss of aesthetics, which was then only a current philosoph ical problem, initiated earlier by baumgarten and hamann.12 this kantian separation between the free and independent human life and the mechanically determined nature and his lack of a viable solution later became manifested in the divorce between epistemology and ethics, of which it was further c o n f i i e d by a division between law, technology, and science.13 for kant, art expressed the subject’s d e s k to find and expose hisher own free natures into the orb of the object, thus rendering art something based and founded upon the subjective. this was done with the kantian notion of the idea,14 which was sort of like schopenhauer’s “will,” which pervaded every existence. this idea was the purpose and meaning of the structures of nature and objects. for kant, everything in the world progressed in a purposive way toward a certain end. this teleological idea could be perceived by the intuitive and appreciative senses which bring about an aesthetic judgment: “this judgment relies upon the fact that the object is received in the subject in terms of ‘feeling’ and in terms of a harmonious play of understanding and imaginati~n.”’~ kantian con cepts and categories like intuition, imagination, understanding, abd apperception all provide for an experience of the idea, thus its complete subjective nature. without knowledge of the thing-in-itself, we as sub ject are left to devise a connection with the object that formulates itself into an “idea,” which is representative of a formal structure “outside.” here representations of the idea merely rely upon the concreteness, or the formality of the object, without which no easy representation can be possible. now the notion of freedom comes along with the taxonomy of imagi nation and understanding. the imagination is free to consider and do what it wills of the idea.16 this freedom of imagination allows the sub ject to further hisher considerations of a cognitive and noncognitive claim over nature. some very crucial distinctions are made by kant that allow us to understand how this freedom of our categories arrives at some structured satisfaction (or aesthetic pleasure for the subject). the distinction is made between two reactions to objects: on the one hand, there are sensations we receive purely from the sensual intuition of an object. this is a pure consideration of the object for its sensation and the enjoyment that the object may give through one’s senses alone. weatherston calls this sort of sensation the agreeableness of an 0 b j e ~ t . l ~ nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 75 it should be noted that this agreeableness is entirely contingent upon individual inclinations. the second form of pleasme, which is distin guished from the first, is what we shall call beauty or disintemted plea ’ surell and is based upon the cognition we receive from the form of an object. regardless of the object’s cham and enjoyment that it may deliv er to the senses, its beauty is based upon the form it presents to our under standing. beauty is brought about by a purely formal sense that touches our rationale and intellect. beauty is further divided into two other categories: free and adherent beauty,i9 both of which are subjective characteristics of beauty itself. the former is the “free hand” consideration of beauty, but without atten tion to the cognitive and purposive ends of the object and without delib eration upon the charm and enjoyment an object may provide the sub ject. adherent beauty refers to the attention paid to the concepts and pur poses that an object of beauty may serve to the cognition. thus, adher ent beauty embodies the aesthetic idea.20 music as a r t in kantian aesthetics in kant’s aesthetic categories, music is the lowest of all art forms, even lower than the telling of a joke. the reason kant gives such a low con sideration to music can be easily determined when we consider it in the matrix of the above two categories. compared to other art, music and color are aesthetic artifacts that are hard to categorize under the rubric of the above two general categories. other art forms have formal structures that are easily identified as defined figures that express a certain concrete and thus a representational form. but with music and color, this is not the case. they seem not to represent any form or design of a higher order that prick our cognitive minds. are they beautiful art forms that extend their “forms” to our mind, or are they just sensually pleasurable, offering our minds charm and enjoyment for their own sake? to answer the above question, one would have to be able to place music in one of the categories of satisfaction mentioned above. since most music (and colors) are abstract and nonrepresentational,21 and con sidering that the division of satisfaction into the agreeable and beautiful is based upon the concrete representation of the subject’s “idea” of the object, we are left with no choice but to place music into the realm of the agreeable.22 if music is placed into the agreeable form of satisfaction, then music has nothing to say to the intellect, nor can it represent the “idea” of an object. thus it becomes nonpurposive in its appeal. however, it can be strongly argued that music does represent the idea, maybe even more eloquently than any other art form. for example, as schopenhauer would have it, music is the articulation of the “will,” the very conceptless language of the idea itself, thus making music the high 76 the american journal of islamic social sciences 151 est of all art forms. even kierkegaard, in eifher/or, discusses the possi bility of music or any other abstract form of art as being the highest of all forms of art. thus for kierkegaard, mozart’s opera don juan was the greatest achievement in the arts, because of its pure abstractness.23 if the abstractness of the art form makes art more beautiful and expressive, then it would appear that kant was quite wrong, we have before us a counterexample to kant’s critique of judgment. fu~thermore, if music is a powerful tool for the conjuring of different emotions and the “playing” of the mind, then how can it be considered such a low and base form of art? does this quality not make music an important form of art, especially if art’s focal purpose is to make man conscious of himself through his feelings and emotions, as ibn sina and a l g m i tried to establish? both of them divided music into two parts: the formal material shuctme of the sound itself and its spiritual structure, the latter being conducive to pure spiritual and personal growth. consequently, the problem arises: if music is really such an important form of art, and the kantian aesthetic seems to deny its importance, then would art really have to represent and create cognitively moral emotions to be art? does art really need to fuse the subject within the object, with the force and power of representation? ‘the point about music for these thinkers,” bowie states, “is that, although it is sensuous, it does not necessarily represent anything. as such, it may be understood as ‘representing’ what cannot be represented in the subject, the supersensuous basis of subjectivity which kant’s phi losophy cannot arti~ulate.”~ for kant, music was an art of empty for malisms and of nonrepresentational forms, condemning music to a lower f o m of art that acted as the “language of emotions.” but does art have to be representational and structured to be p a t ? do morality, cognition, understanding, purpose, and teleological ideals, all of which kant believed add purpose and meaning to art, have to be included in art and beauty? these qualities do not exist in the domains of music. here lies the emergence of a divorce and separation between morality, purpose, and meaning on the one hand, and nonrepresentation, noncognitive, and the immoral, on the other. in other words, aesthetic success is not in the formal structures, representations of an object, and its moral capacities of purpose, but in its sensuousness and feeling. woe to kant: “i love him who willeth the creation of something beyond himself and then per isheth,” thus spoke zarathustra. kant accidentally lit the match, hegel set the wick aflame, nietzsche placed the dynamite on the bundle of morals, and modernism has watched the explosion and destruction of these morals. the result: art has become not a tool to self-understanding, self-consciousness, and human development, as kant wished it; rather, art has become something that is relished by the senses and glorified by the debased sentiments of nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 77 humankind. humans are now justified in creating images of immoral and brutally obscene organisms of art that do not teach or educate the mass es about the impoxtance of moral considerations. for the autonomist moral education is invalid, because morals have no authority over the aesthetic modes of an art form.= we also see many forms of “abstract” art which have no apparent meaning or any moral or real sisnificance to human life except the sen sational emotions that they evoke by the different uses and positionings of the various colors. we see “abstract” objects being distorted and deformed to bring out our emotional responses and not our moral and cognitive replies. the deformed and distorted creations of the abstract artists do not represent any reality, yet they do create a reality of their own. (this art form found its greatest manifestation in the distortion and deformation of the world during world war i and ii.) we find literature and drama being diseased by the lack of moral consideration in their pro ductions and writings,26 where even excessive violence and immoral acts are part and parcel of a “successful” art piece.” all these illusions of aesthetic productions are not in any way without criticism from the young and old. many people actually despise and abhor many of these immoral and senseless forms of art. for example, people stand up against the violence portrayed in movies; parents prevent their children from watching certain types of obscene shows. these expressions of repulsion and repugnance arise not only from people’s moral voice but also from the natud dispositions that make them human. thus aesthetic autonomy does not result in a description and explanation of human nature. if a certain idea or concept is against human nature, it shall never last long. now we see in contempomy times a retum to the grand m o d sublimity of the forgotten.28 autonomy in art autonomy of art refers to that art or aesthetic expression that is strict ly isolated and independent of all other knowledge forms and disci p l i n e ~ ? ~ first, i will briefly consider the ontological aspects of autonomous art and then move on to the epistemological aspects. ontologically, autonomists contend that art should exist only for its own sake. aa has intrinsic values that are enough to warrant its own exis tence, which also justifies its own perception of ‘‘truth’’ and “ndity” per se. this existence, then, does not need any extrinsic entities for it to be art, meaning that it does not need to be judged, discussed, or evaluated by “other social realms which pursue cognitive, political or moral ~ a l u e . ” ~ nor does art need to judge or evaluate these dikiplines for it to vindicate itself. it then follows that the content of art does not really mat ter. it is the form and design of the art piece that is relevant to its validi 78 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15: 1 ty?l for when art is judged by other disciplines of truth, it is evaluated according to its content, i.e., the messages and the information thqt it pro vides within its content. this is not the case, however, mainly because of the assumed autonomy of information and meaning that art embodies. furthermore, autonomists assert that art cannot be judged at all by any discipline other than itself. so how does art judge itself? it takes its own form and design and evaluates them according to other established art forms. that is, art judges itself according to its own form and structure.32 second, art judges itself on how well it aesthetically “absorbs” an indi vidual. this absorption-the soaking in of the form, structure, and design of a piece-is important to the aesthetic flavor and success. so what is important is not the content of the art piece, but only the form, because art judges itself and others may judge it by the form. if we apply the above ontology of art to the realms of religion and ethics, we will find some very disturbing results. ethics, which in the islamic sense is equivalent to has no form or design structures. consequently, ethics and religion do not possess any artistic form, mak ing ethics and religion not applicable to the arts. in other words, religion cannot be depicted in a universal form; thus, it cannot be represented, so to speak, in the arts. one may argue, however, that religion does have a representational universal form in the arts, some of which may be, for example, the depiction of struggle and patience. but as kierkegaad rightly notes, these temporal concepts of struggle and patience are anti thetical to art’s atemporal and universal nature.34 not only does morali ty have nothing to do with art, because its want in form, but morality can not be universally applied to all art?5 therefore, ethics and religion have nothing to do with art. epistemologically speaking, autonomous art has a truth system that is independent of considerations and influences of other truth valuing sys tems. this is impending, as in the case of ethical and religious truths. aesthetic autonomy possesses its own truth values independent of all other disciplines, including the truths of ethics and religion. this means that for an art piece to be successful, its truths need not be ethically or religiously directed. so an art piece that is immoral and unethical may still be considered aesthetically successful.36 this renders art very dan gerous to society at large. in the platonic sense this means art can be used to manipulate the masses for any reason at all, ethical or moreover, epistemological considerations of the aesthetic autonomy of art show that it is based on relative and antifoundational postulates and premises. these tendencies of aesthetic autonomy have grave effects on the “absolute” nature of truth and reality. if art is a tool that expresses truths, then how does it go about doing this when it believes truths to be of a relative nature? thus, judging an art piece according to its “truth” content and form is very difficult. in the case of aesthetic autonomy, nasirn: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 79 evaluation of an art piece by truth content and form is impossible because of the relative nature of truth. evaluation is not formalized or structured upon any absolute basis, but rather only upon certain other preconditions of art, such as sensuality, visualization, audio representa tion, and other experiences. as a result the whole program becomes an antimoral modus operandi. upon further consideration these inconsistencies bring about practical implications that create confusion and doubt in the truth of reality. confusion is a consequence of the relativism that autonomous art forges, making way for a forlorn existential system to dawn upon reality. without an absolute and transcendent basis for art (or any other disci pline for that matter), systems end up having no particular objective or goal, thereby causing an inextricable system to develop. this can be seen in the sociology of knowledge programs that were initiated by karl mannheim without any absolute or a priori postulates, making it “exis tentially conditioned.” ultimately, making validity of reality statements becomes impossible?* the islamic perspective islamic art is not autonomous in any sense of the word. islamic aes thetics is totally coherent and involved with the values and judgments of science, law, socioeconomic conditions, religion, morality, and other knowledge ~chemes.3~ this unification finds its source in tuwhid, which directs and integrates all knowledge into one aggregate whole, each fmd ing consistency in the other. this absolute gives direction and control to all subjective and/or objective dictations of reality. without this absolute and focal point, no complete conception of reality can be found. this center is established within the universal dimensions of the qur’an and the sunnah, whereby the islamic paradigm rests on an a pri o n substructure that pervades and directs the a posteriori superstructure which finds its functional nature in the ijtihadi precepts.40 this is what masudul alam choudhq calls his epistemological-ontological (e-0) simultaneity principle!1 extending these abstract notions into an islamic theory of aesthetics, we find that the absolute and a priori postulates guide an artwork in becoming islamically aesthetic and pleasing to the moral sense and even engaging to the sensual senses. at the same time the a posteriori finds its function when the artist uses hisher own intu itions and creative skills to develop an artwork. the absolute is directly from god, and it relates to humans what is needed for their satisfaction and for their successful development. it dic tates to humans what is required of both the soul and of the body, mak ing the absolute postulate of the islamic paradigm something that con siders both the spiritual and material realms of existence. both realms 80 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15:l thus gain expression in the functional expositions of an art piece, be it drama or a painting. upon subsequent deliberation upon islamic aesthet ic theory, one finds that the absolute is inscribed upon the infiite con tinuum, creating in the fink human creations of an art piece, inscriptions of infiite acts and conveyances. so, in the islamic works of art one finds the descriptions of infiite which seem to flow upon eternal rivers finding their sources among the sublime. these seem to extend beyond the f i t e plains of vision and sow seeds of continuous infiities upon the impressionable unconscious and conscious mind of the behold er. making these realizations and sensations of infiinity, the real and grand aesthetic experience that each human heart yearns for and desper ately longs for in its continual projections upon the human soul. all this i n f i i t y extends from the absolute a priori sources of islamic art. thus does god say: “those who believe, and whose hearts find satisfaction in the remembrance of allah: for without doubt in the remembrance of allah do heaxts find satisfaction” (qur’an, 13:28). in the islamic paradigm, the end of art is the manifestation of the absolute t r ~ t h . 4 ~ this absolute truth is nothing but god himself. god is thus, the very beginning of art, as its postulate, and its end, as in its adornment. however, one must heed the fact that the absolute truth is not to be fully manifested within a finite realm, such as this universe. god is beyond space and time, above this universe and not within it. only when time and space are extended infinitely will god be manifest ed. the moment when time and space and other finite dimensions are extended is called the ukhiruh.44 within this world humans shall never be able to realize all of the absolute, rather only as much as god wills. therefore, there seems to be a moment to moment realization of the truth as time increases, making it a dynamic proce~s.4~ but truth is never to be attained in its fullest splendor, except at the end of time itself, wherein truth itself shall be known. this is in total contradiction to the kantian notion of optimal states of truth, that finds its expression in most of the western sciences: that all truth is out there and can be achieved and subdued in its fullest quintes sence and that nothing can hinder this struggle.% choudhury has a very interesting discussion of the optimal states of knowledge and truth, wherein he concludes: “the neo-classical world-view is also non-discur sive, non-process and non-dialectic in essence. in it, knowledge is inca pable of being formed, for it already exists in its optimal state. hence, the universe around complying to the neo-classical world-view must neces sarily behave optimally, without chances of conflict and shortfalls remaining.”47 given all of the above, it would seem appropriate to say that islamic art expresses nothing but the pure submission to the absolute one god. this view may be right, but it seems much too geneml to do any real nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 81 philosophical work. islamic art can also be defined as the expression of the islamic, or muslim, worldview.48 this latter definition is ultimately the same as the first, because the islamic worldview is based upon the pleasure of the absolute one. however, this latter definition further articulates a refined approach to aesthetics and islamic art, in that it pre supposes a sort of truth tracking and information carrying ability in the arts. in other words, islamic art does cany information and truths con cerning the islamic worldview, its approach to the universe, and its cre ator. in addition, it may be judged to be aesthetically successful if it con forms to the islamic worldview. on the other hand, if the piece does not conform to the islamic worldview, then that piece is regarded as artisti cally unsuccessful. the islamic worldview does presuppose the exis tence of islamic values that must be maintained and upheld. these val ues are given to us not only by our rational abilities, but also, and more importantly, through revelation. revelation, or the qur’an and sunnah, contain the injunctions, statements, propositions, and descriptions of the absolute will that help give us direction with regards to reality and our selves. therefore, if the injunctions, statements, propositions, and descriptions of the revelation are found expressively lacking in an art piece, that piece is judged as islamically unsuccessful. and if a piece contains an expression of these injunctions, statements, propositions, and descriptions, then that piece is found to be islamically successful. thus, unlike kant, the aesthetic judgment that islam passes upon artwork is determined not by the self alone, but also by a purely objective source, i.e., revelation. kant also tried, unsuccessfully, to place beauty in the rubrics of the intellect. but as we have thus far seen, islam places beau ty not only in the rubric of the intellect, but also in the realm of revela tion and truth. this means that islamic art does not have an independent existence from revelation and truth but rather is an integral part of them. that is why islamic art, as described above, also does not adhere to any sort of aesthetic autonomy. by its very nature islamic art is related to the muslim’s worldview, and this means that the art must say something, or be meaningful, and that it must also be a sort of reminder to the audience. this, further, presupposes that there is an author of a piece, but the author does not become as important to the artistic product, as would the recep tion of the piece by the ummah. the author, or the artist, may still be rec ognized, but once the artistic product has been “given” to the ummah as a whole, then that product is considered as the product of the islamic milieu or worldview. this should not be regarded as the negation of the authog rather, the authorship is given to the ummah as whole, and the center is not in the author or artist, but in the absolute upon which the piece is built. moreover, these injunctions, statements, propositions, and descriptions should be taken as a whole, so that the spirit of the revelation may be able 82 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15:l to perform as the islamic “worldview,” which rightly determines the suc cess of the art. in other words, i have described a worldview as a collec tion of injunctions, statements, propositions and descriptions, when taken all together help us to see the islamic worldview. obviously there may be different interpretations of the various injunctions, statements, propositions, and descriptions of the qur’an and the sunnah, which will eventually be reflected in their respective worldviews, and thus in their different art forms. but what makes these various art forms islamic is their basic agreement in the fundamental absolute (qati’) tenants, injunc tions, statements, propositions, and descriptions of the revelation, or even in their common islamic “spirit.” thus far we have been indirectly attacking kant’s rejection of abstract art as aesthetically beautiful. this discussion of worldviews and common islamic spirits being reflected in an art piece presupposes a mode of rep resentation. theislamic message, worldview, and spirit can be portrayed literally, but this would not do justice to the universal nature of art. the islamic message, worldview, and spirit can also be represented in a con crete form, but this may not capture the complete understanding. also, from the perspective of the audience receiving the art, the message, worldview, and spirit of the piece may be presented literally, but this would limit the value of the educational, knowledge bearing, truth bear ing, and reminding power that it may potentially have. in other words, the audience will be left with an incomplete conception of its worldview. therefore, the best way to represent abstract concepts such as world views is to use abstract vehicles of representation, as s. parvez manzoor eloquently puts it, the living god, though not an abstraction, none the less, is approached in islamic thought in the most abstract way. “there is no other divinity besides god‘’ is the most abstract statement possible about a positive, living deity. just as islam does not clothe its deity in any mythological/anthropomorphic garb, so was the art of islam bound not to accept the representational imagery, and least of all, the humanis tic one. the art that such an islamic passion for abstraction would favor would be a non-representational, abstract 0ne.4~ this may also explain why calligraphy and poetry were the highest of all art forms in the islamic world. music, however, never reached com plete popularity as one of the main representatives of the islamic world view, because of its doubtful validity. so far we have been thinking about islamic art and what it means in light of the above definition. but what about beauty in islamic art? what makes an islamic piece beautiful? in the kantian sense, beauty is that which gives us a sort of intellectual satisfaction, given to us through the object’s pure form and structure. this form and intellectual structure that our minds attribute to the object lead us to the determination of some sort of an aesthetic idea. all this remains in the subject’s sensual perceptions, nasirn: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 83 admixed with the categories of the intellect. thus even the idea is a prod uct of the subject’s mind and not of the object itself. in the islamic sense, however, beauty is not only determined by the individual‘s subjective intellectual categories but also by that of revelation, truth, and goodness, the latter determinants being from the extemal categories. it may be argued, however, that truth and goodness cannot be considered external categories, because they are determined by the subjective. the islamic response to this is that truth and goodness themselves are determined by revelation, and since revelation is considered external source, from god, truth and goodness here also become an external categories. hence, an object is beautiful if it conforms to the standards of beauty given to us by the intellect, revelation, goodness, and truth. it is important to note, how ever, that the “categories” of intellect, truth, and goodness are not to be taken independent of revelzition. in my view, all three are directly or indi rectly related in some way to revelation. this makes revelation the pri mary s o m e in the judgment of beauty. each of these four when taken separately, may be directed and informed by the other, though, they never claim complete independence from the other, save revelation, because of its primacy and infallibility. to further our analysis, let us see how revelation may actually deter mine beauty. by revelation, i mean the qur’an and the sunnah, and their collective spirit and message. in this analysis i will try to restrict myself to the revelation’s ethical injunctions concerning action (hukwn shuri‘, rulings of the sacred law). let me start with the general proposition that anything that is hula1 (allowed) is beautiful, and anything that is hurum (prohibited) is not beautiful. here i am intentionally leaving out the con cepts of mubah (permissible) or mukruh (disappn>ved) and mundub (rec ommended), because this would just add complexity to the simplicity of my point. if the above formulation of beauty is true, then it would seem that beauty can only be known through revelation, since the hula1 and the hurum are only known through revelation themselves. here again, some one might say that the hula1 and the harum can also be known through the intellect. i will return to this point later. if it is true that beauty can be known only through revelation and thus given to us by god, then beau ty is not knowable in any other way. this division further presupposes that the hula1 is good and thus beautiful and that the hurum is bad and thus ugly. two major counterpoints could be made: (1) the hurum can conceivably be beautiful (thus the temptation and desire for the hurum); and (2) beauty (as goodness) can be known independently of revelation (i.e., through the intellect). i con& the point that the hurum could conceivably be regarded as beautiful. this concern, however, may be explained by following the division made by al-ghazali between beauty in its outer form and beau ty in its inner form. al-ghazali says, “the beauty of the outer form which 84 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15: 1 is seen with the bodily eye can be experienced even by children and ani mals, . . . while the beauty of the inner form can only be perceived by the eye of the “heart” and the light of inner vision of man alone.’”o this divi sion of beauty into two components reflects the respective secular approach to beauty, while the inner eye reveals the religious tone of beauty. the hurum may seem beautiful in its outer appearance, but when looked at with the religious inner eye of man, this so-called beauty degrades into something against the absolute, making it something repugnant to the heart of man. unlike kant, though, this division of beau ty is not based only upon the mind of man, but also upon hisfirru and his revelatory sensibilities. as the prophet is believed to have said, “god is beautiful and he loves beauty.” to address the second of the two concerns presented above, i will look at what al-ghazali has to say with regards to independent human deter mination of what is good and evil, and hence, of what is beautiful and ugly. al-ghazali shows in his great work az-mwrusjii that human intel lect is incapable of discerning between good and evil. al-ghazali rea sons that the intellect alone cannot find the command of the shari’ah ( a h uz-shuri‘uh). his motivation for this argument is a rejoinder to the mu‘tazalites, who believed in the supremacy of reason. but here i shall use it for addressing the second concern and for contrasting it to kant’s conception of the good and beautiful. al-ghazali bases his con tentions upon fm revelatory verses and anecdotes. then, he tries to define the terms hwn as “good” and qubh as “evil” within the framework of three definitions. finally, he gives an example of our inability to deter mine what is good and what is evil. the paradigm example for al ghazali is that of lying. lying is conventionally known as an evil act. but what happens if a prophet is being pursued by an assassin. the assassin asks x of the prophet’s whereabouts, but x lies in order to beguile the killer and safeguard the prophet. “al-ghazali argues that this lying is husun because of the good derived from it, i.e., the saving of the prophet’s life. indeed it is more than good. it is obligatory upon the per son who knows the prophet’s whereabouts. in fact, he sins and disobeys if he does not lie.”51 therefore, even evil becomes good in the foregoing example. in other words, reason declares an act good instead of evil relative to a certain condition and situation. how then can reason determine good and evil, when they seem to be relative and not always c o n ~ i s t e n t ? ~ ~ consequently, the only true and assiduous way to determine the truth is through revelation, because its source is from god, who is all-knowing and all-wise. revelation itself expresses when to use and not to use rea son, thereby qualifying the usage of reason when needed. further, in order to safeguard morality from becoming a relative and an existential field of study, we must find some absolute foundations to anchor these nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 85 beliefs. in the islamic sense, these absolute foundations are nothing but the dictation of god as revealed in the qur’an and expressed in the sunnah. so now, if good and evil are not independent of revelatory deter minations, then beauty and ugliness, both being related k t l y to the good and evil, as shown above, are not independent of revelatory judg ment. this, i feel, is also an impomnt contrast between kantian aesthetic theory and the islamic. that is, for kant, morality established in art some sort of purpose and meaning of a higher status, which increased the human revemce for and awe of art for its m o d and intellectual beauty. islamic theory is in total agreement with this. but instead of basing these morals upon the intellect of humankind, islam bases these m o d s upon the infinite and absolute existence of god. unlike western aesthetics, islamic epistemology is based upon infinite expressions of an absolute nature. morality adds purpose and meaning to an art piece; morality is an very important concept in the islamic aesthetic system. as the prophet said about poetry, which may be extended to our general discussion above: “it is a speech, whatever is in agreement with the truth is beauti ful; whatever is not, lacks any goodness.”s3 kantian and islamic views and implications in this section i would like to show the genealogical steps to the sepa ration of the objective and the subjective, which occasioned kant to for mulate an art that was independent and intrinsically valued in itself. this i will do by showing how descartes’s structuring of the world according to the “i” or the self have caused many r i f t s and problems. i will also show how the implications of descartes via kantian theories have caused many dualisms, and i comment upon the islamic solutions and views of a possible islamic aesthetics and a theory of the self. the epistemological and ontological positions of the islamic world view do not warrant or result in such and deleterious art struc tures. when we compare the kantian array with that of the islamic con tentions, we find that the islamic views of art stem from something com pletely different than kant’s. for kant, undoubtedly, man is the end and not the means to anythmg except the development and enhancement of himself; tliis was the focus of all his subsequent thought. as in the greek expressions of anhpomorphic deities, one finds kantian ideals place man as the head and end of all creation. later, as a reaction against kant’s rationally centenxi philosophy, german romanticism based itself upon the absoluteness of the subject, and its “infinite” emotional abyss. little did the romanticists know that they were still basing their philos ophy upon the very same foundations that kant had, i.e., man. this anthropocentric philosophy culminated in nietzsche’s extreme, the 86 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15: 1 superman, and made him etemal with his melodious songs of the etemal recurrence.54 islam on the other hand points not to man as the be-all and end-all. rather, the islamic basis for all is not finite, limited, and imperfect enti ties, but upon the sublime granded5 of the highest and transcendent being, god himself.% god is the end, and man’s means are his pleasure and his ~atisfaction?~ this is the lofty and elevated disposition of the islamic paradigm, while the western paradigm is grounded in the diffb dent and limited existence called humankind. “i think, therefore i am,” descartes’s cogito, was the kindle that began the intellectual pursuit of basing man at the center. later this consum mated into the kantian dualisms present in his separation between the objective and the subjective, which further led, as we saw above, to aes thetic autonomies. for descartes, the problems that were caused by the sepamtion of the objective and the subjective were solved by his addition of god into his philosophical system. kant, on the other hand, tried to solve these problems without a god. from then on mankind has been diverted and distracted from the reality and truth of things. this variance in a priori and absolutes makes all the difference in the world. from the time of descartes, kant, fichte, holderlin, novalis, schelling, and finally hegel (with his descriptions of the end of art), we find desperate deliberations upon the breaking up of the “i” or the self into components and subentities that finally took root in itself, and which bred all the contradictions and paradoxes that one can think of?* how can the “i” be divided? how can the “i” be separated from itself? how can the “i” reflect upon itself? these questions, which were a direct result of making man the end and center of knowledge, have preoccupied minds of the highest status without avail. another very important problem that arises out of the paradox of the self is the impossibility of the subject to step outside of himself or her self in order to realize the existence of the world through an external ver ification of reality. even if the subject could become “extemal,” and look at reality from the vantage point of both the subject’s own individual per ception of the world and the real actual world, it would still be nothing more than a perception of the subject itself. this impossibility has caused much disturbance in our understanding of objects and reality. it has cre ated riddles in our understanding of perceptual realisms and phenome nalisms. where does one end and the other start? how far can we know things-in-themselves? or are there things in the world at all? when taken from the point of the “i,” these questions, and our understanding of per ception and objects, become an almost impossible task. in islam god is the absolute, and highest of all thoughts are the thoughts of him. thoughts of him do not require any separation of the “i,” only a willingness to transcend oneself into a higher plain of thought nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 87 and contemplation. the separation of the “i” does not occur in this scheme, because of the mind’s thoughts of the one and only, causing uni fication of the mind’s thoughts with regards the whole. this, however, does not mean that the self is forgotten or is alienated; the self is being confiied with certainty by god. we do not c o n f i i ourselves, but we are confiied. this contemplation does not disregard reason and intel lect but rather utilizes it and nurtures it. in addition, we find p a t schol ars like al-ghazali showing in the eleventh century that basing knowl edge upon the senses and the mtionale is insufficient and a fragile foun dation for knowledge. on the other hand, having an objective foundation for knowledge, reason, and the senses safeguards human endeavors from becoming worthless cyclic speculations about the phenomena around us.59 some might remark “art is purely a subjective description of reality. how then, can you assert that islamic art can be universal and a unified portrayal of reality?” i would respond very briefly as follows. we have established above that the islamic worldview is grounded and unified upon divine sources that characterize and shape the reality for a muslim. once this postulation is clear, we can then move on and assert that islamic arts and sciences are based upon what i shall call divine realism. this is where the existence of the universe and all it contains is described and confiied through the qur’an and the sunnah to us by god himself. this description and c o n f i i t i o n are external to the indi vidual and not subjective. indeed, it is an objective description of reality by an external force, i.e., god, via revelation. however, interpretation of the external and objective revelation is subjective, in that revelation is considered by an individual who has certain presupposed ideas and notions that influence hisher fu’wil (interpretation). but the individual must distinguish between those verses that allow for interpretation (zunni) and those that are clearcut, unambiguous, unequivocal, and so definite that there is no room for interpretation (i.e., qufi‘ verses). divine realism is also extended into the spheres of islamic art and aes thetic theories. how this works in the islamic arts is that a muslim artist is directed by the a priori set, which consists of the divine sources or the revelation. the revelation describes, confirms, and informs the artist, a priori, that a world does in reality exist and that these noumena are described and demarcated to us by the divine sources. that is the objec tive half of the coin. the other side of the coin is the subjective half, where the artist considers the reality around him/her through the lens of divine realism and through the a posteriori considerations of the world as object. the individual extends hisher cognitive reflections, emotion al biases, psychological influences, perceptual sensations, and intellect upon the object at hand, thus subjectlfying the object. this may be how 88 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15: 1 divine realism attempts to bridge the gap between the phenomena and the noumena. furthermore, in the islamic theory of art we can step outside of our selves; that is, we can look from the “external” vantage point. this can only be done when we have revelation, which by its nature is transcen dent and “external” from our experiences of reality. revelation, when made the center of our reality, allows us to look at ourselves from out side, and thereby allows us to verify existence and perception. we do not find problems in the verification and affirmation of the existence of our selves and of the various sorts of objects the world is made of. we are, thus, not led to extreme notions of idealism, which would ultimately lead to some sort of pantheism, nor to the other extreme of realism, which ultimately would lead to materialism and/or reductionism. the islamic theory finds itself in the middle and & i s the existence of reality and physical objects. it also provides constraints of how far we can go when it comes to the material world, by showing us that the material is only temporary and limited. kant’s work on this separation between the object and the subject brought forth many unsolved problems that required a god, which he would ultimately ignore in his paradoxically acclaimed “transcendental” philosophy. it had brought him to a junction between the free human existence and a mechanically determined natural existence. the only thing for kant that could fill this gap, without god, was an aesthetic the ory. this aesthetic theory was based upon the human intellect, which made for a very weak grounding. so weak was this grounding that it led to divisions between the mechanical and free, between the object and subject, between the representational and the meaningless. notes 1. as shown by goethe’s discussion of a “prosaic age,” or the “age of talent,” where in the human subjective, personal sentiments of reality are absent. 2. enrich heller, the importance of nietzsche (chicago: the university of chicago press, 1988). 7. 3. andrew bowie, aesthetics and subjectivity: from kant to nietzsche (new york manchester university press, 1990), 18. 4. many thinkers have expressed this idea, including schopenhauer and benedetto croce in his famous aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic (1902). 5 . peter szondi says of german idealism: “one could say crudely that the philos ophy of german idealism tried to win back via the path of speculation what kant’s crit icism had to renounce: the unity of subject and the object, of mind (geist) and nature.” 6. there is a brief discussion of this in bowie, 30. 7. noel carroll, “moderate moralism,” the british journal of aesthetics 36, no. 2 (july 1996). 8. alparslan acikgenc, “a concept of philosophy in the qur’anic context,” the american journal of islamic social sciences 11, no. 2 (summer 1994). 9. lamia al-faruqi. 10. kant has written three critiques; critique of pure reason, critique of practical reason, and critique of judgment. it is in his critique of judgment that he develops his whole aesthetic theory. nasim: toward an islamic aesthetic theory 89 11. this was a very important problem that muid a solution in kant’s philosophy. bowie, 1617. 12. bawngarten, aestheticu, part 1 (1750), part 2 (1758). hamann, aestheticu in nuce 11762). . 13. ‘ attempts have been made to combine and unify ethics and technology by some thinkers like mauss and foucault, who have tried to show that technology (technique. in french) has manifestations not only in objects and machines but also in the human sub jects themselves. see michel foucault, “subjective et veritre, 1980-81.” in resume &s cows, 1970-1982 (paris: julliard, 1989). 14. bowie, 24. 15. ibid., 28. 16. ibid., 29. 17. martin weatherston, “kant’s assessment of music in the critique of judgment,” 18. weatherston, 56. kant’s kritik of judgment (london: macmillan, 1892), 55-57. 19. kant, kritik of judgment, 81-84.99. 20. kant, k n t i k of judgment, 235. 21. the claim that music is nonrepresentational could be disputed. but kant seems to think that music is abstract and nonrepresentation, so we will assume this throughout. 22. it can be argued, as kant attempts to, that music can also fall into the category of free beauty. however, his argument for this position ultimately states that music is only the british journuf of aesthetic 36, no. 1 (january 1996): 56. agreeable. (new jersev. 1959). 55-59. 23. soren kierkegaard, eitherlor, trans. david f. swenson and lillian swenson .24. bowie, 29. .. 25. schiller expresses great consideration for the usage of art as “aesthetic education,” because art expresses ideas that reason and demonstration by empirical methods cannot signify. schiller gets this directly from the kantian ideas in general. kant states how the poets created ideas of “the invisible being, the realm of the blessed, hell, eternity. the cre ation,” bowie, 30 (kritik of judgment, 194). 26. mar hussain shows in his the reconstruction of islamic society (lahore: ferozsons, 1992). how islam should deal with moral problems like these in the arts. 27. a good parody of the extreme violence in the movies and on n, is made by the movie pulp fiction, which addresses the fanatic use of violence and obscenity. 28. it seems as if art is, slowly, moving back into the folds of morality: “although a great deal of contemporary criticism presupposes that art can be discussed and even eval uated morally, little effort has been devoted to working out the philosophical foundations of moral criticism” (carroll, 224). 29. ibid.. 224-225. 30. ibid., 224. 31. andrew bowie, “autonomy, aesthetic,” in a companion to aesthetics, ed. david cooper (cambridge, 1992), 33-37. 32. this is important to understand, because the evaluation of an art work is funda mental to its success and the “hufh-value” that it may cany. judging a piece to art itself, and not to reality “outside,” results in total isolation and autonomy from all resources and centers of truth and validity, which autonomous art seems to “transcend.” in islam, art is judged and evaluated by the qur‘an and the sunnah of the prophet, and it is judged by reality and thefitruh. 33. what i mean by this assertion is that ethics and modity are both mutually united and combined into the religious. that is, the religion of islam does not separate itself into ethics, morality, and religion. but are all one and the same. thus does the religion of islam dictate to us what is ethically and morally right or wrong. 34. george pattison, “kierkegaard: aesthetics and ‘the aesthetic,”’british j o u m l of aesthetics 31, no. 2 (april 1991). 35. carroll, 225. 36. a perfect example of this view is marcel duchamp’s signing and exhibiting of a urinal. is the urinal an expression of something aesthetically beyond experience, or is it just a urinal? 37. this brings us to another topic that, unfortunately, cannot be discussed in this paper: art and the power of advertisements. here, art becomes something of a capitalist showpiece that requires monetary value alone, thus making it into a mmmodity. this 90 the american journal of islamic social sciences 15: 1 reduces art to nothing but something that expresses the need and desire of marketed objects and not something that is valued because of its ability to increase the under standing of human subjects. see bill readings, introducing lyotard: art and politics (london: routledge, 1991). 38. t.z. lavine, history and anti-history in philosophy (netherlands: kluwer academic publishem, 1989). 58-67. 39. as beautifully expressed by isma‘il al-faruqi‘s tawhfd: its implications for thought and life (hemdon: iiit, 1992). 40. masudul alam choudhury, “a critical examination of the concept of islamization of knowledge in contemporary times,” muslim education quarterly 10. no. 4 (summer 1993): 10. 41. throughout the rest of this paper i shall make my theory of islamic aesthetics a coherent and consistent description of choudhury’s principle of e 0 simultaneity. 42. al-faruqi, 201-202. 43. as hegel made it out to be, in subjugating art into the field of philosophy. 44. choudhury.8. 45. ibid., 11-12. 46. ibid., 19. 47. ibid., 19. 48. m. abdul jabbar beg, “fine arts in islamic civilization,” in fine arts in islamic civilization, ed. m.a.j. beg. 2. 49. s. parvez h h u o o r , “the legacy of islam in the visual arts and the role of modem muslim youth in preserving and perpetuating this heritage,’’ world assembly of muslim youth (march 1979): 9. 50. beg, 9. 5 1. a.z. hammad, “ghazali’s juristic treatment of the shariah rules in al-mustasfa,” the american journal of social sciences 4, no. 2 (december 1987): 163. 52. as a matter of fact, al-ghazali concludes his discussion of reason and revelation by stating that there are four mots of error in determining good and evil: “1) confusion in the use of terminology; 2) subjective assessment of acts based on personal aims; 3) faulty generalization in characterizing hasan and qubh in disregard of exceptions to the rule; and 4) reason’s erroneous imagination caused by association.” harnmad, 63. 53. attributed to the prophet by ibn rashiq in kitab a1 ‘umdafi mahasin al-shi’r wa adabih. vol. 1.27. 54. see nietzsche’s famous work, thus spoke zurathustra (18851885). 55. mohammad mi-ud-din has a great treatise on this subject; see his ideology of the future (islamabad, 1990). 56. qur’an: 5156-58; 229; 25: 61-62; 16:77-78; 1434; 16:18. 57. qur’an: 2112,272; 652; 13:22; 18:28, 110; 28:88; 3039; 5527. 58. bowie’s work, aesthetics and subjectivity: from kant to nietzsche, explains these relations and how many thinkers regarded these questions. 59. see al-ghazali’s, al-munqidh m’n al-&la1 wa’l-musil ila dhi‘l-’izza wa’-jalal, ar. ed. and french trans. by farid jabre (beirut, 1959), where he addresses the issue that was disturbing him when he was younger: the question of the certainty of knowledge and existence. limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches to argumentation michael h.g hoffmann georgia institute o/technology abstract: some proponents of epistemological approaches to argumentation (biro, siegel, lumer, goldman) assume that it should be possible to develop non-relative criteria of argument evaluation. by contrast, this paper argues that any evaluation of an argument depends (a) on the cognitive situation of the evaluator, (b) on background knowledge that is available for this evaluator in a certain situation, and (c)-in some cases-on the belief-value-system this person shares. resume: les partisans de l'approche epistemologique (biro, siegel, lumer, goldman) supposent qu'ij devrait etre possible de developper des criteres nonrelatifs pour evaluer des arguments. par contraste, je soutiens que n' importe quelle evaluation d'un argument depend (a) de la situation cognitive de l' evaluateur, et (b) des connaissances generales qui lui sont accessibles pour cette evaluation, et (c) dans certains cas, du systeme de valeurs de cette personne. keywords: argument evaluation and quality, standards of argumentation, epistemological approaches, relativism, objectivism, conflict, disagreement, cognitive situation, backgrouind knowledge, belief-value-system 1. introduction so-called "epistemological approaches to argumentation" focus on the idea that the main function of arguments and argumentations is to generate knowledge or justified belief the primary goal is not to find consensus between participants or to persuade somebody to believe in a certain claim, but to produce rationally "justified" beliefs or, as others say, "true beliefs" (biro & siegel 1992; feldman 1994, 176; goldman 1999; lumer 1990,30; 1991; siegel & biro 1997,278). based on this, some proponents of an epistemological approach assume that the quality of arguments and argumentations can be evaluated by more objective criteria than, say, by observing a group of people's reactions to an argument or by performing a survey that shows how "successful" a certain argument is. the question i want to discuss in this paper is whether this is possible. is it convincing, as many claim, that there are non-relative standards of argument evaluation? are the standards the literature provides sufficient to justify in each case a clear distinction between "good" and "bad" arguments? since the answer to both these questions seems to be connected with the possibility that arguments can generate true beliefs, or knowledge, the broader focus of this paper will be on limits of truth in argumentations. © informal logic vol. 25, no.3 (2005): pp. 245-260. 246 michael hg hoffmann looking for limits means, of course, that [ am less interested in things that are not really controversial. there is no question that we have to teach certain standards of argument construction and eva i uation in order to improve the practice of argumentation. but the question is: is it possible to formulate standards of argument evaluation in a way that an evaluation's result is solely determined by the standards applied, so that whoever used these criteria to evaluate an argument would come to the same result? can those standards be applied to each and every argument in a way that a clear and unquestionable decision regarding its quality is possible? [f that would be possible, many other things would be possible too. for example, it would be possible based on those "objective" standards to decide objectively which patiy in a conflict on a certain issue has the better argument since, at the end, there can only be one truth. formulating the question in this way would presuppose a very strong version of an epistemological approach to argumentation: a unique truth and objective criteria to decide whether an argument for a proposition claimed to be true is a good one or a bad one. by contrast, a weaker-and relativist-version might accept the possibility of true propositions but could claim, for example, that evaluation standards depend on a community of people accepting these standards in a certain historical, social, cultural, cognitive, emotional, etc., situation. [f a theory rejects the possibility of truth altogether, [ would not call it an "epistemological" approach. there is. of course, a broad area of intermediate possibilities between both these extreme versions of epistemological approaches to argumentation. questioning the "limits" of truth means a critical reflection on where to put exactly the boundary between what should be acceptable and what is not. any discussion of these possibil ities depends. of course. on how the concepts of "truth", "objectivity", and "relativity" are defined. [n order to cope with this problem. i will start with 'vhat has been provided by the literature so far. the strategy is to discuss a range of epistemological approaches in a way that the authors' terminology can be critically retlected as well. with regard to the concepts of "argument" and "argumentation," i should say in advance that i am following alvin goldman in using "argument" for a "set of statements or propositions scheillatized as . r i' .... r h • therefore po ... it contains one or more premises and a conclusion. where the premises jointly provide evidential support (not necessarily conclusive) for the conclusion". "argumentation", on the other hand, is used if"a speaker presents an argument to an audience, in which he asserts and defends the conclusion by appeal to the premises". it is "monological argumentation" when there is only one speaker, and a "dialogical" when there are two or more arguing for different sides (goldman 1999, 131). thus, the main difference between an "argument" and an "argumentation" is that if we focus on the former, it is sufficient to retlect on the set of statements that form an argument, while if we focus on the latter. we have to take the context into account in which this set of propositions is form ulated. limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches 247 2. biro and siegel's "intrinsic" quality of arguments the strongest version of an epistemological approach to argumentation, as far as i can see, has been developed by john biro and harvey siegel. they claim that it is possible to determine "the goodness of good arguments" based on what they call '"an internal account" (biro & siegel 1992,86). the idea seems to be that arguments themselves possess "certain epistemic properties, such as epistemic seriousness", and if those properties are missing, we get a bad argument. it is, however, hard to understand what exactly the authors intend to say: "the hallmark of a good argument is obviously to provide an intrinsic explanation of what is wrong when an argument lacks such a property" (ihid, 93). is an "intrinsic explanation" the same as an "internal property" of an argument? what does it mean that an argument "provides" an explanation? does it mean that any reader of such an argument would automatically generate such an "explanation"? the "epistemic property" sec:ms to be connected somehow with providing "a bridge from known truths or justified beliefs to as yet unknown (or at least unrecognized) truths or as yet unjustified beliefs. an argument aims at, and a good one succeeds in, leading an inquirer or an audience from some proposition(s) whose truth or justifiedness they accept to others whose truth or justifiedness they wi ii see themselves as having good reasons to accept on its basis" (biro & siegel 1992,92, their emphasis). but how can it be possible that all this depends on the argument ilselj (cf. siegel 1999, 184)? is there any 'knowledge generating power' that is present in some arguments but not in others? the remaining part of their article confirms a certain vagueness of this approach: what is it for a conclusion to be warranted by an argument? the short answer is: a conclusion is warranted by an argument if the argument renders belief in the conclusion rational, if the premises of the argument provide good reasons for and so warrant its conclusion .... when does an argument render a conclusion rationally justified; belief in its conclusion (on its basis) rational? here we enter into contentious epistemological territory and must proceed with caution. in general, an argument renders belief in a claim (on its basis) rational when the reasons provided by the argument for the claim meet criteria concerning the goodness of reasons .... when are reasons 'good enough '? here we reach the heart of epistemology ... there are a wide variety of principles of reason assessment, ranging from the subject-neutral principles of logic to the subject-specific principles governing reason assessment in the special fields. '" moreover, the diverse epistemological stances available to the argumentation theorist will yield substantively different principles of reason assessment and, with them, different criteria of argument evaluation. (biro & siegel 1992,97-99) what started impressively strong with the claim that there are "epistemic properties" of arguments "themselves" that allow their evaluation independently of any relation to anything else ends so finally in an unspecified variety of "different principles" that range from "subject-neutral" ones like logical validity to "subject-specific" 248 michael h g hoffinann ones. however, since biro and siegel do not specify their "principles of reason assessment", there is no way to assess their approach. their claim that good arguments have certain "epistemic properties" remains vague. in a more recent article, harvey siegel defended the thesis "that the quality of arguments is a· feature of the argument itself' by criticizing a so-called "multiculturalist approach to argument quality" (siegel 1999, 184). he tries to demonstrate the weakness of four arguments that proponents of cultureand perspective-relativity might formulate. in his first argument, siegel accepts that there is no "perspective less perspective", no "cosmic exile", and no vantage point beyond any "conceptual scheme" (191). but, he says, we are not "trapped" forever in any specific perspective; we are able to learn and, thus, to transcend any perspective. however, it is hard to imagine that a relativist would deny the possibility of developing and transcending perspectives, and of shifting between different perspectives. this first argument poses rather a problem for siegel himself. it is obviously contradictory to claim, on the one hand, "that we inevitably judge from some framework or other" (191) and, on the other, that "the quality of the argument is a feature of the argument itself" (184). if we can determine the quality of an argument only by means of a judgment, and if all judgments are determined by the evaluator's framework, we have to conclude that any argument evaluation is relative to those frameworks and not a question of "the argument itself'. problematic is also siegel's second argument. he says that we are not denying that our principles of argument evaluation and criteria of argument quality are local and particular, in the sense that they are ours: articulated and endorsed by us, in our particular historical/cultural context. but acknowledging their particularly [sic] does not preclude us from proclaiming their universality: that is, their legitimate applicability to arguments, considered independently of their location. (193) it might indeed be possible that the evaluation standards i am using in my particular situation happen to be "universal" standards, but how could i know that? and how could it be possible for anyone to justify the claim that her or his standards are in fact "the" universal standards? however, the "main difficulty with conceiving of argument quality in culturally relative terms" is, according to siegel, the following. he maintains that "any advocate of a culturally relative conception of argument quality" who claims rationality for his or her arguments-that is, that these arguments are "warranted by the reasons offered in its support"-hmust presuppose" just those absolute standards she is trying to get rid of (194). this argument is similar to a variety of arguments siegel developed already in his book relativism refuted in order to demonstrate that relativism as an epistemological position is "self-defeating and incoherent" (siegel 1987). if the relativist protagoras in plato's theaetetus claims "to be right" he presupposes what he rejects (4). if he claims that all opinions are true only for limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches 249 those who believe them, then his own claim is at the same time true and false because he believes it to be true while his opponents think it is false (sf.), etc. all these arguments, however, are simply confusing what a relativist might claim and what siegel himselfis not ready to give up: a presupposed non-relative understanding of "rationality", "rightness", "truth", and so forth. an extreme relativist, however, would not have any problems to claim-as protagoras does-that his statement is only true for himself; he does not care whether it is false for others. and a moderate relativist could hint at the difference between her hope to argue rationally and to say the truth and her inability to prove that she is right. in a way, the whole debate is about who is supposed to carry the burden of proof. siegel is right when he says that a relativist who claims "the truth" of relativism, or who tries to "justify" relativism in a non-relative way, would contradict himself. but why should he or she try to do that? from my point of view, relativism is not a "theory", but an assumption that is inevitable if we do not succeed in proving the possibility of nonrelative knowledge. siegel's fourth and last argument against relativism in argumentation theory attacks an observation that has been an important starting point especially for "postmodern" thinkers (cf. lyotard 1984 <1979>,1993; vattimo 1991 <1985», but earlier also for the frankfurt schoo i (horkheimer & adorno 2002 < 1947» and later for feminist epistemologists (cf. smith 1990; longino 1996 <1993>; harding 1996 <1993». it is the observation that distinguishing certain arguments based on their "rationality" equals an "exercise of power" (siegel 1999, 197). thus, an "impersonal, transcultural view of argument quality" could be criticized as a "rhetorical, power-laden construct" (197); a trick we use to get an advantage in all these political power games. siegel's main objection against this view is that it "plagues culture-relative as well as transcultural views of argument quality" (ibid.). but this underestimates the fact that it makes a difference whether people are claiming to possess the better argument only because they belong to a certain culture or because they are following a universal standard of correct thinking. the critics of rationality as a universal standard always emphasized that it is more dangerous when "exercises of power" can be hidden behind claims on universality, and that universality itself is a totalitarian concept. however, the problem of power in discourse can also be viewed from the opposite direction. george boger has recently argued that relativist approaches that are replacing the "truth requirement of a good argument" by "an acceptability requirement" might-given "widely divergent audiences not sharing a common interest but engaged in an 'argumentative conversation'''-''unfairly favor the stronger of the 'disputants' and place the weaker at a decided disadvantage" (boger 2005, 189). thus, he is arguing exactly in the opposite direction: it is not that truth orientation is a means to establish power, but not focusing on truth means, first of all, that we leave a space unoccupied that finally will be structured only by power. this is indeed a good point. [t might seem that a relativist approach justifies at the 250 michael hg hoffmann end everything-implicitly, at least-if truth is no longer an absolute standard to control the rationality of human communication. but what are we supposed to do if-as in many cases-we simply do not have access to "the" truth? we cannot simply "secure objective knowledge" (189) if objective knowledge is beyond what we can achieve by our means. taking boger's objection seriously should lead to a form of relativism, i would argue, that does not abandon the notion oftruth altogether. following the argument developed by bernard williams in truth and truthfidness, we should save truth at least as a "value", that is as an ethical standard. even ifit is impossible to formulate a final and complete justification of truth claims, we can respect truth as an ideal that ought to be both the goal of our endeavors and a behavioral guideline that governs the practice of argumentation. in this latter sense, bernard williams claims "accuracy and sincerity" as the "basic virtues of truth": [yjou do the best you can to acquire true beliefs, and what you say reveals what you believe. the authority of academics must be rooted in their truthfulness in both these respects: they take care, and they do not lie. (williams 2002, i i ) truth should be viewed, first of all, as a moral value that requires accuracy, sincerity, seriousness, and open-mindedness in our attempts to understand. we should mention at this point that also siegel, after refuting relativism, formulates an understanding of what he calls an "absolutist epistemology" that allows a belief system to be "both self-correcting and corrigible" (siegel 1987, 161). the sort of "absolutism" he favors requires "the possibility of objective, non-question-begging evaluation of putative knowledge claims, in terms of criteria which are taken as absolute but which nonetheless admit criticism and improvement" (162). this way, however, "objective, non-question-begging" evaluation criteria are not "intrinsic properties" of an "argument itself', but simply presupposed by individuals (taken as''). but is there any justification for such a presupposition beyond the subjective framework of a certain person? siegel claims that his "fallibilist, non-dogmatic, self-correcting absolutism, which provides for objectivity in the evaluation of knowledge claims and the possibility of criticism and improvement of criteria which guide such evaluation, is entirely compatible with the rejection of relativism" (162). i find it hard to see this compatibility. only if we turn the meaning of concepts like "objectivity" and "absolute" upside down would it be compatible. remember that the latin absolutus (from ab-solvo) means literally "detached, uncoupled", and "objective" in philosophy is usually opposed to "subjective". both terms emphasize independence from any individual perspective and activity. however, if we presuppose such an independence of evaluation criteria, how can we change them without making them relative to what we are doing with them? relative "to time, to place, to society, to culture, to historical epoch, to conceptual framework, to personal training or conviction"as siegel introduces "relativism" in his book (xiii)? r i limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches 251 3. lumer's principles of argument evaluation while biro and siegel do not specify evaluation criteria beyond the rather vague claim that there "are a wide variety of principles of reason assessment", and while it remains unclear how siegel can reconcile the "objectivity" of those criteria with the subjective dimension of criteria improvement, christoph lumer, on the one hand, offers a highly elaborated distinction of "epistemological principles ... which formulate sufficient conditions for the truth or acceptability of propositions" (1991, 101) and, on the other hand, provides some ideas that might be helpful for clarifying the problem of relativity and non-relativity of argument evaluation (1991; cf also 1990). lumer's starting point is the consideration that it would be unsatisfactory-at least from a philosophical point of view-if the fact that validity criteria as used in deductive logic cannot be applied to evaluating all kinds of arguments would lead to a situation in which the quality of arguments can only be determined by "finding out whether a certain type of speech would convince some addresses" (1991, 98). his goal is to define "validity criteria" for argumentations, whereby "validity" is defined here-a bit unusually-as fulfi \i ing an argumentation's "standard-function" (100). these criteria are at the same time criteria for the assessment of arguments and argumentations. (note that lumer's definition of "argumentation" corresponds to our "argumenf', while his "argument" is what i am calling "reason"). according to lumer, the "standard:{unction of argumentations" is "to convince rationally or to show the acceptability of the thesis" (100), that is to generate knowledge, or to lead. the argument's addressee "to the truth" (1990, 6, 43ff). the essential idea of his approach is to use this standard-function "for assessing the usefulness of proposed criteria for the validity of argumentations" (1991, 100). the standard-function, obviously, can be fulfilled by quite different meansdepending on what kind of argument we use: knowledge can be generated, for example, by deduction (in this case we use "conclusive" principles of validity) or by "revelation" if we think that everything "is true what has been revealed in the bible" (101). in between both these extremes, we should find what an epistemological approach to argumentation is all about: "efficient" principles; that is, principles which are not conclusive but "efficient in the sense that their correct use only. leads to acceptable beliefs; these are probably true or verisimil beliefs" (101). inductive principles, for example, are efficient but not conclusive. one of lumer's goals is to define those "efficient principles". in his book praktische argumentationstheorie, lumer develops those efficient principles by a method called "idealizing hermeneutics" (1990, 1 off; all translations from this book are mine). the goal of this method is to define the standard function of arguments based on an empirical analysis of those arguments that seem to be valid and adequate, to determine the rules (or principles, or conditions) that are necessary to fulfill this standard function, and finally to structure these rules "in axiomatic form" (13). 252 michael hg hoffinann an example for the outcome of this procedure is provided in lumer (1991) with regard to validity criteria for "ideal deductive argumentations" (102 ff.). most of these criteria refer to the argument itself. they concern the identification of an argument's structure, the "guarantee of truth" ("the propositions of the arguments of a complete and valid deductive argumentation are true and they deductively imply the proposition of the thesis"), and what lumer calls "adequacy in principle: ... there must be at least one person sometime who knows that the arguments are acceptable, but who doesn't know this about the thesis" (102). this condition is necessary since "an instrument is an instrument" only ifits function can be fulfilled in principle. however, there is also one "validity principle" that refers to an argument's addressee. it is called "adequacy in concrete situations": a valid deductive argumentation will be adequate for rationally convincing an addressee of the thesis if the following conditions are fulfilled: i. the addressee is linguistically proficient, open-minded, attentive, and discriminating; 2. he knows that the arguments are acceptable but doesn't know this about the thesis; 3. the relation of implication between the propositions of the arguments and the proposition of the thesis is sufficiently direct so that it can easily be grasped by the addressee; if necessary, for fulfilling this condition the argumentation will have to be divided in a few subargumentations; 4. the set of arguments contains only arguments which are necessary for the deduction of the thesis. (lumer 1991, 102) based on this principle, an argument evaluation has to go beyond analyzing the argument itself. to determine whether an argument is good or bad, we have also to check whether the four conditions listed in the quote are fulfilled in a concrete situation. if the standard function of an argument is to generate knowledge by leading somebody to the truth, then not only the argument itself must fulfill certain conditions but also the argument's addressee. the quality of an argumentation depends therefore also·on what can be called the "cognitive situation" of an argument's addressee. if the quality of an argumentation depends on the addressee's cognitive situation, one might suspect a form of relativism here. however, there is-at least according to lumer's presentation of this point-no relativity in the evaluation of an argumentation. any evaluator should be able to look at a concrete situation and to tell whether the cognitive conditions formulated in the quote are fulfilled or not. if they are fulfilled, as well as the criteria concerning the argument itself, then the argumentation is a good one; the argument should fulfill its standard function in this concrete situation. relativity, however, has to be considered here at a different point. the cognitive conditions lumer formulates-the ability to understand the argument's language, open-mindedness, knowledge about the premises but not the thesis, the ability to grasp the relation between premises and thesis, and so on-have not only to be presupposed on the side of the argument's addressee, but also on the side of the limits o/truth: exploring epistemological approaches 253 evaluator of an argument. that might sound like a triviality at this point, but if we ask for evaluation standards that could be used also in conflicts to decide "objectively" which parties' arguments are better, then all forms of possible biases should be taken intu account. since evaluators of arguments might be more or less able to fulfill the cognitive conditions for themselves that they have to evaluate with regard to an argument's addressee, the argument evaluation itselfis relative to the particular constraints and possibilities of an evaluator. as we will see, this distinction between argument situation, on the one hand, and argument evaluation, on the other, is even more important when it comes to two further forms of relativism in argumentations. 4. three forms of relativism our discussion of the cognitive situation of the person an argument is addressing showed that we have to think about more than the "argument itself' when we are looking for evaluation criteria for knowledge promoting argumentations. however, there are two further considerations that force us to go beyond the argument itself. the first one concerns background knowledge that influences the assessment of arguments in a concrete situation, and the second one our general belief-value systems. the problem of background knowledge in a certain situation becomes visible in one of lumer's considerations. it is obvious that we need different validity criteria dependent on the type of argument. for what he calls "interpretative argumentation" (also known as "abduction" or "reasoning to the best explanation"), for example, lumer presents the following "epistemological principle": "a (singular) proposition (about an event) will be true ifit is part of the only possible explanation of a known fact" (lumer 1991, 105). in order to apply this principle, however, certain conditions must be fulfilled. the critical one is that we need to prove "that there is no other set of hypotheses leading to a possible explanation of the explanandum" (105). such a proof, however, is impossible so that "a valid interpretative argumentation only leads to a probabilist belief', as lumer says (106). applying probability theory, however, is only possible if we have a limited and well-defined set of competing sets of hypotheses. but this is usually the case only in idealized models or in trivial situations. it is hardly the case either in scientific inquiry or in situations in which the perception of a problem is "framed" by constraining background knowledge as, for example, in so-called "intractable" conflicts (cf. lewicki, gray, & elliott 2003; hoffmann 2005). in all these situations, it is not only impossible to prove that there are no alternative explanations; it is also impossible to determine the probability of the adequacy of a certain interpretation. in those cases, any evaluation of an argument is limited by the background knowledge an evaluator has at her or his disposal in a concrete situation. 254 michael h g hoffmann this knowledge dependency has been emphasized especially by richard feldman in his epistemological approach. he argued that: it is (almost) inevitable that we make argument goodness relative to individuals. this is because background knowledge must play some role in the evaluati9n of such arguments, and such knowledge obviously varies from one person to another. (feldman 1994, 182 f.) he gives a nice example. consider you have to pick up a guest speaker for a sports banquet and you have to decide whether to drive a small or a large car. you know that he is a professional basketball player, so you might formulate the following inductive argument: (1) almost all professional basketball players are over six feet tall (2) the guest speaker is a professional basketball player (3) the guest speaker is over six feet tall. (feldman 1994, 177) this may indeed be a good argument, but what if you would know that the title of the speaker's lecture is "even short people can make it in the nba: my personal story" (177)? it seems to be obvious that any evaluation of a non-deductive argument depends on the amount of knowledge that is available in a certain situation. and this is not only true with regard to an individual's always limited point of view. consider the fact that for over 2000 years-from aristotle to kant, to be more precise-the theorem that the triangle's inner angles sum up to 180 0 has been used by nearly every great philosopher as an example for the possibility that there are "a priori" or "analytical" truths in mathematics. as we know since lobacevskij (17921856), janos bolyai (1802-1860), and riemann (1826-1866) however, this theorem is not "absolutely" true; its truth depends on the geometry one chooses to prove it. if euclidean geometry is the only geometry a civilization knows of, an "argument" that is used to prove this theorem will be a good one while it is a bad one today, at least as long as it does not specify the axiomatic system in which the proof is performed. since we can never know what kinds of scientific discoveries the future will bring, knowledge relativity remains a principal constraint for argument evaluation. dependency on available knowledge, however, is not the only point we should take into account. i would argue that a third form of relativism-besides dependency on the evaluator's cognitive situation and on available background knowledge in a specific situation--concerns the relevance of what can be called the belief-value system of the person who evaluates an argument. consider the following "real life" argument that was publ ished by the vatican's sacred congregation for the doctrine of the faith in 1987: from the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way because man is the only creature on earth that god has "wished for himself' and the spiritual soul of each man is "immediately created" by god; his whole being bears the image of the creator. human life is sacred because from its beginning it involves "the creative r limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches 255 action of god" and it remains forever in a special relationship with the creator, who is its sole end. god alone is the lord oflife from its beginning until its end: no one can, in any circumstance, claim for himself the right to destroy directly an innocent human being. (vatican 1987, introduction) this is obviously an "argument" according to the definition i formulated in the introduction to this paper. for the sake of clarity, we might represent it as follows: (c)"from the moment of conception, the life of every human being is to be respected in an absolute way" (i.e., no one has the right to destroy it) because r, it is what god has "wished for himself'; ~ its spiritual soul is "immediately created" by god; ~ its whole being bears the image of the creator; r4 from its beginning it involves "the creative action of god" and it remains forever in a special relationship with the creator, who is its sole end; and rs god alone is the lord of life from its beginning until its end. "donum vitae", the "instruction on respect for human life in its origin and the dignity of procreation: replies to certain questions of the day", from which this argument is cited, has been formulated as the vatican's reaction to the then new technologies of in vitro fertilization and embryo transfer. the argument is part of a 2000-year-old history of argumentation, and it is to this day highly influential within public discourse of western societies, for example with regard to questions like human stem cell research and genetic engineering. but is it a "good" argument or a "bad" one? i cannot see how any answer to this question could be justified based either on what biro and siegel are saying with regard to "the argument itself' or on what lumer provides as epistemological principles and what feldman considers as knowledge dependency. even if catholics might claim that all the premises of this argument are true and justified so that it would indeed be a question of knowledge that is at stake here, it seems to be more adequate to say that arguments ofthis sort are based on specific belief-value systems, that is on networks of belief~ (i.e. what is representable in form of a statement concerning a matter of fact) and values (i.e. behavior guiding beliefs that are based on principles, needs, interests, attitudes, etc.) that are consistent from its bearers' point of view. this way, the evaluation of an argument's quality would not only depend on an evaluator's cognitive capacities, and on the background knowledge available in a concrete situation, but also on what robert c. pinto called "the broader cognitive community" (pinto 2001, 135). pinto already argued that the evaluation of arguments requires us to ask whether it is reasonable to accept an argument "as a member of an historically contingent cognitive community" (133). obviously, there are arguments whose evaluation will differ depending on social and cultural constraints that are accepted or not accepted within certain communities. 256 michael h. g hoffinann the problem that makes it necessary, i think, to distinguish between knowledge dependency and dependency on a belief-value system becomes visible when we try to apply the criteria of argument quality developed by feldman and goldman. feldman's final epistemological criterion is the following: an argument is a good argument for person s ifand only if (i) s is justified in believing the conjunction of all the premises of the argument, (ii) s is justified in believing that the premises are "properly connected" to the conclusion, and (iii) the argument is not defeated for s. (feldman 1994, 179) goldman, on the other side, who, like lumer, uses the advancement of knowledge as a criterion to define "conditions" for good practices of argumentative discourse, offers the following four basic conditions: (1 ) the speaker bel ieves the asserted concl usion; (2) the speaker believes each of the asserted premises; (3)the speaker is justified in believing each of the asserted premises; (4) the asserted premises jointly provide strong support for the conclusion. (goldman 1999, 134) if we consider again our vatican argument, there is no question that the sacred congregation for the doctrine of the faith "believes the asserted conclusion" and "each of the asserted premises", and that none of them is "defeated" from the congregation's point of view. also goldman's fourth condition seems to be fulfilled, at least for the congregation: "the asserted premises jointly provide strong support for the conclusion". if we accept the special relationship between god and the "the life of every human being" as described in all five premises, then we get indeed strong support for the thesis that every human life has to be respected in the way god has to be respected. in this way, as feldman says, "the premises are 'properly connected' to the conclusion". the main problem, however, for both these approaches concerns the question of justification. what does it mean that "the speaker" has to be "justified in believing each of the asserted premises"? what kind of "justification" should we expect with regard to any of the premises in our example? there is no question that the sacred congregation itself feels justified in believing the premises. this becomes visible in additional footnotes to some of the premises (deleted in my quote) which show that these propositions are themselves part of a longer discussion. whatever is claimed in this argument is embedded in a larger, consistent belief-value system, and each of the premises can be justified with regard to this system. or should we expect something like an "objective" justification? in an earlier article, goldman argued that being "justified in believing" a premise should not only be.a "subjective duty", but should be "viewed as (an) independent requirement(s) of objective duty" (1994, 34 f.). that means that "justified beliefs are ones produced by beliefforming processes with high truth ratios; so justified beliefs are likely to be true" (35). limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches 257 however, what might be plausible with regard to scientific tnlths and scientific methods which can be evaluated "by reference to the promotion of true belief and error avoidance" (35) seems to be hopelessly inadequate when it comes to arguments like the one formulated by the vatican. in his "veritistic epistemology" developed in knowledge in a social world, goldman seems to presuppose that there is only one "truth," since this approach "requires some sort of correspondence theory of truth" (goldman 1999, 10, 59 ff). but when it comes to genuine conflicts, or what fogelin (1985) called "deep disagreements", especially those that are based on cultural or religious differences (cf e.g. wittes 2005), nobody would disagree, i guess, that there are a lot of so-called "truths" with regard to which it is simply impossible to apply goldman's "descriptive-success theory" of truth (os): an item x (a proposition, a sentence, a belief, etc.) is true if and only if x is descriptively successful, that is, x purports to describe reality and its content fits reality. (goldman 1999,59) asking whether any of the reasons formulated by the vatican is "descriptively successful" would move a controversy on this argument only to the next level of fighting for incompatible claims. based on those observations i would argue that there are many arguments out there to which neither the criterion of being jus tifiable nor that of promoting truth can be applied successfully. that is, their evaluation does not depend on knowledge claims people can more or less easily agree upon, but on something else that might be called the belief-value system of the person who formulates, or who evaluates, an argument. conclusion epistemological approaches to argumentation emphasize that the function of argumentation is not only to convince somebody by any available means, or to reach consensus in conflicts, but also to promote knowledge, that is to generate true or justified beliefs. a goal of epistemologists in argumentation theory is thus to develop and to justify rules and practices of argumentation that "will promote knowledge rather than subvert it" (goldman 1999, viii; cf lumer 1990). for goldman, for example, argumentation is a "social practice" having a "positive veritistic value", as he calls this property (1999,87 ff). his more general goal is to develop a "veritistic epistemology" which is "concerned with the production of knowledge" (1999, 5). "under veritism we are asked to select the social practices that would best advance the cause of knowledge", that is those practices that generate true beliefs (ibid. 79). additionally, there seems to be a certain expectation that if it would be possible to identify those "epistemological principles" and rules of argumentation that are "sufficient conditions for the truth or acceptability of propositions" (lumer 1991, 101), that is, principles that are justifiable as promoting knowledge, then we would get at the same time criteria for the evaluation of arguments which were objective and non-relative in so far as they do not depend on an evaluator's time, place, 258 michael hg hoffmann society, culture, historical epoch, conceptual framework, personal training or conviction-as we can define the general meaning of "relativism" following siegel (1987, xiii). those criteria were objective and non-relative criteria of argument evaluation, since the only thing an evaluator had to do was to check whether an argumentation follows these rules and principles or not. the question on which this article focused was whether epistemological approaches to argumentation do indeed provide principles, rules, and standards of argument evaluation that allow us to distinguish clearly between "good" and "bad" arguments. it seems to me without any doubt that the suggestions discussed above allow us to decide at least comparatively which rules and practices of argumentation probably have a more positive impact on the promotion of knowledge than a more negative one. however, the question is whether such a comparative approach is sufficient to allow a non-relative evaluation of argumentations. we could try, as lumer suggests with his adequacy principle that demands to check the cognitive situation of an argument's addressee, to include as many factors on which the quality of argumentations depend as possible into the evaluation procedure itself. this way, it would be possible, for example, to evaluate the vatican's argument with regard to a certain belief-value system that has to be presupposed in order to accept the premises and the conclusion. however, the main problem with such an approach is that the three forms of relativism i distinguished in this paper--dependency on a specific cognitive situation, on available background knowledge, and on a specific belief-value system-are not only relevant for the people who formulate and who are confronted with an argument, but also for the evaluators themselves. since, as evaluators, we can only take into account what we are aware of, limits of truth are defined by our own individual possibilities and constraints. references biro, 1., & siegel, h. (1992). normativity, argumentation, and an epistemic theory of fallacies. [n f. h. v. eemeren, r. grootendorst, 1. a. blair & c. a. williard (eds.), argumentation illuminated' selected papers from the 1990 international conference on argumentation (pp. 81-103). dordrecht: foris. boger, g. (2005). subordinating truth-[s acceptability acceptable? argumentation, 19(2),187-238. feldman, r. (1994). good arguments. [n f. f. schmitt (ed.), socializing epistemology the social dimensions of knolvledge (pp. 159-188). lanham, md: rowman & littlefield publishers. fogelin, r. (1985). the logic of deep disagreements. informal logic. 7, 1-8. goldman, a. i. (1994). argumentation and social epistemology. the journal of philosophy. 91(1), 27-49. limits of truth: exploring epistemological approaches 259 goldman, a. i. (1999). knowledge in a social world. oxford: clarendon press. harding, s. (1996 < 1993». rethinking standpoint epistemology: what is 'strong objectivity'? in e. f. keller & h. e. longino (eds.), feminism and science (pp. 235248). oxfordlnew york: oxford university press. hoffmann, m. h. 0. (2005). logical argument mapping: a method for overcoming cognitive problems of conflict management. international journal of conflict management, 16(4),305-335. horkheimer, m., & adorno, t. w. (2002 <1947». dialectic of enlightenment. philosophical fragments (dialektik der aztjkldrllng) (e. jephcott, trans.). stanford, calif.: stanford university press. lewicki, r. j., gray, b., & elliott, m. (eds.). (2003). making sense of intractable environmental conflicts concepts and cases. washington covelo london: island press. longino, h. e. (1996 <1993». subjects, power, and knowledge: description and prescription in feminist philosophies of science. in e. f. keller & h. e. longino (eds.), feminism and science (pp. 264-279). oxford; new york: oxford university press. lumer, c. (1990). praktische argumentationstheorie: theoretische grundlagen, praktische begriindllng und regeln wichtiger argumentationsarten. braunschweig; wiesbaden: vieweg. lumer, c. (1991). structure and function of argumentations. an epistemological approach to determining criteria for the validity and adequacy of argumentations. in f. h. v. eemeren (ed.), proceedings of the second international conference on argumentation. organi::ed by the international society for the study of argumentation (issa) at the university of amsterdam, june 19-22, 1990 (pp. 98107). amsterdam: sicsat. lyotard,1. f. (1984 <1979». the postmodern condition. a report on knoll'ledge (0. bennington & b. massumi, trans.). minneapolis university of minnesota press. lyotard, j. f. (1993). toward the postmodern. atlantic highlands, n.j.: humanities press international. pinto, r. c. (200 i). argument, inference and dialectic. collected papers on informal logic. dordrecht; boston: kluwer academic. siegel, h. (1987). relativism refitted. dordrecht: reidel siegel, h. (1999). argument quality and cultural difference. argumentation, 13(2), 183201. siegel, h., & biro, j. (1997). epistemic normativity, argumentation, and fallacies. argumentation, 1/(3), 277-292. smith, d. e. (1990). the conceptual practices of power.' a feminist sociology of knowledge. boston: northeastern university press. vatican (1987). the gift of life (donum vitae). instruction on respect for human life in its origin and the dignity of procreation: replies to certain questions of the day. http://wwwnccbuscc.org/prolife/tdocs/donumvitae.htm. vattimo, g. (1991 <1985». the end of modernity nihilism and hermeneutics in postmodern culture: the johns hopkins university press. 260 michael hg hoffmann williams, b. (2002). truth & truthfulness. an essay in genealogy: princeton univ. pro wittes, t. c. (ed.). (2005). holv israelis and palestinians negotiate: a cross cultural analysis of the oslo peace process. washington: united states institute of peace press. michael h g hoffmann school of public policy georgia institute of technology d.m smith building 685 cherry street atlanta, ga 30332-0345 michael. hoffmann@pubpolicygatech.edu microsoft word gamberini.doc gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 14 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ studies in christian-jewish relations a peer-reviewed e-journal of the council of centers on jewish-christian relations published by the center for christian-jewish learning at boston college “‘with sincere reverence’: a christological perspective for the interreligious dialogue envisioned by nostra aetate” paolo gamberini, s. j. pontifical theological faculty of southern italy “san luigi,” naples volume i (2005-2006): 14-23 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 15 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ the ethnical and cultural situation in italy as well as in many european countries has radically changed in recent years. the increase of immigration, especially from north africa and from asia, is slowly changing the way europeans think about their own religious and cultural identity. the arrival of muslims, buddhists, hindus and sikhs challenges who we are as catholics. islam has become the second largest religion in italy. in his speech to the city in the year 2000, the former archbishop of bologna, giacomo biffi, said that either europe will become christian again or else it will become muslim.1 the cardinal was also targeting the nihilistic and pluralistic culture which will not be able to face the ideological attack of islam. this is why the catholic church has tried to have the continent’s christian roots acknowledged in the european constitution, but as we know without success. facing not only the religious expansion of islam and of other religions, but also preoccupied by the threat of terrorist fundamentalism, many catholics are tempted to defend their identity by suspecting any kind of pluralistic attitude in dealing with the present situation. they affirm themselves by excluding anyone who is different ethnically and religiously. they claim themselves by removing others. therefore, there is a need for renewing the spirit of the conciliar declaration nostra aetate (na), which reminds us that the catholic church rejects nothing that is true and holy in the other religions. the church acknowledges “with sincere reverence” (sincera cum observantia) that the other religions reflect a ray of that truth which enlightens all humanity. the 1974 guidelines for implementing the conciliar declaration nostra aetate, no. 4 – prepared by the 1 cardinal giacomo biffi, “la città di san petronio nel iii millennio,” il regno-documenti, 17 (2000): 551. commission for religious relations with the jews – states that the church must always promote better mutual understanding to overcome the reciprocal ignorance and the frequent confrontations among people of different beliefs. theologians have a particular task in providing discernment, in order to inform interreligious dialogue with the christological proclamation that jesus christ is “‘the way, the truth, and the life’ (jn 14:6), in whom people may find the fullness of religious life, in whom god has reconciled all things to himself” (na, §2). i will highlight three different moments in which this “sincere reverence” towards other religions may be realized. the first moment may be called methodological and will refer to the ignatian tradition of the spiritual exercises. i will develop first of all the praesupponendum (presupposition) as an attitude of being able to listen to the religious experience of the other; then the contemplatio ad amorem (contemplation in attaining love) as the awareness and recognition of the action of the spirit: being able to distinguish the religious experience of god from its theoretical and practical interpretations; and finally the magis, the continuing transcending of the religious conscience in reaching out to god: deus semper maior (god is always greater). the second moment of my paper will be more theoretical. i will deal with the question of truth within interreligious dialogue and how god’s ineffable transcendence and otherness have been revealed in this jesus of nazareth. “no one has seen god at any time; the only begotten god who is in the bosom of the father, he has made him known” (jn 1:18). the humanity of god, jesus’ particularity, is not a limitation for the interreligious dialogue, but constitutes an adequate perspective for determining the universality of jesus christ. studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 16 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ the third moment considers the practical dimension of the dialogue. i will articulate the inner otherness of god (trinity) with god’s becoming other than himself (incarnation): i will show how the evangelical praxis of the believer, who makes himself everything for everybody, is able in the praxis, more than in theory, to sustain the eschatological tension between the already and not yet, which characterizes interreligious dialogue. 1. the methodological moment st. ignatius of loyola wrote the book of the spiritual exercises as a guide on how to experience god and to make decisions in one’s own life in a selfless way. at the beginning of the spiritual exercises st. ignatius introduces some presuppositions (praesupponendum) which say that he who is giving the spiritual exercises should “be ready to save his neighbor’s proposition than to condemn it. if he cannot save it, let him inquire how he means it; and if he means it badly, let him correct him with charity. if that is not enough, let him seek all the suitable means to bring him to mean it well, and save him.”2 when we apply this principle to interreligious dialogue it means that it is necessary to listen carefully to the religious experience of the other believers, trying more and more to assume the other’s perspective instead of coercing the other into one’s own viewpoint. “listening is the first step in understanding. in listening we indicate both that we care about the other and also that we have something to learn from the other. it seems to me that religious humility mandates listening as a basic mode of being in an 2 see david l. fleming, sj, saint ignatius, the spriritual exercises: a literal translation and a contemporary reading 6th ed. (st. louis: the institute of jesuit sources, 1991). see also j.thomas, i segreti dei gesuiti. gli esercizi spirituali (casale monferrato: piemme, 1986). interreligious context.”3 we may formulate the golden rule of interreligious dialogue in this way: “try always to understand the others, as you would like to be understood.”4 we need to listen to the muslim as a muslim, the buddhist as a buddhist. dialogue and proclamation (dp), a may, 1991 document of the pontifical council for interreligious dialogue (pcid), states that christians must be prepared to learn and to receive from and through others the positive values of their traditions. through this attentive listening and open attitude christians “may be moved to give up ingrained prejudices, to revise preconceived ideas, and even sometimes to allow the understanding of their faith to be purified” (§49).5 in §235-§236 of the spiritual exercises we may find the second methodological principle for interreligious dialogue. everyone is invited to acknowledge how god dwells, labors, and acts in all created things. that means that by giving up one’s own preconceived ideas and by having receptive minds, as the pcid document affirms, christians should recognize that god has “also manifested himself in some 3 a. goshen-gottstein, “judaism and incarnational theologies: mapping out the parameters of dialogue,” journal of ecumenical studies 39, no. 3-4 (june 2002): 23. 4 m. schulz, “der beitrag von immanuel levinas zum jüdisch-christlichen dialog:menschwerdung gottes,” müncher theologiszhe zeitschrift 56 (2005): 152. 5 cf., “much contemporary theological thinking is done precisely in dialogue with others. the purpose of such dialogue is twofold: first, to correct imbalances that stem from a false perception of the other or from excluding the other from one’s horizons; and second, the encounter with the other furnishes us with new ways of perceiving and presenting our religious convictions. ultimately, the encounter with the other fashions our own self-perception, as well as our religious understanding” (alon goshen-gottstein, “judaisms and incarnational theologies,” 221). studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 17 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ way to the followers of other religious traditions” (§48).6 the spirit of god is not only at work in the religious life of individual believers, “but also in the religious traditions to which they belong” (§17). during the first interreligious meeting in assisi on oct. 27, 1986, and again in his speech to the roman curia in december of the same year, john paul ii declared that “every authentic prayer is moved by the holy spirit.”7 in one of his wednesday catecheses, on sept. 10, 1998, john paul ii remarked that “very often at the source of the variety of religions there are founders who realized in the spirit a deep religious experience. this spiritual experience has been transferred into the doctrines, rites and teachings of the different religions.”8 in order to perceive the spirit at work within these religions it is necessary to go beyond the propositions and formulations of those to whom we listen. we need at this moment to pay attention to the eighth rule for the discernment of spirits of the second week. ignatius loyola distinguishes very carefully the starting moment of the spiritual consolation, in which the soul is touched by god himself, and the following moment of this experience. “for often in this second time, through one’s own course of habits and the consequences of the concepts and judgements, or through the good spirit or through the bad, he forms various resolutions and opinions which are not given immediately by 6 the federation of asian bishops’ conferences declared in november 1986 that religions have the gift of an authentic experience of the selfcommunication of the divine word and of the saving presence of the holy spirit. (quoted in congregazione generale 34a della compagnia di gesù (1995), decreto v, roma 1996, 86). see j.-m.biron, “la compagnie de jésus et le dialogue interreligieux,” cahiers de spiritualité ignatienne 110 (2004) : 97-111. 7 giovanni paolo ii, “discorso ai cardinali, alla famiglia pontificia e alla curia e prelatura romana,” il regno-documenti 32 (1987): 136. 8 see l’osservatore romano (september 10, 1998). god our lord, and therefore they have need to be very well examined before entire credit is given them, or they are put into effect” (§336). if we extend this eighth rule not only to individuals but to religions, then we need to distinguish between the written and oral traditions, kept in sacred scriptures and teachings, and the original self-communication of god received by the founders of these religions.9 dialogue and proclamation (§30, §78) states that prayerful discernment and theological reflection is required in order to discern the presence of the spirit within the doctrines and precepts of the other religions. the august, 2000 declaration of the congregation for the doctrine of the faith, dominus iesus says that god “does not fail to make himself present in many ways, not only to individuals, but also to entire peoples through their spiritual riches, of which their religions are the main and essential expression even when they contain ‘gaps, insufficiencies and errors’. therefore, the sacred books of other religions, which in actual fact direct and nourish the existence of their followers, receive from the mystery of christ the elements of goodness and grace which they contain (§8).” by discerning the first and the second moment of god’s self-communication in these religions and distinguishing the original spiritual gift from its human interpretations and categories, we may be able to participate in the spiritual experience of the other and be receptive to the ways other religions proclaim and live their experience of god. by 9 “in religious experience it is possible to distinguish between a superstructure which i call belief and an infrastructure which i call faith. the superstructure is the external word, the external revelation, the external reality, the word used in history and culturally conditioned. the infrastructure is the interior word, the word which addresses the heart, the intimate revelation.” (w. johnston, l’œil intérieur. mysticisme et religion [paris: desclée de brouwer, 1982], 82-83). studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 18 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ transcending the categorical expressions of other religions we reach “a much deeper level, that of the spirit, where exchange and sharing give a mutual witness to one’s beliefs and a common exploration of one’s respective religious convictions.”10 the aim of interreligious dialogue is a deeper conversion of all towards god and everyone is invited “to leave one’s previous spiritual or religious situation in order to direct oneself towards another.”11 “the christian theologian in dialogue with the other is called faithfully to reflect on the experience of tracing a pilgrimage of constant departure which is also an entry into this fullness which god promises.”12 by converting oneself more and more to god, one comes closer to truth. na, §2 states that in the manner of life and conduct, in the precepts and teachings of these religions, there is a reflection of that truth which enlightens all people. this does not mean that the truth, which enlightens all religions, is still hidden and inconceivable. truth is not the outcome of complementary truths found in other religions. jesus christ is “the way, the truth and the life.” dialogue and proclamation states, however, that “the fullness of truth received in jesus christ does not give individual christians the guarantee that they have grasped that truth fully. in the last analysis truth is not a thing we possess, but a person by whom we must allow ourselves to be possessed. this is an unending process” (§49). in order to reflect on this important aspect of the interreligious dialogue we need to consider the second moment of this discussion. 10 dp, §40. 11 secretariat for non-christians, “the attitude of the church towards the followers of other religions: reflections and orientations on dialogue and mission,” aas 75 (1984): §37. 12 michael barnes, theology and the dialogue of religions (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2002), 219. 2. the theoretical moment in the contemplation to gain love, st. ignatius invites the retreatant to search and find god in everything. this is not a nameless and abstract god but the god of jesus christ. god’s truth was made visible and accessible in the particular history of jesus of nazareth. god does not exclude humanity. the human jesus defines god’s very essence. “it is precisely god’s deity which, rightly understood, includes his humanity.”13 god can be humanly expressed since god is also human in his being. dominus iesus declares that “the truth about god is not abolished or reduced because it is spoken in human language” (§6). the human god is not less than god. god finds his appropriate and adequate self-expression in the humanity of jesus. this does not dissolve the mysterious character of god’s revelation, but it is manifest in jesus christ. we should not look for god beyond the humanity of jesus, but we should always go beyond our relative and finite ways of expressing the mystery of incarnation. this truth qualifies the identity of the christian faith as a revealed religion. to set this truth aside means to alter christianity and to make interreligious dialogue impossible because christians would enter into dialogue without their own identity. we would not have a “sincere reverence,” if we dialogue already with a presumption, a common denominator for all religions called the unfathomable mystery, into which we reduce all religions into one.14 on the contrary, each religion is in dialogue with its own presuppositions. 13 karl barth, the humanity of god (richmond: john knox, 1960), 46. 14 see paolo gamberini, “kenosi e universalità del cristianesimo,” filosofia e teologia 17 (2003): 426-434. studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 19 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ to argue the truth of christian faith is very complex in the cultural context of our days, which is on one side relativist and on the other side marked by a clash of civilizations and religions; but we cannot deny truth or become agnostic, either saying that truth cannot be known, or saying that truth is what the majority decides.15 in a speech at the pontifical lateran university on may 12, 2004, the president of the italian senate, marcello pera, asked, “if one truth is equal to another truth, why should we dialogue? and if in faith there is no truth, how can we ever be saved?”16 according to pera absolute truth bars dialogue or an acknowledgment of what “is true and holy” in other religions, as na, §2 and ad gentes, §9 declare. to answer this serious objection we need to articulate in the right way the criterion and the condition of truth, in order to avoid both relativism and fundamentalism. whoever dialogues is well aware of his own criterion of truth (torah, holy scriptures, qu’ran). denying what makes a jew a jew, a christian a christian, ignoring that everyone is committed thoroughly to his measure of truth, boycotts and does not promote dialogue at all. to leave one’s own belief in order to be in dialogue with the other would change dialogue into a monologue. instead, each religion must question and clarify, what are the criterion and condition of the truth it claims.17 15 see joseph ratzinger, fede-verità-tolleranza. il cristianesimo e le religioni del mondo (siena: cantagalli, 2003), 115ff. 16 m. pera, “il relativismo, il cristianesimo e l’occidente,” lezione alla pontificia università lateranense per i 150 anni di fondazione della facoltà di diritto civile, roma, 12 maggio 2004, http://www.senato.it/ presidente/21572/21575/28223/composizioneattopresidente.htm. 17 by criterion we mean the objective reference (in se) of what constitutes an identity; by condition we mean the perspective (pro nobis) in and through which that objective reference is perceived. to deny this when christians proclaim their truth, they refer to the way this truth became flesh in jesus of nazareth. there is a deep link between the truth and this jesus, as it is stated in jesus’ affirmation: “i am the truth” (jn 14:6). this is quite a paradoxical affirmation and in certain way intolerant. this identification between the “i” of jesus and the truth is intolerable for everyone who encourages relativism, but also for those who oppose any form of fundamentalism. behind that “i” there may be hidden an institution or an ideology, or even a church. if god is the truth, whoever (an individual, a group, or a religion) stands on god’s side is also in the truth and becomes the interpreter of truth. the attributes of god’s word qualify god’s spokespersons. in order to understand the paradoxical character of the johannine affirmation we must pay attention to the proximal context of jesus’ self-definition: the paschal experience. “now before the feast of the passover, when jesus knew that his hour was come that he should depart out of this world unto the father, having loved his own which were in the world, he loved them unto the end” (jn 13:1). jesus’ passion, death and resurrection reveal that in the identification between truth and the i of jesus a deeper revelation of god and a different way of defining truth have been shown. jesus’ self-giving for others (kénosis) is the essential condition by which jesus expresses his being the truth of god the father. there is a deep connection between “i am the truth” of jesus’ saying and the johannine affirmation that summarizes the whole easter event: “there is no greater love than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends” (jn 15:13). becoming the neighbor of whoever was poor, sick and marginal, until he made himself “friend of correlative dimension of truth leads either to reducing the objective reference to one’s own perspective (relativism) or to making one’s own perspective the criterion of truth (fundamentalism). see v. melchiorre, essere e parola (milan: vita e pensiero, 1982). studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 20 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ sinners” (cf. mt 11:19), jesus manifested that the criterion of his truth is the experience of otherness which has its origin in god the father and has its end in embracing the other. jesus’ identification with the truth reveals that god defines his very being in the humanity of jesus and in him god has assumed the extreme otherness of the sinner. jesus emptied himself so totally for the sake of others, that his life was defined in relation to sinners. that god affirms himself in relation to another from himself, to that wholly other who is the sinner, this belongs to the paschal revelation of god, which can be recapitulated in the johannine expression “god is love” (1 jn 4:8). the very possibility that god becomes other from himself is god’s very essence which is constituted by inner relations: father, son and holy spirit. without denying biblical monotheistic faith, christians believe that the one god is not an absolute being, resting in splendid solitude. the god of jesus christ is ontologically open within and beyond himself. therefore, the category of “otherness” finds in the christian idea of god its foundation. if interreligious dialogue is made possible by acknowledging the other in his difference and limits, then the logic guiding this dialogue is the same as that of the paschal existence, when jesus laid down his life for the others, and of the trinitarian life, where each person in the one god exists for the sake of the other person. this different god calls for a different understanding of what truth is. we may quote saint augustine: “we do not enter into truth but through love” (non entratur in veritatem nisi per charitatem).18 god is not afraid of dialogue as the dogmatic constitution on divine revelation (dei verbum) declares: “the invisible god (see col 1;15, 1 tm 1:17) out of 18 augustine, “de gratia contra faustum,” opera, f. tempsky g. freytag, lipsia 1891, xxxii, cap. xviii. the abundance of his love speaks to human beings as friends (see ex 33:11; jn 15:14-15) and lives among them (see bar 3:38), so that he may invite and take them into fellowship with himself” (§2). the absolute truth is essentially “conversational” and “self-communication.” “truth itself may become for us an idol, because truth, separated from love, is not god: it becomes an image, an idol which we must neither love nor adore.”19 in a christian perspective, truth and dialogue are neither opposed nor juxtaposed: they essentially correspond to each other. this relation, between truth and dialogue, determines what kind of universality may be attributed to christian truth. if christian identity originates from the life-style and thoughtstyle of jesus, we have to avoid any form of exclusive or inclusive christianity in dialogue with other religions. “instead of diminishing the scandal of the word made flesh, in order to ease interreligious dialogue, it is necessary to show how the principle of incarnation, that the absolute reveals himself in and through a historical particularity, invites us not to make christianity an absolute, that is, a religion excluding others.”20 if jesus is defined by his relation to others, it means that also the other religions define christ’s event. dialogue and proclamation, §48-49 states: [w]hile remaining firm in their belief that in jesus christ, the only mediator between god and humanity (cf. 1 tm 2:4-6), the fullness of revelation has been given to them, christians must remember that god has also manifested himself in some way to the followers of other religious traditions. consequently, it is with receptive minds that 19 b. pascal, pensieri, a cura di paolo serini 3rd ed. (milan: arnoldo mondadori editore, 1988), n. 541, 314. 20 c. geffré, “le pluralisme religieux comme question théologique,” vie spirituelle 3 (1998) : 586 . studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 21 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ they approach the convictions and values of others. the fullness of truth received in jesus christ does not give individual christians the guarantee that they have grasped that truth fully. in the last analysis truth is not a thing we possess, but a person by whom we must allow ourselves to be possessed. this is an unending process.21 only to god is known how the many religions participate in the work of the holy spirit and how they can be associated with the paschal mystery.22 “on the last day the mysterious convergence of all religions among them will be revealed together with their meaning within god’s one plan of salvation.”23 in the meantime, however, if it is true that god is love, the way the spirit of christ touches every human person is by the experience of mutual love. to give a christian account of the experience of being in relationship with the other, committed always to living ‘in between’ this concrete position within history and the fullness of meaning which comes at the end of history and which can only be anticipated in hope, is only possible if one is willing to take the risk of crossing the threshold, of encountering the other person.24 3. the practical moment after examining the methodological and theoretical dimensions of interreligious dialogue, we consider now the practical moment. in order to make the catholic church 21 n.b. “the spirit of truth will lead you to the complete truth” (jn 16:13). 22 cf. gaudium et spes, § 22. 23 c. geffré “le pluralisme religieux comme question théologique,” vie spirituelle 3 (1998), 584. 24 m. barnes, theology and the dialogue of religions, 226. receptive to interreligious dialogue in authentic spirit, both realism and discernment are necessary. first of all realism: everyone should seek to comprehend the religion of the other as the other understands it, according to its own parameters and not according to a superficial idea of that religion. speaking about islam in the post-synodal apostolic exhortation ecclesia in europa, john paul ii said that a proper relationship with islam needs to be conducted prudently, “with clear ideas about possibilities and limits, and with confidence in god’s saving plan for all his children. it is also necessary to take into account the notable gap between european culture, with its profound christian roots, and muslim thought” (§57). together with realism we need also discernment. this asks first of all for an ethical foundation, which is the golden rule found in many religions: “do to others what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the law and the prophets” (mt 7:12); “love your neighbor as yourself” (lv 19:18); “not one of you truly believes until you wish for others what you wish for yourself” (40 hadith an-nawawi, 13); “this is the sum of the dharma: do nothing unto others which would cause you pain if done to you” (mahabharata 5:1517). card. karl lehmann declared that: [t]he problem of violence in every religion is of utmost importance. whoever wants to dictate his conviction with power and violence cuts himself off from any kind of interreligious dialogue. every religion should examine in which way its own image of god pursues an ideal of violent imposition of her belief upon the others [...] each religion should be critical of certain praxis of religious studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 22 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ coercion (for christian churches: heresy, inquisition, missions).25 discernment should be done not only on an ethical base but also a spiritual one. the eschatological event of god, who became human in jesus, continues in the selfidentification of christ with the little ones, the hungry, the thirsty and the excluded (cf mt 25:35). as god became other-from-himself (incarnation) by being other-in-himself (trinity), so christians are called everyday to discover their own identity by becoming other than themselves. saint paul says: to the jews i became as a jew, so that i might win jews; to those who are under the law, as under the law though not being myself under the law, so that i might win those who are under the law; to those who are without law, as without law, though not being without the law of god but under the law of christ, so that i might win those who are without law. to the weak i became weak, that i might win the weak; i have become all things to all men, so that i may by all means save some.26 paul defines his own identity by relating it to others: he meets those who are under the law not without that law that binds to the problems of the law. he meets the weak not as the strong one, in order to let them feel more greatly the suffering caused by their weaknesses. he does not face the jews as a christian who denies them the authenticity of their specific way to god. he meets everybody with what identifies each one of them before others and before god. paul’s ego constitutes himself by 25 karl lehmann, “una religione tra le altre,” il regno-documenti 48 (2003): 46. 26 1 cor 9:20-22. encountering the human and religious determining factors of the other. through these strong denotations of the other paul articulates his own identity in a plural way. he needs these strong factors which determine the identity of the other, in order to find his own way to god, overcoming his own weakness and his inclination to violence.27 translating this into the language of interreligious dialogue, we may say that the christian is called to become a jew, to become a muslim, “for the sake of the gospel” (1 cor 9:23). it is not simply becoming more tolerant or respectful for the dignity of the other. as god became human by remaining god, so the christian is called to become a refugee with the refugees, an outcast with the outcast, a muslim with the muslims, by remaining himself. the more as a christian he dialogues, the more he will be able to be incarnated in the belief and in the life of the other believer, and vice versa. the model for such dialogue is jesus’ relationship with the father. “through participation in that relationship – father and son united by the sprit of love – christians learn how to relate to others. the analogy of “mutual indwelling” (perichoresis) of the divine persons within the godhead teaches the virtues and practice of hospitality and welcome.”28 the more christians dwell in the way of believing and of living of muslims, of jews, of hindus, the more they will understand their own christian identity and why god’s being is defined as love.29 27 h.-j. sander, “il cristiano nel postmoderno: identità plurale,” il regnoattualità 50 (2005): 23. 28 m. barnes, theology and the dialogue of religions, 228. 29 cf. frank whaling, christian theology and world religions. a global approach, (london: society for promoting christian knowledge, 1986), 130-131. studies in christian-jewish relations volume 1 (2005-2006): 14-23 gamberini, “with sincere reverence” 23 http://escholarship.bc.edu/scjr/vol1/iss1/art3/ “to be ‘oneself as another’ entails a participation in the mystery of god’s self-giving which alone can mend the ‘broken middle’ of interfaith relations.”30 by getting to know the spiritual tradition of the other, christians understand better their own faith, purifying it from what causes obstacles or misunderstandings in the partner. at the same time differences between the christian faith and the other religions may appear more clearly. everyone will understand his own religious identity not without the others but in relation to the others.31 “if christian identity is found only in generous-hearted relationship, in learning to see ‘oneself as another,’ then it will be through trust in the spirit that constant conversion is made possible. faith, love and hope are reciprocal dimensions of the christian life, manifestations of god’s own self-giving, the grace which makes for human flourishing.”32 30 m. barnes, theology and the dialogue of religions, 207. 31 cf. “the spirit of god breaks through the self-enclosed world we inhabit; the spirit re-creates us and sets us on the road toward becoming what i like to call a ‘catholic personality’, a personal microcosm of the eschatological new creation. a catholic personality is a personality enriched by otherness, a personality which is what it is only because multiple others have been reflected in it in a particular way. the distance from my own culture that results from being born by the spirit creates a fissure in me through which others can come in. the spirit unlatches the doors of my heart saying: ‘you are not only you; others belong to you too’” (m. volf, exclusion and embrace. a theological exploration of identity, otherness, and reconciliation [nashville: abingdon press, 1996], 51). “one does not live without others. this means that one does not live without fighting with others. so we need, not just once but everyday, to give up the naive conviction that ‘we understand each other’, and to get out of the sentimental meanderings, by which we hoped to hide under certain expressions and defenses the reality of the other” (m. de certeau, mai senza l’altro [magnano: qiqaion, 1993], 41). 32 m. barnes, theology and the dialogue of religions, 228. in conclusion, i summarize the three moments mentioned above as three theses: 1) the dynamics of the spiritual exercises invites us to listen and to acknowledge in the other the work of the spirit by distinguishing the religious experience of god from its consequent theoretical and ethical interpretations; 2) the spirit at work in the other religions is the spirit of jesus christ, who became a human being for others; 3) interreligious dialogue lives the eschatological tension between the already and not yet. this tension should not be explained by means of a theory but lived and supported in the praxis of a believing love. peripheralia the page number in the footer is not for bibliographic referencingwww.tandfonline.com/ojfp 76 on occasions my friend henry and i meet for lunch at the sagewood café and have deep discussions on nefarious subjects over toasted sandwiches. today was a debate on whether one should rather tell a lie that softens or the truth that hurts. we also turned it the other way around with the proposition that it was better to be hurt by the truth than comforted by a lie. this arose from a patient i was looking after in an old age home who suffers from pre-dementia. i get asked the same question by this patient, “will my husband be coming today?” her husband has been dead for several years. in this manner another perennial ethical dilemma arises when one has to inform a patient that they have cancer or a life threatening disease. decisions of this kind are influenced by the patient’s character and beliefs as well as those of family members. this is all weighed up with the stages of the disease, the prognosis and the context within which the patient lives. one of the benefits of general practice is that giving information is not necessarily a now-or-never affair but is often a considered process over the progression of time. this process often depends on choosing the right time to give the information; what the french call le moment juste. it is an intuitive moment which gives one an opening to discuss a sensitive subject. in recent years the right to know has become paramount in bioethical circles unless there are exceptional circumstances involving cultural, religious or personal beliefs. dilemmas, though, arise when a competent patient requests not to know a diagnosis or prognosis. there is also the “white lie” which is the grey area (if you will pardon the chromatic metaphors) between the absolute pure truth and the deliberate dishonest lie. the white lie involves the subtle variations between the absolute truth (which is a disputed phenomenon in philosophy) and the black mendacious lie. between the two are the relativistic approaches of partial disclosure as well as the concept of therapeutic privilege. therapeutic privilege allows physicians to withhold information when they think a patient may be unable to cope with the information or may be harmed by the information. in official language this goes “except in circumstances where there is substantial evidence that such disclosure would be contrary to his/her best interests.” (national health act 2003,9, section 6 (1)(a)). one of the main reasons for not informing the patient of the full truth may be the doctor’s concern that the patient may refuse a treatment that is in their best interests. the other common reason is that the news may cause extreme anxiety especially in those who are already anxious or already suffer from a general anxiety or psychiatric disorder. lying can be defined as the direct communication of a statement one knows to be false. there can also be several gradations to these communications. deception, for instance, is actively and intentionally causing a patient to adopt a false belief and is done with deliberate intent. this raises the complex philosophical dilemma between always telling the truth exactly as it is (the kantian deontological approach) and giving false statements or partial disclosure in order to procure a good outcome (the consequentialist/utilitarian approach). another slight variation on this theme is “concealment” when one intentionally avoids communicating all the relevant information to a patient. almost unintentionally, we may use “misleading” euphemisms and what winston churchill called “terminological inexactitudes”. even silences and non-verbal responses may be used to create either an impression of affirmation or disapproval. in some cultures there is a belief that statements may generate a self-fulfilling prophecy such as informing the patient of side effects, which will then make them happen, almost like letting the genie out of the bottle. into this complex mixture is the choice of words one uses and the different forms of language manipulation that influences the patient. the tone of voice, timing, inflection and emphasis or lack of emphasis all play a part in how information is conveyed and interpreted. it is never completely possible to eliminate our agendas to help the patient and therefore we may convey our information in many one-sided ways. “if falsehood, like truth, had only one face,” said michelle de montaigne in the 16th century, “we would be in better shape. for we would take as certain the opposite of what the liar said. but the reverse of truth has a hundred thousand shapes and a limitless field”. during the long years of medical training, we are imprinted with ways to seek and tell the finite truth or as nearly as we can get to it. in our mechanistic thought processes, we work in a linear way towards an objective (diagnosis) and a goal (outcome). this gives us security of purpose in a clinical and technological discipline. the apotheosis of this training is the concept of evidence-based medicine. we rationalise within systems and like to order our thoughts deterministically in order to achieve cures and outcomes, which we believe are medically best for the patients. this is the doctor’s truth but this may not be the truth for the patient. vladimir lenin putatively said “do not ask, is it true? ask, true for whom?” “true for whom” is one of the enigmas in medical practice when giving information to patients and when helping patients make decisions. chris ellis is a family physician in pietermaritzburg, kwazulu-natal e mail: cristobalellis@gmail.com the truth “it takes two to speak the truth, one to speak and another to hear.” henry david thoreau acta theologica 1999: 2· worship and spirituality as a praxisorientated apologetic in a postmodern world (the new age) an incarnational engaged approach1 e k foshaugen2 abstract this article highlights certain tenets of postmodernism and then att~mpts to provide an evangelical christian 'response. postmodern ideology and its religious face as reflected in the new age mo'{ement need not cause disquietude or be derided. rather, postmodern thought should be allowed to challenge any premodern fundamentalism and modern rationalism char the evangelical church has uncritically internklised or embraced. postr:ilodernism provides an incredible opportunity ro· tlevelop new methods to demonstrate the gospel message of love and hope. in this article it is argued that this is best done through the supernatural power of an incarnational, engaged worship and spirituality (of adoration aqd action). then, uncondidonal and sacrificial love is demonstraced as a praxi~' orientated apologetic through the christian's life-story. christian truth claims need co be authenticated, convictions must be acted out, to provide plausibility, persuasion, incentive and inducement in a pluralistic and relativistic postmodern world that is aware and hungers after spiritualiry. the postmodern intellectual siruation is profoundly complex and ambiguous. 2 there is a diversity of cultural and intellectual cross currents shaping ·the postmodern intellectual climate. pragmatism, existentialism, psychoanalysis, marxism, feminism, deconstructionism, and· postempiricist philosophy of science are some of the most prominent shapers, of postmodernism. the open-ended, indeterminate postmodern mind has develop,ed from this maelstrom of divergent impulses and tenc,lencies. mcgrath (1996:184) defines postmodernism as follows: postmodernism is generally taken to be something of a cultural sensibility without, absolutes, fixed certainties or foundations, this article.is a reflection of the study done in the doctoral thesis of e k poshaugen under che promocorship of prof] s kellerman of the department of practical tpeology of the university of the free state, bloemfontein, south africa. 2 dr ek foshaugen, p 0 box 290, tableview, 7439. south africa. 1 " foshaugen worship and spirituality which cakes delight in pluralism and divergence, and which aims to think through the radical 'situaredness' of all human thought. 1. the postmodern ideology there are a few working principles that emerge when one studies these diverse and divergent strands that combine to form postmodernism. tamas (1991:395) notes an appreciation of the plasticity and constant change of reality and knowledge, a stress on the priority of concrete experience over fixed abstract principles, and a conviction that no single a priori thought system should govern belief or investigation, as key principles. this naturally calls into question traditional notions of truth, structure, and reality. the center of discourse is dislocated to the edges of human preference and subjectivity. people are increasingly attributing thinking and actions to their cultural background. truth and responsibility are discredited notions because postmodernism is not a set of doctrines or truth claims. postmodernists deconstruct metanarratives so that no one particular belief is more true or believable than another. deconstruction declares that the identity and intention of the author of a text are irrelevant to the interpretation of the text. two general principles of this approach to the reading of texts are: anything that is written will convey meanings that its author did not intend and could not have intended, and the author cannot adequately put into words what he or she means in the first place (mcgrath 1996:186). metanarratives are large-scale theoretical interpretations purportedly of universal application. they often have a terroristic or militaristic function to sanction the illusion of a universal human history. often scripture as a metanarrative has been used to legitimise prejudices (e.g. apartheid) and perpetuate violence against people. thus, it is not difficult to understand the postmodern attitude to metanarratives. reality eludes all attempts at conformity so there can never be any absolute foundation. all truth is a social construct, pragmatically justified. reality is constructed by the mind and not simply perceived by it. if reality is a fluid, unfolding process then the quest 2 acta theologica 1999: 2 for knowledge is endlessly self-revising, continually affected and moulded by one's actions and beliefs. all human understanding is interpretation and no interpretation is final. continuing advances in anthropology, sociology, history, and linguistics have underscored the relativity of human knowledge, bringing increased awareness of the eurocentric character of western thought, and of the cognitive bias produced by factors such as class, race and ethnicity. the postmodernist thesis is that idiosyncratic cultural-linguistic forms of life ultimately generate all human thought. knowledge is nothing more than the historically contingent product of linguistic and social practices of particular local communities of interpreters, with no assured "ever-closer" relation to an independent ahistorical reality (tamas 1991:395-402). any interpretation of a text cannot claim ultimate authority because of the hidden incongruity and contradictions chat undermine and impair its unity and coherence. the result of this is that all meaning is ultimately 'up in the air' and indeterminable. there is no such thing as true meaning. how can christianity's truth claims (the mecanarrative of redemption history in jesus christ) be considered when there are so many rival alternatives, and truth is a devalued notion? in postmodern ideology all claims to truth are equally valid and plausible. thus christianity is acceptable because it is believed to be true by some, not because it is true. 2. a christian response to postmodernism a pragmatic test applied to the christian truth claim will demonstrate whether a truth delivers what it promises. according to john 13 & 17, christianity is to be a community of believers that is characterised chiefly by worship of god, love for each other, and unity. the church is challenged to demonstrate a christianity that transforms lives, and integrates them into a community of love. christianity can only overcome the plausibility problem the postmodernist ideology of relativism and pluralism presents through a demonstration of the truths it claims. this will be best be done 3 foshaugen worship and spirituality through an incarnational engaged approach to worship. and spirituality as a praxis-orientated apologetic. the theological and philosophical apologetics will only be listened to in a context where they have been demonstrated. then they will prove to be incipiently plausible. (in the postmodern world, religious relativism is incompatible with the objective truth claims of christianity.) for the christian, the issue becomes one of whether it is necessary to become a relativist to be open to truth in other religions. this issue is eliminated when one adopts the attitude that the only truths that are false in other religions, are those that are incompatible with scripture. it is also important to realise that because multiple, incompatible truth claims exist, it does not mean that one of them is not objectively true. the postmodern relativistic position does not allow for a definitive answer to the four inescapable questions dealing with origin, morality, meaning and destiny. jesus said that he is the way, the truth and the life (john 14:6). for the christian, truth is thus knowable and absolute. it could be argued that the philosophy of postmodernism is seeking unity in diversity through relativism. the christian could respond with the model of the trinity that provides a community of love, respect and dignity that does not mitigate individuality, personfl.lity or diversity. the recognition of all religions by postmodernists unknowingly ac.knowledges the longing of the human heart to worship. an examination of history reveals an intense pursuit of things spiritual. (this is not surprising as humanity js made in the image of god.) but worship needs the constraints of truth or it can go in any direction at the whim of those worshipping. the christian is told by jesus to worship in spirit and in truth. postmodernism cannot critique an individual or a society's ethics or belief system (unless it is an absolute claim). thus auschwitz, birkenau, treblinka and apartheid must be accepted or at best, can only be ineffectively critiqued. victor frankl (1982:xxi) believes that the gas chambers of the nazis were the ultimate consequences of the theory that man is 4 acta theologica 1999:2 nothing but the product of heredity.and environment. he believes the decimation of the jews was ultimately prepared in lecrure hall of nihilistic scientists and philosophers. where and how will postmodernism draw the line on morals and ethics and worldviews? "if christianity is true, then we know some things about people that they do not know themselves" writes sire (1995: 111). this gives christianity the confidence to challenge postmodernism assumptions. sire (1995:113) argues that once the possibility that god exists is accomplished, traditional apologetics can be used. the postmodern thinker has to admit that he believes relativism is true. this means truth is necessary and important. the christian should accept the postmodern critique of modernity in relation to the belief that humans can through their mental faculties grasp truth with certainty. the·best reason to believe something is usually because you are convinced that it is true. but which conjectures, which worldviews best explain the questions people are asking? will a postmodern or a christian.worldview deal adequately 1 be coherent and self-consistent with, the existence of humanity? the starting point in meeting postmodernism .is in a praxisorientated apologetic: a willingness to offer one's life in adoration and action, in true worship and spirituality. the christian is to live under the ethos of the cross, willing to suffer with and for others. what it means to be a christian is inseparable from what it means to be the church of god. the church has a word to speak to the world because it embodies an alternative way of ordering human life made possible by ] es us christ. kenneson sees beliefs and convictjons as habits of acti,ng. thus, his model of plausibility and persuasion is one in which the facts or truth one cites are available only because certain convictions have been acted out. he writes: the paradigm i am advocating frankly admits. that a~l truth claims require for their widespread acceptance the testimony of trusted and thereby authorized witnesses (1995:lb3). the belief chat christianity has a relevancy and a truth to convey is one thing, a reason to be heard is another. 5 foshaugen worship and spirituality christians are told in 1 peter to always be ready to give an answer to rhose who ask questions abour the christian faith but in the postmodern world few are asking. any efforr to argue people into the kingdom of god by insisting that what christianity reaches is objectively true reduces the christian faith to a form of gnosticism (secret knowledge) in a postmodern world. the life of the church, the worship and spirituality of christians is what will give christian truth claims integrity, credibility, veraciousness and intelligibility. jesus is revealed to society and culture as he is mediated through the chrisrian, through communities of human beings energised, inspired and moved by rhe holy spirit. for the statement 'jesus is lord' to be objectively true, his lordship must be visible in the worship and spirituality of the christian. it must be demonstrated. when the church lives its proclamation, when it lives in the community in such a way that its life is incomprehensible apart from the god of scripture, the jesus of the gospel; then and only then, will the postmodern world ask it about the hope it has and only then will it have something to say. ludwig wittgenstein (1980:35) warns that the truth can be spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by someone who still lives in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth on just one occasion. walter brueggemann (1978) argues in chapters 5 and 6 of his book that jesus christ embodied the counter ideological dynamic of sensitivity to suffering. jesus enters the religious and political world of israel and offers a scathing critique of the ritual system imposed by the religious leaders of israel. this system marginalised many and caused much pain and suffering. the christian is to be a living epistle (2 car 3: 1-3), bringing the world a personal narrative based on adoration and action. this is worship and spirituality as a lifestyle, a praxis-orientated apologetic, an incarnational, engaged approach, in a postmodern age. 6 acta theologica 3. positive influence of postmodernism 1999: 2 in the postmodern era religion is recognised as a fundamental human activity in which every society and individual symbolically interprets and engages the nature of being. in a postmodern world, christianity is intellectually pertinent. the market place of ideas is wide open as the result of the demise of the absoluteness of human reason and science, and the supernatural is once again open to consideration. veith (1994:68) observes without a belief in god... it would be difficult to avoid postmodernist conclusions. if there is no transcendent logos, then there can be no absolutes, no meaning apart from human culture, no way out of che prison house of language.... postmodernism may represent che dead-end the implosion, the deconscruccion of accempts co do without god. so, what does postmodernism do for christianity? • postmodernism reminds the christian theologian that theology is not complete, but a developing and maturing science. there are many approaches to theology, none of which can claim to be complete. it is the obligation of the theologian to explore all propositions in accordance with god's word, to better understand the divine disclosure that god has given. • postmodernism reveals the futility of self-dependence and forces the christian to depend on christ for everything. only in christ we find design, significance, and purpose. • postmodernism points out to the christian church and individuals that we all have presuppositions, and that no one is impartial and unprejudiced. we all bring our tentative assumptions and conjectures to our experience; each fact about the world is theory-laden. allen (1989:6) argues that christian theology has yet to become postmodern. by this one assumes he is talking about theology still being influenced by premodern fundamentalism and modern rationalists. the modernist theologian still refutes doctrines that he oi:she deems unscientific or irrational, and the premodern fundamentalist will not allow his or her doctrine to engage the world. 7 foshaugen worship and spirituality postmodern christian theology must analyse, explicate, and critique rationalism by substantiating the impossibility of reason apart from presupposing god; it rejects fideism and seclusion because it demonstrates that god is the basis for rationality. are the theologian, the church, and the christian ready to meet the challenge? allen (1989:8) says, they have within their heritage immensely powerful ideas, not to mention a living lord. it is to be believed that demonstrating our living lord in an incarnational, engaged approach to worship and spirituality, reflected as a praxis-orientated apologetic, will prepare the christian to win the day for christ. many of the new generation are coming of age with little or no religion as a point of cultural and personal reference. this is a real opportunity, as one who knows nothing of religion tends to have no prejudices against it. postmodernism has opened up a new era of spirituality and the church of true believers must rise to the challenge or miss one of the greatest opportunities for spreading the gospel. why in an age of almost unparalleled interest in spirituality, is the church still so incredibly unpopular? is it not because the modern evangelical gospel tends to be too refined, defined, and regulated' by this i mean chat the gospel is a systemaric a-z of everything you need to know about life, death and eternity. whilst this 'package' is generally assumed to represent new testament christianity, it was never presented in this way, either by jesus or the apostles. this pre-packaged gospel is really a systematised stringing together of lots of little pieces which, in their original context, were presented as they stood, without being fitted into a coherent scheme. a recent survey that shows that 69 per cent of people cannot put a date on their conversion: it was a gradual process a journey. compare this with a survey done 25 years ag9 during which 69 per cent of the respondents said it was datable. this is part of the cultural shift that is taking place (tomlinson 1995:141-143). the implications for the church's evangelisarion program is nor to seek fast results, but to develop models of evangelisation which will help 8 acta theologica 1999: 2 people along the gradual pathway that seems to be the prevalent means of conversion today. in a postmodern world people merely see in the church more of what they see and reject in the outside world; hierarchies, bureaucracies, and power struggles. (it is essential that christians live and practise transparent, non-hypocritical, non-legalistic lifestyles, without compromising the convictions they hold dear, conscious of the fact that one's opinions sometimes change.) nonchrisrians obviously want nothing to do with the church because they believe that it will not bring them personal spiritual fulfilment. if one bears this in mind, it only serves to emphasise the value of worship and spirituality as defined and developed in this study. if the community of believers were to practice the type of spirituality reflected in romans 12:1 and hebrews 13:15-16 they would draw people to christ. the most effective method of evangelisation is the very life they live. the practical love for one's neighbour is ari irresistible means for winning over one's fellowmen to christ. in practising love, christians do not seek immediate results, in fact they are to love regardless of the results. in a world of changing values, morals and ideals, the love that christ has·given christians and that, they, in turn, give to the world, can become a beacon of light drawing people to jesus christ. as the church faces these new challenges, she must redefine nor her mission, but her methods. in order to be relevant yesterday, today and tomorrow, the focus of the church should always reflect the application of romans 12:1-2 and hebrews 13:15-16. worship and spirituality constitute a lifestyle of action and the most effective witness. is there any future for the church in a postmodern world? the answer is an emphatic yes. wells (1988:304) writes: will modern people therefore heed the biblical, eschatological message? at a rational level they may not, bur powerful psychological forces flow in rhe opposite direction. the modern experience, shaped by a secularity that powerfully shifts our attention to the future, co a vision of humanity poised on the brink of a terrifying abyss, means that few of our contemporaries can ignore the future. and biblical faith, above all else, wants to consider it. 9 foshaugen worship and spirituality in an article amaladoss (1995:317) discusses mission as action. he writes: as christians we visualize a world where there will be a 'new heaven and a new earth' (rev 21:1), because we believe that god is active in the process of transforming this world. that is che hope thac sustains us and makes us ever more creative to bring out what is best in human beings. thus, he defines the mission of christians as living the faith experience in jesus christ, so that the christian may be credible, and this credibility can amount to evangelisation. 4. conclusion in this new era there is no place for escapist theology. the environment outside the church is hostile and apathetic, yet that is where we practice and live our christian life. the message of hope is more than ever relevant for a world staring into the depths of non-existence. but we musr allow people ro find god where rhey are. the emergence of narrative theology in recent years will play a pivotal role in overcoming christians' bias towards a rational presentation of christianity. the intellect is engaged when systematic rheology is practised but the hearr is engaged through storytelling. ir is very difficult ro engage rhe postmodernist with propositional truths when relativism rules his/her thinking. but, the presentation of an incarnational and engaged life is a 'story' that will be seen and heard. there are four significant propositions to allow this to happen to a person. 4.1 master the story. this means that one must learn the incredible story of god's love for his creation as revealed in scripture (god's love story). also, learn the smaller story of experiencing god in one's own life (your story). 4.2 own and meditate your story. to own your story you must accept it. accept yourselfi make friends with your dark side, your brokenness, so that you understand and experience the redemptive love of jesus (he overcame the darkness in his own life.) spend rime looking at rhe stories of your life (the way jo acta theologica 1999: 2 god has worked in your life). learn to recognise your own humanness (sinfulness and weakness) and experience daily the grace of god (that saved you and is still functioning in all of your life through the ministry of the spirit). this will help you become transparent, non-hypocritical, and less legalistic, and more accepting of those living according to a relativistic ideology. 4.3 pray the story. prayer bonds our story and god's. talk to god about all your experiences, brokenness, and concerns. then listen to god and experience his awesome love, grace and mercy. 4.4 share the story. open the shadows and joys of your story to a soul-mate (a trusted friend). then apportion your story that is bonded with god's story with broken people rhat need the holistic liberation that is found only in salvation through jesus christ. this is best done through an incarnational, engaged lifestyle. helmut thielicke (1970:18-19) wrote about how the figure of jesus had been 'amputated' over the ages, how jesus had been repeatedly crucified by the church throughour its history. he has been scourged and bruised and locked in the prison of countless systems and philosophies. treated as a body of thought, he has literally been lowered into conceptual graves and covered with stone slabs so that he might not arise and trouble us any more .... but this is the miracle, that from chis succession of graves jesus christ has risen again and again. in a postmodern world christian worship and spirituality must produce the actions that give voice to the nature and will of god. christians will demonstrate the christian truth claims when worship and spirituality are expressed as praxis-orientated apologetics. then jesus christ will 'rise again' in the postmodern world in an incarnational and engaged christian faith. the religiosity and secularisation of the church must be replaced with a message oflove and hope ministered through the supernatural power of an incarnational and engaged worship and spiriruality. this 11 .i foshaugen worship and spiricualiry is not an abstract, sweeping, pious, or poetical love of sentiment, utterance, or conscience. this love is an abandonment of selfishness, and the will to practise self-sacrifice; it is practical, specific, involving courageous deeds to anyone who needs you in this world and at chis moment. this is the incarnational, engaged approach to worship and spirituality as a praxis-orientated apologetic in a postmodern world that this study argues for. the christian's lifestyle and witness of adoration and action, practised, experienced, and demonstrated through worship and spirituality functioning as a praxis-orientated apologetic, can be labelled 'an incarnational, engaged approach to effective proclamation of the gospel in a postmodern world.' 12 acea theologica bibliography all.end 1999:2 1989. christian belief in a post-modern world. louisville: westminister. amaladossm 1995. "mission as action in hope", in thomas n, readings in world missiom. london: spck. brueggemann w 19,78. the prophetic imagination. philadelphia: fortress. frankl v 1982. the dtjctor and the soul: introduction to !ogotherapy. new york: knopf kenneson pd 1995. "there's no such thing as objective truth, and it's a good thing", in phillips t r & okholm d l, christian apologetics in the postmodern world. illinois: ivp. mcgrath a 1996. a passion for truth. leicester: apollos. sire) w 1995. "on being a foil for christ and an idiot for nobody'', in phillips t r & okholm d l, christian apologetics in the postmodern world. illinois: !vp. tarnas r 1991. the passion of the western mind. london: pimlico. thelicke h 1970. how motkrn should theology be? fontana. tomlinson d 1995.'the post evangelical. london: triangle. veith ge 1994. guide to contemporary culture. leicester: crossway books. weils d f 1988. "the future'', in noll ma & wells d f, christian faith and practice in the motkrn world. grand rapids: eerdmans. wittgenstein l 1980. culture and value. oxford: blackwell. 13 brain_3_1 71 a brief history of fuzzy logic angel garrido faculty of sciences, uned, madrid, spain agarrido@mat.uned.es motto : “everything is vague to a degree which you do not realize until they tried to specify” (bertrand russell, vagueness [1]). abstract the problems of uncertainty, imprecision and vagueness have been discussed for many years. these problems have been major topics in philosophical circles with much debate, in particular, about the nature of vagueness and the ability of traditional boolean logic to cope with concepts and perceptions that are imprecise or vague. the fuzzy logic (which is usually translated into castilian by “lógica borrosa”, or “lógica difusa”, but also by “lógica heurística”) can be considered a bypass-valued logics (multi-valued logic, mvl, its acronym in english). it is founded on, and is closely related to-fuzzy sets theory, and successfully applied on fuzzy systems. you might think that fuzzy logic is quite recent and what has worked for a short time, but its origins date back at least to the greek philosophers and especially plato (428-347 b.c.). it even seems plausible to trace their origins in china and india. because it seems that they were the first to consider that all things need not be of a certain type or quit, but there are a stopover between. that is, be the pioneers in considering that there may be varying degrees of truth and falsehood. in case of colors, for example, between white and black there is a whole infinite scale: the shades of gray. some recent theorems show that in principle fuzzy logic can be used to model any continuous system, be it based in ai, or physics, or biology, or economics, etc. investigators in many fields may find that fuzzy, commonsense models are more useful, and many more accurate than are standard mathematical ones. we analyze here the history and development of this problem: fuzziness, or “borrosidad” (in castilian), essential to work with uncertainty. keywords: mathematical logic, non-classical logics, fuzzy logic, uncertainty, philosophical aspects of fuzzy logic. 1. introduction as we know, logic is the study of the structure and principles of correct reasoning, and more specifically, attempts to establish the principles that guarantee the validity of deductive arguments. the central concept of validity is for logic, because when we affirm the validity of an argument are saying that it is impossible that its conclusion is false if its premises are true. propositions are descriptions of the world, that is, are affirmations or denials of events in various possible worlds, of which the “real world” is just one of them. there is a long philosophical tradition of distinguishing between truth necessary (a priori or “logical”) and facts “contingent” (a posteriori or “factual”). both have really led the two concepts of logical truth, without being opposed to each other, are quite different: the conception of truth as coherence, and the conception of truth as correspondence. according to the point of view of consistency, a proposition is true or false depending on their relationship with respect to a given set of propositions, because they have been consistently applied the rules of that system. under the terms of correspondence, a proposition is true or false, if it agrees with reality, that is, the fact referred to. other views have tried to be overcome such dichotomy. among them may be mentioned the semantic point of view, raised by polish mathematician and philosopher alfred tarski (1902-1983). 2. truth or falsity to further enhance the complexity of the problem, one should bear in mind that not only told the truth or falsity of propositions, but also of theories, ideas and models. and so, we allow new and different conception of truth. brainotes brain. broad research in artificial intelligence and neuroscience volume 3, issue 1, february 2012, issn 2067-3957 (online), issn 2068 0473 (print) 72 the basic idea underlying all these approaches is that of an intrinsic dichotomy between true and false. this opposition implies the validity of two fundamental laws of classical logic: principle of excluded middle: every proposition is true or false, and there is another possibility. principle of non-contradiction: no statement is true and false simultaneously. this basic idea generates a series of paradoxes and dissatisfaction that is based on the need to overcome this strict truth-bivalence of classical logic. accept that a proposition about a future event is true or false becomes necessary or impossible, respectively, the event expressed by the proposition. the solution proposed by jan lukasiewicz himself in his classic 1920, is the acceptance of a logic with three truth values (or three-valued), also called trivalent), which in addition to true and false, accepts a value of indeterminate truth, which is ascribed a truth value or grade of membership of 0.5. in the eighteenth century, david hume (1711-1776) and immanuel kant (1724-1804) were inquiring about such concepts. they concluded that the reasoning is acquired through experiences throughout our lives. hume believed in the logic of common sense, and kant thought that only mathematicians could provide clear and precise definitions, both accepting that there were conflicting principles that had no solution. in conclusion, both were detecting conflicting principles within the so-called classical logic. then in the early twentieth century, the british philosopher and mathematician bertrand russell reported the idea that classical logic inevitably leads to contradictions. a study on the “vagaries” of language [1], concluding that the vagueness is precisely one degree. also charles sanders peirce (1839-1914) somewhat anticipated this, but there are many who, like bart kosko, bertrand russell considered the father of fuzzy logic. because in the early twentieth century, the british philosopher and mathematician bertrand russell (1872-1970) reported the idea that classical logic inevitably leads to contradictions, making a study on the vagaries of language [10], and concluding that the vagueness is precisely one degree. 3. the origins of fuzzy logic according to this theory, we have a transfer function derived from the characteristic function usually called the “membership function”, which runs from the universe of discourse, u, until the unit closed interval of reals, which is [0, 1]. not so in the sets “classic” or “crisp sets”, where the range of the function is reduced to a set consisting of only two elements, namely was the {0, 1}. therefore, fuzzy set theory is a generalization of classical set theory. the thesis then proposed emerged from the study of various thinkers from many different disciplines, who, like him, had a different vision of the problems of traditional logic. the paradox of all sets that do not contain themselves, that is very famous and was proposed by bertrand russell. or the uncertainty principle of quantum physics by werner heisenberg. the theory of “vague sets” (today, so-called fuzzy sets) proceeds from the quantum physicist and german philosopher max black (1937), which also analyzes the problem of modeling “vagueness”. he differs from russell in that he proposes that traditional logic can be used by representing vagueness at an appropriate level of detail and suggests that russell's definition of vagueness confuses vagueness with generality. he discusses vagueness of terms or symbols by using borderline cases where it is unclear whether the term can be used to describe the case. when discussing scientific measurement he points out “the indeterminacy which is characteristic in vagueness is present also in all scientific measurement”. an idea put forward by black is the idea of a consistency profile or curve to enable some analysis of the ambiguity of a word or symbol. to the fuzzy logic researcher of today these curves bear a strong resemblance to the membership functions of (type-1)-fuzzy sets. and also may be considered the subsequent contribution of the polish jan lukasiewiz (1878-1956). so, they must be greatly influenced lofti a. zadeh (b. 1921) to publish that article [2] in the journal information and control, and three years later (since 1968), the socalled “fuzzy algorithm”. a. garrido – a brief history of fuzzy logic 73 at the beginning of its brainstorm, the papers published by lotfi a. zadeh was not well received in the west, even in many cases were bitterly dismissed by the more conservative elements of the scientific community. however, over time began to gain enough supporters, which led to these theories were being extended again and again, settling firmly among the most innovative scientists, and especially among the best professionals, more than anywhere else, initially in japan and then south korea, china and india. europe and the states have been incorporated into this new math, but more slowly. as a matter picturesque, if you will, but true, we can tell that the now recognized by many as “the father of fuzzy logic”, lotfi a. zadeh, in his time met with executives from ibm, which told him that his “discovery” had no interest or no utility. of course, it will be considered a very clear model of intelligence and vision. were it not so, you probably have developed the united states and other western countries many of the remarkable technological advances arising from the new science. zadeh's intention was to create a formalism to handle more efficiently the imprecision of human reasoning. it was in 1971 when he published his “quantitative fuzzy semantics”, in which appeared the formal elements that led to the methodology of fuzzy logic and its applications, as known today. from the above it follows that you may need a radical rethink of our classical concepts of truth and falsehood, replacing the concept of fuzziness (vagueness or fuzziness) as a result of which the truth or falsity are only extreme cases. by fuzziness understand the fact that a proposition may be partially true and partially false simultaneously. a person is not just high or low, but partially may participate in both features, so that only above and below certain heights necessarily called it higher or lower bound, while in the intermediate zone of both heights exist as a graduation which is ceasing to be high. it seems intuitively clear that the concept of fuzziness is rooted in most of our ways of thinking and speaking. another separate issue is the valuation that each individual granted such a fuzzy character (the glass half full or half empty), which depend on subjective psychological issues and difficult to evaluate. the fuzzy principle states that everything is a matter of degree. it will be its more famous “leitmotiv”. all propositions acquire a truth value between one (true) and zero (false), inclusive. the allocation of these extreme values will only be given in the case of logical truths or falsehoods or strong inductions: “all men are mortal” can be an example of strong induction, since there is no counterexample. the arguments for introducing the concept of fuzziness in logic have already been exposed, but it will be necessary to examine in detail some key aspects: a) the historical background and methodological concept. b) the possibility of building an infinite-valued formal language, and if so, try to define their properties and laws. c) the philosophical and practical consequences stemming from such introduction. 4. eastern vs. western perspective the well-known american professor bart kosko [3] highlighted the differences between eastern and western philosophies regarding the concept of truth, summing up in opposition against aristotle buddha. in fact, kosko said that western philosophy, aristotle's successor, has accepted uncritically the bivalent as the system that is useful, but overly simplifying complex reality. put simply: what has won in simplicity is lost in accuracy. by contrast, eastern philosophies: buddha, lao tse, confucius, etc. always have accepted the strict unity of opposites, of what they call (as we know) the yin and yang. on the other hand, if it is true that aristotle was the great introducer of bivalence absolute, we should not ignore that he was not spent entirely overlooked aspects could be fuzzy propositions, as when he commented that: “in any case, what is said according to these (qualities) supports arguably the most and least”, or when we talk about that we can come to knowledge, but without the certainty of it. if aristotle did not study this concept, it may have been lacking the necessary brain. broad research in artificial intelligence and neuroscience volume 3, issue 1, february 2012, issn 2067-3957 (online), issn 2068 0473 (print) 74 mathematical knowledge for development. it was not until the appearance of a calculus increasingly systematic and operational, combinatorial and probability theory, or the new theory, now known as 'crisp', or classic, sets, initiated by cantor, as well as modern statistics and matrix calculations. as mentioned earlier, aristotle did not have the mathematical apparatus for developing a fuzzy logic. the gestation of this construct starts with newton and leibniz, who developed calculus in the seventeenth century. despite the obsession with accuracy in mathematics has made them perfectly applicable sentence einstein: “to the extent that mathematics refer to reality, not true. and to the extent they are true, not refer to reality”. but does not say einstein is undoubtedly the deductive apparatus developed by mathematics facilitates the understanding of reality. the explanation given by aristotle movement is replaced by the most innovative in newton, but thanks to a sharp appoggiatura in calculus, without which it would not have been possible. however, the infinitesimal calculus in depth was only used for the study of physics in the following centuries, experiencing spectacular growth with euler, laplace, lagrange, fourier, and so on. today permeates all sciences, both social and human and natural. this calculus mathematics introduced the question of degree: to what degree is modified by changing seamlessly b, where a is a dependent variable b? classical aristotelian logic has been shown, therefore, and for a long time, quite effective in science so-called “hard”, such as math or physics. but it is insufficient when the predicates contain imprecision, uncertainty or vagueness, on the other hand, is how the brain actually works and human reasoning, and in general, is how systems behave around us. fuzzy logic has also helped that the software can interpret judgments of this kind. 5. applications of fuzzy logic in fuzzy logic, statements are not absolutely true or absolutely false [4]. one thing can be true to 5% (technically, its “degree of truth” is 0.05). and the variables (or categories) are no longer numbers but no names or borders linguistically accurate (high or low, rich or poor, are fat or thin, is healthy or sick, old or young, hot, or cold, or conversely, “is normal”, and with what degree this occurs, etc.), operators that modify them are of the “lot”, “pretty”, “too”, “almost” or “not too much”. these are called fuzzy modifiers (“hedges” or even “fuzzy modifiers”). this is attributed a value to each of these features diffuse, and that value is accentuated or diluted according, for example, the various powers or roots of the initial values or with polynomial expressions that depend on these functions. they are called modifiers “intensification” or “expansion” (dilation), respectively, with gradual effects and variation. the feature of working with border regions is not fully defined itself in this area of mathematics [6]. in 1973, with the basic theory of zadeh fuzzy controllers, other researchers began to apply fuzzy logic to various mechanical and industrial processes, improving existing hitherto. established several research groups at universities fuzzy japanese. thus, professors terano and shibata in tokyo, with professors tanaka and asai in osaka, made major contributions both to the development of fuzzy logic theory and its applications [7, 8]. in 1980 professor ebrahim mandani in the united kingdom [9-11], designed the first fuzzy controller for a steam engine, which would be applied to control a cement plant in denmark, and did-of course-with great success. in 1987 hitachi used a fuzzy controller for the sendai train control, which used an innovative system created by man. since then, the controller has been doing his job very efficiently. it was also during this year of 1987 when the company omron developed the first commercial fuzzy controllers. so the year 1987 is considered the “fuzzy boom” due to the large number of products based on fuzzy logic to be traded. in 1993, fuji fuzzy logic applied to control chemical injection water treatment plants for the first time in japan. it was right there in the country nippon and south korea, where more height fuzzy logic has been, creating close partnerships between government, universities and industries [12, 13]. parallel to the study of the applications of fuzzy logic, professors takagi and sugeno developed the first approach to construct fuzzy rules (fuzzy rules), from training data or training a. garrido – a brief history of fuzzy logic 75 (fuzzy learning). the applications of fuzzy logic in everyday life since then grow rapidly. in fact, already part of it. for example, some brands of washing machine using fuzzy logic are electrolux, aeg and miele, and use these computational methods to moderate the program if the clothes washing “is not very dirty”, which is a vague concept. the technique also is widespread in the abs, braking cars, auto focus cameras, or control of the elevators, spam filters, also called “spam”, and the now ubiquitous video games. manufacturers do not want to give much publicity to the fuzziness implicit in these developments for an obvious reason. to say that their cars' brake controlled by fuzzy logic does not belong to the class of messages that can sell more cars. to build a fuzzy system, an engineer might begin with a set of fuzzy rules from an expert. an engineer might define the degrees of membership in various fuzzy input and output sets with sets of curves. the fuzzy rules, or rules of a fuzzy system, define a set of overlapping patches that relate a full range of inputs to a full range of outputs. in that sense, the fuzzy system approximates some mathematical function or equation of cause and effect. a very important result says that fuzzy systems can approximate any continuous math function. bart kosko [3] proved this uniform convergence theorem by showing that enough small fuzzy patches can sufficiently cover the graph of any function or input/output relation. the theorem also shows that we can pick in advance the maximum error of the approximation and be sure there exists a finite number of fuzzy rules that achieve it. and recent advances in neural networks, or neural nets (in terms of programs that learn from experience), and genetic algorithms (as programs evolve over time) are certainly a fitting complement to fuzzy logic. another key reason for increased research in this field would be the interest in neural networks and fuzzy systems resemblance. wanted relations between the two techniques, thereby obtaining neuro-fuzzy systems, which use learning methods based on neural networks to identify and optimize its parameters [8]. then, as we say, appeared genetic algorithms, which together with neural networks and “fuzzy systems” are powerful and therefore are of great interest for future research, both current and mathematics for the most new, it is already here, quickly taking shape [13]. neural networks are collections of “neurons” and “synapses” that change their values in response to inputs from surrounding neurons and synapses. the neural network acts like a computer, because it maps inputs to outputs. the neurons and synapses may be silicon components, or equations in software, that simulate their behavior. supervised learning, reached through supervised networks, tune the rules of a fuzzy system as if they were synapses. the user provides the first set of rules, which the neural net refines by running through hundreds of thousands of inputs, slightly varying the fuzzy sets each time to see how well the system performs. the network tends to keep the changes that improve performance and to ignore the others. unsupervised learning, reached through unsupervised neural networks, blindly cluster data into groups (by a procedure so-called clustering), the members of which resemble one another. there may be no given right or wrong response or way to organize the data. it is in advance. fuzzy modeling is many times used to transform the knowledge of an expert into a mathematical model. the emphasis is on constructing a fuzzy expert system that replaces the human expert. also as a tool that can assist human observers in the difficult task of transforming their observations into a mathematical model. in many fields of science, human observers have provided linguistic descriptions and explanations of various systems. however, to study these phenomena, there is a need to construct a suitable mathematical model, a process that usually requires a very subtle mathematical understanding. fuzzy modeling is a many more direct and natural approach for transforming the linguistic description into such model. a fuzzy model represents the real system in a form that corresponds closely to the way humans perceive it. thus, the model is easily understandable, and each parameter has a readily perceivable meaning. the model can be easily altered to incorporate new phenomena, and if its behavior is different than expected, it is usually easy to find which rule should be modified, and brain. broad research in artificial intelligence and neuroscience volume 3, issue 1, february 2012, issn 2067-3957 (online), issn 2068 0473 (print) 76 how. furthermore, the mathematical procedures used in fuzzy modeling have been tried and tested many times, and their techniques are relatively well documented. the possible “bad reputation”, or the bitter controversy over fuzzy logic, apart from prejudice, will be possibly wrong with a name chosen, as noted at the outset. what is fuzzy logic is not in itself, which has a precise mathematical definition, but the world over which it applies, including our perception of its boundaries and categories [14, 15]. 6. conclusions the fuzzy logic research continues to advance in the leading countries [17-19], if we talk in terms of economic and technical progress, even-though with a slower walk-in countries with more traditional scientific culture and static, as may well be the spanish country. but groups that have formed at least attempt to advance our science always precarious in different “grades” -following that direction. also on deep (on mathematical foundations and philosophical) theoretical consequences, which influences the future challenges [6, 20]. there are two major barriers that prevent full dissemination and absorption of this new way of dealing with science, at least some of their fields. these are the traditional view of mathematical topics, repeated ad nauseam until even when they have long since lost interest and effectiveness. hence, there are those who ignore even this new science has emerged, partly ignorance and partly is contempt. another major difficulty is that it looks like a useful tool around, but not very consistent from the theoretical point of view, looking with disdain, and often are often technical issues from the ivory tower in which entrenched than a few mathematicians. and it is a very pernicious and absurd position where they exist. science and technology are lost or saved together. both have a common origin and are two approaches, often converging to the same reality, which has many facets. logically if a thing is useful it will be the better. account not only the beauty. the real world is not precise and the notions of vagueness, looseness, uncertainty, imprecision, concepts and perceptions are central to the way human beings solve problem. it must be stated that some progress, such as the aggregation operators (t-norms, tconorms, and so on) as well as in fuzzy modeling, are crucial. and alongside all this development, new generalizations of mathematical theories which allow them to be applied in the treatment of uncertainty still waiting, in some states more or less forward, to create a new mathematics, more down to reality. it is also important to note that fields apparently far enough outside and out of the treatment of fuzziness, such as the symmetry and the entropy, have entered into new avenues of research by fuzzy symmetry, the fuzzy entropy, the fuzzy graphs, and so on. about my country, for instance, we must to mention the group working at the department of artificial intelligence at the university of granada, or the center for artificial intelligence research at mieres, created by the government of asturias. there is also a remarkable group of researchers that works in barcelona and in madrid, on diverse fuzzy logic topics. references [1] russell, b. “vagueness” read before the jowett society, oxford, 25 november 1922. first published in the australasian journal of psychology and philosophy, 1 (june 1923): 84-92. this text may be also taken from collected papers, vol. 9, pp. 147-154. [2] zadeh, l.a., “fuzzy sets”, information and control, vol. 8, pp. 338-353, 1965. [3] kosko, b., fuzzy thinking: the new science of fuzzy logic, hyperion, 1993. [4] dubois, d., and prade, h., fuzzy sets and systems: theory and applications, academic press, new york, 1980. [5] jang, j.-s. r., “fuzzy modeling using generalized neural networks and kalman filter algorithm”, proc. of the ninth national conf. on artificial intelligence (aaai-91), pp. 762-767, july 1991. a. garrido – a brief history of fuzzy logic 77 [6] garrido, a., “searching the arcane origins of fuzzy logic”, brain (broad research in artificial intelligence and neuroscience), vol. 2, issue 2, may-june 2011, pp. 51-57, bacau, 2011. [7] jang, j.-s. r., and sun, c.-t., “neuro-fuzzy modeling and control”, proceedings of the ieee, march 1995. [8] jang, j.-s. r., and sun, c.-t., neuro-fuzzy and soft computing: a computational approach to learning and machine intelligence, prentice hall, 1997. [9] mamdani, e.h., and assilian, s.,“an experiment in linguistic synthesis with a fuzzy logic controller”, international journal of man-machine studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 1-13, 1975. [10] mamdani, e.h., “advances in the linguistic synthesis of fuzzy controllers”, international journal of man-machine studies, vol. 8, pp. 669-678, 1976. [11] mamdani, e.h., “applications of fuzzy logic to approximate reasoning using linguistic synthesis”, ieee transactions on computers, vol. 26, no. 12, pp. 1182-1191, 1977. [12] sugeno, m., “fuzzy measures and fuzzy integrals: a survey” (m.m. gupta, g. n. saridis, and b.r. gaines, editors), fuzzy automata and decision processes, pp. 89-102, north-holland, ny, 1977. [13] sugeno, m., industrial applications of fuzzy control, elsevier science pub. co.1985. [14] wang, l.-x., adaptive fuzzy systems and control: design and stability analysis, prentice hall, 1994. [15] yager, r., “on a general class of fuzzy connectives”, fuzzy sets and systems, 4:235-242, 1980. [16] zadeh, l.a., “outline of a new approach to the analysis of complex systems and decision processes”, ieee transactions on systems, man, and cybernetics, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 28-44, jan. 1973. [17] zadeh, l.a., “the concept of a linguistic variable and its application to approximate reasoning, parts 1, 2, and 3”, information sciences, 1975, 8:199-249, 8:301-357, 9:43-80. [18] zadeh, l.a., “fuzzy logic”, computer, vol. 1, no. 4, pp. 83-93, 1988. [19] zadeh, l.a., “knowledge representation in fuzzy logic”, ieee transactions on knowledge and data engineering, vol. 1, pp. 89-100, 1989. [20] williamson, t., vagueness. routledge, london, 1994. international journal of social and educational innovation (ijsei) no.1/ 2014 25 theory of knowledge by experts lepcaliuc anamaria stefan cel mare university suceava, romania anamarialepcaliuc@yahoo.ca received 25.06.2014; accepted 23.07. 2014 abstract few thinkers have failed to score with such force of ideas, both education and policy universe during the first decades of the twentieth century, as did john dewey. hi's instrumentalism was considered a pragmatist version of the current version which gives more substance "structure" created by the two and has firmly established that traditional philosophical conception that analyze the practical effects of beliefs and our actions should be represent the most important concern of the human mind. intelligence has its basis in experience, but not instrumental, in that it was only a means that produces, mechanically, a preset goal, it is "an organ imaginative and creative," says dewey, leading to the future and past "has significance for all disciplines who have an intimate connection with human behavior: logic, ethics, aesthetics, economy. keywords: theory, logistics, traditional philosophical conception, intelligene 1.introduction few thinkers have failed to score with such force of ideas, both education and policy universe during the first decades of the twentieth century, as did john dewey. john dewey's instrumentalism was considered a pragmatist version of the current version which gives more substance "structure" created by the two and has firmly established that traditional philosophical conception that analyze the practical effects of beliefs and our actions should be represent the most important concern of the human mind. intelligence has its basis in experience, but not instrumental, in that it was only a means that produces, mechanically, a preset goal, it is "an organ imaginative and creative," says dewey, leading to the future and past "has significance for all disciplines who have an intimate connection with human behavior: logic, ethics, aesthetics, economy [...]". the ultimate goal of morally, is constantly improving and refining the process of intelligence, "growth", accumulating, continuous reconstruction of experience. organic connection between the theory of knowledge, ethics and dewey's conception of society is even more visible when american philosopher argues that social institutions should critically examine the social function of intelligence, because it is not innate and can not be polished in isolation. the development of "skills" democracy must begin at school, namely in the first years of the child's educational experience. dewey does not agree with the idea that the school prepares future members of society. it should be seen, rather, as an extension of society, where the child operates seamlessly as a full member of the community. international journal of social and educational innovation (ijsei) no.1/ 2014 26 john dewey is considered by specialist reviewers as one of the most important representatives of modern american pragmatism, "dr. dewey's scientific perspective and his arguments are largely derived from a review of the scientific method." he claims that the truth of an idea lies in its correspondence with reality, and that the term should be understood otherwise than according to the traditional theory of truth correspondence. he believes that for a pragmatist, an idea is consistent with reality when it leads to solving a problematic situation, being used successfully in action to achieve a certain goal individually. dewey addresses the issue of knowledge in a naturalistic manner, considering the development of knowledge is a human adaptive response to environmental conditions, the role of this response being to intervene actively in the environment and turn. dewey believes that for an instrumentalist, knowledge is not just passive reception of a reality independent of the mind, but is the result of investigative activities. our judgments are tools that serve to explain how to carry our interaction with the environment and predict our future experiences. they operate in situations of life and have implications for our future existence. judgments are tools which work together with the experience in the meaning that they are able to connect to each other different experiments (thus making possible the prediction), but are, in turn, screened through experience. according to dewey, judgments should be regarded as resources in the process of investigation and should be evaluated according to their effectiveness or ineffectiveness. in the value of truth, it is relative to the opportunity to justify their assertion. to understand clearly what the truth of a judgment in terms of dewey, it is necessary to specify in advance how he thinks the investigation stems that reach the truth. the reason is that, for dewey, inquiry is the means by which we approach the truth, building it all the time. american philosopher distinguishes five phases of the investigation, namely indeterminate situation, setting a problem, determine the solution of the problem, reasoning and experiment. the investigation stems from a problematic situation and consists of "controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into a situation that is so determined in its constituent distinctions and relations that converts elements of the original situation into a unified whole" . 2. some problematic situation concerning dewey’ problem investigation can turn an indeterminate situation into one determined. the operating conducting the investigation deliberate changes on cognitive situation, reaching eventually, build subject knowledge, there are no pre-trial investigation, but is the product of this process. dewey does not deny that before the investigation take place, there are events surrounding nature but considers that they are not objects of knowledge only when they are investigated. characteristics of an object of knowledge depend on the specific conditions which have been imposed since the beginning of the investigation process. the researcher attempts to solve some problematic situation, devise a specific procedure on which is to be conducted the research and make observations and measurements in terms of concepts that are available in that phase of development of science. in the process of investigation, indeterminate situation from which we started is transformed and the object of knowledge is built. dewey points international journal of social and educational innovation (ijsei) no.1/ 2014 27 out that "according to pragmatism, ideas (judgments and judgments are included for convenience in this period) are attitude response to extra-ideal things, extra-mental." turning to the first stage of the investigation, the problematic situation, it is characterized by dewey as a situation in which instinctive responses that the body gives the environment no longer allow individuals to achieve their goals. based on these data, he can understand the problem faced and may make this hypothetical solutions. the experiment follows according to the requirements imposed by the initial difficulty. success hypothesis to be tested experimentally depends on how comprehensive it helps to solve the difficulty identified. the truth of the hypothesis depends on the consequences that occur when it is implemented where consequences of the difficulty of resolving the original, which generated the investigation, the hypothesis tested is true (though its truth is accepted provisionally, thanks to useful results obtained after checking them). consequences if not eliminate the difficulty, then it means that the hypothesis is false to address. summarizing, we can say that to be true, a judge must satisfy two conditions: first, it must be justified, that is the product of an investigation which was carried out in order to solve a given problem; secondly, it should solve the problem that prompted the formulation of this judgment as a possible solution to them. dewey rejects foundationalism and position failibilist. he believes that any court accepted as true is only provisional status, as long as you can provide a sufficiently coherent understanding of reality, so that it can serve as a basis for human action. according to dewey: "the ability to reach the truth and using it is a fundamental problem and a condition of modern life." owning truth makes life easier for us and allows us to act more effectively, which is why it is very important for each of us to know the truth and we can use. it is noteworthy that in his later works, dewey will get to have doubts about the possibility of formulating a clear and precise characterization of the truth. 3.conclusions and sugestions in conclusion i would like to mention that one aspect of the pragmatic theory of truth for which currently advocates and american pragmatism is the anti-foundationalism, rejecting the idea of the existence of unquestionable foundations of theories. and the right time to introduce his comments: "dewey's theory of knowledge has not been processed in a manner to bring into the mainstream of anglo-american epistemology. today few epistemology appreciate what dewey's thought can contribute to the solution of problems of knowledge launched by other theorists. " as can be seen, is a project formulated in general terms, which provides a range of information on current pragmatic points of interest but whose chances of success are difficult to assess. however, if the attempt to formalize a pragmatic theory of truth will be a success and will allow any objections which have been brought to this theory, i would say that there are encouraging prospects contemporary pragmatist project to be successful. international journal of social and educational innovation (ijsei) no.1/ 2014 28 references: [1] dewey, john. (1910). “a short catechism concerning truth”. in the influence of darwin on philosophy and other essays, new york, henry holt and company. [2] dewey, john. (1938). logic: the theory of inquiry, new york, holt. [3] dewey, john. (1910). “the significance of the problem of knowledge”. in the influence of darwin on philosophy and other essays, new york, henry holt and company. [4] glock, hans-johann. (2003). “logical pragmatism in quine and davidson on language”. in thought and reality, cambridge, cambridge university press, 2003. [5] gouinlock, james; dewey, john. (1998). the routledge encyclopedia of philosophy, london and new york, routledge, 1998. [6] haack, susan, “pragmatism”. (2000). in jonathan dancy and ernest sosa (eds.), dictionary of philosophy knowledge, vol. ii bucharest: three, 2000 [7] haack, susan, “two theories of truth: the relation between the theories of john dewey and bertrand russell” in the journal of philosophy. website http://www.journalofphilosophy.org/ [accesed 12.05.2014] il 33 goddu review pubvers © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. book review logic, truth and inquiry by mark weinstein king’s college london, uk: college publications, 2013. pp. viii, 1-232. softcover. isbn-13: 978-1-84890-100-1, isbn-10: 1848901003. us$ 17.00 review by g.c. goddu department of philosophy university of richmond 28 westshampton way richmond, va 23137 u.s.a. ggoddu@richmond.edu mark weinstein’s, logic, truth and inquiry is an ambitious and provocative case for a theory of truth and warrant strength that will undergird an “account of argument in the broad sense of current argumentation theory” (p. 12). i begin with a very schematic synopsis of weinstein’s rich discussion through his six chapters. weinstein himself notes that his arguments are “frequently presented in broad outline” (p. 1), so my quick sketch will be even broader. i conclude with some brief observations about both what the book leaves unresolved and the merits of weinstein’s intriguing book. 1. synopsis in the first chapter, weinstein frames the challenge of providing an adequate account of truth for argumentation theory. according to review of logic, truth and inquiry © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 463 weinstein, despite recognition of the importance of context (and audience), informal logicians and argumentation theorists still tend to adhere to a basic logic that is underpinned by a correspondence theory of truth. but, “ordinary argumentation most often deals with issues for which a corresponding reality is none too clear” (p. 7). one consequence, says weinstein, has been a shift away from truth toward acceptability within the theory of argument evaluation. but weinstein wants to resist this shift since “no mater how construed or qualified, acceptability still remains vulnerable to the question: it is (e.g., rationally) acceptable, but is it true …?” (p. 9). but if not correspondence or acceptability, “whence the epistemic adequacy of arguments?” (p. 15). weinstein considers james freeman’s commonsense foundationalism, which locates the epistemic adequacy in the generation of acceptable premises via reliable belief generating mechanisms, but rejects it on the grounds that at best this is only the beginning of the story, for the reliability of the mechanisms can only be judged against the backdrop of critical inquiry. next, weinstein considers robert pinto’s appeal to “critical practice,” which weinstein, in at least broad outline, accepts. but weinstein eschews pinto’s (and most of informal logic’s) prevalent focus on “ordinary argumentation” and instead proposes scientific inquiry as “more appropriate as an epistemological paradigm of successful critical practice than the procedures of commonsense solutions to everyday problems” (p. 35). weinstein turns from his discussion of the adequacy of premises in the first chapter to a discussion of the adequacy of inferences in chapter 2. in particular, weinstein is interested in grounding a theory of entailment adequate for argumentation theory as he conceives it. hence, in the first section of the chapter, weinstein runs through a quick exploration of deductive validity, carnap’s meaning postulates, harvey siegel’s fallibilist foundationalism, trudy govier’s discussion of argument reconstruction, and stephen toulmin’s warrants. in the second section of the chapter, weinstein proposes and defends modeling toulmin’s warrants not in terms of a metamathematical model g.c. goddu © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 464 based on arithmetic, but rather one based on scientific inquiry. the hope is to avoid siegel’s worries about relativism while avoiding the narrow applicability of deductive validity as a standard. the upshot of chapter 2 is that the adequacy of inferences will be based on the warrants backing them, so argumentation theory needs a theory of the adequacy of warrants. that is the general project of chapter 3. weinstein begins chapter 3 with a discussion of putnam’s internal realist take on truth, in which truth is not external to our theorizing, but grows within it (p. 75). unfortunately, like many in argumentation theory, putnam resorts to an ideal epistemic community to try to avoid relativism. but “without some sense of what warrants the standards to which such an ideal community would appeal truth collapses into acceptability” (p. 76). weinstein instead recommends trying to capture putnam’s insights about truth via metamathematical models based on capturing scientific inquiry rather than arithmetic. part ii of chapter 3 presents weinstein’s model of emerging truth (met). while typical of the dense going of formalism, weinstein helpfully intersperses the formalism with scholia, paragraphs that in his words “explain or amplify the formalism.” the general gist of the formalism is to define a sequence of models, ordered in time, based not on a logical consequence relation, but a weaker explanation-like relation. while truth in a model is standard, weinstein claims the more relevant features of the overarching structure are the features of the sequences of models. very roughly, the ordering of the models is meant to capture the breadth, depth, and consilience of the theories the models represent. the ordering will generate a “best” theory, t, with a “best” ontology, o*, from which a fairly standard tarskian truth predicate can be defined: “s is true” for s in t and t in scientific structure tt, iff o*||-s (p. 100). but, “the truth condition for the various theories t, of tt, that is to say o*, cannot be ascertained independently of the history of tt, but grows out of the progressive nature of tt” (p. 101). in chapter 4, weinstein uses the met to ground a theory of warrant strength. in particular, taking the generalizations contained review of logic, truth and inquiry © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 465 in the ordered realizations of theories modeled in met as warrants, he proposes to determine the strength of a warrant in terms of the embeddedness of the warrrant within the ordering of models. in this way he hopes to account for a more nuanaced view of contradiction and how we maintain generalizations even in the light of counter-instances. briefly, counter-instances that are not themselves supported by warrants at least as deeply embedded as the generalizations they challenge are rationally resisted. in the latter setions of the chapter, weinstein shows how this can be done by amalgamating his met with a modified adaptive logic of christian straßer and dunja seselja. an elaboration of this amalgamation is done in part v via weinstein’s discussion of staßer and seselja’s example of the continental drift debate of the 1920s (which in this context also serves as an example of the application of met to a substantive debate). chapter 5 is devoted to connecting the met to empirical instances in order to show that the theoretical framework is not empty. the primary example is the development of the peridoic table. of course showing that the inquiry that leads to the periodic table matches the met should be no surprise since it is that inquiry that motivated weinstein’s development of the met. but in the latter half of the chapter, weinstein presents a “metaphoric extension of the logical metaphor that is the met,” (p. 158) to legal, ethical, and political argument “to indicate the possibility of applying the core concepts of the met across the spectrum [of argument cultures]” (p. 179). one of the apparent consequnces of chapter 5, was that the adequate evaluation of arguments requires understanding the larger frameworks within which particular arguments are made. what then are the implications for critical thinking and informal logic? chapter 6, while on the one hand a tracing out of some of the implications of weinstein’s work for critical thinking, informal logic, and argumentation theory (and the teaching of critical thinking to undergraduates), is mostly devoted to discussions of the motivations and insights that led weinstein towards the met (as but one possible way to encapsulate those insights) (p. 200). g.c. goddu © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 466 hence, much of the chapter recapitulates much of weinstein’s earlier work arguing for an “applied epistemology” focus for critical thinking and informal logic and could almost be read first as a foundation for the previous five chapters. 2. observations those familiar with weinstein’s work will recognize many of the arguments and themes of his papers and presentations from the last three decades. weinstein’s hope is that in this book “others see my work,…, as a unified whole” (p. 214). given the usual dense and wide-ranging nature of weinstein’s papers and talks, it is a benefit to see what weinstein himself calls the “fragments” connected in a mostly unified package. of course, given three decades of scope, there are tensions within the text. i give four interconnected examples. firstly, there is an unresolved balancing act between the judgments of the experts in a field determining such things as the appropriateness of approximations within the model framework, and the resulting model complexes being normative constraints on the judgments of experts in the field. this is related to a second tension between the pragmatics and the formalism. those who are leary of formalism’s role in argumentation theory are unlikely to be assuaged by weinstein’s account, and those who treat formalism seriously are likely to be concerned by the appeal to intuitive judgments to ground the formalism—for example, resolving ties in competing warrant strength is a pragmatic decision (p 126). in general, one might worry about the degree to which our parochial decisions underpin the normativity of the models versus the alleged objectivity of the resulting model complexes acting as a constraint on what counts as a “good” judgment. thirdly, despite early attempts to eschew acceptability in favor of at least an emergent truth, later chapters seem to fall back on acceptability. for example, weinstein writes: “to indicate a logical structure for acceptability that, at the limit, is as true as we can ever hope for” (p. 147). indeed, we might wonder whether review of logic, truth and inquiry © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 467 what weinstein calls scientific truth or tt-truth is also subject to the open question that weinstein, in chapter 1, poses as a problem for acceptability—yes s is satisfied by the complex of models that constitute the ontology of tt, but is it true? finally, there is a tension between how the model is supposed to be applicable from science to politics (in that sense it is a general account of argumentation) and yet it also be the case that “restricted principles from within the disciplines, order and inform the understanding of substantial arguments more effectively than do many of the more abstract analyses common in informal logic” (p. 203). given the ambitious and broad-ranging project weinstein undertakes, it is also unsurprising that there are unresolved questions about the consequences of his views. for example, what is the upshot for argument cogency? is it that we really cannot determine argument cogency without a whole lot more background analysis than is usually available? on the one hand one may be skeptical of this result since we do seem to make local judgments of adequacy—in the face of dubious or even obviously false premises, or clearly insufficient reasons we are right to reject (or at least abstain from) certain propositions, views, theories, etc. but on the other hand, if weinstein is correct, then there is a worry that we will not be able to adequately assess arguments without being experts in the domain of use and given the desire to prepare students (and ourselves) to be able to assess a wide variety of arguments from a plethora of domains, without being experts in all these domains. also, weinstein presents an idealized, well-behaved model of inquiry. model chains are added to over time in a nice neat fashion. but one might wonder how chains or parts of chains are redacted in a scientific structure. put another way, the ideal model may give us a way to see emerging “truth,” but how does it capture or represent what is rejected or taken to be false? in standard model-theoretic constructions of possible worlds for example, falsehood is just absence from the world. but in weinstein’s proposal we are comparing complexes of models over time. hence, it may just be that all (relevant) model chains are considered—it is just the ones that will be “rejected” as false will g.c. goddu © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 468 be the ones that are not as deeply embedded and interconnected with what inquiry reveals as the most “virtuous” model complex. weinstein is not unaware of many of these tensions and unresolved questions, but these just point the way to future research. for example, he writes: “my use of intuitive, oversimplified and idealized metamathematical constructs should be seen as an invitation to others to extend and correct the basic insight through mathematical constructions that more adequately describe the model relations in chains of models for particular aspects of signifincant inquiry” (p. 95). given his own view, the inquiry required for the filling in of the details of the model or, say, the details of the relationship between the generality of weinstein’s proposal and the reliance on discipline specific norms could easily engender significant shifts in the overall structure of the resulting theory. (though if weinstein is correct, even these shifts would still vindicate the underlying intution of his model of inquiry.) for example, how general the standards are (even if the model used to measure the standards in the various disciplines is roughly the same) may depend upon the outcome of the possibility of a toe (theory of everything) in which the model networks will be connected to each other in ways that allow for univocal assessment of the strength of warrants, or whether the networks will only be connected in a way that allows for discipline specific evaluations of arguments and warrant strengths. either outcome is consistent with weinstein’s proposal. one should not construe my raising of these tensions and questions within weinstein’s work as refutations of its worth, but rather goads for continued refinement. there are many intriguing, even if controversial, proposals and arguments that warrant argumentation theorists’ interest and deep consideration. for example, the radical, yet intriguing view that “truth is seen as a field property rather than a relation between a proposition and a state of affairs” (p. 2); or that argumentation theory need not eschew formal models and yet can still capture the dynamics of argument and inquiry rather than just some static absolute truth; or that a shift in focus away from commonsense review of logic, truth and inquiry © g.c. goddu. informal logic, vol. 33, no. 3 (2013), pp. 462-469. 469 everyday argument to the more rigouros, but still less than absolutely certain, domain of scientific inquiry as the basis for a theory of argumentation is merited—after all, if we are interested in improving the reasoning of others why focus on how people in fact argue everyday rather than on the more demanding and selfcorrective practice of scientific inquiry? but perhaps the most promising proposal is the view of chapters 3 and 4 that warrant strength can be measured in the met. if true, then a means of comparing the respective weight of competing arguments is possible and may help resolve the dialectical tier issue of how much defending against objections an arguer is obligated to perform. my brief observations barely scratch the surface of the deep, broad-ranging, and challenging discussions in weinstein’s book. an unabshed foray into the foundations of argumentation theory (and inquiry in general), along with unreserved metamathematical modelling makes logic, truth and inquiry not for the faint of heart. but argument and inquiry are extremely complex phenomena, so we should expect attempts to elucidate them to be equally complex. the diligent reader, however, will be rewarded by the rich and fruitful position weinstein lays out—a position that needs consideration by a broad spectrum of argumentation theorists. the lord scroop fallacy hermane. stark south suburban college abstract: in this paper i identify a fallacy. the fallacy is worth noting for practical and theoretical reasons. first, the rampant occurrences ofthis fallacy-{:specially at moments calling for careful thought-indicate that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of those found in standard logic texts. second, the fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds oflogical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus it presents a two-tiered challenge to oversimplified accounts of how an argument can go bad. resume: 1'identifie un sophisme dont on dolt prendre note pour des raisons pratique et theorique. premierement, sa grande frequence indique qu'ii nuit plus it la bonne reflexion que la plupart des autres sophismes qu' on trouve couramment dans les manuels. deuxiemement, ce sophisme se distingue de la plupart des autres sophismes par ses multiples types d' erreurs logiques, et par les situations anormales ou il se commet. ii presente donc deux defis aux explications excessivement simples des erreurs d'un argument. keywords: fallacy, logical error, inforrnallogic, critical thinking, self-vitiation, selfreference, interpretative charity. the lord scroop fallacy for your own reasons turn into your bosoms, as dogs upon their masters .... shakespeare, king henry v, ii,ii henry v's clever observation concerning self-reference implications captures not only the self-impugned treachery of lord scroop and the other conspirators but also the leading theme of this paper, which is the exposure of a fallacy that involves the giving of reasons that, if referred back on themselves, backfire. i to claim "there are no absolutes" with absolute conviction is one example of what i have in mind, but the fallacy i identify herein involves not merely a self-vitiation resulting from self-reference-a phenomenon already confronted in philosophical discussions of, for example, inconsistency and the liar paradox-but also an © informal logic vol. 20, no.3 (2000): pp.245-259. 246 herman e. stark attack on the worth of thought itself. the fallacy, which i name in memoriam of the memorable way that an assertion backfires in the lord scroop scene (such is a philosophical benefit of drama), is rather the more specific logical error of advancing premises that are (unwittingly) self-vitiating in nature for conclusions that are directly anti-thought in tone. occasions for and occurrences of this seductive and thought-stultifying error are distressingly rampant-indeed, students will leave a critical thinking class only to utter instances of the fallacy-and thus what i call the lord scroop fallacy has emerged as singularly treacherous to those perhaps hopeless but nevertheless noble attempts to cultivate a community of thoughtful beings. the inside scoop on scroop i was led to the scroop fallacy by discovering that some colleagues had made similar observations to mine on the "talk" that we came across in our experience as both students and teachers at universities and colleges, public and private. we observed that certain ubiquitous and at bottom self-refuting platitudes invariably arise in the course of class discussion, in exams and term papers, in the idle talk overheard in the campus corridors, at facuity lunches, in conference presentations given by professional educators, and in meetings with administrators. certain instances of this talk have been discussed in the history of philosophy (going back at least to plato's remarks on relativism in the theaetetus, e.g., 152a-157b), but one finds oneself newly struck by them because of the near-sacrosanct status they have achieved in pop-collegiate culture. careful attention to what walton calls the pragmatic aspect of fallacies reveals further that these platitudes are being used as abbreviated proofs for the idea that there is nothing to be justified, discovered, or gained by thinking.2 one can even see such talk as taking the form and function of what can be described as a set of kuhn ian "cultural paradigmatic propositions". uttering the platitudes is taken as a sign that the speaker belongs in the "enlightened" community (i.e., a sign that the speaker has transcended the dusty myth that rational thought is possible and worthwhile). given all this, i was moved to collect these "dogmas" into a list and then synoptically recognized that many of them are instances of the same fallacy.] here is a portion of that list (the division into two groups will be explained shortly): group i i. there is no truth. 2. all generalizations are false. 3. one should not tolerate any intolerance. 4. words cannot express the truth. 5. there are two sides to every story. 6. all opinions are equal. the lord scroop fallacy 247 7. all knowledge is based on personal experience. 8. you should think for yourself! 9. who's to say? 10. everything is a matter of opinion. 11. all perspectives are true. 12. nothing is certain. group ii 13. there are no absolutes. 14. everything is relative. 15. everything changes. 16. objectivity is impossible. 17. there are no ultimate answers. i should note at the outset here that not every utterance of the above items constitutes a logical error or fallacy; whether either has been committed depends on a variety of factors, including who makes the assertion and why they make it. i take it that i have not committed a logical error or fallacy by listing the dogmas 4 • the point for now, rather, is that i do not find professional philosophers arguing against bivalence logic in my classes (or at administrative meetings, for that matter), and thus i find myself needing to take class time to explain the fallaciousness of these dogmas (but often letting it slide at administrative meetings). and this is the fact about pop-collegiate culture that i want to underline in this paper. my claim is that these dogmas are hindering-in virtue of their content and not merely qua dogmas-students from entering "the community of sanity." this (ideal) community is guided by the spirit of "critical openmindedness for the sake of truth," and members of it are marked by the recognition that rationally authoritative thought is in some way or other possible. as putnam puts it: what is better or what is worse about most questions of human concern is not just a matter of opinion. recognizing that this is so is the essential price of admission to the community of sanity.s the dogmas i now tum to offering some refutations of the dogmas, i.e., of the more popular avowals of the fallacy. the refutations will be rather quick-i offer a deeper and more charitable analysis later in the paper-but that does not mean that they are not instructive, especially for students (i shall limit my focus to "students" for ease of expression). indeed, my contention is that most of our contemporary students need to hear these quick refutations if they are ever going to enter the community of sanity; refinements, disputations, and considerations of interpretative charity can come thereafter, and be more incisive as a result. by first focusing on the simple mistakes found in everyday arguments students can be made aware 248 herman e. stark that the intellectual insouciance that accompanies their anti-thought attitudes is no longer quite so slick given that they are suddenly unable to defend, much less describe, their conclusions on intellectual life in a non-self-refuting way6. i put the dogmas in quotation marks to emphasize that students are asserting them as true (and thus to bring out the irony even further). the reason for the two groups is as follows. the fallacy involved with the assertion of these dogmas is the popular logical error of maintaining "worthlessness of thought" conclusions based on assertions that actually imply their own negations. to assert the dogmas, in other words, is actually to assert the opposite of the dogmas. but there are various ways to show the self-refuting nature of such assertions, and thus the distinct groups. most generally and simply, all of the dogmas can be shown false by considering the proposition true-as those who assert the dogmas would have us believe-and then showing how this assumption implies the negation of the proposition. in addition, the dogmas can be shown to be necessarily false by tracing out the implications from all remaining possibilities, i.e., by showing that assuming the proposition to be false likewise implies the negation of the proposition. the dogmas in group ii, however, can be shown false either in this manner or by employing this method: if dogma d is assumed to be true, and if truth has property p, then d ends up false because it denies property p, and if dogma d is assumed to be false, then d ends up, again, false. 7 group i 1. "there is no truth." it should be pointed out to students that the sweeping and heady content of this anti-socratic and pro-pontius pilate dogma should not make us quake and quit cognizing, for it is really but a sentence that is, like any other proposition, true or false. and if it is true then we have a truth. and thus to assert the dogma is to refute it. moreover, if it is false, then it is true that there is truth. either way and we get truth--every time (ceteris paribus) a non-anti-bivalencing student utters the dogma. 2. "all generalizations are false." this dogma perhaps deserves to be so popular given heinous stereotyping. but not really. some generalizations, e.g., "memphis summers are humid," after all, are true. and although it can be tricky determining whether something is a generalization or a stereotype, there is a difference. but on to the matter of showing the falsity of this dogma (remembering that most students who utter it are not aware of russellian-type formal distinctions involving restricted scopes). the claim that all generalizations are false is itself true or false. if the dogma is true, then, being itself a generalization, we have a true generalization. if the dogma is false, on the the lord scroop fallacy 249 other hand, then that means there is at least one true generalization. either way the dogma is shown false. 8 3. "one should not tolerate any intolerance." should one tolerate such an extremist imperative? if the dogma is true, then one should not tolerate the dogma itself. if the dogma is false, then one should tolerate some intolerance (possible example of defensible intolerance: the refusal to tolerate such self-refuting propositions after their exposure). either way, then, and there is some intolerance that one should tolerate. 4. "words cannot express the truth." a telling response to this assertion is "you don't say?" it may also be useful to note that plato attacks it fairly directly at 473 of the republic, and that the power of certain poems, plays, fairy tales and novels to reveal truth suggests that there is truth in words that neither experience nor anything else can express. but sports stars still seem particularly enamored of the underlying idea--e.g., the inevitable "it is undescribable!" (sic) in response to the journalist's equally unimaginative question of "how it feels" to have just won the championship. in such cases it is often best to agree that the sports star may indeed lack the requisite linguistic competency to describe the experience, but also to point out that there is a distinction between "i can't describe x" and "x is undescribable." but there is no reason to pick on sports stars since the assertion abounds in academia too, e.g., in some presentations of buddhism or taoism, and here a koan of sorts can be used as a reply. one should ask if what the professor is telling one (in uttering the assertion) is the truth. if yes, then words can express the truth. if no, then it is false to claim that words can never express the truth, which is to say words can express the truth. either way, the negation of the dogma ends up as truey 5. "there are two sides to every story." this dogma is uttered to express the idea that "enlightened" people "know" that for any position taken there is certain to be a counter-position that is truth-containing. perhaps many who buy into this dogma are overly-attached to examples involving car accidents, the soothing words of apparently omniscient marriage counselors, or even aesop's fable "the man and the lion." but even in the case of car accidents it is possible and indeed often actual that there is "just one side to the story," and just because the dogma is roundly taken to be an a priori truth-as are the other dogmas~oes not prove that it is a priori or even true. if it is true that there are two truth-containing sides to every story, then there is another truth-containing side to the dogma itself. this truth-containing other side to the dogma is this: "there are not (at least) two sides to every story," or, more precisely, "there is just one truth-containing side to some stories." in other words, 250 herman e. stark if the dogma is true, then it is true that some stories have only one side and hence the dogma is false. on the other hand, if the dogma is false, then again we are left committed to the truth of the proposition that asserts some stories as having but one side. either way, i.e., if there is or is not another side to the dogma, one ends up with the negation of the dogma as being true. 10 6. "all opinions are equal." if this dogma is taken in a certain way then it could make sense, for the class of opinion is epistemically inferior to the class of knowledge (see plato's divided line analogy in the republic, 509d-511 e), and so when viewed from the latter class the assertion may be true. if no student knows the color of my car, then no pure opinion would stand out, ceteris paribus, as authoritative compared to the others, and all the guesses would be of equal epistemic unimportance. but the problem is that the dogma is not intended in this literal sense but rather taken to mean that all declarative sentences are of equal epistemic weight. to assert the dogma, in other words, is to declare that no declarative sentence is a case of knowledge. the dogma, understood in this non-literal way, is self-impugning, and its falsity can be shown as follows. the dogma is either true or false. if it is false, then we have this claim as true: "not all opinions are equal." if the dogma is true, then all opinions, including the opinion opposite to the dogma, are true. that opposite opinion is this: "not all opinions are equal." either way and the negation of the dogma is true. 7. "all knowledge is based on personal experience." this dogma would invalidate the possibility oflearning something worthwhile in a lecture, from a book, or through thought. moreover, do we really have to jump off the top of the sears tower to know what will happen below? the dogma is asserted to be an item of knowledge, but if so is it based on personal experience? if no, then not all knowledge is based on personal experience. if yes, then on what experience could it possibly be based? it would seem none, for what experience can put one into contact with "all knowledge?" and it would be an odd move in the context of this dogma to try to get to "all knowledge" by making inferences to what has not been personally experienced. the upshot, then, is that to claim that the dogma is itself an item of knowledge leads to the conclusion that not all knowledge is based on personal experience. as an aside (an aside that shows the ethical dimensions of informal logic), this is a particularly harmful instance of the scroop fallacy because of the student lives that have been scarred by its gullery. ii 8. "you should think for yourself1" many who consider themselves champions of critical thinking champion this dogma. they devoutly teach that one shouldn't just do what others do and think what the lord scroop fallacy 251 others think but rather that one should think for oneselt~ but if this dogma is true then one shouldn't pay any attention to it! to be less pithy (which is hard to resist in a paper like this), the irony is that when students "hear and believe" this dogma they are most often not being "independent" at all but rather robotically doing what others tell them to do. more often than not, in other words, students end up oblivious to the fact that as they charge forth from class unto the world, proclaiming "i think for myself," they have become nothing other than mindless mimics of the dogma. another line of criticism is to note that the formulation of the dogma is itself thoughtless. a lamentable linguistic fad nowadays is to use really overstated phrases as if the proper word alone is impotent. the dogma displays this same thoughtless instinct with its inclusion of the words 'for yourself after 'think'. the word 'think' is enough! it is thoughtless to demand that students think for themselves; one should rather demand that they think. to put things in yet another way, this dogma is either true or false. if it is false that you should think for yourself, then one should do the opposite of the dogma, which is apparently just thinking. if the dogma is true, then one should do the opposite of the dogma, viz., think. either way, one should not follow the order to think for oneself-but one should think. 9. "who's to say?" this rhetorical question is the favorite new excuse to stop thinking. those who smugly toss it out at every juncture are in fact utterly lost in abstraction, for they are forgetting the fact that despite occasional misfires we do fly planes, perform surgery, prescribe eyeglass strengths, and correctly conjugate foreign verbs. my favorite rejoinder to it is "i am," but less flashy is "whoever has the best reasons." and if a student is quick enough on the uptake to fire back with "who's to say who has the best reasons?", then it is often effective to point out again the fact that we do perform symphonies, utilize cat-scans, build skyscrapers, identify fallacies, and leave classrooms through doorways instead of through the wall, and that this indicates that there already is rational authority, and that indeed we often identify such authority in terms of training, knowle9ge, reliability, or relevant experience. a self-referential refutation is as follows. "who's to say?" most often really means "no one can speak with rational authority about matter x." but the student, in advancing this claim, is attempting to speak with rational authority about matter x! by claiming that no one can speak with authority about matter x the student is thereby attempting to make a rationally authoritative claim about matter x. it should be noted that this error of obliviously helping oneself to a god's-eye perspective from which to issue forth sweeping proclamations-whether or not the proclamation is at the same time the denial of such a vantage point-is a bit of recurring hubris in both the history of philosophy and the other scroop-instantiating dog252 herman e. stark mas. 12 the best rejoinder to one who pushes this dogma, then, is "who are you to say 'who's to say?'?" 10. "everything is a matter of opinion." is it a matter of opinion that everything is a matter of opinion? if no, then not everything is a matter of opinion. if yes, then what is being asserted is that it is not a matter of opinion that something may not be a matter of opinion. either way, we end up with something that is not a matter of opinion. ii. "all perspectives are true." this dogma has special appeal for students reading (or misreading, if it be possible) nietzsche's der wille zur macht. but if the dogma is false, then not all perspectives are true. ifit is true, then this perspective is also true: not all perspectives are true, le., some perspectives are not true. either way, we end up with a perspective that is not true. 12. "nothing is certain." is that certain? if yes, then something is certain. if no, then it is not certain that nothing is certain, i.e., the possibility of something certain is certain. either way, we end up with something certain. group ii each of the dogmas in this group will be refuted by two different methods. the general method (hereinafter "om"), as seen above, assumes the propositions to be true and then draws out the implication that the proposition is therefore false, and then adds on to this by tracing how the assumption that the proposition is false leads to the same implication. the other method requires the auxiliary recognition that truth is absolute, nonrelative, immutable, objective, and ultimate. the characteristics of truth method (hereinafter "ctm"), in other words, requires a direct appeal to the characteristics of the "classic" concept of truth in order to generate a refutation. as a brief aside, why should one grant the auxiliary assumption that ctm requires? some students will question, in other words, why it should be granted that truth is absolute, nonrelative, immutable, objective, and ultimate. one useful reply-for the students, though perhaps not for the professional philosopher theorizing on truth-is to hit the following points. first, what kind of answer does the student want? a nonabsolute, relative, mutable, subjective and nonultimate one? second, does the student have any reason for maintaining that truth does not have these characteristics-i.e., a reason more plausible than the standard conclusions invalidly drawn from the mundane recognition that different people have differing the lord scroop fallacy 253 opinions? (this is not ad ignorantiam because of the next remark). third, is the student aware of-much less able to refute-the arguments that philosophers and others have offered in support of these classic characterizations oftruth?13 socrates' "doubling the square" example in the meno and augustine's observation that seven and three were, are, and will be ten (allowing that middle-sized objects are being added in base 10), for example, should at least be pondered before making any final rejection of the auxiliary assumption. 14 but even if one is of a withholding disposition with regard to the classic characteristics of truth, the following dogmas are still refutable by om. 13. "there are no absolutes." students utter this dogma with absolute conviction. but one should be perplexed when they ardently attempt to convince one of its truth. is it absolute that there are no absolutes? if yes, then there is an absolute. if no, then the dogma has neither bark nor bite and the assertion of it is merely shorthand for "it is not absolute that there are no absolutes," which is itself ironically tantamount to the claim that the very possibility of there being an absolute is itself an absolute possibility. either way we get something absolute. here is the ctm refutation: the dogma "there are no absolutes" is either true or false. if it is true then we have an absolute (given that truth is absolute). if it is false then we have an absolute. 14. "everything is relative." this dogma is really just a different formulation of the "nothing is absolute" dogma. the smarter students-usually disdainful of their colleagues-tend to prefer this version because they think it has an einstein-like flavor to it. is but like the other formulation this one is also demonstrably false, and indeed in two ways, om goes as follows. if everything is relative, one has to wonder, then isn't it relative that everything is relative? if no, then we have something nonrelative. if yes, then "it is relative that everything is relative" is what is being asserted, but that just asserts the non-relative possibility that something is nonrelative. either way we get something nonrelative, ctm runs as follows: if the dogma is true then we have something nonrelative (given that truth is nonrelative). if the dogma is false then we also have something nonrelative. 15. "everything changes." the quickest response to this dogma is to ask what the sum of two apples and three apples is today. it is also instructive to point out that assertions such as "hildegard is wearing a red sweater" are incomplete, el\iptical, or time-bound. but om would have us ask this question: does the dogma itself change? if no, then 254 herman e. stark not everything changes. if yes, then into what does it change? into what can it change? presumably into this only: not everything changes. either way, whether or not the dogma is itself included under everything, to assert the dogma is to assert that not everything changes. ctm is as follows: if the dogma is true then there is something that does not change (given that truth is immutable). if the dogma is false then something does not change. 16 16. "objectivity is impossible." is this dogma itself objective? if it is, then we have something objective, which of course entails the weaker claim that objectivity is possible. if, on the other hand, the dogma is not objective, e.g., if it is subjective (or intersubjective) that objectivity is impossible, then we have the objective possibility that objectivity is possible. either way and we have something objective. the ctm analysis of this dogma is this: if the dogma is true then we have something objective (given that truth is objective). if the dogma is false then it is true that there is objectivity. 17. "there are no ultimate answers." this dogma has been around for a long time and has been sanctioned by many a reputable sage. 17 it means that ultimately there are no ultimates. but this, of course, is confounding. is not this dogma itself expressed as an ultimate answer? it is, and hence by asserting the dogma one falsifies it. and even if it weren't ultimate, then the dogma would in fact be this claim: it is not ultimate that there are no ultimate answers, which is ironically tantamount to the claim that there is an ultimate possibility that there are ultimate answers. either way we get something ultimate. the ctm analysis is as follows: the dogma is true or false. if it is false, then it is true that there are ultimate answers. if the dogma is true, then there are ultimate answers (given that truth is ultimate). what precisely is wrong with scroop? one reason for identifying the scroop fallacy is that it is more pernicious to clear thinking than many of the fallacies found in standard logic texts. a second reason for identifying it is more theoretical in nature. the scroop fallacy stands apart from most others in that it contains multiple kinds of logical error (i.e., fallacious and non-fallacious logical errors) that are themselves committed in abnormal ways, and thus it presents a two-tiered challenge to oversimplified accounts of how an argument can go bad. the standard logic text will state that an argument can go bad by containing either a false premise or a mistake in reasoning. it states further that the latter flaw the lord scroop fallacy 255 is of peculiar interest to the logician whereas the former is not since the determination of truth values is (usually) an empirical matter. this description is in keeping with the soundness/validity distinction. but the scroop fallacy does not fall cleanly into this description. first, the falsity of the scroop premises is not an empirical matter but indeed a logical one. it is a logical error, though not a fallacy, to assert certain propositions. as such the scroop premises are indeed of peculiar interest to the logician. second, the logical falsity of the scroop premises is too peculiar to be adequately covered by those exception-admitting footnotes mentioning contradictions as premises, for the scroop premises are sui generis in that they combine features of both contradictions and paradoxes. falsity due to self-reference implications is sufficiently different than falsity due to asserting a straightforward p&-p, whereas the necessary falsity of the scroop premises makes them sufficiently different than the "true if false and false if true" feature of paradoxes. it thus seems that there are different kinds oflogical error worth noting within the already neglected class of logical errors in assertion. third, the reason scroop is a fallacy is not simply because it is something that contains a logical error. it is one thing to advance assertions that are self-vitiating, and another to base anti-thought conclusions on such assertions. scroop, as introduced above, is the attempt to do the latter, and this is what makes it a fallacy. scroop is a failure in argumentation. an explicit definition is useful at this point: the lord scroop fallacy: the logical error of advancing premises that are (unwittingly) self-vitiating in nature for conclusions that are directly anti-thought in tone. this definition, by the way, rules out the liar paradox and other sorts of nonanti-thought albeit self-vitiating propositions as instances of scroop premises (the liar paradox, for example, is a problem for thought, not an attack on the worth of thought), but the main point is that scroop is not reducible to the error of asserting self-vitiating propositions. the mere presence of a logical error in something does not entail the presence of a fallacious argument, and scroop underlines this oftignored theoretical point. fourth, the texts identify "mistakes in reasoning" as the specific kind oflogical error that would make scroop a fallacy, but scroop does not involve a mistake in reasoning; i.e., the inferences from the scroop premises to the scroop anti-thought conclusion are valid. it is not merely that the dogmas, if true, imply anti-thought conclusions, but rather more convincingly that any inference from a necessarily false premise is valid. and so if an account of fallacies does not recognize any other kind of logical error in argument than mistakes in reasoning, then scroop is not a fallacy. 256 herman e. stark but it seems that an account of fallacies should recognize logical errors in argumentation that extend beyond that of mistakes in reasoning. petitio principii, for example, involves no invalid inference (p implies p), and can furthermore involve neither empirical nor logical errors in assertion, but it still fails as an attempt to provide support for a conclusion. is scroop is also a failure in argumentation, and this failure also cannot be accounted for in terms of an invalid inference. the upshot is that scroop joins the ranks of the lonely petitio, making it less easy to downplay the anomalous petitio in order to preserve a uniform definition offallacy. moreover, scroop and petitio conjunctively support (though perhaps the former even more than the latter) the idea that the class of logical errors in argument extends beyond mistakes in reasoning. and even if one balks at this suggestion it is still the case that scroop forces one to clarify in extraordinary detail just why or why not something is classifiable as a fallacy or indeed a logical error. what precisely is wrong with scroop? we have seen that this question is theoretically instructive because there are numerous things wrong with scroop and isolating them serves to delineate and underline various conceptual aspects of argumentation and remind us of the odd ways that they can be instantiated. charity and scroop why does shakespeare's henry v expose the scroop conspiracy in the subtle manner he does? is he bent on humiliating his enemies, or on maximizing his revenge by drawing out the inquisition? something else? in any event, henry does seem to go all out to make the conspirators eat their earlier words against mercy. and this is what he accomplishes, but with an extraordinary twist. henry is a christian monarch and-if we are to accept dostoevski's "problem of educating a prince" reading ofthe henry iv plays-a man profoundly aware of the existential importance of learning and teaching. and thus the twist: through henry's manner of dealing with the conspirators they come to regret qua repent their harsh words against mercy. henry, with respect to the conspirators, exercises charity at its most profound, for he understood them in terms of humans worthy of confronting a truth previously and harmfully missed. following this lead-in both method and outcomei now will apply the principle of charity to the scroop fallacy.19 applying the principle of interpretative charity to the scroop fallacy would seem, at first glance, to give us this: most instances of the scroop fallacy are but overstatements. what is really meant by most of those who assert the dogmas, in other words, is that the scope of thought is severely limited because most generalizations are false, few absolutes exist, objectivity is largely impossible, etc. but a problem with this more charitable interpretation, a problem stressed in this essay, is that it does not account for the stultification of thought and the range of intellectual insouciance exhibited by many of those who utter the dogmas. too many the lord scroop fallacy 257 students, in other words, cannot be understood as thoughtfully defending an intellectually plausible relativism. there may be a weird consistency about using thoughtless premises to defend anti-thought conclusions, but such argumentation stili does not qualify as thoughtful. furthermore, the use of sloppy formulations concerning fundamental matters is grossly thoughtless (to adapt socrates' remonstration of thrasymachus at 344e of the republic). these problems are too interdictive for this first way of applying the principle of charity to the scroop fallacy, and so i suggest a second. a truer albeit darker way of applying charity to scroop would have us understand the widespread and automatic instances of the fallacy as more of a communal rather than individual failing. the widespread instances of the scroop fallacy are symptoms of the general distortion of an intellectual virtue-"thoughtful openmindedness"-into vice-"failure to exercise critical thought". the perfidious nature of the scroop fauacy thus lies in the bitter irony that this anti-thought fallacy has actually been encouraged by the push for inculcating "open-minded" attitudes in students. as is the case with many other sound sentiments, it is the sad fate of the schola for authentic open-mindedness to have been transposed by dogmatic dissemination into a wearisome recitative. the evil of close-mindednessas opposed to its epistemological ill-effect of hindering the pursuit of truth-is that it does nothing to hinder human inertia in its slide towards the robotic and therefore towards the banality of evil. and this is what has happened in the case of the scroop fallacy. the prevalence of certain scroop-instantiating chants among students, e.g., "everything is a matter of opinion," is evidence enough that the virtue of "critical open-mindedness for the sake of truth" has been misappropriated by pop-collegiate culture, and logic/critical thinking instructors may be partly to blame because oftheir failure to check occurrences of the lord scroop fauacy.2o notes i lord scroop had counseled king henry, in preceding moments of the play, against being merciful to a man caught railing against king henry, and so now scroop, who has just been exposed to all those present as a participant in a plot against henry, finds himself rather tongue-tied when it comes to begging for mercy. scroop's claim (that mercy should not be granted to those who commit crimes against the king) thus backfires on scroop, i.e., on the speaker and not on the claim itself, and so is slightly different than the fallacy discussed in this paper, but the main analogy-the backfire lesson-still holds. 2 for "logical pragmatics" see d. walton, informal logic: a handbook for critical argumentation (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1989). l it has been suggested to me that i should refer to instances of the fallacy not as dogmas but rather as maxims, slogans or dicta because the propositions are not actually believed, e.g., students do not "really" mean them, or at least not in an exceptionless way. but don't they? determining belief is a tricky matter. students 258 herman e. stark do, to be sure, exit classrooms via the doorway rather than by attempting to go through brick walls, and thus their behavior bespeaks some belief in objective truth, but on the other hand they are rendered intellectually paralyzed in philosophical discussion by their robotic expostulations of the propositions, and thus this indicates a "real" sense in which they (sometimes) believe them, or think they believe them. 4 this warning against the seemingly obvious pitfalls of abstracting language from context continues to be missed both in and out of professional philosophy (probably due in part to the mantra-chanting proclivities of humankind). in the present day, for example, the mere use of certain words is taken to be "insensitive"; such a fahrenheit 451 mentality misses the fact that whether an insensitive remark has occurred depends on context (perhaps someone has mispronounced, or is struggling to learn english, or is listing for others those words that are usually taken to be insensitive) . 5 hilary putnam, "why is a philosopher?", in realism with a human face, ed. j. conant (cambridge: harvard university press, 1990), 114. 6 my position is thus a counter-{)r perhaps better a supplement-to fisher's emphasis on theoretical arguments as "real arguments". see a. fisher, the logic of real arguments (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1998).. along these lines, but opposite with respect to truth value and more complicated with respect to analysis, is ray sorenson's discussion of propositions whose utterance guarantees their truth (apart from 'i exist'). he offers 'i believe some claims that are necessarily false' as such an example, noting that anyone who tries to correct him by claiming that it is not possible to believe what is impossible is conceding that he believes a false proposition-which in this case is a proposition (sorenson claims) that is necessarily false. r. sorenson, american philosophical quarterly, vol. 33, no. 3, july 1996, 247. 1 the explicitly formal presentation here of these rather simple techniques should be considered in light of j.j.c. smart's remarks in chapter 1 of philosophy and scientific realism about philosophers being fitted to eliminate nonsense, the desirability of some technique for recognizing non-obvious nonsense, and the application of such a technique as being at least a part of philosophy. ~ there are different kinds of generalization, and some of them are true even if there are exceptions. a ceteris paribus generalization, for example, is not shown false merely by pointing out an exception. 9 consider also that alfred de musset tells us that "11 vaut mieux faire que dire" (pierre et camille, ch. 2). 10 for an extended discussion of the "two sides" dogma, see trudy govier, "are there two sides to every question?" in trudy govier, ed., selected issues in logic and communication (belmont, ca: wadsworth, 1988). llanother aside is that those who push this dogma are victims of a mediocre view of human cognitive abilities; they fail to recognize that some humans can learn from other people's experiences. llconsider, in light of the point just made, the following attack on the possibility of objective truth: "the falsity of our past ideas indicates that our current ideas are not true either." if so, then we have indication that this idea is itself false. the lord scroop fallacy 259 13 it should be noted that the explications of the individual characteristics is a separate matter and a burden shared by those who deny that truth should be so described. 14my parenthetical qualifier (by augustine's arithmetic example) is included to highlight both the contextual nature of the evaluation of reasoning and the fact that contextuality does not detract from universality. for augustine's example, see on free choice of the will. trans. b. hackstaff (new york: macmillan co., 1964),2.7.82-83. apropos augustine, the suggestion in this paper that the role of the informal logician in-' cludes the observing of and concern for the thoughtful community is somewhat reminiscent of the motives and circumstances surrounding augustine's the city of god. 15 relativity theory, of course, does not endorse the claim that everything is relative. to set matters straight (geodesically speaking), what is "relative" in relativity theory are the descriptions of specific events. but that which is crucial for knowledge, e.g., the laws of nature, is not relative. 16this dogma reminds me of the following prediction about the stock market that i have found in every personal finance book that i have read: "the stock market will remain unpredictable." 17 including bertrand russell in his the problems of philosophy (oxford: oxford university press, 1959), 16]: "".no definite answers [to philosophical questions] can, as a rule, be known to be true". that sounds pretty definite and pretty definite to me. i&for an analysis of the further idea that not all circular reasoning is vicious, see h. brown, "circular justifications", in psa, vol. 1, 1994,406-414. 19the truth that henry's tactic makes manifest to the conspirators, by the way, should not be articulated as a moral imperative (as is the simplistic fashion), e.g., "one should be merciful", but rather in terms of something like "the existential realization of how an act of mercy can bespeak the worth of graciousness". 2°anything worthwhile in this essay is dedicated to michael degnan. i am gratefully indebted, if that not be a contradiction in terms, to the following for their sharp criticisms and comments on earlier, even worse versions of this essay: michael degnan, michael gelven, james hardy, tomis kapitan, mitch haney, hal brown, members of an ap a audience, and anonymous reviewers for informal logic. herman e stark department of humanities south suburban college 15800 s state street south holland, il 60473 usa. hermanestark@yahoo.com microsoft word androff _jv_ 1970-copyedit2_8-13-12 ______________ david k. androff, msw, ph.d., is an assistant professor in the school of social work at arizona state university in phoenix. copyright © 2012 advances in social work vol. 13 no. 2 (summer 2012), 408-419 adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions in the north american context: local examples of a global restorative justice intervention david k. androff abstract: truth and reconciliation commissions (trcs) are restorative justice mechanisms for addressing human rights violations and injustice at the macro level. mainly applied in the global south, they have only recently been adapted within north america. the greensboro, nc trc was launched by grassroots and community-based organizations in 2004 to examine the causes and consequences of a 1979 incident of racial violence. the canadian trc was established in 2008 to address the legacy of colonial policies of assimilation and the forced schooling of indigenous populations. through a comparison of these two cases, this paper will investigate how the north american context shapes the nature of the problems that these trcs address, how they are organized, their relationship to the legal system, the role of civil society, and their relationship to poverty and reparations. implications for social work, restorative justice and the potential for additional trcs in north america are discussed. keywords: truth and reconciliation commissions, restorative justice, human rights trcs, social work and the north american context truth and reconciliation commissions (trcs) are a popular human rights intervention based upon restorative justice principles that entail investigations into past human rights violations (hayner, 2001). trcs have been implemented around the world in diverse settings such as south and central america, africa, and asia. while each one is unique, a trc may be defined as a national or community-based intervention to repair social fabric damaged by violence and oppression through investigation (truth seeking) (androff, 2012a) and dialogue (reconciliation) (androff, in press). the first trcs in the 1970s and 80s emerged in africa and south america as tools to assist societies transitioning from dictatorships and regimes of political oppression. the most famous trc occurred in south africa, and was part of the political compromise in the transition from apartheid to democracy (minow, 1998). the high profile and perceived success of the south african trc in contributing to the peaceful transition and forestalling a civil war inspired many subsequent trcs around the world, including sierra leone, timorleste, peru, morocco, and the solomon islands. trcs focus on providing the victims of human rights violations with information about the nature and details of crime; this serves to clarify the nature of the violence and to create opportunities for closure and healing for victims (androff, 2012b). trcs can include multiple forms of justice, but are centered on the restorative justice principles of responding to victims’ needs, engaging multiple stakeholders, and attempting to rebuild the relationship and social fabric that are damaged by violence (androff, 2010a). through bringing together victims, perpetrators and community members to share their androff/adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions 409 experiences before a public and supportive commission, trcs contribute to reconciling formerly divided and antagonistic people. trcs often incorporate elements of local or traditional culture, such as indigenous conflict resolution or community justice to facilitate reconciliation (androff, 2008). trcs conclude their work by publishing a final report with detailed findings from their investigation and participants’ testimonials; these reports also make recommendations for moving forward, promoting further reconciliation, and institutional reform. trcs and social work trcs are multi-disciplinary interventions, drawing upon theory and practice from diverse fields such as law, theology, psychology, political science, anthropology, sociology, and social work. androff (2010b) has explored the connection between trcs and social work. trcs are relevant to social work in the problems that they respond to and seek to ameliorate, such as assisting disempowered and vulnerable populations, confronting racism, and improving the social welfare of victims of violence and oppression; their methods, such as community practice, civic engagement, narrative recovery from trauma; and their goals, such as reconciliation and peace-building, building strong sustainable communities, and promoting social justice and human rights. social workers in south africa provided therapeutic support and social services to victims as part of the trc (hamber, 1998; sacco & hoffman, 2004). in addition, social workers in south africa contributed to the trc through professional advocacy; social work educators and professional organizations submitted statements to the trc detailing their complicity in apartheid policies, such as not admitting black students to social work schools and maintaining different standards of practice between white and black south africans (loffell, 2000; lombard, 2000). social workers from australia and new zealand were involved in the timor-leste trc in assessing the mental health needs of the largely traumatized population and designing a mental health services delivery system and policies. the trc in canada is holding public events at schools of social work, and coordinating outreach efforts to ensure the participation of indigenous populations (www.trc.ca). despite these connections, there are many missed opportunities for social workers to supplement and improve the work of trcs (androff, 2010b). there is a natural relationship between the values and goals of trcs with the profession of social work’s code of ethics. social workers could contribute their professional knowledge and practice skills of assessing and working with vulnerable people by facilitating interviews and eliciting testimonials before trcs, and providing therapeutic and social support to victims. trcs represent an opportunity for social workers to deliver culturally competent psychosocial services, and to engage in advocacy on behalf of oppressed and vulnerable populations. north american context north america differs in many regards from the settings where past trcs have been implemented. five characteristics of previous trcs guide this comparative analysis of advances in social work, summer 2012, 13(2) 410 trcs: the background context of violence that they address; the nature of how trcs are initiated, usually through a political transition; the level of cooperation with the legal system; the role of civil society; and the economic context of poverty, inequality, and development. each characteristic is discussed in the contrast between the global south and north. are the problems that trcs respond to in north america qualitatively different than those faced in the global south, or are they variations of the same problems? the global south is a term that loosely applies to less developed countries, emerging nations, and what used to be commonly referred to as the third world. trcs in the global south have addressed the problems of military dictatorships, political oppression, civil wars, "dirty" wars, ethnic cleansing, foreign invasion and occupation (hayner, 2001). nations in the global north, typically industrialized, democratic, and situated in western europe and north america, are less often associated with the violence, strife, and corruption of the global south. yet there remain structural problems of violence, oppression, poverty, and injustice that trcs can address. most trcs have occurred in the context of a political transition (hayner, 2001). trcs are one mechanism that societies use to facilitate transitions from oppressive political states to democracy, and are often part of a new government’s attempt to reckon with the past and set the stage for a new social contract with the people. trcs are a part of the field of transitional justice; much of the discussion and debate about trcs involves reforming social institutions; promoting national healing, reconciliation, and unity; and achieving accountability for perpetrators and effective justice for victims (minow, 1998). however, governments in the global north may be less likely to experience a political transition. if there is no overt or otherwise shift in power relations – can trcs in the global north still be called transitional justice? after a political transition, the new government often confers legitimacy upon the trc; in post-conflict settings, trcs can suffer from being perceived as overly sympathetic with particular interest groups. when there is no political transition, trcs are sometime initiated and operated by the same government that was in power during the contested period, and may even bear responsibility for some of the abuses. how is the legitimacy of trcs affected when the same government responsible for perpetrating abuses and injustice is implementing a trc or similar intervention for its own past abuses? transitional justice mechanisms often compensate for the lack of or weak judiciaries. trcs are frequently called “hybrid” interventions where they operate in tandem with legal systems. in timor-leste, the trc referred “serious crimes” to the formal legal system, and perpetrators of “less serious crimes” could avoid prosecution by participating in community reconciliation ceremonies (androff, 2008). in south africa, perpetrators who made a full confession for their politically motivated crimes under apartheid could receive legal amnesty (minow, 1998). however, western nations pride themselves on the rule of law and are characterized by strong independent legal systems that address a wide range of civil and criminal offenses. do the functioning legal systems of the in the west diminish the role that a trc can play, and how does such a system change the way that a trc could operate? restorative justice scholars and practitioners advocate for the reform androff/adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions 411 of criminal justice systems in the west, perhaps trcs could add to such efforts (beck, kropf, & leonard, 2011). priscilla hayner (2001) has called civil society the “essential ingredient” of trcs. civil society groups have influenced the work of many trcs to ensure their responsiveness and sensitivity to victims groups, women’s groups, and children. in the west, there is a historical tradition of civil society groups organizing, advocating and influencing social and political institutions. should civil society play a greater role with trcs in north america, or is there less of a need due to the pre-existence of community based and grassroots organizations? most trcs have occurred in the global south, in many settings that have been characterized by mass poverty and deprivation, inequality, and economic and social underdevelopment. these conditions often exacerbate conflict or are causal factors in the precipitating violence. there is a growing recognition that economic and social development is a crucial component to post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation. research from the balkans (stover & weinstein, 2004) indicates that economic recovery can contribute to pro-social relations between antagonistic parties. trcs have been increasingly concerned about the conditions of inequality and deprivation that must be remedied in order to achieve sustainable peace, and have given greater attention to the “positive” human rights, such as the right to development and material welfare. early trcs in latin america made efforts to include reparations and restitution for victims of human rights violations and their families, yet also suffered criticism that they were “buying off” victims as a substitution for justice. how should trcs in industrialized, developed nations focus on issues of reparations? in the context of a “richer” nation with higher standards of living and social welfare policies, is there less of a need for trcs to include these issues? of course, poverty exists in developed economies, and victims of violence and other human rights abuses also suffer material consequences of lost income and decreased standards of living regardless of the overall economic context. having raised several questions about how the differences between the historical, political, legal, civil, and economic contexts of past settings of trcs contrast with that of many nations in the global north, two case studies will provide examples to further investigate how trcs may be adapted to various settings. the two case studies are drawn from the only trcs to have been implemented in north america: in the united states and in canada. north american trcs greensboro, nc the gtrc was a community’s response to the 1979 ‘greensboro massacre’. on november 3, 1979 a caravan of kkk and american nazi party members fired into a labor demonstration that was being held in a low-income neighborhood of greensboro, north carolina (gtrc, 2006; magarrell & wesley, 2008). five people were killed and 10 were injured. the demonstrators were a racially mixed group with ties to the communist worker’s party. they had been organizing for labor rights and social justice advances in social work, summer 2012, 13(2) 412 in north carolina, and had gained union leadership roles in local textile mills. they had previously confronted the klan, and there was an escalation of provocative rhetoric leading up to the attack. the city of greensboro did not react well to the shooting. they arrested and harassed the victims, and distorted the media coverage of the violence to portray the incident as an equal shootout between two radical fringe groups rather than a one-sided attack. the victims were portrayed as dangerous communist agitators, outsiders without community ties. many suspected greensboro police complicity in the attack; later it was learned that the greensboro police department and the fbi had an informant inside the kkk – and knowledge that they were arming themselves in advance of the demonstration, however there was no police presence on the day of the attack. distrust of the city government deepened, particularly among low-income and african american residents. there were three subsequent legal trials. two criminal trials resulted in acquittals for the perpetrators by all white juries, even though the attack was videotaped in broad daylight. however, the district attorney wasn’t supportive of the victims, equating the killing of communists in the usa to the vietnam war. the victims felt that the criminal justice system did not produce any meaningful justice for those killed. these events negatively affected economic, social and political dimensions of life in greensboro, and the lingering racial tensions contributed to a climate of animosity. in 1985, the victims won a federal civil suit against the perpetrators and the greensboro police department for the wrongful death of one of the victims, and used the settlement to fund their organizing efforts and to expose their story, discover the truth behind the violence, and pursue justice for the victims. greensboro truth and reconciliation commission (gtrc) 25 years later, community-based organizations, grassroots groups, churches, and civil rights organizations partnered to create a trc as a means of re-investigating the greensboro massacre and to promote reconciliation in the community (gtrc, 2006; magarrell & wesley, 2008). the international center for transitional justice provided consultation, and the gtrc received funding through philanthropic organizations and individual donations. although initiated in part by the victims of the greensboro massacre and their supporters, a selection process was implemented to ensure that the commissioners who led the gtrc would be objective and independent. the gtrc was launched in 2004; its seven commissioners were mandated to examine the context, causes and consequences of the events of november 3, 1979, and to promote dialogue and reconciliation in the community. although their focus was only one day, they used this one event as a lens through which to investigate patterns of racism, anti-union activity, and white supremacy over decades. in their investigation, the gtrc reviewed the evidence from all three legal trials, local and federal law enforcement records, newspaper articles and academic literature. in addition, they took approximately 200 statements given in personal interviews and public hearings. the gtrc held three public hearings; the first was focused on the events leading up to 3 november 1979, the second on the events of that day, and the third on the consequences androff/adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions 413 of the violence. in 2006, the gtrc finished its work by releasing a comprehensive final report, with recommendations for the community (gtrc, 2006). the gtrc was a grassroots or community-based trc. some have called it an “unofficial truth project” (bickford, 2007). throughout the process, the mayor and city council of greensboro officially opposed the gtrc, however all the african american city council members voted to support it. while being a grassroots commission had some benefits, there were some clear limitations associated with the lack of state sponsorship. chief among them was that the gtrc lacked subpoena power, and thus could not compel the participation of individuals, nor obtain official records. another obstacle to the investigation was the strict control of information by federal agencies. several documents released to the gtrc under the freedom of information act were substantially blacked out. there was no question of amnesty – however the widows and survivors of the attack signed an agreement that they would not pursue prosecution if any new evidence was uncovered in the re-investigation. while the majority of gtrc participants were victims and concerned community members, groups critical of the victims and the gtrc also participated. greensboro police personnel, lawyers from the criminal trials, and some kkk members and a former nazi came forward, giving statements and attending the public hearings. although one perpetrator came forward, expressed remorse and apologized to the family of the demonstrator that he had murdered, many felt that the failure of more perpetrators to participate or disclose details about law enforcement complicity in the attack hindered a broader reconciliation in the community (androff, 2010a). despite these criticisms and its limitations, the gtrc became a powerful example of participatory democracy and for what citizens could achieve to face their community’s past in spite of government resistance. many participants felt that the gtrc’s ability to bring people together in a peaceful setting who used to be violently antagonistic demonstrates the potential for reconciliation built on mutual tolerance and peaceful coexistence. the gtrc, as a community based restorative justice intervention, made important contributions and the grassroots coalitions forged in its creation and implementation have continued to work for political and social change in greensboro. canada the canadian truth and reconciliation commission addresses the legacy of the indian residential schools which operated over 100 years as part of a national policy of forced assimilation (ictj, 2008). the residential schools, begun in 1874, were run first by churches and charity organizations and then by the state, primarily the child welfare system (fast & collin-vézina, 2010). the policy of forced schooling separated first nations, inuit, and other aboriginal children from their families and placed them into institutional boarding schools. children were not allowed to speak their native languages or practice their cultural and spiritual beliefs. these policies were aimed at changing the cultural identity of the child, or to “kill the indian in the child”. the schools were overcrowded and underfunded; children faced high rates of disease, malnutrition, physical and sexual abuse, and death. over 150,000 indigenous children attended the indian residential schools, the last of which closed in 1996. advances in social work, summer 2012, 13(2) 414 this experience was deeply traumatic to the indigenous populations of canada, which continue to struggle with numerous social problems such as high rates of poverty, disease, family violence, substance abuse and over-representation in the child welfare and criminal justice systems (trocmé, knoke, & blackstock, 2004). historical trauma refers to traumatic events that are not limited to individuals, but affect social groups, to communities (fast & collin-vézina, 2010). based on research with holocaust survivors and their children, the concept of historical trauma also attends to how trauma is passed down inter-generationally. in addition to collective distress, it is also about harm that was intentionally perpetrated by outsiders. historical injustices and traumatic events have been connected to contemporary social problems. indigenous populations in canada suffer many disparities and disproportionalities across many domains of wellbeing; they experience lower life expectancy, high rates of disease, high incidence and concentrations of poverty, high rates of substance abuse and family violence (trocmé, knoke & blackstock, 2004). in canada, 30 to 40% of all children in the child welfare system are indigenous (farris-manning & zandstra, 2003), and the rate of suicide among indigenous youth is 5 to 7 times greater (health canada, 2006). canadian truth and reconciliation commission (ctrc) the 2006 indian residential schools settlement agreement (irssa) was the result of years of advocacy, legal suits, and negotiation with indigenous communities and survivors of the indian residential schools (ictj, 2008). in 2008, prime minister harper made a formal apology on behalf of the state to all indigenous communities for the policies of forced schooling and assimilation, acknowledging that government policy was to separate and isolate indigenous children from their families and communities; churches and professional social work organizations have also apologized for their role in the indian residential schools. the judicial agreement included $2 billion in reparations to be paid by the canadian government and the 4 churches that also administered the schools. the common experience fund pays a lump sum of $10,000 to any survivor who spent any part of a year in one of the schools, and $3,000 for each additional year. the independent assessment process allows for victims of physical and sexual abuse additional reparations of up to $275,000, but the burden falls upon the victim to document the abuse. the irssa also set up funds for healing and commemorative programs to address cultural and collective harms through the promotion of spiritual renewal, public education, memorials, and museums. the irssa established a national level truth and reconciliation commission with a 5-year mandate, allocating $60 million in funding. supplementing the other aspects of the irssa, the trc was created to allow the survivors to tell their story and to educate the public about the nature of the abuses suffered in the indian residential schools. the purpose includes unearthing the previously silenced stories and providing validation and emotional relief for the survivors, as well as to combat the widespread ignorance about the history. the canadian trc is unique; it is the first to be established at a national level in a western nation, the first to be initiated through the judicial system, and the first to focus colonial harms against indigenous people. androff/adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions 415 the ctrc began in 2008, and is currently ongoing, but has faced several significant challenges. there have been changes in personnel, funding cuts, delays, and tensions between the twin goals of accountability for perpetrators and reconciliation and healing. the ctrc does not have subpoena power to compel the participation of perpetrators, and its mandate does not allow for the naming of individual perpetrators. furthermore, the ctrc faces the challenge of ensuring that victims perceive the process as legitimate. it is conducting outreach among indigenous communities across canada to educate survivors about the process and to ensure that they have the opportunity to participate. as this trc has been implemented relatively late in the history of the indian residential schools, many survivors are passing on. the timor-leste trc also faced challenges in conducting outreach to rural participants; many communities were wary of participating at first and regrettably many only felt confident about coming forward after the official process concluded (androff, 2008). despite these challenges, the ctrc is an opportunity to raise awareness about the impact of colonialism and atrocities committed against indigenous peoples, and has the potential to result in political and social change that benefits the indigenous population of canada. the north american context revisited having explored the two case examples of north american adaptations of trcs, a return to the characteristics of this unique context provides insights into the viability and future for how this global restorative justice intervention could be implemented locally. how do the underlying problems and background contexts addressed by the gtrc and ctrc compare with previous trcs? the gtrc was focused on one episode of racial violence between two groups, yet also was concerned with the nature of the state’s involvement in the violence. the gtrc was particularly interested in the degree of complicity of the greensboro police department, the fbi, and the atf: how much foreknowledge did they possess about what the kkk and nazis were planning? what could they have done to prevent the attack, either through neglect if not tacit approval? some in greensboro questioned if these law enforcement agencies had a more active role in planning the attack, and that perhaps the economic interests that were threatened by the demonstrators’ success in labor organizing, such as the owners of local textile mills, also bear some responsibility. the ctrc also addressed an issue of state abuse, albeit much larger, that of essentially the colonization and forced assimilation of the indigenous population. the harms recognized in the irssa and the subsequent government apologies were the direct consequence of state policy; a concerted and organized effort to destroy a people, their culture, their communities, and their future through their children. from these examples, it may be that trcs in the north american context can be effective at addressing the abuses and excesses of the modern state such as institutional racism and the effects of colonialism. this may be a relevant direction for future trcs in north america or other western, developed nations in the global north. given that many nations in the global north are characterized by strong government states, trcs may serve as a vehicle for addressing the unequal distribution of power in society, overlooked problems that the state has failed to address, and historical abuses that remain contemporarily significant. furthermore, as advances in social work, summer 2012, 13(2) 416 many nations in the west have significant minority populations (for example, the us is rapidly becoming a minority-majority country), trcs could be important tools for dealing with conflict between groups within a pluralistic state. in addition, as the pressures of immigration into developed countries increase, potential conflicts around race, ethnicity, religion, language, and culture may present opportunities for applying trcs to promote a positive vision of diversity and co-existence. one relevant example may be police abuse; community discord often follows episodes of police brutality and violence. trcs could be effective tools for grappling with the issues of minority relations with state power. trcs in the north american context are not likely to be generated through a process of political transition. these governments are more stable, and less likely to engage in transitions from oppression to democracy. most are democracies, and therefore open to social and political change from within the system. how does the lack of a political transition affect trcs? the gtrc was limited in many ways be the lack of official state sanction, and in fact by the contemporary city administration’s resistance. many participants in the gtrc felt that its work was hampered and a fuller reconciliation was impeded by a lack of political change in greensboro, because the same political, economic, and social interests that influenced the local government in 1979 essentially remained in power in 2004. without the resources or stamp of legitimacy of state support, the gtrc’s investigation and its outreach to all city residents was limited. the ctrc is also limited in some ways by the lack of political transition, and indeed many indigenous communities in canada have questioned the authenticity and genuineness of the ctrc as it comes from the same source that perpetrated the original injustice. some first nations tribes have protested the ctrc for this reason. based on these examples, it is clear that trcs in the global north will face challenges of legitimacy connected to the lack of a transition context. trcs in north america that are organized by or in concert with the government will be challenged to overcome perceptions and cynicism about being an exercise in political expediency. these trcs are also at risk of being co-opted for ulterior political motives. trcs that are not connected to the political system may suffer from enjoying less political support or be more likely to be resisted by the political structure. at the same time, political transitions can be messy and confusing, and there can be a benefit to efforts to address past violations within a stable economic and political framework. trcs may be a tool to shift power within an existing democratic system. how can trcs in the north american context cooperate with existing legal and social service systems? unlike previous trcs, trcs in north america are not likely to be implemented in a legal vacuum. however, the existing legal system, and in particular the criminal justice system is far from perfect and could benefit from significant reform. the gtrc was in part a response to the failure of the legal system to provide justice for the victims and hold the perpetrators accountable. the so-called functioning legal system resulted in acquittals for the killers, although there was a civil settlement in federal court. the ctrc was also the result of a civil settlement; in both cases there was no criminal sanction for the parties responsible for the abuses. despite the shortcomings of current legal systems, the canadian judicial system did render the irssa, which may point to androff/adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions 417 future possibilities. neither the gtrc nor the ctrc has an official relationship with the legal system. the potential for hybrid trcs, working in tandem with the courts, has not been explored. however there is a precedent for hybrid courts, possible examples include drug courts, mental health courts, and perhaps most appropriately tribal courts. these models may indicate how trcs can partner with courts to provide a more meaningful justice for victims by promoting accountability while still attending to the restorative justice principle of restoring the social fabric. there is a great opportunity for civil society organizations to make use of the trc model in north america. the presence of a vibrant civil society can strengthen the work of trcs, regardless if they are operated with or without state sanction. either way, civil society groups have the potential to influence and support trcs in north america. civil society must be more active to ensure that trcs are responsive to victims’ rights, and can work to prevent their co-option by political institutions. trcs in north america can be a vital tool for participatory democracy; a means for citizens to engage in civic action to address the problems of their community and society. can trcs be a tool for addressing poverty and inequality in western democracies? obviously, poverty still exists in western nations. yet the relative high standards of living may mean that trcs will focus less upon victims’ economic welfare and place more emphasis upon reconciliation or healing. however, trcs can serve an important function in addressing inequality by calling attention to the often overlooked, marginalized populations that exist, if somewhat hidden, in rich countries. through participant testimonials, public hearings, and dissemination of final reports, trcs can publicize the plight of poor and vulnerable people, drawing public support for supportive policies what is the future for trcs in north america or other western democracies? there are several possibilities. communities across the u.s. south have begun to explore organizing trcs to address their own histories of racial violence and oppression, including in eastern north carolina, mississippi, and one in new orleans to address the causes and consequences of the disaster following hurricane katrina (magarrell & gutierrez, 2006). a group of descendants from a preeminent new england family that profited from the trans-atlantic slave trade have suggested that the trc model may be useful for grappling with their legacy in the history of enslavement in the u.s. (dewolf, 2008). scholars such as walters (2008) have called for a trc to examine the contentious issue of reparations for slavery in the u.s. trcs may be useful for addressing other issues of indigenous rights; the u.s. shares a history of forced schooling and destructive assimilation policies of indigenous people with canada. senator leahy from vermont, the chairman of the senate judiciary committee, made national news when he called for a commission to investigate torture, questionable interrogation techniques, and wrongdoings committed in the “war on terror” (cnn, 2009). it is a sad reality that there is no shortage of human rights violations, even in the global north for which trcs may be a useful intervention. anywhere that there is community trauma, or an abuse of state power, trcs can contribute to the recognition of harm to victims and the reconciliation of divided societies. advances in social work, summer 2012, 13(2) 418 references androff, d. (2008). working in the mud: community reconciliation and restorative justice in timor-leste. in k. van wormer (ed.) restorative justice across the east and the west (pp. 123-144). hong kong: casa verde publishing. androff, d. (2010a). ‘to not hate’: reconciliation among victims of violence and participants of the greensboro truth and reconciliation commission. contemporary justice review, 13(3), 269-285. androff, d. (2010b). truth and reconciliation commissions (trcs): an international human rights intervention and its connection to social work. british journal of social work, 40(6), 1960-1977. androff, d. (2012a). can civil society reclaim truth? results from a community-based truth and reconciliation commission. international journal of transitional justice, 6(2), 296-317. androff, d. (2012b). narrative healing among victims of violence: the impact of the greensboro truth and reconciliation commission. families in society, 93(1), 38-46. androff, d. (in press). reconciliation in a community based restorative justice intervention: victim assessment of the greensboro truth and reconciliation commission. journal of sociology & social welfare. beck, e., kropf, n., & leonard, p. (2011). social work and restorative justice: skills for dialogue, peacemaking, and reconciliation. oxford: oxford university press. bickford, l. (2007). unofficial truth projects. human rights quarterly, 29(4), 994-1035. cnn. (march 4, 2009). leahy calls for ‘truth commission on torture. retrieved from http://edition.cnn.com/2009/politics/03/04/leahy.commission/?iref=mpstoryview dewolf, t. (2008) inheriting the trade: a northern family confronts its legacy as the largest slave trading dynasty in us history. boston: beacon press. farris-manning, c., & zandstra, m. (2003). children in care in canada: a summary of current issues and trends with recommendations for future research. child welfare league of canada. retrieved from http://www.cecwcepb.ca/sites/default/files/publications/en/childrenincaremar2003final.pdf fast, e., & collin-vézina, d. (2010). historical trauma, race-based trauma, and resilience of indigenous peoples: a literature review. first peoples child & family review, 5(1), 126-136. greensboro truth and reconciliation commission (gtrc). (2006). greensboro truth and reconciliation commission report. retrieved from www.greensborotrc.org hamber, b. (1998). the burdens of truth: an evaluation of the psychological support services and initiatives undertaken by the south african truth and reconciliation commission. american imago, 55(1), 9-28. androff/adaptations of truth and reconciliation commissions 419 hayner, p. (2001). unspeakable truths: confronting state terror and atrocity. new york: routledge. health canada. (2006). suicide prevention. retrieved from http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/fniahspnia/promotion/suicide/index-eng.php international center for transitional justice (ictj). (2008). canada’s truth and reconciliation commission. retrieved from www.ictj.org loffell, j. (2000). truth and social services. social work, 36(1), 53-68. lombard, a. (2000). enhancing a human rights culture through social work practice and training. social work, 36(2), 124-140. magarrell, l., & gutierrez, b. (2006). lessons in truth-seeking: international experiences informing united states initiatives. international center for transitional justice and beloved community center, conference report series, july 6-8, 2006, new york, international center for transitional justice. magarrell, l., & wesley, j. (2008). learning from greensboro: truth and reconciliation in the united states. philadelphia: university of pennsylvania press. minow, m. (1998). between vengeance and forgiveness: facing history after genocide and mass violence. boston: beacon. sacco, t., & hoffmann, w. (2004). seeking truth and reconciliation in south africa: a social work contribution. international social work, 47(2), 157-167. stover, e., & weinstein, h. (eds.). (2004). my neighbor, my enemy: justice and community in the aftermath of mass atrocity. cambridge: cambridge university press. trocmé, n., knoke, d., & blackstock, c. (2004). pathways to overrepresentation of aboriginal children in canada’s child welfare system. social service review, 78(4), 577-600. walters, r. (2008). the price of racial reconciliation. ann arbor, mi: university of michigan press. author note: address correspondence to: david k. androff, msw, ph.d., arizona state university, school of social work, mail code 3920, 411 n. central ave, ste. 800, phoenix, az 85004-0689. email: david.androff@asu.edu 31 transversal: international journal for the historiography of science, 1 (2016) 31-45 issn 2526-2270 www.historiographyofscience.org © the author 2016 — this is an open access article dossier ludwik fleck tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck artur koterski1 abstract: one of the factors that adversely influenced the worldwide reception of fleck was the rather narrow critical interest that his ideas had aroused in poland. apart from a few reviews of his book (1935), only two polemics were published before wwii, and these likewise fell into oblivion. the philosophical views of one of those polemists, tadeusz bilikiewicz, shared the same fate. since an acquaintance with bilikiewicz’s background would seem to be a necessary condition for a (full) understanding of his controversy with fleck, the aim of this paper is to sketch his views on the history and sociology of science, and to clarify certain errors regarding the facts of his life. keywords: tadeusz bilikiewicz; history of medicine; sociology of science; realism; constructivism received: 30 august 2016. accepted: 30 october 2016. ____________________________________________________________________________________ introduction bilikiewicz is mainly remembered by his psychiatry students, and a fairly narrow group of medical historians and philosophers — predominantly fleck scholars — for a dispute with ludwik fleck, which began in 1939, following fleck’s critical remarks on bilikiewicz’s approach to history. as his polemics with fleck attracted attention, his contribution has been invariably used as a pretext to scrutinize and explain fleck’s views. accordingly, bilikiewicz’s position, as formulated in his book on the history of embryology (1932), and his numerous papers from the 1930s, have been ignored and remain virtually unknown. the aim of this paper is therefore to sketch bilikiewicz’s life and his philosophical background in his exchange with fleck. this 1 artur koterski is an assistant professor in the department of logic and cognitive sciences – faculty of philosophy and sociology – maria curie-sklodowska university. pl. mcs 5. lublin. 20-031. poland. e-mail: zlimn@hektor.umcs.lublin.pl artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 32 should clarify some of the factual errors found in works where bilikiewicz is mentioned and assist in better understanding his exchange with fleck. life tadeusz antoni bilikiewicz was born in lwów (now lviv, ukraine) on april 5, 1901 — at that time under franz josef occupation. when the great war broke out, he was a scout and served as a courier for piłsudski’s legions. being of age in 1918, he joined the legions as a volunteer and was soon severely wounded in an encounter with ukrainian troops near chorośnica (khorosnytsia, now in ukraine). when bilikiewicz left the army as a corporal, he decided to study “exact philosophy”, convinced by his father that “philosophy not based on natural science led to speculations” (bilikiewicz, 1978, 8). following this advice, he began studying medicine at the jagiellonian university in kraków (cracow). having graduated with a phd in 1925 (a thesis was not then required to obtain a doctorate from the medical faculty), bilikiewicz began working in an infirmary in kraków and continued his philosophical education. his health soon deteriorated, and he left for leysin in switzerland, to recuperate in a sanatorium, where he stayed from 1926 to 1928. during this period, he wrote and published his first book, the problem of life in the light of comparative psychology (1928) and worked as a volunteer (volontärarzt) at the “burghölzli” psychiatrischen universitätsklinik in zürich. during his four-month internship (from april to august 1928), he made a very good impression, and the director, hans w. maier, offered him an assistantship. however, bilikiewicz declined, and accepted an offer from his kraków philosophy supervisor, witold rubczyński. rubczyński advised him to do his habilitation in the department of history and philosophy of medicine. this was the first academic department of its kind in europe. it was established in 1920 and had since been chaired by władysław szumowski (cf. szumowski, 1920, 278; löwy, 2000, 295–296; gajda, 2005, 10). thus, bilikiewicz returned to poland in 1928 to obtain in a junior assistant position at the jagiellonian university in september that year. at the outset of his career as a medical historian, bilikiewicz owed a lot to szumowski and even more to henry e. sigerist, whom he considered a teacher and a friend (cf. bilikiewicz, 1969, 112). as sigerist had left zürich in 1925, bilikiewicz could not meet him during his stay there. however, he had a recommendation from maier, so he was able to communicate with sigerist. they made an appointment in bern: in the meantime, using my sojourn in switzerland, i established communication with prof. henry e. sigerist, the director of the medical history institute in leipzig. i did not know him personally. but he proposed a meeting in a café. i would recognize him by an ostentatiously held copy of völkischer beobachter. it came off. i apparently made a good impression on him because we have since become friends. […] i came to be greatly indebted to sigerist afterwards. (bilikiewicz, 1978, 11; cf. bilikiewicz, 1957a, 558)2 while sigerist’s friendly attitude is well-known, it would appear that it was more their extensive agreement on professional matters that induced sigerist to help bilikiewicz. sigerist immediately invited bilikiewicz to leipzig, where he, bilikiewicz, spent two or three weeks (sources conflict) at the institute during the fall/winter semester of 1928. sigerist offered bilikiewicz his assistance in obtaining a rockefeller foundation stipend for his research into the history of medicine and considered taking bilikiewicz with him to baltimore in the future. soon after their meeting, sigerist explored the options of having a german translation of the problem of life published. sigerist tried to interest the felix meiner publishing house, but to no avail. interestingly, he also wrote a letter to fellow townsman hans driesch, whose views are discussed and used extensively in bilikiewicz’s book: 2 curiously, in a 1957 paper, most probably due to censorship, bilikiewicz did not mention the nsdap organ as the identification sign, but rather a liberal german newspaper — the vossische zeitung. (the quotations from the sources unpublished in english are translated by the author) artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 33 a young polish colleague, dr. bilikiewicz […], has written a book entitled the problem of life in the light of comparative psychology. the book has appeared in polish, so no one can read it, and the colleague would like to have it published in german. […] please excuse me this unsolicited communication; this concerns a very amiable man, who has made quite an impression on me and to whom i would like to be of assistance in whatever way i can. (sigerist to driesch, dec. 14, 1928)3 on dec. 12, 1928, sigerist wrote to bilikiewicz that he had discussed the book with driesch, and that driesch had expressed an interest in meeting him. whether the two did in fact meet is not known. in any case, their efforts to have the book published in german came to nothing. bilikiewicz received his first rockefeller stipend, with the assistance of sigerist, in 1930. this supported 6 months’ research at sigerist’s institute (from april to october). he worked on german translations of hippocrates with sigerist and owsei temkin. in may, 1931, with his 1928 book as his thesis, bilikiewicz earned his second phd in kraków, this time in philosophy. in that same year, he also published a book on john johnston (1931),4 which was accepted as his habilitationsschrift on the history and philosophy of medicine. bilikiewicz was awarded his first venia legendi in june, 1931. the award was conferred by the medical faculty of the jagiellonian university and approved by janusz jędrzejewicz, then head of the ministry of religious creeds and public enlightenment on aug. 22, 1931. according to bilikiewicz’s memoirs, the council of the medical faculty of the stefan batory university in wilno (now vilnius, lithuania) appointed him extraordinarius of history and philosophy of medicine on june 30, 1931. however, an impending transformation of the polish education system (the “jędrzejewicz reform”) prevented the council’s plans from coming to fruition, and neither the chair for bilikiewicz nor the department of history and philosophy of medicine were ever founded. thus, he did not go to wilno, staying instead in kraków, where he taught as a privatdozent and junior assistant.5 bilikiewicz was granted another 6-month rockefeller stipend in 1932. he went to paris, where he met sigerist again. this time, he was not bound to any institution, so he simply worked with historical sources in parisian libraries. that same year, he published a book that he had written in leipzig entitled the embryology in the age of baroque and rococo. this work was commissioned by sigerist and published as the second (and, as it turned out, the final) volume of arbeiten des instituts für geschichte der medizin an der universität leipzig series.6 in june 1932, sigerist signed the introduction that he had written for this book, and in august, he left for the united states where obtained a position at john hopkins university in baltimore. bilikiewicz, however, decided to stay in poland. he gives patriotic reasons for this and for some other decisions concerning his professional activities in his memoirs.7 that bilikiewicz was unable to obtain an appropriate academic position in kraków was definitely not due to any academic shortcoming on his part. in april 1934, the ministry, under the direction of jędrzejewicz, rejected an application from the council of the medical faculty of the jagiellonian university in kraków to promote bilikiewicz to an adjunct professorship and raise his salary. he continued to work there as the senior assistant (although with the payment of the junior assistant) till the end of april, 1935, and as a private 3 “ein junger polnischer kollege, dr. bilikiewicz […], hat ein buch geschrieben, das den titel führt: ‘das problem des lebens im lichte der prinzipien der vergleichenden psychologie’. das buch ist polnisch erschienen, sodass kein mensch es lesen kann, und der kollege möchte es gern in deutscher übersetzung herausbringen. […] bitte entschuldigung sie die störung. es handelt sich um einen sehr liebenswürdigen menschen, der mir einen vorzüglichen eindruck gemacht hat und den ich gern behilflich sein möchte, wenn es sich irgendwie machen lässt” (henry sigerist’s collection at the universitätsarchive leipzig, med. fak. d05/1e, item 758; italics added). 4 bilikiewicz published a 25-page résumé of this book in german (1930). 5 while the jędrzejewicz reform was officially introduced in march, 1932, and only applied to tertiary education a year later, some trenchant actions (e.g. layoffs) had already been undertaken in the fall of 1931. it has been noted (nasierowski, 2009) that bilikiewicz’s failure to obtain permanent positions in kraków and wilno possibly saved his life in both cases. he avoided the sonderaktion krakau (nov. 11, 1939) and the mass deportation of the polish intelligentsia by the soviet occupation authorities (june, 1940) on the polish territory they acquired pursuant to the ribbentrop– molotov pact. 6 the first in the series was stephen d’irsay’s book on albrecht von haller (1930). 7 although they remained in touch after that (except for wwii), their last meeting took place at the international congress for the history of medicine in madrid in sept., 1935 (cf. bilikiewicz, 1957a, 560; the paper incorrectly gives the year as 1936). artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 34 docent afterwards (he remained a docent of jagiellonian university until dec., 1946; cf. archiwum uniwersytetu jagiellońskiego, s ii 619, tadeusz bilikiewicz’s personal files). in 1935, bilikiewicz accepted a post of ward head of a psychiatric hospital in kocborowo (german: konradstein; now a district of starogard gdański). he stayed there until 1946.8 a year later, he was awarded another habilitation (from wrocław university), this time in psychiatry. he moved to gdańsk and was made chair of the department of history and philosophy of medicine at the medical academy, and director of the clinic of psychiatric diseases. in 1953, he obtained a full professorship. bilikiewicz was a member of numerous scientific societies, among others the deutsche akademie der naturforscher leopoldina (now the nationale akademie der wissenschaften). besides the history of medicine, bilikiewicz’s later career was devoted to psychiatry and psychology — focusing on the etiopathogenesis of mental illnesses, psychoneurosis, psychosis and sexology. (he also made a remarkable attempt to solve the mind-body problem — see bilikiewicz, 1971; bilikiewicz, 1974). he retired in 1971 and died nine years later on nov. 10, 1980, in gdańsk.9 fleck and bilikiewicz belonged to the same generation, were born in the same place, studied the same professions, worked on closely related problems, and finally engaged in a polemical exchange, but there is no evidence that they ever met in person. the aims of history of medicine the early attempts made by scientists themselves to understand and describe the mutual dependency of science and the cultural milieu began in the late 1920s (cf. fleck, 1986 [1929]; dembowski, 1930; schrödinger, 1935 [1932], 66–106).10 bilikiewicz’s book, die embryologie… (1932), also belonged to this trend. it was one the first works on the development of embryology in the 17th and 18th centuries, then a gap in the history of medicine, and to document the evolutionary conversion from the mechanicist to the vitalist position in this field.11 in terms of the sociology of medicine, it was to trace the impact of two consecutive general cultural trends on the content of embryological theories and their progress. in his understanding of the aims of the history of medicine, bilikiewicz followed the guidelines of the sigerist’s program quite closely (cf. sigerist, 1922). on the one hand, the history of medicine fulfills its obvious historical aim, as it preserves cultural heritage. on the other, it serves methodological purposes. the history of medicine enables the current state of medicine to be understood as the result of a long, complicated, multithreaded, and ongoing process that often leads to error (cf. bilikiewicz, 1928a, 829). by drawing attention to such errors, the history of medicine assists in the realization that contemporary medicine likewise swims in a sea of errors. in so doing, it fosters an anti-dogmatic attitude (cf. bilikiewicz, 1933, 1 & 4). the development of medical ideas is highly conditioned and the history of medicine should study this topic in socio-cultural contexts (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932a, 52). on the sigerist-bilikiewicz view, the understanding of the medicine of the past requires a close collaboration between the exact sciences and the humanities. in this way, the history of medicine constitutes a juncture between them (cf. bilikiewicz, 1933, 4; bilikiewicz, 1935, 63; bilikiewicz, 1938a, 292). finally, the history of medicine also has practical value for the present in that it provides knowledge about relatively rare medical situations e.g. the great 8 the german occupation authorities decided to maintain just one mental asylum in the reichsgau danzigwestpreussen, and it happened to be the hospital in kocborowo. bilikiewicz witnessed the implementation of nazi policy towards his patients for five years, and in 1948, he testified as an expert witness in the supreme national tribunal in the case against the war criminal albert forster, the gauleitner of the reichsgau danzig-westpreussen (cf. bilikiewicz, 1948; see also his 1966 and 1978, 15–17). 9 cf. bilikiewicz, 1978; see also: sieńkowski, 1981 (includes a comprehensive bibliography of bilikiewicz’s works); konopka, 1981 (with a bibliography of bilikiewicz’s works in history of medicine); suchodolski, 2002; kujawski, 2012 (with a bibliography of selected reviews by bilikiewicz); gryglewski, 2013. this biography is also based on the sources from universitätsarchive leipzig, germany, and archiwum uniwersytetu jagiellońskiego, kraków, poland. 10 it is worth noting that the existence of the “the same style of thinking and doing” in different cultural areas and that this orientation “makes us pay careful attention to detail and at the same time recognizes the great lines which run through the whole” was also indicated in the vienna circle. (cf. carnap, 1968 [1928], xviii; see also dahms, 2004) 11 it was preceded by works of cole (1930) and sarton (1931). artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 35 epidemics (for bilikiewicz, this was rather a byproduct of the history of medicine — cf. bilikiewicz, 1933, 1; bilikiewicz, 1938a, 292). in his book, bilikiewicz also acknowledged the influence of two contemporary basel professors — the historian heinrich wölfflin (who was a student of jacob burckhardt, sigerist’s intellectual master), and the idealist philosopher karl joël, who had recently published a work on the cultural history of philosophy and the philosophy of history — and their ideas of synthesis, zeitgeist, and style of thought, its development, and change (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932, 10; see also bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939], 259 & 264; wölfflin, 1950 [1915]; joël, 1928). elsewhere, bilikiewicz mentioned another idealist historian, leopold von ranke (burckhardt’s teacher in berlin), who saw the task of history as finding the essences behind the facts (cf. bilikiewicz, 1933, 4; novick, 2005, 28). there is no doubt that in terms of methodology of science bilikiewicz followed the principles expounded by władysław biegański. biegański holds that truth is “the final aim of every cognition” and he comprehends this claim within the framework of his previsionism (biegański, 1990 [1908], 112; biegański, 1910, p. ii; see also kijania-placek, 2009, 192–196). according to this view — usually epitomized in the comtean maxim savoir pour prévoir — scientific cognition consists in predicting properties, relationships, and causes and effects of things and phenomena (cf. biegański, 1910, 80–85; biegański, 1915, 24). as predictions include retrodictions and explanations in this theory, bilikiewicz could apply it to the history of medicine. accordingly, he maintains that: the aim of historical research is not in the least to reproduce the past, or even to approach the truth […]. truth as such does not interest a historian. […] the reproduction of historical truth is not possible due to the incompetence of a knowing mind. […] this circumstance has undermined to a high degree the objective value of historical sources. (bilikiewicz, 1938a, 292; see also bilikiewicz, 1938, 120; bilikiewicz, 1957, 352; biegański, 1914, 1–2; biegański, 1915, 259) history does not provide faithful models but it serves “only to acquire a cognitive orientation as to reality” (bilikiewicz, 1938a, 292; see also bilikiewicz, 1938, 125). this aim is achieved when long developmental lines are identified. this is where bilikiewicz complies again with sigerist, who ascribes such a task to the history of medicine (cf. sigerist, 1926, 19). this quest invariably has a re-constructional nature. whether from a lack of data or an inability to recognize all the material facts, the historian is forced to invoke fictitious constructions. this “necessary epistemological evil”, which is responsible for the falsity of a historical theory as a whole, is principally detectable in varying degrees in all scientific domains, including the hard sciences. this is also how bilikiewicz reconstructed the rejection of epigenesis at the outset of modern embryology, the acceptance of preformationism, the debates between the “animalculists” and the “ovists”, the cessation of these ways of thinking, the final triumph of epigenetics, and the emergence of vitalism from mechanicism. bilikiewicz depicts the development of culture, which naturally encompasses science and philosophy, as a process guided by the spirit of the time, i.e. the zeitgeist. this sets the ideals that are followed, mostly unconsciously, in any branch of cultural activity. in science, the epoch-specific zeitgeist sets the aims and the scope of the problems to be solved, specifies the methods used to obtain the solutions, and influences both the choice of evidence, and the interpretations of the empirical data (or, in lakatosian terminology, it marks off the logic of scientific discovery). since the ideals set by the zeitgeist are the same for everyone, some parallelisms between apparently disparate domains can be observed. bilikiewicz tries to demonstrate this with the history of embryology during the baroque and rococo periods. thus, the objectives of his research are formulated as follows: in addition to the important embryologic-analytic material, we will generally try to include all the significant historical events that form or appear to form the spirit of the time in this synthesis. […] we will uncover the dependence of the dominant [embryological] view in a [given] period on trends, theories and world-views in […] seemingly quite disparate branches of science and psychologically examine the mysterious parallelism of influences that a particular epoch exerts on authors from the most diverse areas. (bilikiewicz, 1932, 10) the concept of the zeitgeist plays a crucial role in reconstructing and understanding the past, as it enables history to be rendered as more than a mere collection of facts. this is especially important for the history of artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 36 science and making sense of conceptand theory-formation, scientific change, and the cultural dependency of such processes. on that view, history requires a synthetic, i.e. constructivist, approach (cf. bilikiewicz, 1931a, 250; bilikiewicz, 1933, 4). this is far from obvious: what we call the zeitgeist, or character of an epoch, […] what determines the choice of specified theories and the discardment of others, what is embodied in the style, fashion, current views, morals, and the life of an individual and a society — when considered from a distance — it all appears as something supraindividual, as an “objective spirit” that binds individuals and communities into a uniform, harmonized whole with invisible ties. (bilikiewicz, 1932, 11) however, a zeitgeist is not discovered but rather constructed: “what we call the spirit of the time is not infrequently a creation of our subjective judgment with which we, as it were aprioristically, begin to process historical material” (bilikiewicz, 1935a, 203; see also bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 259–260). the zeitgeist is a historian’s construction that helps pin down some features of constantly changing phenomena, and a conceptualization of reality that sets some directions “in the chaos that surrounds us” (cf. bilikiewicz, 1938, 120). the concept of the spirit of the time introduces a certain order and, therefore allows retrodictions to be made. when it is “identified”: the gaps in the sources cease to be a nightmare that jolts the historian’s conscience. the enormous field that is left for his individual historical construction, creativity, and intelligence makes it possible to fully use the sources, even if they are residuary and fragmentary, as the building blocks in the historical synthesis undertaken from this general standpoint. (bilikiewicz, 1932a, 53) once the given spirit of the time is determined, it is considered and investigated as if it were a real object. it might be thought that bilikiewicz’s constructionism would have been appreciated by fleck, but it was otherwise. the debate with fleck fleck’s comments on bilikiewicz’s book (1932) are interesting for several reasons. most importantly, the book sparked a discussion on fleck’s conception. this was an extremely rare occurrence at the time. in contradistinction to izydora dąmbska’s criticism (1937; see also fleck, 1938), bilikiewicz’s reply is written from a standpoint close to that of fleck, notwithstanding all the differences that both sides tried to point out. it is no accident that the disputants formulated objections against each other that were similar, if not identical. this section, however, focuses on whether fleck’s criticism finds a rationale in bilikiewicz’s views on the nature of scientific truth, the scientific character of history, the plausibility of its results, and the peculiarity of the objects investigated by historians. 1. truth. fleck deems bilikiewicz guilty of an improper approach to styles and the environmental conditioning of scientific knowledge; one that eventually leads either to dogmatism or relativism. bilikiewicz contributes to the danger that “a new generation of future scientific workers is growing up to believe that truth in the good, old professional sense of this word does not exist anymore” (fleck, 1990a [1939a], 251; translation modified). 2. scientificity. in the proper, i.e. scientific approach, research proceeds within the general sociology that investigates the rise and development of a directed, collective, cognitive mood that leads to a thought-style. bilikiewicz’s sociology, however, does not really go beyond rather vague, belles-lettres considerations.12 12 we might note here that similar criticisms were voiced against other authors of a similar historical orientation. thus, reviewing joël’s book (1928), sydney hook writes: “it is written with journalistic verve, reveals a bowing acquaintance with many fields of knowledge, and by the use of dramatic, stylistic antitheses conveys a quality of breathlessness which makes at least for interest if not altogether for accuracy” (hook, 1937, 131). artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 37 3. plausibility. bilikiewicz tries to examine and compare two comprehensive wholes in embryology. according to fleck, however, different thought-styles — even when they belong to the same period — often represent contrary tendencies that cannot be captured consistently without some flagrant oversimplifications. furthermore, new discoveries are possible when an observer’s cognitive alertness has been shaped and changed, and this kind of influence appears only within thought-collectives. therefore, it is they who should be sociologically examined. the intellectual development of the past is judged better, fleck concludes, when separate thoughtcollectives and their interactions are compared and investigated (including interactions across eras). 4. incommensurability. in general, the difference between thought-styles may involve their incommensurability.13 it is therefore advisable to confine their comparative analysis to individual sentences from particular texts, and not to work on “entire views and theories”, as was attempted by bilikiewicz. further exchange between fleck and bilikiewicz reveals deep disagreement over scientific realism (cf. fleck, 1990b [1939b]; bilikiewicz, 1990b [1939b]. therefore, bilikiewicz’s position on all five issues raised by fleck, and not just the four he originally addressed, are investigated here. ad 1: bilikiewicz on truth, relativism, and dogmatism. bilikiewicz is rather laconic about truth and his concept of style may easily — but superficially — prompt a relativistic interpretation. such a reading would be supported by the consideration that, as bilikiewicz was under the noticeable influence of biegański, he could also accept the latter’s non-classical theory of truth, which dispenses with the absoluteness of truth and makes it relative to “the content of earlier acquisitions of our cognition” (biegański, 1910, 139, see also 163). however, bilikiewicz firmly rejects the charge of relativism, and in his works on biegański, he is in principle silent about the latter’s theory of truth. in his reply to fleck, bilikiewicz mentions that when writing his 1932 book he assumed “that there exists an objective state of affairs which is cognizable to a high degree. the purpose of science is to study this objective state of affairs […] and the transmission of the content of cognition, i.e. the truth (as it appears to us), to other researchers” (bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 261; translation modified). the tension between objectivity and stylishness can be resolved by his twofold understanding of truth. bilikiewicz, most probably following husserl (cf. husserl, 2008, 311–312), claims that truth can be understood in two ways.14 first, epistemologically, as an agreement of our judgment with a real state of affairs. in this sense, true judgments are fallible and relative to our state of knowledge. second, truth, in its metaphysical meaning, is that very state of affairs. in this sense, it is objective and absolute (cf. bilikiewicz, 1928, 17–18). bilikiewicz holds, as do many other fallibilists later, that principally there is no absolute certainty as to whether scientific judgments correspond to absolute reality (cf. bilikiewicz, 1928, 43), but we sometimes know that we are not wrong and “the state of affairs determined in our judgment coincides 100% with that state of affairs we call the truth” (bilikiewicz, 1928, 140). it should be noted that bilikiewicz never equalized all belief systems in terms of cognitive value. for instance, he criticized the mystical and irrational tendencies in 1930s german medicine, which eventually turned into what he called “medical hitlerism”, and manifestly ridiculed the dialectical materialism that haunted soviet science and philosophy (cf. bilikiewicz, 1931b, 240; bilikiewicz, 1932b; bilikiewicz, 1933a, 243–244; bilikiewicz, 1934, 264 and bilikiewicz, 1933b). he repeatedly stressed the reluctance of the polish school of medicine towards speculative thinking (cf. sine auctoris, 1928, 834; bilikiewicz, 1929, 141; bilikiewicz, 1935, 63) and called for criticism and exactness. these appeals were made from a perspective far removed from scientistic dogmatism (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932b). bilikiewicz agrees with fleck that the claim regarding the influence exerted on scientific results by the intellectual environment can induce the acceptance of a relativistic or skeptical position. however, he is convinced that the research on the stylishness of science “in fact sharpens the accuracy and firmness of our knowledge of reality through a criticism of the way we perceive reality” (bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 261). 13 in the relevant passage of the english translation the polish word used by fleck, “niewspółmierne” (i.e. “incommensurable”), is rendered as “incomparable” (fleck, 1990a [1939a], 253). 14 the conjecture is that bilikiewicz never relinquished this idea, as he was still talking about two kinds of truth in a 1976 conference paper entitled “the influence of criticism and censorship on determinations of historical truth” (1976, 1–3), which the communist censors did not allow to be printed (this was not the first time — see suchodolski, 2002, 42 & 45), and in his autobiography (bilikiewicz, 1978, 44). artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 38 ad 2: bilikiewicz on the scientific nature of the history of medicine. undoubtedly, it would be easier to comment on bilikiewicz had he followed his own recommendations on exactness more closely. however, fleck’s remarks may create a false impression as to the character of bilikiewicz’s book (nb: that of fleck met with similar criticism). bilikiewicz, who as a scientist impressed not only sigerist but also karl sudhoff, wrote a historical book that adequately met the scientific standards that were commonly accepted at the time in this field. it does not therefore significantly differ in that respect from other acclaimed works on the history of medicine. bilikiewicz nevertheless agrees that historical research will never obtain the degree of exactness of the hard sciences — and from this perspective, his work may seem to be “artistic, literary, intuitive, and subjective rather than scientific”. however, as history also belongs to science, the charge regarding the nonscientific character of his work is unjustified (cf. bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 264–265). ad 3: bilikiewicz on the plausibility of zeitgeist-based historical reconstructions. in the preface to his book, bilikiewicz informs his readers that ambitious history requires fictional thought constructions. constructing the zeitgeist consists in finding the cultural quintessence of the given period. without that, historians would be lost in a multitude of facts, so they are forced to proceed according to the law of economy. for aesthetic reasons, the creative historian strives to complete the picture of the epoch. those elements not in harmony with the zeitgeist are eventually seen as unimportant, detached from the zeitgeist, and replaced by well-orchestrated ones. this procedure certainly gives the historian a lot of freedom. however, bilikiewicz imposed some significant limitations in order to preserve the division between nature and culture. these constructions are by no means arbitrary. they have to be internally and externally consistent. the requirement of consistency with the main theories accepted in other domains of science (if fulfilled) makes bilikiewicz’s account testable in principle and grants it scientific status. this is emphasized by bilikiewicz in his rejoinder to fleck: “i did not try to transcend the experience” (bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 261; translation modified). bilikiewicz suggests that fleck’s objection stems from a different vision of the sociological approach to science. for him, it is meant to explore the influence of the environment on the content of science, whereas for fleck it aims to show the influence of the environment (or the thought collective) on scientific work — or the sociological influence on the cognitive conditions of the mind (cf. bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 257). bilikiewicz admits that both these objectives deserve more attention from the scientific community, but at the same time, he is convinced that his historical findings would lose their importance if viewed through a fleckian prism, because of the constructivist metaphysics that underlies fleck’s theory. however, he implies that these two approaches rather supplement each other. ad 4: bilikiewicz on the incommensurability of styles and scientific change. the curious character of the relationships between the views formulated within disparate thought-styles, familiar from fleck’s work and underlined in their exchange, was not unknown to bilikiewicz. in particular, he recognizes the possibility of semantic incommensurability: is there not a concern that historical sources […] will not provide what is needed by the modern researcher? for who produced these sources? the physicians of yore, educated in a world of entirely different medical concepts, knew nothing about modern symptomatology, and had no comprehension of modern methods of examination and observation. are those insights then […] translatable into the language of modern medical concepts? there is no doubt that in many cases this is possible, but not always. the objection that uniform conclusions perhaps cannot be drawn from two sets of premises formulated differently in terms of methodology must therefore be considered. (bilikiewicz, 1933, 3; italics added) on this point, the difference between fleck and bilikiewicz seems to be one of degree. for the former, incommensurability holds in so many cases that a new type of comparative epistemology, which he outlined in his book, is required to overcome it (fleck, 1979 [1935]). if fleck is correct as to the commonness of incommensurability (in any sense he had in mind), then his advice to confine the studies of two thoughtartur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 39 styles to a comparative analysis of particular texts and sentences is generally correct. however, the antecedent in this conditional is rather disputable. it is worth mentioning that, in addition to incommensurability, bilikiewicz indicates some other features that may be problematic for the rational reconstructions of scientific change, and his view of the development of science does not sound unfamiliar to modern ears. each spirit of the time goes through two phases. during the first, the ideals set by the new zeitgeist come to prominence, and are more and more successfully realized in different cultural domains. in this period, the spirit of the time influences the choice of scientific evidence, and the interpretations of experiments. this claim refers especially to false confirmations and to cases where falsifications are ignored. thus, in “the century of the woman”, buffon, who supported the idea of equality of the both sexes, reported the discovery of female spermatozoa (cf. needham, 1963 [1931], 208; needham, 1959 [1934], 216; gasking, 1967, 89– 90), while the discovery of the parthenogenesis of aphids did not make van leeuwenhoek abandon animalculism (cf. fry, 2000, 28–29; schierbeek, 1957, 83–91, 96–97; see also pinto-correia, 1997, 103– 104). on the other hand, in its second, decadent period, the zeitgeist is usually burdened with empirical problems which can no longer be simply ignored. if, however, they are partly absorbed by a theory, then this happens either with a significant departure from its initial tenets or with a violation of some of the ideals set by the zeitgeist. during the first period, metaphysical stipulations are commonly used to reconcile the empirical data with the current zeitgeist if need be.15 however, changes introduced in this way are — to use lakatos’ terminology once more — heuristically progressive. this is usually not the case during a crisis. this kind of corruption of the old ideals catalyzes the process of acquiring the ideals of the new zeitgeist.16 when the new zeitgeist finally arrives, the old one seems unbearably outdated, although the theories formulated within the new framework may contain “kuhnian losses”. for instance, when pierre louis maupertuis converts to epigenesis, he, in contradistinction to the preformationists, cannot explain continuity within species (i.e. that cats bear cats etc.) or exclude abiogenesis. the proponents of the epigenetic approach also had to abandon all the extra-embryological “benefits” of preformationism, due to which it was used as an argument against atheism, or a justification for otherwise morally questionable habits like arranged marriages (cf. roe, 2010). on the other hand, the new theory allowed maupertuis to address some of the questions that had mystified the preformationists, e.g. the resemblance of offspring to both parents (especially in the case of hybrids). in principle, two spirits of the time cannot co-exist in the same society in the same period, although it is impossible to draw a clear boundary delineating when and where the old one was finally superseded. therefore, after a noticeable zeitgeist-shift, the old theories usually have their epigones and the old views are not completely abandoned (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932, 90). the transition has an evolutionary nature.17 the partisans of a new competing theory, developed under the auspices of a new zeitgeist, handle the same data collected by the adherents of the superseded one, but reinterpret them within the new framework as confirming evidence (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932, 151). when the evidence is limited, as often happens in the case of new theories, scientists make use of untestable hypotheses as explanations. metaphysics is in any case indispensable as “even the simplest research, the simplest inference from empirical facts, contains some metaphysical presuppositions” (bilikiewicz, 1935, 63). science is a social enterprise, undertaken by entire generations. considered in the long term, it changes in an evolutionary and cumulative manner (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932, 169; bilikiewicz, 1935, 63). 15 years later jay gould made the same observation: “i finally read the major works of preformationism in its heyday […] — and i greatly admired the major arguments and their rationales. i understood, first of all, that the most ‘absurd’ notions (from current perspective) made reasonable sense under the ‘factual lacks’ of eighteen-century science” (gould, 1997, xv). 16 a methodological application of the maxim corruptio unius, generatio alteris is exemplified by the dispute between caspar wolff and albrecht von haller, the epigone of preformationism (cf. needham, 1963 [1931], 211–214; needham, 1959 [1934], 220–222; gasking, 1967, 101–104, 107–115; roe, 1981). 17 in his book, bilikiewicz applies the adjective “revolutionary” in a scientific context twice. in neither case does it have the kuhnian or popperian meaning (cf. bilikiewicz, 1932, 41 & 104). artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 40 ad. 5. bilikiewicz and scientific realism. the fleckian commentators usually agree that he is a constructivist (see, e.g., löwy, 1990, 215–224; herrnstein smith, 2005, 46–83; egloff, 2015, 54–62; see also strobach, 2011; seidel, 2011). a kind of constructivism is also present in bilikiewicz’s methodology. therefore, the bone of contention between them would appear to be not whether the use of constructions is acceptable in a theory of science, but rather how constructionist the theory can be. it will be argued, however, that bilikiewicz’s theory is at least compatible with scientific realism. bilikiewicz never questions that the world exists independently of any knowing subject. in the debate with fleck, he argues that his opponent’s position involves unacceptable metaphysics, namely the rejection of objective reality (cf. bilikiewicz, 1990a [1939a], 258; bilikiewicz, 1990b [1939b], 275). it is concluded here that he is a metaphysical realist. this is, of course, too little to ascribe scientific realism to him. this may seem a difficult task since bilikiewicz’s methodology deals almost exclusively with modern history of medicine on the one hand, and the rather outdated biology on the other, while the current debate between scientific realism and instrumentalism concerns mainly the matured disciplines. it is, however, possible to regard him as a proponent of scientific realism in its moderate version. strong scientific realism claims that the best theories (matured and successful) are nearly true (cf. psillos, 1999, xv; chakravartty, 2011, 157). bilikiewicz, however, thinks that in history it is otherwise, i.e. that even the best theories are (most likely) false. those fallibilists who adopt the scientific realism position often accept the truthlikeness thesis that successive theories, while literary false, approximate the truth better and better. bilikiewicz does not endorse this claim in history, but that is not tantamount to saying that history does not find any truths at all. they can be achieved “with the methods of natural science that enable a historian to determine a historical truth, which is individual, one-time, and particular” (bilikiewicz, 1938a, 292).18 when it comes to historical generalizations, however, the use of fictitious construction is inevitable. strong scientific realism claims that the central terms of the best current theories are genuinely referential (cf. leplin, 1984, 1). according to bilikiewicz, there are indispensable terms in historical nomenclature that do not have any real reference, for instance, the spirit of the time or the style. it is not clear what status he would assign to other important historical concepts, e.g. state, crisis, and revolution, but nowhere does he claim that no theoretical concept has any reference. in addition to historical constructs, bilikiewicz points out the occurrences of non-referential terms in scientific hypotheses (e.g. harvey’s aura seminalis), and experimental results (e.g. hartsoeker’s homunculus). bilikiewicz thinks — to stress it again — that terms without a genuine reference enter science under the influence of the current style and that this impact can be discovered, reduced or eliminated when the zeitgeist is analyzed (cf. bilikiewicz, 1939a, 261; bilikiewicz, 1933, 4; see also fleck, 1938, 195). bilikiewicz’s views clearly echo the instrumentalism taught by biegański. however, his position would seem to be more accurately classified as a weak version of scientific realism. bilikiewicz maintains that historical theories have truth value and that their falseness depends on the structure of the world. this in principle makes him an ontological realist. bilikiewicz agrees that justified historical beliefs are possible, and this makes him an epistemological realist. this realism is very weak indeed. however, it should get stronger once the constraint to history is lifted and other domains of science, where the role of construction is not as important as it is in the humanities, are taken into account. this finds confirmation in bilikiewicz’s way of speaking, as he ordinarily uses plainly realistic language when talking about the theoretical entities of modern physics. for instance, when considering very small, hypothetical primitive organisms, he says: “these creatures take a direct part in processes about which we people […] can only […] conjecture. they are able to look and see nearly directly […] chemical reactions as such, touch the bounds of a molecule, and perhaps see the structure of an atom” (bilikiewicz, 1928, 183). furthermore, bilikiewicz not only endorses metaphysical realism but he also admits that the scientific world descriptions approach the truth: indeed, this reality does not perhaps appear as we depict it […], howbeit […] we acknowledge not only that the external world and its objects exist but, moreover, that the degree of probability with 18 it is a necessary condition that the historian’s research is able to give “[…] the outcomes that correspond to reality only when it is conducted in a strict co-operation of humanist and naturalist minds (cf. bilikiewicz, 1933, 4, italics added). artur koterski – tadeusz bilikiewicz’s background in the debate with ludwik fleck 41 which we predicate about the objects of this world, and with which the relationships between these objects hold, nearly coincides with the degree of the objective truth. (bilikiewicz, 1928, 148) there are good reasons to say that bilikiewicz is an epistemological optimist. this fact is overshadowed by the skepticism which he expressed in his book on embryology and smaller works in the 1930s; however, this skepticism was related and practically confined to the humanities, and more particularly, to history. it was his realism that lied at the bottom of his disagreement with fleck — despite many striking similarities in their views. conclusion at the end of the day bilikiewicz concludes that his and fleck’s viewpoints are too far apart to continue the debate (1990b [1939b], 274). the discrepancy would not be easily visible without their polemics. on the other hand, this real disagreement over realism was merely the upshot of a not quite accurately addressed criticism. fleck was definitely mistaken if he thought that bilikiewicz was in any way sympathetic to the alethic relativists. and this was established. the answer to the question of whether bilikiewicz’s style of writing unintentionally supports a relativistic interpretation of his own views is rather subjective. it may be noted that a non-relativist rendition of fleck’s thought still represents a demanding challenge to fleck’s commentators. the complaint about the non-scientific slips in bilikiewicz’s book from an author whose style of writing could not find the approval of scientific philosophers from the lviv-warsaw school also calls to mind the biblical dictum medice, cura te ipsum. the more serious remark that stood behind it, namely, that general sociology offers a better framework for investigating the environmental influence on cognition, should be seen as a proposal that was considered and met with a rejection from bilikiewicz, who justified this decision by their different research goals. if bilikiewicz is right, then two of the other objections raised by fleck lose their importance. while from this perspective, their debate does indeed prove to be largely vacuous, it does have other merits. first, it definitely clarified bilikiewicz’s position on the realism/constructivism controversy. second, it gives the best but apparently still unrealized chance to interpret fleck’s teaching in a way that would permanently detach it from postmodern eisegeses. references sine auctoris, “iv zjazd polskich historyków i filozofów medycyny w krakowie”, polska gazeta lekarska, r. vii, nr 45 1928, 833–835 [“iv convention of polish historians and philosophers of medicine in cracow”, in polish (a report most likely written by bilikiewicz)]. biegański, władysław. logika medycyny, czyli krytyka poznania lekarskiego, warszawa: księgarnia e. wendego i s-ka, 1908, 2nd ed. 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polish]. szumowski, władysław. “filozofia medycyny jako przedmiot uniwersytecki”, przegląd filozoficzny, r. 23 1920, 278–294 [“philosophy of medicine as a university discipline”, in polish]. wölfflin, heinrich. principles of art history: the problem of the development of style in later art, new york: dover 1950 (kunstgeschichtliche grundbegriffe: das problem der stilentwicklung in der neueren kunst. bruckmann, münchen 1915). title of the paper [16 point font] © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. argumentative bullshit josé ángel gascón department of philosophy universidad católica del maule avenida san miguel 3605, talca chile jgascon@ucm.cl abstract: harry frankfurt characterised bullshit as assertions that are made without a concern for truth. assertions, however, are not the only type of speech act that can be bullshit. here, i propose the concept of argumentative bullshit and show how a speech acts account of bullshit assertions can be generalised to bullshit arguments. argumentative bullshit, on this account, would be the production of an argument without a concern for the supporting relation between reasons and claim. résumé: harry frankfurt a caractérisé les conneries comme des affirmations faites sans souci de la vérité. les affirmations, cependant, ne sont pas le seul type d'acte de parole qui peuvent être des conneries. ici, je propose le concept de conneries argumentatives et je montre comment l’explication des affirmations de conneries par les actes de parole peut s’appliquer à des arguments de conneries. avancer des conneries argumentatives, dans ce récit, serait la production d'un argument sans se soucier de la relation d’appui entre les raisons et leur conclusion. keywords: assertion, reasons, speech acts, supporting relation, truth 1. introduction it is often pointed out that there are a lot of bad arguments out there.1 people frequently assess opinions on the basis of irrelevant characteristics of the person who expresses them, draw strong conclusions from insufficient sets of data, and distort the meaning 1 in this paper, i will use the qualifiers “bad” and “good” as general terms that characterise the quality of arguments without committing myself to any specific view about the criteria of a good argument. for my purposes, it is immaterial whether the quality of arguments is conceptualised in terms of the acceptabilityrelevance-sufficiency criteria (johnson and blair 1994), of argumentation schemes correctly applied in a certain type of dialogue (walton 2013), or any other way. 290 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. of those standpoints with which they disagree, among many other argumentative blunders and tricks. in this article, i am not interested in these garden-variety cases of bad argumentation. rather, i would like to focus on a special case of bad argumentative performance, one that does not merely involve flawed arguments. the phenomenon that i will discuss here reveals a deeper flaw—or, rather, a deeper perversion of argumentative standards. the main difference between bad arguments and the kind of cases that i have in mind is, i believe, the following: in the face of a bad argument, it is generally appropriate to use a counterargument to point out its flaws. even if the arguer is so unskilled or obstinate that nothing will convince them that their argument is flawed, it makes sense in the context to expose those flaws. the reason is that the arguer is at least trying to put forward a good argument. they sincerely believe that their argument is good and should convince us, even if they are wrong. their efforts may be minimal, they may have lazily satisfied themselves with the first, manifestly inadequate argument that came to their mind, but they are genuinely presenting a reason in support of a claim. in this paper, however, i am not interested in such merely bad arguments. i will focus on cases in which it is not even possible to pin down an argument that can be plausibly attributed to the arguer. in those cases, the argumentative utterance is so problematic that we cannot even outline a plausible scheme for the purported argument in order to assess its quality. as a simple case of bad argument—the kind of arguments that will not concern me here—consider the following example from the popular tv series the simpsons.2 a bear is spotted roaming the streets of the small town of springfield—an unprecedented event. having received numerous complaints from frightened townspeople, the mayor decides to create a “bear patrol.” then, the following dialogue ensues between two of the protagonists of the series, homer and his daughter lisa: homer: not a bear in sight. the bear patrol must be working like a charm. 2 season 7, episode 23, “much apu about nothing.” argumentative bullshit 291 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. lisa: that’s specious reasoning, dad. homer: thank you, honey. lisa: by your logic i could claim that this rock keeps tigers away. homer: oh, how does it work? lisa: it doesn’t work. homer: uh-huh. lisa: it’s just a stupid rock. homer: uh-huh. lisa: but i don’t see any tigers around, do you? homer: lisa, i want to buy your rock. here, homer puts forward an argument to the effect that the current absence of bears shows that the bear patrol is working. it is a bad argument because it attempts to establish a relation of causality by pointing to a single instance of the presence of a bear patrol and the absence of bears, while historically there has been no such correlation—there had never been either bears or bear patrols. lisa tries to show this to her father with her analogy of the “anti-tiger” rock, albeit with little success. nevertheless, the important point here is that lisa’s counterargument is relevant and appropriate: homer genuinely pretends to support a claim with a reason and lisa’s analogy shows why homer’s attempt fails. consider now a different example of poor argumentation. in june 2020, in the midst of the covid-19 pandemic, there was a public hearing in palm beach county (florida) to discuss a mandate for wearing masks in public. several residents intervened with anti-mask arguments that went viral on the internet. here are a couple of the most remarkable arguments: i don’t wear a mask for the same reason i don’t wear underwear— things gotta breathe.3 they want to throw god’s wonderful breathing system out the door. you’re all turning your backs on it.4 3https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/i-dont-wear-a-mask-for-the-samereason-i-dont-wear-underwear-anti-maskers-in-us-warn-of-satanism-pedophilia 4https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-53178251/they-want-to-throwgod-s-wonderful-breathing-system-out https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/i-dont-wear-a-mask-for-the-same-reason-i-dont-wear-underwear-anti-maskers-in-us-warn-of-satanism-pedophilia https://www.freepressjournal.in/world/i-dont-wear-a-mask-for-the-same-reason-i-dont-wear-underwear-anti-maskers-in-us-warn-of-satanism-pedophilia https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-53178251/they-want-to-throw-god-s-wonderful-breathing-system-out https://www.bbc.com/news/av/world-us-canada-53178251/they-want-to-throw-god-s-wonderful-breathing-system-out 292 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. these are, as in our previous example, very bad arguments, but there is a slight yet crucial difference: how could we possibly respond to them? one cannot avoid the feeling that a reasonable counterargument, similar to lisa’s, would be very awkward. would it have really been necessary to point out to the first arguer that we do not “breathe” through our genitals in the same sense that we “breathe” through our mouth and nose? and did the second arguer really need the explanation that protecting our respiratory system with a mask is not throwing “god’s wonderful breathing system out the door,” just as wearing sunglasses is not throwing our visual system out the door? there would have been something odd in those responses, not only because, in all likelihood, the arguers were not unaware of that information, but also because the counterarguments seem to miss the point. they are treating seriously arguments that were not designed to argue in a serious and responsible manner. the oddity of engaging in thorough argument in those cases resembles, i believe, the awkwardness of responding “what evidence do you have?” to a neighbour who has casually remarked in the elevator that the weather will be nice tomorrow. sure, the neighbour has made an assertion, and every assertion commits the speaker to the truth of its propositional content, but it would be a mistake to take it as a serious assertion. small talk hardly counts as a language game in which epistemic norms should be respected. sometimes, however, in contexts that call for epistemic responsibility, people also make assertions without committing themselves to the truth of their propositional content, just as our neighbour in the elevator. one can detect those cases because, in spite of the context, it feels odd to ask the speaker for evidence or to challenge the truth of the proposition asserted. i believe that something similar happens in the example of the anti-maskers: it would feel odd to put forward counterarguments. in that case, however, the problem lies in their arguments rather than their assertions. even if they are seriously committed to their opposition to masks, the antimaskers’ arguments do not seem to be serious arguments. there is a well-known term for assertions that disregard the norm of truth: bullshit. as we will see in the next section, the bullshitter is unconcerned about whether the assertions they are argumentative bullshit 293 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. making are true or false. the assertions may be true as a matter of fact, but that is irrelevant to them. in that respect, they are unlike a liar: lies are assertions that are believed to be false. bullshit is not always objectionable, it is common and acceptable in certain circumstances, such as the example of the elevator; however, very often it is. here i want to argue that a similar concept can fruitfully be applied to argumentation. briefly put, argumentative bullshit could be the production of reasons for a claim without regard to whether the reasons given really support that claim. this is different from sophisms, which are argumentative tactics used to deceive an audience, from paralogisms, which are errors of reasoning (walton 2013, p. 216), and also from simply bad arguments that are put forward sincerely. whoever tries to deceive or makes a mistake in argumentation is still taking into account the supporting relation between reasons and claim, just as those who lie or who mistakenly make a false assertion are taking into account the norm of truth. the argumentative bullshitter, on the other hand, does not care about the supporting relation. that is the difference between the simpsons and the anti-maskers examples. homer is a very bad reasoner, but he sincerely believes that he is putting forward a good argument. anti-maskers, however, are simply using humour and religious appeals without considering whether they themselves even see their reasons as good grounds for their claim. in the following sections, i will sketch out the details of the concept of argumentative bullshit. first, in section 2, i will discuss the notion of bullshit as it was outlined by harry frankfurt, and i will propose a speech acts approach. then, in section 3, i will show how that concept, which was originally related to assertions, could be adapted to arguments. the most promising way to do that, i will argue, is to conceptualise arguments as speech acts. through several examples, i hope to show that argumentative bullshit can be distinguished from mere bad or weak arguments, just as bullshit is distinct from lies. 294 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. 2. the concept of bullshit in a very brief essay, frankfurt (2005) proposed a theory of the common and widely used word “bullshit.” bullshit, he argued, is an assertion that does not purport to represent how the world really is. assertions, such as “the weather will be nice tomorrow” or “the major cause of tides is the moon’s gravitational pull,” are supposed to describe parts of reality, but bullshit dispenses with that requirement altogether. this is the essence of bullshit, according to frankfurt (p. 33): “lack of connection to a concern with truth.” whoever produces bullshit does not care whether they are providing an accurate description of reality—they are not using assertions the way they are meant to be used. bullshitting, however, is not merely lying. the bullshitter is undoubtedly faking something, and that is what makes it problematic, but unlike the liar, the bullshitter is not interested in covering up some truth. rather, what the bullshitter fakes is their attitude towards reality. as frankfurt puts it: the fact about himself that the bullshitter hides, on the other hand, is that the truth-values of his statements are of no central interest to him; what we are not to understand is that his intention is neither to report the truth nor to conceal it (2005, p. 55). on some occasions, an assertion produced as bullshit might turn out to be true after all, but that is irrelevant to its characterisation as bullshit. what matters is that the speaker is not using assertions the way they are supposed to be used: as representations of the world. in a way, liars at least take into account the truth-value of assertions, if only to deceive about them. a person must believe that they know the truth in order to lie. bullshitters, on the other hand, are completely uninterested in truth. as frankfurt says, “the essence of bullshit is not that it is false but that it is phony” (2005, p. 47). he explains this difference with an illuminating metaphor: someone who lies and someone who tells the truth are playing on opposite sides, so to speak, in the same game. each responds to the facts as he understands them, although the response of the one argumentative bullshit 295 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. is guided by the authority of the truth, while the response of the other defies that authority and refuses to meet its demands. the bullshitter ignores these demands altogether. he does not reject the authority of the truth, as the liar does, and oppose himself to it. he pays no attention to it at all. by virtue of this, bullshit is a greater enemy of the truth than lies are (2005, pp. 60-61). nonetheless, bullshit is tolerated and even encouraged in many contexts of interpersonal relations where truth is not the main concern. these are usually contexts in which politeness trumps truth, as in the elevator example that we saw in the introduction. for other examples, consider what happens when people get presents that they do not like and must show gratitude, when people have to apologise for an action that they do not regret doing, when people say to a friend in distress that “everything’s going to be ok,” or when a company tells each of its clients “we care about you.” all of that is bullshit, no doubt, but our societies approve of it. the problem, of course, is that bullshit is very often not that innocuous. it is produced in contexts in which truth does matter. politics is usually the first domain that comes to mind when one thinks about pernicious bullshit. as hardcastle and reisch (2006) point out in the preface to their edited collection of essays on bullshit, when frankfurt was presenting his book, everybody was thinking of the claims, made by supporters of the invasion of iraq, that iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction and that it was involved in the terrorist attacks of september 11th, 2001. moreover, not only politicians but also all of us produce bullshit. according to frankfurt, our current democracies encourage bullshit because of the “widespread conviction that it is the responsibility of a citizen in a democracy to have opinions about everything” (2005, pp. 63–64), even though it is not possible to have reliable evidence about everything. the result is a continuous flow of factual claims in our societies whose purpose is alignment with a political party or movement, moral grandstanding (tosi and warmke 2016), or practical interests—anything but truth. even in academic contexts, claims can be suspected to be bullshit when, for example, they are factual claims for which it is impossible to find real evidence. cohen illustrates this with a quote by david miller: “of course, 296 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. everyone spends much more time thinking about sex now than people did a hundred years ago” (2006, p. 131). now, as i said, i want to adapt this concept of bullshit to arguments rather than assertions. as we will see in the next section, this requires sustaining the notion that bullshit arguments are not used as they are meant to be used, just as bullshit assertions are not used with a concern for truth. for this analogy to be successful, we need a clear view of how assertions relate to truth so that a similar relation can be defined between arguments and their point, their purpose, their function, or whatever that relationship consists in. is it that the function of assertions is to represent reality? relying on a functional relation would be problematic both for assertions and arguments. the idea that assertions have a function would be very controversiali for one would not want to endorse it. assertions serve a variety of functions. one could perhaps say that the essential function of assertions is to convey information, and that idea may seem appealing because it links assertions to truth. however, very often the main function of an assertion is not to convey information, even though it is appropriately related to truth; instead, it may be to warn, to entertain, to make acquaintances, to pass an exam, to protest, and so on. so it seems that assertions do not have a definite function and, for similar reasons, the same can be said of a goal or a purpose. as for arguments, admittedly the notion that they have a function or purpose has proven to be more appealing. johnson (2000, p. 149), for instance, argues that the study of arguments must be based on their function, which—according to him—is persuading someone of the truth of something by producing reasons that support the claim in question. pragma-dialecticians have also proposed that the function of argumentative moves is to “contribute constructively to the resolution of a difference of opinion” (eemeren 2018, p. 29). however, this functional approach to arguments is not universally accepted, and goodwin (2007) has presented a strong case that arguments have no specific function. therefore, it would be better not to rely on such a doubtful idea as the function of arguments or assertions. what we need is a relatively uncontroversial account of the link between assertions and truth, one that can also be plausibly applied argumentative bullshit 297 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. to arguments. a promising approach is to focus on the constitutive conditions of speech acts: truth figures prominently in the essential condition of assertion, constitutive rules of speech acts do not preclude different uses or purposes, and—as we will see in the next section—arguments can be analysed as speech acts as well. the essential condition is what identifies a speech act, what makes it an instance of that type of speech act. in the case of assertions, these belong to the category of representatives, and searle proposed that the essential condition of representatives is that they “commit the speaker (in varying degrees) to something’s being the case, to the truth of the expressed proposition” (1976, p. 10). many later treatments of assertion have held that there is a norm of assertion which involves truth in one or another form. for example, williamson (2000, p. 243) argues that assertion is governed by the rule that one should only assert what one knows5 and, according to lackey (2007), the rule is that one should only assert what is reasonable to believe.6 in brandom’s (1994) theory, whoever makes an assertion commits themselves to the truth of that assertion, which aligns closely with searle’s idea of commitment. assertions, then, are a type of speech act that is inherently connected to truth, even if they can be used for a variety of purposes. an assertion made without any concern for its truth is, in a sense, a bluff or a phony thing (frankfurt 2005, pp. 46–47). the bullshitter, in this view, would be an asserter who does not honour the essential condition of assertion because they refuse to commit themselves to the truth of their assertions. this may sound paradoxical: how could an assertion be made if the essential condition—that is, what identifies assertions—is not fulfilled? it may seem that, if the essential condition is not fulfilled, there is simply no assertion.7 the solution to this puzzle, i believe, lies in the public character of the commitment to which the essential condition of representatives refers. whether or not a speaker is committed to the truth of a proposition does not depend solely on their intentions but also, importantly, to the way their utterances are taken by their audience. if an utterance is seen as an 5 knowledge, as is well known, implies truth. 6 believing simply means taking as true. 7 i am very grateful to an anonymous reviewer for raising this important point. 298 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. assertion by their listeners, i would regard the essential condition of representatives as fulfilled—the speaker is indeed committed to the truth of the propositional content. the problem with bullshit, then, would be that the speaker themselves does not acknowledge such commitment. the speech act has been made but the speaker does not take responsibility for its pragmatic consequences. in that sense, the speech act is defective. notice also that bullshit does not merely involve a violation of the sincerity condition of assertion, which requires that the speaker believe the proposition asserted (searle 1976, p. 10). liars obviously violate the sincerity condition, but what happens with bullshitters is, i believe, more complex. bullshitters’ lack of concern for the truth of the propositional content of their assertions results, as i argued, in their refusal to commit themselves to them. what this means is, among other things, that they will not stand by their assertions, will not respond to challenges made to their assertions, and will not even attempt to provide evidence. a liar can respond to challenges and provide evidence and still be a liar. the problem with bullshit, therefore, lies in the speaker’s refusal to honour their commitments. it is a lack of seriousness rather than a lack of sincerity. such an account of bullshit avoids one problem. frankfurt argued that bullshitters show a lack of concern for truth, but what truth? surely some truths matter to them—bullshitters do not necessarily disregard truth in general. advertisers, for example, produce a lot of bullshit when they speak about the virtues of their products, but they are no doubt interested in how well their products are selling, whether or not the public is “buying” their bullshit, and so on. the speech acts account gives a simple answer: “bullshit” is a term that applies to specific assertions when they are produced without concern for the truth of their propositional content.8 8 notice that this view would also allow us to characterise as bullshit not only assertions but also other types of speech acts. bullshit promises can be promises in which the speaker does not regard themselves as committed to perform the action in question—even if they intend to do it and therefore fulfil the sincerity condition. bullshit orders can be orders in which the speaker does not expect the listener to perform the action in question—even if they want the listener to do it. argumentative bullshit 299 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. now, how can we tell when that is happening? we do not have direct access to other people’s beliefs and intentions, so we must find some guidelines to know when an assertion has been made without concern for the truth of its propositional content. even though i do not believe that necessary and sufficient conditions for bullshit can be found, we can still identify some indications of the likely presence of bullshit: • the question of whether the assertion is true or false is met with perplexity. (this would be an extreme, and probably uncommon, form of bullshit.) • when asked for evidence for the assertion, the speaker refuses to provide it. • evidence contrary to the asserted fact is disregarded outright by the speaker. • the assertion is so unclear or vague that its propositional content cannot be determined.9 • the assertion plays no role in the speaker’s actual practical reasoning. • the assertion is manifestly incoherent with other assertions of the speaker or with her behaviour. as i said, these are just clues. if, for example, the speaker refuses to give evidence for an assertion, they might simply be intellectually arrogant; or, if the speaker disregards contrary evidence, they might simply be dogmatic. nevertheless, taken as guidelines, i richardson (2006) comes very close to this idea when he talks about “performative bullshit.” according to him, performative bullshit takes place when a commitment—a promise, say—is seen as fulfilled simply because it was uttered. thus, it “has the form of a commitment, but it is not a real commitment” (p. 93). and he adds that “the realm of performative bullshit goes well beyond commitments of various sorts” (p. 94). he remarks that it also includes arguments, as when “performative bullshit directs that an argument be taken as a good argument by virtue of having been offered as a good argument” (p. 94). this conception of bullshit as purportedly self-fulfilling is not, however, the characterisation that i am endorsing here, which is more faithful to frankfurt’s original account. 9 this mirrors cohen’s (2006) characterisation of bullshit as “unclarifiable unclarity,” which he regards as a different kind of bullshit from frankfurt’s. 300 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. believe they can be useful to detect bullshit assertions. let us see now how all this can be applied to arguments. 3. bullshitting in arguments argumentative bullshit takes place in arguments rather than bare assertions. when an arguer puts forward an argument, i believe it is safe to say that they commits themselves to two aspects of the argument: the truth of the reasons and the supporting relation between the reasons and the claim.10 let us focus for a moment on the truth of reasons. given that reasons are assertions, an arguer who puts forward an argument commits themselves to the truth of those assertions. argumentative bullshit regarding reasons, then, would involve an arguer being unwilling to commit themselves to the truth of certain assertions. this is simply frankfurt’s concept of bullshit, which we saw in the previous section. therefore, this kind of argumentative bullshit can be reduced to regular bullshit, and for this reason i will leave it aside. the kind of argumentative bullshit that i find most interesting has to do with the supporting relation between a reason and a claim. in what follows, i will use the term “argumentative bullshit” to refer only to that specific kind. as i explained in the introduction, argumentative bullshit in this sense is different from bad (even very bad) arguments. the problem is rather that it is difficult to ascertain whether there is a serious argument there. it may be that the purported argument is so manifestly flawed or incoherent that it seems implausible that the arguer themselves would seriously endorse it. in his reply to frankfurt’s essay, cohen (2006) proposes additional kinds of bullshit based on certain features of the text or utterance. he says: “unclarifiable unclarity is one such feature. rubbish, in the sense of arguments that are grossly deficient either in logic or in sensitivity to empirical evidence, is another” (p. 131). the point that i want to emphasise here is that some arguments are so grossly deficient precisely because the arguer does not care about the relationship between the reasons and the claim. that would also explain the arguers’ refusal to 10 i thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out to me the importance of the truth of reasons. argumentative bullshit 301 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. maintain a reasonable argumentative exchange—as we will see— for they were never interested in supporting claims in the first place. in the previous section, i argued that the problem with bullshit assertions is that speakers utter them without honouring the essential condition of the speech act or the norm of commitment to truth. as it happens, arguments have also been analysed as speech acts, and therefore, a similar account of argumentative bullshit can be offered. eemeren and grootendorst (1984), founders of the pragma-dialectical theory, first proposed the idea that argumentation can be characterised as an “illocutionary act complex.” it is complex because it is composed of elementary speech acts— assertions, which function as reasons that support a standpoint. just as searle did with elementary speech acts, eemeren and grootendorst proposed an essential condition for the speech act of argumentation. in fact, they proposed two essential conditions, one for pro-argumentation: advancing the constellation of statements s1, s2,..., sn counts as an attempt by s to justify o to l’s satisfaction, i.e. to convince l of the acceptability of o (p. 43). where s is the speaker, l is the listener, o is an expressed opinion, and s1, s2,..., sn are a constellation of statements. the second essential condition is proposed for contra-argumentation: advancing the constellation of statements s1, s2,..., sn counts as an attempt by s to refute o to l’s satisfaction, i.e. to convince l of the unacceptability of o (eemeren and grootendorst 1984, p.43). bermejo-luque (2011), following in eemeren and grootendorst’s footsteps, characterises argumentation as a second order speech act complex, which is constituted by a speech act of adducing (reasons) and a speech act of concluding (a standpoint). each of these speech acts has an essential condition, and the speech act complex of argumentation includes the essential conditions of both of its components. thus, the essential conditions of argumentation are: 302 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. 1. adducing r with such and such pragmatic force is a means to show that a target-claim c is correct. 2. s aims to show that a target-claim c is correct (p. 72). r stands for the reasons and s is the speaker. for reasons of simplicity and convenience, let us adopt bermejo-luque’s version of the essential conditions of arguments.11 moreover, for the purposes of characterising argumentative bullshit, we should focus on condition 1—arguably, if condition 2 is not fulfilled, then the speaker is not even pretending to argue. i will suggest just a couple of modifications to condition 1. first, in order to preserve my intuition that argumentative bullshit has to do with a lack of concern for the supporting relation, let us use that phrase instead of referring to the correctness of the target-claim. and second, i believe that the condition should refer to the speaker’s commitment to the belief that such reasons support that claim, rather than to whether they in fact support it or not. this is because, in bermejoluque’s formulation of condition 1, bad arguments—those in which the reasons are not really means to show that the claim is correct—would not even count as arguments. hence, essential condition 1 for arguments could be something like this: 1. adducing reasons r with such and such pragmatic force commits the speaker to the belief that r supports a targetclaim c. now, let us assume that the speaker fulfils essential condition 2, and can therefore plausibly be regarded as arguing for a claim. this can usually be determined by context—facts such as that a disagreement has emerged and that a decision has to be made, for example. however, even though the arguer has produced something in the form of a reason, they do not seem committed to the belief that such a reason supports such a claim—either the arguer expressly refuses that commitment, or it is not plausible to attribute it to them. in that case, what we have is argumentative bullshit. 11 notice that both the pragma-dialecticians and bermejo-luque speak about the speech act of argumentation, but i will use the term “argument” here. argumentative bullshit 303 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. it might be that the arguer is so manifestly incoherent that they cannot be regarded as really committed to the belief in the supporting relation. other times, the purported supporting relation would be so clearly absurd that it seems implausible to attribute it to the arguer. this was the case with the anti-maskers’ arguments mentioned in the introduction. just imagine how implausible it would be to interpret the first of those interventions as something like the following argument: the fact that genitals need to breathe is a good reason not to wear underwear. the upper airways are similar to the genitals in this respect. therefore, there is a good reason not to wear a mask. for another example, recall donald trump’s famous controversial announcement in 2017 that the usa would withdraw from the paris agreement.12 among several reasons he offered—which, regardless of whether they were good or bad, could at least be seen as genuine attempts to support his decision—he said: “i was elected to represent the citizens of pittsburgh, not paris.” this cannot be plausibly interpreted as a serious reason—even trump knew that the paris agreement was not about the citizens of paris. the most plausible interpretation, i submit, is that it was argumentative bullshit. thus, we can see here that there is a fundamental difference between argumentative bullshit and bad arguments. bad arguments are arguments after all, but it is characteristic of argumentative bullshit that it typically cannot be plausibly interpreted as an argument to which the arguer is willing to commit themselves. bullshit arguments are not real arguments; they are vaguely related claims whose point is rather to make a humorous pun, to appeal to religious or political sentiments, to portray oneself in a good light, or to denigrate the interlocutor, among many other possible purposes. 12 https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/trump-standswith-pittsburgh-but-mayor-says-hes-with-paris/2092378/ https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/trump-stands-with-pittsburgh-but-mayor-says-hes-with-paris/2092378/ https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/news/national-international/trump-stands-with-pittsburgh-but-mayor-says-hes-with-paris/2092378/ 304 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. the notion of argumentative bullshit, i believe, solves one problem that theorists often face when trying to interpret flagrant instances of defective argumentation. sometimes, it seems to me, it would be necessary to force argumentative moves such as threats, appeals to emotions, or ad hominem attacks into an implausible interpretation so that they fit the scheme of this or that fallacy. at the very least, i believe that this is dangerously likely to happen when analysing actual, real-world arguments—as opposed to the classic made-up textbook examples. the result can be a representation of an argument that bears little resemblance to what the arguer actually said, and that it hardly makes sense to attribute to the arguer. consider, for instance, the ad hominem argument. according to walton (1998) the generic scheme of the ad hominem is: a is a bad person. therefore, a’s argument α should not be accepted (p. 112) however, it seems to me unlikely that all the arguers who make what resembles an illegitimate ad hominem move commit themselves to an argument of that or a similar form. sometimes— perhaps often—personal attacks are not presented as reasons that support a claim on the basis of a plausible warrant but as mere comments or innuendos. something wrong has clearly been done, but interpreting it as an argument feels like a misrepresentation. the problem here is one that hamblin already saw: person a makes statement s: person b says ‘it was c who told you that, and i happen to know that his mother-in law is living in sin with a russian’: a objects, ‘the falsity of s does not follow from any facts about the morals of c’s mother-in-law; that is an argumentum ad hominem’: b may reply “i did not claim that it followed. i simply made a remark about incidentals of the statement's history. draw what conclusion you like. if the cap fits…” this would be disingenuous, but the point remains that b cannot be convicted of fallacy until he can have an argument pinned on him (1970, pp. 224–25). argumentative bullshit 305 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. when something like that happens, there is a way to conceptualise the wrongness of the move without interpreting it implausibly as an argument: the arguer is just bullshitting. finally, consider those cases in which an arguer puts forward something as a reason but is simply incapable of elaborating on it or supporting it when required. faced with critical questioning, the arguer simply cannot show how their alleged reason supports her claim. as a result, the critical discussion gets stuck. i believe this tends to happen with arguments that are heard and repeated without a proper understanding of what they mean—especially when popular slogans are used as reasons. think of those people who, in order to defend or undermine a specific claim, simply blurt out slogans like “not everything is in the books,” “just because you can't prove it doesn't mean it isn't true,” or “absence of evidence is not evidence of absence.” if they are simply repeating them without having any idea how they apply to the case at hand, then that is argumentative bullshit. recently, a striking example of this kind of bullshit—albeit not one involving slogans—appeared on the tv programme “the late show.” the host, stephen colbert, was interviewing kamala harris, running mate of the democratic presidential candidate joe biden. colbert pointed out that harris had been extremely critical of biden during the primary debates:13 colbert: in those debates you landed haymakers on joe biden. i mean, his teeth were like chiclets all over the stage and now i believe you that you’re fully supportive of him. how does that transition happen? how do you go from being such a passionate opponent on such bedrock principles for you, and now you guys seem to be pals? harris: it was a debate. colbert: not everybody landed punches like you did though. harris: it was a debate! colbert: so you don’t mean it? harris: it was a debate! literally, it was a debate. 13https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/08/17/kamala_harris_dismisses _past_biden_criticism_it_was_a_debate.html https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/08/17/kamala_harris_dismisses_past_biden_criticism_it_was_a_debate.html https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2020/08/17/kamala_harris_dismisses_past_biden_criticism_it_was_a_debate.html 306 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. notice how harris is unable to provide any satisfactory answer to colbert’s critical questioning beyond simply repeating the same line over and over again. here, it is not even clear what claim harris is defending. it is safe to say that she is trying to justify her behaviour, but beyond that, nothing more specific can be said. she refuses to commit herself to more concrete claims, such as “i did not mean it.” her answer, therefore, seems to be argumentative bullshit. in conclusion, just as with bullshit assertions, certain guidelines can be outlined to detect the likely presence of argumentative bullshit. here, as in the case of bullshit assertions, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions that uniquely identify argumentative bullshit—it is, after all, a matter of context and interpretation—but i believe that the following factors are strongly indicative of it: • the warrant that would be necessary to support the purported argument is a belief that would be very implausible to attribute to the arguer—or the arguer explicitly refuses to commit herself to it. • when critically questioned about the supporting relation between reasons and claim, the arguer refuses to discuss it. • counterexamples or, in general, evidence contrary to the supporting relation are disregarded outright by the speaker. • the purported argument is manifestly incoherent with other arguments presented by the same arguer. 4. conclusion a speech acts account of bullshit allows us to generalise the concept beyond assertions. here, i have proposed a way to apply it to argumentation. i have explained how, far from being a bizarre theoretical curiosity, the concept of argumentative bullshit allows us to interpret more faithfully certain argumentative moves that it is not easy to see as arguments. in my view, just as commitment to truth is essential to assertions, commitment to the supporting argumentative bullshit 307 © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. relation is essential to arguments. a lack of concern for the supporting relation is what characterises argumentative bullshit. once we know what argumentative bullshit is, what can be done to address such a problem in argumentation? i do not think it would be a good idea to shout “bullshit!” every time we think our partner in an argument is bullshitting. first, as i insisted, there are no necessary and sufficient conditions for bullshit, so its identification is always a matter of context and interpretation. there are no hard-and-fast rules here. what seemed at first sight to be argumentative bullshit may turn out to be a serious argument after all. and, secondly, nothing good can come out of an accusation of bullshit. it is an obviously offensive term, and such an accusation is very unlikely to bring a discussion back on track—it is more likely to derail the discussion completely. what, then, is the appropriate response to argumentative bullshit? in the introduction i remarked that when an arguer produces argumentative bullshit, it feels odd to counterargue. it would be as if you do not get a joke. it feels too strict. i believe, however, that that is exactly what we should do. someone should have asked the anti-maskers whether they seriously believed that the genitals and the upper airways are similar in that respect. someone should have asked trump whether he believed that the paris agreement was about the citizens of paris. what we should do, then, is what colbert did when he insisted that harris should explain what “it was a debate” meant. when we suspect that our interlocutor is producing argumentative bullshit, we should take it seriously and challenge it. that way, our interlocutor’s unwillingness to engage in a serious argument will be exposed. and, if it turns out that it was not argumentative bullshit but a serious argument, nothing is lost—we have already taken it seriously and the discussion will continue without disturbance. acknowledgements this research was possible thanks to the postdoctoral scholarship fondecyt n. 3190149 of anid/conicyt, and also to the project pgc2018-095941b-100, “prácticas argumentativas y 308 gascón © josé ángel gascón. informal logic, vol. 41, no. 3 (2021), pp. 289–308. pragmática de las razones,” of the spanish ministerio de ciencia, innovación y universidades – agencia estatal de investigación. references bermejo-luque, lilian. 2011. giving reasons: a linguistic-pragmatic approach to argumentation theory. springer. brandom, robert b. 1994. making it explicit: reasoning, representing and discursive commitment. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. cohen, g. a. 2006. deeper into bullshit. in bullshit and philosophy, eds. gary l. hardcastle and george a. reisch. chicago: open court. eemeren, frans h. van. 2018. argumentation theory: a pragmadialectical perspective. springer. eemeren, frans h. van and rob grootendorst. 1984. speech acts in argumentative discussions. dordrecht: foris publications. frankfurt, harry g. 2005. on bullshit. princeton, new jersey: princeton university press. goodwin, jean. 2007. argument has no function. informal logic 27(1): 69–90. hamblin, charles l. 1970. fallacies. newport news, va: vale press. hardcastle, gary l. and george a. reisch, eds. 2006. bullshit and philosophy. chicago: open court. johnson, ralph h. 2000. manifest rationality: a pragmatic theory of argument. mahwah, nj: lawrence erlbaum associates. johnson, ralph h. and j. anthony blair. 1994. logical self-defense. new york: mcgraw-hill. lackey, jennifer. 2007. norms of assertion. noûs. 41(4): 594–626. richardson, alan. 2006. performing bullshit and the post-sincere condition. in bullshit and philosophy, eds. gary l. hardcastle and george a. reisch. chicago: open court. searle, john r. 1976. a classification of illocutionary acts. language in society 5(1): 1–23. tosi, justin and brandon warmke. 2016. moral grandstanding. philosophy & public affairs 44(3): 197–217. walton, douglas. 1998. ad hominem arguments. tuscaloosa: university of alabama press. walton, douglas. 2013. methods of argumentation. new york: cambridge university press. williamson, timothy. 2000. knowledge and its limits. new york: oxford university press. instructions for ispacs 2003 camera-ready manuscript elsya: journal of english language studies vol. 1, no. 2, june 2019, pp. 45-49 available online at: http://ojs.journal.unilak.ac.id/index.php/elsya 45 insight into the theory of truth from the lens of five review articles farni wulandari 1 ,cendy lauren 2 , and anggi resti rahmadani 3 1 applied linguistics center, pekanbaru, indonesia 2 high school 2 tambang, pekanbaru, indonesia 3 vocational high school 3 pekanbaru, indonesia farniwulandari@gmail.com article history received : 1 april 2019 revised : 17 april 2019 accepted : 27 may 2019 keywords truth critique linguistics theory difference of perspectives meaning abstract as a central philosophical subject, the discourse of truth has existed for thousands of years. one of the most influential theories of truth is james & katz (1975) book entitled “the meaning of truth.” this study aims to analyze the different views on the theory of truth from five articles that have reviewed the theory. this study used a descriptive qualitative method to review these five articles, which serve as the data that this study analyzed. the textual analysis identified and classified the different opinions of other researchers who have reviewed the theory in detail. additionally, this paper also reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of these five review articles that served as a benchmark in reviewing the theory of truth. 1. introduction researchers have theorized the matter of truth for a millennium, that it is almost impossible to cover the wholesome nuance of truth in one booklet alone one article. words held many meanings in whatever form they take the appearance of (derin et al., 2019). what makes words so much more interesting is that context makes the truth of word meanings very different from first glance, even when it is written in seemingly plain terms (bates, lane, & lange, 1993; englebretsen, 2017). the theme of a writing piece can significantly change the meaning of the words it contains (davidson, 2000; fischer, halbach, kriener, & stern, 2015). the branch of science that studies the meaning of words is known as semantics. kamp (1981) has explained meaning as two different concepts that dominate semantics. the first is how meaning is seen as the determiner of truth. the second is how meaning is what a language user obtains when they understand the words that they see or hear. these two concepts have influenced many disciplines, including the field of education (kendler, 2015). with this in mind, this study is interested in a particular psychologist‟s conception of truth. to be specific, the harvard medical school graduate, william james, who is primarily known for his publications on „truth‟. in this article, a lot of controversies that makes many people interested in reviewing the theory developed by a figure known as the father of this psychologist. this time the author uses a qualitative descriptive method to review at least five articles that have been reviewed by several authors to find out what theorists are more definite about the truth stated by william james. this writing is also motivated by the problems developed in writing articles that serve as a benchmark in writing this article. in writing this article, the writer develops the strengths and weaknesses of the articles that are reviewed by several authors in other articles that serve as a benchmark in writing this article. in a famous article, james put forward a theory of truth, but unlike peirce's argument, discusses the practical role used by the concept of truth. james also asserted truth represented belief: true belief is a satisfying belief, in a certain sense. however, unlike peirce james suggested that what can be satisfying cannot be released and cannot be forced, namely: how they will discuss and investigate what is going on. in a lecture published as “pragmatism new names for some old ways of thinking: a new name for some old ways of thinking” (1907), james wrote: “ideas ... become true just in so far as they help us get into satisfactory relations with other parts of our experience, to summarize them and get about them by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the constant succession of particular phenomena.” james & katz (1975: 34). in the meaning of truth, he multiplies by quoting a lot and noting that "when pragmatists speak of truth, they and their ideas, namely their workability" (james & katz, 1975: 6). james's point is that from a practical point of view, we use the concept of truth to signal our belief in certain ideas or beliefs. true beliefs are actionable beliefs, which are reliable, and that lead to predictable results. further speculation is the disturbance that is not any good. elsya: journal of english language studies vol. 1, no. 2, june 2019, pp. 45-49 available online at: http://ojs.journal.unilak.ac.id/index.php/elsya 46 2. method this method of this study is a qualitative description. this is chosen because of its ease of enabling researchers to simultaneously collect data and analyze said data. this method is used to look at the five articles that have reviewed the theory of truth that william james conceptualized. these five articles are then analyzed with textual analysis, which is a methodology that lets researchers interpret the language in the text. this analysis method is chosen in order to gain information regarding how the authors of each article view james‟ theory of truth. 3. results & discussion in his 1907 book pragmatism, james described empirically, nominalist, positivist and utilitarian inspiration of his pragmatic philosophy, which in many places in his works he described as radical empiricism: "pragmatism represents a very familiar attitude in philosophy, empirical attitude, but according to his i, that represents it, both in a more radical form and in a less pleasant form than he had ever assumed. a pragmatist turns his back firmly and again because of many habits that are favoured by professional philosophers. he turned away from abstraction and shortcomings, from verbal solutions, from a priori terrible reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and absolute presence and origin. he turned to concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards actions and power. that means an obedient empirical temperament and a rationalist temper to give up sincerely. for example, agreeing with nominalism, always appealing to special things; with utilitarianism in emphasizing the practical aspects; with positivism in contempt of verbal solutions, useless questions and metaphysical abstractions. there has not been a specific result, so far, but only an attitude of orientation is what the pragmatic method means. the attitude of looking away from the first things, principles, „categories,‟ supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts. regarding james's pragmatic truth theory, frank thilly and ledger wood wrote: "pragmatism is a method of determining the truth or falsity of propositions that are appropriate because they fulfil or do not meet our goals and meet our biological and emotional needs; the true proposition is the acceptance that leads to success, the wrong proposition is the proposition that results in failure and frustration. in introducing a reference to satisfaction, usefulness, practicality and role in the definition of truth, james drastically changed the pattern of pragmatism from pierce's more intellectual formulation. "the test, then, of a theory, a belief, a doctrine, must affect us, its practical consequences. this is a pragmatic test. always ask yourself what the difference will be in your experience whether you accept materialism or idealism, determinism or free will, monism or pluralism, atheism or theism. on the one hand, it is the doctrine of despair; on the other hand, the doctrine of hope. „regarding pragmatic principles, if god's hypothesis works satisfactorily, in the broadest sense of the word, that is true. 'test of truth, then, that is the practical consequence; ownership of truth is not an end in itself, but only an initial means for other vital satisfaction. knowledge is an instrument; it exists for life, not a life for knowledge. in the famous pragmatic words, the advocate of humanism fcs schiller: "pragmatism writes essays to trace the actual 'making of truth', the actual ways in which discrimination between right and wrong is done, and stems from generalizations about methods of determining nature truth. from such empirical observations, the doctrine is obtained that when a statement claims the truth, the consequences are always used to test its claim. for pragmatism, "truth" is not permanent, necessary, universal, objective or absolute; on the contrary, "truth," for pragmatists, is basically relative, special, temporary, changeable, subjective. in pragmatism, the understanding of any proposition, and therefore its truth or falsity, must be judged by the mental habits it causes, the effect it has on the action, and the pragmatic value or work. in pragmatism, the truth or the value of knowledge of a particular proposition has no insight that should give us into things, but rather its beneficial relationship with human life. therefore, a pragmatic insult to traditional metaphysics or ontology. for pragmatists, religious beliefs, like all beliefs, have truth values in their level of use for human life and well-being. therefore, pragmatism is more than a method; instead, it is a doctrine, theory of knowledge or a kind of epistemology, philosophy. in the pragmatic world, if individual judgments, or assumptions, or axioms, or postulates, or theories, or systems of thought "work," and meet our psychological, emotional, or social needs, then, to the extent and so long as this applies, it is useful, valuable, and "right." james wrote in his pragmatism: "true ideas are ideas that we can assimilate, validate, strengthen, and verify. james argues that "every idea that will bring us to prosper from one part of our experience to another, connect things satisfactorily, work safely, save the workforce, is true to so many, true in so far, true in terms of instrumental. for james, "an idea is not just a mirror or passive reflection of reality; it is a habit of acting in a certain way, and because it is a plan or guide for our actions. if we follow elsya: journal of english language studies vol. 1, no. 2, june 2019, pp. 45-49 available online at: http://ojs.journal.unilak.ac.id/index.php/elsya 47 this plan, we will have a series of experiences that lead to reality or not. for example, our ideas about tigers encourage us to take certain actions that can bring us before tigers or not. if these experiences bring us to reality, the idea that drives them is accurate, if they fail to do it, then it's wrong. in short, the idea is correct if it leads us to the object. the series of experiences that connect ideas with reality is the stable relationship of agreement or appointment. therefore, for james, truth is not an unchanging or inherent property of an idea; it is something that happens to an idea when verified by experience. there is no truth to something that we find in reality as if it were there before we thought about it. we make the truth by formulating ideas and acting on them; the verification process (as the word indicates) is indeed one of 'truthmaking. bergson placed his finger on the essential nature of truth in james's philosophy when he wrote: 'we find the truth to use reality when we create mechanical devices to use natural force. it seems to me that we can deduce the whole essence of the pragmatic truth perception in a formula like this: while in other doctrines, new truths are inventions because pragmatism is an invention. although james insisted that it was one of humanity's principal tasks to pursue original ideas, he did not regard their ownership as an end in itself, but only as an 'initial means towards other vital satisfaction. therefore, there are two aspects to a correct idea: factual verification, and its usefulness for life. these can be distinguished but not separated; unless we have a need or desire for an object, we will not be led to verify our ideas about an object. if we are not interested in tigers, we will not be asked to move actions that will bring us before them. ideas are nothing but instruments to satisfy some wants or needs, and verification inexperience is not an end in itself but a process that is fulfilled only in its actual use. because individuals differ in their needs and desires, it can be understood that james's pragmatism must emphasize the role of the individual in determining the truth. an idea is right to the extent that it is satisfying, but what satisfies one person does not always satisfy another. therefore truth is to some degree plastic and relative to individuals. explaining the practical, anti-speculative, practical, consequentialism of pragmatism, juan jose sanguineti writes: "pragmatism is a philosophy that reduces the value of theoretical truth to its practical consequences. in theory or speculation is knowledge intended to the extent that it shows what is; on the contrary, practical truth shows what must be done. for realism, the main foundation of action is found like things, because things go that far. in pragmatism, there is no theoretical truth, in the sense that there is no truth that indicates existence: truth is reduced to the human conception that serves action (theory as a function of praxis). so it is clear that pragmatism is a consequence of every doctrine in which the idea of truth disappears, such as scepticism or even idealism, because if human thought is not a reflection of reality, then it will need to establish a function in that context. human behaviour: thinking must at least be beneficial to human life. then, criticizing the pragmatic theory of james's truth rooted in its practical use, sanguineti notes it is true that practice can function as verification or sign of truth, but only relates to practical truth: new commercial products show themselves useful in practice; instead, the phrase 'emperor is emperor' is true or false without practical consequences, james's theory bases itself on several principles regarding what is practical. this principle has become the object of theoretical affirmation. if not, how do people know whether the idea is practical? (each person may have a very different concept, in this case, it is true that only with high confidence and conviction can one act efficaciously, but confidence is usually born from an awareness of the truth (doctor heals illness with certain medicines that he believes in). only in exceptional cases do new hypotheses that need to have faith risk the rejection of reality. p. coffey's criticism of the pragmatic criteria of utility in relation to truth: "we do not deny that the practical problems of a belief can create assumptions for or against its truth, that the 'fruits' of doctrine can be criteria. , an additional test, of its truth or falsity, its practical fruits: because of course if false speculative conclusions follow logically from any doctrine as antecedents, this is a certain index whose doctrine is wrong. pragmatism criticism joseph t. barron: "pragmatism awareness theory is wrong. this school regards experience as a continuous stream from which the mind chooses certain aspects because of their usefulness or ability to serve. the mind is basically selective. the mind is not required by the presentation of experience to choose this or that aspect. this is basically free in carrying out its preferences. but does introspection support this opinion? when we examine the way in which our knowledge is formed, is it not clear that our environment often forces knowledge on us, in the sense that we feel ourselves under duress as we know it? isn't it equally clear that very often we are forced to realize the reality that is contrary to our needs? and which prevents our desires? if our knowledge is true, shouldn't we adjust our judgments about reality with the reality that we value? if introspection decisions are credible, the basic notes in the doctrine of pragmatic knowledge are not based on facts. elsya: journal of english language studies vol. 1, no. 2, june 2019, pp. 45-49 available online at: http://ojs.journal.unilak.ac.id/index.php/elsya 48 "knowledge is not completely practical. recognizing that knowledge is the result of the interaction of the mind with its environment, the deduction that knowledge never goes beyond the practice field is haram. in essence, it is an undue limitation of the scope of cognitive interest. knowledge, which is considered either phylogenetic or ontogenetically, may emerge as a practical interest, but that is not a guarantee for the statement that it must remain practical. pragmatism emphasizes aspects of thinking that are too important. the falsity of its position is due to the mistaken assumption that a creature can only function within the limits of the cause that makes it exist. once a creature has been realized, it can develop new needs that go beyond the causes that produce them. the mind may be practical in the beginning but introspection tells us that it is beyond its practical beginning. when man starts thinking he becomes a thinking creature, and thus he is released from having to limit his thinking to facts that are of practical interest. „humans no longer only need to live; they also need to know. humans start thinking about eating; he has evolved to the point where he eats so he can think. knowledge is scientific or contemplative and practical because the world can be understood as well as plastic. we all feel within us the urge to know it merely to know. curiosity, a disc species of divine discontent, 'drives us to acquire knowledge, many of which are entirely impractical. thinking is a means to an end, but it can be a goal in itself. the pleasure that comes from knowledge is one of the values that enrich life for us, and therefore contemplative thinking is not always otiose. uninterested contemplation and enjoyment of the beauty, splendour, meaning, and order of things for their interests are for some humans who inherently have a proper function of consciousness. “a brief discussion of the pragmatic doctrine of the nature of knowledge cannot be ignored without mentioning this school's reproachful attitude towards metaphysical reasoning, and towards speculative philosophy in general.” pragmatists oppose abstract speculation which states that it is futile and barren. they argue that philosophy must be applied. it must come down from the clouds and become a pedestrian. it must be busy by itself in answering pressing social problems that demand solutions. this is an attitude of mind that is found not only among people who tend to be pragmatic it is also found among scientists. although widely accepted, this view cannot be maintained. "the main reason for prohibiting acceptance is because it is too exclusive. philosophy must be practical but should it be limited to that domain? a more comprehensive and truer view of the function of philosophy includes its speculative and practical functions. it should be noted that in constructing his views on the instrumental character of our thinking, dewey has created a speculative philosophy. he proved that the mind must not be speculative with speculation. the practical value of his speculation 'seems best at best only the negative value of cleansing is considered a mental obstacle to change and to rebuild, and because of its own metaphysical peculiarity is far less clear and provokes doubt than the practical attitude intended to provide it. a foundation, they tend to weaken, instead of increasing the possible influence for the good that philosophy might have. it can be said that those who deny the validity of metaphysical and speculative thinking do so at the risk of self-contradiction because their statement that metaphysical thought is nugatory itself is metaphysical itself 4. conclusion james (1907) understands this principle as telling us what practical value truth has. true beliefs are guaranteed not to conflict with subsequent experience. likewise, peirce‟s slogan tells us those true beliefs will remain settled at the end of the prolonged inquiry. peirce‟s slogan is perhaps most typically associated with pragmatist views of truth, so we might take it to be our canonical neoclassical theory. however, contemporary literature does not seem to have firmly settled upon a received „neo-classical‟ pragmatist theory. in her reconstruction, haack (1976) notes that the pragmatists‟ views on truth also make room for the idea that truth involves a kind of correspondence, insofar as the scientific method of inquiry is answerable to some independent world. peirce, for instance, does not reject a correspondence theory outright; instead, he complains that it provides merely a „nominal‟ or „transcendental‟ definition of truth, which is cut off from practical matters of experience, belief, and doubt. this realisation marks an essential difference between the pragmatist theories and the coherence theory we just considered. even so, pragmatist theories also have an affinity with coherence theories, insofar as we expect the end of inquiry to be a coherent system of beliefs. as haack also notes, james maintains an important verificationist idea: truth is what is verifiable. references bates, l., lane, j., & lange, e. (1993). writing clearly: responding to student writing. boston: heinie. davidson, d. (2000). a coherence theory of truth and knowledge. epistemology: an anthology, 154-163. derin, t., deliani, s., fauziah, n., afifah, n., & hamuddin, b. (2019). indonesians‟ tendency to refer abbreviation as acronym: types of abbreviation as word formation process. globish: an englishindonesian journal for english, education, and culture, 8(2). elsya: journal of english language studies vol. 1, no. 2, june 2019, pp. 45-49 available online at: http://ojs.journal.unilak.ac.id/index.php/elsya 49 englebretsen, g. (2017). bare facts and naked truths: a new correspondence theory of truth. routledge. fischer, m., halbach, v., kriener, j., & stern, j. (2015). axiomatizing semantic theories of truth?. the review of symbolic logic, 8(2), 257-278. haack, s. (1976). the pragmatist theory of truth. the british journal for the philosophy of science, 27(3), 231-249. james, w. (1907). pragmatism's conception of truth. the journal of philosophy, psychology and scientific methods, 4(6), 141-155. james, w., & katz, e. (1975). the meaning of truth (vol. 2). harvard university press. kamp, h. (1981). a theory of truth and semantic representation. formal semantics-the essential readings, 189-222. kendler, k. s. (2015). toward a limited realism for psychiatric nosology based on the coherence theory of truth. psychological medicine, 45(6), 1115-1118. kirkham, r. l. (1992). theories of truth: a critical introduction. szuchman, l. t., & thomlison, b. (2010). writing with style: apa style for social work. cengage learning. corresponding author: tom grimwood, phd university of cumbria email: tom.grimwood@cumbria.ac.uk journal of applied hermeneutics issn: 1927-4416 may 4, 2021 ©the author(s) 2021 on covidiots and covexperts: stupidity and the politics of health tom grimwood abstract the covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing interpretative event. the effectiveness of delivering prevention strategies is in negotiation with day-to-day arguments in the public sphere, not just by “experts” in peer-reviewed papers, but also in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and digital media platforms. in this paper, i explore a particular facet of these public debate over the politics of health: the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. i argue that the growth of this commonplace within discussion is rooted in particular models of interpretation which limit selfunderstanding, by over-emphasising certain points of significance within the interpretative horizon over more banal (and “stupid”) aspects that are, nevertheless, influential on health interventions. keywords stupidity, agnotology, knowledge, expertise, post-truth, uncertainty analysing the advent of what he terms our current “burnout society,” byung-chul han points to the problematic role of immunology as a framework for interpretation. “the past century was an immunological age,” he argues. “the epoch sought to distinguish clearly between inside and outside, friend and foe, self and other. […] the object of immune defense is the foreign as such.” (2015, pp. 1-2) the “fundamental category” of immunology is the other (2015, p. 2), and immunization has thus served as an interpretative category which links together otherwise disparate concerns in medicine, politics, and technology (see esposito, 2011, p. 1). yet for han, this immunological model is insufficient to describe the workings of 21st century late capitalism with its globalised networks and dissolution of boundaries. if the model of immunology leads to grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 2 disciplinary responses – the type of organisational control which was described so well by foucault’s account of institutions such as hospitals and factories – for han, we now live in an “achievement society.” here, negative control is replaced by an excess of positivity, and “prohibitions, commandments, and the law are replaced by projects, initiatives, and motivation.” (2015, p. 9) the problem is no longer an external other, but rather the demands of self-fulfilment requiring immune responses to be suppressed “so that information will circulate faster and capital will accelerate” (2017, p. 83). amid the mass exchange of knowledge via communication networks which are no longer concerned with borders and have absorbed all forms of otherness, han suggests “the idiot, the fool” – the one who performs an “inner contraction of thinking to make a new beginning,” who “wants to turn the absurd into the highest power of thought” – has “all but vanished from society.” (2017, pp. 81-82) the idiot, han argues, being “un-networked and uninformed,” would stand opposed to “the neoliberal power of domination: total communication and total surveillance” (83); if only the achievement society allowed for the stupid. it is fair to say that the covid-19 pandemic has necessarily and pointedly re-introduced immunology into our models of thinking, while simultaneously retaining the hallmarks of han’s achievement society. consequently, it should be no surprise the extent to which the pandemic has highlighted the significance of the politics of health as an ongoing interpretative event. that is to say: the effectiveness of health delivery is in negotiation with day-to-day arguments in the public sphere, not just by “experts” in peer-reviewed papers, but also (and perhaps predominantly) in the everyday interpretations and discussions of available expertise on print and digital media platforms. there is no separation of communication networks. hence, the emergence of a pandemic of a previously unseen virus is not only, as carley et al. suggest, “arguably […] one of the greatest challenges to ebm [evidence-based medicine] since the term was coined” (2020, p. 572). for clinicians, they note that the emergence of a new pandemic in a digital age is problematic because of: the sheer volume of new “evidence” that we are faced with. on the one hand, this research can be both informative and hypothesis generating, but on the other hand, it is prone to selective promotion and can overwhelm the user by the nature of volume and the frequency of publication. (carley et al., 2020, p. 574) the same issue is at hand in the public discussion of how best to deal with the virus: the lack of clear and well-established protocols, the variations in approaches taken by different countries, and, particularly of note in the uk, the ways in which its key themes – global travel and border control, state-sanctioned lockdown and welfare provision, considerations of society’s “vulnerable” and the legacy of downgraded public health investment – interweave into existing political arguments. as a result, discussion amongst the “general public” around whether to accept or reject a particular health intervention frequently take place in the same public forums, and particularly on social media, in which these existing political debates take place. in this way, one can easily suggest that the decisions made by members of the public whether to wear a mask, whether to visit a general practice, and whether to conform to social distancing rules is mediated at least in part by interpretations of the volume, frequency, and promotion of certain views, on social media no less than in the world of ebm. precisely because of this, the debate over public health and individual behaviour within the covid-19 pandemic has been framed by the longergrimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 3 term interrelationship between politics and health (see bambra et al., 2005; oliver, 2006) and, in this case, in particular the critical discussion over the role of expertise in the times digital media saturation, one which has challenged the health professions as much as any other (see, for example, hawkes, 2017; heinrich, 2020; hopf et al., 2019). this is what paul and haddad describe as a “new truth regime, [where] politics seems to have unilaterally withdrawn from the social contract and appears to operate, once again, primarily on the basis of a stubborn will to ignorance and blatant forms of denial” (2019, p. 300). what, though, of han’s “idiot”? do they return, like the immunological model, and if so, in what form? in this paper, i want to explore a particular facet of these public debate over the politics of health, or rather, a particular commonplace line of reasoning, a particular topic of discussion which situates covid-19 at the centre of the so-called “post-truth” mediasphere battleground. this is the deployment of the commonplace of stupidity. as with any discussion of the pandemic in 2020 and 2021, my paper here can only be schematic at this point: we lack any finality, and the interpretative connections i want to suggest may yet take unexpected turns. nevertheless, the role of stupidity in public debate has been an increasingly febrile one. the interpretative distinction between the stupid and the intelligent, the unreflective with the rational and the conspiratorial with the informed has long been found in arguments against the more general, precovid “anti-vaxxers,” the united states presidential elections in both 2016 and 2020, and, either side of the brexit divide in the united kingdom. it is within the context of covid-19, though, that specific questions for applied hermeneutics are brought to the fore. it seems appropriate to illustrate the commonplace of stupidity through some examples of their primary vehicle for communication, the internet meme. grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 4 these are images and texts that are easily shared and viewed, at speed, across digital media platform, in order to spread a message or viewpoint. in this way, the internet meme operates on a level of what aristotle termed the enthymeme: that is, a unit of cultural transmission embedded within an audience’s ability to accept similarities across situations (see grimwood, 2021, p.180). similarly, memes appeal to the manifestation what gadamer turns to as the sensus communis underlying interpretative judgement (2004, pp. 28-29). in this sense, these meme examples appeal to a clear argument: following science is the antithesis to being stupid. those who do not “follow the science” are, therefore, stupid. accompanying the concern for the decline in the value of expertise, and the associated ascent of fake news and post-truth, the line is very clearly drawn in social media between those with intellect and those without, those committed to the value of fact over the allure of conspiracy. in such a context, the aim of the arguments around applied responses to the pandemic revolves around an established commonplace of digital rhetoric, encapsulated in a popular pre-covid meme which asserted “science: it reduces the stupid.” the ethos of the stupid isn’t this obvious? perhaps too obvious: the readymade accessibility of this form of critique renders stupidity a cliché. it is merely stating what we (the non-stupid) already know; the equivalent of showing a picture of a globe to a flat-earther (and typically with much the same effect; that is, none). but much like the use of clichés, something more is being appealed to than tautology. if the medium for these accusations is often irony or humour, the sentiment is certainly not flippant. this is not the “oh, don’t be so stupid!” that we might say to a partner or sibling. instead, the mud is very much supposed to stick. after all, in the midst of a pandemic, the stakes are very real: a reasonable, evidence-based approach to public health initiatives is key to the prevention of further spread and deaths from the virus. this is not the “idiotism” which han borrows from deleuze, a celebrated instigator of new thought by virtue of their idiosyncrasies (han, 2017, p. 81). clearly, so-called “covidiots,” while sometimes declaring opposition to various notions of neoliberal domination, are nevertheless entirely networked, fuelled by communication access, and au fait with the language of reason and evidence. at the same time, the prevalence of this specific trope and its specific concern with expertise suggests it is something more than an ad hominem attack (even if it is that as well). and in that sense, it grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 5 seems right to ask: what kind of stupidity is being referred to? if, as i have already suggested, these accusations of covid-19 behaviours are embedded within the wider concerns for the fate of expertise in contemporary culture, then what are the wider interpretative systems used to frame them? to complicate this question, stupidity itself bears an etymological relationship to the idea of a “type.” the latin stupēre root term (to be stunned or numb) gives rise not only to stupidus, with its sense of stultifying astonishment, but also to typos, an impression or model, and to typtein, to strike or beat. in antiquity, then, stupidity carried the sense of being stunned still, whether by amazement or by violence. it was only in the 17th century that the notion of halting came to refer to a slowness of mind; and only later still that stupidity was defined as ignorance. indeed, in the 19th century nietzsche describes stupidity not as an error or misunderstanding, but rather thoughts which are true but “base” (see deleuze, 1962/2006, p. 98) this alignment is also at work in gustave le bon’s the crowd, a 1895 treatise on mass psychology, which remains so persuasive it is reprinted almost every year. for le bon, stupidity is exemplified by the formation of the crowd: once inside, individuals become incapable of logical argumentation, and instead allow their behaviours and attitudes to change via the contagion of suggestibility. this is, in effect, the spreading stultification of critical thought, and it is clear that on this view stupidity – much like a virus – needs containment and reducing. indeed, as ernesto laclau has shown, le bon’s line between social organisation and mass crowds “coincides […] with the frontier separating the normal from the pathological” (laclau, 2005, p. 29). nevertheless, while le bon’s dated views might still be entreated in discussions of the decline of expertise in the face of political populism, they do not in themselves shed much light on the meaning of stupidity as a trope: not just because of laclau’s argument that le bon woefully fails to account for the myriad of ways people might group together and communicate whilst also thinking relatively logically, but additionally because le bon insists that mass psychology requires anonymity, and the loss of self. however, the targets of the memes above are not anonymous; if anything, covid-deniers and anti-vaxxers are prominent not just in identifying themselves, but in their displays of (apparent) reason and evidence to support their claims. it is perhaps for this reason that another answer to has become particularly prominent, which is the invocation of “confident idiocy,” or what has become known as the dunning-kruger effect. in a small experiment in social psychology, david dunning and justin kruger asked participants to report on their confidence in carrying out a task, and then compared this to how the candidates actually performed. they argued that there was a direct correlation between confidence and performance: the more confident a participant was, the less well they had performed. the study concluded that incompetent people were unable, and unwilling, to acknowledge their lack of competence, because this would require the very expertise that they lacked; instead, they will become more belligerent in their view of their own abilities. arguments by anti-vaccination advocates and claims that covid-19-deniers are seen as fine illustrations of this, as the direct reproach to established evidence-bases is precisely what buoys the arguer. the louder one shouts about one’s expertise, the less one is likely to know. unlike le bon, kruger and dunning’s work is notable for its emphasis on the individual at fault: arguing that “the miscalibration of the incompetent stems from an error about the self, whereas the miscalibration of the highly competent stems from an error about others” (1999, p. 1127, my grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 6 emphasis). this particular aspect of the dunning-kruger account of stupidity is often picked up by its proponents. for example, us blogger and obstetrician gynecologist amy tuteur, argues that the “disparagement of expertise may boost the self-esteem of its promoters, but often harms everyone else. what confident idiots know rarely represents the sum total of all knowledge on the subject; that’s why real expertise is worthy of respect” (tuteur, 2016, on-line). writing for forbes, ethan siegel concludes that the dunning-kruger effect can only be challenged by a response based on one’s ethos rather than pathos. it: requires a kind of transformation within yourself. it means that you need to be humble, and admit that you, yourself, lack the necessary expertise to evaluate the science before you. it means that you need to be brave enough to turn to the consensus of scientific experts […]. if we listen to the science, we can attempt to take the best path possible forward through the greatest challenges facing modern society. we can choose to ignore it, but if we do, the consequences will only increase in severity. (siegel, 2020, on-line) this focus on character traits serves to cement that stupid people are not simply mistaken on the facts, they are also morally wrong. the change to be made is within the individual, in order that they are better able to “listen to the science.” and clearly, in many instances of public debate, the emphasis on choice is one of moral imperative: to not wear a mask is to risk the lives of others; so is avoiding a vaccine. these are individual choices about our behaviours which have effects on the people around us, just as refusing to self-isolate or taking a holiday to north wales are. in some cases, choice is emphasised precisely to frame an action as moral, rather than, say economic (as in the case, for example, of the person who refuses to self-isolate because they work in the gig economy and can’t afford to take the time from work). but more fundamental to our concerns here is the role of choice in accepting or not accepting knowledge. inherent to this version of confident idiocy is a working assumption that we can pick up and use information as it passes us by, as we please. therefore, if we choose wrong, we are stupid, and probably immoral for that. of course, this can be very convincing, especially when faced with the stream of sometimes bizarre claims and conspiracy theories which one can encounter on social media regarding covid-19. but the more interesting aspect of the dunning-kruger research is that it bears significant marks of the production of expertise (“real expertise” that is “worthy of respect”). for example, it is referred to as “dunning-kruger,” when the original paper has kruger’s name first. but it is not the kruger-dunning effect, because kruger was at the time only a graduate student, whilst dunning was the professor. hence, when the skeptical ob blog declares in relation to the confidence we might have in expert views, “that’s why professional qualifications are so important,” the wider implications of that claim are unwittingly reflected in the dunning-kruger example: that is, the darker side of what jason brennan has championed as “epistocracy” (brennan, 2016), or the advocacy of elite knowledge over and against democratic representation (mcgoey, 2019). titles matter. furthermore, dunning and kruger’s original studies were of students at university. it is perhaps not surprising that over-confidence was a problem here: students who had reached tertiary education, often at great financial cost to themselves, may well be disposed to feeling a certain elevated confidence in their abilities. the use of students as participants is common practice in much social psychology simply because they are more readily available and easier to recruit than others, and this keeps the costs of an experiment down grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 7 considerably. while it is therefore problematic to scale up these findings to those participating in internet debates – the self-confidence of the original participants was not opposed to expertise but embedded in the same system that produces it – such choices of data subjects represent what paul and haddad term “convenient uncertainty” (2019, p. 306): a choice made less out of intentional exclusion of non-students, but rather from “agnotological convenience” (see also proctor, 2008, p. 24). for some, these points are insignificant; the evidence still stands and the observation is still astute. however, both points demonstrate the cultural and economic aspects of expertise which a simple line between confidence and competence does not attend to; as well as how convention and tradition is a key determinant to which forms of reasoning and illustration are used. what is significant is that the contemporary invocation of “confident idiocy” takes place against the backdrop of a specific (though notoriously ill-defined; see keane, 2013, 2018, vogelmann, 2018) cultural context: that of “post-truth.” this, too, is a context beset with agnotological convenience. the term “post-truth” has become, amid the genuine concerns over its political and cultural effects, a de facto victory of a positivistic certainty; and accompanying this victory is an industry of conferences, academic papers, and even research centres that have arisen in its wake to determine who are the intelligent ones and who are the confident idiots. but in this response, “post-truth” rather too quickly becomes merely “non-truth,” and the complexity of the “post” prefix is lost. too quickly, post-truth is shaped into a shorthand straw man figure to be bested by conservative epistemological mantra, a figure uncannily similar to older enemies of that same mantra, such as radical feminism, post-modernism, or the hermeneutics of suspicion (see, for example, haack, 2019). too quickly, the complexities of “post-truth” becomes a cipher for nothing other than a yearning for an ideal model of academic institutions of truth and readily graspable “facts.” this is not to dismiss kruger and dunning’s argument, and certainly not to deny that ignorance can be damaging to public health efforts. instead, i would argue that there are certain rituals, processes and cultures of knowledge production which remain at work when peer-reviewed research becomes the content of public debate. and if it might be tempting for the epistocrat to suggest that the invocation of dunning-kruger by a wider population leads to misrepresentation because, ironically, it is being utilised by non-experts, this merely repeats these rituals, processes, and cultures once more. as such, this case highlights the way in which a beacon of reference for framing “stupidity” carries with it a number of less manifest aspects of “intelligence” in our time, which nevertheless constitute an interpretative horizon in the gadmerian sense of combining cognitive, normative, and reproductive aspects of interpretation (gadamer, 2004, p. 309). as such, if we are to interpret the impact of these commonplaces of public debate on applied health interventions within the pandemic, then we need to attend to how such horizonal aspects facilitate the shorthand of “reducing the stupid” which turns epistemology into moral requirement: that is, what cultures and rituals are maintained or perpetuated, and what this speed of judgement leaves out, or steps around. stupidity on (and in) the horizon a prime reason that the pandemic brings this shorthand into focus is that, as carley et al. argue, the pandemic provides “a time when we can experience first-hand the journey from ignorance grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 8 about the disease through to a better understanding and approach to diagnostics and interventional therapy.” (2020, p. 574) as such, one could argue that covid-19 has shone a light on the processes of knowledge-production which are more usually obscured either by a form of site-exclusivity (hidden behind the pay walls of academic journals or the real walls of the university and the laboratory), or the length of time such production usually takes due to funding, access to resources, ethical approval, and so on, all of which has been accelerated in covidrelated research during 2020 and 2021. furthermore, the political machinations of evidence – from the micro academic rituals of dunning-kruger to the macro policy decisions, funding allocations, and presentation of data of national government (see ashton, 2020, pp. 160-179) – have also been manifest. if this is the case, then it becomes increasingly clear that the invocation of stupidity is not a simple reliance on the “facts,” however popular the positivist revival in public (and large parts of academic) debate might be. the rhetoric of “the science,” in need of defending from the stupid, masks the complex yet entirely functional ways in which such science is made meaningful, and consolidated from a myriad of data into one single “the.” or, in other words: to judge something as stupid requires interpretation. the word ignorance stems from the latin ignorantia, a lack of knowledge, but its long journey – via middle english and old french – to today’s usage leaves a number of ambiguities in it. arfini (2019), for example, notes that “to be ignorant” and “to ignore” are two quite distinct perspectives: the former suggests being uninformed or unlearned, the latter suggested an intentional refusal to take notice of something. this is echoed in the work of both mcgoey and paul and haddad, who note in their respective fields of practice (sociology of health and policy studies) that rather than aligning ignorance with misinformation or falsehood, choosing to ignore aspects of a certain horizon can form “very tangible effects of selective processing of researchbased knowledge,” where “ignorance emerges as a by-product in knowledge-making processes.” (paul & haddad, 2019, p. 308) on these arguments, ignorance is not the “other” to knowledge, as the scientistic memes might suggest, but rather a material part of it. knowledge itself depends on a level of “strategic ignorance,” if only to reach something like a “conclusion” in a manageable form. as before, this begins to reflect something like a performance of what gadamer terms the ontological “effective-historical consciousness” which situate our interpretative acts: the horizon for understanding which is not universal in reach but rather a “range of vision that includes everything that can be seen from a particular vantage point” (gadamer, 2004, p. 301). this fluctuating frame of reference is shaped and changed by the limits of our situation and knowledge, and the ways in which such knowledge is significant to us. our horizons are not simply operational knowledge of the world, but also our expectations, projections and hopes. like prejudice, the strategic ignorance raised by mcgoey and paul and haddad is not necessarily an obstacle to understanding. it is, rather, a condition of understanding itself: such “fore-understanding” is “what determines what can be realised as a unified meaning and thus determines how the fore-conception of completeness is applied” (gadamer, 2004, p. 294). in this light, it is noticeable that, like many in the field, carley et al. utilise a narrative structure for ignorance whereby the concept emerges from a sense of assumed completion: in other words, ignorance is only a step on the way to proper knowledge. hence, this is a “journey,” not an errant adventure. we start with nothing, in order that we finish in possession of understanding. this notion of possession – from not having knowledge to having it, from not having an appropriate grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 9 therapy to carrying out an intervention with it, and so on – is instructive, and not just typical of health research. indeed, in analytic epistemology possession is the keystone of both dominant views of ignorance: what is known as the “standard view on ignorance” refers to it as a lack of knowledge (one cannot both be ignorant and have knowledge of a certain thing, whereas the “new view” argues that it is the absence or lack of true beliefs (one cannot be ignorant and have a true belief about something). both assume that knowledge, beliefs, and truth are things that people possess, and subsequently excludes one from holding both at the same time. but if possession is at the centre of knowledge, it cannot be a literal “possession”: after all, one does not physically pick up knowledge in their hand. storing memories is not exactly the same as storing real books (if it was, surely the distribution of photocopied handouts would have been far more successful in higher education over the years). indeed, as paul mason has argued (2015), in an age where digital files can be infinitely reproduced, premising possession on scarcity – one has it or one doesn’t – ceases to make sense. instead, in all of the cases above possession serves as a practical – and highly traditional – illustrative structure. it is, in this sense, not just a description but also a trope in which certain conditions for understanding are established via the imagery of possession. key to the effect of this trope is a binary rhetoric: one possesses something, or one does not, just as one has knowledge, or one does not. hence, when we read that “science reduces the stupid,” we are clearly not meant to ponder on those parts of the history of science we would now think of as “stupid,” and whether that should be considered a longerterm part of the reduction. in this sense, such non-stupidity is both historical, in that it follows a temporal path in achieving its goals, whilst also being outside of history (both because its focus on “fact” contests the hermeneutic effective-historical consciousness of a situated horizon, and because the achievement of its goal is always assumed: a vaccine, a herd immunity, etc.). this is what vattimo and zabala once referred to as “the winner’s history” (2011, pp. 37-39): it was, because it was always going to be. in this sense, we may well stop and pause before the assumed “completion” at work in the narrative structure of ignorance’s journey to knowledge. gadamer’s account of the horizon and fore-understanding allows us to unpick some of the problems with this binary rhetoric; in particular, the modality of what gadamer refers to, following scheler, as “knowledge as domination,” (2004, p. 447) which hermeneutics is opposed to. instead, the responsibility of the hermeneutic encounter is to establish the relationships between the kind of ignorance or stupidity in play, and the wider concerns around expertise and methodological rigour. it is precisely the domain of the commonplace – the enthymeme, the sensus communis, the internet meme – in which the persuasive work of the tropes underlying claims to understanding are at their most effective, but also at their most bare in terms of the limits they reveal. at the same time, while gadamer’s argument that fore-standing determines our sense of how this journey can or will be completed, there is reason for caution around moving from this general account of ignorance as constitutive of knowledge, and what is at stake in the specific covidrelated invocations of stupidity, and of knowledge production in the time of pandemic. the caution revolves around this: for gadamer, “a person who has an horizon knows the relative significance of everything within this horizon, whether it is near or far, great or small” (2004, p. 301). in this way, our understanding is formed out of an acknowledgement of our ignorance, the gaps or incompletions in our horizons, which requires a necessary open-ness to other horizons: grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 10 “working out the hermeneutical situation means acquiring the right horizon of inquiry for the questions evoked by the encounter with tradition” (gadamer, 2004, p. 302). this knowledge of significance is especially important to the clinician-patient relationship, and why gadamer aligns medicine with rhetoric, with both requiring to know when to speak and when to remain silent, and “the right kinds of discourse to exercise an effect on the soul in the right kinds of way” (gadamer, 1996, p. 41). i have suggested earlier in this paper, though, that while the interpreter being aware of the relative significance of what is within their horizon, it is precisely the formative aspects of knowledge which are both pointedly insignificant yet banally effective which trouble the simplicity of this “journey” from ignorance to knowledge. not only is this a symptom of han’s “achievement society” – where interpretation is less a dialogue and more a constant curation of information exchange – but furthermore, within the covid-19 pandemic specifically, it is the question of significance which underlies the very effectiveness of certain public health interventions: from what constitutes a significant number of deaths or vaccinations, to how significant leaving one’s house twice for exercise or washing the car during national lockdown. in this way, one might suggest that, if only for the moment, measures such as national lockdowns which affect the entire experience of being (see žižek, 2020, p. 129) raise some interesting problems for gadamer’s account of “relative significance” as differentiated from the insignificant, and consequently the understanding of one’s horizon from the open-ness to others, into question. as such, i think there is more to say about the construction of an interpretative horizon and the specific way in which stupidity is playing its role within the pandemic. models of the non-stupid, or “colonial interpretation” in his critique of the uk’s handling of the pandemic, john ashton points out that the discourse around the virus has been dominated by limited forms of knowledge; namely, laboratory-based epidemiology and data modelling (2020, p. 213). in the main body that advises the uk government, the scientific advisory group for emergencies (sage), there is a notable absence of public health experts, as well as historians of disease outbreak and anthropologists, whom ashton argues would provide lived context – particularly of the interconnection between health, economy and society – for interventions. the issue i want to take from this observation is not to question which discipline is best suited to support the covid response, but rather how a narrow model of “knowledge” affects the interpretations of stupidity under consideration. this, i think, suggests the adoption of a particular model of immunology which, unlike han’s account, is intrinsically related to both practices of health intervention and its requirements of “knowledge”: that is, how the binary relationship between knowledge and ignorance is figured. whereas foucault described immunology in terms of disciplinary institutions, this re-introduced immunology, idiosyncratically placed within technologies that have, if han is correct, outgrown it, can be described in terms of interpretative horizons that have already internalised the recognition of what is “significant” and what is not. it seems clear that a reliance on a narrow horizon of expertise risks what charles mills once referred to, in the context of race relations, as a “closed circuit of epistemic authority” (2007, p. 34), whereby the structures of approval reinforce their own narratives. politically, when governments in the midst of a pandemic argue that they are “following the science” or being grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 11 “guided by the data,” the singularity of this claim – the science, the data – insists on a binary line between official intelligence and what might be cast as “alternative facts.” the question becomes fixed on whether the science says x or y; or whether this science is better than that science (for example: the science of herd immunity versus elimination strategies). within a digital mediasphere where both the data is there, alongside any number of youtube conspiracy theories and re-presentations of that evidence, the circuit of epistemic authority is only closed tighter: regardless of whether i am supportive of covid interventions or suspicious of them, i am right because of the data, and the data makes me right. this is why chris anderson’s polemic that the transparency and availability of data would lead to “the end of theory” – “with enough data, the numbers speak for themselves” (quoted in han, 2017, p. 58) – is troubled precisely by the prevalence of so much information. for the “right data” to be identified as such, interpretation frequently falls back on the traditional means of demarcating truth from everyday thinking, even when the complexities of “post-truth” problematize such means. we are therefore left with an awkward juxtaposition of a complicated pandemic in need of complicated answers (research, policy, intervention, vaccine, and longer term social measures) next to a brute and simplistic view of stupidity. yet this is not just an unfortunate by-product of internet aggression, or a careless insult used once too many times. the themes that we have identified so far – embedding facts in a system of elite institutional practices, the alignment of intelligence with possession, the spread of knowledge as a moral duty through tropes of journey and travel, and an aggressive distinction between all of these and an underdeveloped, “stupid” other – all echo a spirit of interpretation that utilises the notion of ignorance as core to its own value, a spirit which we might have once described as colonialist. such an interpretative colonialism borrows the motifs of binary distinctions (civilised versus stupid) and traversing borders (the “journey” of knowledge about covid, and specifically of vaccinations, is expected to consolidate in the global north before finding its way to the poorer nations). stupidity thus becomes not only a display of ignorance, or an act of immorality, but one of barbarity: a wilful destruction of evidence, and consequently the health of a population. barbarity, as we know, is the hallmark of the barbarian: a term originally coined for those who did not speak greek in the classical world, the name mocking the uncivilised noises that came from their mouths. in the history of stupidity, insults are always intertwined with interpretative strategies. there is also a colonial resonance with the nostalgia for interpretative certainty, and indeed the tropes which present ignorance and stupidity as mere steps towards their obliteration – journeys, possession, binary moral choice – are imposed at the expense of the tensions and contradictions within the pandemic’s social, cultural, and political effects. if such nostalgia may appear anachronistic within the present context, it is supported only by the revelations which repeat the legacy of real history: that the impact of covid-19 up racial and social disparities (see, for example, greenaway et al., 2020; nafilyan et al., 2021; van dyke et al., 2021); or that the line between legislation to prevent the spread of the virus and the curtailing of civil rights and protests is often difficult to discern (see civicus monitor, 2020). indeed, if the “reducing the stupid” that was promised turns out to be what vattimo and zabala describe as “nothing else than the ‘silencing’ of other interlocutors through an apparent dialogue,” then “truth and violence will become interchangeable” (2011, p. 19). it’s a pandemic, stupid grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 12 these are all big issues to pass over so quickly. my suggestion here is merely that these echoes of the colonial seem to order the significant from the insignificant of an interpretative horizon, at a time when making that judgement is increasingly difficult. furthermore, the difficulty of making this judgement is rooted in part in the inevitable link between the politics of health (how to deal with the pandemic) and the politics of expertise (how to deal with post-truth, alternative facts and fake news), as well as in part a consequence of attempting to think through immunology in the context of public health, when, as han suggested at the start of this paper, immunology is no longer the appropriate modality for understanding a late-capitalist “achievement society” of digital communication networks. but what do we do when confronted with genuine ignorance or misdirected understanding – be this a person travelling too far from their home, a patient refusing a vaccine, or a protestor outside of a clinic warning of global conspiracies? the answer is clearly not found in the imperative for people to simply make their own minds up (or “do your own research!” as belowthe-line comments so frequently call for). this would merely continue the models of possession and choice lying at the heart of the traditional disdain for ignorance, which we have already called into question. likewise, any banal recourse to liberal rights (“everyone has the right to an opinion,” etc.) or arguments about negative freedom (“who are we to call another person stupid?”) should be dismissed, because rights are not the ethical problem at hand. nor would this answer address the obvious need for speed and urgency in public health responses to the pandemic. i take as granted that, in such times, collective and unified responses by a population are more effective and preferable. the risk, though, is that a binary model of knowledge as possession overlooks the production of knowledge, not in terms of interpreting the “evidence” or “data” (which is where covid conspiracies speak at odds with government advisors using the same language), but rather in terms of the flow and circulation of interpretation at work in any form of understanding. this is the nub of the issue. when deployed in public health debates, it becomes clear that the accusation of stupidity carries an interpretative commitment that goes beyond a simple identification of lack of knowledge. instead it becomes a key trope for maintaining certain economies of practice which are, in turn, embedded within a range of contexts that can and should be questioned. paul and haddad thus rightly note that dismissing (or ignoring) ignorance can be significant. “a merely defensive move animated by the desire to restore the shattered fabric of science and policy is […] not enough” (2019, p. 300, my emphasis). instead, attempting to reconstruct the hermeneutic horizons in play can bring into focus the ways in which this trope moves so easily through matters of applied health to wider political and epistemological concerns. in this sense, it is perfectly reasonable to accept that accusations of stupidity are effectively throwaway insults, and that the study of memes and on-line debates are perhaps the least significant concerns in the current global health situation. my argument is simply that what is considered insignificant in one’s horizon – whether this be social psychologists using students in experiments, the ways in which immunological models support approaches to epistemology, or the uncomfortable resonances with past cultural practices of domination – can yet be telling, precisely because of its insignificance. grimwood journal of applied hermeneutics 2021article 6 13 if these insignificances are what are passed over in silence when stupidity is invoked, then engaging with them may offer alternative ways to speak about the experience of an immunological struggle in an achievement society. and this, i think, is an issue: when we insist on the primacy of knowledge as a possessed determinant of morality, what we lack is a way of speaking which falls in-between knowing and not-knowing. not quite han’s idiot, but more a way of articulating experiences within and beyond the pandemic which are not as easy to categorise as “other” or “alienated” along the traditional immunological models of society. this would be to interpret what one might fear in a vaccine, or how one may feel about distance from loved ones, when the pandemic has inflicted an excess of same-ness: from the dreary repetition of lockdown to the same public health problems and socio-cultural inequalities. it would also involve the mindfulness of what broader structures and politics of meaning – and their effective histories – are invoked when insisting, through a throwaway meme or in-depth research paper, on the completion of knowledge, the triumph of achievement, or the certainty of what stupidity is. references arfini, s. 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(2016). dunning kruger nation and the disparagement of expertise. the skeptical ob, september 8th. https://www.skepticalob.com/2016/09/dunning-kruger-nation-and-thedisparagement-of-expertise.html van dyke, m., mendoza, m., li, w., parker, e., belay, b., davis, e., quint, j., penman-aguilar, a., & clarke, k. (2021). racial and ethnic disparities in covid-19 incidence by age, sex, and period among persons aged <25 years — 16 u.s. jurisdictions, january 1–december 31, 2020. morbidity and mortality weekly report, 70(11), 382–388. http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7011e1 vattimo, g., & zabala, s. (2011). hermeneutic communism. columbia university press. vogelmann, f. (2018). the problem of post-truth: rethinking the relationship between truth and politics. behemoth: a journal on civilisation, 11(2), 18-37. https://doi.org/10.6094/behemoth.2018.11.2.986 žižek, s. (2020). pandemic! covid-19 shakes the world. polity press. https://doi.org/10.1177/0141076821999973 https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.publhealth.25.101802.123126 https://doi.org/10.1007/s11077-019-09352-4 https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/07/30/you-must-not-do-your-own-research-when-it-comes-to-science/ https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/07/30/you-must-not-do-your-own-research-when-it-comes-to-science/ https://www.skepticalob.com/2016/09/dunning-kruger-nation-and-the-disparagement-of-expertise.html https://www.skepticalob.com/2016/09/dunning-kruger-nation-and-the-disparagement-of-expertise.html http://dx.doi.org/10.15585/mmwr.mm7011e1 https://doi.org/10.6094/behemoth.2018.11.2.986 58 vol. 21 no. 1, april 2021, pp. 58 – 67 doi: 10.24071/joll.v21i1.2783 available at https://e-journal.usd.ac.id/index.php/joll/index this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-sharealike 4.0 international license. positioning the portrayal of white protagonists in o.a bushnell’s the return of lono and ka’a’awa kristiawan indriyanto, ida rochani adi & muh. arif rokhman kristiawan.i@mail.ugm.ac.id ; idaadi@ugm.ac.id ; arokhman@ugm.ac.id doctoral program of american studies, universitas gadjah mada, indonesia abstract article information this paper explores the role of literature in the post-truth age through reading on o.a bushnell’s the return of lono and ka’a’awa. a hawai’ian novelist, bushnell contextualizes the earliest interactions between the native hawai’ian (kanaka maoli) and the white settlers which began with the arrival of captain cook’s expedition in 1778. through his fictions, bushnell underlines positive portrayal of the white characters to provide a counter-discourse to the generally accepted history of hawai’ian colonialism. through first person point of view, white characters become the central figure in both of bushnell’s fictions. through reading on o.a bushnell’s narration, this paper aims to elaborate how the hawai’ian natives also become a willing partner in western colonialism which highlights their colonial complicity. the concept of colonial complicity is employed to highlight the participation of the natives in promoting western way of thinking. the analysis argues that although bushnell contextualizes the complicity of the hawai’ians in promoting western discourse, resistance also occurs through creation of a hybrid culture. this paper concludes that in the post truth era, literature should always strive to uncover the truth based on subjective interpretation instead of abiding of a universal truth. keywords: hawai’ian literature, post-truth, colonial complicity received: 20 august 2020 revised: 27 october 2020 accepted: 24 december 2020 introduction in the closing of the year 2016, the world is moving toward the post truth era. although several monumental events in 2016 such as brexit, the election of donald trump into the seat of u.s presidency and the declaration of turkish president -erdogan concerning a state of emergency in turkey, it is not to say that pre-2016, the existence of post truth is in limbo. the emergence of post truth era has been foreshadowed by several historical events. media news covering the gulf wars, false accusation that iraq’s leader, saddam hussein is in possession of weapon of mass destructions (wmd) and the subsequent war of terrors are several examples of disinformation and hoaxes which infers that empirical existence of post truth has long been in existence (mejia et al., 2018, p. 110). yet, it should be underlined that the events post2016 dramatically shapes the current situation https://e-journal.usd.ac.id/index.php/joll/index mailto:kristiawan.i@mail.ugm.ac.id mailto:idaadi@ugm.ac.id journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 59 of post truth era. the aftermath of us presidential election, especially the spread of information in the era of social media plays a pivotal role in creating a post truth world. fake news that thrived by conforming readers’ gut feeling, such as hyperbolically inflated number of immigrant -mainly muslim refugeesis widely accepted by trump’s supporters, without bothering of checking the fact (willsey, 2018, p. 500) in this post truth era, questions arise regarding how to position disciplines in humanities field, especially literature in the rapidly changing world. on her article, fiction in the post-truth era (2017), worthington argues that post truth’s appeals to emotion and personal belief instead of objective facts causes the rising surge of popularity in memoir and autofiction. her reasoning is that, after realizing that the notion that ‘the truth’ is no longer relevant to us (the readers), they become more and more invested in knowing a particular version of the truth (2017, p. 476). compared to other genres of literature, memoirs reflect their writers’ very specific view of the truth or can be stated as subjective truth. another opinion is proposed by di battista and hubener in the environmental humanities in a post-truth world (2017). focusing especially on the prevalence of climate change denials in trumpian government, they reiterates the key roles of artists, writers, activists, scholars and critics to “uncover truth, to hold reality up to the light so that it cannot be denied….reaching wider audiences and engaging in truly public realitybased discourse should be a top priority” (2017, p. 2). in an era that blurred the line between fiction and reality, literature and critical analysis remain as important as ever. literature, both writers and critics should continue to offer interpretation in seeking for truth through literary analysis. contextualizing how literature is viewed within the context of the posttruth era, some commentaries concerning the term itself should be addressed. according to oxford dictionary, post-truth is relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief (in battista & huebener, 2017, p. 34). this word experiences a surge in popularity during the outcome of the brexit referendum in june 2016 and donald trump’s election as u.s president at november 2016. the popularity of the term post truth as a result of the divisive public opinion of the aforementioned events causes this word to be chosen as oxford dictionary word of the year in 2016. in the context of these events, musolff summarizes how “the notion that truth is under severe attack has become a commonplace that is continuously reinforced by coverage of ‘fake news’, ‘alternative facts’, ‘truth markets’ and competing publics, especially in internetbased media” (2019, p. 355). in this post truth era, the claim that opposing sides spread fake news and hoaxes is enough to make the audience lose interest in paying attention to them and unwilling to align themselves into the speaker’s intention. on his book, the work of literature in an age of post-truth (2018), schaberg extrapolates the position of literature in the current post truth era. schaberg argues that literature by definition is an avenue for post truth opinion, to be wary of truth with a capital ‘t’, definite or absolute claims…ahistorical and universal. careful studies of rhetoric and context often reveals claim of truth to be riddled with contradiction (2018, p. 1). post-2016, the notion of post truth suddenly swerves into the negative, in which post truth is associated with hoaxes, lying and half-truth. a literature work by nature is fictional, or a verisimilitude of the reality itself, even an autobiography, as author ≠ narrator ≠ character (genette et al., 1990, p. 350) . based on this definition, it cannot be stated that literature offers false perceptions, disinformation or hoaxes, as literature rejects the claims of a universal truth. the universal “truths” characteristics of literary works are often unverifiable: they are too general, they have an essential value component, they are grounded in a highly personal outlook, and so forth (lamarque, 2010, p. 380). stating his argument on literature within the post truth world, schaberg asserts the potential of journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) kristiawan indriyanto, ida rochani adi & muh. arif rokhman 60 literature to connect people across culture, but should also remain true to the multiinterpretative trait of literary works. in an era of rapid compartmentalization, where people’s beliefs and political stance are all too frequently cordoned off from one another…the work of literature can connect people, a novel can conjure a whole world. but the work of literature might also present ways to think across different things, to see amalgram, disjunctions, and the murky areas of overlap and co-shaping (2018, p. 144). this paper aim to contribute toward locating literature in the post truth era through postcolonial reading on the return of lono and ka’a’awa, two novels written by o.a bushnell, a hawai’ian novelist. as a nation who is illegally annexed by the u.s in the 1899, a culmination of years of colonialism and economic domination, resistance toward u.s occupation is articulated by the native hawai’ians ethnic group (kanaka maoli). one of the most vocal critics of the ongoing american domination is haunani-kay trask, a prolific native writer, activist, and lecturer in the university of hawai’i in honolulu. her strong anti-american stances is underlined in several of her articles and speeches. several of which are, “the americans, my people, are our enemies” (kay-trask, 1993, p. 75) and also “we need to think very, very clearly about who the enemy is. the enemy is united states of america and everyone who supports it” (in scanlan, 2017). moreover, kay-trask’s disdain toward america also manifests in her rejection of any hawai’ian literature which is not written by the islanders itself. this view is expressed through her statement that “hawai’ian literature is that which is composed by hawai’ians…. residence in hawai’i does not make one hawai’ian.” (1999, p. 168) this narrow-minded genealogy of hawai’ian literature is rejected by other scholars, mainly ho’omanawanui who instead proposes the anthologized hawai’ian literature based on both geographical and thematic elements (2015, p. 227). based on ho’omanawanui’s conception of hawai’ian literature, o.a bushnell, a westerner is included as a figure of hawai’ian literary scene, a convention which is scorned through kay-trask refusal to acknowledge non-hawai’ian writers. bushnell’s fictions reimagine the early period of hawai’ian colonialism and explores that the hawai’ian natives, contrary to what kay-trask asserts is also a complicit party during the colonial period. several prior analyses on hawai’ian literature, especially novels written by o. a bushnell have been conducted. on his article, indriyanto (2020) foregrounds the articulation of aloha aina epistemology in ka’a’awa that considers the surrounding landscape as part of hawai’ian ohana/family as a possible avenue to counter the anthropocentrism of western society. he explores how this paradigm lies in stark contrast with the western anthropocentric view that places human beings as agents of imperialism, and nature as mere commodity is subjected to exploitation, plunder, and pillage (2020, p. 4). it can be seen how previous analysis of ka’a’awa emphasizes more on the environmental ethics that regulate human and non-human relationship instead of analyzing the representation of white/haole characters. another extrapolation of bushnell’s literature comes from liangphinith’s finding (2015). her argumentation focuses on positioning bushnell’s fictional works as an example of ‘local’ literature due to bushnell, although a white caucasian was born and raised in kaka’ako in honolulu (2015, p. 22). different with these prior analysis on o.a bushnell’s novels, this paper exemplifies upon the representation of white protagonists to challenge the claim that hawai’ian literature should only be written by native hawai’ians. moving back into an analysis of o.a bushnell’s the return of lono and ka’a’awa, it is important to underline that the colonialism in hawai’i as reflected in these novels is foregrounded in a different angle, from the perspective of the white settlers. bushnell contextualizes how the encroachment of western powers and their eventual colonization on this archipelago is also supported in no small part from the willing participation of the natives or their complicity. colonialism occurs due to the complicity of the journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 61 colonized in accepting the process of colonialism and become a willing partner. ulla vuorela defines it as the participation of the colonized in the hegemonic discourses, involvement in the promoting of universal thinking, and practices of domination” (2009, p. 19). through the powerful and authoritative western civilizing process, the colonized are lured to take part in its process (2009, p. 1) derived from vuorela’s concept of colonial complicity, the analysis explores how the hawai’ians islanders themselves are also a complicit party in their resulting state of being dominated by the whites. the complicity of the colonized is based on inequal power relations that designates the inferiority of the non-western civilization. as theorized by ashcroft et al, (2007, p. 32) the non-western people are delegated as the other, devout of culture, religion and language before the entrance of the west as civilizing powers. this paradigm that denigrates the non-west agency results in inferiority complex which eventually leads into the adoption of western way of living. fanon theorizes the existence of ‘mental colonialism’ in which the colonized party felt inferior to their own culture due to western colonialism (1963, p. 5). this problematic struggle will be further expounded in the analysis. methodology this study is qualitative research that employs two novels written by o. a bushnell, a hawai’ian-american writer, the return of lono (1971) and ka’a’awa (1972). qualitative research aims to explore and understand individuals or groups ascribe to a social or human problem (cresswell, 1998, p. 77). the analysis is conducted by underlying several quotations of the texts and arguing how the representation of white characters is viewed in a positive light, to counter the demonization of whites/haole by several hawai’ian scholars. besides positioning the literature as primary data, the present study also provides secondary data from journals, articles, and essays to better contextualize the historical situation in hawai’i. results and discussion reinterpretation of captain cook and colonial complicity in the return of lono o.a bushnell’s the return of lono and ka’a’awa contextualizes the condition in hawai’i during the early period of western colonialism by foregrounding the role of the white protagonists. in the return of lono, bushnell refigures the portrayal of captain cook, the man who leads the expedition to discover the hawai’ian archipelago to place him in a more positive portrayal. in his foreword, bushnell acknowledges that “one of the greatest ironies in hawaii’s history lies in the fact that the greatest man to visit her shores is today the least known and the most despised” (1971, p. 55). while the ones who irrevocable shape the political and religious situation in hawai’i is the american protestant missionaries in the 1820’s, bushnell argues that the hawaiians places the blame of their current plight on captain cook instead. bushnell’s portrayal of captain cook refigures his depiction in a positive pedestal. instead of a figuration of western explorer who is hellbent of claiming the riches of the undiscovered islands to british crown, cook is depicted as sympathetic to the diseases his sailor unknowingly brought to the isles, respectful to the local customs and the kahuna (shamans) as the hawai’ian religious authority. extrapolating on the circumstances dealing with captain cook’s discovery of the hawai’ian isle, mainly on the bay of kealakekua, island of hawai’i is intertwined with the joyful celebratory -held by the natives – to commemorate his arrival. this event becomes a point of contention in modern hawai’i, especially the reaction of the natives at that time toward the arrival of cook’s expedition. reading on several elementary school textbooks such as hawaii the aloha state (1982), kaomea questions how the records of cook’s voyage describes the natives as ‘very happy that we (the expedition) had come.” knowing that captain cook’s discovery of hawai’ian archipelago ultimately brought disease and destruction, she finds it strange journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) kristiawan indriyanto, ida rochani adi & muh. arif rokhman 62 that the hawai’ian islanders initially welcome cook’s expedition with bountiful hospitality. (2000, p. 232). in bushnell’s interpretation, the circumstances concerning captain cook’s arrival on the kealakekua bay is entirely coincidental. besides arriving at the festive period makahiki, cook’s voyage coincides with the ancient hawai’ian prophecy that the exiled god of fertility, lono will eventually returns on floating islands. as aforementioned, bushnell’s the return of lono provides a counter discourse towards the denouncement of captain cook in modern hawai’i. answering kaomea’s claim that the whites brought untold diseases and destruction to the hawai’ians people, bushnell narrates how cook is aware to the venereal plagues his sailor brought to this isolated isle, and is deeply troubled with this fact. his previous expedition on the island of kau’i leads his unsupervised seaman to share the bed with local women, and unwittingly unleashes venereal diseases among the natives. "aye," the captain answered him bitterly. "the chief est scourge of hell has been released among the natives of these islands: it appears that the venereal disease, that gift of civilization, was left by our crews at kauai, when we visited there a year ago." the captain did not gainsay him. "you see, gentlemen, how good intention is circumvented by lusting men." the scorn in his voice showed how disappointed he was in his men. (bushnell, 1971, p. 40) unwilling to commit the same mistake, cook orders that no members of his expedition to have sexual intercourse with the women in hawai’i isle. “let us try to give them here as long a freedom from this malady as we can," he cried (1971, p. 42). disobedience is considered a capital offence and will be punished by twenty lashes at the mast. good intentioned man as he was, it is beyond his control that years after his expedition, after the hawai’ian archipelago is firmly anchored in a global networks, sailors, whalers, and pirates with no such sexual restrains cause epidemic of syphilis and measles that devastated the indigenous islanders (haley, 2016; inglis, 2013; kuykendall, 1938). bushnell’s portrayal of captain james cooks exemplifies his respect towards the indigenous islanders’ culture and customs, and although he is deified as the second coming of lono, he does not misuse his capabilities. admiring the physical appearances, health and cleanliness of the hawai’ians, cook considers the islanders as the representation of ‘noble savage’ and intends to endeavor, by all proper means, to cultivate a friendship with them (1971, p. 33). he outspokenly admires “the widespread polynesian tongue…how the natives outdo the english in seamanship, with nothing more than canoes for their journeying” (1971, p. 55). no one among the natives is most revered than the high chief of kona and kau, kalaniopuu. in the lead, standing upon the platform joining the two great hulls of the double canoe, were thirty men of rank, some of whom were dressed in the most magnificent feathered cloaks we had ever seen (1971, p. 50). as aforementioned, although cook is deified by the natives, and his status allows him to exhort the natives without repercussion in a strict kapu system, he does not abuse his prerogatives. he orders his sailor to be restrained in taking things from the countryside, such as woods from the mountain to repair the ship, in preparation for further voyage (1971, p. 123). this is in total contrast with another example from herman cortez, for example, how his status as god quetzalcoatl conducts him to blackmail emperor montezuma ii to remove all the riches from tenochtitlan for the benefit of spanish invaders (martinez, 1996, p. 215). the submissiveness and obedience of the local islanders toward cook’s arrival, and eventually the whites on a mass-scale can be interpreted to highlight their colonial complicity, how they willingly assists the colonialism of the western power. kaomea believes that the obeisance of the islanders is caused by their inferiority of the foreigners’ military forces, mainly their firearms (2010, p. 20). although this is one factor, this paper asserts that the hawai’ian’s own system of law and regulation, the kapu system plays a more pivotal role. kapu is a system of taboo in which the people are segregated based on their social classes, chiefs (alli) and the priests (kahuna) journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 63 are the highest in the hierarchy. “the common people were kept under control by the regimen of kapu, a complex list of foods, lands, and practices that were forbidden to defined classes of people” (haley, 2016, p. 29). this draconian law which is punishable by death stark contrasts with the seemingly peaceful idyllic paradise in the pacific ocean. the authority of the chiefs was sacrosanct, founded on their descent from the gods ; and their policy and minister of state were the dreaded priests, the kahunas. beneath these lordly ones, at the pinnacle of their pyramid of rank, were the lesser chiefs and the lesser kahuna, and supporting them, in the misery of the mass, were the commoner. (bushnell, 1971, p. 115) the kapu system persists for over a thousand years, since the ancestors of the hawai’ians people migrate from tahiti to the north, yet the arrival of the whites irrevocably molds the power dynamic of hawai’ian society. the chiefs and priests claim descent of the gods and no one stands above them in the hierarchy except the gods themselves. the arrival of captain cook’s expedition, whom he is deified as lono returned immediately places cook and his fellow seaman in the pinnacle of hawai’ian society. even in the ceremony, the revered chief kalaniopuu immediately prostrates in front of the voyagers, “settling into it slowly and stiffly, as if it were a position new to him, never before faced with superior rank” (1971, p. 64). while cook was unable to witness the vast changes of hawai’ian society due to his untimely death, the collapse of kapu system, and the subsequent introduction of western way of living occurs no less than half a century later, a situation represented in bushnell’s other novel, ka’a’awa. the inferiority complex of the hawai’ians, due to the seemingly superior western culture, tradition and custom plays a pivotal role in abandoning their ancestral tradition. colonial complicity, hybridity and resistance in ka’a’awa ka’a’awa : a novel about hawaii in the 1850’s -shortened to ka’a’awa – chronicles the rapid changes in hawai’ian society due to western colonialism. the old kapu system is abolished, the kahuna who still held true to the old ways are slowly being phased out, the missionaries become the king’s advisors and ministers and land across the isles is parceled out for the settler’s plantation and growing industry. the rapidly changing society becomes the concern of bushnell’s narration which is revealed through two main characters. the two protagonists of this narration represent the opposite spectrum in this turmoil period, hiram nihoa, advisor of the fourth kamehameha, alexander liholiho and saul bristol, a foreigner who although at first treat the natives with scorn and disdain, eventually immerse himself in the local tradition. first half of the story deals with nihoa’s travels all around o’ahu island to comprehend the vast changes in his home island, some two decades after the kapu system was abolished. the formidable queen regnant, ka’ahumanu, wife of the kamehameha the conqueror -in no small part by her husband’s interaction with the whites – enact the prohibition of the thousand-year-old kapu system. for years, she had observed foreigners break kapus repeatedly, and no volcanos erupted, the officers and traders who called at the island had no kapus, and they lived healthier and more abundantly than her people (haley, 2016, p. 46). seaton acknowledges that the abolishment of the kapu system is the only known time in the history of the world when a people threw over a long-establishment religious system with nothing to replace it (1974). the void of religious authority is soon filled by american calvinist missionaries. in bushnell’s ka’a’awa, two decades has passed since the beginning of proselytizing of the kingdom of hawai’i in the mid 1830’s. the introduction of christianity through western missionaries is legitimized under the stigma of paganism towards hawai’ian polytheistic belief. as explored by indriyanto (2020, p. 60), western discourse positions hawai’ians epistemology that emphasizes the sanctity of nature as heathenish, contrary to the christian belief in which nature exists to serve humanity. traditional hawai’ians dances such as hula is considered as a sinful practice that promote sexuality. in ka’a’awa, bushnell depicts an event in which the hawai’ians characters, journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) kristiawan indriyanto, ida rochani adi & muh. arif rokhman 64 influenced by western perception of hula refuse to held a hula performance old people have forgotten the old ways. because they, in turn, were influenced by the american missionaries, who hate and decry our heathen dances. by this time, they were in a frenzy of lasciviousness, revealing the hula-hula in its very worst excesses— and at its sensual best. (bushnell, 1972, p. 209) the complicity of the hawai’ians people in embracing western traditions and abandoning their belief results in resistance. bushnell narrates how the hawai’ians, such as his protagonist, hiram nihoa while openly proclaims themselves to be christian and attend sunday prayers, keep on preserving the old ways by worshipping the ancestral hawai’ian deities. during his journey all across the island of o’ahu, nihoa prays “first to jehovah, then kane, ku, lono, and kanaloa, the four great gods, and the forty lesser gods” (bushnell, 1972, p. 17). through nihoa’s perspective, bushnell intends to create an acculturation of cultures between the western lord and hawai’ian deities, or in other word hybrid culture. nihoa’s assertion, ““after all, did they (hawai’ians deities) not live in these blessed isles long before bingham and jehovah come?” (bushnell, 1972, p. 67) illustrates the hawai’ians’ hybridity in which they preserve their custom under dominant western discourse. some powerful high chiefs even be deviant enough to continue the worship of the pagan tradition such as the kanemilohai. they never go to church, these ancient ones, less because of their age, i suspect, than because of their devotion to the pagan gods. they give me no proof, of course, that they cling to the ancient religion, but anyone who is not blind can conclude as much from the care with which they maintain the pagan temple that adjoins the household. unlike other temples i have seen, invaded by weeds and shrubs, ragged around their edges where the loose rocks have been knocked down by zealot christians or by careless children, this one is in perfect order (bushnell, 1972, p. 219). another example of the hawai’ians’ resistance toward western colonialism is asserted through nihoa’s refusal to use english names in referring to local places. as theorized by adams (2003, p. 24), the act of naming and classification of both people in places in english language is intended as an apparatus of control. furthermore, different with hawai’ians place names in which “ a name of a place is special, unique, and sacred” (2005, p. 25), renaming in english is arbitrary, in which there is no correlation between the names employed and the place. nihoa’s refusal to acknowledge the renaming of hawai’ian place in english highlights another nuance of resistance in preserving the local tradition, legend, and myth behind place names. the back of punchbowl, where it meets the hillside which nowadays is called ka papakolea, which is to say plover flat. "everything is being named anew," when first i came to live in honolulu, this place called ka papakolea had another name: kewalo it was called then. that hill called punchbowl—there is another of those ugly haole names (bushnell, 1972, p. 72). second half of ka’a’awa is recounted from the perspective of a white man (haole), saul bristol. originally intended to escape america into asia, he is stranded by a shipwreck and is found by alex liholiho, the future kamehameha iv. while at first he is detached from the natives around his farm in ka’a’awa, an outbreak of measles and influenza that devastated the indigenous population encourages him to devote his living for the advancement of the community. it is important to underline that it is a white man, a foreigner who express his plight toward the miserable state of the islanders instead of their local chiefs and other authorities. from that vantage, where once chiefs and priests must have gazed out upon fertile fields and hundreds of happy people, today i saw only desolation. the people are gone, dead and vanished into the earth, and among the smothering weeds only the stone platforms upon which once their houses rose, only a few sagging, rotting grass huts, remain to show that this was a journal of language and literature vol. 21 no. 1 – april 2021 issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) 65 thriving community (bushnell, 1972, p. 220). similar with his portrayal of captain cook in the return of lono, the white character in ka’a’awa is viewed sympathetically. while at first bristol abides to the colonialist discourse that considers the inhabitant of ka’a’awa valley as “little more than an animal, whom i condemned for their brutishness” (bushnell, 1972, p. 318), he later becomes sympathetic to the plight of the islanders. the suicide of high chief kanemilohai and his entire family by burning causes bristol to be considered as the chief of ka’a’awa by the local villagers. in the rapidly changing world due to their arrival of western missionaries and traders, the natives are honored by how bristol teaches new ways of cultivating the land, western agriculture and educating the natives and their offspring’s in reading and writing. “i was a schoolmaster in america. i shall teach you not only the reading and the writing. i shall teach you all i know about the great world beyond the sea" (p. 283284). both protagonists express their caution on the present stance of hawai’ian society. the erasure of the kapu system has caused the old ways to be forgotten, and with diseases that strikes the isles, the majority of the high chiefs are now deceased, or reside in honolulu without knowing what happened in the outskirt area. “the old ways are being forgotten, if they are not already abandoned, and nothing new has taken their place. now the people live in filth as well as in want.” (p.259) bushnell stresses how the hawai’ians are experiencing inferiority complex ever since the arrival of captain cook’s expedition. feeling that the whites are superior in every way conceivable to them, religion, technology, no restriction of the kapu system, the hawai’ians are made to feel ignorant and useless, as is seen in this passage: i think that we are a dying race because now we live in fear, not in harmony. because we do not know what to do or what to believe. because we have lost our respect for ourselves. this is the worst thing the foreigners have done to us: in so many ways they have made us to feel that we are ignorant and useless. in so many ways, they have taken away our respect for ourselves (1972, p. 369). this inferiority complex, to quote fanon’s assertion is one reason for the colonial complicity of the hawai’ian islanders. under the binarism that delegate western tradition and custom as heathenish, barbaric and backwards, the allure of western civilization rapidly transforms the hawai’ians’ way of thinking, in line with the western standard. the refusal to held a hula performance under the belief that this dance promotes sexuality is one example of hawai’ian internalization of what the westerners think about themselves. through his narration, bushnell provides several examples of resistances toward dominant western discourse through nihoa’s acculturation of ancestral hawai’ian deities and christianity. based on the analysis of colonial complicity and resistance this paper asserts that bushnell’s narration provides a counterdiscourse toward the strong-anti colonialist tone of the hawai’ian nationalist such as haunani kay-trask. his portrayal of white characters depicts them positively as someone who is concerned with the plight faced by the islanders. although bushnell explores the colonial complicity of the islanders in promoting western way of thinking, this paradigm also results in resistance in the form of creating a hybrid culture. this phenomenon highlights the negotiation between two cultures, hawai’ian and the west, which in schaberg’s idea is riddled with “amalgram, disjunctions, and the murky areas of overlap and co-shaping” (2018, p. 144). conclusion based on the analysis of bushnell’s fictions, this paper argues that in the post truth era, literature should always strives to uncover the truth. it is not to say that universal or general truth should be taken for granted, but instead offering a multi interpretation of literature, as what literary critics has been done up to this point should be continued. in line with schaberg’s arguments, literature offers more than one way of percieving truth, to see amalgram and area of overlapping which differs from one scholar to another. the journal of language and literature issn: 1410-5691 (print); 2580-5878 (online) kristiawan indriyanto, ida rochani adi & muh. arif rokhman 66 reading of bushnell’s the return of lono and ka’a’awa exemplifies how the hawai’ian islanders themselves are also complicit in the spread of colonial discourse. their abolishment of the kapu system indicates their inferiority complex, how westerners that are unbound by the restrictive systems prove their superiority compared to the indigenous people. they lose their self-esteem, their respect, and their dignity, adopting the western ways and abandoning their ancestral beliefs. yet it should be noted that their complicity also results in resistance through the creation of a hybrid culture. acknowledgement this paper is part of the ongoing dissertation written by the author entitled lingkungan dalam karya sastra diaspora: kajian ekokritik poskolonial terhadap sastra amerika-hawai’i. the argumentation mainly covers the third chapter of the dissertation. this writer expresses his gratitude toward the insight given by the supervisors; 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(2017). fiction in the “posttruth” era: the ironic effects of autofiction. critique studies in contemporary fiction, 58(5), 471–483. https://doi.org/10.1080/00111619.201 7.1331999 conclusion © 2021 author(s). open access. this article is “studi slavistici”, xviii, 2021, 2: 209-223 distributed under the terms of the cc by 4.0 doi: 10.36253/studi_slavis-10077 submitted on 2020, november 30th issn 1824-7601 (online) accepted on 2021, august 29th a r t i c l e s ( t h e m a t i c b l o c k ) alessandro achilli (university of cagliari) – alessandro.achilli@unica.it the author declares that there is no conflict of interest alessandro achilli beauty, truth, and sincerity. lesja ukrajinka and the responsibility of art between aestheticism and the pursuit of authenticity* lesja ukrajinka’s reputation as “the only man” in ukrainian literature of the early twentieth century (franko 1981: 271) has generated and continues generating a specific reception of her contribution to ukrainian literary culture. in spite of – or maybe thanks to – the abundant and diverse feminist scholarship on lesja ukrajinka available, her figure is associated with the image of a defiant and resilient ukrainianness, in which her ‘masculine’ agency is combined with the traditional image of berehynja as a female protector of a mythicized ukrainian nation1. her prominent role in the traditional canon of ukrainian literature, in which she shares the podium with the national writer par excellence taras ševčenko and the extremely prolific galician intellectual ivan franko, has been consolidated in many ways, including through school programs, the affection for her symbolic persona nurtured by the ukrainian diaspora, and her visual presence during the euromaidan revolution, again alongside ševčenko and franko. in a national culture that has traditionally relied on literature as an ersatz for a missing statehood or a yet-to-be-created national identity, lesja ukrajinka’s works – as with those of several other ‘national writers’ – have run the risk of being paradoxically ‘dismissed’ as just one more manifestation of the ukrainian spirit. i here suggest that they be viewed as fully-fledged protagonists of the european early-twentieth-century canon. the question that i will attempt to briefly answer in this article touches upon the issue of art’s responsibility towards such human constructions as the individual, society and the nation as contrasted with the pursuit of beauty as a value in itself in some of lesja ukrajinka’s writings. from the point of view of literary history, this contribution can be read as one more attempt to investigate the nature of early ukrainian modernism in its confrontation with the so-called populist stream, the latter of which understood literature as a mere, although crucial, instrument of national consolidation. * research for this article was made possible by grants from the ukrainian studies support fund of the association of ukrainians in victoria, australia, the ukrainian studies foundation in australia and monash university. 1 for an interpretation of lesja ukrajinka’s androg yny between reception stereotypes and self-characterization see zborovs’ka 2002: 83-95. 210 alessandro achilli as a writer and a reader endowed with a striking curiosity for several languages and literatures and an insightful commentator of the cultural developments of her time, lesja ukrajinka was caught between an understanding of literature as a key factor in nationbuilding and a feeling of sympathy and support for the free, not necessarily and not primarily political evolution of the arts that she observed and enjoyed in the national traditions that she read, translated and commented upon. in her 1999 book, vira ahejeva situates lesja ukrajinka in the history of ukrainian and european modernism, paying special attention to the figure of the artist as it is represented in lesja ukrajinka’s poems and plays. focusing mostly on the long dramatic poem u pušči (‘in the wilderness’), ahejeva sees the conflict between the artist’s commitment to serve the people and his or her allegiance to his or her authentic inspiration as the cornerstone of lesja ukrajinka’s complex allegiance to modernist art (ahejeva 1999: 49-75). reflections on art, its ethical boundaries and the artist’s morality can be found to different extents in most of her pieces, including, but not limited to, u pušči, rufin i priscilla and lisova pisnja. because of space constraints, i will mostly focus on the play blakytna trojanda and the dramatic poems advokat martijan and orhija, which have been generally discussed from other points of view. these three pieces encompass some of the most beloved settings of her dramatic production: the early christian, the classic and the ukrainian. in these plays, although the problem of art’s nature and duties is far from being exhausted by them, lesja ukrajinka develops a reflection on art’s possibilities and its place in history, in a context marked by the question of the ethical responsibility of the individual towards themselves and their community. more specifically, these plays significantly contribute to the conversation on beauty, truth, responsibility and sincerity in art – and beyond art – that constitutes the most notable part of lesja ukrajinka’s long, and at times contradictory, reckoning with contemporary aesthetics. i also argue that for lesja ukrajinka the question of art and its place in the world is far from concerning artists alone. as a key element of human existence, art is everywhere and its potential and limits are a matter for everyone. before focusing on drama, i will also discuss other texts by lesja ukrajinka, including critical essays, poems and letters, in which her own views on art, its contemporary developments and the condition of ukrainian literature come to the fore with particular evidence. by doing so, i aim to show how lesja ukrajinka’s musings on art in both her creative pieces and her critical writings form a complex body of reflections that cannot be reduced to a univocal approach or point of view, be it national or purely aesthetic. the multilayered nature of the freedom that bohdan pastuch sees as the main pivot of lesja ukrajinka’s works (pastuch 2012: 16-17) means it is impossible to oversimplify her complex art philosophy. however, in partial contrast to pastuch, i here argue that freedom may not be the most fitting term to define lesja ukrajinka’s art philosophy. in her view, the artist’s freedom is limited by the need to respect art’s communicative function, something that she sees as jeopardised in contemporary culture. as we shall see, it is the pursuit of art’s ‘authenticity’ that guides lesja ukrajinka’s reflections and her writing. beauty, truth, and sincerity 211 in an unpublished conference paper, danylo struk discussed the positioning of lesja ukrajinka and her works in the history of ukrainian modernism focusing on the problem of her relationship with the aestheticist movement. while the study of the aesthetic boundaries of modernism in ukraine is in itself a still unresolved problem, the issue of lesja ukrajinka’s participation in ukrainian modernism is no less challenging. while it would be hard to confute ahejeva’s general view that “lesja ukrajinka formed a modernist conception of art by overcoming populist mottos and stereotypes, as well as by interiorising and transforming traditional romantic concepts”, both the breadth of modernist aesthetics and the complexity of lesja ukrajinka’s relation with early modernism call for a more articulated approach to this question2. quite clearly, and tellingly, separating her lyrical poetry from the rest of her œuvre, struk ventured to conclude his contribution stating that “through her poetic dramas and her criticism lesia ukrainka is not only a part of ukrainian modernism chronologically, but together with ievshan, is a true proponent of aestheticism in ukrainian literature”3. struk sees “artistic plausibility” and “authorial sincerity” as the main features of lesja ukrajinka’s embrace of aestheticism4, an aestheticism that he, following lesja ukrajinka herself, contrasts with the frivolousness and moral emptiness of the most extreme manifestations of decadent aestheticism. while struk’s statement can appear to be quite problematic, it is the very definition of aestheticism that is determining here. a complex term that the princeton encyclopedia of poetry and poetics defines as a “term for a literary, philosophical, and cultural movement of the late nineteenth century that came to be identified with the phrase ‘art for art’s sake’” (greene 2012: 10), aestheticism has been often scrutinized in light of its stance towards values and commonly accepted morality5. of particular interest in this context is lesja ukrajinka’s essay on gabriele d’annunzio and ada negri, written in 1899 and published in 1900. in dva napravlenija v novejšej ital’jan skoj literature (ada negri i d’annuncio), lesja ukrajinka focuses on contemporary literature, but her essay also includes a short historical overview of certain trends in the history of italian literature that she sees reflected in more recent developments. lesja ukrajinka 2 “модерністська концепція мистецтва формувалася у лесі українки через подолання народницьких лозунгів і стереотипів, засвоєння й трансформацію традиційних романтичних уявлень” (ahejeva 1999: 50). 3 d.h. struk, lesia ukrainka and the aestheticist perspective, unpublished conference paper, p. 13, cfr. <http://sites.utoronto.ca/elul/struk-mem/works/ukrainka-aestheticist.pdf> (latest access: 07.05.21). 4 ibidem. 5 the issue regarding aestheticism’s moral or its lack thereof is of central importance in debates around fin-de-siècle art. for example, this controversy is excellently captured in discussions around oscar wilde. see quintus 1980: 561: “when jackson discussed wilde in the eighteen-nineties, he said that wilde could not abandon himself to an unprincipled french aestheticism because of the ‘still small voice’ which continued to check wilde’s enthusiasm and to prevent him from being as immoral and amoral as the french upon whom he drew so heavily for his ideas. something held wilde back, jackson notes, and kept him from being a gautier or a huysmans”. 212 alessandro achilli does not shy away from defining ‘tendentiousness’ (tendencioznost’) as the most typical trait of both gabriele d’annunzio’s and ada negri’s works, and the one that makes a comparison between them meaningful and tenable in spite of the clear differences between the two authors in terms of style and cultural orientation. however, in lesja ukrajinka’s view, their alleged tendentiousness is nothing new from the point of view of italian literary history: в качестве тенденциозных поэтов ада негри и д’аннунцио являются продолжателями вековой традиции итальянской поэзии. начало этой традиции положил основатель итальянской литературы данте, который в своей “божественной комедии”, проникнутой мистической мечтательностью, не забывает среди ужасов ада политической борьбы ... эта идея возрождения италии была долгое время главным жизненным нервом итальянской поэзии, и упадок патриотизма всегда шел рука об руку с упадком поэтического творчества (ukrajinka 1975-1979, viii: 29). from dante and petrarch through tasso to carducci and other nineteenth-century italian writers, lesja ukrajinka reads the bulk of italian literature through the prism of its struggle for the nation and its (re)birth. significantly, she links the decay (upadok) of patriotism that has occasionally happened in italian cultural history to the decay of poetry itself, using a term that has been used as a synonym for decadence (decadentism in the italian context) as a cultural movement, possibly echoing dmitrij merežkovskij’s influential essay from 1893 o pričinach upadka i o novych tečenijach sovremennoj russkoj literatury. later in her article, lesja ukrajinka explicitly defines d’annunzio as a decadent, but her musings over d’annunzio’s poetry and prose leave the impression that she is actually trying to compromise with herself, balancing between a more or less open condemnation of his decadence and admiration for his poetic talent, which is also a reflection of d’annunzio’s complex literary self-positioning. “новое слово д’аннунцио не в этом стремлении обновить обветшавшее: несмотря на призывы к возрождению, он певец вырождения” (ukrajinka 1975-1979, viii: 50). a similar approach can be found in zametki o novejšej pol’skoj literature, her 19001901 article on contemporary polish literature. writing on stanisław przybyszewski, one of the most successful writers of her generation, lesja ukrajinka is again at odds with decadent art. it is the issue of the artist’s “absolute” freedom that she contests: итак, искусство и артист свободны абсолютно. можно бы, пожалуй, заключить из этого, что новая теория признает, кроме принципа силы, еще и принцип свободы, но увы! мы видим нечто прямо противоположное (ukrajinka 1975-1979, viii: 119). after listing all the things that the modern artists cannot allegedly do, such as speaking to the masses and talking politics and representing things, lesja ukrajinka comes to the conclusion that the so-called free artists of her and przybyszewski’s time are actually deprived of many of the freedoms that those artists believe to enjoy: beauty, truth, and sincerity 213 таким образом “абсолютно свободный артист” является чем-то вроде лишенного всех прав состояния. судя по тем положительным примерам, на которые указывает пшибишевский в своих критических очерках, бедному свободному артисту даже выбор тем предоставляется очень небольшой: любовь, смерть... и, кажется, все (ukrajinka 1975-1979, viii: 119-120). lesja ukrajinka sees no freedom in the contemporary infatuation with extreme states of mind and the obsessive search for a new type of beauty. in her view, without pursuing a connection with people and their nation, modernist artists, like prisoners of their own souls, are condemned to solipsism and monotony. lesja ukrajinka’s ambiguous attitude towards international early modernist literature, and especially its decadent and symbolist trends, is the object of some of the most interesting literary comments in her epistolary exchanges. writing from berlin to her mother in 1899, she expresses her absolute contempt for jugendstil6. in a letter to volodymyr hnatjuk from 1900, she speaks of her “antipathy towards modernists” (“нехай ваша хв[алена] редакція поборе відому мені свою нехіть до ‘модерністів’” [ukrajinka 2017b: 202]), possibly also hinting at her awareness that modernist literature was actually much more complex and meaningful than she, also a translator of maeterlinck, might instinctively perceive it to be. however, in her later remarks about serhij jefremov after the publication of his muchdiscussed essay v poiskach novoj krasoty, she shows a much more sophisticated approach to contemporary literature. angry with jefremov for his condemnation of ol’ha kobyljans’ka and other writers from bukovyna, and especially irritated by his failure to understand that the influence of german literature on their own writings was actually positive and enriching, lesja ukrajinka accuses jefremov of not understanding the complex character of contemporary literary trends. while the loss of the text of her open letter to jefremov, which she unsuccessfully submitted to “kievskaja starina” for publication, prevents us from having access to an articulated response, some of the letters that she wrote from san remo in early 1903 offer an interesting insight into her view of decadence and symbolism at the dawn of the new century. in a letter to olena pčilka, lesja ukrajinka accuses jefremov of not differentiating between symbolism and decadence. talking about the latter, to which she assigns major poets such as verlaine and rimbaud, she indirectly states her belief that true poetry cannot be separated from moral and social commitment: верлен був дуже щирий поет і таки справжній поет, хоча вдача його, а через те й поезія була протеївська по змінливості і значно психопатична, – але що може зробити поет, окрім того, щоб бути щирим? верлен не був квієтистом, його, як і бодлера, 6 “буля ліля і на виставі ‘secession’ (‘modernisten’, отих, що jugend видають), вона їй страшно не сподобалась. купила мені на показ іллюстрований каталог, то справді якесь страхіття. емма і марі, роздивляючись той каталог, раз-у-раз скрикували: hässlich, grässlich, sche[u]sslich, gre[u]elhaft! na, ist es möglich? ich bin sprachlos! я на сюю secession не хочу дивитися, хоч би й могла!” (ukrajinka 2017b: 130). 214 alessandro achilli захоплювали і моральні і соціальні питання, тільки він довго ні на чому спинитись не міг. так само і rimbaud (ukrajinka 2018: 21). almost as if feeling the need to defend verlaine and rimbaud from both public accusations and her own instinct, lesja ukrajinka sees the poet’s main duty in his or her commitment to sincerity, while also stressing the absolute importance of their duty towards society, not necessarily considered from a national point of view. if verlaine and rimbaud failed, while baudelaire’s status is unclear, it was because of their mental illness. in her study of the obsession with the rhetorics of sincerity in russian cultural history, ellen rutten has defined it as a combination of “genuineness, truthfulness, and the quality of not pretending”, while also pointing out that it “is something that an addresser ‘demonstrates’ or ‘shows’ and that the addressee ‘doubts’” (rutten 2017: 37). sincerity has been deemed a significant innovation in the artistic culture of the early twentieth century, as a reaction to both the search for objectivity of realism and the moral detachment of fin-de-siècle aestheticism (peyre 1963: 237). although sincerity could then be unexpectedly taken to its extreme through some of the most daring manifestations of the early avant-garde such as the emotional outbursts of expressionism or the penchant for épatage of futurism, lesja ukrajinka’s insistence on sincerity can be viewed as in line with the reaction to the alleged aloofness of much of late nineteenth-century art that was part of the complex cultural landscape of the first years of the new century. implicitly, lesja ukrajinka’s call for innovation, which paradoxically also involved her re-adaption of neoromanticism, was also a reaction against the powerful populist vein that she observed in her own literary tradition. in one of her very first letters, lesja ukrajinka reveals how her antipathy for the provocative character of modern literature was not limited to decadent writers, but also included realism and its most extreme manifestations like naturalism: з французьких книжок, окрім жорж санда, я мало читала в первотворі, більш у перекладах і то з новітніх натуралістів школи золя, котрі мені зовсім не подобаються, бо мені здається, що в їх більше страхів різних та ефектів ніж тої правди, або сама безпросвітня бридота. за цеє ж я не люблю й толстого, та ще й за його містицизм я ж, як нарошне, читала більш усього його останні твори, в котрих окрім чортів та ангелів нічого не видко, або само тільки страхиття як напр. “смерть ивана ильича” (ukrajinka 2017a: 56). quite unexpectedly, it is in a lack of truth, or artistic truth, that lesja ukrajinka sees the most disappointing side of naturalism, a broadly understood category in which she also seems to include lev tolstoj’s late works and their ‘mysticism’. interestingly, she uses the same term (strachittja, here strachyttja) to refer to the excesses of both naturalism and jugendstil. in lesja ukrajinka’s view, art that lacks sincerity and truth has no choice but to recur to a bombastic style with the aim of shocking its readers. according to her, this is modern(ist) art’s unsuccessful attempt to make up for the missing value of something that, aware of the long and diverse tradition of this term in the beauty, truth, and sincerity 215 history of philosophy, we could call ‘authenticity’. alessandro ferrara has defined authenticity as “what is uniquely indispensable for an individual to be himself or herself ” (ferrara 1998: ix). in lesja ukrajinka’s view, art must be truthful, beautiful and sincere. if it fails to live up to this standard, it betrays its own nature and vocation, thus losing its authenticity. her low opinion of realistic prose by such ukrainian authors as ivan nečuj-levyc’kyj and oleksandr konys’kyj, whom she repeatedly and with a certain degree of maximalism accuses of a lack of artistic taste7, can be explained by the same obsession with the ideal of an art that needs to be true to itself in order to be able to impact the world. writers and intellectuals are free, but their freedom is somewhat limited by the necessity to comply with the rules of art and its communicative mission. lesja ukrajinka’s cool reception of some of the most successful trends in contemporary literature, both ukrainian and international, can be seen as related to her views on her own duties as a (ukrainian) writer and public intellectual, in a period during which ukrainian literature was set to enter a phase of rapid and irreversible secularisation. in a poem she wrote in 1898 to celebrate the first centennial anniversary of ivan kotljarevs’kyj’s enejida and hence of modern ukrainian literary culture as such, explicitly titled na stolitnij juvilej ukrajins’koji literatury (ukrajinka 1975-1979, i: 174-175), lesja ukrajinka’s lyrical subject laments the exceptional condition of ukrainian literature if compared with the experience of (most) other national traditions: у кожного люду, у кожній країні живий такий спогад, що в його в давнині були золотії віки, як пісня й слово були у шанобі в міцних сього світу; не тілки на гробі складались поетам вінки. apparently celebrating the privileged status of literati in medieval europe, synecdochically referred to as the whole world, lesja ukrajinka’s lyrical subject makes use of the golden-age topos to describe the poor condition of ukrainian literature, which not only suffers in the present, but cannot even boast or dream of returning to a glorious past. however, the second stanza complicates the seemingly stark contrast between ukraine and the west indirectly, but unmistakably hinted at in the first: за пишнії хрії, величнії оди, король слав поетам-співцям нагороди, він славу їх мав у руці; за ввічливі станції, гучні мадригали 7 “мені тілько жаль, що наша бідна українська література отак поневіряється через різних нечуїв, кониських, чайченків і т.п. ‘корифеїв’, а то, про мене, хоч би їхніми творами греблі гачено” (ukrajinka 2017a: 157). 216 alessandro achilli вродливиці теж нагороду давали не знали погорди співці. the harmony between writers and rulers described in the opening lines is here questioned by explicit references to issues of power and subordination. it is now evident that writers had to pay an enormous price to enjoy their privileged status and their reputation, namely the total dependence of their inspiration on the self-aggrandising mania of their rulers. the following stanza makes this even more explicit by using imagery linked to incarceration such as shackles (kajdany). the second half of the poem, graphically separated from the first, is dedicated to ukrainian literature. readers might expect the decay of late nineteenth-century ukraine to be contrasted with ukraine’s own golden age, that of the glory of cossackdom, but this seems not to be the case. the hetmanate is directly mentioned, but the contribution to its splendour by writers recognised as individuals endowed with personality and inspiration is long forgotten: так... в кожній країні є спогади раю! нема тільки в тебе їх, рідний мій краю! були й за гетьманів співці; з них деякі вічнії співи зложили, а як їх наймення? і де їх могили, щоб скласти хоч пізні вінці! according to the lyrical subject, not even in times of national success were ukrainian writers able to enjoy the privileges to which their western colleagues were entitled. moreover, this stanza appears to condemn the idea of art as a mere instrument of national struggle if the unique contribution of each artist as having individual worth per se is not granted the recognition that it deserves. the second half of the poem ends with the same reference to shackles that concludes the first. ukrainian literature and western literature may seem to be very different, but they actually turn out to be more similar than expected, sharing the same subordination to rulers and the same indifference towards writers as human beings, merely reduced to producers of encomiastic poetry. ivan kotljarevs’kyj, the father of modern ukrainian literature and the ideal protagonist of the poem, is not thematized or hinted at in the poem. the first author in modern ukrainian literature recognized as such, he remains a blank space, as absent and mute as the writers from cossack times that preceded him both in the poem and in the history of ukrainian culture. the poem seems to enact the same silence that the lyrical subject laments as a central feature of ukrainian culture. the issue of writers’ anonymity, of their failed public acknowledgement, is crucial here. it is as if lesja ukrajinka were anticipating one of the central tenets of postcolonial criticism, namely the invisibility, or inaudibility of the subaltern. however, eventually laying an ideal, long-awaited wreath at the grave of old ukrainian literature in the final line, lesja ukrajinka’s lyrical subject is able to make up for centuries of forced silence through the performative act of the poem beauty, truth, and sincerity 217 itself. moreover, the poem is authored by a female writer, although this is not evident from the text of the poem itself, with the lyrical subject concealing itself behind its lamentation and the act of its final celebration of its predecessors. in the context of the implied author’s work, however, the text is likely to be perceived as part of the literary legacy of a powerful female writer, thus representing a reckoning with both the plight of the writer under oppression, although the status of artists broadly speaking in the west is also subjected to criticism, and the eternal and much deeper female condition of subalternity. the issue of lesja ukrajinka’s complex concept of art’s place in the world, the role of beauty and the relationship of creativity and responsibility plays an important part in most of her theatre plays. in blakytna trojanda, a play from 1896 that has received critical attention especially with regard to its depiction of what used to go by the name of hysteria (most recently boruszkowska 2020) and lesja ukrajinka’s debut as a playwright, modernity and modern(ist) art are the subject of conversations between ljubov hoščyns’ka, the tragic protagonist, and her interlocutors. throughout the play a number of subtle references are made that seem to hint at an idea of modern art as fallacious. in the first act, ostrožyn, a writer and journalist who significantly looks older for his age, keeps asking ljubov whether her taste in art and music, and her conversation style are ‘modern’, or ‘new’. ljubov’s elusive, sarcastic answers demonstrate her lack of sympathy for fashionable trends, which one would link to decadence. in one of her most articulated replies to ostrožyn on the subject, ljubov accuses her generation of moral weakness: m-r острожин, се розмова серйозна, хоча теж moderne, коли хочете. [...] справді, панове, розмова наша виходить à la ibsen. що ж робити? наше бідне покоління стільки вже ганьби прийняло за необачність, егоїзм, що нарешті задумало поправити свою репутацію і поставило ребром питання про спадковість. се, панове, варто давньої християнської філософської моралі. закон причинності, спадковість, виродження – от наші нові боги (ukrajinka 1975-1979, iii: 17). in a statement full of ambiguities and that has significant repercussions on the discourse on psychic disease central to the play, ljubov sees the contemporary embrace of hereditary theories as a way of eschewing personal commitment to morality. in her next reply to one of the guests at her house, ljubov raises the issue of responsibility (vidpovidal’nist’). by doing so, she flips the current argument that people are doomed to dealing with the fatal consequences of their background by stating that hereditariness forces, or should force individuals to act because of the results that their actions and choices will have on future generations. ostrožyn, obsessed with the modern taste, claims that “ми мусимо дбати тільки про своє власне ‘я’ і прислухатись до його емоцій” (ukrajinka 1975-1979, iii: 18). it should nevertheless be noted, as irena makaryk does in her article on strindberg’s influence on lesja ukrajinka, that ljubov herself falls prey to hereditary theories, thus contradicting her own stance: “liubov’s certainty that she will become mad in fact brings about her madness” (makaryk 1984: 28). later in the play, after being accused by one of the male characters of having ‘ascetic’ tastes because of her interest in science, ljubov expresses 218 alessandro achilli her actual contempt for ascetism: “у мене аскетичний погляд? ну, не знаєте ви мене! (палко.) адже мені усякий аскетизм, усяке фацірство глибоко противне” (ukrajinka 1975-1979, iii: 29). ljubov’s declared refusal of ascetism, although in contrast with some of her actual life choices and eventually not enacted8, can be read as at least a statement of faith in life, which implies her embracing of authenticity and sincerity as integral parts of the human experience. her being “enamoured of risk”, as svitlana krys correctly put it (krys 2007: 396), is linked to her frustrated artistic ambitions, which roman weretelnyk sees at the roots of her mental illness (weretelnyk 1989: 36). in ljubov’s view, art, science, values and responsibility form a continuum outside of which any of these components loses its validity and its power. while art is not absolutized, as it is in the contemporary fashion for which ljubov does not have much sympathy, albeit not denying it altogether, art is a fundamental part of human life, and its connection with ethics is crucial. in conclusion, one can say that although in blakytna troianda the main character’s weltanschauung is not matched by her deeds, her passionate plea for an art that does not refuse the living world and envisages engaging with it embodies some crucial aspects of lesja ukrajinka’s art philosophy in the early stages of her literary career. one of the most compelling instances of lesja ukrajinka’s complex exploration of beauty in art, a question she approached in several of her writings, can be found in advokat martijan, a piece of drama that she worked on between 1911 and 1913. not among her most discussed works, advokat martijan originated in the context of lesja ukrajinka’s productive fascination for early christian times. the play has been mostly read as a typical tale of intergenerational conflict in the spirit of ivan turgenev’s fathers and sons (witochynska 1983: 161-162). advokat martijan retains the focus on hereditariness central to blakytna trojanda, although abandoning the central role such theories play in ljubov hoščyns’ka’s story. the plot of the play centres around martijan and his family, including his two children, avrelija and valent. describing her fascination for the christian faith, which her father has to hide so as not to jeopardize his career as a lawyer, avrelija defines her faith as ‘dead’. not being able to live her life and her religiousness in full means for avrelija being deprived of the regenerating power of the faith that she has decided to embrace. the outer, aesthetic side of a given religion plays a crucial role in her relationship with faith: а все-таки я чула, що в церквах є малювання і величні співи, але мені заказано на те. я тільки безборонно бачу в вікна на вулицях весь ідолянський культ : веселі сатурналії, поважні теорії жерців, похід весталок, 8 i am thankful to one of the anonymous reviewers for prompting me to better assess ljubov’s contradictory rejection of ascetism, which she actually refuses to follow, resulting in the failure of her relationship with orest, her suicide and his death. beauty, truth, and sincerity 219 і думаю: “ся віра неправдива, але чому в ній стільки є краси, а наша правда так убого вбрана?” від сих думок любов моя вмирає... (ukrajinka 1975-1979, vi: 21) to avrelija, there is no distinction between faith, life, beauty, love and truth. while her father advises her that she, as a christian, should be able to grasp the ‘higher beauty’ of her faith, avrelija replies that the only time she has experienced real, living beauty was when she saw a young girl in a circus standing up for her faith while being persecuted. for avrelija, the only way in which faith, and hence life, can be meaningful is by providing believers with the very concrete experience of beauty. beauty can also be said to prevail on truth in the hierarchy of avrelija’s values. although she has no doubt that paganism is untrue, while christianity is simply ‘our truth’, she cannot but admire the pagans’ attention to the aesthetic side of religion. in her view, truth needs beauty to keep being perceived as such. being equivalent to love, truth risks dying if it is not sustained by a powerful commitment to the emotionality provided by the aesthetic experience. significantly, avrelija also lists refined rhetoric as a source of aesthetic pleasure alongside visual performances. to her, the “serious theories” of pagan priests are as beautiful as the vestals’ processions and the cheerfulness of saturnalia. valent, avrelija’s brother, is also in disagreement with their father regarding the way in which religion should be lived. valent’s aestheticization of religion is no less intense than that of his sister, although his allegiance to christianity appears more solid than hers. his view of christianity as a fully rewarding experience combines the mysticism of spiritual ecstasy with the physical fervour of the worshippers’ collective body: у мене дух займався, як я слухав про вхід господній у єрусалим, коли юрба народу незчисленна ‘осанна сину божому!’ кричала, і віття ліс над нею колихався. се ж був тріумф! (ukrajinka 1975-1979, vi: 28) while for avrelija beauty is the embodiment of faith, valent sees in glory the highest realisation of religion’s connubium with art. without the fulfillment of a totalizing worship in which body and soul come together, religion loses its appeal, which explains why he disapproves of his father’s clear-headed, moderate faith. valent expresses his fascination for paul, whose deeds he would be ready to imitate and whose glory he envies. similarly to his sister, for valent religion is powerless without the support of rhetoric: “чин живий / або живеє слово – се талан мій” (ukrajinka 1975-1979, vi: 31). valent has attempted to achieve glory through literature, but in his view the written word does not guarantee the 220 alessandro achilli degree of satisfaction that he sees as a requisite for achieving true glory. in his conversations with his father, valent notes that martijan’s glory is not enough for him. stating his willingness to be sincere, valent maintains that in his work as an advocate, his father is not actually granted the opportunity to defend the truth. moreover, valent laments that martijan’s work does not bring him any glory. only emotional rhetoric and heroic deeds can quench valent’s thirst for honour and fulfillment. the younger generation cannot conceive of a careful approach to both faith and life, two notions that if lived to the fullest come to be identified as the same thing. deprived of vital energ y, religion makes no sense to avrelija and valent. the two siblings’ idealistic view of religion-as-life is however unlikely to pass the test of the real world, as martijan knows. one of the play’s enigmas is its very title, which draws the reader’s attention to martijan and not to his children or the other characters that surround martijan. at the centre of both parts of this ‘dramatic poem’, martijan ambiguously stands for a careful, uninspiring approach to life and spirituality. lacking sincerity and courage, martijan cannot be a hero, although his refusal to live religion as an aesthetic experience may signal a deeper, pristine connection to faith, thus standing for a different, actually more profound level of authenticity. moreover, his cautious choices have given him the chance to raise his children as christians, thus enabling the true faith to thrive and be passed down to future generations. orhija is one of lesja ukrajinka’s last works. antej, its protagonist, is a greek singer from corinth who refuses to accept the unavoidable presence of the roman power in his personal life as an artist and in the choices of those who surround him, including his wife nerisa and his students and colleagues. the national question plays a not secondary role in the play, with issues of cultural colonialism and imperial oppression given a prominent position. although the juxtaposition of the greek and the roman world is likely to be read as a metaphor for the ukrainian-russian context, the colonial question is far from exhausting orhija’s thematic repertoire. in her recent “postcolonial reading” of orhija, anastassiya andrianova highlighted “the tension between the colonial artist’s idealist aesthetics and her material realities” (andrianova 2015: 26). rightly pointing out the complex axiological configuration of the play, which she cannot find duly analysed in the rather straightforward readings of orhija as an anticolonial piece proposed by most of the play’s commentators, andrianova defines orhija as “a national drama that asks us to reconsider whether its hero’s idealism may not disguise an inflexible and ultimately sterile parochialism” (andrianova 2015: 27). the juxtaposition of authentic inspiration and the constraints of the real world, in which men and women of art are forced to adapt their inspiration and their skills to the political context of their time, is indeed a central theme of the piece. the protagonist antej’s resistance to compromise with the colonial power actually means the impossibility for him to have his art admired by a potentially large audience. andrianova correctly sees in antej’s “archaic national aesthetic” (andrianova 2015: 41) the cause of his failure. however, in the context of lesja ukrajinka’s complex approach to the many challenges of her times, including both the recent developments in the arts that she disliked and ukraine’s subjugation to russian imperial power, antej’s stubbornness can be read in more beauty, truth, and sincerity 221 than one way. his unconditional cult of art as a pure, sacred entity actually resembles the decadent religion of art. antej calls the sculptor fedon’s decision to sell a statue of terpsichore to the roman patron a sin, but fedon’s reply highlights the shortcomings in antej’s uncompromising stance, while also developing the reflection on glory central to advokat martijan: “не розумію, що ти з мене хочеш! / чи мав би й я весь вік, як ти, сидіти / без хліба і без слави?” (ukrajinka 1975-1979, vi: 187). while antej’s following reply is centred around the national question (“се повинен / терпіти еллін, коли хліб і славу / здобути може тільки з римських рук” [ukrajinka 1975-1979, vi: 187]), fedon objects to him that without his glory a greek is not a greek. later in the play, using wording that could be read as an allusion to ivan franko, antej’s wife nerisa similarly accuses him of neglecting true glory in favour of sterile idealism: “такому ж от, як ти, хіба лишиться / зів’яле листя та вінці надгробні” (ukrajinka 1975-1979, vi: 194). to be sure, antej also happens to demonstrate a more refined political conscience than that of the people that surround him. replying to his sister evfrozina’s claim that hellas’s future is in his hands, antej objects that it is not wise to set all hopes on a single person. the final scene, with antej killing his wife with his lyre and then committing suicide with one of the lyre’s strings, epitomizes the catastrophic consequences of antej’s refusal to come to terms with the world in which he should be able to live and operate, or, to use a ševčenkian term that appears in the play, to accept and make the best of his fate (dolja). while andrianova and other scholars have rightly stressed the weight of the feminist discourse of the play, with nerisa being more rational than her husband, antej’s story can also be read as an allegory for the dangerous, or even fatal consequences of a dogmatic approach to art and the inability to understand and shape the social environment in which art has to be produced and disseminated. a refusal to mediate with society, even if this is regulated by a colonial power, means for artists a betrayal of their responsibility towards themselves and their talent. in both her creative writings and her critical utterances, lesja ukrajinka shows a traditional, although non-dogmatic view of literature as a platform for authenticity, intuitively grasped as the truest expression of a human being’s personality and of art’s own communicative potential. as peter lamarque put it discussing the relationship between literature and truth since plato and aristoteles, “the proper focus for the truth debate must rest with the question of value rather than the question of fact and not so much with the value of truth, which is not controversial, but the value of literature, which is” (lamarque 2009: 367). in lesja ukrajinka’s thinking, life is worthless without true art and art is helpless and inauthentic when it is not powered by sincerity and unable to function in the world. artists are responsible for both allegiance to their own inspiration and the integration of their talent in the life of society. the failures and contradictions of many of her characters, including blakytna trojanda’s ljubov and orhija’s antej, may be read as a result of their inability to reconcile their idealized art concepts with real life, to have art functioning in the world. the dichotomy of art and life, be it that lived or proclaimed by her characters or the one she observed among her contemporaries, has no place in lesja ukrajinka’s worldview. it is because of the transformative potential of art that it cannot be reduced to a 222 alessandro achilli mere aesthetic pleasure, while the failure to embed art in life – both personal and societal, or even national – equates to its silence, with potentially fatal outcomes for its coryphaei. although her refusal of some of the most successful names and works of fin-de-siècle literature and art is likely to appear naïve from the vantage point of today, one may conclude by saying that lesja ukrajinka’s pragmatic approach, not least motivated by her willingness to support ukrainian literature in its quick development, leaves little room for ideological extremism. the very contrast between the maximalist views of some of her characters and their life choices is fascinatingly contradictory, and their often tragic fates seem to cast a shadow of healthy relativism on the whole of her metaliterary work. we cannot but greet this as a sign of lesja ukrajinka’s modernity. literature ahejeva 1999: v. ahejeva, poetesa zlamu stolit’: tvorčist’ lesi ukrajinky v postmodernij interpretaciji, kyjiv 1999. andrianova 2015: a. andrianova, a postcolonial reading of lesia ukraïnka’s orhiia, “modern drama”, lviii, 2015, 1, pp. 25-45. boruszkowska 2020: i. boruszkowska, attitudes passionnelles. the blue rose (blakytna troianda) — the first play by lesia ukraïnka, in: a. achilli, s. yekelchyk, d. yesypenko (eds.), cossacks in jamaica, ukraine at the antipodes: essays in honor of marko pavlyshyn, boston 2020, pp. 348362. ferrara 1998: a. ferrara, reflective authenticity: rethinking the project of modernity, london-new york 1998. franko 1981: i. franko, zibrannja tvoriv u p’jatdesjaty tomach, xxxi, kyjiv 1981. greene 2012: r. greene (ed.), the princeton encyclopedia of poetry and poetics, princeton 2012. krys 2007: s. krys, a comparative feminist reading of lesia ukrainka’s and henrik ibsen’s dramas, “canadian review of comparative literature / revue canadienne de littérature comparée”, xxxiv, 2007, 4, pp. 388-407. lamarque 2009: p. lamarque, literature and truth, in: g.l. hagberg, w. jost (eds.), a companion to the philosophy of literature, malden 2009, pp. 367384. makaryk 1984: i. makaryk, lesia ukrainka’s blakytna troianda: apropos the theme of psychic murder, “studia ucrainica”, ii, 1984, 5, pp. 25-32. pastuch 2012: b. pastuch, formy svobody u dramaturhiji lesi ukrajinky, “slovo i čas”, 2012, 2 (614), pp. 16-21. peyre 1963: h. peyre, literature and sincerity, new haven-london-paris 1963. beauty, truth, and sincerity 223 quintus 1980: j.a. quintus, the moral implications of oscar wilde’s aestheticism, “texas studies in literature and language”, xxii, 1980, 4, pp. 559574. rutten 2017: e. rutten, sincerity after communism: a cultural history, new haven-london 2017. ukrajinka 1975-1979: l. ukrajinka, zibrannja tvoriv u dvanadcjaty tomach, kyjiv 19751979. ukrajinka 2017a: l. ukrajinka, lysty 1876-1897, kyjiv 2017. ukrajinka 2017b: l. ukrajinka, lysty 1898-1902, kyjiv 2017. ukrajinka 2018: l. ukrajinka, lysty 1903-1913, kyjiv 2018. weretelnyk 1989: r. weretelnyk, a feminist reading of lesia ukrainka’s dramas, unpublished phd dissertation, ottawa 1989. witochynska 1983: o. witochynska, le conflit des générations chez lessia oukraïnka, in: actes du colloque lessia oukraïnka (sorbonne, les 23 et 24 avril 1982), paris-munich 1983, pp. 159-168. zborovs’ka 2002: n. zborovs’ka, moja lesja ukrajinka: esej, ternopil’ 2002. abstract alessandro achilli beauty, truth, and sincerity. lesja ukrajinka and the responsibility of art between aestheticism and the pursuit of authenticity in both her creative writings and her criticism, lesja ukrajinka developed a complex reflection on the nature of art and the artist’s place in society. prompted by her ambiguous response to contemporary trends in the arts such as decadence, she saw true art as the product of an authentic inspiration able to function in its social context. in this article, i attempt to show the complexity of lesja ukrajinka’s concept of art, neither instrumental nor ascetic, on the basis of a number of extracts from her critical writings, her letters, her poetry, and her works for theatre, with special attention to blakytna trojanda, advokat martijan, and orhija. keywords lesja ukrajinka; ukrainian literature; ukrainian modernism; ukrainian theater; aestheticism. c. camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method of discerning spiritual truth abstract this article explores pavel florenskij’s dialectical method as the preferred way to discern spiritual truth. it presents the russian polymath’s method within his sociopolitical and ecclesiastical contexts and two of his works, namely his magnum opus entitled the pillar and ground of truth, and his lecture reason and dialectics, both of which are significant for interpreting florenskij’s thought. the article also provides an intertextual reading of florenskij’s pillar to argue that its context is 1 timothy 3:14-16. it then analyses the similarities between the context of 1 timothy and that of the pillar. as they fall within a period during which particular churches faced certain challenges, both texts call for discernment of the true identity of the church. 1. introduction it is fitting to start this reflection on pavel aleksandrovič florenskij’s method in discerning spiritual truth with a quote from tertullian: when the apostle would restrain us, he expressly names philosophy as that which he would have us be on our guard against. writing to the colossians, he says, ‘see that no one beguile you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, and contrary to the wisdom of the holy spirit.’ he had been at athens, and had in his interviews (with its philosophers) become acquainted with acta theologica 2013 suppl 17: 228-246 doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.4314/actat.v32i2s.13 issn 1015-8758 © uv/ufs <http://www.ufs.ac.za/actatheologica> rev. dr charlò camilleri, o.carm. executive director of the carmelite institute malta, lecturer at the faculty of theology of the university of malta, member of the centro internazionale studi sta maria maddalena de’ pazzi firenze, and research fellow of the university of the free state, bloemfontein, south africa. e-mail: charlocarm@ gmail.com. produced by sun media bloemfontein acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 229 that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth, while it only corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own manifold heresies, by the variety of its mutually repugnant sects. what indeed has athens to do with jerusalem? what concord is there between the academy and the church? what between heretics and christians? our instruction comes from the porch of solomon, who had himself taught that the lord should be sought in simplicity of heart (wisdom 1:1). away with all attempts to produce a mottled christianity of stoic, platonic, and dialectic composition! we want no curious disputation after possessing christ jesus, no inquisition after enjoying the gospel! with our faith, we desire no further belief. for this is our palmary faith, that there is nothing which we ought to believe besides (tertullian 1844:7). the inspiration for the choice of this citation, which, from my viewpoint, mirrors the russian polymath’s persona, is florenskij’s personality and writings. a detailed investigation of florenskij’s weltanshauung, expressed in his erudite writings, is sufficient to understand the reason for such an approximation. besides, this is not new to the study of florenskij. in an appreciation of his friend pavel, sergej bulgakov (1971:128) stated that in him “met and were united in a particular way culture and the church, athens and jerusalem”. in a recent elaboration on bulgakov’s indirect reference to tertullian’s rhetorical question on the relationship between athens and rome, the academy and the church, natalino valentini (2004:10) states that florenskij’s integrative and interdisciplinary method concretizes itself in the definitive choice of his faithful belonging to the church, a belonging which, although faced with actual persecution, is nonetheless alien to any hesitation. to some extent, florenskij’s own metaphysical and physical preoccupations echo tertullian’s commentary on the apostle’s warning in his letter to the colossians. paul the apostle, tertullian and florenskij alert us to “that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth”. they claim that philosophy – to be understood, in this instance, as “human wisdom” (tertullian 1844:7), “logical terms” (florensky 1997:5, 7, 24), the musings of the “rational mind”1 and human understanding which is contrary to the wisdom of the holy spirit (florensky 1997:80-105) – corrupts truth while thrusting us into an impasse in our search for truth. 1 рассудок (german: verstand) differs from paзyм (german: vernuft) inasmuch as the former comes from man (understanding) and, in florenskij, it tends to oppose god’s wisdom, while the latter, “reason”, originates in god and enables us to have a unified vision of reality. camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 230 it would not be far-fetched to state that the church still has the same preoccupations, especially those who reflect upon the complex relationship of the ecclesiastical experience of a community of believers immersed in the world. on the basis of the belief in the incarnation, this preoccupation presses for renewed and valid answers to the challenges posited by such a complex relationship. the johannine jesus himself, in the priestly discourse given during the last supper, touches upon this issue while praying for the disciples who are called to be immersed in the world without being of the world. it should be made clear from the outset that the polymath’s plan of action and solution are different, at least in part, from those of his predecessor. while tertullian rules out the dialectical method, florenskij promotes it, alongside reason, as the key to discerning spiritual truth (истина). it is assumed that reason and dialectic are florenskij’s way of critically reflecting on the lived experience of spiritual truth in the church. discernment is in itself a “critical reflection on lived spirituality” (waaijman 2001:483). it observes differences, perceives tension, gathers and sorts out knowledge with respect to the way toward god: it tests the end and the means and creates a critical centre. with a contemplative eye it looks at a person’s life journey and envisions its perfection (waaijman 2001:483). this study attempts to explain florenskij’s personal experience of the act of discernment. although, as far as one can tell, florenskij does not use the terms discernment or discretio in the conventional sense of the word, he makes, through his own experience, a useful and more focused contribution to the theme of discernment. his reflection on discerning spiritual truth through dialectics is not theoretical inasmuch as it reflects his own way of going through a discerning process. in the western tradition, discernment is often conventionally regarded as acts performed by an individual within the context of spiritual direction, conscience, personal experience, choice and feelings and as relating to the human subject that is challenged to examine deeper motivations and to test them (waaijman 2001:492-500). taking, as an example, florenskij’s experience from the russian orthodox tradition, this search for, and testing of deeper motivations would include reflection on spiritual truths that may be helpful for discernment in the wider context on a critical moment in the life of the church. testing one’s motivations with an eye on the spiritual way could also imply a testing in terms of the wisdom of the past and of spiritual truths. this article purports that florenskij’s insights can be helpful in this instance: how does one, through dialectics, discover those spiritual truths that are also relevant for the spiritual way. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 231 2. the context разум и диалектика is the title of the oration delivered by florenskij to defend his thesis in 1914. it marks his proposal for an adequate and unified theory of reality. one cannot, to some extent, understand his method in the pillar and ground of truth without reading the oration. similarly, one will not comprehend what is implied in the oration without knowing the context. soon after graduating in mathematics and physics, florenskij enrols in the moscow theological academy. during his years at the academy, he publishes various erudite works in search of his own personal approach to the discovery of truth. in a letter dated 31 january 1906 and addressed to andrej belyj,2 florenskij laments that he is finding it difficult, nearly impossible, to get his works published: to a particular journal [my work] is too scientific, to another one, written too much ‘in a new style’; to another one, it’s too mathematical, etc., another one doesn’t like the mystical and theological elements. in short, i am incapable of meeting everybody’s expectations and in conscience i cannot change that method, which – as it appears to me – seems to be my authentic journey (the researching of concepts and the synthesis of heterogenic material (belyj-florenskij 2004:72-73). in a nutshell, florenskij describes his “new style” of putting together and integrating various areas of human knowledge. florenskij’s new style, especially with regard to his reflections on the identity and mission of the church as “bulwark of truth” (1tim 3:15) should be read in the light of the historical turning point for the orthodox church in russia in the wake of the 1905 revolution and, at a later stage, in the 1917 bolshevik revolt. as a detailed analysis of the historical, social, political and religious background is beyond the scope of this article, only brief remarks will be made on the context. the twelve-year period between the revolution and the revolt (1905-1917) was marked by a certain profound awareness, especially among the non-religious intelligentsia, that first the tsarist authocracy had to be overthrown and that, secondly, the russian orthodox church had become “a slave of conscience”. the roots of this new awareness originated in the suppression of the moscow patriarchate by tsar peter the great (1672-1725) and its being supplanted by the holy synod to keep the russian orthodox church under control and to neuter its opposition to the westernisation of russia (feralto 2012:297). in fact, this change in conscience had already started with the reforms imposed by patriarch 2 polymath. his real name is boris nikolaevich bugaev, son of nikolai vasilievich bugaev, founder of the moscow school of mathematics. camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 232 nikon of moscow (1605-1681) and tsar aleksej, leaving a divided church in russia. subsequent to these reforms, the politics of peter the great paved the way for the russian conscience to move from an ecclesiastically trained world view to the russian secular technical and scientist utopia visualised as real enlightenment (stammler 1960:225; tagliagambe 2006:20). in this context, there developed a paradoxical mixture of spiritual vigour – flourishing among the russian christian intelligentsia – and the rise of utopic nihilism – culminating in the bolschevic revolution: the church was demanding the proclamation of a council and the re-establishment of the moscow patriarchate amidst high expectations and disillusionment in various movements. there were calls for a reformed, restructured and spiritual church by, for instance, the merežkovskij’s3 who, inspired by “nietzsche’s challenge to rationalism, positivism, and christianity” (rosenthal 2007:330), argued that there was no hope for the “historical church” and preferred to practise their religion at home (pyman 2010:96). this profound change or shift also had negative, violent and divisive consequences on both the ecclesiastical and the political level, as is well known from the still influential history (bianchi 2008:15-24; freeze 1996:308-350; camilleri 2012:24-43; attard 2012:33). within the context of the church, faith and religion, one is faced with the question as to how to discern truth and remain faithful to it amidst changing times. challenged by this question that arose from a conflict between culture and religion, florenskij found that discernment increasingly made him “speak from within the church” (pyman 2010:96), respecting its two dimensions of the spiritual and the historical, rather than from without or in opposition to the church. in so doing, he was distancing himself from the so-called “godseeking” intelligentsia (богоискатели) who abandoned orthodoxy (pyman 2010:96). florenskij’s understanding of the church is that she is at one time indissolubly united to her creator and divine founder and inseparable from her own human condition. consequently, because of her particular constitution, the church has a double character, and 3 followers of the “new religious consciousness” movement led by dmitrij merežkovskij (1865-1940) and nikolai berdiaev (1874-1948). as with the symbolist movement, it was influenced by vladimir solovyov (1853-1900). florenskij, himself at one time part of the bogoiskateli movement, was influenced by solov’ëv’s unitarian world view as expressed in his sophiology and godmanhood, but he did not fall into the excesses of these movements. florenskij criticises “the people of the ‘new consciousness’” in letter five of the pillar, while delving into an analysis of the holy spirit’s role in the life of the church as the comforter (florenskij 1997:91). for a detailed study, see bernice glatzer rosenthal’s essay, a new spirituality: the confluence of nietzsche and orthodoxy in russian religious thought (steinberg & coleman 2007:330-357). acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 233 her substantial duality – dualité constitutive – or dual character is revealed in every movement of the ecclesiastical body (understood in its biblical sense) (florenskij 2008:112). this duality reflects, or is an extension of the bi-unity of jesus christ, her founder (florenskij 2008:112). duality is also typical of the divine-human act of discernment, understood as a spiritual-moral act involving god’s truth approaching us and our freely choosing to behold his revelation (costa 2002:159). florenskij’s upbringing was marked by the utopic rise of a new scientific conscience, in which religion was taboo and regarded as obscure (florenskij 2011:181; pyman 2010:2-3; attard 2012:33). faced with a deep spiritual crisis on an existential and relational level, florenskij moved from science, mathematics and physics to theology. he went as far as to reject the chair offered to him at the department of mathematics and physics at the moscow university in order to further his studies at the moscow theological academy in sergiev posad. nonetheless, this shift did not mean that he abandoned his scientific endeavours. it was rather an integrative process that combined the lived experience of the church with an immersion in the challenges of the emerging secular society to the imperial church. this shift also included his response to his family’s criticism. florenskij (1999:45-130) defends his radical decision to study theology in the 1904 dialogue эмпирея и эмпирия. in 1912, he presented in part the thesis entitled on spiritual truth. two years later, he defended it and published it in its entirety after many revisions and second thoughts as the pillar and ground of truth (1914). this magisterial work had to be evaluated by the academic council and the holy synod. his mentors s.s. glagolev and bishop theodor pozdeevskij, fearing the restrictive censorship of the synod, reluctantly urged florenskij to make major changes, among which, the elimination of the fundamental chapters – from the perspective of the polymath’s vision – on gehenna, wisdom, friendship and jealousy (valentini 2004:85-87). these chapters were, in florenskij’s opinion, “the philosophical and theological telos” of the entire opus (florenskij 1996:742-743).4 4 it would be interesting to analyse these chapters in order to illuminate the theological (and perhaps political) motivation behind censorship. such a hermeneutical exercise would take into consideration that florenskij’s pillar calls “for an experiential dogmatics” (valliere 2007:391), while challenging the church’s dogmatism as a response to the cultural and religious crisis of the time. in his догматизм и догматика, florenskij (1994:561) uses the metaphor of a beautiful but gloomy gothic cathedral to lament that “the body and the soul camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 234 3. capturing the spirit and responding to change the essay on orthodox theodicy is considered to be one of the major theological works of the twentieth century. it had an impact on both the russian culture prior to world war i and the russian orthodox church’s “frozen period” during the soviet regime after the downfall of the tsarist regime. florenskij’s personality and work are prophetic witnesses in a period marked by deep transitions in culture, faith and spirituality. florenskij describes this experience vividly: a fracture in world history was verified in what i experienced. all of a sudden it became clear to me that ‘time was being dislodged from its hinges’ and that because of this, something very important was coming to an end, not only for me, but also for history. this instilled in me a sense of mortal anxiety and burning pain. it was the unbearable consciousness of perceiving the demolition of that which was constructed with enormous effort, not only mine, but the common effort of the whole of europe. nonetheless, in this intense suffering, it was possible to perceive the onset of freedom and resurrection, again, not only mine, but that of all people (florenskij 1988:138). florenskij was aware that the empiricism of a technical and scientific world view, in which he was formed, was yielding to a spiritual world view. in his understanding, the renaissance was submitting to the middle ages, obviously not in a chronological order, but in the search for existential meaning and, thus, for truth (florenskij 1988:147). epochal changes, with their many voices and sounds, with their instability and chaotic noise, are privileged loci for discernment. in 1905, florenskij expressed this when, in an analytical study entitled гамлет and dedicated to his friend sergej troickij, he reads the tragedy as the danish prince “being so torn between two incompatible consciences that a deepseated fracture splits his personality” (florenskij 2004:41). this situation of life and death requires wisdom that is able to integrate the two (florenskij 2004:37-41), so that one may move forward with one, good conscience. hamlet is finally crushed between two consciences or world views. in gamlet, florenskij purports to experience (опыт) in a dialectical manner. quoting schelling, he states that dialectic of the religious worldview have separated themselves from each other”. people outside the church cannot find their way in, while insiders are imprisoned in lifeless traditionalism hurling ineffective anathemas to outsiders, who, ironically, may wish to enter. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 235 consiste in una serie di prove del pensiero che si succedono coerentemente, consiste in una serie di esperienze del pensiero su se stesso, correttamente concatenate; il pensiero sperimenta se stesso, organizzando singoli momenti del processo dialettico, e attenendosi nel far questo alle proprie leggi, alla propria natura. tuttavia, man mano che organizza i singoli momenti – o sistemi – la ragione scopre un limite nell’anello della catena che ha creato, la sua incompatibilità con le condizioni necessarie della veridicità, con i criteri di verità; scopre la falsità del singolo anello in quanto tale quando viene preso nella sua esclusività (florenskij 2004:9-10).5 it is through the dialectical movement that the microcosmic individual reason connects with the macrocosmic universal reason (florenskij 2004:11). in line with the medieval world view, florenskij (1983; 2007:208) is convinced that there is an ideal affinity and correspondence between the structure of the individual and the world; there is a reciprocal conditioning of each other, an interpenetration of one into the other, a substantial bond between them. dialectic is, therefore, fundamental in order to discern reality. in an incomplete work у водоразделов мысли. чёрты конкретной метафизики, florenskij develops his understanding of the dialectical process (florenskij 1990).6 in this instance, reason and objective reality enter into a reciprocal, eternal and rhythmic dialogue, in which the former is attracted to objectivity through an experience of awe. 5 in razum i dialektika, florenskij mentions: “questo è il contenuto del libro. passiamo ora la metodo. ebbene, per colui che lo ha sfogliato credo che non vi sia dubbio che tale metodo sia la dialettica, intendendo il termine nella sua accezione più vasta di pensiero immediato, vivo e vitale in contrapposizione al pensiero scolastico, e cioè raziocinante, che analizza e classifica. non è un discorso sul processo del pensiero, ma il processo stesso del pensiero nella sua immediatezza, è il pensiero palpitante dimostrabile ad oculos. e l’esempio più semplice della dialettica, cioè del pensiero in movimento, è in fondo ogni autentica conversazione. dialettica sarà anche ciò che a questo mio discorso seguirà, e cioè il dibattimento. l’esempio più sommo di dialettica applicata alla fede lo ha offerto l’apostolo paolo nelle sue lettere: non è della vita dello spirito che ci parla l’apostolo, ma è la vita stessa che si riversa nelle sue parole e scorre come un flusso vivo. tra la realtà e il discorso su di essa non c’è sdoppiamento, è la realtà stessa che si presenta al nostro spirito nelle parole dell’apostolo.” (valentini 2004:102-103). 6 on the threshold of thought. sections of this incomplete study are available in italian translations, among which florenskij (2007:121-229; 2003:75-135; 2003). camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 236 in this integrative procedure, dialectic is neither the beginning nor the end; it is essentially the intermediary between thought and the relationship with the other. it is a process, a mystical one, we can say, which enables us to connect with other worlds (florenskij 2004:12-13). taking into consideration all of the above, it becomes understandable why, in this particular ecclesiastical context within which he was moving, florenskij proposes dialectic as the way to discern spiritual truth: dialectic has to do with the concrete, the dynamic, the contradictory, and so it finds abundant materials in the history of christian movements. for all movements are at once concrete and dynamic, while christian movements have been marked with external and internal conflict, whether one considers christianity as a whole, or even this or that larger church or communion. the materials of dialectic, then, are primarily the conflicts in christian movements. but to these must be added the secondary conflicts in historical accounts and theological interpretations of the movements. besides the materials of dialectic, there is its aim. this is high and distant. as empirical science aims at a complete explanation of all phenomena, so dialectic aims at a comprehensive viewpoint. it seeks some single base or some single set of related bases from which it can proceed to an understanding of the character, the oppositions, and the relations of the many viewpoints exhibited in conflicting christian movements, their conflicting histories, and their conflicting interpretations (lonergan 1999:129). in line with reason (pазум), dialectic compares, criticises and purifies categories and perspectives aiming at truth. in the pillar and ground of truth, florenskij reflects critically on “the problem of the certitude of truth” (florensky 1997:20), by analytically examining the manner in which truth comes to us and by distinguishing between reality or veracity and deception or illusion. the text itself takes the form of seemingly unconnected letters which, when combined, enlighten us with knowledge of the spiritual truth emerging from it. 3.1 a text within the text the title of the work is a quote from 1 timothy 3:15, where paul writes about the church (especially verses 14-16): i hope to come to you soon, but i am writing these instructions to you so that if i am delayed, you may know how one ought to behave in the household of god, which is the church of the living god, the pillar and bulwark of the truth. great indeed, we confess, is the mystery of our religion: he was manifested in the flesh, vindicated in acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 237 the spirit, seen by angels, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, taken up in glory. the meaning of the pillar and its method can be better understood in this biblical context which inspired it. paul penned his letter so that the addressee “may know how one ought to behave in the household of god, which is the church of the living god, the pillar and bulwark [ground] of truth”. the context of the letter is about the transition of the ephesian church from ascetic judaism to gnosticism. the church was in danger of passing from exposure to scrupulous legalism to superstition and godlessness.7 there was also the challenge of false masters or teachers who presented themselves as enlightened (gnostic), true interpreters of the christian way. paul directs the overseers to guide the church in truth. centuries later, by analogy, florenskij’s text originated in similar transitional phases in the social, political, theological and ecclesiastical spheres. these phases threatened to alter the church’s understanding of herself, her identity and her mission. kenworthy comments that, in an age where secularising rulers of the eighteenth century sought to restrict the church’s activities to the ‘spiritual’ realm, a trend that was dramatically reinforced by soviet rule (pereira 2010:163),8 such a change neutralised the charismatic energy of the church as a catalyst of transformation in the ecclesiastical and socio-political spheres.9 in an early text, intimately linked with the pillar, florenskij laments that the “concept” of the church was in “a blurred state of confusion”. quoting paul jalaguier, a waldesian theologian, he thus calls for “prudence” in rationally analysing this concept in the light of sacred scripture as interpreted by the church. this process of knowing on the basis of, to use cassian’s words, 7 see, for example, 1tim 1-3; 1 tim 4:3; 1 tim 6:20. 8 see also kenworthy (2010) and kenworthy’s study in steinberg & wanter (2008:21-54). 9 contemporary upheavals in the social, religious and political spheres reveal this as a recurrent challenge worth reflecting upon via a sound theology of culture. as a particular example, i would like to refer to the closing statements of yekaterina samutsevich, maria alyokhina and nadezhda tolokonnikova delivered on 8 august 2012 at the moskow khamovniki district court during the pussy riot trial, wherein the three feminist political protestors where charged with inciting religious hatred against the orthodox church on 21 february 2012 in a performance in christ the saviour cathedral in moscow. for their closing statements, cf. shayevich (2012). for the socio-political and religious dynamics, cf. kasparov (2012); bohm (2012). camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 238 “true judgement and knowledge” (conférences 2, 2-7; 9.9; 14, 1-8, 21, 34) is necessary in order to maintain, in florenskij’s words, the integrity or purity (целомудрие) of the “mystery of the church” (eph 5:32): with sacred zest, it is necessary, on the one hand, to pay attention and not to limit ourselves only to biblical data. on the other hand, we should be cautious not to cross the boundaries and ultimately to add or detract anything [...]. beneath every text of the word of god there resides the hidden light; in every sound, wisdom. the competence of science is, therefore, in this case, to gather the particular texts disseminated in the sacred scriptures and to band them together into a systematic structured whole, without altering that which is gathered (florenskij 2006:101-102). the vague ecclesiastical concept is the result of the lack of an ecclesiastical experience (florenskij 1997:8-9). florenskij purports that discernment through this dialectical method maintains harmony in the church’s life within the framework of rational analysis (florenskij 2006:115; waaijman 2001:484). in 1 timothy 3, paul describes the church with the biblical phrase “the household of god” which generally refers to israel and “more often to the temple in jerusalem” (wild 1993:898). worth noting in this context is that before the temple’s entrance were two free-standing bronze pillars, signifying perhaps the exodus pillars of smoke and fire through which god’s presence accompanied and led israel in the wilderness. these pillars were given the names yakin, meaning “he will establish”, and boaz, meaning “in strength”. these “fire-pillars of cosmic significance” (mckenzie 1992:874) recalled the presence amidst god’s household established in strength. the church is the pillar of truth inasmuch as it continuously preserves and makes present in history the divine truth revealed in jesus christ. as household of god, she is also the pillar of truth inasmuch as those who are of truth belong to christ and, therefore, to the church as his body in time. the apostles themselves are also called the twelve foundations of the church (see rev 21:14) inasmuch as they guarantee tradition, namely apostolic succession, from christ himself (see 1 cor 3:11; eph 2:20; rev 21:14). thus, the church rests on christ as the foundational truth in itself, distinct from the truth acknowledged by the world. she is established in strength upon this foundational truth which supports itself and the church. in 1 timothy 3, the truth preserved and upheld by the church “is the great mystery of our religion or godliness”, namely christ who “was manifested in the flesh, vindicated in the spirit, seen by angels, preached among the nations, believed on in the world, taken up in glory” (cf. also jn 1:14; ph 2:7). the entire mystery of christ himself, including the incarnation, is “the acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 239 mystery of godliness” who was hidden “with god” and was made manifest (see jn 1:1, 14; rom 16:25-26; col 1:26-27; 2 tm 1:10; tit 2:11; 3:41) to the church who, in turn, professes and confesses it (in the faith of believers) as upholder of the truth.10 the structure of florenskij’s book is not systematic. as indicated earlier, it is composed of twelve letters written to a brother or friend who was for florenskij the sacrament of christ the friend.11 the genre itself not only reveals the eruditeness of the author who draws from liturgical, patristic and philosophical (classical and modern) sources in his quest for gaining knowledge of truth, but is also a persuasive model of florenskij’s method in discerning spiritual truth. the fundamental methodology and thrust of the work reveal the following approaches (gustafson 1997:ix-xxiii): • epistemological: florenskij uses symbolic logic and arithmology with detailed precision. • moral: florenskij analyses the phenomenon of the human capacity for relationships, for example friendship and jealousy. • ontological: florenskij analyses being (existence, reality) and the metaphysical relationship between different categories of being. such an approach is visible in his letter on triunity and wisdom. florenskij uses these approaches to investigate how, from a christian (orthodox) perspective, one can arrive at spiritual truth and live according to it. florenskij’s perspective is unitarian. he proposes a christian world view (weltanschauung) which, in line with the trinitarian model, through faith dialectically brings together all ideas, objects, experiences, contradictions and persons into mutual relationship and interpenetration. according to florenskij, disunity reveals the sinful state of a humanity that is alienated from truth, living in an illusory (not real) state (false self), which is quintessentially the experience of gehenna (hell). disunity leads to ἐποχή (suspension) and to nihilism. the former takes the form of, first, cartesian methodological doubt (scepticism) in which, rationally, one doubts the truth of one’s beliefs and of, secondly, philosophical scepticism which denies all possibility of knowledge, leading to a nihilistic vicious circle of philosophical despair over the loss of god, the loss of objective and absolute values, and over the postmodern condition of alienation and dehumanisation. in this instance, reason degenerates into unhinged ratiocination (florenskij 2004:100). 10 this paragraph is partly indebted to jamieson, fausset & brown (2000) and to discussions with rev. dr. paul sciberras. 11 recent scholarly works have shown that the friend in question is sergej troickij. camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 240 instead of approaching reality with a scrutinising mind, florenskij proposes to behold the truth in contemplation (вглядывает’ся) (florenskij 1914:95) which approaches us directly through phenomena, namely through appearances or forms which constitute our experience. in other words, spiritual truth – god – approaches us (anthropodicy – όδóσ kάτω – way downwards – kenosis) while we move towards it (theodicy – όδóσ άνω – way upwards – ascesis) (florenskij 1914:96). this contemplative stance together with the horizontal paradigm of descent-ascent echoes the johannine tradition, so influential in the development of the christian ascetical-mystical tradition. complementary to the way upwards and the way downwards is the other johannine paradigm of moving from the centre to the periphery, as rendered in the johannine account of jesus’ journey to galilee (beutler 2012). this paradigm is also found in florenskij’s experience of a horizontal (person to person) and vertical (god to humanity) movement towards beholding truth. in fact, florenskij understands truth in its fundamental connection with lived experience (опыт). istina, moreover, contains in itself the ordinary and shared drama of life. in his reflection on istina (genuine fundamental truth which differs from правда – pravda, namely just/justice, correct, true, right), florenskij brings together phenomena and noumena (things in themselves, which constitute reality and are independent of our own experience of them). while, according to kant, we remain ignorant of the noumenal realm and impose the structure of our concepts onto the objects of our knowledge, florenskij holds that one can reach truth through contemplation. thus, for florenskij, the rational search for truth will inevitably lead to the stability of faith in the trinity experienced as the fullness of being and knowledge. for florenskij, reason, longing for and being drawn towards certainty and stability (florenskij 1914:100) cannot, on their own accord, behold knowledge of ultimate truth. the journey towards this knowledge is an ascetical one of detachment from all phenomena in order to contemplate the noumena behind them. ultimately, truth is the trinity itself wherein the divine persons distinctively coexist in the same essence. by participating in divine life, all things coexist in unity through sophia (wisdom) which is god’s readiness to allow the entire creation into the trinitarian life. the journey towards divinisation takes place in and through divine love which then overflows into loving relationships of philia (friendship) and agape (brotherhood), the basic conditions for ecclesiality (соборность). florenskij was convinced that one arrives at truth only in and by experiencing the church. it is in experiencing ecclesiality that one arrives at truth inasmuch as it is religion – understood as the binding force between those who profess the same faith – which “saves us from ourselves, acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 241 saving our interior world from the latent chaos present therein” (florenskij 1914:93). following solov’ëv, florenskij purports that “the church is in fact at the basis of society” (florenskij 2006:113). she is not only the aggregation of people (the faithful), but also that which binds them together, namely, that essential form of unity given to them from on high and through which they can participate in the divine life (florenskij 2006:113).12 it is worth noting how florenskij defines salvation. for him, salvation is merely “the equilibrium in the spiritual life”, namely the equilibrium between the vertical and the horizontal, the human and the divine principles and their reasonable bi-unity. equilibrium is only possible through direct religious experience (florenskij 2006:112). the vertical-horizontal movement finds its noblest expression and stability in the person of jesus christ, god and man, and in the community he founded in response to peter’s solemn profession of faith in matthew 16:16-18 (florenskij 2006:111). the very notions or images of pillar and ground or bulwark transmit this sense of stability in the face of the restless passions, of sceptic instability and of the flux of time. by befriending and holding on to this “unshakable” spiritual truth, “solid as a cliff”, one receives the gift of “sovereign freedom”, salvation from the wild, hellish fire of the gehenna, “purity of heart” or integrity, and peaceful stillness in god’s reign (florenskij 1997:187-189; waaijman 2001:510; un chartreux 2003:40-41). 3.2 navigating between scylla and charybdis facing the danger of being enslaved by or caught up between two ideological movements made up, on the one hand, of the holy synod controlling the russian orthodox church leading her to a deadlock and, on the other, of the reactionary “god-seeking” intelligentsia advocating a spiritual ecclesiality (florenskij 1997:187; valentini 2004:86-89), florenskij reverts to god’s household to find, through wise discernment, spiritual truth within “the spiritual treasures of the church” and so, to gradually come “to see their value” (valentini 2004:5). his thought emerges from the experience of a life enlightened by an intellect moved by the holy spirit which, for him, is the essence of ecclesiality (florenskij 1997:8; bulkagov 1980:17-41; rupnik 2001:28-29). in so doing, he indicates the way forward for the church to remain faithful to herself and to the truth upon which she 12 this is a direct quote from solov’ëv (sobranie sočinenji iii/ii, 2:351). camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 242 is built and which she has the mission to preserve. herein lies perhaps the validity of florenskij’s method of discernment, even for the present, when spiritual discernment tends to stem forth from the solicitude, open to all of the faithful, to embark in the task of renewal in all spheres of the church’s life, paying particular attention to the challenges pertaining to the church’s unity, the spiritual-pastoral leadership, apostolic choices, the synchronization between charism and establishment, the individual and the community, freedom and authority, and finally between the different charisma and ministries existent and operative in it (costa 2002:155). in describing his method, florenskij explains that he never for a moment attempted to please his opponents: i will not permit anyone to put limits to my conscience and to my thought, but at the same time i do not intend to violate the conscience or understanding of others, no matter how much these appear to me to be ridiculous (florenskij 1914:97; valentini 2004:86). in making necessary changes to the text on spiritual truth, he was not motivated by fear of the holy synod, but by the fact that, in submitting a dissertation for a defence, one expects such changes – even though they did not affect the essence of his method (valentini 2004:86-87). the judgement which does most justice to florenskij’s method of discernment and acquiring knowledge of spiritual truth (as presented mainly in the pillar and ground of truth) is that of bishop theodor, who remarks: upon reading this work, the feeling is that one does not only become knowledgeable in particular areas, but that one grows spiritually with it; to really comprehend this work, it is necessary to grow first (pozdeevskij 1914:140-181). indeed, florenskij’s way of experiencing this method was that of a spiritual exercise. examiners and judges could fail him and deprive him of his work, but they could not take from the depths of his heart that which he came to possess during the process itself: “it is good for me to adhere to god: in him i have put my hope.” (florenskij 1914:98; valentini 2004:111).13 what is this if not spiritual wisdom and discernment? 13 see also psalm 73 (72): 28. acta theologica supplementum 17 2013 243 bibliography archimandrita, s. 2008. silvano del monte athos (1866-1938). la vita, la dottrina, gli scritti. milano: gribaudi. attard, g. 2012. closest to the heart. unity in friendship according to pavel aleksandrovič florenskij (1882-1937). dissertation presented in part fulfilment for the requirements of the s.th.l. degree in spiritual theology at the pontifical gregorian university in rome. belyj, a. & florenskij, p.a. 2004. l’arte, il simbolo e dio. lettere sullo spirito russo. translated by giuseppina giuliano (ed.). milano: medusa. 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(ed.) 2010. philantropy and social compassion in eastern orthodox tradition. new york: theotokos press. the sophia institute studies in orthodox theology 2. pozdeevskij, t. 1914. o duchovnoj istine. opyt pravopslavnoj foedisei. bogoslovskij vestnik 2:140-181. pyman, a. 2010. pavel florensky: a quiet genius. the tragic and extraordinary life of russia’s unknown da vinci. new york: continuum. rupnik, m.i. 2001. el discernimiento. madrid: ppc. shayevich, b. 2012. politics. pussy riot closing statements. [online.] retrieved from: www. nplusonemag.com/pussy-riot-closing-statements [18 august 2012]. stammler, h. 1960. the great tradition in russian philosophy. russian review 19(3):225. steinberg, m. & wanter, c. (ed.) 2008. religion, morality and community in post-soviet societies. washington/ bloomington: woodrow wilson centre press/indiana university press. steinberg, m. & coleman h.j. (ed.) 2007. sacred stories. religion and spirituality in modern russia. bloomington: indiana university press. solov’ëv, v. 1911-1914. sobranie sočinenji. st. petersburg: prosveshchenie. tagliagambe, s. 2006. come leggere florenskij. milano: tascabili bompiani. camilleri pavel aleksadrovič florenskij’s method 246 tertulliani 1844. liber de praescriptionibus adversus haereticos. in: pl, ii, 9-74a. j.p. migne (ed.). turnhout: brepols. un chartreux 2003. le discernement des esprits. paris: presse de la renaissance. valentini, n. 2004. pavel a. florenskij. brescia: editrice morcellania. novecento teologico 14. waaijman, k. 2001. spirituality. forms, foundations, method. translated by john vriend. leuven: peeters. studies in spirituality supplement. keywords trefwoorde pavel a. florenskij pavel a. florenskij discernment onderskeiding spiritual truth geestelike waarheid dialectic dialektiek introductory essay: canadaâ•žs own brand of truth and reconciliation? the international indigenous policy journal volume 2 issue 3 truth and reconciliation article 1 august 2011 introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? joanna r . quinn the university of western ontario, jquinn2@uwo.ca recommended citation quinn, j. r. (2011). introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation?. the international indigenous policy journal, 2(3) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.1 this letter from the editor is brought to you for free and open access by scholarship@western. it has been accepted for inclusion in the international indigenous policy journal by an authorized administrator of scholarship@western. for more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca. introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? abstract the question of how societies might reach some kind of truth or reconciliation is complicated in post-conflict societies, where physical and social devastation is obvious. yet in so-called “settler” societies, evidence of that kind of devastation, including the gross violation of human rights and blatant abuse, along with the lasting impact of that abuse, remains invisible to many, as outlined by the authors who have contributed to this special edition. creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ letter from the guest editor joanna r. quinn introductory essay canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? the question of how societies might reach some kind of truth or reconciliation is complicated in post-conflict societies, where physical and social devastation is obvious. yet in socalled “settler” societies, evidence of that kind of devastation, including the gross violation of human rights and blatant abuse, along with the lasting impact of that abuse, remains invisible to many, as outlined by the authors who have contributed to this special edition. the latter is, unfortunately, the case in canada, where the indian residential schools (irs) operated from the 19th century until the last school closed in 1996. under that system, aboriginal children were required to attend schools that would “take the indian out of the child,”1 a form of “aggressive assimilation.”2 nearly 150,000 children of aboriginal, inuit and métis origin were separated from their families and communities and forced to attend the schools.3 there, they suffered unimaginable physical, sexual, and emotional abuse.4 in early 1998, in reporting on the royal commission on aboriginal peoples, then-minister of indian affairs and northern development jane stewart offered “a solemn offer of reconciliation,” which acknowledged the role of the government of canada in the indian residential schools.5 although there had been significant negotiation between aboriginal groups and the churches that had, in many cases, run the schools, the government of canada did very little until it finally signed the indian residential schools settlement agreement in 2006.6 1 ward churchill, kill the indian, save the man (san francisco: city lights books, 2004). among other things, the settlement agreement included the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission (trc). and in 2008, then-prime minister stephen harper made a “statement of apology,” which stated: “therefore, on behalf of the government of canada and all canadians, i stand before you, in this chamber so central to our life as a country, to apologize to aboriginal 2 cbc news, “a history of residential schools in canada,” [faq on-line]; available from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2008/05/16/f-faqs-residential-schools.html; accessed 21 april 2011. 3 cbc news, “a history of residential schools in canada.” 4 indian residential school survivors’ society, “history,” [article on-line]; available from http://www.irsss.ca/history/; accessed 21 april 2011. 5 “notes for an address by the honourable jane stewart, minister of indian affairs and northern development, on the occasion of the unveiling of gathering strength — canada’s aboriginal action plan,” ottawa, ontario, january 7 1998, [speech on-line]; available from http://www.aincinac.gc.ca/ai/rqpi/apo/js_spea-eng.asp; accessed 21 april 2011. 6 “a condensed timeline of events,” in from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools, eds. marlene brant castellano, linda archibald, and mike degagné (ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation, 2008), 64-65. 1 quinn: introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? published by scholarship@western, 2011 peoples for canada's role in the indian residential schools system.”7 stanton’s essay in this collection clearly traces the events that led to the creation of the settlement agreement and, eventually, the trc, as well as the lasting damage that was ultimately done by the indian residential schools. the trc of canada was finally appointed on june 1, 2008, with a five-year mandate.8 to acknowledge residential school experiences, impacts, and consequences; that mandate is very clear about the seven goals of the trc: to provide a holistic, culturally appropriate and safe setting for people to come forward; to witness, support, promote and facilitate truth and reconciliation; to promote awareness and public education of canadians about the indian residential schools; to create an historical record of the irs system and its legacy; to produce a report including recommendations; and to support the commemoration of former irs students and their families.9 the trc secretariat has been working to carry out these activities, through a series of national and community events, and through the gathering of statements, as well as through a rigorous research and documentation effort. as the paper by bonner and james in this collection demonstrates, however, the canadian trc is seen by many as a marked departure from truth commissions held in many other places across the globe. for example, it will not hold public hearings where witnesses are compelled to come forward, at least not in the manner that is traditionally understood within the transitional justice scholarship. optimists view this as opening up space for a dialogue without fear of sanction on the part of those who will testify and otherwise provide information. likewise, the trc will not name the names of those who are responsible for the abuses that were carried out. the trc’s mandate prohibits this. even without the naming of names, however, the commission will still be engaged in the gathering of evidence that can help to build a narrative of truth, and that can fill in the many gaps that exist in the historical record. the research that is conducted and received, and the testimony that is gathered, will bring the abuses suffered in the indian residential schools into sharper focus. this information can be of real benefit to the community. the main difficulty is that while the aboriginal community knows all too well what took place in the indian residential schools, the dominant, “settler” community knows precious little—as 7 “prime minister harper offers full apology on behalf of canadians for the indian residential schools system,” 11 june 2008 [speech on-line]; available from http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/rqpi/apo/indexeng.asp; accessed 21 april 2011. 8 justice harry laforme was appointed the first commission chair, but resigned in october 2008. claudette dumont-smith and jane brewin morley were appointed as commissioners, and stepped down june 1, 2009. the new chair is justice murray sinclair, and the new commissioners are marie wilson and chief wilton littlechild. 9 “schedule ‘n’: mandate for the truth and reconciliation commission,” indian residential schools agreement; available from http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/pdfs/schedule_n_en.pdf; accessed 31 may 2011. 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 1 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/1 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.1 stanton points out in her essay, the dominant community was never consulted in the settlement agreement process. the stories that are emerging from the work of the trc are simply not reaching the dominant community. for all the speeches, the remarks, and the agreements signed, the sum total does not seem to have impacted the wider canadian society in any way. it is confounding that a developed society such as canada has had no real uptake of these important issues, the recognition of which might spark the beginnings of a real transition within the broader society. czyzewski points out in her essay in this collection that the trc’s educative function does not yet seem to have had any broad impact—nor has it lead to what bonner and james call “reframing”. as czyzewski notes, “if indigenous peoples are opening up and sharing painful stories to inactive ears, or not being heard at all, who is doing the transforming?” canadians still seem wilfully unaware of these events. the lasting impact of the trc on the aboriginal community as a whole in canada is astonishingly small. the government of canada seems not to be prepared to alleviate the problems that the indian residential schools system created, including unfulfilled treaty obligations, the nonrecognition of rights, re-writing the indian act, re-working the department of indian and northern affairs, and other development-related issues. the government is reluctant, even, to engage with aboriginal peoples in a meaningful dialogue about what the issues are that are most important.10 the real benefit of the trc process can and should be the acknowledgement and recognition of what happened in the indian residential schools system—by the community from which the abuses were perpetrated. czyzewski’s argument about knowing the other’s experience, demonstrates exactly that. my own work in the area of acknowledgement11 and recognition has demonstrated the acute need for this kind of acknowledgement, and how it can contribute to the social well-being of communities and the broader society. it is important for people in all parts of the broader society to begin to support the work of the trc, by promoting a deeper understanding of what it can do, how it might begin to do that, and by engaging in its activities. 10 christian aboriginal infrastructure developments, “meaningful consultation in canada: the alternative to forced aboriginal assimilation,” [submission to government of canada on-line]; available from http://caid.ca/meacon092409.pdf; accessed 21 april 2011. 11 joanna r. quinn, the politics of acknowledgement: truth commissions in uganda and haiti. vancouver: ubc press, 2010. 3 quinn: introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? published by scholarship@western, 2011 the international indigenous policy journal august 2011 introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? joanna r. quinn recommended citation introductory essay: canada’s own brand of truth and reconciliation? abstract creative commons license introductory essay: canadaâ•žs own brand of truth and reconciliation? persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 79 persona and parrhesia: research notes on the dialectics of the real matt eo st oc chett i abstract if reality is socially established through practices that, directly or indirectly, depend on communication and therefore on some notion of truth, the idea of a post-truth communicative regime or “age” may seem not only bizarre but also worrying. the dissolution of the real, announced by the prophets of postmodernism in the form of either a “perfect crime” or a “liquid reality”, has been interpreted as the effect of the crisis of truth and legitimation that jeanfrançois lyotard (1982) referred to with his notions of “performativity” and “legitimation by force”. from this perspective, reality depends upon truth, and the possibility of truth depends, in turn, on configurations of power that seem too elusive and ephemeral to be effectively engaged with in either theory or practice. in this paper, i mobilise the notions of parrhesia and persona in an effort to establish an alternative standpoint from which to discuss the epistemological and ontological implications of the postmodern condition and the crisis of truth associated with it. the main point can perhaps be summarised in the idea that, if the new regime of truth (or post-truth) relies on persona expressing the roles/characters compatible with it, the notion of parrhesia may gain a critical relevance for the normative evaluation of these personas and the social implications of their truth. famously reintroduced by michel foucault (1999) in his analysis of truth and its discursive conditions, the notion of parrhesia has a heuristic potential that has not been fully exploited. while challenging the social construction of reality on practical grounds in fundamental ways, the digitalisation of social life also presents theoretical challenges, some of which can be addressed by the reconceptualisation of parrhesia in relation to the social role of the persona rather than the individual. in my paper, i present some preliminary research notes in this direction. key words parrhesia; persona; dialectics of the real; post-digital; post-truth the dialectics of the real the main goal of this paper is to offer some preliminary reflections on the heuristic and critical opportunities associated with the conceptual binary of “persona” and “parrhesia”, and to see stocchetti 80 how these opportunities might apply to the implications of the digital turn in the dialectics of the real. the reproduction of the real is a process characterised by tensions: for example, tensions between the past, the present, and visions of the future; between the real and the ideal; and between what is possible and what is desirable. this process presents both competitive and non-competitive aspects and has a communicative and a non-communicative dimension. the competitive aspects consist in the efforts of a variety of social forces to increase their influence over the social construction of the real. the competition for influence over the construction of the real, however, is associated with other non-competitive aspects that, in forms of shared meanings, rules, and so forth, constitute both the stake and the struggle. for example, the “meaning” of the real and the “rules” in the competition for the control of the process that reproduces it. the notion of truth is important, in this perspective, as the communicative device that allows for the constitution of the shared (and therefore non-competitive) grounds for the competition among social forces and the resolution of the dialectical tensions that participates in the re-production of the real. but what happens if the shared grounds themselves become a stake in the competition for the control of the real? jean-françois lyotard and jean baudrillard are probably two of the most well-known thinkers that, in their problematisation of truth and the real, have addressed this possibility. lyotard (1982) suggests that, with the decline of science and the metanarrative that supported the social value and legitimating functions of truth, the social construction and legitimation of the real take place through performativity. the decline of truth and the rise of performativity, with the fundamental changes in the legitimation of the social bond associated with this mutation, reflects the power of capitalism, or, more precisely, the strength of the social forces inspired by that ideology. according to lyotard: this procedure operates within the following framework: since “reality” is what provides the evidence used as proof in scientific argumentation, and also provides prescriptions and promises of a juridical, ethical, and political nature with results, one can master all of these games by mastering “reality”. that is precisely what technology can do. by reinforcing technology, one “reinforces” reality, and one’s chances of being just and right increase accordingly. reciprocally, technology is reinforced all the more effectively if one has access to scientific knowledge and decision-making authority. (1982, p. 47) the “incredulity” with the great narratives that used to provide the moral grounds for the role of science and truth in the legitimisation of the social and political order creates the conditions for the rise of performative knowledge and self-legitimation or “legitimation by power” (47). in practice, this consists in the imposition of a state of affairs, a naturalised social order that is beyond the possibility of rational confutation or change because, in this perspective, only hegemonic forces can “perform” truth and truth always performs in support of hegemonic forces. for baudrillard (1994), it is the “code”, the evocative but otherwise elusive notion performing fundamental explanatory functions, that is the ultimate “agent” in the process of effacement of the real and its substitution with the hyperreal. in baudrillard’s words: to dissimulate is to pretend not to have what one has. to simulate is to feign to have what one doesn’t have. one implies a presence, the other an absence. but it is more complicated than that because simulating is not pretending […] therefore, pretending, or dissimulating leaves the principle of reality intact: the persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 81 difference is always clear, it is simply masked, whereas simulation threatens the difference between the “true” and the “false”, the “real” and the “imaginary”. (p. 3) in these formulations, the process i have described in term of the dialectics of the real is subverted by an extreme outcome of the competition for control over the reproduction of the real: the acquisition of a total hegemony by the social forces of capitalism (in its “late” form). as a result of this conceptual subversion (a subversion that is brought about in the representation of the process by the way the process itself is conceptualised), the notion of truth becomes totally dependent on power (performativity) and the real itself totally outside the reach of the competitive aspects and dialectical tensions of this reproduction process – in practice a transcendental notion. my suggestion here is to “remember foucault”, the idea that every power generates resistance and the intimate, and in some respects even contradictory, relationship between forms of power and regimes of truth (taylor 1984). somehow paradoxically, baudrillard (2003, p. 6) expressed the same idea when he wrote that “[a]llergy to any definitive order, to any definitive power, is—happily—universal”. foucault’s problematisation of truth in terms of parrhesia and the parrhesiastic game is interesting for it recovers the autonomy of truth in relations of power and the possibility of truth-dependent power. this is in antagonism to the power-dependent truth of performativity, and the dissolution of truth in the regime of simulation. the same problematisation of truth in terms of parrhesia and the parrhesiastic game, however, while providing the conceptual opportunity to re-open the competition for the real, also suggests the nature of the agent of this opening/competition and the constitutive features of this kind of agency. this, i argue, is the persona. my argument here is that the power of moral truth (parrhesia) and the ability of creative adaptation (a form of adaptation in which the agent mutates in order to change the environment: the persona) are brought together in the construction of reality. these forces combine in what i called the dialectics of the real: that is, the process of destruction/creation (of meaning) or affirmation and negation of any given (formulation of) reality in the communicative construction of the real through which we control our environment. from this perspective reality is not an iron cage protecting truth from utopia, but rather a more or less impermanent result of a process in which the production, destruction, and reproduction of truth are necessary moments of dialectic tensions expressing alternative and possibly competing forms of truths, power/knowledge, and possibilities of social change. on conceptual grounds, therefore, parrhesia and persona seem promising elements of a critical standpoint for the study of the reproduction of the real and its tensions. this can, perhaps, help us to move beyond the intellectual impasse brought about by formulations of the problem of power in the reproduction of reality in terms of performative truth and simulation. mentioning the dialectics of the real is a preliminary step towards arguing for the relevance of the persona and parrhesia as an analytical binary. this conceptual tool may, or may not, allow us to study important aspects of our social world that would otherwise be hard to grasp and therefore liable to be neglected. in this paper, i will not discuss the dialectic of the real further but rather concentrate on the methodological argument: the case for the heuristic productivity of this binary. furthermore, i will argue that the contribution and therefore the value of this binary is in line with the analytical tradition, the normative concerns, and ultimately the social project of critical social theory. stocchetti 82 persona, parrhesia, and critical social theory michel foucault (1999) discusses the notion of parrhesia as part of his analysis of the discourse of truth. the goal of his analysis was not to identify the conditions of truth in the classic world but rather to problematize “truth-telling as a specific activity, or as a role” (p.74). foucault summarises the specifics of this activity as follows: parrhesia is a kind of verbal activity where the speaker has a specific relation to truth through frankness, a certain relationship to his own life through danger, a certain type of relation to himself or other people through criticism (self-criticism or criticism of other people), and a specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty. more precisely, parrhesia is a verbal activity in which a speaker expresses his personal relationship to truth, and risks his life because he recognizes truth-telling as a duty to improve or help other people (as well as himself). in parrhesia, the speaker uses his freedom and chooses frankness instead of persuasion, truth instead of falsehood or silence, the risk of death instead of life and security, criticism instead of flattery, and moral duty instead of self-interest and moral apathy. (p. 6) an important aspect of parrhesia is a rather unique discursive effect of authorisation in which the content and the speaker of the content constitute and legitimate each other in the act of speaking. foucault discusses this in terms of enunciation and enunciandum: in parrhesia the speaker emphasizes the fact that he is both the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the enunciandum—that he himself is the subject of the opinion to which he refers. the specific “speech activity” of the parrhesiastic enunciation thus takes the form: “i am the one who thinks this and that”. (p. 3) this discursive effect is presumably the cause of the transformative power of parrhesia both on the persona who dares to speak the truth, or “parrhesiastes”, and on the other personae participating in the parrhesiastic game. in this game, the authority of both the parrhesiastes and the content of her speech depends on at least three conditions: a) the fact that her criticism of a more powerful persona, the “tyrant”, implies a danger for her life, b) the awareness of this danger, and c) its acceptance. when these conditions are met, parrhesia become a transformative power with subversive effects and the parrhesiastes an influential political persona. foucault informs us that, according to the ancient greeks, not everyone can play the parrhesiastic game and be a parrhesiastes. the requirements include being free and aware of what must be said, at the cost of a personal risk and for the good of the city. short of this awareness and these qualities, speaking becomes mere shallow and unrestrained utterance (another meaning of parrhesia, albeit not as common in those times) or a compulsive behaviour and therefore not free. to play the parrhesiastic game, a parrhesiastes was required to have a specific relation with truth and to choose risk over personal comfort. for this specific relation to exist, however, our would-be parrhesiastes also needed to have a specific relation with the social world in its historical specifics, for example a given society, in a given time, and in a given place. the parrhesiastes is thus the persona that, in certain conditions, can play the “parrhesiastic game”. in foucault’s problematisation, however, it is important to distinguish at least two moments in the reconstruction of this “game”: before and after what he calls “the crisis persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 83 of democratic institutions” (33). this is a crisis that, he argued, prepares the grounds for a fundamental change in the nature of the “truth game”: […] from that truth game which—in the classical greek conception of parrhesia—was constituted by the fact that someone was courageous enough to tell the truth to other people […] to another truth game which now consists in being courageous enough to disclose the truth about oneself. (p. 62) the crisis of parrhesia is a crisis of the persona of the parrhesiastes and a situation in which the complex set of relations constituting the parrhesiastes as a socio-political persona become problematic. in foucault’s words: the crisis of parrhesia, which emerges at the crossroads of an interrogation about democracy and an interrogation about truth, gives rise to a problematization of some hitherto unproblematic relations between freedom, power, democracy, education, and truth in athens at the end of the fifth century. from the previous problem of gaining access to parrhesia in spite of the silence of god, we move to a problematization of parrhesia, i.e., parrhesia itself becomes problematic, split within itself. (p. 31) in foucault’s formulation, therefore, the parrhesiastes seems to be either a persona with a distinctive relation to truth, or a socio-political or public role played by a persona with a special relation to truth.i the notion itself, i suggest, offers some interesting analytical opportunities that can be described in relation to more conventional notions (for example, in goffman and jung), but that, from a critical perspective, are perhaps more salient than these. common to goffman and jung, for example, is the metaphor of the persona as a “mask” that makes it possible for the individual to adapt and to participate to the social world—indeed to adapt in order to participate. this metaphor, however, hides as much as it reveals. while adaptation seems to be the main concern of goffman’s (1959) “presentation of the self”, jung’s (1977) problematisation of the persona is more concerned with what lies behind the mask, the core of our identity, with deep roots in the collective unconscious. in fact, for goffman: to the degree that a performance highlights the common official values of the society in which it occurs, we may look at it, in the manner of durkheim and radcliffe-brown, as a ceremony—as an expressive rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the moral values of the community. furthermore, in so far as the expressive bias of performances come to be accepted as reality, then that which is accepted at the moment as reality will have some of the characteristics of a celebration. (1959, p. 45) in this view, the persona has primarily “conservative” rather than subversive functions towards the moral values and the “reality” of the community. this kind of persona participates in the “celebration” of a reality that, albeit temporary, is stripped of the tensions that i described in terms of the dialectics of the real. what is important in this perspective, however, is the connection that the persona must have, and learn to manage, with precisely the elements constituting her reality—independently from the connotation of this concept. this knowledge, i would claim, is necessary but not sufficient in the constitution of the parrhesiastes. for jung, persona is a tool both useful and problematic. it is an interface that allows us to live in the world, but at the same time an obstacle to the authenticity of our participation in it. for jung: stocchetti 84 the persona is a complicated system of relations between individual consciousness and society, fittingly enough a kind of mask, designed on the one hand to make a definite impression upon others, and, on the other, to conceal the true nature of the individual. (1977, p. 190) jung’s persona is in some respects more complex than goffman’s due to the role that the individual and collective unconscious play in the life and in the very constitution of the individual. jung acknowledges that “the word persona is really a very appropriate expression for it, since it originally meant the mask worn by an actor, signifying the role he played” (p. 155). for jung, however: fundamentally the persona is nothing real: it is a compromise between individual and society as to what a man should appear to be. he takes a name, earns a title, represents an office, he is this or that. in a certain sense all this is real, yet in relation to the essential individuality of the person concerned it is only a secondary reality, a product of compromise, in making which others often have a greater share than he. the persona is a semblance, a twodimensional reality, to give it a nickname. (p. 156) the risks that this mask implies for the individual have nothing to do with truth and the subversive effects that truth-telling may have on one’s (sense of) reality, but with the possibility for the individual to become trapped in the role of her persona: to become what society forces her to be, or the “mask” that is supposed to perform as a protection against social pressures. the process of individuation, which occurs in normal development as well as in analysis, is the process that makes it possible for the individual to avoid this risk and shed this mask. the analysis of the persona, for jung, seeks to “strip off the mask, and discover that what seemed to be individual is at bottom collective; in other words, that the persona was only a mask for the collective psyche” (p. 156). even from this short description, it should be clear that some significant aspects of the persona of the parrhesiastes differ from goffman’s and jung’s persona. if the persona is fundamentally a mask, or a role defined as “the enactment of rights and duties attached to a given status” (goffman 1959, p. 27), foucault’s parrhesiastes has far less concern than goffman’s individual about the credibility of its role. in the former, the “mask” makes the persona much more than in the latter. the notion of “performance” that is central to goffman’s discussion (p. 28ff.) appears not just inappropriate, but a fundamental misconstrual of the motives of the parrhesiastes’ public behaviour. the parrhesiastes is the individual who speaks parrhesia, the moral truth. however, the moral truth of the parrhesiastes is authoritative and influential because the persona of the parrhesiastes is not merely a “mask” to pursue personal interests, to avoid embarrassment (like in goffman), or to protect our deeper self from the pressures of society (like in jung). rather, it is a relationship that bounds the individual to the self, to the community, and to a duty toward truth with potentially dangerous implications for the one who dare to speak it. in foucault’s problematisation, the functions of the persona/parrhesiastes are not primarily adaptive, like in goffman and jung, conservative, like in goffman, or defensive, like in jung. instead, they are mainly participatory, progressive, and possibly subversive of the established relations of power and the reality associated with them. the parrhesiastes brings to surface the tensions of the dialectics of the real. her persona, to perform parrhesiastic functions, cannot be a mere compromise between self and society. the knowledge of society and awareness of what is good for the community must be persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 85 coupled with a commitment to truth so as to choose risk against comfort. it is the element of risk, in addition to the social competence, but in antithesis to the idea of social comfort, appropriateness, or compromise, that gives the parrhesiastes her subversive functions vis-a-vis the tyrant. this dimension of personal risk is present but misconstrued in jung, for whom the only risk for the individual is that of identifying with the mask. the jungian individuation, as a process of progressive awareness about the inner self, presents, however, some affinities with the practice of the parrhesiastic game as a form of introspection: a later meaning of parrhesia that foucault describes in relation to the crisis of the democratic institutions. this crisis, according to foucault, transforms parrhesia into a discipline of the soul. in this practice, courage consists in facing the truth about oneself. it is as if, once the parrhesiastes becomes an obsolete persona for the socio-political conditions of its time, the functions of the parrhesiastic game are preserved in the relationship with the self: to preserve the moral functions of truth. from a jungian perspective, the risks of de-individuation lie in the mask becoming the face. and this is where the later notion of parrhesia as the courage to discover the truth about oneself seems most compatible with the jungian interpretation. to become a parrhesiastes, an individual is required to become aware of the “mask”, to avoid the reduction of its identity to it but also to use the mask properly, to establish a creative or productive relationship between her inner self and the social world. the jungian process of individuation and parrhesia as a discipline of the soul seems, in other words, different from, but compatible with formulations of the socratic invitation to “know thyself” and, from this perspective, a constitutive aspect of the parrhesiastes’ moral authority. in sum, when the notion of parrhesia combines with that of persona, the result is a new and rather special kind of political persona, the parrhesiastes. this notion combines elements from more conventional formulations, such as in goffman and jung, in addition to new features. the blending of criticism and self-criticism with the “duty to improve or help other people” and the “specific relation to moral law through freedom and duty” (6) may sound familiar for those who are acquainted with the critical tradition in the social sciences and humanities. the normative roots of this tradition have been traditionally discussed in relation to the works of karl marx and sigmund freud (fromm 1966). i suggest that the mobilisation of parrhesia and persona may, indeed, establish analytical and pedagogical grounds compatible with this tradition. on analytical grounds, the parrhesiastes is a notion that combines the heuristic opportunities of the other two notions: the persona and parrhesia. the concept of persona locates individual agency within, rather than outside of, the complex interplay of communicative practices and competing forces that participate in the social construction of the real. the concept of parrhesia is important because it emancipates the problem of truth and the possibility of its effects, from the constraints of the discourses associated with empirical control, performativity, or even instrumental reason, to establish parrhesia and the parrhesiastes/persona as antagonistic or subversive forces in the dialectics of the real. on pedagogical grounds, the ideal of parrhesiastic truth, inviting the individual to problematise issues of moral truth in relation to power, self, and society, seems a promising element of the critical pedagogy promoted by paulo freire and others (freire 2001, 2013). the discourse of parrhesia can be a starting point to unmask the relations of power constituting a given regime of truth but also a way to bring about forms of critical consciousness and ultimately the possibility of emancipative social change. stocchetti 86 as i shall argue, combining the notions of parrhesia and the persona offers critical grounds to further research on the role of critical pedagogy in education and the impact of the “post-truth” regime and the “digital turn” in the dialectics of the real. the “digital turn” as a preliminary point, i would like to mention the methodological “trap” of construing persona and parrhesia as dependent variables of technological change instead of forces with, at least, partial autonomous agency in the dialectics of the real. this process is social and communicative and, therefore, open to the influence of technological change, but not dependent on that. the idea that every technological change is a “revolution” that radically changes the nature of the process through which the real is constructed is a reflection of technological determinism that, in turn, is an expression of the influence of hegemonic forces in the dialectics of the real. the discontinuities allegedly produced by the “digital turn” are part of an ideological discourse promoting myths, such as the “end of politics”, the “end of history”, and so forth (mosco 2004); their fundamental function, as roland barthes noted, is that of “depoliticized speech”, a form of communication that hides its own political function (barthes 1972). the capacity to assess the nature and direction of the discontinuities allegedly brought about by the digital turn in the dialectics of the real depends on the relation that the parrhesiastes has with herself, the community, and the inclination to risk. it depends on qualities that belong to goffman’s “performer” and to jung’s persona, combined with the meanings of parrhesia, before and after the crisis of democratic institutions (foucault 1999, p. 33). the main question to ask, in this perspective, is not how does digitalisation change the parrhesiastes? but rather what are the moral truths that should be uttered in relation to the changes brought about by digitalisation? the idea implicit in this state of affairs can, perhaps, be expressed in terms of a moral duty. the parrhesiastes must constantly update her knowledge about self, society, and the relation between them, which constitute her persona, so to preserve a notion of moral truth without remaining attached to any specific connotation of this notion. this kind of exercise is hermeneutic in kind. it pertains to the very essence of critical hermeneutics, not primarily as a “theory of meaning” (roberge 2011, pp. 6-7), but as an interpretative practice in which issues of meaning are addressed in association with issues of power. for a subversive truth to be uttered in a parrhesiastic game of some sorts, the problem of assessing the impact of the digital turn on the dialectics of the real concerns not only technological change but also changes in, for example, the social forces and strategies that are deployed in this process to foster or resist technological change. a further possibility is to forget, for a moment, the idea that the digital turn has “revolutionary” potential and look instead at the continuities, that is, aspects or processes associated with the dialectics of the real that the digital turn contributes to reinforcing rather than undermining or transforming. one good candidate i would like to suggest here is what anthony giddens (1990, p. 21) referred to as “disembedding” or “the ‘lifting out’ of social relations from local context of interaction and their restructuring across indefinite spans of time-space” . this feature of modernity is an influential source of change for the social relationships that construe the persona of the parrhesiastes and the features of the moral truth. digitalisation facilitates the disembedding of social relations, for example, making physical absence not only possible but even productive through mobile technology (villi & stocchetti 2011). once morality itself is “disembedded”, all the ingredients of the parrhesiastic game are affected: relations of power, the social construction of the self, the relation with the relevant communities, and the notion of moral truth. digital disembedding is a fundamental force of globalisation that giddens defines as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 87 link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (1990, p. 64). to the extent that the influence of the parrhesiastes is rooted in society and is culture-specific, disembedding, more than digitalisation per se, represents an important challenge to their role in the resolution of tensions that constitute the dialectics of the real. the problem (a conceptual problem with political implications) here is to see how the persona/parrhesiastes and the parrhesiastic truth are still meaningful notions when their distinctive features are construed on a global rather than local level. the influence of the parrhesiastes in the dialectics of the real is not much a result of her persona, but a more complex combination of factors that include, for example, identification with a community, a vision of the public interest, and courage. an important element in the constitution of the parrhesiastes is the “tyrant”: the persona that participates in the parrhesiastic game as the source of the potential punishment that constitutes courage as a fundamental feature of the parrhesiastes persona. what this perspective suggests, therefore, is the problematisation of the discourse of truth in relation to new forms of power: the new “tyrants” implicated with the digital turn and the processes this supports, such as disembedding and globalisation. the question one may want to ask is then: who is the “tyrant” in the digital age? or more precisely, how does the digital turn affect the possibility of parrhesiastic game/truth by bringing about the mutation of the persona/tyrant? zygmunt bauman (2004, pp. 42-48), for example, argues that in “liquid time” domination is not exercised through direct control or presence, but through the mere preservation of precarieté that transforms the freedom of the rulers into insecurity for the ruled. the question would then be, how does the digital turn foster “absent domination” (42-48), “liquid fear” (bauman, 2006), and ultimately the influence of new “absent” tyrants in the dialectics of the real? what are their features? and what kind of punishment should be expected for the new parrhesiastes? the possibility for anyone to play the parrhesiastic game nowadays depends on the possibility of answering these questions. another notion to be problematised is that of “digital persona” and the idea that the affordances associated with digitalisation offer the techno-savvy individual the possibility of a deeper and more extensive control over the construction of her persona. a superficial interpreter of goffman’s persona, for example, may be led to believe that a digital performer can have more effective control over her persona than her non-digital homologue, while neglecting the fact that our digitalised performer has to face the challenges of digitalised “social establishments”. the possibility of anonymous personae, for example, may give some relief to goffman’s persona and her concerns. however, this is obviously useless for foucault’s parrhesiastes, since anonymity undermines the moral value of parrhesia by hiding the identity of the parrhesiastes and removing the element of risk. from a different perspective, the digital persona is a creature whose very existence is dependent on a privately owned technological infrastructure designed to serve private corporate interests. questions concerning the exclusive affordances of the digital persona can surely be asked. but when it comes to parrhesia and the parrhesiastic game, one also needs to problematise the impact of a communicative infrastructure, not only on what a person can do but in relation to what a person becomes. the growing concern and literature about digital loneliness, digital narcissism, digital alienation and so forth suggests that the control of the persona is a key stake in the competition for control over the processes of the dialectics of the real. the digital turn, and the digitalisation of the social, brings about not only a problem of authenticity (of “false” persona or “false truth”), although this is surely a dimension, but also a profound change in the political economy of the communicative conditions of the parrhesiastic game. a core aspect of this change consists in the disembedding of both the persona and parrhesia from the social/local and their dependence on a technological infrastructure implicated in the reproduction of capitalist influence on the dialectics of the real (allmer 2015; curran et al. 2012; fuchs 2014; mcchesney 2013). perhaps stocchetti 88 on a more positive note, however, the perils of digitalisation feed forces that move towards a post-digital age. the distinctive feature of this age is not the rejection of the digital, but rather the incredulity about the possibility of emancipation in a technological environment dominated by private interests and the logic of profit—one in which corporations can use technology to control individuals in support of their interests, more than individuals can use technology to pursue personal goals. other features include the informed scepticism about the promises of the “virtual”, a new interest in non-mediated relationships, a strong demand for alternative uses of available technology, and a fundamental disbelief in the myths of technocentric discourse and their “digital expression” (mosco 2004). when, in a digital world, the awareness of being manipulated is stronger than the feeling of empowerment, and when the social realisation of new forms of digital loneliness or addictions is deliberately obscured by a promotional culture fed by the profitability of digital business, the problem of truth easily becomes a problem of personal identity. the problem is one of adaptation and identity management. the strategies responsible for the presentations of the self in the digital environment depend on affordances that are not primarily designed to enable a more effective presentation of the self, but to foster mutual promotional strategies that support productive engagement with the same infrastructure. individuals discover themselves more and more as producer/consumers of digital content rather than managers of their social image. in other words, we want to be “someone”, and we use available communication technology to that purpose. but, in the process of establishing and preserving our digital persona, we become aware that “someone else” is created. this is the persona imposed on individuals by the technological infrastructure and, ultimately, the strategies and interests of those who control/own it. in these conditions, the search for truth becomes a fundamental aspect of the search for a more autonomous and functional persona, and parrhesia a fundamental ideal and a point of reference in this search. the question of whether the “post-digital” persona can credibly bear the political responsibilities and the authority of the classic parrhesiastes remains an open question since the features of the post-digital age itself are still too unclear. in relation to the dialectics of the real, however, there is a least one notion that is useful to look at from the point of view of the persona and parrhesia. the dialectics of the real in the regime of post-truth the notion of post truth is commonly taken to describe “circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief” (oxford dictionaries, 2017). while this term is a neologism, the “circumstances” it describes are not unique to our times. the relative influence of “objective facts” over emotions and beliefs has always been problematic in the history of human knowledge for the simple reason that, in the pressing circumstances of daily-life problem solving, the latter are far more easily accessible than the former. what i think is interesting in this notion and its sudden popularity, however, is the possibility to interpret both as “signs” of a widespread need for a new problematisation of truth. the process foucault discussed in relation to a distant past and the greek-roman political culture, in other words, is happening again in our times and on a global scale. the core problem triggering this problematisation, now and then, is not primarily about epistemology or the nature of truth but, more pressingly, about the pragmatics or legitimation of political power. from the perspective adopted in this discussion, the post-truth debate can be interpreted as persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 89 part of a problematisation of truth in the dialectics of the real. today, like in the time and place of foucault’s analysis, this problematisation involves truth, democracy, and education. if this is true, there are perhaps a few aspects of this problematisation that are worth looking at. the problematisation of truth in terms of post-truth presents some elements of continuity with the “postmodern condition”. the role of emotions and beliefs, for example, may recall the “new type of emotional ground tone” that fredric jameson (1991, p. 6) called “intensities”, as one of the five constitutive features of postmodernism construed as the “cultural logic of late capitalism”. in the connotation of (a claim to) a more sustainable truth for the digital age, on the other hand, the post-truth is the continuation of the “performative” move in the dialectics of the real: a move that, according to lyotard, describes hegemonic influences in the dialectics of the real. the important point to keep in mind, however, is that as intellectual tradition, postmodernism and post-structuralism were also an expression of a radical turn in social critique. the interpretations of truth, power, and the relation between the two generated by this turn sought to expose the role of hegemonic forces in the dialectics of the real and support, albeit with debatable results, an emancipatory agenda. on similar grounds, i would argue that the current problematisation of truth is a response to the crisis of the truth regimes of performativity and simulation, and their functionalities for the hegemonic forces in the dialectics of the real. the main aspect of this crisis is, perhaps, the legitimation gap between these regimes of truth and their effects on the social bond. in the dialectics of the real, this gap ultimately undermines the influence of the social forces associated with the regimes of truth of performativity and simulation. the response to this crisis is inspired by at least two different projects: one aiming at improving the quality of truth to save the possibility of democracy politics, and the other aiming at effacing the subversive potential of truth from the dialectics of the real in order to liquidate the “risks” associated with democratic politics. in the first project, the notion of post-truth participates in a critique that seeks to identify the features of a regime of truth more compatible with the preservation of democratic ideals in the conditions of late capitalism—the core analytical challenge of critical social theory. in the second, the introduction of the same notion is a discursive move in the opposite direction. it is an effort to address the crisis of legitimation by liquidating the role of truth to neutralise its subversive potential in the dialectic of the real. although one may suggest that this effort is rather clumsy, the problem it tries to address is quite important: the legitimation of a social bond and the preservation of inequalities through regimes of truth producing a reality that increasingly appears unacceptable and unsustainable.ii the relative influence of these interpretations in the processes of the dialectics of the real depends on the relative strength of the social forces associated to them. the relevance of the parrhesiastes—of the binary persona/parrhesia—can be argued in relation to what i would call the political economy of truth in the dialectics of the real: the less reliable the available truth, the greater its value. in time of crisis, in other words, the parrhesiastes may become an influential political persona by virtue of her unique relation with truth, knowledge, and courage. if the notion of post-truth, with all its ambivalence, and following foucault, is construed as a problematisation of truth, democracy, and education, the blending of the persona with parrhesia may offer a standpoint for some critical reflections. these concern the possible outcomes of this problematisation, the crisis that triggers it, and the role of (democratic) education on the nature of these outcomes. persona and parrhesia in critical pedagogy stocchetti 90 if the salvation of the democratic project requires a persona with the skills and will to perform the remaking of truth through the exercise of parrhesia, where does this persona come from? if the capacity for the creative adaptation that substantiates the persona is a feature of human psychological structure, where does the inclination to risk originate from? and, even if one concedes that the knowledges necessary for the exercise of parrhesia—such as the knowledge about oneself, about society and about the specifics of the problem at hand—may simply be available in one form of another, what makes the persona of the parrhesiastes choose to use those knowledges for the sake of a moral truth and against her personal interest in safety? the question concerning the origins of the parrhesiastes is important because, if left unanswered, it shrouds parrhesia and the parrhesiastes with an aura of myth and fatalism that does not quite fit with the normative project of critical social theory. in other words, for all its fascination and intellectual credibility, foucault’s problematisation of truth and democracy remains sterile if we cannot learn how to deal with the problematisation of truth and democracy in our age. as an avenue for further research, i think this question leads to the role of education and, more precisely, to the role of the pedagogical dimension of educational practices. by this, i mean to describe the features of learning pertaining not primarily to the acquisition of knowledge, but to the forming of the learner’s personality. in practice, this is the persona that can perform parrhesia, not only because of what she knows, but because of who she is. this distinction is important, for the purposes of this discussion, because in common parlance learning is a notion that combines, and to some extent confuses, two very different processes: the acquisition of knowledges and the transformation of the individual, which results from the acquisition of these knowledges but also from the interaction with her educators. the digital turn in education, for example, seems to be inspired by a deliberate effort to separate the learner from the educator, to decouple the acquisition of knowledges from the transformations and, presumably, the risks associated with exposure to the persona of the educator. the regime of post-truth, on the other hand, implies a “performative” pedagogy as an interpellation to grow up without moral certainties and, therefore, without the need nor the capacity to face personal risk for the sake of a moral truth. the tyrants of the digital age and the post-truth regime will soon have nothing to worry about if, in our “knowledge societies”, the practical possibility of parrhesia will be effaced by the pedagogical repression of the distinction between what is true and what is right. this is why the pedagogical dimension of education is crucial. in foucault’s problematisation of truth, this role remains quite marginal. from the perspective of the dialectics of the real, instead, this role can hardly be overestimated. to the extent that the actual genesis of the parrhesiastes depends on the variety of practices we usually refer to as education, this is the terrain of the competition for the construction of the real between the democratic and the performative projects, that is, between the efforts of “remaking” and those of “effacing” the truth. as with every social practice, pedagogical practices simultaneously influence, and are influenced by, education. if the importance of the pedagogical dimension of education for the practical possibility of parrhesia seems plausible, the next important question concerns the nature of the pedagogical standpoints and approaches that could credibly support educational practices and regimes of truths compatible with democratic futures. my suggestion here is to combine the problematisation of truth and the analysis of the persona with the tradition of critical pedagogy. the model of the persona that can inspire democratic education in times of post-truth and political radicalisation cannot be limited to the alternatives implied by goffman and jung. the former is too passive, too close to freire’s “adaptation”, a condition in which an individual “loses persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 91 his ability to make choices and is subjected to the choices of others, to the extent that his decisions are no longer his own because they result from external prescriptions” (freire 2013, p. 4). the jungian model, on the other hand, is introspective and functional to the moral development of the individual but too disconnected from the tensions of the dialectics of the real. the combination of persona and parrhesia in the pedagogical model of the parrhesiastes needs to effectively blend knowledge of the self and awareness of the relations of power affecting the dialectics of the real. this blending seems a pedagogical requirement for what freire called integration as “the capacity to adapt oneself to reality plus the critical capacity to make choices and to transform reality” (freire 2013, p. 4). included in this critical capacity is the commitment to truth and to risk. the elements of ambivalence in the problematisation of truth add further grounds to the importance of the pedagogical profile of the parrhesiastes in education. the crisis of truth is associated with the crisis of democracy because the possibility of a common ground of legitimate knowledge is a fundamental requirement for democratic political competition. if this is true, the crisis of truth and the crisis of democracy are interconnected phenomena whose concomitance may easily establish a downward, “performative” spiral towards authoritarianism. against this risk, one possibility is, perhaps, to problematise democracy in terms of constructive adaptation to the post-digital/post-truth age. constructive adaptation here means the adaptation of democratic values and aspirations to the impermanence of the real. this possibility also depends, in my view, on the education of individuals as parrhesiastes. summary in this paper, i have sought to offer some preliminary and unsystematic reflections towards the formulation of a critical approach to the dialectics of the real that could move beyond the conceptual impasse of “performativity” and “simulation”. i have suggested that the notions of persona and parrhesia, and the work of authors such as carl gustav jung, erving goffman, and michel foucault, among others, can provide useful conceptual tools to address the problem of the political role of truth. the main point in this paper is therefore about the analytical and pedagogical relevance of the parrhesiastes as a political persona defined in relation to a particular notion of truth. the working hypothesis behind this point is that to conceive of truth and persona in terms of parrhesia and parrhesiastes may help us to deal with the conceptual and even political impasse brought about by the conceptualisation of truth in terms of performativity and simulation. to support my arguments, i postulated that the real is an impermanent state of affairs reflecting more or less stable equilibria between tensions and social forces that are, perhaps, useful to describe in terms of a dialectical process: the dialectics of the real. the impermanence of the real is both an opportunity and a challenge. it offers an opportunity for those who seek emancipative social change, but also a constant source of apprehension for those who benefit from hegemonic relations of power. in the dialectics of the real, therefore, social forces may compete and take action to enhance their own influence in this process, in effect, to increase the chances that tensions are resolved in a way favourable to their interests, visions, values, and so forth. the analytical, normative, and even pedagogical value of the standpoint constituted by the notions of persona/parrhesia can be appreciated in relation to the functions of truth in the legitimation of the impermanent outcomes of this dialectical process. from this analytical standpoint, i have suggested that the impact of the digital turn in the dialectics of the real is mediated by disembedding and globalisation, and their effects on the social grounds of the persona and moral truth as these unite in the political persona of the stocchetti 92 parrhesiastes. from the same perspective, i have interpreted the appearance and sudden popularity of “post-truth” as a sign of a new problematisation of parrhesia. regimes of truth based on performativity and simulation originate the crisis of legitimation and the problematisation of truth, education, and democracy, as foucault has suggested. this problematisation, however, presents some elements of continuity with the “cultural logic of late capitalism”, and is ideologically ambivalent. ambivalence here means that the same problematisation is inspired by oppressive as well as emancipative purposes. the crisis of legitimation that manifests itself in the problematisation of truth enhances the political relevance of the parrhesiastes as a political persona, and as a pedagogical profile that can inspire democratic education in continuity with the tradition of critical pedagogy initiated, in modern times, by paulo freire and others. persona and parrhesia are notions of a critical approach that, constituting the parrhesiastes as a persona with unique features, can help us understand the impact of the digital turn and the regime of post-truth on the dialectics of the real. this approach belongs to the tradition of critical social theory to the extent that it seeks “critical” rather than traditional knowledge, that is, knowledge inspired by emancipative purposes. secondly, it problematises concepts, meanings, criteria, standpoints, and so forth as the social grounds of knowledge. these are the tools that are part of the reality we study and that we change while we study. finally, this approach can also participate in the pedagogical or non-analytical dimension of this tradition: namely, in the formation of individuals equipped with critical analytical and normative skills to become active participants in the dialectics of the real as parrhesiastes. i this difference is important since it suggests that the relationship between the “parrhesia” and “persona” in the construction of the real is, in fact, not as simple as i have described it here and worth more attention. i am grateful to the anonymous reviewer for pointing that out. ii thomas piketty’s (2014) analysis of the non-sustainability of capitalism in the 21st century is perhaps the most popular non-marxist contribution in this direction. end notes works cited allmer, t 2015, critical theory and social media: between emancipation and commodification, routledge, london. barthes, r 1972 mythologies, trans. a lavers, hill and wang, new york. baudrillard, j 1994, simulacra and simulation, trans. sf glaser the university of michigan press, ann arbour. ——— 2003, the spirit of terrorism and other essays, trans. c turner, verso, london. bauman, z 2004, 4a community, polity, london. ——— 2006, liquid fear, polity press, cambridge. curran, j, fenton, n & freedman, d 2012, misunderstanding the internet, routledge, london. foucault, m. 1999, discourse and truth: the problematization of parrhesia, foucault, info, retrieved 28 november 2017, http://foucault.info/documents/parrhesia/ freire, p 2001, pedagogy of freedom: ethics, democracy, and civic courage, trans. p clarke,rowman & littlefield, lanham. ——— 2013, education for critical consciousness, bloomsbury, london. fromm, e 1966, ‘marxism, psychoanalysis and reality’, tagebuch. monatshefte für kultur, politik, wirtschaft, vol. 21, no. 9, pp. 5-6. persona studies 2017, vol. 3, no. 2 93 fuchs, c 2014, social media: a critical introduction, sage, london. giddens, a 1990, the consequences of modernity, polity, cambridge. goffman, e 1959, presentation of self in everyday life, penguin, harmondsworth. jameson, f 1991, postmodernism or the cultural logic of late capitalism, duke university press, durham. jung, cg 1977, ‘two essays on analytical psychology (1943, 1945)’, in the collected works of c.g. jung vol. 7, ed and trans. g adler and r f c hull, routledge & kegan paul, london. lyotard, j 1982, the postmodern condition: a report on knowledge, university of minnesota press, minneapolis. mcchesney, rw 2013, digital disconnect: how capitalism is turning internet against democracy, the new press, new york. mosco, v 2004, the digital sublime. myth, power, and cyberspace, the mit press, cambridge. oxford dictionaries, 2017, ‘post-truth’, oxford university press, oxford. piketty, t 2014, capital in the twenty-first century, trans. arthur goldhammer, harvard university press, cambridge and london. roberge, j 2011, ‘what is critical hermeneutics?’, thesis eleven, vol 106, no. 1, pp. 5-22. taylor, c 1984, ‘foucault on freedom & truth’, political theory, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 152-183. villi, m & stocchetti, m 2011, ‘visual mobile communication, mediated presence and the politics of space’, visual studies, vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 102-112. november 2020 61 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice wrestling with “will to truth” in early childhood education: cracking spaces for multiplicity and complexity through poetry chenying wang chenying wang is a med student in early childhood education at the university of british columbia. email: educchenyingwang@ gmail.com listen to an early learning classroom, a room filled with laughter, giggles, and squabbles over toys. watch your step in an early learning classroom, a floor where crawling kids chase light-up shoes worn by running kids. pay attention to an early learning classroom, a space where multiple pots of aromatic plants thrive, where a puddle of spilled milk is drying. then, feel an early learning classroom. put yourself in this room as an early childhood educator, so that you can feel how this room is calling on you to respond—to what you hear, see, smell, and feel— carefully and thoughtfully. then you fall into waves of complex decision-making processes. you wonder: when children squabble should i step in and model conflict resolution skills that are suggested by that influential professional magazine for early childhood educators? you think: or maybe i should step back and let the squabbling ones develop their own ways of handling conflicts through trial and error as my well-respected colleague often does in this classroom? you question: shall i remind the running ones to slow to the “inside speed” to maintain a safe space for themselves and those chasing after them? you reflect: or maybe i can turn this moment into a learning opportunity for beneficial risk-taking practice? you hesitate: is it better to tell the child who spilled milk to clean up after themself to foster a sense of responsibility? or is it more reasonable for me to clean it as i can do it very quickly and nap time is approaching? put yourself in an early learning classroom as an early childhood educator. you find yourself overwhelmed by these countless waves. the waves of decision making. these waves are followed by waves of tangled feelings—unsettlement, uncertainty, and weakness. the waves come one after another. your energy drains as you wrestle with so many possible decisions from minute to minute. you are exhausted. so, you struggle to find a way to deal with the waves instead of being overwhelmed by them. you think to yourself: i must find the truth about young children, which will inform me on how to make the right decision. you tell yourself: i must find the most authentic and best ways to think, act, feel and practice as an early childhood educator. you close your eyes and wonder if, in that way, you could free yourself from the labour of wrestling with waves of pedagogical decision making. this article intends to provoke ongoing conversations in the early childhood education context about “will to truth,” which glenda macnaughton regards as the intent to know and determine the “normal” and “preferred” ways to think, act, and feel as early childhood educators. the pervading existence of will to truth amplifies concerns over fixed and determined ways to think and act as early childhood educators because “truth” and systems of power are closely linked to one another. to honour complexity and fluidity in thinking and acting as early childhood educators, the author argues for moving beyond will to truth and offers poetic practice as one possibility to reinvent habitual understandings. key words: truth; power; poststructuralism; poetry; practices in early childhood education november 2020 62 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice the opening is a story of me as an early childhood educator struggling to make the decisions—the “good,” “best,” and “authoritative” ones. it is an autobiographical story, but it could also be a story of many early childhood education colleagues and friends, as we have all encountered the difficulty of making decisions in an early learning classroom. we struggle to arrive at the decision because we want our pedagogical decisions to optimize young children’s experiences of exploring and developing. this struggle is an example of how “will to truth” (macnaughton, 2005) is entrenched in the early childhood education (ece) context. to glenda macnaughton, the will to truth is about the intent to find certainty in “how to think, act and feel as normal early childhood educators” (p. 39). it is understandable that we educators have this intent to find certainties of what should be done, but we need to be cautious since these certainties shape (and constrain) how we think and act as early childhood educators. thus, i hope this story serves as an invitation—to early childhood educators and those working in other disciplines—to pay close attention to will to truth. i want to invite readers to examine how will to truth is pervasive in daily ece practices, to explore why it is necessary to move beyond it, and to experimentally wrestle with it. this paper unfolds as follows. first, i explain the concept of truth and discuss its relationship to power from a poststructuralist perspective. next, i build on the discussion of the relationship between truth and power to problematize will to truth within the context of early childhood education. finally, i propose the process of creating poetry as both a tool and a condition to move beyond will to truth. the desire to make “the” decision: how is it tied to power? the metaphor of waves in the opening narrative describes the numerous moments of making pedagogical decisions. this metaphor illustrates the intense and challenging nature of working as an early childhood educator, and it also highlights how will to truth pervasively exists within the context of ece. to explain what will to truth is and why it is problematic, it is necessary to make clear what is meant by truth. the discussion about truth is premised on michel foucault’s understanding of truth. foucault was a french philosopher who is often associated with poststructuralism, which challenges what comes to be normalized and accepted as “natural truths” and overturns the hierarchical relationship between the “truth” and its alternatives (benozzo, 2018). drawing on foucault, macnaughton (2005) points out that the “truths” in ece discipline are produced, and these “truths” are “culturally biased norms about how children should be” (p. 19). macnaughton claims that “a truth is authoritative” and its authority “lies in its claim to be a statement about a phenomenon that is factual and, therefore, correct” (p. 23). that is to say, a poststructuralist educator would understand that the so-called truths about children are constructed consensus or norms rather than universal facts. jennifer gore (1993, as cited by macnaughton, 2005, p. 30) indicates that disciplinary “truths” generate authoritative norms about “what needs to be done” and “how it should be done” in the early childhood field. macnaughton (2005) further proposes that these truths (re)produce inequity since certain knowledge of young children (i.e., ways to think, act, and feel about young children) is privileged and alternative ways are othered. for example, when i was a practicum educator, i always handled quarrels over a toy by first observing for a minute, and if the quarrel was not solved or no one came to me for help, i would step in to instruct the children about certain social skills. i might say, “avery, you can use your words and tell jordan ‘sorry, i am not done with using it yet. i will let you know when i am done so you can take a turn’” to instruct a “preferred” way to handle quarrels. how i acted and what language i chose to use in responding to this situation were influenced by the training i received during practicum. i treated what i learned from the training as authoritative and rarely attended to alternative approaches. over time, this specific approach turned into my default response to children’s quarrels. my view of quarrels began to be settled and fixed. i saw quarrelling as a behaviour that should always be discouraged, and i overlooked november 2020 63 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice alternative understandings of quarrelling (e.g., seeing quarrels as learning opportunities for children to develop negotiating skills or social interaction skills). making pedagogical decisions involves consumption and construction of truth. our pedagogical decisions—all the choices we make about language, materials, environments, and routines—are motivated by our understandings of young children and how we should educate them. through our pedagogical decisions, we transmit our particular understandings. over time, as macnaughton (2005) has pointed out, certain understandings or knowledge become “settled so firmly into the fabric of early childhood studies” that their familiarity generates the norms in the discipline of ece (p. 1). when any particular pedagogical knowledge is established as a norm (i.e., produced as a truth), it assumes power and determines what pedagogical decisions are “correct.” in other words, this “truth” governs what should be said or done. in turn, pedagogical decisions that are motivated by a particular “truth” endorse the authenticity given to the truth, and thus the power effects of truth are reinforced. this complex connection between pedagogical decisions, produced truth, and power is what foucault (1980) meant when he described truth as “linked in circular relations with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects of power which it induces and which extend it” (p. 133). how will to truth affects ece: problematizing will to truth the will to truth affects how educators’ practice because it generates the production of truth in ece. “truth” in ece governs what educators should say and do and limits ways to think, feel, act, and practice (macnaughton, 2005). without intentionally questioning the authority in what is normalized as truths, the dominant ways to think and act in the ece context continue to govern our thoughts and acts and lead to constrained responses that can lack fluidity. for instance, cooke, wong, and press (2019) found that the current conceptualization of beneficial risk in ece mainly focuses on children’s experiences of outdoor physical play. cooke et al. (2019) argue that these predominant views of risk narrow educators’ understanding of risk and constrain their pedagogical decisions. for example, educators may overlook emotional and cognitive risk taking which would benefit children’s “holistic learning and development” (p. 9). as the will to truth governs how we think and act, complexity and diversity are then dishonoured. complexity— the complexity in children’s acts and thoughts, the complexity in the ways to understand and feel about young children, and the complexity in our pedagogical decisions—is ignored. encouraged by carl leggo, a canadian scholar who influences and inspires scholarship of arts-based inquiry, i regard the “tangled complexity” (2014, p. 99) in human beings’ experiences as something beautiful that should be recognized and honoured. i believe that complexity enriches our dialogues and experiences, and the uncertainties that come along with complexity motivate us to question and create. when our thoughts and actions are limited to norms, where shall the beauty of complexity exist and flow? the will to truth also reinforces the right/wrong binary to consume and construct meanings in ece. the will to truth—the intent to determine what is true or not—is embedded in binary oppositions (e.g., true/false, good/bad, desired/undesirable). these binaries derive more distinctions in the understandings of ece, such as included/ excluded and empowered/disempowered (kocher & pacini-ketchabaw, 2011). kocher and pacini-ketchabaw (2011) indicate that binaries are “packed with certainties, applicable knowledge and regulated spaces” and empower certain groups of people as the holders of knowledge (p. 49). as one binary opposition is more valued, the opposing binary is then “othered” and silenced (kocher & pacini-ketchabaw, 2011; macnaughton, 2005). dahlberg, moss, and pence (2013) suggest thinking in a both/and way, rather than either/or, to disrupt the hierarchical relationship between the privileged binary and the disadvantaged binary. november 2020 64 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice wrestling with will to truth: employing poetry as a tool and a condition what does it mean to move beyond the will to truth? to macnaughton, moving beyond the will to truth is a deliberate practice for liberation to “create new and multiple meanings” in the ece community (p. 199). she proposes several approaches to move beyond the will to truth, all of which are built on the idea of revealing the politics of the truths and unsettling their normalized meanings. drawing on macnaughton, i offer my own suggestions for moving beyond the will to truth by (1) intentionally disrupting the certainties of what is “best” or “true”; (2) refusing to unquestioningly adopt normalized pedagogical thoughts and actions as “what should be done and needs to be done”; and (3) attentively exploring both the dominant and alternative understandings of young children instead of seeing them in an either/or way. i aim to challenge the authority that is given to widely held “truths,” and i regard the claim of truth as problematic. yet, my argument for moving beyond the will to truth is about wrestling with will to truth rather than competing with it. to me, wrestling differs from competing in that wrestling involves moves in various directions instead of in the opposite direction only. the idea of wrestling emphasizes that our relationship with truth is not limited to either moving toward it or escaping from the systems of power that are associated with a truth. we may also move close to the constructed truths to carefully examine how they become norms over time and how they affect how we think and act. we can move away from truths by refusing to naturalize the existing hierarchical relationship between the constructed truth and its alternatives. we can also move around the constructed truths by means of attentively exploring alternative ways to think, act, feel, and practice as early childhood educators. because wrestling with the will to truth does not argue for a move solely in opposition to the constructed truths, the idea of moving beyond the will to truth does not aim to encourage educators to radically disapprove of what are (or have been) widely held as truths. rather, the suggestion to wrestle with the will to truth encourages various interactions with constructed truths, continuously and experimentally. through a combination of various moves, a space is created where alternative, unexpected, and multiple ways to understand ece continuously emerge. the aim in highlighting wrestling instead of competing with the will to truth is to avoid creating new uneven power relations in the process of normalizing opposite voices against “truth.” i chose to experiment with poetry because i am intrigued by the unlimited meanings packed into the succinct, yet thoughtfully selected, words that poetry invites. i use poetry as a tool and a condition to crack spaces for multiplicity and to disrupt singular truths. my purpose in sharing this experiment of moving beyond the will to truth with poetry is to illustrate one approach. i have no intention to claim poetry as the best approach, and i understand there are various ways and/or processes to move beyond the will to truth. before presenting my example of using poetry to move beyond the will to truth, i want to give some background about how i created this poem. the poem is made up of two monologues representing two imagined narrators. these monologues are inspired by conversations that arose from observing parents helping their young child to put on a jacket and the child was fully capable of doing this alone. some colleagues shared their concerns over this scenario because they saw it as parents actively discouraging young children from becoming independent. i have conflicting thoughts and feelings toward this concern. on one hand, i understand my colleagues’ view of independence because it is one of the characteristics my family values. on the other hand, as an asian growing up in a cultural context where parents helping young children is not uncommon, i understand that this scenario could also be interpreted as a message of care and love. for years i struggled to decide what should be done in responding to this scenario, and i gave myself a vague answer: “it depends on the context.” but i was still dissatisfied with this either/or answer, as i felt trapped by the complexity embedded in complicated contexts. through the process of november 2020 65 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice creating this braided poem, surprisingly, i was able to appreciate the complexity in the different understandings. this braided poem captures the parallels, overlaps, differences, and conflicts between the two perspectives, all at once. thus, this poem offers me an opportunity to think with these understandings in a both/and way. braiding two narrators’ stories invites us to understand their different perspectives in a both/and way, rather than either/or. although i visually merged these two stories by degrees, i do not aim to build a consensus on how this scenario should be understood. instead, i want to foreground the complexity in our understandings. ruminating on this article i raised the question at the beginning of this article, does knowing the truth in ece free us from the labour of wrestling with waves of pedagogical decision making? my answer is no! the intent to know the truths of early years pedagogy only leads us to endless struggles with the power effects that are generated from truths. one might november 2020 66 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice ask, “then what should we do with these waves?” i would say to live with them. we can embrace the complexities that are inherent in pedagogical decisions and creatively discover the potential learning opportunities hidden within them. as we live with the waves, we keep the conversations, questions, and experiments flowing. as one who has been searching to know and determine what is “right” and “good” and who is still wrestling with truths, i recognize the difficulty in reinventing our habitual understandings. nevertheless, like macnaughton (2005), i believe that by continuously working to move beyond the will to truth, we can free ourselves from “asymmetrical relations of power and their effects within specific regimes of truth” (p. 44). by wrestling with our will to truth, we can reestablish our relationship with the “truths” in ece. the process of wrestling with the will to truth is challenging, but it can also lead us to serendipitous encounters that may enrich and expand our understandings of ece. for example, while writing this poem, i consistently moved back and forth between two imagined narrators based on my background and previous experiences. this experience enabled me to understand this scenario more holistically because i can see how the two perspectives are connected (both/and) rather than separated (either/or). by inviting experimentations to wrestle with the will to truth, we can create a space where stories about ece are not constrained by normalized truths. by embracing complexity, we provoke conversations that are “ongoing, always in process, and never definitive” (leggo, 2019, p. 9). and these continuous and fluid conversations can crack stabilized ways of thinking and acting and enable us to live with the waves—the waves of pedagogical decision making that are part of the intense and challenging nature of working as an early childhood educator. november 2020 67 vol. 45 no. 4 journal of childhood studies ideas from practice references benozzo, a. (2018). poststructuralism. in c. cassell, a. l. cunliffe, & g. grandy (eds.), the sage handbook of qualitative business and management research methods (pp. 86–101). sage. https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781526430212 cooke, m., wong, s., & press, f. (2019). towards a re-conceptualisation of risk in early childhood education. contemporary issues in early childhood, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1177/1463949119840740 dahlberg, g., moss, p., & pence, a. (2013). beyond quality in early childhood education and care: languages of evaluation (3rd ed.). routledgefalmer. foucault, m. (1980). power/knowledge: selected interviews and other writings, 1972–1977 (c. gordon, trans.). pantheon. leggo, c. (2019). challenging hierarchy: narrative ruminations on leadership in education. in r. irwin, e. hasebe-ludt, & a. sinner (eds.), storying the world: the contributions of carl leggo on language and poetry (pp. 38–49). routledge. macnaughton, g. (2005). doing foucault in early childhood studies. routledge. pacini-ketchabaw, v., & kocher, l. (2011). destabilizing binaries in early childhood education: the possibilities of pedagogical documentation. in p. danaher (ed.), beyond binaries in education research (pp. 46–59). routledge. the role of islamic ljtlhad in the regulation a n d correction of capital markets tdhii jabir al-'alwiini i am hesitant to speak on the role of ijtihiid in an islamic capital mar ket, because this topic requires understanding two important but difficult areas whose primary sources are in different languages. the first area is ijtihiid which is connected withfiqh issues; the majority of its sources are in arabic. the second area is economics which is connected with the analysis of capital markets; the majority of its sources are in european languages. linking ethics and economics is necessary but difficult. necessary, because every economic choice has a spiritual dimension. difficult, because secular economics severs the link, by reducing values to tastes and arguing that different ethical values do not change the method of choice. therefore, properly linking ijtihiid and economics is a difficult task, requiring determined effort to refute the secular separation of ethics and economics. i spent over 100 hours thinking, reading, and analyzing the essential points of both until i could establish common ground between them. zjtihiid is of central importance in usul al-fiqh, and concerns the method of implementing the spirit of the sacred texts in any environ ment. since the third century a.h., i j t i h d has been the main theme of dialog between the different schools offiqh. to this day scholars debate the issue. economics is an important science in our time, influencing several other sciences. since the capital market is a significant topic in econom ics, it is important to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the neo classical analysis of capital markets' in developing an islamic capital market. we must also understand the history of economic thought, how capital markets became an important part of it, and why many neoclas t%ha jcibir al-'alwai is both president and professor at the school of islamic and social sciences ( s i s s ) , leesburg, virginia. this article was translatedfrom arabic into english by waleed el-an~ary who is a research analyst in islamic ecommics at siss. 40 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 sical economists believe that their analysis is objective and spiritually neutral. since the last century, some of our ulum4 have tried to build common ground between economics and ijtihdd on matters of economic develop ment, adopting many of the views of economists. some ‘ulum4 have called for imitation of the west and its modernity to achieve prosperity, and have adopted elements of western methodology. they have thought that the ummah resists change by clinging to concepts of halul and harum in economic activity, thereby hindering the community from development and preventing it from overcoming economic problems. such ‘ulumij have attempted to justify imitation of the west on econom ic matters on the basis of the ma$lu?uih (benefit) of the community, the relativity of fiqh, the absence of alternatives, or a combination of all three. yet, this approach justifies taqlid (blind imitation) of the west by erro neously combining i j t i h d from the islamic world with economics from the western world. a truly islamic economics and ijtihdd, on the other hand, must apply traditional principles to the contemporary world, com bining the transmitted (naqli) sciences and intellectual (‘uqli) sciences. precise understanding of islamic principles must inform both disciplines to establish the true complementarity between them and successfully apply the islamic paradigm to economic problems. bad economic analy sis can misinform the best i j t i h d , just as an erroneous ijtihcid can vitiate the best economic analysis. those who call for tuqlid of the west often combine both errors. thus, failure to apply traditional islamic principles to either ijtihiid or economics creates a duality between the old and the new, between nuql and uql. and this duality creates potential for opposition which is a seri ous challenge to all muslim thinkers, regardless of whether they be econ omists, political scientists, sociologists, orfuqahu. this challenge raises big questions. is islam capable of dealing with this duality or not? can the shari‘ah give us solutions for any problems past, present, or future? the ummah needs to see that the shari‘ah pro vides solutions by applying traditional islamic principles to both uqli and nuqli sciences. the solution must, therefore, come from the epistemo logical and methodological point of view which carefully defines and applies islamic principles, not tuqliil of the west. to build a solution based on traditional islamic principles, we need to understand the m a q a i d , or higher values and causes of the shari‘ah. without looking at all of these points, it is very difficult to answer questions of economic policy and the challenge of secular economic thought, especially on cap ital markets. the islamic paradigm is, therefore, essential to build the common ground between ijtihcd and economics on which the islamic solution is a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic zjtihdd in . . . captial markets 41 based. we suggest that there are three essential islamic principles which our paradigm is based on. the first is tawhid, the truth that god is the absolute and the necessary starting point of any islamic analysis. the second principle is tazkiya, or purification of man and society from evil. the third principle is ‘urnrdn, or the building of civilization for the accomplishment of good. the principles form a complete and consistent set which can be applied to ijtihdd and economics, for knowing the truth that god is the absolute requires the elimination of evil and the accomplishment of the good. moreover, all three principles are necessary in a truly islamic society. for example, it would be hypocritical to know the truth without apply ing it to purify oneself and society from evil and neglecting real needs in building civilization for the accomplishment of the good. similarly, purification from evil is not possible without knowledge of the truth and the existence of an islamic civilization is crucial to assist man in know ing and conforming to the truth. finally, building civilization to accom plish the good is not possible unless it is based upon truth and is the reflection of pure intentions rather than greed. these essential islamic principles or higher values are the pillars of our islamic paradigm. they guarantee that the character of our paradigm is wassatiya (avoids excess as evil and finds the good situated between two excesses), tawazzan (balanced), ‘ad1 (just), istiqdma (direct, not wind. ing), rabbaniyya (from god), ‘alamiyya (global], al-amum (universal), and ashsurnul (includes every part of life, leaving nothing unaswered). when these three principles are the common ground of ijtihdd and eco nomics, we can integrate both in developing an islamic capital market. the references on ijtihdd and economics, however, are very different. zjtihcld is a central issue in usul al-jiqh among all the schools of law, and is the seventh chapter of any traditional usuli book. all of these sources are in arabic posing a big obstacle for many researchers. zjtihczd will be the first topic of our discussion. economics and the capital market will be the second topic of our dis cussion. unfortunately, there are few books in islamic languages on this subject, but many in european languages. in most of these books, neo classical economists conflate values and preferences to separate ethics and economics, excluding essential spiritual principles from their analy sis. neoclassical economists claim that this is objective and spiritually neutral, but this assertion is questionable. we will attempt to establish that ethics and economics cannot be separated because values and pref erences cannot be conflated, and this is the basis for an islamic theory of choice. of course, a full treatment of this topic requires many researchers to deal with both western and traditional islamic sources from different points of view. 42 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 this introduction indicates how difficult it is to properly link ijtihiid and economics, and to deal with the capital market from an islamic per spective, even though i think we should try to deal with this challenge. before i leave this introduction to the main themes on ijtihiid and eco nomics, i would like to emphasize that this paper will deal with the top ics objectively without an attempt to give legal rulings or recommend specific policies. we will try to discover the link between the two fields, dealing with the principles that would help others apply them to specific cases. ljtihad when we think about ijtihiid in our science of usul al-fiqh, we cannot unequivocally say that in its current format it provides us with an effec tive methodology for optimal solutions to all of our contemporary issues. we cannot make such a claim whether or not there is anyone in this time who can be a mujtahid mutlaq (an expert qualified to make ijtihiid in all areas of fiqh without conditions), and whether or not we can identify such a person. therefore, it is imperative that we reconstruct the concept of i j t i h d itself so that it can become a methodological tool capable of responding to the challenges and questions of our time and future gener ations. zjtihiid need not be a closed tool to be used only within a special ized methodology. to be able to reconstruct ijtihdd, we need to take note of the follow ing. first, in itsfiqh dimension, i j t i h d is limited to the genius of an ‘alim who is able to formulate the appropriate question given the event(s) and to go to the text of the qur’an and sunnah for a ruling. if he cannot find a direct answer, then he looks for an answer where ijmii (consensus) was achieved. if that is not possible, then he proceeds to qiyiis or articulates a legal principle to be his line of approach.’ but in our time, this is no longer possible with the explosion of knowl edge and communication, which increases not only every day, but every hour and minute. there is additional information to incorporate into ijti hd with the advent of the social sciences, their appearance in world affairs, and spread into different spheres. similarly, the collapse of the idea of the “limitedness of the text and the unlimitedness of the events” in the face of the holistic thought and purposes of the qur’an and sum^ (which exemplifies qur’anic principles) makes it clearly necessary to apply islamic principles within ijtihiid. in turn, this application requires information from other sciences, no longer allowing the limitation of ijti hczd to thefiqhi sphere and no longer limiting it to one person. and thus we have to establish a strong connection between the social sciences (as a tool in understanding the event[s] to formulate the relevant ethical a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic z j t i h d in . . . captial markets 4 j question) and fiqh (as the science according to which these formulated incidents have moral value and meaning). second, due to the difficulty for individual i j t i h d , it becomes impera tive that we adopt the principle of collective or institutional i j t i h d estab lished on multiple and diverse disciplines and specialists, outside of the framework of what is now known asfutwu committees orfiqh councils, despite their importance. zjtihdd should be undertaken within the frame work of coming up with competent research institutions that include ded icated scholars (from all schools offiqh) of usul, law, hadith and tafsfr, as well as social scientists, linguists, and community leaders. guidelines may be established to determine the constitution of the i j t i h d team depending on the issue. this does not negate the individual’s role in ijti hdd, rather it emphasizes it and gives it direction. whenever such an institution for collective ijtihdd develops, the nature of ijtihdd itself will change, taking a different shape with the following characteristics. first, ijtihiid will no longer be a process based on a theo retical dialog-undertaken by the individual mujtuhid-between the text and dictionaries for the sake of deducing a ruling established on an infer ence based on the semantic that the usul scholars and logicians are accus tomed to. second, the ijtihdd institution will feel a great need for the utilization of all methodological means available in the social sciences, and possi bly some of the methodologies used in the natural sciences. these means and methodologies to aid in the study and analysis of the incidents under consideration will be used to understand, analyze, and better define the incident. such an approach includes, in addition to the linguistic method, the statistical, quantitative, and qualitative methods as well as other tools. even the linguistic method itself will have to be modified to better uti lize the developments that have taken place in the study, analysis, and deconstruction of text for the purpose of gaining deeper insight as to its purpose. third, a need shall then arise to bring to the forefront the characteris tics of the shari’ah and the nature of its universal textual proofs (al-adil lah ul-kulliyyuh). it becomes imperative, then, to understand the the par ticular textual evidence within the framework of the universal textual proofs. it is not sufficient to only collect particular proofs relevant to the issue; rather, such proofs or evidence need to be understood within the context the shari’ah’s universal textual proofs, its goals and purposes, and the nature of its originating source, the qur’an, and its particular, clarifying, and binding source, the sunnah. fourth, the need shall become apparent to understand the precise rela tionship between the qur’an and the sunnah. this relationship shall con sider the qur’an as the only originating source of law and the sunnah as the only clarifying and binding source. such a relationship between the 44 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 originating and clarifying sources does not allow their separation. the relationship calls for understanding the nature of bayyan, its characteris tics, and how it details the general, interprets the vague, specifies the generic, and generalizes the particular. all this is done for the sake of revealing the methodology used in applying the text to reality in the prophet’s time, and how such a methodology could be generalized for all ages so that humanity may be guided by the values and regulations of the qur’an and the sunnah till the end of time. fifth, when these ijtihdd centers and research academies get estab lished, the need shall become apparent to reexamine what has come to be known as controversial legal indicators (al-adillah al-mukhtaldf fiha) and leave behind that which is no longer relevant. other indicators may be renewed and developed and further regulated by the originating and clarifying sources. sixth, the higher values of the shari‘ah, tawhid (the unity of god, truth that god is the absolute), tazkiyah (purification from evil), and ‘umrdn (building of civilization to accomplish the good), shall be the guiding lights, regulating standards, and just scales against which the outcome of the institutional ijtihdd shall be evaluated. seventh, it shall become apparent after such institutional ijtihdd has become widespread that no matter how many safeguards and means human effort has been afforded, ijtihdd cannot be presented as produc ing everlasting rules binding for future generations, or that these rules are even responsive to their needs. this ijtihiid should not lead to the estab lishment of schools of thought and sects that may erode the unity of the ummah, impede its future development, and become a barrier for future generations to practice ijtihdd. the most we can expect from thefiqh of any generation is to offer solutions to crises and challenges that face a specific society in a certain time, place, and circumstances. the outcome of such i j t i w cannot be absolute and should not be binding for those other than the generation of that i j t i ~ d and whoever chooses to adopt that ijtihdd. in the case that a consensus exists among the people of a region or a certain time about a previous ijtihdd ruling, it shall become binding upon them but not necessarily upon people of other regions or other times. only the qur’an and sunnah have binding authority. thus, we recover the effectiveness, vitality, and continuity of ijtihiid, making it an integral part of the psychological and mental state of the ummah, and not an exception. eighth, the practice of ijtihdd from academic and research centers will reveal the universal characteristics of islam. these characteristics are not merely virtues of islam, but should be applied as methodological guide lines in the formulation of collective ijtihdd. at the forefront of these characteristics is the universality of islam. the universality is indicated by the fact that the shari‘ah is a law of ease and a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijtihrzd in . . . captial markets 45 mercy (removes discomfort) is based on the authority of the sacred book, is connected with the finality of prophethood, and provides a necessary methodology. this universality indicates that the message of islam is for all humanity in every place and time until the judgement day. the rapid spread of this message to all corners of the globe took place according to a perfect methodology that began by preparing the final prophet, charg ing him with warning his relatives (the people of makkah and the sur rounding area), and then building an ummah that provided a model for the rest of humanity to emulate. the mission of islam is global although it addresses humanity through a specific social entity in its own language (arabic), dealing with the community’s needs and problems. these are not necessarily the prob lems of all of humanity in all times and places, but can be used as a model for other societies which face different needs and problems by drawing from the methodology, values, and purposes of the qur’an. the qur’an is so resourceful that if you read it at any time or age, it will pro vide answers to specific questions. at one level, the qur’an gives an answer for the prophet’s time. at another level, it applies the link to the prophet’s community to project the answer into the future. the multiple meanings and applications of the text are fascinating, and this is how the qur’an addresses the problem of communicating absolute values in a rel ative environment, linking the transient to the eternal and the specific to the general. this correlation between the relative and the absolute has been achieved in the qur’anic text. this was necessary because if the qur’an had ignored the problems of the prophet’s community, it would have been impossible to project these absolute values forward. there would have been no example of how to apply the message. in a short period of time, islam was able to incorporate all other civi lizations because of its universal vision, which proves its beneficial power in every time and place. this final message is characterized by the absolute book and last prophet. the message, therefore, contains cate gories to integrate the continuous and the temporary, the general and specific, and the global and local to satisfy its goals and objectives. unfortunately, our current religious teachings and studies do not pre pare us to understand these essential principles. because of these reli gious teachings, some people approach the qur’an as if it were meant only for themselves, like a closed letter which our ancestors carried with out opening. this leads some people to misinterpret the qur’an from their current point of view, equating jinn with bacteria, or equating money with capitalism or socialism. some people take the opposite posi tion, thinking that the qur’anic message is meant for our ancestors, sim ply providing the current generation with general directions without spe cific instructions. both positions represent extremes that do not reflect a true understanding of the qur’an, placing limits on the methodology used 46 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 to understand the sacred text. a deep understanding requires a knowl edge of the dichotomies in islamic discourse, namely, the absolute and relative, the general and specific, the continuous and temporary, and the local and global in the qur’anic teachings. we cannot understand the sacred text otherwise. our ancestors did understand these categories in qur’anic discourse, and incorporated them into usul al-fiqh in what they called “chapters of terminology” and “chapters of what is common in qur’an and sunnah.” these chapters include discussion of the general and specific, absolute and limited, ayats with locked and flexible meanings, abrogation and the abrogated, etc. and they established some constraints and criteria to dis tinguish between different levels of qur’anic discourse, and to differen tiate between the legislative and nonlegislative as well as the obligatory vard or wajib) and the forbidden or reprehensible ( b r i m or makruh). indeed, our ancestors understood the qur’anic distinctions between these things so clearly that they were able to differentiate five categories for action: forbidden, reprehensible, indifferent, recommended, and obliga tory. they even distinguished between two types of reprehensible cate gories: makruh tanzih which implies unsuitability for a person, and makruh tabrim which leads to the border of b r i m . they also classified necessities into three categories, namely, essential needs, means to these needs, and embellishments or accessories to support these means. to serve and carry the message of islam, proving its applicability and usefulness for every time and place, we need to build upon what they have done. this requires using our knowledge to go back and rethink what should be the contents of the different categories discussed above. this is an essential, dangerous, and difficult journey, particularly for a mentality which has been in the habit of taqlid rather than ijtihd for sev eral centuries. and we should establish centers for collective ijtihd to be the instruments to implement this task. let us consider a simple example of how a specific incident is devel oped into a general legal principle to understand how principles guide ijtihd. let us take the case of adoption. the qur’an deals with this through the example of zayd (adopted son of the prophet), declaring that the prophet had no male children. even though this message applied to a specific arab community at that time, the principle applies today that adoption does not entail changing the child’s name and literally creating new parents (although the qur’an emphasizes the great rewards and spir itual virtues of caring for orphans). there are many other examples of establishing a principle through specific events infiqh, such as emanci pation of slaves, war booty, etc. since our ancestors understood how the qur’an communicates princi ples through specific incidents, they were not waiting for the qur’an to tell them that, “this is relative, this is absolute. this is general, this is a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijtihdd in . . . captial markets 47 specific. if the circumstances change, do this or that.” but allah revealed the qur’an as he wills, and he revealed it to the ummah in this way, plac ing a heavy task of interpreting this sacred text on the people of dhikr and the scholars. (here is) a book which we have sent down unto thee, full of blessings, that they may meditate on its signs, and that men of understanding may receive admonition. (38:29) nor should the believers all go forth together; if a contingent from every expedition remained behind, they could devote themselves to studies in religion, and admonish the people when they return to them-that thus they (may learn) to guard them selves (against evil). (9: 122) our ancestors produced many great achievements with this understand ing, and if our generation continued on the same level without stopping ijtihd, we could properly understand the qur’anic categories mentioned in our usul ul-fqh. if we pursue deep thought and illuminate our minds, we can build on the great achievements of our ancestors. their rnujtuhids set for themselves tens of principles for legal judge ment, deriving solutions appropriate for their problems. examples of these legal principles are: alleviate legal hardship, block licit means to illicit ends, choose the most prudent course, limit the matter to make options more plentiful, difficulties attract facility, the illicit can be ren dered licit by necessity or overwhelming circumstances, the needs of the public may be considered the same as those of the individual, and there may be acceptance in continuation for matters unacceptable in initiation. these rules represent deep jurisprudential, legal thought and past gener ations may have considered them more than enough to deal with their problems. through these partial rules that are based on the total objec tives of the shari‘ah, they were able to properly understand rules related to specific situations. they did not necessarily articulate the framework they used to derive these partial rules from the purposes of the shari’ah, or how to apply the holistic point of view involving different levels of qur’anic discourse and instruction. in this regard, the example of how the qur’an dealt with the problem of drinking is important, and can be applied to slavery which was as pop ular as drinking at that time. if the qur’an achieved prohibition of drink ing at that time, the muslims were expected to achieve the end of slav ery shortly afterwards. the fact that it was not able to completely elimi nate slavery during the prophet’s time does not mean that it was left to continue. the ruling to ultimately eliminate slavery was in the qur’an, but the full application of the rule took some time. since all the qur’anic rulings related to emancipation, not slavery, we know that slavery must 48 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 ultimately end. indeed, slaves were to be considered as brothers, to eat what we eat, wear what we wear, and work as we work (not to be given overbearing tasks). all this let people know that slavery was a temporary situation. moreover, people were forbidden from calling others as “slaves,” and were required to address them more affectionately. people have talked a lot about how islam released slaves, but nobody talks about why slavery lasted until the recent universal emancipation. why did we not reach global prohibition? we should have reached this conclusion ourselves since we did not have any rules for enslaving people. the truth is that slavery was a sensitive issue. thefuqahij went around it-we did not fiid somebody to “break the egg.” the abbassids and ottomans were more powerful than other civilizations at their time, but they did not abolish slavery because they did not understand the nature of the sacred text. for example, the texts require that the expiation for an accidental killing is freeing a slave. according to nasafi’s tafstr, freeing a slave is like giving life to what is dead. indeed, slavery is associated with kufr in the days of ignorance, and kufr is related to spiritual death; the person who accepts islam is like the person who was dead whom god gave life. moreover, the analogy between charity and freeing a slave is erroneous because the essence of money is as an object for use where as the essence of a person is to be free. our ancestors supported emanci pation, saying slavery was like death and kufr. they came so close to prohibition, but did not embrace it. but if it is our job to resist kufr and finish every trace of it in our society, why did we not eliminate slavery in our society and the rest of the world? we had the power, and even if other civilizations continued with slavery, we could have at least elimi nated it in our own. the whole question goes back to our inability to deal with what is continuous and limited, what is global and specific in the qur’an. this is why we did not abolish slavery and left it to the west. given this understanding of ijtim, we now turn to economics. economics and the capital market when we turn to the islamic economic tradition, we find a rich histo ry of economics as applied ethics. muslim intellectuals were well aware of the distinction between “tastes” and values, and that values determine the methodology one uses to make a choice whereas tastes do not. because values cannot be reduced to preferences or tastes, differences in the content of desires due to values imply different methodologies of choice. muslim scholars, therefore, recognize that ethics and economics are inseparable, for every choice has a spiritual dimension since god is the absolute. secular neoclassical economic thought, on the other hand, denies that a “distinction between castes, preferences, values and ethics can coher a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijfihdd in . . . captial markets 49 ently be made.”2 the theory conflates values and tastes, and argues that different values do not change the methodology of choice any more than tastes do, thereby separating ethics and economic^.^ witness to this the fact that milton friedman declared in his nobel acceptance address, “the great saints of history have served their ‘private interest’ just as the most money grubbing miser has served his intere~t.”~ but if neoclassical theory does not logically distinguish between tastes and values, one has good reason to question how it can contribute to islamic economic policy which does. we will pursue this question, sug gesting that secular neoclassical theory cannot accommodate islamic values, and that an islamic theory of choice which recognizes the dis tinction between tastes and values can better inform collective ijtihiid on capital markets. we will draw out the policy implications of the essen tial islamic principles of tawhid, tuzkiyuh, and ‘umriin for the capital market, and respond to potential objections from neoclassical econo mists. let us begin with the neoclassical theory of choice as espoused by milton friedman, gary becker, and the “chicago school of economics” because they have won the most nobel prizes in economics for the past decade, and they provide a good starting point for the neoclassical approach. while their approach attempts to answer essential economic questions, it lacks spiritual neutrality. it is based on the doctrine that the only thing anyone is capable of desiring or pursuing as an end in itself is one’s own self-interest or utility, in which pleasure, satisfaction, and hap piness are used as synonym^.^ the theory does not deny that people sometimes do desire the happiness of others, but insists that people are capable of desiring the happiness of others only as a means to their own happiness. purely altruistic and benevolent actions and desires, therefore, do not exist. the noble actions of the prophet or the muqurrubcn are, according to neoclassical theory, disguised forms of self-serving behav ior rather than models of conformity to the truth. it is one thing to sug gest that men often “put their own interests first,” which islamic eco nomics takes into consideration, and another thing to’assert that they are capable of nothing else, denying man’s ability to be motivated by the truth or god rather than utility. as the qur’an states several times, god is the truth (ul-huqq) for he is the real. while the chicago school’s neoclassical approach denies the spiritual nature of man (read their literature on the economics of crime, marriage, fertility, etc.), islamic economics recognizes that the ultimate motivating cause for the faithful is not utility or happiness, but the truth. for although happiness accompanies conformity to the truth, it is an effect rather than a motivating cause. “our willing is not inspired by our desires alone, fundamentally it is inspired by the truth, and this is independent of our immediate interests.”6 if man meets his spiritual needs fully by con 50 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 forming to the truth with the whole of his being, the result is spiritual virtue, or “beauty of sou^."^ with spiritual virtue comes true happiness, for beauty and the love of beauty give the soul happiness. indeed, “sen sible beauties are situated outside the soul, and their meeting with it is more or less accidental; if the soul wishes to be happy in an uncondi tional and permanent fashion, it must carry the beautiful within itself.”* happiness is therefore an effect which constantly accompanies spiritual virtue, and this explains why a pious man with few means is far happier than an impious man of great wealth. as the prophet said, “the muslim in every situation is happy [bi khayr].” the chicago school erroneously inverts cause and effect by subordi nating truth to utility and declaring utility to be the sole motivating cause. it is a theory of choice appropriate for the nufs ul-umuruh (the soul which commands to evil), for only the nufs would reduce values to tastes, sub ordinate the truth to utility, and ignore the reasons behind preferences. this reduction by the nafs applies to both spiritual complements such as physical needs and opposites such as anti-spiritual desires. for example, the chicago school’s neoclassical approach suggests that a spiritually inclined person should allocate his time between complementary needs such as praying, eating, and working such that the utility of the last moment spent in each of these activities is equal. this would maximize utility since any discrepancy would mean the individual could increase utility by reallocating his time. the same principle applies to allocating time to different questions on an exam. yet, this approach to a hierarchy of spiritual and other needs is only appropriate for the nufs because these needs are qualitatively different, whereas points on an exam are not. lumping “spiritual utility,” “eating utility,” and “working utility” into one utility incorrectly requires substi tutability between spiritual and other needs, creating tension between them. this is erroneous because a different type of “spiritual utility” accompanies both eating and working. as the prophet said, a man work ing to feed his family is performing an act of worship as if he were pray ing. man’s life ca~i be integrated around a sacred center only if qualita tively different types of utility exist simultaneously, explaining how the sacred is always present without conflicting with man’s other needs. indeed, every aspect of life is sacred in islam because nothing is outside of the absolute, and no aspect of life is profane because everything is attached to god. for the faithful, there is no question of allocating resources between the sacred and profane or between spiritual and other needs because everything has a spiritual context. they find the ultimate purpose of any action in god because no end is beyond him and no end has sufficient reason if it stops short of him. thus, the neoclassical approach to spiritual and other needs collapses into one type of utility, creating trade-offs that do not exist in reality, but a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic i’jtihcid in . . . captial markets 5 1 only as an illusion of the nafs. indeed, the trade-offs could only exist when one does not recognize the spiritual nature of all activities on the one hand, and one vitiates spiritual activity with an inferior intention on the other. through such false trade-offs, the chicago school’s neoclassi cal approach sets the stage for the sacrifice of spiritual needs. the same principle applies to the neoclassical approach to the opposi tion between spiritual needs and anti-spiritual desires. for example, the chicago school’s literature on the economics of crime suggests that the spiritual costs of crime can be traded off against its material benefits in a single measure of utility. obviously, this is a theory of choice for the nafs, for such costs and benefits are incommensurable. the faithful, on the other hand, recognize that spiritual benefits cannot be traded-off against criminal gain, for this would require that there be a further end beyond god which aggregates both, and this contradicts the truth that god is the absolute. the faithful, therefore, do not engage in the type of calculation that the chicago school suggests. unlike the nafs, the ruh or spirit recognizes that good and evil are qualitatively different, relating to different intentions because there are qualitatively different criteria upon which to make a choice. the ruh judges the alternatives not with respect to utility, but with respect to the truth by examining the reasons behind good and evil desires. indeed, the ruh would not adjust its estimate of a “mono-utility” if the material benefits of crime increased. moreover, not only is the neoclassical approach irrelevant for the ruh, it is unstable for the nafs since ignorance of the truth is not necessarily permanent. god saves whom he wills, and the ruh can overcome the nafs al-amarah with the truth, transforming it into the nafs mutma’innah, or “soul at peace.” thus, this neoclassical approach to both spiritual complements and opposites corresponds to a theory of choice for the nafs, not the ruh. economists attempt to make all choices commensurable, reducing them to a single intention, by employing the concept of “indifference.” if, for example, a person rates options a and b as being equally good, the person is “indifferent” between them. this indifference is only pos sible, however, when there is one intention-multiple intentions will lead a person to prefer option a to b, or vice-versa, depending on which intention has higher priority. in other words, indifference is impossible and preference is necessary when there are two or more intentions. when many options are compared, a set of points that a person r a n k s equally form what economists call an “indifference curve.” these curves are central to neoclassical economic analysis because advanced mathematics can be applied to them, i.e., maximize utility according to the shapes of indifference curves. according to neoclassical theory, the saint and the money-grubbing miser simply have differently shaped indifference curves. while this may be true for tastes that reflect a single intention, it cannot be true for values that reflect multiple intentions. it is only by 52 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 reducing values to tastes that the chicago school claims to have a theo ry of choice that is independent of ethics. but this theory of choice itself incorporates bad ethics into economics and is only appropriate for the nafs. indeed, the theory even denies that there is an inner battle between the ruh and the nufs, for the theory maintains everything is reducible to a single intention under indifference curves. the chicago school, there fore, denies the teaching of the prophet that we must continuously engage in the inner jihiid, because for them no such battle exists. some economists recognize that this is obviously false, and that there are major problems with the neoclassical approach of the chicago school. they attempt to limit the application of indifference curves to situations in which the alternatives are qualitatively similar and morally neutral, such as optimally allocating one’s time to questions on an exam to maximize one’s score. because a variety of further intentions are con sistent with maximizing one’s score on an exam, such situations accom modate multiple intentions. while this approach to limiting the use of indifference curves is spiritually neutral, it suffers from the fact that these situations are too few to cover essential economic choices since spiritu al considerations appear everywhere. for example, how much wealth one strives for and the nature of economic institutions are spiritual choic es in traditional islamic civilization, for nothing is profane. without explaining the “budget constraint” and the institutional environment, economic theory is fatally incomplete, abstracting from the essence of the problem it seeks to solve. moreover, applying indifference curves only to goods such as food and clothes does not eliminate the problem of spiritual neutrality. indeed, when one is over-consuming food and clothes for pleasure, indifference curves can exist between such tastes. but when one is directing needs for food and clothes to support spiritual work, they are not substitutes and indifference curves do not exist -one cannot wear food or eat clothes. they can only be viewed as substitutes towards a single intention such as pleasure if the mfs, not the ruh, is in control. in this sense, the incom mensurability of real needs is based on values, whereas the commensu rability of arbitrary desires is based on tastes. by reducing needs which are not substitutes to desires which are through indifference curves, neo classical theory once again reduces values to tastes, and violates spiritu al neutrality. the range of spiritually neutral economic choices to which indifference curves apply is far narrower than any neoclassical econom ic approach accepts. indeed, economists who recognize that indifference curves do not exist for spiritual needs must, therefore, justify why they should exist between other qualitatively different needs. hence, the indifference curves which are central to neoclassical theo ry force economists to choose between spiritual neutrality and logical completeness. economists can either apply their theory of choice in a a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic zjtihdd in . . . captial markets 53 spiritually neutral way, leaving essential economic questions unan swered and the theory incomplete; or economists can provide answers to essential questions by using a theory of choice which is not spiritually neutral. islamic economics does not have this problem because it denies the existence of indifference curves between a hierarchy of qualitatively different spiritual and other needs on the one hand, and spiritual needs and anti-spiritual desires on the other. islamic economics recognizes the existence of indifference curves within each qualitatively comparable “level,” and applies ethical analysis for differences between levels. since only the nufs conflates values and tastes, ignoring the reasons for these “preferences,” neoclassical economics is only a theory of choice for the mfs. while indifference curves reflecting a single intention can exist for different tastes, they do not exist for different values. whereas “there is no arguing about tastes” since they do not depend on the truth and do not require justification, there is ethical argument about values which depend on truth and require justification. islamic economics recognizes these crucial distinctions, and thereby combines ethics and economics in a the ory of choice for the ruh which is spiritually neutral-it recognizes god rather than utility as the absolute-and logically complete. any effort at collective ijtihczd on the capital market should, therefore, beware of neoclassical errors. developing an islamic capital market requires not only a correct understanding of ijtihczd, but also a correct vision of economics with which to inform ijtihd. one cannot base eco nomic analysis on secular economic fallacies any more than one can base i j t i w on anti-islamic principles. indeed, modernists usually substitute tuqlid of the great imams like abu hanifa and his school of law with tuqlid of some economists like milton friedman and the “chicago school of economics.” it is useful to remember that not long ago many people were arguing for tuqlid based on karl marx rather than abu hanifa, despite the fact that many religious leaders recognized and pre dicted that communism must fail because it inverts spiritual principles? the point is not that the islamic world should blindly follow the imams of the past, but that one should not simply replace them with secular economists today. indeed, blindly following milton friedman instead of karl marx may simply replace one error with another. adopting the neo classical fallacy which inverts spiritual principles necessarily leads to self-destruction, for the qur’an and hadith continuously warn man of spiritual indifference, regardless of whether it is applied to communism or any other economic system. in short, it is more dangerous to base tuqlid on secular economic thought than on past islamic thought, and understanding the latter can play a key role in refuting the former to cor rectly inform ijtihd. in brief, the danger of blindly following neoclassical economics in developing an islamic capital market is illustrated by the secular analy 54 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 sis of ribu. (regardless of how one defines ribu-“preferences” may generate either extremely high or low interest rates-the point is not to examine islamic arguments on interest, but to examine whether the neo classical justification of it is spiritually neutral.) secular economists usu ally attempt to justify the morality of ribu by arguing that consumption today gives more utility than consumption tomorrow, so that a lender must restrain himself in order to lend money. this theory was popular ized by irving fisher, a major economist on capital markets, and the the ory is taught in economics courses on savings and investment. (while we recognize that this is not the only neoclassical justification for ribii, it is a popular one. our purpose is simply to illustrate that this is not spiritu ally neutral.) according to this argument, the lender’s “effort” to restrain himself from consumption deserves a reward just as the effort of labor in production deserves a reward. this secular economic argument equates not consuming too much, which a muslim is supposed to do even with out compensation, with the jihid of a man laboring to support his fami ly. these two types of “effort” are not, however, comparable from the islamic point of view. abstaining from an evil such as overconsumption is not something that morally requires a payment, whereas accomplish ing a good such as working to support one’s family clearly deserves com pensation. as the prophet instructed, “pay the laborer his wages before the drying up of his sweat.” he did not say pay the person who has more money than he needs today extra money tomorrow so that he will not commit the sin of consuming too much today. the real effort is to abstain from ribu, not simply restraining oneself from consuming too much today. secular economists often respond that abstaining from ribu will ruin the economy. the qur’an counters this threat by stating that the devil threatens the muslim with poverty when he abstains from ribu whereas god promises him blessings. god’s promise is empirically verifiable by the simple fact that stock invest ments are much more profitable than bonds in the long-run. for exam ple, statistics from ibbottson associates show that $1 invested in long term government bonds in 1926 would be worth $33.73 today whereas $1 invested in stocks on the new york stock exchange would be worth $1,370.95 and $1 invested in the smallest 10% of stocks on the exchange would be worth $4,495.99.1° if someone objects that small or short-term investments cannot be accommodated by the stock market to offer supe rior returns to capital, the response is that in these cases abstaining from riba does not lead to the dire poverty economists threaten muslims with. on the contrary, guranteed interest actually guarantees poverty for future muslim generations. as any natural resource economist will testi fy, maximizing the value of nonrenewable resources such as oil requires selling practically everything within 50 to 100 years. discounting the consumption of future generations values their consumption of these a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic zjtihcd in . . . captial markets 55 nonrenewable resources at practically zero. the “optimal” sales plan is to exhaust nearly all of the resource within a few generations, after which the resource has little economic value because a positive interest rate makes $20 for a barrel of oil today worth much more than $20 for the same barrel 50 years from now. therefore, future generations are not properly represented in the economic equation, a case of “missing mar kets” in the language of economists. moreover, labor has a spiritual purpose ultimately directed towards god in conformity with truth whereas ribu does not, for the prophet said that a man working to feed his family is performing an act of worship as if he were praying. indeed, the shari‘ah makes the effort to earn one’s “daily bread” a religious act as obligatory as specifically religious duties, and gives religious meaning to all acts which are necessary for a muslim’s life, but not those which are exploitative luxuries such as ribu. this is why the qur’an implies that to work for a living and to be chari table to one’s family, the opposite of hoarding wealth with ribu, is tanta mount to defending the faith.” the prophet stressed this fact when a young man with a strong physique was running to his shop through the area where the prophet was marshalling his men to repel an enemy assault. someone remarked that he wished the youth would use his body and health to run in the way of god by enlisting to defend the faith. the prophet responded, “if this young man runs with the intention of not depending on others and refraining from begging, he is in the way of god. if he strives for the livelihood of his weak parents or weak children, he is in the way of god. if he tries to show his health out of pride, he is in the way of the devil.”’2 by defining mujlu& as the effect of confor mity to truth, islamic economics opposes the erroneous neoclassical definition as personal desire. only a vision of economics that correctly recognizes the spiritual possibility of truth as motivating cause and m j l u & as effect can inform the ijtihcsd to develop islamic capital mar kets. this brief example suggests how tuqlfd of western economists like milton fnedman can lead to ruin in the formation of islamic capital mar k e t ~ . ’ ~ indeed, tuqlfd based on an older but truly islamic ijtihiid is pre ferrable to the modern tuqlfd of western economics based on a secular ijtihiid. even if this tuqtzd is accidental, muslims must never forget that blindly following secular economic thought, whether it be neoclassical or marxist, evenutally leads to ruin. and this accidental tuqtzd is the real danger in the current environment. while some modernists argue that a futwu is not necessary to justify the tuqtzd of western financial institu tions, other muslims often unknowingly confuse a futwu which supprts tuqtid of the west with a real ijtihcsd. the two are obviously completely different, just as an occupied territory is different from an independent state. 56 the american journal of islamic social sciences 1 4 3 however, tuqtid of past legal rulings on economic matters is also dan gerous. while the islamic view of man as god‘s servant (‘abd) and vicegerent (khulifab allah fi ue-ur& has not changed, the circumstances according to which man fulfills these roles and makes his choices have. in today’s complex environment of industrial production and institution al trade, tuqlid is no longer possible. earlyfatdwu dealt with relatively simple economic situations in which exchange was more individual than institutional, and production was more agricultural than industrial. because questions about just and unjust transactions were simpler, the fuqih did not need the expertise of others and could make legal deliber ations alone. this is extremely difficult today since the knowledge required to deal with the complex environment is enormous, requiring specialized investigation in several areas. moreover, early futdwu dealt with transactions within dur ul-zslum when islamic civilization was politically and economically dominant, and did not address the interna tional trade of today when many muslim countries are dominated eco nomically if not politically. for all these reasons, pastfiqh on economic matters does not necessarily apply to the current environment, and it is necessary to look to the qur’an and sunnah for guidance. the correct methodology is to apply islamic principles to economic policy, integrating ethics and economics around the three essential prin ciples of tuwhid, tuzkiyuh, and ‘umrdn. all three principles have impor tant implications for the islamic view of wealth, and by extension, the role of capital markets in an islamic society. applied to wealth, the truth that god is the absolute requires that man recognize that wealth is a means which serves his spiritual interests, not an end in and of itself. if the absolute is that which requires no further justification, then the first principle excludes the possibility of money or anything else being viewed as a self-sufficient end. moreover, the first principle obviously requires that the faithful have in view god rather than any other good as their ultimate end, for god can never be a means to a further end, and to suggest otherwise is to deny that god is the sovereign good “requiring no justification in terms of a higher good.” l4 the second principle, tuzkiyuh, requires that man’s will and sentiment be pure, willing and loving all things for god. purity requires that the will of homo zslumicus should keep in view the sovereign good, and view all things in their connection with this good. his sentiment should be objective in loving all things in their divine context. it would be illog ical and against truth for homo zslumicus to will or love things outside their divine cause, for that would constitute the sin of idolatry and is “to hate indirectly the cause from which all perfection and all love derive.”15 the second principle, therefore, requires that man must not be passionately attached to wealth, that he must be grateful to god for his rizq (provisions) viewing nature as an uyut of allah, and that he must be a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic i j t i h d in . . . captial markets 57 generous in his dealings with others. indeed, zukut is based on the same root as tuzkiyuh, showing how generosity is intimately connected with the third principle requires that man accomplish the good in building civilization. this requires that man should not waste his god-given tal ents and resources, neither underutilizing them and neglecting to fulfill his real needs nor exploiting them in the service of greed rather than god. in accomplishing the good, the third principle requires man to be vigilant and not slothful, building wealth and civilization to fulfill real spiritual and other needs and not abuse them for the sake of passion. these three principles, therefore, show that islam recognizes the importance of wealth in a hierarchy of spiritual and other needs, or m a s d i h of man. the islamic economic hierarchy recognizes that exter nal goods such as wealth are means to goods of the body such as health and beauty, which are in turn the physical support for the spiritual work which manifests itself in intrinsic virtue, the “goods of the soul.” the islamic principles of tuwhid, tuzkiyuh, and ‘urnriin regulate this hierarchy and integrate man’s spiritual and other needs into a meaningful whole, realizing and implementing the shuhuduhtuyn (the fundamental witness es of faith). in this sense, islamic economics recognizes the possibility that man can be motivated by the truth or god rather than utility or hap piness in eliminating evil and accomplishing the good. islam, therefore, clearly recognizes the role of capital markets in rais ing funds for companies and projects that help the community fulfill its physical and other needs while providing necessary liquidity. but the operation of the capital market cannot betray the purpose of its existence which is determined by these three essential islamic principles. islamic values must be in the marketplace as well as the mosque, for god is the witness to all contracts. therefore, companies and investors must use resources ethically in a way which is consistent with these principles, raising many questions on how the capital market can be used as a means to wealth or development that supports the spiritual ends of society. such questions cannot be answered by simply assuming that the capital mar ket or wealth is an end in and of itself. indeed, the principles imply that freedom is not an unconditional right, but is the result of fulfilling one’s responsibilities, it is self-contradictory to argue that human dignity gives unlimited rights to the basest of men, allowing them to destroy what makes up man’s real dignity, his attachment to god. several questions follow that suggest the kinds of responsibilities these principles imply for companies and investors. the questions are intend ed to be suggestive, not exhaustive, and relate directly to the equity rather than debt market. although several of the questions apply to both, they are placed in the context of the stock rather than bond market because of the concern that the latter ultimately contradicts essential islamic princi purity. 58 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:2 ples. more investigation is needed to determine distinctions between types of bonds, and what types are islamically acceptable, e.g. bonds for public works projects such as airports. turning first to companies, these principles obviously raise questions about corporate responsibilities to customers, employees, and sharehold ers. is it islamicatly acceptable, for example, for companies to use money raised in the capital market to create entry barriers which inhibit compe tition, allowing companies to charge their customers higher prices? the islamic principles clearly show that this would be unacceptable, yet this has occurred in several industries in the united states.16 can companies treat some shareholders differently than others, even when they make similar investments? justice requires that investors be treated equitably, and that arbitrarily treating some shareholders better than others is unac ceptable. and what type of technology will the companies buy with the capital they raise in the stock market? case studies by the appropriate technology institute clearly show that the technology sold to developing countries by the west cannot be transplanted and is often inappropriate for its needs. e. f. schumacher, the economist famous for popularizing appropriate technology, has demonstrated that large-scale western tech nology is often not in the best interests of the pe0p1e.l~ some economists may object that the market always produces the most efficient types of technology, but research by the appropriate technology institute shows this is not always the case and inappropriate technology can conflict with spiritual principles. after billions of dollars have been loaned to devel oping countries to buy inappropriate technology with such dismal results, it is time to consider more appropriate technologies. and what responsibilities do companies have to the environment and to future gen erations, both with respect to pollution and to resources? is it acceptable, for example, for companies to use capital from the stock market to deplete nonrenewable resources within 50 or 100 years because this maximizes financial gain? once again, this is contrary to islamic princi ples, but is the regular practice of the oil industry which represents some of the largest publicly traded companies in the world. in short, capital must be used, not abused, according to islamic principles if the idea of an islamic capital market is to have any meaning. although the previous questions highlight differences between islamic and secular stock markets, there are several areas of common concern, particularly in providing investors with complete information on corpo rations; otherwise, unscrupulous brokers and companies can deceive investors into purchasing practically worthless shares, as was common in the early days of the u.s. stock market and is still occurring to some extent today. only in the last decade has the u.s. securities and exchange commission closed notorious brokerage firms like blinder and robinson, known to experienced investors and industry experts as a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijtihad in . . . captial markets 59 “blind’em and rob’em.” this brokerage fm would routinely create a company in which it was the only “market-maker,” or transactor of sales, and create an enormous spread between the “bid” price and the “ask” price, making an enormous profit on the difference. to trick potential investors into buying shares, the brokerage fm would tell them that the company manufactured something morally commendable like bibles. it would then manipulate the stock price by sending it higher and higher, moving investors into and out of the stock (known as “churning the accounts”). on each transaction, the brokerage firm made a huge profit. the fm would continue to manipulate the stock price higher before bringing it crashing down and wiping out the investors who were left owning shares. then the process would begin again with a new round of investors. certain types of stocks today are still notorious for scandals, such as “penny stocks” in gold or oil companies which attract investors with false promises of vast discoveries of gold or oil deposits. there should, therefore, be investigaion of a large drop in a stock‘s price to ensure there is no manipulation. similarly, unscrupulous brokers must be prevented from selling their own shares to their customers at unnecessarily high prices by buying shares for themselves before their customers. however, the elimination of these swindles is not sufficient to make the market “islamic,” because the islamic market concerns itself with other ethical questions as well. moreover, the function of all participants such as market-makers and dealers must be examined and justified in the light of islamic principles. turning to investors, islamic principles clearly raise questions about the investments available to them. investments in liquor and casino stocks, for example, are obviously illegal. but what about futures and options trading on companies selling halal products? futures contracts on stocks requires more study, and should be stopped until they are prop erly analyzed. (of course, futures contracts on commodities require the seller to actually have the commodity specified in the contract.) similarly, options are questionable because they give the right of one investor to buy shares from or sell shares to another investor before a given time at a pre-determined price in exchange for a fixed, irretrievable payment. many scholars argue that this type of transaction encourages speculation and allows exploitation, both of which are against islamic principles. similarly, one must answer the question of how much lever age is islamically permissible when investing in stocks? can investors put 10% down in the hope of greater profits, and pay interest on the 90% balance? this was the policy of the new york stock exchange before the stock market crash of 1929. afterwards, the minimum investment was increased to 50% because such high leverage contributed to the col lapse of prices, creating instability by encouraging speculation. such destabilizing’speculation is clearly against islamic principles, and is the 60 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 major reason some modernists argue that bonds are necessary since stocks are unstable. yet, many economists have pointed out that the presence of debt fiancing and speculation is a major cause of stock mar ket instability in the f i t place.i8 this is especially important in the cur rent market environment when price-earnings ratios are at extremely high levels. in the past year, alan greenspan, chairman of the u.s. federal reserve, has repeatedly warned investors to invest cautiously, clearly discouraging leveraged investments which increase market volatility. this is good advice because price-earnings ratios and market volatility in the u.s. have now reached levels similar to those before the market crash of 1987. some economists argue that the volatility of the stock market is not rational, and information systems on company per formance and stock prices must be better utilitzed. therefore, trading rules that limit leverage are critical to stabilizing the stock market and maximizing investor safety. short-selling also increases instability, and is clearly against islamic principles. under trading rules that allow lever age and short-selling which decrease stability, fewer investors will pros per from the growth of publicly traded companies and fewer funds will be available for the capital market in the long term. neoclassical economists often argue that regulations that reduce choic es for investors and companies are harmful. they argue that one must contradict the essential islamic principles of the qur’an or sunnah because of the masfa?za of the community, the relativity of fiqh, the absence of alternatives, or a combination of all three. however, those who are engaged in collective ijtihiid must defend the islamic economic approach using applied ethics from these erroneous charges, and we will make a few suggestions in this regard. let us begin with the last argument, lack of alternatives. actually, this is a variation of the maslab argument since it derives its force from the harm that would befall the community if it abstained from the economic activity in question. as the earlier discussion on the principles of an islamic capital market showed, alternatives do exist, but only the lack of creativity and desire to make an effort prevent their implementation. therefore, this section focuses on the first two arguments used by neo classical economists to create obstacles to the development of islamic alternatives, the maslab of the community and the relativity offiqh. as pointed out earlier, what is relative must conform to the absolute, not vice-versa. scholars in usul al-fiqh have maintained that arguments based on what is relative (such as maslab and time) are not valid against arguments based on what is absolute, namely, the qur’an and sunnah, as well as the principles they necessarily imply. erroneous arguments that contradict the absolute based on the relative make the relative absolute, contradicting the first principle of tawhid. without absolute and eternal standards based on tawhid, there is no basis upon which to evaluate a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijtihad in . . . captial markets 61 either masla& or changes in time. consequently, there is no basis on which to purify individuals and society from evil or to accomplish the good, thereby contradicting the second and third principles of tuzkiyuh and ‘umrdn, respectively. the argument that man can determine what is in his best interests by thinking about masla& without refemng to revelation is absurd. the qur’an commands man to think about his interests with an intelligence which is pure (salim) but that is only possible if one follows the shari‘ah. when passionate desires control man and he breaks the shari‘ah, his intelligent alone is not sufficient for him to determine what is in his best interests. similarly, the fact that some parts offiqh are relative cannot be used to argue that all parts are relative. this erroneous argument implies that everything is relative, which itself is self-contradictory. one scholar answers this absurd proposition in the following manner: relativism sets out to reduce every element of absoluteness to a relativity, while making a quite illogical exception in favor of this reduction itself. in effect, relativism consists in declaring it to be true that there is no such thing as truth, or in declaring it to be absolutely true that nothing but the relatively true exists; one might just as well say that language does not exist, or write that there is no such things as writing. in short, every idea is reduced to a relativity of some sort, whether psychological, historical, or social; but the assertion nullifies itself by the fact that it too pre sents itself as a psychological, historical, or social relativity. the assertion nullifies itself if it is true, and by nullifying itself logi cally proves thereby that it is false; its initial absurdity lies in the implicit claim to be unique in escaping, as if by enchantment, from a relativity that is declared alone to be po~sib1e.l~ thus, arguments which contradict the absolute because of masla& or time are fallacious. unfortunately, secular economics combines both errors in a way which is even more extreme than that of najm al-din al tufi who argued that masla& has priority even over the qur’an and sunnah. secular economists and some muslims have used this type of argument against developing a truly islamic capital market. of course, specialists in usul ul-fiqh recognize the danger of tufi‘s argument, and have developed an extensive literature on the appropriate use of masla& in legal arguments. the scholars have strongly rejected radical interpre tations of masla&, as the following quote from zahid al-kawthari’s crit icism of tufi illustrates: one of their spurious methods in attempting to change the s h a f in accordance with their desires is to state that “the basic princi 62 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 ple of legislation in such matters as relating to transactions among men is the principle of m a s l a b ; if the text opposes this m a s l a b , the text should be abandoned and m a s l a b should be followed.” what an evil to utter such statements, and to make it a basis for the construction of the new shar‘! this is nothing but an attempt to violate the divine law (al-shar‘ al-zlahi) in order to permit in the name of rna&z& what the shar‘ has forbidden. ask this libertine (al-fajir) what is this masla& on which you want to construct your law? , . . the first person to open this gate of evil . . . was najm al-tufi al-hanbali . . . no muslim has ever uttered such a statement . . . this is naked heresy. whoever listens to such talk, he partakes of noth ing of knowledge or religion?o although in the islamic world tufi was clearly unsuccessful in his attempt to abuse the concept of m u s l a b and create heretical legislation, unfortunately, in the west, his british counterpart jeremy bentham was much more successful. bentham played a key role in the development of the secular economics that now opposes the development of a truly islamic capital market. bentham defined ma&@ in terms of individual desires, regardless of whether they are from the nafs al-amurah or not. modem economics uses the same approach by defining m a s l a b as any voluntary choice. according to this theory, more choices are always bet ter because any voluntary exchange supposedly increases the m a s l a b of society (assuming it does not create a negative “externality,” or nega tively affect others). islamic rules on ethics in the capital market, accord ing to this theory, are wrong because they reduce the choices of the peo ple. modem economics claims to be for the m a s l a b of society by max imizing these choices in accordance with the pareto principle that “nobody can be made better off without anybody being made worse off.” from the islamic point of view, this definition of m a s l a b is absurd and simply replaces serving god with serving one’s passions in terms of utility. indeed, the theory makes the relative absolute by subordinating truth to desires, not distinguishing between “the mental states involved in believing something that really is true and a successful deception.”21 the neoclassical definition of m u & & z ignores whether an action or intention is in conformity with the truth of the absolute, allowing an egoistic illusion to be preferable to the bitter truth, and a complete delu sion that one has realized the meaning of existence to be the same as actually doing so. it is, therefore, irrelevant to economics if the perceived masla& is false as to its object or level. in the latter case,“the object can be good, but happiness can be wrong if it cuts it[selfl off from its divine context. . .”22 a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijtihad in . . . captial markets 63 such false happiness or mu&& is unacceptable from any spiritual point of view. if the nafs al-amaruh is making choices instead of the ruh, then fewer choices are better for both the individual and society. as al ghazzali said, some men have to be driven to heaven with a whip. conforming capital markets to islamic principles by eliminating evil choices and creating good choices is the true definition of masla&. unfortunately, many muslim scholars believe that western economics can guide the ummah to develop its capital markets, so it is very impor tant to show how these economic arguments make m a ~ l a & absolute instead of god and invert essential islamic principles. indeed, the economic definition of masla& destroys the islamic inte gration of the ummah’s spiritual and other needs by inverting the three key principles. the definition clearly inverts the first islamic principle of tawhid by making masla@ absolute instead of god. it is to deny that god is the sovereign good “requiring no justification in terms of a high er good,” and to replace god with m ~ s l a @ ? ~ according to economics, wealth can be an end in and of itself because ma$a@ is not subordinate to the truth. in replacing truth with error, economics similarly inverts the second islamic principle of tuzkiyuh. by making ma$la& absolute, economics denies the need for purity in willing and loving all things for god, and makes its inversion unavoidable. rather than eliminating evil, acting according to the economic definition accomplishes it. without truth to regulate maslaha and man’s desires, he is bound to be passionately attached to wealth, ungrateful, and greedy (opposite tazkiyuh’s require ment of detachment, satisfaction, and generosity) as the qur’an and hadith testify. similarly, the economic definition of masla& perverts the third prin ciple of ‘umrdn, substituting the accomplishment of good with an exag gerated concept of development which resembles an irrational swelling more than an intelligible civilization. unlimited greed leads to the exploitation of nature and inevitably to an environmental crisis. moreover, society decays from the pursuit of immoral pleasures associ ated with the economic definition of masla&. this is obviously incon sistent with the third principle of building civilization to accomplish the good because it implies a wealth motivated by greed rather than spiritu al principles. indeed, this is the very starting point of western econom ics, beginning with adam smith who examined the wealth of nations from the point of view material pursuits without spiritual ends.24 he did not believe in revelation, and did not believe that god had an impact on things in the world. on the contrary, he was a deist who believed that god‘s hands were “cut-off’ from the world. similarly, john locke believed that god was unknowable, and men had to base civilization on human reason rather than revelation. for locke, the purpose of govern 64 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 ment is to facilitate the unlimited accumulation of money and exploita tion of nature for material prosperity. “the negation of nature,” he argued, “is the way toward h a p p i n e ~ s . ” ~ ~ such doctrines which underlie secular economics are a parody of the islamic concept of ‘umriin. contemporary scholars such as muhammad sa‘id ramadan al-buti have correctly argued that utilitarian philosophy, of which economics is the central application, represents nothing short of an attempt to destroy i ~ l a m . 2 ~ to better understand the dangerous character of secular eco nomics, it is helpful to understand more about jeremy bentham, the “founding father” of modem ~tilitarianism.2~ indeed, bentham hated god and religion and vehemently attacked both. john colls, a former dis ciple of bentham who later turned against him, described bentham’s vol umes on religion as “volumes of blasphemy and slander . . . against the author of christianity and his people.”28 bentham attacked the church’s teachings, arguing that bans against practices which did not “harm oth ers,” such as sexual indulgence, homosexuality, and others, actually decreased utility. for bentham, questions about the truth of religion were irrelevant and relegated to second-order considerations if divorced from justifications in terms of utility. his book an introduction to the principles of morals and legislation established the utilitarian principles on which the state should replace religious laws, thereby governing society with secular laws based on the science of legislative utilitarianism. after trying to influence others with the book before its publication, bentham dreamed that he was “a founder of a sect, of course a personage of great sanctity and i m p ~ r t a n c e . ” ~ ~ bentham dreamed of himself as the savior of england and possibly the world, and when he was asked by “a great man” what he should do “to save the nation”, bentham replied, “take up my book, & follow me.” bentham implied that his book should replace scripture as the best plan to save the world, for it is a book with “the true flavour of the fruit of the tree of knowledge.” the angel who delivered it to him said that bentham “had no occasion to eat it . . . as st. john did his: all i had to do was cram it as well as i could down the throats of other people.”30 given this account of bentham’s source of inspiration, one should have no questions about applying secular economics to the development of islamic capital markets. unfortunately, many muslim scholars call for help from secular economists, not understanding the dangerous assump tions behind their economic policy recommendations. secular econom ics has no category for motivation by the truth because utility is absolute. muslim economists can refute this approach by drawing on the valuable literature in usul ul-fiqh which had a parallel refutation of tufi. scholars in usul ul-fiqh must also be aware of the dangerous assumptions in neoclassical economics. the efforts of both groups of scholars can generate truly islamic alternatives for the ummah and refute the argu a1 ‘alwani: the role of islamic ijtihdd in . . . captial markets 65 ments of modernists that an islamic economy does not serve the m $ a k of the society. conclusion hence, t q t i d of secular economics and institutions is even more dan gerous than tuqlid of scholars in islamic law. contemporary muslim scholars must, therefore, have an accurate understanding of both ijtihczd and islamic economics on which to base policy on capital markets. bad economic analysis can misinform the best ijtihcid, just as an erroneous ijtihcid can vitiate the best economic analysis. a correct understanding of both disciplines must be achieved through applying to both the three essential islamic principles: tawhid, the truth that god is the absolute; tuzkiyuh, the purification of man and society from evil; and ‘urnrcin, the building of civilization for the accomplishment of good. by recognizing that truth is the motivating cause of the faithful in purification from evil and the accomplishment of the good, authentic ijti hiid and islamic economics can be combined to develop a truly islamic capital market. the same analysis must also refute the erroneous legal and economic arguments of those who favor tuqtid of the west with a futwu. if the current ijtim fails to apply such essential islamic princi ples today, the ummah will certainly face a more perilous situation in the future, for nothing useful can be accomplished without the truth. indeed, the most important cause of our current economic problems is lack of wisdom. consequently, we do not know how to properly use the resources which god has blessed us with. the secular economist’s argu ment that scarcity is necessary because everyone must have insatiable desires is a myth which the west has propagated. god’s justice must be the source of our guidance, for wealth is god‘s wealth, humanity is god‘s creation, we are his vicegerents, and we must fulfill our duty to him. god says the truth, and may he guide us. notes 1. for example, that avoiding evil is prior to doing good. 2. geoffrey brennan, “the economist’s approach to ethics: a late twentieth century view,” in peter groenewegen, economics and ethics? (new york: routlege, 1996), p. 124. 3 . ibid. 4. quoted from tibor machan, “reason in economics versus ethics, international journal of social economics (1996), p. 21. 5. c. dyke, philosophy of economics (englewood cliffs, nj: prentice-hall, 1981). 6. frithjof schuon, spiritual perspectives and human facts (middlesex: perennial books, 1987), p. 93. 7. humility, for example, has its source in one’s total dependence on god, aware ness of which prevents man from overestimating himself and underestimating others. 8. as seyyed hossein n a s r z t e s , marxism is christian charity without christ. the needfor a scared science (albany: state university of new york press, 1993), p. 152. pp. 10-11. 66 the american journal of islamic social sciences 14:3 9. frithjof schuon, esoterism as principle and way (middlesex: perennial books, 1981), p. 94. 10. ibbotson and associates, stocks, bonds, bills, and inflation: 1997 yearbook (chicago: ibbotson and associates, 1997). 1 1 . muhammad abdul-rauf, f a muslim’s reflections on democratic capitalism (washington, dc: american enterprise institute), p. 5. 12. al ghazzali, ihya ulum id-din (new delhi: kitab bhavan), vol. 2, p. 54. 13. as the first section of the paper will clarify, it is important to point out that an interest-free capital market does not by itself guarantee that the capital market is islamic, for it is possible to have an un-islamic capital market that is interest-free. 14. e.f. schumacher, guide for the perplexed (new york battam, 1997), p. 58. 15. frithjof schuon, stations of wisdom (bloomington: world wisdom books, 1995), 16. the breakfast cereal industry represented by companies like kellogg’s and post is a recent example. only after the u.s. government applied heavy legal pressure did the industry’s companies respond by reducing their prices. see f.m. scherer’s industrial organization for these and other examples. 17. e.f. schumacher, small is beautiful: economics as i f people mattered (new york penguin, 1973). 18. m. umer chapra, towards a just monetary system (leicester: the islamic foundation, 1985), pp. 95-100. 19. frithjof schuon, logic and transcendence (middlesex: perennial books, 1984), 20. masud, shatibi‘s philosophy, p. 163. 21. james griffin, well-being: its meaning, measurement, and moral importance (oxford: clarendon press, 1986), p. 13. 22. frithjof schuon, esoterism as principle and way (middlesex: perennial books, 1981). p. 102. 23. e.f. schumacher, guide for the perplexed, p. 58. 24. harry landreth and david collander, history of economic thought (boston: houghton mifflin co., 1994), p. 67. 25. jeremy rifkin with ted howard, the emerging order: god in the age of scarcity (new york: g.p. putnam’s sons, 1979), p. 30. 26. masud, shatibi‘s philosophy, p. 132. 27. the following account of bentham draws from an article by waleed el-ansary on “the spiritual significance of jihad in economics,” american journal of islalmic social sciences, june 1997, p. 251. 28. quoted from james crimmins, secular utilitarianism: social science and the critique of religion in the thgouth of jeremy bentham (oxford: clarendon press, 1990), p. 148. p. 94. p. 1. 29. ibid, p. 287. 30. ibid, p. 315. int. j. of computers, communications & control, issn 1841-9836, e-issn 1841-9844 vol. vi (2011), no. 3 (september), pp. 577-580 on the meaning of approximate reasoning − an unassuming subsidiary to lotfi zadeh’s paper dedicated to the memory of grigore moisil − h.-n. l. teodorescu horia-nicolai l. teodorescu gheorghe asachi technical university, iasi, romania institute for computer science, romanian academy, iasi branch abstract: the concept of “approximate reasoning” is central to zadeh’s contributions in logic. standard fuzzy logic as we use today is only one potential interpretation of zadeh’s concept. i discuss various meanings for the syntagme “approximate reasoning” as intuitively presented in the paper zadeh dedicated to the memory of grigore c. moisil in 1975. keywords: logic, truth value, natural language, inference. 1 introduction i perceive three central ideas in zadeh’s wide conceptual construction in his work until now. the first one is that words and propositions in natural languages, consequently human thoughts are not representable by standard sets and standard binary predicates. the second central idea in many of zadeh’s papers is that humans perform computations in an approximate manner that real numbers can not represent well. the third idea, which zadeh presented in his more recent works, is that of granularity of human mental representations and reasoning. these three strong points were represented by zadeh in various forms and synthesized in the title of his paper on “computing with words” [1]. most frequently and zadeh himself is doing no exception authors cite as the initial paper clearly stating the approximate reasoning model the one published in the journal information sciences, july 1975 [2]. however, another paper published in synthese [3], during the same year, deals with the main ideas in approximate reasoning, not to mention a conference paper published in 1974. the paper published in synthese is important in several ways. first, it offers clear explanations of the meanings associated by zadeh to the syntagme “approximate reasoning”. second, the paper was published in a well-established journal that “spans the topics of epistemology, methodology and philosophy of science,” thus boldly reaching to a large audience in a set of fundamental disciplines and daringly affirming the importance of the new concepts. third, the paper is important for the romanian scientists because it re-enforces the understanding of grigore moisil’s contributions and the deep connections between zadeh and moisil. for an in-depth coverage of the last topic, see [4], [5]. zadeh starts the paper [3] from the common-sense remark that “it is a truism that much of human reasoning is approximate rather than precise in nature.” from that remark, he builds a broad program for research. the program that zadeh establishes remains, in my opinion, unfinished. in the abstract of the paper discussed here, zadeh states “since t [the truth-value set] is not closed under the operations of negation, conjunction, disjunction and implication, the results of an operation on truth-values in t requires, in general, a linguistic approximation by a truth value in t .” with copyright c⃝ 2006-2011 by ccc publications 578 h.-n. l. teodorescu this clarification, classic fuzzy logic as we know today is not a proper representation of zadeh’s original ideas. there are two ways to interpret the above quotation. the first interpretation is in the frame of the classic thinking and runs as follows. because language is a set of propositions (we restrict the discussion to truth-valuable propositions only), under whatever logic, all simple and composed propositions have a truth value. denoting the set of truth values by t , the above remark by zadeh has no effect. moreover, when defining the truth-valuation function we already need to know the set of truth values, which again makes ineffective zadeh’s remark. standard fuzzy logic pursue this direction of thinking, as it starts with . under this approach, as t is given, what is needed is to define the logic operators for the respective logic. the second interpretation is constructive. it may start with the assumption that language is not predetermined and must be constructed as a recursive, dynamic process, as poets, writers, other language professionals, and laymen do every day. whenever a new proposition is invented, it is assigned a meaning. the meaning includes what we conveniently name “truth”, a coverage degree of the reality that we need for making inferences. the truth may or may not be numerically representable. moreover, the truth of a composed proposition may not be representable by the truth of each of the initial propositions. therefore, the “set of truth values” evolves continuously. that, in turn, creates a stumbling block. because we are supposed to know the truth of the original sentences, but not of the result, how are we supposed to infer? the answer proposed by zadeh is that we still have an approximate truth in the initial set of truth values, approximating the truth of the new proposition. he hypothesizes that there is always an inverse application, which i will name projection, from the new truth set to the original one, indicating a truth degree in the original set that approximates the truth degree of the composed proposition. that makes our reasoning possible, if approximate. this way of thinking, more or less directly suggested by zadeh, opens the door to several formal descriptions. i sketch below a loose formalism for the recursive approach. consider a language l = ({p},c1,c2, · · ·cr), where p denotes extant propositions and ck logic operators (either unary or binary). notice that l is an initial language, meaning that the initial set {p} is evolvable, that is, it is recursively increased by adding propositions correctly formed from the initial ones through logic operations. assume that any proposition has a characteristic named truth value. thus, there is some set t of truth values (i use for this set the same notation as zadeh’s), as well as an application such that for any proposition p there is a truth value in t . also assume that any propositions can be concatenated to produce a new or extant proposition. whenever such proposition is new in the language, it has a characteristic truth value which is not necessarily in t . we can regard the creation of new propositions (including those used for reasoning) as producing an application t → t ′ , as for the negation operator, or t ×t ×· · · → t ′, as for the connectives. the new t−set which includes the original one. moreover, for satisfying zadeh’s hypothesis, there is a projection operation ϑ. notice that whenever a new proposition is produced, l is modified. because of t non-closure to logic operations, we can not talk about a t (proper) set for a language. instead, we can conceive an object named t∗-set that can be seen as a string of sets, each generated recursively from the previous t-set or from a product of t-sets. the string must be complemented by a string of applications from a t-set (or from a product of such sets) to the next one in the sequence. next, we need to allow for a construction where the term approximate makes sense. several mathematical constructions may be used in this respect, namely the concept of topological space, where approximate may mean “in a vicinity of”, the concept of metric space or one of its variants, as pseudo-metric space, where the term approximate may be interpreted as “at a distance less than epsilon”, or a measurable space, where the truth may be conceived as elements of the space and the approximation is interpreted as on the meaning of approximate reasoning − an unassuming subsidiary to lotfi zadeh’s paper dedicated to the memory of grigore moisil − 579 “the difference between the measures of the respective two truth values (here, a value can be represented for example by a measurable set) is less than epsilon.” the version based on the measurable spaces corresponds to the probabilities. the same version is adopted below, but with no direct connection to probabilities. the main requirements for the t∗-set are: i) the truth-attribute of a proposition is represented by an application θ : l → t , where t is measurable. ii) for any two extant propositions p1 and p2 and for any connective c, the new proposition p1cp2 has a truth degree such that t∪{θ(p1cp2)} is measurable and includes the measurable space t . iii) for any valid linguistic construction that uses logic operators, there is an application ϑ : t ′ → t ′ , named back-projection. iv) for any connective c, there is a formula fc such that ϑ(θ(p1cp2)) and fc(θ(p1),θ(p2)) are two points close enough in t . standard fuzzy logic obviously satisfies the above conditions, with t = t ′. replacing the measurable space with a metric one, we obtain another construction, which may be closer to zadeh’s intuition in [3]. using distances d : t → t , the conditions to satisfy are: d(ϑ(¬p),1 − θ(p)) < ε d(ϑ(p ∧ q),min(θ(p),θ(q)) < ε d(ϑ(p ∨ q),max(θ(p),θ(q)) < ε, where ε is the allowed approximation error. as grigore moisil has done, zadeh emphasizes in all his work how much language is fundamentally creative. by stating that “ t · · · is not closed under the logic operations,” he highlights that there is always generation of new meaning, or at least an evolution of the meaning, whenever a sentence is uttered. i believe that this is one of the fundamental contributions made by zadeh’s work until now. understanding the creative process in languages and in reasoning was significantly elucidated by zadeh’s work, yet much remains to be done for deriving conclusions and theoretical developments in the directions pointed to by his works. the developments informally suggested above may indicate several such directions, yet others may be put forward in a more formal manner during the years to come. acknowledgment. i thank several colleagues and the referees for their comments and suggestions. the note was not supported by, but is related to research performed in the frame of the romanian academy. bibliography [1] l.a. zadeh, fuzzy logic = computing with words. fuzzy systems, ieee transactions on, volume: 4 issue 2, pp. 103–111 (may 1996) [2] l.a. zadeh, the concept of a linguistic variable and its application to approximate reasoning i, information sciences, vol. 8, no. 3, pp. 199-249, july 1975. [3] l.a. zadeh, fuzzy logic and approximate reasoning (in memory of grigore moisil). synthese, vol. 30, (1975), pp. 407-428, d. reidel publishing co, dordrecht, holland 580 h.-n. l. teodorescu [4] g. georgescu, a. iorgulescu, s. rudeanu, grigore c. moisil (1906 1973) and his school in algebraic logic. int. j. computers, communications & control, vol. i (2006), no. 1, pp. 81-99 [5] z. lemnaouar and a. abdelaziz, on the representation of l-m algebra by intuitionistic fuzzy subsets. arima j., volume 4 (2006), pp. 72-85 a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission the international indigenous policy journal volume 1 | issue 1 article 3 may 2010 a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission marc a. flisfeder university of windsor recommended citation flisfeder, m. a. (2010). a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission. th e international indigenous policy journal, 1(1) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 this policy is brought to you for free and open access by scholarship@western. it has been accepted for inclusion in the international indigenous policy journal by an authorized administrator of scholarship@western. for more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca. a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission abstract in the past year, the government of canada has established the indian residential schools (irs) truth and reconciliation commission (trc) to address the deleterious effect that the irs system has had on aboriginal communities. this paper argues that the trc as an alternative dispute resolution mechanism is flawed since it focuses too much on truth at the expense of reconciliation. while the proliferation of historical truths is of great importance, without mapping a path to reconciliation, the canadian public will simply learn about the mistakes of the past without addressing the residual, communal impacts of the irs system that continue to linger. the truth and reconciliation commission must therefore approach its mandate broadly and in a manner reminiscent of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples of 1996. keywords alternative dispute resolution, indian residential school, truth and reconciliation commission acknowledgments the author wishes to thank professor gemma smyth and ms. anna gersh for their generous support and feedback on earlier editions of this paper, as well as two anonymous reviewers for their commentary. creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ introduction truth and reconciliation are separate and important elements in overcoming mass wrongs. while truth can be attached to fact finding, bridging the path to reconciliation can be far more difficult. in the ojibway creation epic, sky woman cast a curse upon the earth and odeina was one of the many who died. when odeina arrived at the spirit world, there was a chasm separating it from the earth, denying spirits their final resting place. odeina showed strength and wisdom by using the branches of trees to build a bridge to traverse the rift. for his selflessness, odeina was allowed to return to life and was given the added responsibility of sharing his wisdom (borrows 2006). a successful truth and reconciliation commission must be like odeina: it must have the wisdom to build a bridge over the chasm that separates truth and reconciliation, but it must also take on the responsibility of sharing this wisdom widely and with future generations. in the past year, the government of canada has established the indian residential schools (irs) truth and reconciliation commission (trc) to address the deleterious effect that the irs system has had on aboriginal communities. a trc is a commission tasked with investigating and revealing past wrongdoing by a government, or by non-state actors, in the hope of resolving conflict left over from the past. sadly, i do not believe the trc has been set up in such a way that will enable it to demonstrate odeina-like qualities, since the mandate of the commission focuses too much on truth and not enough on reconciliation. when addressing the problems faced by these communities, the experience of residential schools is only one piece of the puzzle. other variables must be specifically defined and addressed or, else, they will linger on in the background. the problem is that the trc is approaching the residential school problem as an isolated issue, rather than taking a holistic approach. this is contrary to traditional 1 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 aboriginal teachings that everything is related; wisdom is often represented visually by locating individuals at the centre of a set of concentric circles that ripple outward to include family, community, nation and the natural world (castellano 2008). while the commission may help define the “truth” of the residential school system, it fails to build a bridge to “reconciliation,” because it does not address the many ripples that have flowed from the irs system. without a holistic form of reconciliation, the trc cannot be successful. in explaining my concern for the commission, i will begin by sketching a history of the trc and how it came about. the purpose of this sketch is to place the current state of the trc into context. i will then explain how the trc differs from a typical courtroom adjudicative model and why the trc has the potential to be an effective form of alternative dispute resolution in addressing the mass wrongs of the irs system. the term “alternative dispute resolution” is used here in the sense that the trc is a method of resolving disputes that is alternative to a courtroom adjudicative model. however, since the trc is the result of a court-approved civil settlement of a class action lawsuit, the approach that i take in this analysis is legal rather than sociological. it will be noted that traditional legal models have failed to bring justice to irs survivors. nevertheless, a public inquiry such as the trc (particularly one headed up by a judge) will inevitably be treated in a quasi-judicial manner by some of the actors involved. this paper is not meant to displace the value of a social discussion of the trc but hopefully can serve as a companion to such work. following the section on how the trc differs from traditional courtroom adjudication, i will discuss the pieces that must fall into place to ensure that the trc will indeed be successful, including elements of a restorative justice model. for reconciliation to occur, the trc process must engage all levels of government as well as aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples. finally, 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 i will close with an explanation of why those pieces have not in fact fallen into place by comparing the mandate of the trc with the royal commission on aboriginal peoples of 1996 (rcap), which undertook to review a multitude of problems faced by the aboriginal peoples of canada, including indian residential schools, and that has been successful in many ways. history of the trc: how and why it was created in order to understand the context in which the trc will take place, it is important to begin with an understanding of how the indian residential school system progressed over time (castellano, archibald and degagne 2008; milloy 1999). the physical and sexual abuses as well as the mass cultural appropriation suffered by irs survivors did not occur overnight. these atrocities are deeply set in the bowels of canadian history, since the irs system had a significant impact on the destruction of language, culture and identity of aboriginal communities. children were forcibly taken away from their families and punished for speaking their native tongue or observing traditional practices. traditional systems were regularly belittled and denigrated by the operators of the schools. the first missionary-operated school in canada was established near quebec city between 1620 and 1629, more than 200 years before the first indian residential school was opened in brantford, ontario in 1831. the brantford school would remain one of the longest lasting indian residential schools, closing its doors in 1969 (castellano et al. 2008; milloy 1999). however, back in 1892 the federal government entered into a formal operation partnership with various church entities that ran the schools in question. in 1907, red flags came up for the first time when indian affairs’ chief medical inspector p.h. bryce reported numerous deficiencies at the schools with respect to the health of students. notwithstanding this fact, in 1920 deputy superintendent general of indian affairs duncan campbell scott made residential 3 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 school attendance compulsory. in 1958, almost four decades later, indian affairs regional inspectors recommended the abolition of residential schools. rather than closing residential schools, the government ended its partnership with churches and began transferring control to indian bands starting in 1970 (castellano et al. 2008; milloy 1999). the first public reports of abuse came in 1989 from the mount cashel orphanage. two years later, grand chief phil fontaine of the assembly of first nations publicly disclosed tales of the abuse he personally suffered in the residential schools. around this time, churches started to issue apologies for their role in residential schools, including the united church (1986), the oblates of mary immaculate (1991), the anglican church (1993), and the presbyterian church (1994). in 2006, 99 years after the first warning signs were reported by inspector bryce and after it had become clear that the cost of litigation was erecting barriers to justice, the federal government signed the indian residential schools settlement agreement with legal representatives for the survivors, the assembly of first nations, the inuit representatives, and the church entities (castellano et al. 2008; milloy 1999). the truth and reconciliation commission was launched in 2008 as a part of the settlement agreement and, in the same year, the federal government formally apologized to the survivors of the indian residential schools. prior to the trc, rcap was established in august 1991 with broad terms of reference. these terms called for an examination into the problems that have plagued the relationship between aboriginals and canadian society throughout history and for recommendations to improve this relationship. the commission was composed of seven members and included four aboriginals with one, georges erasmus, being named co-chairperson. it was clear from the outset that rcap’s inquiry was to contain a significant aboriginal point of view. the commission released its final report in 1996, consisting of approximately 3,500 pages bound 4 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 within five volumes. several other interim or special reports were released during rcap’s discovery period. true to its mandate, rcap’s investigation into the present and past associations between canadian society and aboriginals was encyclopaedic and its recommendations were detailed and numerous. many of these recommendations can be seen as an attempt to redirect the evolution of the relationship between aboriginal and non-aboriginal society in positive directions (stack 1999). although rcap was not expressly set out as a truth and reconciliation commission, it was restorative justice and clearly an attempt at reconciliation. fast forward ten years to the trc, which forms part of the 2006 court approved agreement between the parties that settled the class action law suit launched by survivors. its mandate, purpose, system design and mode of operation are specifically set out in schedule “n” of the agreement (truth and reconciliation commission mandate). the preamble to schedule “n” states that the purpose of the commission is to promote “continued healing,” through an ongoing, individual and collective process. these objectives are more fully defined in section 1 of the agreement, which states inter alia: the goals of the commission shall be to . . . [p]roduce and submit to the parties to the agreement a report including recommendations to the government of canada concerning the irs system and experience including: the history, purpose, operation and supervision of the irs system, the effect and consequences of irs (including systemic harms, intergenerational consequences and the impact on human dignity) and the ongoing legacy of the residential schools (truth and reconciliation commission mandate: s. 1(f)). the goals are far reaching and suggest a desire to ameliorate some of the ills that have plagued aboriginal communities beyond the direct consequences of the irs system. 5 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 it is submitted that in order to fully address the deeply rooted history of the irs system and the related effects on aboriginal communities in canada, the trc ought to act with the intent of succeeding the royal commission on aboriginal peoples of 1996. since the releases of its final report as well as its interim reports, rcap has helped to frame the discourse of judges, lawyers and policy makers on a wide array of topics relating to the amelioration of social conditions faced by aboriginal peoples (stack 1999). indeed, the mandate of the trc expressly states that it “will build upon the work of past and existing processes, archival records, resources and documentation, including the work and records of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples of 1996” (truth and reconciliation commission mandate: s. 4(3)). the rcap final report included an entire chapter on the concerns raised by the irs system and its findings have been lauded for bringing aboriginal perspectives into canadian courtrooms (stack 1999). a successful trc must comprehensively identify historical truths and make recommendations that can be applied to wide ranging situations in order to truly realize its potential benefits. the successes of rcap and its role in producing restorative justice for aboriginal communities will be more fully addressed in the penultimate section of this paper. the deficiencies of the common law in dealing with aboriginal issues and the potential of the trc to be an effective form of alternative dispute resolution generally speaking, there are five aims to the canadian trc: 1) to discover, clarify and formally acknowledge past abuses; 2) to respond to specific needs of victims; 3) to contribute to justice and accountability; 4) to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; and 5) to promote reconciliation and reduce conflict over the past (rice and snyder 2008). overarching these objectives is the fact that the trc must promote reconciliation within society as a whole, not just within aboriginal communities. a typical court room procedure could not 6 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 address sufficiently the many vagaries of the trc, nor would the formalistic approach of court room procedure necessarily be desirable. indeed, schedule “n” of the settlement agreement expressly states that the commissioners “shall not hold formal hearings, nor act as a public inquiry, nor conduct a formal legal process” (truth and reconciliation commission mandate: s. 2(b)). when violence is perpetrated on a mass scale, courts are often unable to process the huge number of claims, either in criminal court or in civil suits (rice and snyder 2008). moreover, the courts are not designed to heal broken relationships within society. the deficiencies of litigation in the irs system context first became apparent following the federal government’s statement of reconciliation (1988). after the statement had been made, a tide of litigation swelled to include thirteen thousand irs survivors alleging emotional as well as physical and sexual abuse (castellano, et. al. 2008). these court procedures took a tremendous financial toll on survivors, churches and government. eventually, it became clear that the costs were insupportable and were ultimately erecting barriers to justice. similarly, rcap favoured negotiated political solutions, because of the uncertainty involved in litigation (stack 1999). litigation in disputes between aboriginal communities and the crown is usually met with judicial restraint. it is therefore submitted that settlements involving aboriginal communities require some type of alternative dispute resolution (adr) process to take place outside of the typical courtroom setting. when litigation involving irs survivors sprung up, courts were not equipped with the tools needed to address all of the wrongs that had been claimed to that point. this may be because the legal structure and process were established by europeans without any consideration of aboriginal issues. little merit was attributed to causes of action based on cultural appropriation and courts were only concerned with claims of sexual and physical abuse. as loss 7 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 of culture is not a recognized cause of action, the complainants did not have the closure that would be granted from recognition of all the wrongs committed against them; indeed, the very purpose behind the irs system was cultural appropriation. most cases were addressed under the torts of sexual assault and battery, and any mention of cultural loss was just another factor to consider in the overall assessment of compensation. some academics assert that the law of torts is an inappropriate tool to tackle the subject of residential school cultural abuse, since cultural loss is a loss for the community, not just the individual, and, therefore, is inadequately dealt with by tort law’s narrow, individualistic paradigm (hutchinson 2007). the fact that courts refuse to recognize cultural appropriation as a cause of action is an indicator of why an alternative dispute mechanism is needed. however, the problems surrounding claims for loss of language and culture were also fuelled by the federal government’s initial adr program for residential school claims that was established following the original statement of reconciliation in 1998 (before the settlement agreement that created the trc). this out-of-court compensation scheme, launched in 2003, covered sexual and physical abuse but did not include payment for loss of culture and language. in fact, claimants who adhered to the adr process were required to sign a waiver which prohibited them from launching future claims on the basis of losses to culture and language. this had the effect of bringing the individualistic paradigm of tort law into the adr process. there were many calls for cultural loss compensation to be brought into the adr scheme, including calls from both the canadian bar association and the assembly of first nations (oxaal 2005). over time, it became clear that traditional legal proceedings as well as the first adr scheme proposed by the federal government were insufficient to adequately address the restitution sought by irs survivors. in the face of wrongs, people often turn to the courts as the 8 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 arbiters of truth. when courts are called upon to make determinations with respect to guilt, culpability or liability, however, they “must often strip away the complexity of the truth and make a judgement about what part of the truth matters to resolve a conflict or controversy” (llewellyn 2008: 191). the trc is not charged with the same task as the court. its concern and focus is reconciliation and, to this end, it cannot afford to strip away or ignore the messiness or complexity of truth.i as such, the trc has the potential to resolve matters that have handcuffed traditional legal proceedings. achieving success: overcoming communal post-traumatic stress disorder the aboriginal healing foundation, a publicly funded advocacy body, has framed the resolution of issues surrounding the irs system in the quartered circle of a medicine wheel, a figure widely used in first nations teachings (castellano 2008). the steps proposed for resolution are as follows: 1) acknowledgement − naming the harmful acts and admitting that they were wrong; 2) redress − taking action to compensate for harms inflicted, 3) healing − restoring physical, mental, social/emotional and spiritual balance in individuals, families, communities, and nations; and 4) reconciliation − accepting one another following injurious acts or periods of conflict and developing mutual trust. the process is circular since the forging of better relationships is ongoing. the goal of reconciliation raises the issue of relationships between peoples as well as dignity and mutual respect. however, the mandate of the irs trc does not clearly define what is meant by “reconciliation”. neither “the meaning nor means of reconciliation receive much attention in the mandate despite the hope reflected by its name that this body would be about both truth and reconciliation” (llewellyn 2008:186). the closest that the trc’s mandate comes to defining reconciliation appears to be the statement in the preamble that “[t]he truth of our common 9 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 experience will help us set our spirits free and pave the way to reconciliation.” this sentiment seems to be borrowed from the south african truth and reconciliation commission’s slogan: “truth. the road to reconciliation” (llewellyn 2008). the slogan seems to make clear that while truth is needed to establish reconciliation, truth alone is not enough. there must be a true map to reconciliation for the irs trc to be successful. moreover, there must be a clear definition of what is meant by “reconciliation” so that the destination is known before charting the map and building the bridge that traverses the chasm. a coherent process, therefore, requires a paradigm shift. reconciliation requires a number of systemic remedies to cure the mass wrong: it must present an opportunity for healing in aboriginal communities and involve non-aboriginal communities and the private sector. “reconciliation is about healing relationships, building trust, and working out differences” (rice and snyder 2008:45). true reconciliation is not “forgive and forget”; true reconciliation is “to remember and change” (lederach 1998:245). reconciliation must address concerns about both the past and the future. “acknowledgement of the past through truth-telling, recognition of interdependence, and desire or necessity for peaceful co-existence in the future are key elements of reconciliation” (rice and snyder 2008:46). admittedly, however, the term “reconciliation” carries varied meanings (mcneil 2003). the trc may wish to begin the process of reconciliation by determining what precisely it means for survivors and the wider public. since the irs system is so closely tied to aspects of colonialism, reconciliation in the canadian context must provide a holistic approach to ameliorate both the direct and residual social and psychological effects that the irs system has had on aboriginal communities. it must account for the many ripples that have flowed from the irs epicentre and continue to marginalize aboriginal people in canada. 10 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 as previously mentioned in the discussion on regular court proceedings, the irs system had a significant impact on the destruction of language, culture and identity for aboriginal communities. children were plucked away from their homes and forbidden from speaking their native tongue or observing traditional practices. traditional systems were belittled or denigrated by church entities, the education system, and the laws that existed under the irs system, which has lead to an internalized sense of inferiority in aboriginal communities. this sentiment has been described as a communal post-traumatic stress disorder (rice and snyder 2008). when children returned from residential schools lacking language, relationships and practical skills to reintegrate into the community, the capacity of extended families to help reintegrate was far beyond what could be accomplished through one-on-one therapies delivered by mental health professionals (castellano 2008). a study of the aboriginal healing foundation revealed that: images of traumatic events and adaptive or maladaptive responses become imbedded in shared memories of the community and are passed on to successive generations by storytelling, community interaction and communication, patterns of parenting, emotionally laden memories, and inherited predisposition to [posttraumatic stress disorder]. even if events are not fully remembered, behavioural patterns rooted in collective memory persist in community life, becoming the backdrop for interpreting and responding to current reality (castellano 2008:390). many young people in aboriginal communities, who were not direct victims of the irs system, have inherited this sense of inferiority and have started to doubt the viability of their own traditional healing processes. the effect of which has been a lack of self-worth and endemic 11 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 suicides among the young who question the place of their traditions in contemporary society (hallett, chandler and lalonde 2007; chandler and lalonde 2008). the communal post-traumatic stress disorder felt by aboriginal communities is similar to the sentiments expressed during other truth commissions around the world. most often these commissions are set up by states recovering from civil war, dictatorships or internal unrest. however, the irs trc differs from other truth and reconciliation commissions since it has not come about in the face of political transition. as a settler society, the path to reconciliation has unique challenges. in this context, three major factors require attention in considering the path to reconciliation: 1) the legacy of colonialism that impacts the political, social, and economic life of aboriginal people; 2) the historical and contemporary myths prevalent in canadian society that rationalize canada’s policies toward aboriginal people; and 3) the impact of colonization/residential schools on aboriginal identities that adds an additional layer of healing to the reconciliation process (rice and snyder 2008). each of these factors requires deeper understanding of the social and psychological issues faced by aboriginal communities beyond a superficial discussion of facts of the irs system. in other words, the consequences of the irs system extend far beyond the wrongs felt by the survivors themselves and a holistic process is needed to bring forth healing and reconciliation. in achieving this end, there are lessons that can be learned from the experience in australia. in 1991 the australian parliament enacted the council for aboriginal reconciliation act, which was meant to begin a process of reconciliation between the indigenous peoples and wider society. however, the resulting process was framed in a nation building discourse that placed a “ceiling” on indigenous aspirations and demonstrated a subtle and perhaps even unconscious assimilationist agenda (short 2003). it is hoped that the canadian trc can learn 12 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 from the troubled australian approach to develop a system that is truly responsive to aboriginal aspirations. for reconciliation to occur, the wider society must adapt in response to the revelations of the trc. how to achieve success: restorative justice it has been argued that historic injustice, such as the irs system, should be used as a justification to expand and shape the protection of aboriginal cultural rights under section 35 of the constitution act, 1982 (hutchinson 2007). in this sense, the expansion of rights would be used as a form of compensation (hutchinson 2007). for the trc, however, reconciliation must go beyond mere judicial recognition of rights and should mean discovering ways to repair mental trauma of a collective community. this requires a view to the future and not simply a review of the truth of the past. reconciliation in this lens means restorative justice; restorative in the sense that aboriginal communities ought to be restored, as much as possible, to the condition they could have been, absent the mass wrongs committed in the irs system. this is essentially the philosophy underlying remedies in tort law: when an individual suffers physical trauma as a result of a tort committed by their neighbour, then it is expected that a court would award damages for loss of potential future income stemming from the inability to work while recovering from the injury. a judge in this case must assess “what could have been,” absent the wrongful act. reconciliation of wrongs committed in irs must also attempt to determine “what could have been,” if not for the atrocities committed to aboriginal communities. while admittedly some individuals who attended residential schools have argued that the experience was positive and promoted their quality of life as they grew older, most would state otherwise. 13 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 unlike the tort victim however, survivors cannot simply be “restored” through financial compensation. reconciliation through the restoration of potential focuses on the prospects of the victim. in the south african trc, many critics argued that the commission failed to prosecute and punish offenders, offering amnesty instead. these critics cried foul at the lack of “justice” that caused the gap between truth and reconciliation. justice in this sense was retributive and was thought to necessitate punishment, not acknowledgement and dialogue (llewellyn and howse 1999). what the critics failed to see was that a different form of justice was being used to build that bridge: restorative justice. “any bridge must pay close attention to the ground upon which it is anchored. . . restorative justice offers a clear picture of the nature of the ground on both sides of the bridge” (llewellyn 2008:188). the restorative potential of truth commissions has been viewed by some with scepticism. it has been argued that truth commissions tend to confuse aspiration with prediction, questioning whether anyone really knows that truth commissions secure the benefits of healing, catharsis, disclosure of the truth and so forth (allen 1999). while critics admit that in some instances, participation in the hearings of truth commissions does result in individual ‘catharsis,’ a feeling of settled business, they argue that in other instances rage and frustration may increase rather than abate (allen 1999). therefore, these critics argue that it is doubtful whether any general claims whatsoever can be made about the capacity of truth commissions to secure the claimed benefits and that the prospects for ‘collective healing,’ whatever that is, do not seem particularly promising in many cases (allen 1999). it is my view, however, that these critics focus on the challenges of a truth commission, rather than on their potential. while it is certainly difficult to 14 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 achieve successful reconciliation, i believe it is possible through clearly defined goals and objectives, or through understanding “the nature of the ground on both sides of the bridge.” first, restorative justice must engage the non-aboriginal public and communities. the view that the residential school experience was injurious in itself, and not just in instances of physical and sexual abuse, is shared by only a small proportion of canadian citizens, in contrast to the view of most first nations, inuit and métis people (castellano 2008). in other words, these divergent historiographies create a barrier to reconciliation, and non-aboriginal canadians would benefit from a greater appreciation of how aboriginal people and communities view the irs system. the trc is clearly designed to present the truth to the public through events, education campaigns, media, reports and public archives. this will allow the public to be witness to the atrocities of the irs system. however, it will be important to engage non-aboriginal canadians at a deeper level in order to work toward reconciliation. this can include efforts to reverse negative stereotypes that linger regarding aboriginal people and present a challenge to policy-makers wishing to narrow the gap in living conditions between aboriginal and nonaboriginal people. quite frankly, it is unlikely that most non-aboriginal canadians are even aware that there is a truth and reconciliation commission taking place, while others might not even care (wente 2007). providing non-aboriginal canadians with greater knowledge and understanding might encourage them to want to reconcile. engaging the non-aboriginal public in the process as parties and not simply witnesses will present a great challenge. nevertheless, it is an important one to address, since it is through their engagement and involvement that the reconciliatory process might begin (llewellyn 2008). second, restorative justice requires the restoration of relationships harmed. when a wrong is perpetrated, its harm extends throughout the web of interconnectedness that binds the 15 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 members of a society. at the south african trc, for example, an interesting phenomenon was the abundance of apologies that took place despite the fact that apologizing was not connected to amnesty in the mandate of the commission (weisman 2006). remorse in that sense was unexpectedly coupled with the healing process and helped to demonstrate that all parties to the mass wrongs were deeply and personally affected by them. this is demonstrative of just how truth commissions differ from war crimes tribunals as a response to mass wrongs. war crimes tribunals punish the guilty, while truth commissions have a view to the lasting relationship between actors. mass wrongdoing profoundly affects the victim, the wrongdoer and their immediate families, supporters, and communities; in essence, they affect the very fabric of society. reconciliation must go beyond truth and mend this web of interconnectedness. third, once the trc has the opportunity to review the truths and make recommendations on how to mend social relationships with a view towards reconciliation, it is important to ensure that these recommendations are indeed enforced. the recommendations of the trc will only be worthwhile if they are made known, understood and responded to (llewellyn 2008). if the truth is told and goes without a response, then this might actually further damage the relationships involved. the commission cannot expect to achieve reconciliation within its five-year mandate. therefore, it must make recommendations with a view to future generations. while el salvador’s truth commission was one of the few commissions whose recommendations were mandatory in the terms of reference, the recommendations of state-sanctioned commissions tend to be more influential than reports of non-governmental advocacy groups (rice and snyder 2008). therefore, there is hope that the recommendations of the trc will be enforced, though this remains to be seen. 16 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 engaging non-aboriginal communities, mending the web of interconnectedness that connects members of society and ensuring that the recommendations of the trc are enforced are objectives that are easily stated but not easily achieved. while this might involve expanding aboriginal constitutional rights, it must first ameliorate the conditions in aboriginal communities in a non-judicial context, including the way that these communities are perceived by the general public. that is how restorative justice can be used as a tool for bridge building from truth to reconciliation and can ensure that the trc is successful in achieving the goals set out in its mandate. what the trc can do to ensure success far from attempting to provide restorative justice, the mandate of the trc is set up in such a way as to document truth but provides little in the form of reconciliation. by contrast, it is worth considering the hearings, research and report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples, which first brought the devastating effects of the irs system of social engineering into public scrutiny (castellano et al. 2008). rcap highlighted the problems facing aboriginal communities in canada but also called for remedies through comprehensive recommendations. in calling for a more extensive public inquiry into residential schools, the commission wrote: no segment of our research aroused more outrage and shame than the story of the residential schools. certainly there were hundreds of children who survived and scores who benefited from the education they received. and there were teachers and administrators who gave years of their lives to what they believed was a noble experiment. but the incredible damage – loss of life, denigration of culture, destruction of self-respect and self-esteem, rupture of families, impact of these traumas on succeeding generations, and the enormity of the cultural triumphalism 17 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 that lay behind the enterprise – will deeply disturb anyone who allows this story to seep into their consciousness and recognizes that these policies and deeds were perpetrated by canadians no better or worse intentioned, no better or worse educated than we are today. this episode reveals what has been demonstrated repeatedly in the subsequent events of this century: the capacity of powerful but grievously false premises to take over public institutions and render them powerless to mount effective resistance. it is also evidence of the capacity of democratic populations to tolerate moral enormities in their midst (1996:601602). while i concede that there is an interest in fully documenting the past, it would seem from this statement that the overarching wrongs of the irs system are to an extent already documented, though not well disseminated. further truth telling will undoubtedly aid this dissemination process. however, rather than expunging their five-year term recording truth, it is once again submitted that the trc ought to use more time discovering ways of restoring justice to aboriginal communities. the mandate of the trc scantly sets out a path to reconciliation and that is why i fear that it will not be successful. the trc is more likely to build bridges, if it were to be mandated by principles more closely resembling rcap. as mentioned above, rcap is specifically referred to in the mandate of the trc. however, it is only referred to in the context of building “upon the work of past and existing processes, archival records, resources and documentation” (truth and reconciliation commission mandate: s. 4(c)). therefore, it would seem that the focus on rcap in the mandate is on its truth gathering, rather than on the impact of its recommendations. this is unfortunate considering the tremendous impact that the recommendations of rcap have had on canadian 18 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 courts and policy makers. the work of the royal commission has been used by judges and lawyers as a source of aboriginal perspective in a number of different ways. it has been used to inform the exercise of judicial discretion in the justice system. as well, it has assisted in the modification of the rules of evidence to make room for oral histories and it has been used to suggest a new approach to the right of self-government. most importantly, the work of rcap has been used as authority to justify the crafting of legal remedies that encourage negotiation between aboriginals and the canadian state (stack 1999). its success can be measured in its legacy. the most disappointing part of the mandate of the trc is that it apparently stops short of trying to build a similar legacy, or even build upon the work done by rcap. the mandate of rcap in finding ways to improve the relationship between aboriginal and non-aboriginal society is very similar to the manner that the courts have interpreted the obligations that section 35(1) of the constitution act, 1982 have bestowed upon them – to reconcile aboriginal and non-aboriginal interests (stack 1999). so it should not come as too much of a surprise that the work of rcap would be of interest to lawyers and judges, who seek to affect a fair and just reconciliation. considering such success, this is precisely the approach that the trc ought to take. rcap appears to have had the effect of bringing more aboriginal perspectives to bear in the courtroom and in canadian jurisprudence. moreover, the judicial trend appears to be that this is likely to continue into the future. while rcap may not be a cureall, it still has the hallmarks of a restorative justice approach. while the work of the trc will focus specifically on the context and impacts of residential schools, testimony invited before the commission and exploration of the history, purpose, and consequences of the schools will inevitably extend into broad systemic issues that ripple throughout society (castellano et al. 2008). the main problem with the mandate is that it 19 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 fails to open up to the reality that the testimony heard in the gathering of truth cannot be neatly summed up as relating to the irs system. it will be far-reaching and will inevitably touch on many of the ills associated with a colonial society. the commission ought to be prepared to take on greater issues in a manner similar to the rcap. otherwise, it will be gathering truth on one issue, while turning a blind eye to others. far from building bridges, this approach may very well prove destructive. conclusion there is one statement from the rcap report that particularly remains burned in the mind: “these policies and deeds were perpetrated by canadians no better or worse intentioned, no better or worse educated than we are today.” the statement is troubling because it suggests that the mindset that led to the atrocities of the irs system continues to be imbedded in the fabric of canadian society. how can the commission truly bring forth a path to reconciliation without first curing public consciousness? while the proliferation of truth is of great importance, without mapping a path to reconciliation, the canadian public will simply learn about the mistakes of the past, while committing entirely new ones. gathering truth is only the first part of changing perceptions. just as odeina returned to the earth to share his wisdom, the trc must spread the acumen of a reconciliatory approach to canadian society. the success of the irs trc cannot be measured on any simple scale. there is neither a comparator group nor a unit of measurement to determine if the canadian trc has achieved the goals set out in its mandate. only history will tell if the bridge between truth and reconciliation has truly been built. however, at this early stage in the process, considering the terms set out in the mandate of the trc, it is difficult to see how the bridge building process can possibly occur. the focal point of the mandate is too closely connected to truth at the expense of reconciliation. 20 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 without charting a course of action that encompasses the principles of a restorative justice approach, the trc will be an opportunity lost. odeina is remembered for both bridge-building and sharing his wisdom. i hope that the commission can learn from odeina and be successful. 21 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 endnotes i although and as i explain in later sections, the trc has failed to live up to this focus. 22 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 references allen, jonathan. 1999. “balancing justice and social unity: political theory and the idea of a truth and reconciliation commission.” university of toronto law journal 49:315. retrieved november 2008. available: quick law. borrows, john. 2006. indigenous legal traditions in canada. [unpublished, archived at the canada law commission]. cash, john. 2004. “the political/cultural unconscious and the process of reconciliation.” postcolonial studies 7:165. castellano, marlene brant. 2008. “a holistic approach to reconciliation: insights from research of the aboriginal healing foundation.” pp. 385-400 in from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools, edited by marlene brant castellano, linda archibald and mike degagné. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. castellano, archibald and degagné, mike (editors). 2008. from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. constitution act, 1982, being schedule b to the canada act 1982 (u.k.), 1982, c. 11. indian and northern affairs canada, statement of reconciliation, online: inac <http://www.ainc-inac.ca/gs/rec_e.html>. hutchinson, celeste. 2007. “reparations for historical injustice: can cultural appropriation as a result of residential schools provide justification for aboriginal cultural rights?” saskatchewan law review 70:425. retrieved november 2008. available: quick law. indian residential schools truth and reconciliation commission. n.d. “truth and 23 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 reconciliation commission mandate.” retrieved november 2008 (http://www.trccvr.ca/mandateen.html). lederach, john p. 1998. “beyond violence: building sustainable peace.” pp. 236-248 in the handbook of interethnic coexistence, edited by eugene weiner. new york: continuum international group. llewellyn, jennifer j. 2008. “bridging the gap between truth and reconciliation: restorative justice and the indian residential schools truth and reconciliation commission.” in from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools, edited by marlene brant castellano, linda archibald and mike degagné. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. llewellyn, jennifer j. and howse, robert. 1999. “institutions for restorative justice: the south african truth and reconciliation commission.” university of toronto law journal 49:355. retrieved november 2008. available: quick law. mcneil, kent. 2003. “reconciliation and the supreme court: the opposing views of chief justices lamer and mclachlin.” the indigenous law journal 2:1. milloy, john. 1999. a national crime – the canadian government and the residential school system – 1879-1986. winnipeg: university of manitoba press. oxaal, zoë. 2005. “‘removing that which was indian from the plaintiff’: tort recovery for loss of language and culture in residential schools litigation.” saskatchewan law review 367. retrieved november 2008. available: quick law. rice, brian and snyder, anna. 2008. “reconciliation in the context of a settler society: healing 24 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 1, iss. 1 [2010], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol1/iss1/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2010.1.1.3 the legacy of colonialism in canada.” pp. 45-61 in from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools, edited by marlene brant castellano, linda archibald and mike degagné. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. royal commission on aboriginal peoples. 1996. report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples: volume 1: looking forward, looking back. ottawa: minister of supply and services canada. short, damien. 2003. “australian ‘aboriginal’ reconciliation: the latest phase in the colonial project.” citizenship studies 7:291. stack, david. 1999. “the impact of rcap on the judiciary: brining aboriginal perspectives into the courtroom.” saskatchewan law review 62:471. retrieved november, 2008. available: quick law. weisman, richard. 2006. “showing remorse at the trc: towards a constitutive approach to reparative discourse” windsor year book of access to justice 24:221. retrieved november 2008. available: quick law. wente, margaret. 2007. “trapped in the aboriginal narrative.” the globe and mail, june 28. 25 flisfeder: a bridge to reconciliation published by scholarship@western, 2010 the international indigenous policy journal may 2010 a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission marc a. flisfeder recommended citation a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission abstract keywords acknowledgments creative commons license a bridge to reconciliation: a critique of the indian residential school truth commission the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education the international indigenous policy journal volume 2 issue 3 truth and reconciliation article 4 august 2011 the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education karina czyzewski university of toronto, karina.czyzewski@utoronto.ca recommended citation czyzewski, k. (2011). the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education. the international indigenous policy journal, 2(3) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 this research is brought to you for free and open access by scholarship@western. it has been accepted for inclusion in the international indigenous policy journal by an authorized administrator of scholarship@western. for more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca. the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education abstract in 2006, the government of canada announced the approval of a final residential schools settlement agreement with the collaboration of the four churches responsible (united, anglican, presbyterian, catholic), the federal government and residential school survivors. schedule "n" of the agreement lists the mandate of the trc; therein, the trc states one of its goals as: (d) to promote awareness and public education of canadians about the system and its impacts. can education as the trc hopes to engender truly be transformative, renewing relationships and promoting healing in the process of forging these new relationships? the literature reviewed and the conferences attended highlighted that generating empathy may be a necessary ingredient for the instigation of social change, but is insufficient. transformation through education, or reconciliation through truth-telling, testimonial reading and responsible listening would mean claiming a genuine, supportive responsibility for the colonial past. educational policy and media initiatives are fundamental to creating awareness, developing public interest and support of the trc's recommendations. however, authors also stress the importance of critical pedagogy in the whole process of truth and reconciliation, and that real reconciliation would require confronting the racism that initiated these institutions and allowed for a decontextualization of their impacts. keywords trc, canada, indigenous, public education, transformative education, testimonial reading acknowledgments the author would like to acknowledge the generous direction and feedback from dr. martin cannon at oise. she would also like to acknowledge subsequent reviews by nicholas czyzewski, and her colleagues emily anson, emma yasui and anatoly venovcev. creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ introduction the residential school system was a colonial policy that operated for over one hundred years, with the last school closing in 1996.1 despite this fact, it is not uncommon to have conversations with people of varying ages that have never heard of this system. in 2006, the government of canada announced the approval of a final indian residential schools settlement agreement (irssa) in collaboration with four of the churches who operated residential schools (united, anglican, presbyterian, and catholic), the federal government, and residential school survivors. the agreement provided for individual common experience payments and an independent assessment process, but also included collective measures such as the truth and reconciliation commission (trc of canada). schedule "n"2 part of a contemporary international trend, the truth and reconciliation commission shares with similar initiatives the notion that a more inclusive citizenship, as well as reconciliation, can be achieved through truth-telling and subsequent public education about "past" injustices. this goal, which mainly speaks to a discourse on empathy, is supposed to produce a transformation in settler canadians vis-à-vis indigenous peoples. what would this goal require canadians to do? when we confront nationals of the agreement lists the mandate of the trc; therein, the trc states one of its goals as: "(d) to promote awareness and public education of canadians about the irs system and its impacts". also within this section, the trc claims that reconciliation is a process that necessitates the commitment of all parties -indigenous peoples, the government and all canadiansto work toward a healthier future together, however that is defined. to go from a largely unaware public to a place of understanding (and widespread commitment to "healthy" relationships) is not so easily conceived. if “the residential school system is powerfully symbolic of the flawed relationship[s]” (castellano et al., 2008, p. 404) between settlers and indigenous peoples, and “the work of truth and reconciliation has at its core human relationships,” (erasmus, 2009, p. ix) then the trc must conceptualize its role in relation to the necessity of transforming these relationships. 3 the foreword to schedule "n" of the irssa, the trc's mandate, describes how the trc is part of an effort to put the "events of the past behind us." the mandate's authors state that the trc is symbolic of the government's sincere interest in holistically addressing the impacts of the residential school system and forging respectful, lasting relationships with all the parties involved. on the impacts of colonialism, who gets to feel bad and who is doing the transforming (ahmed, 2005, p. 11)? what are the risks of empathy in the context of social change and reconciliation? can canadians be engaged in a "testimonial reading" ((boler, 1997 p. 263) and listening of the trc and its report? how does public education and desired transformations translate into actual social change? what are the consequences to any and all in this process? and finally, does the trc and its mandate overshadow (as some would argue) more pressing issues around indigenous rights (such as land claims) or citizenship (indian status) and does its recovery discourse overlook the significance of regeneration, restitution and resurgence (alfred, 2005, p.151)? 1gordon reserve residential school, saskatchewan. retrieved april 1, 2010 from http://www.anglican.ca/rs/history/schools/gordons-school-punnichy.htm 2 will be referred to as sch."n.” see appendix (1). 3 thobani (2007, p. 248) describes the national subject as one that is exalted to a “higher order of humanity” through a political process “organized by the juridical order and the institution of citizenship” and through the exclusion of others. 1 czyzewski: the trc: insights into the goal of transformative education published by scholarship@western, 2011 they also suggest that truth-telling and sharing of common experiences with all canadians will offer the route to reconciliation. can education -as the trc hopes to engendertruly be transformative, renewing relationships and promoting healing in the process of forging these new connections? this article seeks to unpack the aforementioned questions by problematizing the ideal of transformative education as exemplified in the trc's mandate. a potential lesson plan for the trc i shut my eyes tight and tried not to listen to what [father millar] was doing. it made me so sick to hear that, and sarah, she didn't say a word, didn't make a sound, didn't even cry. i think he did that to her a lot. she was always sick, always in the dorm. she finally died too. that must have been a relief for her. she suffered so much (jaine ed., 1993, p. 123). the abuse that occurred behind the walls of the institutions that were the residential schools is certainly no secret. one need only to look at the form for the independent assessment process to get an indication of some of the atrocities that involved students and staff. these included physical assault for speaking a native language, to sexually explicit comments, to rape. children also had their hair cut off, symbolic of a severed cultural connection. they were malnourished, had to endure harsh physical labour, faced exposure to the elements from inadequate clothing, and were unable to speak to siblings or see family, in some cases for years. although not all students went through the same experiences, or underwent the same degree of negativity, all were made to live in fear (sinclair, 2009) and were disconnected from language, spiritual and cultural teachings, family, community, and a nurturing environment. public education for the trc would require several components if it is truly to address the effects of the residential schools. it would need to include an examination of the motivations for implementing such a system, the workings of the system itself, and the implications this system has had on people today. this multi-faceted education would speak to the fact that this was a mandatory system with over 150,000 attendees (legacy of hope foundation, 2010). it would outline the negative environment forced upon students, some below the minimum age for school attendance4 awareness of the residential school system via the trc is intended to target the whole of the canadian public. as beverly jacobs (2008, p. 225) commented, "everyone [in canada] needs to know this part of our shared history–all indigenous peoples (first nations, métis and inuit) and all settlers" . it is also pivotal to convey details on the generations of students that survived, as well as the nature and process of intergenerational trauma in its contributions to domestic violence, low self-esteem and depression, and negative life situations. a complex and layered public education is necessary for non-indigenous peoples to grasp the severity of this colonial system's effect on entire nations. only such an educational framework could adequately describe a system that impacted every indigenous person directly or indirectly, and where there remains an estimated 85,000 (ibid.) survivors alive today dealing with these (for the most part unacknowledged) impacts by the canadian public. 5 4the law enforced that children were taken between the ages of 7-15 years (kelly, 2008, p. 23). . the education of the "truth" about residential schools to the canadian public is 5 the term "settler" encompasses all of whom are not indigenous and who therefore settled on native land: early french and english settlers and their descendants; subsequent groups of settlers; as well as recent 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 intended to enlighten them about indigenous realities in canada, a country that once explicitly envisioned indigenous demise or complete assimilation for numerous decades. this knowledge then, of a disturbing reality and the injustices and trauma of lived indigenous experiences under such a system, is hypothesized, from the statement we saw earlier, to transform canadians to feel empathetic toward indigenous peoples. this transformation, as described in schedule "n,” is the route to reconciliation; it is to be the basis for establishing healthy relationships. it is to be the basis for forging a brighter future together where indigenous peoples are respected for their "citizens plus" status, and their previous treaty promises and rights as the first peoples of canada and are upheld. difficult knowledge is “necessary to break us out of a numbing routine [...] to provoke selfdoubt” (britzman & dippo, 2000, p. 34); it is from “the persistence of awful thoughts [that]a state of open-mindedness where exploring issues of allegiance, commitment, destruction, trauma, and community can be taken seriously” (p. 36). neither can it simply be more knowledge –"disruptive" knowledge is required for challenging oppression (kumashiro, 2000, p. 34), like deconstructing “normalcy” as a socio-cultural construct. however, if indigenous peoples are opening up and sharing painful stories to inactive ears, or not being heard at all, who is doing the transforming? on a deeper level, by striving for reconciliation, the trc is presumably asking more of canadians than simply being put to tears by painful stories .what a public education of assimilative colonial policies, of genocidal policies, of building healthy relationships and reconciliation between indigenous peoples, non-indigenous and the canadian government truly means is claiming a genuine, supportive responsibility for the colonial past. and this is indeed a lofty goal. from truth to reconciliation: pedagogical possibilities canadians taking responsibility for our colonial legacies involves the acknowledgement that non-indigenous peoples are all complicit in allowing a destructive system to go on for so long. it is an acknowledgement of the types of beliefs that rationalized such a system and that it has taken until 2010 for the stories to be shared in a public space for a national audience. it is also an acknowledgement of the ignorance and erasure of the impacts the residential school system has had on an entire population and how these account for many negative behaviours present today. these acknowledgements are profound and would require a shifting, at least momentarily, of canadian pride to that of guilt and shame for having such stains on our national conscience (alfred, 2005), and feelings of empathy for those who have fallen victim to such a regime. learners would be encouraged to achieve a critical consciousness about the privilege that they hold in a society where, due to their heritage, but not that of certain "others,” they were exalted as representative canadians. they held a perceived desired citizenship as national subjects, which allowed for them to dictate how these "others" should live, while avoiding the turmoil their dictates imposed (thobani, 2007). the confidence-shaking of such learning would recognize privilege not as a quality acquired by hard-working immigrants that "pulled themselves up by their bootstraps"; but instead, as a social position granted via prejudice and racial bias. reflecting on freire's pedagogy of the oppressed, disruptive learning shifts the focus to a "pedagogy for the privileged" (currystevens, 2007), where learners are encouraged to recognize that those who hold power as a newcomers to canada. 3 czyzewski: the trc: insights into the goal of transformative education published by scholarship@western, 2011 dominant group, dictate privilege: who will have better access to privileged life situations, opportunities, as well as be able to disadvantage and differentiate themselves from those deemed "inferior" based on ethnocentric criteria. this includes policies such as placing children in residential schools to "civilize" them. as a set of steps in the process of confidence-shaking for privileged learners then, one must begin with an awareness of oppression as present, and then explore oppression as being structural and not confined to the past (curry-stevens, 2007, p. 45).this partly entails reconsidering the idealized canada many believe in, in addition to recognizing the naturalization of dominance (ibid., p. 46). this learning would then encourage a critique of the dynamics of oppression in our society and a structural analysis of power (ibid., p. 47). another important aspect to this learning requires us to situate ourselves, according to curry-stevens, as oppressed. this is relevant because we can all share in the common experiences of having suffered injustices in our lives. that this be affirmed is inherent to all human beings and provides the foundation from which we build empathy for one another (ibid., p. 48). from here stems the more difficult task of locating oneself as privileged, recognizing the "benefits that flow from that privilege,” and then seeing oneself as oppressor (ibid., p. 49). learners are asked to recognize that "their life experiences have been affected by their privileged identity,” "their social location" in society (ibid., p. 48-9). "most important of all, no one is off the hook since we can all claim to stand as oppressor and oppressed in relation to someone else," (razack, 1998, p. 47). this last step where we understand how we act to oppress others will encounter much resistance, but it is a necessary final culmination to this education. ultimately, this would be an education not only for the privileged, but for all canadians newcomers and established settlersin the hopes of deconstructing oppression and breaking down oppressive structures. what follows from these steps is then a process of confidencebuilding, wherein the learner is encouraged by the educator to unlearn domination and thus improve social justice by challenging inequality (curry-stevens, 2007, p. 54).this challenging could come in the form of transformed relationships, to the coalition-building between immigrant and indigenous peoples that thobani espouses (2007, p. 17). moreover, sinclair points out that newcomers are not exempt from the process of continued colonial relations because what they are gaining now is something that was taken away from indigenous peoples, mainly land and resources (2009).this is not an easy task to ask of persons who may be fleeing from oppressive regimes themselves, but a working example of how our identities as oppressor and oppressed can be simultaneous, or how class solidarity could be more constructive to attending to injustices than solidarity along racial or gender lines (collins, 1989, p. 1). this pedagogical framework demonstrates how education can indeed be transformative: how empathy, as it were, can translate into social action. the trc may catalyze empathy in some, where people would then be motivated to press for more funding for on-reserve schools, for instance, or would recognize the importance of keeping the only first nations university in canada in existence and well-funded. however, much of this pedagogy depends on an effective and supportive educator, or basically a social justice coach. the next section complicates the notion of empathy and national sentiments even further and elaborates on some of the shortcomings the trc may face in light of their public education aspirations. 4 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 complicating the empathetic body politic in the politics of bad feeling (2005), sara ahmed problematizes notions of "national shame" and "feeling bad" with regards to the injustices toward indigenous peoples in australia. structured around "sorry days" and "sorry books” (an opportunity for members of the australian public to apologize for their country's own assimilationist policies), the author argues that these feelings fall short of creating solidarity or reconciliation; that the latter necessitates instead solidifying sentiments into action, creating different relationships between people and the "effects of histories of violence" (ahmed, 2005, p. 84).she claims that through these shaming events, the body politic moves too quickly through guilt, shame and mourning in the hopes of "putting the past behind us,” or in other words: now that non-indigenous canadians have felt bad, they are entitled and empowered to feel good again. these bad feelings allow for the reader to enter into a relationship with the "other,” but one wherein "the pain of others becomes 'ours', an appropriation that transforms and perhaps even neutralizes their pain into our sadness" (ibid., p. 74). monture-angus (1999) reiterates this point: "when non-aboriginal guilt becomes the focus of any process meant to address historical wrongs, aboriginal pain is appropriated and then transformed. this transformation is a recreation of colonial relationships" (p. 26). these feelings of shame emanate from the acknowledgement of a history of unjust social relations. if these feelings go unquestioned or uncriticized however, in the movement from shame to pride, we will then witness a re-covering of the nation through a forgetting of those very relations of violence (ahmed, 2005). this premature movement from shame to pride does not represent reconciliation because it is not inclusive of all who are still injured from historical wrongs and from our failure to recognize them today. the forging of new relationships is not confined to interpersonal relations, but extends to the connections we have to our own feelings and injuries. recognition of injury through truth-telling and our witnessing of such stories is necessary for reconciliation, wherein "feeling better" would be achieved through the exposure of healing as a form of recovery, and not simply "feeling better" through the recovery of pride. in the risks of empathy, boler (1997) argues that "passive empathy" -concerns directed to a distant other is insufficient at educating the reader to engender social change; this type of reading enables simplistic and consumptive modes of identification with the “other.” passive empathy situates the privileged in a position of "voyeuristic pleasure of listening and judging the other from a position of power/safe distance" (boler, 1997, p. 260). through her own experiences as a professor of multiculturalism, boler argues that educators should be pushing for a "testimonial reading,” invoking the responsibility of privileged listeners. educating nationals and thus shifting the colonial imaginary requires questioning if we can truly know the "other's" experiences, because empathy implies full identification with their suffering. instead, the author suggests that "testimonial reading inspires an empathetic response that motivates action: a 'historicized ethics' engaged across genres, that radically shifts our self-reflective understanding of power relations" (boler, 1997, p. 256). empathy implies a fear for oneself, where the "other" and their pain become secondary to the concern that these injuries could potentially happen to you. empathy operates insomuch that it identifies our differences wherein i can safely say i am not presently the one suffering. this "empathetic identification requires the 'other's' difference in order to consume it as sameness" (ibid., p. 258), as shared history. a testimonial reading then would require students to place themselves alongside the "social forces that create the climate of obstacles the other must confront," (ibid.,p. 257) in an effort to persuade students to act upon these forces. 5 czyzewski: the trc: insights into the goal of transformative education published by scholarship@western, 2011 "testimony,” as is necessary in statement gathering of residential school experiences, “is trauma's genre" (boler, 1997, p. 264): these "uncomfortable stories" (st. denis, 2009, p. 178) of excess and unimaginable horrors promote self-reflective engagement of the reader's position of power and safe distance, and also abdicate the reader’s responsibility for these oppressive social forces, attitudes, practices and structures. listening differently is crucial to this process of critical learning and of establishing relationality with truth-tellers, where we are continually unsettled by asking ourselves what it means to be taught by the experiences of others (simon et al. eds., 2000, p. 6), in particular by historically suppressed voices. "education remains important to any struggle to reduce inequality" (mickelson & smith, 2004, p. 269), but education on its own does not necessarily lead to social change. in this regard, razack (1998) suggests "ground-clearing activities" as a conduit to such a goal: what [this refers to] is reflecting critically on how we hear and how we speak; on the choices we make about which voice to use and when to use it; and, most important of all, on developing pedagogical practices that enable us to pose these questions and use the various answers to guide those concrete moral choices we are constantly being called upon to make (razack, 1998, p. 54). we can see after exploring these examples that the trc cannot expect transformation simply through storytelling. these painful experiences, where the opening of wounds may not be heard because of the consumptive benefit the dominant population may derive from them (ibid., p. 48), will demand an ethical listening and reading, and will necessitate follow-up discourses and activities in order to produce social change. beyond risks: important obstacles to reconciliation let us return to the reasons why the government implemented the policy of promoting awareness and public education of the irs system, and the education that is truly needed to be able to embark on a path of reconciliation. in other words, if education was to be truly transformative, what would that transformation look like? this question elicits the broader theme of what it is we would like to see change about the way canadian society operates, the latter's relations with indigenous peoples, and why transformation is needed. in race and reconciliation in a post-trc south africa, valji (2004) argues that the transition from apartheid to democracy and the subsequent ideologies espoused by the trc have been far more complex than idealized. she describes how racial prejudice and violence did not suddenly disappear post-trc, but continues to be an obstacle to substantive equality and inclusive citizenship. valji evaluates the contribution of the trc to current understandings of history and identity, and how the trc's ironic silence on the issue of "race" constitutes a barrier to real reconciliation. she problematizes the trc’s role in producing transformation and outlines the importance of taking ownership of our colonial history to advance reconciliation (younging et al., 2009). real reconciliation would entail acknowledging the inherent racism necessary to devise institutions like the residential schools. the pervasiveness of this racism can also partly explain why it took until 2008 for the government to issue a public apology. indeed, "one way to dehumanize an individual or a group is to deny the reality of their experiences," notes collins (1989, p. 11). therefore, we will know that reconciliation has occurred when every canadian truly 6 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 knows not only about the residential school system, but more importantly how such a system becomes naturalized and its impacts become decontextualized. the impacts of colonial policies and canadians' indifference to them produce and reproduce various social issues such as discrimination, inadequate housing, domestic violence, poverty, and destructive lifestyles. reconciliation will only be possible, then, if racism is recognized as structural, pervasive and on-going; but is also addressed as impactful, and inherently linked to other forms of discrimination, like sexism. canadians have denied that racism and gendered violence fuelled colonization, whose benefits are not restricted to the past and early colonial canadians, but continue to benefit all non-indigenous. we thrive off of what was taken away from indigenous peoples (sinclair, 2009). this lack of understanding supports the inappropriate notion that racism is based on individual acts and not generated through systemic, structural means (dion, 2009, p. 150). addressing racism through critical pedagogical practices would be representative of the government of canada and canadians' "profound commitment to establishing new relationships embedded in mutual recognition and respect” (sch.“n”), whereas a conventional education may "initiate a response to the suffering but refrain from engaging in a discussion of the cause of that suffering" (dion, 2009, p. 126). one onkwehonwe6 as beverly jacobs noted in her address in the house of commons in june 2006 and in her response to prime minister stephen harper's apology two years later, the unjust realities that many indigenous peoples face are human rights violations or, as ward churchill (2004) put it, crimes against humanity. it is under these conditions that trcs are created. jacobs states in her response that undergoing transformation will be observed when change has occurred: when languages have been revitalized, women are no longer targets of violence, and indigenous peoples are no longer disproportionately living in poverty (2008, p. 225). "i look forward to the day when we are no longer fighting for equality because we have reclaimed our way of being," (2008, p. 225) says jacobs. perspective on learning offered by alfred (2995) advocates that learning is itself one of transformation, an act of radical defiance that defines a warrior. a critical education is needed then to support questioning of the interconnectedness of knowledge and power; where there is a language of critique to address the systems in place that racially discriminate, but as well, a language of possibility that maps out hopeful relationships and the path toward them (dion, 2009). change and transformation therefore are related to a shifting of power wherein the dominant culture no longer tolerates taken-for-granted stereotypes and "we know what's best for you" attitudes. "the process of reconciliation must first recognize and then ameliorate the power imbalances between canada as a nation and first nations" (monture-angus, 1999, p. 33). we will witness this transformation and reconciliation when it spells a national acceptance of indigenous title and rights, and status as "citizens plus" 7 indeed, one might question the sincerity of the government's "profound commitment" ; when there is a reaffirming of nation-to-nation relations; when adequate financial resources are allocated to alleviating social ills; when canada fully acknowledges these human rights violations and significantly tries "to remedy in full the consequences of colonial imposition" (ibid., p. 23). 6original people (alfred, 2005, p. 19). 7construction coined by harry b. hawthorn in what has now come to be known as the "hawthorn report": hawthorn, h. b, ed. (1966-7). a survey of the contemporary indians of canada: economic, political, educational needs and policies. ottawa. 7 czyzewski: the trc: insights into the goal of transformative education published by scholarship@western, 2011 (sch.“n”) when confronted with the news of funding cuts to the aboriginal healing foundation (ahf) for the 2010 fiscal year. the ahf was directly funded by the government to address the legacies left behind by the residential schools, and the ahf in turn funds community-planned, community-driven projects on the ground. we are left wondering if this sort of action really adds validity to the statement that the trc is part of a process of "sincere indication and acknowledgement of the injustices and harms experienced by aboriginal people and the need for continued healing" (sch."n"). these funding cuts come in light of the fact that these testimonies, these truths, will require the opening of wounds, which has already been initiated with the common experience payments and independent assessment processes. if this trc process is only superficially taken up by canadians and we do not see a sincere implementation of canada's apology, then as monture-angus (1999) writes, [t]his kind of apologizing accomplishes more in the direction of massaging white guilt than in alleviating indian pain. in fact, in the aftermath of the so-called [1998] apology, i was witness to an unleashing of memories and pain in indian communities--communities where existing social services and health resources were largely inadequate to deal with the memories that were turned to the surface by the minister's apology ( p. 26-7). this sentiment of unease was reiterated as well at the "truth, reconciliation and the residential schools" conference at nipissing university in march 2010. indigenous peoples in canada and the marginalized are burdened by the telling and retelling of personal, traumatic stories because of the inability for many canadians to listen, or to act once these stories have been heard. furthermore, “if the truth is told and goes without response, this might result in further harm to the relationships involved” (llewellyn, 2008, p. 200). the opening up of these wounds would not be in vain then if once heard, we saw a sincere working toward reconciliation and toward an inclusive citizenship. other obstacles to this goal of reconciliation initiated by the trc are outlined in its very mandate. the trc is not allowed to cover the experiences of those who were in day schools; they have financial limitations; there will be no naming-of-names, which would make certain people, groups or organizations accountable for their actions; and the commission will only operate for five years, after which, how this education will continue has not been decided. the methods for public education have not been established beyond the national events, which seems problematic in terms of who will witness these events and if they can genuinely generate a sustained commitment to change. advocating responsibility and recognizing our complicity as oppressors is usually characterized by rather intimate processes of confidence-shaking, as the work of the educators quoted above in workshops and classrooms attest to. transformative education is already complex and without a clearly defined trajectory, it becomes that much harder to imagine. some scholars have critiqued the commission overall because it may in fact be distracting from potentially more important issues such as land claim settlements. the residential school legacy is part of a longer colonial history that began with the dispossession of indigenous lands. this last point speaks to a discourse that sees the theme of "recovery" as restraining, and suggests one of "regeneration" instead. according to alfred (2005), a “regeneration of ourselves and our nations” (p. 151) would promote a transcendence of these colonial experiences. what would follow is "restitution,” instead of reconciliation, the latter alfred describes as “fatally flawed because it depends on the false notion of a moral equivalency between onkwehonwe and settlers and on a basic acceptance of colonial institutions and relationships” (ibid.). according to this 8 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 reasoning, reconciliation is a “western-based concept to be imposed on the aboriginal peoples without regard to their own traditional practices of restoring personal and collective peace and harmony,” not to mention that several authors argue that conciliation had never even taken place (ibid., p. 22; ahf trc, 2008). indigenous peoples do not need to reconcile with colonialism, but instead canadians need to establish, according to alfred, “how to use restitution as the first step towards creating justice and a moral society” (alfred, 2009, p. 182). a last consideration is the centrality of collective indigenous “rights”8 and land claims in many of these struggles that can largely be understood as antithetical to the neoliberal functioning of the canadian state. the issue of land claims which goes hand in hand with establishing sustainable economies can be construed by nationals as barriers to individual settler claims, territorial expansionism and related capitalistic endeavours. these are enormous obstacles to feasibly establishing the equal relationships needed for reconciliation, and it remains to be seen "whether a genuine multiracial democracy can be created and sustained in an era of global economy and a moment of xenophobic frenzy" (west, 2004, p. 126). some recommendations to the trc the trc will end its mandate with the creation of a research centre and a report complete with recommendations. considering that the aforementioned structural limitations are evident and sinclair, chair of the commission, himself has doubts about the potential impact the trc (cbc, 2010), these recommendations then could potentially be catalysts for restoring relationships through transformative education. the recommendations would do well to propose educational policy that would mandate an accurate history of indigenous-settler relations in schools. on the other hand, some are sceptical of the possible extent of critical pedagogy in state-run institutions.9 the trc might also recommend language revitalization programs, renewed funding for the ahf and equitable funding to on-reserve first nations students. they could recommend funding for site-specific services in urban centres that would address stressful life situations that are attributable to these legacies and intergenerational trauma (menzies, 2008; spittal, 2002). the trc could also recommend a more pervasive allowance for the possibilities of self-determination over education and health services, for instance. ultimately though, so that these recommendations are acted upon by government, they need to be endorsed by a wider canadian public, which “requires that they attach a lot of significance on a daily basis to everything that can foster constructive management of the relationship” (dussault, 2009, p. 33). this would necessitate garnering public interest and support through community and national-level awareness and media campaigns. these circumstances made the recommendations put forth by the berger inquiry impossible to ignore and indicate mechanisms for success (stanton, 2010). parliament needs to “make room for aboriginal representation in mainstream political life” (amagoalik, 2008, p. 95) in general. what would be complimentary or at least equally helpful is therefore, imaginative pedagogical avenues run jointly or perhaps separate from the state’s ideological apparatuses all-together may be necessary. 8 rights have been criticized as an essentially western concept, as well as rights are state-defined and divvied out as such. 9althusser (1971) describes schools as state apparatuses and antonio gramsci (1971) states that schools maintain hegemony and the dominant social order, as also cited by kumashiro (2000, p. 36). 9 czyzewski: the trc: insights into the goal of transformative education published by scholarship@western, 2011 pressing for an international body that would overlook trc processes globally and press for change post-trc. “the conversation about reconciliation is not optional, and it could be central to the agenda of the united nations if we acknowledged global realities” (mckay, 2008, p. 104). this is an avenue the trc has already implicated itself in by presenting a proposal to the un. education and awareness are fundamental to developing public interest and support, and highlight the significance of pedagogy in the whole process of truth and reconciliation. transformation through education, or reconciliation through truth-telling and responsible listening, will only be achieved if these obstacles are addressed and overcome. the trc may possibly provide the spark from which we will see the beginning of an engagement by the canadian public toward this shared colonial history, its impacts and ongoing relations. the methods necessary for attending to these items and the place of transformative education within the trc process still remain to be determined as the commission's work unfolds. 10 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 references ahmed, s. (2005). the politics of bad feeling. australian critical race and whiteness studies association journal 1, 72-85. alfred, t. (2005). colonial staines on our existence. in wasáse: indigenous pathways of action and freedom (pp. 101-178). peterborough: broadview press, ltd. annett, k. d. (2001). hidden from history: the canadian holocaust. vancouver: the truth commission into genocide in canada. boler, m. (1997). the risks of empathy: interrogating multiculturalism's gaze. cultural studies, 11(2), 253-73. britzman, d. p., & dippo, d. (2000). on the future of awful thoughts in teacher education. teaching education, 11(1), 31-37. castellano, m. b., archibald, l., & degagné, m. (eds.). (2008). from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation research series. churchill, w. (2004). crimes against humanity. in m. l. andersen, & p. h. collins (eds.), race, class and gender (pp. 321-328). belmont: wadsworth. collins, p. h. (2009). another kind of public education: race, schools, the media, and democratic possibilities. boston: beacon press. collins, p. h. (1989).toward a new vision: race, class, and gender as categories of analysis and connection a publication for the research clearinghouse and curriculum integration project. memphis: center for research on women. curry-stevens, a. (2007). new forms of transformative education: pedagogy for the privileged. journal of transformative education, 5(1), 33-58. dion, s. d. (2009). braiding histories: learning from aboriginal peoples' experiences and perspectives. vancouver: ubc press. gramsci, a. (1971). state and civil society. selections from the prison notebooks, 228-270. haig-brown, c. (2009). decolonizing diaspora: whose traditional land are we on? cultural and pedagogical inquiry, 1(1), 4-21. ing, r . (2006). canada's indian residential schools and their impacts on mothering. in m. d. lavell-harvard, & j. c. lavell, (eds.), until our hearts are on the ground: aboriginal mothering, oppression, resistance and rebirth (pp 157-172). bradford: demeter press. jacobs, b. (2008). response to canada's apology to residential school survivors. canadian womanstudies, 26 (3&4), 223-225. jacobs, b. (2006, june 6).in-house address, 39th parliament, 1st session: standing committee on the status of women. jaine, l. (ed.). (1993). residential schools: the stolen years. saskatoon: university extension press. kirmayer, l. j., & valaskakis, g. g. (eds.). (2009). healing traditions. vancouver: ubc press. kumashiro, k. (2000). toward a theory of anti-oppressive education. review of educational research, 70(1), 25-53. legacy of hope foundation. (2010). where are the children? retrieved from www.wherearethechildren.ca menzies, p. (2008). developing an aboriginal healing model for intergenerational trauma. international 11 czyzewski: the trc: insights into the goal of transformative education published by scholarship@western, 2011 journal of health promotion and education. mickelson, r. a., & smith, s. s. (2004). can education eliminate race, class, and gender inequality? in m. l. andersen, & p. h. collins (eds.), race, class and gender (pp. 361-370). belmont: wadsworth. monture-angus, p. (1999). to break with the past: searching for the meaning of self-determination. in journeying forward: dreaming first nations' independence (pp. 21-39). fernwood publishing. narine, s. (2009, october). ambitious mandate for truth and reconciliation commission. windspeaker, 8. razack, s. (2008, october).violence against first nations: on ongoing colonialism. presentation given at ubc, okanagan. razack, s. (1998). looking white people in the eye: gender, race and culture in courtrooms and classrooms. toronto: university of toronto press. section "n.”(2009). truth and reconciliation canada homepage. retrieved from http://www.trc-cvr.ca simon, r. i., rosenberg, s., & eppert, c. (2000). between hope and despair: pedagogy and the remembrance of historical trauma. new york: rowman and littlefield publishers, inc. sinclair, honorable justice murray. (2009). they came for the children. lecture at the university of toronto. retrieved from www.law.utoronto.ca/conferences/sinclair.html spittal, p. n, laliberte, n., brooks, r., small, w., craib, k. j., o'shaughnessy, m. v., & schechter, m. t. (2002). canada's continuing apartheid: the hiv risk profiles of aboriginal women who use injection drugs in vancouver's downtown eastside. vancouver: british columbia centre for excellence in hiv/aids. stanton, k. (2010). public inquiries and truth commissions: exploring canada's response to the indian residential schools legacy. paper from trc conference, university of toronto. st. denis, v. (2009). rethinking culture theory in aboriginal education. in c. levine-rasky (ed.), canadian perspectives in sociology education (pp. 163-182). toronto: oxford university press, 2009. theissen, g., & hamber, b. (1998). a state of denial: white south africans' attitudes to the truth and reconciliation commission. indicator south africa, 15(1), 8-12. thobani, s. (2007). exalted subjects: studies in the making of race and nation in canada. toronto: university of toronto press. truth, reconciliation and the residential schools conference. (2010, march). nipissing university. valji, n. (2004).race and reconciliation in a post-trc south africa. ten years of democracy in southern africa conference paper, queen's university, kingston. west, c. (2004). race matters. in m. l. andersen, & p. h. collins (eds.), race, class and gender (pp. 121-126). belmont: wadsworth. younging, g., dewar,j., & degagné, m. (eds.). (2009). response, responsibility, and renewal: canada's truth and reconciliation journey. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation research series. 12 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.4 the international indigenous policy journal august 2011 the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education karina czyzewski recommended citation the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education abstract keywords acknowledgments creative commons license the truth and reconciliation commission of canada: insights into the goal of transformative education kazm.cdr frederic conybeare’s translation of hovhannes yerets khnusetsi’s the key of truth the classical armenian and english versions of the18th century ecclesiastic hovhannes yerets khnusetsi’s work the key of truth are devoted to the worship and ritual order of the paulikians, a religious-heretical movement in armenia. the editor and translator of the original text was frederic conybeare(1898). the key of truth was written in 1782 in the province of taron. not only the book, but the introduction and the chronicle attached to it are of great interest. conybeare’s version is based on a manuscript with some parts either missing or erased. what conybeare did was publishing the key of truth in grabar (classical armenian), adding his own corrections and comments to the original. the paulikian religious heresy is rather old. like the tondrakiyts sect it was widely spread in armenia. but the doctrine of the paulikians was closer to the ideology of the official church, and it was for this reason that it survived for rather a long period among armenian clergymen. it is notable that the leaders of the tondrakiyts doctrine had once belonged to the high clergy. aristakes lastivertsi’s history gives the most detailed evidence about the tondrakiyts; the two chapters of this work are entirely devoted to the criticism of the mentioned sect (chapter 22, on the tondrakiyts’ evil sect which appeared in the province of harq and deluded great many people; chapter 23, how the fire of this delusion spread in mananaghi).1 portraying one of the leaders of the tondrakiyts’ leaders, bishop hakobos, aristakes lastivertsi comments: “a certain bishop, named hakobos, who was the overseer of the churches in the province of harq, pretended to be a righteous man; he wore rags, fasted and would walk bare-footed, he chose priests, who would follow him dressed in plain clothes, refused to partake of delicious food and sang psalms. …but all this was false and not true... even our lord, speaking about them, warned in his preaching: “take care not to be misled by false prophets who will approach you in sheep’s hide, but are wolves inside.”2 this very hakobos then began preaching against christ. frederic conybeare translated the key of truth in order to acquaint the european theologians with the teaching of the paulikians. the manuscript was discovered under the following circumstances. in 1891, during his stay in russian armenia, conybeare was working in echmiadzin library. he was looking for the armenian translation of 152 armenian folia anglistika armenological studies paruyr sahakyan enoch’s book3 but accidentally came across a writing concerning the sect of the paulikians. conybeare knew quite well the importance of his discovery. in 1893, owing to g. ter-mkrtchian, connybeare got a copy of the manuscript he had ordered and in 1898 he published the key of truth as a book. the opening parts of this volume touch upon questions of heresy, pages 1-65 include the original text in armenian, pages 69-124 contain the english translation of the original, and pages 125178 present anti-heretical writings by grigor narekatsi (st. gregory of narek), grigor magistros, hovhan odznetsi and nerses shnorhali. in his work unknown armenian sects in 16-17th centuries, tadevos avdalbekian mentions the key of truth. he was familiar with conybeare’s translation and quotes from it.4 he writes: “the faith root of the new tondrakiyts, the key of truth openly calls jesus the new adam, jesus the man, jesus the new man, a new creature and not a creator, whereas mary, the blessed virgin is called merely a woman.”5 tadevos avdalbekian notes that the early tondrakiyts rejected baptism and the eucharist. this cannot be said of the late tondrakiyts, who accepted both sacramentst: “four are they which save man, first, repentance, second right faith, third holy baptism, and fourth the holy precious body and blood of our lord jesus christ”:6 accepting the mentioned sacraments of the armenian apostolic church, the late paulikians rejected confirmation, holy orders, anointing of the sick and matrimony, and suggested they “are not salvation of our souls, but are unnecessary and not obligatory.”7 the aim of the key of truth is clarified in the section of the book entitled a word to the beloved reader. here the author confesses the difficulties he has experienced while compiling such a responsible work: “although the throng of distractions and the temptations and storms of the world, and the manifold hindrances, strong to disturb our transitory life in various ways,although these have sorely beset us and suffered us not to undertake this necessary work”. however, inspired by heavenly thoughts, urged by the interests of the armenian church and in order to make the communal life of his people healthier, he fulfills the commands of christ. every christian and every christian family must live and survive according to the commandments of our lord’s son and never swerve from them. we must believe in jesus christ, be christened according to his orders and deserve eternal life for “he who shall not believe, shall be judged”8 a reader inexperienced in theology can hardly notice sectarian layer in the key of truth. the ideas of the gospel writers are constantly repeated here. the author completely agrees with them and only in a few cases seems to deviate from them. in the introduction of the work hovhannes yerets confesses that while narrating the work he had the inspiration of his heavenly father but wrote “in a brief and discreet manner.” in the chronicle f. conybeare expresses his disappointment concerning the missing and erased parts of the manuscript. in some cases he skillfully restores the missing fragments, as, for example in the conclusion of the metrical parts attached to the introduction: this brief descourse shall ye search and deeply o’er it meditate. if it please you, then revere it, as it were a voice of thunder.9 conybeare rightly mentions that the text of the chronicle is incomplete too. in the 153 armenological studies armenian folia anglistika corresponding part of the chronicle, in the postscript he adds: “one or more pages of ms. are here lost.”10 the chronicle itself is of great value. in the first place it shows the condition of armenian manuscript writing in the last quarter of the 18th century, when armenians had their printing houses in different parts of the world. second, the art of manuscript writing went on to develop on paper and the scripts were worrying about the fate of their works in case they were copied by hand. the mentioned fact was especially important in case of hovhannes yerets’ manuscript for, as he mentions in the introduction of the work, it was addressed to the whole nation, including armenia proper and numerous armenian colonies in countries of europe and asia. faithful to the mindset of medieval manuscript writing, he mentions in the preserved part of the chronicle that there can be some shortcomings in his narrative: “moreover, i humbly entreat you with warm love and faith to forgive the shortcomings, the insufficiences, and the faults of composition or of grammar. and also as touching the syllables, or writing, or verbs or nouns or eight parts of the art”11: conybeare suggests that the shortcomings might have appeared through the carelessness of the unskilled copiers: “if in regard to them ye find any errors or shortcomings, they are not due to ourselves, but have found their way into it as being of unpractised copyists”12: in the grabar (classical armenian) text the scholar points to the missing fragments, sometimes correcting errors of the copyists or adding versions he thinks to be more correct. judging from the chronicle, we can say that there have been some metrical parts in the original version, which the author had written drawing inspiration from the relevant parts of the gospel. chapter 19 speaks of the importance of the baptismal rite. it recounts of christ’s followers, the disciples peter and paul, mary magdalene, simon’s mother-in-law and others. “for they with great contrition recieved glory and honour from jesus christ our saviour, as is clear in the holy gospel, and in the acts of the holy apostles, and elsewhere”13: according to conybeare, the fragment is incomplete and a metrical part should have been attached to it. in his commentaries he writes: “here, two leaves lost, in ms, four pages, 74-77, torn out.”14 the preserved part of the fragment reads as follows: come my children of the new zion, take on you the crown of the lord jesus. cherish in yourselves each word spoken take your places in the ranks on the right hand if ye listen into the church the infinite god shall save you.15 in the margins of the key of truth there are matching commentaries explaining what writings, considered sacred in terms of christian religion, the author has made use of in order to narrate the given fragment. the list includes excerpts from the gospels of 154 armenian folia anglistika armenological studies matthew, mark and john, genesis and exodus parts of the old testament, the letters of apostle paul to hebrews and the philippians. in the margins one can find explanations of some christian symbols as well. the discussed writing by hovhannes yerets reveals the scholar’s desire to make the faithful of the armenian church the followers of the key of truth. this was a serious threat for the official church. the dangerous fact of joining a heresy was especially perilous because of the absence of armenian statehood, and the church saw itself entirely responsible for the national unity. the devoted and patriotic fathers of the church were those who would realize this difficult mission. connybeare was skilled in armenian ecclesiastical literature, especially writings which struggled against heretical doctrines, contrary to or incompatible with the ideology of the official church. the middle ages have known numerous fighters for the purity of faith against heretical doctrines. connybeare appended to the english translation of the key of truth some anti-heretical works and papers of grigor narekatsi (st. gregori of narek), hovhannes odznetsi, grigor magistros and nerses shnorhali. the contents of the annotation to these writings disclose the anxiety of the aforementioned scholars. chapter 2i of the key of truth is entitled: “about our lord jesus christ, that as he laid down canons and precepts, so do we proceed with god’s help.” hovhannes yerets points to the place16 in luke’s gospel which describes the baptism of christ. “during a general baptism of the people, when jesus too had been baptized and was praying, heaven opened and the holy spirit descended on him in bodily form like a dove, and there came a voice from heaven, you are my beloved son. in you i delight.” the works criticizing heresies show clearly that heretical doctrines disavowed many rites of the christian church, baptism in the first place. hovhannes odznetsi, the catholikos of armenians in 717-728, wrote a document entitled against the paulikians17. warnings against the paulikians are found in the canons18 of the same author. hovhannes odznetsi calls the paulikians impious heretics who should be avoided. they should not be given shelter nor should anyone talk to them, as they are the descendants of the evil one, who have forgotten about their love towards our lord. the one who joins them or is gracious towards them should be tortured and severely punished. grigor magistors in his letter 67 writes that the paulikians know the holy gospel and the books of the apostles perfectly well but reject baptism and call it a death19. another work directed against heresies, tondrakiyts in particular, is grigor narekatsi’s letter. poghos khachatryan has rightly mentioned that the paper is the exprsssion of narekatsi’s true resentment: “the reading of the letter reveals narekatsi’s wrath towards smbat zarehavantsi and his followers. his feelings are so earnest that it would be an error to think he is concealing his true vision of the question.” 20 in the letter g. narekatsi strictly condemns zarehavantsi sending curses and imprecations on him. many interpretative works have been written to deepen the true christian faith among armenians and to make the old and new testaments understandable for them. what is more, analogous works have been written in non-christian surroundings, for 155 armenological studies armenian folia anglistika christians living among muslims. a noteworthy example is kahlil gibran ’s prophet, a work which is recognized internationally.21 hovhannes yerets’ the key of truth includes 22 chapters.22 further the chapters are not enumerated and interrogative marks stand instead of chapter numbers. certain chapters include ritual instructions. thus for instance: “and after the reading of paul, tis meet for the elect one to ask the name of the catechumen: ‘by what name do ye disire to call this catechumen according to law and not with a fabulous name?’ and then he readeth the holy gospel, luke ii 21.” 23 in the corresponding part of the gospel according to luke it is said that “eight days later the time came to circumcise him, and he was given the name jesus, the name given by the angel before he was conceived” luke 1, 2, 21. the key of truth is rich in poetic devices characteristic of medieval literature. its poetics is closely connected to the poetics of the bible. a good example is the device of question and answer. below we quote the following two passages: concerning the christian doctrine question. art thou a christian? answer. yes, i am a christian by the grace of christ. q. how are we to difine a christian? a. thus-one who knows our lord jesus christ, what he is and keeps his commandments. q. what is the command and precept of our lord jesus christ, which we keep? a. that which our lord prescribed to his disciples and his faithful, saying: “if ye love me, ye will keep my commandments. as i also have kept the commandments of my father”. q. how many are the commandments of our lord jesus christ? a. these. first, hope, second, repentance, third, faith, fourth, baptism, fifth, communion, sixth, love, which is chief of all. q. what is christ, and as what must we know him and belive him to be? a. even as the universal and apostolic holy church believed, so must we also believe. q. how did the blessed apostles believe? teach us. a. as st. john the evangelist showeth, saying: “we have believed and know that thou art christ, the son of god who wast to come into the world”. q. so then, as touching those who baptize catechumens, is their baptism true or vain? a. it is vain and a fraud. for catechumens have not repentance, have not hope, neither have they the holy faith. wherefore their baptism is not true and is not salvation. q. then whose baptism and communion is valid? a. their holy baptism and communion only is valid who have original and operative sin24: similar questions and answers can be found in the concluding parts of the key of truth, in the chapter entitled: “concerning the judgement that is one and not two.” 156 armenian folia anglistika armenological studies question. how many judgements of god are there as touching the dead and the living? answer. there is but one judgement and not two. q. then, if there is one judgement of god which he holdeth through christ; why do some gainsayers say that there are two judgements and not one the one, they say, private and apart, and the other universal. a. they thus speak lies merely because their father is satan. even as our lord says, that which he speaketh false he speaketh out of his own, and his father is satan. q. i pray thee, venerable father, to give us instruction as touching how many judgements there be. a. i tell thee that the universal and apostolic church confesses one only, saying that man dies once and after that is judgement. this is the meaning of the holy church, that as for man death comes once, so also will his resurrection and judgement be one and not two. q. then did christ, our lord and intercessor, truly know the wickedness of their minds, who have established false and monstrous laws, or did he not ? a. yes, venerable father, he truly knew, and therefore said: “beware of evil workers,” and “by their fruits ye shall know them” who are disciples of lies and deceit, and not of my truth. as the holy church expressly declareth. q. did our lord jesus christ really know the day of judgement or no? a. since the heavenly father, true god, did not reveal that day to his beloved son; as he saith concerning the end of the world: “no man knoweth it, not the angels in heaven, nor the son; but the father alone”. further he saith: “out of my own self i speak nothing; but whatsoever command my father gave me, that i speak.” behold, my reverent one, how christ, the son of god, of his own self could not say aught, unless his father revealed it to him. q. but forasmuch as our lord jesus christ could not by himself without the ordinance of god know the day of judgement, how do some gainsayers declare, in opposition to the truth of the son of god, that there is a separate judgement and place of expiation for sinners? a. because, as i at the first told thee, they are the heritors of their father’s deceit; and through the spirit of that same evil one they ever and always ordain false laws and false precepts. behold, my loved one, their teacher, who has disguised himself in the form of a monk and preached unto them the torments of hell, in order to ensnare their souls.” 25 conybeare’s bilingual edition of the key of truth is an important philological contribution to armeniology, it is a significant scholarly attempt to make armenian spiritual literature better-known to the international reader. nevertheless, the work has not yet been subjected to philological examination. intersetingly, conybeare’s the key of truth is considered in terms of marxismleninism in h.gabrielian’s history of armenian philosophy. the armenian part of the key of truth ends in conybeare’s chronicle written in classical armenian, a fact which shows the scholar’s great love towards armenia and armenian manuscript-writing: “i, frederic conybeare, the humblest of oxford teachers, 157 armenological studies armenian folia anglistika an armenist and an admirer of armenia, after having found a copy of the manuscript called the key of truth, translated it into my native english and printed it through the order and expense of oxford university vardapets, wise and noble people in their printing house in 1895 anno domini. i was down-hearted for numerous pages of the manuscript were lost because of the carelessness of certain people. i was never able to restore them and, hence, could not print the complete manuscript including the church rites, of which the scribe informs us in the chronicle. for this reason, i implore those who will find a complete copy of the manuscript to send it to me in order that i will be able to print its missing parts.” notes and references: 1. lastivertsi aristakes. patmutyun. yerevan, 1971, pp. 86-98. 2. ibid, p. 87. 3. desendant of adam (7th generation). enoch is also one of the three people in the bible taken to heaven while still alive. the book of enoch is a pseudepigraphal work attributed to enoch and as the bible says “and enoch walked with god, and he was not; for god took him.” (genesis 5:24; see also heb. 11:5). the book of enoch does not form part of the canon of scripture. the hebrew and arab writers considered enoch a scientist and ascribed to him the invention of figures and astrology (see bibleyskaya entsiklopediya, trud y izdanie arkhimanderita nikifora, moskva, 1891, p. 239). 4. in the footnotes the year of the publication of conybeare’s work is not correct (see tadevos avdalbekian. hayagitakan hetazotutyunner. yerevan, 1969, p. 208): 5. ibid, p. 208. 6. the key of truth. a manual of the paulicain church of armenia. the armenian text, edited and translated with illustrative documents and introduction by f.c. conybeare, oxford, 1898, p. 119. 7. ibid. 8. ibid, p.73. 9. ibid, p. 72. 10. ibid, p. 124. 11. ibid. 12. ibid. 13. ibid p. 92: 14. ibid. 15. ibid, p. 93. 16. luke 3, 21, 22. 17. see odznetsi hovhannes: matenagrutyun, venetik, 1833. 18. ibid, pp. 24 -33. 19. magistros grigor. girq tghtots. alexandropol, 1910, tught 67. 20. khachatrian p. grigor narekatsin yev hay mijnadary. girq arajin, st. ejmiatsin, 1966, p.99. 158 armenian folia anglistika armenological studies 21. gibran kahlil. margaren. hajatsuts garegin arqeps. gazantcyan, istanpul, 1992. 22. yev yaghages khratoj dzernadrutyan, glukh 22 (see the armenian text, p. 38). 23. ibid. 24. ibid, pp. 117-118. 25. ibid, pp. 121-122. ðàìð²üüºê ºðºò êüàôêºòàô §´²ü²èæ öþø²ðîàô⺲ü¦ ºðîæ îàüæ´ºðú²ü â²ð¶ø²üàôâúàôüà ð³ûáó »ï»õ»óáõ å³íéçïû³ý ³õ³ý¹ç å³ßï³ùáõýù³ûçý ¨ íçë³ï³ý ï³ñ·çý ¿ ýíçñí³í 18-ñ¹ ¹³ñç ñ³û ñá·¨áñ³ï³ý ðáíñ³ýý»ë ºñ»ó êýáõë»óáõ §´³ý³éç ×ßù³ñïáõ㻳ý¦ ³ñå»ù³íáñ »ñïá` ·ñí³í 1782ã. î³ñáý ·³í³éáõù: ´ý³·ñç ã³ñ·ù³ýçãý áõ ññ³ï³ñ³ïçãá üñ»¹»ñçï îáýçμ»ñý ¿, áñá, 1891ã-çý ³ßë³ï»éáí ¾çùç³íýç ê. êçýá¹ç ·ñ³¹³ñ³ýáõù, ³éçã ¿ áõý»ýáõù í³ýáã³ý³éáõ ³ûë ³ßë³ïáõãû³ýá, ïé³ñ»éáõ ýñ³ ï³ñ¨áñáõãûáõýá ¨ ññ³ï³ñ³ï»éáõ áã ùç³ûý çñ ïáõùçó ×ß·ñïí³í áõ é³ûýáñ»ý í³ýáã³·ñí³í μý³·çñá ·ñ³μ³ñáí, ³ûé¨ ³û¹ μý³·ñç ³ý·é»ñ»ý ã³ñ·ù³ýáõãûáõýá: ²û¹ ã³ñ·ù³ýáõãû³ùμ ¿é »íñáå³ï³ý ³ëïí³í³μ³ýáõãû³ýá ñ³ûïýç ¿ ¹³éýáõù å³íéçïû³ý ³õ³ý¹ç í³ñ¹³å»ïáõãûáõýá: 159 armenological studies armenian folia anglistika -83.pdf -83.pdf kazm.pdf kazm2.pdf 1-83_.pdf 1-17.pdf 18-27.pdf 28-83.pdf 42-83.pdf 84-91.pdf 92-159.pdf << /ascii85encodepages false /allowtransparency false /autopositionepsfiles true /autorotatepages /all /binding /left /calgrayprofile (dot gain 20%) /calrgbprofile (srgb iec61966-2.1) /calcmykprofile (u.s. web coated \050swop\051 v2) /srgbprofile (srgb iec61966-2.1) /cannotembedfontpolicy /warning /compatibilitylevel 1.4 /compressobjects /tags /compresspages true /convertimagestoindexed true /passthroughjpegimages true /createjdffile false /createjobticket false /defaultrenderingintent /default /detectblends true /detectcurves 0.0000 /colorconversionstrategy /leavecolorunchanged /dothumbnails false 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<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> /sve <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> /enu (use these settings to create adobe pdf documents for quality printing on desktop printers and proofers. created pdf documents can be opened with acrobat and adobe reader 5.0 and later.) /rus () >> /namespace [ (adobe) (common) (1.0) ] /othernamespaces [ << /asreaderspreads false /cropimagestoframes true /errorcontrol /warnandcontinue /flattenerignorespreadoverrides false /includeguidesgrids false /includenonprinting false /includeslug false /namespace [ (adobe) (indesign) (4.0) ] /omitplacedbitmaps false /omitplacedeps false /omitplacedpdf false /simulateoverprint /legacy >> << /addbleedmarks false /addcolorbars false /addcropmarks false /addpageinfo false /addregmarks false /convertcolors /noconversion /destinationprofilename () /destinationprofileselector /na /downsample16bitimages true /flattenerpreset << /presetselector /mediumresolution >> /formelements false /generatestructure true /includebookmarks false /includehyperlinks false /includeinteractive false /includelayers false /includeprofiles true /multimediahandling /useobjectsettings /namespace [ (adobe) (creativesuite) (2.0) ] /pdfxoutputintentprofileselector /na /preserveediting true /untaggedcmykhandling /leaveuntagged /untaggedrgbhandling /leaveuntagged /usedocumentbleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /hwresolution [2400 2400] /pagesize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice << /ascii85encodepages false /allowtransparency false /autopositionepsfiles true /autorotatepages /all /binding /left /calgrayprofile (dot gain 20%) /calrgbprofile (srgb iec61966-2.1) /calcmykprofile (u.s. web coated \050swop\051 v2) /srgbprofile (srgb iec61966-2.1) /cannotembedfontpolicy /warning /compatibilitylevel 1.4 /compressobjects /tags /compresspages true /convertimagestoindexed true /passthroughjpegimages true /createjdffile false /createjobticket false /defaultrenderingintent /default /detectblends true /detectcurves 0.0000 /colorconversionstrategy /leavecolorunchanged /dothumbnails false /embedallfonts true /embedopentype false /parseiccprofilesincomments true /embedjoboptions true /dscreportinglevel 0 /emitdscwarnings false /endpage -1 /imagememory 1048576 /lockdistillerparams false /maxsubsetpct 100 /optimize true /opm 1 /parsedsccomments true /parsedsccommentsfordocinfo true /preservecopypage true /preservedicmykvalues true /preserveepsinfo true /preserveflatness true /preservehalftoneinfo false /preserveopicomments false /preserveoverprintsettings true /startpage 1 /subsetfonts true /transferfunctioninfo /apply /ucrandbginfo /preserve /useprologue false /colorsettingsfile () /alwaysembed [ true ] /neverembed [ true ] /antialiascolorimages false /cropcolorimages true /colorimageminresolution 300 /colorimageminresolutionpolicy /ok /downsamplecolorimages false /colorimagedownsampletype /bicubic /colorimageresolution 300 /colorimagedepth -1 /colorimagemindownsampledepth 1 /colorimagedownsamplethreshold 1.50000 /encodecolorimages false /colorimagefilter /dctencode /autofiltercolorimages true /colorimageautofilterstrategy /jpeg /coloracsimagedict << /qfactor 0.15 /hsamples [1 1 1 1] /vsamples [1 1 1 1] >> /colorimagedict << /qfactor 0.15 /hsamples [1 1 1 1] /vsamples [1 1 1 1] >> /jpeg2000coloracsimagedict << /tilewidth 256 /tileheight 256 /quality 30 >> /jpeg2000colorimagedict << /tilewidth 256 /tileheight 256 /quality 30 >> /antialiasgrayimages false /cropgrayimages true /grayimageminresolution 300 /grayimageminresolutionpolicy /ok /downsamplegrayimages false /grayimagedownsampletype /bicubic /grayimageresolution 300 /grayimagedepth -1 /grayimagemindownsampledepth 2 /grayimagedownsamplethreshold 1.50000 /encodegrayimages false /grayimagefilter /dctencode /autofiltergrayimages true /grayimageautofilterstrategy /jpeg /grayacsimagedict << /qfactor 0.15 /hsamples [1 1 1 1] /vsamples [1 1 1 1] >> /grayimagedict << /qfactor 0.15 /hsamples [1 1 1 1] /vsamples [1 1 1 1] >> /jpeg2000grayacsimagedict << /tilewidth 256 /tileheight 256 /quality 30 >> /jpeg2000grayimagedict << /tilewidth 256 /tileheight 256 /quality 30 >> /antialiasmonoimages false /cropmonoimages true /monoimageminresolution 1200 /monoimageminresolutionpolicy /ok /downsamplemonoimages false /monoimagedownsampletype /bicubic /monoimageresolution 1200 /monoimagedepth -1 /monoimagedownsamplethreshold 1.50000 /encodemonoimages false /monoimagefilter /ccittfaxencode /monoimagedict << /k -1 >> /allowpsxobjects false /checkcompliance [ /none ] /pdfx1acheck false /pdfx3check false /pdfxcompliantpdfonly false /pdfxnotrimboxerror true /pdfxtrimboxtomediaboxoffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /pdfxsetbleedboxtomediabox true /pdfxbleedboxtotrimboxoffset [ 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 0.00000 ] /pdfxoutputintentprofile () /pdfxoutputconditionidentifier () /pdfxoutputcondition () /pdfxregistryname () /pdfxtrapped /false /description << /chs 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/fra 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/ita <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> /jpn 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<feffc7740020c124c815c7440020c0acc6a9d558c5ec0020b370c2a4d06cd0d10020d504b9b0d1300020bc0f0020ad50c815ae30c5d0c11c0020ace0d488c9c8b85c0020c778c1c4d560002000410064006f0062006500200050004400460020bb38c11cb97c0020c791c131d569b2c8b2e4002e0020c774b807ac8c0020c791c131b41c00200050004400460020bb38c11cb2940020004100630072006f0062006100740020bc0f002000410064006f00620065002000520065006100640065007200200035002e00300020c774c0c1c5d0c11c0020c5f40020c2180020c788c2b5b2c8b2e4002e> /nld (gebruik deze instellingen om adobe pdf-documenten te maken voor kwaliteitsafdrukken op desktopprinters en proofers. de gemaakte pdf-documenten kunnen worden geopend met acrobat en adobe reader 5.0 en hoger.) /nor 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<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> /sve <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> /enu (use these settings to create adobe pdf documents for quality printing on desktop printers and proofers. created pdf documents can be opened with acrobat and adobe reader 5.0 and later.) /rus () >> /namespace [ (adobe) (common) (1.0) ] /othernamespaces [ << /asreaderspreads false /cropimagestoframes true /errorcontrol /warnandcontinue /flattenerignorespreadoverrides false /includeguidesgrids false /includenonprinting false /includeslug false /namespace [ (adobe) (indesign) (4.0) ] /omitplacedbitmaps false /omitplacedeps false /omitplacedpdf false /simulateoverprint /legacy >> << /addbleedmarks false /addcolorbars false /addcropmarks false /addpageinfo false /addregmarks false /convertcolors /noconversion /destinationprofilename () /destinationprofileselector /na /downsample16bitimages true /flattenerpreset << /presetselector /mediumresolution >> /formelements false /generatestructure true /includebookmarks false /includehyperlinks false /includeinteractive false /includelayers false /includeprofiles true /multimediahandling /useobjectsettings /namespace [ (adobe) (creativesuite) (2.0) ] /pdfxoutputintentprofileselector /na /preserveediting true 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/untaggedcmykhandling /leaveuntagged /untaggedrgbhandling /leaveuntagged /usedocumentbleed false >> ] >> setdistillerparams << /hwresolution [2400 2400] /pagesize [612.000 792.000] >> setpagedevice mikael stamm 85 glimpses of truth in a sea of nescience: reflections on ereignis in art in wölfli, heidegger and advaita vedānta mikael stamm1 figure 1: wölfli 1905. mediziinische fakultäät. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 2021, 85-109 © 2000 by assumption university press 86 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june abstract martin heidegger’s deconstruction of western metaphysics was a project designed to retrieve an appreciation of the question of being through a distancing from the distortions created by the history metaphysics itself. this project takes several forms, but a particularly radical form can be seen by interpreting heidegger’s work contributions to philosophy in the light of the indian philosophical tradition, advaita vedānta. we find in this juxtaposition an accentuation of three concepts: self, concealment and being. the relation of these three elements can be seen within the movement of the work of art, and can be seen especially vividly in outsider art. it is in outsider art that we see the movement towards a disruption which breaks us free from metaphysical thought, throwing us into a pre-metaphysical realm, while still under influence of what advaita philosophy would call nescience [māyā, avidyā]. we intent to show in this article that the works of adolf wölfli can be seen as a manifestation of the rupture of ‘pre-metaphysical occurrence’ disrupting our normal discourse; an occurrence that ultimately can be verified only by its own example, as a unique appearance. keywords: adolf wölfli; martin heidegger; advaita vedānta; nescience; outsider art introduction heidegger’s critique of metaphysics involves the idea that the history of metaphysics conceals the most important question in philosophy, the question of being. so much of heidegger’s early work was a project designed to peel away the distortions of our understanding or truth, in order to retrieve or uncover this question of being. mikael stamm 87 this project is continued in heidegger’s radicalized question concerning being as such, i.e. beyng, as expressed in the beiträge zur philosophie (vom ereignis) (contributions to philosophy) (hereafter shortened to beiträge)2. heidegger designates a pre-ontological condition ‘beyng’ [seyn], spelled with an ‘y’, as opposed to the metaphysical ‘being’ [sein], which is reflected and developed within western philosophy as such. furthermore, when the beiträge is interpreted in the light of an indian philosophical tradition, advaita vedānta, there emerged a significant accentuation of three crucial concepts: self, concealment and beyng. the beiträge expressed a critique of western calculative culture as conditioned by a metaphysical state termed ‘machination’ [machenschaft], which is seen as an ever intensifying metaphysical distortion of a true premetaphysical beyng. this metaphysical distortion is inherently connected to its ‘true source’, as an original pervasive occurrence [ereignis] which conditions any ‘later’ metaphysical object-related concepts of truth. now, if a pervasive distortion is active in this self-propagating way, clouding our sense of what is true and real, then everything we can relate to must be affected by this pervasive deficiency, similar to advaita vedānta’s sanskrit concepts of a cosmic nescience, predominately expressed as avidyā or māyā. the underlying presumption of this study is that art represent a potency, which has the capability to disrupt the dominating (false) objectbeing [sein], and bring forward a glimpse of true beyng [seyn]. the question is now: what kind of art might possess this power? and how is this thought to be operative within our common modes of understanding? we intend to show in this article that the works of adolf wölfli can be seen as a manifestation of a ‘pre-metaphysical occurrence’, as a comprehensive refusal of our normal understanding of self and world. machination and the radical difference the beiträge distinguishes itself from traditional philosophy by its peculiar distancing; a positioning of itself outside conventional western philosophy, which only expresses and propagates a metaphysical distortion 88 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june of the original beyng. this distancing in the beiträge owes its peculiar position to an inexpressible otherness, projected through the concept of an ereignis, which can be defined as an occurrence of beyng beyond the comprehensive distortion of truth, machination, in this study interpreted as a manifestation of nescience. this ‘distortion’ in beiträge, denotes a way of perceiving everything there is, as derived from objects [seiendes] in their character of makeability [machbarkeit], which conceal the real source of their original illumination.3 in machenschaft, the ‘machen-’ (make, do, produce) is to be understood as a reference to the passive wissen (knowledge) in wissenschaft (science), which signifies a calculating cognition corresponding to the active makeability (manipulation) of objects. this understanding of objects, as something that can be acted upon and subsumed in a field of calculative knowledge and planning, is ‘superimposed’ on being as such [seyn], affecting everything (‘beings’) which can be understood or articulated. therefore, the question of true beyng requires a withdrawal [ent-zug] from all representational calculation in a fundamental refusal [verweigerung] of the world of utilization, i.e. of understanding subsumed to makeability.4 how is this refusal possible? does it mean anything else than a pure negation, given that it is deprived of any means of positive articulations? this problem of articulation of an incomparable other truth, in the context of an all-pervasive nescience, is the reason behind the seemingly detour to an indian tradition. the point is that the advaita vedānta tradition regards any form of conceptualization or differentiation as part of a comprehensive illusory potency [māyā, avidyā], and insists that this illusion can only be dispelled through an event of true knowledge of a non-dualistic reality. the advaitic nescience and truth śaṇkarācārya (8th century ce), regarded as the founder of the tradition of advaita vedānta, formulated the concepts of a nescience [māyā or avidyā] and an ultimate reality [brahman] in his commentary on bādarāyaṇa’s brahmasūtras (3rd – 2nd century bce).5 nescience refers mikael stamm 89 to the entire phenomenal world in which humans and things appear, while ultimate reality means an incommensurable true being, the ground of nescience and yet beyond any conceivable difference. ultimate reality, brahman, cannot be thought of as an object or an entity; brahman is beyond categories of beings and the realization that the apparent phenomenal reality is in fact brahman is the achievement of true knowledge, vidyā, which frees the self from the bondage of māyā.6 the interesting point is now: what can be truly said about the prevailing absence of truth? the pluralistic world of objects and appearances are part of the workings of the pervasive indeterminable māyā, which binds the selves to a web of attachments. in this state of bondage is included an illusory self, the antaḥkaraṇa, here designating the intellect, mind and ego; all of which are regarded as instruments of cognition of phenomena, and therefore themselves essentially insentient and object-like. śaṇkara explains the state of nescience by positing a fundamental difference between self [ātman] and non-self [anātman],7 and characterizes this ontological difference as something that creates a fundamental misconception: “the mutual superimposition [adhyāsa] of the self and the non-self, which is termed nescience [avidyā], is the presupposition on which there base all the practical distinctions”.8 the ‘practical distinctions’ accounts for the entire domain of differences within the phenomenal world. the circular logic of this conceptualization is due to the fact that the distinction between self and non-self is considered as both the cause of the ontological confusion, and an effect of the same misconception. vācaspati miśra in his bhāmatī (9th century)9, a commentary on śaṇkara’s brahmasūtrabhasya, pointed out, that if the true self [ātman] was radically different from any objective entity, then it could not be subject to nescience and therefore he raised the question concerning the actual subject (location) of nescience. miśra claimed that the operation of nescience has to be located in the individual self [jīva], because ignorance can never be associated with the pure being, brahman, and in this way he managed to preserve the truth of brahman as an absolute pure other.10 this made 90 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june necessary a differentiation of the concept of the self: an insentient inner cognizing organ [antaḥkaraṇa], a sentient individual self [jīva] and a non-individual essential self [ātman]; these three selves are connected to the mysterious workings of māyā, and to the dualistic tension between the indeterminable nescience and the corresponding radically different truth. in heidegger’s terms, the differentiation between beings and beyng can only be resolved by a transformative event, as a thrust [ruck], which moves the self away from the order of things [seiendes]. this event is closely connected to a similar tripling of the meaning of the self in beiträge, as in the bhāmatī: firstly, an “i” [ich] reflecting the distortion of truth, the machination; secondly, a dubious but necessary self [selbst] part of machination as well as the truth, designating the place of the operation of the machination; and thirdly, an essential principle, the dasein, accessible only through the ambiguous self. ereignis and the unmanageable strife the concepts of beyng and self are further explored in the beiträge in an analysis of the phenomenon of death, which leads to the ultimate possibility of ‘being-away’ [weg-sein], and further to nothingness [nichts/nichthafte]: since beyng implies a refusal [verweigerung] of the unessential apparent being [unseiende], beyng needs the nothingness: “since beyng is permeated with the “not” [nichthaft], for the perseverance of its truth it needs the persistence of the not [nicht] and thus also nonbeings [nichtige]”.11 the path of understanding beyng must go through the refusal of the object-being and the implications of negation, i.e. leaving the common, in order to engage in the strange [fremde]. in this way the sense of the otherness of truth means that everything is transformed in the light of truth, and this is expressed as a sudden movement or displacement [versetzung].12 this concept of nothingness takes us beyond the negation “in the sense of an excess [übermaβ] of pure refusal.”13 an ‘excess of refusal’ is not a return to the original point, rather it is a thinking which points towards a qualitative leap; a choice of a fundamental refusal that nonetheless both cancels and changes itself in retrospect. mikael stamm 91 this movement of negation of the common from which the “i” has defined itself, means that the subject (location) of nescience, the self [selbst] also possesses the power to free [ent-setzen] itself from the siege of things and the ‘false’ self. ‘ent-setzen’ here possesses both the sense of being relocated, and the feeling of ‘horror’ of being torn from the common.14 this ambiguity is exactly what makes possible the occurrence of an ent-setzung; fear of the unknown and in the same movement: being freed through a projection towards beyng. this proximity to beyng is to be understood as a timely transformative event [ereignis], in which the self is appropriated by beyng, which ‘suddenly and properly’ shows everything in their own essences.15 in the “der ursprung des kunstwerkes” (the origin of the work of art)16 this glimpse of an authentic understanding of beyng is directly connected to works of art a connection explicitly stated in beiträge’s §247 as properly belonging to this paragraph as a ‘grounding’ (exposition) of the truth of the self, the dasein.17 the essential characteristic of an artwork is that art evades the ‘being of a utility’, the mark of the machination, because it exhibits a capability of a different order altogether.18 it sets up a world [welt] as a whole, in a form of a new spaciousness [geräumigkeit] in which beings can be met. another aspect is that it discloses the necessary support of the setting forth [herstellung] of the world, i.e. the earth [erde] that moves into the open of the world. the important point here is that earth is a mystical concept which signifies that it essentially withdraws from every meaning.19 this implies an inherent conflict; on one hand, that the world of meanings has to determine that which remains closed to it, and on the other, that the earth has to preserve its self-seclusiveness to support meanings. this original unifying strife [streit] of opposites is not a deficiency, but constitutes the essence of everything that can be. not unlike a heraclitean sense of a pre-ontological éris, which lets everything show in a ‘unity of opposites’.20 heidegger’s claim is that this is what artworks do: they place a rift [riß] which instigates a strife between clearing [lichtung] and concealing [verbergung], between world and earth.21 this is the mark or fundamental 92 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june design of beyng, designating an original timely appearing, a ‘clearing of beings’ [lichtung des seienden].22 the artwork fixates (expresses) this rift/design in a figure [gestalt] as a concrete placing [stellen]. this event in art of evoking the mystical earth and the meaningful world is what heidegger terms a thrust [stoß], a sudden movement to an ‘outside’ of the familiar things: the more essentially this thrust comes into the open, the stranger and more solitary the works becomes […] the more essentially the extraordinary is thrust to the surface and the long-familiar thrust down […]. to submit to this displacement [verrückung] means: to transform all familiar relations to world and to earth.23 this is truth in art: it leaves the realm of the common, and leads to an extraordinary appearing of the complete other. tantric art the pāśupatis were followers of the teaching taught by paśupati (around 200 ce.) which aimed at a complete independence from the world, and which required from the devotees a transcending all material opposites by roaming cremation grounds and participate in ‘impure’ rituals, while continually practicing at least twelve years of yogic meditation.24 one of the most striking examples of this transcendence by submergence is that of kāraikkāl ammaiyār (5th or 6th century ce.), a female poet and devotee of śiva, from the early cult of the tamil śaiva siddhānta.25 her poetry is characterized by a continual overflow of creativeness which obliterates the organized ”i”. in the periya puranam it is said that she prayed to śiva that the earthly flesh she had worn for the sake of her husband would disappear and be replaced by the form of a skeleton, an appearance proper of complete devotion to the terrible form of śiva. her prayers were heard, and from the moment of her transformation, she roamed the cremation grounds of tiruālangkādu. she is described as being smeared in ashes, engaging in erratic behavior and submerged mikael stamm 93 in a continual state of devotion to bhairava śiva: demons with flaming mouths and rolling, fiery eyes / roaming around, doing the tuṇaṅkai-dance / running and dancing in the terrifying forest /draw out a burning corpse from the fire and eat the flesh // the place where our lord raises his leg / with the hero’s kalal jingling / and the anklets tinkling / dancing so that the fire in his hand spreads everywhere / and his hair whips around / is tiruvālaṅkāṭu.26 there is no place for convention or even a community of devotees; there is only the divine vision of the object of her all-consuming devotion. the radical strategy of solitude and social distancing as a condition of insight, brings us to remember the words of beiträge concerning the ‘few and rare’, who essentially do not belong to any community or group, which are excluded from an intimation of the true self.27 this ‘outsider approach’ can be seen in figure 2, the images of the terrible aspect of śiva with his female part, the goddess kālī incorporated, which accentuates a distancing from a conventional godhead by a display of death, sexuality and aggressiveness framed within an ornamented ritualized space. art as excess of refusal: adolf wölfli the term ‘outsider art’ carries specific historical and cultural meanings. according to david maclagan’s discussion of the expression, it refers to both the artworks and their artists.28 he contends that such artists frequently lived on the margins of society and didn’t fit into the conventional establishment, and that they frequently had no opportunities to formally ‘learn the trade.’ they rarely saw their creations as a form of individual artistic expression, and therefore didn’t really think themselves as ‘artists’ at all. maclagan further pointed out that the artworks were originally regarded as therapeutic byproducts of a psychiatric treatment; contributing to this view were several factors: the artworks didn’t exhibit traits of conventional artistic styles, and they were frequently made of 94 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june figure 2: the hindu goddess kali and god bhairava in union. painting; watercolor. los. angeles county museum of art. mikael stamm 95 random materials of whatever was available to the artist, leaving an impression of a crude unreflective work. this impression was strengthened due to apparently purposeless repetitions of the same motifs, and that the works were frequently not approachable through conventional codes of representation, and therefore seemingly impenetrable to conventional artistic interpretations.29 one of the most famous representatives of outsider art is the painter adolf wölfli (1864–1930) who was a resident of the waldau psychiatric institution, located near bern in switzerland.30 wölfli’s early life as an orphan and a child laborer, hired out to different foster families, is described as a harsh existence completely subjected to whatever the families would put him through. later he endured a life of an itinerant laborer, did the military service and two years in prison, due to an attempted sexual assault on a young girl. after a similar incident he was committed to waldau where he stayed till the end of his days. wölfli began to draw, write and compose in 1899, and worked continuously on his artworks until the end of his life. from 1908 onwards he began to systemize his productions by making references to overall narratives, which described adventurous travels around the world or fantastic autobiographical events, all of which were expressed in drawings, musical compositions, poetry, or fictional prose. walter morgenthaler mentions wölfli’s peculiar method of working with his art as an almost mechanistic activity of drawing and writing. he worked continually without emotion with the exception of moments of hostility towards those who would interrupt his endless stream of creation.31 wölfli’s attitude towards his work can be described as almost painful, that is, a continual frustration due to his inability to capture the entire stream of his imaginative visions, over which he seemingly has no control. morgenthaler uses the word maßlosigkeit to designate a hastiness, a ruthlessness, or a lack of moderation: words chasing other words, forms and shades being reduplicated; an excess of flow of creations which relentlessly seek material to be manifested in. 96 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june the whole is less than its parts the fives works selected for this article are drawn from different periods of wölfli’s production: figure 1 and 3 are selected from the period of “early drawings” (1904-1907) before wölfli began attaching titles to series of works, figure 4 is taken from the theme titled from the cradle to the grave (1908-12), figure 5 from geographic and algebraic books (1912-16), and figure 6 from the funeral march (1928-1930).32 we will go through these selected works, which illustrate a certain development in wölfli’s style. in figure 1 (mediziinische fakultäät), reproduced at the beginning of this article, we find all the recurrent basic elements which are characteristic of wölfli’s works throughout his artistic development:33 ornamental ‘strips’ in different patterns are used as frames, either encircling the entire drawing or running through parts of it. in all areas of the drawings are inserted ornamental ‘snails’, individual or in a chain; a half-bow with one or two dots, similar to a stylized eye and ear. similar insertions are visible everywhere in the drawings in the form of an ornamental small female bird (‘vögelii’), not unlike the snail, but with a bird-like form instead. other frequently used elements are stylized black eyes, like an oversize pair of spectacle or pair of shadows hiding the eyes. many variations of icon-like ‘self-portraits’ with or without mustaches, often combined with a black cross and/or black eyes. these recurrent elements are combined in characteristic symmetrical patterns on different levels of the design. furthermore, the particular features of figure 1 reveals a monochrome composition constructed around both a vertical and a horizontal symmetry, but comprising a ‘flow’ of forms, which fill every bit of space. there is no representation of ‘empty space’ or any conventional horizon which would ground a representational orientation. an extreme excess of ornamental elements occupies the drawing, in the form of iconfaces and stylized organic forms (‘snails’/‘birds’) which are swept into an overall movement, which seems to form the shape of a butterfly. words and sentences are inserted inside confined shaded areas, integrated as a mikael stamm 97 in figure 3 (felsenau) there are recognizable components of a city; houses, buildings, trees, and what looks like a large factory chimney, presumably a part the city of bern, protected/separated by a diagonal railing and river. we may assume that the river is aare, which runs adjacent to felsenau and through the center of bern. even if the elements refer to specific geographical places, they are still decorated and formed by the characteristic elements mentioned above. these elements make the geographical location look ‘alien’, since they participate in a pattern that serves a higher purpose than just representation. the symmetry is mirrored figure 3: wölfli 1907. felsenau. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung part of the visual form. tfwo words are present in the upper part of the of the drawing as a kind of title, though not referring to any recognizable theme: “mediziinische fakultäät”. as a peculiar general characteristic, each of the myriad forms are graphically marked as if they contain material inside to be protected from the outside, or maybe to prevent any outside material from contaminating the interior of the form. 98 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june around a diagonal strip, the river, and the entire drawing is framed with stylized self-portraits, ‘snails’ and ‘vögeliis’. the strips direct the flows, making the drawing unmistakably repetitious and uncanny despite its formal references to a geographical location. figure 4: wölfli 1911.london=nord. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung mikael stamm 99 in figure 4 (london=nord), though the capitalized word “london=nord” indicates a geographical location, there are in this work no visible landmarks. names and numbers are inserted in the strips, but the musical compositions are here a dominant element of the design, supported by elements and the strict symmetry. the abstraction here is intensified, compared to the drawings in figure 1 and 3, as well as the christian symbols and the presence of st. adolf in four separate spheres, each connected to the others by musical notes and a symbolic strips of stylized fishes. the symmetry is both vertical and horizontal, centered around the four larger self-portraits combined with crosses. in figure 5 (die kreutzigung des heiligen skt. adolf), the presence of the musical component and the christian theme are intensified. the musical notes, the facial self-portraits and the crosses are arranged around a christian crucifixion of an ornamental adolf wölfli-like image, in which a crown of thorns and marks of spikes in hands and feet are visible. the elements, birds and snails, are inserted in every bit of spaces figure 5: wölfli 1914. die kreutzigung des heiligen skt. adolf. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung 100 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june between the inserted pictures of four saint-like figures resembling wölfli, and higher above, a god-like wölfli, presumably flanked by heavenly hymns. the symmetry is constructed around a vertical line in the center, though two horizontal lines divides the drawing in three realms. the structural division is rigid, and the rhythmic flow is here replaced by a strict rectangular design. though a certain development is visible through the four drawings, certain features are discernable in all of them: an excess of ornamental elements flowing in rhythmically movements, which directed by a structure of graphically marked borders of separation, imposing the impression of each element as an independent or isolated unit. this overflow of autonomous details seems to be in constant conflict with the strict symmetrical overall design. the repetitions of elements seem to be of a ritualistic importance, that is, they seem to be arranged in a necessary structure in each design, to infuse an alternative order associated with places, constructions, occurrences, symbols, names, etc. the divided self now we will return to the concept of the self, and the implication of the peculiar division in advaita vedānta. the advaitic dichotomy of the self made visible the beiträge’s parallel split: on the one hand the “i” that is part of the phenomenal nescience, on the other hand, the true principle of the self, the dasein, concealed by the “i”. this peculiar structure of the self reflects the fundamental division regarding nescience and truth, or in heidegger’s terms, the machination and beyng. we are able to understand from these fundamental differences of meanings, the division that wölfli expressed, i.e. the painful task of fixating the endless interior stream of visions, which are seemingly not controlled by an “i”. in the works of wölfli, this peculiar role of the divided self is expressed in a subversion of the position of the usual or familiar; a distancing that lets the artwork stand ‘solitary’ outside the common frame of relations (e.g. history of art, genres, biographies, sociological explanations, etc.). this signifies a movement away from the order of things into a ‘nothingness’ created by mikael stamm 101 the split within the self. we return to our four drawings for illustrations of this point: figure 1 exhibits an overflow of ornamental elements and rhythmic flows of forms, whose lack of structured space leaves no room for a placing of an organized self. instead we are faced with a dis-orientation through a flood of words, sounds, faces, eyes, mouths, shadows, gods, snakes, borders, patterns, brims; a reflections of a dying self, looking back at the spectator from a foreign world. in figure 3 the reconstructed site of the city shows a diagonal flow between two realms, divided in an ‘inside’ and an ‘outside’ of the separation. the fragmented city, vaguely recognizable, has been reassembled in a way which shows a new constructed space seen through the memories of a number of distributed selves. figure 4 shows the reduplication of four ascending realms, each centered around a self, each with its own musical composition, but attached to each other by a hieratical rigid scheme. figure 5 displays several distinctly marked insertions of smaller drawings, or ‘windows’, into a larger drawing, surrounded by a ‘loudness’ of musical arrangements, and a replacement of christ with st. adolf, a god-like figure festooned with hymns, words and ornamental figures and patterns. the self is both crucified, resurrected, divinized, and distributed throughout a choirs of saintly and angelic beings, showing a network of reduplicated “i”s with a presiding self as the highest of all. in all four drawings the intrusion of the other [fremde, andere] is visible as a transforming factor [ereignis], causing the overflow and destruction the normal self [ich, ahaṁkāra]. this is present both as a horrifying feeling of losing the self in a fragmented world, and as an orchestral celebration of a different new order. death is felt as the death of an “i”, as its final being-away [weg-sein], bringing in an excess of nothingness [nichts] which reflects that which has no center, and as such is injected into all forms and materials to be seen. 102 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june figure 6: wölfli 1929. ohne titel. © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung mikael stamm 103 an excess of refusal we have seen in heidegger’s “der ursprung des kunstwerkes” that the concept of rift [riß] plays an important role, in the sense of an original rupture and design of the strife between earth and world. for wölfli, this strife is expressed in the drawings in various ways. between a centric representation of an “i” and a fragmented self and, and between death and celebration of those selves. furthermore, we have observed in the drawings a conflictual relation between overflowing elements and the controlling power of borders and frames, or put simply: a tension between material flows and restrictive forms. these conflictual settings are raised in wölfli’s artworks in a way which echoes the original strife, beyond the normalized structure of a utility-being. the works of wölfli are these conflictual relationships, and therefore a harmonic ideal can only be represented within a distorted arrangement like figure 6, shown above, taken from the last project, the ‘funeral march’. here we notice pictures taken from magazines and subordinated to a flow of hastily scribbled names and numbers, which undermines the images of idyllic scenes. the discomfort transferred from the drawings and collages are due to the ever present strangeness and conflictual rift, from which we look back on our, now estranged, common world. the distorting ereignis the character of nescience, avidyā, in advaita vedānta, manifests itself due to a beginningless ontological difference between self (being) and non-self (beings), making possible a fundamental confusion/attraction, through which the flow of phenomena is formed. this ontological difference can only be seen in retrospect as a unifying conflict expressed in a mutual superimposition, or as an interdependence of concealment and clearing, since it has already exerted its impact, as reflected in a dualistic tension. if the original rift [riß] can be expressed in art, then it has to manifest as a radical other, an alien intrusion into the familiar scheme, since it can only be seen through the effect of the same 104 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june rift. in heidegger’s analysis and his selection of van gogh to illustrate the rift, there is a symmetrical relationship between earth and world. this tends to undermine the radicality of the rupture and the effects of nescience. both in wölfli’s artworks and tantric art, there is a tendency where the rift is uncontrollable; the work does not disappear back into the world of nescience. thus, in wölfli’s artworks the rift is expressed in the difference between the flow of visions and the fixation of the same. the continual flow is mimicked in each drawing’s strict rhythm and design and between the drawings as their overall narrative, which binds the sheets together in an endless chain. these mimicking fixations are not part of a reconstruction of the ‘true’ inner stream, because they have already changed the flow before the fixation, and therefore the reality of the flow can only exist as that which is inherently absent. the event of truth, the ereignis, is here present as the continual restoration of something irrevocably lost. the truth then becomes the ‘true’ distortion of a distortion (machenschaft or avidyā), and the event of truth becomes the destruction of the “i” and the reconstruction of a different structure, which refrains from controlling the self-secluding material aspect. conclusion why do we speak of truth and not of an aesthetic experience? in our perspective, such radical works of art are designed not to affect the emotional or cognitive faculties of a spectator; rather they trigger a premetaphysical understanding that displaces the delusions of an “i” and the schemes of machination. in our interpretation of heidegger, though, we would choose an approach somewhat different from “der ursprung des kunstwerkes”, where the analysis of a painting of van gogh accentuated an authentic lifeworld, invoking earth and world. rather we would accentuate van gogh’s heightened use of complementary colors, and the connected collapse of the form-aspect into unstable vibrant material. compared with heidegger’s more symmetrical analysis of earth and world, we would accentuate the denial of the appearing world of normality, this pointing mikael stamm 105 to the original conflictual rift of beyng. why the advaitic perspective? the insistence of a radically different concept of truth, a complete other, is nowhere more present than in the concept of a pervasive nescience and its possible obliteration through the inexpressible transformative vidyā. this refusal is in wölfli’s works visible as a violent strife embedded in stylized tableaus, comprising an overflow of ornamental details in a continual conflict with forms and borders. this ever-present threatening loss of control seems to represent an ever present danger which has to be countered by the highest authority: the divine “i”, st. adolf, who overlooks the shattered spectacle of a number of reduplicated selves. in wölfli’s artworks the glimpse of truth is present as the denial of nescience; a negation that points to the source of reality through three conflictual settings: that between a continual stream of visions and a mimicking fixation of the same; that between the mourning of the collapse of the self and the celebration of the new worlds of the distributed selves; and that between an overflowing movement of mystic material and the opposite confinement of borders and frames. there is no ‘new’ truth in wölfli’s artworks, only the turbulence created by the absence truth in the midst of nescience. endnotes 1 mikael stamm is a researcher in western and indian philosophy. he is the author of the book sacred sound and language in classical śaiva siddhānta. email: mikaelstamm@yahoo.co.uk 2 i will in the following refer to both the german and the english editions: heidegger 1989. beiträge zur philosophie (vom ereignis), and the english translation, heidegger. 2012. contribution to philosophy (of the event). translated by richard rojcewicz & daniela vallega-neu. 3 heidegger 1989/2012, 126/100. 4 heidegger 1989/2012, 470/370. 5 thibaut, george. 1962. the vedānta sutras of bādarāyaṇa with the commentary of śaṇkara. vol.1-2. 106 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june 6 thibaut 1962, vol.1, p.34. though not systematically in the beginning, there seem to be differences which were gradually developed from the time of śaṇkara through the works of his followers; māyā became connected predominately to the projective function, while avidyā was generally used when referred to the veiling power. 7 thibaut 1962, vol.1, p.3. 8 thibaut 1962, vol.1, p.6. 9 sastri, suryanarayana s.s. and kunhan c. raja. 1933. the bhāmatī of vācaspati on śaṇkara’s brahmasutrabhāṣya (catussūtrī). 10 sastri 1933, 194. 11 heidegger 1989/2012, 101/80. 12 heidegger 1989/2012, 233/184. 13 heidegger 1989/2012, 245/193. 14 heidegger 1989/2012, 482/379. 15 heidegger 1989/2012, 66-67/83-84. 16 heidegger, martin. 1980. “der upsprung des kunstwerkes“. in holzwege, 1-72. english translation: heidegger, martin. 2002. “the origin of the work of art”. in off the beaten track. translated by julian young and kenneth haynes, 1-56. 17 heidegger 1989/2012, 392/310. 18 heidegger 1980/2002, 23/16. 19 heidegger 1980/2002, 31-33/24-25 20 robinson, t.m. 1987. heraclitus. fragments. p.49. 21 heidegger 1980/2002, 49/37. 22 heidegger 1980/2002, 49/38. 23 heidegger 1980/2002, 52/40. 24 stamm, mikael. 2019. sacred sound and language in classical śaiva siddhānta. 40-41. 25 rangachari, r. 2010. saint sekkizhar’s periya puranam. 162-169. the south indian scripture periya puranam describes the lives of the sixty-three nāyanmārs, the canonical poet-saints of the cult of śaiva siddhānta. the poetry of kāraikkāl ammaiyār is included in the eleventh book of the holy thirumurai, a collection of the most revered tamil devotional hymns in praise of śiva. 26 craddock, elaine. 2010. śiva’s demon devotee kāraikkāl ammariyār. 58. 27 heidegger, 1989/2012, 322/254-255. 28 maclagan, david. 2009. outsider art: from the margins to the marketplace. 7-14. 29 an interesting point here is that the gradual acceptance of outsider art or its earlier continental term art brut coined by jean dubuffet, was conditioned by the art critics and art collectors to see outsider art in accordance with the modern concept of a lone artist expressing his talent or genius in artworks. outsider art was considered an example of an unpolished but primordial creative impulse, something authentic mikael stamm 107 and unexploited. the outsider-label may on one hand catch a notion of a radical nonconventionalism, but on the other hand, it fails to capture the significance of a genuine difference, because such a labelling inevitably assimilates any ‘outside’ into an ‘inside’ of the established history of art. 30 morgenthaler, walter. 1985. ein geisteskranker als künstler: adolf wölfli. 1-13. 31 morgenthaler 1985, 13-16. 32 impressum, “adolf wölfli: werk“, adolfwoelfli.ch, adolf wölfli stiftung, 20-05-2021, https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/werk 33 morgenthaler, 1985, p.48, and spoerri, elka. 2012. “wölfli’s vocabulary of forms”. in wölfli: creator of the universe. 268-273. references craddock, elaine. 2010. śiva’s demon devotee kāraikkāl ammariyār. new york: sony press. heidegger, martin. 1980. “der upsprung des kunstwerkes“. in holzwege, 1-72 vittorio klostermann, frankfurt am main. ---. 1989. beiträge zur philosophie (vom ereignis). frankfurt am main: vittorio klostermann. ---. 2002. “the origin of the work of art”. in off the beaten track. translated by julian young and kenneth haynes, 1-56. cambridge: cambridge university press. ---. 2012. contribution to philosophy (of the event). translated by richard rojcewicz & daniela vallega-neu. bloomington and indianapolis: indiana university press. impressum. “adolf wölfli: werk“. adolfwoelfli.ch. adolf wölfli stiftung. 20-05-2021. https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/werk. maclagan, david. 2009. outsider art: from the margins to the marketplace. london: reactions books.. morgenthaler, walter. 1985. ein geisteskranker als künstler: adolf wölfli. wien: medusa verlag. 108 prajñā vihāra vol. 22 no. 1 january to june rangachari, r. 2010. saint sekkizhar’s periya puranam: the stories of 63 saivite saints. tiruvannamalai: sri ramanasramam. robinson, t.m. 1987. heraclitus. fragments. toronto: university of toronto press. sastri, suryanarayana s.s. and kunhan c. raja. 1933. the bhāmatī of vācaspati on śaṇkara’s brahmasutrabhāṣya (catussūtrī). madras: theosophical publishing house. spoerri, elka. 2012. “wölfli’s vocabulary of forms”. in wölfli: creator of the universe. bern: arbor vitae / abcd. stamm, mikael. 2019. sacred sound and language in classical śaiva siddhānta. gilleleje: mikael stamm. thibaut, george. 1962. the vedānta sutras of bādarāyaṇa with the commentary of śaṇkara. vol.1-2. new york: dower publication. “unknown”. . the hindu goddess kali and god bhairava in union. painting; watercolor, opaque watercolor on paper, image: 11 3/4 x 7 5/16 in. (29.85 x 18.57 cm); sheet: 12 3/16 x 7 1/2 in. (30.96 x 19.05 cm) made in: nepal gift of dr. and mrs. robert s. coles to lacma (m.81.206.7). angeles county museum of art. wölfli, adolf. 1905. mediziinische fakultäät. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/0/4/csm_a-1988.09_2__71a4cc9610.jpg bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. ---. 1907. felsenau. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/5/5/csm_ adolfwoelfli_a-8997_8227082b4b.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. ---. 1911. london=nord. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/d/3/csm_adolf_ woelfli_a9243---76_01_2379301622.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. mikael stamm 109 ---. 1911. die kreutzigung des heiligen skt. adolf. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/a/3/csm_adolf_ woelfli_a9253---104_01_99aaa2ae38.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. ---. 1911. ohne titel. retrieved 26-04-2021 from: https://www.adolfwoelfli.ch/fileadmin/_processed_/0/4/csm_adolf_ woelfli_a-9404---s.4017_01_de8393f2dd.jpg. bern: © 2021 adolf wölfli stiftung • impressum. article5-1 philosophy and culture in book one of plato’s republic charles freeland mahidol university international college, thailand according to the twentieth century german philosopher hansgeorg gadamer, a philosophical text always arises as a response to a question; so, an important principle to keep in mind when interpreting a philosophical text is to read it in light of the question to which that text is a response. for plato’s republic, for example, the questions posed are questions of justice and of the nature of virtue, or the overall ‘best-ness’ of an individual. thus, the questions “what is justice?” and “how can justice be brought about in the soul of the individual and in the city?” are asked in different ways and in different forms in many of plato’s dialogues. it would seem that a good way to bring these questions better into focus would be to see them in the light of their cultural context. this would involve special difficulties, no doubt, for ancient greek culture is many ways so distant from that of the modern europe it inspired. but seeing plato’s concern for justice and especially for education in justice in the light of its cultural context seems not only useful but also crucial for a proper understanding of his text. in discussing the cultural context for ancient greek philosophy, we do not intend to show a material or historical cause for philosophy. culture is not a cause and philosophy is not a mere effect. there is no cause-effect relation between culture and philosophy. culture and philosophy are not separate from one another, with culture on one side and philosophy on the other. philosophy was within culture. conversely, greek culture was philosophical. indeed, it would be difficult to isolate the philosophical tendencies in greek culture, as they were seemingly everywhere, woven into the fabric of daily life as into their literature, their arts, their political systems and outlooks and into their ethical views. a classical philosophical text, a platonic-socratic dialogue, for example, is situated within a cultural framework or world, which, for the classical greeks, was divided into the public and private domains. (on “world”, cf. heidegger’s being and time, i, iii, p. 61, 100 prajñâ vihâra, volume 5, number 1, january-june, 2004, 100-118 © 2000 by assumption university press translation by joan stambaugh) it would benefit anyone trying to interpret such a philosophical text, therefore, to know something about the cultural world from which it speaks. we shall attempt such a reading of plato’s republic, book one, especially the conversations first between socrates and cephalus, then between socrates and the sophist thrasymachus. but first, allow us to make some introductory comments. i. not only for the beauty of their arts, ancient greeks have been equally admired for their enquiring, restlessly inventive spirit. they are credited with practically inventing the western european notions of humanism and democracy. they are credited with honoring and respecting the human individual – so long as that individual was male and a citizen of a polis (a city-state) — in a way no other ancient culture appears to have done. they enjoyed freedom of speech and their religion, being neither monotheistic nor orthodox, allowed for considerable freedom of worship. science, philosophy, free inquiry, the visual and performing arts, all thereby flourished. little wonder, then, that the greeks have been the object of much fascination and study on the part of later philosophers and historians, or that their influence has been seen as extending far beyond their own time and historical situation. one tendency in interpreting greek philosophy and culture has been to look behind the shining achievements and seek their source in a social-psychological perspective. for such modern scholars as jacob burckhardt, for example, writing in the second half of the nineteenth century, greek culture and philosophy was inherently pessimistic in that the greeks saw the human situation not in terms of religious salvation or of an after-life, but in terms of the “absoluteness of the here-and-now”. the greeks were thus among the first to understand “what it is to be a human in the modern sense”, which is “to live in the present without hope for the future”, as beyond both hope and morality. in a strikingly modern way, they wrestled with the necessity of human beings to confront themselves and to affirm themselves in their own radical finitude, in their own being towards death, from which there is no escape. (the greeks and greek civilization, translated by sheila stern and edited by oswyn charles freeland 101 murray, st. martins press, 1998, the editors introduction, p xxxix). thus, the greek love of beauty, harmony, law, and order, was only a mask by which they looked into the death, horror and chaos that is in the midst of all human life. if such is the case, this speaks volumes for not only the cultural but also the philosophical outlook of the ancient greeks. one could then see the harmony and balance of their arts as a beautiful illusions trembling over an abyss of death and nothingness. but this deeply pessimistic outlook can also be seen as optimistic, if one follows friedrich nietzsche’s interpretation of ancient greek philosophy and culture. what is the background to this and what is meant by ‘optimism’? greek optimism lay in its will to know, and so to master the world around them. for the philosopher nietzsche, this optimism was expressed most pointedly in its socratic philosophy. “philosophy” was, after all, a word evidently first used by plato and meant the “love of wisdom”, where to be wise was to know the principle of all things, especially one’s ‘self’. because of our finitude, the darkness of the flesh and of the powers of our desires, plato, for one, was not so optimistic about the chances of human beings every becoming truly wise, so there was an emphasis on the search for wisdom, and on the quest and the questioning process, the desire for knowledge, in short, rather than the actual results. so, for the greeks, this philosophical attitude meant looking at the world with wonder. perhaps this attitude was already detectable in their mythology, which aristotle described as being “full of wonder”, but it was especially philosophy that said to actually begin in wonder. to wonder about the world is first to be aware of one’s ignorance and therefore to desire knowledge. plato’s symposium shows how human beings are possessed by an erotic desire for knowledge, a desire, a true eros, which carries the human soul to ever-higher domains of truth and beauty. everywhere, then, as they looked upon particular things and human actions in the world and admired their beauty, the greek philosopher and scientist sought their concept, the universal dimension for all things. by seeking the universal concepts for all things and for all human actions, they could then master those things and those actions. hence, not only science but also ethical life was brought under a powerful will to knowledge. virtue, in the socratic view, thus became identified with knowledge, and implied mastery of life and human excellence 102 prajñâ vihâra achieved through attaining both theoretical and practical modes of knowledge. these classical lines of inquiry helped open the paths that would later be followed by modern ethics, politics, science, logic, and mathematics. the greeks thus demonstrated a powerful desire for knowledge, a ‘will to knowledge’ and an optimism that greatly impressed such later thinkers as friedrich nietzsche, for example, in the second half of the nineteenth century. he saw both greek classical, tragic culture and its philosophy as essentially ‘optimistic’, in the senses just described. but for him, the word “optimism” also has ironic, even negative connotations. this points out the ambiguity in nietzsche’s reading of ancient greek culture. in his twilight of the idols, for example, he wrote a section entitled “the problem of socrates” in which he describes the socratic optimism as the reverse side of a deeper decadence. with socrates, the rabble rises to the top of society. socratic philosophy expressed, nietzsche thought, a deep contempt for life. “life is no good”, socrates might have thought. perhaps this came about as a result of his having penetrated into the finitude of life, into the death and impermanence that characterizes all things human. but in his earlier book, the birth of tragedy, section 18, nietzsche wrote that greek culture was “alexandrian” (“apollonian” as opposed to “dionysian”) and “socratic”. as such, it was characterized by an over-bounding desire to know whereby to know was to conquer as alexander the great had conquered the whole known world. it was also to be thus under the spell of a beautiful illusion: namely, the “cheerfulness of (the) theoretical man” blindly possessed by an insatiable desire to know and by the “delusion of being able thereby to heal the wound of existence.” and this, nietzsche thought, still characterized the situation of modern europe in the late nineteenth century. it, too, is a culture energized by a will to know, and in knowing, possessing, and above all, mastering. but whether pessimistic or optimistic, classical greek culture and philosophy both began to look at the world with a new wonder and to question the relations and possibilities of human existence in ways unheard of before them. this has been called their “enlightenment” (a cultural period dating from, roughly, the middle 6th to the fourth centuries), and the philosopher, in the form of socratic man, was an essential part of it. charles freeland 103 but the relations between the philosopher, especially in the person of socrates, and the athenian polis, were not always so harmonious and accommodating. excessive (hubristic) in his desire (eros) for beauty and knowledge and somewhat aristocratic or oligarchic in his political inclinations, he quickly found himself at odds with athenian society. he asked too many questions and the results of his inquiries were rarely satisfactory. he was thought arrogant in his dealings with other people, especially with the athenian court, and appeared to meddle in the business of others when he questioned them about the kinds and quality of lives they were living. his attitudes about the gods and goddesses were controversial. he was seen communing with strange spirit deities. he asked about things in a way that was outside of accepted religious and ritual frameworks and that was implicitly critical of those frameworks. although he appears in his last days as arguing in support of the democratic laws of athens, addressing them as though democratic laws were the philosopher’s virtual parents, he was long suspected as being an ally of a kind of spartan oligarchy and an enemy of athenian democracy. he claimed (see plato’s the apology of socrates) that his work, his questioning and questionable work as a philosopher, was a continuation of the work of the gods and that he had been stationed in athens like a soldier on a mission from god. little wonder, then, that people thought him odd, bad mannered, and potentially dangerous. little wonder, too, that the athenian youth found him so irresistible. alciabiades, for example, the brilliant, corrupt, and traitorous athenian general, blamed for the athenian military disaster at syracuse in 415413 b.c., was particularly smitten, if one can believe what he says about socrates in the symposium. all of this came to a head in the trial of socrates that was finally conducted in the year 399 b.c., after the end of the peloponnesian war. here, the philosopher was charged with impiety and with corrupting the youth. these may have been cover charges, perhaps, because to an amnesty following the end of the war with sparta, crimes alleged to have been committed during the war years could not be brought to trial. so, these charges were drafted instead of the ones the enemies of socrates would have liked: namely, that socrates was an enemy of athenian democracy and that his philosophical practice was undermining its constitution and its institutions. especially because 104 prajñâ vihâra socrates had so closely defined philosophy in terms of education (paideia) in justice and in the good, and because his educational programs were so critical of the given mythological, religious, contexts, and because he had thereby become identified with another potentially dangerous lot, the sophists, he thus became the target for a conservative backlash in athens which had no doubt been brewing for some decades before 399 b.c.. so, in aristophanes’ comic play, the clouds, for example, produced in the spring of 423 b.c., socrates is shown swinging from a basket suspended from a high wire as he attempts ludicrously to study the clouds as meteorological phenomena rather than as divinities. caricatured in the play as the strange director of a kind of “school for sophists”, a man unkempt and contemptuous of social conventions, socrates was also shown teaching the young how make weaker arguments seem stronger and, when not doing that, pursuing his nonsensical and materialistic questions and theories about the natural world (“that there is no zeus and that the sun is a stone”, and “how many flea-feet can a flea jump?”), and finally, and most dangerously, he taught the young how to question the authority of their parents and even to physically beat them if necessary. that there were no hard feelings on socrates’ part because of the rough treatment he received in this parody of sophistic teachings is shown in an anecdote repeated in charles rowan beye’s ancient greek literature and society (cornell university press, 1987, p. 104). beye relates how socrates was in the audience at the performance of the play and that he even stood up to show the audience how well the mask worn by the actor resembled his own real face. but, socrates also claimed in his 399 b.c. defense speech before the athenian court that this play had contributed to a prejudice against him and that this prejudice was, indeed, the background to the present charges he was then facing, especially those of impiety and corrupting the youth. but, whether true or not, this does pose the question of the wider cultural and political setting for socratic philosophy and the consequences and impact that philosophy had within athenian classical society. what was this ‘enlightenment’ that the sophists and philosophers offered to their students? the word ‘enlightenment’ refers in a general way to the retreat or withdrawal of an essentially religious or mythological outlook on the world and its gradual transformation into a more charles freeland 105 recognizably philosophical and scientific outlook. in terms outside of religion or myth, in a discourse that both borrowed from and transformed the prevailing religious frameworks, the greek philosophers, tragedians, and scientists had begun to question human existence in all its relations with earth and sky, gods and men. during the greek enlightenment of fifth-century, athens was thus the stage for an explosion of experiments and invention in poetry and tragic drama, art, philosophy, and science. many philosophers shared the perception of human existence as deeply divided between the desires of the flesh and those of the spirit. they saw human nature as defined and determined by its essential and radical finitude, that is to say, by death and all else that divides human existence and keeps it from becoming divine. deep human spiritual yearnings for knowledge, immortality, beauty, harmony, and power are evidence of a definitively human desire to transcend the limits of the human condition. certainly, one finds similar expressions of this in other cultures. there was, indeed, an important tradition of wisdom in ancient china and india, and in some ways their reflections on ethics and politics parallel those of the greeks (one thinks, for example of the parallels between the greek kaloskagathos, the beautiful and good gentleman, and the notion of the “superior man” or the “man of wisdom” found in the writings of confucius or mencius, or of the ways in which ancient chinese philosophy posed the essential questions of good self government, or ethics, and the relations of ethics and politics, for another). but this should not cover over the uniqueness of either the greek or the asian examples. the word “philosophy”, especially in its platonistic and socratic usages, is, after all, a greek word, and, as such, it is deeply rooted in a distinctly greek outlook on life and the world. thus, the ‘enlightenment’ promised by socrates required the faceto-face encounter of living conversation. this is how enlightenment was to be achieved. not by private meditation, but in the public conversations among fellow citizens. socrates thus adopted the dialogue form in which he questions both himself and others especially about ethics and about the best way for a human being to live. in the course of his conversations, socrates must confront the forces of religious myths, and of sophistry. both cephalus and thrasymachus, from book one of plato’s republic can be seen as representing these outlooks. in his conversations with 106 prajñâ vihâra them, socrates was seeking a kind of enlightenment whereby one would live a better life in this life and in this world. and this meant a living life devoted in part to the overcoming of ignorance, especially self-ignorance. he called it “the examined life”. realized through dialogue, socratic ‘enlightenment’ was, thus, a kind of purging or purification of the soul of socrates’ interlocutor of all the false opinions it held. this would allow the soul to then receive proper instruction in the truth. so, book one of the republic, for example, shows how, in order to bring the concept of true justice into view, it is necessary first to confront the forces of ritual and myth and, above all, sophistry, which stand in the way. socratic enlightenment would thus amount to a turning of the human soul toward the good and towards true justice. standing in the way of this are not only the sophists, but also the many religious myths that formed the backbone of classical greek education, (see book two for a thorough discussion of the negative influence of homeric and hesiodic myths on education). these would be the enemies of this paideic turning of the soul, for they would only reinforce selfishness and fear at the expense of true knowledge. we would like now to show the importance of these two cultural contexts – that of the religious and mythic-ritual culture and that of the competing sophistic movement — for the platonic and socratic ethical and political philosophy as found in plato’s republic, and to discuss why they had to be confronted by the philosopher. ii. first, however, some general questions: what was philosophy for the ancient greeks and what cultural factors nourished its emergence in greece from the archaic through the classical periods (the 6th to the 4th centuries)? philosophy, in its greek manifestations, has become associated with a feeling of wonder and a desire for knowledge. it posed the question of being, of ultimate reality, and of human existence, a question posed in such a way that it appeared to owe nothing to the context of religious experience. unlike religious myth, the first philosophers did not identify the origins and sources from which existence springs with the gods. “what charles freeland 107 directs the cosmos,” heraclitus said, “is both willing and unwilling to be called zeus.” as the young nietzsche observed, the greeks sought to formulate the essential being of existence not in terms of a god or goddess but in terms of an element, ‘water’, in the case of thales, ‘fire’ for heraclitus, ‘air’ for anaxagoras, and so on. where to know meant to know the ultimate principles and sources of all things, this knowledge sought not a divinity, but a material element, something more akin to the ancient words of night, of earth and chaos than to the anthropomorphic deities of greek mythology. this was certainly a change in perspective, and part of a more generalized greek ‘enlightenment’. but the philosophers were also looking, somewhat in the manner of the mythological outlook, for a way to express the seeming unity and rationality of existence. the idea that “all things are somehow one” was an idea with a receptive ear in both the poet and the philosopher. for the philosopher, however, this unity, this “logos” as heraclitus would call it, was rational rather than religious or mythical. access to it was through thought, through questioning, through intellectual insight and conversation with others and in the face of others rather than through religious ritual. thus, the philosopher could well seem to a more conservative audience to be somehow at odds with religious conventions and to be perhaps a danger to a society in which social and political legitimacy often had mythic and religious foundations. a conservative backlash against the enlightenment in general and against the philosopher was evident, as we have already seen, in greek tragedy and comedy. moreover, because of the way he questions, because, one could presume, of the power of his rhetoric and his skill in argumentation, socrates was also taken to be a sophist, not a philosopher, then, but someone intent only on false persuasions and on rhetorical virtuosity. this would be a dangerous confusion, in socrates’ eyes, of true philosophy and sophistry, for the latter does not teach truth. we shall return to this shortly. in his apology socrates denied that he is a sophist on the grounds that he had nothing to teach and that he was poor and had never earned money for his work. but beyond those rather superficial issues, there was socrates’ more important concern that philosophical education in the virtues, in justice, for example, was being taken as a kind of skillful 108 prajñâ vihâra game that one plays for one’s own benefit. to this socrates replied that his one and only concern was for truth and for turning the souls of the young toward the good. thus, turning the tables on his judges, socrates repeats how his philosophical activity, his questioning of the poets, politicians, and the artisans, was an important way of continuing the work of the gods insofar as it sought the true grounds for the possibility of human happiness and well-being, (eudaimonia, as this is called in greek), and to oppose him thereby could itself be taken as a form of disrespect for the gods. an arrogant, heedless claim, no doubt, one that even he may not have taken all that seriously, but one that nonetheless earned him the cruel enmity of the state. so, in answer to the question of the chief role and concern of philosophy, socrates would have said that it is a true preparation for death in the sense that it is a mode of taking care of one’s soul, taking care of the immortal dimension of every human individual. this was his path of ‘enlightenment’, which does not mean just the pursuit of theoretical wisdom, no matter how lofty the latter may seem, but the pursuit of a better human life in this world. for this, philosophy was above all education in the virtues, especially justice, the unity of all the virtues and the sole ground for human happiness. philosophy’s chief concern was thus for education in justice and in the other virtues. it was the path that should be followed by all who seek the good and by all who seek thereby to realize the ultimate possibilities of human existence. and insofar as philosophy was education in justice and in the good, it was necessary for it to confront the forces of myth and ritual, on one hand, and sophistic rhetoric on the other. let us now focus on these issues as they develop in book one of plato’s republic. in the republic, set perhaps in the year of 421 b.c. during the peloponnesian war and during one of the lulls in that war, the peace of nicias, these issues are again strongly evident. socrates is much younger in this dialogue, yet in the images and allegories he presents in the course of his night-long conversation with the young glaucon and adeimantus, brothers of plato, on the question of justice, he seems to already know the fortune that is to befall him in the year 399 b.c. he recognizes already that the wisdom seeker will be at odds with conventional society and common opinion and that there will be dangers, charles freeland 109 especially when the philosopher seeks to educate others and lead them out of the cave of human political life and onto the true paths of the just life. he shares these visions with his young interlocutors, emphasizing the risks of the philosophical life as well as its divine-like pleasures. but first, socrates must show his young interlocutors how both the mythic view and the sophistic views of justice are mistaken, and how they have misconceived both the rewards and burdens of the just life. there are readings of plato’s republic for which the whole dialogue is set in a mythical context. not only does the dialogue open with socrates and his friends on the way to see a certain spectacular thracian festival featuring horsemen bearing torches, but also the dialogue can itself perhaps be interpreted as presenting the mythic journey of the soul as it seeks the higher, transcendent realms of knowledge and existence. the dialogue’s visions and allegories show a journey of the soul, one taken perhaps after death, as the soul ascends the ladder of true being and knowing. no doubt plato placed the human soul and the care, as he called it for the human soul, at the center of his concerns, for the soul, he held, was the immortal dimension of human existence. so there should be no surprise in seeing this theme as central to the republic. but, in book one of the republic, where an old man, socrates’ host for the evening, is shown preparing himself for ritual sacrifices at the altar of the gods, the question of the proper care for the human soul is raised in connection with the question of justice. as the dialogue opens, cephalus, who is described as aged and as rich, is concerned about what will happen to his soul after his death. he is concerned about whether or not he has lived a just life. old age has its benefits, he tells the younger socrates, specifically in the ways it frees the human soul from being a prisoner to physical, sexual lusts. but it also brings trepidations aroused by the terrors and tales told in the myths about what happens to the souls of the unjust. greek poetry and myth were replete with stories about how the unjust are tortured after death and how the gods reward the just. what should one do in order to be favorably remembered by the gods? is it enough to perform ritual ceremonies and to attempt as though in a business arrangement to purchase the good will of the gods, as though one’s true character counts 110 prajñâ vihâra for little and one’s purchasing power counts for everything? should one only be concerned for the just life when one is old and presumably too old to learn about justice and the living of a just life? isn’t it too late then, when one’s life is over, to worry about whether or not one has lived justly? for socrates, a poor and younger man, it would seem cephalus’ concerns would suggest that he, socrates, could neither be just nor in the position to raise the important concerns of justice. so, when cephalus defines justice as making sure paying what one owes and as telling the truth, all but the latter component in this definition would seem to leave socrates out, for he was poor and by all accounts, cared nothing for money. no doubt cephalus represents a prevailing strain of conservative thought and action in classical greek culture. whether or not the greeks believed in their myths, they certainly placed stock in the idea that how one lived might influence the kind of torments or rewards one might receive in the next life. there was widespread belief in the idea that the soul survived the death of the body. belief in rebirth or reincarnation was widespread, even among philosophers, plato included. but cephalus seems only concerned about the next life, whereas socrates’ idea seems to be that one must first get this life right and that if that is the case, one need not worry about the next life. indeed, socrates only speaks of the next life in mythic terms. what comes after death cannot be a subject of knowledge. there is only myth. but, for socrates, one must live one’s life as though one’s actions and the choices one made counted for something. no harm can come to the good man, he is fond of saying, and education in justice can bring about a condition of the human soul in which one can live best both in this life and in the next. by the time one is old, it is too late for sacrifices, and little can be done finally to assuage the lingering suspicions that one has not lived one’s life in the best manner possible. justice and the just life, where these are defined in terms of virtues and of human excellence of living, cannot thus be brought about merely through proper business dealings. they require thought, and they require critical thinking about what one is doing and what the principles for one’s action really are and whether they are good principles and how those principles have indeed guided one’s actions. cephalus has never taken these dimensions into account because, for him, justice is a simple charles freeland 111 matter of lighting the incense at the altars and of purchasing one’s peace of mind through the exercise of religious ritual. how one has lived, what one was in the course of human life can be altered or arranged through the proper ministry of ritual. of course, should one be unburdened of any fears for the next life or for the mythic vengeance of the gods, there are no longer any reasons remaining to be just. then, there is only this life, and one should then pursue it with all the gusto one can muster. one can then let one’s full appetites and lusts rule one’s actions. socrates dialogues with cephalus because no doubt he in some way represents the conventional elements of greek religious culture. so, socrates, the philosopher, felt obligated in the name of truth to interrogate and to critically examine the claims of myths and ritual practices to be guides for human action. should one ground one’s life on or base one’s life on fear? fear of what may befall one in the next life? for this is what the poets taught. in any event, the real issue for socrates is to elaborate a definition of justice that owes nothing to the rewards or fine consequences that may come from justice. glaucon and adeimantus rightly demand an account of justice in which justice is perceived as desirable in itself and not for its rewards. this is the challenge socrates must face and it is one that is first and most forcefully presented in the person and in the arguments of a sophist named thrasymachus. who were the sophists and what were their goals? according to jean-pierre vernant, especially three major cultural transformations contributed to the emergence of philosophy. first, discussed above, was the transformation of religious and mythic culture. secondly, there were the economic and technical transformations that brought about not only the use of money as a medium of exchange but in the opening of new markets and foreign exchanges and relations. this brought new ideas and perspectives that enriched the philosophical culture of ancient greece. but thirdly there was the sophistic movement and the use of persuasion as playing an important role in greek political life. as there was no king or monarch to dictate the course of political life in greece or to proclaim by decree what the laws of the land would be, persuasion and skills in persuasion became more important in deciding the types and nature of 112 prajñâ vihâra law to be obeyed by all citizens. in greek democratic society each and every citizen, no matter how modest their station in life, stood a chance of becoming head of state, or occupying some other strategic role in greek political society. thus, the sophists were traveling teachers who taught skills in rhetoric to young men desiring political success. for socrates, the sophists were especially dangerous in that they taught the powers of persuasion over those of truth. to speak the truth (parrhesia) in political contexts was something of a political right in ancient athenian culture. yet, the sophists had turned this into the teaching of rhetoric, (speeches made especially to the assembly and to the law courts), the art of the powers of persuasion, but did so at the expense of truth. nietzsche showed how rhetoric belongs to a culture that still lives in the grip of mythic images. such a culture, he said, has not yet developed a sense of historical fact. its people want to be persuaded, seduced, by images and conventions rather than be instructed in the truth. (see his “description of ancient rhetoric”, texts from a lecture course given in 1872-73) thus, there are links between the mythic culture of cephalus and the sophistic culture of thrasymachus. the sophists practiced and taught the art of persuasion rather than truth telling. this is an important issue for socrates. his defense speech before the athenian court and the jury of 501 begins by telling the court that meletus has been so persuasive in his opening remarks to the court that even he, socrates has almost forgotten who he is. socrates’ accusers have been very persuasive, yet they did not tell the truth about who he, socrates, is. so, socrates says that it shall be his mission that day before his fellow athenian citizens and before the judges and his accusers alike to tell the truth, to present himself to the court as he is in truth. the risk, of course, is that truth is not persuasive. so, from the beginning of his defense speech, his apology, socrates points out a distinction, (which, one could suppose, he considered unfortunate), that truth telling, especially in cases such as this in which one has been a target of slanderous accusations, was not often persuasive. the distinction is also implied in the phaedrus (247d), where socrates proclaims, “the truth is my subject.” odd as it may seem, book one of the republic shows the ideal of telling the truth about justice as something actually shared by both socrates and the sophist, thrasymachus. the sophist here, too, intends charles freeland 113 to tell the truth about justice. he will ‘give the show away’, so to speak, about successful tyrants and reveal the tricks and delusions by which tyrant, like the perfect puppeteer he must be, works the strings of the sheep-like people he governs. the sophist will show how justice, for the many, amounts to no more than legal conventionalism, or, obedience to the law, and which they, the ruled and the governed, foolishly take to be to their advantage, especially insofar as they are, like sheep, herd animals and find their safety and security in obedience. but, thrasymachus continues, the law is not to their advantage but to the advantage of the ruler, the ruthless and cunning tyrant who has an eye out for one thing only, his own self-interest, which, thrasymachus allows, he understands perfectly. thus, the tyrant might seem to have perfect self-knowledge and to have, therefore, perfect self-master and self-possession. but as socrates will show, the tyrant is defined and guided by his appetites, especially the irrational desire to always get more or to get the better of everyone, his likes as well as his opposites. so, he is always at war with himself and with others. the tyrant, thrasymachus says, legislates the law, changes the constitution, and in doing so, slants and distorts the law so that it benefits him by feeding his interests. those who obey the law, meanwhile, really end up benefiting not themselves, but the tyrant. naïve, well-intended obedience to law, obedience to slanted and unjust laws, is by far the most economical and efficient way for the tyrant to maintain his grip on absolute power. no police force is needed in such a system to keep people in line. they are happy to obey, innocent as they are of the true nature of justice and its apparent opposite, injustice. this is where the sophist’s craft comes in. it shall be the sophist’s job to teach the skill of persuasion to others, potential tyrants, so that they might employ it to create false images of themselves as just and lawful men so that they can appear to be just before the public and so be better able privately to practice perfect injustice. justice then becomes a mirror game, a sucker’s game, and a technique in the most insidious sense of the word. against this, socrates would like to uphold a vision of justice as stronger, more unified, and more successful, therefore, than injustice. but socrates must first show the inconsistencies in thrasymachus’s ‘truthful’ account of justice. where thrasymachus attempts to tell the 114 prajñâ vihâra truth about justice, whereby justice is not a benefit to the just but only to the unjust, and where he further admits that this will work only if the just and obedient ones do not see justice for what it is but for what it is not, socrates must show that this cannot be the case, and that thrasymachus is mistaken. ironically, socrates shows that the only way for the unjust man to succeed in his dealings is for him to be just rather than unjust. justice here implies not obedience to the law but cooperation and harmony with others, the way musicians play together to create beautiful music. thrasymachus’s contention that the unjust man will always try to get the better of everyone, just and unjust alike, is quickly shown by socrates to be self-defeating. the unjust man can only succeed if he at some point agrees to cooperate with others. he will need allies and this will require justice. even thieves do not steal from one another, for if they do, they will be defeated. so, socrates suspects that thrasymachus is, beneath his sophistic appearances, a true lover of knowledge, and socrates would like to bring this out and enlist thrasymachus as an ally in the struggle to find true justice and to provide an account of true justice that will also be persuasive in that it will indeed turn the souls of the hearers of the conversation and the discourse on justice toward the good. thus, it will contribute to the education of the guardians. their education will be effective and complete only when it is education in true justice. thus, their education will bring about and maintain a stable condition (hexis) of justice in their souls that will shield them from all evil. again, the distinction between telling the truth and speaking in a way that persuades but does not tell the truth is strongly pertinent. by the tentative and unsatisfactory conclusion of the dialogue with thrasymachus in book one, socrates has roughly sketched a conception of justice in which justice is more than merely a skill whereby one pursues one’s self interests and always seeks one’s own advantage over others. if justice is such a skill, it will, like many skills, be stricken by the ambiguity of being fully capable of doing either great good or great harm, as is medicine, for example. so, justice, too, would be a kind of pharmakon, the kind of thing that can equally kill or cure. this is especially the case where justice, as a deceitful technique practiced by the tyrant, is linked charles freeland 115 to the technique of rhetoric and where the tyrant uses persuasive rhetoric to succeed in his attempts to get his own advantage over others. but for socrates, on the other hand, justice must be seen not as a skill, something instrumental, calculating, and linked to rhetoric, but as a virtue, an excellence of soul and practical action, and, therefore, a component essential to the well being of both the individual and the political community (polis). because it is a virtue, justice shall benefit the just, for it is a life (bios) guided by intelligence and harmony rather than by the always restless chaos of the appetites. justice becomes, then, a paramount virtue unifying the private and public domains by practically eliminating the distinction between the private and the public. the private was always a threat, in socrates’ view, for the ‘private’ meant the home, women, private lives and private interests. such environments only nourish self-interests by turning the individual away from the public toward his own private life (bios). through his truthful and hopefully persuasive speech, (logos), socrates hopes to secure a life, (bios), linked to the social and to the community rather than to the private sphere. but in this new logos on justice, the bios socrates seeks is one in which one’s self interests, far from being set aside, are cultivated such that they become isomorphic with the interests of the whole political community. justice pays. that shall be shown in the long account that follows book one to be the truth of justice, insofar as a human being can know it and give expression (in true accounts, or true opinions) to it. throughout, though, one should not miss this connection socrates is making between truth and persuasion, for what is at issue in these discussions is the link between logos and bios, between the principles that one adopts and the life one lives. this is what everyone must seek and question for themselves, especially when they meet socrates. whether politician, poet, or artisan, one must give an account of oneself, one must tell the truth about oneself and the kind of life one is living. (see also plato’s laches, 187e –188e) so, the debate with the sophists and socrates’ concern for the difference between telling the truth and merely being persuasive is a crucial one insofar as ethics and politics are concerned. for socrates, justice itself, both an ethical and a political virtue, is largely a matter of human life (bios) being guided by right principles (logos) and rational desires, such that to flourish as both an 116 prajñâ vihâra individual and as a member of the political community depends upon it.* iii. socrates’ questions concerning the best life for the individual and for the political community resonated throughout greek classical culture. in this concluding section, we would like to set forth a sketch of some of the background cultural questions and tensions that should be taken into account for a better understanding of yet another important question one finds in plato’s republic, a question as relevant today as it was in classical times, namely, the question of the relation between the individual and the state, the private and the public domains. first, what was an “individual” in classical greek culture? again, classical greece is often identified with or defined by “humanism”. by and large, humanism here refers the ways in which greeks put the human dimension at the center of their concerns. as was quoted above, “man is the measure of all things.” sculptures of gods and goddesses were anthropomorphic – the greek individual written large, in bronze letters, and so made monumental. the bronze sculptures of zeus found in the sea, or the so-called riace warriors, are all heroic visions of the greek individual. he is shown athletic, free standing, proud, independent, and capable, as the weapons he brandishes testify. earlier sculptures, the famous kritian boy (c. 480 b.c.), for example, show at an even earlier date many of the same features. gods or men? it would be difficult to say. there were, and not only in plato and aristotle, but more generally in greek culture, descriptions of the kaloikagathoi, the beautiful, good, noble and ‘just’ individuals. they were those who had realized in their lifetimes a kind of special worth (time) that was so important for athenian culture. time social worth, or reputation was wholly in the eye of the beholder, so it was an important form of the social marking of identity. as such, the individual as kalloskagathos was, literally, the beautiful *my discussion of the relations between bios and logos is indebted to m. foucault’s “discourse and truth” unpublished transcript of a seminar given at u.c. berkeley in 1983.) charles freeland 117 man, the virtuous man who could lead others and lead himself as well. he was the one of special time, one whose life had become a work of art, a thing of beauty to be much admired, especially in the poems and myths, the memories, in short, that would be told about him and his time long after his death. so, the conception of the kalloskagathos is linked to the greek awareness of human finitude and of the more general greek conviction that such life at best is but a wretched shadow of life lived in the here and now. the man is beautiful and so the subject of legend and memory; so, in the language and the words of the mythos, he will live on, or at least the statue dedicated in his memory will serve to prompt the recall of what he, too, once was. again, a link between bios and logos, where, in this instance, it is immortal life that is promised for the kalloskagathos insofar as he shall live on in the collective memory of the community. perhaps this is the worth, the time that becomes the stuff of legends, that socrates is implicitly holding out to the young glaucon and adeimantus an implicit promise that, not despite the intrinsic worth of justice, the just life will also bring about a condition of such time and such remembered beauty for them, as well. moreover, there is a related notion that may help us to understand the nature and purposes of the platonic-socratic dialogue technique, and that is the cultural and political fact that, insofar as one was a male and an athenian citizen, one primarily lived one’s life in the face-to-face encounter with others, and that to be recognized by others was all important, and that self-knowledge, a classical and humanistic ideal, was possible only through others, especially in the ‘face-to-face’, let us say, of the living conversation, the word, the logos shared with others, in the eyes and ears of the other. aristotle’s discussion of friendship in the nicomachaean ethics is quite clear on this point: self-knowledge is possible only through or by way of friendships with others. so, in the socratic dialogue, wherein one must give an account of oneself, there is also an ongoing search for self-knowledge. but, what was this ‘self’ that was, or that could be known? according to vernant (the greeks, translated by charles lambert and teresa levendar fagan, chicago, 1995, p. 19), the individual in classical greek society was not the same as the individual in modern european society. the greek individual was not a bearer of universal 118 prajñâ vihâra rights. there were no “human rights” in humanistic classical athens. moreover, the classical or archaic (pre-classical period from late seventh to the early 5th centuries b.c.) individual was not a “person” in the sense of having a secret, singular inner life that would lie at the foundations of the originality and the possibility of anyone saying “me”. as the discussion of time has shown, everything seemed most importantly on the surface of appearances. there being no real inner life, the athenian individual was essentially social and community directed. having no concept of the private person, the greeks used the word idiotes, “idiot”, in modern english, to describe the person withdrawn from his ‘true self’ which was public man. (see ancient greek literature and society, by charles rowan beye, cornell university press, 1987, p. 104) but, and this will lead us to our next important point, there was in the democratic regimes of athenian political history, despite all these communal and polis related tendencies, considerable emphasis placed on the private domain. so, vernant, in his discussion of this, quotes thucydides, (2.37.2-3) where he points out the freedom and privacy enjoyed by athenians: “…. far from exercising a jealous surveillance over each other, we do not feel called upon to be angry with our neighbor for doing what he likes….” but, in connection with time, there is an important, socially restraining dimension: how one appeared to others in the sight of others was an important part of the calculation of time. knowledge, idea, (eidos), are all sight words, or directly imply the in-sight of intelligence, and self-knowledge was realizable only in sight of others, in the face-to-face encounter with others. so, the greek individual was first and above all, a citizen, and the passage of the young man into fullfledged citizenship and adulthood were important transitions in life. for the philosophers, the individual was, most importantly, a public and political kind of animal. (aristotle). thus, the lead issue for socrates concerning his debate with the sophists and with the poets and myth-tellers is how such logoi affect the bios of the individuals who hear them. plato’s overt concern for this, expressed in the context of a discussion of the dangers of democracy in book eight of the republic (557a-c), is precisely that free speech, (parrhesia), something encouraged in democratic regimes, would be coupled with not only the freedom of each and all to tell the truth but charles freeland 119 with the freedom of each and all to their own choice of life. democratic tendencies with regards to logos would have disastrous consequences for both the bios of the individual and for the greater polis. (“….and isn’t the (democratic) city full of freedom and free speech? and isn’t there license in it to do whatever one wants?.…and where there’s license, it’s plain that each man would organize his life privately just as it pleased him….” republic 557a-c). in other words, for plato, the chief danger of speeches, and the freedom to speak and to tell the truth, is that it might lead to everyone choosing a free and private life, that it would thus bring harm to social cohesion. (see also foucault, op. cited, p. 54.) how to persuade the citizens of a democratic regime of the dangers of democracy in which the freedoms promised are illusory and self destructive, and because of their emphasis on the private at the expense of the public domains, and how democracies then become the breeding grounds and hatcheries for the tyrannical souls that will grow to become the eager pupils of sophists such as thrasymachus. thus, plato’s great, almost mythic dialogue on the just life must be seen as written from within the cultural, historical and political context of an athenian world that was dynamic rather than static, and that was endlessly involved in an ongoing and frequently violent debate about the virtues of democracy versus oligarchy and tyranny. plato’s questions thus seem as essential to ancient culture as to our own, and in addressing his concerns in this way, we have shown how plato’s texts still speak to us today, wherever there are societies in which human beings ask about the ways and possibilities of true human happiness and justice. for these seem, the leading questions in plato’s republic, the question of the examined life, the question and the quest that seeks a true account of justice that will succeed in persuading and so turning the human soul toward the good; an account of justice that will show it to be the intellectual, conceptual principle of ethical life and, as such, the practical cause of excellence in the action for both the individual and the community. in the platonic-socratic conception of the just man, justice will be more than merely obeying the law. it will be that virtuous life that binds the individual to the community of his fellow citizens whereby both individual and community alike will attain to a kind of health, harmony and well being of soul that is the best possible for a human 120 prajñâ vihâra being, given the radical finitude of the human situation. it is only in this that one can find from within the radical finitude of the human situation a true opening to infinite life, not only in that other men will remember the beauty of one’s life, but that one will also be remembered by the gods. charles freeland 121 references foucault, michel, fearless speech. edited by joseph pearson. los angeles: semiotext (e): 2001. gadamer, hans-georg, the idea of the good in platonic-aristotelian philosophy. translated by p. christopher smith. new haven and london: yale, 1986. nietzsche, friedrich, on rhethoric and language (1872-3). edited and translated by sander l. gliman, carole blair and david j. parent, new york and oxford: oxford, 1989. plato, republic. translated by g.h.a. grube. indianapolis: hackett publishing co., 1974. _______, phaedrus. translated by alexander nehamas and paul woodruff, indianapolis: hackett, 1955. vernant, jean-pierre, mythe et pensée chez les grecs. paris: editions la découverte, 1985. 122 prajñâ vihâra analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 1 communicating toward personhood susan t. gardner abstract: marshalling a mind-numbing array of data, harvard political scientist robert d. putnam, in his book bowling alone, shows that on virtually every conceivable measure, civic participation, or what he refers to as “social capital,” is plummeting to levels not seen for almost 100 years. and we should care, putnam argues, because connectivity is directly related to both individual and social wellbeing on a wide variety of measures. on the other hand, social capital of the “bonding kind” brings with it the ugly side effect of animosity toward outsiders. given the increasing heterogeneity of our world, the goal therefore must be to enhance connectivity of the “bridging sort,” i.e., connecting across differences. this, in turn, requires that we first clarify what bridging communicative styles looks like. examining communication as it might transpire (a) in kant’s kingdom of ends, (b) through the perspective of habermas’ “communicative action,” and (c) within the scientific community, offers a compelling suggestion that there is a way of communicating such that, if adopted, one would come to view others as if they were persons, i.e., that a bridging communicative style facilitates a kind of bonding that sees through differences toward the commonality of personhood. this paper will briefly explore how communicating toward personhood might be promoted. the need to increase social capital. in his dense and provocative book bowling alone—published at the opening of this new century, 1 robert d. putnam, harvard political scientist and the peter and isabel malkin professor of public policy, argues that, with regard to social capital, i.e., those fundamental bonds that keep us connected to one another, we are on the verge of going bankrupt. marshalling a mind-numbing array of data, putnam shows that on virtually every conceivable measure, from political participation, to volunteering, to religious affiliation, to union membership, to participation in organized sport (hence the title), even to sharing dinner with friends, civic participation is plummeting to levels not seen for almost 100 years. and we should care, putnam argues, because connectivity is, on the one hand, inversely related to crime, while, on the other, positively related with economic prosperity, physical health, overall sense of personal well-being and how well education works. those with “can-do” attitudes will immediately respond, “well, tell us the cause, and we’ll fix the problem”— and putnam obliges by presenting a plethora of data that suggests that there are a number of factors that contribute to these dissipating social bonds, amongst them “time famine” caused by increasing commute times and the technological invasion of the home, as well as the fact that the prime mover of social bonding has left her post. but putnam warns against this disease model of getting rid of the germs in order to get the patient back to health—or what he refers to as a “reactionary form of nostalgia.” he notes that just as those experiencing the social chaos of rapid urbanization in the 1890’s ought to have resisted the temptation to say that, “life was much nicer back in the village. everybody back to the farm,” so we ought to resist the temptation to say “life was much nicer back in the fifties. would all women please report to the kitchen, and turn off the tv on the way.”2 well, no kidding. but let us not lose the essential point that is buried in the jest of this facetious comment, and that is that the onus lies with us to create unique ways of reconnecting with one another as we go forward into the twenty-first century. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 2 putnam does not leave us entirely without a compass, however. he notes that while what he refers to as “bonding social capital” has all the merits previously described, it brings with it its own poison, namely that, while reinforcing connection with those on the inside, it likewise tends to reinforce animosity toward those on the outside. as well, bonded groups, as we are all too well aware, can be far more effective in their capacity to execute nefarious ends than individuals in isolation. indeed, it is surely not outside the realm of probability to suggest—though putnam never actually mentions this—that at least one psychological factor contributing to the dramatic drop in social capital might very well be the revulsion of enlightened thinkers toward the inherent, often irrational, conformity and exclusivity that group membership entails. one way to try to avoid the negative side effect of “bonding social capital” would be, instead, to focus on “bridging social capital.” putnam explains the difference between these two kinds of social capital by pointing out that “bonding” social capital is like joining a “favor bank”—“i’ll do this for you now in expectation that you will return the favor.” “bridging” social capital, by contrast, requires the adoption of the norm of “generalized reciprocity”: “i’ll do this for you without expecting anything specific from you, in the confident expectation that someone else will do something for me down the road.” putnam goes on to liken the greater social efficacy of “bridging” over “bonding” by noting that “a society characterized by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than barter.” and he says elsewhere that “bonding social capital constitutes a kind of sociological superglue”—apparently meaning that people in relatively small groups get really stuck on one another, whereas “bridging social capital provides a sociological wd-40” –presumably meaning that “bridging individuals” are more able to engage in relatively “squeak-free” interaction with a large variety of individuals.3 from a philosopher’s point of view, since putnam’s research (presumably by necessity) focuses on bonded groups, the big question that he leaves untouched is what a bridging person would look like. what kind of communicative style would fuel such bridging social connectivity? how might we articulate its guiding principle? in order to avoid the treacly sweet, “kumbaya”4 “love they neighbor sort” of admonition that tends to glue people together against those who are not their neighbors, let us begin with the more academic suggestion that bridging will be markedly facilitated if we see (as opposed to love) other humans as persons “like ourselves.” let’s try to unpack what such a suggestion might entail. seeing persons clearly, to see humans as persons requires a lot more than seeing humans as merely humans. when we see humans as humans only, what we see are animals of the species homo sapiens. to treat humans as humans only would be to treat them as animals only and thus, to echo kant, would be to treat them as a means only (which is not in any sense, by the way, to condone the despicable way that we humans treat animals). what kant would have humans do, rather, is to treat humans also always as “ends.” what precisely might this involve? according to kant, to treat others as ends-in-themselves is to treat others as primarily self-conscious rational agents. this admonition is harder to understand than may at first appear since self-conscious rationality is, from an “excluded spectator” point of view, completely invisible. this is so because an agent cannot see self-conscious rationality in another unless s/he is able to understand and potentially linguistically interact with that other. it is this language barrier that may explain why humans have such difficulty recognizing personhood as it functions outside of our species. there is, for instance, enormous evidence to suggest that whales are not only self-conscious, but as well, have a complex language of their own that differs not only across whale species, but even across pods, though we humans—no doubt because we cannot share their environment—have been unable to crack the code. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 3 since we cannot talk to whales we apparently feel relatively unencumbered by our practice of wantonly killing them, a practice that, to this day, is checked only by a concern for potential extinction, rather than for the moral health of humans who may very well be—indeed most probably are—committing mass murder. “feel free to kill those with whom you cannot communicate”: interesting dictum, which suggests that at least a necessary condition of seeing personhood is the propensity to dialogue with that other. dialoguing with a person, however, cannot mean just spitting out words, nor can it mean simply engaging in turn taking in an effort to persuade another. using words as weapons in this way is simply to don a more sophisticated manipulatory mantle that is characteristic of the push and shove techniques that we think of as characterizing the animal kingdom. the question is, then, what sort of communicative style maximizes the possibility of seeing the personhood of one’s communicative partner. seeing persons through communicative interpersonal visiting habermas, in his book, a theory of communicative action, vol. 1, takes viewing others as rational self-conscious agents seriously. he argues that you cannot judge the adequacy of an agent’s reasoned support of her assertions and/or actions—(an adequacy that can nonetheless be objectively measured5 according to how it stand up to such critical evaluation as coherence, prediction, etc.)—unless you first understand the invisible personal larger context—i.e., a person’s life-world (or lebenswelt)6—from which those assertions and/or actions make sense, i.e., seem rational, to that agent. seeing another as a unique rational self-conscious agent thus appears to be a necessary condition for being able to judge the adequacy of what habermas refers to as their criticizable validity claims.7 another way of putting this point would be to say that engaging in communicative rationality of the habermasian sort requires of participants that they render their personal boundaries highly permeable,8 i.e., that they each get comfortable both with welcoming foreigners and traveling to distant lands.9 while this “fusing of horizons”10 –as gadamer would put it—seems precisely what the doctor ordered with regard to enhancing social capital, the question that now begs an answer is how to make such a goal attractive. that is, given the time and energy expenditures required, as well as the natural tendency to self-protect, the question that now seriously surfaces is whether, and if so how, it is possible to inspire ordinary individuals to engage in the strenuous work of attempting to hermeneutically analyze of the claims of others, while welcoming hermeneutic invasion of their own turf? genuine inquiry requires a commitment to both fallibility and truth the answer, it seems to me, is as simple as it is difficult to achieve. if the goal is to inspire individuals to communicatively visit one another’s personal spaces, then clearly a necessary condition for ramping up enthusiasm for such interpersonal travel is to instill in participants an unshakeable and abiding belief in their own fallibility11. if interpersonal bridging is ever to become commonplace, in other words, the start point must begin not just with an acceptance, but with a celebration, of the fact that, regardless of the apparent adequacy of any belief, judgment, or opinion, there is always the possibility of a better answer around the corner, and that that corner may very well be within the rational self-conscious space of others. it is truth, then, with a capital t—or, more specifically, the belief that one is already in possession of the truth—that forms the fault line that tends to preclude the possibility of interpersonal bridging. it is truthpossession that blinds us to the personhood of others. but how can this be, some may wonder. after all, it is the belief in the objectivity of truth that fuels the impetus for interpersonal inquiry to begin with. why else would i go to the trouble of attempting to estimate the adequacy of your criticizable validity claims if i did not believe, from the get-go, that there were legitimate means by which to judge whether those claims were more or less adequate than the my own. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 4 we thus seem to have found ourselves in an interesting paradox. on the one hand, a belief that one has found the truth thereafter tends to close off respectful communication with those who disagree, while on the other, belief in the objectivity of truth is a necessary condition for respectful habermasian communication to begin with. respectful communication needs truth; truth can destroy respectful communication. how do we get out of this devil’s paradox? solving the “truth paradox” interestingly, this “truth paradox” is anything but a problem for those most commonly credited with pursuing truth. that is, rather than skirting it, this “truth paradox” has been actively embraced by scientists who utilize it—much to our combined benefit—through the ingenious infusion of the null hypothesis at the core of the scientific method. the null hypothesis is anchored in the recognition that one cannot verify12, for example, that “this drug always works,” and that hence, the approach must be reversed, i.e., that one must attempt to show, rather, that it is not the case the drug works. if, after a strenuous unbiased investigation, i fail to prove the null hypothesis, i.e., i fail to prove that the drug does not work, then i have grounds for believing that it is true that this drug works, but i only have grounds because, of course, the investigation itself may have been faulty. thus, though it is evident, beyond doubt, that we can make progress toward truth using the scientific method, it is built into the fact that the method employed is one of falsifiability,13 rather then verifiability, that it is incapable of revealing absolute, i.e., uncriticizabe, or unrefineable, truth. given the fact that scientists recognize that “the truth that survives falsification” is the only truth to which they have access but which is nonetheless a truth of which they can never be absolutely sure (i.e., this is truth with a small “t” 14), scientists thus remain eagerly open to public discourse with the view to ensuring continuous vetting by further inquiry. that is, it is this practical ideal of “least faulty”—though metaphysically anchored in the regulative ideal of truth with a capital t—that keeps the lines of genuine cooperative inquiry open and which invites creative contributions of colleagues. this notion of “colleague,” as used in the scientific community, is an interesting one in that it surreptitiously suggests that one of the inevitable side effects of engaging in genuine inquiry is that inquirers come to view those who are likewise engaged as allies, cohorts, associates, or collaborators in the pursuit of truth. none of which is to say, of course, that colleagues always agree, or even that they are always civil. but it is to say that, insofar as individuals are committed to tracking truth while knowing that they will never get there, they recognize that the enterprise is intrinsically intersubjective—that they have need of one another in this enterprise. it is the absolute conviction, on the one hand, that progress towards truth can be made, accompanied, on the other hand, by the absolute conviction that the truth-seeking process can never reach its end, that keeps scientists communicatively interacting with one another as if they were persons and in so doing they instantiate their mutual personhood. enhancing bridging communicative styles the answer with regard to how we might enhance bridging communicative styles so as to increase social capital, as putnam would have us do, is thus already within our midst and, indeed, has already been suggested by american pragmatists charles s. peirce15 and john dewey.16 that is, if all of us undertook to employ the scientific method in the pursuit of answers to everyday practical questions17 (which i refer to elsewhere as “scientific ethicism”18), the happy result ought to be, on the one hand, the production of better solutions to human problems, while on the other, the enhancement of the human capacity to see co-inquirers as persons. it is inquiry in the pursuit of truth that one knows can nonetheless never be fully grasped, in other words, that creates the analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 5 “in-between”—in martin buber’s19 words—where persons can meet in the middle, and in so doing, perceive one another as “thous” rather than merely as “its.” it is inquiry in the pursuit of always illusive, always unattainable, truth with regard to everyday practical and ethical issues, whether they be private or public, or of incidental or of historical significance, in still other words, that persons will come to view others who are likewise engaged as colleagues of importance in pursuit of a worthwhile endeavor. ramping up inquiry in “philosophy for children” since the educational program, philosophy for children (p4c), incorporates as its fundamental pedagogical tool the community of inquiry in which participants cooperatively inquire about any topic that is of interest and importance to them, it is in a unique position to enhance the kind of general inquiring communicative style that can be expected to feed directly into the bridging tendencies of its students. indeed, given the overwhelming manipulative communicative styles employed in traditional education, i.e., communication in order to persuade, one wonders how else our youngsters are going to learn bridging tendencies except though years of experience in communities of genuine inquiry that form the base of p4c. nonetheless, if enhancing the general inquiring communicative tendencies is to become one of the official goals of p4c, there are a number of fault lines in the present program that need to be addressed. thus, in the name of the procedure that gives value to this enterprise, i.e., falsifying towards truth, i will end by focusing on three flaws, or obstacles, that p4c would do well to rework in order that it may offer to the world a more perfect package. obstacles 1: clarity with regards to its goal(s). philip cam, in a recent challenging article entitled philosophy and freedom,20 says courageously—and, i think, correctly—that advocates of p4c cannot claim to know what they are doing if they are unclear about the larger purpose, i.e., if they are unclear about what p4c is most fundamentally trying to achieve. cam goes on to argue that the guiding ideal of the community of inquiry ought to be freedom (in the deweyan sense of flourishing), rather than truth (citing an earlier article of mine 21). in light of the fact that i have recently written a critical thinking text entitled “thinking your way to freedom,”22 it is clear that there are many way in which cam and i converge. however, there seems to remain one point of divergence and that is my belief that one of the most pernicious obstacles in making the case for the value of learning to “generally inquire” is the refusal of many in the p4c camp to embrace the notion of truth23. if there is no truth, how can there possibly be any point to inquiring? thus, it seems to me that, though reticence about truth is understandable since its misrepresentation, as has just been pointed out, can do more harm than good, nonetheless p4c needs to courageously promulgate the nuanced practical ideal24 that the point of inquiry is to ferret out the least worst option that survives a stringent impartial multi-dimensional and on-going falsification process.25 in contrast to the “product” notion of truth that kills inquiry, this “process” notion of truth depends upon it. it is truth with a small “t” that legitimizes the commitment to bridging communication. thus, though cam is no doubt on the right track by making the claim that the ultimate payoff of mutual interpersonal inquiry is personal autonomy and mutual well being, along with flourishing personhood and an increase social capital, we must be absolutely clear that the immediate goal that makes the ultimate payoff possible is a universal commitment to fallibility in the face of the always open possibility of discovering claims that are “truthier” than those to which one presently adheres. obstacle 2: advocating respect for the ideas of others. though it is common among p4c advocates to argue that we ought to always “respect the ideas of others,” 26 only a little reflection will show that, within the context of genuine inquiry, this notion is incomprehensible. if mary makes a point that is not backed by reason or evidence, or if john manipulates the reasons and/or evidence in order to support the conclusion that he wishes to be true, it is not at all clear why we should respect either of their ideas, just as it would not be at all clear what it would mean to respect the ideas of a scientist who had analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 6 cooked the books. on other hand, it is nonetheless true, as mill so eloquently pointed out in “on liberty,”27 that even poor reasoning can sometimes serve as fodder for truth insofar as it requires good reasoners to figure out why they think what they think, and why other alternatives are not equally good. thus, while it is no doubt appropriate that we advocate an attitude of appreciation of all who genuinely attempt to contribute to the inquiry at hand, nonetheless, it seems equally important that players recognize that “bringing down poorly reasoned positions” is the name of the game. how else are we going to help individuals think well and, importantly, to maintain personal permeability within the context of disagreement if they have never had the experience of having their illegitimate ideas publicly, though presumably, kindly shredded? how else can communities of inquiry be saved from sinking into a mere exchange of ideas, if most inquiry time is subverted by the efforts of “inquirers”— in the name of “respect”—to molly coddle one another? thus, though habermas is adamant in his claim that understanding requires that one enter the other’s lifeworld and, hence, to that extent, becomes the other’s “neighbor,”28 he is also at pains to point out that such understanding in no way implies acceptance or agreement29. thus, i may understand why, for instance, you are intent on seeking the demise of all israelis or palestinians, or all hutus or tutsis, or all christians or muslims (or whatever) because you are enraged by some past injustice, nonetheless my job is to issue the summons30 that challenges you to justify your intended actions in light of a much wider horizon. and if you fail to open the door to the possibility that your position may be faulty, my job surely is to keep on knocking. obstacle 3: advocating feelings. not unrelated to the above, there have been a number of recent attempts to incorporate “caring thinking” as the third pinnacle to accompany critical and creative thinking goals of p4c.31 it seems to me that this is even more dangerous to the p4c movement (as i have argued strenuously elsewhere32) than advocating that we must all respect the viewpoints of others. the strength of the p4c movement lies in the fact that, unlike education with a substantive agenda, p4c implicitly recognizes the dignity of potentially autonomous persons by not dictating to participants what they ought to think and feel, but rather focuses instead on the perfection of the procedures used to inquire. and while “caring” may seem like a laudable goal, it may very well produce the kind of bonding that is too sticky for outsiders to penetrate. besides, as has already been discussed, insofar as all who are engaged in dialogue are committed to genuine inquiry, there will, as a result of individuals attempting to understand and judge the merits of various justificatory positions, emerge a sense of collegiality, i.e., a recognition that we all become more of who we are in “the in-between.” the moral of the story is that we cannot aim directly at personhood. we need, rather, to aim toward truth, and to the degree that others aim similarly, and to the degree that we all recognize that our own fallibility dictates the constant need of the perspective-taking capacity of others, personhood will follow. that is, to the degree that participants in a community of inquiry internalize the inquiry process, they can be expected to adopt a generalized “respect for persons” in the sense that they will feel obliged to reasonably defend their positions and to be open to the reasons offered by those who think differently. battersby and bailin, in their article reason appreciation33, echo this point that inquiry itself breeds respect when they say that “reasoning is the least manipulative and most respectful way to motivate change in belief and behaviour. to give reasons rather than threats, to reason with, rather than cajole or manipulate, is . . . to respect the autonomy of the other person.” conclusion we need to take seriously putnam’s warning that we ignore our dramatically decreasing social capital to our detriment. and we ought also to heed his advise that in our multi-cultural global village, the sort of social capital that we try to resurrect should be of the less sticky sort, i.e., “bridging” rather than “bonding.” the collegiality inherently fostered by scientific inquiry that is based on the assumption of fallibility and that requires continuous public input in the cooperative effort to falsify towards truth, suggests that adopting this inquiring communicative style toward those pressing philosophical questions of how we ought to live, will not only give us better answers analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 7 but, in the process, will make our common personhood more visibly valuable. as an educational program that explicitly promotes extensive participation in communities of inquiry about issues of practical importance, philosophy for children can be a landmark educational movement that will promote “bridging attitudes” at the very time that we most need them. and for its value to be legitimate and to be recognized as such, advocates will have to continue their time-honored engagement in self-reflective cooperative inquiry so as to perfect its potential impact. it is in that light that i suggest: (1) that we be more courageous in precisely clarifying the goals— which, in my view, ought to be the entrenchment of inquiring attitudes securely anchored by the certainty that better answers are the inevitably result when fallible inquirers work cooperatively within the stringent demands of tracking-truth. this goal, in turn, suggests (2) that we avoid advocating respect for opinions unless they are worthy of respect, and (3) that we beware of promulgating “caring thinking” as the stickiness of such emotional bonding may impede the bridging force of genuine inquiry. and so, my friends, let us go forward together confident that the educational endeavor to which we have committed so much energy and effort is one of extraordinary value in that, on the one hand, it insists that students actually talk with (rather than at) one another (which seems to be a necessary condition for seeing personhood) while, on the other, if done well, fosters genuine inquiring attitudes (which ought to be sufficient for bridging toward personhood). it is within this context, then, it seems to me, that p4cers can, with some legitimacy, adopt as our mantra a slight twist of the words of robert browning: “inquire along with me. the best is yet to be34.” endnotes 1. putman, r. d. bowling alone. new york: simon & schuster, 2000. 2. ibid. 401. 3. ibid. 23. 4. ibid. 21. 5. habermas, j. the theory of communicative action. vol. 1: reason and the rationalization of society. trans. thomas mccarthy. boston: beacon press, 1992. (german text: 1981.) 22, 25. 6. “meanings . . . can be made accessible only from the inside. symbolically presturctured reality forms a universe that is hermetically sealed to the view of observers incapable of . . . becoming at least potential members of [that other’s lifeworld]. habermas. ibid., 112. 7. ibid., x. 8. in his book a new earth: awakening to your life’s purpose (new york: plume printing, 2006), eckhart tolle echoes a similar theme when we argues that attaching to0 rigidly to beliefs systems jeopardize one’s well being as the “most rigid structures will collapse first.” 19. 9. i am grateful to dr. barbara weber for pointing out to me, in a personal communication, that the word “person” in greek is “per-sonne.” “per” means “through,” while “sonne” refers to “sounds.” a person was a human in a theatre play with a mask through which one could hear a voice. this, interestingly, suggests that to “seeing a person” requires that “we hear what is behind the mask.” 10. gadamer, hg. truth and method, 40-41, quoted by habermas. ibid. p. 134. 11. peirce, c.s. “the scientific attitude and fallibilism.” philosophical writings of peirce. ed. justus buchler. new york: dover publications, 1955. 42-59. 12. there is a long a distinguished philosophical discussion about verifiability, particularly in the logical positivist camp. see, e.g., a.j. ayer, language, truth and logic (1936, revised in 1946), and his comments on the criterion of falsifiability in the central questions of philosophy. london: weidenfeld and nicholson, 1973. 27-29. 13. for a discussion on the importance of falsifiability in science see popper, k. conjectures and refutations: the growth of scientific knowledge. london,1963. see also gardner, s.t. “truth in ethics (and elsewhere).” analytic teaching, vol. 19, no. 2, april, 1998. 55-62. 14. gardner, ibid. 15. “. . . sentiments in their development will be very greatly determined by accidental causes. . . . to satisfy our analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 8 doubts, therefore, it is necessary that a method should be found by which our beliefs may be determined by nothing human, but by some external permanency—by something upon which our thinking has no effect. . . . such is the method of science (18). peirce, c.s. “the fixation of belief.” philosophical writings of peirce. ed. justus buchler. new york: dover publications, 1955. 5-22. 16. “the attainment of a unified method means that the fundamental unity of the structure of inquiry in common sense and science be recognized, their difference being one in the problems which they are directly concerned, not in their respective logics. . . (81). dewey, j. logic: the theory of inquiry. new york: henry holt, 1938. 17. in my critical thinking text, entitled thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning (philadelphia: temple university press, 2008), students are asked to focus their newly acquired falsifiability-based thinking skills on issues that are of real personal relevance, such as whether or not it is ok to get blind drunk every week-end, or whether casual sex is ok, rather then focusing on such academic issues as whether capital punishment should be legal. 18. in a paper entitled, “beyond universalizability” presented in july 2008 at the xxii world congress in philosophy in seoul, i make a plea for leaving behind universalizability as a moral test, since a fanatic can easily pass the test simply by being mindlessly wedded to his own biases, e.g., a nazi imaginatively consenting to be killed if she were a jew. if we adopted instead a more scientific approach to ethical questions, the nazi first of all would have to give reasons for his point of view, e.g., that all jews are vermin, and then that reasoning would be subject to the test of falsifiability. 19. buber, m. i and thou. 2nd ed. new york: charles scribner’s sons, 1958. 20. cam p. “philosophy and freedom.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts. eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber. frankfurt am main: lang (hodos edition), 2008. 21. “inquiry is no mere conversation: it is hard work.” published in analytic teaching, april 1996, vol. 16, no. 2, 41 – 50, as well as the australian journal for critical and creative thinking, vol. 3, no. 2, october, 1995, 38-49. 22. thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press, 2008. 23. with the notable exception of burgh, g., t. field, and m. freakley in their recent book ethics and the community of inquiry: education for deliberative democracy. melbourne, australia: thompson, 2006, who argue strenuously for “the objectivity of genuine inquiry.” see, in particular, chapter 3. 24. “so, the disposition of inquirers to pursue a particular epistemic aim involves a practical commitment to truth, that is, a commitment expressed by certain kinds of actions –those directed at discovery and justification (i.e., deweyan ‘proof’). ibid., 53. 25. i have talked of this notion of truth in several places including my article “truth in ethics (and elsewhere).” analytic teaching, vol. 19, no. 2, april, 1998.55-62. i have also detailed the process of truth seeking in practical reasoning in my critical thinking text entitled thinking your way to freedom: a guide to owning your own practical reasoning. philadelphia: temple university press, 2008. 26. burgh, g., t. field & m. freakley in their ethics and the community of inquiry: education for deliberative democracy (melbourne, australia: thompson, 2006) say, for instance, that “these aspects of caring thinking are captured under the heading of being aware of the context in which discussion takes place, sharing discussion, welcoming and respecting each other’s views, and engaging in self-correction” (112)—emphasis added. 27. mill, j.s. on liberty. (1859) new york: penguin, 1974. 28. habermas, j. op. cit. 112. 29. ibid. 136. 30. weber, b. “with habermas against habermas: a phenomenological critique of communicative rationality.” paper delivered at the university of victoria, february 15, 2008. 31. sharp, a m. “caring thinking and the education of the emotions.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practical concepts.eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber. frankfurt am main: lang (hodos edition), 2008. 32. gardner, s.t. “love they neighbor? maybe not.” children philosophize worldwide: theoretical and practianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 29 no.1 9 cal concepts. eds. eva marsal, takara dobashi, barbara weber. frankfurt am main: lang (hodos edition), 2008. 33. battersby, mark and sharon bailin. reason appreciation. reason reclaimed. eds. h.v. hansen and r. pinto. newport, va: vale press, 2007. 34. the actual line is “grow old along with me. the best is yet to be,” from browning’s poem “rabbi ben ezra.” address coresspondence to: susan gardner capilano university 2055 purcell way north vancouver bc canada, v7j 3h5 sgardner@capilanou.ca marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 66 “un geste suffit”? unpacking the inconvenient truths about al gore’s celebrity activism p. dav id mars hall, gle nn d’cr u z, a n d shary n mcdon a ld abstract the present work interrogates al gore’s persona as a climate change activist with reference to a process we describe with the neologism “personafication”: the act of constructing/presenting a public persona in order to cultivate impressions that enable public figures to consolidate authoritative reputations. the formation of such a commanding persona requires the circulation of three forms of symbolic capital: cultural, celebrity, and reputational capital as well as the performance of overtly theatrical strategies calculated to establish an empathetic relationship between performer and audience. in 2006, former vice president al gore released the award-winning documentary, an inconvenient truth. this film subsequently functioned as a catalyst for various forms of climate change activism. this paper unpacks the contradictory ideological and cultural work performed by the film with reference to what we describe as un geste suffit; that is, those gestures that merely perform individual agency in order to connect the formulation of personal ethical identity to communal forms of political activism like environmentalism. through a close reading of the presentation of gore’s persona in the film itself, and research which tracks the reception and political efficacy of the film, the paper contributes to the growing body of scholarship on the politics of environmental/scientific communication. finally, we locate our reading of gore’s film within a contemporary context by making reference to the way an inconvenient truth is both resistant to and complicit with the environmental policies of the trump administration. key words celebrity activism; persona; al gore; climate change; an inconvenient truth (film) introduction this paper unpacks the ideological work performed by al gore’s environmental activism by tracking and analysing the development of his profoundly complex public persona with a focus on his award-winning film, an inconvenient truth (2006), a formative vehicle for what we call gore’s personafication. that is, a process that involves three dimensions: the ‘facticity’ of persona, the acquisition and display of symbolic capital, and the affective performance of persona. we do this to better articulate the political dimension of persona studies (marshall and henderson 2016), and contribute to the growing body of scholarship on celebrity activism in the fields of cultural studies (see for example pezzullo 2013), celebrity studies (see for example littler & goodman 2013; marshall 2013; turner 2016) and, more specifically, environmental persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 67 communication. in doing this we acknowledge, in the words of cox and pezzullo, that “the way we communicate with one another about the environment powerfully affects how we define both it and ourselves and, therefore, how we define our relationships with the natural world” (2016, p. 2). however, we also believe that it is important to pay attention to the complex mechanisms that confer and undermine the authority of public figures such as gore. put differently, we argue that the performative dimension of celebrity persona constitutes a hitherto neglected “node” of the “circuit of culture” developed as an analytical methodology by stuart hall and his colleagues in the late 1990s (du gay et al. 1997, pp. xxx-xxxi). we will frame our analysis of gore’s environmental activism with a discussion of the connections between the performance of individual agency in everyday life and the performance of activism in celebrity culture. vice-president ‘bore’ from 1993-2001, al gore was the 45th vice-president of the united states. had he not become a prominent environmentalist activist his fame might have faded from collective public memory. in policy terms, he might be remembered as an advocate for universal access to the internet, various environmental causes, and as a staunch defender of bill clinton during the monica lewinsky scandal. as vp, commentators perceived gore as an earnest, hardworking, pedantic bore. for example, writing in 2000, the year of gore’s unsuccessful presidential campaign, david maraniss and ellen nakashima of the washington post noted that gore “is often contrasted with the personality of his political patron and white house boss, bill clinton, who is considered more extemporaneous” (2000). the post journalists sought to make public gore’s mediocre academic record, and question gore’s credentials as a tech-savvy candidate. their article ends with a quote from gore’s then press secretary, chris lehane, who states, "this just proves that many of the preconceived notions of al gore have been stiff and boring . . . he in fact has a very rich and well-rounded background--artist, athlete and academic" (in maraniss & nakashima 2000). the article ignores the fact that gore wrote a senior year thesis at harvard university titled ‘the impact of television on the conduct of the presidency, 1947-1969’ (gore, 1969). the thesis itself concerns the way televised presidential press conferences transformed the way that the white house disseminated information under the administrations of eisenhower, kennedy, johnson, and nixon. the salient point here is that as a former student of television, gore was aware of the role media play in political life. however, it would be imprudent to claim that the authorship of this thesis alone accounts for gore’s eventual transformation from pedantic bore to dynamic climate change warrior. nonetheless, it is important to bear in mind that gore has had a long-standing interest in the relationship between media and political communication, and, as we shall see, this background forms one significant context for understanding the way the performative node of the circuit of culture impacts on the construction of gore’s persona. we will return the facticity of gore’s persona later; for the moment we need to acknowledge that we live in the era of celebrity politics. this is a complex relationship that scholars such as wheeler (2013) have outlined permeates our fields of popular and political culture, and works to reform the way that issues migrate through our mediated world. we need to recognise that it is a time when the relationship between popular culture and politics generates celebrity politicians and political celebrities. moreover, it is important to acknowledge further that in our relatively new era of social media, we have a different circulation of newsfeeds that challenge the power and conventions of legacy media. as lance bennett’s work has explored, this increasing personalisation of politics shifts from legacy marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 68 media’s constitution of a public “daily us” (drawing from negroponte 1995) to new media’s “daily me” (bennett 2016, p. 1; bennett & segerberg 2012, pp. 739-768). this personalization of politics is potentially pushing us into further blending of celebrity and politics, albeit perhaps with a different configuration around issues and personalities. john street (2004) makes a distinction between two types of celebrity politicians. the first is an elected representative who has a background in an entertainment industry (ronald reagan and arnold schwarzenegger, for example). the second is an elected official who seeks celebrity status through association (tony blair consorting with pop stars). of course, people who hold prestigious political office also accrue the trappings of celebrity (obama is a paradigmatic instance of this kind of celebrity politician). gore is yet another type of celebrity politician since he draws on his former life as a politician to bolster his credibility while promoting an activist agenda through making films and associating with activist celebrities. this paper argues that gore’s particular brand of celebrity activism draws heavily on his cultivation of a new persona, one that is distinctive from his vp persona. more importantly, gore’s public presentation of self is enmeshed with a form of political activism, which both connects and distinguishes him from the activities of celebrity activists such as leonardo dicaprio, for example. it is therefore necessary to examine this form of celebrity activism as a prelude to our account of gore’s personafication. it is also important to stress that we are not making value judgements about the efficacy of celebrity activism per se. in what follows, we contrast the similarities and differences between gore’s activist strategies and those of celebrity activists involved in what puzzello (2011) calls ‘buycott’ strategies. that is, a form of consumer activism that involves the purchase of products deemed to be good for the environment. while we are agnostic about the pragmatic value of such actions, we acknowledge that mass consumption of certain kinds of environmentally-friendly products might produce beneficial consequences that are independent of the consumer’s ethical commitment to environmental politics. with these caveats aside, the focus of this paper is on the personafication of gore as a significant moment in the history of climate change communication. un geste suffit let there be light, or not. sometime during the 1990s, a concise imperative appeared under an inordinate number of light switches in the public institutions of ottawa and montreal: un geste suffit. this exhortation, a sufficient gesture, conveyed the idea that by simply turning off a light, people could make a small contribution to saving electricity. such a gesture would also contribute, presumably, to both economic efficiency and environmental responsibility. it was also a caring sentiment that at the institutional level attached the institution to the metanarrative of environmentalism and at least pushed individual employees to feel a shared obligation. meta-narratives have often been linked to capitalism, religion, socialism and the sense of progress attached to modernity (lyotard 1984); but despite lyotard’s belief that the postmodern condition was marked by an incredulity towards meta-narratives (lyotard 1984, p. xxiv), it is important to acknowledge that they can continue to function as mechanisms that describe how complex cultural representations flow through narratives that organise the self and society. in this sense, environmentalism is a meta-narrative that provides people with an intelligible structure for everyday life by promoting a set of stories that ‘makes sense’ of the order of things. on one level, then, environmentalism is a complex scientific discourse that substantiates the reality of global warming, but it is also a gestural narrative that enables individuals to express solidarity with an ethical belief system that confers on them an identity that is indivisibly connected to the meta-narrative of climate crisis. persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 69 the salient point here is not that people are deluded or misguided about the real impact of small performative gestures. rather, the imperative described above has an ideological function; it addresses people as individuals and communicates the idea that a small individual gesture, like turning off the lights, can meaningfully contribute to averting a climatic cataclysm that is a consequence of complex forces generated by industrialisation, public policy, and capitalism. the act of turning off a light becomes a performative act of individualized agency. put differently, it is a form of political engagement that possesses an ethical posture and moves through the individual into a collective experience. but perhaps there is the unsettling feeling amongst those of us who perform such gestures that they merely produce affective sentiments as opposed to concrete political interventions. as we shall see in what follows, we underestimate the political valence of affective sentiments at our peril. we should at least consider whether such acts are merely selfsufficient gestures that do little more than communicate an ethical identity. celebrity environmentalism celebrities often use their fame and elevated social status to bring attention to a variety of political issues. chris rojek coined the term “celanthropy” to refer “to the voluntary participation of celebrities in humanitarian fundraising, publicity awareness and charity building” (2012, p. 67). ethical gestures performed by celebrities are different from those performed by “ordinary” people because of their public visibility and reach. this is why most social justice campaigners, especially those concerned with environmental activism, value celebrity activism. indeed, celebrity environmentalism, an important subset of celebrity activism, has become an increasingly common way for celebrities to engage with the world. for example, in 2003 a public relations firm ordered five toyota priuses to chauffeur interested stars to the oscars. harrison ford, callista flockhart, leonardo dicaprio, jeff goldblum, and cameron diaz used these vehicles to transport themselves to the 75th oscars. this gesture may appear ridiculous in some ways. after all, the prius is a hybrid car, which still uses fossil fuel. however, the mere hint that the electricity that partially powers the car may come from renewable energy resources is enough to convey the stars’ concern about conservation. this gesture, which attracted significant media attention, is structurally very similar to un geste suffit. in both cases, a performative gesture communicates concern, and functions as a mechanism to connect an individual to a collective social cause. however, the ethical look of someone like leonardo dicaprio is striking in the way it conveys a sense of position and fortitude that has an almost religious dimension to it. more importantly, the spectacle of celebrities aligning themselves with the prius demonstrates the extent to which celebrity culture and environmental activism are enmeshed in a complex web of relations that cannot be understood without reference to corporate capitalism. dan brockington argues that the flourishing of celebrity conservation is part of an ever-closer intertwining of conservation and corporate capitalism. companies are greening, with varying degrees of sincerity and effectiveness, because being green enhances sales. conservation is becoming more commercial because selling commodities provides funds. (brockington 2009, p. 2) in other words, brockington points to a growing symbiotic relationship between corporations and ethical consumers, those people who engage in what phaedra c. pezzullo calls “buycotting” (2011). that is, “a concerted effort to make a point of spending money—as well as to convince others to make a point of spending money—on a product or service in the hopes of affirming specific condition(s) or practice(s) of an institution” (pezzullo 2011, p. 125). thus, the celebrity endorsement of the prius is an example of the “buycott”, which is obviously a performative marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 70 gesture, writ large. this is not to say that celebrity activism is somehow insincere or ineffective. rather, it is to accept that activism takes place within a specific ideological context, as we shall see when we examine al gore’s environmental activism. moreover, it is important to understand that our consumption of commodities also reflects an ethical posture towards the environment. to reiterate brockington’s point, environmental activism is imbricated within the economic and cultural flows of consumer capitalism, which means that activism is mediated through our consumption of commodities. in a sense, the consumption of commodities—clean energy, hybrid automobiles, organic groceries and so on—help us understand our relationship to other parts of the world. they also help us recognize that even if these items do not originally belong to our domestic world, they become part and parcel of our everyday lives, and give expression to our ideological proclivities. in other words, we make ethical choices in the very act of consumption. the celebrity endorsement of the prius discussed earlier is a good example of commodity activism. even though the prius happens to be a reasonably expensive car, the decision to drive the vehicle performs an ideological function in affirming an ethical position with respect to the environment. the act is structurally identical to the way in which we might choose fair trade coffee. in both cases the consumer makes an apparently ethical calculation to determine whether a particular product is harmful to the environment. for example, the production of palm oil decimates wildlife habitats in countries like indonesia. the salient point in this discussion for our purposes is that such consumer activism, whether performed by celebrities or everyday people, reinforces the belief that activism is primarily a matter of individual action and choice. the major question posed by activists such as gore concerns individual agency: what can you, as a consumer, do to save the environment? buy fresh food? recycle waste? gore’s film, an inconvenient truth (2006), , makes a series of such pragmatic consumer oriented suggestions as the credits roll at the end of the movie. celebrity activism, we contend, with brockington and others, is a hyper-individual expression. we can detect, in that hyper-expression of individuality, the ideological suppositions that naturalize capitalist consumption to media consumption. so, in a sense, celebrity with its reinforcement of hyperindividuality, is an articulation of a kind of individualized capitalism. of course, there are different conceptualisations of agency with respect to global warming. bruno latour, for example, argues that non-human agents play a profound role in the climate crisis (2014; 2017, p. 41). this position is quite foreign to traditional anthropomorphic accounts of agency. in brief, latour claims that gaia, the earth itself, functions as an agent that affects all sorts of things (2017, p. 41). not just humans, but every dimension of plant and animal life. suffice it say that we are living in the anthropocene, which is, by definition, the result of collective human agency in the form of toxic industrialisation, collapsing the distinction between geological time and human time through its impact of the environment (latour 2014; 2017). the question of agency, human or otherwise, is fraught with complications and conundrums. in short, we have argued thus far that while we may be able to make rational choices as consumers, we cannot fully understand how individual human agency connects with the complex set of institutions, discourses, and material forces that operate at global levels, national levels, and even regional levels. so where does all this leave us with respect to celebrity activism? is such activism un geste suffit? are celebrity activists industrial agents? in other words, are they comfortable with consumer capitalism, and committed to a form of commodity activism that expresses individuality entirely in terms of industrial models of agency? what follows in this paper is a critical interrogation of al gore’s performance of individualized human agency and his commitment to a form of consumer activism that is consistent with capitalist ideology. we will pay particular attention to gore’s affective embodiment of industrial agency and focus on the ways his activism depends on the construction of an authentic public persona. while gore may persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 71 or may not be fully conscious of what he is doing, and may or may not be able to even substantiate his position with respect to his public presentation of self, he nevertheless adopts an ethical posture that makes sense in terms of a common-sense notion of individual agency. the question, then, is to determine whether gore’s environmental activism is similar to the un geste suffit that each of us performs when we turn off the lights in the name of conservation. in order to formulate an answer, we need to take a close look at gore’s public persona. the personafication of al gore let us state here that any conscious attempt to construct an authoritative and authentic public persona cannot succeed without public consent. put simply, the construction and presentation of a public self means little if it is not endorsed and accepted by a significant portion of the public. as current research regarding the political in persona studies has reiterated, persona is neither an individual nor collective identity, but instead the negotiation of the individual–and the collective–for the use of an identity in a public and collective world (see marshall & barbour 2015; marshall & henderson 2016). in this sense, all public figures are inherently ambivalent with regard to questions of authority and authenticity, for the celebrity is, among many other things, a polysemic text that can be read in various ways. for example, al gore’s political credentials probably hold little value for a rabid trump supporter. indeed, gore’s political background is more than likely to undermine his authority in the eyes of those with antithetical political sympathies. graeme turner echoes this observation in a special issue of the journal environmental communication focused on popular culture, when he argues that celebrities are just as effective at attracting derision as desire, and so it is not surprising that the same ambivalence we find in relation to celebrities in general might affect the public’s response to specific celebrities’ engagement in projects of celanthropy. high-profile celebrities engaged in major global humanitarian causes, such as bono, sting, or angelina jolie, have certainly earnt admiration and respect for their activities, but they have also attracted criticism and in some cases even ridicule. (turner 2016, p 811) this is not to say that there is nothing to be gained from examining the way gore mobilizes certain discourses and performative strategies to construct an engaging and authoritative public persona. rather, it is to recognize that qualities like authority and authenticity depend on public recognition. having said that, let us look more closely at the visible components of gore’s persona with reference to what we call the facticity of persona. that is, those publicly visible qualities and external conditions that define a human being. our analysis might begin with an enumeration of those qualities and conditions that function as a backdrop to gore’s public persona. with respect to the facticity of his persona, we can say that al gore is a white, heterosexual man who served as vice president of the united states under president bill clinton, and ran for the presidency himself in the year 2000. he was born into a political family, his father was senator albert gore snr, and he spent his early years living in washington d.c. and on the family farm in tennessee. (the gore family grew tobacco amongst other crops.) gore refers to all of these ‘facts’ in an inconvenient truth (2006), for he builds his persona on the back of these self-evident truths about his life :the first section of the film contains a montage of gore’s political career in order to immediately establish his authority as a man engaged in public life for the betterment of his country. however, if we are to more fully understand what we might call the personafication of al gore, we need to look at how gore expands on these biographical facts to create a compelling narrative about the ethical posture he adopts with respect to the environment, for an inconvenient truth (2006) is as much about gore as it is about climate change. marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 72 the neologism, personafication, describes three interconnected processes involved in the creation of an authoritative public persona: (1) the facticity of persona (2) the acquisition and display of symbolic capital (3) the affective performance of persona we have already dealt with the facticity of persona, so let us turn our attention to the role various forms of symbolic capital play in the construction of an authoritative public persona. gore’s public persona draws on his accumulation of three forms of symbolic capital: cultural capital, celebrity capital, and reputational capitali. born into a wealthy family, gore’s stocks of cultural capital have always been high. as a graduate of harvard university, he effortlessly conveys the cultural authority associated with an ivy league education. further, gore’s early literary ambitions reveal themselves in his speech patterns: he is extremely articulate, and effortlessly refers to a wide range of scientific and literary texts during his speeches and presentations, and the folksy, southern lilt of his accent stresses rather than diminishes his authority by conveying a friendly informality to his otherwise serious declarations. in his article, ‘celebrity capital: redefining celebrity using field theory’ olivier driessens (2013) argues that media visibility is a form of capital that celebrities accrue and convert into other forms of economic or political capital. driessens (2013) argues that visibility is the key to accumulating celebrity capital, and gore’s high-profile political career coupled with his environmental activism has certainly made him visible to the public. this proactive form of global civic leadership can also be linked to reputational capital. petrick et al. (1999, p. 60) consider reputational capital as intangible value based on stakeholders’ perceptions of organisations as responsible corporate citizens solidifying trust, credibility, and reliability. they associate superior leadership with the creation and sustainability of reputational capital (petrick et al. 1999). as such, we assert that such capital can be bolstered through a public figure’s leadership and association with institutions. it is possible to argue that the american government’s stocks of reputational capital have always been questionable (a point we will return to at the end of this paper). nevertheless, gore himself overtly draws on his experience as a politician to lend credibility and an air of authenticity to his activism. shingler and wieringa (1998, p. 11) argue that radio hosts are closely aligned with the public reputation of the stations they work for, and often overtly personify their station’s image. while gore’s primary affiliation is with a political party and the public offices he held in the clinton administration, there is little doubt that a significant part of his persona relies on what we might call reputational capital. as previously stated, his film consistently makes reference to gore’s political career in order to consolidate his reputation as a trustworthy source of knowledge. early in the film gore declares “i was in politics for a long time. i’m proud of my services” (an inconvenient truth 2006). a littler later in the film he states: when i went to the congress in the middle 1970s i helped organize the first hearings on global warming, i asked my professor to be the lead-off witness. i thought that would have such a big impact we’d be on the way to solving this problem, but it didn’t work out that way. i kept having hearings. in 1984, i went to the senate and really dug deeply into this issue with science roundtables and the like. i wrote a book about it. i ran for president in 1988 partly to try to gain some visibility for this issue. in 1992 i went to the white house. we passed a version of a carbon tax and some other measures to try to address this. i went to kyoto in 1997 to help get a treaty that is so controversial, in the us, at least. in 2000 my opponent pledged to regulate the co2. that was not a pledge that persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 73 was kept. the point of this is all this time you can see what i have seen all these years. it just keeps going up. it is relentless. (an inconvenient truth 2006) this speech consolidates gore as the quintessential “good guy” politician and a man of action, someone who gets things done through public service. it is also important to underscore that the effectiveness of how a message is received depends on the credibility of the messenger. there are several dimensions of credibility summarized by roobina ohanian (1990) as a combination of factors that can include the communicator being trustworthy, demonstrating expertise and being physically attractive. ohanian developed a source-credibility scale, where attributes are classified under the three dimensions; each can be measured along a scale of extreme opposites, for example “trustworthy – untrustworthy” (1990, p. 50). there are several positive personal attributes demonstrated by gore that help explain why he may persuade people to alter their opinions and ultimately change their behaviour. an audience who perceives a communicator to be trustworthy has confidence in the speaker (ohanian 1990, p. 41). positive attributes that demonstrate someone is trustworthy include being dependable, honest, reliable, and sincere (ohanian 1990, p. 50). although gore was not successful in winning the 2000 u.s. presidential election, he won the popular vote with 500,000+ more votes than george w. bush received (factcheck.org 2016, para. 2). as such, it can be surmised that gore was considered an authoritative candidate with suitable expertise to be placed in this position of trust and power by 50,999,897 u.s. voters (federal election commission 2001). although gore was awarded the nobel peace prize after the release of an inconvenient truth (borick & rabe 2010), the prize provides further validation of his sincerity regarding the climate change issue. gore’s popularity among voters also demonstrates his status as an expert. a former military serviceman, journalist, and politician, gore can demonstrate that he encompasses several qualities as per ohanian’s scale of expertise including experience, knowledge, and skills (1990, p. 50). lastly, the attribute of “attractiveness” is characterized by ohanian as classy, beautiful, elegant, and sexy (1990, p. 50). while attractiveness can be considered subjective, arguably gore delivered his message with consummate style. the documentary reinforced gore’s strength of appeal by framing him as “a man of good private moral character, a dutiful son, loving father, and loyal sibling…(with) no political aspirations to be served…only shared concerns with the audience” (olson 2007, p. 99). gore’s source credibility provided appeal for multiple audiences globally, triggering a series of positive outcomes. this brings us to the last feature of the process we are calling personafication in affective performance: those overtly theatrical strategies calculated to establish an empathetic relationship between performer and audience. there is always a performative dimension to consolidating the authority and authenticity of a public persona, and on the evidence of an inconvenient truth alone, gore is a consummate performer. unlike the current potus, whose authority derives from an archaic model of masculine strength, gore exudes an aura of authority that is tempered by the cultivation of an extremely accessible and likeable public persona (gore’s concession speech to bush is an exemplar of graciousness and modesty). gore also does a great line in selfdeprecation. he has great comic timing and turns his greatest professional and personal disappointment (his loss of the 2000 election) into a running gag. he opens the ‘slide show’ portion of his film by saying “i’m al gore. i used to be the next president of the united states. [laughter and applause from audience] i don’t find that particularly funny” (an inconvenient truth 2006). he regularly riffs on this particular gag in other presentations such as his ted talks. gore’s ability to reflect on the past saw a deliberate shift in the way he presented himself. historically, some of the adjectives describing gore’s attributes, speaking style, and marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 74 presence include pedantic, stiff, boring, pompous, patronising, and condescending (fallows 2000; olson 2007, p. 92). gore’s need to be precise or seek perfection had come across as “wooden”; this was also acknowledged by gore himself in the late 90s (fallows 2000, para 1). james fallows concluded that some of the criticism directed at gore’s speaking style was when his political opponents sought to send him off script (2000, para 14). while he was more comfortable speaking in a structured way, over time he repositioned himself as “an aggressive, combative campaigner” adopting an “assertive demeanour” (fallows 2000, para 22) james olson and graeme haynes sought to understand how gore had been so effective “given his prior reputation as a wooden speaker” (2008, p. 200). they ascertain that gore presents a case using a “powerful speech style” (olson & haynes 2008, p. 205) supported by compelling imagery, statistics, and authoritative scientists, but audiences are further persuaded by gore’s source characteristics. they summarise gore as credible, attractive, and powerful linking these to his personal attributes: intelligent, articulate, humorous, trustworthy, authoritative, honest, charismatic and likeable (olson & haynes 2008, p. 204). this depiction is reinforced by shaun o’connell (2015, pp. 11-12) who declares that “gone was the gore of stilted, senatorial rhetoric; instead the gore persona who narrates this film is a relaxed, often witty sincere, straight-talking man” and he “draws on the authority of his standing as a political celebrity, his political experience and awareness, as well as his family history in a foregrounding of personality that humanizes the topic”. the presentation of gore in 2006 shifts gears, rhetorically speaking. drawing on his early interest in literature (he originally had ambitions to become a novelist), gore voices the lyrical commentary that accompanies the pastoral montage that opens the film. his rhetorical intent is clear: this is what we are destroying, folks! the actual slide show commences with commentary on images of the earth taken by astronauts. once again, the rhetorical intent invokes a sublime conception of the earth, which foregrounds the planet’s fragility. the salient point here is that gore is a nimble performer capable of mobilising a wide range of performative strategies—comedy, lyricism, and an almost religious form of sublime mysticism—to pave the way for his presentation of the science of climate change, a notoriously complex topic that resists simplification (a fact ruthlessly exploited by climate sceptics). having established his credentials and personality, gore moves on to the business of explaining global warming to his presumably lay audience. we do not have the luxury of analysing the film in minute detail, but we do need to address the question of gore’s attempts to engage his audience on both a cerebral and an emotional level. difrancesco and young argue that the film’s visual imagery is essential for making climate change ‘consumable’ for a sizable fraction of the population. while images are often said to embody complexity (being worth the proverbial thousand words), media theory tells us that they also reduce complexity by providing interpretive frames or narratives that selectively blend fact and emotion. (difrancesco & young 2011, p. 518) while awash with a welter of facts about climate science that are cleverly presented through graphic and dramatic illustrations, gore and the creative team responsible for the film realize that they need to not just perform caring for the environment, but they need to inspire their audience to become activists. this is why the film interrupts the slide show with a series of reflective monologues that gore delivers about his personal struggles and emotional traumas, including the 2000 election: “well, that was a hard blow. but what do you do? you make the best of it. it brought into clear focus, the mission that i had been pursuing for all these years. i started giving the slide show again” (an inconvenient truth 2006). persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 75 the monologue concerning the near death of one of his sons provides personal revelations about gore’s realization that life is fragile and precious; another is about the death of his sister from lung cancer. this tragic event caused the gore family to stop farming tobacco. delivered in suitably mournful, hushed tones, gore is essentially talking about making a difficult ethical choice in the face of another inconvenient truth about the connection between smoking and lung cancer. gore’s sister was a life-long smoker, and the family’s realization that they were complicit in her suffering due to their cultivation of tobacco resulted in their abandoning tobacco farming at some financial expense. each anecdote conveys a highly personal trauma, which invites an empathetic response from the audience. rhetorically, the film uses personal trauma to elicit an emotional connection to its subject matter. the audience needs to feel a personal connection to the consequences of global warming if they are to respond to the film by making their own set of ethical choices, by choosing personal behaviours that reduce energy consumption for example. conventional drama is primarily about eliciting some kind of affective audience response, which is why we ignore the performative dimension of gore’s presentation of self at our peril. the affects of al gore’s climate change warrior persona having established the centrality of gore’s persona to the film, we must now look at its reception. on one level, it is difficult to dispute the film’s success as both a film and as an inspiration for those people convinced by its message. an inconvenient truth received thirtytwo awards and ten additional award nominations, including the academy award for best documentary in 2007 (imbd c. 2016). moreover, the documentary earned us$25 million at the box office (borick & rabe 2010, p. 785). the documentary’s reach extended even further as it was shown for free in schools in several countries (bbc news 2007; olson 2007). additionally, we can measure the success of the documentary with reference to the activism it has directly inspired. by encouraging individual political agency as well as changes in personal behaviour, gore’s film suggests that grassroots activism can change public policy (olson 2007, p. 100). it is clear that an inconvenient truth became the catalyst for a movement that saw thousands of volunteers step up to replicate gore’s message within their own communities. in may 2016, the climate reality project sought to mark the 10-year anniversary of the release of an inconvenient truth. they set up a hashtag on facebook to encourage people, regardless of age, to share how the film changed them. we can summarize their responses with reference to four broad themes: (1) we woke up, (2) we grew up understanding the facts–and taking action, (3) we changed it up, and (4) we spoke up and taught others (the climate reality project 2016). some representative statements include: wow! #ait10 was instrumental in what has become my passion. a part of @climatereality since 2007. thanks @algore. (contributor a) #ait10 its been 10 years already! i first watched it when i was in class 10, 6 years ago! and now i am a #climateleader for our environment. (contributor b) ten years ago changed my career to engineer batteries for hybrid and electric cars. bought a chevy volt. ev enthusiast. #ait10. (contributor c) i went to the climate reality training in toronto ... i have written letters to our local paper, to the prime minister. i have taken part in twitter chats with [climate reality] and the un, where some of the things i have said have reached over 7,000 people! [and] i have appeared on a local radio station with another lady who was trained in toronto … and just when i'm feeling like i should marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 76 maybe slow down a little, someone will thank me or come up and talk to me about something i have said. this gives me hope that maybe, just maybe i am helping in this battle in a small way. (contributor d) (the climate reality project 2016) extending olson’s (2007, p. 90) view that an inconvenient truth was a form of “social advocacy that successfully galvanized ordinary people” is the resultant initiative, climate change reality leadership corps. to date, 12,322 volunteers across 137 countries have been trained to deliver the climate change message, representing a growth of over 1,500 volunteers since the ten-year anniversary (the climate reality project c.2018). these environmental ambassadors leverage credibility from gore’s film to create their own representations as experts in this climate space. the diversity of ages, occupations, and locations of subsequent ‘climate leaders’ allows the unified message to reach a variety of audiences, large and small, through a variety of media. the function of these climate leaders provides a contemporary focus to past literature on the role of significant influencers or “champions” (reynolds 2008, p. 9) who are a fundamental component in the resolution of social and environmental issues. champions are considered agents of change that seek to resolve issues (reynolds 2008, p. 9). within an organisation, champions are pivotal in identifying and highlighting issues they feel passionate about, which can encourage decision makers to prioritize issues (madden, scaife & crissman 2006, p. 53). the climate reality project has become an organisation that helps individuals harness their passion and provide them with expertise to help deliver key messages to a variety of audiences. we can find a range of profiles representing the diversity and motivations of climate reality leaders on the climate reality project web pages. is it possible to classify gore as a pioneering climate change warrior? he has been able to keep the climate change conversation alive by establishing the climate reality project. studies examining social alliance phenomena attribute several characteristics found among key influencers or leaders championing a cause: credibility, entrepreneurial initiative, energy, resourcefulness, and being well-connected (berger, cunningham & drumwright 2006; hartman, hofman & stafford 1999). united by a common purpose, several celebrities have become spokespersons for the environment, which helps the climate reality project leverage off their individual personas. some notable celebrity advocates include mark ruffalo, emma thompson, arnold schwarzenegger, don cheadle, jessica alba, robert redford, ian somerhalder, pharrell williams, and leonardo dicaprio (the climate reality project 2015). strength and expansion can be drawn from the collaborative efforts when actors unite. not only do these celebrity activists harbour their own source credibility and subsequent influence, but when united as a single voice, they help to sustain momentum of an issue of this magnitude. this form of collaboration around an issue supports the notion of social responsibility clusters, whereby organisations and individuals “form around a social issue and act as catalysts in soliciting further support and generating positive change” (mcdonald 2014, p. 344). tangible outputs resulting from an inconvenient truth includes this unity of celebrity activists, leadership/volunteer training, and geographic reach. collectively, this demonstrates an innovative approach and mechanism to expand and maintain visibility of the issue. through advocacy, these additional celebrity and climate leader voices extend the time that audiences and advocates remain enthusiastic about solving the issue. while the need to reduce environmental impacts had been in the public’s consciousness long before the release of an inconvenient truth (2006), the film enthused new audiences about the possibility of finding solutions to global warming. enthusiasm to demonstrate individual advocacy and assert grassroots pressure on policy makers provides a strong demonstration of the influence the film and gore have helped advance (olson 2007, p. 105). with the knowledge that people can persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 77 become complacent, and other issues take prominence, the evolutionary tactics deployed by the climate reality project have helped sustain climate change as a significant issue. this is all well and good, but how do we account for the fact that now donald trump is the president of the united states, many of the practical policy initiatives implemented by the obama administration have already been dismantled? and what is the status of the ethical gestures advocated by gore’s film in a communications context that must contend with social media trolls, fake news, and “alternative facts”? it has never been more crucial to be mindful of the complexities involved in communicating climate change. indeed, a large number of scholars from a variety of different disciplines are attempting to unpack the rhetoric or politics of climate change communication. the situation, according to much of this research, is dire and trump’s election is a symptom of our collective failure to communicate climate science effectively. pearce et al. observe that around 2009, there still was hope that ‘better’ climate change communication would increasingly and relatively straightforwardly lead to better global and local climate change policies with popular uptake of such policies. such hopes have been dented in the intervening years and public interest in climate change has dwindled, at least as measured through trends for search terms on google. (pearce et al. 2015, p. 613) moreover, they point out that the climate change debate is being conducted in new media, which facilitate immediate two-way exchanges that require a different approach to analysing public opinion. it also requires us to admit that the debate is now primarily political, as opposed to being scientific—pearce et al. argue that “a content analysis of articles published in the new york times found “a gradual decline in the volume of material within the ‘science’ topic and an expansion of themes classified under the ‘politics’ topic’ between 1995 and 2010” (2015, p. 615). it is important to underscore that while gore may see his political career as an asset in the fight against indifference towards the impending climate change apocalypse, not everyone shares this view. smith and leiserowitz (2012), in their paper on the rise of global warming scepticism, actually identify gore’s political career as a significant liability: americans associate global warming with former vice president al gore, whom some of them intensely dislike. their negative affect for gore thus becomes associated with “global warming” despite the fact they may know little to nothing about the risks. finally, at a neurological level affective responses typically occur prior to conscious awareness or cognitive processing, and subsequent cognitive processing draws substantially upon these prior feelings to decide whether to pay attention, how to interpret the stimulus, and especially to prime the body for action before the threat has been analytically identified and labelled. (smith & leiserowitz 2012, p. 1029) this study provides a sober corrective to those who may view an inconvenient truth (2006) as a wholly persuasive piece of environmental activism. the point we need to absorb is that rational argumentation, and the presentation of scientific facts, no matter how well articulated or aesthetically pleasing, do relatively little to convince people to change their minds about the real threat of a climatic cataclysm. finally, there is also the fact that gore’s brand of activism, especially in its ‘practical’ consumerist guise, fails to contest the one major inconvenient truth that lies at the heart of the climate change debate: ethical consumerism alone will not provide a solution to the warming of the planet. raising this issue, which in bold terms is tantamount to saying that capitalism is the root cause of our present malaise, does not automatically dismiss gore’s sincerity. it does, however, marshall, d’cruz & mcdonald 78 demand that we consider zizek’s proposition that “the state political elites serve capital” (2010, p. 334). moreover, any market-based solution to climate change, for zizek, is delusional. naomi klein makes a similar argument, in a different register, in her book this changes everything, when she writes that looking for “new ways to privatize the commons and profit from disaster is what our current system is built to do; left to its own devices, it is capable of nothing else” (2014, p. 9). yet this is essentially gore’s major solution to the problem. it is worth noting that jason w. moore (2017) among others argues that the term ‘captialocene’ captures a more accurate causal narrative concerning the present ecological crisis. towards the end of the film, emboldened by a state of patriotic fervor, gore declares: we have everything we need, save perhaps political will. in america, political will is a renewable resource. we have the ability to do this. each one of us is a cause of global warming, but each of us can make choices to change that with the things we buy, with the electricity we use, the cars we drive. we can make choices to bring our individual carbon emissions to zero. the solutions are in our hands. we just have to have the determination to make them happen. (an inconvenient truth 2006) again, with ethical consumption, un geste suffit. it also seems that “political will” is a scarce resource in today’s world. zizek, in his book, living in the end times, repeats fredric jameson’s observation that “it is easier to imagine a total catastrophe which ends all life on earth than it is to imagine a real change in capitalist relations—as if, after a global cataclysm, capitalism will somehow continue” (2010, p. 334). as president trump wreaks havoc on the environment we need to seriously consider whether market solutions are capable of solving the crisis of climate change, or whether the various exhortations to publicly perform our ethical affiliations is akin to rearranging deckchairs on the titanic. coda: an inconvenient sequel (2017) directed by jon shenk and bonni cohen, an inconvenient sequel: truth to power (2017) premiered at the 2017 sundance film festival on january 19th, where it reportedly received two standing ovations. (the film was released in cinemas in july of 2017). shenk, in a pre-release publicity video, points out that a lot has changed in the decade since the original film was made (in siegel 2017). on the one hand, the climate change crisis has deepened, and many of gore’s speculations about its impact on the environment have come to pass. for example, his claim that the site of the new world trade center in new york could be submerged by rising water levels occurred as a consequence of hurricane sandy in 2012. on a brighter note, renewable energy technologies (solar, wind, and battery storage) have become more sophisticated and now, arguably, present hitherto unimagined solutions to the crisis. they also represent new economic opportunities for astute investors. according to its directors, the film eschews the high-tech slide show format of the first film for a cinéma vérité aesthetic. cameras follow gore as he plays the role of an impassioned 24/7 climate change warrior. he also reprises his role as the slightly goofy, regular guy who tells ‘dad jokes’ to bolster his self-deprecating persona. this time around, gore is even more explicitly theatrical, especially in his closing monologue, which quotes martin luther king extensively and establishes his work as equal with the major social causes of the last two centuries as well as exhorting us not to despair since despair can be paralysing. indeed, the filmmakers use the discourse of drama to talk about the film’s strengths, which can be found in gore’s lone-crusader activities as well as in the dramatic tension between the escalating climate crisis and the antipathy expressed towards this imminent disaster by the film’s primary villain, president donald trump. the film consolidates gore’s activist persona by documenting his behind-the-scenes negotiations at the 2015 paris climate conference, and persona studies 2018, vol. 4, no. 2 79 leading communication workshops for climate leadership advocates. these sequences confirm that gore addresses the environmental crisis by operating at two levels. his celebrity persona opens doors to the highest levels of global politics, where he uses his celebrity capital to argue his case. and he also mobilises his celebrity persona at a grass roots level. on the 5th december 2016, gore met with then president-elect trump. details of the meeting are scant. “i had a lengthy and very productive session with the president-elect,” gore told reporters after the meetings. “it was a sincere search for areas of common ground. i had a meeting beforehand with ivanka trump. the bulk of the time was with the president-elect, donald trump. i found it an extremely interesting conversation, and to be continued, and i’m just going to leave it at that,” he added. (halper & rosner 2016). unfortunately, gore did not have to wait too long to see where trump actually stood on the issue of global warming. it would be remiss to dismiss gore’s activism as a form of celebrity vanity, yet we need to be attentive to the contradictions that mark the personafication of gore within the context of ‘trump’s america’. it is too early to tell how the former vice president’s persona will function in the era of ‘fake news’ and ‘alternative facts’. and we will have to wait and see whether an inconvenient sequel can connect with enough of its audience to make a difference to their everyday actions with respect to performing or exceeding un geste suffit. i the concept of different forms of capital emerges from pierre bourdieu’s work in distinction (2010). we have elaborated the distinctions among cultural, reputational, and celebrity capital, drawing our reading of reputation from petrick et al. (1999) and doorley and garcia (2015), cultural capital specifically determined by modes of distinction and differentiation of class fractions as bourdieu developed, and celebrity capital derived from driessens’ development of this formation of power and drawing on the related work of hunter, burgers, and davidsson (2009). end notes works cited an inconvenient sequel: truth to power 2017, film, dir. bonni cohen and john shenk, paramount. an inconvenient truth: a global warning 2006, film, dir. davis guggenheim, paramount. bbc news 2007, ‘gore climate film’s nine ‘errors’’, bbc news, 11 october, retrieved 20 november 2016, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7037671.stm> bennett, wl 2016, news: the politics of illusion, university of chicago press. bennett, wl & segerberg, a 2012, 'the logic of connective action: digital media and the personalization of contentious politics', information, communication & society, vol. 15, no. 5, pp. 739-68. berger, i. e, cunningham, p. h & drumwright, m.e 2006, 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personafication of al gore the affects of al gore’s climate change warrior persona coda: an inconvenient sequel (2017) works cited \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 117 post truth and role of international relation study case study: security concept on terrorism case in asia region ‘ amaritasari, indah pangestu bhayangkara jakarta raya university, indonesia abstract: post truth era is defined as the era when the truth seems right but actually not always correct. it is also an era characterized by media and journalism concerns, especially in the face of false statements by politicians. it flourishes post-truth society, phenomenon, and politics especially when referring to the two big political moments in 2016: the discharge of the united kingdom from the european union (brexit) and the election of donald trump as president of the united states. post truth is also connected with the issue of war on terror where trump was criticized to be a post-truth and demanded for such response. thus, security becomes an issue, which is being discussed, debated, and applied in this situation in international relations, which emerge onto deepening and broadening security. one subject that can be the material to support the discussion is the international relations, which associated with realism and liberalism approach. this paper explores the post truth and analyses using two main approaches of international relation study by extracting and examining the security concepts and terrorism in asia region. keyword : security, securitization, extremism, human rights, and post truth submission : feb, 11th 2020 revision : march 11th 2020 publication : may 30th 2020 introduction international politics congested with the context of post truth phenomena in 2016 to 2017, which can be seen in europe and usa. the united kingdom’s decision to leave european union and donald trump’s won that shocked many polluters, journalists, academics (crilley, 2018). in international relations, it gave three responses: (1) international relations as a form of combat between strategic narratives fought upon the complex media terrain; (2) the norms underpinning the current international order such as human rights and international law constitute a robust architecture that imposes cost of falsehood (forst and michelsen, \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 118 2017); (3) reflection made by international relation study on what ‘post-thruth’ means today in relation to the legitimacy of its knowledge claims (forst and michelsen, 2017). in 2017, the munich security conference addressed the rise of the maximum uncertainty due to international relationship and security. it was the year when huge changes began. the new elected president of us and elections in some countries in europe raised the issue of populism and the question of the relationship with russia. at the same time, syria was involved as a catastrophic giant and can be considered to be associated with a western foreign policy. additionally, europe is facing a crisis with the east, too(conference, 2018). in asia, the region is growing with some significant powers including economic power. asia plays a pivotal role in globalization and as the main driver in growth of worldwide market today. some analysis predicted that the global power is shifting from the west to the east particularly in economic issues (guardian, 2017). the potential power is challenged with the potential risk of post truth era and terrorism. currently, countries in asia are categorized as medium to low development of human index(wikipedia). in the international relation security studies (iss), the term is used as third world even though it has been criticized. the issues of peace and security become significant in asia as the shift to interest in war in the third world (zinckle, 1996) also created a turn from inter-state war to wars within states(berdal, 1996). the situation is contested with the development of technology that can speed up the distribution of information and communication, which has a tendency to disregard the correctness of the news. in technology and communication, the use of social media in asia has grown 21 percent yearon-year, with 482 million new users signing up over the course of 2016. just five countries accounted for more than half of that growth: china (with 134 million new social media users over the past year), india (+55 million), indonesia (+27 million), the us (+22 million), and brazil (+19 million)(technicasia, 2017). the rapid development of technology brings the reality of current social political feature in different phases and stages that challenge many aspects of people’s life in terms of security, communication, interaction, and belief. opinion and narrative can be manipulated and misleading, but in many aspects, they can also be beneficial to prevent and give understanding of a conflict. new ways of using innovative technology create a term called ‘post truth’ that is actually associated with the progress of technology long before it becomes advanced like now. insufficient understanding of human rights associated with freedom of speech and information in connection with post truth can be counterproductive for peace and security. the data can also be manipulated in the case of post truth, which can lead to a malfunction of democracy. how does this situation affect asia? how is security interpreted in order to produce an effect on the development of international and regional peace especially after the cold war and particularly in the post truth era? what is it like with regard to war on terror? what is exactly post truth particularly in relation to widener and deepener? \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 119 method this paper uses qualitative method in analyzing the problem with secondary recourses that accessible publicly. the data can be reports, journal, books, and media that verified though triangulation mechanism. the analysis made using international relations theoretical by scooping detail to a case to get more results. result and discussion realism perspective on the issue of post truth and security the term of ‘post truth’ came into oxford dictionaries in 2016 after the united kingdom (uk) left the european union (eu) and donald trump was elected as us president. the dictionaries define ‘post truth’ as a situation “in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief.”( dictionaries, 2018) the word becomes word of the year in the same year as it is produced. the ecosystem of media nowadays refers to what president barack obama states, as new media ecosystem of everything is true and nothing is true(romerick, 2017). post truth politics was used to describe the paradoxical situation in the us where the republican party was nevertheless able to present itself as more bipartisan since individuals of the democratic party were more likely to support republican policies than vice versa (grits, 2010). in the environmental politics, the situation of the post truth techniques to attack environmental measures were meant to combat climate change to benefit industry donor (john, 2011). the munich security conference 2017 addresses post truth with post west and post order. in the conference, the concept of post truth was interpreted as people are dealing with a new level of fake news, public warfare, of using the digital words to disseminate information that is nothing but propaganda. the instrument used for distributing the propaganda is more effective today by using social media; it can influence many millions of people with not true and not so-true information, as it is the case with cambridge analytica and the victory of trump as president of the us and the referendum that led to brexit (guardian, 2018). the former director of cambridge analytica, alexander nix, argued that cooperation like google, facebook, amazon, are large companies that are monetizing people’s data. this situation is a challenge to world peace and cooperation in the international system. post west refers to the questioning of an era of illiberalism where authoritarian government is going to replace more and more traditional west value-based democracy. this is a decline of classic leader of the us and the disappearance of the classic leader of the west lead by us. the post truth and post west raise the issue of post order in general. it is questioning the work of global governments such as osce or un(ischiger, 2018). security cannot be defined in a single term in this complex situation. buzzan and weaver treat a security sector as a lens and a value-based logic, rather than a well-defined part of society (buzan, barry, ole wæver and jaap de wilde, 1998:8). it argues that security discourse as a prism (andrej zwitter and jaap de wilde, 2008). as a prism, there is a \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 120 derivative concept of security. there are three elements – security as a derivative concept, the idea of a broadened security agenda, and challenging the assumption of the state as the referent object of security – might be said to be common points of discussion in all the ‘critical’ approaches to security: emancipation, community, and identity. emancipation means that the critical security study (css) argue that the corporeal, material existence of human beings should be the central focus of security studies: that is, security should ultimately be concerned with the real world security of human beings. consequently, for css, the study of security should seek to illuminate the wide range of constraints on human well being that exist in many parts of the world, and challenge the forms of security knowledge and practices that perpetuate these constraints (williams, nick vaugh. 2010: 24). security is usually identified as the concept to secure something using the means of control, but also what security does (buzan and wæver, 2003: 491). discussing security is unable to be detached from the context of securitization. it is because security is not understood as its substance but through its performance namely securitization (guzzini, 2011: 330). it is a process when state actors transforming subjects into matters of security (buzan and wæver, 2003: 491). the securitisation underlies concept on subjective and objective in the context of security study, the concept and/or definition of security is challenged after the end of the cold war especially by widening and deepening security in the study of international relations (iss). the main drivers of post cold war traditionalism are great power politics, technology, events, institutionalism, and academic debate (hansen, 2009). terrorism is one of the items that contributes as sub-drives under events. the academic debate on epistemology can also supply for the post cold war traditionalism. as the nature of cold war is changing after the cold war, the post cold war traditionalism and the approaches of security concept are expanding including the issue of the legitimate contestants between widening and deepening approaches, namely conventional and critical, constructivism, post colonialism, human security, critical security studies, feminism, copenhagen school, and post structuralism. the challenge is mainly on the issue of operational definition and/or normative one and where is the un materials particularly on human rights standards position to shape and/or help the problem particularly the post truth era. mohammad ayoob, ole waever, michael klare and daniel thomas definitions are considered as the wideners to the concept and definition of security whereas ken booth and spike peterson are regarded as deepeners. tarry argued that all of these definitions are fundamentally normative and so general as to be analytically meaningless (tarry, 2018). there is a risk of having the concept of security unstable since there is a widespread disagreement. tarry argued that it is only on methodological grounds that this apparent gap between perspectives can be bridged and the widespread disagreements resolved with respect to this "essentially contested concept." the unresolved security concept is more complex and contested in the post truth era and the case of the war on terrorism. the securitization highly occurs in many aspects, which can, to \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 121 certain extent, jeopardizing the goal of security at individual and national level especially when it comes to the issue of human rights. the securitization as the concept to discursive construction of issues in relation to the process between ‘security’ and ‘security threats’ and is applied into the context war on terror (mcdonal, nd). the european states had been built on an understanding of security as oriented towards external threats, and rested upon ‘a strong identification of the security of the state with the security of its citizens’ (krause, 1996). this understanding of security implies that state-centric conceptions of security provide neither an analytical nor a normative position from which to identify the threats that regimes may pose to their own citizens. while the concept of security is still varied in definition among international relations scholars, the theory of securitization arises. it is being contested, but some scholars still use it to provide an explanation about security. securitization theory seeks to explain the politics through which (1) the security character of public problems is established, (2) the social commitments resulting from the collective acceptance that a phenomenon is a threat are fixed and (3) the possibility of a particular policy is created. in the last decade, research on securitization has grown significantly (balzacq, 2015). it is argued by balzacq that securitization theory is agnostic as to the reality of threats. indeed, according to securitization theorists, the collective acceptance that something counts as a threat is not decided solely on the basis of the correspondence between discourse and reality. exposure to relevant evidence cannot, in itself, account for the belief of a community in a phenomenon; the interests and the needs of the community are equally constitutive of how a community sees, thinks about and deals with a phenomenon. this argument is supported by most of the empirical studies examined above and has important consequences. in the post cold war era, the definition of the issue of securitization can highly occur with the involvement of state centric and traditionalist approach concept of security and it is the beginning of a fundamentally different political environment both in a real and in a theoretical sense. as discussed in the previous paragraph, securitization was agnostic to the reality of threats and it is also something that a community sees and thinks through: the use of technology for disseminating information and communication with the possibility of disregarding the concept of correctness of facts and/or through fact-checking methods seems to be accepted under the securitization processes. this argument is supported by most of the empirical studies examined above and has important consequences. however, this phenomenon can be highly manipulated using technology by expanding any mechanism to support the argument of securitization using strategies such as through algorithm system, psychological mind fraud/trickery, hoax, etc. this becomes more complex to explain about war on terror as measure to combat terrorism. in general the typology of a counter terrorism strategy (cts) is divided into three: (1) war model of cts; (2) extended criminal justice of cts; and (3) criminal justice of cts (privedarshi, 2010). each of this typology has the risk of human rights violation while proceeding the case, but one can contribute a greater risk than the other. human rights \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 122 standard produced by united nations can be as guidance for states’ cts. the human rights standpoint responding to terrorism and post truth while the iss remains difficult to justify security, the united nations (un) with human rights instruments are trying to provide a ‘solution’ toward the problem of terrorism and post truth in the name of security by ‘putting aside’ the debate of security and leaving security and terrorism undefined. the united nations (un) and key regional human rights experts have actually responded to this phenomenon of post truth by calling on state actors to ensure that they disseminate reliable and trustworthy information, including about matters of public interest, such as the economy, public health, security and the environment. in the un-joint declaration states that “state actors should not make, sponsor, encourage or further disseminate statements which they know or reasonably should know to be false (disinformation) or which demonstrate a reckless disregard for verifiable information (propaganda),” the latest un cts is concerned with tackling the root cause of terrorism. the approach is socalled ‘prevention of violent extremism’ (pve). before the un launched the plan of action on pve, there have been a number of resolutions issued by the un security council addressing terrorism and extremism. after the september 11, 2011 attacks, the un adopted resolution 1373 on the counter terrorism committee (ctc). five years later, (2006), there was a consensus to change from reactive action toward prevention and more comprehensive approaches to terrorism by working on areas of "conducting the spread of violent extremism", including strengthening the state, and law and human rights enforcement as a basis for rejecting terrorism. another resolution issued was 2122, i.e resolution on the importance of increasing attention to women, religion and security, which are relevant areas. resolution 2129 was the establishment of counter-terrorism committee executive directorate (cted). resolution 2178 encourages states to strengthen local communities, non-state actors to create counter narratives, including empowerment of young people, families, women, religion, culture and education. in addition to a resolution directly responding to terrorism and extremism, the un also issued a more specific resolution to address the conditions of women in conflict areas known as resolution 1325 on women, peace and security. in october 2015, the united nations organized a global study on the implementation of resolution 1325 in various parts of the world. this resolution is in the form of the national action plan (nap), and the increased commitment of many countries related to the women's agenda, peace and security. there are also very serious findings related to the rise of fundamentalism and extremism in conflict-affected and post-conflict countries, which was then responded by the un security council by issuing resolution 2242 on the integration of pve into the women's agenda of peace and security. the emergence of the pve approach announced on 15 january 2016 by the un secretary general marked a shift in both counter terorism and counter violent extrimism approaches, as it still features a security-oriented approach. pve approach with seven pillars that exist are: 1) dialogue and prevention of conflict; 2) strengthening of \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 123 governance, human rights and rule of law; 3) strengthening community involvement; 4) youth empowerment; 5) gender equality and women's empowerment; 6) education, skills and working facilities; 7) strategic communication, the internet and social media, is expected to shift the approach of un member states to pay more attention and intervene in the root causes of problems that foster terrorism. of these resolutions, the question is still remaining to address is in relation to the new phenomenon of terrorism called lone wolf. it becomes more complex and problematic in the post truth area where the use of the internet can actually influence someone to be a lone terrorist fighter without having to directly affiliate with a terrorist group. at the same time the new strategy played by isis where it wants its members to go back to their home country to be terrorists. of this isis approach to terrorism, un has issued a resolution; take an example of one of the un resolutions on ct, 2178. however, this resolution is difficult to be implementable. in regard to banning the fund that supports terrorism, un issued a list of suspected organizations, which are assumed to fund terrorism activity. the list was developed and/or formed based on the resource from the internet. as what happens in the case of the cambridge analytic, the source of the internet can be manipulative in the era of post truth. at national level, it becomes more complicated, the state is forced to ‘criminalise’ certain groups and/or individuals, which might breach the concept of fundamental human rights, namely presumption of innocence and/or due process of law. thus, it is not surprising that the un security council’s report on countering terrorism announce that there are two countries in asean that implement preventive/administrative detention to prevent terrorism and rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign terrorist fighters into society, rather than prosecuting them under the criminal justice system. such initiative of un resolutions without proper human rights guidance can be misleading. this creates the possibility for the state to breach human rights and fundamental freedom that might foster violent extremism. of these measures, how can they prevent lone wolves and/or someone to be a lone wolf? if the term of lone wolf is still debated, the question that is still remaining to address is how all of the un measures in balance between human rights and counter-terrorism strategy can prevent individuals from being attracted to and/or getting involved in violent extremism and/or terrorism act? it is still a question that remains to be asked. the logic behind the un pve strategy was the identification of grievances and push and pull factor of violent terrorist ultimately can prevent someone from not becoming a lone wolf. but, this logic remains to be challenged with evidence and data. projecting asia’s security in the post truth in relation to war on terror and the use of human rights standards asia’s security in this section is divided into south asia and south east asia regions. the regional threat of south asia, which consists of afghanistan, india, bangladesh, maldives, pakistan and srilanka, is victimized region. attacks in this region represent the continuation of a pattern that began to emerge more than two decades ago and shows no signs of \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 124 abatement. india continues to be among the world’s most consistently targeted states. since the 1990s, it has endured multiple terrorist attacks linked to individuals who have trained or fought with al-qaida associates in pakistan and afghanistan. veterans of terrorist networks in afghanistan have conducted a number of terrorist attacks in pakistan (un, 2015). the use of social media to spread news in the post truth era has indicated that abuse of the internet to recruit foreign terrorist fighters is a major concern. states have taken steps to prohibit recruitment and counter violent extremism in accordance with resolution 1624 (2005). although these steps are encouraging, it should be noted that an overly vigorous response by law enforcement to counter the recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, especially through the internet, may violate fundamental rights, such as the freedom of expression and the freedom of association. in regard to south east asia, although many states of south-east asia continue to be vulnerable to the threat of international terrorism, many positive trends and developments have emerged in the past few years, and the nature of the threat has evolved significantly. the capacity of some terrorist groups (including the al-qaida-related jemaah islamiyah)1 to commit terrorist acts has been undermined by robust law enforcement and community engagement. in addition, recent peace agreements2 between governments and separatist groups have helped to prevent terrorist incidents. however, the region faces a new terrorism threat in the form of foreign terrorist fighters travelling from south-east asia to fight with isil. a special military unit called “katibah nusantara”, mostly consisting of malaysian and indonesian foreign terrorist fighters, was created inside isil six months after its establishment. in april 2015, the unit demonstrated military capability by capturing several kurdish-held territories in iraq. katibah nusantara is assisting isil in achieving its ambition to make south-east asia part of its worldwide “caliphate”. isil uploads propaganda to its websites in the malaysian and indonesian languages,3 and katibah nusantara is thought to be taking care of families of south-east asian foreign terrorist fighters and developing a network in the region. the threat of isil has expanded rapidly across south-east asia since the summer of 2014. the number of foreign terrorist fighters from south-east asia has significantly increased. governments officially acknowledge that 209 indonesians, 80 1 jemaah islamiyah has stated that it aims to establish an islamic state in south-east asia, including indonesia, malaysia, singapore, southern thailand, brunei darussalam and the southern part of the philippines.
 2 the philippines concluded a comprehensive peace agreement with the moro islamic liberation front in march 2014; indonesia concluded a peace agreement with the free aceh movement in 2005; and myanmar has concluded peace agreements with several ethnic groups. 3 around 10 malaysian language websites and 70 indonesian language websites had been detected in june 2015.
 \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 125 malaysians and two singaporean families are fighting for isil.4 the linkage between katibah nusantara and experienced returnees exacerbates the terrorist threat in the region. indonesia, malaysia and singapore have detected several terrorist plots organized by isil returnees. around 30 south-east asian terrorist groups, including jemaah islamiyah in indonesia and the abu sayyaf group in the philippines, have publicly pledged allegiance to isil.5 however, the linkage between the abu sayyaf group and isil has not yet been proved. since the group is considered to be more money-oriented than ideological (it frequently engages in kidnapping for ransom and extortion), this alliance may be a means to generate financial and logistical support from isil. two states use preventive/administrative detention to prevent terrorism and rehabilitate and reintegrate foreign terrorist fighters into society, rather than prosecuting them under the criminal justice system. un security council has noted that this could raise human rights concerns. this region is also under threat of the use of social media to recruit the terrorist foreign fighters. in a much bigger scope, the use of social media and the internet can be highly manipulated by owner politics people and/or wealth class. in the case of indonesia, the growth of cyber 4 as at january 2015, the government of the philippines was aware that two filipinos had been killed in the syrian arab republic, but had no evidence of filipinos having fought for isil. 5 the moro islamic liberation front and the moro national liberation front in the philippines have condemned isil. picture 1: cyber muslim army \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 126 army for disseminating the concern of muslim friends-foes through the use of social media whatsapp is a raised (picture 1). in the recent cases of indonesia bombing in east java and police stations has a connection with the mako brimob (paramilitary police headquarters) detention facility’s riot, in which the facility was housing terrorist prisoners. manzi, ali fauzi's nickname on the battlefield, said the surabaya bombs was part of a revenge related to the incident at mako brimob. in the video clip, instagram, it was clearly picturizing extremist prisoners being fed by the police because their both hands were handcuffed on a bus journey to nusakambangan, a penal island off the south coast of java. this trigger anger among the terrorist prisoners networks that are all affiliated with isis (kompas, 2018). the future of asia security in the post truth era is blended with hope and fear as the development of technology can be hijacked for the use of weapons for war whether physical or psychological. conclusion in the era of post truth where facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief because of the use of internet and social media does increase a concern for the future of asia’s security especially in relation to countering violent extremism. while terrorism is still the global impended threat, an unstable concept of security and/or national security in the study particularly in international relations and terrorism can lead to an arbitrary and/or possible breach of human rights standards with the concept of securitization. on the other hand, the breach of human rights standard can foster the growth of violent extremism as indicated by the un national action plan for the prevention of violent extremism that can lead to terrorism. in-depth study is needed to identify an effective measure to use human rights standards for protecting the life of individuals and society as a whole especially in relation to the situation in the post truth era. in the asian context, the threat of the internet and social media may pose a different impact compared to the other regions because this region has its largest and populous continent in the world with most various ethnicity and beliefs. thus, the security concept, and the use of social media and information technology combined with the measure of using human rights needs to pay close attention to the social construct of asia in order to avoid an improper approach of security measures which can lead to instability and make an impact on peace for the region. \ journal of social political sciences jsps vol. 1, no. 2, may, 2020 issn: 2715-7539 (online) 127 references balzacq, t., léonard, s., & ruzicka, j. 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(2008). introduction. in terrorism and the politics of response (pp. 1– 15). routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203889336.ch0 foucault studies foucault studies © matthew sharpe, 2005 issn: 1832-5203 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116, may 2005 article ‘critique’ as technology of the self matthew sharpe, deakin university, australia abstract: this inquiry is situated at the intersection of two enigmas. the first is the enigma of the status of kant's practice of critique, which has been the subject of heated debate since shortly after the publication of the first edition of the critique of pure reason. the second enigma is that of foucault's apparent later 'turn' to kant, and the label of 'critique', to describe his own theoretical practice. i argue that kant's practice of 'critique' should be read, after foucault, as a distinctly modern practice in the care of the self, governed by kant's famous rubric of the 'primacy of practical reason'. in this way, too, foucault's later interest in kant one which in fact takes up a line present in his work from his complementary thesis on kant's anthropology is cast into distinct relief. against habermas and others, i propose that this interest does not represent any 'break' or 'turn' in foucault's work. in line with foucault's repeated denials that he was interested after 1976 in a 'return to the ancients', i argue that foucault's writings on critique represent instead both a deepening theoretical selfconsciousness, and part of his project to forge an ethics adequate to the historical present. critique is virtue michel foucault, "what is critique?" last year (2004) marked the 200th year of the death of immanuel kant. in that time, kant's proper name has become nearly synonymous with the word 'critique' that, without precedent, he introduced as a systematic term into western philosophy. nevertheless, like the proverbial coin that has been too long in circulation, the precise meaning of 'critique' has since smoothed around the semantic edges. one hears today of 'critiques' of everything from other philosophers to social practices, institutions, epochs and western civilisation itself. "by its function, critique seems to be condemned to dispersion, dependency, and pure heteronomy".1 1 michel foucault, “what is virtue”, quoted in judith butler, “what is critique?, an essay on foucault’s virtue” [accessed 1/12/04]. available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/kadish/what%20is%20critique%20j%20butler.p df, 4. 97 http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/kadish/what is critique j butler.pdf http://www.law.berkeley.edu/cenpro/kadish/what is critique j butler.pdf foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 ironically, this semantic 'heteronomy' is in one way one more mark of kant's manifold influence upon contemporary thought, an influence that is the widest topic of this paper. for, in a familiar intellectual vicissitude, from shortly after the 1781 publication of the critique of pure reason, it was only kant's harshest critics who seemed certain about what his work had done. in fichte's words, kant "philosophised too little about his own philosophising"; or again, "this singular thinker looks more marvellous to me every day. i believe he possesses a genius that reveals the truth to him without showing him why it is true".2 if kant's critiques undoubtedly aim to hold up a kind of philosophical mirror to us, what is clear is that later philosophers have not failed to see their own philosophical visages in its "transcendental reflection". we are now familiar with kant the philosopher of science, kant the protoanalytic philosopher, kant the foundingif foundedontologist of finitude, kant the psychologistic philosopher of mind, ormost recently of all, and the joker in the packkant the lacanian avant la lettre. this essay addresses the question of "what is critique?". i want to address this question by engaging with another enigma in the history of modern european ideas. this is the enigma posed to us by michel foucault's later texts on kant's work, culminating in the 1984 essay: "what is enlightenment?" foucault's essay marks both the 200th anniversary of kant's essay on the same question, and one of foucault's own last written texts. the enigma here is that kant stands as an avowed philosophical champion of the modernity whose epistemic, disciplinary and biopolitical parameters foucault had devoted much of his career to 'revaluing', in avowedly nietzschean terms. yet, in foucault's "what is enlightenment?": ... we do not meet the kant familiar from the order of things, the epistemologist who thrust open the door to the age of anthropological thought and the human sciences ... instead we encounter a different kantthe precursor of the young hegelians, the kant who was the first to make a serious break with the metaphysical heritage, who turned philosophy away from the eternal verities and concentrated on what philosophers had until then considered to be without concept and nonexistent, merely contingent and transitory.3 in the face of this apparent disparity, critics have questioned whether foucault's late works on kant enact a substantive break with all his other work. in "taking aim at the heart of the present", habermas’ tribute to foucault, habermas famously suggests that this break amounts to something of a last minute recantation: 2 quoted in daniel breazeale, “on kant’s method”. (unpublished paper, delivered at bicentennial immanuel kant conference, university of auckland, 2004), 1. 3 jürgen habermas, "taking aim at the heart of the present", the new conservatives edited and translated by sherry weber nicholson (london: polity press 1989), 174. 98 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self "of the circle of those in my generation engaged in philosophical diagnoses of the times, foucault has had the most lasting effect on the zeitgeist, not least because of the earnestness with which he perseveres in productive contradictions ... equally instructive is the contradiction in which foucault becomes entangled when he opposes his critique of power, … with the analytic of the true in such a way that the former is deprived of the normative standards it would have to derive from the latter. perhaps it is this contradiction that drew foucault, in this last of his texts, back into a sphere of influence he had tried to blast open, that of the philosophical discourse of modernity ..."4 my thesis is this. in order to sustain any strong hypothesis of a 'final foucault', critics have to elide several important things. first, there is the fact that "what is enlightenment?" is not a 'stand alone' piece of foucault’s on kant. foucault's later, positive interest in kant dates back at least as far as may 1978, when he gave a lecture entitled "what is critique?" to the french society of philosophy.5 this fact alone dates the later foucaultian interest in kant as very nearly coterminous with his much more widely remarked ‘return to the ancients’ after volume i of history of sexuality. (see conclusion) we should also recall, in this connection, that the young foucault translated kant’s anthropology, and that his these complementaire was a commentary on kant’s last published text, and its bearing on the question what is man? that he was to take up in the order of things. 6 4 habermas, “taking aim …”, 178-179. for an authoritative survey of habermas’ response to foucault, cf. dreyfus, hubert and rabinow, paul (1986) `what is maturity? foucault and habermas on "what is enlightenment?" ', in foucault: a critical reader, ed. david couzens hoy. (cambridge: blackwell, 1986), pp. 109-121. cf. also michael kelly ed. critique and power: recasting the foucault/habermas debate (cambridge: ma: mit press, 1994). 5 judith butler, “what is critique”, p. 20, note 4. 6 we cannot discuss in detail here the vexed question of the role of kant in the earlier foucault. it suffices for the position here to say that han and allen have differently but convincingly shown that the position of (for example) thomas wartenberg and james schmidt that in the order of things, kant figures only negatively, as that figure who “had the dubious honor of awakening philosophy from its ‘dogmatic slumbers’ only to lull it back into what foucault dubbed the ‘anthropological sleep’”, is overly simplistic. (james schmidt and thomas wartenberg, “foucault’s enlightenment: critique, revolution, and the fashioning of the self”, in kelly ed. critique and power, 146) it is not only that, for foucault, kant stands as the inaugurator of “our modernity”, with its post-classical episteme, within whose scope we cannot help but think. (michel foucault, the order of things: an archaeology of the human sciences (new york: vintage, 1994), 242) as foucault comments in “a preface to transgression”, a contemporaneous piece to the order of things, for him kant “opened the way for the advance of critical thought”, both in his exposure of the classical episteme as metaphysical, and in his attempt to think human finitude in the transcendental orbit, which resists anthropologisation. as i will argue in the conclusion, i thus follow han and allen in asserting a continuity in foucault’s 99 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 second, there are foucault's denials of any break of his later texts with his earlier work. in the "preface" of the use of pleasure, foucault already proclaimed that the later work on the ancients "made it possible to go back through what i was already thinking, ... and to see what i had done from a different perspective ... i seem to have gained a better perspective on the way that i worked ..."7 in "what is enlightenment?", which is more in point, foucault denies that the kantian work of 'critique' simply opposes what "the historical ontology of the present" that he had been constructing since the 1960s. rather, as beatrice hans in particular has interrogated, he proposes an “archaeological” and “genealogical” transformation of it, as we shall comment in conclusion.8 with these markers pointing towards a closer proximity of foucault to kant than might be thought, what i want to propose here is something even more apparently unlikely, and as far as i am aware, unprecedented. in his essay on descartes, "my body, this paper, this fire", foucault centrally criticises derrida for not reading descartes' meditations as a textual practice in askesis: the ethical process of self-formation. a "meditation", foucault stresses, is a form of what he elsewhere calls "self writing", written techniques through which individuals in stoicism and christianity monitored and transformed his rapport a soi (relationship to her/himself).9 descartes' famous text in 'first philosophy', foucault agrees in a different register with both heidegger and derrida10 is not the complete break with the past that it presents itself as. whatever we might be drawn to say about its enunciated content, there is another, performative level of the text, as a practice in askesis. on this level of its enunciation, a continuity with the tradition is harboured: "on the other hand, a "meditation" produces, as so many discursive events, new utterances that carry with them a series of modifications of the enunciating subject [: through what is said in meditation, the subject passes from darkness to light, from impurity to purity, from the constraint of appraisal of kant, one which has a lasting bearing on the construction of his critical project. cf. beatrice han, foucault’s critical project: between the transcendental and the historical, translated by edward pile (stanford university press, 1998), pp. 17-37, esp. 19-20; amy allen, “foucault and enlightenment: a critical reappraisal”. constellations, volume 10. no. 2: 183, 184-186, 187. 7 michel foucault, use of pleasure (harmondsworth: penguin, 1986), 11 8 michel foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, in the essential works of foucault, volume i, ethics: subjectivity and truth, ed. paul rabinow. (new york: new press, 1997), p. 315; cf. beatrice han, foucault’s critical project: between the transcendental and the historical translated by edward pile (stanford university press, 1998). 9 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 207 ff. 10 cf. martin heidegger, being and time trans. macquarie and robinson (london: blackwell, 1983), #18-21], 100 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self passions to detachment, from uncertainty and disordered movements to the serenity of wisdom, and so on]".11 my hypothesis here, put simply, is that we shouldand can productivelyread kantian 'critique' as foucault reads descartes' meditative philosophical practice. to do this will be to analyse 'critique', as foucault only suggested, as a modern "technology of the self" that stands in the line of older methods of askesis. to say this is not to commit oneself to the untenable idea that 'critique' is, or is even directly continuous with, pre-modern forms of askesis, "self writing" or philosophy in general. as robert pippin writes: ... the issue [kant] virtually invented, the 'conditions of the possibility of possible experience' is ... a radically new formulation of philosophy's task. and so provides for the first time the appropriate way of thinking about the deepest philosophical issues in the modern revolution.12 if we are to read 'critique' as a 'technology of the self', that is, we shall have to recognise that it introduces new elements, instruments deep changes, andnot leastlays claim to a universal validity, proffering its work of askesis as repeatable by anyone. nevertheless, the 'gains' of this procedure, if it is tenable at all, are evident, as i shall expand in conclusion. on the side of kant scholarship, we will have made a provocative intervention in the continuing debate concerning kant's method. on the side of foucault scholarship, we shall have provided a significant foundation for understanding why foucault might have turned to kant at the same time as he apparently returned to the greeks. it is telling here, i would suggest, that foucault himself says in "what is enlightenment?" that the "modernity" kant's critiques are tied to is: ... an attitude ... a voluntary choice made by certain people ... a way of thinking and of feeling that at one and the same time marks a relation of belonging and a task. a bit, no doubt, like what the greeks called an ethos.13 i: the primacy of practical reason, and the ideal of the highest good we have mentioned the plethora of understandings of kant's practice in the three critiques. these vary nearly as much as the more well-known opinions about the significance of his achievement. the enigma here can be stated economically: kant's critiques trace our intellectual, aesthetic and moral 11 michel foucault, “my body, this paper, this fire" translated by geoff bennington, slightly modified, in j. faubion, ed., aesthetics, method and epistemology (new york: new press, 1998), 406 12 robert pippin, modernism as a philosophical problem 2nd edition (london: blackwell, 1999), 46. 13 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, 309 (my italics). 101 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 capabilities back to the workings of our cognitive 'faculties' or 'powers'. yet the very performance of this 'tracing back' does not exactly match what kant tells us that any of these faculties can achieve, either alone or in conjunction. the statements that comprise the critiques can clearly not be the products of either pre-discursive "intuition"14 or of "imagination" that synthesises the 'intuitions' and performs the mysterious work of the schematism.15 but neither do kant's texts 'match' the described accomplishments of the "understanding" whose possibility they explain. the critiques are not works in natural science.16 nor however do their conclusions or method map exactly onto the described achievements of theoretical "reason", which inferentially and asymptotically works to unify the totality of given judgments into a coherent whole.17 what all purely 'theoretical' stagings of kant's work overlook, however, is kant's repeated avowal of 'the primacy of practical reason' to his critical endeavours. and it is this ‘primacy’ that i want to problematise here. to be sure, following kant's own texts, this 'primacy' is most often taken to refer to kant's rethinking of the ideas of reason (freedom, god, immortality) which were hitherto the province of theoretical metaphysicsin terms of his thinking about morality.18 where speculative reason was, as we could say, there now practical reason shall be; or, in the famed words of the b preface to the critique of pure reason: "i have found it necessary to deny knowledge in order to make room for faith".19 yet, i think velkley is clearly right to argue that any position that would assert that this kantian operation exhausts the meaning of the 'primacy of practical reason' falls short. in several different ways, this 'primacy' is a more involved matter. in a 'reflection' of 1869, kant wrote: 'the practical sciences determine the worth of the theoretical. what has no such [practical] employment is indeed worthless. the practical sciences come first in relation to intention, because ends must precede means. but in execution, the theoretical sciences must be first'.20 and this passage is far from ‘standing alone’ in kant’s oeuvre, as velkley highlights. the opposition that it establishes, between a priority in ‘execution’ (where theoretical work must come first) as against a priority in significance 14 kant, critique of pure reason translated by norman kemp smith (london: macmillan, 1929), a19 ff. 15 kant, critique of pure reason, a100-102, b103, a136/b176 ff. 16 kant, critique of pure reason, a148/b187 ff. 17 kant, critique of pure reason, a302/b359 18 richard velkley, freedom and the end of reason: on the moral foundation of kant’s critical philosophy (chicago: university of chicago press, 1989), 9. 19 kant, critique of pure reason, bxxx. 20 at velkley, freedom and the end of reason, 5 102 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self (where moral or practical concerns must come first, because ends orient means), anticipates kant's 'mature' insistence that his critical theoretical work was 'propaedeutic' to work in metaphysics, conceived primarily as a metaphysics of morals.21 this is a key position kant defends in the first critique's "doctrine of method" in general, and "the canon of pure reason" in particular. "all the interests" of reason coalesce around three ideas, kant claims in sections i and ii of the “canon”god, freedom, and immortality.22 yet, according to kant, in a position that clearly anticipates the "postulates" in the second critique, our reason-able interest in these ideas is in its turn animated by “practical” concerns, and the orienting question “what we ought to do?”23 reason is “impelled by a tendency of its nature”, kant contends in section ii, towards conceiving what kant he calls the "ideal of the highest good": a natural world in which moral autonomy would yet converge fully with the just distribution of happiness24. and it is “only for the sake of this convergence [that] reason postulate[s] god and a future life”.25 highlighting such kantian testimony, beiser and velkey have argued that the key figure in awakening kant from his metaphysical slumbers was not david hume but jean-jacques rousseau. according to velkley, rousseau's significance arises from his well-known ethico-political criticism of the enlightenment, which kant encountered in 1764-65.26 rousseau's criticism introduced to kant the possibility that the unchecked development of reason in its post-baconian, instrumental forms may produce a culture no less inhumane than the nature which it allows humans to master. in beiser's account, rousseau's defence of human autonomy in the social contract occasioned not only kant's break with 'moral sentiment' theories, and 'relocation' of the moral substance in a reason above and beyond ‘natural’ affects.27 it also instituted a "primacy of the political" in kant's thinking. rousseau taught kant that "metaphysics undermined rather than supported morality", "alienating" humans from a recognition of their own moral autonomy by "hypostasising" its productsthe laws of human moralityas the expression of the will or 'natural law' of god.28 in both beiser’s and velkley’s accounts, then, kant’s critical philosophyconceived as decisively post-rousseauian29is situated as a 21 velkley, freedom and the end of reason, 5 22 immanuel kant, critique of pure reason, a805/b833. 23 kant, critique of pure reason, a800/b828. 24 kant, critique of pure reason, a808/b836. 25 velkley, freedom and the end of reason, 141. 26 velkley, freedom and the end of reason, chapter 1. 27 frederick beiser, the fate of reason: german philosophy from kant to fichte. (cambridge: harvard university press, 1987), 30. 28 beiser, the fate of reason, 32. 29 compare also robert pippin, modernism as a philosophical problem, 48-49. 103 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 response to its particular ethico-political context, or what leo strauss calls “the first crisis of modernity”.30 the reservation of space for ‘private’ belief, as a kind of beneficial side effect of the critique of cognition, is thus far from being all that is in play in kant’s claim that critique is primarily practical. and pertinently for us here, it is such an ethico-political understanding of critique that foucault also defends in his later works on kant. in an astonishing paragraph connecting kant's short "answer to the question: 'what is enlightenment?'" to his larger critical philosophy, foucault writes in his “what is enlightenment?” paper exactly: kant, in fact, describes enlightenment as the moment when humanity is going to put its own reason to use, without subjecting itself to any authority; now, it is precisely at this moment that critique is necessary: since its role is that of defining the conditions under which the use of reason is legitimate in order to determine what can be known [connaitre], what must be done, and what may be hoped ... the critique is, in a sense, the handbook of reason in the age of enlightenment and, conversely, the enlightenment is the age of critique.31 it is at this point that i want to introduce my exegetical hypothesis directly, of reading 'critique' as a 'technology of the self'. ii: technologies of the self, and foucault's stoicism foucault does not use the term 'technology of the self" in volume ii of history of sexuality. it is developed in the context of foucault's work on the hellenic and imperial periods, and in particular in his work on the stoics.32 kant's debt to ancient scepticism, mediated via eighteenth century german thought and david hume, is well established.33 yet kant also repeatedly avowed his admiration of the stoics. to quote the logic: the stoics … were dialectical in speculative philosophy, dogmatic in moral philosophy, and showed an unusual dignity in their practical principles, by which they sowed the seeds of the most sublime ethos that ever existed …34 30 leo strauss, “the three waves of modernity”, in introduction to political philosophy edited by hilail giblin (wayne state university press: usa, 1990). 31 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, 308. 32 michel foucault, care of the self . the history of sexuality volume iii translated robert hurley (london: penguin, `986), 45 ; michel foucault, ethics, 208 ff, 223-250. 33 cf. giorgio tonelli, “kant and the ancient skeptics”, pp. 69-98 in richard h. popkin et al (eds.) scepticism in the enlightenment (kluwer academic publishers: dordrecht, 1997), 69-98. 34 immanuel kant, logic translated with an introduction by robert s. hartman and wolfgang schwarz (dover: new york, 1974), 34; cf. richard velkley, freedom and the end of reason: on the moral foundation of kant’s critical philosophy, 105 ff. 104 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self foucault's appraisal of the stoics is concerned, in the programmatic terms of his later 'genealogy of ethics', to trace the continuities and discontinuities of stoic ethics with the greeks’. in contrast both with 'platonic' philosophy but also the christian 'hermeneutics of the self'35, foucault in particular underscores how, in stoicism, the truth that the self must orient its askesis around hails from outside himself, in the logoi of the teachers and the masters.36 the particular stoic technes that he examinesthe written hupomnemata that the subject produces and keeps close37, the bodily gumnasia 38 or such meditative practices (melete) as the famous praemeditatio malorum 39 are all then conceived by stoicism as "ethico-poetic" [plutarch] ways in which this external truth is made personal or "subjectivised".40 mutatis mutandis, the ergon of the ascetic techniques of the stoics was not the confessional unearthing or "reactivation" of guilt about abhorrent ‘internal’ desires. it was instead a question of periodically and deliberately (re)activating in the individual's mind the "rules of action"41 he would internalise: of "a set of practices by which one can acquire, assimilate, and transform truth into a permanent principle of action".42 two things from foucault's reading of the stoics need to be singled out here. first, at the level of what foucault calls the ethical "substance": the stoic practices, for foucault, are not concerned primarily with the individual's ideas and impulses, whether to interpret their concealed origins or otherwise. as foucault specifies in reading epictetus' conception of "self-examination", "he means [that] as soon as an idea comes to mind"to emphasise, from whence ever this idea might have come"you have to think of the rules you must apply to evaluate it".43 it is a question, that is, not of one's ideas or impulses themselves but of how one responds to them, in the light of the true logoi that one is striving to subjectivise. as foucault writes: "the subject is not the operating ground for the process of deciphering but the point where the rules of conduct come together in memory".44 secondly, the telos of stoic ethics, as in greek ethics, remains self-mastery: "the progressive consideration of self ... attained not through the renunciation of reality [as in christian ethics] but through the acquisition and assimilation of truth".45 stoic ascetic practices serve this end by standing as a kind of periodic testing of one's self: "it is a question of 35 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 83-86, 241-249 36 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 237, 238. 37 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 209-214. 38 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 240. 39 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 239. 40 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 209. 41 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 238. 42 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 239. 43 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 240. 44 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 237. 45 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 239. 105 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 testing the [self's ethical] preparation. is this truth assimilated enough to become ethics so that we can behave as we must when an event presents itself?"46 iii: critique as technology of the self in the "preface" to the use of pleasure, foucault introduces a quadripartite schema in order to analyse different ethical modes of rapport a soi, which interestingly evokes the four causes of the greeks. each historical form of ethical self-relationship is analysed as to its "substance" ("the material that is going to be worked over by ethics"47); a mode of subjectivation ("the way in which people are invited or incited to recognise their moral obligations"48); the means by which the ethical self-transformation is undertaken49, and the telos that orients the entire rapport.50 applying this schema to kantian critique, what can we say? at the level of the telos or ‘final cause’, we have already seen that kant names the telos of his critical philosophy "the ideal of the highest good": a world where nature has been harmonised with autonomy. the "substance" which "critique" would "work over" as a "propadaeutic" to this end is evidently the most distant “aspect” of critique from any of the ethical practices foucault examines.51 as kant makes clear from the 1781 "preface" to the critique of pure reason, 'critique' is a practice in philosophy conceived as metaphysics. the "substance" it will problematise is a reason that would be impersonal, universal and a priori, whether theoretical or practical. what remains to be investigated, then, is the not-inconsiderable problem of how the means of critique, together with its mode of subjectivation, are to work upon this impersonal and apparently theoretical reason, in order to move towards this avowed practical, ethico-political ideal. means the decisive point that foucault singles out in the quote from "what is enlightenment?" above, alongside velkley and beiser, is that kant's "critique" of reason does not issue in a wholesale rejection of reason's authority.52 such a rejection would presuppose access to some foundational truth higher or deeper than reason, in whose name the rejection could be enacted. yet, as 46 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 241. 47 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 263 48 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 264, 49 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 265. 50 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 265. 51 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 263. 52 velkley, freedom and the end of reason, 3 ff. 106 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self o'neill argues, kant's "doctrine of method" in the critique of pure reason emphasises that "critique" simply does not aim to resolve the aporias that the "transcendental dialectic" shows insist whenever rational systems have tried to render themselves wholly systematic.53 kant's issue with both scepticism and dogmatism is of a different kind. each, according to kant, presupposes that the ideal of philosophy ought to be an account that could speak knowingly and/or wholly about things-in-themselves. the one side (dogmatism) claims successes in achieving this ideal, while the other, in accepting defeat, denounces (and potentially renounces) reason itself. for kantian critique, however, what is at issue is rather the inherited presupposition of this very idealwhether affirmed or denied.54 to quote robert pippin: kant’s idealism … replaces the great classical and early modern theme of ‘nature’ (the discovery of which originally made philosophy possible) with a new issue …55 in other words, the practice (or, in foucault's terms, the "means") of "critique' is simply not situated at the same level as previous philosophical accounts. there is then a formal parallel to be drawn here, as can be seen, between how all previous 'metaphysical' claims to the truth stand for kantian 'critique', and how the "ideas" and impulses of the individual stand in stoic technologies of the self: to recall, not as contents to be affirmed, denied, or interpreted, but to be tested "administratively" against the logoi that the stoic subject has made his own.56 one could not be more wrong for this reason to assert, as zygmunt bauman has done, that kant's 'critical philosophy' is totalising, and hence implicitly (at least ) totalitarian.57 "reason is no dictator", kant argues.58 to paraphrase foucault on the stoics, kant's critiques are not the operating ground for the location of any one truth of the whole, to which all would have to accede. they are rather the point where the rules of reason are brought together, and reason itself is held up not as a claimant to metaphysical truth concerning things-in-themselves, but as a tribunal wherein all such claims can be evaluated, and to which they can be duly referred. this, i would contend, is the reason why, as has been pointed out59, one of the 53 onora o’neill, “vindicating reason.” the cambridge companion to kant, ed. p. guyer (cambridge: cambridge university press, 1992), 282 ff. 54 beiser, the fate of reason, 30 ff.; cf. hannah arendt, lectures on kant’s political philosophy edited with an interpretive essay by ronald beiner (usa: university of chicago press, 1992), 32-33, 34. 55 pippin, modernism as a philosophical problem, p. 46. 56 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 208 ff.; 238 ff. 57 zygmunt bauman, modernity and ambivalence (ithaca, ny: cornell university press, 1991) 58 kant, critique of pure reason, a786/b814; cf. o’neill, “vindicating reason”, 296. 59 stanley rosen, hermeneutics as politics (oxford university press: uk, 1987), 35-36. 107 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 predominant metaphorics kant draws on to describe his own philosophical practice is juridical: in fact "patterned on a specific legal tradition within the late roman empire" (sic.), as daniel breazeale and dieter henrich have noted.60 in “the doctrine of method”, kant describes the ‘negative’ aspect of critical philosophyin terms that are very evocative, given foucault’s later workas a “discipline”.61 all of this might however seem to situate kantian critique as preciselythe most sublime exercise imaginable in begging the question. we might well accept that "critique", like stoic self-examination, is a kind of 'second-order' philosophical activity that would evaluate 'first order' metaphysical claims. yet none of this resolves the prior question of from whence the critical subject could itself derive and justify the 'juridical' principles with which this edifying activity would be accomplished.62 to this question kant's answer is simple and decisive. to quote the a "preface" of the critique of pure reason, "critique" responds to a call he claims to hear resounding in the "age" itself: a "call to reason to undertake the most laborious of all tasksthat of self-examination".63 in foucault's terms in "the ethics of concern for the self as a practice of freedom", that is to say, "critique"certainly no less than greek ethics although in a different register is a considered practice of self-reflection.64 in order to understand how this is possible (sic.), let us consider kant's "transcendental deduction" of the categories. kant proclaimed this to be both his hardest and most important labour on behalf of metaphysics.65 two things are decisive about this ‘labour’ for us here: * first, kant's argument does not proceed by showing simply and directly that, since there is an evident disparity between the manifold diversity of our intuitions and the ordered unity of our intelligible experiences, some work of active cognitive synthesis must be presupposed. such an argument, by itself, would not have stood for anything against hume, and/or would not have demonstrated the imputed a priori necessity of the categories. kant's argument rather proceeds by way of nothing short of a transcendental demonstration that all consciousness is implicitly selfconsciousness. it is only a philosophical recollection of what kant calls "the unity of apperception", in virtue of which “it must be possible for the "'i think' to accompany all my representations"66, that kant thinks allows us 60 breazeale, “on kant’s method”, p. 3. 61 kant, critique of pure reason, a708-712/b736-740. 62 kant, critique of pure reason, a710/b738. 63 kant, critique of pure reason, ax (my italics). 64 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 284. 65 kant, critique of pure reason, axvi. 66 kant, critique of pure reason, b131. 108 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self to 'deduce' the necessity of the categories. and why is this? kant’s claim is that if, per impossible, consciousness did not have access to such formative a priori concepts, neither could it ever stand at a sufficient distance from this manifold as to be able to conceive of its diversity as one unity which ‘i think’.67 * second, the terms in which kant differentiates "transcendental deduction" from other types of inquiry, which draw on the roman juridical tropes noted above, are crucial. transcendental deduction does not ask a question of fact (quid facti) about what it aims to explain, kant specifies. it asks a question of a legalistic nature, "about that which is rightful (quid juris)".68 what is decisive here is that the question quid juris will then not be satisfied by recourse to some event, property, cause, or sufficient reason for what is to be explained. rather, it demands that its respondent to take up kant's juridical languagehim/herself 'take a stand' by adducing (a) principle(s) in whose name s/he has acted. what a transcendental deduction asks about, that isand also what it anticipatesare that normative rules will be found, even in the heart of the most 'pre-reflective' human experiences. it is a question of rules and proprieties, if you like, not things and their properties. as robert brandom in particular has highlighted, for kant (as later for frege or wittgenstein), to be a subject is to be a rule-following being.69 to quote robert pippin: "kant attempts to show that in all empirical experience, or representation of objects, and in all intentional activity, there simply are, necessarily, spontaneously, self-legislated rules or conditions, that human awareness and action is spontaneously self-determining, whether we recognise it as such or not".70 mode of subjectivation: the meaningfulness of reading "critique" as a "technology of the self" begins to emerge. the "means" of kantian critique is a self-reflection of the subject of reason, or what kant calls in "the amphibology of pure reason", "transcendental reflection".71 this practice would make explicit the rules that this subject has implicitly been bound to all along, and in virtue of which it is constituted as the subject that it is. what remains, from the perspective of the later foucault's schema, is only the question of the mode d'assujettissement, through which the subject of reason would be hailed as a subject of critique. 67 p.f strawson, the bounds of sense: an essay on kant’s critique of pure reason (london: methuen, 1966), 96-97. 68 kant, critique of pure reason, a84/b114 69 robert brandom, articulating reasons (harvard university press: usa, 2000), 158-164. 70 pippin, modernism as a philosophical problem, p. 49. 71 kant, critique of pure reason, a260/b310 ff.; cf. breazeale, “on kant’s method”, p. 13. 109 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 answering this question, i contend, will also allow us to resolve the stillopaque connection between the means of critical self-reflection, and the ethico-political end of human autonomy. for if we ask about the way in which the subject of reason is “invited” by critique to undertake its self-reflective work, we must answer that for kant, the answer is not simply that it is "because we are rational beings".72 the thing that calls forth the 'critical' or negative aspect of critique, according to him (and we recall here our remarks above about rousseau), is rather that, as rational beings, we are always (potentially) divided against ourselves, and liable to actively fall into one or other form of heteronomy.73 as kant commences the “canon of pure reason” by saying: it is humiliating to human reason that it achieves nothing in its pure employment, and indeed stands in need of a discipline to check its extravagances, and to guard it against the deceptions which arise therefrom.74 gilles deleuze has observed, in difference and repetition that, with the notion of "transcendental illusion", kant introduces into the history of ideas a profoundly new notion of what philosophy should rightfully oppose.75 for, in what amounts to a truly striking anthropological hypothesis, kant effectively suggests in the "transcendental dialectic" that the origins of humanity's inveterate interests in god, freedom, and the truth of the whole (‘nature’) lie in nothing more august than the rational practices (like counting or dividing) of our most everyday thinking.76 the problem is that, if these 'all-too-human' modes of reasoning are simply iterated, they eventually generate the "transcendental illusion[s]" of some noumenal entity or event that would close the series, but whose (non)existence can in no way be verified. the reason is thatif we can conceive or believe in the existence of such things as god or a first causewe can only conceive them as beyond the scope of the possible operation of the categories that lay out the framework of what we can legitimately discursively assert.77 intuitions without concepts are blind, as kant says, but also concepts without intuitions must remain empty.78 and it is here – with this recognition of the mode of subjectivation of critique as the “call” to us as divided rational beings – that the connection of 72 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 264. foucault is here speaking of the stoics. 73 cf. arendt, lectures on kant’s political philosophy, 32. “using his own mind, kant discovered the ‘scandal of reason’, that is, that it is not just tradition and authority that lead us astray but the faculty of reason itself”. 74 kant, critique of pure reason, a795/b823; cf. a850/b878. 75 gilles deleuze, difference and repetition translated by paul patton (new york: columbia university press, 1994), p. 150. 76 cf. o’neill, “vindicating reason”, p. 291. 77 kant, critique of pure reason, a756/b784. 78 kant, critique of pure reason, a51/b75. 110 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self critique’s peculiar means of rational askesis with kant's interest in autonomy emerges. in "what is critique?", foucault comments that critique as such is always concerned with "how not to be governed, or, better, the art of not being governed like that at that cost".79 foucault’s comment in "what is enlightenment?" is however more precise, when he says that, for kant: ... illegitimate uses of reason are what give rise to dogmatism and heteronomy, along with illusions; on the other hand, it is when the legitimate use of reason has been clearly defined that its autonomy can be assured.80 and why is this? "uses of reason" are illegitimate, according to kant, when they lead subjects to make claims to truth or rightness that yet cannot be justified except in terms of ‘ghost seer’-like access to foundations beyond the legitimate scope of the rules that critique has shown necessarily underlie intelligible experience. in kant’s general view … to be ‘premodern’ or in any sense less enlightened than one should be, is to be ‘uncritical’. in the obvious sense of that term, this just means claiming to know something, or to make a claim on someone, without being able to justify such a claim against objectors.81 a further parallel between critique as ethical and classical ethics announces itself here, then. in classical ethics, the tyrant was conceived of as someone who "exceeds the legitimate exercise of one's power" insofar as s/he had not mastered her own "fantasies, appetites and illusions", as foucault puts it.82 but just so, for kant, a potential tyrant is s/he who has not tested her/his ideas by critique, and so can think to impose their unmastered claims about the whole monologically upon others. kantian autonomy, on the other hand, is not some untutored negative liberty from all norms or constraints, as conservative critics will probably always repeat. it is thinking and acting on principles (nomoi) that “defer to no 'ungrounded' authority"whether philosophical or political83but rather hail from what kant calls variously the "spontaneity" or "epigenesis" of one's own (auto) reason. to quote "what is orientation in thinking?": to think for oneself is a matter of seeking the highest touchstone of truth in oneself (that is, in one's own reason), and the maxim of thinking for oneself at all times constitutes enlightenment...84 79 at butler, “what is critique? foucault’s virtue”, p. 9; stefan bohm and sverre spoelstra, “no critique” ephemera: theory and politics in organization (2004), p. 96 80 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, p. 308. 81 pippin, modernism as a philosophical problem, p. 55. 82 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 288. 83 o’neill, “vindicating reason”, p. 299. 84 at o’neill, “vindicating reason”, p. 300. 111 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 in other words, although kant's presentations very often suggest that the telos of critique lies even asymptotically only at the end of the process of selfreflection, it is as trueand arguably more historically singularthat this telos of autonomy in another sense also coincides with the means of critique itself. herbert marcuse put this idea much later when he argued in “philosophy and critical theory” that, after kant, "freedom is the ‘formal element’ of rationality, the only form in which reason can be".85 conclusion so, to schematise, the claim is that kant’s critique is a technology of the self whose parameters can be analysed fruitfully in terms of foucault’s four-fold schema for the analysis of such techniques. the schema looks like this: substance mode of subjectivation means telos pure reason theoretical practical the internal dividedness of rationality (‘dialectical’ tendency to illusion) self-reflection on the conditions of possibility and limits of the rules governing one’s reason autonomy: ideal of highest good : harmony of happiness with autonomy there are at least two reasons to oppose such a reading. the first is what ian hunter, drawing on foucault, calls the "abstract and academic character of modern philosophy [which] means that it is no longer cultivated as a way of life".86 this manifest abstractness of kantian critique is registered in the schema in the would-be substance of critique conceived as askesis, which is reason in its a priori potentialities. the second and deeper hesitation concerns a correlative of this ‘abstract and academic character’: namely, that critique is directed at the subject of reason, who could be anyone at all. as foucault specifies in “on the genealogy of ethics”, descartes’ meditations, themselves an askesis, nevertheless set in place a methodological procedure that could be followed by anyone. this meant that for the first time, “evidence is substituted for askesis at the point where the relationship to the self intersects with the relation to others and to the world”.87 kant’s subject of reason, however divided, would seem, no less than the nameless subject of descartes’ 85 herbert marcuse, “philosophy and critical theory”, in negations (penguin: london, translated by jeffrey shapiro, 1968: 137 86 ian hunter, “the morals of metaphysics: kant’s groundwork as intellectual paideia.” critical inquiry (chicago) 28 (2002), 908; cf. foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 279-280. 87 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 279. 112 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self meditations, to be no one in particular and so hardly a likely basis for any technology of ‘self’-formation. the ‘gains’ of this manoeuvre can however now be spelt out. on the level of kant scholarship, to read kantian critique as analbeit impersonal ascetic practice, is to reinstall the ‘primacy of practical reason’ at the heart of our understanding of kant. in doing so, we would be placing the ongoing debate about kant’s method on a quite different, and less ‘abstract and academic’ footing. if critique is seen, as foucault defines ethics as such, as a “considered form that freedom takes when it is informed by reflection”88, all depictions of kant as a proto-analytic philosopher, or unwitting ‘synthetic’ empiricist, are by-passed. this is not the type of account that is required, any more than a new statement in traditional metaphysics was the type of account that kant was after. rather, kant’s chimerical naming of the concern of philosophy as the ‘synthetic a priori’ could be read as registering kant’s new conception of philosophy as a practice in self-reflection, at a different level than speculative attempts to systematically account for the truth of the whole. we would here be joining recent work by daniel breazeale on kant, which locates the ground of his procedure in the capacity for “transcendental reflection”. as breazeale says: ”an apt motto for transcendental philosophy might therefore be the delphic dictum: ‘know thyself’”89. the work such a reading of critique does is even clearer in terms of our understanding of why foucault might have been drawn to describe himself shortly before his death as a thinker “if … indeed perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of kant”.90 critics who would suggest that the later foucault enacted a nostalgic return to the greeks need always to recall his citation of baudelaire’s principle ‘you have no right to despise the present” in “what is enlightenment?”, let alone his own denials of any such move.91 surely the deepest problem with this reading of foucault’s later work, however, is that, in order to valorise the greeks even so much as he does, foucault needs to bracket or de-emphasise any references to the cosmological framing of greek ethicswitness for example book i of the nichomachean ethics. as charles taylor nicely puts it, “the underlying ideal” (or telos) of foucault’s later reflections, in terms of the history of ideas, seems to be patently un-greek; indeed “some variant of that most invisible, because it is the most pervasive, modern goods, unconstrained freedom”.92 what reading critique according to the methodology that foucault used to read the greeks and romans shows, though, is how close critique stands to the type of self-forming activity that foucault is clearly attracted to 88 foucault, ethics: subjectivity and truth, 284. 89 breazeale, “on kant’s method”, 13; pippin, modernism as a philosophical problem, 55. 90 at bohm and spoestra, “no critique”, p. 95. 91 cf. david owen, maturity and modernity (london: routledge, 1994), p. 206 92 charles taylor, sources of the self (cambridge, harvard university press, 1989), p. 489. 113 foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 in the self-mastery of the greeksone which is carried out, that is, out of the reach of norms imposed asymmetrically by authorities external to the subject. to quote the first critique: reason must in all its undertakings subject itself to criticism, should it limit freedom of criticism by any prohibitions, it should harm itself … nothing is so important through its usefulness, nothing so sacred, that it may be exempted from this searching examination, which knows no respect for persons. reason depends on freedom for its very existence.93 moreover, if we read critique as a procedure in “self-discipline”94 whose only ‘product’ is not a doctrine, but a subject who reserves the autonomy to ask the quid juris question about any and all claims that it makes or that are made upon it, we can see how such a methodological program can have been ‘owned’ by foucault late in his career. amy allen in particular has emphasised this in her “foucault and enlightenment: a critical reappraisal”.95 foucault in no way renounces his critique (sic.) of the disciplinary and biopolitical aspects of modernity in his texts on kant. this is the force of his scathing remarks about humanism, and the “blackmail of the enlightenment”, in “what is enlightenment?”96 in this context, it is not just that foucault now says that he is “inclined to see enlightenment and humanism in tension rather than identity”.97 this new insight is grounded in his owning of critique as an ethos or “work carried out by ourselves upon ourselves as free beings”; and of enlightenment, as in kant, as an ongoing task rather than some already-achieved accomplishment whose completed forms we could passively admire.98 such a self-reflective ethos, in particular, is always able to see in modern humanism simply one more type ofalbeit institutionalised and historicalmetaphysical position (like dogmatism or scepticism in the first critique) that would lay claim to normatively determine the subject. as such, it too should be subject to the “self-discipline” of critique, although such a self-reflection, for foucault no less than for hegel and nietzsche, is deeply historical in ways kant’s critiques were not.99 so, let me make a final point to close. the point of this paper is in no way an attempt to absurdly ‘collapse’ either foucault into kant, or visa versa. pivotal differences remain between the projects of the two authors. in terms of their respective re-framings of philosophy as an “attitude” or ethos, which is 93 kant, critique of pure reason, a738-9/b766-7. 94 kant, critique of pure reason, a709/b737. 95 allen, “foucault and enlightenment”, 200. 96 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, p. 312 ff. 97 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, p 304. 98 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, p. 316. 99 foucault, “what is enlightenment?”, p. 315; allen, “foucault and enlightenment”, 190-191. 114 sharpe: ‘critique’ as technology of the self the central point of similarity i have tried to emphasise between their works, in fact, this very fact that such differences between them remains is of the essence. if we were to try to locate the principle of the existing differences between foucault and kant, though, it would seem to lie exactly in their orientation towards the question and the possibility of epistemic and moral universality. as the predominant reception of foucault’s work bears out, foucault’s work reads at times as opposed to any form of universality per se, and to indeed see within itafter nietzschethe reactive rationale for the levelling of individuals and singularity as such.100 foucault hence differentiates his form of ‘critique’ in “what is enlightenment?” from that of kant in the following terms: but if the kantian question was that of knowing what limits knowledge has to renounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the product of arbitrary constraints?101 kant’s work, by contrast, inaugurates the tradition that runs through german idealism into the work of marx, and which sees in universality precisely that dimension which frees humans as humans from immediate immersion in the particularity of sensuous existence. as marcuse puts this type of position in “the foundations of historical materialism”, talking of marx’s notion of the ‘species’or universalityof a type of being, which discursive human understanding can uncover beneath the manifold appearances: the species of a being is that … is the ‘principle’ of its being that is common to all the particular features of what it is: the general essence of this being. if man can make the species of every being his object, the general essence of every being can become objective for him: … it is for this reason … that he can relate freely to every being: he is not limited to the particular state of the being and his immediate relationship to it, but he can take the being as it is in its essence beyond its immediate, particular, actual state …102 we saw above how kant stakes exactly this type of contention, in examining the “transcendental deduction” of the first critique. as kant’s argument runs, without the categories, there could be no possibility of self-consciousness; and without this possibility, there could not be any consciousness of objects at all, 100 cf. for example david owen, maturity and modernity, chapter 10. 101 michel foucault, “what is enlightenment”. accessed 13/12/04. available at http://foucault.info/documents/whatisenlightenment/foucault.whatisenlightenment. en.html 102 herbert marcuse, “the foundation of historical materialism”, in studies in critical philosophy(western printing services: bristol, 1972), 26-27 115 http://foucault.info/documents/whatisenlightenment/foucault.whatisenlightenment.en.html http://foucault.info/documents/whatisenlightenment/foucault.whatisenlightenment.en.html foucault studies, no 2, pp. 97-116 let alone a possibility of critique. universality is in and after kant then seen not as a cloying equalization but something thatin the distance it allows visà-vis the particularis an enabling thing: indeed, the condition for the possibility of anything like autonomy and individuality. it is surely a sign of the force of the thought of foucault and kant that, in many ways, the stake of this key philosophical disparity stands at the philosophical basis of the most lasting contemporary debates about the providence of modernity, and the possibility and desirability of any ‘postmodern condition’. as for any terminus of these debates, perhaps we can do no better to close than to cite foucault’s famous response when asked about his politics, and whether it embodied a kind of pessimism or rationale for apathy: my point is not that everything is bad, but that everything is dangerous, which is not the same as bad. if everything is dangerous, then we always have something to do. so my position leads not to apathy but to a hyperand pessimistic activism. i think that the ethico-political choice we have to make every day is to determine which is the main danger.103 103 michel foucault, quoted at owen, maturity and modernity, p. 206. 116 i: the primacy of practical reason ii: technologies of the self iii: critique as technology of the self means mode of subjectivation conclusion resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism feminist philosophy quarterly volume 4 | issue 2 article 2 2018 resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism samantha n. wesch university of alberta, wesch@ualberta.ca recommended citation wesch, samantha n.. 2018. "resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism."feminist philosophy quarterly4, (2). article 2. resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism1 samantha wesch abstract this paper examines the contemporary phenomena of sexualized depictions of nazism in various forms of media. drawing on both the work on power and on resistance and perfectionist ethics of michel foucault, i argue nazism has become conflated with deviant sexuality and used as a “floating signifier” in media to represent and further binary good/evil, normal/abnormal narratives. i argue that there are three primary tropes of sexualized representation (“sexy sadistic,” “gender nonconformist,” and “star-crossed”) which each adheres to the same binary logic. applying foucault’s theory of biopolitics, particularly that of the “perverse implantation” and “the speaker’s benefit,” i further argue nazism has become conflated with deviant sexuality through the constitutive and product influence biopower has on the sexuality of subjects. i conclude this paper by looking to contemporary jewish voices and, looking to foucault’s perfectionist ethics, argue that sexualized representations of nazism are problematic because of their silencing effect on the narratives of the victims and survivors of the shoah, and that representations of nazism based on the binary logic of good/evil and normal/abnormal ought to be resisted in favour of depictions based on survivor and witness testimony. keywords: foucault; foucaultian politics; biopower; biopolitics; sovereign power; binary logic; binary narrative; philosophy of sexuality; perfectionist ethics; foucaultian ethics; foucaultian resistance; holocaust media; shoah media; holocaust representation; shoah representation; ethics of representation; ethics of media in november 2014, rapper and sex symbol nicki minaj caused controversy with the depiction of german fascism in her music video “only.” though hip hop has never been shy toward harnessing the attention-grabbing power of shock value, the blatant sexualization of nazism in “only” is relevantly distinct from the profanity 1 i would like to thank kyler chittick, jared burton, courtney bogstie, matti thurlin, howard nye, jack zupko, and, most of all, my supervisor chloe taylor for their kindness and support throughout the duration of this project. 1 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 typically seen in mainstream rap. a cartoon minaj appears in a skintight gimp suit, with her record label’s logo modified to resemble a swastika plastered on arm bands, banners, flags, and the centre of minaj’s breasts. animated completely in red and greyscale, featuring rows of soldiers in front of a nuremberg-style palace, minaj is accused of emulating the triumph of the will, and of deliberately releasing the video on the anniversary of the kristallnacht (mccormack 2014). though “only” was publicly criticized (foxman 2014; denham 2014), the trend of representing nazism as erotic is prevalent in contemporary media, and has been since wwii. typically, representations of nazism are highly sexualized, glamorized, and sensationalized, with no regard for or attention to the horrors and suffering conveyed in survivor testimony. over eleven million people perished in concentration camps; horrendous suffering was the consequence of german fascism. such atrocity brought forth from evil intention and exploitation of the desperate usually invokes compassion and mourning, yet the conflation of “sexy” and german fascism is so pervasive in western media it has become mundane, and even considered an actual quality of historical nazism. michel foucault asks: how is it that nazism—which was represented by shabby, pathetic puritanical characters, laughably victorian old maids, or at best, smutty individuals— how has it managed to become . . . in all the pornographic literature throughout the world, the ultimate symbol of eroticism? (foucault 1989, 97) sexy, or at least sexual, has become as essential to depictions of nazism as swastikas, small square moustaches, and anti-semitism, and consequently, these symbols and objects have become deeply entangled with eroticism, with one announcing the presence of the other. the erotic presentation of nazism makes these fictional characters both easily recognizable and consumable; more importantly, i argue, it also functions as a means of establishing and preserving hegemonic narratives. when deviant sexuality becomes understood as the “truth” of nazism, the testimony of survivors and the stories of those lost are swept away by the claims of uncovering a “greater,” “more real” truth of the opposing binaries of good/evil, normal/abnormal, and deviant sexuality/heteronormative romance. sexualized representations perform the revealing of a greater, more fundamental “truth” than can be found in the narratives of survivors and witnesses. i take up foucault’s question and offer an ethical analysis, drawing on foucault’s later works, for resistance to the understandings of a truth of deviant sexuality of nazism, and the sexualized representations to which this assumption is foundational. i begin by arguing sexualized depictions of nazism tend to adhere to the same logic of representation, and produce and shape a collective understanding of the shoah which conforms to a binary narrative of “good versus evil” through conflation with deviant sexuality. second, i 2 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 apply foucault’s theories of power and sexuality to understand how and why this conflation has happened, and how nazism is used as a floating signifier for the evil/abnormal. finally, i argue these understandings and representations can and should be resisted in favour of media which is grounded in survivor testimony, as opposed to hegemonic narratives, to discuss and preserve the histories of the victims of german fascism. the purpose of this paper is not to prescribe strict rules for representations of nazism nor to make judgements about the way individuals view and respond to these portrayals, nor do i mean to morally condemn every piece of media i examine in this paper; i believe that it is possible to be critical of aspects of representations without saying the piece itself is problematic. rather, my purpose is to look critically at how and why nazism has become sexualized, and to argue that these representations function to disregard or silence witness testimony, and exploit suffering of the victims of the shoah through guising hegemonic binaries of good/evil, normal/abnormal, and others, through technologies of power. following foucault’s ethics of engaging critically with power to cultivate one’s own freedom, i look at what forces have caused nazism to become sexualized, and why subjects should be resistant to these representations. claims of “truth” in opposition to subjectivity were a major interest of foucault’s throughout his career. foucault importantly denies there can be a “liberating truth” that frees subjects from power. he rejects the traditional or popular correspondence theory of truth, that there is a singular, “right” truth which reflects something “real” about the world. foucault is primarily concerned with exploring how and why current political conditions arose. he is curious about how the particular phenomena of our present emerged, understanding these as contingent and stemming from particular historical conditions, rather than universal or necessary. foucault notes that making these claims of knowledge or existence of a “truth,” to sexuality, human nature, morality, and so on, is a mechanism of biopolitics, and often appears to “prove” or “support” preexisting moral or political commitments of the state (gutting 2013). he is skeptical of a possible universal truth to questions about humanity; foucault is explicit that he is not seeking a “truth” in his work, nor does he think this is the job of the philosopher. rather, he critically engages with knowledge and power in order to help his reader reflect on their own situation with power structures and how they may live within them. inspired by nietzsche, foucault argues “truth,” in the correspondence theory sense, is a conceptual invention used to connect knowledge to the implication of power technologies (elden 2017, 32–35). power and knowledge are then deeply intertwined through the concept of and claims to this “truth.” therefore, the “factual truth” is never entirely clear. this critical attitude towards claims of “truths” and what these claims are doing are integral for our following discussion. how claims of a knowledge or discovery of a 3 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 “foundational” or “greater” truth function as a technology of power is essential to our following discussion. in the seinfeld episode “the raincoats,” jerry and his girlfriend are spotted by newman kissing during a screening of schindler’s list. when jerry’s confronted, he responds arguing he had not seen his girlfriend in so long the couple could not resist. but perhaps something else got them hot and bothered. in “fascinating fascism,” susan sontag argues nazism is marketed and consumed like pornography, as demonstrated in her analysis of a pocket book of nazi paraphernalia: ss regalia is [pornographic]. the cover already makes that clear. across the large black swastika in the nazi flag is a diagonal stripe which reads “over 100 brilliant four-colour photographs” and the price, exactly the way a sticker with the price on it used to be affixed—part teaser, part deference to censorship—dead centre, covering the model’s genitalia, on the covers of pornographic magazine. (sontag 1975) this is the standard marketing of nazism from the 1940s to today. a recent edition of mein kampf2 features a black and white portrait of hitler with “new: uncensored edition” bannered across the top, “uncensored” bolded in red, and another red banner diagonally covering part of the portrait. the similarities between these books, published forty years apart, are astounding; both sensationalize their material, while claiming to present truthful documentation. despite appearing radically different on the surface, i argue, the majority of media featuring nazism obeys the same logic of representation. there is always an assertion of a claim of a “hidden,” “greater” truth to the opposing binaries of the axis and the allies, and a further claim that this is revealed in the sexuality of each of the opposing sides. nazism is used as an easily accessible and universal symbol of the evil/abnormal to make a greater claim in the overarching western narrative of good/normal versus evil/abnormal. the binaries of good/evil, normal/abnormal, order/chaos, natural/unnatural, and romantic love/deviant sexuality have become intertwined in popular media featuring national socialism so that nazism may be used as an assumed symbol that evil/abnormal is infectious, desirable, and has the potential to become absolutely powerful. in his lecture series abnormal, foucault argues the binary normal/abnormal as a stable and meaningful “truth” of individuals, is used as a normalizing dispensary technology, while simultaneously producing more “abnormalities.” sexual deviance is one of these “abnormalities,” and sexuality is thereby presented to have within it the truth of an individual’s “normalcy” or “ab 2 published by elite minds, inc. 4 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 normality.” deviant sexuality, as indicating the truth of “abnormality,” becomes as much a symbol of “evil” as a nasty cackle or an all-black outfit: fascism is everywhere, above all in our heads. . . . the non-analysis of fascism is one of the most important political facts [post-wwii]. . . . it enables fascism to be used as a floating signifier, whose function is essentially that of denunciation. (foucault 1980a, 139) it is through lack of examination and attention to testimonies, paired with the spectacles of power that characterize national socialism, that nazism becomes a symbolic replacement or indicator of evil/abnormal. when nazism is used as a floating signifier, real suffering is taken up, distorted, and used as a symbol of a “greater truth” (that the “normal” will triumph over the “abnormal”). the “good/evil” narrative disguises itself in the dress of nazis and jews, hushing survivors by claiming the “more real” or “overarching” truth. nazism is particularly effective as a floating signifier; one cannot question or disagree with the representation of nazism in these depictions without risking being labelled a “fascist” or “nazi sympathizer” themselves, despite these extreme erotic fictionalizations having almost nothing in common with the accounts of survivors. for the most part, despite their claims of “truth,” these representations certainly do not concern themselves with reflecting the accounts of survivors. i argue there are three standard but non-mutually exclusive ways nazism is conflated with deviant sexuality, each following the same binary logic of representation tied to hegemony. these are: through bdsm imagery, through gender nonconformity, and in opposition to heteronormative romantic love. the “sexy sadistic nazi” presents the desire to subordinate and inflict pain on others as a universal quality of german fascists, either being “natural” to the subject or inherited once they join the party. these characters exhibit sexual excitement and/or gratification, either explicitly or implicitly, from subordinating, humiliating, torturing, experimenting on, and killing camp prisoners, ally soldiers, and even other lower-ranking nazis.3 3 mainstream and “highbrow” films that feature the “sexy sadistic nazi” include the night porter (1974), sophie’s choice (1982), schindler’s list (1993), apt pupil (1998), island at war (2004), the reader (2008), and inglourious basterds (2009), but nearly all cinematic representation of nazism feature motifs of the “sexy sadistic” nazi. and this is not just in film but appears in literature as well, though these fictionalized accounts share their own style as well; tours of the black clock (1989), eve’s tattoo (1992), the kommandment’s mistress (1993), hitler’s angel (1997), hitler and geli (1997), hitler’s niece (1999), and the kindly ones (2006) are popular novels which 5 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 the “sexy sadistic” nazi made one of its first appearances in “stalag fiction,” a genre of pocket books published in tel aviv in the early 1960s (richardson 2012, 45). despite being israeli written and produced, stalag fictions avoid acknowledging jewish suffering. the stories focus on “ally versus axis” characters, with nearly no jewish characters, and only allusions to the shoah. judaism is always external to, if not completely disregarded from, stalag fiction (pinchevski and brand 2007, 390, 398). adherence to testimony and historical documentation is swapped for the themes and logic of representing evil/abnormal established in men’s adventure magazines of the 1950s (pinchevski and brand 2007, 391). stalags flout accuracy in favour of narratives of hegemonically masculine heroes who conquer and defeat the evil/abnormal, but not before voyeuristic eyes enjoy the humiliation and torture of the female protagonist. the female ss officers of stalag fiction are abnormal; they are sadistic and promiscuous, rejecting hegemonic femininity. ally heroes conquer the nazis, restore women to their subordinate roles, dismantle sexual deviance, and replace it with heteronormative romance. women are reminded in stalags both of the dangers of resistance to their subordination and of sexual and gender deviance. although the works are clearly fictions, the authors of stalag fiction attempt to make their stories appear as documentation of true events. stalags were published under american-sounding pseudonyms, credited to nonexistent translators, and written in the form of a diary (brothers 2011). this attempt to legitimize the alternated narrative, based not on survivor or soldier testimony, but on archetypes and ideals of hegemony, works to further sensationalize the material, and to justify its violence. soon after the popularity of stalag fiction, a whole film genre of “sexy sadistic” nazis emerged in the west, the most famous being ilsa, she wolf of the ss. ilsa depicts the reign and fall of the cruel and curvaceous commander of a pow and experimentation camp. ilsa is very much the typical nazisploitation film. the genre is defined by lack of plot, graphic scientific experimentation, torture, and violent sexual assaults, with domineering, anti-social, and beautiful nazi officers/scientists who are defeated, usually by rape and murder. ilsa, like a number of nazisploitation films, begins with a “historical disclaimer” claiming that the film is based on true events, and even performs the exposing of real horrors (kozma 2012, 59). but, unlike stalags, nazisploitation films utilized real photographic documentation of concentration camps and pulled “inspiration” from famous and mythologized nazis. the use of the historical disclaimer implies a connection between the third reich and fiction depictions of nazism, intentionally blurring the viewers’ knowledge of what is feature sexually deviant nazis. fictions of hitler’s own abnormal sexual tendencies are notably more popular in literature than film. bdsm, gender deviance, and incest are notably prevalent themes. 6 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 based in documentation and what is fictional. nazisploitation films perform bearing witness and testimony, while anchoring their claims in the logic of hegemony. the “based on a true story” tagline makes the films more titillating and removes guilt from the viewer for the voyeuristic morbid pleasure of watching the victims tortured and the female perpetrators defeated through graphic rape and violence. accuracy of representation to testimony or historical documentations does not matter as long as the nazis are represented as directly conflicting with the “good” in the established binary; getting who-is-who in the good/evil binary right is what is “truth” in hegemonic logic. the heyday of stalag fiction and nazisploitation is over, but their influence is still seen in contemporary media. purposeful confusion of fantasy and reality has shaped popular representations, and subsequently cultural understanding, of german fascism. “lowbrow” media, such as bdsm pornography,4 fictional erotica,5 and internet fan fiction,6 overtly display the influence of nazisploitation and its hegemonic foundation. better disguised is its influence in mainstream and “highbrow” depictions. alicia kozma argues nazisploitation produced the subsequent rules for how nazism is recognized and represented in mainstream film: nazisploitation films . . . develop generic tropes and an enduring aesthetic that is critical to the creation of cinematic nazism. the translation of those images to mainstream film created powerful mythic images that have pushed past the margins of exploitation and made an indelible impact on film as a whole. the iconic images engrained by nazisploitation films are gendered, bound in the costume of fetish and signaled through violence and a particular fascination with the body. (kozma 2012, 56) but this goes even further than kozma claims. even mainstream depictions of nazism establish their narratives through claims to truth based in the oppositional hegemonic logic of the normal/abnormal binary. kozma compares ilsa to dr. elsa schneider, the nazi-sympathizing archaeologist from indiana jones and the last crusade (kozma 2012, 62). both reject hegemonic femininity; they are sexually deviant, 4 mood pictures’ dr. mengele (2005), gestapo and gestapo 2 (2006) and keith j. cocker’s blitzkreig: return to stalag 69 (2008) are a few examples. 5 a quick amazon.com search will bring you to bend over hitler, forced by the nazi soldier, leather nazis, and suzie’s ss spanking story, to name a few. 6 both the fictionalized version of ameon goeth from schindler’s list and col. franz landa of inglourious bastards have dedicated fandom. 7 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 professional, unmarried intellectuals who commit violent acts.7 ilsa and elsa both follow the same logic of “abnormality”; for ilsa this signals her intrinsic evil/abnormality (she only appears to be human), while elsa chooses evil over good. these deviations from feminine norms make them abnormal, and therefore dangerous. for this, each is punished and destroyed by hegemonic masculinity (one begins to ponder the origin of “femi-nazi”). elsa is humanized by her momentary adherence to the good/normal; she is attracted and sympathetic to jones, and admits hatred for her nazi employers, but, ultimately, her commitment to intellectual achievement, coded as abnormality, wins out, and she is inevitably destroyed. isla and elsa are both also examples of the second form of representation, the “gender nonconformist” nazi. gender deviance in depictions of nazism is both overt and subtle, and appears across sexes. the “gender nonconformist” nazi manifests in two primary ways: gender fluidity and feminization. many representations of nazism engage with both femininity and masculinity, making them a fluid hybrid of each, consequently neither “male” nor “female,” and therefore, abnormal. many sexualized representations of nazism display hyper-feminine and hyper-masculine traits simultaneously, and their appearance and behaviours slide between the extremes of gender expression, while the heroes display a stable hegemonic gender identity corresponding to their biological sex.8 one of the most vivid depictions of the dual manifestation of hyper-femininity and hyper-masculinity is the villainess bruno from frank miller’s graphic novel the dark knight returns. bruno has an army-style buzz cut and a machine gun; she towers over her male cronies with her height and robust musculature; and she wears nothing but swastikas on her voluptuous breasts and bottom, brown-uniform bottomless chaps, long black gloves, and combat boots. blending hyper-femininity and hyper-masculinity renders bruno synchronously sexual and repulsive; her exaggerative gendered features turn her into a violent, sexual monster. her appearance garners multiple jabs throughout the novel, and her gender fluidity appears to be both the manifestation and the basis of her 7 oliver speck has suggested that the conflation of nazism with ruthless scientific pursuits depicts intellectualism and academia as suspicious or even sinister; the “mad scientist nazi” likely finds its basis in the anti-intellectualism it works to enforce (speck 2012, 202). this is especially true in the case of intellectually driven women. 8 examples of these include lady gaga’s music video “alejandro,” michelle “bombshell” mcgee’s controversial 2005 photoshoot and subsequent bdsm pornography film, col. franz landa from inglourious basterds, and the films the damned, cabaret, and the night porter. 8 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 evil. the rejection of stable masculinity or femininity acts as an indication of these characters’ rejection of hegemony, and therefore reveals their evil/abnormality. the feminization of nazism is often used to detract from its power and trivialize both its power and its racist logic and agenda, and it is usually accompanied by sexual humiliation and violence. adolph hitler himself is the target of much of this, potentially beginning with the decades-long fascination with his alleged single testicle. the film little nicky features a sequence of daily life in hell in which hitler, dressed as a french maid, is forcibly penetrated with a pineapple. in jackboots on whitehall, hitler sings and prances while dressed as queen elizabeth i. the producers draws much of its humour from the feminization of german fascism. the eccentric nazi-in-hiding franz pens the musical springtime for hitler, and reveals hitler’s middle name to be elizabeth, as he was “descended from a long line of english queens” (stroman 2005). recently, the popular comedy website collegehumour.com produced the sketch “ways hitler was like a teenage girl,” featuring a parody of hitler at a teenage slumber party, yelling at his mom and reading from his diary, while the narrator cites biographical facts. this feminization changes the intimidating displays of nazism into ridiculous spectacles: conflation with femininity both destabilizes german fascist power and trivializes it. comparing hitler to english queens, a surprisingly reoccurring motif, insinuates he is dramatic, histrionic, and unfit for and undeserving of leadership. the feminization of nazism both delegitimizes its power and makes a mockery of its ends. ladelle mcwhorter explains the function of “queering” hitler in racism and sexual oppression in anglo-america: hitler’s alleged homosexuality had become a joke in popular media in the united states long before pearl harbour, and entry into the war. . . . available evidence led . . . researchers to conclude that hitler was effeminate and had homosexual tendencies—which made him queer by 1940s standards; however, none found any evidence of overt homosexual activity. (mcwhorter 2009, 239–240) unfounded accusations of homosexuality were used to “other” hitler (and by extension, nazi racism) from the hegemony of western culture. this just-so narrative, used to illustrate the “truth” of an intrinsic abnormality of nazism, subsequently produced feminized representations of german fascism, while still maintaining a presentation of a “factual” basis. nazism is subordinated, and nazis are revealed to be hysterical floozies who only care about indulgence and decorum, through conflation with heteronormative femininity. in representations featuring the “gender nonconforming” nazi, females are portrayed as hard, militaristic, lustful soldiers, while males are dramatic, superficial, and hysterical. though each representation functions differently, attributing gender fluidity and femininity to nazism both functions 9 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 as a marker representing a “truth” of an abnormal, and works to subordinate nazism and gender nonconformity as evil and in opposition to hegemony. not all sexy nazis are desecrated by hegemony. sometimes, nazi characters are saved, converted, or redeemed through heteronormative romantic love. stories of the “star-crossed” nazi usually feature (typically male) nazis caught between love for an opposite-sex ally or jew, and their loyalty to german fascism and sexual deviance, and, consequently, abnormality.9 in schindler’s list (spielberg 1993), ameon goeth gains sexual gratification, at least implicitly, from his disturbingly nonchalant humiliation, torture, and murder of camp prisoners. his only humanizing quality is his “love” for his jewish maid, helen hirsch. notice, in the previous two discussions, jews are external to, and often disregarded in, the representation. with the “starcrossed” nazi, they play an important role in the narrative, but always as defined in opposition to, and as needing saving from, nazism. goeth and hirsch’s relationship is depicted as that of an abusive but infatuated husband and reluctant wife; though he treats her horribly his fondness and devotion are genuine. his violence towards her is horrendous, but, in typical hegemonic fashion, his “true love” for her has the potential to redeem him from his abuse. on their first meeting, goeth instantly falls for hirsch (“love at first sight”), choosing her over more qualified domestic help with a lightly cloaked insinuation of virginity: “i don’t want someone else’s maid.” schindler recognizes goeth’s love, and when hirsch confesses her fear of goeth, schindler explains the special, even miraculous, impact she has on goeth. goeth is shown sympathetically when he reaches out to hirsch; only the beautiful ashkenazi brings the nazi to his knees, and offers him redemption, revealing the truth of his potential “normalcy.” schindler’s list and other works with the “star-crossed” nazi place fascist characters in dualisms of good/evil and normal/abnormal, suggesting the character is torn between sides in the eternal battle of good and evil. though the “star-crossed” nazi’s “truth” is not presented as inherently evil/abnormal, it still adheres to the logic of representation which uses nazism as a floating signifier for evil/abnormal for the purposes of perpetuating a political message about human nature, sexuality, and romantic love. the previous analysis reveals sexualized depictions of nazism adhere to specific rules of hegemonic representation; this already established binary formula absorbs the shoah into a good/evil political mythology which is marketable and consumable. i argue foucault can tell us why nazism is particularly effective as a floating 9 examples of the “star-crossed” nazi are featured in the films the sound of music (1965), the night porter (1974), the summer of my german soldier (1978), indiana jones and the last crusade (1985), aimee & jaguar (1999), black book (2006), the reader (2008), and suite française (2015), to name a few. 10 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 signifier, and how sexuality has become an essential aspect of its life as a floating signifier. this section will look to foucault’s work on sovereign and biopower to examine how the unique power dynamics in the historical third reich contribute to contemporary erotic preoccupation with nazism, and how present forces of regulatory and disciplinary power have worked to sexualize nazism. i argue it is the first condition which captures erotic attention and produces fascination around nazism, and the second condition which has given rise to the distinctly sexual connotation western media has imparted on german fascism. michel foucault was fourteen when the nazi occupation of france began in 1940. foucault spent a large part of his youth under the threatening presence of nazism and the oppressive influence of the regime’s ideology (macey 2004, 15). this period spent under german fascism certainly made an impression on foucault and influenced his theory of sovereign and biopower.10 foucault directly addresses the unusual power dynamics of the third reich in the history of sexuality vol. 1: an introduction and his lecture series society must be defended. in the former, he writes: “nazism was doubtless the most cunning and the most naive (and the former because of the latter) combination of the fantasies of blood and paroxysms of a disciplinary power” (foucault 1978, 149). foucault is referring to the blending of sovereign power and biopower; the distinct and usually, but not necessarily, separate forms of power he theorizes exist in western societies. i argue that, to understand the erotic appeal of nazism today, we must look to not only the biopolitical binaries of othering the abnormal at work in our own society, but also the power dynamics of nazi germany itself. in history of sexuality vol. 1, and its predecessor discipline and punish, foucault claims the dominant forces exercised on populations and individuals have shifted from sovereign power, which demanded obedience to a single authority enforced through spectacles of violence and death, to biopower, which operates through technologies not usually recognized as power on both individuals and populations to produce thoughts, desires, and beliefs to more effectively manage external behaviour. the third reich combined these two forms of power and their technologies in ways which foucault argues are unique to that specific historical and political situation; german fascism was a rare case in which strong elements of both sovereign power and biopower operate in complimentary ways. national socialism was able to establish racist and oppressive laws and demand compliancy of both behaviour and belief through the simultaneous use of dazzling spectacles of power and through subtle disciplinary and regulatory technologies. both the sovereign “blood right” to rule and biopower’s claim for “the greater good” are blended 10 foucault speaks directly of his encounters with nazi power while writing about spain under the franco dictatorship (foucault 1994, 775). 11 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 to establish the authority of german fascism; those with aryan blood are given authority not solely because they are the superior race, but also because it is only those of aryan blood who can continue biological progression and facilitate the flourishing of society and humanity. foucault explains how these seemingly oppositional forces worked together in hitler’s germany: we have, then, in nazi society something that is really quite extraordinary: this is a society which has generalized biopower in an absolute sense, but which has also generalized the sovereign right to kill. the two mechanisms— the classic, archaic mechanisms that gave the state the right of life and death over its citizens, and the mechanism organized around discipline and regulation, or in other words, the new mechanism of power—coincide exactly. we can therefore say this: the nazi state makes the field of the life it manages, protects, guarantees, and cultivates in biological terms absolutely coextensive with the sovereign right to kill anyone, meaning not only other people, but also its own people. (foucault 2003, 260) hitler believed in the idea of the “aryan master race,” that different biological races were in possession of different qualities and potentials shaped by evolutionary pressures; the aryan race, he believed, was responsible for all of humanity’s achievements and the only race capable of further growth (bendersky 2014, 20). blood and the common good were rendered inseparable in the nazi myth that established its claim to power (and thus blending sovereign and biopower); inherited superiority bestowed the right to rule to those with the inborn ability for the evolution of civilization and the continuation of human development. their right to rule was both inborn and for the greater good. foucault argues this conflation with biology and social progress, based on social darwinism, is basis of the logic and power of german fascism (foucault 1989b, 269). if both biological and cultural evolution are one, the fate of civilization is therefore dependent on the reproductive behaviours of the entire population, most importantly those genetically desirable. pleasure and desire are then both the aryan race’s defence and its vulnerability; race purity and expansion will continue their evolutionary legacy, while interbreeding and reproductive failure would dismantle present progress and halt further advancement. sexuality becomes a collective and individual responsibility. nazism utilized “the characteristic privileges of sovereign power [over] the right to life and death” (foucault 1978, 135); those who were hostile to the leviathan, either through the threat posed by their biology or through direct disobedience to the sovereign führer, were killed (though not always in the spectacular and public sense characteristic of sovereign power). the genocide and execution carried out by the nazi party can be understood simultaneously as justi12 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 fied by the mutually reinforcing protection of the sovereign and as a necessity for the promotion of the “greater good.” nazi mythology teaches that aryan blood, and therefore the entirety of human progress, is in danger at the hands (or, more accurately, the genitals) of competing less-evolved genes; hitler believed that the jewish people were the greatest threat to the aryan race because of their racial purity and self-preservation (bendersky 2014, 21). keeping the aryan genome pristine and increasing offspring production could not be enough to ensure the future of the aryan race. foucault explains that biopower required national socialism to kill in the name of life: wars . . . were waged on behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations were mobilized for the purpose of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity; massacres have become vital. . . . one had a right to kill those who presented a biological danger to others. (foucault 1978, 137–138) the third reich maintained its benevolent appearance by declaring that some were too dangerous to live. these were not just those of non-aryan races; “eugenically undesirable” aryans, such as those with mental and physical disabilities, homosexuals, and others, were the manifestation of erosion within aryan blood. there existed both internal and external threats to the population, each with equal means of desecration between their legs. the reproductive bodies of both non-aryans and “eugenically undesirable” aryans were presented to the general population as biological weapons of mass destruction, and the third reich became preoccupied with the sexual behaviours and desires of its subjects. sexuality was now understood as a public and political act; what was sexually permissible became a central aspect of population policy, and essential to the actualization of national goals (timm, 2005, 223). the importance of sexuality to population control transformed it from the inconsequential and uninteresting to a predominant part of the anxious and paranoid collective consciousness. german fascism endorsed a reproductive preemptive strike that required the cooperation of all eugenically desirable aryans; the plan was for racially pure aryan subjects to both out-produce others races and effectively annihilate competing genetics before their numbers could overwhelm or contaminate the aryan ones. what was before of little interest or consequence to the government now suddenly was a national concern; genitals became property of the regime. regulatory power was implemented through the study and surveillance of the reproductive lives of the german population. the nuremberg laws (better known as the “blood purity laws”) offered “eugenically desirable” aryans various incentives for early marriage and high birthrates, and for the barring of aryan women from the use of birth control and abortion, while creating disincentives, forced sterilization, and even “euthanasia” for 13 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 those deemed “eugenically undesirable” (heineman 2005, 43). reproduction became “compulsory labour” for “eugenically desirable” aryans, as the desirable population was “made to live” (heineman 2005, 43). it is important to note that, contrary to popular belief, the third reich was not an entirely sexually repressive society. historian dagmar herzog has argued that fascist germany was a sexually complex society and that its attractiveness to citizens (and, i argue, part of its contemporary appeal) was partially due to its attitudes towards sexuality and romance: the deliberate sacralization of human love [was] a crucial aspect of national socialism’s reconfiguration of notions of mortality and furthering ongoing processes of secularization . . . to read the nazis’ paeans to the delights of love as simply tactical embellishment of what was actually a narrowly reproduction-oriented agenda would be to miss the ways nazi advice-givers inserted themselves into the most elemental desires for personal happiness . . . even as the glorification of heterosexual romance provided the context for (and distracting counterpoint to) defences of some of the most grotesque and violent aspects of nazi politics. (d. herzog 2005, 15) romantic love was understood as a “higher pleasure” than intercourse, and one that races less-evolved than aryans were not capable of. the “eugenically undesirable,” particularly the jewish people, were deemed sexually driven and predatory without interest or capacity for romantic love. jewish men were understood as simultaneously animalistic yet organized in their plan to exploit and corrupt aryan women, and to spread venereal disease and infection into the aryan race. jewish women were believed to be promiscuous and sexually voracious and were said to disguise themselves as racially pure women to prey on aryan men (szobar 2005, 147). promiscuity and sexual desire were deemed suspicious; aryans were instructed to remain chaste until marriage because of the dangers of non-aryan sexualities. traditional romantic and family values were to be defended against from corrupting animalistic sexualities: “aggressive sexuality was coded as jewish and dangerous” (swett 2011, 42), and lust was feared and romance glorified. though the contemporary popular understanding of sexuality in the third reich may not be completely historically accurate, general knowledge of the relationship between power and sexuality, and the strength of sexuality in the collective consciousness of nazi germany, have contributed to western erotic fascination with nazism. mcwhorter notes in her discussion of the “queering” of hitler, western countries were able to maintain their allegiance to biopolitics and eugenic and hegemonic logic, the same forces at the foundation of nazi germany, by “othering” nazism through declaring a “truth” of abnormality (mcwhorter 2009, 244). it becomes clear the ideological basis of nazi germany is not far from the “othering” done through the conflation of deviant sexuality with 14 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 nazism. it is this shallow and general historical understanding that has allowed nazism to work as an especially effective floating signifier for the evil/abnormal, particularly when paired with deviant sexuality. i have argued that nazism has become conflated with sexuality through the power dynamics displayed in nazi culture and paraphernalia through the “othering” done by western cultures to preserve their own destructive biopolitics. i also see one more component of its sexualization: through the inadvertent eroticism constituted by power relations. foucault argues labelling acts and attractions as sexually perverse and taxonimizing desires as “sexualities” that are both inherent to and revealing of the true nature of the subject, is “less a principle of inhibition than an inciting and multiplying mechanism” (foucault 1978, 46). an attraction to nazism is created first by its presentation as dangerous and powerful, then enforced by the cultural belief that sexualities are inborn and unchanging parts of identity. according to foucault, the judgement of a sexual desire as shameful, disgusting, and perverted only makes the attraction more powerful and erotic. and what could be more immoral and distasteful than an erotic inclination towards the perpetrators of some of history’s worst crimes? sexual imaginations are sparked and relationships eroticized when they are outlawed; these seemingly contradictory desires are the unintended residue of biopower’s productive effect on a subject’s desires. foucault explains that sex acts and attractions are split into a binary, in which everything erotic must be either “permitted or forbidden” (foucault 1978, 83). though the intention of exercising this constituting power over subjects is to perpetuate what is permitted and extinguish the forbidden, power works in unexpected and unwanted ways. the relationship between power and sexuality is unpredictable and impossible to control, and attempts to constrain and direct desire usually backfire. power relations render the sexually forbidden, and therefore evil/abnormal, as accidentally desirable, and the conflation of sexuality and identity make these desires stable and more powerful. the role contemporary representations of nazism have been given in the good/evil binary has, inadvertently, eroticized it. foucault refers to the unintentional production of undesirable sexualities through mechanisms of biopower as “the perverse implantation.” we can understand the sexual energy surrounding nazism in contemporary collective consciousness as the perverse implantation on a greater scale than the medicalized version foucault puts forth in the history of sexuality vol. 1: an introduction, but as following the same logic. here, the perverse implantation is working at the level of mainly populations, as opposed to just individuals. there are two aspects at work in the sexualization of the fictional nazism that is used as a floating signifier. first, its conflation with the evil/abnormal renders it dangerous and powerful, and each is very erotic. foucault explains how its conflation with power reveals the sexual understanding of power: “power has an erotic charge. . . . aren’t we witnessing the begin15 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 nings of a re-eroticization of power, taken to a pathetic, ridiculous extreme by the porn-shops with the nazi insignia that you can find in the united states?” (foucault 1989a, 97–98). nazi imagery has become so closely associated with “sexy” that sex has become conflated with its symbolism and vice versa. though perhaps counter-intuitive, all uses of nazism as a floating signifier, no matter how lewd or offensive, adhere to the same logic of biopower. even the most vulgar depictions of nazism are not a form of resistance to power; though deemed an undesirable sexuality, they still play into biopower’s effect on sexuality. foucault explains that what he refers to as the “speaker’s benefit”—performing resistance and presentation of exploration of sexualized nazism as liberated from constraints— is itself constituted by power relations: there may be [a] reason that makes it so gratifying for us to define the relationship between sex and power in terms of repression; something that one might call the speaker’s benefit. if sex is repressed, that is, condemned to prohibition, nonexistence and silence, then the mere fact that one is speaking about it has the appearance of a deliberate transgression. a person who holds forth in such language places himself to a certain extent outside the reach of power; he upsets established law; he somehow anticipates the coming freedom. (foucault 1978, 6) those who enjoy nazisploitation, or other blatantly sexualized media involving nazis, may feel as though they are being brave or naughty while expressing their “real selves and sexuality.” this is, however, a failure to understand that expressions of sexuality are not inherently liberating; if one is buying into biopower and believing that constituted desires are real, inherent parts of the self, and that power is only repressive on sexualities, then they are failing to understand the real relationship between power and sexuality and adhering to the idea that sexuality is a real, stable aspect of the self. this further perpetuates these beliefs and adheres to the logic of biopower. there is nothing inherently “sexy” about nazism, nor is anyone in possession of a natural disposition of sexual attraction to german fascism. what has rendered nazism erotic is its presentation in media as the manifestation of the evil/abnormal, the taboo surrounding nazism and sexuality, and the configuration of nazism as powerful and even otherworldly. no one is sexually attracted to the “real nazis”; they instead desire the fantasy created around national socialism that allows it to function as a floating signifier. it is not an attraction to nazism per se, but an attraction to the power and abnormality it has come to represent in media, and that exists in collective consciousness. the second aspect of the perverse implantation is the belief that desires are indicative of a subject’s “sexuality.” fleeting, meaningless desires constituted 16 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 through power relations are transformed into prevalent erotic inclinations that the subject believes are an unchanging aspect of their identity, through categorization, documentation, study, and diagnosis of perversions and sexualities. subjects are made to believe that “therein resided a truth” (foucault 1978, 158) of both their natural sexuality, and what this sexuality means about the nature of themselves and of humanity. nazism’s presence in collective consciousness, paired with sexual media representations where it is used as a floating signifier, has allowed nazi directeddesire to become an aspect of the identity of those so inclined. this is manifest not as people necessarily identifying with a “nazi sexuality,” but with conflating nazism with a dark seductive power to which a subject’s attraction reveals their true nature. when sexuality becomes “a sort of mirage in which we think we see ourselves reflected” (foucault 1978, 157), arbitrary feelings become understood as indicative of a “true self,” and these attractions become more permanent and pervasive. there is nothing inherently sexy about nazism, and desires directed at german fascism reveal no truth about the subject or a greater human nature; however, these erotic feelings do reveal the ways in which power is acting on subject and the ways in which national socialism is conveyed in media and in collective consciousness” (foucault 1978, 45). whether the sexualization of nazism in media is an unintended byproduct of biopower or an effective way of perpetuating the dualisms of good/evil (normal/abnormal), it is certainly an example of the productive workings of power relations working in surprising and unexpected ways. now that we have a clear foucaultian picture of how and why nazism has been sexualized, and an understanding that these representations rely on a hegemonic logic which is damaging to witness and survivor testimony, what are we to do? throughout his work, foucault argued that it was harmful and wrong to claim to speak for or on behalf of others, and advocated for an “archeology” of the voices of people whose stories have historically been silenced and swept aside of discussion and study. much of his work11 has focused on creating a discourse where those who have been ignored, ridiculed, and marginalized through biopolitics may speak on their own behalf and be listened to seriously. foucault worked to create a dialogue in which the voices of the unheard could be freely expressed and acknowledged without being glamourized, romanticized, or commodified: [the masses] know far better than [the intellectual] and they are certainly capable of expressing themselves. but there exists a system of power which 11 specifically, in his discussion of knowledge in the archeology of knowledge, but this is also applied in his books madness and civilization, the birth of the clinic, discipline and punish, and history of sexuality vol. i 17 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 blocks, prohibits, and invalidates this discourse and this knowledge, a power not only found in manifest authority of censorship but one that profoundly and subtly penetrates an entire societal network. . . . the intellectual’s role is no longer to place himself “somewhat ahead and to the side” in order to express the stifled truth of the collectivity; rather it is to struggle against forms of power that transform him into its object and instrument in the sphere of “knowledge,” “truth,” “consciousness,” and “discourse.” (foucault 1980b) the job of the philosopher is to resist pressures to explain the lives and experiences of others, but to show how these voices have been stifled and give room so they may speak freely. the flip side of this, then, is foucault’s rejection of an ethics of hard imperatives decided on by philosophers (foucault 1988, 49). such kinds of normative judgements would, after all, undermine the philosopher’s role of the critic of power; moral imperatives make, for foucault, a problematic claim a “truth” of what is right. what foucault ultimately rejects is the sort of imperative-based ethics of deontology and consequentialism; it is clear, given both his earlier texts and his own activism, he is not a moral subjectivist. but how can there be an ethics without truth?12 though he never offered a comprehensive moral theory, foucault began to develop an “aesthetics of life” rooted in the possibility of a “self-constitution” in his final books (foucault 1997, 291). this “self-constitution” refers to the subject’s own ability to resist and engage with power structures. johanna oksala explains: foucault sought to develop a way to think about ethics and politics that does not rely on any ahistorical, ontological assumptions about the subject. the subject is neither the starting point nor the foundation of morality, any more than it was of epistemology or history. throughout his work foucault warned us against fixed meanings of what a human being is. to be consistent, his ethics cannot be built on any foundational understanding of the ethical subject, but on the contrary, must aim to break essences, constants and human natures. ethics becomes possible exactly the movement of revealing forms of subjectivity as contingent and questioning constraining essences. (oksala 2005, 192) foucault holds that the subject has, to some extent, a role in producing their sexuality; the subject will be necessarily at least somewhat sexually constituted by the power exercised on them, but the subject does have the ability to resist and disman 12 charles taylor (1984) raises this fascinating point in his essay “foucault on freedom and truth.” 18 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 tle power, though this is difficult. foucault’s final works are concerned with exploring how subjects in alternate cultures understood and expressed sexuality; foucault reveals how much of understanding and practice of sexuality is culturally shaped. contemporary power may be inescapable, but in embracing resistance one may become, to some extent, self-constituting. timothy o’leary maintains that history of sexuality vol. 1 has a distinctly moral slant: “the history of sexuality, volume 1 deals with ethics because it deals with the ways we are constituted and constitute ourselves as subjects; and the task of understanding the historical forces which have made us the kinds of individuals that we are is, for foucault, one of the most important tasks of ethics” (o’leary 2002, 31). history of sexuality vol. 1 engages directly with foucault’s “aesthetic of life” because it examines how subjects are constituted by power, and therefore, inadvertently, offers the means of resistance to this constitution. therefore, sexual practices are neither inherently liberating or oppressive, but it is how we engage with sexuality that is ethically significant. pat califia defends the use of the nazi fantasy in sexual role-play: “not everyone who wears a swastika is a nazi . . . s/m is more a parody of the hidden sexual nature of fascism than it is a worship or acquiesce to it” (califia 1982, 36). it is true that many people attracted to fascism do not condone nazism or other racist ideologies. the problem with califia’s claim lies in the “truth” claim. califia argues that part of the positive and liberating nature of s/m role-play is that the historical oppressor often is the one degraded or in the masochistic role; s/m allows for a reversal of power dynamics through fantasy (35–36). this is clearly an example of the speaker’s benefit; califia claims the resistance of nazi sexual fetishization lies in its “parody” of some sort of sexual or erotic “truth” to fascism. though seemingly resistant, ascribing a “truth,” particularly one corresponding to deviant sexuality, follows straight back to hegemonic logic. assuming there to be a hidden “truth” to nazism, and believing and role-playing this, rather than attending to survivor testimony, buys directly into biopolitics. a notion playing on the logic of the speaker’s benefit has been used to argue in favour of less explicit representations of nazism which follow the hegemonic structure. todd herzog argues films which “flip the script,” such as inglourious basterds, are constructive because they free cinematic representations of the shoah from constraints around political correctness and sensitivity. herzog holds there is a problematic sanctified treatment of nazism in film which should be upset and resisted through films which play with the course of history (t. herzog 2012, 282). herzog is confused that this sort of fictionalized “turning the tables” on nazism is both something new and a form of resistance to the traditional logic of representation of nazism in media. inglourious basterds is merely the most mainstream and critically acclaimed of these “alternate” but “more true” presentations of nazism. i hold the personal role-playing and cinematic representations that califia and herzog 19 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 argue in favour of are the opposite of liberating, but rather, through claiming to find “truth” or “liberation” in claims to truth, silence witness testimony. as feminist philosopher jana sawicki explains, one should not confuse different manifestations of the same power dynamics with liberation or resistance: foucault wants to shift our attention away from a preoccupation with “repression” as a central concept of analyzing the relationship between sex and power . . . relations of power are dispersed and fragmented throughout the social field . . . if there is no central locus of power, neither is there a central locus of resistance. (sawicki 1988, 182–187) this is not to say that presenting a nonsexualized or noneroticized depiction of nazism is an act of resistance. we cannot say this; presumably, it is possible for there to be representations of nazism which engage with sexuality without enforcing hegemonic narratives or claiming to tell the “truth” of the shoah. however, fictions which construct nazism as a floating signifier adhere to and perpetuate understandings of the evil/abnormal as established by biopower and always compromise the voices of survivors and witnesses, and many of these representations have done so through appeals to sexuality. as gavriel d. rosenfeld explains, the more nazism is an object of entertainment and a prop in fantasies, the less seriously the general population regards the shoah (rosenfeld 2015, 339). though it will be difficult, perhaps not even entirely possible, resistance to attractions to glamourized nazi imagery is both liberating for the subject and discontinues damaging understandings of german fascism. giving into every desire is not to act in a sexually liberated way; rather, it is sexually liberating to understand that sources of pleasure are not inherent to identity and so can be cultivated (foucault 1978, 157). sensationalized depictions of nazism often do not seek to perpetuate the memory of the shoah or the suffering of its victims, but rather regard it as a fiction that may be used as a setting for its own purposes. to use the history of the shoah as a means—whether it be to make a comment on human nature or the existence of evil, for sexual gratification, for cathartic fantasy, and so forth—fails to regard the shoah with respect or dignity. writer, professor, and survivor elie wiesel replied to the sensationalizing of fascist power and victim suffering, and the disregard for historical accuracy in nbc’s 1978 miniseries holocaust: untrue, offensive, cheap; as a tv production, the film is an insult to those who perished and those who survived. . . . if [the series] makes you cry, you will cry for the wrong reasons. . . . the implications are troubling and far reaching. . . . it removes us from the event rather than bringing us closer to it. . . . the holocaust must be remembered. but not as a show. (wiesel 1978) 20 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 philosopher martin buber argued against the death penalty for nazi war criminal adolph eichmann for reasons which may be applied to fictional portrayals of nazism. buber himself was disgusted with the sensationalism of the eichmann trial and pleaded for life imprisonment instead of capital punishment for eichmann (friedman 1983, 356). buber held this “symbolic justice” was useless and would present some sort of retribution where none was possible (friedman 1983, 359). the suffering of the shoah can never be made up for, and buber was concerned that eichmann’s death would create a false sense of justice. this is true also of any fictionalized attempt; these pieces should not be presented as if they provide any sort of “symbolic justice” as this diminishes the reality of suffering. buber was further concerned with what treating eichmann as a force of evil would mean for collective consciousness (friedman 1983, 360). depicting nazism as a supernatural force of darkness, and suggesting that the death and destruction (either real or depicted) of nazis may be justice for victims’ suffering, is problematic as it presents itself as retroactively serving justice where none is possible. foucault offers us a jarring yet hopeful understanding of ourselves as political and sexual beings. by understanding the ways in which power, knowledge, and claims of truth in sexuality work exploitatively to disregard witness testimony and use the shoah as a prop for the assertion of hegemony, we can acknowledge the damage exploitive representations of nazism do to collective understandings of the shoah and resist the temptation to look past the suffering of many to find a hidden “truth.” foucault’s aesthetics of life give the means by which we can better listen to narratives of the shoah, and free these stories from biopolitical usage. references: bendersky, joseph w. 2014. a concise history of nazi germany, 4th edition. plymouth: rowman and littlefield. brothers, eric. 2011. “‘stalags’: kinky s&m pulp fiction from israel.” suite.io, published february 1. https://suite.io/eric-brothers/503b207. 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translated by colin gordon, leo marshall, john mepham, and kate soper, 134–145. brighton: harvester press. ———. 1980b. “intellectuals and power: a conversation between michel foucault and gilles deleuze.” in language, counter-memory, practice: selected essays and interviews by michel foucault, edited by donald f. bouchard. new york: cornell university press. transcript reprinted at libcom.org, http://libcom.org/library/intellectuals-power-a-conversation-betweenmichel-foucault-and-gilles-deleuze. ———. 1988. “an aesthetics of existence.” in michel foucault: politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writing 1977–1984, edited by lawrence d. kritzman, translated by alan sheridan et al., 47–56. new york: routledge. ———. 1989a. “film and popular memory.” in foucault live: collected interviews, 1961–1984, edited by sylvère lotringer, translated by john johnston, 122– 132. new york: semiotext(e). ———. 1989b. “an ethics of pleasure.” in foucault live: collected interviews, 1961– 1984, 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york: continuum international. kozma, alicia. 2012. “ilsa and elsa: nazisploitation, mainstream film and cinematic transference.” in nazisploitation! the nazi image in low-brow cinema and culture, edited by daniel h. magilow, elizabeth bridges, and kristin t. vander lugt, 55–71. new york: continuum international. macey, david. 2004. michel foucault. london: reaktion books. mccormack, david. 2014. “rapper nicki minaj accused of “glorifying hitler” over blatant use of nazi imagery in her latest video.” daily mail online, november 10. http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2827929/rapper-nickiminaj-accused-glorifing-hitler-blatant-use-nazi-imagery-latest-video.html. mcwhorter, ladelle. 2009. racism and sexual oppression in anglo-america: a genealogy. indianapolis: indiana university press. oksala, johanna. 2005. foucault on freedom. cambridge: cambridge university press. o’leary, timothy. 2002. foucault and the art of ethics. london: continuum. pinchevski, amit and roy brand. 2007. “holocaust perversions: the stalag pulp fiction and the eichmann trial” critical studies in media communication 24 (5): 387–407. richardson, michael d. 2012. “sexual deviance and the naked body in cinematic representations of nazis.” in nazisploitation! the nazi image in low-brow cinema and culture, edited by daniel h. magilow, elizabeth bridges, and kristin t. vander lugt, 38–54. new york: continuum international. rosenfeld, gavriel d. 2015. hi hitler! how the nazi past is being normalized in contemporary culture. cambridge: cambridge university press. sawicki, jana. 1988. “identity politics and sexual freedom: foucault and feminism.” in feminism and foucault: reflections on resistance, edited by irene diamond and lee quinby, 177–199. boston: northeastern university press. 23 wesch: resisting ilsa published by scholarship@western, 2018 sontag, susan. 1975. “fascinating fascism.” new york review of books. february 6. http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/1975/feb/06/fascinating0fascism/. speck, oliver c. 2012. “is tarantino serious? the twofold image of the auteur and the state of exception.” in quentin tarantino’s inglourious basterds: a manipulation of metacinema, edited by robert von dassanowsky, 193–213. new york: continuum international. spielberg, steven (director). 1993. schindler’s list. universal pictures and amblin entertainment, 2013, dvd. stroman, susan (director). 2005. the producers. universal pictures, columbia pictures, and brooksfilms, 2006, dvd. swett, pamela e. 2011. “selling sexual pleasure in 1930s germany.” in power and pleasure in nazi germany, edited by pamela e. swett, corey ross, and fabrice d’almeida, 39–66 new york: palgrave macmillan. szobar, patricia. 2005. “telling sexual stories in the nazi courts of law: race defilement in germany, 1933 to 1945.” in sexuality and german fascism, edited by dagmar herzog, 131–163. new york: berghahn books. taylor, charles. 1984.“foucault on freedom and truth.” political theory 12 (2): 152– 183. timm, annette f. 2005. “sex with a purpose: prostitution, venereal disease, and militarized masculinity in the third reich.” in sexuality and german fascism, edited by dagmar herzog, 223–255. new york: berghahn books. wiesel, elie. 1978. “the trivializing of the holocaust.” new york times, april 16. https://www.nytimes.com/1978/04/16/archives/tv-view-trivializing-theholocaust-semifact-and-semifiction-tv-view.html. samantha wesch is currently an ma student in the department of women’s and gender studies at the university of alberta. she received an ma in philosophy from the university of toronto in 2017, and a ba (hons) in philosophy from the university of alberta in 2016. wesch’s research primarily focuses on ethics, epistemology, kant, foucault, enlightenment philosophy, and the philosophy of sexuality. 24 feminist philosophy quarterly, vol. 4 [2018], iss. 2, art. 2 https://ir.lib.uwo.ca/fpq/vol4/iss2/2 feminist philosophy quarterly 2018 resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism samantha n. wesch recommended citation resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism cover page footnote resisting ilsa: foucaultian ethics and the sexualization of nazism microsoft word 02 velthuizen.docx td the journal for transdisciplinary research in southern africa, 10(3) december 2014, s special edition: san dispute resolution, pp. 19-35. on truth-telling and storytelling: truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture and a history of violent conflict ag velthuizen1 abstract the aim of this article is to propose some principles and practices for truth-seeking during research into violent conflict. to achieve this aim, an argument is deployed by analysing the theoretical concepts “truth”, “myth” and “oral culture” as sources of knowledge. this conceptual analysis precedes a discussion on community-based participatory research (cbpr) as a research methodology to access the knowledge of lived experiences embedded in the oral culture of the san community of platfontein, near kimberley, south africa. it was found that cbpr contains good practices to use in research to judge the probable truth about disputes. the cbpr process is ideal for determining the accuracy of data in the context of a specific culture, considering the norms, spiritual influences and personal considerations of knowledge-holders that accompany a unique cosmology. a variety and equity of worldviews and perspectives of what happened during violent conflict successfully challenges hegemonic power relationships, paradigms and narratives, ultimately leading to informed judgements of what is probably true about a conflict. cbpr with the san of platfontein revealed principles that can be used as guidelines for researching disputes where oral culture is involved. keywords: truth, myth, oral culture, cbpr, san, conflict, dispute introduction this article is not about “the truth shall set you free” and other clichés, but more about what tolstoy affirms: “there is only one thing, and only one thing, in which it is granted to you to be free in life, all else being beyond your power: that is to recognise and profess the truth.”2 the article is therefore inspired by the quest to find the truth about events of the past that informs the present and opens the mind to new possibilities and a better way of living. we should not hesitate to use “truth” to find and implement solutions leading to a better world. however, finding the truth is the challenge. the question that always remains is whether the truth we perceive is always “true” in all circumstances. finding the truth is even more of a 1 senior researcher in the institute for dispute resolution in africa, college of law, 2 tolstoy, l. 2008. the kingdom of god is within you. radford: wilder publications, p. 240. velthuizen 20 challenge if it is intentionally hidden or forgotten or manipulated. in the case of dramatic events, such as violent conflict, one may instinctively change the facts to make the experience acceptable to the listener which is always a challenge for research into violent conflict. in this regard, the san people of platfontein have much knowledge, gained over a long period, to share about the avoidance of conflict and dealing with violence.3 the journey with the san is part of a never-ending quest for knowledge that can bring about human development and understanding of the world in which we live. against this background the research problem arises: how do researchers process narratives from an oral culture such as that of the san to establish the truth about the causes, dynamics and consequences of violent conflict? to solve this problem, the article proposes some principles and practices for truth-seeking during research into violent conflict. in pursuit of this aim, it is argued that there are many perspectives on what happened during violent conflict. therefore a methodology is required that merges all valid perspectives into a body of knowledge that can be regarded as sufficiently truthful to be used for policy-making and the implementation of interventions. this argument is deployed by analysing the concepts “truth”, “myth” and “oral culture” as sources of knowledge. the conceptual analysis opens the way for a discussion on communitybased participatory research as a research methodology to access the knowledge of lived experiences embedded in an oral culture, in this case the san community of platfontein near kimberley in south africa. conceptual framework what is “the truth”? although there are many theories of truth, for the purpose of this article they can roughly be divided into correspondence theory, coherence theory and pragmatic theory. correspondence theory of truth correspondence theory has its foundation in the work of greek philosophers, mainly socrates, plato and aristotle. the basic argument is that the truth is an accurate description of things.4 plato claims that human intelligence is capable of reaching the spiritual, moral and educational essence of existence in the context of other elements.5 according to aristotle, underlying things (“pragmata”) render statements as fact or situations if they are logically structured.6 thomas aquinas emphasised conforming to reality as the foundation of truth; he 3 see the san dispute resolution oral archive http://uir.unisa.ac.za (restricted access) for research reports on the dispute resolution knowledge of the san. 4 prior, a.n. 1969.‘correspondence theory of truth’. in encyclopaedia of philosophy (2). london: macmillan, pp. 223–224. 5 ibid, 223. 6 david, m. 2005. ‘correspondence theory of truth’. in stanford encyclopedia of philosophy. available at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truth-correspondence/ (accessed 25 september 2014). truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 21 claimed that truth is the application of the intellect to things. being or reality is the foundation of truth, which is found in the human mind, acquired through human senses, understanding, reason and judgement.7 in the context of this paper, these affirmations mean that truth-seeking after violent conflict requires complete accuracy of description in the context in which the conflict takes place. furthermore, if these suggestions are accepted, the truth is not only empirical, but subject to reflection and taking a certain position on what can be regarded as true. coherence theory of truth according to coherence theory8, truth requires a proper fit of elements into the whole. coherence implies more than logical consistency: it requires that propositions in a coherent system imply mutual support of each other. the completeness of a set of concepts is critical to validating the usefulness of a whole system. coherence may entail many true systems or one absolute system. one such coherent system was developed by the rationalist philosophers such as kant, spinoza and leibnitz. coherence systems are challenged because they cannot be justified by practicality. heidegger9 emphasised conforming to reality. however he was seeking to expand the notion of “correspondence truth”, pointing out that it is rooted in a more original or “primordial” truth, called aletheia, which is disclosure, unveiling and uncovering as condition for true correspondence and the ontological condition for assertions to be true or false. if the above propositions are analysed, they imply that empirical investigation is required at the place where the specific violent event took place. the “truth” can then be claimed when it is disclosed by participants in the event, or deliberately found through methods of investigation. if these discoveries are then placed in the context of a coherent system, they can be validated as truth. if read together with the requirement of correspondence (as suggested by the greek philosophers), to be valid truth requires not only coherence, but also accuracy and critical reflection of where the facts fit into the whole. pragmatic theory of truth pragmatists reject the notion of absolute truth and do not make metaphysical claims about the world, seeking to bridge the gap between correspondence theory and coherence theory. truth comes from experience and can only be verified by results if put into practice. charles pierce10, for instance, asserts that truth starts with an abstract concept that is then subjected to endless investigation, leading towards “scientific belief”. confession of inaccuracy or onesidedness is an essential ingredient of finding the truth. according to dewey,11 scientific, 7 prior, ibid, 224. 8 white, a.r. 1969. ‘coherence theory of truth’. in encyclopedia of philosophy. london: macmillan, p.130. 9 heidegger, m. 1972. on time and being. new york: harper & row, p.70. 10 pierce, c.s. 1901. ‘truth and falsity and error’. in j.m. baldwin (ed.), dictionary of philosophy and psychology (2, pp. 718–720. 11 bernstein, r.j. 1969. ‘dewey, john’. in encyclopedia of philosophy (2). london: macmillan, p.383. velthuizen 22 technical, sociological, philosophical and cultural inquiry is self-corrective if openly submitted for testing by a community of inquirers, during which clarification, justification, refinement or refutation take place. foucault12 is concerned with the way in which power positions affect views of realities. he asserts that power is a relationship between individuals and that relationships play a role in what is believed to be true. every human relationship is to some degree a power relationship or a perpetual strategic relationship.13 because of this relationship, there are multiple histories of the same events, but from different perspectives within different power relationships. foucault encourages people to reject dogmatic worldviews, and suggests that various forms of rationality are desirable to unsettle certitudes.14 however, a plethora of accounts of the same events poses the challenge of reflecting on everything.15 these assertions imply that to discover the truth after violent conflict requires extensive research covering a relatively long time, in order to gather all the perceptions of what happened and to validate data without rejecting any perspectives as “incorrect” because they do not fit into any dominant narrative or belief system. seeking the truth about violent conflict also requires sufficient time to allow for the discovery of accurate explanations in the space where it happened, to evaluate, analyse and reflect on all the perspectives and to judge where power relationships and continued strategic contests distort perspectives. myth myths are popularly defined as tales believed to be true, usually sacred, set in the distant past or other worlds or parts of the world, and with extra-human, non-human or heroic characters.16 however, myths can also be functional, as narratives that are formative or reflective of a social order or values within a culture. paul radin17 describes myth as a distinctive function and implication determined by individual members of society, calling them “the myth-makers”, who explain symbolically how people live. the explanatory theme may be so dominant that everything else becomes subordinated to it. myths can also be representative of a particular epistemology, coherent in terms of myth and history (structuralist). claude levi-strauss18 explains that sometimes anthropologists collect myths in “shreds” and “patches” as disconnected stories without relationships to each other. 12 foucault, m. 1998. politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writings 1977–1984. in l.d. kritzman (ed)., politics, philosophy, culture: interviews and other writings, new york: routledge, p.83. 13 ibid, 168. 14 ibid, 883. 15 ibid, 327. 16 bascom, w. 1965. the forms of folklore: prose narratives. journal of american folklore (78), pp. 3–20. 17 radin, p. 1950. ‘the basic myth of the north american indians’. in eranos-jahrbuch: der mensch und die mythische welt. zurich: rhein-verlag, pp. 359–419. 18 levi-strauss, c. 1978. myth and meaning. new york: routledge, pp. 29–37. truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 23 this disconnected state may be an anarchic one where “native wise men” and “philosophers” put together the myths to be collected by anthropologists from outside the society. the question is: where does mythology end and where does history begin in a society without archives and only a verbal tradition? levi-strauss continues to answer this question, explaining that the basic structures of the story may be the same, but the content may differ. therefore, one property of a myth is that it can be observed under different transformations, with the transformation of one element requiring other elements to be rearranged. the same mythical elements may be combined repeatedly in a closed system. history, being an open system, allows explanations to be arranged and then rearranged, using the same material, building up an original account. two different accounts can be accepted as true even when one account is better or more accurate than the other or at least equally valid. to avoid these accounts being imaginary, a better understanding of history can be obtained by salvage archaeology, by establishing correspondence (what corresponds and what does not), bridging the gap in our minds between mythology and history. cillian mcgrattan explains that social groups construct their own historical narratives, but questions if entire societies can “work through” the past. many “truths” emerge in postconflict situations, but those “truths” should be tested against evidence by working through other archival evidence and oral history. historians have to point out the moral and political assumptions as well as compromises that often “lie at the heart” of narratives, to allow for more rational debate over responsibility for actions in the past. furthermore, creating greater space for marginalised voices, such as those of victims, the elderly, or women, helps to broaden the concept of peace from being merely about expediency to being about justice, discussion and consensus.19 an analysis of these propositions about myth sensitises the researcher who investigates the history of violent conflict to the probability that stories created by prominent people may become a dominant narrative and framework for analysis for everything that happened in the past. to overcome this trap it is important for the researcher to find the pattern of relationships between variables in content of as many narratives as possible, including those by voices that have been deliberately marginalised and silenced in the past. the findings of this research should be verified using other ways of investigating historical truths, such as finding physical evidence of what happened (for example artefacts), and acknowledging that all knowledge claims are subject to interpretation. oral culture according to ong,20 in an oral culture the theory “you know what you can recall” is relevant. how do people in an oral culture recall what happened? an oral culture has no texts. an 19 mcgrattan, c. 2011. ‘historians in post-conflict societies: northern ireland after the troubles’. available at http://www.historyandpolicy.org/policy-papers/papers/historians-inpost-conflict-societies-northern-ireland-after-the-troubles (accessed 23 september 2014). 20 ong, w.j. 2005. orality and literacy: the technologizing of the word. taylor and francis elibrary, pp. 36–145. available at http://occupytampa.org/files/wcom/ong%20walter%20orality%20and%20literacy.pdf (accessed 23 september 2014). velthuizen 24 interlocutor is essential. sustained thought in an oral culture is therefore tied to communication. experience can be put into any words, transforming it a little without falsifying it, to recall the experience. orality is more elaborate than individual words with a mnemonic base of thought (a pattern of ideas or associations that help one to remember something). furthermore, orality is additive (the use of “and”); aggregative (oral cultures prefer the “brave soldier” to just “the soldier”); fluent; excessive; voluble; and conservative (repeating what is known). moreover, orality is close to the “human life world” in the sense that oral cultures must conceptualise and verbalise all their knowledge with reference to familiar interactions of human beings. orality is also empathetic and participatory, using concepts in realistic frames of reference, identifying with the known. oral narrative in primary oral cultures is agonistic in tone, using proverbs and riddles to engage in verbal and intellectual contests with passionate descriptions of physical violence, which can be explained in terms of persistent physical hardships and violence in many societies. oral societies are homeostatic (they tend to maintain internal stability) by living in the present, maintaining stability by getting rid of memories which no longer have present relevance. oral memorisation is subject to direct social pressures and changes the narrator’s judgement of what audiences need or tolerate. for oral cultures, the cosmos is perpetual with man at its centre, with the audience becoming one with the speaker. an oral culture cannot deliver a lengthy, sizeable, climactic linear plot, cannot organise even shorter narrative in an intellectual, relentless climactic way and is not much concerned with exact sequence or extranarrative references. therefore, the examination of phenomena or truth claims is impossible without writing and reading. some people in primary oral cultures may not have been exposed to writing in any form, but can produce powerful and valuable verbal “performance of high artistic and human worth”. this may no longer have been possible once writing took over the mind. however, without writing, human consciousness cannot achieve its full potential. orality is destined to and needs to produce written knowledge.21 vansina22 defined oral traditions as documents of the present inheriting a message from the past, encompassing all verbal testimonies concerning the past. oral materials can be of value to historians, whether in the form of proverbs, poetry, songs or epics. these oral materials should be regarded in the same way as written documents to avoid exploitation by deliberately being fed historical information. most ethnographers accept oral tradition as sources of history. however, ethnologists who have attempted to study the history of people without writing have faced challenges, causing them to believe that oral traditions are not reliable even if they contain some truth, because it is impossible to assess the amount of truth contained in orality. oral narratives should be methodically examined for validity and reliability, as is done for written text, to see what distortions are most likely and to assess the value of narratives as historical evidence. from these statements it can be inferred that narratives from people who belong to an oral culture are essential to uncover the truth about what happened before, during and after violent conflict if the people were participants, victims or observers in a conflict. in an oral culture, important information about how the teller personally experienced the past is 21 ibid, pp. 8–14. 22 vansina, j. 1965. oral tradition: a study in historical methodology. translated by h.m. wright. harmondsworth: penguin, synopsis. truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 25 conveyed to the researcher as interlocutor. it is for the researcher as receiver of these messages to determine the pattern of associations that is made during the narrative, accepting that there may be much “noise” because of the sometimes-colourful use of language or the narrator subscribing to a popular dominant narrative or myth. it is for the researcher to acknowledge the limitations that come with the use of language: sometimes peers want the story to be told in a certain way, or important facts are omitted because the storyteller considers them irrelevant, shameful or hurtful. furthermore, it is important for the researcher to interpret the message in terms of the cosmology of the specific culture: many oral cultures sees personhood and the universe as one, expecting the listener to understand where the narrative fits in a broader scheme (for instance spirituality), without necessarily referring to it specifically. it is therefore important that as many narratives as possible are captured, so that they can be subjected to validation, evaluation, analysis and interpretation to allow for judging what the truth about what happened is – in other words a thorough research process. seeking the truth in the narratives of post-conflict society braithwaite23 found that there are many sequences of truth, justice and reconciliation. one sequence takes place in a “top-down truth zone” where reconciliation can take place on a foundation of only partial truths, where partial truth and reconciliation are mutually supportive. an alternative sequence takes place in the “expanding zone” that enables high integrity top-down truth-telling to call on bottom-up truth telling for reconciliation. a third sequence takes place in a “networked zone”, where peace-builders network across organisations to respond to local voices and build on the virtues of a network towards reconciliation. lundy and mcgovern24 remind us that only people who are inside a community can gain access to key individuals, groups and sensitive information that is often off-limits to “outside” researchers. because they are trusted, “insiders” may be able to penetrate some of the most unconquerable silences. when researching violently divided societies, providing an opportunity for excluded and alienated voices to be heard is important for post-conflict transformation. in this case, the value of truth lies largely in the way it validates popular knowledge, which can be a psychologically and socially desirable end of research in a society emerging from conflict. testimonial truth claims give important recognition to marginalised historical experiences in sites of conflict, where there are few other evidential traces than the words of a witness. victims, relatives and others maintain a shadowy understanding of the meaning of truth and the purpose of telling it, with a strong sense that speaking “truth” matters to refute certain things that did not happen, or to assert things that definitely did happen. therefore, research should place the “subject” of the research at the centre of the process: for instance, victim-centred truth-telling should focus on the bearer of testimony as 23 braithwaite, j. 2013. ‘truth, reconciliation and peacebuilding’. in v. king, r. macgill & r.wescombe (eds), peace in action: practices, perspectives and policies that make a difference. wagga wagga: king macgill wescombe publications, p. 30. 24 lundy, p. & mcgovern, m. 2006. participation, truth and partiality: participatory action research, community-based truth-telling and post-conflict transition in northern ireland. sociology 40(1), pp. 84. velthuizen 26 the narrator of past experiences and active participant in truth-telling. participation is a key principle in reaching the desired end-state of truth-telling. nabudere25 asserts that understanding people’s views requires adopting an epistemology that recognises orality as a valid source of knowledge. orality can only be interpreted with multi and interdisciplinary approaches to unravel the complexity of revelations, which is not possible within a single discipline. to see the world as systemic and more holistically, transdisciplinarity is also required.26 nissani27explains that all research takes place along a continuum ranging from two imaginary poles, starting from disciplinary work to a grand synthesis of all human knowledge, achieved through disciplinary knowledge, with disciplinary, multidisciplinary, interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary research as “four arrows shot from a single bow of knowledge” towards a target. velthuizen28 professes that transdisciplinary research is necessary to determine the causes of violent conflict. the researcher needs to break out of the stifling constraints of systems thinking and the linear processes of western hermeneutics created by disciplinarity. therefore, the researcher should recognise that people in conflict might have varied experiences of reality. these realities need to be accessed, collated, integrated and synthesised for new knowledge to emerge, recognising the normative-spiritual realm that informs the epistemology and cosmology of africa. it is in the village community that knowledge can be discovered and used to find lasting solutions to conflict, using various methods from all disciplines without being over-concerned about disciplinarity. community-based participatory research (cbpr) as avenue for truth finding community-based participatory research (cbpr) is an approach to research that equitably involves community members, organisational representatives and researchers in all aspects of the research process as partners who all contribute expertise, sharing decision-making and ownership. the aim of cbpr is to augment knowledge and understanding of a given experience, and to integrate that knowledge with interventions related to policies and social change, improving the quality of life of community members.29 ideally the participatory approach to research is a democratic negotiated process between academic and community 25 nabudere, d.w. 2006. investment choices for education in africa. paper for dbsa/hsrc/wits nepad conference 19–21 september 2006, johannesburg. available at http://www.rrojasdatabank.info/devstate/nabudere.doc (accessed 6 october 2014). 26 max-neef, m.a. 2005. foundations of transdisciplinarity. ecological economics, (533). available at http://www.sciencedirect.com (accessed 14 october 2011). 27 nissani, m. 1995. fruit salads and smoothies: a working definition on interdisciplinarity. journal of educational thought (29). 28 velthuizen, a.g. 2012. the transdisciplinary approach to understanding the causes of wicked problems such as the violent conflict in rwanda. the journal for transdisciplinary research in southern africa, 8(1), pp. 51–62. 29 israel, b.a., schulz, a.j., parker, e.a., becker, a.b., allen, a. & guzman, j.r. 2008. ‘critical issues in developing and following cbpr principles’. in m. minkler & n. wallerstein (eds), community-based participatory research for health: from process to outcomes (2nd ed.). san francisco: jossey-bass, pp. 47–66. truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 27 partners to ensure that the research process maintains social and cultural relevance, while at the same time scientific rigour is maintained. cbpr requires empowerment of people, ownership by the community and capacity-building while translating scientific knowledge into action.30 the cbpr approach is aligned with the modern view of anthropology – that research is not a study of people, but a study with people. the community is involved in the research planning, implementation and evaluation and dissemination of results to ensure diverse perspectives and capacity-building in the community. the research implies work and study with people, immersed with the people in an environment of joint activity, experience and educating perceptions of the world to “open our eyes and minds” to other possibilities of being.31 for research to be useful for policy change and to build healthy communities, practitioners of cbpr must take seriously notions of research rigour, validity and reliability. practitioners of cbpr need to “broaden the bandwidth of validity” by ensuring that the research question is valid or relevant to the community and that different “ways of knowing,” including community knowledge, are valued alongside scientific sources of knowledge.32 when these assertions concerning cbpr are evaluated and analysed, it is found that cbpr contains all the elements that are required for research where truth-seeking is a vital point of departure to finding solutions for challenges that emanate from violent conflict in the past, including the risk of sporadic violence re-emerging. cbpr is an ideal instrument for empirical investigation by seeking voluntary disclosure or deliberately uncovering facts by accessing the varied lived experiences of participants. in this regard, cbpr presents many opportunities to mitigate or overcome the barriers of language and personality in accessing data by allowing for a flexible application of research methods and approaches that works well in a specific environment. furthermore, cbpr calls for a lengthy process to enable capturing and sifting of “noise” contained in narratives, and for an extensive process of evaluation, validation, moderation, storing, retrieval, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, learning and dissemination. the above analysis reveals that the cbpr process is ideal for determining the accuracy of data by placing it into the context of the cosmology of a specific culture, considering the norms, spiritual influences and personal considerations of knowledge-holders. access to many different worldviews and perspectives of what happened during conflict ensures triangulation of views and identification of recursive themes. ensuring equity of perspectives makes it possible to break away from hegemonic power relationships that enforce specific paradigms and dominant narratives, so often the symptoms of persistent contest for power in a community. moreover, cbpr creates the opportunity for researchers to collectively analyse 30 cargo, m., delormier, t., lévesque, l., horn-miller, k., mccomber, a. & macaulay, a.c. 2008. can the democratic ideal of participatory research be achieved? an inside look at an academic-indigenous community partnership. health education research, (235, pp. 904–914). 31 ingold, t. 2011. being alive: essays on movement, knowledge and description. new york:   routledge, p. 238. 32 minkler, m., garcia, a.p., rubin,v. & wallerstein, n. 2008. community-based participatory research: a strategy for building healthy communities and promoting health through policy change. available at http://www.policylink.org p.12 (accessed 1 october 2014). velthuizen 28 and interpret captured narratives through joint critical reflection to find a pattern of associations among variables and to judge what is probably true. community-based participatory research with the san of platfontein the san are the first people of southern africa, traced back to the last glacial maximum (about 20 000 years ago) and still further back to “mitochondrial eve” 190 000 years ago, the origin of all africans.33 the modern history of the san is characterised by enslavement and the loss or limited use of ancestral land. during this time the san had to cope with conflict by withdrawing to remote areas. some clans and individuals joined broader society to profit from interaction with traders, hunters and missionaries.34 traditionally, the san developed an indigenous dispute resolution system suited to the needs of a collective hunter-gatherer society.35 today san clans can be differentiated by the mutually unintelligible dialects they speak. for instance, kwhedam is spoken by the san of the okwa valley of botswana, the central kalahari desert, north-east botswana, south-east zambia and western zimbabwe, while !xun is spoken by the san living in the tsumkwe area of namibia, north-western botswana, southern angola and south africa. 36 the two groups of san living at platfontein (figure 1), the !xun and the khwe, are originally from northern namibia and south-east angola. . traditionally, san clans never lived together in one village and preferred to stick to their own small groups or extended family units, away from other people. 37the khwe were cultivators and cattle-herders who lived for centuries along the kavango and kwando rivers in close contact with the bantu groups of the kavango region of namibia and the cuando-cubango province of angola the !xun were mostly hunter-gatherers who lived in remote savannah areas. when the portuguese ruled angola, from 1966 the !xun and the khwe became trackers (called “flechas”) serving the portuguese military in southern angola until 1975.38 in 1976, after angola became independent from portugal, the !xun and khwe were formed into a military unit (31 battalion of the south african defence force) to participate in counter-insurgency operations in angola. in march 1990, after namibia became independent, the san were resettled at schmidtsdrift on the vaal river in the northern cape province of south africa.39 in june 1996, the !xun and khwe became the owners of platfontein, wildebeeskuil and 33 oppenheimer, s. 2004.out of africa’s eden. the peopling of the world. johannesburg: jonathan ball. 34 hohmann, t. (ed. 2003. ‘contesting land, development, identity and representation’. in the san and the state. köln: rüdiger köppe verlag. 35 boulle, l. 2013. a history of alternative dispute resolution. adr bulletin 7(7), p.130. available at http://epublications.bond.edu.au/adr/vol7/iss7/3 (accessed 17 july 2013). 36 bleek, w. h. i. & lloyd, l. c. 1911. specimens of bushman folklore. london: george allen & company. 37 correspondence with mario mahongo, traditional leader of the !xun, 27 november 2014. 38 cann, j.p. 2013. the flechas. insurgent hunting in eastern angola, 1965–1974. 30 south publishers: africa@war series (11). 39 robbins, d. 2007. the story of south africa’s discarded san soldiers. johannesburg: jonathan ball. truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 29 droogfontein near kimberley, the capital of the northern cape, and settled in platfontein where they today live “in spatially segregated settlements”. 40 f i g u r e 1 : l o c a t i o n o f t h e p l a t f o n t e i n s a n ( ! x u n a n d k h w e ) i n s o u t h a f r i c a 41 internal disputes are persistent, with sporadic violence exacerbated by social ills such as alcoholism and drugs and frustrations over appalling living conditions. furthermore, relationships between the community and governance authorities can at best be described as “uncertain”, calling for dispute resolution capacity-building together with the community and research-driven interventions to break the cycle of poverty and violence that prevents the community taking its rightful place in south african society.42 40 robins, s., madzudzo, e. & brenzinger, m. 2006. ‘assessment of the status of the san in south africa, angola, zambia and zimbabwe’. in regional assessment of the status of the san in southern africa report series (2). windhoek: legal assistance centre. 41 robins, s., madzudzo, e. & brenzinger, m. 2006. ‘assessment of the status of the san in south africa, angola, zambia and zimbabwe’. in regional assessment of the status of the san in southern africa report series (2). windhoek: legal assistance centre. 42 recurrent themes in the analysis of collated research reports found in the san dispute resolution oral archive. http://uir.unisa.ac.za (restricted access. velthuizen 30 data-gathering through voluntary disclosure during cbpr with the san of platfontein based on the assumption that truth-seeking is a vital element in finding solutions to dysfunctions that emanate from violent conflict, the institute for dispute resolution in africa (idra) launched a cbpr research project with the san of platfontein under the auspices of the college of law at unisa. the community was selected for research because of their unique lived experiences and oral culture, enabling them to articulate what happened in their history, which was marked by violent conflict. subsequently, research began in september 2013 with the informed consent of the san community. the research is conducted in three phases, namely a discovery phase that was concluded in september 2014, on ongoing design phase that will end in march 2015, to be followed by an implementation phase in 2015 when the designed solutions will be implemented. the discovery phase resulted in 250 research reports43 based on semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings and interpretation discussions. approximately 1 000 adults in platfontein, including men and women of all ages, participated as knowledge-holders, adhering to the principle of equity in participation. appreciative inquiry was used, meaning that questions focused on dispute resolution practices that had worked well in the past. despite the positive intentions of appreciative inquiry, it was inevitable that knowledge was volunteered that reflected negative aspects that are associated with conflict. no voices were silenced and all who provided informed and voluntary consent, participated. in platfontein, there is always the risk of sporadic violence because of social ills such as drug abuse and alcoholism. however, determining how a history of violent conflict influences current violent behaviour is a complex process.44 therefore, data-gathering had to access as many narratives as possible about the causes, dynamics and consequences of the conflict over a timeline of 60 years (starting with the origins of the community in angola) and over a geographical area that covers the resettlements from angola to namibia to schmidtsdrift to platfontein. furthermore, various actors and their past and present roles in conflict had to be analysed. a general spirit of cooperation from most community members enabled thorough empirical investigation. data was obtained mostly through voluntary disclosure to young fieldworkers who were trained by unisa to gather data. deliberate uncovering of facts was restricted to the chief investigator from unisa, who engaged in informal discussions with specific individuals to clarify certain facts. however, it was found that a trade-off was needed between maintaining the trust of these individuals and the obligation to report. eventually the chief investigator decided that no clarification discussions warranted a breach of trust. the methods of data-gathering consisted of a triangulation of semi-structured interviews, focus group meetings and interpretative discussions. these methods ensured access to a variety of the lived experiences of participants, who in many cases confirmed the way in which different people experienced the same event, but also enabled the researchers to discover contradictions in the narratives. 43 the reports can be found on the san dispute resolution oral archive. http://uir.unisa.ac.za (restricted access). 44 velthuizen, a. interview with angela kedisaletse-louw, platfontein social worker, 10 september 2014. truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 31 the research team found it exceptionally challenging to mitigate or overcome the barriers that language and personality placed on accessing data. all narratives had to be captured from !xun and khwe into afrikaans or english (depending on what the fieldworker felt comfortable with) and then translated into english for processing. sound recordings and selective video clips were made of all interviews and focus groups for verification purposes to mitigate the probable loss of important data, sift out unimportant noise and to allow for verification by the chief investigator, if necessary. in the end, the research team was confident that the flexible application of research methods and approaches worked well in that specific environment, which is characterised by an embedded oral culture and limited writing skills, especially among older participants. furthermore, the combination of methods allowed various kinds of personality to participate and tell their story in a community where excluding people is regarded with suspicion. before the research commenced it was acknowledged by researchers, sponsors and the community leadership that it would be a lengthy process. therefore, sufficient time was planned to capture narrative data, write and transmit field research reports after sifting out the “noise” contained in narratives. however, the time required for the extensive process of evaluation, validation, moderation, storing, retrieval, analysis, synthesis, interpretation, learning and dissemination was underestimated, mainly because there were not enough sufficiently trained people to perform all these tasks while managing a project in the procrastinating bureaucracy that is associated with a big institution such as unisa. determining the accuracy of data during cbpr as discussed, determining the accuracy of data is an exceptional challenge when working with narratives in an oral culture. however, the many different worldviews and perspectives of what happened during conflicts enabled thematic analysis. first researchers and writers had to familiarise themselves with all the research reports in the san dispute resolution oral archives (data corpus analysis). the next step was to conduct data item analysis (analysing all the reports looking for recursive keywords) and data extract analysis, (collating data into tables according to question/indicator numbers for coding). the data corpus analysis and data item analysis was applied by writers from several disciplines (who were invited to a writers’ retreat in august 2014) to collated data in the san dispute resolution oral archives. it was found that even experienced scholars did not have the skills to analyse collated data. a further attempt to do narrative analysis (analysis of selected narratives from specific data items and extracts) failed because the primary data contained in the narratives could only be accessed by a researcher who could understand and speak !xun or khwe, and such a person was not available. using transcripts for analysis was not possible because these languages can only be written in the simplest form. these limitations were found to be a major constraint when academics trained in western traditions try to analyse data from communities that do not speak english. these limitations were overcome by allowing writers to apply their own knowledge of analysing data within their own disciplines. key knowledge holders and field researchers from the san community participated in the writers’ retreat together with the writers, assisting them with analysis, critical reflection and interpretation of the data. velthuizen 32 a strong point of the research was its success in maintaining equity of perspectives. the research avoided hegemonic control and manipulation, in the sense that no authority intervened in the research process. the research team was supported and allowed to follow the process that was agreed upon before the start of the research. at community level, great care was taken that power relationships in the community were not able to enforce specific paradigms. dominant narratives were identified at a very early stage and avoided or moderated by deliberately allowing other voices to be heard, especially after persistent contests for power in a community were discovered. judging the truth during cbpr cbpr creates the opportunity for researchers to collectively analyse and critically reflect on captured narratives. a series of conversations proved to be essential in verifying the accuracy of thematic analysis findings. a concentric circle approach was followed for interpretative conversations. in the centre of this circle were the elders of the community, who listened to presentations from the research team and corrected some inaccuracies. the next circle involved conversations between senior researchers from unisa (including two post-doctoral fellows from ethiopia) and the leaders of the community, in which valuable knowledge was exchanged to fill some gaps in the research. a further circle consisted of researchers, fieldworkers and practitioners who gathered in a major writers’ retreat; during this session, the knowledge of the village community was effectively fused with that of other knowledgeholders. the writers’ retreat, and analyses by the scholars in preparation for articles aimed at publication, revealed a pattern of associations among variables. it furthermore created the opportunity for the 12 scholars who participated to judge probabilities in the data presented. the conversation circle was then expanded as a first effort at triangulating the findings of the research with other san communities. during a visit to the community of the ‡khomani san of andriesvale (also in the northern cape province, 230km north of the town of upington, about 600km from platfontein), the results of the research were brainstormed with the leaders of andriesvale and platfontein, facilitated by unisa researchers. another visit to communities in botswana is planned for early 2015 to complete the triangulation of the research findings. a challenge that remains is for scholars from outside the community to determine the truth. the san of platfontein live in the context of a cosmology that contains aspects of western culture such as hierarchical thinking and disciplined behaviour, inherited from a history of militarisation and subservience. however, in general customary practices are maintained in the form of compassion, sharing, reciprocity, dignity of personhood, responsibility to others and interdependence, which underlie the humanistic principles of africa. scholars need to understand this context before judging the truth about knowledge claims. together with spiritual influences such as the belief in witchcraft and the strong influence of 15 churches in platfontein, the context of knowledge claims may be difficult to judge without insight into the cosmology and normative foundation of the san of platfontein. these may overlap with those of other people but are probably different, taking into account the san’s unique history of subservience, genocide, exploitation and militarisation as well as the current government neglect of the people of platfontein. truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 33 truth as premise for conciliation and development a rigorous research process ensured that the body of knowledge that was accumulated could be described as “probably true”. such a body of knowledge is a vital driver of the current design phase and the implementation of intervention phase that is envisaged for 2015. ludema et al45 describe the design stage as systematic exploration by community members of what kinds of social architecture would translate their visions of best experiences from the past and hopes for the future into reality. during this phase the community, as a networked organisation, will merge with other organisations, donors, government officials and other communities as they interact. participants in current disputes should admit their needs and contract to help one another grow, deliberately seeking and relying on mutual inputs and support. to achieve successful design, further conversations with community knowledge-holders will take place, talking to different interest groups and mapping solutions to current conflicts. during the first week of november 2014, a large-scale conference was held with the community and invited scholars, during which participants developed a series of propositions to replace “what is” with “what might be”. the conference provided a forum in which the researchers can share their findings and articulate their vision of and approach to build capacity for community dispute resolution. the aim of the design phase is to generate energy for action and a sense of hope, excitement and cooperation as well as ownership of the future, leading to authentic positive change and innovation. the “socially constructive potential” of the community must be unlocked to replace existing “deficit constructions”. a space should be created for new voices to emerge, expanding the circles of dialogue to build a “supportive relational context that allows for the positive construction of a new social reality”.46 the implementation phase involves emphatic learning, focusing on the bilateral and inter-generational transfer of knowledge, recognising the different roles people play in a community. learning will be in the form of a series of capacity-building workshops where joint experimentation will be guided by research results as a set of parallel, complementary processes of experimentation and dialogue. the workshops will be platforms for change, guided by the preservation of local culture to redistribute power by creating opportunities for self-empowerment through learning towards a new disputeresolution capacity.47 to achieve this vision, the aim is to launch joint initiatives. two parallel activities are envisaged. the first set of interventions is a series of capacity-building seminars in the 45 ludema, j.d., cooperider, d.l. & barret, f.j. 2012. appreciative inquiry: the power of the unconditional positive question. available at http://www.2012waic.com/wpcontent/uploads/2012/05/ludema-cooperrider-barrett-goed.pdf pp.7–9 (accessed 10 july 2013). 46 ibid, pp.10–11. 47 hagos, a. 1996. ‘indigenous channels of communication, development and governance in africa’. in m. dia (ed), africa’s management in the 1990s and beyond: reconciling indigenous and transplanted institutions. washington, d.c.: world bank. velthuizen 34 community to transfer knowledge to community members in a structured way. a second set of interventions will involve other role players from outside the community who did not participate in the research but committed themselves to use the research results to deliver tangible change, transformation and innovation to intervene in the state of poverty in the community, the core cause of violent conflict. conclusions this paper began with the aim of proposing some principles and practices for truth-seeking during research into violent conflict. to achieve this aim, an argument was deployed by analysing the concepts “truth”, “myth” and “oral culture” as sources of knowledge. this conceptual analysis preceded a discussion of cbpr as a research methodology to access the knowledge of lived experiences embedded in the oral culture of the san community of platfontein. concerning good practice, it was found that cbpr contains all the requirements for research in which empirical investigation, mitigation of language and personality barriers, flexible application of research methods and a thorough processing of knowledge claims to find probable truth are required. furthermore, the integrative and intense intra-active character of the cbpr process is ideal for determining the accuracy of data in the context of a specific culture, considering the norms, spiritual influences and personal considerations of knowledge-holders that come with a unique cosmology. moreover, many different worldviews and perspectives of what happened during the conflict ensuring equity of perspectives, as well as challenging hegemonic power relationships, paradigms, and narratives; ultimately informed judgement of what is probably true about a conflict. cbpr with the san of platfontein, involving an interconnected web of stakeholders and knowledge-holders, revealed the following principles that should inform cbpr involving communities with an oral culture and a history of violent conflict: • recognition of the community as a site of knowledge: knowledge is the most important asset of a community that is in conflict or recovering from conflict. the community is the holder of this knowledge. the challenge facing researchers is to access this knowledge using methods that are acceptable to the community. • collaborative equitable partnerships: equity in terms of gender, age and ethnicity is maintained through all phases of the research, including data discovery, information processing, dissemination of results, solution design and intervention. • emphatic learning and capacity-building: from the inception of the cbpr project all participants should learn from the activities until formal capacity-building embeds good practices. • holistic perspectives of conflict and disputes: a holistic perspective of the probable truth about causes, dynamics, actors and consequences is maintained in geographical/ecological, cultural and historic contexts. • integration of research with broader social innovation: cbpr is consequential, meaning that knowledge activates a series of interventions and events that lead to new ways of thinking and doing. • openly challenging divisionary thinking: hegemonic, subservient relationships and manipulation of research are challenged through activities such as deliberately truth-seeking during research involving communities with an oral culture td, 10(3), december 2014, pp. 19-35. 35 promoting equitable participation in truth-seeking, collaborative learning and joint solution design and implementation. • academic rigour complemented by social responsibility: the scientific quality of the research and research outputs is not negotiable. cbpr provides for rigorous maintenance of academic standards while opening the way for the social responsibility all scholars should actively pursue. international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 79 challenges and opportunities for the mission of the churches in indonesia in the postmodern era volume: 3 number: 1 page: 79-90 megawati zainal institute injil indonesia, batu, jawa timur, indonesia corresponding author: megawati zainal e-mail: ibumegawati2020@gmail.com article history: received: 2022-01-22 revised: 2022-02-15 accepted: 2022-03-06 abstract: postmodernism is a very controversial term. on the one hand, this term is often used cynically and mockingly. however, in reality, the term has attracted the wider community's interest even outside the academic world. indeed the term has shown that it can articulate several crises and the fundamental socio-cultural changes that we are currently experiencing. the distinctive character of modernism always tries to find the basis of 'knowledge' about 'what' reality is, namely by returning to the subject of knowing (understood psychologically and transcendentally). it is hoped that a 'certainty' can be found, which is very basic for human knowledge of 'reality', namely the imagined reality as an external reality. in contrast, in postmodernism, human understanding is then built based on the perspective of society with 'subjectivity' and 'language'. at this point, there is no absolute truth, so postmodern must create its own mini-narrative to be a reference for its life. the church as god's messenger and representative is present to provide direction and strengthen the voice of a sacred conscience to postmodernism. the desire to make narratives is not led by wild feelings or intuition, but by reason that has been renewed continuously. the church should accomplish this by relying fully on the sovereign authority of the subject of faith rather than relying on her own fragile and sin-distorted powers of reason. keywords: postmodern, reasoning, meta-narrative, mini-narrative, mini supra-narrative cite this as: zainal, m., (2022). “challenges and opportunities for the mission of the churches in indonesia in the postmodern era.” international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences, 3 (1), 79-90. introduction postmodernism is the era that is taking place today and is lived by the people of indonesia and even the whole world. the thinking initiated by people who adhere to postmodernism focuses more on critical theory, which is critical of existing science and technology to find progress in emancipatory independence. postmodernism is a very controversial term. on the one hand, this term is often used cynically and ridiculed. on the other hand, however, the term has captured the wider community's interest even outside the academic world. it shows that he can articulate some of the crises that bring about the fundamental socio-cultural changes that we are currently experiencing. postmodernism, in its influence, is so widespread even in the lives of believers. the meaning of this term is like a wilderness inhabited by a variety of wild animals, wild animals, and reptiles to very different types of birds. therefore, the term postmodern until now is a term that is very difficult to define in a standard sense and very easy to misunderstand. it exists in all fields, both in the world of philosophy, science, and culture. postmodernism has played a role and "overshadowed" all schools of thought unrelated to each other. postmodernism can interpret various things because it does not want to be restrained, but on the other hand, it always acts to criticize everything for the progress it wants. he also does not want to fence himself in with anything or anyone. it cannot be demanded to fix the social and cultural order, which is neither ideal nor positive. for most modern people to feel angry, they needed intervention from a classical orthodox ideology that dared to fight back against the negative currents of postmodern. the general public must recognize the atmosphere of the meeting of modern and postmodern that they are not friendly. in fact, postmodernism has exacerbated the crisis of identity, social structure, civilization and the international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 80 direction of the times. for example, the post-truth lifestyle was the last wave that was carried in postmodern to the midst of global society (west and east). post-truth is not a product of postmodernism, but is demonstrated uncontrollably in an uncontrolled social culture as well. it is not even "comfortable" in the name of postmodern relativism. post-truth is a product of adam and eve's fall into sin in the garden of eden (genesis 3). the power of post-truth influence is unstoppable from generation to generation, ruling over all human life. pluralistic societies in both the west and the east enjoy the euphoria of a post-truth spirit, for the sake of imposing their will without thinking about the truth. all post-truth statements are always disseminated in vile ways such as "nonsense, spreading fake news, telling each other, and so on". so, they actualize themselves with forms of fake news, fake news, slander, refuse allegiance to the truth and live as they please, without fear and shame in showing moral corruption. for them, wrong is right. a collection of academics with normal academic eyes considers post-truth to be a symptom of the strength of sin that hits and destroys the civilized order of the nation that is being built. donny danardono, a lecturer in philosophy at the legal studies study program and the environmental and urban masters program, unika soegijapranata from semarang, wrote in his journal that this post-truth clash marked the death of reason, and of course, also clearly demonstrated the death of conscience. the spirit of postmodernism contributes fuel (booster) for post-truth partying openly everywhere, actualizing human identity which has been wrapped up by moral control and customs or classical religious signs. meclenna conveys her pessimism that this world's civilization will be further damaged by oppression, ignorance and malnutrition…because important intellectuals have replaced seriousness with a tangle of flickering language games, which in fact are not as beautiful as the words mean. it is the current situation with the phenomenon faced by the wider community. a manifestation of rebellion against the truth by not hiding, but blatantly defeating god with his institutions, both church and state. the postmodernism movement is increasingly directed towards freedom of will both rationally and morally compared to a wise attitude in obeying regulations and truth. that is why postmodernism is often responded to cynically and ridiculed. however, the postmodernism movement in the life of the general public has been structured in socio-cultural joints from the estuary to the upstream and is massive. empirical facts such as it make anyone have to admit that postmodern has captivated and controlled (drive) human life in general, like a flood that swept across the world. meanwhile, most human minds are being continuously eroded by the crisis of truth, example, and patriotism. from within it growing distrust, confusion of roles to stand and seek the eternal source of truth. who has the right to be a spokesperson, teacher, or preacher to represent god, diagnose, analyze, lead, or role model? something that is essential or sacred in religion and the principles of truth has been seen as not absolute, so how are christianity and the church's responsibility in indonesia in responding to this challenge. as the salt and light of christ, the church is dealing directly with the above problems. will the church be the same because it is a time like this so that she does not care or, on the contrary, feels challenged to fight it and accommodate it so that it becomes a more appropriate means of service to generations lost by the consequences of sin? the mission of the church should keep moving to correct and declare errors to postmodernism that: (1) the absoluteness of the reality, god the creator of the heavens and the earth is recognized or not, he remains absolute and fully sovereign; (2) the absoluteness and authority of god is not determined by the statements and attitudes and treatment of human beings who belittle and discriminate; (3) that the bible is the word of god and the truth in the bible is absolute: past, present and future will never change; because the absolute god revealed the bible; (4) that jesus christ is the only way, truth, and life (john 14:6). salvation is the essence of the christian faith which will never disappear under the threat of even death (romans 8:31-39). even this fact is absolute; (5) that death due to sin is absolute. postmodernism, with its relativism, subjectivism, pluralism and impermanence perspectives, is just a figment. considering the premises of postmodernism, which are still based on modernism, the opportunity for dialogue and international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 81 building intellectuals responsible for truth and conscience is still wide open. it applies to modern philosophers and scholars and the church, which has the source of absolute truth in the bible. methods this research uses a qualitative approach, specifically a literature review. this approach was taken to obtain a valid qualitative understanding so that through the topics discussed in this study, it is hoped that it can strengthen the motivation and spirit of steadfast service with god, the head of the church. the author also prays that this paper teleologically can contribute to thought in a culture that is already unclear about the meaning of life and specifically in terms of morality. result and discussion recognizing and understanding postmodern reasoning the term post from the word postmodern is generally understood to indicate the "after" modern era, so the postmodern meaning must be referred to from the modern which existed in the previous era. for postmodernists, the term post-defined in postmodern is not related in terms of time or chronology of a period, but means "beyond", beyond, namely philosophical thought that goes beyond modern philosophy, which is considered to have failed to build an enlightenment project. the grand narrative (meta-narrative) of modern philosophy is only a mere fantasy of fairy tales; what is called reality does not match reality and the existing context. in the postmodern era, you must create your own narrative according to the problems of life in its own local context. when the transition between the two began, almost no one in history could be sure. however, some records show that during nietzsche's time, this understanding already existed. allegedly when social science discusses science and art, postmodernism began to develop. in his book modernity and postmodernity, d.a. lyon writes, "since the 1980s the social sciences have engaged with a growing debate over "postmodernity” … discussions within the arts, including particularly architecture”. it can be concluded that postmodern was present in the 20th century. stephen tong said that historically philosophy was the age of analysis, the century of analysis that continued the 19th century (the age of ideology). get to know postmodernism and the postmodern era. what changes have taken place between the modern and the postmodern? busthan refers to the descriptions of charles jencks and bambang sugiharto, explaining that from a philosophical perspective, signs of a change in the way of thinking about reality are detected. the distinctive character of the modern way of thinking is, always trying to find the basics of 'knowledge' (epistemology, wissenschaft) about 'what' really (ta onta) reality. an attempt to return to the subject of the source who knows (ontologically, which is transcendental). it is hoped that something 'definite' can be found that can underlie human knowledge of this 'reality', namely the reality that is believed (in his assumption) as an external reality, namely the creator. in contrast, in the postmodern era, human understanding is built based on the perspective of society, no longer dealing with its original reality and ontology. the 'subjectivity' and 'language' of society become concept development references. at this point, truth becomes relative, because each community has its own perspective to discuss it. as a result, nothing is absolute. truth is relative, and in conclusion, there is no "certainty" in this world. such an understanding would be very vulnerable to use as a basis for a science. the idea that "reality or truth is relative" in postmodern has an element of metaphorical language that is not narrow. the basic motivation of postmodernism is not wanting to be confined in one field or one existing scientific discipline. in pluralism, all idiosyncrasies are removed and replaced with global ethics. postmodernism's presuppositions or assumptions in critical thinking must depart from a standard "nothing" about a definition, a standard of value, an advantage, what is stated to be true, and which has a single meaning. how a community or society reads, interprets, interprets, and defines is referred to in developing knowledge. international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 82 the mindset referred to is based on the pattern of the community. reality is defined from the self that is tolerated and compromised against the local context rather than the universal. in different communities, places, and opportunities at different times, there will be a reality of different values, meanings, meanings, and this must be respected (even though it is utopian, which of course will blunder again). according to stephen tong, the development of philosophy in this era is part of an evolutive social form that reduces or deconstructs previous modernity. that is postmodernism. the mindset of the social community becomes a reference that washes away the personal reasoning of each individual. stephen tong views postmodern people as highly intellectual, but low in conscience, and unaware that this dangerous ideology has poisoned them. postmodern philosophers' mindset challenges the modern mindset, which is only based on rationality and empiricism. according to subeno, postmodernism never emphasizes the spiritual aspect because it wants to destroy the supremacy of logic and the rational foundation of modernism. derrida and foucault define postmodernism as a radical form of modernity that ultimately kills itself because it is difficult to uniform any theories. the mindset that develops the rationality and empirical claim of modernity is strongly motivated by the role of desire (desire) regarding the results of other views. postmodernism achieves its own narrative, when desire becomes the master of rebellion and demands by criticizing to break away from the strongholds of universal rationality. desire is one of his main strategies for being free to mature or master himself. postmodern philosophy refers to the pragmatic philosophy of john dewey, which concentrates on the knowledge that is practical and useful or meaningful to its practitioners. the ideal philosophy that dewey wants is a philosophy that always has an interest in (can answer) social problems, in which it is always raging with problems of political philosophy (how do you want rulers or tyranny, and so on) and problems of economic philosophy. the epistemology of metaphysics (meta-narrative) must also be able to translate social problems, not just floating around in ideology. thus, postmodernism is not discarding or negating modernism (the age of ideology), but rather about self-freedom as a subject who has the right to feel and enjoy his modernity in his own personal way, to suit the political and economic interests that are being fought for. all modern premises and theories are still used but without disciplinary boundaries that must be respected. this style of self-desire has become a global wave of masses. the philosophy that was initiated in the postmodern era can be classified as a philosophy that departs with the assumption that it is never definitive, in the sense that there is no standard of value or meta-narrative. gerald bray also had the same understanding. they act this way because for them: 1. modern truth values , which have been the standard of knowledge and values, are relative in their local social context. 2. philosophical thoughts presented by modern thinkers in a universal meta-narrative are considered unable to answer the challenge of the socio-cultural crisis (in their subjective interpretation). 3. building a mini-narrative according to the local context, namely, narrowing the attention to the local or local cultural context independent of the universal context (meta-narrative). 4. every individual has the right to interpret the reality and social phenomena that are deemed necessary to be a small conclusion or mini-narrative. it is also open to reinterpretation by other social groups, not to find an anti-thesis synthesis, but because the realm of relativity that exists is always attached to the group in question. as a result, found: 1. relativism is popping up everywhere, so it does not believe in all universal things, because everything has become very relative. 2. every establishment of modernism has been reorganized, so that in the context of the uncertainty of perspective and meaning, people are given the freedom to do what they want. international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 83 3. universal provisions become fragmented, with no whole standard that ensures everything (in pluralism, there is equality in existentialism). the spirit of postmodernism like this, according to juanda, also indicates the advantages and disadvantages of postmodernism during its globalized movement. the fire or spirit of postmodernism can be summarized as follows: a) temporarily putting aside all kinds of truth from any philosophy, in order to be able to be critically free. postmodernism, in its work to be critical, does not want to be confined and trapped in any form of foundational philosophical thought. b) independence in knowledge with a critical style and creativity of his own mind. c) postmodernism does not throw away modern thought but uses it with a new way of thinking according to its creativity to renew modern premises here and there, in order to achieve the interests of social subjectivity. they are creative and innovative in elaborating various philosophical bases that are desired and at will. d) postmodernism is still in the realm of modernism and tries to continue to lead or elevate things from modernism just for the sake of its passion for building a more evolutive social civilization. in the view of modernism, the definition of local context (mini-narrative) from postmodernism does not have a clear philosophical premise, so it cannot be a reference and judge (protest) universal (permanent meta-narrative). understanding postmodernism a. pessimistically and skeptically (challenges that extinguish the gospel). suppose you analyze the description of the concepts of postmodernism above to find gaps in christian ministry among them. in that case, several things easily lead to pessimism and skepticism for the church. some of the things that are meant include: 1. with the rejection of the truth of reality (god) and absolute values, then all divine beliefs will not be accepted as absolutes. in short, in things, grand-narrative christianity does not exist a place to talk about the person and work of god, the authority of the bible, salvation in christ, moral values, holiness, sin, and so on. in the statements of christian doctrine, they responded: "that is your opinion, not our opinion." postmodernism has eliminated all the characteristics that exist in every religion, including the christian faith. if so, the church's voice clearly has no place to assert its role again. 2. actions without a definite basis of reason first and only prioritize sentiment and desire or lust are things that have always been a problem in the postmodern era. postmodernism wants, the church must submit to postmodernism, if it does not want to keep its mouth shut from its indoctrination and be eliminated in this era. for them, faith without reason is only by feeling; intuition makes christianity pragmatic and no longer cares about the authority of the bible. the self is more exalted than god and the sovereignty of his word. compromise with the relative world takes priority, and there is no place to remain consistent with absolute truth. thus, it is orthodoxly not a true christian church (born again). 3. language terms are used to play each other's tastes and desires. certainty becomes nil. the reason, faith, conscience, and mentality must die to build social relations. the phenomenon of false relations occurs everywhere in the sphere of religion and among people, because of this kind of postmodernism philosophy. 4. in terms of social and organizational management, postmodernism cannot be considered in making a policy in various domains or fields of human life, especially collectively and within an institution. because everything that is analyzed and discussed, as well as what will be concluded, has been trapped in language terms that are always relative, can never be definitive, and there are free rights of multiple interpretations or multi metaphors whose jungles are unlimited. international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 84 5. living in the realm of postmodernism is like a dead fish being swept away by the currents of local people's assumptions. otherwise, they will be removed or ostracized. how to deal with this mindset, especially with the spread of post-truth in various electronic media and discussions in the wider community? that is why, bruce mccomiskey called post-truth rhetoric "unethical rhetoric". the soul and social mentality of the community become sick. postmodernism which struggles to criticize then, leaves universal reality only for the sake of social welfare. the local context community becomes utopian because of the absurdity of its "unethical rhetoric" struggle. postmodernism's relativity without value standards and even control of values is insulted, so it does not provide an opportunity for hope for the existence of truth alone, and a healthy social fraternity is not built. 6. the knowledge of christ and salvation by christ, which was once clear and firm, is now completely different in the postmodern realm, both in terms of concepts and attitudes of daily faith. man must be a god for himself, but it is really ambiguous because all for the sake of compromising with the group so that one taste, one desire. the standard of living is not to god and his word, but how people say. for postmodernism imposing humans in meta-narratives, absolute truth is evil. that is why, the church has no right to comment on lgbt and same-sex marriage, and the breakdown of other social structures. they should be given independence because this is the postmodern era. the pessimistic analysis up to this point would suggest, that christianity is in danger of being wiped out! the gospel no longer has the authority to be the message of joy that frees the curse of sin. the gospel is no longer absolute good news! logical conclusion: humans who drift into the patterns of taste and will of society indicate that they are not opinionated and have personality. it marks him as having no reason or reason! critical efforts against postmodern humans like this, on the one hand, can trap people who are drifting there, the stronger they are there. on the other hand, trapping yourself as a christian into making fun of them or doing nothing, rather than empathizing with them. logical analyzes like this make it impossible to make friends again and are increasingly deadlocked to serve the people of postmodernism. any language terms that are used to build a communication and service approach to postmodernism are ambiguous, gray terms, so there is no reliable way or method (skeptic). has this condition become a common view for god's church? is it possible for christianity to respond to the expression of postmodernists who say, that all this analysis is only "logical according to your mini-narrative", do not be careless with "your meta-narrative". listen to my "mini-narrative." ramly b. lumintang, in his book dangers of postmodernism and the role of the reformed creed, he responds with several points as to the impact of postmodernism on the church, namely: (1) the pessimism of postmodernism makes the church discouraged; (2) the church becomes an enslaved person/servant who provides psychological needs for the congregation. in other words, the church becomes a mental hospital for postmodernists; (3) the church becomes a laboratory for the leadership and self-actualization of the congregation. b. optimistically and dynamically (opportunities and humility). the church should not only focus on the socio-cultural phenomena that postmodernism has brought about. the church is obliged to grasp the nomenclature of the ism held by postmodernists, namely its philosophical mindset related to meta-narrative and mini-narrative issues. in fact, if you look at history, the problem of their philosophy is not new in the current era, but has been going on throughout the history of human civilization. at the level of learning arithmetic (mathematics) in high school, we have met a 2+2=4 meta-narrative dealing with facts that are not "reasonable", such as 2+2=10 or 2+2=11. the results of these different additions do not deserve to be insulted and reproached, because they are all-natural and true. mathematics and science have never had a problem with that. from an early age, we are all taught that the meta-narrative 2+2=4 is based on a number based on 10. and when we were in high school, we met a new mini-narrative of a number international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 85 based on 4, which produces 10, then a number based on 3 produces the number 11. the world of science, which today has long dominated the entire world through digital technology, is based on the number base 2. in high school, students are also exposed to the church's arrogance regarding the geocentric meta-narrative. in the early modern age, there were several heliocentric mini-narratives of copernicus, john kepler and galilei galileo, which the church vehemently opposed. many things cannot be explained from anything found in the history of the philosophy of science in this world, including friedrich nietzsche's "god is dead" mini-narrative, which is actually a satire for faithful church members but whose faith is dead. nietzsche's words are inspiring. re-define who god really is behind the church liturgy and in real life. for nietzsche, if god is so almighty, where is the might of christians today? for him, christians are just funny comedians. biblical authorities have revealed that the ontologies of meta-narratives and mini-narratives are original from god and by god. an example of fact: the meta-narrative of one language around the world was broken down into various mini-narratives of languages and dialects by god himself in the event of the building of the tower of babel (genesis 11:1-9). god changed god's meta-narrative from the ancestors of the israelites across the euphrates in a mini-narrative that originates from his own super-narrative, namely yhwh, to abraham (joshua 24:42-3). then it continues in the context of israel leaving egypt starting at mount horeb when moses saw a thorn bush with fire that was burning but not burning. it is very powerful when the meta-narrative of pharaoh's king collides with yhwh's mini supra-narrative, which ends with the death of pharaoh and his entire army in the red sea. in the sermon on the mount, the lord jesus repeatedly used the phrase "you have heard the words: ...but i say to you,..." (matthew 5). the lord jesus presents a mini-narrative that originates from his own super-narrative authority, which is the word of god (john 1:2-3) between the metanarratives of the talmud and mishna at that time. the entire record of the book of acts is god's super-wisdom patterns of the gospel of jesus christ conveyed by the holy spirit about the mininarrative of the gospel of the kingdom of god proclaimed through the disciples of christ amid various false meta-narratives in all nations from jerusalem to rome. . all of these unique things, god intended for a glorious purpose and meaning according to his eternal design. the presence of postmodern, which is philosophically based on metaphorical language games to redefine reality in order to answer the context of local struggles, can actually mark the progress of god's handiwork that has occurred in the tower of babel incident. as long as the church recognizes that everything that happens on this earth is under god's sovereignty, then the mininarrative that collides with the meta-narrative in the current era is the return of the manifestation of the tower of babel in the form of a postmodern philosophy that is more complicated amid a world of virtual digital technology that is proud of. by humans today. has postmodernism rejected the absolute truth? facts in the history of human civilization, many mini-narratives match the reality of the truth and have gotten rid of various false metanarratives which mislead and destroy human civilization. on the other hand, many mini-narratives do not match reality and are destructive. these things can be seen from their socio-cultural fruits. on the one hand, postmodern people criticize modern people with a different approach to questions about reality. the current era is no longer about black and white or asking, "which is right?" but their question: "is reality only this?" "is this all that is true?" on the other hand, doubts about standard and universal meta-narratives do not mean discarding universal reality or truth; instead, they are looking for the completeness of universal reality or truth from various points of view. postmodernism wants to collect as complete an understanding as possible for a diamond building about reality or truth as a whole, according to its multifaceted nature. we use one or more facets of truth to be a living mirror, because we have not yet fully discovered the complete facet. we have these glasses differently according to the context of life, each mini-narrative. truth has multiple facets is according to biblical revelation. god reveals himself according to the context of the struggles that humans need and the human capacity to grasp or digest god's truth. international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 86 yhwh expresses himself to humans in various facets according to events that occur in their respective contexts. that is why we find the names el-elyon, el-shaddai, yhwh-rapha, yhwhnissi, yhwh-shalom, yhwh-jireh, and so on. throughout the old and new testaments, the gospel of the kingdom of god is revealed in various facets: in the context of moses, david, the prophets, matthew, mark, luke, john, stephen, philip, peter, paul, and so on, according to the context of the call or object of ministry. each of them. the church in the postmodern age in her calling as a missionary, the church, light and salt of the earth (for postmodernism), still has a ministry context that is always relevant to completing god's mandate. allah, the wisest, is still guarding, leading with his sublime super-narrative mini-equipment, to answer the existing society's struggles. mini-supra narrative from the right narrative source, namely the bible, which was revealed by mini-narrative after mini-narrative from god (that is why supra, meaning that transcends human understanding and local context, but is conveyed in the local human language anthropomorphically) then automatically progressively into a perfectly complete narrative in christ (ephesians 1:9-10; hebrews 1:1-3). therefore, amid various teaching winds, the church must be faithful in upholding and enlightening and correcting postmodern with a timeless narrative consistency, so that the world can obtain an authoritative mindset reference for all its critical struggles. meanwhile, as his church, christians must continue to practice self-denial. learning to carry one's cross is a sacred obligation that does not stop (luke 9:23) and even faithfully corrects oneself according to bible truth so that it is continuously renewed in the likeness of christ (semper reformanda) and can express oneself on behalf of god to answer through the authority of the bible for all the troubles of life in life. postmodern society. the church is here to give direction, to strengthen the voice of a sacred conscience to postmodernism through the bible, so that wild feelings or intuitions do not lead to the desire to make narratives, but by reason that has been renewed by the blood of christ and continuously by his word (john 17 :17-19; hebrews 9:14). various forms of concepts, doctrinal teaching modules, evangelism, theological dialogue approach amid community service need agile and dynamic revisions according to the need for dialectics with the existing context (i peter 3:15). the mini supra-narrative originating from the grand narrative, the reality of god who is present in the person of christ, must be obtained by society only from the church, which is uncompromising with the things of the world which are distorted by the wickedness of sin. theological, christocentric and missiological postmodernism have always been awaited in all human civilizations, as god does it through his own church in every age and context. with the power of the living word of god, the church calls postmodernism to abandon items and return to god to establish itself in a sacred and eternal narrative. the church in his grace can be the base of hope in this postmodernism-stricken world. the mission of the churches in indonesia in the postmodern era the church's mission should not be an institutional movement, but a movement of children of god who have a clear responsibility for god's will. for god's children who always renew themselves before god (always to be reforming), there is nothing greater in this world than god's will other than god himself. every child of god in the church needs to have two dimensions in mission, namely an internal dimension that understands the theological philosophy of the church's missionary movement and an external dimension that expresses his love for god in a community that makes each other aware of god's call, reminds, builds together in god's love and grace. all material assets that exist personally or institutionally are a gift from god that are deployed as infrastructure that international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 87 i. dimensions of theological philosophy a. mission motivation in the postmodern era the church's mission should never base its ministry motivation on observing and analyzing the context of a society that has become the object of the postmodernism mini-narrative. churches should realize that they exist only because 6). without god's new birth, any critical attempt to context or time, the mini-narrative is a blunder, futile, misleading and shameful. the church can do something in the society of her day; that is, the motivation and essence of the church's mission depart from her loyalty to god's truth as stated in the bible, and the bible becomes the only source for authoritative principles of faith in personal life. b. reading opportunities theologically god in jesus christ is the subject of faith for his church, providing opportunities for missions. therefore, he equips with the authority of his power, sends and leads according to his purposes (matthew 28:18-20). in the church that leads in him, there cannot be any opportunity and authority in missions. any challenge is not a challenge in the hands of god and certainly not a challenge for the believing church. works of god's mission that will mature the faith of his church. the mission opportunity of the lord's church is theological and theocentric. opportunities are not sought amid a wave of postmodernism with various desires and narratives, but rather in the presence of christ in every person of god's child. (john 15:4-6). by dwelling in him, the mission of the church does not need to despair, does not need to run away from the world (postmodern), and does not become reckless, but remains subject to the authority of the mission of christ leads his existence. directs, and in his fullness, he covers; in his commission, he sows and reaps with the children of god. fully sovereign christ oversees the history of his kingdom in any context of life on this earth, not on human subjects) who has the power to conquer and renew the ideology and socio-cultural impact of postmodernism, so that it becomes effective according to his purpose. ii. the basis of the movement of the mission of the church of god the church should be on a mission to honor and love god through the things god does in the world and his church. some of the main principles that the lord's church should have in god's mission: 1. god's active existence and power govern all of his creation (psalm 47:8). the mission of the lord's church should be part of the mission of god who is ruling this world. therefore, this mission must not be disturbed by any ideology, including postmodernism. 2. the word of god is absolutely true, living, transforming and working like a double-edged sword (hebrews 4:12). the pure word of god must be consistently proclaimed to overcome, enlighten and direct postmodern philosophy. the gospel of christ is the essence of a revelation: the old testament prophesies christ, the gospel fulfills the old testament prophecy, the acts of the apostles proclaim the fulfillment of the old testament, the apostles' letters confirm the fulfillment of reading and understanding it christologically and christocentrically. the enemy of god and his word is sin and satan, who works on all ideologies, including postmodernism. only the holy spirit of god who has led the writing of the bible believes in the absolute reality of god's word to all who hear it. only the bible can show, and christians are expected to become human beings with clear and firm christian personalities as representatives of god who salt and illuminate the world (matt 5:13-16). 3. regional evangelism. evangelization to young people and adults throughout the archipelago collaborates with educational institutions and the government (minister of education and technology research and culture or sports). a mission that instills faith in the gospel of christ and the mental formation of the nation so that it becomes a nation that is responsible to god and others. in addition to upholding the meta-narrative, it also stimulates the mind and heart of naturation international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 88 towards their community environment through the principles and examples of a responsible mini-narrative to allah. 4. cultural seminars. spreading ideas and directing public opinion to mini-narratives that are responsible to god, nation and state. this service involves interfaith academics, philosophers, and scholars in state government, both at the center (ministers) and regions. 5. cultural museum the cultural museum that summarizes various works of human civilization, including various arts, is a place to introduce the history of culture in various ages (including civilizations before christ), from various nations in the world. the general adult congregation and young people must draw on and learn from the information of various museum guides who understand the philosophy of postmodernism, in any museum. the church should deliberately provide a study program to several museums at home and abroad. the aim is to identify and motivate the development of healthy mini-narratives with positive impacts and lasting value. expanding wise horizons that are not as narrow as the local community's culture, so that they can be creative and dynamic incorrect and wise mini-narratives. learn to read the times creatively and constructively to form a healthy mindset towards understanding meta-narratives and mininarratives. this kind of learning stimulates the responsibility of a productive life for humankind in general and particularly for the nation and the country itself. the mission of god's churches is not yet perfect in serving god's congregation and the people of indonesia. all theocentric mission efforts are still being considered together by not stopping learning and negotiating together for the sake of god's work not being neglected. for example, during the covid '19 pandemic, he continued to try to be involved in various diaconal services for several areas experiencing natural disasters, together with the government to accommodate vaccinations, until he was motivated to immediately establish independent health clinics that were both permanent and mobile for the benefit of the general public. these are all efforts to embody god's mini-mini-narratives, not just discourses, but also seminars. the mission of god's churches must continue to seek influences that impact the social structure of society and postmodern culture, and bring about life-changing visionary blessings, leading to the meta-narrative reality, god in christ jesus. conclusion postmodernism is a philosophy that always directs humans to think that everything is relative in nature. this thought has negated the principle of absolute truth. postmodernism develops in a bipolar way in society, both philosophically and culturally. philosophically it develops through a sincere mindset and discipline in the search for various fields of truth (in the form of various mininarratives) that complement each other. culturally, glorifying philosophy that boils down to desire (desire) rather than reason is the strategy. some form mini-narratives that are artistic in nature. others manifest their mini-narratives through actions that indulge (indulge) desires regardless of the realm of truth in their conscience (wild relativity). in god, the opportunity for service to postmodernists is always wide open according to his infinite and incomprehensible wealth of wisdom for those who do not know him. what is classified as a postmodern socio-cultural challenge for god's true churches should be meaningful to test the love for god and neighbor and even to examine the importance of christian philosophy and the biblical doctrines that have been initiated? training apologizing with the power of christ's love and fighting in the world of postmodern philosophy must continue to be prepared and realized from generation to generation. god's churches, in their mission, must also be aware of themselves to always hone and sharpen creativity on the fully sovereign bible text to be able to have a dialectic in the current historical context. the main goal is only to reach every soul that god will capture through his church both today and in the future. international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 89 learning the wisdom and virtue of god's love for this sin-polluted world is never finished, but the learning is a lifestyle of god's congregation that should be enjoyed with joy from christ jesus as god incarnate. all the learning and mission struggles that are carried out are a glorious opportunity to witness how deep and great the actions of god's mission are that transcend all things, so that the faith that god has given becomes strong. the mission is an act of love that comes from within a christian. in this mission, the power of god's narrative through his word will have multiple effects: to the person of the object, to socio-cultural changes, to a renewed ideological change, to a glorified god and to strengthen the fragile self. sola gratia, sola fide, sola scriptura, solus christus, hallelujah, soli deo gloria. references alkitab, lembaga alkitab indonesia, jakarta, 1997. bustan, abdy, postmodernisme, kompasiana, 24/7/2014. https://www.kompasiana.com/abdibusthan/5975d1c02bbb132bfd12c022/postmodernisme ?page=all block, david, post-truth and political discourse, cham, macmillan palgrave, 2019. bray, gerald, allah telah berfirman sejarah theologi kristen jilid 2, momentum, surabaya, 2019, danardono, donny, http://repository.unika.ac.id/22084/1/3.pasca%20kebenaran%20dan%20matinya %20nalar___donny%20danardono.pdf juanda, anda, aliran-aliran filsafat landasan kurikulum dan pembelajaran, cv. confident, bandung, 2016. kon., d. a. lyon, modernity and postmodernity: new dictionary of christian ethics & pastoral theology, (david j. atkinson, david f. field, arthur f. holmes, oliver o’donovan, illinois: ivp academic, 1995. lukito, daniel lucas. esensi dan relevansi teologia reformed, hendra g. mulia, ed, perjuangan menantang zaman, reformed institute press, jakarta 2000. lumintang, ramli b, bahaya postmodernisme dan peranan kredo reformed, departemen multi media yppii, batu, 2010. mccomiskey, bruce, post-truth rhetoric and composition, colorado, utah state university press, 2017. mcrobbie, angela, posmodernisme dan budaya pop. kreasi wacana, yogyakarta 2011. megill, allan, prophets of extremity:nietzche, heidegger, foucault, derrida, berkeley and los angeles, university of california press, 1985. nietzche, friedrich, senjakala berhala dan anti-krist, terjemahan hartono hadikusumo, bentang budaya, yogyakarta, 1999. piliang, yasraf amir, post-realitas, jalasutra, yogyakarta 2010. sumakul, h. w. b. postmodernitas, memaknai masyarakat plural abad ke-21, bpk gunung mulia, jakarta, 2012, 120. sugiharto, ign bambang, postmodernisme: tantangan bagi filsafat, penerbit : kanisius, yogyakarta 1996. supriadi, made nopen, april 2020, manna rafflesia 6(2):112-134 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341092865_tinjauan_teologis_terhadap_postm odernisme_dan_implikasinya_bagi_iman_kristen setiawan, johan & sudrajat, ajat, pemikiran postmodernisme dan pandangannya terhadap ilmu pengetahuan, jurnal filsafat, vol. 28, no. 1, februari 2018. subeno, sutjipto, signifikansi apologetika trinitarian cornelius van til dalam mengahadapi gerakan zaman baru, jurnal verbum christi, vol. 1, no. 1, sttrii, jakarta april 2014, https://www.kompasiana.com/abdibusthan/5975d1c02bbb132bfd12c022/postmodernisme?page=all https://www.kompasiana.com/abdibusthan/5975d1c02bbb132bfd12c022/postmodernisme?page=all https://www.researchgate.net/journal/manna-rafflesia-2356-4547 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341092865_tinjauan_teologis_terhadap_postmodernisme_dan_implikasinya_bagi_iman_kristen https://www.researchgate.net/publication/341092865_tinjauan_teologis_terhadap_postmodernisme_dan_implikasinya_bagi_iman_kristen international journal of environmental, sustainability, and social sciences issn 2720-9644 (print); issn 2721-0871 (online) https://journalkeberlanjutan.com/index.php/ijesss 90 sukarno, banin diar, etika driyarkara dan relevansinya di era postmodern, jurnal filsafat vol. 23 no, 1, jakarta april 2013. susabda, yakub b., pengantar ke dalam teologi reformed, lrii, jakarta 1994. suwignyo dan agus, ed.: post truth dan (anti) pluralisme, kompas, 2019. tong, joseph, keunggulan anugerah mutlak, sttb, bandung 2006, tong, stephen, mengapa teologi reformed, jurnal verbum christi vol. 1 no. 1, jakarta 2014. ------------------, abad yang bodoh, hendra g, mulia, ed, perjuangan menantang zaman, reformed institute press, jakarta 2000. canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? the international indigenous policy journal volume 2 issue 3 truth and reconciliation article 2 august 2011 canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? kim stanton stanton legal, stanton@stantonlex.ca recommended citation stanton, k. (2011). canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past?. the international indigenous policy journal, 2(3) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 this research is brought to you for free and open access by scholarship@western. it has been accepted for inclusion in the international indigenous policy journal by an authorized administrator of scholarship@western. for more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca. canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? abstract the indian residential schools (irs) system has been referred to as “canada's greatest national shame”. the irs system is now the subject of the canadian truth and reconciliation commission (trc). unlike other truth commissions that have been created due to regime change, where a majority of citizens sought a truthseeking process, canada’s trc arose as a result of protracted litigation by survivors of the irs system against the government and churches that ran the schools. this article reviews the genesis of trc in a legal settlement agreement, along with some of the challenges this origin entails. keywords truth and reconciliation commission, residential schools, legal settlement agreements creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ the indian residential schools (irs) system1 has been referred to as “canada's greatest national shame”.2 for over a century, the canadian government sought to assimilate indigenous children into the non-indigenous culture by promoting and then requiring their attendance at church-run schools. the first indian residential schools opened in the 1880s in western canada and eventually, they operated in every province and territory except prince edward island, new brunswick and newfoundland. the system was at its height in the 1920s with compulsory attendance under the indian act and over 80 schools in operation. the irs system is now the subject of the canadian truth and reconciliation commission (trc). unlike other truth commissions that have been created due to regime change, where a majority of citizens sought a truth-seeking process, canada’s trc arose as a result of protracted litigation by survivors of the irs system against the government and churches that ran the schools. this article reviews the genesis of trc in a legal settlement agreement, along with some of the challenges this origin entails. 3 most indian residential schools were run by entities of the catholic church,4 children were separated from their families and communities and sent far away to schools where they were forbidden to speak their languages, practice their spirituality or express their cultures. the impacts of this policy as manifested through irs have echoed down the generations. indigenous people who never attended an irs have nonetheless suffered from the harms inflicted there due to the interruption of traditional cultural transmission and parenting skills, the loss of skills enabling traditional life on the land, the pathologies and dysfunction now endemic in many indigenous communities and the loss of language, culture and spirituality. it is only in the last few years that the government has acknowledged that its assimilation policy was harmful. with others run by the anglican, presbyterian, methodist and later the united churches. 5 1 books that provide much more extensive information about irs than is possible to provide here include j.r. miller, shingwauk's vision: a history of native residential schools (toronto: university of toronto press, 1996) and john s. milloy, a national crime: the canadian government and the residential school system, 1879 to 1986 (winnipeg: university of manitoba press, 1999). see also the report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples vols. 1-5 (ottawa: supply and services canada, 1996) [rcap report], especially vol. 1, part 2 “false assumptions and a failed relationship”, c. 10 “residential schools”. “indian” is the antiquated and incorrect moniker used in government parlance for canada’s indigenous peoples. it has done so only in response to overwhelming legal pressure. 2 adrienne clarkson, “her excellency the right honourable adrienne clarkson address at the university of toronto faculty association's c.b. macpherson lecture” (31 march 2004). 3 miller, shingwauk's vision, supra note 1, at 142. 4 see rcap report, vol. 1, supra note 1, part 2, c.10, text accompanying table 10.1: “in 1931 there were 44 roman catholic (rc), 21 church of england (ce), 13 united church (uc) and 2 presbyterian (pr) schools. these proportions among the denominations were constant throughout the history of the system.” note that the catholic church is not organized as one central body, but rather as individual orders. see canadian conference of catholic bishops, “apology on residential schools by the catholic church”, online: <http://www.cccb.ca/site/content/view/2630/1019/lang,eng/>: “the catholic community in canada has a decentralized structure. each diocesan bishop is autonomous in his diocese and, although relating to the canadian conference of catholic bishops, is not responsible to it.” 5 according to pamela o'connor, “squaring the circle: how canada is dealing with the legacy of its indian residential schools experiment” (2000) 28 int’l j. legal info. 232 at 236, the federal government only recently admitted that the policy purpose of irs was one of assimilation rather than education. 1 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 while it is true that there were caring individuals among the teachers and workers at some of the schools, and some children did receive an education, the dominant narrative of the schools reveals the violence inherent in the policy behind the irs system: to “kill the indian [to] save the man”.6 despite earlier press reports those that escaped physical or sexual abuse still suffered the loneliness of separation from family, the confusion of being taught their culture was inferior, and the loss of their language and spirituality. eventually the government concluded that the schools were not successful tools of assimilation. the government withdrew from its partnership with the churches in 1969, at which time it took over the irs and began to transfer control to indian bands. the majority of residential schools were closed by the mid-1980s, with a few remaining until the last closure in 1996. 7 and several criminal investigations by police in the late 1980s,8 the irs issue did not garner national attention until 1990, when chief phil fontaine went public with his experience of irs abuse,9 opening the door for other survivors to begin sharing their experiences. the extent of the irs legacy became better known with the establishment of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples (rcap).10 rcap was established in 1991, and during the course of 178 days of public hearings in 96 communities, many survivors of the schools gave emotional and troubling testimony recounting the abuses they had suffered, thus bringing wider attention to the irs legacy. in 1996, rcap made its recommendation calling for a public inquiry into irs. no public inquiry was established in response to that recommendation. the federal government made what it called a statement of reconciliation.11 minister of indian affairs jane stewart made the statement but for many, it fell short of an apology.12 the native women’s association of canada formally refused to accept the statement as an apology, and the inuit tapirisat of canada found the statement to be incomplete.13 6 j.a. macrae, department of indian affairs inspector of schools for the north west in the 1880s, quoted in milloy, supra note indeed, the word “apology” did not 1, at 27. 7 see for example: maureen brosnahan, “indians recall bitter school days” winnipeg free press (22 june 1982), at 21. 8 miller, shingwauk's vision, supra note 1, at 329, citing investigations at williams lake and lytton, british columbia. 9 assembly of manitoba chiefs, “residential schools: a chronology”, online: assembly of manitoba chiefs, http://manitobachiefs.com/issue/residential.html (accessed january 2009). 10 j.r. miller, “troubled legacy: a history of indian residential schools” (2003) 66 sask. l. rev. 357 at 381. the five volume, 3,500-page rcap report covers 500 years of history between non-indigenous and indigenous peoples in what is now canada, and makes 440 recommendations calling for comprehensive changes in the relationship between canada’s indigenous and non-indigenous peoples: rcap report, supra note 1. 11 see canada, gathering strength: canada's aboriginal action plan (indian affairs and northern development: public works and government services canada, 1997); “statement of reconciliation: learning from the past.” statement read by hon. jane stewart, minister of indian affairs and northern development (7 january 1998). 12 buti, antonio. "responding to the legacy of canadian residential schools." (2001) murdoch university electronic journal of law 8 (4) at para. 36, citing law commission of canada, minister's reference on institutional child abuse: discussion paper (1999) 15. 13 morse, bradford w., and tanya m. kozak. “gathering strength: the government of canada’s response to the final report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples.” blind spots: an examination of the federal government's response to the report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples. (ottawa: aboriginal rights coalition, 2001), [“blind spots”] 32, at 36. 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 appear in the statement. observers suggest that the government did not issue a full apology for fear it would be viewed as an admission of liability that would weaken its legal position in the various court claims being brought by irs survivors.14 in the late 1990s, the failure of the government to adequately respond to rcap, and in particular, to adequately address the recommendations on irs, created enormous frustration amongst survivors and dashed any hopes of a political resolution to the issue. 15 this frustration with the lack of a political response prompted irs survivors to turn to legal responses in an effort to seek redress in the courts for the harms they suffered, a strategy that ultimately led to a negotiated solution.16 in 1997 phil fontaine was elected national chief of the assembly of first nations and commenced negotiations with the churches and the federal government for a settlement for irs survivors. settlement discussions began to be impacted when the courts started to decide some of the first irs civil cases, apportioning liability between the government and the churches. the legal mechanisms survivors turned to included criminal prosecution, civil litigation, and alternative dispute resolution. criminal prosecution resulted in some retributive justice with respect to a few individual aging perpetrators of sexual abuse, but could not address systemic issues and harms of irs. civil litigation also resulted in some damage awards for a few survivors, but the process was lengthy and again the harms acknowledged by the courts were limited. alternative dispute resolution (adr) was an attempt to remedy the difficulties of the civil litigation system but it too ultimately failed to fulfill the goal of having a streamlined and effective process to address survivors’ needs. thus, each mechanism offered a measure of assistance in bringing the irs legacy to public attention, but each mechanism failed to adequately address the historical injustices created by the irs system. 17 following the launch of multiple class action lawsuits,18 a consensus developed around the assembly of first nations’ recommendations in its 2004 report which called for a lump sum reparations payment, additional compensation for specific abuses, expedited payments for the sick and elderly, and a truth-sharing and reconciliation process.19 in november 2005, the parties reached an agreement in principle that was finalized in may 2006,20 and approved by the courts later in the year.21 14 morse, blind spots, at 46. the settlement agreement came into effect 19 september 2007. by the time of the settlement agreement, 14,903 survivors had filed claims against the government. only 2,805 15 stewart, phillip. “federal government’s response to the royal commission on aboriginal peoples” in blind spots, 49 at 54. 16 these are legal mechanisms utilized in the canadian legal order to address the irs legacy. 17 see for example blackwater v. plint (1998), 161 d.l.r. (4th) 538 (bcsc). 18 in addition to the cloud v. canada (attorney general) (2004), 247 d.l.r. (4th) 667 (ont. ca) class action in ontario, there were four others within a few years: canada, notice of class actions (indian residential school alternative dispute resolution process), online: assembly of first nations, http://www.afn.ca/residentialschools/pdf/notice_of_class_actions.pdf (accessed 30 november 2010). 19 see letter from indigenous bar association to frank iacobucci (17 october 2005), on file with the author. 20 the indian residential schools settlement agreement (the “settlement agreement”) was concluded may 8, 2006, following an agreement in principle (“aip”) signed 23 november 2005. schedule n of the settlement agreement, “mandate for the truth and reconciliation commission” (schedule e of the aip), sets out the terms of a truth commission. 21 see for example the 15 december 2006 decision quatell v. attorney general of canada, 2006 bcsc 1840, per brenner c.j.; and baxter v. canada, (2006) 83 o.r. (3d) 481 (ont. sup. ct.) per winkler j (as he then was). 3 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 http://www.lexisnexis.com/ca/legal/search/runremotelink.do?service=citation&langcountry=ca&risb=21_t6996380178&a=0.534600597966695&linkinfo=f%23ca%23or3%23page%25481%25vol%2583%25sel2%2583%25&bct=a� claims had been resolved through litigation or the adr process, with damage awards upwards of $110 million.22 the irs settlement agreement is the largest class action settlement in canadian history 23 and has well over 100 signatories. the settlement agreement sets aside $1.9 billion for the approximately 80,000 living survivors of the irs schools.24 the settlement agreement comprises several mechanisms of redress for survivors of irs, including a common experience payment,25 an independent assessment process,26 a fund for commemorative projects,27 and a fund for healing projects.28 the trc is like other truth and reconciliation commissions in that it is an official, temporary, non-judicial fact-finding body set up to investigate a pattern of abuses of human rights committed over a number of years. finally, the settlement agreement provides for the establishment of the truth and reconciliation commission. 29 22 canada, indian residential schools resolutions canada, “backgrounder: indian residential schools” (ottawa: indian residential schools resolutions canada, 2005). that is, it is a government-sponsored commission, with a five-year mandate, intended to investigate the irs system and its legacy. like other truth commissions, the trc mandate includes the creation of a historical record and the making of recommendations. however, aside from the unique mandate and structure that reflect the national context in which the trc is taking place, the trc is distinctive in that it is the only truth commission to be created out of litigation. in other contexts in which truth commissions have arisen, they have been instigated by a new regime to look into the abuses of a past regime, as in argentina, peru and chile. occasionally, a truth commission arises as part of a peace accord brokered between parties to a conflict, as in el salvador, guatemala and sierra leone. in canada, the trc is a result of negotiations between multiple parties of class action lawsuits. this means that the trc will be faced with the need to prompt canadians to invest in and take ownership of a process that they did not instigate. that is, the trc was not created out of a groundswell of concern about irs survivors by the public; rather it was agreed to by their government’s legal advisers in order to settle costly litigation. were it not for the enormous financial cost to the government of continuing to defend against the class actions, the trc would not exist in canada. 23 indian and northern affairs canada, “backgrounder indian residential schools settlement agreement” (2008), http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/rqpi/info/nwz/2008/20080425b_is-eng.asp (accessed 30 november 2010). 24 survivors who wished to retain their right to sue the government and the churches had to formally optout of the settlement agreement by 20 august 2007. had more than 5,000 survivors opted out, the settlement would have been void: settlement agreement, supra note 20, at para. 4.14. 25 the common experience payment is $10,000 for the first year a person attended irs and $3,000 for each additional year. the payment is symbolic and intended to acknowledge the fact that simply attending an irs was a harm: settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule n, art. 5. 26 those survivors who wish to be compensated for harms that are ordinarily compensable in the tort system, such as serious physical and sexual abuse, can make a claim under the independent assessment process, which has a schedule of monetary compensation for a range of abuses depending on their severity. settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule d “independent assessment process”. 27 this is a $20 million fund for activities that commemorate the children and communities affected by the schools. settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule j. 28 the settlement agreement provides for an additional $125 million over five years to support the projects of the aboriginal healing foundation. settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule m, s. 3.03. 29 based on the definition set out in report of the secretary-general, the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies, un doc. s/2004/616, para. 50 at 17. 4 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 as adverted to above, one of the reasons that people sought a truth commission in canada was that the usual legal mechanisms had proven to be inadequate. in response to survivor experiences with the criminal and civil litigation processes, it appears from schedule n that the settlement agreement negotiators sought to establish a body that would not mimic a legal proceeding such as a trial. schedule n specifies the powers, duties and procedures of the trc, including receiving statements.30 the schedule also sets out what the trc may not do in pursuit of its mandate; it shall not hold formal hearings, have subpoena powers, or name names, as discussed below. the trc’s responsibilities with respect to methodology and procedure are enumerated.31 the factors the trc must take into account in exercising its duties are set out, including a direction that the commissioners: “shall not hold formal hearings, nor act as a public inquiry, nor conduct a formal legal process”.32 the guiding principles state at the outset of the mandate that the trc will focus on being victim-centred, and respect the health and safety of participants. these aspects acknowledge that previous legal mechanisms have caused grief and pain to survivors, and attempt to avoid duplication of that occurrence. with this wording, the negotiators of the settlement agreement likely were trying to stress their intention for the trc not to duplicate criminal or civil court proceedings or the independent assessment process. nor is the trc to repeat the perceived difficulties encountered with public inquiries in the past, where adversarial processes overtook the substance of the inquiry. this section of the mandate can be read as eschewing a formal legal process for the trc, and by formal, it seems to refer to adversarial processes. 33 the trc was sought as a mechanism that would operate in a non-adversarial manner. in other contexts, truth commissions have been expected to be less ‘lawyer-driven’ than other legal mechanisms.34 in canada, where the government and the churches have acknowledged that abuses occurred and that the irs system was harmful, the evidence that is presented to the trc is not for the purposes of convincing the commissioners that the abuses occurred. the trc is occurring separately from the reparations process and other elements of the settlement agreement. the while all truth commissions do involve lawyers in their activities to varying degrees, the idea that negotiators in canada gleaned from international examples is to emphasize the focus on victims, and reduce the focus on the skill of legal counsel to shape the information gained. this reduced focus on legal personnel arose because sometimes truth commissions are established in environments where the legal system may be in disarray, with few lawyers and judges left in a country (either alive, or who are not part of the prior regime). it may also be because the number of violations is so large that the prosecutorial system is overwhelmed and another mechanism is necessary to seek accountability. a truth commission may also be sought in order to elicit truth-telling in an environment where the adversarial approach of a trial, with its tools such as cross-examination, would be inappropriate. 30 settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule n, s. 2. 31 ibid., schedule n, s. 3. 32 ibid., schedule n, s. 2(b). 33 mike cachagee, executive director of the national residential school survivors' society, has noted that it will be difficult for some survivors to trust an organization run by the government when the schools were mandated by that government: canadian press, “truth commission may not bring forgiveness: chair” (21 february 2010), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/story/2010/02/21/man-truth-reconciliationcommission-sinclair.html (accessed 23 march 2011). 34 see mark freeman, truth commissions and procedural fairness (cambridge, new york: cambridge university press, 2006) at 124. 5 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 purpose of having the trc as a separate body allows for a focus on its distinctive goals: acknowledging and witnessing the irs experience, promoting awareness of the irs system and its impacts, and creating a public record of the irs legacy.35 alleged perpetrators have no incentive to participate in the trc but perhaps they may be more willing to engage in the process if they know that they will not be subject to any legal proceedings as a result of their participation. a truth commission is intended to promote public accountability and combat impunity for human rights violations, so a refusal to name names where there is clear evidence of culpability may attract criticism. on the other hand, while most truth commissions have the power to name perpetrators, few have done so. these goals suggest a desire for a less adversarial process than the court process. 36 aside from the frustrations of the lack of a political response to the irs legacy and the dissatisfaction with the other legal mechanisms available, a further reason that survivors sought a truth commission in the irs negotiations was the widespread ignorance amongst non-indigenous canadians about the irs system and its profound and continuing effect on indigenous communities. the advantage of a truth commission for combating such ignorance is the ability to create an incontrovertible historical record and enable significant public education. the trc is tasked with creating a record of the irs system and its impacts. and in the canadian context, the institutional nature of the main “perpetrators” – the government and the churches – alters the dynamic. many of the people who staffed the schools or directed government irs policy are dead, thus there will be more participation of present day government and church institutional representatives than of individuals who were directly involved with the irs. as parties to the settlement agreement, there is an expectation that the institutions will participate in the trc process. given that most of their representatives will not themselves have been perpetrators of specific abuses, it is perhaps not surprising that the trc has neither subpoena power nor the power to name names, two commonly allocated powers for truth commissions. however, while gaining the truth about irs for non-indigenous people may be educational, it may be re-traumatizing for survivors.37 in addition, the truth will be different for each person depending on their experiences. some survivors and church or government representatives will resist the idea that the irs system was wholly negative, preferring to focus on the fact that some children did receive an education and that some survivors look back to their teachers with fondness.38 consensus that residential school experience was injurious in itself, not just in instances of physical and sexual abuse, is shared by only a small proportion of still, the truth that the irs system existed and that it has been largely devastating for indigenous peoples is already known to indigenous peoples, but this truth is not well known to the majority of canadians: 35 see settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule n, “mandate for the trc”, s. 1. 36 priscilla b. hayner, unspeakable truths: confronting state terror and atrocity (new york: routledge, 2001) [hayner, unspeakable truths], at 107. 37 i acknowledge that there is no one truth to be found or uncovered, but rather a narrative to be constructed based on the information gathered by the truth-seeking process. 38 miller, shingwauk’s vision, supra note 1 at 341-2. 6 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 canadian citizens, in contrast to the view of most first nations, inuit and métis people.39 there are significant gaps between the knowledge and understanding of the irs system that many non-indigenous people may be expected to have as compared to that of many indigenous people. 40 these gaps arise from longstanding beliefs about the history and intentions of government policy, and the legacies of such policies such as cycles of dependency and negative social indicators.41 as with other truth commissions, it is not that the trc is likely to expose facts that were previously unknown; rather, it will “make an indispensable contribution in acknowledging these facts”. in other contexts, truth commissions have attempted to create a more complete historical record of a tragic period in a state’s history by rounding out the state’s version of events with information gained from investigation, records and testimony. 42 in canada, the factual truth about irs may be publicly available, but that truth is still resisted in the dominant narrative. this dominant narrative says that the schools were created and run with the best intentions and that in hindsight some of the methods used and some of the individuals involved may have been overly harsh or abusive. at variance with that narrative is a conflicting account that views the schools as one attempt at obliterating the indigenous cultures in what is now canada.43 some view the irs system as only one component of a larger colonial project that is embodied in many aspects of the indian act.44 however, non-indigenous canadians will largely be unaware of the systemic aspect of the irs legacy.45 39 marlene brant castellano, “a holistic approach to reconciliation: insights from research of the aboriginal healing foundation” in marlene b. castellano, linda archibald and mike degagné, eds. from truth to reconciliation: transforming the legacy of residential schools (ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation, 2008) 385 at 386. in the canadian case, the fact that the government has issued an unequivocal apology may help to refute the myth held by many non-indigenous canadians that irs was akin to a bad boarding school, where individual 40 this is not to suggest that all the learning will be on the non-indigenous side; rather, it is just to note that more non-indigenous people will have more to learn than non-indigenous people since the irs system is generally better known in indigenous communities. for polling information on the latter point, see environics research group, final report: 2008 national benchmark survey (prepared for indian residential schools resolution canada and the truth and reconciliation commission, 2008) [environics, benchmark survey], at 13ff. 41 the differing perceptions are evident in the stereotypes that are visible in mainstream media coverage of the settlement agreement. see for example jack branswell and ken meaney, “residential school cash has deadly fallout; suicides, drug abuse attributed to compensation” calgary herald (26 january 2009) a7; canadian press, “racist overtones surround residential school payments: national chief” guelph mercury (20 september 2007) a6. 42 pablo de grieff, “justice and reparations” in jon miller and rahul kumar, eds. reparations: interdisciplinary inquiries (toronto: oxford university press, 2007) 153 at 161-162. 43 roland chrisjohn, sherri lynn young and michael maraun, eds. the circle game: shadows and substance in the indian residential school experience in canada (penticton, b.c.: theytus books, 2006) at 4-5. 44 see courtney jung, “canada and the legacy of the indian residential schools: transitional justice for indigenous peoples in a non-transitional society” (8 april 2009), social science research network, http://ssrn.com/abstract=1374950, (accessed 30 november 2010) at 2. 45 a poll conducted for indian residential schools resolution canada and the trc in may 2008 found that six in ten canadians were unable to cite any long-term consequence for survivors of having gone through the irs system: environics, benchmark survey, supra note 40, at 20. 7 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 teachers were abusive. the apology acknowledged that irs was intended to force assimilation of indigenous children – “to kill the indian in the child”.46 canadians may find that a commission addressing the legacy of residential schools provides a manageable way to learn about and understand the larger causes of the colonial policy under which irs was created. still, given that the trc will not be able to identify perpetrators in its report, the truth it tells about irs will necessarily be incomplete. the trc report will therefore need to address the broader truth about the irs system itself, identifying the structures and institutions that created and perpetuated the toll upon indigenous peoples. the ability to focus on the larger picture can then be a strength of the trc. the importance of the work the trc must do, at the outset, to address these differing narratives cannot be underestimated if the reconciliation aspect of the mandate is to have any chance of success. one of the most important things a truth commission can do is to engage the wider public with its work. the utility of the commission is lessened if it compiles a history that is destined to silently land on a library shelf.47 a commission must create a narrative that may form the basis of national reconciliation, but the commission must first “manage to penetrate the collective consciousness of the people.”48 how can this be achieved? hayner and freeman set out factors that are likely to improve the chances of a truth commission being effective. in particular, they note the importance of public support for the establishment of a truth commission; the presence of a vigorous and engaged civil society (and in particular of strong victims’ groups, human rights groups, religious leaders and intellectuals); widespread social identification with the victims of the abuses; vocal and independent media; and persistent international attention and pressure.49 the canadian trc has not yet attained all of these factors. it is unclear how wide public support was for its establishment since the canadian public at large was not formally consulted in the irs negotiations. while canada has strong civil society organizations, there is not yet any organized coalition (outside the parties to the settlement agreement) vocally supporting the trc’s work. there has been some positive media coverage but the trc is yet to be ubiquitous in the press, either domestic or international.50 an unusual aspect of this trc is that its mandate does not direct that it will hold hearings. rather, schedule n refers to receiving “statements”, holding “sessions”, “consultations” and certainly with a country as large as canada, the media will be an important tool in engaging those who are unable to participate in the trc’s national events because the events are distant from where they live. 46 stephen harper, prime minister, “statement of apology – to former students of indian residential schools” (ottawa, 11 june 2008), online: http://www.ainc-inac.gc.ca/ai/rqpi/apo/index-eng.asp>. 47 neil j. kritz, “where we are and how we got here: an overview of developments in the search for justice and reconciliation” in a. henkin, the legacy of abuse (new york: the aspen institute and nyu school of law, 2002) 21, at 38. 48 erin daly and jeremy sarkin, in reconciliation in divided societies (university of pennsylvania press, 2007) at 110. 49 priscilla b. hayner and mark freeman, “‘truth-telling’ in international institution for democracy and electoral assistance”, reconciliation after violent conflict: a handbook (stockholm: international idea, 2003) [idea handbook] 122 at 128-9. 50 most canadians who had heard about the settlement agreement had done so due to mass media: environics, benchmark survey, supra note 40 at 27. the polling report notes at 25 that overall, awareness among canadians of the settlement agreement was “fairly low” – only four in ten had heard of the common experience payment, and two in ten or fewer had heard of the other elements of the settlement agreement. 8 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 “public events”.51 as noted above, the mandate states that the trc: “shall not hold formal hearings”.52 while this is no doubt in part to protect the privacy of survivors, it also shields the government and churches from scrutiny by the public. it means that the trc will not hold an activity that is virtually a hallmark of truth commissions elsewhere. this aspect of the trc’s mandate must be explained to and by the media for the public to understand, since most people associate truth commissions with the south african trc, which held public hearings, and people may thus reasonably expect a truth commission to hold hearings.53 other truth commissions have held institutional hearings to focus on the issues arising in certain sectors of the public service or society at large. for instance, south africa had hearings on the legal profession and the judiciary, while ghana had institutional hearings with respect to the security sector, media, prisons, as well as the legal profession and the judiciary. 54 the purpose is to reveal the structural and institutional nature of the human rights violations that occurred in order to recommend ways in which to prevent future recurrences, regardless of the individuals who may be in charge of or working for those institutions. it is not clear if the trc will hold any such hearings, yet institutional hearings with respect to government policy in different areas of indigenous people’s lives may be useful and important for preventing recurrences of abuses such as irs.55 the mandate as set out in schedule n of the settlement agreement frames the trc as part of a process of “rebuilding and renewing … the relationship between aboriginal and nonaboriginal canadians”, requiring “commitment from … the people of canada”. in order to work toward reconciliation of the canadian society as a whole, there needs to be active, sustained and significant outreach to civil society beyond the parties to the settlement agreement. such processes of dialogue and consultation help to generate awareness and then cultivate ownership of the national reconciliation process. there is no requirement for a report at the end of the five-year mandate of the trc, but such a report would be useful in order for the trc to have the opportunity to assess the material it has reviewed and heard to identify structural or systemic issues. both institutional hearings and a final report are vehicles with important potential for public education by the trc. while the canadian trc is a result of a legal settlement that includes parties that represent some components of civil society, they are by no means broadly representative of canadian society as a whole. although some of the major aboriginal organizations are involved in the trc process, not all aboriginal organizations are parties to the settlement agreement. large 51 the trc held its first national event in winnipeg in june 2010. the event did not receive broad media attention such as to captivate the nation. 52 settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule n, s. 2(b). 53 perhaps the best known truth commission, the south african truth and reconciliation commission reported to then president nelson mandela in october 1998, after conducting hearings over the course of three years in which it heard from close to 20,000 victims of the apartheid era. 54 ghana’s national reconciliation commission was inaugurated in 2002 to investigate periods of unconstitutional rule since independence. 55 see for example edward john, “from apology to action: a response to the residential schools apology” vancouver sun (12 june 2008): today we find that over 50 percent of all children in government care are aboriginal and in the north region of the province the percentage is a staggering 77 percent. … it is estimated that there are three times the number of children in government care now than there were children in residential schools at the height of their operations. edward john is grand chief, tl'azt'en nation. 9 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 swaths of the non-indigenous public have no involvement in the trc so far. involving the broader public will be easier if civil society organizations, beyond the parties to the settlement agreement, get involved and support the work of the trc. this could be instigated by outreach from the trc itself, but given its limited resources, it would be useful if the parties to the settlement agreement could take the initiative. church groups and survivor groups could collaborate and contact other civil society organizations to form a broad-based coalition to support and to increase awareness of the trc’s work. in canada, indigenous legal institutions and systems have often been ignored and devalued. the trc must proceed with an acute awareness of this history and adopt the advice of rcap on the concept of respecting the systems of traditions of the peoples whom it hopes to reconcile. as llewellyn observes, the trc’s mandate does not provide much detail with respect to the reconciliation aspect of its work.56 the mandate refers to healing the relationship between peoples.57 in the transitional justice context, mechanisms such as apologies, commemoration, reparations, and truth commissions are viewed as means for achieving societal reconciliation. reconciliation is a multifaceted process and often, as with south africa, truth commissions are expected to engage several of these mechanisms in an effort to achieve societal healing. canada’s trc is not asked to do all the work of redress because the elements of commemoration and reparations are structured as different parts of the settlement agreement. this means that the focus of the trc’s work need not be to determine the compensation that survivors should receive or to duplicate the commemorative work that is already being done by the aboriginal healing foundation, a body created in response to rcap’s recommendations on irs.58 an additional element critical to the reconciliation process that the trc does not have to address is that of an apology. the trc was inaugurated on 1 june 2008. although not part of the settlement agreement, on 11 june 2008, the government gave its long-awaited apology to survivors of the irs. 59 the prime minister gave this apology in the house of commons. the leaders of the other federal parties represented in parliament also gave an apology. the leaders of five national aboriginal organizations responded from the floor of the house. the apology received a generally positive response from survivors and the public and marked a rare moment of awareness in the general canadian population.60 truth commissions are often expected to make recommendations with respect to appropriate reparations for the victims such as compensation that may enable the victims to improve their quality of life. these recommendations are adopted to varying degrees by the state. in the canadian context, the reparations have already been determined in large part through the the apology also provided the trc with a good start: the government acknowledged the truth of the irs system’s harms, enabling the trc to commence its work without having to convince the country that the irs legacy existed. 56 jennifer llewellyn, “bridging the gap between truth and reconciliation: restorative justice and the indian residential schools truth and reconciliation commission” in castellano, archibald and degagné, supra note 39, 185 at 186. 57 see settlement agreement, supra note 20, schedule n, preamble. 58 despite its reputation for excellence, the aboriginal healing foundation’s funding was not renewed by the government of canada in the march 2010 federal budget, signaling a lack of concern by the harper conservatives for the reconciliation process that the ahf’s work supports. 59 stephen harper, “statement of apology” supra note 46. 60 just after the apology, a poll found an unusually high level of awareness: 83 percent of those surveyed were aware of the apology: omar el c, “school-abuse apology widely backed” globe and mail (14 june 2008) a4, citing an innovative research group conducted the poll between june 11 and 13. 10 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 common experience payment and independent assessment process. what if the trc makes determinations that go far beyond what the reparative mechanisms of the settlement agreement encompass? what can be the response to the trc’s findings if the apology and reparations have already been meted out? these are challenges that may arise given the ambitious structure of the settlement agreement. it is too early to tell whether these matters will arise, but they are possibilities that the trc can contemplate in determining its process. the fact that the irs negotiators decided to have a trc in addition to and separate from these other aspects of the settlement suggests that there is something to be gained from having the trc process itself. that is, something is expected from the trc that is different from the usual truth commission results of making recommendations for commemoration, apology and reparation. there is something about the process itself that is valued here; something unique to the canadian context. it remains to be seen if separating the truth-seeking process from the reparations process is an appropriate way of proceeding. again, this is one of the reasons why it will be so important for the trc to actively educate the public as to its operations and goals. how well a truth commission educates the public about its work will determine its ability to garner public support. a high level of public support can bolster a commission’s credibility and thus its reputation, which can in turn smooth the way for the commission to access information and address the needs of victims. also important for maintaining its own credibility is a truth commission’s management of public expectations about its work. this is another task that does not appear in any written mandate for a truth and reconciliation commission. the trc will need to be extremely conscious of the expectations that it may arouse in survivors of irs. these expectations will be of an order entirely different and more complex than those of the nonindigenous public. truth commissions have often raised expectations of victims that there will be some resolution to their situation because the very existence of a commission suggests that its presence will make a difference.61 another challenge for the trc relates to the likelihood that most of the testimony it receives will come from survivors. this may create the appearance that the trc will rely upon the survivors to do the work to be reconciled or perhaps reintegrated (or “conciled”/integrated) into canadian society. the trc must be careful not to reinforce the idea rejected by rcap: that the government avoided responsibility by expecting irs survivors to do the work to heal themselves. expectations may be even higher when the commission seeks not just truth but also reconciliation as a central goal. 62 61 see sam garkawe, “the south african truth and reconciliation commission: a suitable model to enhance the role and rights of the victims of gross violations of human rights?” (2003) 27 melbourne u.l.rev. 334, at 351. the means of reconciliation include truth telling, acknowledgement of past wrongs, reparations for the victims, addressing the structural causes of the wrongs, and a rebalancing between societal groups to prevent the harms recurring. the trc must find a way to include the nonindigenous public such that they acknowledge the irs system is everyone’s problem to address. the reconciliation process must be framed by the trc as a mutual process to be engaged in by indigenous and non-indigenous peoples alike; it should not be a one-sided process. 62 see discussion of report, vol. 1, supra note 1, part 2, c. 10, section 4 “epilogue”, text accompanying notes 330-332, 335. 11 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 while the settlement agreement negotiators emphatically sought to distinguish the trc from the south african version,63 it is important to glean from the comparative experience some realistic guidance about what this trc can achieve. not all truth commissions have framed their goal as reconciliation of the country, but “[t]hose that have – including south africa’s trc and the national commission on truth and reconciliation in chile – have found it to be a very difficult mission.”64 further, the term “reconciliation” implies that the parties were once whole, experienced a rift, and now must be made whole again. but in colonial settings, this is not the case. the relationship between indigenous and settler peoples in canada was one of nations encountering nations, where one gradually oppressed and marginalized the other. indigenous peoples never agreed to the denial of their sovereignty, cultures or identities. reconciliation may or may not occur on an individual or national level; calling the exercise “truth and reconciliation” sets up both concepts as a goal, but no one can declare a person or nation to be reconciled. in addition, it is possible that truth (a slippery concept at the best of times) and reconciliation will be viewed completely differently depending upon who is asked. some may see that these objectives have been achieved while others will dispute that perception. the latter may be concerned that those in power have appeared to support reconciliation for their own political purposes. 65 thus, in the canadian context, reconciliation must refer to “transformative” as opposed to “restorative” reconciliation.66 one commentator notes that reconciliation on a national level must be at least in part a political process that includes acknowledgement of political and legal rights of indigenous peoples.67 63 at a june 2007 conference on the then upcoming canadian truth and reconciliation commission, national chief phil fontaine adamantly stated that the canadian commission was not modeled on the south african truth and reconciliation commission: phil fontaine, “the long journey to justice: the personal as political” (lecture presented at “preparing for the truth commission: sharing the truth about residential schools. a conference on truth and reconciliation as restorative justice”, university of calgary, june 15, 2007) [calgary conference, 2007] [unpublished]. fontaine stepped down as national chief at the assembly of first nations annual general meeting in calgary on july 21, 2009. this highlights the difficulty with public expectations that can be created when a body called a “truth and reconciliation” commission is created. the trc cannot reasonably be expected to reconcile on its own the entire relationship between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in canada. on the face of it, the trc’s mandate is limited to the irs system: to create a historical record of the irs system and to educate the public about the irs legacy. 64 priscilla hayner, “same species, different animal: how south africa compares to truth commissions worldwide” in charles villa-vicencio and wilhelm verwoerd, eds. looking back, reaching forward: reflections on the truth and reconciliation commission of south africa (cape town: university of cape town press, 2000) 32 at 39. 65 indeed, as noted by mclachlin c.j.c. in haida nation v. british columbia (minister of forests), 2004 scc 73 at para. 25: “put simply, canada’s aboriginal peoples were here when europeans came, and were never conquered.” 66 will kymlicka and bashir bashir, eds., the politics of reconciliation in multicultural societies (oxford: oxford university press, 2008) “introduction” at 19, describe these two modes of reconciliation: “the restorative dimension seeks to restore and heal a pre-existing ‘we’, by closing up a temporary breach, while the transformative dimension seeks to create a new ‘we’, which requires opening up new possibilities that did not exist before.” 67 chris cunneen, “reparations and restorative justice: responding to the gross violation of human rights” in heather strang and john braithwaite, eds., restorative justice and civil society (cambridge: cambridge university press, 2001) 83 at 90. 12 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 in canada, continued power imbalances will make it difficult for a reconciliation process to truly take root.68 when he was lieutenant governor of ontario, james bartleman, a member of the chippewas of mnjikaning first nation, warned that unless canadian society as a whole signals that it is serious about according equal economic and social rights to indigenous canadians, the trc’s commissioners will find that “they have been shod with shoes of clay. there can be no true reconciliation and canada cannot claim it is a just and equal society unless economic and social equality is accorded to aboriginal people.”69 how can the trc contribute to a broader sense of reconciliation in a society that is only prepared to address these power imbalances in an incremental way? 70 castellano recalls the observation in rcap’s report that in the search for reconciliation between peoples, the leadership of public institutions in adopting a more respectful stance is extremely important.71 gonzales lists advantages canada has compared to other states in holding a truth commission, including the government’s apology, the presence of “sophisticated advocacy institutions” that have assisted survivors, and the settlement agreement on reparations and the fact that the mandate does not provide much detail does offer an opportunity for the trc to broadly interpret its possibilities. while the trc must exercise caution with respect to what it can reasonably accomplish in the five years it has been granted, perhaps the irs system can be a springboard for the exploration of broader issues in indigenous/non-indigenous relations in canada. after all, there is a distinction to be made in the trc’s mandate – the trc is expected to address the irs system, but it is also expected to address the irs legacy. the irs system is something that can be quantified with respect to how many schools, where they were in operation, for how long, and under what government directives. the irs legacy is a much more amorphous question. the trc can complete an effective historical study of the irs system while exploring broader political questions in its discussion of the irs legacy. this may include situating the irs legacy within colonialism, making connections between irs and socioeconomic conditions for indigenous communities, consideration of the levels of violence, criminalization, marginalization and discrimination experienced by indigenous people, or a myriad of other possible avenues of investigation. 68 ibid. at 146. 69 james bartleman, “the importance of truth telling in a just society” ((lecture presented at “preparing for the truth commission: sharing the truth about residential schools. a conference on truth and reconciliation as restorative justice”, university of calgary, 15 june 2007) [unpublished]. 70 indeed, some critics of the trc process view the concept of “reconciliation” as a way for the canadian government to appear to address an issue without actually addressing it. see roland chrisjohn and tanya wasacase, “half-truths and whole lies: rhetoric in the ‘apology’ and the truth and reconciliation commission” in gregory younging, jonathan dewar and michael degagné, eds. from truth to reconciliation: response, responsibility and renewal – canada’s truth and reconciliation journey (ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation, 2009) 217 and see taiaiake alfred, “restitution is the real pathway to justice for indigenous peoples” in younging, dewar and degagné, ibid., 179, at 184, for an assessment of canada as an “imperial enterprise … operating in the guise of a liberal democratic state [that] is, by design and culture, incapable of just and peaceful relations with indigenous peoples.” 71 marlene brant castellano, “renewing the relationship: a perspective on the impact of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples” in aboriginal rights coalition, blind spots supra note 15, 1, at 12. 13 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 truth-telling.72 he states that unlike most societies seeking to inaugurate a truth commission, canada is not emerging from a period of prolonged or significant violence that has left legal and governance institutions in disarray.73 nonetheless, even if canada does have certain advantages compared to other countries establishing truth commissions, it has some challenges ahead: “multiple violations of the human dignity of aboriginal peoples over generations and their relative powerlessness in the face of public institutions have created distrust that public dialogue can bring about change.”74 canada has a comparatively privileged opportunity to make considered decisions with respect to institutional design of mechanisms to address deep societal problems. it has a functioning parliament and justice system, a constitution that includes a charter of rights and freedoms, an independent judiciary, thousands of trained legal professionals, an active civil society and a rights-conscious culture. these factors can facilitate a process that is responsive to survivors of historical injustice. however, it was a legal settlement agreement that produced the trc in canada. survivors called for the truth commission after years of seeking redress through other legal mechanisms; a truth commission was not the government’s choice of how to proceed. 75 other established democracies that are faced with addressing historical injustices might glean from the canadian process that a truth commission process may have stronger prospects if it arises from a societal decision, rather than as a result of a settlement of litigation. the survivors sought a legal mechanism other than those that have been tried so far in canada to address the legacy of irs. in its mandate, the trc is designed to fulfill the goals of the parties. however, while the trc may fulfill some of the needs expressed by survivors for a reconciliation process, given the negligible involvement of the non-indigenous public, it is hard to say whether reconciliation on a broader societal level can be initiated. 72 eduardo gonzales, “residential schools: give truth a chance, canada” globe and mail (4 november 2008). gonzales is a senior associate with the international center for transitional justice, and has consulted for the trc. 73 jung, supra note 44, subtitles her 2009 article “transitional justice for indigenous people in a nontransitional society”. this assessment may not accord with perspectives of indigenous communities whose legal and governance institutions have been severely damaged by colonization and who may consider that a transition is underway. 74 castellano, “a holistic approach to reconciliation”, supra note 39, at 386. 75 the proposal for including a truth commission in the settlement agreement did not come from the government; it came from the survivors of the schools: rick mofina, “‘truth commission’ urged: hearings may satisfy victims of residential school abuse without assigning blame” the [saskatoon] star phoenix (6 june 2000) front page. 14 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 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(2001). gathering strength: the government of canada’s response to the final report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples. in aboriginal rights coalition, blind spots: 17 stanton: canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? published by scholarship@western, 2011 http://www.thestarphoenix.com/� an examination of the federal government's response to the report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples (p. 32-48). ottawa: aboriginal rights coalition. o'connor, p. (2000). squaring the circle: how canada is dealing with the legacy of its indian residential schools experiment. international journal of legal information, 28, 232. quatell v. attorney general of canada, 2006 bcsc 1840 stewart, p. (2001). federal government’s response to the royal commission on aboriginal peoples. in aboriginal rights coalition, blind spots: an examination of the federal government's response to the report of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples (p. 49). ottawa: aboriginal rights coalition. taiaiake, a. (2009). restitution is the real pathway to justice for indigenous peoples. in g. younging, j. dewar, & m. degagné (eds.), from truth to reconciliation: response, responsibility and renewal – canada’s truth and reconciliation journey (p. 179). ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. u.n. security council. report of the secretary-general on the rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies (s/2004/616). 18 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 2 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/2 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.2 the international indigenous policy journal august 2011 canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? kim stanton recommended citation canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? abstract keywords creative commons license canada's truth and reconciliation commission: settling the past? o legado de paulo freire para as políticas de currículo e para o trabalho docente, no brasil to cite this article please include all of the following details: butler, jesse k., ng-a-fook, nicholas,vaudrin-charette, julie, mcfaden, ferne (2015). living between truth and reconciliation: responsibilities, colonial institutions, and settler scholars transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tc i <access date> living between truth and reconciliation: responsibilities, colonial institutions, and settler scholars jesse k. butler1, nicholas ng-a-fook2, julie vaudrin-charette3, & ferne mcfadden4 university of ottawa, canada reconciliation must become a way of life. it will take many years to repair damaged trust and relationships in aboriginal communities and between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples. reconciliation not only requires apologies, reparations, the relearning of canada’s national history, and public commemoration, but also needs real social, political, and economic change. ongoing public education and dialogue are essential to reconciliation. governments, churches, educational institutions, and canadians from all walks of life are responsible for taking action on reconciliation in concrete ways, working collaboratively with aboriginal peoples. reconciliation begins with each and every one of us. (the truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015a, pp. 240-241) we are at that crossroads in our country, the one where we face the decision of whether we strive for true reconciliation or whether we remain a country in denial. there is no more room for the politics of divisiveness. now is the time where we must all come together as a nation not to just accept but begin to reconcile with what is our darkest stain. as justice sinclair so clearly pointed out in those days in ottawa, this is not just a first nations problem or issue. it is a canadian one. (joseph boyden, 2015, paragraph 23) [jesse] the university of ottawa, along with its surrounding affluent neighbourhood of sandy hill, is curtained on its three sides by rideaux—the rideau river (east), the rideau canal (west), and rideau street (north). the word “rideau” is from the french word for “curtain,” and is just one of many european words imposed onto this landscape by canada’s settler society. in ottawa, however, this one name seems to take on particular symbolic significance, suggesting all of the “curtains” we hang around ourselves as a settler society, hiding ourselves from seeing the colonized landscape we occupy. that these rideaux surround the university of ottawa seems particularly fitting, given this institution’s complex colonial history. (it was originally founded by the oblates, who also ran most of the catholic residential schools in canada, trc, 2015a, p. 52.) the situation, however, extends beyond this one institution. the name “rideau” hangs as a curtain over this entire colonial capital, disguising our ongoing presence on unceded algonquin territory. if you follow rideau street west from campus, over the rideau canal, it becomes wellington street, and runs past some of the central institutions that govern our settler state: parliament, the supreme court, and the butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 45 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci national archives. to the east, past the rideau river, rideau street turns into montreal road, running through the less affluent neighbourhood of vanier, where much of ottawa’s first nations, métis, and inuit population has taken up residence. in the midst of montreal road’ s decaying architecture, the wabano centre for aboriginal health, a beautiful new edifice of glass and stone, stands out as a major landmark, and a visual sign of indigenous resurgence in these territories. residing and working among these geographical grids of signification, what are our responsibilities as settler educators and researchers? as curriculum scholars, we are particularly aware of how this colonial history has manifested itself in our educational curricula, which have historically looked elsewhere (to europe or the united states) to define who we are here in canada (tomkins, 1981). in response to this history, cynthia chambers (1999) has challenged canadian curriculum scholars to write about “the particular places and regions where we live and work” (p. 147), a theme which has since been taken up numerous times by chambers (2003, 2008, 2012) and by others (blood, chambers, donald, hasebeludt, & big head, 2012, ng-a-fook, 2007, 2014). as settler scholars, therefore, our research activities should not be directed solely to our immediate context of settler cosmopolitanism— a context that we have artificially constructed over the landscape. instead, how do we begin to look beyond the curricular curtains to the pre-existing relational landscape, and its prior “natural context” that makes all of this possible (henderson, 2000)? we live among a complex topography of relations that are “inscribed in our theorizing, as either presence or absence, whether we want them there or not” (chambers, 1999, p. 147) . in the work we have undertaken here, we have attempted to take on this challenge. the complexity of ottawa’s colonial geography became particularly clear in the spring of 2015, when two conferences hosted at the university of ottawa’s faculty of education—the international association for the advancement of curriculum studies (iaacs) and the canadian society for the study of education (csse) —coincided with the ceremonies related to the release of the truth and reconciliation commission of canada’s (trc) final report on residential schooling. while both conferences made concerted efforts to create a central place for algonquin anishinàbeg voices, there was still a disconnect between these different events taking place in the same city. some of the scholars attending the conferences took the time to join the walk for reconciliation down wellington street, or to attend the final trc ceremonies, but to do so meant missing concurrent conference sessions. there are complex curricular issues here related to the coordination of a conference for local, provincial, national, or international communities of scholars. yet if we, as canadian educational researchers, cannot mobilize to engage with canada’s shameful history of “cultural genocide” perpetuated against indigenous peoples through state sponsored educational programs like the indian residential schooling system (trc, 2015a, p. 1), how can we expect the rest of the settler population to do so? four years ago in this same journal, smith, ng-a-fook, berry, and spence (2011) reflected on their various responsibilities to take up the history of residential schooling as settler researchers and educators. with the final release of the trc report this spring, now is a good time for us to revisit their concerns, as a new group of settler curriculum scholars teaching and learning within this colonial capital. our essay mirrors this previous publication in form and content. to do so, we present a series of reflective narrative snapshots (adapted from our presentations at the 2015 iaacs and csse conferences which were hosted at the university of ottawa). in that previous publication, ng-a-fook (2011) drew on the work of paulo freire to argue that these multiple perspectives on residential school history represented the “theoretical limit-situations associated with appropriating indigenous historical butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 46 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci knowledges” (p. 63). a limit-situation, according to freire (1970/2005), is a situation that brings us up against the limits of our current understanding and forces us to expand our awareness. in his words: people, as beings “in a situation,” find themselves rooted in temporal -spatial conditions which mark them and which they also mark. they will tend to reflect on their own “situationality” to the extent that they are challenged by it to act upon it. human beings are because they are in a situation. and they will be more the more they not only critically reflect upon their existence but critically act upon it. (p. 109) the trc’s report calls for settler scholars and educators to revisit their past, present, and future limit-situations. as julia emberley (2013) notes, the testimonies of residential school survivors collected by the trc are provoking a shift within eurocentric epistemologies. “[o]ne important aspect of this epistemi c shift,” she contends, “involves the recognition of a speaking subject that is situated in a field of multiple subjugated and nonsubjugated interdependencies” (p. 143). the perspectives we present, therefore, are not intended to embody the authoritative voice of a single (colonial) epistemology, but four situated responses to how the trc calls us forth as non-indigenous scholars to enact reconciliation in our research and our teaching. in what follows: 1. jesse presents an analysis of the inclusion (and marginalization) of indigenous perspectives in ontario’s civics curriculum, arguing that the continuing subjugation of indigenous to eurocentric perspectives indicates the need for more radical approaches to curricular decolonization. 2. julie shares her conversation with a team of settler educators in a quebec college context trying to indigenize their institution, and suggests the types of personal, collective, and institutional transformations that this work involves. 3. ferne presents findings from her interviews with teacher candidates completing a voluntary practicum in an indigenous community, and argues for more intentional inclusion of indigenous knowledges and teaching methods in teacher education. 4. nicholas addresses the different strategic ways in which his faculty of education is attempting to respond to the recommendations put forth by the association of canadian deans of education accord on indigenous education, the 13 principles, and trc calls for action. in presenting our situated perspectives on the trc, we demonstrate how we continue to come up against limit-situations in our inherited settler epistemologies, and how these call us forth—past the curtains that hide the colonized landscape—to re/envision our future participation with indigenous communities toward reconciliation. as the trc (2015a) states: “reconciliation begins with each and every one of us” (p. 241). and so we must begin. the marginalization of indigenous perspectives in the ontario curriculum [jesse] the final report of the trc (2015a) has confirmed what indigenous scholars have long argued: that indigenous peoples’ experiences of education in canada have been shaped by a distant and colonial government that assumes it knows what children need better than their own families. battiste (1998) calls this educational model “cognitive imperialism” (p. 17). as she describes: butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 47 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci this fragmented accumulation of knowledge builds on eurocentric strategies that maintain their knowledge is universal, that it derives from standards of good that are universally appropriate, that the ideas and ideals are so familiar they need not be questioned, and that all questions can be posed and resolved within it. (p. 21) the specific form of cognitive imperialism has changed, but the underlying logic continues. according to weenie (2008), it currently translates into the experience of being placed on the periphery of the curriculum. indigenous cultures are included, but in simplistic and tokenistic ways—what battiste (2011) calls an “add-and-stir” approach—that in no way disrupt the central eurocentric assumptions that govern our educational system (battiste, 2013, cherubini & hodson, 2008, donald, 2009). in this section, i explore some of these issues by comparing the inclusion of indigenous content in the current and previous versions of the grade 10 civics curriculum produced by the ontario ministry of education (ome, 2005, 2013). while such analyses are necessary across the curriculum, citizenship is a particularly problematic concept for indigenous students (deer, 2009), making civics an important place to start. in analyzing this curriculum as a document, i am not assuming that policy translates into classroom practice in a simplistic way. as redwing saunders and hill (2007) have argued: “although curriculum is structured in a rigid compartmentalized plan, good teachers integrate and find fluidity in their practice” (p. 1032). nonetheless, a number of educational researchers have pointed to the powerful effects of policy documents in general (ball, maguire, br aun, & hoskin, 2011, lankshear, 1998), and curriculum policy documents in particular (apple, 2004, bergen & mclean, 2014). these authors indicate that, although the analysis of curriculum policy documents cannot give a complete picture of the effects of a policy, such analysis still provides important insights into the range of possible responses that the policy constrains or leaves open. ontario’s curriculum policy is structured by broad “overall expectations” followed by “specific expectations” that break these down into greater detail. within the possibilities and limitations of such an outcomes-based approach, therefore, the 2013 ontario civics curriculum represents a clear effort to include more indigenous content. in the 2005 policy document, only 3 out of the 33 specific expectations make any kind of explicit reference to indigenous peoples, while the 2013 document has increased them to 12 out of the 37 specific expectations. this represents a certain degree of progress. nonetheless, this simple quantitative increase does not resolve the core qualitative problem of indigenous knowledges being consigned to the periphery. as the 2013 introduction states: “the expectations in these courses provide numerous opportunities for students to break through ster eotypes and to learn about various social, religious, and ethnocultural groups, including first nation, métis, and inuit people” (ome, 2013, p. 49). the word “opportunities” here performs a dual purpose, suggesting both possibility and contingency. none of the references to indigenous peoples in either document occur within the overall expectations, which are the core outcomes teachers are asked to make reference to when evaluating students’ work. furthermore, these references do not occur in the formal explication of the specific expectations. instead, they are made reference to in the curricular and pedagogical examples. indeed, the increased number of references in the 2013 document can largely be accounted for by the significant increase in the number of examples. at no point is there stated any necessity to teach these topics in the classroom. moreover, the references often work to further marginalize indigenous histories and ways of knowing. for example, several of the 2013 references are simply the inc lusion of butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 48 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci indigenous governments as one of the “levels” of government in canada, paralleling it with municipal governments as a “level” below the national and provincial. in this way, the civics curriculum fails to acknowledge indigenous government as a separate order, grounded in the nation-to-nation relationships established through treaties (henderson, 2013, turner, 2013). the overall effect is that indigenous perspectives are included in the curriculum, while simultaneously being pushed to the periphery. they are included only where they fit as a subcategory to what donald (2009) calls elsewhere the existing colonial frontier logics that structure the policy document. the marginalization of indigenous peoples, and of their respective epistemologies, is perhaps most apparent in the model of human development found in the preface to the 2013 document (see figure 1). this model is a variation of a first nations medicine wheel, modified to include different concentric circles—an inner circle of “self/spirit” and an outer circle of “context” (ome, 2013, p. 4). in separating “self” from “context” in this manner, the model continues to perpetuate the long history of imposing colonial concepts, such as individuality, onto our understandings of indigenous communities (smith, 1999, pp. 47-50). these additions impose a eurocentric way of thinking onto the medicine wheel, in which the different elements relate not through a relational totality but through an analytic hierarchy that subdivides the constituent elements. figure 1: human development model (source: ontario ministry of education, 2013, p. 4) this analytic subdivision is identified by bell (2013) as an area in which the ontario curriculum conflicts with indigenous models of education. as she explains: “in the ontario curriculum guidelines there is a breaking apart of concepts without relation to the whole which reflects the socio-cultural, historical, political time period of its writing” (p. 99). bell goes on to provide an anishinaabe model of the medicine wheel, which provides a productive contrast here (see figure 2). while neither “self” nor “context” are explicitly included in bell’s model, a careful reading suggests that both are present throughout it, but in a relational rather than an analytic form. “self” is not an isolated, autonomous entity lurking in between mind, body, heart, and spirit, but a dynamic result of their relational interaction. likewise, “context” is not a reality separate from and existing beyond the boundaries of self, but is dynamically related to mind, body, heart, and spirit—as self, society, and environment mutually constitute one another. where “context” in the curriculum document is implied to be inert and objective, the four directions here are explicitly relational, for the y are not merely a field within which the self can be placed, but are orientations a person always exists in butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 49 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci relation to. as castellano (2000) argues, “the medicine wheel is not a model of rigid categorization . . . rather, it is a model of balance” (p. 30). figure 2: the four directions (source: bell, 2013, p. 96) the problematic nature of the analytic model becomes clear in how it is taken up in the 2013 curriculum document. because the elements are analytically defined and autonomous, they are more easily isolated, and the writers of the 2013 document deemphasize context and emphasize self. the description that immediately precedes the figure frames how it is read: its components – the cognitive, emotional, physical, and social domains – are interrelated and independent, and all are subject to the influence of a person’s environment or context. at the centre is an “enduring (yet changing) core” – a sense of self, or spirit – that connects the different aspects of development and experience. (ome, 2013, p. 4) “context” here is de-emphasized through its placement in a subordinate clause, while “self” is emphasized through a lengthier description and the hierarchically-loaded introductory phrase “at the centre.” furthermore, the 2013 document goes on to provide decidedly eurocentric descriptions of the four elements of the medicine wheel, placing them at the service of an autonomous individualistic “self.” for instance, “social development” – which by most definitions would be primarily concerned with rel ationships – is described with the following examples: “self-development (self-concept, self-efficacy, self-esteem); identity formation (gender identity, social group identity, spiritual identity); relationships (peer, family, romantic)” (p. 4). here the primary examples of “social development” are in fact forms of self-relation, with relationships to others only mentioned as an afterthought. this appropriation of the medicine wheel in order to advance a eurocentric model of the autonomous and individual self is typical of the way indigenous cultures are used while also being kept to the periphery of the ontario curriculum. we do not have time here to explore this in more detail, but we hope that we have given a glimpse of the complex limitsituations we must come up against if we want to truly advance reconciliation in our curriculum. when the trc (2015a) calls for “developing culturally appropriate curricula” as one aspect of a reformed indigenous education policy (p. 197), the task required of us is far greater than the “add-and-stir” approach of including more tokenistic references within our existing curricula (battiste, 2011). rather we must rethink the symbolic bases of meaning that butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 50 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci define what it means to be a “citizen” in our society, and what alterna te cultural and educational trajectories might enable a student to enter into these conversations. in an article on decolonizing canadian citizenship, woons (2013) argues: many indigenous peoples reject participating in shared institutions largely for symbolic reasons. they may feel their participation could be interpreted as legitimizing institutions that historically marginalized them. moreover, the symbolism associated with canadian institutions can seem, from an indigenous perspective, as foreign or at least as irrelevant as dutch, american, or indonesian institutions. as mentioned previously, the symbolism within canadian institutions makes the situation worse because it currently misrepresents indigenous peoples. (p. 202) woons goes on to suggest that citizenship should be understood not as a shared monolithic identity, but a common sense of belonging, grounded in mutual respect. as the preceding analysis suggests, such respect for multiplicity is difficult to achieve in a standardized and state-controlled curriculum. rather, as various scholars have contended (e.g., donald, glanfield, & sterenberg, 2011, 2012, simpson, 2014), it will likely require us to reform our traditional top-down approach to curriculum, in favour of an approach more responsive to students’ local communities and relationships with their environments. indigenizing curriculum in quebec’s colleges [julie] as part of my current doctoral research, and as a pedagogical advisor at a college in quebec, i have been documenting the emerging relationships between settler educators and indigenous people, land, language, culture. i draw on aoksisowaato’op (blood et al., 2012), a blackfoot concept used in curriculum studies, which reminds us of “the ethical importance of visiting a place as an act of ethical renewal that is life-giving and lifesustaining, both to the place and to ourselves” (p.48). in my curricular work with colleagues, we seek to understand what it means for settler scholars in quebec to develop ethical relational pedagogy in our particular time and place. our initial step, as a team of teachers from various disciplines —social sciences, arts, multimedia, etc.—was an attempt at demarginalizing our positionality as social justice educators. a pedagogical process emerged, driven by an intentionality of engagement (battiste, 2013, gorski, 2008). among us, some had a continuous, heart-felt commitment towards indigenizing the curriculum, while others wanted to know where to begin. given that there are very few indigenous students at our college, our endeavour provoked discussions on the in-between spaces of marginalization, relational pedagogy and processes of reconciliation. we wanted to reaffirm within the college that we saw first nations, métis, inuit communities, culture, and history, as a full component of what canadian education should look like (chambers, 2008, battiste, 2010). second, i observed that despite a strong intentionality towards reconciliation, most of the teachers on the team felt they did not know enough about first nations, métis and inuit peoples to bring indigenous content to their students. a primary concern was on accuracy of facts and approaches in delivering appropriate class-content to their students, meeting their disciplinary criteria. we wanted to play a role in bringing indigenous perspectives within our institution, without making cultural faux-pas. together, we imagined a multidisciplinary initiative for the following academic year, to bring more teachers on board by providing more information on/with indigenous peoples and perspectives in their curriculum. butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 51 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci our intention was not to perpetuate the symbolic violences of colonialism. yet, a pedagogical approach focusing on content might present a way around the tricky question of developing relationships with the specific anishnaabe nation, whose land our college occupies. in fact, wouldn’t it be easier to indigenize curriculum through a content-based, disciplinary approach? as tuck & gaztambide-fernandez (2013) indicate, these are the limitsituations of a multiculturalist paradigm: when being inclusive, whitestream curriculum begins to absorb and contain, consuming and erasing the other, by always-already positioning the accumulated knowledge as other to, less refined, more subjective and less reliable than the whitestream. the story is just a better story when there are more white people in it. (p. 82) to go beyond such narratives, we had to move into a different pedagogical space, where teachers and students could relate, in person, with members of the anishinàbeg nation. as a team, we envisioned this shift from content-based to relational pedagogy in our everyday practices. tuning into the trc’s principles of reconciliation (2015b, p.4), we reached out to an elder to assist us with our planning process. we invited elders to share stories with our students of the intergenerational impacts of residential schools, language, and broken treaties. these workshops sought to trigger students’ curiosity, reflection and desire to foster further relationships between our nations. students were welcomed to anishinàbeg language through an opening prayer song. some students were surprised by the opening prayer and practices, and wondered why these were permitted within our secular context. our team of educators experienced the limit-situations of creating cultural divides within an intercultural paradigm. this resulted in a moment where the risk of reinforcing stereotypes, or creating further sense of “us” and “them,” needed to be deconstructed. the focus on otherness needed to be transformed toward an inter-cultural relational space (pretceille, 2013, emongo & white, 2014). such divisive politics can occur on multiple layers: in our institutional positionality as “marginalized educators” engaged in social justice, in our perceptions of teaching and learning, in our hesitations and errands in finding ways to relate, in the students’ reactions to languages and cultural practices, in the very boundaries we create within ourselves. students, and teachers, within and beyond our team, needed to visit this zone of discomfort in order to realize that they were hearing for the first time the language that has been spoken across this land since time immemorial. so, how can we move beyond divisive politics in our pedagogy of reconciliation? aoksisowaato’p brought a different dimension to our teaching. we were attempting to reconcile the relational dimensions of our curriculum and pedagogy. we strove to anchor our experience within the various places we inhabit—as program teams, as an institution, and with anishinàbeg people in urban and on-reserve situations. entering into a second interdisciplinary project, we started to deconstruct our colonial discourse, questioning our identity as the descendants of settlers, immigrants, or first peoples, and reconstructing our pedagogy around relationships between teachers, with students, within our institutions and ourselves. in this fragile, third limit-situation, a shift of paradigm occurred where we became aware of the existing institutional boundaries that in turn create divisive forces, and recognized that these boundaries have shaped our experiences in becoming. we continue to work on going beyond without erasing them. our pedagogies are now enriched by the perspectives and relations established within and outside our institution—including the kitigan zibi kikinamadinan school. elders, members of the educational board, and students butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 52 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci are present in creating collective dialogical spaces in which a conversation on major social justice issues such as reconciliation can begin at our post-secondary institution. as elder gilbert whiteduck offered a closing prayer at the iaacs conference, i felt a tension between proximity to an indigenous voice and the cultural divide created through genocide of language and culture. my inner-voice, as a settler researcher, with all its good intentions, becomes frail. my certitudes, as a curriculum advisor, evaporate: i realise that what i haven’t learned is more crucial to my individual becoming within a collecti ve than any past experiences. i am still learning a key component, which is to be humbled, as a tiny part of a much larger ecosystem of reconciliation. in fact, the perpetuation of the symbolic violence of discourse still lives within us, in our curriculum, in our pedagogies, and sometimes in our attempts to change. as we accept to be transformed by the people on whose land we sit, we do it with the radical hope that it brings all of us closer to reconciliation. miigwetch… pre-service teachers, curriculum, and indigenous pedagogies [ferne] scholars working in the area of aboriginal education continue to stress the lack of knowledge non-indigenous teachers have in terms of the intergenerational impacts of colonizing the indigenous territories some of us now call canada (dion, 2007, kanu, 2007, 2011, maciver, 2012). consequently, indigenous scholars and communities are calling for teacher education programs to be more proactive in addressing the absence of historical and epistemological knowledge with teacher candidates before they transition to their future classrooms. during an interview, justice sinclair reminded us that: part of the misunderstanding that we see so prevalent in canadian society is young adults, and adults in positions of leadership, constantly demonstrate a total lack of understanding and misunderstanding about who aboriginal people are … and what non-aboriginal society has contributed and done to aboriginal people that has caused the situation to be what it is in aboriginal canada. (quoted in chiose, 2015, paragraph 4) as a recent graduate of a canadian bachelor of education program, coming to terms with my limit-situations as a non-indigenous teacher teaching within this contemporary context, i have been reflecting on my experiences worki ng with and learning from the kitigan zibi anishinabeg algonquin community. now during my graduate studies, i have spoken with non-indigenous student teachers who have also had the same community servicelearning opportunities to teach and learn from first nations teachers at the kitigan zibi kikinamadinan school. what follows in this section, are narrative snapshots of the limitsituations student teachers encountered through teaching at a first nations band council administered elementary school. colonial schooling: reflections entering the program, student teachers5 had a similar (lack of) experience and understanding of indigenous communities who live across the territories that we call canada. student teachers talked about the lack of representation in their lived experiences with the ontario curriculum. some student teachers acknowledge that there were indigenous students in their classes. however, their histories and cultures were either absent or at the periphery of butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 53 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci the school curriculum (weenie, 2008). when included, they encountered the ‘stereotypical’ arts and crafts projects often taught as they approached the “thanksgiving holiday,” or in history courses where they learned about the fur trade and positive impacts of settler -first nations relationships. one student teacher, nicole, mentioned knowing that “we were on their land,” whereas another, sam, was aware that there are hidden things we don’t like to talk about as they may tarnish the canada’s historical “peacemaking” image. their lived experiences echoed within my memories of learning about the first peoples of canada. in grade 3 we did a two-week unit on the mi’kmaq of eastern canada. our teachers gave us booklets to fill out. we watched movies and read small stories. we moved unsupervised through small group stations. later, during a grade 10 school trip to the local mi’kmaq reserve i learned that this first nations community was not only a historical narrative. indeed, they still existed! taking our experiences as an example, it would s eem our bachelor of education program would have quite a ways to go in preparing us to teach indigenous histories and perspectives in our future classrooms. for the most part, such epistemologies of ignorance formed an important limit-situation for my lived experiences within the teacher education program at the university of ottawa. provoking the present absence of indigenous histories within teacher education programs during my research, several teacher candidates expressed the possibilities and limitsituations of how well the bachelor of education prepared them to redress indigenous and non-indigenous relations within their future classrooms. and yet, the overall sentiment for most teacher candidates remained that they were unprepared to take up indige nous histories and ways of knowing within the curriculum-as-planned, -implemented, and -lived with students (aoki, 1986/2004). consequently, teacher candidates frequently called for a compulsory course on indigenous histories, knowledges, and perspectives. moreover, the student teachers also wished there were more curricular and pedagogical examples throughout the program of how to bring indigenous histories, cultures, and ways of knowing into their classrooms. instead, during their schooling the curriculum placed more emphasis on the social and economic deficits of first nations communities. nicole was grateful for the learning that happened during her community service learning teaching placement at the kitigan zibi school. she did not feel the bachelor of education really prepared her for how to bring first nations into her future classes. during our interview, she stated: i feel like because it’s a concept that not everybody still to this day knows really enough about so they are doing a great job at educating us on what happened and how aboriginal students feel on and off reserves, like we do have some perspective and they’ve been really focusing on that but actually putting it into practice in a classroom is a different thing. students are sensitive ri ght and how do you expose the truth without breaking too many hearts. (nicole, april 2015) she was not alone in this thinking. sam reflected: i think the hands on learning at the reserve, at kitigan zibi, did me more a favour than learning in the classroom could. even in the program, in the classrooms i don’t think it came up all that much. we talk about socially, as the curriculum being eurocentric, it still leaves out first nations perspectives. (sam, april 2015) butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 54 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci an attitude of ‘not my issue, i don’t have to deal with it’ was something rebecca identified as a recurring theme in her classes when the topic of indigenous education came up. she felt the program should have focused on getting: people to start looking at it as a relationship, where it doesn’t matter if you interact with first nations people every day or never meet an aboriginal person in your life. you are part of canadian history that has since inception intertwined with aboriginal communities and it’s your responsibility as a citizen to know what happened in history and educate others so it doesn’t happen again. (rebecca, april 2015) all three of these teacher candidates participated in an additional two week teaching practicum at the kikinamadinan school. each candidate expressed that the experience at kitigan zibi was a significant influence in their preparation to teach future canadian children about indigenous histories and ways of knowing. during their teaching placement at kikinamadinan school, the candidates had opportunities to see first nation educators teaching and learning with kitigan zibi students. the teacher candidates stressed the importance of being able to experience a first nations reserve that challenged the negative representations that are so prevalent in the media. while not necessarily leaving them prepared to teach about first nations, the experience left them more willing to try, more confident to find resources to bring into the classroom, and more aware of what the intergenerational issues even are. reflecting on her learning, nicole talked about feeling as though her learning happened fluidly, or unconsciously, with ideas and concepts becoming part of her internal framework rather than things she can reference explicitly. while she doesn’t yet feel entirely prepared to bring first nations into her future classrooms, she does credit her experiences within the kitigan zibi community for enhancing her future capacity to address their absent histories in the classroom. peter—one of the few male student teachers participating in the larger project—credits having visited and seen the reserve for making him more at ease to teach a unit on first nations histories and perspectives. he tells us, “you can elaborate more having been there and worked with the people and havi ng been part of their lives.” reflecting on the common unease felt by several teacher candidates in terms of how they will incorporate indigenous perspectives and history in their classrooms in accurate and respectful ways, kevin commented that, “it just comes down to, you know, having humility. you’ve got to be humble about things. you can’t be afraid to try things or embarrassed or whatever. you can learn from your mistakes and improve upon them.” in their final report, the trc recommends for canada to “provide necessary funding to post-secondary institutions to educate teachers on how to integrate indigenous knowledge and teaching methods in classrooms” (2015, p. 294). focusing on the role of universities, justice sinclair said during the closing trc events: the commission is greatly concerned over the fact that universities continue to graduate people into important professional positions who don’t have an understanding, education, and respect of who aboriginal people are and what they have to contribute in those areas. (quoted in chiose, 2015, paragraph 10) perhaps what we can take from experiences such as those i’ve shared here is that it’s time for universities, in preparing new professionals, including in the field of education, to find new ways of having them learn about historical and contemporary issues and relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous canadians. my research suggests that butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 55 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci community service-learning projects with indigenous communities can address an important curricular absence that continues to exist within the teacher education program at the university of ottawa. as bell (2011) has suggested, the best way for universities to prepare teachers on how to integrate indigenous knowledge and teaching methods, and provide them with an understanding and respect of who indigenous people are, may be to invite indigenous educators or community members to do the teaching. visiting places as re-visioning like relatives, places must be fed and cared for. like family and old friends, plac es are visited and in return they care for us, they may gift us with dreams and answers to our prayers. stay awhile; sit down; tell stories; eat and drink and offer something to those who came before, those who shaped this landscape and who were shaped by it; those who made our precious and precarious life possible. (chambers, 2006, p. 34) [nicholas] many people travel to ottawa each year, the capital of canada. they take tours of parliament hill, the byward market, rideau canal, ottawa river, and our national museums. prior to our gathering at the 5th triennial international association for the advancement of curriculum studies conference, we invited fellow curriculum scholars to visit and take refuge within our capital institution while sharing their research, stories, performances, and lived experiences. our gathering took place within the institutional walls of a colonial capital, which sits at the base of the ottawa valley and overlooks the confluences and tributaries of the kichi sibi (ottawa river) that meander across and beyond the traditional territories of the anishinàbeg who have lived upon this landscape since time immemorial. to acknowledge our respect to the anishinàbeg people who came before us and shaped this landscape, some of us travelled to the kitigan zibi reserve where we ate, drank, and shared stories with elders, school administrators, and teachers at their community centre and the kikinamadinan school. elders like gilbert whiteduck, a former chief, discussed what has made and makes their precarious lives possible both on and off their reserve. here “visiting,” as chambers (2006) makes clear, “is a form of renewal, a way of renewing and recreating people, places and beings, and their relationships to one another ” (p. 35). how might we then revisit the stories of truth and reconciliation inside and outside the contexts of public education as a way of renewing and recreating our relationships with one another? during his welcoming as our opening iaacs keynote address, gilbert whiteduck reminded us that the cosmological, emotional, intellectual, physical, and spiritual topographies of this landscape have provided, and continue to provide, a place, a gift, for us to meet and revisit the contested histories of, and contemporary relations betwe en our peoples. the anishinàbeg, he stressed that night, share a language, a gift from the creator, which established their first relationships with turtle island since time immemorial. he discussed the intergenerational violence that his community has experienced and continues to experience at the hands of colonial corporate surveyors, politicians, police, and educational bureaucrats. gilbert whiteduck stressed that what we need now to move forward during these times of truth and reconciliation is not another call for small steps, but rather a radical step forward that re-en/visions our future relations as sovereign indigenous and non-indigenous peoples. in 2007, several indian residential school survivors won a class action settlement agreement worth an estimated 2 billion dollars. the canadian government officially butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 56 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci responded a year later with a public state apology for the violent intergenerational impacts of residential schooling. soon after, the truth and reconciliation commission travelled across canada, listening to the stories of survivors, and facilitating various public commemorative events for both indigenous and non-indigenous communities6. often forgotten within this recent sequence of events, however, is that first nation, métis and inuit communities and their leaders had been petitioning the canadian government and its people to acknowledge their constitutional treaty obligations for several decades prior to the 2008 apology. such obligations included land settlements, educational funding, and judicial and political recognition of first nations sovereignty as part of canada’s constitutional act—what henderson (2013) has termed constitutional reconciliation. despite this momentum, opportunities to study the complexities of truth and reconciliation in terms of our historical and ongoing treaty obligations are for the most part absent from our school curriculum in ontario and from the public memory of a settler nation-state (see ng-a-fook and milne, 2014). and yet, although we now have several policies in place, our public educational institutions across canada are in still caught up in the processes of implementing small steps in response to the release of the truth and reconciliation commission’s final report (see http://www.trc.ca). here within the faculty of education at the university of ottawa, we are now caught between the processes of acknowledging truth and re-visioning indigenous and nonindigenous relations as reconciliation. on the one hand, we are attempting in collaboration with organizations like project of the heart and the kitigan zibi educational sector to develop, implement, and live curriculum that addresses the intergenerational impacts of the indian residential schooling (irs) system within our teacher education program (see www.projectofheart.ca). on the other, and as we look toward the future, we have established a first nations, métis, and inuit (fmni) advisory committee comprised of different local indigenous and non-indigenous educational stakeholders, kitigan zibi elders, school administrators and teachers, university of ottawa professors, graduate students, and teacher candidates. one of the mandates of the fmni advisory committee seeks to strengthen the consultative protocols between local first nations, métis, and inuit communities and the professors who are developing and implementing curriculum within our teacher education program. elders stressed that our professors and administrators need to visit the kitigan zibi community and places that inform their teachings more frequently. in response, we facilitated a one-day retreat for all of our professors prior to the commencement of this year’s teacher education program. and yet, much more work toward re-visioning and renewing our relations still needs to be done. the fmni advisory committee has sought to develop various ways in which they can leverage existing policy documents like the association of canadian deans of education (acde) accord on indigenous education to challenge how: the processes of colonization have either outlawed or suppressed indigenous knowledge systems, especially language and culture, and have contributed significantly to the low levels of educational attainment and high r ates of social issues such as suicide, incarceration, unemployment, and family or community separation. (acde, 2010, p. 2) our teacher education program has responded to such calls to action by making first nations, inuit and métis education: historical experiences and contemporary perspectives (ped 3138) a mandatory course for all incoming 2016-2017 candidates. when compared to http://www.trc.ca/ http://www.projectofheart.ca/ butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 57 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci some of the other universities across canada this is a small, and long overdue, step. such programmatic re-visioning responds to the trc’s (2015c) call to action on education for reconciliation: we call upon the federal, provincial, and territorial governments, in consultation and collaboration with survivors, aboriginal peoples, and educators, to: i. make age appropriate curriculum on residential schools, treaties, and aboriginal peoples’ historical and contemporary contributions to canada a mandatory education requirement for kindergarten to grade twelve students. ii. provide the necessary funding to post-secondary institutions to educate teachers on how to integrate indigenous knowledge and teaching methods into classrooms. (p. 7) at our fmni advisory committee meetings we are now discussing the content, developing protocols for elders, and establishing the necessary expertise of course instructors. to facilitate such re-visioning and renewal, our program like the acde accord on indigenous education is now committed toward:  supporting a socially just society for indigenous peoples;  reflecting a respectful, collaborative, and consultative process with indigenous and nonindigenous knowledge holders;  promoting multiple partnerships among educational and indigenous communities; and  valuing the diversity of indigenous knowledges and ways of knowing and learning. (p. 5) and yet, the biggest obstacle that continues to create limit-situations for re-visioning and implementing the trc calls to action is often the lack of “know how” or “radical leap of faith” within our faculty of education and local school boards. for example we do not hav e any elders or indigenous scholars who are doing research or teaching as regular professors within our faculty. in turn, we are limited by the epistemological and ontological limitsituations that inform our worldviews as non-indigenous educators. therefore another small step forward for our faculty and others will be a commitment toward hiring the necessary professional expertise—either as regular professors or as consultants—who can help us develop, implement, and sustain such re-visioning toward renewal and reconciliation. our newly elected federal government has revised its policies and principles toward indigenous peoples who have inhabited turtle island since time immemorial. at the university of ottawa there is an institutional and political commitment toward enacting policies of reconciliation that move beyond pedagogical and curricular strategies that promote historical and cultural awareness. we are calling for teacher educators, teachers, and teacher candidates to become political actors, engaged citizens, within each of their particular spheres of influence. on june 29 2015, universities across canada committed to 13 different principles, which “acknowledge the unique needs of indigenous communities across canada and their goals of autonomy and self-determination” (see http://sass.uottawa.ca/en/aboriginal/principles). much like the calls to action and accord on indigenous education these principles asks universities to:  recognize the importance of indigenization of curricula through responsive a cademic programming, support programs, orientations, and pedagogies; butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 58 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci  recognize the importance of providing greater exposure and knowledge for nonindigenous students on the realities, histories, cultures and beliefs of indigenous people in canada; and  recognize the importance of fostering intercultural engagement among indigenous and non-indigenous students, faculty and staff. (see http://sass.uottawa.ca/en/aboriginal/principles) in our research, personal, and professional lives as non-indigenous canadian teachers and citizens jesse, julie, ferne, and myself are committed toward such principles. we continue to challenge and provoke policymakers toward re-visioning the provincial school curricula. we are collaborating with the kitigan zibi education sector and other educational stakeholders to revisit the present absence of indigenous histories, knowledges, and perspectives within our institutions and respective curricula. in light of these prop osed principles, our radical hope is that such small steps back, and forward, will create a place for us to visit, share stories, eat, drink, listen, and renew our relations as indigenous and nonindigenous canadians during such times of reconciliation. concluding between truth and reconciliation [jesse & julie] for us, as settler scholars and educators, a first step in the process of reconciliation is an acknowledgement of the land, and it’s meaning for the people that have been living across these territories since times immemorial. as we have suggested in various ways through our conference presentations at iaacs and csse, and through the resultant reflections we present here, this acknowledgement must be more than a formality. we must tear back the curricular curtains of colonialism and engage in building sustained and meaningful relationships with local indigenous communities, and with the landscape that sustains all of us. in the words of the trc (2015a): together, canadians must do more than talk about reconciliation; we must learn how to practise reconciliation in our everyday lives—within ourselves and our families, and in our communities, governments, places of worship, schools, and workplaces. to do so constructively, canadians must remain committed to the ongoing work of establishing and maintaining respectful relationships. (p. 21) from our perspectives and lived experiences, we have suggested here that this involves encountering the limit-situations of our monolithic eurocentric epistemologies, and reimagining our curriculum development, teacher education, and professional development within local and relational contexts. in this spirit, allow us to pull back the curtains one more time to look upon the landscape of ottawa, where iaacs and csse took place alongside the trc’s closing ceremonies on unceded algonquin land. we can follow the rideau river or the rideau canal north to where they empty into the ottawa river. at the centre of what is now called the national capital region, the chaudière falls are an ancient sacred site for the anishinaabe nation. for much of the last century, however, the falls have been dammed and closed off for industrial purposes (payne, 2015). the anishinaabe have maintained their claim to the area, and the late elder william commanda envisioned this site as a space for reconciliation. as described by macdougall (2014): http://sass.uottawa.ca/en/aboriginal/principles butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 59 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci the vision for the site that commanda named “asinabka”, an anishinaabe word meaning “place of glare rock,” includes the creation of indigenous and peace centres on the downstream victoria island and the undamming of the falls, along with full public parkland on the two adjacent islands in question. the two-fold vision is based on “healing, strengthening and uniting all aboriginal peoples” and “sharing indigenous values and culture with all others.” (p.1) recently, a condominium development plan—named “zibi” from the anishnaabe word for “river” —has been put forward with the intent to build a “one of a kind world-class community” on the site, while recognizing its situation on unceded algonquin land. although the plan includes stated intentions for working “together with the algonquin-anishinabe people to raise public awareness of anishinabe culture and forge opportunities for mutually beneficial social and economic collaboration” (windmill developments, 2015, para. 3), including the collaboration of various members of the anishinàbeg nation, it has met many layers of internal and external opposition. the famous first nations architect douglas cardinal has been a vocal opponent of the plan, advocating a return to william commanda’s vision for the region (payne, 2015). meanwhile, kirby whiteduck, chief of pikwàkanagàn first nation, has defended the plan as a practical step toward reconciliation: to see zibi as simply a greedy condo project, a meagre job generator or a dubious financial transaction is to miss the bigger, more positive story of reconciliation. working in partnership with the private sector is the only option that can deliver true and lasting benefits to current and future generations. (whiteduck, 2015, para. 13) should sacred land become prime real-estate, even with cultural and economic accommodations? this question has resulted in heated debate, with various algonquin communities in the region taking both sides (payne, 2015). we are certainly not in a position to answer this complex question here, particularly given whiteduck’s (2015) warning against non-indigenous interference undermining the selfdetermination of the algonquin people. we raise this issue, however, as yet another example of the complexity of the landscape within which we are operating. the site of the contentious debate over the zibi development is a short walk from the delta ottawa, where the trc held its closing ceremonies. it is not much farther to the university of ottawa, where we hosted iaacs and csse, and attempted to engage with reconciliation—though often in very abstract ways. yet it is precisely in such practical questions of sovereignty over land and resources that ethereal concepts like decolonization and reconciliation become meaningful (tuck & yang, 2012, turner, 2013). this, in turn, points us back to the long road ahead of us if we truly want to pursue reconciliation. as the epigraphs from the trc and joseph boyden at the beginning of this paper suggest, as a nation we currently find ourselves in between truth and reconciliation. thanks in a large part to the work of the trc, we are finally beginning to recognize the magnitude of the harm we have done. yet there is a great distance between knowing this and making it right. as researchers and educators, this work calls us beyond theoretical engagement, toward building and sustaining relationships with indigenous communities. it also calls us, following cynthia chambers, toward genuine engagement with the landscape that underlies and sustains our colonial institutions—with its complex past and with its uncertain future. butler, ng-a-fook, vaudrin-charette and mcfadden. living between truth and reconciliation 60 transnational curriculum inquiry 12 (2) 2015 http://nitinat.library.ubc.ca/ojs/index.php/tci notes 1 jessekbutler@gmail.com 2nngafook@uottawa.ca 3jvaudrincharette@gmail.com 4 fernemcfadden@gmail.com 5 all names used to reference the student teachers have been changed. 6 to see a timeline on the establishment of the indian residential schooling system and ensuing truth and reconciliation commission consult the following website: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/a-timeline-of-residential-schools-the-truth-and-reconciliationcommission-1.724434. references aoki, t. t. 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(2013). curriculum, replacement, and settler futurity. journal of curriculum theorizing, 29(1), 72-89. tuck, e., & yang, k. w. (2012). decolonization is not a metaphor. decolonization: indigeneity, education & society, 1(1), 1-40. turner, d. (2013). on the idea of reconciliation in contemporary aboriginal politics. in j. henderson & p. wakeham (eds.), reconciling canada: critical perspectives on the culture of redress (pp. 100-114). toronto, on: university of toronto press. weenie, a. (2008). curricular theorizing from the periphery. curriculum inquiry, 38(5), 545557. whiteduck, k. (2015, august 14). kirby whiteduck: the algonquin people don’t need to be saved from the zibi project. the ottawa citizen. retrieved from: http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/kirby-whiteduck-the-algonquin-people-dontneed-to-be-saved-from-the-zibi-project windmill developments (2015). zibi is more than just a name. retrieved from: http://www.zibi.ca/project/vision-and-plan/ woons, m. (2014). decolonizing canadian citizenship: shared belonging, not shared identity. settler colonial studies, 4(2), 192-208. submitted: december, 15th, 2015. approved: december, 29 th , 2015. http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/2015/findings/exec_summary_2015_05_31_web_o.pdf http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/2015/findings/exec_summary_2015_05_31_web_o.pdf http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/2015/findings/principles_2015_05_31_web_o.pdf http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/2015/findings/principles_2015_05_31_web_o.pdf http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/2015/findings/calls_to_action_english2.pdf http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/2015/findings/calls_to_action_english2.pdf http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/kirby-whiteduck-the-algonquin-people-dont-need-to-be-saved-from-the-zibi-project http://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/kirby-whiteduck-the-algonquin-people-dont-need-to-be-saved-from-the-zibi-project http://www.zibi.ca/project/vision-and-plan/ analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 79 the clifford/james debate richard hall theoretic philosophy knows no passion save the passion for truth, has no fear save the fear of error, cherishes no hope save the hope of theoretic success. --josiah royce evidentialism, a doctrine of epistemic justification stipulating that a belief is warranted if and only if it is supported by evidence, is a central tenet of anglo-american empiricism particularly in its form as logical empiricism or positivism. advocated by locke and hume, it is found early on in this tradition. perhaps the most impassioned advocate of evidentialism is the english mathematician and philosopher, william k. clifford, who in his “the ethics of belief” gave this doctrine a moral twist by declaring uncompromisingly that to believe anything on insufficient evidence is not merely imprudent or foolish, but morally wrong no less. clifford is perhaps remembered today outside of mathematical circles for william james’ riposte to him in the “will to believe.” james contended that we are not in the wrong to believe things without sufficient evidence; indeed, we have the right, no less, in certain cases so to believe. james’ contention is based on his exposure of an unacknowledged bias behind clifford’s stricture against believing on insufficient evidence, namely, the fear of error. however, james appeals to another bias, no less legitimate than the fear of error, which justifies believing on insufficient evidence, namely, the hope of truth. in what follows i hope to show that, though it may not be initially apparent, james is actually closer to clifford’s views than one might suppose. both are pragmatists (clifford in spirit if not in name), and james no less than clifford is committed to the empiricist principle of verification. james, moreover, concedes that clifford’s epistemological strictures should be observed in assessing scientific beliefs, but makes a qualified exception for moral and religious beliefs. james, i think, does not so much refute clifford’s evidentialism—much of which he accepts—as significantly qualify and even expand upon it. i shall begin by explaining why clifford holds such a strong evidentialist view, and then go on to consider james’ response. this is followed by a consideration of their agreements and differences, and finally by an assessment of the merits of james’s response. clifford begins with a parable of a ship-owner who is about to send a ship to sea. he cannot be absolutely sure of the ship’s seaworthiness. it is an old ship, not originally well built, and having undergone many repairs. he could wait to have the ship thoroughly overhauled and refitted, but at great expense. he nevertheless suppresses his doubts; after all, the ship had weathered many voyages, and in rough seas, safely arriving back in port. he sends the ship on her way. the ship sinks and all on board drown. the ship-owner is blamable, avers clifford, “because he had no right to believe on such evidence as was before him.” his belief in the vessel’s seaworthiness was ill gotten since “he had acquired his belief not by honestly earning it in patient investigation, but by stifling his doubts.” even had the voyage been successful, the ship-owner would still not escape censure because he acted on a belief with insufficient evidence. it is not the belief itself, or the baneful consequences of the action ensuing from it, which confers moral blame on its holder, but the inadequacy of the evidence for the belief. hence, clifford’s uncompromising dictum: “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for any one, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence.” further, “if a man, holding a belief which he was taught in childhood or persuaded of analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 80 afterwards, keeps down and pushes away any doubts which arise about it in his mind,” then, admonishes clifford, “the life of that man is one long sin against mankind.”1 holding a belief is not just a cognitive matter, but is essentially a deeply moral one. today, unfortunately, we can update clifford’s fictional parable with actual historical events from our recent past such as the first space-shuttle disaster, the oil spill in the gulf of mexico, and the mining accidents in west virginia. in all these cases where avoidable negligence was found there were men whose thought processes may have resembled the ship-owner’s. but what exactly is morally wrong about believing on insufficient evidence? clifford explains that beliefs are not wholly private, innocuous, inconsequential, and ephemeral mental states. they are incipient actions, as acorns are incipient oaks. any belief, however seemingly trivial, has the potential of issuing in behavior—if not immediately, then in the future. beliefs can be sundered from their corollary actions only in theory. “he who truly believes that which prompts him to an action,” says clifford with a biblical flourish, “has looked upon the action to lust after it, he has committed it already in his heart.” like landmines, beliefs may remain dormant for years only later to explode into action with the right stimulus. “if a belief is not realised immediately in open deeds, it is stored up for the guidance of the future.”2 clifford, moreover, notes that a belief is efficacious in ways other than being productive of behavior. it is psychologically efficacious at the personal level insofar as it ineluctably enters into relations with other beliefs we hold, reinforcing or weakening them, thereby helping form a composite of belief. a belief, according to clifford, goes to make a part of that aggregate of beliefs which is the link between sensation and action at every moment of all our lives, and which is so organized and compacted together that no part of it can be isolated from the rest, but every new addition modifies the structure of the whole. no real belief, however trifling and fragmentary it may seem, is ever truly insignificant; it prepares us to receive more of its like, confirms those which resembled it before, and weakens others; and so gradually it lays a stealthy train in our inmost thoughts, which may some day explode into overt action, and leave its stamp upon our character forever. yet a belief is sociologically efficacious at the social level. a belief, though it may be possessed by us as individuals, is not our private possession but something held in the public trust. our beliefs emerge from a matrix of belief built up from the larger culture of which we are parts, and they in turn react upon it. clifford evinces here a fine sense of the sociology of belief: and no one man’s belief is in any case a private matter which concerns himself alone. our lives are guided by that general conception of the course of things which has been created by society for social purposes. our words, our phrases, our forms and processes and modes of thought, are common property, fashioned and perfected from age to age; an heirloom which every succeeding generation inherits as a precious deposit and a sacred trust to be handed on to the next one, not unchanged but enlarged and purified, with some clear marks of its proper handiwork. into this, for good or ill, is woven every belief of every man who has speechof his fellows. an awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which posterity will live.3 no man is an island; as long as we hold beliefs at all, they must, however indirectly and minutely, affect the larger culture for good or bad, and in the mass they will prove enormously consequential. consequently, because beliefs ineluctably issue in action, and have such a powerful influence on both ourselves and on others, it behooves us to choose them very carefully, to suppress no doubts about them, to scrupulously and rigorously examine and test them to determine whether or not they hold water—what “an awful privilege, and an awful responsibility, that we should help to create the world in which posterity will live.” thus clifford’s extreme and uncompromising evidentialism. for clifford, then, skepticism respecting beliefs together with their acceptance only upon sufficient evidence analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 81 is a moral imperative since belief, “that sacred faculty which prompts the decisions of our will, and knits into harmonious working all the compacted energies of our being, is ours not for ourselves, but for humanity.” and because of the social efficaciousness of beliefs, none of us, no matter how lowly, is exempt from the duty of scrupulosity with respect to our own—“no simplicity of mind, no obscurity of station, can escape the universal duty of questioning all that we believe.” incredulousness for clifford is the highest virtue so, “whoso would deserve well of his fellows in this matter will guard the purity of his belief with a very fanaticism of jealous care, lest at any time it should rest on an unworthy object, and catch a stain which can never be wiped away.” a paradigm of one who guarded the purity of his belief with his incessant and conscientious quest for more and more evidence to support it is charles darwin. darwin delayed for years the publication of on the origin of species lest he had insufficient evidence for his theory of natural selection. it was only when he feared that alfred russel wallace might jump the gun on him and publish his own similar findings that darwin published his. belief, stipulates clifford, “is rightly used on truths which have been established by long experience and waiting toil, and which have stood in the fierce light of free and fearless questioning,” otherwise “it is desecrated when given to unproved and unquestioned statements.”4 if so, then belief is indeed rightly used on darwin’s theory. clifford, though, does make some significant qualifications to his otherwise stringent evidentialism. first, we may accept certain beliefs as true without ourselves having acquired the requisite evidence for or personally tested them if that evidence has been acquired by others, or they have been tested time and time again by those qualified to do so and shown not wanting. thus, says clifford, “certain great principles, and these most fitted for the guidance of life, have stood out more and more clearly in proportion to the care and honesty with which they were tested, and have acquired in this way a practical certainty.”5 such presumably are moral precepts like the golden rule and scientific laws like newton’s laws of motion and boyle’s law of gases. second, we may properly believe what is only probably true (what lacks evidence sufficient for certainty) because the results of such belief may vindicate our belief in future probabilities: “there are many cases in which it is our duty to act upon probabilities, although the evidence is not such as to justify present belief; because it is precisely by such action, and by observation of its fruits, that evidence is got which may justify future belief.”6 for example, meteorologists in forecasting the weather deal exclusively with probabilities; however, their forecasts are necessary to navigation on the seas and in the air and so must be made. and if their predictions turn out true more times than not, then our future belief in these probabilities together with the actions taken because of them is vindicated. third, scientists sometimes need to believe things which go beyond their experience and so have no empirical evidence. induction is one of those great principles most fitted for the guidance of life that clifford speaks of, but, as hume noted, it cannot be empirically validated since it involves predictions about future events of which no one has had experience. a child burnt yesterday dreads the fire because she believes inductively that the fire today or tomorrow will burn her as well. however, though she has as yet no experience or real evidence of today’s or tomorrow’s fire for her belief, she is nonetheless justified in so believing because of the uniformity in nature. clifford allows, “we may go beyond experience by assuming that what we do not know is like what we do know; or, in other words, we may add to our experience on the assumption of a uniformity in nature. . . . we may fill in our picture of what is and has been, as experience gives it us, in such a way as to make the whole consistent with this uniformity.” however, “no evidence,” cautions clifford, “can justify us in believing the truth of a statement which is contrary to, or outside of, the uniformity of nature.” here clifford presumably has in mind belief in miracles. moreover, we have no warrant “to believe that nature is absolutely and universally uniform.” the principle of the uniformity in nature “only tells us that in forming beliefs which go beyond our experience, we may make the assumption that nature is practically uniform so far as we are concerned. within the range of human action and verification, we may form, by help of this assumption, actual beliefs; beyond it, only those hypotheses which serve for the more accurate asking of questions.”7 though clifford is skeptical of the veracity of revealed religion in references to the pronouncements of buddha and mohammed, nowhere does he mention christian faith in particular, the implied gravamen of his attack analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 82 on belief ill supported by evidence. however, that implication was not lost on his contemporaries. tom flynn writes, “to victorian intellectuals caught in the fury of that era’s crisis of faith, clifford’s essay served up a corrosive tonic whose ingestion must surely have seared away the last vestiges of faith. so it seemed to rationalists who embraced its forbidding evidentialism—and to champions of the church who struggled to reply to it.”8 clifford, along with such as thomas huxley and henry thomas buckle, belonged to a generation of religious skeptics and agnostics. james was of the same generation but, owing no doubt to his upbringing and temperament, did not join the chorus of these cultured despisers of religion. he was as well aware as they of science’s challenges to faith and of the obsolescence of some traditional religious beliefs. however, as a psychologist, he believed that religion is an ineradicable part of human nature—a virtual instinct—and that at its best it has therapeutic value for the individual and an ameliorative effect on society; and, as a philosopher, he believed that religious experience in its mystical form might be an avenue to knowledge inaccessible to reason and the scientific method. for james, religion is an indispensable and inestimable form of life still possible within and compatible with a scientific worldview. james demonstrated that one could be both scientifically enlightened and authentically religious without suffering cognitive dissonance as a result. james’ defense of religion is an example of the mediatory role he assumed of reconciling ideological extremes and an expression of his metaphysical pluralism. broadly considered, his “will to believe” (more accurately, “the right to believe”), together with his the varieties of religious experience, is james’ apologia for religious faith. more particularly, it is a polemical rejoinder to clifford. james takes clifford to task on three points. first, he challenges the plausibility of clifford’s epistemological criterion of evidential sufficiency. second, he detects an unexamined emotive bias behind clifford’s insistence on sufficiency of evidence as the sole warrant for belief. and third, he shows that clifford’s stringent requirement for warranted belief may, paradoxically, block the road to truth. with respect to evidential sufficiency, nowhere does clifford specify its criterion, an infallible mark by which one could know that it has been reached; he only assumes that there is one. for james, anyway, the quest for that criterion is a fool’s errand. “objective evidence and certitude are doubtless very fine ideals to play with, but where on this moonlit and dream visited planet are they found?” he asks rhetorically. he notes further, “no concrete test of what is really true has ever been agreed upon.” for example, the rationalist’s test of “the inconceivability of the opposite,” the empiricist’s test of “the capacity to be verified by sense,” or the idealist’s test of “the possession of complete organic unity or self-relation, realized when a thing is its own other,” have all been found wanting. and what has been claimed as objectively certain and self-evident by some has been denied by others. “apart from abstract propositions of comparison,” says james, “we find no proposition ever regarded by any one as evidently certain that has not either been called a falsehood, or at least had its truth sincerely questioned by some one else.” indeed, certainty has even been claimed for mutually contradictory beliefs such as those constituting kant’s antimonies. james’ diagnosis for this state of affairs is “that the intellect, even with truth directly in its grasp, may have no infallible signal for knowing whether it be true or no.”9 in his reply to clifford, though, james considers not just the epistemology of belief but the psychology of belief as well. ever the psychologist, james discerns lurking behind clifford’s stricture against believing on insufficient evidence a certain attitude or dispositional imperative, namely, “we must avoid error.” this is the counsel of fear, the fear of being duped. better by far to be secure in unbelief, than to believe and risk being wrong and so made a fool of. yet there is an alternative attitude or motive, which james identifies, no less legitimate and compelling in determining what to believe, and that is, “we must know the truth.”10 this is the counsel of hope. from fear of error we may miss out on truth. both attitudes entail risk. avoiding error at all costs risks losing truth; seeking truth, come what may, risks being duped. note that neither of these epistemological motives—the fear of error or the hope of truth—is amenable to evidential validation. but each is appropriate depending on the kind of beliefs being weighed. whether one should be motivated by fear of error or desire for truth in choosing among beliefs depends on the kind of choice before us. james stipulates, “let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 83 proposed to our belief.” a choice between beliefs he calls an option. james classifies options according to whether they are dead or live, unforced or forced upon us, and trivial or momentous in their consequences. a dead choice or option is one where the choice of believing or not believing does not even arise because we have no interest in it. whether to believe that neptune may be the cause of storms at sea or not is such a dead option. a live option is one where the choice of believing or disbelieving is of vital interest to us such that we are willing to act on it. whether to believe that democracy is the best form of government or not is an example of a live option. beyond this, an option may be unforced or forced upon us. either believing that acupuncture works or does not work is a choice that i have to make one way or the other. finally, an option may be trivial or momentous. a trivial option concerns a choice between beliefs where the consequences of choosing are unimportant. believing that sitting on the left side or the right side of the bus is the better choice is such a trivial case. by contrast, a momentous option is one that is live for us and unavoidable, and occurs but once in a life time; moreover, the choice once made can never be undone and is enormously consequential for us. thus, the choice between sinking all my life’s savings in an investment scheme or not would be a momentous one. it is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity. once the choice is made, there is no turning back. the consequences involved are tremendous. i stand to loose everything in this risky venture or might become a millionaire. it is exactly this kind of option that robert frost poignantly illustrates in his poem, the road not taken. deciding which road to take in frost’s yellow wood would be momentous in the extreme since once made there is no returning, and the road actually taken, the poet says retrospectively, “made all the difference.” an option that is live, forced upon us, and momentous is what james calls a “genuine” option.11 now in cases where our options or choices are not genuine, that is, neither forced upon us nor momentous, then we should adopt the cautious attitude of avoiding error. “wherever the option between losing truth and gaining it is not momentous,” advises james, “we can throw the chance of gaining truth away, and at any rate save ourselves from any chance of believing falsehood, by not making up our minds at all till objective evidence has come.” this is the case in choosing among scientific hypotheses. “what difference, indeed, does it make to most of us whether we have or have not a theory of the röntgen rays, whether we believe or not in mind-stuff, or have a conviction about the causality of conscious states?” james asks rhetorically. “it makes no difference. such options are not forced on us. on every account it is better not to make them, but still keep weighing reasons pro et contra with an indifferent hand.” to update james’ own examples, the option of believing either that homo sapiens originated in africa or in asia, for example, is not momentous. it does not demand an immediate decision, and the consequences of believing either way are not overwhelmingly important. here our belief ought to be strictly determined by the evidence, and only when the amount of evidence is, in some sense, sufficient need we make up our minds. the same is true in cases of testing drugs for human consumption. here we must avoid error at all costs, since human life and health depend upon it. we can afford to wait until all the results of rigorous testing are in, since the results of failing to do so might be catastrophic. laboratory personnel who test drugs are in the same position, with the same responsibility, as clifford’s ship owner. with respect to accepting or rejecting scientific hypotheses, then, james completely agrees with clifford’s stricture against accepting nothing without sufficient evidence. james affirms that the fear of error should motivate the scientist, and that shunning error is properly endemic to the scientific method: the most useful investigator, because the most sensitive observer, is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived. science has organized this nervousness into a regular technique, her so-called method of verification; and she has fallen so deeply in love with the method that one may even say she has ceased to care for truth by itself at all. it is only truth as technically verified that interests her. the truth of truths might come in merely affirmative form, and she would decline to touch it.12 having conceded this much to clifford, however, james goes on to argue that sometimes we have no choice but to believe things for which at the time we have insufficient evidence, for refusing to do so might lead to the loss of truth and a diminished life. and among those beliefs are just those religious beliefs clifford repudiated, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 84 moral beliefs, and metaphysical doctrines. options concerning which moral beliefs to hold, if any, are genuine since they are unavoidable and momentous. yet they cannot be decided empirically, and so the issue of evidential sufficiency hardly occurs. that decision now devolves upon the will. “the question of having moral beliefs at all or not having them is decided by our will,” maintains james. “are our moral preferences true or false, or are they only odd biological phenomena, making things good or bad for us, but in themselves indifferent? how can your pure intellect decide?” moreover, says james, “if your heart does not want a world of moral reality, your head will assuredly never make you believe in one,”13 whatever the evidence in its favor. and, i might add, it is not just moral beliefs that elude definitive empirical justification, but also beliefs about values generally such as aesthetic beliefs concerning the nature and value of beauty and of art. but above all it is religious beliefs that james is particularly anxious to vindicate, a vindication that would be continued later in his varieties. james reduces all religions down two fundamental affirmations, namely, that good will out—“the best things are the more eternal things”—and we are immediately better off if we believe this. our option is either to believe these propositions to be true or not. obviously, this option, like the moral, is live, momentous and inescapable—in a word, genuine. yet again there is no evidence sufficient to determine that one choice is true and the other false. and to remain agnostic by refusing to decide one way or another is itself a choice motivated as well by the fear of error. since the intellect cannot decide the issue it is left up to the will or what james calls our “passional nature”: “our passional nature not only lawfully may, but must, decide an option between propositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature be decided on intellectual grounds.”14 now in the cases of genuine options concerning our moral and religious beliefs which, unlike the case of scientific beliefs, elude immediate empirical justification, observing the dictum of “seek truth” is entirely appropriate. here the conflict is not between the intellect and the will, but between two attitudes—the fear of error and the hope of truth. and the impulse to seek truth is no less legitimate than the caution to avoid error—indeed, given what is at stake, it is the more reasonable. furthermore, in the case of such beliefs, our willingness to seek truth even in the teeth of insufficient evidence and the threat of being duped may actually bring about the truth sought. james assures us, “faith in a fact can help create the fact ” for there are “cases where a fact cannot come at all unless a preliminary faith exists in its coming.”15 thus, if we truly desire a world of moral reality, believe in and act on it, then we may discover and come to know the truth of that reality. we may find a world responsive to and chiming in with our moral impulses, judgments, and actions. however, if we do not want such a world, and do not believe in and act on it, then we shall make no such discovery. the same is especially true of religious beliefs. religion is “a postulator of new facts,” says james, such that “the world interpreted religiously is not the materialistic world over again, with an altered expression; it must have, over and above the altered expression, a natural constitution different at some point from that which a materialistic world would have. it must be such that different events can be expected in it, different conduct must be required.”16 so, if those expectations are met, and that different conduct is forthcoming, then our religious beliefs are vindicated. we may come to discern the hand of providence in the course of human events after all, particularly if we act to turn that hand. however, if we lack the requisite faith, then we will be blind and indifferent to this world differently constituted according to faith. emerson finely expresses the way the world might appear to one having moral or religious faith: “as the world was plastic and fluid in the hands of god, so it is ever to so much of his attributes as we bring to it. to ignorance and sin, it is flint. they adapt themselves to it as they may; but in proportion as a man has any thing in him divine, the firmament flows before him and takes his signet and form.”17 although he does not mention them in “will to believe,” choices between opposed metaphysical beliefs are also among those where the truth-seeking disposition is appropriate. this is particularly so in the case of stale-mated oppositions where good reasons can be given for either choice but there is insufficient evidence to decide decisively in favor of one over the other. an example of such is the opposition between determinism and indeterminism (free will). because this is an issue that concerned him personally, james confronted and resolved it head on. in his essay, “the dilemma of determinism,” james claims that it is impossible for this issue to be decisively resolved empirically: “facts practically have hardly anything to do with making us either determinists or indeterminists.” consequently, as is the case with moral and religious believes, it is left for the will to decide. analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 85 (what makes us determinists or indeterminists is what james calls “different faiths”18 or sentiments.) and that is exactly what happened in james’ own case. james had long been beset with deep depressions, fear of insanity, hypochondria, listlessness, and indirection. but then he had an epiphany of sorts upon reading the french psychologist, charles renouvier. in a diary entry for april 30, 1870, he writes, i think that yesterday was a crisis in my life. i finished the first part of renouvier’s second essais and see no reason why his definition of free will — “the sustaining of a thought because i choose to when i might have other thoughts”— need be the definition of an illusion. at any rate, i will assume for the present — until next year — that it is no illusion. my first act of free will shall be to believe in free will.19 though he had no evidential warrant for this belief, the beneficial results of his acting upon it were remarkable. his life now had direction; he overcame his various psychological ailments, and went on to become a great psychologist and philosopher. neither of these emotional stances, fear of error and hope of truth, is more or less acceptable than the other. each is appropriate within its own sphere. thus, the motive of avoiding error is appropriate within the sphere of scientific investigation, whereas the motive of seeking truth is appropriate within the spheres of religious faith, moral commitment, and metaphysical outlook. however—and this is significant—even in the case of moral and religious beliefs james himself does not abandon a form of evidentialism; even they are open to and demand some form of empirical verification—but at a later time. this possibility is allowed in his conception of “belief” in “will to believe”: “let us give the name of hypothesis to anything that may be proposed to our belief.” now a hypothesis is a belief that is held tentatively until empirically verified by tests. moral and religious beliefs, then, are just such hypotheses. like scientific hypotheses, they stand to be tested. scientific hypotheses are tested through experimentation. moral and religious hypotheses can be tested only by applying them in practice, by acting on them, looking for their consequences to see whether our expectations regarding them are met. in varieties, james states that the truth of religious beliefs is to be validated by their practical fruits. he gives the example of belief in god. those who hold this belief typically expect that god will guarantee that “the best things are the more eternal things.” since this expectation must be either met or not met, then belief in god is a bona fide hypothesis; it, like a scientific hypothesis, is in principle verifiable and falsifiable (though it would be difficult to determine when this verification or falsification occurs). here is james account of the hypothetical nature of theism as found in varieties: god’s existence is the guarantee of an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. this world may indeed, as science assures us, some day burn up or freeze; but if it is part of his order, the old ideals are sure to be brought elsewhere to fruition, so that where god is, tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and dissolution are not the absolutely final things. only when this farther step of faith concerning god is taken, and remote objective consequences are predicted, does religion, as it seems to me, get wholly free from the first immediate subjective experience, and bring a real hypothesis into play. [561-62] as mentioned above, james regards religion as “a postulator of new facts,” though he is agnostic about their nature: “what the more characteristically divine facts are, apart from the actual inflow of energy in the faith-state and the prayer-state, i know not.”20 if, indeed, the remote objective consequences in fact come to pass, then this serves as some validation for the beliefs in question. however, for us to know this, we need to take the first step by actively seeking truth, even at the risk of being duped. in other words, the evidence for our moral, religious and metaphysical beliefs needs to be forced by our first assenting to them. this was certainly the case with james’ belief in free will, the life-changing effects of which were its vindication and a retroactive sign of its truth. during the discussion of this paper after its oral presentation the following question was raised: how long should one wait for the future confirmation and vindication of moral and religious hypotheses that james alanalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 86 lows? james sets no time limit, nor is it necessary. it may come sooner or later in the course of life; if not sooner, then the faith that it will come later is part of the experiment—to give up on the hypothesis too soon would forever preclude its verification. my sense is that their confirmation typically comes not as a damascus road revelation (though it may do so) but slowly and incrementally, and even ambiguously. this question, though, stands to be settled empirically. surveys may be done to determine how many people lose their faith and the reasons for it, and how many persist in their faith and for what reasons. and those reasons may be that they see practical benefits accruing to them over time as a result of their faith. some studies, albeit highly controversial, have already shown that people of faith are happier and live longer than those without faith. james and clifford, then, are not as far apart as one might think. both are pragmatists of sorts insofar as they alike hold to a behavioral conception of beliefs as preparations and guides to action which are validated by the occurrence of their expected results. james, in his “philosophical conceptions and practical results,” affirms, “beliefs, in short, are really rules for action,”21 which parallels clifford’s affirmation that “no belief is real unless it guide our actions, and those very actions supply a test of its truth.” both are empiricists in their equal insistence that beliefs must be verified empirically. no belief is to be accepted on faith (for james not, ultimately, even religious beliefs) but rigorously and continuously investigated: according to clifford: in regard, then, to the sacred tradition of humanity, we learn that it consists, not in propositions or statements which are to be accepted and believed on the authority of the tradition, but in questions rightly asked, in conceptions which enable us to ask further questions, and in methods of answering questions. the value of all these things depends on their being tested day by day. the very sacredness of the precious deposit imposes upon us the duty and the responsibility of testing it, of purifying and enlarging it to the utmost of our power.22 clifford here conceives of science less as a body of received knowledge than as a method of inquiry, where truth can by approached only asymptotically since truth itself is ever evolving. this is a pragmatic conception of science and truth that james would definitely accede to. in pragmatism, james states, “the truth of an idea is not a stagnant property inherent in it. truth happens to an idea. it becomes true, is made true by events. its verity is in fact an event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its veri-fication. its validity is the process of its valid-ation.”23 furthermore, clifford and james alike concede that certain beliefs may be rightly held without sufficient evidence. clifford specifically includes among them assumptions like the principle of uniformity in nature, the viability of induction, and the trustworthiness of statistical probabilities; james specifically includes moral, religious, and metaphysical beliefs. further, both think that such beliefs are vindicated by their usefulness. thus for clifford the belief that nature is uniform is vindicated by the useful results that come from applying it: “and practically demonstrative inference—that which gives us a right to believe in the result of it—is a clear showing that in no other way than by the truth of this result can the uniformity of nature be saved.”24 and for james religious belief, as a postulator of new facts, is vindicated if those facts are forthcoming. james’ departures from clifford stem from his being a more consistent and thorough-going pragmatist (and empiricist) than clifford. he thus enfranchises religious beliefs as inductive hypotheses, putting them on the same epistemological footing as scientific hypotheses—their validation too must await experimental results in the form of expectations fulfilled. religious beliefs, no less than scientific ones, may be treated hypothetically, and in this way deserve a chance for their future verification. james, no less than clifford, demands evidence for even religious beliefs. he is no fideist. but, unlike clifford, he is willing to wait for that evidence to emerge later in their case, whereas clifford wants evidence now before risking belief. this marks the chief difference between james’ empiricism and that of traditional empiricists like clifford. according to ralph barton perry, “whereas according to the traditional view experience has spoken, according to james experience has yet to speak, and its response will be proportional to the boldness and happy inspiration with which it is interrogated.” james believes that the prospect of finding truth justifies waiting for the results of that interrogation. “the truly empirianalytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 87 cal mind,” says perry, “imagines curious possibilities and gives nature every chance to reveal itself in unfamiliar ways.”25 on this account, james was possessed of a truly empirical mind. we shall never know whether certain beliefs are true—miss out on their truth—or false unless we take the risk of believing and acting on them. “but the skeptic who does not formulate any hypotheses,” according to edward c. moore, “can never correct them by the discovery of errors or reinforce them by the act of having them lead him successfully.”26 and as james says, “a rule of thinking [clifford’s] which would absolutely prevent me from acknowledging certain kinds of truth if those kinds of truth were really there, would be an irrational rule.”27 the issue joined by james and clifford over what conditions should be met for our acceptance of a belief is a long-standing one dating back at least to hume. it is, as james would say, a live and momentous one, especially so today. it is the very issue between the so-called new atheists and the religionists who oppose them. richard dawkins, sam harris, daniel dennet, paul kurtz, and company, are uncompromisingly committed to clifford’s position, whereas their opponents, at least tacitly, side with james. clifford’s stricture that only beliefs based on sufficient evidence are warranted is a stock-in-trade argument against theism. one might say that evidentialism has become a perennial problem of philosophy, and an importunate one at that. consequently, it deserves to be addressed across the university curriculum and not just in philosophy courses where, of course, it should be given careful consideration. how, then, might evidentialism be addressed in the classroom? the opportunities for doing so abound particularly in those fields like the natural and social sciences where theories proliferate. a theory, or hypothesis, is, using james’ terminology, “anything that may be proposed to our belief,” where we have the option either to accept or reject. students might be required to classify options according to whether they are alive, forced upon them, and momentous. in the case of scientific theories, where the options are not genuine insofar as they are neither momentous nor forced upon us, the cautious avoidance of error ought to be the rule and evidence must be demanded for their acceptance (something on which both james and clifford agree). however, the students’ option or choice among theories becomes particularly acute in those cases where theories conflict, and where the evidence on either side does not decisively outweigh that on the other, which is especially true of those theories in the social sciences that are not falsifiable—think, for example, of the various conflicting theories of personality in psychology. the students might be asked to choose among such conflicting theories, and give reasons for their choices, and to consider what criteria might be brought to bear in making a choice. furthermore, they might be instructed to identify those deep assumptions covertly made in science where sufficient evidence is lacking (something clifford concedes) such as the principles of induction and of the uniformity in nature, and why those assumptions are warranted. addressing the issue of evidentialism would enable students to realize that science is not a static body of holy writ but a pragmatic method of inquiry into truth that is never complete and final (on which james and clifford again agree), to avoid the pitfall of “scientism,” and to better appreciate the rightful place science occupies in the economy of human life—to wit, to bring home to them the point of hamlet’s remark, “there are more things in heaven and earth, horatio, than are dreamt of in your philosophy.” the most opportune place to address the issue of evidentialism is, of course, in courses in philosophy— especially epistemology, philosophy of science, and philosophy of religion—which cry out for a discussion of this issue. the following questions might be profitably raised there: what counts as evidence for a belief? what makes the evidence in support of a belief sufficient for its acceptance; in other words, what are the criteria of sufficiency? do the criteria or standards of evidential sufficiency necessarily shift from field to field so that what is appropriate in one field of inquiry may not be so in another; that is, do these standards depend on the object of inquiry? thus, beliefs that might pass muster in a court of law may not do so in a laboratory. aristotle’s remark that standards of precision necessarily differ from field to field, e.g. those in mathematics are more stringent than those in the social sciences, might apply as well to the standards of evidential sufficiency required by those fields. finally, what are we do with those moral, religious, and metaphysical beliefs that seem incapable of achieving evidential sufficiency? should we dismiss them as nonsensical, as do the logical positivists, or as immoral, as does clifford, or hold them tentatively as recommended by james? analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 88 let me conclude with what i think are the indisputable merits of james’ position. james teaches us the wisdom of following the middle way. he shows us how to shake off the shackles of a constrictive scientism and stultifying skepticism without falling into the abyss of irrational subjectivism and anti-intellectualism. he exposes the inexpugnable psychological factor, the emotional bias, the voluntaristic element, lying behind all forms of epistemological justification. he thereby redeems ethics, religion, and metaphysics from the exile to which positivism sends them. he demonstrates that the faith of the moralist and the religionist is not unfounded, without betraying the spirit of scientific empiricism. as moore puts is, “this act of faith—the belief that there are answers and we can find them—is intrinsic to all of james’s philosophy. he insists upon an element of belief— over and above what we can prove rationally or experimentally—in all of the knowledge process.”28 i close with a quotation james takes from fitz james stephen. it neatly and poignantly expresses james’ counsel to seek and hope for truth even when sufficient evidence is wanting: we stand on a mountain pass in the midst of whirling snow and blinding mist, through which we get glimpses now and then of paths which may be deceptive. if we stand still we shall be frozen to death. if we take the wrong road we shall be dashed to pieces. we do not certainly know whether there is any right one. what must we do? “be strong and of a good courage.” act for the best, hope for the best, and take what comes. . . . if death ends all, we cannot meet death better.29 endnotes 1 william k. clifford, “the ethics of belief,” in lectures and essays (london: macmillan, 1879), pp. 164, 175. 2 ibid., p. 168. 3 ibid., pp. 168-69. 4 ibid., pp.170, 171, 170-71, 170. 5 ibid., p. 177. 6 ibid., pp. 177-78. 7 ibid., pp. 199-200, 203, 204 8 tom flynn, “clifford in whole,” free inquiry, xxx, no. 1 (december, 2009/january, 2010), 63. 9 william james, “the will to believe,” in the will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy (new york: dover publications, inc., 1956), pp. 14, 15, 16. 10 ibid., p. 17. 11 ibid., pp. 2, 3. 12 ibid., pp. 19-20, 21. 13 ibid., pp. 22-23. 14 ibid., pp. 25, 11. 15 ibid., p. 25. 16 william james, the varieties of religious experience, a study in human nature (new york: the modern library, 2002), pp. 562-63. 17 ralph waldo emerson, “the american scholar,” in ralph waldo emerson: selected essays, lectures, and poems, ed. by robert d. richardson, jr. (new york: bantam books, 1990), p. 94. 18 william james, “the dilemma of determinism,” in the will to believe, and other essays in popular philosophy (new york: dover publications, inc., 1956), pp. 152, 153. 19 ralph barton perry, the thought and character of william james, i (boston: little, brown, and company, 1936), 323. 20 james, varieties, pp. 561-62, 563. 21 william james, “philosophical conceptions and practical results,” in william james, writings 1878-1899 (new york: the library of america, 1992), p. 1079. 22 clifford, “the ethics of belief,” pp. 183, 197-98. the definition of “belief” as a rule or guide for action originated with alexander bain, a scots psychologist, who defined belief as preparedness for action. clifford makes no mention of his having derived this definition from bain. however, nicholas st. john green, analytic teaching and philosophical praxis vol. 31 no.1 89 who along with peirce and james was a member of boston’s metaphysical club that met in the early 1870s, took up the idea from bain and suggested it to others in the club. in response, peirce wrote “the fixation of belief” and “how to make our ideas clear” that were published in popular science monthly. thus, bain’s idea contains the seeds of pragmatism. see thomas s. knight, charles peirce, the great american thinker series (new york: washington square press, inc., 1965), pp. 45-46. 23 william james, pragmatism, in william james, writings 1902-1910 (new york: the library of america, 1987), p. 574. 24 clifford, “the ethics of belief,” p. 203. 25 perry, william james, i, 558. 26 edward c. moore, william james, the great american thinker series (new york: washington square press, inc., 1965), p. 98. 27 james, “the will to believe,” p. 28. 28 moore, william james, p. 98. 29 james, “the will to believe,” p. 31. address correspondence to: richard hall fayetteville state university fayetteville, north carolina rhall@uncsfu.edu givel, m., (2015). mahayana buddhism and gross national happiness in bhutan. international journal of wellbeing, 5(2), 14-27. doi:10.5502/ijw.v5i2.2 michael givel university of oklahoma mgivel@ou.edu copyright belongs to the author(s) www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 14 article mahayana buddhism and gross national happiness in bhutan michael givel abstract: in 1972, the fourth king of bhutan announced that gross national happiness was more important than gross domestic product. in this paper, the basic conceptual features of mahayana buddhism are discussed particularly as they relate to the mahayana buddhist view of happiness. the primary purpose of mahayana buddhism is to spread happiness and compassion to everyone in the world. this includes that by awakening to the ultimate truth, one obtains greater clarity and insight about the true nature of the universe, leading to internal peace and happiness. as this paper shows, the goal of modern gross national happiness is also based on mahayana buddhist principles to increase happiness for everyone. this occurs through governmental policies and programs that promote material needs balanced with becoming enlightened. keywords: bhutan, gross national happiness, public policy, mahayana buddhism introduction mahayana buddhism, which was the state religion of bhutan in the early 1970s and still has a substantial influence today, has been intricately entwined with culture and politics, including gross national happiness (gnh), in bhutan. in this paper, i will provide an overview of the mahayana buddhist view of happiness and how it impacts gnh. a deep understanding of mahayana buddhism provides an important basis to understand why and how gnh operates as a primary policy influence in modern bhutan. when shakyamuni buddha (formerly prince siddhartha) found enlightenment around or after 400 b.c.e. after six years of striving and one night of meditating under the bodhi tree in what is now northeastern india, the new religion of buddhism emerged. 1 buddha’s awakening brought forth a religious movement that was grounded in the principal belief that profound suffering exists in the world. this suffering can be resolved by following buddhist dharma or law that facilitates happiness and bliss (armstrong 2004; assavavirulhakarn 2010; batchelor 2010; keown 2013; leighton 2012; mcgovern 1922; mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003; d. t. suzuki 1968). in buddha’s first sermon, he identified suffering as all-pervasive in life (morgan 2010). he saw the fundamental bases of suffering as the need to survive day-to-day existence, illness, aging, and death. as it was written in the dhammacakkapavattana sutta, which is buddha’s first sermon after finding enlightenment: 1 there is no general scholarly consensus on the exact date that the buddha found enlightenment. a number of scholars, though, regard the date of enlightenment to be near his death, approaching 400 b.c.e. see also: gethin, foundations of buddhism, 1998, 13-14 and gombrich, 1988, 32 for general comments. to get the details see heinz bechert 1982, "the date of the buddha reconsidered" indologia taurinensia 10, pp. 29-36. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 15 suffering, as a noble truth, is this: birth is suffering, aging is suffering, sickness is suffering, death is suffering, sorrow and lamentation, pain, grief and despair are suffering; association with the loathed is suffering, dissociation from the loved is suffering, not to get what one wants is suffering — in short, suffering is the five categories of clinging objects. buddhists believe that suffering also occurs through the selfish and mindless craving of sensual pleasure and material wealth and power by individual egos, which may cause evil deeds (armstrong 2004; batchelor 2010; keown 2013; leighton 2012; mitchell 2008; smith & novak 2003). buddhists have further identified additional reasons suffering continues, including past conditioning to expect suffering and ignorance of the ultimate reality of existence or the ultimate truth. the ultimate truth, which has also been referred to as nirvana (which means “to extinguish desire”), enlightenment, or the awakening, is a state of transcendent metaphysical reality, and the attainment of this state of happiness is the ultimate goal of buddhism (french 2002). in buddhism, the ultimate truth cannot be described, but may be understood only through direct insights, which may come through meditation approaches. only the ultimate truth is permanent. the ultimate truth is the realm beyond death and is the infinite nature of the ultimate reality of the cosmic universe. there is no ultimate reality in the cosmic universe except cosmic emptiness or shunyta.2 by awakening to the ultimate truth, buddhists believe every sentient being can possess peace, bliss, joy, and happiness (gethin 1998; leighton 2012). the understanding of the ultimate truth is, in a general sense, a move toward significant comprehension of the true nature of the universe (gethin 1998; leighton 2012). for all buddhists, the ultimate truth is beyond syllogistic logic and meaning, and within the ultimate truth, all space-time limitations disappear as they are ordinarily experienced by humans (gethin 1998; leighton 2012). paradoxically, however, the rigorous use and traditions of logic and argumentation in some mahayana buddhism is required to obtain the ultimate truth and happiness. in the universe all matter, energy, and time is interrelated and in constant fluid fluctuation (gethin 1998; keown 2013; leighton 2012). within mahayana buddhism, a metaphor of the ocean is an important illustration of this principle. the ocean is absolute, stable and changeless, but the waves are always changing. in much the same way, reality in the here-and-now appears to be based on a unified and observable universe. however, this seemingly unified nature of the universe can also be compared with modern theories of physics, such as einstein’s special theory of relativity or quantum physics, where there are underlying and complex interactions between space, matter, and time that reflect a complex and ever-changing universe. when a sentient being experiences the ultimate truth of the ever-changing universe even paradoxically through rationalist logic, they have liberated themselves from all causes of suffering, including greed, hatred, and delusion, and they enter into a state of clarity, happiness, and peace. by perceiving ultimate truth and eliminating egotism in the form of greed, hatred, and delusion, happiness and enlightenment ensues (goodman 2008). karma, in buddhism, which means willful actions or the fruits of actions, is the everlasting law of cause and effect that is an essential ingredient in knowing the ultimate truth (williams 2008). karma pertains to happiness in the following ways. ultimate happiness is obtained 2 in mahayana and tibetan buddhism, one major position by mipham and others holds that the nature of emptiness and ultimate reality is not knowable. but elements of reality, such as matter and energy, do exist and can be grasped by humans. in contrast, the gelupka school in mahayana buddhism believed that reality is unknowable and encompasses a negation of all worldly corporeality (phuntsho 2013). mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 16 through enlightenment. positive karma results in higher rebirth, bringing one closer to nirvana. the vipaka (result) ripening of karma (deeds) leads to greater happiness, joy, and bliss when a person is reborn. in part, buddhism acquired the karma idea from vedic hinduism, but endowed it with further ethical constructs (morgan 2010). adherents of vedic hinduism, particularly the upanishads, as early as the first century b.c.e. believed that good moral actions by humans turned a person into a good being in the next life while bad moral actions turned a person into a bad person in the next life. under karmic law, which functions as a natural law in the changing and interdependent universe, good or bad deeds have consequences for rebirth and nature, including the happiness of sentient beings (mitchell 2008). karma’s impact in buddhism is not rigid, as it responds on a continual basis to a sentient being’s good or bad deeds (morgan 2010). a sentient being’s present character cannot nullify the consequences of an individual’s misdeeds in past lives but creates better karma to offset bad karma. in particular, four acts that counter past bad karma are remorsefulness, the resolve not to commit an action again, actions to restore justice for past bad actions, and acts of holding another in loving-kindness (morgan 2010). mindfulness of one’s actions can have an important positive effect on future rebirth as a sentient being, including greater happiness. as explained in 2007 by dasho karma ura, president of the centre for bhutan studies in thimphu: because of the discursive nature of karma, all are part of an intricate web. karma is simultaneous and is constantly being revised in all of our interactions with one another. such a view of interdependence sufficiently motivates us to forget our own narrow existence, changing us such that we begin to engage meaningfully with others and pursue collective happiness. by recognizing the true nature of interdependence, one can see that all karma is collective, that all enlightenment is collective, and therefore that happiness and the policies required to promote it must be oriented toward collective achievement (ura 2012). according to buddhists, without awakening to the ultimate truth and happiness and bliss, humans remain on the ever-moving wheel of life (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). additionally, the cravings for sensual pleasure and material wealth and power represented by the wheel of life, are not permanent fixtures of human existence and doing good karmic acts will increase happiness and wellbeing (french 2002). the wheel of life pushes us from one moment of our life to the next, and from one lifetime to the next, within the realms of human, animals, asura or jealous gods, hungry ghosts, and ultimately heaven and hell. yama, the deity of death, holds the wheel of life (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). the outer wheel is divided into a 12-fold chain of dependent origination (pratityasamutpada), which represents the causes and effects of karma that does not bring greater happiness (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). at the top of the wheel is a blind man who represents ignorance. moving clockwise, the potter represents action. next is the monkey, which is symbolic of a consciousness unable or unwilling to comprehend the ultimate truth. three men in a boat represent a vehicle that can carry a sentient being across a body of water of growing consciousness of the ultimate truth and through life. houses with doors and windows are symbolic of the ability to sense reality. lovers represent the ability to engage in sensual impressions of reality. a man with an arrow stabbing his eye is representative of blindness to feeling itself or the feelings accompanying sensing the reality of the ultimate truth. alcoholic drinking represents the non-productive thirst for sensual pleasure. similarly, the monkey in the tree is illustrative of a consciousness fixated on ego-oriented desires. a pregnant woman mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 17 indicates that the birth of a child and eventual old age will bear karma’s burden of good and bad throughout a lifetime. contained in and connected with the outer wheel of life is the second wheel, which represents the six realms of existence. these include heavenly, asura, animal, hell, hungry ghosts and human realms (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). the six realms are metaphorical representations of conditioned existence or samsara. these realms are classified as dukkha or suffering being temporary and not perfect. entry into one of the six realms is based on karmic deeds, good or bad. bad deeds and decreased happiness, upon rebirth, means entry into the asura realm, where there is envy and greed for power. bad deeds also lead to the animal realm in which a sentient being is hunted or slaughtered; the hell realm where suffering is harsh and very long; and hungry ghosts, due to past transgressions, are doomed to suffer insatiable hunger and thirst that cannot be quenched due to past unrelenting material greed. good deeds lead to the heavenly realm where there is continual happiness, pleasure, and no suffering. entry into the human realm is based on both past good and bad deeds, which reflect a sentient being’s current human condition including, for instance, their social prestige and status. all of these realms are inhabited by sentient beings upon rebirth based on their past record of karma. from the buddhist perspective, being caught on the wheel of life means to continue to exist in the everyday realm without realizing or awakening to the ultimate truth (snelling 1998). however, in each of the six realms there is a bodhisattva shown to assist all sentient beings toward obtaining the ultimate truth and happiness. in mahayana buddhism, who remains in this world works to enlighten all and spread happiness and bliss (gethin 1998; keown 2013; leighton 2012). a bodhisattva is not yet a buddha and not yet awakened. bodhisattvas are bodhicitta or the "mind of awakening" with a goal of achieving buddhahood. finally, the third, innermost wheel represents the core reasons for negative karmic designations and decreased happiness. these are known as the three venoms: greed, hatred, and delusion. the poison of those trapped in everyday existence rather than knowing the ultimate truth energizes each of these venoms. this is represented by sentient beings caught within the six realms in the second wheel. ultimately, humans can exit the wheel of life including the third wheel and find bliss and happiness by becoming enlightened. 1.1 the eightfold path the eightfold path is followed in order to lead an ethical life and thus to end ones’ suffering, leading to happiness and the ultimate truth. the eightfold path is the ongoing condition of obtaining increasing bliss and happiness (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). the path is divided into three parts (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). sila encompasses proper physical actions and refraining from improper deeds of body and speech. samadhi focuses on meditation practices, which help to gain the mastery over ones’ own mind necessary to achieve the ultimate truth. prajña offers insight into the true nature of the ultimate truth. contained within sila are right speech, right action, and right livelihood (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). right speech is required because words have an impact on others, and also influence spiritual development. it is important to speak charitable words that are truthful, pleasant and benefit others (morgan 2010). for the buddha, this meant avoiding falsehoods, slander, harsh words, or gossip (morgan 2010). abstaining from false speech is important to happiness because lies are motivated either by greed, by which the suffering of material attachments is increased; hatred, by which it is intended for other people to suffer; or delusion, as in an exaggeration or joke, and by which rationality is abandoned and replaced by ignorance. abstaining from slanderous speech is important because such speech is meant only to foster ill mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 18 feelings and alienating division. either the motivation to hurt another’s reputation or to win favor for your own ego is perverse and should be quelled. happiness comes through cooperation, not self-interest and denigration. abstaining from harsh language is important because it is born of anger, and aims to cause pain of some kind. a person who has controlled his own mind has no need for such expressions of enmity. gentle words foster understanding, cooperation, and ultimately, happiness. abstaining from idle chatter is important because if people talk of things, which have no depth or importance, they are more likely to find their minds wander into areas which are perverse or undesirable, which the mind will then feed on in unhealthy fantasy. words should be chosen carefully in order to not diminish their meaning. followers of this tenet should also try to avoid useless information in order to keep their minds unclouded in their path to understanding. the overarching goal of speaking right words is to create a foundation to establish peaceful relationships with all sentient beings (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). right action means moral action that avoids causing harm to any sentient being in whatever one does (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). right actions are not only what actions a person should not do, but also what actions a person should do. exhibiting compassion for all embodies this. incorporated in right action is the moral code of the five precepts, which call for people to respect and cherish life and respect others (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). buddhism places a heavy emphasis on the need to end destructive acts and to end dissatisfaction in the world through action. abstaining from the taking of life is important because, aside from the obvious suffering that comes from the act of killing (the harm to the being itself, the emotional weight of the act of killing, and the grief of those who knew the victim), killing, like lying, comes from greed, hatred, or delusion, all of which hinder one’s ability to find personal contentment. the opposite of the inclination to kill is deep compassion and sympathy for other sentient beings, and this type of love leads to widespread happiness. abstaining from taking what is not given (through stealing or deceit) is important because buddhism values contentment with what one has, and giving up ties to the material world. theft in any form comes from greed or hatred, both of which diminish happiness. abstaining from sexual misconduct (having relations with a married or engaged person, a convict, one who is underage, those under a vow of celibacy, or close relations, or any intercourse which occurs by force) is important because according to the guidelines given in buddhism partnerships, which constitute misconduct directly, this hurts someone in the process. in its most extreme form, the celibacy of nuns and monks represents the purity of thought required to reach enlightenment, which should not be clouded with distracting sexual thoughts. right livelihood includes engaging in occupations that do not cause harm, pain, or injustice for others (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). the buddha included engaging in the sale of weapons, harming animals, and producing intoxicants as examples of harmful types of livelihood. also, one should not make more money than one needs, as this could lead to deception and exploitation of others (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). the promotion of economic equality under gnh allows for people who may otherwise, due to their poverty, feel the need to resort to dishonest or directly harmful livelihoods to branch out into other facets of the economy, and to make an honest and productive living, while being able to support themselves and their family. the work one does should ultimately spread compassion to all sentient beings. within samadhi are another three parts of the noble eightfold path: right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration. right effort includes making use of meditation practices, which overcome negative or unwholesome states of mind. these meditation efforts should occur mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 19 on an ongoing basis (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). right effort also includes ridding oneself of the desire to commit unwholesome acts (mitchell 2008). right effort involves the release of energy, which can be used in pursuit of “desire, aggression, violence, and ambition on the one hand, and generosity, self-discipline, kindness, concentration, and understanding on the other” (access to insight). this means that, specifically, when energy is focused on the elimination of suffering, it promotes happiness, and this concentration is right effort. right mindfulness is having a keen sense of awareness about what is happening in the present (gethin 2004; snelling 1998). this includes focusing on feelings, the body, current consciousness, and unwholesome thoughts through meditation practices (morgan 2010). meditation is essential for the mind to stay on the eightfold path because it focuses on feelings and thoughts from the past and idealizes what might happen in the future (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). mindfulness through meditation is the kind of objective awareness that allows one to see into the true nature of the universe as well as to gain understanding of buddhist teaching in the present. this stage of focus is closely tied to experiencing enlightenment, the ultimate happiness. right mindfulness is “the only way,” to indicate that a positive range of experiences are nothing without the insight granted through right mindfulness, and it is thus the key to sustaining one’s earthly happiness. right concentration requires that the focus of the mind is free of distraction so it will be clear and sharp enough to reach full realization of the ultimate truth. this process requires great patience and focus, and requires continual meditation. key approaches to training the mind in right concentration are mastering tranquility and insights into reality (mitchell 2008). this stage unifies the other mental factors in becoming enlightened. it blocks out all distractions and focuses the mind on a single point for the greatest level of comprehension, given that the absence of ignorance and the presence of intense self-knowledge lead ultimately to happiness. right concentration is necessary to sharpen the ability of the other elements to the point at which they are able to penetrate into the true meaning of things. this understanding is where happiness comes from, either from the knowledge that the material world holds no bearing on personal satisfaction, or from the acceptance and application of the four noble truths. through right concentration, mental and emotional peacefulness ensue, which foster realization of the ultimate truth (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). prajña is the wisdom, which purifies the mind and allows awakening to the ultimate truth. within prajña are the final two parts of the eightfold path, right understanding and right thought. right understanding is obtaining clear insight into the impermanence of the world, understanding how ego leads to greed and even evil, and comprehending every aspect of the dharma, or law, of the buddha (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). right understanding includes agreement with the four noble truths and the development of a deep awareness of dissatisfaction in the world (mitchell 2008). acceptance of the four noble truths leads to the understanding and elimination of suffering, which in turn leads to happiness. right thought includes developing freedom from states of mind that include greed and desire to harm others. right thought also focuses on refraining from unwholesome thoughts. conversely, right thought also focuses on concern for the suffering of others (mitchell 2008; morgan 2010; smith & novak 2003). renunciation of the material world fosters happiness in oneself by eliminating personal suffering due to desire and ego. kindness and compassion foster happiness in others. refusing to harm others limits the amount of suffering allowed to thrive in a society. by faithfully practicing the eightfold path, a person moves towards greater happiness, compassion, and joy. mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 20 1.2 buddhism after the lifetime of the buddha a number of scholars believe about three months before the buddha died at the age of 80 and entered paranirvana, or final liberation, the first buddhist council convened in rajgir, then capital of the kingdom of magadha, to maintain buddha’s teachings (harvey 2013). most of magadha is located in the modern indian state of bihar, which also includes bodh gaya where the buddha found enlightenment and happiness (harvey 2013). after the buddha reached parinirvana or final nirvana, his body was cremated, and his ashes were buried under eight stupas, or chortens, as they are called in tibet and bhutan. stupas or chortens symbolize buddha and his passage into nirvana upon his death (harvey 2013). two other stupas contained the urn and ashes of the buddha. stupas depict a crowned buddha sitting in a meditation position on a lion throne and are an important icon in buddhism. during the first buddhist council, the conveners divided buddha’s teachings into three baskets, known as the tripitaka (mitchell 2008). the sutra pitaka or the basket of discourses provides advice by the buddha on meditation techniques and requirements and contains instruction by the buddha on training the mind. another set of teachings is the basket of discipline, which contains more than 225 rules of conduct for monks and nuns. finally, like many buddhist teachings, the basket of higher knowledge contains buddha’s insights into the nature of reality, including obtaining enlightenment and happiness (morgan 2010). during the second buddhist council, which was held about 100 years after the first buddhist council, simmering divisions in the monastic community reached a boiling point, which initiated a process that resulted in a schism in buddhism (assavavirulhakarn 2010; morgan 2010; b. suzuki 1948; d. t. suzuki 1968).while there is not complete scholarly consensus as to what caused the schism, a number of scholars believe that the dispute between the sthaviras and the mahāsāṃghikas centered on the nature of what was the vinaya. vinaya, which is the path out of suffering by becoming, enlightened and happy, is the regulatory framework for the sangha or buddhist religious community. the third buddhist council is thought to have been convened in pataliputra by king ashka in 250 b.c.e. not all scholars believe the third buddhist council actually happened, as there are no written records of the proceedings (morgan 2010). however, oral buddhist traditions affirm that it did occur. the primary purpose of the third buddhist council was to purge “unworthy monks”(mitchell 2008; morgan 2010). subsequently, theravada buddhism originated in sri lanka in the first century c.e. and became firmly established by the third century c.e. (lopez 2001; snelling 1998). mahayana buddhism developed in china and india in the first century c.e. and was firmly established by the fourth century c.e. (lopez 2001; snelling 1998; b. suzuki 1948).theravada buddhism is primarily practiced in modern day southeast asia and sri lanka. mahayana buddhism is predominantly in central and east asia, including bhutan, tibet, and china as well as korea, japan, and vietnam (morgan 2010). 2. the mahayana worldview the core beliefs of mahayana buddhism deal with the impermanence of reality, non-dualistic reality, egoless reality, karma, transmigration or rebirth, and the ultimate truth. the mahayana view of impermanence includes fluidity of all spirit and matter (gethin 1998; keown 2013; leighton 2012; williams 2008). impermanence is essential, as it represents how matter and energy are formed, endure, and decay in the universe (gethin 1998; keown 2013; leighton 2012; williams 2008). like all forms of buddhism, mahayana also focuses on the process of uncovering insight into the ultimate truth (kakol 2002). mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 21 from the perspective of mahayana buddhism, the ultimate truth of the universe is based on the non-duality of reality (gethin 1998; keown 2013; leighton 2012; williams, 2008), meaning that all in the universe is interconnected. non-duality also means that all binary opposites will or can be eliminated. any perceived dualities are based on illusions or doubts about the ultimate nature of the universe. dualities must be eliminated in order to obtain enlightenment, or knowledge of the ultimate truth (c. t. dorji 2008). mahayana buddhists also believe that all of reality is egoless. there is no rigidity in personalities, as they are subject to complex changes. nor does mahayana recognize the judeochristian concept of the soul (williams 2008). in mahayana buddhism all reality is impermanent. from this perspective, humans also have no permanent self or soul as they go from rebirth to rebirth (harvey 2013). by contrast, in judeo-christian beliefs, the soul is the spiritual part of a human that is immortal and is often thought to survive beyond death (editors of encyclopedia britannica 2010). additionally, in mahayana, those that possess an ego are subject to suffering in the form of greed, craving for unnecessary things, undue political power, and even evil, all of which prevent them from obtaining enlightenment. thus, one of the goals of mahayana buddhism is to counter and eliminate egoism. transmigration in mahayana reflects the karma that sentient beings have obtained in past lives. under transmigration, there is a causal link between the deeds of the current life and the quality of the next one. the accumulation of good and bad acts in a lifetime provides the condition for a future birth (snelling 1998). if a being’s life is filled with bad karma, they may be reborn in a hellish realm. ultimately, positive karma is an important end goal of mahayana buddhism, and it is embodied in all aspects of the eightfold path. when a sentient being comprehends the ultimate truth, there is a cessation of suffering and a destruction of the seeds of future rebirth based on good or bad karmic deeds (lopez 2001). 2.1 differences between mahayana and theravada worldviews beyond the core values of buddhism, there are a few key fundamental differences between mahayana and theravada buddhism. a major expectation of mahayana buddhism is an existence based on compassion and improving happiness and social wellbeing in the here-andnow for all sentient beings (keown 2013). instead of achieving enlightenment for oneself, bodhisattvas seek to bring compassion, happiness, and wellbeing to everyone else. service to others is central to being a bodhisattva. this contrasts with theravada belief where the primary emphasis is on each individual seeking and obtaining awareness of the ultimate truth (keown 2013). mahayana buddhists also view the buddha in trikaya doctrine as a benevolent supernatural entity, in contrast to the historical buddha (keown 2013; leighton 2012). in trikaya, buddha has three bodies: his nirmanakaya or body in this world; his dharma body, in which he is eternal beyond all dualities in reality; and sambhogaya, in which his body manifests itself for bodhisattvas in a celestial domain (snelling 1998). theravada does not have the trikaya concept, viewing the buddha as a historical figure (leighton 2012). this belief in a supernatural buddha eventually led to a new mahayana worldview, where the buddha contained three bodies. these are dharmakaya, or the buddha being the same as the ultimate truth; sambohogakaya, where the buddha who is transcendent exists in a heavenly paradise; and nirmanakaya, where the buddha has a mortal body on earth (keown 2013). mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 22 2.2 mahayana buddhism and gross national happiness the mission of bodhisattvas in mahayana buddhism is to spread happiness to the world. by awakening to the ultimate truth, one obtains clarity and insight about the true nature of the universe, as well as internal peace and happiness (gethin 1998). this happiness results in joy in human relations. through obtainment of the ultimate truth, greater and positive potentialities of the enlightened beings are unlocked. all laypeople have the inner buddha nature, and thus can obtain this happiness (leighton 2012). 2.2.1 modern gross national happiness in 1972 his majesty king jigme singye wangchuck announced that: “gross national happiness (gnh) is more important than gross domestic product (gdp) (l. dorji 2008).” this pronouncement by the fourth king of bhutan has become in subsequent years a primary public policy to balance the growing pressures of modern capitalism and modernization with bhutan’s ancient mahayana buddhist traditions and culture (c. t. dorji 1997; l. dorji 2008; mathou 1999, 2001; ramakant & misra 1996; rose 1977; sinha 2001; voice of america news 2005; wangchuk 2004). under gnh, gdp is considered an inadequate measure of wellbeing and happiness (c. t. dorji 1997; l. dorji 2008; t. dorji 2004; mathou 1999, 2001; ramakant & misra 1996; rose 1977; sinha 2001; voice of america news 2005; wangchuk 2004). in one sense, a person can be happy while they are performing atrocious acts, as when a dysfunctional narcissistic person inflicts emotional pain on others for self-gratification, with no remorse. in addition, happiness and wellbeing can be defined as a current happy mood. on the other hand, wellbeing or happiness as described in gnh and mahayana buddhism includes current satisfaction with ones’ entire life or a satisfaction with a fulfilling life. each of these definitions of happiness and satisfaction are based on the meeting of human needs, environmental protection, cultural protection, and democratic or good governance including the protection of political and civil rights. recently, these four pillars have been reclassified into nine domains. the domains include: psychological wellbeing, health, education, time use, cultural diversity and resilience, good governance, community vitality, ecological diversity and resilience, and living standards (centre for bhutan studies, 2011a). each domain represents an essential part of national wellbeing and happiness. happiness is defined as governmental action to create the conditions for a “good life” including meeting material needs, being in ecological harmony with the planet, and providing the basis for bhutanese citizens to become enlightened. for instance psychological wellbeing is defined, in part as a citizen’s spirituality level and employment of good karma (centre for bhutan studies, 2011b). in 2008 bhutan adopted its first written constitution, which contains several provisions that link gnh to mahayana buddhism (royal government of bhutan 2008). article 3, section 1 declared that: “(mahayana) buddhism is the spiritual heritage of bhutan, which promotes the principles and values of peace, non-violence, compassion, and tolerance.” in article 2, section 2 related to the constitutional monarchy: bhutan’s king is required under the chhoe-sid-nyi or dual system of religion and politics to promote mahayana buddhism as the state religion. article 3, section 4 empowers “religious institutions and personalities” to promote the spiritual heritage of the nation “…while also ensuring that religion remains separate from politics in bhutan.” under article 3, section 3, the king also appoints the je khenpo (head monk) with training in the drukpa school of mahayana buddhism. the je khenpo must be a highly skilled spiritual master in mahayana buddhism and be accomplished in ked-dzog or spiritual development. in turn, under article 3, section 5, the je khenpo appoints, with the recommendation of the mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 23 dratshang lhentshog (commissioner of monastic affairs), five lopons or masters of mahayana buddhism to serve on the central buddhist monk council. article 4, section 1 requires that: the state preserve, protect, and promote the cultural heritage of the country, including monuments, places and objects of artistic or historic interest, dzongs (ancient buddhist religious and civil fortresses), lhakhangs (buddhist temples), goendeys (buddhist monastic communities), ten-sum (buddhist images, scriptures, and stupas), nyes (buddhist pilgrimage sites), language, literature, music, visual arts and religion to enrich society and the cultural life of citizens. in tandem with this mandate to preserve and promote mahayana buddhism as a state religion and policy, article 9, section 2 states, “the state shall strive to promote those conditions that will enable the pursuit of gross national happiness.” as provided by the gnh commission: gnh is a multi-dimensional development approach that seeks to achieve a harmonious balance between material wellbeing and the spiritual, emotional and cultural needs of our society (gross national happiness commission 2015). the gnh commission further explains relative to spiritual happiness and gnh: we have now clearly distinguished the ‘happiness’… in gnh from the fleeting, pleasurable ‘feel good’ moods so often associated with that term. we know that true abiding happiness cannot exist while others suffer, and comes only from serving others, living in harmony with nature, and realizing our innate wisdom and the true and brilliant nature of our own minds (gross national happiness commission 2015). this statement reflects the primary goal of seeking enlightenment under mahayana buddhism. in mahayana, overcoming suffering and becoming enlightened and happy through the fourth noble truth or eightfold path occurs by becoming aware of the nature of reality including good karma by serving others and being in harmony with nature. 2.2.2 implementation of gross national happiness the gnh commission is the key national planning agency in bhutan that operationalizes and evaluates gnh’s incorporation in all government programs (gross national happiness commission 2015). in furtherance of this policy objective, the gnh commission uses the thimphu, bhutan-based centre for bhutan studies’ gnh index, which measures four pillars of gnh: economic growth or materialism, cultural preservation, ecological protection, and good governance (centre for bhutan studies 2011a, 2011c). for the purposes of further analysis of gnh in bhutanese society the four pillars have been expanded into nine domains (centre for bhutan studies 2011a, 2011c; thinley 2009). the nine domains include: standard of living, good governance, time use and balance, community vitality, cultural vitality and diversity, ecosystem vitality and diversity, health of the population, education, and psychological wellbeing (centre for bhutan studies 2011a, 2011c; thinley 2009). the centre for bhutan studies has recently developed 33 measures based on national public opinion surveys to assess progress toward national wellbeing as reflected in the nine domains (centre for bhutan studies 2011a, 2011c; thinley 2009). the psychological wellbeing domain in particular and especially as it relates to government promotion of mahayana buddhism, measures the degree of spiritual happiness of bhutanese citizens in the areas of: spirituality level, prayer recitation, meditation, and consideration of karma (centre for bhutan studies 2015). ultimately, at the center of all development efforts under gnh is a focus on the material and spiritual welfare and wellbeing of each individual in bhutan (centre for bhutan studies 2011a, 2011c). as the gnh commission indicates “the gnh paradigm concludes that ‘economic mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 24 growth is not an end in itself, but rather a means to achieve more important ends …happiness’” (gross national happiness commission 2015). gnh in bhutan as implemented by governmental agencies is based on the mahayana idea that enlightenment can be obtained by everyone. compassionate mahayana public policies based on gnh can increase the likelihood of citizens becoming enlightened, blissful, and happy. while there is no universally accepted definition of happiness, the specific religious-based mahayana view of enlightenment and happiness implemented through governmental action and public policies contrasts with several prominent modern western and secular views. utilitarianism, for instance, holds that the role of government is maximizing total benefits for many while reducing the suffering or negatives for as many as possible (bentham 2007). the maximization of utility includes enhancing hedonistic pleasure, economic prosperity, and a lack of suffering or pain. this approach to material happiness relies on government, but focuses on promoting secular happiness for as many citizens as possible. utilitarian happiness in significant part contrasts with the mahayana religious view of happiness contained in the second noble truth, which calls for overcoming suffering related to unwarranted ego-cravings including seeking an undue amount of material things. another modern western view of happiness is contained in the enlightenment-based idea of liberty, such as the “liberty, equality, fraternity” of france, “unity, justice and liberty” in germany, “life, liberty, security of the person" in the canadian charter of rights, and “life liberty and the pursuit of happiness” in the us declaration of independence. liberty in each case is considered an inherent and inalienable right for human happiness by which governments are required to protect, in some combination, citizens’ life, their liberty from political abuses by government, and private property. this contrasts, in part, with the gnh and mahayana view of happiness, in which the bhutanese state has a duty to promote conditions for citizens to individually and actively obtain enlightenment and happiness. here, the emphasis is not solely on government protecting rights, but also on citizens having a duty to practice compassion and seek enlightenment and happiness. a third example of a western view of happiness is rawlsian happiness (rawls 2005). from rawl’s perspective, people are made happy when they are successfully executing a rational plan in life, based on favorable conditions, and their expectations are good that the plan will succeed based on justice (rawls 2005). rawlsian justice includes every person simultaneously having the right to civil liberties, equality of opportunity, and distributive state policies that meet basic human needs. again, the focus here is on secular governmental action to meet secular requirements for happiness for citizens. by contrast, the mahayana view of happiness is focused on the religious goal of all citizens seeking and becoming enlightened. however, in mahayana buddhism, as in rawlsian justice, there is a goal of compassion for others by working to alleviate human suffering through such approaches as meeting basic human needs, through individual or government actions as in bhutan, and respecting the sanctity and integrity of all sentient beings, including humans. unlike a number of western and secular approaches to happiness, such as these three examples, in which the state provides basic needs or checks governmental abuses, mahayanaoriented gnh includes governmental action to provide suitable conditions for religious happiness. this is in tandem with individual citizen responsibility to become enlightened. 3. conclusion obtaining happiness is a central focus of mahayana buddhism doctrine, and in seeking the ultimate truth sentient beings look to reach a holistic balancing of material, emotional, and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/utility mahayana buddhism givel www.internationaljournalofwellbeing.org 25 spiritual needs (bhutan broadcasting service 2008; tashi 2004; thinley 2007). gnh means government facilitating the achievement of the collective happiness of society (bhutan broadcasting service 2008; tashi 2004). according to mahayana buddhist beliefs, happiness and compassion arise from awareness of suffering in the self and in others (achieved by removing the distraction of immediate suffering and through education). while the 2008 bhutanese constitution explicitly calls for mahayana buddhism to be the state religion in bhutan, the constitution in article 3, section 2 requires that the king protect all religions in bhutan. article 7, section 4 provides for freedom of religious practice with no person required to belong to another faith by means of “…coercion and inducement.” as written in article 7, section 1, all bhutanese citizens are accorded equal protection of the law and are not discriminated against based on religion. moreover, article 8, section 3 requires that bhutanese citizens promote tolerance regardless of “…religious, linguistic, regional or sectional diversities.” given that mahayana buddhism is the state religion in bhutan and about 22% of the population is hindu, these constitutional provisions in a legal sense provide important requirements on the right to practice a religion other than mahayana buddhism (united states central intelligence agency 2015). however, modern legal requirements since 2008 and reality as it occurs in societal practices in promoting freedom of religion may not always be ‘in sync’. while gnh is a policy that explicitly promotes mahayana buddhism, a key question remains how gnh will bridge religious differences in its promotion of wellbeing. will non-buddhists in bhutan even be marginalized within gnh? the answer is not yet known, but is certain to be tested within the framework of the recent constitutional provisions that afford human rights in the practice of religion while making mahayana buddhism a state religion. the relief of material needs sponsored and promoted by the government, in tandem with the spiritual and emotional needs of individuals, are a primary goal of bhutan in a mahayana buddhist context of compassion for all in this world. moreover, bodhisattvas can facilitate the development of a gnh society by spreading compassion and countering ignorance. oppositely from gdp, gnh focuses on the individuals who make up society and their wellbeing, rather than external economic phenomena. buddhist canons indicate that focusing only on ego-driven cravings and the illusion of material wealth will lead to unhappiness, making gnh an appropriate buddhist response to the worldwide use of economic indexes as indicators of success. authors michael givel university of oklahoma mgivel@ou.edu publishing timeline received 4 may 2015 accepted 4 may 2015 published 21 june 2015 references armstrong, k. 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(2008). mahāyāna buddhism: the doctrinal foundation. london: routledge. http://www.bhutanaudit.gov.bt/about%20us/mandates/constitution%20of%20bhutan%202008.pdf https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bt.html http://www.kosei-shuppan.co.jp/english/text/mag/2007/07_101112_10.html http://www.voanews.com/content/a-13-2005-04-20-voa51/397244.html http://dx.doi.org/10.1525/as.2004.44.6.836 the three râ•žs of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina the international indigenous policy journal volume 2 issue 3 truth and reconciliation article 3 august 2011 the three r’s of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina michelle bonner department of political science, university of victoria, mbonner@uvic.ca matt james department of political science, university of victoria, mattjame@uvic.ca recommended citation bonner, m. , james, m. (2011). the three r’s of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina. the international indigenous policy journal, 2(3) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 this research is brought to you for free and open access by scholarship@western. it has been accepted for inclusion in the international indigenous policy journal by an authorized administrator of scholarship@western. for more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca. the three r’s of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina abstract in canada an officially mandated truth commission inquiring into the forced assimilation and abuse of indigenous children in state-organized and funded residential schools raises profound and in many ways quite novel questions about transitional justice concerning indigenous peoples in advanced capitalist societies. this article compares the canadian case with that of a quintessential transitional justice pioneer: argentina. focusing on the efforts of justice-seekers in each country, it reveals similarities in their respective pursuits of what the article identifies as three important transitional justice goals: reparation, responsibility and reframing. however, the article also finds a crucial difference between the two cases. this difference is that justice seekers in argentina have placed a heavy emphasis on social and political accountability, a goal that, in various ways, has received much less attention in the canadian case. we conclude that this absence raises broader issues about transitional justice processes in countries marked by ongoing legacies of anti-indigenous colonialism—issues that canadians from the settler society, in particular, must begin urgently to address. keywords transitional justice; reparations; indigenous peoples; truth commissions; colonialism; argentina; canada acknowledgments both authors gratefully acknowledge support from the social sciences and humanities research council of canada. thanks also to julia bareman and adam molnar for excellent research assistance, and to rosemary nagy, pablo policzer, and robinder sehdev for helpful comments. creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ introduction as is well known, practices of transitional justice aim to democratize, build cultures of accountability, and promote respect for human rights in countries emerging from authoritarian rule, dictatorship, or mass atrocity. less certain, however, is the applicability of transitional justice, as either a family of mechanisms or as an overarching conceptual framework, beyond the more familiar contexts of regime change or collapse seen most typically in countries of the global south. this question of applicability is central to a development addressed directly in this article: the advent in canada of an officially mandated truth commission inquiring into the forced assimilation and abuse of indigenous children in state-organized and funded residential schools. for more than a century, successive canadian federal governments operated a policy that took over 100,000 native children from their families and placed them in boarding schools operated by the country’s major christian denominations. the schools were established with the specific goal of eradicating indigenous languages and cultures, a goal they sought to achieve by separating children from their families and communities, denigrating native traditions and ways, and practicing ruthlessly punitive forms of quasi-military discipline (miller, 1996). physical and sexual abuse were rampant in the schools and shockingly high mortality rates from disease and neglect were common (hackett, 2005). furthermore, and contrary to the canadian prime minister’s recent assertion that his country has no history of colonialism (simard, 2009), the residential schools also advanced a broader agenda of settler colonization; by attempting to eliminate native capacities for cultural and community reproduction, the schools aimed to ensure that distinct self-governing indigenous communities would no longer exist. the emergence of a canadian truth commission into these outrages raises novel questions about the prospects for “transitional justice in a non-transitional society” (jung, 2009), particularly given the tendency in the literature to equate transitional justice with liberalization processes in the post-communist world or global south (e.g. hayner, 2002; phelps, 2004). but as eric posner and adrian vermeule (2003-2004) have pointed out, this view ignores the importance of quintessentially transitional questions of retroactivity, compensation, and historical inquiry in so-called “consolidated democracies” wrestling with their own abuses, injustices, and inequalities. indeed, the legal scholar jeremy webber concludes more specifically that canada’s colonial domination of indigenous peoples makes imperative what he describes as the quintessentially transitional task of developing legal cultures and institutions that respect rather than seek to smother cultural, normative, and legal diversity (webber, 2009). this article agrees with these latter arguments and views. at the same time, it takes a slightly different path. rather than asking broadly about the applicability of transitional justice in the global north or mounting a particular argument about what kind of legal or institutional innovations canadian circumstances may require, we undertake a comparative study of transitional justice struggles themselves. our goal is 1 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 to highlight the similarities, analyze the differences, and move beyond the assumption that the north has nothing to learn from the south. in terms of comparison, we seek critically to understand the character of canada’s initial engagement with transitional justice mechanisms and notions by considering the transition-related struggles of social movements in argentina, a country whose significant and well documented role as a transitional justice pioneer provides a useful baseline of assessment. at the same time, we wish to underscore our recognition of indigenous communities in canada as distinct political communities with the inherent right of self-determination; by focusing on social movement struggles, we do not mean to assimilate indigenous nations to prevailing scholarly conceptions of “social movements” (cf. woolford, 2005). instead, we mean only to highlight our overarching empirical focus on the key demands and themes of justice-seekers in the two countries. that is, we ask: what does a comparison of the two cases reveal about the transitional nature of the demands and themes of justice-seekers in canada? the justification for this kind of “bottom-up” approach is in fact strong, particularly in the canadian case. the point is simple. the circumstances of regime change or concerted international pressure typically associated with transitional justice are glaringly absent in canada. instead, the limited moves seen so far, such as the 2006 indian residential schools settlement agreement compensation package for former students, the official 2008 state apology for the residential schools policy, and the formal establishment in 2009 of the truth and reconciliation commission of canada, reflect indigenous mobilization and pressure in the face of official obfuscation and denial. thus, attention to these kinds of society-level struggles is arguably even more crucial in the canadian case than it might be in situations where the pressures for transition are more varied and multiple. the difficulties of an argentina-canada comparison must be acknowledged. in canada, the justice-seekers are indigenous communities addressing wrongs (in particular, brutally assimilationist residential schools) that occurred within a so-called liberal democracy over many decades; some of the very worst wrongdoing occurred more than thirty years ago and many of the perpetrators and architects of those abuses are no longer alive. in argentina, by contrast, the justice-seekers belong primarily to the dominant (non-indigenous) ethnic group and focus on the injustices of an authoritarian military regime which lasted only seven years; the injustices are also of sufficiently recent vintage that many of the direct perpetrators are still alive, with some even continuing to occupy positions of public power. these differences are significant. yet we contend that there is something to be learned from bringing together what the comparative political science literature would call these two, “most different” cases (przeworski & teune, 1998). argentina, a dramatic case of democratizing transition involving a move from classic authoritarianism to trials of senior regime figures in just a matter of years, offers an important vantage point of clarity on canada’s more diffuse processes of historical reckoning. precisely because of the vaster scale and shorter time-frame involved, the argentine case serves to 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 foreground important considerations about its canadian counterpart that might otherwise go unnoticed. our comparison also has a mildly subversive bent. while socalled “modernization” approaches have often sought paternalistically to apply theories and ideas constructed from the study of so-called established democracies to issues of political and economic development in the global south (see e.g. rostow, 1960; huntington, 1968), this article tries to reverse the modernization logic by asking what the so-called third world might teach the first. the conclusions emerging from our comparison are as follows. we argue that there is much to be gained from viewing the canadian case through a transitional justice lens and that the argentine comparison raises important considerations for projects of reconstruction in settler societies that, like canada, are marked by ongoing legacies of colonialism. more specifically, we emphasize the issue of accountability, a goal that, while central for justice seekers in argentina, is in many ways eerily absent in the canadian case.1 this emphasis on accountability follows in part from our consideration of the argentine case, which, as will be seen, stands as something of an exemplar to canada in this regard. but it also reflects what our analysis shows about the politics of reparation and truth-seeking in relation to the residential schools. in essence, the impact of colonialism on native communities means that indigenous priorities in the canadian context tend to involve projects of individual reparation, community healing, and political regeneration and rebuilding. these priorities leave indigenous peoples little opportunity and perhaps even little inclination to pursue a host of important forensic considerations pertaining to the identification and possible sanction of canadian individuals and institutions responsible for gross injustices and abuses of human rights. indeed, from the standpoint of indigenous emphases on decolonization and internal community rebuilding, a concern with accountability in the interest of improving and perhaps morally regenerating the structures of the settler state might seem beside the point; groups seeking to exercise their self-determination rights may simply have bigger to be sure, there are sound reasons why indigenous justice-seekers in canada have not prioritized accountability to the same degree or in the same way as have their argentine counterparts; this article explores some of the most important explanations. but a focus on argentine struggles for legal, political, and social accountability as a prerequisite for the transitional goal of ‘nunca más’ (never again) forces us to ask a question seldom heard in the canadian settler society. the question is this: in the interest of promoting a transition from the colonial authoritarianism manifested so glaringly in the residential schools, how might accountability—by which we mean not necessarily criminal trials but, perhaps more importantly, the full public disclosure of relevant facts and documents and, where possible, the identification and public answerability of architects and perpetrators of injustices—be pursued in a manner appropriate to the canadian context? 1 for more on the various forms of accountability see for example peruzzotti and smulovitz (2006). 3 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 fish to fry. but this does not mean that accountability for canadian institutions and actors should simply be sacrificed. finally, our comparison of the two cases shows profound similarities between the argentine dictatorship’s approach to its so-called subversives, on the one hand, and the treatment of indigenous peoples under the residential schools policy, on the other— similarities that many canadians, smugly confident in their country’s status as a “first world” liberal democracy, may be loath to acknowledge. thus, by highlighting the authoritarianism within canadian liberal democracy and by emphasizing what canada can learn from the role of justice-seekers in argentina’s democratizing transition, we hope ultimately to see at home what transitional justice aims to promote in other corners of the globe: political introspection in the service of political change. our analysis begins with argentina, an indisputable example of transitional justice; it then explores the canadian case. striving to ground the ensuing comparison in those local projects and aspirations that appear most pertinent to tasks of transition, the article compares the two cases by focusing on how justice-seekers in each country have approached three key areas of concern for groups promoting change in the wake of massive and systematic violations of human rights: reparation, responsibility, and reframing. reparation looks forward, signalling not only the concern of victims and survivors with monetary compensation but, just as importantly—as the word’s root, “repair,” indicates—with upholding dignity and recovering health in the wake of gross violations of human rights. by responsibility, we mean to emphasize the key backwardlooking tasks on which groups seeking reparation and political transition must focus: affixing causal responsibility and assigning moral blame for the relevant injustices (cf. james, 2009). finally, as students of social movements might suspect, our emphasis on reframing is meant more specifically to direct attention towards the quintessential justice-seekers’ imperative: to transform prevailing understandings about both the sources and the elimination of unnecessary suffering.2 argentina argentina is a classic case study of transitional justice. from 1976 to 1983 the country experienced a brutal military regime. as many as 30,000 people disappeared, thousands were killed, and thousands more were imprisoned for political reasons and tortured. during this period a vocal human rights movement emerged. the most 2 readers may wonder why we do not emphasize a “fourth ‘r’, reconciliation, given its prominence in both the title of the truth and reconciliation commission of canada and in transitional justice discourses worldwide. our reasoning is simple. reconciliation is not a primary goal of most politically engaged victims and survivors in the wake of massive injustice. it seems rather a prudential consideration raised by the need to live alongside former tormentors and antagonists and thus more often a priority for state actors. for a critique of the notion of reconciliation in the canadian context, see alfred, wasase. 4 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 famous argentine human rights organization, the mothers of the plaza de mayo, drew international attention that contributed to the end of the military regime. today, the human rights movement remains prominent and influential in argentina. beginning in 1983, the newly elected government ended the military’s self-amnesty, freed political prisoners, sought to find the disappeared, established a truth commission, and initiated trials against those involved in the military regime’s abuses. subsequent governments have provided monetary reparations to victims and victims’ families, as well as assistance in finding missing grandchildren who were illegally adopted under the military regime. thus, argentina has used a wide spectrum of transitional justice mechanisms, some of which argentine human rights organizations have preferred over others. let us now look at the argentine pursuit of transitional justice through our lenses of reparation, responsibility, and reframing. reparation although the relevant scholarly literature often treats reparation as a relatively narrow matter of compensating victims materially for serious injuries or losses, it is useful to draw here on the broader definition adopted by the united nations general assembly (2006), which describes reparation as an ensemble of responses encompassing the following possible measures: “restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition” (for a helpful discussion on the different notions of reparation, see de greiff, 2007). because justiceseekers are likely to pursue and emphasize different aspects of reparation in different historical situations and different cultural contexts, this broader definition is useful in a “most different” cases comparison as a means of ensuring that important aspects of reparation are not missed. indeed, it is evident that argentine human rights organizations and activists have pursued a wide range of reparative goals corresponding to what the un calls restitution, satisfaction, and guarantees of non-repetition. restitution involves, “whenever possible, restor[ing] the victim to the original situation before the gross violations of international human rights law or serious violations of humanitarian law occurred”; relevant examples range from the restoration of liberty to the reestablishment of family life. satisfaction tends to encompass still more specific instances of restitution, such as “the search for the whereabouts of the disappeared … for the identities of the children abducted …for the bodies of those killed [and] assistance in the recovery, identification and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims” (united nations, 2006). collectively, these were the initial priorities of argentine human rights organizations; they remain priorities for some groups today, most notably, the grandmothers of the plaza de mayo. crucial about these restitution priorities in argentina is that their prominence reflected 5 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 the fact that there were indeed key aspects of past wrongdoing that could, in some form, be undone. goals pertaining to restitution and satisfaction in relation to the family are particularly central in the work of argentine human rights organizations. families were torn apart by the dictatorship and they now need to be rebuilt; this reality informed the creation of many of the most famous argentine human rights organizations, such as the mothers of the plaza de mayo.3 while the disappeared could not be returned alive other people could. after lobbying successfully the government to free political prisoners, human rights organizations turned their attention to the fate of children who had been adopted into homes considered “acceptable” by the military regime, which believed that the children were innocent victims of their parents’ subversion and could therefore be “re-educated” through adoption. the grandmothers of the plaza de mayo demanded that these children be given the truth about their identity and returned to their families (often grandparents). in 1992 president menem responded to these demands by establishing the national commission for the right to identity (conadi) whose mandate was to work with the grandmothers and the national bank of genetics data to assist in locating the missing grandchildren (bonner, 2007). as of september 10, 2008, ninety-five grandchildren had been located (abuelas de plaza de mayo, 2010). the mothers met and organized as a result of their individual struggles to find out from the military regime the location of their disappeared children and grandchildren and to have them returned. for years, from the time of the dictatorship until after its demise, the movement’s slogan was “return them alive.” when electoral democracy re-emerged, the mothers of the plaza de mayo met with newly elected president raúl alfonsín to discuss the return of the disappeared. alfonsín embraced this goal until it became clear that it would not be possible; the disappeared were gone and assumed dead. there have also been at least two further, more controversial attempts by argentine governments to make reparation. the first relates to that aspect of reparation corresponding to what the un calls “satisfaction.” some human rights organizations, most notably the argentine forensic anthropology team, but also the mothers of the plaza de mayo – founding line and others, argue that it is important to locate the bodies of the disappeared and to ascertain the truth about their identity; their argument is that recovering the bodies will allow families to confirm and mourn their losses. other argentine human rights organizations, such as the mothers of the plaza de mayo association, disagree, insisting that confirmation of death and date of death can lead to the imposition of statutes of limitations, thus shielding those who committed the crime. these latter groups have also argued that recovering bodies may suggest that the struggle for justice is over; from their perspective, locating bodies 3 other well-known family-based argentine human rights organizations include the grandmothers of the plaza de mayo, h.i.j.o.s. (children of the disappeared), and families of the disappeared and imprisoned for political reasons. 6 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 impedes judicial sanction (another aspect of satisfaction) and could even thereby hamper retributively-focused efforts to “guarantee non-repetition.” the second government attempt to make reparation was a response to pressure from the inter-american court on human rights rather than from human rights organizations themselves. in this case the argentine state began in 1991 to provide financial reparation to political prisoners and family members of the disappeared who came forward, thus initiating the un’s “compensation” aspect of reparation. if claimed, ex-political prisoners are compensated $76.66 per day in jail, while families of the disappeared can receive $240,000 for each loved one who is recognized by the state as disappeared (bonner, 2007). most human rights organizations have accepted that these reparations represent the state’s partial recognition of the truth about what happened, while also noting the importance of financial compensation to families that had suffered great losses; for example, in some cases grandparents on pensions have been raising grandchildren, whose parents were disappeared. however, the mothers of the plaza de mayo association have made a forceful counterargument: that financial reparation is, in their words, “prostitution”; it involves the state buying the bodies of the disappeared and indeed buying its way out of responsibility. such criticisms may reflect hostility to the appearance of monetary compensation as a possible alternative to more thoroughgoing measures of accountability when military and authoritarian forces appear to threaten the goal of transition (cf. teitel, 2000). these concerns may indeed have been well-founded in argentina. a series of amnesty laws and pardons enacted between 1986 and 1990 freed or excused all military officers initially charged in national courts for human rights abuses (bonner, 2007); financial reparation in 1991 came immediately after these amnesty laws and pardons, possibly appearing to replace judicial sanctions. in such instances, therefore, human rights organizations may well have perceived that one aspect of reparation—financial compensation—was being used unreasonably to substitute for another, namely, the goal of satisfaction. thus, victims and justice-seekers in the argentine case have been concerned to prevent financial compensation from becoming a narrow substitute for more capacious and ambitious assignments of state responsibility. the article’s next section develops and expands upon this crucial point. responsibility in transitional justice, as with the notion of reparation itself, questions of responsibility are central; the relevant claims and debates revolve inevitably around issues of causation, moral blame, and contemporary reparative duty (james, 2009). of course, different campaigns and contexts will weigh and arrange these three elements differently, as the previous discussion of the controversies around reparative obligation in the argentine case has shown. now it is appropriate to ask: in what other ways have the groups struggling for justice in the aftermath of the argentine dictatorship 7 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 addressed the crucial transitional matters of determining causal responsibility and affixing moral blame? of paramount importance for argentine human rights organizations, these matters of responsibility have been pursued in relation to three quintessential instruments of transitional justice: the truth commission, criminal trials, and processes of lustration. the argentine truth commission was established five days after the newly elected government took office in 1983, and its best-seller report, nunca más, was published the following year. yet, like monetary reparations, the truth commission proved controversial within the argentine human rights movement. neither human rights organizations nor their representatives were included among the members of the commission, although the commission did meet with some of the human rights organizations and solicited information from all of them. most of the human rights organizations save one were willing to work with the truth commission, but for none was the “truth” ascertained and produced by the commission sufficient. for example, the number of people recognized in the truth commission report as disappeared by the dictatorship is 8,960; the number claimed by rights organizations is 30,000. indeed, full truth is still an important objective for argentine human rights organizations. during the 2008 demonstration commemorating the march 24, 1976 coup, a speaker stated to a supportive audience: “we call for the opening of the armed forces archives in order to know the entire truth. without this impunity persists, the perpetrators of the genocide maintain their pact of silence” (madres de plaza de mayo – línea fundadora, 2008). thus, critics—hoping both to know the truth for its own sake and to better apportion moral blame—have lamented the failure of the truth commission to establish the full scope and nature of the state’s causal responsibility. argentine human rights groups have also emphasized criminal trials as a means of ascertaining and apportioning responsibility. since the return of electoral democracy, trials and the related fight against amnesties and pardons have been central to the agenda of argentine rights organizations (bonner, 2005). in almost every year since 1984 the slogan for the yearly march of resistance, organized by many of the most prominent relevant groups, has included explicit references to “trial and punishment,” proclaimed “no” to amnesties and pardons (such as the due obedience and final point amnesty laws), and declared “no” to “impunity” (madres de plaza de mayo – línea fundadora, 2008). in 1989, the slogan of the event emphasized the link between trials and truth: “because we are not resigned to the lack of justice. because we are not resigned to the lack of truth. we say: no to final point. no to due obedience. no to the pardon. no to impunity” (madres de plaza de mayo – línea fundadora, 2008b). throughout, the argument has been that criminal trials will furnish truths hitherto missing, ensure the end of impunity, and thus force the state to take more fulsome responsibility for its wrongdoing. lustration, that is, the screening and dismissal of actual or potential officeholders for gross past misdeeds, has been associated with similar objectives. there are 8 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 countless examples of argentine human rights organizations demanding lustration or simply opposing electoral candidates with records of abuses; in some cases these organizations have been successful (elster, 2004). for example, in 2006 pressure from human rights organizations combined with other factors led then governor of the province of buenos aires, felipe solá, to retire thirty-seven buenos aires provincial police officers for having actively participated in clandestine detention centers during the last dictatorship (cels, 2007). lustration is not only punishment for the wrongdoer; it requires public knowledge of the name of the individual and of which among their deeds merit lustration. lustration thus makes the state take contemporary responsibility for past wrongdoing by removing known abuse perpetrators from its power structures. like incarceration, it removes human rights violators from powerful positions in public life, again helping to assure victims that state institutions can be trusted. thus, argentine activists and rights groups have struggled almost continually to go beyond the apportionment of causal responsibility and moral blame offered by the truth commission, demanding the removal of abusers from the government and state apparatus through jailing, lustration, or, where applicable, both. they argue that the conduct of numerous, determinate individuals demands the removal of said individuals from public life. their aim is not simply retributive in the classic criminal justice sense. instead, rights groups insist more specifically that what these individuals represent, and perhaps continue to value and believe, cannot be part of the new, post-transitional society that argentina must create. thus, the project of determining causal responsibility and affixing moral blame is also very much linked to the processes of political reframing that these groups promote. reframing as many authors have pointed out (teitel, 2000; payne, 2008; phelps, 2004), effective transitional justice involves changing the terms, discourses, and symbols used to explain past events in order to change the future. these processes are designated by the term, reframing (see gamson, 1985). the symbolic, ideational, and discursive efforts associated with processes of reframing are crucial to enterprises of transition because, over the long term, effective and meaningful transition tends to require replacing the conceptualizations of citizenship, belonging, and community that underpinned the violator regime with more satisfactory understandings and notions (barahona de brito, gonzaléí-enriquez, & aguilar). thus, because victims of the dictatorship were excluded from the regime’s definition of citizen and nation, activists seek reframed definitions that include themselves—the former so-called subversives— and their loved ones. at the same time, they have struggled to reframe understandings of the dictatorship from an allegedly necessary fight against subversion to a “genocide” 9 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 that assaulted and indeed nearly destroyed values essential to an even minimally just society. these aims have been articulated in two important ways. the first concerns the family. during the dictatorship the military regime called on mothers to defend the family and the nation by denouncing their children if they suspected them of being subversives. if their loved ones disappeared, families were expected to mourn in silence; not to do so was considered equivalent to supporting terrorism (bonner, 2007). accordingly, reclaiming citizenship and nation has involved concerted efforts to reframe the nation-as-family. the frame proposed by human rights organizations stresses that the causes of democratization and human rights require precisely the sort of respect for and protection of families that the dictatorship so manifestly failed to provide. for example, in 1983 a member of the grandmothers of the plaza de mayo explained, “what can one hope for from someone who thinks that destroying the family, hiding children, negating their identity, will lead to a democracy, an ideal family” (serpaj, 1983). not limiting human rights violations to the past, the mothers of the plaza de mayo association responded to the 2001 argentine economic crisis by explaining in an open letter to the government: “the mothers of the plaza de mayo put the responsibility of the crime of our children’s hunger on all those who govern. we cannot accept that our children eat stuffed toads, rats, rotten food, sick horses in order to survive. these are the future citizens we are raising?” (asociación madres de plaza de mayo, 2002). this reframing insists that defending human rights protects the family and in turn promotes a more appropriate and more democratic understanding of citizenship and nation. the second major reframing effort directly contests the idea, so central to the former dictatorship, that the disappeared deserved their fates because they threatened the nation. rights groups have argued in contrast that the disappeared were in fact heroes struggling for a better world and a more just argentina. from this standpoint, the continuation of the struggle of the disappeared is in fact a contribution to argentine democracy. consider, for example part of the lengthy slogan used in the annual march of resistance in 2006: because we defend the principles of the 30,000 detained-disappeared, their objectives, their struggle, their solidarity and their commitment to build a just and free country, with social laws that protect all of the people. because our children left their example of how to live. the mothers, we continue forward with them: in the defence of human rights, the right to freedom, the right to equality and against discrimination, to health, education and culture, to housing, work, just salaries, a dignified pension. (mpm-lf, 2008) particularly interesting about this reframing is its view on matters of social and economic rights. whereas social and economic rights are often presented in reparative 10 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 struggles as matters of rehabilitating individual victims, in the argentine conception the target is the entire society; that is, not only the living victims of the dictatorship (the exdisappeared, ex-political prisoners, and their families) need social services to heal, but all argentines. understanding this point requires grasping the importance to the dictatorship of neo-liberal economic policies, which, among other things, involved funding cuts to important social services. accordingly, many argentine human rights organizations frame the dictatorship as an “economic genocide,” stressing in particular that the broader end served by the disappearances and deaths was to impose on argentines an economic system that they did not want and from which they continue to suffer (bonner, 2007). reframing the dictatorship in this manner, human rights organizations aim to place health, education, and the economic well-being of all argentines—the goals pursued by the victims of the dictatorship—as central aspects of the new democratic argentina. in addition, many human rights organizations also address issues such as the rights of indigenous peoples and immigrants. for example, cels, a prominent argentine human rights organization, covers these topics in its yearly human rights reports, and apdh and serpaj-argentina have working groups dedicated to addressing human rights issues as they relate to indigenous communities. the new vision of the nation promoted by human rights organizations is of one that protects human rights for everyone in argentina regardless of political views, class, ethnicity, or citizenship. in this sense, justice is about understanding the past in such a way that the new nation includes those who were forcefully excluded. to summarize, the transitional justice work of argentine human rights activists and organizations has been analyzed here along three, interrelated planes of activity: reparation, responsibility, and reframing. within each category there is an array of possible means for achieving the relevant goals. the path to reparation pursued by argentine justice-seekers has emphasized undoing the wrongs of the dictatorship to the fullest extent possible; at the same time, it has de-emphasized the importance of monetary compensation. efforts to determine and apportion state responsibility have focused primarily on criminal trials and lustration; while certainly of considerable import, the official truth commission was seen by activists as somewhat disappointing in this respect. finally, argentine justice-seekers have sought to reframe past abuses in ways congenial to pursuing the broader and quintessentially transitional goal of forging a new, inclusive, democratic, and just—socially, economically, and politically— nationhood and citizenship. as the analysis of the canadian case now hopes to show, the efforts of justiceseekers concerned with the impact and legacy of the country’s system of residential schools for aboriginal, métis, and inuit peoples can also be usefully understood by focusing on matters of reparation, responsibility, and reframing. the following account indicates that the means pursued for achieving these goals, as well as the relative weighting among them, differ significantly from what has just been seen in the 11 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 argentine case. notwithstanding these differences, however, the article’s conclusion argues for more important overriding similarities, lessons, and linkages. first, it holds that the contrasts and comparisons offered here suggest the general applicability of transitional justice as a conceptual framework for understanding the recent canadian struggles over the residential schools. second, it maintains that these contrasts and comparisons also highlight important lessons for both canadians in particular and for those concerned with the prospects for transition from settler colonialism in general. specifically, we aim to draw the reader’s attention to the issue of accountability. canada canada’s century-long residential-schools policy separated, often permanently and violently, over 100,000 native children from their families, cultures, communities, and languages (miller, 1999; milloy, 1999). a former federal government advisory body, the law commission of canada, concluded that the schools reflected “genocidal intent” in deliberately exposing aboriginal and métis children to “abuses perpetrated with the explicit goal of eradicating native ways.” (claes & clifton, 1998, p. 18). by attacking their capacity to resist settler domination and encroachment and thus their capacities to exist as distinct self-governing communities, the residential schools policy was central to the larger canadian goal of colonizing indigenous peoples. physical and sexual abuse was also rampant in the schools. some researchers estimate that between 48 and 70 per cent of students were sexually abused (feldthusen, 2007, p. 62), while a leading account concludes that “a reign of disciplinary terror, punctuated by incidents of stark abuse, continued to be the ordinary tenor of life in many schools” well into the 1970s (milloy, 1999, p. 290). more recent scholarly and community work suggests that the schools are responsible for ongoing, intergenerational legacies of family and community dysfunction that affect negatively the health, happiness, and economic conditions of aboriginal, inuit, and métis communities (see chrisjohn, 2006). canada’s last residential school closed in 1986. from this brief account a canadian-argentine parallel immediately emerges. in both cases, authoritarian policies aimed to destroy families and communities whose existence was deemed ideologically or culturally incompatible with goals essential to the regime. furthermore, in both cases the brutal and long-term intergenerational effects of authoritarian policies have kept alive movements of families and survivors seeking both immediate reparation and long-term political change. therefore, both cases feature precisely the kinds of phenomena that serve to awaken and keep alive in victims a long-term thirst for transitional justice: “communication among the victims of wrongdoing … visible physical reminders of the wrongdoing, and perpetuation of the state of affairs caused by the wrongdoing” (elster, 2004, p. 223). 12 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 reparation as has already been seen, reparation was conceived initially in argentina as a question of restoring, to the maximum extent possible, the pre-dictatorship status quo. as it became apparent that the “disappeared” were in fact dead, reparative efforts turned quickly to matters of satisfaction. affected families sought information about the fate of the disappeared and official acknowledgment of the state’s role in their disappearance; reparation’s compensatory aspect was a distant and even controversial aim. in canada, by contrast, the evolution and dominant focus of reparatory efforts has been quite different. although the indigenous and métis communities affected by canada’s system of indian residential schools have emphasized a number of important reparative considerations, for a brief initial period their major focus was indeed on retributive justice traditionally conceived. the cruelty and suffering that constitute the schools’ main legacy gained significant canadian attention in the mid-1990s as survivors of sexual abuse persuaded authorities to begin laying criminal charges against individual school personnel who had committed acts of physical or sexual abuse (milloy, 1999). however, this retributive focus began quickly to shade into a reparative one. the first such indication came with a raft of civil actions, which, while continuing the classic retributive aim of affixing legal responsibility to and imposing punishment on individual wrongdoers, sought financial compensation for not only harms of physical and sexual abuse, but for losses of language and culture as well (buti, 2001). while complainants in the criminal trials and plaintiffs in the civil suits were clearly seeking to impose classic, western-style legal accountability on abusers and on the state and church authorities responsible for running the schools, they were, perhaps more importantly, seeking rehabilitation. often left destitute and with significant unmet medical and counselling needs, many former residential schools students stressed that the compensation potentially furnished by their legal suits was their best means of furthering personal recoveries amidst a prevailing climate of state and societal indifference (o’neil, 1998). the assembly of first nations, the body representing the leadership of the reserve communities created under canada’s indian act system, summarized the prevailing mood of this initial phase of response: “people [wanted] to work on themselves first, help family next, and then their communities” (assembly of first nations, 1994). most of the civil suits eventually coalesced into the landmark 2002 baxter class action, in which over 10,000 former students sought approximately $12 billion in damages for physical and sexual abuse, loss of language and culture, inadequate education and living conditions, family separation, and ongoing emotional and psychological harm (miller, 2003, p. 382). the focus on compensation and rehabilitation was not confined to the legal arena. following the 1996 recommendations of the royal commission on aboriginal peoples, numerous aboriginal, inuit, and métis organizations began to demand that the canadian federal government take direct responsibility for the harm it had caused by 13 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 implementing a multi-pronged program of financial, health care, and counselling assistance for all former residential school students (james, 1999). the affected communities also began to emphasize satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition; they demanded that the state take responsibility for its wrongdoing by acknowledging and apologizing both for the harm caused by the schools and for the brutal aims of the residential schools policy (see assembly of first nations, 2005). by pressing for an official inquiry or truth commission they also urged that the intent and impact of the residential schools be conveyed to the wider canadian public as well (claes & clifton, 1998). thus, in the case of the residential schools, survivors and affected communities settled fairly quickly on a comprehensive reparative agenda emphasizing financial compensation, rehabilitation, and various aspects of satisfaction and guarantees of nonrepetition, particularly an official apology and truth commission. this predominant emphasis on compensation contrasts significantly with the argentine case. more subtly, the two cases differ in their reparative emphases on satisfaction and non-repetition. while argentine human rights campaigners have often focused on the forensic pursuit of information long denied, their indigenous and métis counterparts—only too familiar with the schools and their shameful legacies—have sought rather to bring to wider societal audiences information already in their possession.4 responsibility having discussed the forms of reparation pursued in the two cases, the comparison here proceeds by taking up matters of responsibility. again, the question is asked: in the wake of these gross violations of human rights, how have the victims and affected communities sought to determine causal responsibility and affix moral blame? in contrast to the quite targeted and specific argentine focus on determining the roles and culpability of individual wrongdoers and on holding those individual wrongdoers criminally and politically accountable for their actions, the situation in canada has been quite different. for example, whereas critics of the argentine truth commission worried that “truth” was being promoted as an alternative to justice, in the canadian residential schools debates the “truth versus justice” dilemma—once a staple in the world of transitional justice (hayner, 2002)—has thus far gone virtually undiscussed. of course, the transitional justice literature as a whole has replaced an 4 a partial exception is the very recent and as yet unfulfilled focus in the canadian case on the related questions of the whereabouts of children who disappeared from residential schools and the locations on or near former school sites of unmarked graves containing the remains of children who died or were killed while attending a residential school. see, canada, indian residential schools truth and reconciliation commission, missing children and unmarked burials: research recommendations (2009), http://www.trccvr.ca/pdfs/working_group_on_missing_children_e.pdf. 14 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 earlier view of “truth” and “justice” as polar alternatives with a more nuanced recognition that the two objectives are mutually intertwined (cf. rotberg and thompson, 2000 and roht-arriaza and mariezcurrena, 2006). but in the canadian context, the kinds of forensic and retributive considerations typically associated as key elements of transitional justice have, in many cases, simply been ignored. notwithstanding the admittedly important case of the early focus on criminal prosecutions of sex abusers, there has been no argentinean-style effort to affix causal responsibility and moral blame to determinate individuals—or even in many cases to particular institutions. one important reason for this difference is that, in contrast to the argentine case, where most of the major primary victims are deceased, the residential schools have left behind tens of thousands of living survivors with significant, present-day reparative needs.5 this is not to say that issues of causation and blame have been ignored. the point is instead twofold: first, the dominant focus in the wake of the residential schools has been on forcing the canadian state to embrace its reparative responsibilities; second, this focus has shaped the approach taken by the victims and affected communities to matters of causation and blame. in the early years of mobilization, indigenous and métis communities were forced to devote the bulk of their political energies towards establishing in law the simple fact of the canadian state’s overall policy and control responsibility for the schools. for instance, in the civil suits seeking damages from the state for individual abuse victims, claimants had to engage in a protracted but ultimately successful effort to establish that, despite the role of the main church denominations in the day-to-day running of the schools, the canadian federal government—as the initiator of the residential schools policy and the funder of the schools—was in fact the entity bearing the primary legal responsibility for the harms suffered by residential schools students (assembly of first nations, 2004). in short, they sought to establish causal responsibility as a means of affixing moral blame in order to authoritatively assign contemporary reparative duties. this simple fact has meant that the justice struggles in canada have been shaped predominantly by the imperative to address the financial, health care, and counselling needs of the individual living survivors, their families, and their communities (see e.g. assembly of first nations, 2010). it has meant in addition that the suspicion of reparations that has figured so prominently in argentina, while not entirely absent, has been a relatively minor theme in the struggles around the residential schools. more broadly, an emphasis on reparative considerations also led communities and survivors to wage what turned out to be an at least partially successful effort to convince the canadian federal government and public that the harm caused by the schools extends far beyond individual cases of physical or sexual abuse. two major 5 as of 2007, it was estimated that there were approximately 80,000 living former residential schools students. bradford w. morse, “the indigenous peoples of canada and their efforts to achieve true reparations,” in reparations for indigenous peoples: international and comparative perspectives, ed. federico lenzerini (oxford: oxford university press, 2008), 281. 15 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 instances of this effort should be noted here. one is the mobilization against ottawa’s alternative dispute resolution process, a process that offered compensation only in specific individual proved instances of physical or sexual abuse. critics demanded, and eventually succeeded in winning, a global compensation regime that provides compensation not only for specific incidents of abuse but for each year that every former living student spent in a residential school.6 the point in discussing these efforts is to underscore that a dominant focus on responsibility for reparative needs has led to a corresponding neglect of the emphasis on the responsibility to be accountable—to hold trials, to initiate processes of lustration, to make public pertinent official documents and information—that has proved so prominent in the argentine case. consider, for example, the results of a search and content analysis using the canadian newsstand (proquest) database, covering the period between january 1992 and september 2009. using the keyword, “residential schools,” and focusing on mainstream media stories quoting indigenous sources, we discovered the following: the second relevant instance is the campaign to persuade the federal government to develop a comprehensive, marshallplan style approach to tackling the profound social welfare needs—income support, education, counselling, job training, and health care—stemming from the intergenerational impact of the schools (see e.g. assembly of first nations, 1990). although this campaign appeared to have borne fruit when the liberal government agreed to the 2005 kelowna accord, the accord was repudiated by the incoming conservative regime in early 2006. • 29 pieces containing calls for federal financial compensation • 27 stories about lawsuits seeking civil damages from government, churches, administrators, and abusers • 19 pieces with individuals or organizations demanding a federal government apology • 15 items containing calls for a truth commission • 11 reports featuring calls for federal government rehabilitative assistance • 7 stories including demands for church apologies • 5 items with voices urging the federal government to recognize the schools as sites of cultural harm • 2 reports with demands for information on the location of graves of students who died while at residential school 6 for evidence of the mobilization’s impact, see the reaction of the standing committee on aboriginal affairs and northern development (canada, standing committee on aboriginal affairs and northern development, 38th parliament, 1st session, study on the effectiveness of the government alternative dispute resolution process for the resolution of indian residential school claims (2005), http://www2.parl.gc.ca/housepublications/publication.aspx?docid=1707109andlanguage=eand mode=1andparl=38andses=1.). 16 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 while the filters and biases of canada’s corporate news media are notorious, this schematic accounting at least gives a rough sense of the prevailing emphases that indigenous and métis struggles for justice have managed to convey to the wider society. in short, the federal government’s reparative responsibilities have been foregrounded; direct calls for argentine-style accountability have been seldom heard. indeed, as will be soon seen, this point even applies to the struggles for a canadian truth commission. this is not to say that the reparative emphasis on federal government responsibilities has been narrow. on the contrary: it has involved extensive efforts aimed at convincing the canadian political community that the harm caused by the schools goes past individualized instances of abuse, and instead encompasses the collective, intergenerational trauma—including family separation, substance abuse, and loss of language and culture—caused by a policy whose goal was to exterminate aboriginal, inuit, and métis as distinct peoples. throughout, justice-seekers have sought to establish the federal government’s present-day reparative duty to address the needs of not only former residential schools students but those of their families and communities as well. these efforts bore some fruit in 2006 when the federal government abandoned its ill-conceived adr process and agreed instead, with the main churches, to establish the new, global compensation regime for all former residential schools students (residential school settlement, 2009). more diffusely, a growing acceptance by the canadian federal government and public that canada has been collectively responsible for the devastating intergenerational impact of a systematic assault on indigenous cultures was manifested symbolically in prime minister harper’s official apology (canada, 2008), which acknowledged the broader range of harms associated with the schools and the brutal assimilative impulse underlying the policy. at the time of writing, whether this acknowledgment would in fact lead to the desired results remained to be seen. the distinctiveness of this focus on responsibility has also shaped the indian residential schools truth and reconciliation commission, which was established in 2009 with a five-year mandate. with so far only minimal complaint from victims, and with the full participation of the assembly of first nations and other aboriginal, inuit, and métis organizations, the canadian truth commission has been conceived as what theresa godwin phelps (2004) would identify as a victimand narrative-focused commission, that is, one concerned primarily to collect and publicize survivor viewpoints and experiences (canada, 2009). despite being barred by its mandate from inquiring into specific questions of fault and blame, the canadian truth commission, beyond academic circles (see e.g. de costa, 2009; james, 2009), has attracted no controversies even remotely comparable to the argentine demonstrations against notions of amnesty and pardon. many of the initial proponents of the idea of a truth commission hoped that a commission would focus on achieving greater “public recognition and awareness” of the 17 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 effects of the schools in the hopes that such awareness would ultimately help to prompt appropriate reparative action.7 thus, while an emphasis on the state’s overall causal responsibility and moral blame for gross human rights abuses has characterized both the argentine and canadian cases, there has also been an important difference. in the argentine case, there has been a strong emphasis on using criminal trials and lustration to hold accountable those individuals who were responsible not only for perpetrating abuses but also for conceiving and directing the overall policy context in which abuses were carried out. in the canadian case, by contrast, there has been a comparable neglect of the actual conduct of residential schools personnel, save in the cases of particular incidents of actual direct abuse. indeed, there has been a general overall neglect of the command and policy roles played by individual canadian bureaucrats and officials working not only in the federal indian affairs ministry, but also—and this is important, given the serious allegations about inhumane and racist medical treatment, surreptitious burials, and systemic failure to address in-school deaths—in canada’s federal police force (the royal canadian mounted police), health ministry, medical profession, and various provincial police forces and coroners’ services (for a lurid, yet largely unrefuted, account see annett, 2005). this apparent lack of interest appears to reflect the relatively greater priority placed by justice-seekers in the canadian case on establishing the federal government’s overall reparative responsibilities to former students and their communities: a standpoint from which the potential contribution of mechanisms such as criminal trials and lustration, processes whose primary focus is on visiting retribution on individuals rather than on securing reparation from a political community, would seem fairly minimal. thus, the dominant reparative focus has meant that questions of responsibility in relation to the residential schools have been simultaneously cathected and diffused. when the initial emphasis on individual cases of sexual and physical abuse formed the dominant prism for viewing the residential schools experience, understandings of causal responsibility and moral blame for gross injustice were cathected, that is, channelled directly onto the figures of extraordinary individual abusers. as attention moved to the issue of ottawa’s contemporary reparative other supporters continue to emphasize the potential of such recognition and awareness to help promote social and political reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples in canada (see e.g. flamand, 2009; wagamese, 2009). for their part, critics worry that the commission is a distraction exercise turning attention away from the issues of stolen land and self-determination for indigenous peoples (see e.g. alfred, 2009; waziyatawin, 2009). by contrast, the forensic weaknesses of the commission’s mandate are seldom noted; for example, only one chapter in the 400-plus page volume on the truth commission produced by the aboriginal healing foundation directly addresses this issue (chrisjohn & wasacase, 2009). 7 this was the motivation cited by many of the respondents calling for a truth commission surveyed in claes and clifton, “needs and expectations,” 61. 18 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 responsibilities, the focus then reversed, with truth commission supporters and critics alike taking a relatively diffuse approach to questions of casual responsibility and moral blame, stressing the reparative duties of the canadian government and political community. however, this is not to say that indigenous and métis communities have ignored other, quintessentially political concerns of the sort commonly associated with notions of transitional justice. grasping this point requires moving to our third and final “r.” reframing in the argentine case, reframing efforts have involved multifaceted discursive and symbolic attempts to transform the meaning, nature, and conduct of an entire political community. activists have sought to reframe previous understandings of citizenship and nation that excluded so-called subversives; to reframe the military dictatorship from an anti-communist bulwark to cruel offender against values ranging from conventional human rights to the very notion of family; and to reframe those formerly stigmatized as subversives into heroes who struggled for democracy. the overall aim has been to build a democratic political community that observes human rights and rule of law norms and that promotes social equality and healthy families. in canada, by contrast, and as the preceding discussion of responsibility has suggested, many of the early reframing efforts were driven primarily by reparative needs. struggling to address financial, health care, and counselling needs amidst shameful conditions of “fourth world” impoverishment, activists and community leaders sought to transform canadian understandings of the schools from institutions plagued by individual rogue abusers into repugnant manifestations of a devastating agenda of cultural assimilation. however, reframing efforts have also focused on fundamental matters of political reconstruction; over time these efforts have become increasingly central. for example, at the first ever canadian conference on the residential schools, then afn leader ovide mercredi concluded, “our fundamental problem is the nature of our relationship with canada. structural change in laws and policies is essential” (quoted in: claes & clifton, 1998, p. 97). in the succeeding years, first nation, métis, and inuit communities have worked to turn the residential schools into a “condensation symbol” (edelman, 1964) which encapsulates in pithy and powerfully accessible ways both the colonial injustices visited by canada upon indigenous and métis peoples and the steps that need to be taken to create more just political relationships today. an early example of this focus occurred when indigenous critics blasted ottawa’s 1998 “statement of reconciliation” (canada, 1998) on the residential schools for confining its words of apology only to the matter of abuse and for neglecting to admit that the main purpose of the schools was cultural genocide. in the succeeding years, numerous conferences, pamphlets, survivor testimonials, and academic works 19 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 have established the residential schools as the concrete reflections of a policy, which, by removing children from their communities and languages and by teaching them to despise and forget their heritages and cultures, aimed fundamentally to destroy indigenous and métis communities as distinct self-determining entities (see e.g. assembly of first nations, 1994; assembly of first nations, 2005; chrisjohn, 2006; claes & clifton, 2009; indian residential schools survivors’ society, 2009). furthermore, justice-seekers have noted, the intergenerational result has been not only a litany of counselling, financial, and health care needs, but, more profoundly, culture and language loss in indigenous communities and a diminished, though far from extinguished, capacity for political resistance. this, more explicitly political, reframing project has buttressed a range of aspirations for political transformation that tend to fall under the rubric of what indigenous leaders and advocates call decolonization (alfred & corntassel, 2005). a good overall sense of the aspirations can be garnered from the landmark study of the law commission of canada (claes & clifton, 1998), which drew on numerous books, documents, and conference reports produced by indigenous and métis organizations and researchers, and consulted extensively with former residential school students. the main themes as gathered and articulated by the law commission study (claes & clifton, 1998) are as follows. first, the profound and continuing harms created by the schools constitute damning and final evidence that assimilation is a failed policy that needs to be replaced by new governing frameworks based on the pluralisation of canadian horizons and cultural respect. second, recognizing this fact also requires rejecting the mistaken notion that the contemporary health and welfare needs of aboriginal and inuit peoples can be adequately or indeed appropriately met via some sort of benevolent humanitarianism that simply recreates in gentler, paternalistic form the basic cultural arrogance underpinning the schools. simply put, while ottawa’s responsibility for running the schools means that it has profound and ongoing reparative responsibilities in terms of funding, community needs must be determined and met by the communities themselves. third, the intergenerational weakening caused by the residential schools needs urgently to be reversed by processes of internal revitalization that restore significant measures of cultural autonomy to first nation, métis, and inuit communities. fourth, and finally, both federal government responsibilities and the importance of recovery and revitalization demand that sufficient control over lands, governance, and resources be transferred to indigenous and inuit communities to meet these diverse objectives. in short, therefore, addressing the legacy of the residential schools has been reframed as an enterprise of decolonization that demands from non-indigenous canadians profound attitudinal change, a new sensitivity and openness to indigenous cultures, a renunciation of paternalism, and a willingness to surrender some of the economic and political power unjustly seized through the colonizing process in which the residential schools policy played a central and longstanding part. the following utterances from indigenous and métis organizations concerned with the legacy of the 20 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 schools, as quoted in the claes and clifton volume (1998, p. 121, 99, 114), should give the reader a sense of the valence and texture of these reframing efforts: • “a fundamental focus for reform needs to be on the development of a true economy … sustainable in its methods and outcomes and [that] ensures equitable distribution to all within aboriginal communities” (four worlds international institute). • [a healing model must draw] on traditional understandings of interconnectedness and wholeness … the revival and maintenance of first nations languages [and] the development of policing and judicial systems culturally appropriate to first nations” (assembly of first nations). • “the only moral response to a crime of this magnitude is that it be undone. … we recommend the fair, just, and immediate settlement of land and resource claims … an open-ended fund to be used by aboriginal nations to … reconstitute their societies [and] the replacement [of the department of indian and northern affairs] by institutions reflecting aboriginal philosophies and under aboriginal controls” (roland chrisjohn, sherri young, and michael maraun). in summary, while canadian and argentine justice-seekers have both focused perhaps most fundamentally on far-reaching questions of political reconstruction, the former have tended to stress as their ultimate aim not democratizing the existing regime and including the previously excluded, but rather, effecting new relationships oriented towards the return of stolen land and socio-political decolonization. although the existing literature on transitional justice has tended to ignore this sort of decolonizing effort, it merits viewing from within a transitional justice lens. as the more familiar argentine case reminds us, transitional justice is fundamentally about the reconstruction of political community. and as webber has recently explained, although the theme has been given insufficient attention in the transitional justice literature, such reconstruction in fact tends to require the “adjustment of contending legal and political orders,” an enterprise that includes not only issues of constitutional reform based on responsiveness to the perspectives of the marginalized and oppressed, but also intensive struggles over what languages, idioms, and traditions ought themselves to inform the debates over transition (2010, p. 9-12). the reframing efforts surrounding the residential schools demonstrate the applicability of this fundamental transitional justice concern in the canadian case. conclusion a comparison of argentina and canada in terms of transitional justice is a comparison of “most different” cases. however, as this article has shown, the similarities between the two countries when analyzed through a transitional justice lens 21 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 are actually quite striking. in both cases large scale human rights abuses took place, affecting victims, their families, and the generations that followed. like argentine justice-seekers, canadian justice-seekers are engaged in pursuing reparation, assigning responsibility, and reframing political community. the comparison of the two cases reveals that, while initial concerns might have suggested the fanciful nature of a canada-argentina comparison, it is seen immediately that in fact the incidents at issue in the two countries have remarkable similarities. both the argentine dictatorship and the canadian residential schools policy involved the deliberate targeting of communities, networks, and families for, if not outright destruction, certainly severe intergenerational disruption. in both cases, this targeting manifested the attempt of an abusive regime to solidify its rule and its peculiarly unjust version of the ideal community by eliminating competitor views of how properly to arrange the political. thus, comparing the canadian and argentine cases helps to show that canada’s treatment of aboriginal peoples is indeed “authoritarian” in the classical political science sense of that term. furthermore, in both cases the intergenerational effects of policies of family and community destruction have kept alive in the affected communities a thirst for truth and justice—a thirst of precisely the sort seen in cases of transitional justice around the world. however, as is common in comparisons between countries in transition from gross human rights abuses, let alone in comparisons involving “most different” cases, there are important differences in the choices made by justice-seekers and in the weight assigned by justice-seekers to various transitional justice mechanisms (roht-arriaza & mariezcurrena, 2006). these differences do not suggest that the conceptual framework of transitional justice and its corresponding mechanisms are irrelevant to canada. rather, our understanding of the canadian case, and indeed of the options available to justice-seekers, policymakers, and academics concerned with canada-first nation relations, is enriched by viewing canada through a transitional justice lens. it would seem in turn that the literature on transitional justice could benefit from further consideration of the relevant issues and debates in settler liberal democracies in the global north. the comparison offered here has also identified important differences: in particular, the relative neglect of various accountability outcomes and goals in the residential schools case. but this finding, in particular, suggests the value of this kind of comparative work, highlighting a potential issue of canadian concern that has thus far received relatively little attention from scholars or practitioners. indeed, by prompting consideration of the possible reasons behind the relative neglect of important accountability outcomes and goals in the residential schools case, this article’s comparison helps us to consider the canadian case in a new and revealing light. of course, any adequate understanding of what canadian accountability might involve would require not only further research but also processes of normative argument and political struggle that have in many ways scarcely begun. as a first tentative step, we are suggesting that concerned groups and individuals from the non22 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 indigenous canadian settler society need to begin focusing on questions of political and social accountability, in both the backwardand forward-looking senses. for example, at the most general level, what do we need to know about the individuals and institutions that allowed the residential schools and their attendant atrocities to persist over four generations in order to break canada’s longstanding colonial pattern? this kind of political accountability could include abolishing or, at least in the short term, significantly reconstructing institutions associated with grievous past wrongs relating to the schools, such as canada’s department of indian and northern affairs. social accountability might involve making key political figures and wrongdoers answerable to the public by forcing them, or at least somehow inducing them, to testify before the trc. it might also involve making public and, indeed, widely disseminating, key official documents and communications pertaining to the planning, execution, and ongoing mechanics of the wrongdoing. as this article has shown, these issues of political and social accountability have been little discussed in canada. we have suggested that the relative neglect of the kind of political and social accountability of which we are speaking reflects at least in part the choices and priorities of indigenous and métis communities. considering these choices and priorities in the context of this article’s canada-argentina comparison highlights the following important considerations about historic justice and political transformation in canada. first, the decisions to prioritize the financial and health care needs of residential school survivors and their communities reflect both the intergenerational devastation caused by the residential schools and the poverty and political marginalization faced by so many canadian indigenous and métis communities. second, reparative priorities aside, the more explicitly transitional or reconstructive goals of canada’s aboriginal, métis, and inuit peoples have not generally shared the concern of their argentine counterparts on transforming the internal workings and machinations of existing, mainstream political institutions. instead, their dominant transitional focus has been on reconstructing indigenous-canadian relationships and strengthening indigenous institutions. some may still insist that the long delay of transitional justice in canada means that our preoccupation with accountability is impractical, even moot. but it needs also to be understood—and this point raises the article’s third and final point about what the relative neglect of political accountability projects familiar from the argentine context reveals about the canadian case—what lies behind the delay. that is, it was precisely the political marginalization and oppression of canadian indigenous and métis peoples that prevented the injustices of the residential schools from being considered in a more timely fashion. indeed, and as this article has shown, residential schools survivors and their communities had to wage arduous, long-term battles to bring even the most elementary concerns about the schools onto the canadian public agenda. for example, whereas a truth commission was implemented almost as soon as the argentine military’s regime ended—the commission report then became an instant bestseller—it was two decades after the majority of residential schools had closed before the idea of a canadian truth commission was even publicly discussed. it then took a further decade’s 23 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 worth of political struggle before the notion received an even minimal degree of acceptance by the canadian federal government. in short, therefore, these findings and considerations do not suggest that transitional justice is an irrelevant conceptual category or practical goal in the canadian case. on the contrary: they indicate instead the extent to which the enormity of canada’s injustices have made the barriers to pursuing and even discussing notions of transitional justice in this country so much greater. the authors therefore reject the assumption that transitional justice is only for the global south or only for countries dealing promptly with extremely recent histories of egregious violation. instead, it appears that the relative neglect of both forensic, backward-looking accountability and forward-looking, politically transformative accountability by justice-seekers in the canadian case reflects the enormity of the subjugation and marginalization of canadian indigenous peoples. it also suggests that there may be an important role, currently missing, in canada for the mobilization of settler solidarity organizations to work for this accountability. thus, far from suggesting irrelevancy, this article’s enterprise of comparison has underscored not only the less propitious 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(2000). transitional justice. new york: oxford university press. 28 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 2, iss. 3 [2011], art. 3 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol2/iss3/3 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2011.2.3.3 united nations. office of the high commissioner for human rights. (2006). basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law. retrieved from http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/remedy.htm wagamese, r. (2009). returning to harmony. in g. younging, j. dewar, & m. degagné (eds.), response, responsibility, and renewal. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. waziyatawin. (2009). you can’t un-ring a bell: demonstrating contrition through action. in g. younging, j. dewar, & m. degagné (eds.), response, responsibility, and renewal. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. webber, j. 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(2005). between justice and certainty: treaty making in british columbia. vancouver: university of british columbia press. 29 bonner and james: three r's published by scholarship@western, 2011 the international indigenous policy journal august 2011 the three r’s of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina michelle bonner matt james recommended citation the three r’s of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina abstract keywords acknowledgments creative commons license the three râ•žs of seeking transitional justice: reparation, responsibility, and reframing in canada and argentina locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser? the international indigenous policy journal volume 3 | issue 2 article 4 august 2012 locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser? konstantin s. petoukhov carleton university, kpetoukhov@live.ca recommended citation petoukhov, k. s. (2012). locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser?. th e international indigenous policy journal, 3(2) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 this policy is brought to you for free and open access by scholarship@western. it has been accepted for inclusion in the international indigenous policy journal by an authorized administrator of scholarship@western. for more information, please contact nspence@uwo.ca. locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser? abstract the truth and reconciliation commission (trc) of canada was established to uncover and acknowledge the injustices that took place in indian residential schools and, in doing so, to pave the way to reconciliation. however, the trc does not define reconciliation or how we would know it when (and if ) we get there, thus stirring a debate about what it could mean. this article examines two theories that may potentially be relevant to the trc’s work: charles taylor’s theory of recognition and nancy fraser’s tripartite theory of justice. the goal is to discover what each theory contributes to our understanding of the harms that indigenous peoples suffered in residential schools, as well as in the broader colonial project, and how to address these harms appropriately. keywords nancy fraser, charles taylor, truth and reconciliation commission, indian residential schools acknowledgments i would like to thank professor andrew woolford (department of sociology, university of manitoba) for the valuable feedback on the initial draft of this paper. i would also like to thank the reviewers for their comments and hard work. creative commons license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser? the indian residential school (irs) system was established by the canadian government in the late 19th century and was operated by united, roman catholic, presbyterian, and anglican churches. the primary objectives of irs were to provide indigenous children with religious training, to teach them english or french, and to help them develop the necessary skills that would allow them to function successfully in a settler society (miller, 1996; milloy, 1999). to accomplish these objectives, the schools were designed to function as total institutions and sought to dispossess indigenous children of their cultures, languages, and traditions, while forcing them to adopt euro-canadian identities, values, and lifestyles. while attending the schools, children were often subjected to physical and sexual abuse perpetrated by school staff (teachers, nuns, priests, doctors, and others), and many children died of neglect and diseases. although the last school closed its doors in 1996, the irs legacy extends to the present day. the harms associated with irs include, but are not limited to: the extinction of many indigenous languages; development of psychological, emotional, and behavioural disorders among indigenous children who spent time in residential schools; community and family dysfunction; inability to parent; high suicide rates among the indigenous population; and increased violence and substance abuse among former students (miller, 2000; smith, 2009). survivors of irs began to launch lawsuits against the federal government and churches in the early 1990s to seek compensation for the damage done by residential schooling. in response to the lawsuits, the government offered a statement of regret in 1998 and set up an alternative dispute resolution (adr) process in 2002 as a means to redress irs claims. however, the apology and the adr process failed to satisfy the justice needs of survivors for various reasons. many survivors viewed the apology as an insincere and incomplete acknowledgement of irs experiences, while many claimants considered the adr process complicated, burdensome, and alienating, and further contributed to revictimizing survivors (stout & harp, 2007). the government saw the apparent failure of these strategies and sought to negotiate a new agreement, the 2006 indian residential schools settlement agreement (irssa) that included the provision of an official government apology to survivors, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission (trc), and the creation of a monetary compensation system for former students (indian residential schools resolution canada [irsrc], 2006). the trc began its work in june 2008 with the mandate to discover the truth about the injustices that took place in residential schools and to acknowledge the harm done to former students (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, n.d.). by doing so, the trc plans to advance canadians towards reconciliation and to help “establish new relationships” between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples, which are “embedded in mutual recognition and respect that will forge a brighter future” (trc, n.d., introduction, para. 1). however, as the standing senate committee on aboriginal peoples’ (2010) the journey ahead report points out, the trc’s mandate leaves reconciliation undefined, which raises both theoretical and substantive questions regarding the trc’s proceedings (see, for example, corntassel, chaw-win-is, & t’lakwadzi, 2009; rice & snyder, 2008). furthermore, scholars 1 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 such as nelund (2011) assert that the trc does not operate “from a clear theory of justice” and it is therefore necessary to consider the options that the trc may explore in reaching its objectives of healing and reconciliation (p.57). in the context of the canadian trc, a theoretical framework may help to guide the work of the trc and thus serve as a tool for conceptualizing the stated goals of truth, healing, and reconciliation. the necessity of using a theory of justice in the context of truth commissions is demonstrated by andré du toit (2000), who reflects on the progress made by the south african trc and argues that truth commissions are “eminently political projects” that do not automatically inherit moral foundations when receiving their mandates (p. 122). he goes on to note that truth commissions’ moral conceptions of “‘truth and reconciliation’ may be explicated...in terms of truth as acknowledgement and justice as recognition” (du toit, 2000, p. 123; see also kiss, 2000). accordingly, this paper examines charles taylor’s theory of recognition and nancy fraser’s tripartite theory of justice with the goal to assess their applicability to the trc’s work. charles taylor’s theory of recognition charles taylor’s theory views recognition as an essential component of repairing the harm done in the process of restoring victims’ identities, dignity, and self-respect (abbey, 1999). more precisely, his theory examines the foundations of recognition and offers a philosophical rationale for why acts such as acknowledgment, apology, and compensation are morally necessary. in this sense, taylor’s theory offers a deeper and richer theoretical basis for the principles and values that guide reparative processes. taylor’s (1992) central argument is that recognition of identity is “a vital human need” that is essential to the group survival (p. 26). however, his concern is for more than cultural survival, as he calls for “reciprocal recognition among equals” and the acknowledgement of cultures’ worth (p. 64). he asserts that the various cultures need to adequately recognize each other’s identities in order for social equality to exist. for example, because indigenous peoples were subordinated during the colonial era through institutions such as residential schools, the social equality that should ideally exist between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples was decreased. taylor (1992) argues that every member of society is entitled to adequate recognition and withholding recognition constitutes a form of oppression, which leads to self-depreciation and creation of destructive identity, as evident in the legacy of residential schools. in the broader colonial context, the canadian government perceived indigenous cultures as less valuable than euro-canadian cultures, and has since continued to measure the worth of indigenous cultures against euro-canadian standards, while failing to recognize the uniqueness and originality of indigenous cultural identities. in this manner, euro-canadian society was able to “entrench [its] hegemony by inculcating an image of inferiority in the subjugated” (taylor, 1992, p. 66). as a result of such profound misconceptions, indigenous identities were devalued in worth and intrinsic significance, which led to the diminishment of respect and dignity for indigenous cultures. as taylor (1992) explains: “nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm [by] imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being” (p. 25). 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 cultural values and identities, as taylor argues, must never be negotiated through social processes with “outsiders” such as colonizers, but instead must originate by way of dialogue within self-identified groups. these relationships, according to taylor (1992), occur in intimate spheres and serve as “the key loci of self-discovery and self-affirmation,” while the public sphere serves as a site where recognition among equals may take place (p. 36). an important part of this self-identification process is language as a form of cultural expression, which is transmitted via intra-group interaction. during the residential school era, indigenous children were partly, and often fully, dispossessed of their ability to speak native languages. by separating children from their parents and home communities and by forbidding them to speak native languages in many schools, the residential school system promoted the loss of this important cultural element. arguably, the termination of the residential school system may, among other factors, signify the recognition that the assimilation of indigenous peoples is an injustice. however, miller (1996) and milloy (1999) argue that the recognition of the injustices did not emerge exclusively from the government’s realization that the system itself was morally wrong. instead, other factors, such as the schools’ inability to assimilate children and parental resistance to residential schools, compelled the government to abandon the residential school experiment. given its potential to explain recognition-related injustices, taylor’s theory has come under some criticism. for example, glenn coulthard (2007) raises several issues with taylor’s theory. first is that taylor’s approach fails to address the root causes of misrecognition. coulthard (2007) argues that taylor’s theory may be instrumental in explaining “redistribution schemes like granting certain rights and concessions to indigenous communities via self-government and land claims process,” while leaving intact colonialcapitalist exploitation (p. 446). to coulthard, taylor ignores the economic dimension of capitalism, which in his view is responsible for perpetuating racial inequality. the residential school system was, indeed, a product of a broader structural force – colonialism – and in order to provide recognition to indigenous peoples, this force would need to be dismantled. coulthard also criticizes the lack of attention to the struggle for recognition in taylor’s theory. he argues that without a struggle, recognition is imposed on “subjects” who are passive in accepting it from the dominant society. as a result, these “subjects” do not challenge the power of entities, such as the state. in coulthard’s view, drawing on the work of franz fanon, it is necessary for the “subjects” to win recognition on their own terms. finally, coulthard (2007) challenges the applicability of taylor’s use of the hegelian notion of “reciprocal recognition among equals” in the context of colonial domination (p. 450). he explains that in hegel’s master/slave dialectic, both parties rely on each other for recognition of their respective statuses as either the master or the slave. however, drawing on frantz fanon’s work, coulthard (2007) demonstrates that in the colonial reality, “the mutual character of dependency rarely exists” (p. 450), for the master (the state) does not require recognition from the slave (the colonized) and is able to force the recognition of its hegemony and supremacy upon the slave. 3 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 while i believe that coulthard’s criticisms of taylor’s theory are accurate and valid, it is necessary to apply taylor’s theory to trc processes in order to assess the ability of the theory to promote the recognition of indigenous cultural identities and to account for the injustices indigenous children suffered in residential schools. the theory can be applied in the trc’s context in two distinct ways. first, it can be used to account for the origins of injustices perpetrated by the canadian government and churches against indigenous peoples, which stem from the misrecognition. second, the theory of recognition offers a deeper understanding of the need to restore indigenous identities. more specifically, taylor’s theory possesses a recognitive meta-theoretical dimension by emphasizing and advocating the importance of respect, dignity, and “universal human potential that all humans share,” all of which are crucial elements in establishing or re-establishing human identity and promoting social equality (taylor, 1992, p. 41). incorporation of the theory of recognition in the evaluation of canada’s trc allows for a more advanced understanding about what needs to be done in order to restore the cultural identities of survivors. trc and recognition of indigenous identities this section explores the potential of the trc to remedy the injustices associated with misrecognition by challenging and eradicating the stereotypes of racism and superiority that has historically served as the basis for misrecognition of indigenous cultural identities. accordingly, i seek to examine the potential of the trc to promote the recognition of indigenous cultural identities as unique and distinct, as envisioned by charles taylor. more specifically, the focus here is to assess the trc’s ability to educate the public about indigenous cultures. one of trc’s strategies for educating the public about residential schools includes a partnership between the trc and the canadian museum for human rights (cmhr) to house survivors’ stories of residential school experiences. stuart murray, the museum’s chief executive officer, suggests that through the museum exhibit “canadians and visitors from around the world will gain a better understanding about the schools and their impact” (as cited in sison, 2010, para. 12). the collection of survivors’ experiences will also help to represent indigenous resiliency in the face of assimilation and to assert their presence as distinct and unique cultural groups. similarly, the national research centre (nrc) will be established by the trc to contain survivor testimonies. the nrc’s mandate is to facilitate access for “former students, their families and communities, the general public, researchers and educators who wish to include this historic material in curricula” (trc, n.d., national research centre, para. 1). by incorporating residential school experiences into the collective memory, the nrc and cmhr could play an important role in promoting public awareness about residential schools and, as trc chair murray sinclair optimistically states, “the truth, eventually, will heal us all” (as cited in turenne, 2010, para. 21). the public’s exposure to the truth about residential schools may bring about the recognition and understanding that the schools constituted an injustice, which has had a profound negative impact on indigenous people. one problem with the nrc is that it falls under legal constraints of privacy legislation, which dictates what type of truth is to be included in its archives. by complying with privacy legislation, the 4 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 nrc’s archives may incorporate truth that is inherently limited. for example, the names of the perpetrators who are still alive and who have not been convicted in the court of law will be excluded from its records (canadian broadcasting corporation, 2010a). in addition to promoting the recognition of the harm done, it is also important to consider the ways in which the trc may be able to repair indigenous identities through affirming their equality and worth. in order to do so, it is necessary to examine trc’s national and community events. the national events typically take place in major cities across canada and, according to the trc’s mandate, serve as a “mechanism through which the truth and reconciliation process will engage the canadian public and provide education about the irs system, the experience of former students and their families, and the ongoing legacies of the institutions” (trc n.d., events, para. 2). in contrast, the community events take place in or near former locations of irs and are “designed by communities [to] respond to the needs of the former students, their families and those affected by the irs legacy” (trc n.d., events, para. 5). in essence, both national and community events are public gatherings that strive to engage indigenous and non-indigenous public to come together and learn about the injustices that took place in irs and to share the truth about the past. many survivors during the trc first national event, which took place june 2010 in winnipeg, spoke of the need to restore their cultural and social identities. for example, one survivor shared his identity confusion by saying “i’m not white, not indian, i don’t know what i am” (commissioners’ sharing circles, personal communication, june 18, 2010). to others, the recognition and acceptance of indigenous spirituality, languages, and traditions play an important role in healing the past. as sam achneepineskum relates, “[the public] need[s] to acknowledge where people come from and what happened to us” (as cited in romain, 2010, para. 7). by bringing indigenous and non-indigenous people together, the trc attempts to combat stereotypes of “otherness” that indigenous people have suffered for centuries. as rupert ross (2008) notes, one of trc’s challenges is to foster the recognition through “correcting historical misperceptions of cultural inferiority” (p. 20). similarly, murray sinclair, chair of the trc, notes that the process of “sharing of survivors’ experiences will [allow us] to truly understand them, and in the process, help future generations move forward with respect" (as cited in turtle island, 2010a, para. 5). by learning about the past and beginning to understand the diversity of indigenous cultures, settler canadians may come to understand the misrecognition that indigenous people have suffered. as trc commissioner marie wilson points out, “something amazing can happen when indigenous and non-indigenous perspectives are brought together” (sison, 2009a, para. 13). indirect public participation in trc’s proceedings is facilitated mainly through media coverage, including news and television. according to murray sinclair, the “national media attention generated by the winnipeg event was outstanding and [the] coverage was energetic and analytical” (sinclair, 2010, p. 5). while attending sharing circles, i noted the presence of news media outlets such as ctv, cbc, and aptn. however, there was no live coverage of the event on the radio or television, which would have allowed those who were unable to attend the event to watch it or listen to it in their communities. also, after the completion of the event, the media coverage dissipated and, as a result, many canadians stopped receiving 5 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 up-to-date information on the trc’s work. an additional problem with media coverage is that the community events tend to be smaller than the national events and thus often do not receive adequate coverage, which limits the trc’s ability to achieve its goal of public engagement. this lack of coverage could be due to the remoteness of communities to which the trc travels and results in selective media coverage of trc’s activities. through countering racist stereotypes and attitudes, the trc may be able to lay the groundwork that could serve as a basis for teaching future generations of canadians about indigenous languages, traditions, customs, and the importance of these cultural aspects and their role in creating diverse nations that are characterized by equality rather than dominance of one group over another. in other words, the trc’s objective seems to be aimed at eliminating the perceived inferiority of indigenous people and eradicating the selfproclaimed superiority of european canadians, while fostering a dialogue based on mutual respect and celebrating cultural diversity. according to former national chief of assembly of first nations (afn), phil fontaine, there needs to be widespread acceptance of the past, and without mutual respect based upon recognition, reconciliation is not possible (as cited in macleod, 2009). to accomplish this task, the trc would need to boost its public education initiatives. however, it is unreasonable to expect that the trc, in its five-year lifespan, will right all the wrongs perpetrated within residential schools. instead, it may be able to advance the public understanding of the past and promoting a human rights culture, through which new relationships can be formed. it is now appropriate to return to coulthard’s critiques of charles taylor’s theory of recognition as it relates to the trc. in his work, coulthard (2007) argues that the colonizer often grants concessions, such as recognition of cultural identities, to the oppressed groups as surface remedies for injustices, while leaving colonial structures undisturbed. more specifically, coulthard argues that taylor’s theory fails to account for the necessity of a struggle for recognition. he emphasizes the importance of “conflict and struggles, [without which] the terms of recognition tend to remain in the possession of those in power to bestow on their ‘inferiors’ in ways that they deem appropriate” (p. 449). in the context of residential schools, this criticism would mean that the trc is merely a gesture of assent by the federal government that dispenses recognition for the damage done by residential schools and affirms cultural identities of indigenous groups and survivors’ status as victims. following this logic, the trc can hardly be considered survivors’ “struggle for recognition,” because its vision and mandate are set within the boundaries defined by the government and yield recognition on the government’s terms. given the above critique, it is important not to underestimate survivors’ agency and struggle for recognition. while coulthard points to the lack of struggle in taylor’s theory of recognition, the question becomes: can the trc be considered a space within which a struggle for recognition could occur? to answer this question, it is worthwhile to consider what gerald vizenor (2008) refers to as “survivance,” a concept that signifies indigenous people’s narratives of asserting their presence in the colonized society, resisting the colonizer, enduring attempts of the colonizer to eradicate indigenous cultures, and adapting to societal changes. to vizenor, indigenous identities are not stable, but instead dynamic and responsive to colonizer’s assimilation efforts. in other words, the narratives of 6 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 survivance help to keep indigenous cultures alive in the face of destruction. during the trc national event in winnipeg, a number of survivors exhibited a struggle for recognition by asserting their cultural identities (commissioners’ sharing circles, personal communication, june 17, 2010). these resistance strategies included narratives about survival of indigenous cultures, traditions, and spiritualties in the post-residential school era, sharing stories in indigenous languages or withholding stories altogether, and naming names of the perpetrators of the residential school abuse despite having been instructed against doing so. some survivors, such as peter yellowquill and chantelle devillier, chose to boycott the event and urged others to do the same. to them, the trc was a government’s creation that would fail to bring justice and recognition to survivors (“usefulness of commission,” 2010). coulthard (2007) also argues that taylor’s theory ignores the subjective dimension of colonialism. he refers to an inferiority complex that emerges from the capitalist exploitation and subsequent internalization of racism and unequal power relations by the oppressed groups. in order to dismantle colonialism, it is essential to wage war on the racial and economic basis of inequality1. if this argument is applied to the trc, it is apparent that even though the trc may be effective in applying the label of “survivor” to residential school victims, it locks them in these colonial identities and the “subjectivity of the colonized remains the same – they become ‘emancipated slaves’” (p. 449). according to coulthard, only struggle against the colonizers, as opposed to compliance with their terms of recognition, may help survivors shed their colonial identities. coulthard is also pessimistic about the applicability of hegel’s notion of “reciprocal recognition among equals” in the context of reconciliation efforts between canada’s indigenous and settler peoples. in his argument, this type of recognition is not realistic because the colonizer is not seeking recognition from the colonized. following this view, the trc, which seeks to reaffirm equality and worth of cultural identities of survivors and promote the recognition of the damage done by residential schools, is an inadequate tool for challenging the existing power dynamics between indigenous and canadian governments and fostering recognition among equals. the type of recognition that the canadian government is granting through the trc is not mutual, but is imposed on survivors and survivors’ identities become reified as colonial subjects. upon considering charles taylor’s theory of recognition and its relevance to the trc’s work, it is now appropriate to consider nancy fraser’s tripartite theory of social justice, its applicability to the trc’s work, and its potential to promote decolonization. nancy fraser and decolonizing potential of the trc although the trc meets some of the criteria of charles taylor’s theory of recognition, the question remains as to what the trc could do to help trigger decolonization. in this section, i draw on nancy fraser’s (1995, 2003, 2005, 2008) tripartite theory of social justice to assess the potential of the trc to frame the indian residential school system as a product of colonialism that has not yet been fully eradicated. more precisely, this section of the paper deals with addressing the broader issue of the colonial project: does the trc have the 1 i address the material basis of colonialism in the following section. 7 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 potential to address the underlying causes of the residential school system, look beyond the harm done, and frame it as a systemic issue? in resolving injustices of residential schools, it would be necessary to examine the precursors that led to the subordination of indigenous people that ensured the continued dominance of european settlers. nancy fraser proposes a theoretical framework that is drastically different from charles taylor’s and could be used to assess the trc in terms of its potential to contribute to the process of decolonization2 (as cited in dahl, stolz, & willig, 2004). in fact, fraser dismisses taylor’s approach by arguing that “he effectively ignores distributive injustice altogether, by focusing exclusively on recognition” (dahl et al., 2004, p. 376). in turn, fraser argues that groups may suffer from three distinct types of injustices: socioeconomic, cultural-symbolic, and political. socioeconomic injustices include maldistribution of material resources, which are manifested in exploitation, economic marginalization, and deprivation (fraser, 1995). cultural-symbolic injustices, on the other hand, are those associated with misrecognition and include cultural domination, non-recognition, and disrespect. to fraser, socioeconomic injustices can be remedied through redistribution, while cultural-symbolic injustices can be remedied through providing due recognition. in her later work, fraser has added a third pillar to her model of justice – representation (fraser, 2008; 2009). she argues that representation is becoming increasingly important in light of current struggles for justice and democracy (as cited in dahl et al., 2004). this status model, as she calls it, highlights the importance of transnational politics and governance structures that must be taken into account when considering economic and cultural injustices. representation-related injustices are linked to social inequality and, more specifically, social status, which, in fraser’s terms, can be resolved by providing “recognition of people’s standing as full partners in social interaction [who are] able to participate as peers with others in social life” by ensuring participatory parity in political claims-making (dahl et al., 2004, p. 377). certain groups may suffer from all three types of injustices simultaneously.3 in fraser’s work, remedies to the three categories of injustices may be of two types: transformative and affirmative. transformative remedies, in fraser’s (2005) view, are associated with “correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework” (p. 73). by contrast, affirmative remedies to an injustice are those that attempt to correct “inequalities that arise from the organization of social relations without challenging these relations” (woolford, 2005, p. 31). to begin the discussion about nancy fraser’s theory and how it could be applied to the trc, let us first consider affirmative remedies and their roles in addressing systemic injustices suffered by indigenous people. in the case of redistributive affirmative remedies, the goal is to correct income inequality, which inevitably leaves undisturbed the capitalist mode of production. affirmative redistribution includes corrective measures, such as direct money transfers to the maligned groups, but serves only as a temporary and, therefore, inadequate means for improving their economic situation. more specifically, without challenging the underlying framework, 2 coulthard (2007) also criticizes fraser, but also explains the strengths of her approach. 3 in her earlier work, fraser (1995, 2003) uses examples of gender and “race.” 8 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 economic injustice will recur. to be sure, when addressing economic injustices, affirmative redistribution does little beyond providing concessions to the disadvantaged groups, because it does not “challenge the deep structures that generate class disadvantage” (fraser, 1995, p. 85). fraser’s (1995) transformative redistribution, on the other hand, relates to the economic changes that seek to promote equality through measures such as “redistributing income, reorganizing the division of labour, subjecting investment to democratic decision-making, or transforming other basic economic structures” (p. 73). economic empowerment, in her view, enhances social equality through not only transfers of wealth, but also through the restructuring of social institutions. fraser draws on the work of karl marx and john rawls in justifying her position with respect to the importance of the distribution of resources. in examining the trc through the lens of transformative redistribution, i employ fraser’s conceptualization of the economic redistribution rather broadly. in my analysis, it includes not only the material wealth represented by capital, but also lands and rights to natural resources, among others. with respect to recognition, affirmative remedies tend to promote the revaluing and differentiation of group identities, while leaving intact the elements that led to misrecognition. with regard to indigenous people, affirmative recognition could include an: acknowledgment that [indigenous] peoples represent a distinct ethnic group within the canadian mosaic and that they deserve status equal to other ethnic groups within the nation. the underlying assumption of such an approach is that ethnic identities are primordial categories of difference and that, to get along, we must recognize group differences. (woolford, 2005, p. 33) by increasing the differentiation of the groups’ identities, affirmative remedies tend to promote reification, which, in fraser’s terms, results in “repressive communitarianism” and leads to “right-wing nationalism, religious fundamentalism, and anti-immigrant movements” (dahl et al., 2004, p. 377). transformative recognition, on the other hand, “consists in anti-racist deconstruction aimed at dismantling eurocentrism by destabilizing racial dichotomies” (fraser, 1995, p. 91). the goal of remedies associated with transformative recognition is not to promote essentialized group differentiations, but rather to acknowledge the dynamic and ongoing processes of collective identification that are part and parcel of what it means to be a group. in her earlier work, fraser (1995) argued that transformative recognition required the destabilization of cultural identities, but she later moved to argue that the specific socio-historical circumstances of misrecognition and status denial have a crucial bearing on the form that transformative recognition should take. groups in society may suffer two types of representation-related injustices, according to fraser (2003, 2008). fraser (2009) refers to first type of these injustices as “ordinary-political misrepresentation” (p. 18). these typically take forms of unequal political participation, “intra-frame representation, [and] debates over the relative merits of alternative electoral 9 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 systems” (fraser, 2008, p. 408). affirmative remedies for these injustices include protection of groups’ political rights and ensuring “a fair and equal voice for everyone” (nelund, 2011, p. 65). in the case of residential schools, affirmative remedies for ordinary-political misrepresentation of indigenous people in the canadian political system would seek to remedy surface-level injustices, such as reinstating their right to vote and, to a certain degree, increasing their political decision-making capabilities, with both remedies seeking to establish participatory parity. what these affirmative remedies neglect is the global scale of injustices “in which the international system of supposedly equal sovereign states gerrymanders political space at the expense of the global poor” (fraser, 2008, p. 408). the second level of representation-related injustices is metapolitical injustice, which fraser refers to as “misframing.” these injustices are less obvious and occur when “polity’s boundaries are drawn in such a way as to wrongly deny some people the chance to participate at all in its authorized contests over justice” (fraser, 2008, p. 408). these injustices require transformative remedies that go beyond addressing ordinary-political representation. to remedy injustices of misframing, groups must be invested with power to participate as equal partners in nation-to-nation decision-making and international affairs. woolford (2009), in turn, points out that transformative remedies for representation “would seek to critique systems of representation that deny participation to certain groups and individuals in our societies” (p. 152). trc and transformative change the need for employing a framework that combines transformative recognition, redistribution, and representation in the context of canada’s colonialism is accurately presented in the argument made by robyn green (2010), who observes that without addressing the broader implication of colonialism: there is a risk that a truth commission will only emphasize the necessity for cultural recognition and/or remembrance through the language of a “rights” that could ultimately lead to the (re)construction of indigenous peoples as “minority subjects” (mackey, 1999) within the nation-state. (p. 27) by assessing the trc’s potential to promote recognition, redistribution, and representation, this section seeks to explore the ways in which the trc could promote systemic change (and act as a transformative remedy) or simply serve to affirm the injustices associated with residential schooling and bracket the legacy of colonialism (affirmative remedy). the trc focuses exclusively on discovering the truth about residential schools and their legacy, thus casting itself into the category of affirmative recognitive remedy. more specifically, it tends to promote the recognition of the wrongness of the residential school system and the equality and respect for indigenous cultures, while excluding the discussion of the foundations of the misrecognition. as such, affirmative recognition could reinforce colonialism by reifying indigenous cultural identities. therefore, there needs to be another method of conceptualizing recognition, one that does not rely on the essentializing the notion of “identity.” fraser’s transformative recognition could be applied to the trc in a 10 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 way that does not seek to define identity. more specifically, the trc could promote transformative change and challenge the basis of colonial relationships between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples through the recognition of indigenous rights to selfdetermination in areas such as governance, justice, child welfare, education, and health, among others. in other words, the trc would promote the process that invests indigenous people with control of their destinies. as kathleen mahoney4 (personal communication, november 29, 2010) notes, in order for transformative recognition occur, the trc would have to support the process of: recognition of first nations as one of the founding nations of canada than the french and the english [is important] because that would reflect respect for the first inhabitants of this land. one would hope that there will be recognition with respect to language, making indigenous languages more mainstream in canada so that nonindigenous people could learn and … connect the two cultures. similarly, graydon nicholas, new brunswick’s first lieutenant governor of indigenous descent, argues that indigenous voices must be taken into account when reforming social institutions that were the cause of centuries of oppression of indigenous people. namely, nicholas refers to: all aspects of [aboriginal] life. we're talking about spirituality, the churches. we're talking about the political process at the federal and provincial level. we're talking about our democratic institutions, for example, the military as well as the police forces who were all part of ... removing the spirit of the aboriginal people in this country. (canadian broadcasting corporation, 2010b, para. 9) in his statement, national chief of the afn, shawn atleo, calls for the canadian government to “understand that reconciliation today requires significant changes in the relationship between first nations and governments” (turtle island, 2010b, para. 5). in his view, indigenous people must be supported by the canadian government in their goal of “achieving equitable outcomes and opportunities for first nations students” (turtle island, 2010b, para. 8). in terms of redistribution, the trc also tends to be more affirmative than transformative. for example, it offers reparations, such as the missing children project (with the mandate to locate the children who have not returned from residential schools), commemoration initiative (to memorialize the children who perished in residential schools), and the elimination of certain sections of the indian act (that allowed the government to forcibly place children in residential schools)(klowak, 2010). all of these could be considered measures with the goal to acknowledge residential school experiences. however, the trc falls short of possessing the power to order a more profound restructuring of material relations between indigenous and non-indigenous nations. given indigenous peoples’ interdependence and the special relationship with their lands, in order to exhibit 4 kathleen mahoney is a professor of law at the university of calgary. she was chief negotiator for the assembly of first nations for the indian residential school settlement agreement. 11 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 transformative potential, the trc would need to reach beyond reparations for residential school experiences (ross 2008). according to taiaiake alfred (2009), for example, structural material change would include: massive restitution made to indigenous peoples, collectively and as individuals, including land, transfers of federal and provincial funds, and other forms of compensation for past harms and continuing injustices committed against the land and indigenous peoples, [without which] reconciliation will permanently absolve colonial injustices and is itself a further injustice. (p. 181) alfred speaks of transformative redistributive change that would allow indigenous peoples to regain power, to take control of their lands and resources, and to become self-sufficient groups. survivors who participated in a conference at the geneva park conference centre in november 2009 also expressed their desire for examining indian residential schools from a wider perspective: by reviewing indigenous people’s access to lands and resources (sison, 2009b). waziyatawin (2009) argues that in addition to the lands, other forms of restitution are required to combat colonial structures. these non-land based restitution measures could include “environmental clean up, infrastructure development for sustainable living, educational opportunities, healing centres, resources for language and culture revitalization, relocation expenses for displaced indigenous peoples, and debt relief” (p. 196). in the trc’s context, this could mean restoring funding for the aboriginal healing foundation, which ran out in 2011(thompson, 2010), and including indigenous people who were affected by residential schooling, but did not attend them, in the monetary compensation schemes under the irssa. given these calls for extensive reparations, transformative redistribution will not be an easy task. an example of difficulties that may be encountered in the process of transformative redistribution includes the government’s reluctance to provide restitution to indigenous people, as demonstrated in its resistance and the eventual refusal to sign the $5 billion dollar kelowna accord, a “social justice package with major new funding for indigenous housing, health and education” (de costa, 2009, p. 4). with respect to representation, the trc tends to act as an affirmative solution to residential school experiences as opposed to attempting to remedy injustices of political misframing. more specifically, even though survivor groups have been consulted with regard to what the trc’s design and activities should include, the scope of the debate is quite narrow and does not seem to advance indigenous peoples’ political interests and power outside the trc. therefore, the question becomes: what could the trc do to promote transformative representation? one could argue that this would entail a move toward power sharing in the intergovernmental relations between indigenous and non-indigenous political entities. this, in turn, would provide indigenous people a degree of control over the issues that concern canada domestically. in addition, the trc would be part of the power shift that could create opportunities for indigenous people’s political participation on an international level and in decision-making in the context of canada’s role in the global world. in concrete terms, some of the areas in which indigenous people could gain greater control include canada’s economic and social development, global trade, and international relations. equal 12 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 participation in these spheres may contribute to the empowerment of indigenous people in their struggle for transformative recognition and redistribution. even though the trc represents an affirmative remedy for resolving colonial injustices, it could be considered a step toward promoting broader social change and reforming colonial structures. as de costa (2009) suggests, by addressing residential school experiences, the trc is potentially transformative because it could serve as a “starting point to make connections with indigenous claims, for lands and rights, especially rights to govern and hold jurisdiction over those lands” (p. 1). summary and conclusions this paper assessed the relevance of charles taylor’s and nancy fraser’s theories to the trc’s work by considering their potential to provide the adequate recognition of indigenous cultural identities and to address deeper harms stemming from colonialism. the significance of taylor’s theory lies in its impetus for the recognition of identities, which supersedes any other type of remedy. however, in doing so, its pathology becomes apparent in its disregard for other important types of injustices that indigenous people in canada suffer, namely political and economic. the application of fraser’s theory, on the other hand, provides a more holistic approach to addressing colonial harms and thus carries more relevance to the trc. more precisely, fraser’s theory tends to view the residential school system as a product of colonialism and, in order to resolve the injustices associated with it, call for the deconstruction of the colonial project by instituting transformative change in the economic, cultural, and political spheres. in other words, reconciliation will not be possible until indigenous people become settlers’ equal partners in all aspects of social life. a search for a theory of justice for the canadian trc yields potential policy implications for truth commissions worldwide. a theory of justice may help to strengthen truth commissions’ mandates by clearly conceptualizing their goals and objectives in concrete terms (defining “healing” and “reconciliation,” for example) and identifying the potential strategies to attain them. with regard to the recognition of cultural identities, truth commissions may benefit by first addressing the unequal power relations that originally led to the subjugation of the victims and hegemony of the perpetrators. this could serve as the foundation for the various cultures to come together and, through an open dialogue, begin to build new (or rebuild old) relationships based on mutual respect and recognition. it could also be beneficial for truth commissions to adopt a holistic approach to addressing the harm done to the victims by considering not only the offense(s) that they suffered, but the underlying systemic factors that played a role in creating the conditions (for example, racial discrimination, maldistribution of material resources, and political marginalization of groups) for such offenses to occur. doing so may help to ensure that similar offenses will never again be inflicted. 13 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 references abbey, r. 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(2010, november 10). residential school survivors speak out. timmins press. retrieved from http://www.timminspress.com/2010/11/10/residential-schoolsurvivors-speak-out 15 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 ross, r. (2008). telling truths and seeking reconciliation: exploring the challenges. in m. b. castellano, l. archibald, & m. degagné (eds.), from truth to reconciliation (pp. 143159). ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. sinclair, m. (2010, september 28). presentation to the senate committee on aboriginal peoples. retrieved from http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/file/pdfs/senate%20speech_handout_c opy_e_final.pdf sison, m. (2009a, october 15) truth and reconciliation commission gathers momentum at rideau hall. anglican journal. retrieved from http://www.anglicanjournal.com/nc/other/newsitems/archive/2009/10/article/truth-and-reconciliation-commission-gathersmomentum-at-rideau-hall-8744//abp/167.html sison, m. (2009b, december 8). new canadians need to understand the first nations’ story, too. anglican journal. retrieved from http://www.anglicanjournal.com/nc/other/newsitems/archive/2009/12/article/new-canadians-need-to-understand-the-firstnations-story-too-8848//abp/167.html sison, m. (2010, june 18). school survivors share stories of pain, abuse. anglican journal. retrieved from http://www.anglicanjournal.com/nc/other/newsitems/archive/2010/06/article/special-report-truth-and-reconciliation-commissiontrc-9241//abp/167.html smith, a. (2009, may). indigenous peoples and boarding schools: a comparative study. paper presented at the eighth session of the united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues, new york. standing senate committee on aboriginal peoples. (2010). the journey ahead. ottawa: senate canada. stout, m., & harp, r. (2007). lump sum compensation payments research project. ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. taylor, c. (1992). the politics of recognition. in a. guttmann & c. taylor (eds.), multiculturalism and the “politics of recognition” (pp. 25-73). princeton: princeton university press. thompson, j. (2010, march 30). churchill mp frustrated by cuts to aboriginal healing foundation. kenora daily. retrieved from http://www.kenoradailyminerandnews.com/2010/05/04/churchill-mp-frustratedby-cuts-to-aboriginal-healing-foundation 16 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 3, iss. 2 [2012], art. 4 http://ir.lib.uwo.ca/iipj/vol3/iss2/4 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2012.3.2.4 turenne, p. (2010, june 16). commission starts residential school healing. toronto sun. retrieved from http://www.torontosun.com/news/canada/2010/06/16/14417636.html turtle island. (2010a, october 26). public education initiative – moving beyond the apology. turtle island news. retrieved from http://www.turtleisland.org/discussion/viewtopic.php?f=4&t=7937 turtle island. (2010b, june 11). government of canada's apology. turtle island news. retrieved from http://www.turtleisland.org/discussion/viewtopic.php?t=7601 truth and reconciliation commission of canada. (n.d.). our mandate. retrieved from http://www.trc.ca/websites/trcinstitution/index.php?p=7 usefulness of commission questioned by protesters. (2010, june 16). brandon sun. retrieved from http://www.brandonsun.com/breaking-news/usefulness-of-commissionquestioned-by-protesters-96387054.html vizenor, g. (2008). survivance: narratives of native presence. nebraska: university of nebraska press. waziyatawin. (2009). you can’t un-ring a bell: demonstrating contrition through action. in g. younging, j. dewar, & m. degagné (eds.), response, responsibility, and renewal. (pp. 191-199). ottawa: aboriginal healing foundation. woolford, a. (2005). between justice and certainty: treaty making in british columbia. vancouver: ubc press. woolford, a. (2009). the politics of restorative justice: a critical introduction. halifax: fernwood publishing. 17 petoukhov: locating a theoretical framework published by scholarship@western, 2012 the international indigenous policy journal august 2012 locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser? konstantin s. petoukhov recommended citation locating a theoretical framework for the canadian truth and reconciliation commission: charles taylor or nancy fraser? abstract keywords acknowledgments creative commons license microsoft word 309427-text.native.1346175603.doc facts, truth, and post-truth: access to cognitively and socially just information the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 facts, truth, and post-truth: access to cognitively and socially just information rachel fischer, university of pretoria, south africa erin klazar, university of pretoria, south africa abstract this article addresses facts, truth, post-truth, and the impact on access to cognitively and socially just information. it is predominantly situated within the post-truth context where information is manipulated to such an extent that it becomes disinformation, disguised as truth. the article consists of four main sections: the first section will provide an introduction and overview of key concepts intrinsic to understanding the concerns at hand. the next section is a case study of the role the pr firm, bell pottinger, played in south africa and iraq and the cognitive and social injustices visible in the corresponding events. the selection of these countries provides an opportunity to demonstrate the effect of post-truth and whistleblowing in relation to the challenges experienced in the global south. the third section, on cambridge analytica and digitality, is a discussion of the infamous cambridge analytica and its interferences in political campaigns in trinidad and tobago and the u.s. these discussions lead to the final section as an antidote to post-truth influences, which reflects on the way forward. this section makes recommendations for south african and international initiatives based on unesco’s intergovernmental programme known as the information for all programme (ifap). keywords: cognitive justice; disinformation; fake news; post-truth era/politics; social justice publication type: research article introduction his article will focus on the role of information in the fairness with which economic, political, and social benefits and burdens are distributed in society. it is predominantly situated within a post-truth context where information is manipulated to such an extent that it becomes disinformation, or a kind of ‘fake news’, disguised as truth. this has particularly been seen in the south african political discourse over the past few years where political ideology, mainstream media, and social discourse do not always appear to be aligned to benefit society, but rather adheres to the interests of a select group of individuals abusing positions of power who manipulate the narrative of the society to further self-interest. considering this, this article will predominantly focus on two case studies: the actions of bell pottinger in south africa and the global impact of cambridge analytica’s actions in promoting disinformation. both case studies were made public through the actions of whistle-blowers. whistleblowing is proposed as one antidote to the challenges exposed in the case studies, where involved parties expose the truth amongst the manipulation of media and facts. margaret mead said one should “never doubt t https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world; indeed, it's the only thing that ever has”. (mead, n.d.). whistleblowers are essentially those individuals, who expose potentially corrupt behaviour, which could result in them risking retaliation by, or exclusion from, the organisation. going forward, the discussion will therefore address the importance of access to transparent and quality information, the impact of post-truth era disinformation and the role of whistle-blowers in combatting the effects thereof. furthermore, a matrix is provided of unesco’s information for all programme (ifap) as a means to address the economic, political and social challenges brought about by the spread of disinformation. background in order to understand the informational ethical concerns surrounding the post-truth era, key concepts intrinsic to understanding the concerns at hand need to be discussed. concepts to be covered include disinformation and post-truth. disinformation is false information spread with harmful intent towards a person, social group, or country (ireton & posetti, 2018). post-truth is a term to describe a situation where facts are ignored and considered less important than personal beliefs and where emotional appeals are used to influence public opinion, resulting in us living in a post-truth era, which is “an era in which audiences are more likely to believe information that appeals to emotions or existing personal beliefs, as opposed to seeking and readily accepting information regarded as factual or objective” (cooke, 2017, p. 212). together with the notions of disinformation and post-truth, the main themes of this article are cognitive and social justice. cognitive justice is not just tolerance towards alterity, also understood as difference, in knowledge representation, but also active endeavours towards inter and intracultural dialogues and recognition of diversity. it is realised through “open and flexible designs that do justice to different ways of knowing and being” (van der velden, 2009, p. 38). boaventura de sousa santos argues in similar lines; that the empowerment of the global south can be achieved once we recognise a plurality of knowledges and situate our “epistemological perspective” within the global south, contra western/eurocentric ways of doing and being (de sousa santos, 2007, p. 66). the notion of the ‘south’ is employed to question the dominance of the “eurocentric foundation of […] knowledge production and circulation” which could potentially marginalise or delegitimise indigenous knowledge from the geopolitical ‘southern’ or ‘third world’ (zembylas, 2017, p. 399). consider, for example, the increased deference in discourse that is accorded to individualised value systems or clinical medical science that is valued by the ‘north’ or ‘first world’, as opposed to communal values or more traditional naturopathic medicine often valued in the ‘south’. social justice, as an equally important concept, is the fair and equitable access to and use of information. it also recognises one's right to quality information and one's ability to contribute to the knowledge society (britz, 2006). in terms of intercultural exchanges, one cannot assume that value systems are the same globally. though there may be similarities, there certainly are marked differences too. this notion is supported by capurro and britz when they write “in search of a code of global information ethics: the road travelled and new horizons”, that the values and principles contained with the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) may be interpreted differently by various cultural frameworks (2010). they continue that there may indeed be common terms and common grounds for sharing these values and principles, but that issues such as “solidarity, social justice or indigenous knowledge” are of more importance in “some regions of the world” compared to others (capurro & britz, 2010, p. 33). 6 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 therefore, a cognitively and socially just society is one that allows for diverse discourse resulting from equitable access to information and a broader understanding outside of an individual’s personal belief system. staying only within one’s personal belief system will make one vulnerable to being misled in a post-truth era. we would therefore go one step further, and suggest that for cognitive justice to be realised, even though different forms of knowledge ought to be considered valid and deserving of representation, it must be created, distributed, and consumed responsibly. together with this cognizance of cultural situatedness, which in turn influences the research approach, will promote awareness of a difference in representation. for instance, replication, verification, falsifiability, and so on, are considered to be intrinsic to a (western) research method, ensuring value-free results (coleman & dionisio, 2009). but what if one were to place political values and morals at the centre of the research project, avoid structured theoretical frameworks, implement multi-method research approaches, and include a plurality of or rival and alternative knowledges (coleman & dionisio, 2009). a balance must be struck between the safe and responsible use of information and potential epistemicide, where the validity of cultural knowledge and dialogue is being undermined in the search of a unified theory (zembylas, 2017). the death of knowledge through the manipulation of information, ultimately prevents citizens from enjoying the rights outlined in the definition of social justice. in this instance it becomes clear why this is a concern related to access to information. if the public are given access to fake information or news, or their access is manipulated, the cultural discourse of a society will be fundamentally changed. this is an act of cognitive and social injustice. in south africa, the case study involving bell pottinger and the role they played in state capture, has stood out as a particular reference to media manipulation as part of post-truth political discourse and the social injustices visible in the corresponding events. media manipulation is a manifestation of coerciveness by means of information and communication technologies (icts) and social media, employed by media, politicians, and people in positions of power, to influence one’s awareness of the self and the world (siwak, 2018). due to our various digital activities and ‘presences’, one becomes more susceptible to online or digital influences. this is particularly the case when one’s digital activities are used by organisations to create a digital profile or identity. as seen in cases such as cambridge analytica, which is discussed later in the article, these profiles are used to ‘push’ tailored information that echoes one’s personal belief system, thereby making one vulnerable to post-truth disinformation. therefore, we are not only having real life embodiment, experiences, and influences, but also digital embodiment, experiences, and influences, known as ‘digitality’. this digitality is therefore the expression of oneself in the digital space, together with the creation of related values and relationships which are only made manifest online. siwak refers to the coercive effects of this digitality on “personal relations and desires” (siwak, 2018) in the offline, non-digital world. a similar coerciveness can be observed in the south african instance of state capture, brought to light by the #guptaleaks. state capture and the gupta leaks the concept of state capture was first identified by hellman, et. al (2000) during a 1999 survey on behalf of the world bank and european bank for reconstruction and development. they defined it as “the efforts of firms to shape the underlying rules of the game (i.e. legislation, laws, rules and decrees) through private payments to public officials” (hellman, et.al, 2000, summary findings). in south africa, this term is used to describe the tactics of a complex web of key individuals or ‘oligarchs’ to take advantage of government tenders, a culture of corruption, and the weakening of legislation and law enforcement agencies to maintain dominance of a market. in south africa, these tactics were predominantly effectuated by the gupta family 7 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 through their relationship with former south african president jacob zuma, as well as a network of informally constituted elites amongst the public and private sector (public affairs research institute, 2017). this network worked over many years to manipulate the appointments of specific individuals into power positions in government departments and state owned companies to assist in advancing business interests of the gupta family and their associates. this was done by redirecting high value contracts and tenders to enrich individuals and organisations in the network. the network also acted to ensure that accountability mechanisms, which prevent illegal and unethical associated practices, were not in place, thereby effectively crippling safeguards which ought to have ensured corporate governance. the gupta family received some media attention before 2013, mainly due to their apparent relationship with former president jacob zuma. however, in mid-2013, a spotlight was shone on the family and their political and societal influence. they landed a private plane, carrying guests for a family wedding in sun city, at a military airbase in the capital city of pretoria. it is against the law for private citizens to make use of a military airbase for personal reasons. this seemed to be a turning point for the family, with the media and civil society scrutinising what appeared to be more than just a casual relationship with the president. in mid-2017, two whistle-blowers, with the assistance of investigative journalists, released a cache of emails known now as the #guptaleaks. the emails appeared to have come from a computer or server inside sahara computers (pty) ltd, a gupta-owned company. amongst a number of revelations of corruption and political influence, the emails also revealed that around 2016, the gupta family, through their company oakbay capital (pty) ltd, hired public relations (pr) company bell pottinger based in the united kingdom (uk) to start a campaign using fake news, disinformation, and other propaganda (public affairs research institute, 2017; segal, 2018). this campaign saw the development of the white monopoly capital narrative, placing blame on economic apartheid for the social inequalities in south africa and twisting the meaning of radical economic transformation, all with the purpose of distracting the public away from the activities related to the state capture related corruption (public affairs research institute, 2017). the campaign developed by bell pottinger was part of a multi-pronged approach by the gupta family to redirect public discourse away from their actions, using social media, fake websites, and their own media houses: the new age, a printed newspaper, and ann7, a national television news channel (finlay, 2017). armed with thousands of twitter “guptabots” and other fake social media sites, they began a campaign now known now as race-baiting, specifically aimed at further inciting racial tensions in south africa. the south african social media environment became contaminated with disinformation influencing public and cultural discourse in south africa. external campaigns also managed by bell pottinger, and paid for by the guptas, included black first land first (blf), a revolutionary socialist political movement that drove the same rhetoric and confronted, both online and physically, any journalists that spoke out against the guptas or their business partners. an example of such an attack is when peter bruce, former business day and financial mail editor, was attacked outside of his home by members of the blf, telling him to “go back to europe” and wanting to occupy his home. he had written a number of opinion pieces about the gupta family (goba, 2017). karima brown, a seasoned investigative journalist, was also assaulted by blf supporters at the demonstration outside the home of peter bruce (magwedze & kubheka, 2017). in a country with such a young democracy, still struggling with economic imbalances, press freedom, and cognitive and social justice issues, this campaign had far reaching effects on south africa’s progress. 8 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 the bell pottinger story has demonstrated how an organisation, regulated in their own country, can cause havoc and a breakdown in cognitive and social justice in another country (with little to no personal or professional consequence), if it had not been for the whistle-blowers that released the #guptaleaks. bell pottinger are by no means the only strategists employing disinformation and fake news to fulfil a questionable contract. according to chutel et al (2017), major public relations agencies have historically not shied away from controversial contracts, especially given the lucrative retainers they offer. it would be unfair, however, to paint pr companies as the villains of the information age. in both the us and the uk, where the industry leaders are headquartered, the pr community has a clear set of ethical guidelines against which to measure the actions of agencies, as the public relations and communications association did when it expelled bell pottinger. (2017) however, bell pottinger, working in another country, seemed to have forgotten and contravened these ethical guidelines, as well as general universal values of ethical behaviour. as a result, the public relations and communication association (prca) acted against bell pottinger, which subsequently went under administration. this is an example of an otherwise global phenomenon where those with a modernist transactional approach, superimpose their interests above those with a post-modern interactional approach, resulting in cognitive and social injustice (verwey & muir, 2019). what this means is that dialogical and interactional communication, which are representative of communal values and collective experiences, are undermined. instead, preference is given to individualist values which seek to serve the interests of the individual, or in this instance, the client. according to verwey and muir (2019), “the moral and business failure of bell pottinger cannot simply be understood as a failure to adhere to industry codes of conduct, or as simple greed, criminality of complicity in the state capture project”(p. 98). it should be understood at a much deeper level as a failure of moral philosophy that resulted from a lack of respect for communal values and the societal context in which bell pottinger plied its ‘dark arts’. the actions of bell pottinger were not just a matter of “clever” public relations, but a method of sowing dissent and division amongst the members of a young and polarised democracy. what is needed to rectify this conflict between communal and individual worldviews or value systems, is an ethics of inter-subjectivity. it is argued that by establishing “otherness, difference and marginality” as valid modes of approach to experience, inter-subjectivity opens the way for acceptance of plurality and difference, essentially the core argument of cognitive justice (verwey & muir, 2019). it should be noted that this is not the first instance of this interference in political and societal discourse by bell pottinger. another example was seen between 2006 and 2011, when bell pottinger carried out work for the us pentagon and department of defence for “top secret influence operations during the iraq war” (purkiss & fielding-smith, 2018), valued at over half a billion dollars. according to martin wells, a former employee of bell pottinger, who spoke out about this contract, these operations included the creation of “short tv segments made in the style of arabic news networks and fake insurgent videos which could be used to track the people who watched them” (black & fielding-smith, 2016) on behalf of the u.s. military. this resonates with david joselit when he argues that “anything can now be called fake news, as long as the accuser [or creator] possesses the power (i.e., the platform) to publicise his or her claims” (joselit, 2017, p. 15). in essence, information inherently is always a power-laden construct, for it can be politicised and ab/used by those with the means and authority to do so. 9 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 interpreting cambridge analytica through digitality the role of agency, especially individual agency, is an aspect that becomes questioned by two cambridge analytica scandals. this is illustrated by the revelations of whistle-blower, brittany kaiser, in the documentary “the great hack”, which discussed cambridge analytica’s involvement not just in the brexit election, but also in the 2013 trinidad and tobago election (bradshaw, 2019; seadle, 2019). in a recording of cambridge analytica ceo alexander nix, he stated that during another campaign contract in trinidad and tobago, working for majorityindian united national congress (unc) party, they found the youth in both the indian and afrocaribbean communities were feeling disenfranchised. with the population split between afrotrinidadians and indo-trinidadians being almost equal, cambridge analytica representatives knew they needed to appeal to culture to help swing the vote. they decided to run a non-political campaign targeting the youth to generate a culture of apathy amongst the youth when it came to voting. in the recording, nix states: “we came up with this campaign which was all about ‘be part of the gang, do something cool, be part of a movement.’ and it was called the ‘do so’ campaign […] do so. don't vote. don't be involved in politics. it is like a sign of resistance against – not government, against politics. and voting” (hilder, 2019). nix further justifies the value of the campaign stating: ‘the reason why this was such a good strategy is because we knew, and we really really knew, that when it came to voting, all the afro-caribbean kids wouldn't vote, because they ‘do so’. but all the indian kids would do what their parents told them to do, which is go out and vote. and so all the indians went out and voted, and the difference on the 18-35-year-old turnout is like 40%, and that swung the election by about 6% – which is all we needed!’ (hilder, 2019) this relates to joselit’s argument that we are caught in “a cacophony of irreconcilable truths”, where it appears we have lost the ability to distinguish between blatantly false or true information. those that have the means and the authority, have the power to present the most spectacular—and hence most ‘true’—information (joselit, 2017), leading to cognitive conflict. post-truth is a term to describe a situation where facts are ignored and considered less important than personal beliefs and where emotional appeals are used to influence public opinion, resulting in us living in a post-truth era. cambridge analytica, knowingly, adopted a post-truth strategy in their campaign, using culture, emotional appeals, and personal beliefs to influence the opinion on a specific portion of the population. another whistle-blower was christopher wylie, who exposed the organisation in 2018, implicating how personal information collected from facebook users allowed cambridge analytica to create tailored political campaigns targeted at those same users, that echoed their personal belief systems. this was not only done in the u.s., but also in more than 30 other countries (ghoshal, 2018). insofar as the facebook users ‘agreed’ to the terms and conditions of the applications they used, one must consider to what extent were they aware of the consequences. and specifically, if they were aware, why did they still agree to the application accessing their personal, and their friends’ personal information, available on facebook? is human agency exchanged for benefits mediated by information technology? in his article “digital communication and agency: unseen infrastructures that influence our communicative capacities online”, jakub siwak (2018) utilises gilles deleuze’s notion of ‘digital 10 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 societies of control’ to problematise how our agency, as information users and providers, is potentially negated by digital communication. siwak questions how much agency we have as individuals to formulate and express our political ideas and partake in democratic processes. much of this supposed agency could be manipulated by unseen forces. this article does not consider michel foucault’s surveillance, dossiers, and panopticism as found in his writing on disciplinary societies (foucault & sheridan, 1991), but foucault’s stance is a useful foundation for appreciating deleuze’s concept of control societies. disciplinary societies are predicated on the concept that society can be disciplined, observed, and kept docile—in short, be regulated. conversely, control societies expand on disciplinary societies by means of technological advancements which “extend their reach through interconnected, flexible and networked architectures” (siwak, 2018), ensuring digital surveillance and entrenching capitalism. due to the ever-changing, expanding, and advancing nature of technologies, everything in control societies becomes transformable, but also observable. siwak, vis-à-vis deleuze, argues that this is the precise function which the state and capitalism seek to achieve: one is constantly engaged with the features of digital, information and communication technologies ingrained in societal, political, and economic organisation, impacting one’s ability to operate autonomously. this is exacerbated by the datafication of individual identifiers, such as one’s age, gender, income, and so on, which in turn lead to targeted, personalised advertising based on predictive models of purchasing behaviour. one can then also see this manifested in the targeted interferences of cambridge analytica; the ability to sway voter preferences by data collected from individuals’ facebook pages. this is the “progressive loss of agency” which dissolves autonomy, critical thinking, and individuality (siwak, 2018). one is continually connected, being updated, receiving, and contributing information. he argues this is reason for facebook’s popularity, and other social media platforms, for users are willing to disclose this information in turn for perceived benefits. interpreting deleuze, alexander galloway (2004) argues that these control societies are based on “hyper-speed, digital simulation and replication [and] leave virtually no space for adversarial reflection, creativity [and] modes of experience different to ubiquitous dividuality”(p. 22). accordingly, in the control societies it becomes difficult to distinguish between the ‘individual’ and the ‘mass’, leading to the deindividualized ‘dividual’ and ‘samples’. it becomes a dangerous issue when the state, or government, no longer sees its citizens as participants in free society, but rather ‘things’ to be controlled and manipulated. once again referring to the media manipulation as a manifestation of coerciveness, the coercive effects of this digitality become clearer. it is coercive for it can sway one’s opinion, and if one does not partake in these platforms, you may become an ‘unknown variable’ which is much harder to control, leading to ‘peer pressure’ in participating online (joselit, 2017). much more than this, the online peer pressure may result in active peer pressure to partake in real-life political activities such as voting, demonstrations, protests, for example, as seen in blf and the trinidad and tobago voting campaign. this is supported by the research conducted by jost et al. on how social media facilitates political protest. they argue that social media is an efficient medium for the quick communication of information about events and political developments, “facilitating the organization of protest activity” (jost et al., 2018, p. 86). they do however underscore that while it may assist citizens in collective action towards public engagement, social media is also an instrument for authorities to detect, monitor, and suppress such activity. in consideration of cambridge analytica, it is interesting to consider then how organisations, together with government, may be more concerned with finding ways of influencing and 11 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 controlling citizens, than to provide platforms for civic participation, deliberation, and free speech. the discussions of bell pottinger and cambridge analytica are relevant for two reasons: 1) it is indicative of how corporations and political entities alike can manipulate societies, influencing decisions such as whom to vote for and to encourage civic protests based on alternative facts or disinformation; and 2) it is a manifestation of hegemony and cognitive injustice for it effectively commits epistemicide by subjugating ‘true knowledge’ with ‘popular knowledge’ (de sousa santos, 2007; joselit, 2017; zembylas, 2017). whereas hegemony is the “dominance of one system over another” and epistemicide the “murder of knowledge”, cognitive injustice becomes attained by alternative facts when it is politically, culturally, socially, ideologically, and technologically legitimised to serve the interests of the few (fischer & klazar, 2019). one might argue that alternative facts is another perspective of perceived facts, which allows for a plurality of knowledge representation, but certainly it should not be at the expense of society. this hearkens back to the ethics of inter-subjectivity, which positions the needs of others, and the community, over and above the privileging of the few or the individual (verwey & muir, 2019). in terms of the fight against post-truth globally, as seen in the above discussions, two instances of cultural hegemony impacting public discourse are at play. fundamentally at the root of this is access (or the lack thereof) to quality information. the authors review the fact that the examples are not unique, and they postulate the possibility that this is a manifestation of a global phenomenon where information, as a commodity and a tool, is manipulated by those in power. therefore, the misuse of authority becomes an issue of ethics—as the analysis of good and bad conduct—and a social injustice. it becomes a social injustice when members of society are excluded from fair, open, and transparent discourse. both instances—bell pottinger in south africa and cambridge analytica globally—were brought to light through whistle-blower disclosure. they effectively opened access to information and allowed for more transparent discourse to force those in power to account for their actions. since social justice promotes equitable access to benefits and opportunities to all, and particularly among the least advantaged members of society, the concepts of diversity, inclusion, and access to information have never been so critical. an antidote to post-truth influences the question then is, what happens when information is not created, distributed, and consumed responsibly as a result of political manipulation? cognitive and social injustices are then used as a mechanism by the ideological state apparatus to influence the thinking and decision-making of its citizens. post-truth seeks to directly promote its own (post-)truth. this is manipulative and unjust. lies, propaganda, and manipulation of facts is by no means new. however, due to the ubiquitous nature of icts and the broader channels of distribution used by the media, the distribution of manipulated information results in new challenges. the ability to generate post-truth information, that is pushed directly into our homes and personal space and echoing personal biases through social media, makes it so much more powerful. the use of ‘bots’ and artificial intelligence (ai) means that the scale at which posttruth information is produced far exceeds any soviet union or u.s. war propaganda poster. the scale of fake news and post-truths has a direct impact on cognitive and social justice, influencing economic, political, and social freedoms at all levels. 12 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 these concerns lead the way forward, towards making recommendations for south african and international initiatives that will equip society to better deal with occurrences of post-truth. the united nations educational, scientific and cultural organisation (unesco) has an intergovernmental programme known as information for all programme (ifap). its six objectives include: information for development, information literacy, information accessibility, information preservation, information ethics, and multilingualism in cyberspace (unesco, 2017). ifap seeks to ensure equitable access to and use of icts. however, in consideration of its various parts, it could function as a normative tool to guide efforts in education and policymaking. though many would agree the prevalence of disinformation are disconcerting, there tends to be a lack in accessible normative tools that equips one to differentiate between these types of information. it is precisely the aims of the unesco ifap and the unesco media and information literacy programmes to furnish one with the requisite skills to access, search, critically assess, use, and contribute content wisely, both online and offline (unesco, 2016). the following matrix is provided to 1) give an overview of the ifap objectives, 2) postulate questions applicable to the specific concerns related to the case studies, and 3) recommend activities which could be hosted in countries to combat fake news and disinformation practices, thereby empowering citizens to become more active participants in their democracies and the knowledge society. table 1: ifap matrix towards educating and empowering citizens1 ifap objective guiding questions recommended actions ifap objective 1: information for development: information is key to development, transparency, good governance, and a central requirement to addressing information poverty. • how does the manipulation of information influence developmental requirements of a country? • does the manipulation of information directly, or indirectly, impact the development of social, economic, and political practices within a country? • contributing to the development of skills that help citizens identify quality information; • supporting civil society, the private sector, and government to develop guidelines for best practices; • expanding the reach of oversight bodies, such as public relations institute of south africa, and collaboration with the international programme for the development of communication (ipdc); • promoting freedom of information and access to public information as key to the role of information in development and good governance. 13 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 ifap objective 2: information literacy: information literacy empowers people in all walks of life to seek, evaluate, use, and create information effectively to achieve their personal, social, occupational, and educational goals. • how does being information illiterate disempower citizens to effectively distinguish between accurate, misand disinformation? • what is the responsibility of government towards promoting literacy levels of citizens? • supporting the development of human capabilities (capacitybuilding) in accessing, discerning, critiquing, using, and creating information (information literacy) and participation in an online environment (digital literacy); • promoting the inclusion of the new literacies into national education curricula. ifap objective 3: information preservation: the pace of ict development challenges the safeguarding of documents and the ability to stay abreast of updates and technological developments. this also presents challenges to the preservation of indigenous and traditional forms of knowledge. • how does fake news impact the preservation of information, as a representation of actual or fake events, within a particular milieu? • if the cultural and public discourses are manipulated, to what extent does it affect the perception of traditional and indigenous knowledge? • promoting the preservation of cultural and indigenous heritage; • supporting the development of preservation standards and management tools; • collaborating with international and local ngos to increase awareness of the importance of information preservation. ifap objective 4: information ethics (ie): concerns all ethical considerations resulting from the information lifecycle. also extends to notions of freedom of expression and freedom of access to information, social justice, and social responsibility. • how can government, media, and people in positions of power, enact their social responsibility towards developing an information ethical society which promotes freedom of access to quality information? • how can information ethics education prevent cognitive and social injustice in the future? • promoting freedom of access to information and development and promotion of governmental public domain information; • integrating ie into the mainstream discussions on ethics and integration into educational curricula; • collaborating with other ie centres and initiatives to provide training on ie and e-government. 14 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 ifap objective 5: information accessibility: citizens should have access to crucial information that impacts their livelihoods and should not be precluded from accessing information that should be in the public domain. access to quality and accurate information should be ensured at all times. • what role does government and media play towards empowering citizens to freely and equitably access quality and accurate information? • does the post-truth era imply that we are in an era of censorship, under the guise of freedom of access to information? and if so, why? • working with governments at both the country level and in international forums to advocate for an open platform internet which is accessible to all; • supporting the development of “open” information processing tools, interoperability standards, metadata, content ordering, interfaces to digital collections, search, and preservation tools. ifap objective 6: multilingualism: language is a primary means for communicating information and knowledge. citizens should be able to access and communicate information in a language they understand. • do governments have an obligation towards providing education in all official languages, to ensure citizens are better equipped to read, understand, and distinguish information presented to them via public and other media platforms? • how does the manipulation of language representation exacerbate the distribution of fake news? • promoting a better understanding of open and multilingual access to information through thematic debates and regional campaigns; • collaboration with international initiatives on multilingualism in the cyberspace; • supporting the creation of linguistically and culturally diverse content in cyberspace and offering possibilities for the preservation of endangered languages. conclusion the case studies on bell pottinger and cambridge analytica are instances of developing issues related to all six ifap priority areas. the manipulation or restriction of access to information is fundamentally unethical, and, if actively practiced and endorsed, becomes a cognitive and social injustice. unfortunately, this practice is seen all too often in situations where western institutions seek to subjugate their global south counterparts, albeit argued for liberal or democratic purposes, as seen in the case studies of this article. notwithstanding the various codes of ethics and conduct, which ought to guide behaviour, manipulation of information, for the benefit of the few, still occurs. one should then argue that 15 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 for the needs of the many, and to ensure cognitive and social justice, information should be created, distributed, and consumed responsibly. this should be done in order to achieve developmental goals, universal literacy, and free and equitable access to information. this information should then be preserved for the good of the community, presented in a language they can understand, unchanged by hegemonic forces, and observing ethical considerations throughout the information lifecycle. hence in the spirit of promoting social and cognitive justice, including its inherent construct of fair distribution of both benefits and burdens, voices in the global south become critical in achieving a more holistic understanding of the role of diversity, inclusion, and information access. if one is to manage information responsibly, one needs to raise the standards of society through education, communication, and empowerment, as aligned with the six objectives of ifap. when political leaders and people in positions of power behave irresponsibly and leverage communication technologies to manipulate facts to an ‘alternative truth’ that suits their rhetoric, it can have far reaching consequences, as seen in the case studies. the post-truth era concern is therefore not just what media, political leaders, and people in positions of power are saying but is further compounded by how pervasive icts are in microand macro-environments. due to this, the role of whistle-blowers and active citizens as antidotes to this growing epidemic of fake news and disinformation distribution cannot be over-emphasised. as is stated by george orwell, “in times of universal deceit, telling the truth will be a revolutionary act” (orwell, 1948). endnote 1 the recommended activities are extracted and adapted from unesco’s information for all programme strategic planning (unesco, 2017) references black, c., & fielding-smith, a. 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(2018, february 4). how bell pottinger, p.r. firm for despots and rogues, met its end in south africa. the new york times. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-southafrica.html siwak, j. (2018). digital communication and agency: unseen infrastructures that influence our communicative capacities online. communicare : journal for communication sciences in southern africa, 37(1), 118–135. https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/ejc105755e5c7 unesco. (2016, september 1). media and information literacy. unesco. https://en.unesco.org/themes/media-and-information-literacy unesco. (2017, march 9). information for all programme (ifap). unesco. https://en.unesco.org/programme/ifap 18 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index https://unesdoc.unesco.org/ark:/48223/pf0000265552 https://doi.org/10.1162/octo_a_00279 https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12478 https://ewn.co.za/2017/07/06/karima-brown-was-assaulted-by-blf-members https://ewn.co.za/2017/07/06/karima-brown-was-assaulted-by-blf-members https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1071-never-doubt-that-a-small-group-of-thoughtful-committed-citizens https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/1071-never-doubt-that-a-small-group-of-thoughtful-committed-citizens https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/451258-during-times-of-universal-deceit-telling-the-truth-becomes-a https://www.goodreads.com/quotes/451258-during-times-of-universal-deceit-telling-the-truth-becomes-a https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/ https://pari.org.za/betrayal-promise-report/ https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-04-23/ex-bell-pottinger-psyops-manager-made-qatar-doc https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2018-04-23/ex-bell-pottinger-psyops-manager-made-qatar-doc https://doi.org/10.1002/asi.24333 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/04/business/bell-pottinger-guptas-zuma-south-africa.html https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/ejc-105755e5c7 https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/ejc-105755e5c7 https://en.unesco.org/themes/media-and-information-literacy https://en.unesco.org/programme/ifap facts, truth, and post-truth the international journal of information, diversity, & inclusion, 4(3/4), 2020 issn 2574-3430, jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index doi: 10.33137/ijidi.v4i3/4.33678 van der velden, m. (2009). design for a common world: on ethical agency and cognitive justice. ethics and information technology, 11(1), 37–47. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9178-2 verwey, s., & muir, c. (2019). bell pottinger and the dark art of public relations: ethics of individuality versus ethics of communality. communicare: journal for communication sciences in southern africa, 38(1), 96–116. https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/ejc-173da3f023 zembylas, m. (2017). the quest for cognitive justice: towards a pluriversal human rights education. globalisation, societies and education, 15(4), 397–409. https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2017.1357462 rachel fischer (rachel.fischer@up.ac.za) is a certified ethics officer and an extraordinary research officer at the african centre of excellence for information ethics (aceie) at the information science department, university of pretoria. she manages the communication and activities for this hub which is central to the african network on information ethics. as an information ethicist her functions include being the co-chair of the icie and representing her research at international conferences aligned with unesco’s information for all programme (ifap). she seeks to represent the global south by championing inclusivity and promoting the ifap objectives. her phd research focal areas include information ethics, multilingualism, cognitive justice and exploring the spaces for intercultural dialogue. erin klazar (erinklazar@gmail.com) is a freelance investigative researcher and certified ethics practitioner, focussing on corporate governance and ethical business practices in south africa. she works closely with academia in information ethics and information science and is a part-time lecturer in knowledge management and information ethics at the information science department, university of pretoria. she has completed multiple research papers and projects on information ethical issues related to privacy and surveillance and the need for education in digital wellness throughout all sectors of society. her research interests include cognitive and social justice and responsibility, ethics awareness, as well as the development of educational programmes supporting community engagement. 19 https://jps.library.utoronto.ca/index.php/ijidi/index https://doi.org/10.1007/s10676-008-9178-2 https://journals.co.za/content/journal/10520/ejc-173da3f023 https://doi.org/10.1080/14767724.2017.1357462 mailto:rachel.fischer@up.ac.za mailto:erinklazar@gmail.com introduction background state capture and the gupta leaks interpreting cambridge analytica through digitality an antidote to post-truth influences conclusion endnote references t h e t h i n k e r66 1: blue aloe i t was a brisk afternoon in a valley in yorkshire in the north of england when my art teacher, mr waddington, standing beside me seated at my easel, first introduced me to charles darwin’s phrase, ‘cryptic colouration’ – an organism’s ability to blend into its surroundings. the phrase has stuck with me, spurring a long-standing interest in mimicry – the relationship between survival and calculated obscurity. the national geographic channel provides countless examples of this ability to blend in and dissimulate a given context. human beings are no different. we devote the bulk of our lives to disappearing acts. however, ‘cryptic’ is a curious word to attach to this disposition, for it suggests something mysterious and elusive, and an essay first given as a public lecture at the university college of london’s institute of advanced studies as part of a series of talks on lies. by ashraf jamal art six asides on art &lies © s h u tt e rs to c k .c o m 67v o l u m e 8 2 / 2 0 1 9 not an act of survival, or one of damnation, which, after all, is what it also means to dis-appear. against the endless disappearing acts we consciously or unconsciously perform, it is surely startling to encounter a creature who refuses to do so. joseph conrad’s bling harlequin-figure in heart of darkness springs to mind, but so does a rather strange looking african aloe, created by rowan smith, which i encountered in an art gallery in cape town with the alluring moniker, whatiftheworld. while a compelling facsimile, smith’s aloe was painted a jarring and unearthly swimming pool blue. fixed to a stainless steel stem and bolted to an achingly white, fluorescent-lit, wall, this pale blue plant stood anomalous. part of an austere installation which centred on mimicrydissimulation-camouflage – and the impertinence of this orientation – this chlorinated blue aloe suggested an africa sterile and antiseptic. for there was doubtless something unhealthily pallid in the artist’s colour scheme. in 2015, wired magazine introduced me to another term – ‘plastiglomerate’ – the aggregation of starkly dissimilar yet integrally related synthetic and organic matter, which more compellingly reminded me of the unnatural conditions in which we live. smith’s blue aloe epitomised this unnatural state. for ours, today, is no longer darwin’s cryptically coloured world. ours is a world which has shifted from acts of imposture to acts that are aberrant. and it is in this particular regard that rowan smith’s blue aloe proves an apt prelude to our conversation – art and lies. 2: witches’ oracle as a verb the word – lie – intrigues me most. in its past tense we know it as lay, or lain, as some condition, some thing, which, according to the oed, assumes ‘a horizontal position on a supporting surface … undisturbed or undiscussed’. it is this sense which prompted virginia woolf, in the waves, to ask: ‘what is the thing that lies beneath the semblance of the thing’? the supposition, here, the query, is often asked, for we commonly suppose that meaning, or truth, is something concealed, hidden from view, difficult to ascertain. truth is supposed to exist beneath the lie, and it is truth – said to exist ‘beneath the semblance of the thing’ – which we hanker for and enshrine. it is truth’s remoteness that compels us, its rarity, its preciousness, which we believe best informs and defines us – all the more so in this post-religious and morally bankrupted moment in which we find ourselves. for no one can fail to recognise – in this era dubbed ‘post-truth’ – that which keenly concerns us most is truth’s absence. ours is a realm of veils in which truth possesses no traction and no worth. in our world – a world of copies – we no longer possess the capacity to issue forth truth. a lie has become our staple. it defines our culture. it is the ‘new normal’. the very condition for life itself. it is therefore not the scarcity of truth that matters, but the ubiquity of lies. we live because we lie, we exist the way we do because we cannot imagine a world which is not infused and shaped by deception. lies, therefore, are constitutive. they are the ground – now groundless – which makes it possible to wake up and complete the tasks – riddled with ‘little lies’ – which, we pretend, enable us to continue. lies are the acts and conditions which we must learn to accept, for not to do so would make living unbearable. and yet we gnash and groan in the face of lies. when someone blithely demurs that there are all kinds of truth – ‘alternative facts’ – we protest in the name of some inviolable essence which we insist in believing exists beneath the surface of this post-essential and post-religious moment. however, if there remains a justice in demanding the existence of a condition pure and inviolable, this is not because it is the purity of truth that we seek, but the purity of a better, if contaminated, lie. dissimulation is inescapable. the inauthentic defines who and what we are, especially those who traffic in the arts, in fiction, which plato sought to rout out and condemn as liars. lies – the staple of fiction, of art – are integral to the creation of imagined worlds. lies are wagers, for no one can fail to recognise – in this era dubbed ‘post-truth’ – that which keenly concerns us most is truth’s absence. ours is a realm of veils in which truth possesses no traction and no worth. in our world – a world of copies – we no longer possess the capacity to issue forth truth. a lie has become our staple. art t h e t h i n k e r68 ventures, leaps of faith, willed conditions. they are not intrinsically or essentially bad for us. however, because they are deceptive, they can also be treacherous. we know this well. act 1, scene 1 of shakespeare’s macbeth sets the stage for this treachery. that it stems from the mouths of three witches – and women we are reminded, again and again, are the ciphers of treachery, as is the black man – should alert us to the fact that the ‘lies’ they supposedly tell are not lies at all, but veiled truths. shot through ‘fog and filthy air’, through a veil contaminated, unclear, in which ‘fair is foul, and foul is fair’, the witches present to us their oracular insight which macbeth chooses to read to his own advantage. the moral of the drama is that we cannot presume to know, in absolute truth, the meaning of a statement, we can only infer, at our own peril, its true import. for what the witches’ oracle reminds of is that we can never fully disinter truth from falsity. this difficulty stems not merely from the failure of morality, or the collapse of our cognitive faculties, it stems from a fair deeper problem which friedrich nietzsche in particular has scrupulously tackled. in his essay ‘on truth and lies in a nonmoral sense’, nietzsche reminds us that ‘the art of dissimulation reaches its peak in man. deception, flattering, lying, deluding, talking behind the back, putting up a false front, living in borrowed splendour, wearing a mask, hiding behind convention, playing a role for others and for oneself – in short, a continuous fluttering around the solitary flame of vanity – is so much the rule and the law among men that there is almost nothing which is less comprehensible than how an honest and pure drive for truth could have arisen among them’. the barb is lethal. we cannot ignore nietzsche’s assertion that it is truth that is rare, dissimulation – the culture and rule of lies – which is normative. the witches in macbeth understood this founding condition, for it is not only macbeth’s craven ambition which they ensnare, but his vanity. nietzsche returns, repeatedly, to this ‘pitiless, greedy, insatiable, and murderous’ indifferent and ignorant desire for the realm of lies. ‘the liar’, he says, ‘is a person who uses the valid designations, the words, in order to make something which is unreal appear to be real’. for nietzsche, this dissimulation is not intrinsically wrong, it is inevitable. what concerns him far more is the consequence of this sleight of hand – ‘being harmed by means of fraud’. what troubles us, he says, is ‘not deception itself, but rather the unpleasant, hated consequences of certain sorts of deception’. it is this incarnation of lies – as something profoundly harmful and destructive in its fraudulence – which troubles us most. tautology – fair foul, foul fair – is not a falsity but a complexity wired into a linguistically driven cognitive faculty. words are forked, meaning volatile. this is because ‘we possess nothing but metaphors for things – metaphors which correspond in no way to the original entities’. and concepts – which are the ideational means through which we make sense of things – arise, always, from the equating of the unequal, through acts of transference. macbeth imputes his triumphal fate. it is not that the witches deliberately seek to lead him astray. rather, the act of straying, intrinsic to the confection of meaning, is tragically amplified and guided by macbeth’s overweening vanity and hunger for power. he will find the meaning which he chooses to find in the witches’ oracle. for it is not that they are lying – they speak the truth – but not necessarily the truth macbeth seeks. by placing himself centre-stage, as the rightful ruler, which he is not, macbeth, after nietzsche, mistakenly misreads the witches’ oracle as the particular sum of a ‘regulative an imperative world’. however, this imperative is one of many, for words designate multiple outcomes. what something appears to be is not necessarily what it is. the very essence of a thing can only be understood as a complex of possibilities. what words provide is the appearance of meaning, not meaning in-and-for itself. for as nietzsche reminds us, ‘it is not true that the essence of things “appears” in the empirical world’. truth is mediated at every turn, holographic at best. in the secular realm – a realm relative, truth is mediated at every turn, holographic at best. in the secular realm – a realm relative, speculative – it cannot be satisfactorily regulative. which is why nietzsche reminds us that it is not the fraudulence of meaning-making which is the problem, but its damaging consequence when it is abused. art 69v o l u m e 8 2 / 2 0 1 9 speculative – it cannot be satisfactorily regulative. which is why nietzsche reminds us that it is not the fraudulence of meaning-making which is the problem, but its damaging consequence when it is abused. echoing macbeth, the philosopher reminds us that ‘man has an invincible inclination to allow himself to be deceived and is, as it were, enchanted with happiness when the rhapsodist tells him epic fables as if they were true, or when the actor in the theatre acts more royally than any real king. so long as it is able to deceive without injuring, the master of deception, the intellect, is free’. deception, therefore, is inescapable, even bountiful. but it is also potentially lethal. and one would do well to keep this in mind as we venture into the realm of lies, our natural but also our debased habitat. as for truth? for nietzsche the desire for it remains a mystery. at best, ‘truths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions’. however, it is not this paradox which exercises me most, but the far more pervasive, necessary, and dangerous realm of lies with which we cloak our lives. more particularly, it is this realm of lies and its operation within a specific world – the world of contemporary south african art – which compels me the more. how do lies work effectively in art? when does the lie become dangerous and damaging? 3: pathological attachments in ‘the jerusalem prize acceptance speech’ – an essay to which i’ve returned more persistently than any other – j.m. coetzee considers the difficulty of telling the truth. penned in 1987, in the very heart of a cruelly divisive time in south africa’s history, coetzee notes that therein ‘there is … too much truth for art to hold, truth by the bucketful, truth that overwhelms and swamps every act of the imagination’. by ‘truth’, here, the nobel laureate is speaking of ‘the crudity of life in south africa, the naked force of its appeals, not only at the physical level but at the moral level too, its callousness and its brutalities, its hungers and its rages, its greed and its lies’, which, in hindsight, have never been resolved. and if this crudity persists – a crudity which makes it impossible to imagine my beleaguered country differently – it is because we have been unable to, or have refused ‘to quit a world of pathological attachments and abstract forces, of anger and violence’, and, subsequently, remain unable to ‘take up residence in a world where a living play of feelings and ideas is possible, a world where we truly have an occupation’. our very idea of the world and what it must become is defined by a pathological morality – a need both just and obsessive which has made it impossible to shirk a constitutive abomination – racial inequality, poverty, the psychic horror of centuries of abuse. as a consequence, our art cannot be sustained through enabling appearances – a ‘living play of feelings and ideas’ – and, therefore, finds itself mired in nakedly cruel and violent forces. and yet, if we hold fast to nietzsche’s conclusion that truth is chimerical, then what are we to make of coetzee’s yearning to be rid of ‘pathological attachments’? surely, if art is to ‘truly have an occupation’ it cannot ignore the inescapability of an abusive and cruel world? surely what matters is not art’s capacity to overcome this horror, but its capacity to think and feel through it which remains sustainable? this i think has been coetzee’s project all along – he does not seek some vainglorious and beneficent world, he seeks, rather, to engage with the very gravity of the world in which we exist, a world ground down by naked appeals, hunger, rage, greed and lies – a world intestate and unresolved. this world – shaped and honed through pain – is not one which we must refuse to imagine, but which we must learn to imagine differently. in so doing, we must not only recognise the difficulty of expressing it truthfully – whether this is possible is disputable – we must also reconsider the unscrupulousness of the fictions we live by – the fiction of liberty, self-possession, and selfdetermination. the lie of greatest concern is one in which we accept that we have been defrauded, a lie that champions salvation when there is none, that imagines a world in which, finally, we are one. in south africa no such parity exists. ours remains a society mutilated and ugly, founded on the illusion of supremacy and the shackles of bondage. ubuntu, the southern african credo in which we are whom we are because of others, has withered. it is a sentiment, a ‘truth’, which has been replaced by a pathological culture shaped by hate, fear, confusion, greed, desperation, violence, which, if nietzsche is correct, must be endured. art t h e t h i n k e r70 reflecting on the ‘rawness’ of life in south africa, ‘the evils that were practiced here’, the novelist and essayist, mike nicol, in the waiting country, goes on to examine the inevitability of dissimulation – ‘how we lie to one another’. ‘we lie to accommodate’, he says. ‘we lie because we believe it does not matter. we lie because we think that in the face of so many years of misery, a lie that is for the good is not a lie at all. and we lie because we have no self-respect. we lie because we are victims. we lie because we cannot imagine ourselves in any other way’. but it is not only the instrumentality of lying which is the problem here, but the extent of the fraud perpetrated because it – the psychic cost of lies. for coetzee the root of the problem stems from the falsity of ‘fraternity’, ‘the vain and essentially sentimental yearning that expresses itself in the reform movement’ which he sees as disingenuous and corrupt in its ‘yearning to have fraternity without paying for it’. the destructive consequence of this illusion – the illusion of fraternity – remains with us today. but the problem goes deeper, for what concerns me is not the confection of equality, but the root problem which founds its impossibility. what we are dealing with, when seeking to right a wrong, is not so much truth’s impossibility, but its metaphoricity – for truths, says nietzsche, are illusions both necessary and duplicitous. they come in the way of the greater problem presented to us in-and-through the culture of lies. to better understand just how the south african art world operates, therefore, requires not merely the quest for a truth, but the greater quest to understand just how lies have operated, how they sustain us, and how, at their best, they can begin to help us reconfigure our condition and position in this world. this is because we need lies that operate as enabling metaphors. 4: age of anger an artist who compellingly engages with the duplicitousness of the south african experience is ed young. in his word-works, in particular, one confronts the delusory nature of fraternity and the psychic discordance which wracks the country’s body politic. black in five minutes is but one of many ironic barbs directed at the canned notion of transformation and the ruse of some instantaneous shift. young understands the desire for change, but far more critically he asks us to reflect upon the conditions which makes this change seemingly possible – south africa’s phantom democracy. his aim is not merely to spoof hope, but to understand the yearning which triggers it – a yearning for a different world in a fundamentally indifferent time. because of course at the very moment – historic and global – in which we hunger for connectedness, we also find ourselves confronted with what pankaj mishra terms the ‘widening abyss of race, class and education’. this abyss is by no means peculiar to south africa. what mishra addresses is a global ‘age of anger’, an age crude, barbarous, divisive, which no moral logic can countenance, and in which ‘well-worn pairs of opposites, often corresponding to the bitter divisions in our societies, have once again been put to work: progressive vs. reactionary, open vs. closed, liberalism vs. fascism, rational vs. irrational’. however, while this antithetical realm assumes dominance, it also refuses any reconciliation. indeed, says mishra, ‘our search for rational political explanations for the current disorder is doomed’. this stark conclusion, made in 2017, is chastening. for today one cannot, rationally, resolve an escalating conflict. indeed, the parsing of categories – open/closed, true/false – has become all the more difficult. this is because we can no longer suppose it possible to make distinctions. instead we find ourselves caught in what frantz fanon and achille mbembe have termed a ‘zone of indistinction’ – foggy, filthy – in which it is difficult to disinter being from non-being. fanon’s and mbembe’s insight deserve greater attention on our part, for what concerns the martiniquan psychoanalyst and cameroonian philosopher is the notion that blackness – the black body and psyche – has been so thoroughly obliterated, so wholly denied its self-presence, that it cannot return itself to itself. objectified, to better understand just how the south african art world operates, therefore, requires not merely the quest for a truth, but the greater quest to understand just how lies have operated, how they sustain us, and how, at their best, they can begin to help us reconfigure our condition and position in this world. art 71v o l u m e 8 2 / 2 0 1 9 humiliated, rendered in-existent, it is a body, an agency, which, even today, remains at the margin of being. it is not surprising, therefore, that it is the clamour for being, for breath, for life, which has driven a humancentric will for selfhood. this drive, this yearning, is agonistically evident in a protest placard which reads – i am somebody. for it is the very denial of the human that lies at the heart on an on-going struggle for dignity. my point. however, is not to champion this justifiable right. what interests me, rather, is the voided being, the in-existent limit, the abyssal horror which we choose to flee from, or like macbeth, tragically misconstrue. for as we are inescapably caught up in lies, if deception is the very ground upon which we live, then, surely, the recovery of some solvent agency, some beneficent model for a better life, comes at quite another cost. for one cannot only replace absence with presence, nothingness with something substantive, one must also reflect upon that which is worthwhile which lies within the void – the ability to exploit the veils that cloud us, the mystery that subsists in an afflicted and recessive condition. for to merely rename the black oppressed body positively, to bequeath it with a reason which, for centuries, it was denied, is to merely invert a pathology, replace a lack with a seeming clarity. in so doing, we come to foster a vision of black experience and black art as merely a reactive decree, and, thereby, deny it its richer complexity. for surely the black body and experience, and its artistic expression, should also be allowed its incommensurability, its perversity? if, for mishra, reason is doomed and no longer a useful tool, if reason is on the verge of bankruptcy as a mechanism for mediation, then why should it now assume a dominant role in black expression? as edmund burke, the eighteenth century english theorist of the sublime and compatriot of schiller reminded us, ‘the nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible complexity; and therefore no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable either to man’s nature, or to the quality of his affairs’. reason, as a mechanism in-and-through which to attain a human right, is broken. which is precisely why we find ourselves caught up in an era of hyperbolic excess, hysteria, and, along with it, a mounting violence. it is because ‘reason has been reduced to a bloodlessly instrumental mode of rationality, which does no more than calculate its own advantage’, that we must now reconsider not only its uses but its abuses. for as the marxist cultural analyst, terry eagleton, resumes, ‘nature has been drained of its inner vitality and reduced to so much dead matter for human manipulation. what holds sway over human lives is utility, for which nothing can be precious in itself’. the art world – indeed, the world at large – has fallen victim to this cynically energised and limited application. reactive rather than active, declamatory rather than invocatory, this disposition, while necessary, is also enfeebled, for it blunts and contains a given struggle in scare quotes. divisive, oppositional, monomaniacal, and hysterical, it is a mechanism which cannot save us. hovering as we do in fog and filthy air, it is understandable that we might seek some clarity, but that clarity, as eagleton rightly notes, comes at the expense of complexity. if reason is doomed, if we find ourselves today in a realm in which distinctions are collapsing all about us, in a state increasingly liquid – ‘fluid’ – this state, the state of our time, need not be lamentable. truth after all was never the other of falsity. as nietzsche argues, ours has always been a culture informed in-and-through dissimulation. it is the ideal of truth, an imposition upon an inherently unscrupulous world, which is the strange attractor – a quality and a category which remains inherently remote. which is why i’ve chosen to emphasise the importance of lying as a generative rather than a degenerative agency. what makes ed young’s word-works compelling is not that they seek to speak truth to power, but that they implicate us in a founding hypocrisy. all so fucking african – displayed at frieze-new york in 2016 – is precisely that, a word-work which challenges the fetishization of africa as a continent, an idea, a principle. the tone of young’s work is exasperated, exhausted, numbed not only by the hype but the banalisation of a continent which for the past 500 years has operated as europe’s inverted and perverted other. that there has been a concerted attempt to rewire this prevailing prejudicial perception has in no way stifled its prevalence. instead, what we get is a disjunctive state in which a constitutive pathology is transmogrified. and yet, if we concur with coetzee’s view, then it is those very pathological attachments which, despite all attempts to the art t h e t h i n k e r72 contrary, will prevail. for coetzee it is this very pathological attachment to a dark truth which cannot be vaulted which makes south africa ‘as irresistible as it is unlovable’. while i share coetzee’s conviction, indeed his morbid neurosis, i nevertheless have also asked that we flip the prognosis and, thereby, resist this reading and learn to love the aggrieved and brutalised body of a country and a continent, and its people. for it is only through resistance and love – a resistance and a love which is not prescriptive – that we will begin to understand the complexity of the problem. art’s job, if it can be said to possess one, is not to solve a problem but to inhabit it in an engaging way. and i think that young does just this – he occupies a dilemma and makes it his vocation. in this regard, however, he also goes against the grain – the grain of resistance art which, dominant in the 70s and 80s, muted in the 90s, has resurfaced. for today, we find ourselves thoroughly caught up in mishra’s polarised and doomed logic, precisely because we mistakenly believe that we can think and paint ourselves out of a corner. paradox, however, cannot be so easily overcome, which is precisely why young has chosen to operate inside a contradiction, and, in so doing, foreground the lies which willingly, or unwillingly, we choose to spin. i see black people – a word-work exhibited at the johannesburg art fair in 2015 – expresses an observation. one might assume the first person pronoun – i – to be the subjective perspective of a white male artist. this could be true, but it is also not. the statement does not read, i, ed young, a white south african born in welkom in the free state, see black people. but because we know the artist to be white, male, and notorious, we tend to fix upon what could be a supremacist and racist abstraction of others. the generic conflation – ‘black people’ – is now not read as an objective sighting of a cluster, but a derogatory diminishing of a corpus of singularities into a blurred group. and yet, given the context for the exhibition of this statement, a forum whose very culture is exclusionary and predominantly frequented by a white middle class elite, surely this sighting is inaccurate? surely what young is telling us is that he does not see black people? that black people are markedly absent from a forum – the johannesburg art fair, one of africa’s leading trading centres – and, therefore, that it is their absence which is all the more palpable? 5: the sleep of reason the black body in pain is not the oracle of truth, and yet it is precisely the fixation on abjection which, with a morbid excrescence, has assumed dominance. it is against this impassioned but also pragmatic deployment of the black body – of blackness – which achille mbembe has chosen to think. his critique of black reason, typically dismissed by those who use blackness as a categorical imperative, is an inspiring attempt to think inside the difficulty of a contentious category. ‘though some names can flatter, the name “black” was from the beginning a mechanism for objectification and degradation’, mbembe notes. ‘it drew its strength from its capacity to suffocate and strangle, to amputate and emasculate. the name was like death’. to be black, he more starkly adds, is ‘the prototype of a poisoned, burnt subject … a being whose life is made of ashes’. departing from this most defiled of categories, mbembe seeks to explore just how a category like blackness – typically perceived as debased or threatening and violent – could operate both as ‘the clinical manifestation of a “sickness” of a political nature as it was a practice of the transformation of symbols’. it is only in this doubled sense – as a category pathological and transfiguring – that we can begin to grasp the complexity of the being it frames. the relevance of this approach is that it defies easy polarisation and allows one to inhabit a realm that is indistinct, in which one is no longer captive to the rights of an oppressed body or glibly insouciant in relation to its messianic destiny. it is in this regard that lungiswa gqunta emerges as a particularly canny young artist, for she not only recognises a history of pain and injustice but seeks, through a series of visceral and conceptual installations, to foreground the complexity of the oppressed being. clinical, exacting, daring in its execution, gqunta’s works point to the zone of indistinction, the constitutive void, which defines black experience in contemporary south africa. one work in particular stands out as an instance of this complexity. we see a bedframe, shaped in a precise square, the bed coils starkly a-glimmer, the bed’s frame tracked all about by a cold white light. above the coiled square the artist has fixed a clear art 73v o l u m e 8 2 / 2 0 1 9 it is in this regard that lungiswa gqunta emerges as a particularly canny young artist, for she not only recognises a history of pain and injustice but seeks, through a series of visceral and conceptual installations, to foreground the complexity of the oppressed being. sheet of perspex. this is the structure’s surface – transparent, vertiginous, devoid of any consoling support, for there is no mattress. there is only the frame that we see, the idea of a bed, shorn of any comfort, any fabric which one would reasonably suppose necessary for rest, for sleep. for in this lean sculptural work, spot-lit, stark, it is precisely rest, sleep, which is denied. in the place of a mattress, we find a thin bilious film of petrol. greenly iridescent, it is beautiful and it is chilling, for what lungiswa gqunta is telling us is that this is not a time of sleep but one of violent discord. francisco goya’s etching, as ruthlessly precise as lungiswa gqunta’s skeletal stage, is called ‘the sleep of reason produces monsters’, and it returns us to the implacability of this unrest. for ours is a time in which reason has failed us, in which we have become traumatised, besieged, and panic-stricken. and if we cannot escape the monstrousness of ours blasted lives, it is because we are ruinously inconsolable. the brilliance of gqunta’s installation – the bed is accompanied by a video work in which we see the artist’s calves and feet swaying backwards and forwards, clasped in makeshift sandals made of scrubbing brushes, the bristles replaced with matchsticks – lies in its latent force. for the installation is incendiary. it speaks to a burning world – ‘a being whose life is made of ashes’ – in which there is no privacy, no peace, in which the home is a battleground. as the matchstick points of the brushes sweep across a bed of coals, we imagine that all, in an instant, could be engulfed in flames – a sensation which all the more forcefully ignites itself within us as we see the shimmer of petrol and the delicate impress it has made on the perspex sheet. here we return to my initial reflection on the lie as something shallow, undisturbed and undiscussed, assuming a horizontal position on a supporting surface. but i am also reminded of k sello duiker’s superb novel, the quiet violence of dreams, published in 2001, in which the wracked state of the black imagination assumes its stark presence. for duiker, like gqunta, well knew that reason, dispensed as an antidote to horror, is not only generic but a venomous fake. ‘we’re not all god’s children’, duiker writes. ‘in here god doesn’t exist. i am the forgotten who lies rotting in a barrel of fermenting apples. god never heard my cries. i never saw the light or touched on something sacred in myself. we’re not all mystics who can extract beauty from our pain. some of us are just born with too much corruption to ever survive it’. that duiker’s novel proved the inspiration for a group show jointly curated by blank projects and the stevenson gallery in 2016, should further impress upon us the crippling extent of south africa’s damaged psyche. today we are very far removed indeed from ed young’s only optimistic work, a sculpture of desmond tutu in flight, holding fast to a lurching candelabra. made in 2010, it is a sculpture to which i repeatedly returned with my daughters’. the words which accompanied the grinning airborne desmond tutu, now, in hindsight, are an arid mockery – be patient – the declaration reads – we only have a few things to fix. at the exhausted limit of reason, in the midst of an agonistic and inconsolable fact of abuse, disregard, debasement, duiker, like gqunta and young, seek to create art that infects us with its ruinous difficulty. duiker would kill himself in 2004, but not before he bequeathed us a bare-boned body of work which defied the hypocrisy that still seeks to contain and nullify black experience. ‘i don’t care for people who want to prescribe what it means and doesn’t mean to be african’, he writes. ‘people say things just for the hell of it, to hear their own voices blowing out vacuous breath. i know who i am’. it is this vacuity which we find spoken all about, a vacuity which shapes and informs so much talk of african art today. it is a vacuity that subsists in a dangerous and fraudulent lie. at the root of the problem is perception: what we choose to see and why? given that lies are built into perception, the problem is not that we lie – this is unavoidable – rather, what should be concerning are the lies which come in the way of a deeper understanding. if ed young’s provocation or luniswa gqunta’s insinuation are compelling, it is art t h e t h i n k e r74 because they appeal to this greater understanding – they understand and manipulate the illusory power of art, and, in so doing, tap into the structures of feeling – a structure of anger and dissent – in which it subsists. neither artist is reactive – though young’s art appears to be so – rather, both actively engage with the difficulty of perception, the one by challenging the complacent exploitation of entitlement, the other, more demandingly, by foregrounding a besieged psyche and body. i have written on these matters at great length, and in variant and conflicting iterations, in my book in the world. for the purposes of this conversation, however, i seek only to address the ubiquitous nature of the misperception of african art. there is, for example, the gauche view that the spiking interest in african art signals a ‘second scramble’, yet another occupation and deterritorialization of africa’s agency and value. to bluntly state, as does matthew partridge, that ‘in south africa the art world is a white world, trading in blacks’, is a view that is as convincing as it is offensive and disturbing. but my point, here, is not to bemoan this state of affairs, let alone right it. rather, what interests me far more is the value of a calculated dissonance and an enabling lie. for just as i cannot stomach the exploitation of the black body and its expressions, neither can i wholly endorse the jingoistic assumption that it is an invariable force for good. piety in the understanding of black experience must be routed out. as steve bantu biko noted in i write what i like, ‘the first step … is to make the black man come to himself, to pump back life into his empty shell; to infuse him with pride and dignity, to remind him of his complicity in the crime of allowing himself to be misused and therefore letting evil reign supreme in the country of his birth. this is what we mean by an inward-looking process. this is the definition of “black consciousness”’. the ‘black man’, therefore, is complicit in the engineering of his own dissolution and co-optation in an enterprise which, fundamentally, refuses him a greater probity. and if the art world has allowed this to happen it is precisely because it has favoured the iconic and spectacular at the expense of what edmund burke termed ‘the greatest possible complexity’. tragically still perceived as a curiosity, the black being and its works have rarely been permitted to move beyond an assigned representational economy. there is, of course, an urgent move to override this tendency, the decision by an institution – which will not be named – to exchange its white male blue chip art with works by women and blacks being a typical and rather sinister instance of this new-fangled political correctness. ironically, it is the overweening desire to ‘do good’ and right an imbalance which further compromises an already compromised art world. after nietzsche, it is this political correctness which has emerged as a symptom which has forgotten it is a dangerous illusion. we see this misstep in operation in curatorial projects and tertiary curricula everywhere. the widely touted tragically still perceived as a curiosity, the black being and its works have rarely been permitted to move beyond an assigned representational economy. there is, of course, an urgent move to override this tendency. sleeping pools – lungiswa gqunta art 75v o l u m e 8 2 / 2 0 1 9 decolonising project is a glaring instance of this misstep. as a rational project – a project driven by a good reason – it fails to address the more complex matter of human complexity, a matter, a factor, refused at its outset by colonialism, which, as terry eagleton has rightly pointed out, is ‘at root a political and economic reality, not (as some postcolonial theory imagines) a cultural one’. the greater appeal – expressed by achille mbembe, and which has been troublingly disregarded and disabused today – is to engage in ‘the project of a world that is coming, a world before us, one whose destination is universal, a world freed from the burden of race, from resentment, and from the desire for vengeance that all racism calls into being’. consigned to the dumpster for being utopian, it is a view which nevertheless connects rather than divides us. it is, in other words, a better and more engendering lie, precisely because it holds fast to a beneficent will in a time which is fast becoming irredeemably balkanised. for as james baldwin has reminded us – a reminder which the ideologues amongst us wilfully suppress – ‘the rage of the disesteemed’, while ‘absolutely inevitable’ is also ‘personally fruitless’. art cannot construct solutions to our ills, it can only implicate us in the difficulty of addressing them. as jeannette winterson notes in art objects: essays on ecstasy and eff rontery, ‘the true artist is interested in the art object as an art process, the thing in being, the being of the thing, the struggle, the excitement, the energy, that have found expression in a particular way. the true artist is after the problem. the false artist wants it solved (by somebody else)’. while i do not support winterson’s distinction between the ‘true artist’ and the ‘false artist’, claiming rather that we lie for better or for worse, i nevertheless cannot shirk her conclusion that prescriptive art is also unduly conscriptive – it asks us to complete its meaning, to be its foil. that this incorporating and inclusive view has become increasingly commonplace – the viewer democratically championed as art’s extension and arbiter – reveals the degree to which populism has infected the art world, indeed, the world at large. in this troubling regard, however, we should remember biko’s caution and be wary of being complicit in the ‘crime’ of allowing ourselves to be so ‘misused’. this caution – qualified variously by mbembe, biko, and winterson – is brilliantly heeded and overridden by daniel stompie selibe, who, to my mind, best exemplifies an art in which blackness – as a trope for subjection or victimhood – is exhausted and reconceptualised. in his works – part collage, part febrile mark-making – it is ‘the being of the thing, the struggle, the excitement, the energy’ which compels us. simon schama’s description of the paintings by soutine as ‘observed phenomena’ that ‘dissolve completely in a pottage of paint – the paint flung on with abandon, wet into wet, forming ropes, snakes, flat ribbons of sharp colour, while the whole surging surface is sometimes slashed over with welt-raising strokes of black’, cannily mirrors the abyssal vortex which distinguishes selibe’s world. his is an art refined by oblivion, which stands as a remarkable testimony to the enraging hopelessness which consumes us. for as james baldwin reminded us, ‘people are trapped in history, and history is trapped in them’. the prevailing lie – mired in political correctness, candice – daniel stompie selibe art t h e t h i n k e r76 and thus, after winterson, a lie that generates a ‘false’ art – is that this oblivion must, perforce, be overcome. daniel stompie selibe, i’d wager, has refused this stifling and crippling imperative. rather, his is an art – closest in spirit to k sello duiker’s quiet violence of dreams – which has chosen to inhabit an enraging hopelessness. it is an art poised at the tipping point in the experience of being human at this moment in the twentyfirst century. for it is not only the art of a black south african consciousness but a consciousness that is engulfing the entirety of the world; a consciousness distressed, panic-stricken, fearful, which, nevertheless, must forge a path, no matter how inarticulate and graspingly futile. 6: a different political potential if ‘[t]ruths are illusions which we have forgotten are illusions’, if they are but ‘metaphors that have become worn out and have been drained of sensuous force, coins which have lost their embossing and are now considered as metal and no longer as coins’, it is because they have lost or mistaken their currency. this, however, has not stopped a failed currency from being minted anew. in south africa, i have witnessed this counterfeit played out in the quest for free education in which neither freedom nor education has been fundamentally addressed. but it is not this acutely complex matter with which i wish to conclude this conversation, but its antidote, for above and beneath this rhetoric for change there exists an art which can overcome it – an art which refuses to sustain the fictions which we inevitably embrace, but which, despite this refusal, can nevertheless help us to live better, if difficult, lives. one such fiction, one such lie, for jm coetzee, is that ‘after we die we wake up in another, better world’. another is achille mbembe’s, ‘of a world that is coming … a world freed from … resentment.’ if damned for being fraudulent, they nevertheless hold fast to their currency. and what connects these beliefs, these fantasies, is their fortitude and their fundamental inconclusiveness. for while we cannot shirk the indisputable fact of ‘a widening abyss of race, class, and education’, while our ‘intellectual industry’ has become increasingly polarised, what persists and cannot be overridden, despite innumerable efforts to do so, is our capacity for some starkly austere critical wonder. in the midst of our flawed and aggrieved state, we have the ability to access our better selves. and it is in this particular regard, finally, that i want to share with you the work of a remarkable young artist – alana blignaut. a master’s graduate from the university of witswaterand in johannesburg – i was her external examiner in 2018 – blignaut introduced me to a room blackened, but for one light projection which revealed a series of looped portraits. my first impression was that i was looking at fine pencil drawings, or drawings scored with acute delicacy in some grey ink. photographs were not what i thought i was seeing. this incorrect, yet reasonable impression, made sense when i realised that what blignaut was in fact doing was not taking photographs but digitally morphing a grouping of photographs of men and women respectively, and reconstructing them according to received ideas of caste-phenotype-race. the images were taken from an apartheid prison archive, the subjects deemed a threat to the state. through a digital process – too complex for me to grasp and explain here – the artist had reconfigured the idea of objecthood and personhood. she was asking us to rethink how we see people – the ideological-political-cultural-faux scientific methods we use to appropriate others and consign them to a preordained and imposed set of categories. the reasoning behind it all was especially compelling, for what i thought primarily interested blignaut was not only the system of closed meanings which confined the subject-as-object according to gender and race, but the slippage that occurred in the attempt to do so. the categories were intrinsically aberrant, it seemed, for they also inadvertently announced the a-categorical. this insight i thought then, as i do now, is critical, particularly today, in a culture both local and through a digital process – too complex for me to grasp and explain here – the artist had reconfigured the idea of objecthood and personhood. she was asking us to rethink how we see people – the ideological-politicalcultural-faux scientific methods we use to appropriate others and consign them to a preordained and imposed set of categories. art 77v o l u m e 8 2 / 2 0 1 9 global which seeks to imprison and herd human beings. that blignaut chose the faces of purported ‘criminals’ or perceived ‘threats’ to the apartheid system as her focus and terrain, in no way belied the fact that she was also addressing the darkly current reinvestment in the objectification of human beings according to race and gender. however, her critique was even more far reaching, for what interested the artist was the impertinence and obscenity which undergirds the naming and framing of people. what spurred her on was the vexed impossibility of any strategy of containment. in short, the artist had deftly drawn my attention to the visceral and cognitive fact that no human being can, finally, be reduced to a type. blignaut’s endeavour was not only a brilliant deconstruction of types, but also a deconstruction of the imagined essence mistakenly believed to subsist in types. for through an exploration of ‘facial averaging’, in which a cluster of men and women were morphed to create a single image, we learnt not only of the universality of faces – that we belong to one species – but, far more importantly, that no face can truly contain its singularity, and that faces – the aggregation thereof – resulted in two impossibilities – the impossibility of the singular and the impossibility of the universal. what, one wonders, is achieved in renouncing or suspending these absolutes? for blignaut, i think it opened up a far more fluid comprehension of the viscosity, rather than the density, of being. that the artist is currently undergoing an alteration in gender – thereby challenging the imperative of polarity and the ruse of essences – has surely informed this astoundingly potent work. for as blignaut’s co-supervisor and long-standing collaborator, kathryn smith, more pointedly noted, the artist’s innovation displayed ‘an active perversion of a historically discriminatory and repressive technology and method’, and, in so doing, invoked ‘something both beautiful and unsettling, that asserts a different political potential’. i have chosen to conclude this conversation with blignaut because she has reminded us that the lie that is art, the lie that is perception, is one that harbours great riches – a different political potential. in foregoing certainty, in embracing the infinity that is difference, we arrive at the enabling lie which makes life and art conditions in which we can survive. after all, a ’regulative and imperative world’ is one that kills, no matter how necessary that regulation and imperative may seem to be. ■ this essay was first delivered as a public lecture at the university college of london’s institute of advanced studies on october 3rd 2018, as part of a series of talks on lies. an abridged version – 2000 words – was published by the ias in the spring 2019 issue of think pieces. ‘six asides on art & lies’, since revised, appears in full for the first time in the thinker. selected bibliography james baldwin, ‘stranger in the village’, notes of a native son, boston ma: beacon press, 1955. steve bantu biko, i write what i like, johannesburg: picador africa, 2004. edmund burke, reflections on the revolution in france, new haven: yale university press, 2003 j.m. coetzee, doubling the point: essays and interviews, cambridge ma: harvard university press, 1992. k. sello duiker, the quiet violence of dreams, johannesburg: kwela books, 2001. terry eagleton, culture, new haven and london: yale university press, 2016. ashraf jamal, in the world: essays on contemporary south af rican art, milan: skira, 2017. achille mbembe, the critique of black reason, johannesburg: wits university press, 2018. pankaj mishra, age of anger: a history of the present, london: allen lane, 2017 mike nicol, the waiting country: a south af rican witness, london: victor gollancz, 1995. friedrich nietzsche, ‘on truth and lies in the nonmoral sense’, http:// www.e.scoala.ro/biblioteca/friedrich_nietzsche.html simon schama, hang-ups: essays on painting (mostly), london: bbc books, 2004. susan sontag, regarding the pain of others, london: penguin books, 2004. jeanette winterson: art objects: essays on ecstasy and eff rontery, toronto: alfred a. knopf, 1995 female average male average – alana blignaut art _goback acta polytechnica ctu proceedings doi:10.14311/app.2016.6.0001 acta polytechnica ctu proceedings 6:1–5, 2016 © czech technical university in prague, 2016 available online at http://ojs.cvut.cz/ojs/index.php/app on construction of a reliable ground truth for evaluation of visual slam algorithms jan bayer∗, petr čížek, jan faigl czech technical university, faculty of electrical engineering, technicka 2, prague, czech republic ∗ corresponding author: bayerja1@fel.cvut.cz abstract. in this work we are concerning the problem of localization accuracy evaluation of visual-based simultaneous localization and mapping (slam) techniques. quantitative evaluation of the slam algorithm performance is usually done using the established metrics of relative pose error and absolute trajectory error which require a precise and reliable ground truth. such a ground truth is usually hard to obtain, while it requires an expensive external localization system. in this work we are proposing to use the slam algorithm itself to construct a reliable ground truth by offline frame-by-frame processing. the generated ground truth is suitable for evaluation of different slam systems, as well as for tuning the parametrization of the on-line slam. the presented practical experimental results indicate the feasibility of the proposed approach. keywords: rgb-d slam, localization, ground truth construction, legged robot, rough terrain traversal, adaptive motion gait. 1. introduction reliable localization is an essential prerequisite in many practical robotic scenarios, thus its accuracy is the most important parameter in the evaluation of newly developed localization techniques. there are numerous methods based on various principles that can localize the robot in its operational environment. however, when benchmarking such localization methods it is necessary to use a reliable ground truth together with some established metrics (e.g. [1, 2]). in this work, we address the problem of localization accuracy assessment in a visual simultaneous localization and mapping (slam) task [3]. in principle, it is possible to use publicly available datasets, e.g., the freiburg uni dataset [1], the rgb-d slam dataset [2], or the kitty dataset [4], to evaluate the accuracy of slam method. however, our particular environment, setup, and sensory equipment might not exhibit similar properties as the ones used in these standardized datasets. therefore we need to construct our own dataset and acquire a ground truth to assess the localization accuracy. all the above-mentioned datasets are supplied with a centimeter-level precision ground truth provided by an external localization system like a differential gps [4], which is based on a standard gps enhanced with ground reference stations with known geospatial positions. other types of external localization systems used in publicly available datasets are motion capture system [2] or a total station [5]. the former utilizes the data captured by camera sensors to localize the robot marked with special patterns well-distinguishable in the environment. the later measures distance between the observed object and the static ground station using time of flight principle. a 3-dof position of the robot in a global reference frame is obtained from figure 1. experimental environment the distance and the angles measured by the total station. however, acquisition of a reliable ground truth using any of the mentioned localization techniques might be a considerable problem while all of the aforementioned principles are very expensive. thus we are proposing to use the dataset itself for the ground truth construction by offline frame-by-frame processing of the dataset using the slam algorithm. in such a case, we are not interested in an on-line performance of the algorithm rather than the reliability and accuracy of the constructed trajectory estimate to be used as a ground truth. such a processing is assumed to provide the best trajectory estimate for the given dataset and localization technique. moreover, by taking into account certain factors in the dataset construction., which are discussed further in this paper, it is possible to improve the reliability of the generated ground truth. 1 http://dx.doi.org/10.14311/app.2016.6.0001 http://ojs.cvut.cz/ojs/index.php/app j. bayer, p. čížek, j. faigl acta polytechnica ctu proceedings to verify our hypothesis, we are reporting on the results of such a ground truth construction evaluation based on the rgb-d slam method [6] compared to the ground truth provided by the whycon motion capture system [7]. we evaluated the proposed approach on a challenging dataset obtained with the rgb-d camera mounted on a hexapod walking robot crawling in rough terrain (see fig. 1). such a scenario requires full 6-dof position estimation, while the camera is subjected to unpredictable motion and the resulting dataset is very different in comparison to all the standardized datasets obtained mainly by wheel platforms. the presented approach to ground truth construction is somehow similar to the task of structure-frommotion studied in computer vision community. in [8], the authors use color images from the rgb-d microsoft kinect camera to recover its pose, but for the scene and object recognition purposes. however, in our work we are focusing solely on the localization accuracy rather than the quality of the model (map) of the environment. the paper is structured as follows. section 2 explains our method of getting the ground truth for the evaluation and the used evaluation metrics. the set-up of a practical experiment together with the evaluation results are described in section 3. conclusion and remarks for future work are dedicated to section 4. 2. proposed solution the main motivation of our work is to provide a reliable ground truth estimate whenever a precise external localization is not available to be used as the ground truth. for this reason, we are proposing to use the captured dataset and process it with a slam system offline frame-by-frame with special settings of parameters to minimize the trajectory error. afterward, the resulting trajectory estimate can be used as a ground truth to compare to the online generated trajectories, while in deployment scenarios we are interested in the online performance of slam methods. such an estimated ground truth can be used to compare different slam methods or to find the best parametrization for the online slam trajectory estimation. 2.1. evaluation metrics the slam algorithms can be compared either by the quality of the generated map or the accuracy of the estimated trajectory. as the evaluation metrics, we use the established metrics of ate (absolute trajectory error) and rpe (relative pose error) presented in [2]. ate is given as: fi = q−1i spi, (1) where q−1i is transformation matrix, which maps (i + 1)th point of ground truth to ith point of ground truth. pi is a similar matrix, which maps ith point of the estimated trajectory to the (i + 1)th point of the trajectory. s is a transformation matrix, which aligns the estimated trajectory to the ground truth. ate measures the absolute error of all estimated 6-dof positions, which means that ate can be represented by atet and ateφ, where atet are euclidean distances between estimated poses and corresponding ground truth positions and ateφ is the absolute error of the estimated orientations. rpe measures the drift of the estimated trajectory (error in shape of the trajectory estimate) and it is given by the equation: ei = (q−1i qi+∆) −1(p−1i pi+∆), (2) where ∆ defines a fixed frame interval. we used ∆ = 1 for the evaluation, which means that rpe measures a drift of visual odometry. rpe can be also represented by rpet (the relative translational error) and rpeφ (the relative rotational error). 3. evaluation to test our hypothesis and prove its feasibility we designed a practical experiment where we evaluated the localization accuracy provided by an offline frame-byframe processing of a visual slam dataset captured by a hexapod robot traversing rough terrain with a ground truth provided by an external localization system. in particular, we focused on evaluation with the structured light camera and rgb-d slam algorithm based on [6]. we choose to use the structured light sensor because it is inexpensive and provide the slam method with a metric information unlike the stereo and monocular slam methods which can estimate the trajectory up to scale. for the establishment of a reliable ground truth, we used motion capture system whycon [7] which tracks the circular markers attached to the robot using two logitech hd pro webcam c920 cameras. used external localization provided centimeter-level precision ground truth. we used the rgb-d camera asus xtion pro for the visual slam, which acquires a color image and also depth measurements. the experimental dataset captured using the rgb-d camera mounted on a hexapod walking platform contains sequences of rgb and depth images in full asus xtion pro resolution 640 × 480 px at 10 frames per second. the whole dataset for the evaluation was captured using the ros framework [9]. 3.1. rgb-d slam the considered rgb-d slam system is based on [6] and it operates as follows. first positions of the salient image features are extracted from the rgb image supplemented by their depth provided by the rgb-d sensor. then, a rigid transformation is found 2 vol. 6/2016 on construction of a reliable ground truth frame-by-frame processing online processing trial atet ateφ rpet rpeφ end dist. atet ateφ rpet rpeφ end dist. [cm] [rad] [cm] [rad] [cm] [cm] [rad] [cm] [rad] [cm] no. 1 4.00 – 0.92 – 7.11 9.60 – 1.13 – 3.5 no. 2 4.32 – 0.54 – 12.54 8.13 – 0.56 – 8.93 no. 3 3.68 – 0.40 – 5.21 22.02 – 0.87 – 33.15 no. 4 9.97 0.08 1.21 0.01 9.13 12.50 0.09 1.31 0.01 7.12 no. 5 11.44 0.06 0.80 0.01 15.96 15.64 0.06 0.94 0.02 27.55 table 1. trajectory estimation results y [m] ground-truth and rgb-d slam trajectories 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -12 x [m] 1 0 1.5 -1 -0.5 0 0.5 1 z [ m ] ground-truth rgb-d slam (a) . no.3 y [m] ground-truth and rgb-d slam trajectories 1 0.5 0 -0.5 -12 x [m] 1 0 0.5 -0.5 0 1 z [ m ] ground-truth rgb-d slam (b) . no.4 y [m] ground-truth and rgb-d slam trajectories 1 0 -1 2 x [m] 1 0 1.5 1 -1 0.5 0 -0.5 z [ m ] ground-truth rgb-d slam (c) . no.5 figure 2. trajectory estimation results. using the ransac [10] algorithm between the currently processed frame and a subset of already mapped frames. this subset consists of np directly preceding frames, ng graph neighboring frames and nr random frames from the whole map which serves to detect large loop closures. the estimated pose is then added to the map (pose graph) and refined using the g2o graph optimizing algorithm [11]. the optimization is especially beneficial in case of large loop closures when the whole trajectory estimate is improved. 3.2. experimental setup experimental environment (see fig. 1) that has been used for capturing of the dataset consists of a plane, low stairs, ramp, and square filled with wooden blocks of different heights. the dataset has been captured by a hexapod walking robot equipped with adaptive motion gait [12] which enables the robot to traverse difficult obstacles. the robot was guided by an operator along the squared path of approx. 9 m length. our experimental environment has been designed to represent some basic problems, which can slam method face. these include high speed of rotation at the corners of the trajectory, which affects the precision of rotation estimation. the stairs and wooden blocks parts of the trajectory force angular rotations along the geometrical axis and the descending ramp force the slam method to deal with the limited number of image features. moreover, the locomotion of the hexapod robot induces unpredictable and abrupt camera motions during the whole trajectory. 3.3. results altogether 5 trajectories were captured and analyzed in order to test our hypothesis. ground truth for the first three trajectories; however, does not contain information about the heading of the robot, and thus only translational component of the ate and rpe can be verified. the considered rgb-d slam parametrization for the frame-by-frame dataset processing has been the surf [13] feature extractor detecting 600 features and keeping 400 best matches with a very long comparison horizon of np = 16, ng = 4 and nr = 1. ransac stopping criteria have been set to 85% of inliers and 1000 iterations considering point an inlier if it is not outside the range of 3 pixels. optimization precision has been set to the best values optimizing each individual frame. such a processing took more than 4 hours per one trajectory on intel core i5 machine. to show the feasibility of our approach we processed the dataset online as well. the parametrization for the online processing has been the surf feature extractor detecting 400 features and keeping 250 of them, np = 3, ng = 3 and nr = 1 with 500 ransac iterations and optimization after every 10 frames. such a processing achieves an online performance of average 5.2 frames per second on the same evaluation hardware. the results are summarized in table 1. resulting trajectories for trials no. 3, no. 4 and no. 5 are depicted in figure 2. 3 j. bayer, p. čížek, j. faigl acta polytechnica ctu proceedings 3.4. discussion table 1 indicates that an average atet, when using frame-by-frame processing, is about 1% of the trajectory length and the average rpet is under 1 cm. notice the atet and rpet values are always higher for the online processing results. on the other hand, differences in the ateφ and rpeφ are neglectable although the slight imperfections in the orientation estimation are the most influencing factor in the accuracy of the localization [14]. the results also indicate that the frame-by-frame processing provides the best result obtainable by a given slam method. thus, it is possible to use the estimated ground truth for the evaluation of the online versions of the same algorithm to find the best parametrization which is deployable online onboard of the mobile robot. note, the resulting localization accuracy is also greatly influenced by the loop closure in case the robot visits previously mapped location. if there is no loop closure, then the trajectory estimate is given as the visual odometry only, which error is asymptotically unbound. in case the loop closure is detected, the optimization process corrects the pose estimates along the whole trajectory. the phenomenon is illustrated in figure 2c, where the loop did not close; thus, the trajectory estimate exhibits higher error in the end part of the trajectory, and figure 3 which presents the results of the frame-by-frame processing of the same trajectory with open-loop enabled and disabled. the results for the closed-loop trajectory are atet = 4.19 cm, rpet = 0.94 rad·10−2 and end dist = 7.33 cm, while for the open-loop trajectory are atet = 8.72 cm, rpet = 0.96 rad·10−2 and end dist = 13.73 cm. although the drift of the visual odometry represented by the rpet is similar in both cases, the resulting end distance and absolute trajectory error are higher when the open-loop scenario is considered. thus, we recommend designing the experimental trajectory to exploit the loop closures to obtain a better ground truth estimate. note the prerequisite of our method is that there are no systematic errors, which can significantly decrease the precision of ground truth estimate. to avoid systematic errors we recommend to use a special shape of the robot’s path, e.g., square. 4. conclusion in this paper, we have studied the problem of the localization accuracy assessment in a slam task whenever a reliable ground truth provided by an external localization system is not available. we have proposed to use frame-by-frame processing of the captured dataset to obtain a sufficiently reliable ground truth for the quantitative evaluation of the online slam systems. the estimated ground truth is then suitable for the comparison of different slam methods or determination of the best parametrization of the online slam. note, the important thing for the dataset creation is ground-truth and rgb-d slam trajectories -2 -1.5 x [m] -1 -0.5 0 1.5 1 0.5 y [m] 0 -0.5 0 0.6 0.4 0.2 z [ m ] ground-truth closed-loop open-loop figure 3. comparison of closed-loop and open-loop frame-by-frame processed trajectories the loop closing, which can significantly improve the robot localization and it is also important to design the shape of the path in order to avoid systematic errors. we tested the presented method with a hexapod crawling robot and rgb-d slam system, but we suppose that the proposed method is applicable to different slam methods and different platforms too. presented results support the feasibility of the proposed approach and can be utilized in cases when expensive and hard to setup external localization systems are not available or suitable. acknowledgements the presented work was supported by the czech science foundation (gačr) under research project no. 15-09600y. the support of grant no. sgs16/235/ohk3/3t/13 to petr čížek is also gratefully acknowledged. references [1] r. kümmerle, b. steder, c. dornhege, et al. on measuring the accuracy of slam algorithms. autonomous robots 27(4):387–407, 2009. doi:10.1007/s10514-009-9155-6. [2] j. sturm, n. engelhard, f. endres, et al. a benchmark for the evaluation of rgb-d slam systems. in ieee international conference on intelligent robots and systems, pp. 573–580. 2012. doi:10.1109/iros.2012.6385773. [3] s. thrun, w. burgard, d. fox. probabilistic robotics. mit press, 2005. doi:10.1162/artl.2008.14.2.227. [4] m. menze, a. geiger. object scene flow for autonomous vehicles. in conference on computer vision and pattern recognition, pp. 3061–3070. 2015. doi:10.1109/cvpr.2015.7298925. [5] n. sünderhauf, k. konolige, s. lacroix, p. protzel. visual odometry using sparse bundle adjustment on an autonomous outdoor vehicle, pp. 157–163. springer berlin heidelberg, 2006. doi:10.1007/3-540-30292-1_20. [6] f. endres, j. hess, n. engelhard, et al. an evaluation of the rgb-d slam system. in ieee international conference on robotics and automation, pp. 1691–1696. 2012. doi:10.1109/icra.2012.6225199. 4 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10514-009-9155-6 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/iros.2012.6385773 http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/artl.2008.14.2.227 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2015.7298925 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/3-540-30292-1_20 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icra.2012.6225199 vol. 6/2016 on construction of a reliable ground truth [7] t. krajník, m. nitsche, j. faigl, et al. a practical multirobot localization system. journal of intelligent & robotic systems 76(3-4), 2014. doi:10.1007/s10846-014-0041-x. [8] s. bao. semantic structure from motion. in intl. conf. on computer vision and pattern recognition (cvpr), pp. 2025–2032. 2011. doi:10.1109/cvpr.2011.5995462. [9] m. quigley, k. conley, b. p. gerkey, et al. ros: an open-source robot operating system. in ieee international conference on robotics and automation (icra) – workshop on open source robotics. 2009. [10] m. a. fischler, r. c. bolles. random sample consensus: a paradigm for model fitting with applications to image analysis and automated cartography. communications of the acm 24(6):381–395, 1981. [11] r. kümmerle, g. grisetti, h. strasdat, et al. g2o: a general framework for graph optimization. in ieee international conference on robotics and automation, pp. 3607–3613. 2011. doi:10.1109/icra.2011.5979949. [12] j. mrva, j. faigl. tactile sensing with servo drives feedback only for blind hexapod walking robot. in 10th international workshop on robot motion and control, romoco, pp. 240–245. 2015. doi:10.1109/romoco.2015.7219742. [13] h. bay, a. ess, t. tuytelaars, l. van gool. speeded-up robust features (surf). computer vision and image understanding 110(3):346–359, 2008. doi:10.1016/j.cviu.2007.09.014. [14] p. čížek, j. faigl. on localization and mapping with rgb-d sensor and hexapod walking robot in rough terrains. in ieee international conference on systems, man, and cybernetics, pp. 2273–2278. 2016. 5 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10846-014-0041-x http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/cvpr.2011.5995462 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/icra.2011.5979949 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/romoco.2015.7219742 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cviu.2007.09.014 acta polytechnica ctu proceedings 6:1–5, 2016 1 introduction 2 proposed solution 2.1 evaluation metrics 3 evaluation 3.1 rgb-d slam 3.2 experimental setup 3.3 results 3.4 discussion 4 conclusion acknowledgements references 528 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 copies of this article can be made free of charge and without securing permission, for purposes of teaching, research, or library reserve. consent to other kinds of copying, such as that for creating new works, or for resale, must be obtained from both the journal editor(s) and the author(s). m@n@gement is a double-blind refereed journal where articles are published in their original language as soon as they have been accepted. for a free subscription to m@n@gement, and more information: http://www.management-aims.com © 2013 m@n@gement and the author(s). m@n@gement est la revue officielle de l’aims m@n@gement is the journal official of aims andré spicer 2013 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement, 16(5), 653-666. m@n@gement issn: 1286-4692 emmanuel josserand, cmos, university of technology, sydney (editor in chief) jean-luc arrègle, emlyon business school (editor) laure cabantous, cass business school (editor) stewart clegg, university of technology, sydney (editor) olivier germain, université du québec à montréal (editor, book reviews) karim mignonac, université de toulouse 1 (editor) philippe monin, emlyon business school (editor) tyrone pitsis, university of newcastle (editor) josé pla-barber, universidad de valència (editor) michael tushman, harvard business school (editor) walid shibbib, université de genève (managing editor) alexander bell, université de genève (editorial assistant) martin g. evans, university of toronto (editor emeritus) bernard forgues, emlyon business school (editor emeritus) special issue 653 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations andré spicer cass business school, cu londonandre.spicer.1@city.ac.uk abstract abstract this article argues that a great deal of both ‘talk’ and ‘text’ in organisational settings is, ultimately, bullshit. by ‘bullshit’ i mean the type of organisational speech and text that is produced with scant regard for the truth and is used to willfully mislead and to pursue the interests of the bullshitter. bullshit is particularly prevalent in immaterial roles that lack a clear sense of social purpose. in these contexts, employees try to occupy themselves by engaging in bullshit. they do this by circulating discourses which are strategically ambiguous, over-packed with information and deliberately fleeting in nature. in order to construct these discourses, they frequently turn to examples set by the management fashion industry. when bullshit begins to take hold of an organisation, it can have surprisingly positive effects. it can create a positive image for the company and can help to increase self-confidence and build legitimacy. however, this often comes with some distinctly darker consequences: primary tasks are crowded out, valued occupational identities are compromised and stakeholder trust is undermined. ultimately, bullshit leaves us with organisations that may be appealing on the surface but are distinctly brittle. 654 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 introduction the production of talk and text – or ‘discourse’ is central to organisational life. most of us are now ‘paper pushers’ who spend our days creating, circulating and consuming discourses. one study estimated that office workers whose job is to try to persuade others make up 25% of the us economy (mccloskey and kalmer, 1995). this estimate was recently increased to a whopping 30% (antioch, 2013). so what exactly do all these discourse jockeys spend their time doing? the answer is surprisingly mundane: they create power point presentations, engage in routine discourses in service encounters, chat with colleagues, send emails, sit in meetings, or sit in meetings and send emails to arrange other meetings. if the post-industrialisation of our economy has done one thing, it has been to turn us into ‘talk and text’ workers. even in sectors that are not as naturally talk and text heavy – such as agriculture and manufacturing – discursive work has become increasingly prevalent. for instance, farmers now spend time working on their ‘brands’ and manufacturing workers spend time in team meetings talking about quality targets. just doing things is not enough – what is really important is being able to talk in a compelling and convincing way about what will (or perhaps might) be done. now that discourse is increasingly central to organisational life, how can we understand it? the past two decades have produced whole libraries of work trying to answer this question (phillips and oswick, 2013). putting aside all the theoretical and sophistic explanations, the central insights from the field charged with making sense of all this discourse seem to boil down to this: in organisational life, ‘talk and text’ does not just describe organisational reality, it constitutes it. to put this another way, organisational discourse generates the social reality of organisations. if one were to be even more extreme, discourse could be said to be where the reality of organisational life is located (ashcraft et al, 2009). the organisation is talked and texted into life. underlying the concept that discourse constitutes organisational reality is the assumption that discourse is productive – it creates, calls forward, makes up, crafts and so on. but what if this is not always the case? what if talk and text are not always such productive and creative mechanisms? are there perhaps moments when discourse does things other than construct organisational reality (alvesson and karreman, 2011)? after all, we all know there are occasions where discourse does very little at all. we have all sat through meetings where a colleague spoke at great length and achieved absolutely nothing. we have seen the creation of expensive consultancy reports that were binned as soon as they were released. indeed, we might go as far as suggesting that the great majority of discourses that are produced within organisations are stunningly non-constitutive of organisational reality. how can we understand all these ineffective, empty, ephemeral discourses that float around organisations? in this essay, i would like to argue that they might be best understood as being bullshit. borrowing from harry frankfurt’s (2005) short pamphlet of the same name, i will argue that ‘bullshit’ can be defined as a discourse which is created, circulated and consumed with little respect for or relationship to reality. ‘bullshit’ is crafted to willfully mislead and to serve the bullshitter’s purposes. i will claim that this kind of discourse is particularly prevalent in immaterial contexts that lack a clear sense of social 655 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 purpose or value. in order to stave off this sense of purposelessness, many organisational members turn to the dark art of bullshit. bullshitters make use of discourses that are strategically ambiguous, conceptually overpacked and fleeting. the raw materials for such discourses are frequently provided by, amongst others, the gurus, consultants and business schools of the management fashion industry. the potential outcomes of this bullshit are distinctly two-sided. on the one hand, bullshit can help to bolster an organisation’s image, self-confidence and legitimacy. on the other, it can simultaneously have more corrosive effects such as crowding out the primary task of the organisation, violating (previously) valued occupational identities, and undermining stakeholder trust. the end result is that an organisation indulging in bullshit may have an attractive image but ultimately becomes hollow and brittle. to make this argument, i will begin by looking at debates about organisational discourse. i will point out that non-constructive discourses have been largely overlooked in the broader field of organisational discourse analysis. next, i will examine the characteristics of bullshit, and give some examples of it and of organisational contexts. i will then sketch the outlines of a theory of organisational bullshit. to do this, i will identify what triggers bullshit in organisations, the process of bullshitting and some of the double-edged consequences. i will conclude by outlining what bullshit might mean for organisational discourse analysis and some measures that might be taken to stem the flood of bullshit in contemporary organisations. discourse the study of organisational discourse has grown from what was once a niche area of linguistics into a large field made up of many different theoretical strands. at the core of this field is the conviction that organisational life is largely about the creation, circulation and consumption of talk and text. if we are to understand how organisations work, then we need to follow how these processes of discourse operate and what their effects are. the second central conviction of the field is that the creation, circulation and consumption of talk and text ‘constructs social reality, rather than simply reflects it’ (hardy et al, 2005: 60). organisational discourse is assumed to be the central mechanism though which people make up social reality. most people seem to accept the first assumption that the circulation of talk and text is an important aspect of organisational life. however, the second assumption (that organisational discourse constructs social reality) has been called into question by a range of critical voices. some have argued that this second assumption tends to ignore the role that the agents using and mobilising these discourse have. indeed, if actors are accounted for at all, they are thought about as an after-effect. this is evident in the widely spread assumption that ‘discourse constructs actors’. critics have pointed out that writing off actors and seeing them as an effect of discourse tends to ignore how actors frequently intervene in, resist and rearticulate discourses in ways which are not expected (eg. gabriel, 1999). indeed, careful studies of the active use of organisational discourse have now appeared which deal with these active uses of talk and text. these studies give a rich account of 656 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 the playful and creative ways in which people use discourse to do the work of organising (for review see: ashcraft et al, 2009). in this sense, these studies are not so much about discourse as they are about discursive practice. a second criticism that has been targeted at works of organisational discourse analysis is that they tend to engage in the ontological trick of discursive reductionism. by this i mean that studies of discourse seek to reduce all aspects of social reality into a discourse. critics of this position would point out that this effectively marginalises aspects that do not neatly fit into the arena of language (fleetwood, 2005). of particular note here are materiality and what critical realists are fond of calling ‘underlying generative structures’ such as bureaucracy, capitalism, patriarchy and kinship relationships (reed, 2005). as critics have pointed out, organisational discourse analysis has presented a rather flat and insufficiently nuanced account of organisational life by ignoring these elements. it is as if talk and text (and perhaps talking and texting actors) are all there is. to address this significant oversight, some have developed a discourse analysis informed by critical realism (eg. fairclough, 2005). this approach seeks to focus ‘not just upon discourse, but on relations between discursive and other social elements’ (chouliaraki and fairclough, 2010: 1215) such as materiality, technologies and social structures. by doing this, researchers working in this tradition are able to highlight how discourse can influence and impact these other aspects of social reality (or vice versa). a third potential shortcoming in the literature on discourse has recently been highlighted by alvesson and kärreman (2011). in their intervention, they have pointed out that ‘discourse analysts often seem to emphasize that discourse has a lot of muscle mass – although different muscular discourses may neutralize each other or create uncertain effects. we are not so sure. discourse may make a difference – however, this muscularity cannot be assumed but needs to be demonstrated’ (p.1140). in this passage they point to a very important issue. to simply assume from the outset that organisational discourse constitutes reality is to make a huge leap of ontological faith. and this leap of faith leads us to narrow our empirical gaze to only looking for cases in which discourse in some way constructs or constitutes reality. but as alvesson and karreman point out, surely there are other effects which discourse might have which are far less muscular. it can varnish, gesture, connect, instruct as well as produce and construct (p.1140-1). in many cases, the discourses that litter organisational life are examples of what alvesson and karreman call ‘ephemeral talk’ (p. 1140). this is discourse that ‘has no significant constitutive agency, apart from transient meaning’ (ibid). if we think about this category of discourse for a second, we begin to realise that organisations are actually completely full of fleeting talk that lacks substance. think of many of the meetings that people suffer through – they are frequently hours of empty talk. more ‘serious’ discourses in organisations often have an ephemeral character as well. think of strategy discourse – although it is treated with great reverence, it is often fleeting, interchangeable, relatively meaningless and very ineffective. similar things can be said about statements of organisational values which often seem to jumble together a whole set of nice sounding generic words like ‘quality’, ‘service’, ‘value’ and so on with little effect. indeed, being a middle manager often means becoming adept at working with these ephemeral ‘weasel words’ (watson, 2004). 657 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 what is so remarkable about this large managerial lexicon is how often it has little relationship with the reality of what is going on in an organisation. reading a strategy statement in many firms will not reveal what the firm does. listening to talk in a meeting often reveals little about what happens in employees’ dayto-day work. asking a manager about their leadership style will often reveal fanciful stories rather than actual realities (alvesson and sveningsson, 2003). because it is so deeply disconnected from the everyday reality of organising, such talk often has very little ‘effective’ impact on organisational processes (beyond at times being a pesky distraction which needs to be tolerated). in this sense, a good portion of talk and text in organisations seems to be fundamentally ‘empty’, bearing little relationship with the reality of what goes on in the organisation. training in management involves mastering the art of empty talk. and the skilled managers are the ones who are able to work well with it (swartz, 1991). bullshit if empty talk and text are important parts of organisational life, how should we understand them? i think the key to unlocking this overlooked issue – the dark matter of organisational life – can be found in a short essay by harry frankfurt (2005) entitled ‘on bullshit’. in this striking piece, frankfurt points out that much of our social life is characterised by a flood of what he calls ‘bullshit’. he gives many examples ranging from men engaging in competitive overexaggeration about sports to the public relations industry pushing a product to cultural commentators concerned with ‘sincerity’. for frankfurt, bullshit is not simply a false statement – a claim that is meant to deceive or to violate the truth. rather, bullshit is language that has two distinctive characteristics: (1) it is articulated without concern for the criteria of the truth and (2) the bullshitter willfully articulates it to pursue their own purposes and interests. let us look at each of these points in a little more depth. the first core characteristic of bullshit is that it is talk which has a ‘lack of connection with a concern for the truth’ and an ‘indifference to how things really are’ (p. 33-34)1. to put this differently, bullshit is talk that has been emptied of meaningful content and become hot air. it is a form of discourse which roves across topics, buzz words and conjectures without stopping to test its own worthiness against any criteria of truth (whether that be a comparison with empirical reality, basic criteria of reason or some kind of inter-subjective checking against broadly shared social understandings of reality). a classic instance of bullshit is a set of claims about a new product being ‘better’, ‘brighter’ and ‘whiter’. notice there are no clear criteria about what exactly it is better, brighter and whiter than. indeed, the interlocutor is not supposed to consider a referent at all. they are simply supposed to be carried along by a set of hyperbolic statements. understanding bullshit as being talk or text that is unconcerned with the truth helps us to distinguish it from simple lies. as frankfurt points out, lies are crafted with a concern for the truth (p.51), it is just that they are typically made with an attempt to conceal what the truth is. in contrast, bullshit ranges free without any clear concern for the truth as a referent that needs to be carefully and judiciously avoided. 1. of course, the idea that there is a special class of discourse which is crafted with no relationship to ‘truth’ or ‘how things are’ is scandalous in the extreme for the average discourse theorist. as i have pointed out earlier, many working within the field are of strong social constructivist leanings and sign up to the rather strong ontological claim that reality (‘how things are’) is some kind of product of, or at least completely mediated through, the discourses that we use to understand and engage with it. they would baulk at the claim that there is some kind of pre-discursive truth without a relationship to which a bullshit discourse might be articulated. frankfurter is certainly no friend of social constructivist ontologies. indeed the parting shot of his essay seems to be aimed at precisely this strand of philosophy. while i might not sign up to the hard analytical realism peddled by frankfurter – or even particular strands of critical realism – i think there is merit in considering participants’ experiences and reports of ‘reality’ (which surely most have, however that is defined in an intersubjective way), and considering how much talk which is articulated in organisational life often bears little resemblance to much of the talk which is circulated within organisational life. so for me, bullshit might be more precisely thought about as talk and text which is articulated with no concern for broadly shared understandings and experiences of reality within a particular social group (such as an organisation). 658 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 the second criterion which distinguishes bullshit from normal discourse is the fact that it is composed of talk and text which are produced with the intention to mislead interlocutors so that the bullshitter can pursue their own interests (frankfurt, 2005). what this means is that bullshit has a degree of intentionality about it. bullshit is actively used to do something – to pursue one’s interests through misleading. for instance, a bullshitter might list a whole string of impressive facts and figures about a consumer market (which are rattled off without concern for whether they are accurate or not) so that they are seen as an expert in this area. such an act might deceive us (as they may not in fact be an expert) and serve the bullshitter (as it bestows them with an air of expertise). the intentional nature of bullshitting helps us to distinguish it from discourses which have little relation to the truth but which are not actively intended to mislead. a classic example of the latter would be the talk and text produced by a neophyte in a field whose mistakes and exaggerations we might forgive. if bullshit is empty talk that has no reference to the truth and is produced with the intentions to mislead and to benefit the bullshitter, then the worlds of organisations and management are a veritabletreasure trove of examples2. perhaps the paradigmatic example of this is the well-known boardroom game of ‘bullshit bingo’, where the players are challenged to count up the number of empty buzz words which are used during a meeting. often they will be assigned a buzz word (like ‘value’, ‘quality’, ‘responsibility’ etc.). when your buzz word is uttered during a meeting, you score a point. the person with the highest score at the end of the meeting wins. what makes this game more than just an entertaining pastime is the fact that it points to the emptiness and disconnection from reality often present in management discourses. it suggests that the vocabulary of management is virtually interchangeable and means very little. this point is underlined in a telegram sent on the occasion of the retirement of a british diplomat in rome. in this ceremonial piece of communication, he complained of a “cultural revolution» which was forced on the diplomatic service by the two most powerful uk government departments (the treasury and the cabinet office). this resulted in a ‘change-management agenda . . . written in wall street management speak already ... discredited by the time it [was] introduced. synergies, best practice, benchmarking ... roll out, stakeholder.... fit for purpose, are all prime candidates for a game of bullshit bingo, a substitute for clarity and succinctness.» (macintyre, 2007). what is so concerning for the diplomat about the changing language in the foreign and commonwealth office is not the fact that it is changing, but that it is founded upon ‘management speak’ which is ephemeral and ‘discredited by the time it is introduced’. but more than this, he is concerned with the apparent fuzziness and verbosity of much of this discourse. this stands in strict opposition to the ‘clarity and succinctness’ that he claims to prefer. although we might read this parting missive as a case of sour grapes, there is probably something more here. the language of managerialism is a relatively late-comer to the genteel uk foreign service. and this puts a retiring diplomat in a relatively good position to assess the kind of management speak which has become background noise in most of our working lives. he recognises almost instantly that most management talk is often bullshit – it is speech that is created without a relationship to the truth. it is largely crafted to sound impressive. 2. the other great treasure-trove of bullshit is politics. in her analysis of blairite policy, eleonora belfiore (2009) does a wonderful job of highlighting the role which bullshit plays in arts policy. she traces the rise of the importance of statistical evidence as an important currency in this policy area and shows how this evidence is frequently used in highly selective ways. 659 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 another example of organisational bullshit is the rise of new public management in universities. lorenz (2012) claims that universities are increasingly beset with managerial bullshit including talk about quality, the creation of value, and rankings. according to lorenz this is bullshit because it avoids reference to the truth and instead is mainly concerned with the effects of a discourse. what is more, the propagators of this discourse don’t believe in it themselves. lorenz points out that the bullshit quality of much management talk in universities is particularly debilitating for faculties because its ‘hermetic, self-referential nature’ make it ‘completely resistant to all criticism’ (lorenz, 2012: 601). because it is self-referential, management discourse does not obey or break the rules of scholarship which most university faculties are versed in. it does not make reference to the truth. instead, merchants of management speak seem to be playing a different and altogether more cynical game where truth simply does not count. this is a game in which questioning and critiquing do not seem to work. merchants of bullshit are thus able to avoid being held to criteria such as truth and to the harsh critique which this might involve. a final example of bullshit in organizations is the complex financial moves used by accountants to please their stakeholders. according to norman macintosh (2009), many of the earnings reports routinely issues by large corporations conform to the characteristics of bullshit. they are not strictly truthful insofar as they don’t reflect the underlying characteristics of what the company has actually earned during a quarter. nor are most earnings statements baldfaced lies which purposefully seek to deceive investors and others. rather, macintosh claims, they are bullshit. this is because earnings statements are constructed to please a wide range of interest groups rather than to reflect any underlying reality. they are contrived to comply with the law and various other accounting guidelines. but they are also crafted in a way which keeps analysts and senior management happy too. they ‘satisfy the market for accounting information – investment analysts, shareholders, bankers, top executives, the sec, tax authorities and other related parties’ (p. 158). doing this mean being ‘indifferent to whether or not the earnings report tells the truth or not’ (p. 158). a theory of organisational bullshit in order to understand organisational bullshit, we need to not only look at the phenomenon itself, but also at what prompts it, how it works and what its outcomes are. in this section, i will argue that bullshit is prompted by organisations that are dominated by immaterial roles that provide their occupants with little sense of broader social purpose and value. one way to fill this existential void is through bullshit. i will argue that the process of bullshitting involves articulating discourses which are strategically ambiguous, over-packed and fleeting. bullshitters frequently draw on the raw materials that are provided by the management fashions industry. doing this can have a distinctly two sided-effect. on the one hand, it can help to impress and build confidence in others, allowing an organisation to build legitimacy in the eyes of important stakeholders (and thereby ensure its survival). on the other hand, it crowds out many of the core organisational processes, clashes with organisational members’ occupational identities and undermines stakeholder trust. this can result in a dispirited workforce and a fatal sense of lacking purpose within the organisation. 660 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 prompts of bullshit it is tempting to think that bullshit is simply caused by a few individuals who have a rather cavalier approach to the truth. in many settings this may indeed be true. however, organisational bullshit seems to go beyond just a few rogue employees. there appear to be whole organisations that actively encourage the circulation and propagation of bullshit. frankfurt points out that particular sectors such as those of politics and public relations are especially prone to bullshit. some have even gone as far as to say that spouting bullshit seems to touch the core characteristics of politics (belfiore, 2009). but as i have already indicated, if we look beyond these two bullshit-intense sectors to other areas, we find that there is still a significant amount of discourse that seems to have no regard or connection with the truth. indeed, many large organisations seem to offer significant opportunities for the bullshit artist. so what is it about these particular organisations or industries that seems to provide ample opportunity for bullshit? perhaps a good starting point to this question is provided by graeber’s (2013) short essay on bullshit work. in this widely discussed piece, he argues that recent transformations of the economy have led to an increasing number of what he calls ‘bullshit jobs’. these are jobs in which people ‘spend their entire working lives performing tasks they secretly believe do not really need to be performed’ (graeber, 2013). they are largely concentrated among the managerial, professional, administrative, sales and service sectors. graeber points out that the rise of highly productive technologies during the early 20th century – such as factory automation coupled with the extensive outsourcing of most manufacturing to countries like china has meant that there is less need for labour in western countries. people need to work less but they seem to do more. it is this, greaber argues, that has caused the advent of bullshit jobs. ultimately he sees these empty and meaningless jobs as a way of corralling the surplus time available in western society into the controlling structure of the work place. according to graeber, this helps to ensure our additional free time remains yoked to the demands of an increasingly immaterial form of capitalism. so building on graeber’s argument, we might claim that the basic structural driver for the prevalence of bullshit is a broader socio-economic shift towards an immaterial economy that creates large numbers of jobs without an obvious social value that are often experienced as being purposeless and empty by their occupants. faced with a job that is experienced as being relatively empty and meaningless, occupants are confronted with a profound question – how can they occupy themselves and cope with their pointless working day? graeber points out that occupants of bullshit jobs not only find them meaningless, but are often chronically underemployed. although they are ‘working 40 or even 50 hour weeks on paper’ in reality their job often only requires ‘working 15 hours just as keynes predicted, since the rest of their time is spent organising or attending motivational seminars, updating their facebook profiles or downloading tv box-sets’. amongst these responses to bullshit work, there seem to be two sets of different ways of dealing with the emptiness of many contemporary jobs. one way is to fill the working day with what roland paulsen (2013) has called ‘empty labour’. this is private activity designed to pass the time in a relatively under-stimulating manner such as surfing the internet. the objective of this 661 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 kind of activity is to simply fill the day up and make it pass faster. the other response seems to be propagating, circulating and participating in various forms of bullshit. graeber gives motivational seminars as one example. the more mundane forms of bullshit include endless email exchanges, lengthy meetings, training in pointless skills and, of course, much of the apparently purposeless administrative labour which drains the will to live of so many office dwellers. bullshitting indulging in bullshit is a way of sidestepping the meaninglessness that stalks working life in the immaterial work place. but what exactly does bullshitting entail? at the core of the task of bullshitting seems to be the avoidance of any obvious connections between discourse and truth or reality. this is often a difficult task to achieve as most statements can be pinned down and compared to some criteria in one way or another. the skilled bullshitter seeks to avoid this connection. after all, it would draw them into the requirements of justification and reason-giving – a game they would surely lose at. one way to do this is by relying on significant amounts of strategic ambiguity (eisenberg, 1984). this entails words or concepts that are difficult or impossible to pin down. very broad words like ‘excellence’, ‘quality’ and ‘innovation’ are excellent examples of strategic ambiguity. they are words that could mean almost anything to anybody. using such words makes it difficult for an interlocutor to pin them down and inquire in any more depth into their particular claims. it allows a bullshitter to escape from too much interrogation. another possible strategy is to over-pack discourse with terms and concepts3. this makes it harder to pin down what the core concepts actually are. in the case of over-packed discourse, it is difficult to actually discern what is important and what is not. concepts that should be subjected to further interrogation are skirted over without any further inquiry. discourses of leadership, for example, are over-packed with a whole series of associations, ideas and other concepts (alvesson and spicer, 2012). this makes it difficult for an interlocutor to actually pin down much of this relatively empty leadership talk. over-packing discourse is a way to avoid difficult questions by ensuring that there is no clear focus that might allow us to work out what a concept actually means. a final possible strategy for bullshitting involves ensuring discourses are dynamic. this involves assiduously avoiding any clear commitment to a particular discourse and continually shifting between different terms in a vague and often baseless fashion. by keeping discourse shifting and moving, it is possible for the bullshitter to avoid attaching themselves to a particular position which they might be asked deeper questions about. for instance, many corporate strategies are typically made up of a set of rapidly shifting trends, ideas and management fashions. because the actual content of corporate strategy changes so rapidly, it becomes difficult to subject it to any kind of critical scrutiny. once questioning and criticism has been formulated, the discourse has moved on. the result is that continued shifting discourses are rarely, if ever, subjected to scrutiny. instead, they are tolerated as passing amusements and novelties. 3. the concept of over-packing in relation to discourse analysis is discussed by alvesson and karreman (2011) 662 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 bullshitting is hard work. it requires the capacity to continually come up with new, over-packed, ambiguous concepts. in fact, the creativity this requires is beyond the abilities of most organisational members. to bullshit, most people need a continued supply of discursive resources from external sources. fortunately, there is a whole industry of consultants, gurus and other managerial idea workers who are charged with creating and circulating these discourses. the management ideas industry works through continually feeding out a series of fads and fashions (abrahamson, 1999). these typically are appealing not because they work, but because they are attractively packaged and promoted. this gives potential adopters a stock of ideas and discourses that they can use in their day-to-day acts of bullshit mongering. outcomes the prevalence of bullshit in organisations might seem unappealing, but there are clearly some significantly positive outcomes. bullshit allows individuals to build up an appealing image (often in absence of other more substantive resources such as knowledge and abilities). this is highlighted in a study of a large management consultancy firm that found employees talked about how they used bullshit to impress clients (alvesson and karreman, 2004). bullshit was seen as particularly effective for maintaining a ‘them and us division’ between the members of the consultancy firm and the people buying their services (p. 161). when a consultant inadvertently began to try to bullshit another consultant, they would quickly drop it once they had discovered the identity of their interlocutor (p. 160). the implication here is that bullshit is for the clients, and one should ‘tell it like it is’ to other members of the consultancy. furthermore, this suggests that the bullshit is not believed in by its merchants – it is simply used to impress. bullshit is not just used to impress other people. it can also be used as a kind of confidence trick to impress and convince oneself. this point is made in a study of middle managers by tony watson (1994). he highlights how middle managers often use bullshit as a way of trying to build a convincing narrative about who they are in the face of what is often a very precarious position. liberal doses of bullshit help anxious middle managers to perform a confidence trick on themselves and convince themselves that they are useful and worthwhile members of the organisation who actually have something to add. this can help to firm up their sense of self worth and confidence in taking action – often in the face of many tough challenges and doubts. as well as being used to build an impressive image for others and increase one’s own self-confidence, bullshit is frequently used by organisations to build their broader legitimacy. this is a central insight that can be found in meyer and rowan’s (1977) classic piece on institutional theory. this work points out how organisations often adopt policies and practices not because they are particularly effective or efficient, but because they are considered to be broadly socially acceptable. for instance, many firms adopt total quality management practices not because it helps to make their products be of higher quality but because it makes their organisation appeal to a wider set of stakeholders by appearing to be a ‘good organisation’ (zabrecki, 1998). popular management practices such as total quality management can actually clash with core processes in an organisation and make them less efficient. 663 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 but by building legitimacy through adopting these popular management ideas, these organisations can appeal to core external stakeholders such as investors, funders, buyers and suppliers that provide the organisation with its core resources. if these key stakeholders see the organisation as legitimate, then they are much more likely to be willing to provide the core resources the organisation needs to survive. what this ultimately suggests is that by indulging in bullshit mongering (particular targeted at external audiences), organisations can build their legitimacy and ultimately increase their chances of survival. bullshit in organisations can certainly lead to some positive aspects such as enhanced image, increased self-confidence and bolstered legitimacy. it is for these reasons that bullshit does not just go unchecked, but is actually positively encouraged within many organisations. however, the picture is not always so rosy. organisational bullshit often brings with it some less pleasant consequences. bullshit can become a fatal distraction from the primary tasks of an organisation. by primary tasks, i mean the central activity an organisation was either created to perform or must perform to survive (dartington, 1998). these are tasks like educating students in a university, prudently investing clients’ money in a financial institution, serving food in a restaurant and treating sick patients in a hospital4. because it can help to enhance an organisation’s image, self-belief and legitimacy, managerial bullshit can become quite addictive. when a firm gets hooked on bullshit, a significant amount of the organisation’s effort becomes focused on the production, circulation and consumption of bullshit. this might act as a mere distraction from the primary task of the organisation. if this is the case, then organisational members may need to spend a significant amount of their time and resources on processing this baseless bullshit that holds little relation to the actual substance of organisational life. managers and employees, for instance, will need to spend large chunks of their day attending meetings or implementing change programmes linked with this bullshit. the result is that organisations can begin to neglect the core processes that actually create value within their organisation. this might be tenable for a short period of time, but when processing bullshit that is associated with change efforts becomes a routine part of organisational life, it leads to a systemic distraction from primary tasks. in extreme cases, members of an organisation can completely neglect their primary task, making it uncertain what the organisation actually does and what broader value it offers society. but more than just crowding out the primary task of an organisation, bullshit can trigger a deep sense of affront among organisational members. if members of an organisation are continually subjected to bullshit, they are likely to rapidly stop taking much of it particularly seriously. any new initiative, direction or program is likely to be cynically treated as just another passing fad. but beyond cynicism towards passing initiatives, a deeper and perhaps more painful consequence is that any semblance that there might be a coherent set of criteria and procedures which could be used to test ideas and conjecture is put aside. this can be experienced as a profound challenge by many organisational members who are deeply committed to particular schemes of values that they use to judge worth and value in organisational life. when these schemes are questioned, it is as if the hard won occupational and professional identity of these organisational members is being up-ended. 4. the idea that an organisation has a primary task was treated as a basic axiom in much early organisation theory. however, this was partially called into question by behaviourial theories of the firm which point out that organisations are typically an agglomeration of a number of primary tasks each of which are defined by different political coalitions (cyert and march, 1963). since the complex restructuring of corporations that has happened following the financialisation of corporate control during the 1970s, we have seen this basic axiom being thrown into question. today many organisations either do not seem to own up to having a primary task, assume what they do is in pursuit of some other more grandiose goal (such as shareholder value maximization), articulate a rather abstract sounding primary task which does not seem to look anything like we would expect, or have a confusing array of poorly matched primary tasks (often due to haphazard mergers and acquisitions). the result is that many organisations and their members become utterly confused about what exactly the organisation actually does and therefore what their own purpose within the organisation is. 664 andré spicerm@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 the result is that people working within bullshit laden organisations not only develop a deep sense of cynicism, but also experience a sense of violation and harm being done to their occupational identity, and often, by implication, to themselves. many professionals who have been subjected to the discursive vagaries of new public management, for instance, often experience it as being an assault or affront to their identities as skilled and able professionals. as well as crowding out the primary task of an organisation, and lacerating employee identities, organisational bullshit can severely undermine the trust a range of stakeholders have in an organisation. if stakeholders continue to be confronted with an ongoing parade of what appears to be utterly baseless talk, it is likely that they are going to begin to doubt the genuineness, ability and consistency of the organisation that they are dealing with. when this happens, stakeholders might tolerate the organisation but they are unlikely to rely upon it or develop meaningful and sustainable relationships with it. indeed, it is more likely that these relationships will become transactional and brittle. the result is that when the advantage gained from the transaction begins to wane – or when another better offer turns up – the stakeholder is likely to pull out. what this means for the organisation is that although it might have access to many of the resources which it needs to operate, these resources are likely to be relatively fluid and often difficult to rely upon. thus, if conditions change, many of the core resources that the organisation relies upon such as capital, finding streams, customers, suppliers and so on could rapidly evaporate. consequently, organisations that are mired in bullshit are often the ones that become increasingly brittle, unstable, and liable to be blown apart by small changes in the environment. conclusion in this paper i have argued that one of the striking features of a lot of organisations is that many of their discourses, in both talk and text, are bullshit. by this i mean that a great proportion of their talk and text is produced with little relation to the truth. organisational bullshit is particularly prevalent in immaterial sectors of the economy where people often find themselves charged with jobs which are meaningless and devoid of obvious referents. this void creates conditions that are particularly amenable to being filled with organisational bullshit. this typically involves using highly ambiguous, overpacked and fleeting discourses. the management fashion industry (such as consultants, gurus, business schools and so on) provides individuals and organisations with a rich stream of raw-material for crafting bullshit. as bullshit begins to take hold of an organisation, it can have two quite different effects. on the one hand, it can help to boost the organisation’s image, build selfconfidence and bolster its legitimacy. on the other hand, it can crowd out the primary task of an organisation, violate valued occupational identities within the organisation and ultimately undermine the trust of broader stakeholders in the firm. this means organisations often face a trade off between seeking to build their image, self-confidence and legitimacy through circulating bullshit or bolstering their primary tasks, valued occupational identities and stakeholder trust through avoiding it. unfortunately, in a society and economy which values image so highly (gabriel, 2005), the bullshit option often seems to be the 665 shooting the shit: the role of bullshit in organisations m@n@gement vol. 16 no. 5, 2013, 653-666 default setting. this is unfortunate because this option often leads to brittle organisations with unclear directions, uncommitted (and even incompetent) employees, and highly suspicious and transactional stakeholders. bullshit presents some significant challenges for those who run and work in organisations. it is certainly very attractive, but also potentially very dangerous. the argument i have made above suggests that managers and employees alike need to maintain significant vigilance towards bullshit. one side of this vigilance entails the recognition that a small amount of bullshit may be helpful. bullshit sessions can be useful spaces where people try ideas without having to totally commit to them. bullshit can also be useful insofar as it can help to inspire (self) confidence in managerial initiatives. but the other side of vigilance involves recognising that the constant presence of bullshit can be very harmful for an organisation. this is because it will detract an organisation from its primary tasks, leading to a dangerous goal drift whereby organisations become so mired in bullshit that they lose sight of the purpose for their existence. this suggests that organisations need to develop a capacity to entertain a limited amount of bullshit, in circumscribed spaces. this might involve providing areas for bullshit sessions or even the limited use of bullshit merchants. this first piece of advice is probably not so difficult for most organisations to implement – they already have more than enough bullshit to go around. so what is perhaps more important – and more difficult is that organisations must develop the capacity to effectively process, and in many cases protect themselves from, bullshit. this could involve procedures for the careful vetting of ideas, the application of critical reasoning and simple tests of truth. basic questions could be asked about the reasoning and evidence that underline practices. what is more, it is probably important to slow down the flow of bullshit and focus on giving substance to a limited number of ideas. doing this will help to avoid the ‘narcissistic decay’ (swartz, 1991) which can set in and destroy organisations that lose sight of their primary task, systematically misrecognising the occupational identities of their staff and destroying the sense of trust which stakeholders might have in them. as well as presenting some interesting challenges for organisational members, the prevalence of bullshit posits some challenges for researchers. if organisations are mired in discourses that have no relationship with the truth, then it may be necessary to revisit one of the central assumptions of organisational discourse analysis. by looking for bullshit, we may notice that not all discourses are ‘productive’ or ‘constructive’. they can also be corrosive. as we have seen, bullshit is often more than just ineffectual hot air. it can sometimes be profoundly demoralising and leave whole organisations with little sense of a viable alternative. perhaps discourses can do far more than constitute reality. bullshit discourses can dissolve a sense of reality, leaving organisational members feeling alienated and empty. if this is the case, then we need to begin to pay closer attention to the ways in which discourses can destroy social reality in organisations. andré spicer is professor of organizational behaviour at cass business school, city university of london. he is currently working on a project investigating stupidity 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(1998). the rhetoric and reality of total quality management. administrative science quarterly, 43(3), 602-636. references on judgements and propositions electronic communications of the easst volume 26 (2010) manipulation of graphs, algebras and pictures essays dedicated to hans-jörg kreowski on the occasion of his 60th birthday on judgements and propositions bernd mahr 20 pages guest editors: frank drewes, annegret habel, berthold hoffmann, detlef plump managing editors: tiziana margaria, julia padberg, gabriele taentzer eceasst home page: http://www.easst.org/eceasst/ issn 1863-2122 http://www.easst.org/eceasst/ eceasst on judgements and propositions bernd mahr technische universität berlin, germany mahr@cs.tu-berlin.de abstract: this article studies some of the relevant and historically influential conceptions of the notions of ’judgement’ and ’proposition’ and discusses the relationship of these notions in these conceptions. in some detail the conceptions of aristoteles, brentano and twardowski, frege, martin-löf and of epsilon-theory are presented. a comparison of these conceptions shows fundamental differences which, in a way, illuminate the differences found in the architectures and formal appearances of logics. keywords: judgement, proposition, assertion, presentation, interpretation, justification, truth, logic. 1 introduction provoked by the different architectures and formal appearances of logics the question can be asked “what the fundament of logic is that admits the different views on it.” a natural though not obvious answer is that the different approaches to logic are all rooted on conceptions of judgement and proposition. both notions have been a matter of dispute since the beginning of greek philosophy and are still today under debate, and both are closely linked with logic. to study some of these conceptions and to thereby shed some light on the different forms of logic and on their relationship, is the author’s first motivation to write this article. it turns out, however, that this is not easy at all since the notions of judgement and proposition are deeply involved. they touch on and relate fundamental questions of language, ontology, psychology, philosophy and mathematics, and their meaning is far from being common sense. by some authors the notion of proposition is even objected to be meaningful at all, [voq80, pp. 331–401] and the word judgement is taken to express things of the most different kind, from the most elementary relation between the human mind and the world, [kan90] up to what is realised by natural deduction proofs in intuitionistic type theory1. the author’s interest in the notion of judgement also has another reason. in his studies on the general notion of ‘model’2 it was found that the key to resolve the problems, encountered in explaining the notion of ‘model’ in its full generality, is to transform the original question of “what is a model” from ontology to logic and to ask instead “what justifies a judgement, that something is a model.” deeper analysis of this new question naturally leads to the notions of conception (in german auffassung) and context. [mah97] the notion of conception is closely related to the notions of presentation and judgement, which both have been extensively studied 1see for example göran sundholm: proofs as acts and proofs as objects: some questions for dag prawitz, as well as prawitz’ response to these questions, both in [han98, pp. 187–216, 283–337]. 2see for example [mah09]. 1 / 20 volume 26 (2010) mailto:mahr@cs.tu-berlin.de on judgements and propositions in the 19th century and can count as sources of modern mathematics. on the other hand, judgements are based on conceptions. the author’s studies of the notions of conception and context resulted in a ‘model of conception,’ [mah10] which is an axiomatisation of reflexive universes of things relativised by their subject and context dependency. in a recent thesis [wie09] settheoretic realisations of this axiomatisation have been given and its consistency has been proven. judgements and in particular the judgements of model-being have thereby a sound fundament in their prerequisite ‘conception.’ 2 the notions of judgement and proposition in brief by “judgement” one denotes both, the act of judging and the result of this act.3 a judgement, as an act and as the result of this act, is always concerning something, that which is judged, the judged. a conventional though rather imprecise definition states that that which is judged is a proposition, and that a proposition is what is true or false. the traditional views on judgement date from the presocratic philosopher parmenides, [par69] and, among others, from plato in his sophistes, and predominantly from aristoteles. aristoteles developed in his writings4, which were later collectively called organon (in german werkzeug), in the sense of a tool of the mind, the first elaborated and most influential concept of judgement, and laid therewith the ground for what logic is about. it is common to the traditional views on judgement that that, which is judged, is affirmed or denied to exist, and that ‘being,’ ‘the presence of being there,’ [tug03] and later also ‘existence,’ make the grounds for affirmation and denial. judgements under these views concern things and matters in reality, and, accordingly, the notion of judgement under these views is based on reality as a fundament of truth. despite many extensions and modifications much of the essence of these traditional views, namely of aristoteles’ approach to logic, has been maintained through the times until to the mid 19th century. and it can still be found today in the tarski-style of semantics, as it is commonly used in the model-theoretic semantics of logic. major modifications on the traditional views, which finally lead to the formal treatment of logic today, originate from the work of george boole, namely his investigation of the laws of thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of logic and probabilities [boo58] from 1854, from the works of bernhard bolzano5, namely in his wissenschaftslehre from 1837 and franz brentano [bre08] in his psychologie vom empirischen standpunkte from 1874, as well as from the works of brentano’s students kasimir twardowski [twa82], alexius meinong [mei02] and edmund husserl [hus93], namely on their conceptions of judgement. maybe the strongest influence on modern logic had gottlob frege who, with his begriffsschrift [fre07] from 1879, laid the ground for a new understanding of quantification and predication, and developed basic principles of the notion of judgement, which have later been widely adopted in the formal treatment of semantics. influenced 3what actually is denoted by “judgement” depends heavily on what is considered to be an act of judging and what as the result of this act. see for example göran sundholm: proofs as acts and proofs as objects: some questions for dag prawitz, as well as prawitz’ response to these questions, both in [han98]. 4these writings include categoriae, de interpretatione, analytica priora, analytica posteriori, topica and de sophistiis elenchiis. 5[bol81] from 1837, see also [ber92]. festschrift hjk 2 / 20 eceasst from frege’s work and other sources alfred north whitehead and bertrand russell wrote their principia mathematica [wr62] in the years 1910 to 1913 and ludwig wittgenstein responded in his tractatus logico philosophicus [wit73], published in 1921, to frege and to russell’s theory of knowledge [rus92], which russell wrote in 1913 but then, in reaction to wittgenstein’s criticism, abandoned. later, in his philosophical investigations [wit67], written in the time from 1945 to 1949, wittgenstein recalled and criticised many of the thoughts he had put forward in the tractatus on the nature of language. the modern debates on the notion of judgement owe much to the theory of speech acts as it has been developed in the 50th and 60th of the last century first by john l. austin [aus02] and later by john r. searle. [sea08] in the course of this development the notions of judgement and proposition became a subject matter in ontology and philosophy rather than in classical formal logic where they are, so to say, banned to the meta-level of formalisation and only implicitly present in the interpretation of sentences. explicit use of the notion of judgement, however, can be found in per martin-löf’s intuitionistic type theory, published 1984, and in specification frameworks and formalisms inspired by him, like the calculus of constructions, lf, coq or isabelle, developed since 1992. martin-löf insists on a formal distinction between propositions and judgements. [ml84] this distinction he elaborates further in the lectures on the meaning of the logical constants and the justifications of the logical laws, which he published in 1996, and in a recent lecture on assertions, assertoric contents and propositions6 in 2008. martin-löf’s careful considerations also influenced some of the conceptualisations in epsilontheory (see section 9 below), as it is being studied by the author and his co-workers. 3 realistic conceptions of proposition and judgement at the very beginning of his de interpretatione aristoteles explains his view on the relationship between language, mind and reality, which is essential for the understanding of his conception of judgements: “that what is expressed [logos, in german satz, in english sentence] is a symbol of the states of the soul, and that which is written is a symbol of that which is expressed” [...] “that, of which the states of the soul are images, are the things.” [tw04, p. 19] what is to observe here is that the states of the soul, which may be understood as thoughts in the sense of mental states, mediate between reality on the one side, and sentences being expressed and written on the other. in his conception of the notion of judgement aristoteles takes first of all a linguistic view, but combines it with a psychological and an ontological perspective. he describes a judgement as to being a particular type of sentence: “though a sentence is meant to denote, not every sentence is a judgement but only one in which the assertion of truth or falseness is present. it is, however, not present in every sentence since, for example, a wish is a sentence, but it is neither true nor false.” [ari67b, p. 7] today we would say that he distinguishes different kinds of sentences, a distinction which in speech act theory is made by the distinction of illocutionary forces in the acts of ‘expressing’ by means of sentences. as judgements he singles out assertoric 6see [ml96, pp. 11–60]. his recent thoughts on judgements martin-löf presented in the lecture assertions, assertoric contents and propositions, which he gave at the workshop on judgements, assertions, and propositions the logical semantics and pragmatics of sentences at tu berlin on january 11, 2008. 3 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions sentences and as the criterion for a sentence to be a judgement he states that the sentence is to be grammatically composed of two parts: a subject and a verb. both parts, in his view, have meaning in the sense that they both denote something by convention. and as the criterion for the truth of a judgement he states that in the composition of subject and verb, the copula “is” or a derived form of it, has to reflect the relation of the things the subject and the verb denote: “to affirm [katáphasis] is to express something towards something, and to deny [apóphasis] is to express something away from something”; and concerning truth and falseness of a judgement made, aristoteles writes: “the one, who thinks as being separated what is separated and as being composed what is composed, thinks true; but he thinks false, whose thoughts are contrary to the things.” [ari67c, p. 7] it is to note here that in aristoteles’ view ‘true’ and ‘false’ are not atomic values, as which they are taken by frege, but qualities of thinking. other than logicians today aristoteles restricts his observations to simple judgements of the subject-predicate form. he does not consider complex judgements, which are composed of sub-judgements and logical connectives. for the meaning of simple judgements he follows a simple variant of the principal of compositionality, which postulates that the meaning of composed expressions is the composition of the meanings of the individual expressions. this principle is attributed to frege who applied it in his functional interpretation of sentences.7 a similar principle has also been stated by leibniz in his ars characteristica [krä88, p. 105]. in aristoteles’ view there are two qualities of judgements, namely affirmation and denial, and “every judgement is either a judgement about what there is in reality, what there is by necessity or what there is by possibility”. aristoteles also distinguishes three kinds of judgement: “a judgement [...] is either general, or particular or undetermined. general means that something applies8 to all or none, particular means that something applies to a single, or to a single not, or not to all, and undetermined means that it applies or does not apply without determination of the general or the particular ...” [ari67a] with the concepts of quantification in modern predicate logic, where sentences have a complex structure, the notions of general and particular have become more precisely formulated. 4 formalisation of categorical judgements today we would rephrase aristoteles’ view on judgements as follows: sentences and their written forms refer to thoughts created in a mental act, and these thoughts as mental states, are images of existing things. truth is assigned to thoughts, in the sense of a mental act, and requires the correspondence between that which is thought and the things of which the thoughts, in the sense of mental states, are images. though thoughts, in aristoteles’ sense, correspond to what in speech act theory is called a propositional act, there is also a major difference: aristoteles does not think of thoughts in terms of reference and predication in the way we do, but he insists in, to say it in modern terms, a type theoretical reading of thoughts. take as an example the sentence “all men are mortal,” which, according to his grammatical criterion for judgements and his classification of kinds, is a general judgement. aristoteles’ reading of this sentence can be 7see for example [fre66, pp. 72–91]. 8the english word ‘applying’ is used here to translate the greek word ‘hyparchein.’ festschrift hjk 4 / 20 eceasst formalised as the type proposition (all men) are (mortal) in which the composition of two things is asserted. this sentence is true if in the real world mortality (which is the thing whose image is symbolised by the written expression ‘mortal’) applies to all humans (which is the thing whose image is symbolised by the written expression ‘all men’). the famous ‘problem of universals’ in the middle ages was about the question if things as expressed by the words ‘all men’ and ‘mortal,’ have existence. since frege, motivated by the concept of a mathematical function in arithmetic and higher analysis, proposed predication as a form of function application, which results truth-values, [fre75, pp. 17–39] and since he introduced individual variables for the indication of individuals in quantification, [fre75, p. 33] today’s conventional reading of the respective sentence9 can be expressed in the formalisation ∀x.(men(x) → mortal(x)). if we write atomic predication in the form of a type proposition [mah93], we get ∀x.(x : men → x : mortal) this type propositional formalisation shows, on the one hand, a closer similarity to the aristotelian view, though the sentence as a whole is not a simple judgement anymore. it has a complex structure. it also shows a close similarity to the truth condition for atomic predications in the tarski-style of model-theoretic semantics, which, in a semiformal style, is phrased as for all h it is true that, if (h ∈ amen) then (h ∈ amortal) where h denotes an unspecified individual in the domain of interpretation, and amen and amortal denote subsets of this domain. it is interesting to note that the model-theoretic truth condition expresses the same idea as the truth condition in aristoteles’ view: “the presence of being there.” the only difference is that the aristotelian truth condition concerns things in reality while in the tarski-style of model-theoretic semantics the condition is expressed, relative to a given domain of interpretation, in terms of set-theoretic membership. it is also interesting to note that the (semantic) reading of ∀x. as “for all h, which instantiate x, it is true that” turns the sentence ∀x.(x : men → x : mortal) into a symbolisation of a proposition in which an h-indexed family, not of propositions, but of judgements is expressed. following the conventional model-theoretic interpretation, the above sentence is also true in a world where humans cannot be found, since in this case for every instantiation of x the premise of the implication is false. this property indicates that the use of variables in quantification resolves the difficulty parmenides saw in the notion of ‘non-existence’: he concluded that negation cannot be thought of because “what is not is not, and can therefore not be.” [par69] in the modern understanding of ‘non-existence,’ instead, non-existence is the property of the domain 9see also russell’s on denoting from 1905, which in german translation appeared as [rus00, pp. 3–22]. 5 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions of interpretation that the thing with the property in question cannot be found in it, i.e. is not there. the ‘logical’ reading [tw04] of a simple judgement as a complex sentence resolves this difficulty because it reads “existence” as “existence with some property.” but this conception of existence as ‘being there’ has the consequence that, before existence can be asserted, there is always a universe needed to be given, which consists of the things that ‘are there’ and are known to fall into defined categories. in conventional logic this is enforced in the inductive definition of formulas and the set-theoretic structures for the interpretation of formulas. if we read, to use an example of quine, the “existence of unicorns” as the “existence of something which unicorns,” the question comes up of what the nature of this something is. at the linguistic level of conventional logic it is a variable and at the semantic level in the tarski-style interpretation it is possibly any element in the domain of interpretation. but what it is in a reality that can hardly be well-defined as a set, and what it is itself if it cannot be given the ontological status of a real thing but only the status of an intentional object, is even today a rather open question.10 5 brentano’s notion of judgement early conceptions of judgement and proposition with a particular emphasis on their roles in science and logic have been studied by bernhard bolzano in his wissenschaftslehre (1837). bolzano laid the ground for further investigations by brentano and by his students. a thorough account of these investigations can be found in the article austrian theories of judgement: bolzano, brentano, meinong, and husserl by robin d. rollinger. [rol08, pp. 233–261] of particular interest here is brentano’s conception of intentionality. it opened a new perspective on judgements. following searle, intentionality is also constituent to speech acts. [sea04, pp. 5–13] searle therefore develops his theory of intentionality as a foundation for his theory of speech acts. speech act theory11 strongly influenced modern conceptions of the linking of mental acts and symbolic presentations, and is therefore fundamental for intuitionistic approaches to the notions of proposition and judgement. in brentano’s psychology from an empirical standpoint (1874), an act of judging is a case of a mental act. according to his classification, all mental acts are either presentations [in german vorstellung], or judgements or volitions, and all contain an object intentionally within themselves. this can be concluded from the following famous citation: “every mental phenomenon is characterised by what the scholastics of the middle ages called the intentional (or mental) inexistence of an object, and what we might call, though not wholly unambiguously, reference to a content, direction towards an object (which might not to be understood here as meaning a thing), or immanent objectivity. every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. in presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on. this intentional in-existence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena. no physical phenomenon exhibits anything like it. we would, therefore, define mental phenomena by saying that they are phenomena, which contain an object intentionally within 10i consider this a serious question. a somewhat unsatisfactory answer is given in [gro92, pp. 106–119]. grossmann considers intentional relations as abnormal relations because their objects need not to have existence. 11for the history of speech act theory see [smi90, pp. 29–61]. festschrift hjk 6 / 20 eceasst themselves.” [bre95, pp. 88–89] what in a judgement is affirmed or denied is, in brentano’s view, the existence of this object. and so we might say that brentano conceives of a proposition as the ‘existence of the object of a judgement,’ which may be the case or not. brentano’s conception of intentionality has strongly influenced modern philosophy, namely logic, ontology, existential philosophy and theories of language and semantics. he not only claims that every mental act is a presentation or rests on a presentation, but also that a distinction has to be made between the object presented and the content of its presentation. bernhard bolzano was convinced that there are presentations, which, though they have content, have no object, [bol81, §67, pp. 304–306] like the presentation of a golden mountain or the presentation of a round square. this conviction, however, has the consequence that such things cannot be judged to not exist. but this appears to be against our intuition as we can think or even have an imagination of things, which, we know, do not exist, and also can judge that they do not exist. we can think of a round square and even imagine unicorns and a flat earth, and we daily have the presentation of a user-friendly computer system. even further, we seem to need a presentation of something before we can assert it to not exist. this observation, it turns out, touches at a major problem, the question of what exactly we mean by a proposition and by a judgement and how we understand the relation between a judgement and ‘its’ proposition. the disputes in analytic philosophy literature show that even today this problem has not yet found a commonly accepted solution. 6 twardowski’s theory of presentations kasimir twardowski, one of brentano’s students in vienna, addressed this problem in his habilitation thesis on the content and object of presentations a psychological investigation [twa77] in 1894. he studied the concept of presentation (in german vorstellung) and focuses on the observation that presentations imply in what they present to the mind, two different objects rather than one: the object towards which a presentation is directed (in german gegenstand), and the object, which is its content (in german inhalt). though the topic of his thesis is the concept of presentation, he also deals with the notion of judgement (in german urteil) and sees a “perfect analogy” [twa77, p. 7] between presentations and judgements. both, he states, imply an act, both concern something, namely what is presented and what is judged, and in both this something, which is presented or judged, is to be subdivided into object and content, the latter of which he calls the intentional object of the act. while one and the same object can be presented as well as being judged, he finds the distinction between presentation and judgement in the intentional object of the act: “when the object is presented and when it is judged, in both cases there occurs a third thing, besides the mental act and its object, which is, as it were, a sign of the object: its mental ‘picture’ when it is presented and its existence when it is judged.”12 here the ‘object’ of a judgement is the object about which the judgement is made, while the ‘subject’ of a judgement is that what is affirmed or denied, the object’s existence. twardowski insists that “presentation and judgement are two separated classes of mental phenomena without intermediate forms of transition.” [twa77, p. 6] 12see [twa77, p. 7]; the conception of ‘existence’ as the content of a judgement is not obvious. see grossmann’s criticism on this conception in: reinhard grossmann: introduction, in [twa77, pp. vii ivxxx, here pp. ix xi]. 7 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions the distinction between object and content in what is presented or judged is most natural, though the question of what exactly an object is, about which a judgement can be, still remains unanswered. in the beginning of his treatise on objects in §7 of his investigation twardowski gives a partial answer to it: “according to our view, the object of presentations, of judgements, of feelings, as well as of volitions [in german ‘wollungen’], is something different from the thing as such [in german ‘ding an sich’], if we understand by the latter the unknown cause of what affects our senses. the meaning of the word ‘object’ coincides in this respect with the meaning of the word ‘phenomenon’ or ‘appearance,’ whose cause is either, according to berkeley, god, or, according to the extreme idealists, our own mind, or, according to the moderate ‘realidealists’ the respective things as such. what we have said so far about objects of presentation and what will come to light about them in the following investigations is claimed to hold no matter, which one of the just mentioned viewpoints one may choose. every presentation presents something, no matter whether it exists or not, no matter whether it appears as independent of us in our own imagination; whatever it may be, it is insofar as we have a presentation of it the object of these acts, in contrast to us and our activity of conceiving [in german ‘vorstellenden tätigkeit’].” [twa77, p. 33] and at the end of his treatise on objects he writes: “summarizing what was said, we can describe the object in the following way. everything that is presented through a presentation, that is affirmed or denied through a judgement, that is desired or detested through an emotion [in german ‘gemütsthätigkeit’], we can call an object. objects are either real or not real; they are either possible or impossible objects; they exist or do not exist. what is common to them all is that they are or that they can be the object (not the intentional object!) of mental acts [in german ‘psychischer akte’], that their linguistic designation is the name ..., and that considered as genus [in german ‘gattung’], they form a summum genus, which finds its usual linguistic expression in the word ‘something’ [in german ‘etwas’]. everything which is in the widest sense “something” is called “object,” first of all in regard to a subject, but then also regardless of this relationship.” an important term in this citation is the word “through.” it assigns the mental act and its intentional object the role of a mediator: through the act and content of a presentation an object is presented, and, accordingly, through the acts of affirmation or denial of existence an object is judged. every object, now, existing or not, can be seen to be the object of both, a presentation and a judgement. twardowski’s concept of object of a mental act solves the above mentioned problem of judging non-existing objects to not exist, and bolzano’s belief in presentations, which have no object, turns out to be wrong: “the confusion of the proponents of objectless presentations consists in that they mistook the non-existence of an object for its not being presented.” [twa77, pp. 20–29, here p.22] but despite the fact that the general approach to the objects of a judgement seems to be most reasonable, the ontological status of objects in intentional relations is subject to controversies and not at all free from problems. it is therefore heavily debated in the literature. progress has been made with the invention of ‘states of affairs’ and with the conception that judgements concern states of affairs rather than objects.13 it seems that the invention of states of affairs has two sources: predications on the one hand, as they have been used by frege in his begriffsschrift for the purpose of formalising arithmetic and by peano and russell who applied and developed formal description techniques for other parts of 13see grossmann’s introduction to twardowski in [twa77] and [gro92]. festschrift hjk 8 / 20 eceasst mathematics, and “sachverhalte” on the other, as certain types of (intentional) objects, studied by meinong, husserl and reinach [smi89]. this view is later also found in wittgenstein’s tractatus, the first two sentences of which are: “die welt ist alles, was der fall ist. die welt ist die gesamtheit der tatsachen, nicht der dinge” (“the world is everything that is the case. the world is the total of what is the case, not of the things”).14 7 frege’s conception of proposition and judgement an answer of pragmatic value for the questions of what propositions and judgements are and how they are related seems possible only within a prescriptive deductive or semantic framework15. conventional formal logic makes no clear distinction between the two concepts and avoids their conceptualisation at all. and a dedicated formal theory of propositions and judgements has not yet been proposed. however, there are considerations, which aim at clarification. in his article über sinn und bedeutung (1892) gottlob frege discusses the meaning of verbal expressions, like names, denotations and sentences, and draws the well known distinctions between sign (in german zeichen), sense (in german sinn), reference (in german bedeutung), and presentation (in german vorstellung). “a sign is the expression of some sense and it denotes or references its reference.” [fre75, p. 46] a comparison of this distinction with twardowski’s distinction of names, content and object of a presentation shows many similarities, but also major differences: frege’s sense is not part of a mental state or act. it has objectivity. therefore presentations are not senses and therefore twardowski’s content is not the same as frege’s sense, even though they play similar roles in the designation of an object. and names in twardowski’s conception do not designate matters of affairs but objects. in frege’s conception also sentences have a sense and a reference, and the sense of a sentence is what he calls a thought (in german gedanke). frege’s concept of thought is what husserl and (the early) wittgenstein call matter of affairs [tw04, p. 17], and what russell calls proposition for which he later uses the word assertion.16 if a sign is a sentence, the question is what it references. in frege’s view, a sentence references a truth-value, i.e. the value true or false. accordingly, also truth-values are objects (in german gegenstände). since in twardowski’s habilitation there is no citation of frege’s work, we must conclude that frege’s work was not known in vienna at that time. frege’s conception of proposition was later adopted in formal logic, though in the hidden form of the recursive definition of interpretation and validity, which is derived from frege’s principles of compositionality and truth functionality. in view of its pragmatic language use and meaning, however, frege’s notion of sense has been strongly criticised.17 frege also made an important contribution to the conceptualisation of judgement. what is being affirmed or denied in a judgement is that a proposition is true or false, or in other words, that a matter of affairs is a fact or not. frege thereby frees the concept of judgement from its binding to object-existence. he also draws a clear distinction between proposition and judgement 14see [wit73, p. 11], english translation by the author. 15to a certain degree this is done in martin-löf’s intuitionistic type theory and formalisms following him (see below). see also [hhp93, pp. 143–184]. 16see also [ml96, pp. 11–60], where he gives an account on the development of the concepts of proposition and judgement in the light of his intuitionistic type theory. 17see for example [dum82]. 9 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions by saying that a judgement is not just the affirmation or denial of a proposition, but that the affirmation or denial is asserted. in his begriffsschrift (1879) frege introduces a notation for assertions, the vertical stroke, which he later combined with the horizontal stroke to indicate assigning truth, and the negated horizontal stroke to indicate falseness. so, for example, the assertion that the earth is flat can then be expressed as ` flat (earth) and the assertion that the earth is not flat can be expressed as ` flat (earth) here the symbol ` is to be read as “it is asserted that it is not the case that,” and not as “it is not asserted that it is the case that” which would be the negation of the assertion. frege’s observation that a judgement is more than just the statement of a true or false proposition, because a statement could also mean an assumption, makes the distinction between different kinds of judgements, as it was customary in the traditional views on judgements, meaningless. if we respect this observation, a judgement is always an affirmation. using truth predicates, written in type propositional form, the above assertions may be read as affirmations of the sentences flat (earth) : true and flat (earth) : false frege gives an impressive insight into his style of writing and the purpose and use of formal notations in mathematics in über die wissenschaftliche berechtigung einer begriffsschrift (1882). he motivates the notation of the judgement stroke`with the pragmatic needs in the writing of formal expressions and in the depiction of logical derivations on a sheet of paper. the question of “how can we write?” becomes prominent and the analysis of “what can we write down?” leads to the new view on judgements. frege uses the judgement stroke in a given context of discourse, the context of a given system of axioms and rules or of a given model or theory. it is this context, which justifies the assertion of truth. 8 martin-löf’s conception of judgement and proposition in his intuitionistic type theory, martin-löf makes the following distinction between proposition and judgement: “here the distinction between proposition (ger. satz) and assertion or judgement (ger. urteil) is essential. what we combine by means of the logical operations (falsum, implication, and, or, for all, there is) and hold to be true are propositions. when we hold a proposition to be true, we make a judgement: ((a : proposition) is true) : judgement “in particular, the premises and the conclusion of a logical inference are judgements. the distinction between proposition and judgement was clear from frege to principia. these notions festschrift hjk 10 / 20 eceasst have later been replaced by the formalistic notions of formula and theorem (in a formal system), respectively. contrary to formulas, propositions are not defined inductively. so to speak, they form an open concept. in standard textbook presentations of first order logic, we can distinguish three quite separate steps: 1. inductive definition of terms and formulas 2. specification of axioms and rules of inference 3. semantical interpretation “formulas and deductions are given meaning only through semantics, which is usually done following tarski and assuming set theory. “what we do here is meant to be closer to ordinary mathematical practice. we will avoid keeping form and meaning (content) apart. instead we will at the same time display certain forms of judgement and inference that are used in mathematical proofs and explain them semantically. thus we make explicit what is usually implicitly taken for granted. when one treats logic as any other branch of mathematics, as in the metamathematical tradition originated by hilbert, such judgements and inferences are only partially and formally represented in the so-called object language, while they are implicitly used, as in any other branch of mathematics, in the so-called metalanguage. “our main aim is to build up a system of formal rules representing in the best possible way informal (mathematical) reasoning.” [ml84, pp. 3–4] in martin-löf’s informal reasoning by means of formal rules judgements are not viewed from a language perspective, as aristoteles did and as we still do today, at least in most of the philosophical and formal logic accounts, but are closer to speech acts in the sense of austin’s “how to do things with words.” martin-löf’s informal reasoning is to be seen as a performing of acts of judging, which consist in the writing down of judgements. the writing down of judgements is justified by the rules of the type system, whose premises are again judgements. some rules, however, have no premises. they are axioms. judgements in martin-löf’s type theory have one of the following written forms: a set, a = b, a∈a, or a = b∈a. the last two of these forms correspond closely to the judgements to be made in cantor’s criterion for a set to be ‘well-defined,’ which he phrased in 1882, with the study of powers, when he refined his notion of a set18: “i call an aggregate (a collection, a set) of elements which belong to any domain of concepts [in german begriffssphäre] well-defined, if it must be regarded as internally determined on the basis of its definition and in consequence of the logical principle of the excluded middle. it must also be internally determined whether any object belonging to the same domain of concepts belongs to the aggregate in question as an element or not, and whether two objects belonging to the set, despite formal differences, are equal to one another or not.” all forms of judgement in martin-löf’s type theory propose a natural set-theoretical interpretation. the given system of rules, however, admits also other readings of these forms. one of these readings corresponds to the well known concept of ‘propositions as types,’ also known as 18the criterion is phrased in a letter by cantor to richard dedekind in 1882; see for example [dau79], cited in english from [dau79, p. 83]. 11 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions the curry-howard isomorphism, and reads the judgement a ∈ a as “a is a proof for the proposition a.” this reading is not only the basis of his system as an intuitionistic theory of types, but is also consistent with an intuitionistic interpretation of his approach as a whole: from a meta-level perspective the written forms of judgements symbolise propositions for which his system lays down what counts as a proof.19 this is the way how he explains semantically these forms of judgements. concerning propositions martin-löf writes: “classically, a proposition is nothing but a truth value, that is, an element of the set of truth values, whose two elements are the true and the false. because of the difficulties of justifying the rules for forming propositions by means of quantification over infinite domains, when a proposition is understood as a truth value, this explanation is rejected by the intuitionists and replaced by saying that a proposition is defined by laying down what counts as a proof of the proposition, and that a proposition is true if it has a proof, that is, if a proof of it can be given. “thus, intuitionistically, truth is identified with provability, though of course not (because of gödel’s incompleteness theorem) with derivability within any particular formal system.” [ml84, p. 11] the conventional conception of formal logic leaves these notions of proposition and judgement out of its consideration. it treats these notions only implicitly in the recursive definitions of interpretation and avoids their explicit notation. 9 logics with propositional variables also classical propositional and predicate logics can be seen as conceptions of propositions. they provide linguistic means, usually in terms of alphabets and inductive definitions, to write sentences, which through interpretation become either true or false. sentences in propositional logic are built up from propositional variables and propositional connectives like ‘and,’ ‘or,’ ‘not,’ and may be others. the interpretation of propositional sentences is based on a given truth-assignment, which assigns truth-values ‘true’ or ‘false’ to propositional variables, and is defined by induction as an evaluation function, which assigns truth-values to propositional sentences. here the principles of compositionality and truth functionality are maintained in their purest form. the ‘architecture’ of (first order) predicate logic is not much different, except that atomic formulas are not propositional variables but predications and equalities, that variables are object-variables taking values from a given semantic domain, and that expressive power and expressiveness of predicate logic are enriched by the use of function symbols for object description, relation symbols for predications and quantifiers ranging over the elements of the carrier sets of the semantic domain.20 sentences in these logics are complex forms, which express, trough their 19the status of a proof in the intuitionistic conception of truth has been a matter of discussion. see for example [sun94], as well as sundholm’s and prawitz’ debate in the above mentioned volume 64 in theoria. [han98] 20see for example [emc+01, pp. 221–455]. festschrift hjk 12 / 20 eceasst interpretation for a given truth-assignment or in a given semantic domain, sense, to use frege’s terminology. they may also be read as formal statements of matters of affairs, which are implicit in their formal interpretation. but these matters of affairs are usually not made explicit and only hidden in the recursive interpretation of sentences. the processes of interpretation then only yield truth-values, and equivalence at the object-level can only be expressed in terms of ‘having the same truth-value,’ rather than ‘stating the same matter of affairs.’ this is, how classical logic with a strict separation of syntax and semantics avoids the notions of proposition, and how it treats judgements only implicitly in its definition of the interpretation process relative to a given truth-assignment and semantic domain. there is a particular logic to explicitly express truth of propositions, quantification over propositional variables and propositional equivalence, which has been developed by werner sträter in [str92] and is called ∈t -logic. one of the motivations for its design was to avoid partial truth predicates and to admit formulations like the liar paradox x ≡ x : false to be treated as contradictions. ∈t -logic grew out of an extensional interpretation of types,21 which reads a type proposition e : t as a statement of membership [[e]] ∈ [[t ]] the type proposition ϕ : true would then be read as a statement of membership with [[ϕ]] denoting a proposition and [[true]] a set of true propositions. ∈t -logic is equipped with propositional constants, variables and connectives, quantification over propositional variables, truth predicates and propositional equivalence. its semantics is defined in the tarski-style, where the semantic domain is a domain of propositions and the interpretation function ensures the natural properties of propositional and of first order logic, as far as they apply. it fulfils the well known tarski biconditionals in the sense that the sentence ∀x.(x : true ↔ x) : true is universally true. ∈t -logic has an impredicative nature and allows for intensional semantics of its sentences. extensions of this logic have been defined and studied by philipp zeitz [zei00], who introduced parameterization, by sebastian bab [bab07], who extended ∈t -logic by modal operators, and by steffen lewitzka [lew09], who studied an intuitionistic variant of ∈t -logic. also frege defines in his begriffsschrift22 a logic with propositional variables. frege’s notations admit the reference to objects and to functions over objects, as well as to functions over functions. they allow for propositional variables ranging over truth-values, which are viewed as being objects like any other object, they admit to write operators, which cover the classical 21see [msu90] and [mah93]. 22see also [her83, pp. ix–xv]. 13 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions propositional connectives, and they include propositional equality and quantification. the expressiveness of frege’s logic is closely related to a certain instance of parameterized ∈t -logic in the sense of zeitz. however, there is no perfect analogy. the major difference is in the use of quantification, and in the style of semantics. intuitively, there is good reason to also view classical logics as theories of propositions, no matter if in these logics propositions form a distinct and well defined category of entities to be dealt with or not. this is obvious in the case of logics, which admit propositional variables, and it is even more obvious for ∈t -logic and its extensions, which explicitly support propositional quantification and equivalence, and assume propositions as elements of their semantic domains. can the same be said for judgements? classical logics introduce notations for judgements at their meta-level, usually in the form of a sign denoting validity of a sentence under a given interpretation, like for example the validity of ϕ under the truth-assignment b b |= ϕ but they do this in a rather propositional manner, as they also allow to denoting invalidity. b 6|= ϕ they treat judgements as propositions at the meta-level. otherwise there is little difference between these signs and frege’s judgement stroke. frege’s notation is based on the assumption of a given model so that there is no need to indicate the truth assignment or the semantic domain of interpretation. and also the fact that the judgement stroke is written at the object-level of formalisation is not of much relevance, since it is used at this level not as an operator but as an indicator and, in addition, only at the outermost position of the two-dimensional expressions. the judgement stroke can be omitted but it cannot be negated. negation of the judgement stroke would turn it into a propositional operator. this, by the way is the reason why the expression ϕ : true in ∈t -logic cannot reasonably be interpreted as a judgement. the judgement stroke is not subject to interpretation but is a sign, which has a purely pragmatic meaning. it indicates what is an answer to the question “what can i write?” 10 summary to turn to the question of how the notions of judgement and proposition discussed do relate to each other we try to answer the following questions: 1. is there a distinction made between assertion and judgement? 2. is there a distinction made between proposition and judgement? 3. what is that which is expressed by a judgement? 4. how is a judgement justified? 1. in his intuitionistic type theory martin-löf speaks of judgements rather than assertions, and in his recent lecture on assertions, assertoric contents and propositions, [ml08] he speaks of assertions rather than judgements. not fully conform to other festschrift hjk 14 / 20 eceasst naming conventions he uses the term assertion to denote the verbal expression of a judgement, in the form of a spoken or written sentence, and with the use of some language or notational convention. but, as he argues, the interchangeable use of the terms judgement and assertion is justified since in logic both depend on rules, the focus of his interest, and rules are the same for both. following the assumption that assertions are verbal expressions, judgements may be seen as the mental counterparts of assertions. but this view can hardly be maintained since also assertions include an act of judging. aristoteles avoids this problem by distinguishing between mental states on the one side, which stand in an image-relation to the things, and judgements as symbolisations of these states on the other. he assumes, at least implicitly, that there are two acts: the act of thinking, which, as he says, can be true or false, in the sense of right or wrong, and the act of symbolising, which produces a sentence or its written symbolisation. brentano and twardowski discuss judgements solely at the level of mental acts. written forms are out of their interest. in their understanding contents are in the mind while objects are embedded in an intentional relation. the ontological status of objects, however, remains somewhat unclear23. they may be real or mental objects, like thoughts, and may exist or not. frege’s thoughts, instead, are explicitly thought of as being independent from some mind, as they have objectivity and can be shared by several subjects. in ∈t -logic the distinction between judgement and assertion is mostly irrelevant, like in most formal logics with a set-theoretic tarski-style of semantics. sets in a set-theoretic universe of interpretation have the same ontological status as thoughts in the sense of frege. [gro92, pp. 106–119] they are the means by which, through the application of rules of interpretation, sense and reference, in the sense of frege, are being determined as elements of the given universe. 2. not in all the conceptions discussed a distinction between proposition and judgement is being made. in aristoteles’ conception there is an act of thinking, which has all the ingredients of an act of judging, while the forms of sentences, which are called judgements, may be understood as the grammatical forms of propositions, and the mental states to which they refer, may be understood as propositions, which can be true or false. in brentano’s and twardowski’s conception of judgement the concept of proposition is not explicitly named. what a judgement is about is an object and not necessarily something which is true or false, but something which exists or not. only if we read the content of a judgement, which is the existence of the object the judgement is about, as a kind of proposition, we find a conception of proposition with the familiar relation between propositions and judgements. separated from the object to which the judgement refers, is its presentation on which the judgement relies and whose content is a mental image. if the objects of judgements are matters of affairs, [gro92] rather than objects of some other kind, brentano’s and twardowski’s conception of judgement includes much of the conception of judgement we use today. but still then there are major differences to freges conception. frege’s sense has objectivity, while contents of judgements, in brentano’s and twardowski’s sense, are mental images and are therefore of subjective nature. freges sense is a thought, which objectively represents a matter of affairs, but what a judgement refers to is not this matter of affair but a truth-value. the two approaches would be easier to compare, if we could distinguish between that which a judgement is about and that what the sentence expressing the judgement refers to. a judgement would then be about a matter of affairs (frege’s sense and brentano’s and 23see the introduction to [twa77]. 15 / 20 volume 26 (2010) on judgements and propositions twardowski’s content of the presentation underlying the judgement) and refer to a truth-value (frege’s reference and brentano’s and twardowski’s intentional object). this distinction would be rather natural because of matters of affairs it can meaningfully be said that they exist or not, depending on whether they are facts or not, and this distinction would also be closer to what wittgenstein proposes in his tractatus logico philosophicus, [wit73] but it would not be fully consistent with frege’s and brentano’s and twardowski’s original conceptions. in his intuitionistic type theory martin-löf draws a clear distinction between propositions and judgements and gives formal rules for the formation of judgements. in ∈t -logic, however, the notion of judgement remains only implicit, like in other conventional logics. while the elements of the domain of interpretation are explicitly assumed to be propositions, whatever form they have, the notion of judgement, in the sense of martin-löf, is in ∈t -logic only present at the meta-level and not part of the ‘object language.’ it appears that the notion of judgement, other than the notion of proposition, is not fully semantic in its nature, but has also a substantial pragmatic aspect. this pragmatic aspect is that what frege expresses in his judgement stroke and what speech act theory identified as the illocutionary role or force of an assertoric act: the beholding of truth. despite the truth predicates in ∈t -logic and the fact that it obeys the tarski biconditionals, the beholding of truth is not a feature of the language but an element of its use and as such a consequence of the choice of the universe of interpretation. in martin-löf’s intuitionistic type theory this pragmatic aspect, at least in part, belongs to the ‘object language,’ which gives it the pragmatic flavour, expressed in the question “what can i write?” 3. one can generally say that that which is expressed in a judgement is the truth of some form of predication. this is obvious in aristoteles’ conception and in his choice of sentences, which have the valid form of a ‘judgement,’ and also, at least formally, in frege’s conception of a concept (in german begriff ) as a function whose application results a truth-value. in brentano’s conception that which is expressed in a judgement is the existence or non-existence of an object, which in twardowski’s setting is the judgements content. existence of an object, however, can only be seen as a form of predication if the object can be represented as a matter of affairs. the situation in martin-löf’s intuitionistic type theory is different. that what is expressed in a judgement is the provability of a proposition, or, in a different reading, the membership in a set. there is no notion of truth but at the level of judgements in the correctness of the application of the rules. in what is expressed in a judgement, ∈t -logic is not different to conventional formal logics, with the difference that the predications of truth and falseness differ slightly in their form. 4. if we ask, what justifies a judgement, major differences can be found. in aristoteles’ naturalistic conception justification comes objectively from the things and concerns the question of connectedness. truth applies to thoughts as mental states and depends on a proper correspondence to the reality of things. in brentano’s conception justification has an epistemic nature and is obtained either from deductions or from inductive proofs. a different view is taken by frege who sees the justification of a judgement to rest on necessity, which, according to him, corresponds to deduction, or empirical intuition. but truth, in his conception, is found through judgements, a conception, which gives the judgement stroke not only a pragmatic aspect but, other than it appeared at first, turns it at the same time into a constituent of semantics. despite similarities in the role of judgements, frege’s view differs in this respect from the conception of martin-löf, who sees the basis for justification in the system of rules and not in the beholding of truth. the judgement stroke in his conception is part of pragmatics and not of semantics. in festschrift hjk 16 / 20 eceasst a tarski-style of semantics, as it is applied in ∈t -logic and other conventional logics, the justification comes from the choice of the semantic domain in the interpretation and from the correct application of the interpretation rules. this is not much different to frege’s view, since the choice of the semantic domain of interpretation is also a judgement, and therefore not fully free from subjective influence but other than in frege’s conception, it avoids, so to say, the responsibility for this choice to be part of the interpretation. in the view of ∈t -logic and other conventional logics, truth and the conditions for the justification of judgements can be said to be defined. they are only found in a defined context. acknowledgements: this paper is devoted to hans-jörg kreowski on the occasion of his 60th birthday. with hans-jörg i shared an office from the mid seventies to the beginning of the eighties at the automata and formal languages group at tu berlin. what remained from these times is a feeling of friendship and trust. i thank andrea hillenbrand and sebastian bab for discussions and for their support. bibliography [ari67a] aristoteles. analytica priora, i 27. 43 a 25. in adolf trendelenburg, elemente der aristotelischen logik griechisch und deutsch, p. 11 (translation by the author). rowohlt, 1967. 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[zei00] p. zeitz. parametrisierte ∈t -logik: eine theorie der erweiterung abstrakter logiken um die konzepte wahrheit, referenz und klassische negation. logos verlag berlin, 2000. dissertation, technische universität berlin, 1999. festschrift hjk 20 / 20 introduction the notions of judgement and proposition in brief realistic conceptions of proposition and judgement formalisation of categorical judgements brentano's notion of judgement twardowski's theory of presentations frege's conception of proposition and judgement martin-löf's conception of judgement and proposition logics with propositional variables summary jambet-s2-2009 s j o u r n a l o f t h e j a n v a n e y c k c i r c l e f o r l a c a n i a n i d e o l o g y c r i t i q u e 2 ( 2 0 0 9 ) islam and psychoanalysis, edited by sigi jöttkandt and joan copjec editorial 2 cogito and the subject of arab culture julien maucade 6 to believe or to interpret jean-michel hirt 10 the veil of islam fethi benslama 14 jannah nadia tazi 28 four discourses on authority in islam christian jambet 44 the glow fethi benslama 62 dialogues translations of monotheisms fethi benslama and jean-luc nancy 74 the qur’an and the name-of-the-father keith al-hasani 90 reviews reading backwards: constructing god the impossible in psychoanalysis and the challenge of islam benjamin bishop 96 the powers of the negative: the mathematics of novelty benjamin noys 102 s is on the web at www.lineofbeauty.org c h r i s t i a n j a m b e t translated by sigi jöttkandt f o u r d i s c o u r s e s o n a u t h o r i t y i n i s l a m ike the other monotheistic religions, islam, in a sole act of faith, affirms the absolute unicity, transcendence and authority of god.1 psychoanalysis, which is what brings us back together again today, lends no support to any figure of unicity, position of transcendence, legitimacy of authority in itself. no reality is accorded to the one, if this number has pretensions to some kind of theological validity. unity, unicity, unification: these concepts, which we find at every stage of muslim thought, are held by psychoanalysis to be imaginary. no transcendence, if the real is the real of the unconscious. no legitimation of authority of any kind, if it is true that psychoanalysis flushes out and desacralizes every form of the ideal ego. it ruins political belief, the belief in a subject supposed to know, who would unveil the truth in action and determine justice within the political bond. psychoanalysis sustains propositions inverse to those of monotheism, for the same reasons it critiques the political conception of the world. how could a practice and a doctrine, freud’s, which aims to liberate the subject of identifications from representations of collective mastery, allow for an identification that founds the faithful’s collective link to their scriptural revelation? l freud deduced two propositions about the status of religion from his conception of the unconscious. for freud, religion can be taken back to an obsessional neurotic representation of the law, guaranteeing an illusion of a brilliant future. religious illusion, precisely symmetrical to the imaginary inflation of the paternal figure, is not unlike revolutionary illusion. revolutionary illusion condenses elements from two mirages, those of the political and the religious illusions. without any exaggeration, one could say that freud discredits all revolutionary discourse for the same reasons he made religious hope an illusion. freud sought to dissipate what he held to be illusion, while explaining its power and the necessity of its rule. this is why psychoanalysts who have sought to account for the meaning and depth of islam have had difficulties finding their marks. are they referring to a group of imaginary representations that to a greater or lesser extent structure the discourse of the 1 originally published as “quartre discours de l’authorité en islam” in la psychanalyse dans le monde arabe et islamique, ed. chawki azouri and elisabeth roudinesco (beirut: presses de l’université saint-joseph) 39-63. translated with kind permission of the pusj. s: journal of the jan van eyck circle for lacanian ideology critique 2 (2009): 44-61 j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 45 analyst? would they submit the dogmas of this religion to a freudian interpretation? in both cases, they treat as a miscognition something that the believer, to the contrary, holds to be the real par excellence, god, the unique, whose speech heralds a promise and issues commandments, the essential conditions of salvation. exposing the causes of such a belief, they force truth’s appearance to vanish. but in so doing, do psychoanalysts not dodge the proper mode of existence of the religious phenomenon? in revealing the truth of the unconscious, the truth that belief represses and consciously modifies, do they not neglect the ontological stakes of truth to which belief testifies? but in consenting to such a positioning of the religious problem, would they not have to renounce freud? introducing psychoanalysis to the muslim world is a noble ideal, evocative of the enlightenment. does it not possess the same weakness, always characteristic of the aufklärung, the division of truth between a consciousness that analyzes its illusions and an objective real stripped of all certainty? is it a question of summoning muslims to an analytic praxis whose axioms are atheist? the analysand will have ceased to believe absolutely, such that his or her certainty of faith appears, finally, only as a subjective certainty, and no longer as objective truth, such that the truth of the faithful is reduced to the truth of his or her conscience, to his or her singular anchoring in the truth of the unconscious. this is essential, if analytic praxis is not to be reduced to an inoffensive psychotherapy. but if the testimony of the revealed truth holds firm, not the subject’s truth but the objective truth of god’s speech, how will one grant the analyst his well-known paradoxical authority, which throws the discourses on authority into turmoil? speaking here as a philosopher and not as a psychoanalyst, my question is not whether the various contents of the muslim faith are true or illusory, or whether or not the enlightenment ideal is preferable to these dogmas. even if the notion of truth, the concept of truth, were to merit a more profound examination here, it is enough to admit, as a provisional postulate, that the dogmas of the muslim religion correspond to what kant, rightly, maintained is one of the fundamental constitutions of man, without which, neither moral questions, nor the most basic questions of subsistence could sustain themselves. kant resumes his account of the enduring question of hope in the christian heritage and demonstrates its connection with faith. if philosophical critique could only make hope in a sovereign good vanish from the horizon of reason and freedom of the moderns, it remains a fortiori at the heart of reason and liberty in the foreign thought systems of this modern reason. our intention, in the following, is not to decide in favor of freud’s irreducible atheism nor, on the contrary, of the philosophies that accord some weight of truth to religious phenomena. philosophy and psychoanalysis both accord the greatest importance to the status of authority and, more specifically, to the following question: which subject is supposed to decide what constitutes legitimate authority? without pretending to an exhaustive inquiry, such is the question we wish to pose here regarding authority in islam. let us begin, then, with several elementary observations. islam is often presented, correctly, as a legalistic religion. however, to translate the expression “al-sharîa’a” with “the law” does not clarify the meaning given to this term. to understand by this the exercise of jurisprudence would be to forget that the j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 46 legislation elaborated by the major juridical schools, sunni or shî’ite, is not the whole of the law and even less the whole of religion, but only a part of them. it would be to neglect the horizon of the law, without which the law loses all meaning, namely, eschatology. belief in the day of judgment, hope in just retribution, god’s satisfaction and what the faithful receive in return are the ultimate reasons and first notions of the mohammedan revelation. on the other hand, like all religion, islam poses the question of being in its own way. who has the right to be? what is the authentically subsisting being? what is it to be? without examining religion from an ontological perspective, one inevitably misses the seriousness of that religion; it is reduced to a number of superstitions, rites and modes of obedience that have nothing at stake. the law may well lie at the heart of a revelation that offers a number of commandments one must respect. but it is not the whole of revelation. before it prescribes, and in order for its prescriptions to be authoritative, the revelation states what the real is, existence par excellence, and who the real is. it is from this decision that touches the real, the division between the real and the unreal, that the law draws its authority. consequently, it is worth keeping the distinction between the three terms―revelation, law, jurisprudence―in mind. hope, which is a revealed certainty for islam, is expressed in numerous apocalyptic verses in the qur’an, heralding the day of judgment, paradise and hell. it is intrinsically bound to the presentation of human nature, the fitra or original conception of man. this original nature is that of a respondent. in the seventh sura, al-’a’raf, which is a condensation of the entire prophetic revelation, a celebrated verse states, “when thy lord drew forth from the children of adam―from their loins―their descendants, and made them testify concerning themselves, (saying): ‘am i not your lord (who cherishes and sustains you)?’―they said: ‘yea! we do testify!’ (this), lest ye should say on the day of judgment: ‘of this we were never mindful’ (7: 172).2 what constitutes man, the thing that confers him with both original, non-adulterated, authentic existence and suitable essence is testimony, often called the “primordial pact.” testament to divine lordship, man is fundamentally a servant, al-’abd, according to a definition that retains biblical connotations, insofar as it contains an eminent dignity in the idea of divine service that the angels themselves have no part in. is the messiah not announced in the biblical prophecy of the “suffering servant”? in the highly complex notion of “servant,” we find obedience to the law, of course, but also all that it circumscribes, interprets and amplifies in eschatological meanings or spiritual variations. we must now recall this fundamental relation between the servant and the master so as to illuminate the difficulty one encounters in approaching the question of authority in islam. are our conceptions of auctoritas entirely adequate to the concepts at stake here? i do not think so. they rely too much on the structures of public law and christian political theology, on the legacy of roman law and the reforms carried to these structures, both by the doctrines of natural law and its adversaries. if one is looking for an equivalent to authority in terms such as al-ri’asa, the political commandment, al-sultân, political and religious power, or al-molk, royal authority, one restricts one’s field of examination to the phenomena of authority. the 2 the holy qur’an, trans. yusuf ali. j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 47 use of the unique term, “authority,” seems to me to be legitimate and essential only on two conditions: to greatly expand this concept and, consequently, grant it a large number of different meanings; to define authority in its most generally accepted form: as the legitimacy accorded by the faithful to that which is for them the correct interpretation of revealed speech. far preferable to looking exclusively to juridical devices, the question of authority, taken in this sense, enables the psychoanalyst to penetrate the thickets of islamic religious discourses with greater clarity and distinction. it seems to me that the first move of the psychoanalyst, the first impulse, which involves a certain familiarity with freud, is not always the best. often, it reduces the complexity of islamic obedience to a love of the law, in the sense of the catholic obedience distilled by pierre legendre according to the schema of a “love of the censor.” such a reduction presupposes an implicit juridical definition of the law. now, despite the apparent synonymy that the french language introduces, it is not true that the law of islam is ipso facto a juridical representation of religion. its ordinary meaning is much more expansive, and it enables one to understand how the subject is determined by the juridical interpretation of more complex legalistic injunctions, and what the stakes are between the law and non-juridical norms. beginning from this false step, the psychoanalyst cannot help but err: he will want to subject the stakes of the relations between the servant and his master to this love for the law, for the deciphered sharî’a exclusively in terms of the discourse of jurisprudence. either law will be the truth of islam and its diverse forms of nonjuridical spirituality relegated to an unessential “interior” religion, or this interior religion will pass as superior to external religion, that which determines legislation. whichever we choose, we will subject exterior religion and interior religion to a logical relation between two terms that are mutually exclusive. this scenario exists, of course, but it is not unique, general, prevalent. those who reduce the essential core of the law to jurisprudence, like those who challenge all “legalistic” approaches in the study of spiritual phenomena, agree on a common postulate, what it means, without doubt, to put it in question. we risk becoming victims of polysemy, the word “law” meaning “scriptural revelation,” “norms of behavior and thought,” “divine commandments,” “human jurisprudence deduced from revelation. one would do well to recognize that variations in the meaning of expressions “al-shar’” or “alsharî’a” often authorize such homonymic effects. to this disastrous impulse, i shall oppose a number of prudent arguments. sharî’a has concentric meanings. it designates, in its widest sense, the path traced by a brook, the path which leads to god. in this first meaning, sharî’a is not the discourse of legislation but the revealed guide to the prophet. sharî’a is identified with the right path, al-sirât al-mustaqim. we must therefore distinguish between norms of conduct, guidance, and jurisdiction. prophecy can be very strictly normative, without originarily being legal. it is the source of legality and of legitimacy without being anything other than a system of norms. it may well generate norms of behavior that will nevertheless aspire to be extra-legal, that is to say, which do not pretend to juridical speech. in another sense, by the force and authority acquired by the illustrious founders through precise historical conditions issuing from thousands of j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 48 sunni traditionalists, the integral sharî’a, which was first conceived as a divine knowledge (hikma), found itself identified with a rational exercise of juridical deduction, usûl al-fiqh. it is notable―to cite only one major example―that in his risâla, shafi’î maintains that the essential core of the book, the qur’an, lies in its naming of the “statutes,” in other words, the juridical articulations of the divine law. that it makes the contents of knowledge from the science of these “divine statutes,” and from this knowledge all authentic jurisdictional illumination of the heart of the faithful. shafi’î interprets the pact of adoration that binds the servant to his lord in the following way: obligations, devotions instituted by the qur’anic letter, duties imposed by the prophet, the obligation to make one’s own ruling (ijtihâd). to speak of obligation, is it to speak of law (droit)? yes, but on two conditions: first, that obligation is the concept translating the sovereignty of the divine commandment; second, that the jurist is the subject who expresses the meaning (bayân) of this obligation. shafi’î contends that the knowing jurist is entitled to explain these four categories of adoration, of the worship rendered to god. it makes the jurist the preeminent authority, institutes a hermeneutic filter for the book, of the sunna of the prophet and the practice of ijtihâd. the inversion is striking: sharî’a, reduced to revealed “statutes” and rationales of muslim law, has become the foundation of hikma, of knowledge and expresses the totality, in the space which contains wisdom, as one of its regions, the juridical statutes. to comprehend knowledge as adequating to the integral revelation accorded to the prophet as essentially constituted through duties and obligations is to prepare the ground for juridical interpretation in this precise sense: the jurist will, more than others, have access to the true meaning, prescriptive of the book and of the law. such is the decision of the discourse of the jurist’s authority. it appears only to state what the book is, what the sunna is, what ijtihâd is, and doing so, seems to say nothing other than what the theologians, mystics of other readers of the qur’ran say. but through the turn it gives to the reading of duties and obligations, it surreptitiously introduces a juridical turn that has a very precise function: to situate eminent authority in the jurist himself. today, it passes as self-explanatory, for a selfengendered reality. it is permitted as such by a number of exegetes, it governs the reflexes of certain psychoanalysts. thus its genealogy is forgotten, its history occulted, and its validity sacralized. now, there is no shortage of counter interpretations. one will not be surprised to find them in spiritual exegeses of the qur’an above all. thus, hikma, knowledge, is considered something much greater than sharî’a, which constitutes a degree, but only a degree, seldom the most elevated. another imprudent reflex: it is often said that in islam, political power and authority are not distinguished from each other, and neither can be analyzed without the other. consequently, islam would necessarily be a political religion, and the interior life of the muslim would be governed by the exercise of a public worship indissociable from the organization of the state. now, we can make an objection to this representation, which has dominated the debates following its adoption by certain contemporary islamic political theories. it neglects numerous recognized authorities who by no means aspire to to be “political.” these non-political authorities are not without producing some effects, and consequently they are accompanied by a certain power. j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 49 but this power is reversible, it can have a secondary political facet and a principal non-political facet, or vice versa. both stakes must therefore be studied with precision. we can mention, for example, the figure of the master in the sufi brotherhoods or even certain paradoxical figures in the shi’îte theory of the imamat. at base, this reminds us that the chief historical fact, namely, prophecy, unifies a state by chance, but unifies a community by essence. if one speaks of the social effects of the muslim religion, the modes of religious authority in public life, one must employ the concept of community rather than that of the state. it would only be to illuminate the difficulties confronting the various muslim states following the confounding of the caliph with state power, in the delicate exercise of the two, often incompatible, functions: the government of men and of things, on the one hand, and the spiritual guidance of the community of the faithful, on the other. here, too, we should be attentive to the history of these concepts. political science, in classical islam, distributes itself across several disciplines, and it has never enjoyed the independence and unity that we encounter in the west since antiquity. one must recognize this, one comes across it a little everywhere: in certain philosophers, theologians, in the hadîth, in the writings of “councils,” in the poets or the authors of fables and stories, in the art of the novel, even in the mystics. dispersed and multiple, veiled and discreet as in the court poets, systematically in the philosophers, it is always a science of the foundation of authority, but often a moral reflection on the rules and exercise of power. it is thus not a matter of a general theory of the state but a reflection on the qualities and on the essence of the man of government. moreover, the state is not the indispensable horizon of these reflections, but only a step between the economy and the postulated universal human community “faithful to god.” downstream of the state, the refinement of moral rules, the counsel of good management; upstream of the state, the universal theory of guidance, the link between authority and truth. the political would only boil down to the image offered by our modern reflections on the sovereignty of the state. islam is not hobbesian. let us come to what pertains more specifically to the muslim city. when hellene philosophers study various political regimes, it is in platonic terms, respecting plato’s classifications, combined with the moral lessons of aristotle without the least bit drawn from experience. their object is not a theory of the islamic state but the refoundation, in an apparently muslim frame, of the institutions of justice bequeathed by the sages. there is no explanation of how the infidel state passes into the islamic state because the question does not arise, resolved by the facts, if one understands by this that the world where such a passage would be judged necessary does not exist at times when islam has legal preeminence, and the hostile world that surrounds it is entirely a foreign world, a world outside the world of political reflection. when the atheist is an exception, when the polytheist is a species on the way to extinction, how could one consider the necessity of the islamic state? one questions the essence of the perfect city, the perfect mode of consent between the classes, the political and spiritual guidance of the political man, the corruption of this model, etc. when it became obvious to fârâbî or to nasîr al-dîn tûsî that their thoughts concerned people already living in the dâr al-islam, their aim was to conceptualize the traits of a community ruled by justice and not the conditions under which an islamic state should be installed. it is today that the concept triumphs, on the ruins of a j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 50 community become improbable or “ideal,” like a strange fruit on the tree of western science, to which are grafted modern speculations issuing from the triumph of the jurist’s authority. no speculation, in the classical ages of islam, has ever treated the qur’an as if it pertained to a code of public law which replaced infidel constitutions. never, at least until the situation changed, when islamic territory appeared existentially threatened, until the supreme authority in public law, that of the caliph or the “keeper of the book” faded gravely or entirely, in short, until the contemporary revival of the solitary, and contested in its time, work of the great hanbalite reformer ibn taymmiya. it was necessary for the models of western political representation to be the occasion for rejection, belief and, consequently, the source of a new interrogation, in view of contesting this representation. thus it was that a political thought invited the faithful to an exclusive valorization of the qur’an in its literality and turned this literality, like that of the sunnah of the prophet, into a political code. a man such as al-ghazâlî would simply not be able to write in such an episteme. these are the sunni religious reformers of the 20th century, quickly followed by certain shî’ite intellectuals, who constructed a theological-political system where sharî’a, understood as the wise jurist’s reading of the qur’an, has pretensions to the status of the sovereign decision in matters of public law. it has often been rightly remarked that the shî’ite concept of “government by the wise jurist” strictly appropriate to the thesis that emerged from the sunni milieu according to which the qur’an must become the constitution of the state, is an innovation. this innovation of course has its history, which is that of the slow and sure appropriation of power by the jurists, to the detriment of the traditionalists, mystics, theologians and spiritual philosophers, to the detriment, also, and above all, of the great sovereign figures of the imamat. it has a reality: but no intrinsic sacrality in itself. it is strictly dependent on what it opposes, the modern political episteme, liberal philosophies of political representation, whereas the question of political representation, and thus its contestation, were incompatible with the classical islamic episteme. nothing of the least political consequence, in the modern sense of this term, is expressed in the qur’anic revelation of divine sovereignty. it is correct to say that only in god do authority and power make one, as certain theologians have had no difficulty in sustaining the thesis of the fundamental unity of the attributes of god: in him alone, science, the will and power essentially make one, distinguishing themselves from each other only in words (bi l-i’tibâr) and not in reality (bi lhaqîqat). but what about in man? more generally, how can the absolute sovereignty of god ever found the legitimacy of human authority? the hypothesis of a delegation, of a representation of the divine authority in human authority seems impossible a priori. no space opens up between the exercise of divine authority, revealed in prophetic speech, and that of the faithful servant’s obedience. nothing that resembles a minister or a pope, even less the secularization of religious authority under the leader of a sacralization of the political body. this apparent difficulty was not absent from islam’s situation at its origins. when compared with christianity, the contrasts are striking. whereas christianity has operated pretty much according to the schema of orthodoxy/heresy, one finds j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 51 nothing like this in islam. of the numerous heterodox christian currents, as numerous as they were, as resurgent and renascent as they appear, there was nothing in the theological desire for truth that was and remains a desire for orthodoxy in the ecclesiastical sense of the term. one can deplore or approve of this desire of the ecumenical councils, of the fathers and intellectuals, one can recall the violent excommunications of the theologians and christologians. one can mention the multiplicity of rites and beliefs. what remains is that the schema that orders this variety, that of orthodoxy, designating and stigmatizing heresy, is nothing other than the exercise of the truth in a precise context, that of the revelation of the set of divine truth and a way, a life and a truth that concentrates itself entirely in the figure of christ, opening the way to the incorporation of the truth. “who has seen me has seen the father”: the mediation between the hidden and the apparent, the divine world and the supersensible and the access to the divine is guaranteed by the fleshly manifestation of the word and the divine man in such a way that this incarnation is conducted in the mode of manifestation of the subject of the truth that is the “church.” there are no christian sects, but only expressions of the “church phenomenon,” as reduced and marginal as they may be. inversely, and even if the diverse currents of islam mutually refute and condemn, or even curse each other, if each has pretensions as the sole sect that will be saved at the day of judgment, this does not play out according to the schema of orthodoxy/heresy, because the problem is not, cannot be, that of the orthodox constitution of the church phenomenon, of a church as subject of truth. on this, islam presents an astonishing face to our inquiry. whatever the divisions that separate and oppose them, muslims today are conscious of belonging to the single and the same community. the multiplicity of beliefs does not affect this universality of the communal consciousness. unhappy consciousness, living the drama of the fitna, of discord, as a permanent drama. consciousness avid to make an end of things, and anxious to force an historical destiny that dooms it to an intolerable pluralism. among the simple faithful, this nostalgia for the lost unity encourages attachments to literalist preachings, which promote the return to the letter of the book and to the sunnah. which book? which sunnah? immediately the division returns, the one sole, inevitable fact of the interpretation of texts. depending on whether the corpus of the sunnah is constituted by this master of truth or that, sunnite or shi’ite, we will have a different text. despite the recognition that has amassed to a unique text, with some variations, the qur’an is not exempt from this multiplicity, if it is true that the text never stands on its own but always in the weave of a commentary, a literal explication or a mystical or moral exegesis whose principle of validity is an authority that itself requires foundation, and which frequently only sublates itself. the unity of consciousness thus goes hand in hand with the multiplying proliferation of the figures of authority: the prophet, the imâm who succeeded him, either in the various senses that the different schools of shî’ism give him, or in the general sense, admitted in the sunnite world, of the guide of believers, the caliph or successor of the prophet, the preacher, the missionary, the traditionalist, collector of the sunnah, itself variable, the jurist, the wali, the friend of god whose qualifications come from j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 52 the sanctity of his life or the predestination of testimony, the sage (al-hakîm), whether in the strict philosophical sense or inspired by a more globally encompassing knowledge of the secrets of revelation, the ascetic, the scapegoat, the diverse varieties that one conveniently regroups under the heading of ahl altasawwuf, of sufism, the inspired poet, the astrologist, the commentator, the rationalist theologian (al-mutakallim), etc. nevertheless, four main types of authority seem to me to dominate this infinite plurality: the prophetic guide, prophet or imâm, the theologian, the jurist and the sage. which authority prevails respectively amongst them, what kind of authority diffuses from them further downstream? the prophet or imâm authorizes himself through divine inspiration, or the connaturality that unites him with some emanation from the divine world. the theologian invokes the omnipotence of the rational intelligence, itself founded in the truth of divine intelligence. it was necessary that this gesture, this decision by which the greek logos, the mode of deduction of the demonstrative intellect, was identified with the ‘aql and with certain processes of science that god eternally possesses of the beings he created, in order for theology to affirm its legitimacy. the jurist sometimes invokes a double source of authority: the literal tradition and the deductive intellect. it is the same intelligence, understood in the sense of contemplative intelligence, which founds the activity of the sage. it culminates in a direct vision of the intelligible, and a proximity or a unification with the intelligible. the intelligence, its problematic union of the intelligible and the act of intellection, thus seems to me to be at the heart of the validatory devices of authority, whether of the sage, the jurist or the theologian. one cannot overestimate the problems posed by the theory of intellectual knowledge, when one interrogates the principles of authority in islam. it is through the mediation of such problems that the question of the juridical norm, the moral norm and proximity to the divine decree becomes receptive to various constraining solutions. the authority of the spiritual masters of sufism, like those of the saints, requires a slightly different foundation, visionary imagination, the power of unveiling, vision of the supersensible presence, which moreover does not exclude the power of intelligence. this principle, which we find as well at the origin of prophetic authority or imamology, is the walâya. this term is very difficult to analyze, since it designates a “friendship” with god which has a very rich meaning. it signifies as well a perfect conformity to the divine order of a science that is supernatural to the secrets of revelation. it is a symptom of what constitutes, at the end of time, the problem posed by human authority: how to adequately reflect the sole authority that exists, god’s authority? let us examine this in the context of the caliphate. we know this difficulty was resolved in various ways. for the omeyyade caliphs, the substitution of the name “caliph of god’s envoy” for “caliph of god” enables us to suppose that the function of the prophet’s “successor” in the temporal order, the absolute authority of decision of the caliph, was an authentic exegete of god and of his sovereignty. this, designated by the term al-amr, the imperative, the command, the order, is summarized, by a process of rarefaction, with the exercise of a command in the order of the confusion between religious life and civil life, and the successor of j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 53 the prophet found himself named “commander of believers” in both a secular and a religious sense. in this way, the exercise of authority in exterior exoteric matters could not miss carrying it over to spiritual guidance, and the caliph of the prophet very quickly became confounded with figures of royalty. it is this that originally caused the rebellions and uprisings of the various partisans of ‘alî ibn abî tâlib, known under the generic term shî’ite. the very idea of expressing divine authority under the auspices of a state caliphate power seemed to them to be in contradiction with the authentic, primitive notion of prophecy and of the just imamat, the authority of the guide. in their eyes, this had to have its foundation in god itself, if human authority was to have any chance of avoiding becoming a substitute for god’s authority. more generally, it imposed a division between exterior authority and interior authority, the dimension of the exterior, of the apparent, the exoteric, and that of the interior, the hidden, the esoteric. there are thus three main options possible: an equilibrium between the apparent, the exoteric, exterior prescriptions and the hidden, esoteric; a disequilibrium, weighted in favor of interiority, eventually leading to an indifferent, or even explicitly anti-legislative, authority to the letter of the law; finally, a repudiation of all esoteric dimensions. it is impossible to address these questions of authority without encountering this haunting and at times meticulous discussion of the possible roles of the zâhir and the bâtin, of the exoteric and the esoteric. but, from another perspective, the protests of the kjarijites or hanbalite traditionalists and their disciples are no less revealing. every time an all too human authority threatens to substitute itself for the divine imperative, seeming thereby to ruin the eschatological vocation of prophecy, voices calling for a return to the true sense of the prophecy and of the caliphate are raised. the exercise of authority is like living a contradiction. absolute divine authority is in itself non-participatory. now, in order to found human authority, a man of excellence must be able to participate in it, by virtue of his divine election. here i am choosing to employ terms that are foreign to the qur’an’s scriptural universe, but which rapidly became familiar to islamic thinkers, terms which belong to the platonic lexicons: participation, participatory, participated, non-participatory. i feel authorized to do so by the fact that a number of islamic metaphysical theologians employ them when they find it useful to think in these hellenic neo-platonist terms, along with those from the beginning of the third century of the hijra. nonparticipatory is a predicate of god’s absolute unity. the divine one is not the first term of a numeric chain of multiples, but his unity is fundamentally separated from all multiplicity. it involves an ineffable unity, indescribable, hidden and revealed but simultaneously reserved and veiled by the names that god gives himself in his holy books. now, according to the qur’ran, it is only with the inexpressible essence of god that divine authority makes one. authority and creation belong to god (see the qur’an, 7: 54: “ is it not his to create and to govern?”)―to god in his pure identity, in his mysterious unity. the exercise of divine authority is the foundation, no less mysterious, of what god decrees when he decrees. the notion of foundation encompasses the following meanings: instantaneity, incomprehensible on first examination by human reason, separation from the power that founds, eminent, transcendent, and the founded reality, which is neither necessary in itself nor of the j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 54 same ontological rank as the founder. if god founds and exercises his authority in this act of foundation, he remains transcendent to what he founds, which thus does not succeed him in the way an effect succeeds its cause, and encompasses the reality of a part of its cause. but, being non-participatory in what he founds, god thus remains inimitable in the exercise of his authority and all human authority becomes, by definition, contradictory. the divine real disjoins itself from the symbolic order it founds. from this perspective, there would be nothing to efface the distance between the divine act and human history. nothing, if not prophetic discourse. the first discourse on authority, which islam never stops referring to, in multiple forms, is prophetic discourse. in effect, it is prophecy that manifests a sacred history, situated between the eternity of the divine imperative and the historical progress of the world. this prophetic history has its origin in adam’s pact of obedience and its end in the resurrection (al-quyâmat al-kubra). its historical curve bestows the authentic caliphate with the right to endure until the end of time. but, all the other discourses of authority, the jurist, the theologian, the spiritual master, will have to justify themselves before him as well. let us recall that the qur’an only employs the term caliph, al-khalîfa, plural alkhalâ’if or al-khulafâ’, in the context of a different register to prophetic authority. more properly, the verses 2.30 do not specify what the caliphate is, except by default, or rather through the protest it generates among the angels: “behold, thy lord said to the angels: ‘i will create a vicegerent on earth.’ they said: ‘wilt thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood?―whilst we do celebrate thy praises and glorify thy holy (name)?’ he said: ‘i know what ye know not.’” the authority god confers upon man differs from the angels’ worship of perpetual adoration. the angels are ignorant of the ends of divine providence, and, consequently, the necessity of prophetic history, while maintaining that they know the evil that man will sow. the caliphate authority of god exercises itself “on the earth.” this successional authority entrusted to adam is not a simple potestas. it is not only directed at things below, but also at the realities of the other world. it connects this nether world, evanescent, temporal, illusory, with the real, eternal world, which is the divine world, that of the throne of god, of “reconciled” archangels, of the throne, of paradise, and hell. it makes one only through obedience, in such a way that man’s authority is a paradoxical authority: it exerts much better than it submits to its lord. it is the opposite of temporal omnipotence, although at its lowest level it includes temporal power. we know this theme has been fed by every contestation of established power, either through the testimony of spiritual leaders and mystics, or through the support given to the call (al-da’wa) launched by various individuals claiming a certain form of participation in prophetic destiny, most notably in shi’ism, or by traditional discourses refusing any concession to innovation and laicisation. to cite just one example, let us consider this protest, this appeal to the destination and essence of prophecy in the prologue of the book of oriental theosophy by sohravardî: “if in a given epoch there is someone who is profoundly devoted to the j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 55 divinization of self (al-ta’âlluh) and study (al-bahth), authority (al-ri’âsa) is returned to him and it is he who is the caliph of god.”3 thus spiritual authority asserts its origin in its proximity to the god of the prophets, better yet, an apotheosis, a divinization of self that effaces the distance between the divine world and the world of creation, accompanied by “study,” by which we understand the study of truth through gnostic paths, through spiritual knowledge. the non-political, indeed antipolitical aspiration of this authority, sohravardî makes explicit: “speaking of the authority returned to the perfect sage, i do not mean the exercise of triumphant temporal power (taghallub). far from it because if the imam invested with mystical experience (or divinization of self) sees his authority publicly recognized, he also remains hidden.” we recognize here the division that political knowledge and sufism have maintained between taghallub, the tyrannous temporal dimension (in the platonic sense, and greek term) and the true work of spiritual guidance. it is equally valid that the conceptual content of prophetic authority is hierarchically distributed across humankind in its totality. whence the burning questions of election and hierarchy which never cease to pose themselves once the discourse of prophecy must be relayed through other discourses following the death of the prophet of islam. the following verse testifies to this: “it is he who hath made you (his) agents, inheritors of the earth: he hath raised you in ranks, some above others: that he may try you in the gifts he hath given you” (qur’an, 6:165). the meaning of the elect community is thus the following: to be the caliph in the earth through respect of the primordial pact, and to recognize a hierarchy in itself which is not temporal but essentially prophetic, guarantor of the meaning of the prophecy in its unity. the close relation between the exercise of this authority and the care taken to purify its spiritual interiority are emphasized by the proximity of several major notions: “verily allah knows (all) the hidden things of the heavens and the earth: verily he has full knowledge of all that is in (men's) hearts. he it is that has made you inheritors in the earth” (35: 38-39). of course, by way of the eminent example it makes of the two prophets preceding muhammad, the qur’an indicates that this authority has two essential missions. the case of david must interest us in particular, because it bears in itself all the biblical promise of the messianic future, entirely synthesizing the function of the judge with the prophetic function. he “judges people based on the real” says the qur’an (36: 26). the case of noah is of no less importance. he is invoked to show how the caliphate is eternal, even when the greater part of humanity perishes through the wrath of god. muhammad invokes his example in dramatic circumstances, when he is himself the victim of his peoples’ mockery and incredulity: “he said: ‘o my people! i am no imbecile, but (i am) an apostle from the lord and cherisher of the worlds! i but fulfill towards you the duties of my lord’s mission: i am to you a sincere and trustworthy adviser. do ye wonder that there hath come to you a message from your lord through a man of your own people, to warn you? call in remembrance that he made you inheritors after the people of noah, and gave you a stature tall among the 3 shihâboddîn yahyâ sohravardî, kitâb hikmat al-ishrâq, opera metaphysica et mystica, ed. henry corbin, vol. 2 (tehran: mu’assasah-yi mutali‘at va tahqiqat-i farhangi, 1993 [reprint of the 1945]) 12. j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 56 nations. call in remembrance the benefits (ye have received) from allah. that so ye may prosper’” (7: 67-69). the juridical authority attributed to david evidently founded prophetic authority in a specific domain: to discriminate the faithful from the rebels in accordance with the highest justice, that designated by the term al-haqq, which signifies both the real and the law, not in the sense derived from jurisprudence, but in the sense of the law to which god has the right, in short, obedience to his commandments and to the letter of the book. noah’s exemplariness consists in that prophetic authority is transhistorical. from this transhistorical perspective, the caliphate is no longer a temporal responsibility, posing the well-known problems of dynastic succession, but a constant presence, rejuvenating itself age after age, a responsibility of the envoy that, around this envoy, is returned to humanity at large. it is easy to recognize here the judeo-christian notion of the true prophet, through which the transhistorical reality passes from age to age before ultimately being revealed in jesus. persuaded of his paraceltic mission, muhammad applies the idea to himself, but not without combining it with the notion borrowed from the mani, that of the seal of the prophecy. it is impossible to give an account here―this was extremely brief―of the considerable number of works by muslim intellectuals that, in the service of successive imperial powers called caliphates, have borrowed from these original concepts. what we can insist on, however, is the repeated process by which they have tried to emphasize the moral qualities, specific gifts, familial or clan connections, anything that could justify the legitimacy of power, that is to say, the omnipotence of the sovereign. it is clear that the sunnites, faithful to omeyyades, made no fewer claims to supersensible powers, to extraordinary powers, than the shî’ites when it came to justifying the authority of the man of power. this mystique of authority was nowhere more developed than in the shî’ite world, particularly in the insurrections that led to the establishment of the fatimid caliphate. the imâm, keeper of the book, possesses an enlightened nature, and this suprasensible essence makes him the theologian par excellence. of course, he is not the essence of god, but the manifestation of god, or better, the manifestation of the reality originally founded by god, the universal intelligence. thus identified with the temporal manifestation of god’s absolute knowledge, he mysteriously possesses the original expression of the divine imperative in himself. the absolute authority he exercises over the faithful is the authority of the divine “kun,” the speech by which god gives existence to things. there is a lesson for us in the very significant speculations of the ishmaelite shî’ite intellectuals regarding this authority of the man of god. this authority has a tendency to distribute itself across two different registers, both opposing and interdependent: interiority (al-bâtin) and exteriority (alzâhir). if the legitimate guide has authority over the community’s affairs, if he has the right to govern the community, in anticipation of governing the world, it is because he possesses an exterior authority, corresponding to the exterior dimension of reality. j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 57 this is why the shî’ite messianic movements, as rebellious as they were with respect to existing power, could succeed only by means of what they had themselves rejected: a community governed by the power of the elite wise initiated by the supposed science of the imâm. divine universal intelligence, manifested in the person of the imâm, henceforth transmits itself across different gradations and levels of the esoteric hierarchy, and transforms, metamorphoses, into unlimited temporal power. but this temporal authority supports itself on the esoteria of the prophecy, taught by the imâm, who is the exclusive custodian of it. the tragedy of power in the islamic world, in my eyes, finds its truth in this ambivalence of authority, which the imâmat shî’ite has experimented with from the 10th century until our era. on the one hand, liberatory authority tended toward the reign of ends, with despotic authority governing, on the other hand, in an indefinite power, according to the double register of the apparent―the exoteric―and the hidden, the esoteric. this reversibility of authority even constituted the essence of shî’ite political theology, and it explains the more general fate of the theologies of the true prophet. it is tragic because it expresses two contradictory requirements: either the legitimate guide devotes himself primarily to exteriority, and holds the secret of the esoteric back for an elite. thus, final ends, the ultimate triumph of prophecy’s essential truth in the reign of the awaited resurrector, all this is put off until a later time, perhaps never. or, the esoteric triumphs, and authority aspires to be authority over hearts and minds, without any concrete historical effectuation. either absolute power, or pure spirituality. we may well still be at this point. it strikes me, in effect, that in posing itself in terms of the mediation between the inferior world and the divine world, prophetic authority inevitably bisects between spiritual and temporal authority, in such a way that the different figures of authority who prop themselves up by it assume in a specific way one or other of these missions. i would like to highlight this contradictiosn, which animates the muslim experience. on one side, the inevitable pretension of every discourse which particularizes authority. we have seen an instance of this in shafi’î, when he accomplishes this decisive gesture that reduces and identifies universal knowledge to the exercise of the sharî’a, understood in a juridical sense. on the other side, the prevalence of what one could call the taste or desire for the beautiful totality. nowhere more than in islam is it affirmed that the true is the all. truth, founder of legitimate authority, is everything, must be everything. one will say that this is the hallmark of religion as such. undoubtedly. it is also the hallmark of philosophy, when it merits its name, at least from aristotle to hegel. it is certainly not the conviction of experimental science, or of psychoanalysis, for whom the truth can only be half-said, to borrow jacques lacan’s expression. whence this immediate, profound, constant accord between greek philosophy and islam, despite all the oppositions coming from the traditionalist or juridical worlds. the true is the all. this is the guiding ideal. it would be well for us to remember that, in the islamic world, the phenomena of intolerance, exclusion, or aggressive identification are often born from the miscognition of this statute of truth which is nevertheless unique to it. contrary to what one all too often imagines, it is not a sectorial reading of the qur’an and the j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 58 texts devoted to the sunnah, sunnite or shî’ite, which founds a freedom and a certain form of detachment between the world of temporal power and that of divine spiritual authority. on the contrary, it often upholds the exclusive choice of a world, that of the exercise of juridical power or, in response, that of the interior life and the interior experience. certain theologians, today, maintain that it is enough to choose, in the totality of revelation, what seems compatible with “modernity” in order to save islam while reforming it. now, this gesture was always, precisely, what was going to engender the violent conflict between theological or juridical authorities, and i would like to draw attention to a strategy that is a little different. this consists in silencing the human authorities who authorize themselves through one part of revelation or another, on behalf of extolling the beautiful totality constituted by the phenomenon of the book. to thereby void the violence men exercise against one another, the violence of the man who decides he is the authority over other men in religious affairs, who are supposed to grant him their obedience. this is accomplished by a return, in appearance very conservative, to the “beautiful totality” of the book. it is quite striking that the thinkers responsible for a certain skepticism, or outright opposition, to the omnipotence of the jurist and the political laicization of islam, its reduction to politics, are those who insist on the laws of the “beautiful totality.” these men call themselves ahl al’irfân, often translated as “gnostics,” which is a little misleading. let us call them more properly: holders of integral knowledge. their master, a man who was acutely aware of the paradox we are describing, was the grand master of sunnite sufism, ibn ‘arabî. the success, like the attacks, that the andalusian master’s works are known for these days, like those of his disciples, sunni or shî’ite, testify to how he has touched a nerve. i would like, in closing, to give some indications of this, appealing to a work of qur’anic exegesis, edited in the 17th century by one of the his most faithful readers, who is also, after avicenna the greatest metaphysician of islam, sadroddîn shîrâzî, commonly known as mullâ sadrâ. the work in question is titled mafâtîh al-ghayb, keys to the divine mystery.4 it opens with a very thorough examination of the status of the qur’an. more specifically, of the integral qur’an, that of which, in the sayings of our author concerning the traditions transmitted by the collections of shî’ite authority, the prophet muhammad would have said: “the qur’an is complete. nothing is needed after it, and nothing suffices without it.” such is the status of the “beautiful totality,” of the true totality. one might believe that it implies a “totalitarian” discourse. we will see that it is the total opposite of this. as the integral truth, the qur’an is not simply jurisdictional. to illustrate the effect of its beautiful totality, sadrâ employs the concept of spiritual medicine. it is a question of curing, of delivering one from the slavery of the passions, which are “the iron necklaces of burden”: the love of people, children, country, riches, passionate attachment to the female sex, cupidity and love of power. here is the qur’an thus interpreted in its totality, and on condition of being integral, like an ascetic guide with respect to the bonds that hamper man’s existence, and this is done in terms that a disciple of socrates would find difficult to disown. not coercion, therefore, but liberation. not legal exterior norms, but integral moral norms. placing the greatest emphasis on the letter of qur’anic writing leads to the 4 sadr al-dîn shîrâzî (mullâ sadrâ), mafâtîh al-ghab, ed. muhammad khâjâvî (teheran 1984). j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 59 inverse of juridical literalism: if the qur’an is integral, each letter is a universe of symbols: “in each of the letters of the qur’an, there are a thousand symbols, coquetries and signs.” this is why, following the example of a woman, the letter seduces the heart of the faithful, attracts it to the internal meaning that, in restoring his personal secret, the true identity of the subject, liberates him. this is why the letter separates him from the overpowering demands that come to him from others, and from the suggestions made above. it brings him back to himself and to the recognition of how, singularly in him, lies and resides the other beautiful totality, which corresponds to the beautiful qur’anic totality, perfect man. my conviction is that the meditations on the perfect man have posed a significant challenge by qur’anic revelation to the regime of authority. they encompass the theory of the legitimate imamat, the doctrine of the gradations of authorities, and above all a certain re-evaluation of speech, of man as being of language. we see a good example of this here. the perfect man is the true caliph of god, he is thus created according to god’s form. his authority is primarily an authority of speech. he converses with god, he speaks of spiritual discourses, he has the hearing of the heart. in achieving intelligence in action, he becomes, says sadrâ, a “speaking substance.” this accession to speech is identification with the imperative power that is god’s authority. the perfect man bestows existence on himself, because he participates, by way of meditation on speech, in the act of donation of existence, which is the divine act par excellence it is not a matter of exercising an authority that runs the danger of becoming a collective potestas, but of discovering himself in his position of pure singularity. sadrâ gives an example of this in the exegesis he proposes of a tradition attributed to alî ibn abî tâlib: “the totality of the qur’an lies in the bâ’ of bismillâh and i am the point under the bâ.’” here is sâdra’s commentary: “the whole of the revealed pages is in the point of the bâ of bismillâh. better yet, the collection of beings is in this point. if you want an example, here is one that will bring you closer to an aspect of this truth. when you say, “to allah belongeth all that is in the heavens and on earth” (2:284), the totality of what is in heaven and on earth is understood in a single word. but when you try to refer to them by distinguishing one from another, you need numerous books, then you try to connect the expressions and the meanings among them, although the extension of the world of significations, thus the mutual distinction of its unities, are not analogous with the extension of the world of expressions and their distinction. but if it happens that someone leaves this sensible metaphorical existence and heads towards the effective realization of self, by certain intelligible existence, if he would unite himself with the spiritual realm at the point of contemplating the meaning of the verse, “it is he that doth encompass all things!” (41:54), if he saw his own actual self encompassed in this signification, dominated by it, thus he would contemplate his own existence in the point which is beneath the bâ’, and he would see this bâ’ that is in bismillâh in a place where the eminent greatness of this signification manifests itself.”5 this coincidence between the eminent dignity of each person and the infinite totality of the book is the emancipated response to the challenge of the collective authorities. 5 sadr al-dîn shîrâzî, 21. j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 60 this coincidence of the “self” with the first letter of the book, in which the total and infinite truth intertwines, has an evidently spiritual meaning: what the infallible imâm says to himself realizes itself in each of the faithful. this realization of the totality of divine worlds in man is his maximum perfection, his mysterious identification with freedom and the divine lord. of course, it presupposes an annihilation of god in order to become a permanence in god. consequently, there is no trace of the individual as natural law thinks it, pertaining far more to an effacement of the partial and superficial consciousness in the ocean of letters and their significations. the subject discovers that he is nothing other than an effect of the letter, that his consistency only makes one with the infinite meaning borne by the letter. the effacement of the i is thus proportionate to the progress of the exegesis, which traces the book from sensible darkness to intelligible light, and which passes the fidelity of inferior degrees where it tests all constraints of the matter up to the pure immaterial condition. but since we are questioning the discourse of authority, i would like to put the emphasis on another aspect of these pages. our author, sadrâ, combines his fidelity to the unique authority of the prophet and the imâm with an intuition which he owes to his long meditation on some texts by ibn ‘arabî. from it, he takes the following lesson: unique authority, that of the prophecy in its double dimension, expressed by muhammad and ‘ali, is the letter of the book. it enables one to dismiss all other authority (aside from the exegete of these pages, one will say, who is the ‘ârif, the philosophical spiritual sage). the authority that safra asserts thus resides in his fundamental conviction: not to consent to any human authority, if it is not that of the perfect man, who sustains the law of the “beautiful totality.” now, this perfect man realizes himself in everyone, if he carries out the exegesis of self and of the book, guided by the imâm. and respectively, everyone, the semblance of each singular letter, of which the symbol is the total letter, the bâ. the book is not a guide that addresses everyone collectively, like a political or juridical bond, but all and everyone according to principles of selection and hierarchy. it is helpful to compare this model to that which michel foucault recognized in the christian pastoral tradition: omnes et singulatim, each and everyone singularly.6 this model differs on one essential point: “all” here designates the invisible community of practicing faithful, effectively the knowledge of self and of god, and not the visible community of a church. invisible community, it has reality only in god, erasing itself from this world in order to exist solely in the supreme world of god, the jabarût. on the other hand, singularity affirms itself, emphasizing its rights. not on the model of the christian pastoral tradition addressing each sheep of the flock of course, but on its own model of spirituality in islam, of a self which is indifferently the divine self revealing itself to creation or the creaturely self absorbing itself in god. such is the gnostic model by which the stakes of authorities finds itself subverted, in a face-to-face “alone” with the one, which is the essence of neoplatonism. here, in closing, is sadrâ’s exposition, following the text which we cited earlier: 6 “‘omnes et singulatim’: towards a critique of political reason,” reprinted in dits et ecrits (paris: quarto gallimard, 2001) 953. see also michel foucault, securité, territoire, population. cours au college de france. 1977-1978, “hautes etudes” (paris: gallimard seuil, 2004) 233. j a m b e t : four discourses on authority in islam s2 (2009): 61 “we others, and those who are like us, we only contemplate the darkness of the letters of the qur’an, because we are in the world of darkness. . . consequently, sight only sees the colors and the meaning only obtains sensible realities, the imagination only configures imaginable things, the intelligence only knows the intelligible. it is thus that light is perceived by each, only by the light and “for any to whom allah giveth not light, there is no light!” (qur’an, 24: 40). because of this blackness of sight here down below, we only see the darkness of the qur’an. but when we leave this existence of the semblance, this dark sight, emigrating towards god and his prophet, when we perceive the death of this condition subjected to sensible, imaginative, estimated, intellectual, practical forms, when we remain, by our existence itself in the act of existing in the speech of god, then when we head towards the stability, in an eternal stability, of death toward life, then we see more than blackness in the qur’an. we see only pure whiteness, pure light and an actual realization, according to this verse: “we have made the (qur’an) a light, wherewith we guide such of our servants as we will” (qur’an, 42: 52). god beyond the boundary-stones of thought abbas ahsan abstract in this paper i make the case for epistemic relativism: the radical view that all human knowledge/truth is relative. i extend the application of epistemic relativism to include necessary laws such as the laws of logic. i argue that the truth of such laws are relative to human thought, which are ultimately instances derived from our experiences. these experiences act as limitations to which we are conceptually bound. as a result of this, we cannot apprehend god’s omnipotence. this includes god’s maximal power in being able to perform logically impossible actions. our epistemic inability to conceive of such logically impossible actions is therefore testimony that god transcends the laws of logic. introduction: defining omnipotence attempting to define the term ‘omnipotent’ by referring to a common english dictionary may not seem too difficult. why should it? you pick up a dictionary, search for the word and your enquiry should reveal something like, ‘all-powerfulness’, ‘almighty’, ‘having unlimited power’, etc. such characterizations would, at least to some extent, cognitively satisfy the layperson (that is, of course, if such a person is not seeking anything beyond the vernacular). the dictionary, in this context, would have succeeded in expressing a given meaning. it would have revealed a fairly common—albeit abbas ahsan is a doctoral researcher at the john hick centre for philosophy of religion, situated at the university of birmingham (uk). his current research focuses on the methodology and the possible application of analytic philosophy in the islamic tradition. ahsan, abbas. 2020. “god beyond the boundary-stones of thought.” american journal of islam and society 37, nos. 3-4: 50–97 • doi: 10.35632/ajis.v37i3-4.593 copyright © 2020 international institute of islamic thought 51 an un-philosophical or philosophically superficial—definition of the term which the inquirer had been seeking. this seems fine—at least in isolation from any associated matters. it is only when we begin to associate the term ‘omnipotent’ with a god when the issue becomes apparent. many theists maintain that divine omnipotence is an essential attribute of god. believing that god is all-powerful would have to imply that he is capable of doing all things. on the face of it, this would exclude any and all exceptions. on such grounds, god would possess absolute power and will, allowing him to do everything that he so chooses. however, this hardly settles the matter. what exactly would it mean for god to possess such comprehensive power? what would possessing such power comprise and entail (that is, for god to have the ability and will to perform anything at all)? if there are no conceived limits to god’s power and will, would it imply that he is able to carry out tasks that are casually, logically, and conceptually impossible? would god, if he chose to, be able to change the past, or create a stone so large that he could not lift, or square the circle? the answers to such questions do not appear to lie within the definition of the term ‘omnipotence’ itself—at least not if you subscribe to semantic internalism. on the contrary, even if one were to subscribe to a semantic externalism, the matter would be far from being resolved. in the latter case, the manner in which the putative meaning of a given term is conceptualized and applied to that which it denotes would be prone to oscillating between degrees of vagueness in virtue of the agent. with respect to both semantic internalism and externalism, the definition of ‘omnipotence’ can be considered in one of two ways. it will either mean: that god possesses maximal power relative to all his creation. this particular concept would not allow god to perform any state of affairs, but only those which are (logically) possible (i.e. conceivable). determining such states of affairs would be subject to the agent (mind-dependent); or, that god literally possesses the power to bring about and perform absolutely any state of affairs whatsoever; this includes necessary and impossible (i.e. inconceivable) states of affairs also. determining such states of affairs would not be subject to the agent (mind-independent). the former view represents the term ‘omnipotence’ to be relative to minds that are cognisant of the very term. in the case of god, his omnipotence is proportionally determinable in virtue of his creation. this position does not allow god do perform or bring about absolutely any ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 52 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 state of affairs. it broadly restrains god to a cognitivist understanding of religious language. this in turn makes god susceptible to a whole host of philosophical categories, such as grammar, definability, existence, matters of fact, explanatory hypothesis, inferences, probability, conceivability, etc. an overarching category which god would be susceptible to and confined by, in this respect, would include the laws of logic. consequently, he would be unable to perform any logically impossible and/or inconceivable acts. the latter view refers to god’s power in an absolute sense; one which is not relative to anything. this would also include that he has the ability to do the logically impossible, i.e. carry out contradictory actions. in early modern (western) philosophy this understanding is attributed to rené descartes, the french philosopher, mathematician, and scientist. in a series of letters1 (around eight) to various individuals, descartes implied that god is the creator of eternal truths and is able to perform anything whatsoever. for descartes, it did not matter whether such acts are contradictory and therefore inconceivable for human minds to comprehend. god simply has the ability to perform them. interpretations of descartes suggestions infer that he did not hesitate to believe that god’s power was one without any limit. since god created all the eternal truths, they (along with all other necessary truths) are actually contingent. thus, god could alter them how and when he willed in whichever manner he willed to do so.2 this includes god’s ability to perform actions that would defy the laws of logic. of course, there have been many objections to this view, since it entails an outright rejection of the law of non-contradiction. the law of non-contradiction is formally expressed as ¬ (α ∧ ¬α): namely, it cannot be the case that both α and not-α. regardless of the actual truth value of the variable α, according to this law, the formula on the whole would always be true. this is because a statement and its negation cannot both be true at any one time. the truth of this matter holds no matter what the actual facts of the world may be. this kind of truth is commonly known as a tautology. likewise, a contradiction (the result of defying the law of non-contradiction) would always be false no matter what the actual facts of the world may be. adhering to the law of non-contradiction would therefore impose a genuine constraint on the way in which one conceives the structure of reality.3 the law of non-contradiction prohibits one from accepting/asserting the existence of a contradictory matter or state of affairs, subsequently barring one from accepting/asserting its truth.4 on this view, god cannot bring about a state of affairs that is contradictory. doing 53 so would not only be a rejection of the law of non-contradiction but would present a distorted view of our conception of reality or reality itself. when the issue is presented like this, namely, in a logical context, it becomes hard-hitting. from this perspective accepting or rejecting the law of non-contradiction would dictate as to whether we conceive of a consistent or inconsistent view of reality and god’s ability, respectively. this is certainly the case if the law of non-contradiction is considered to be self-evidently true, irrespective of what one thinks and how the facts of the world might turn out to be. however, descartes seems to be drawing our attention towards something very different. for descartes, eternal truths (which may be inclusive of arithmetic and the laws of logic) do not entirely enjoy a mind-independent status. truths of this nature are not to be considered in the way they commonly are. it is god, according to descartes, who has created all the eternal truths. his power is of the kind which allows him to do so. his ability and will to create such truths implies that he transcends them. this means that god is neither confined nor compelled to act in accordance with such truths. if god happens to create a contradictory state of affairs and we fail to conceive of such states of affairs, then our inability to do so would be a manifestation of our conceptual limitations—not god’s. our conceptual inability does not restrain god’s omnipotence in being able to perform those very actions.5 descartes is supposing that god cannot have any limits. he is infinite. moreover, this would imply that the finite human mind would fail in conceiving of this god in his entirety. brink writes, therefore, frankfurt has seen, it is a mistake to seek a logically coherent explication of descartes’ assertions on god’s ability to make contradictions true or change the eternal truths. for this would mean to try to comprehend the incomprehensible, which is not only impossible and unnecessary, but even impious. (brink 1993, 8) in light of the above it appears that much of the controversy surrounding the concept of omnipotence, or more specifically adopting a specific explanation of omnipotence, needs to be distinguished as to whether it can be attributed to god in its full sense or not. for if you maintain that omnipotence is maximal power, but yet still constrained by logical possibility, then it would entail that the definition of maximal power is rather one of limited power. this line of thought would appear to be somewhat unfitting to the nature of a traditional omnipotent god. alternatively, if you uphold the idea that omnipotence is maximal power, which is not constrained by ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 54 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 logical possibility, then this would result in absolute power. we can then categorize these into the following two notions: god is conceivable in his true state and so are his actions. this would make him finite on the grounds that we, his creation, would be capable of conceiving of him. consequently, he would not be able to perform all tasks whatsoever, because whatever is conceivable to us must be a logical possibility. otherwise, logically impossible acts are rendered inconceivable to us; or, god is inconceivable in his true state and so are his actions. this would make him infinite and absolute. he would transcend the conceptual ability of his creation. consequently, he would be able to perform all tasks, logically impossible or not. we would not be able to conceive or apprehend him or his actions in any delimited sense. i will argue the latter point in the course of this paper. i shall demonstrate that god is omnipotent in the sense that he is able to perform all acts regardless of whether we are able to conceive of them or not. the failure of our capabilities in conceiving of those acts does not imply that they are ‘impossible’ in themselves as states of affairs but only to the confines of our human reasoning. thus, the implications of a logically impossible act would not be inherently impossible for god. instead, its concept and linguistic association to our intellect fails to correspond with any analogous thought process or states of affairs in the actual world. in particular, i will present why it is that we fail to conceive and apprehend logically impossible states of affairs. this would in turn reveal that since we are constrained to certain laws of logic, we cannot infer particular truths as ‘absolute’ and ‘necessary’. inferring that certain truths are absolute and necessary would require us to apprehend the true nature of absoluteness and necessity (in their entirety). however, we cannot do so. this is because the human mind is finite and incapable of generating any original thought. thoughts cannot exclusively be dissociated from human experiences. it is the complex association between our thoughts and experiences that contribute to what have become commonly known as the boundary stones of thought. this would include our thoughts about what have been termed ‘absolute’ and ‘necessary’ truths. i shall argue that they too are relative to human thought. in extension of this claim, i shall infer that all human knowledge is relative. so when we make the claim that ‘god cannot do the logically impossible’, then that claim too is relative to variations in 55 reference frames and conceptual schemas. it would not, therefore, make it ‘impossible’ for god to perform all acts, as he is an infinite and absolute being. instead, such matters would contribute to exhibiting our very own limited mental capacities. i do not anticipate elaborating on the very notion of god himself from a theological perspective. nor do i associate the god in question to any one of the monotheistic religions. the reason for this is twofold. first, this is a philosophical study which predominantly focuses on epistemic and metaphysical matters to do with logical laws and the boundaries of thought. it anticipates applying the findings of this study to a particular theological problem that is to do with god’s omnipotence. it does not engage with theological discourse beyond the point related to the problem of god’s omnipotence. some may consider this an inadequate way to address such a theological problem, while others may deem it theologically irrelevant and/or redundant. i think the charge of theological inadequacy and irrelevance seems to be slightly misplaced in a philosophical study such as this one. that is, of course, not to overlook the theological end to which such a philosophical approach is being applied. moreover, a serious theologian would acknowledge the significance of contemporary modes of philosophical thought. for some theologians philosophical thought may even take precedence over matters of theology. theologians who fall into this camp hold that the manner in which philosophical thought is understood and subsequently applied to theological matters would contribute (and perhaps even shape) the kind of theology one engages in. second, the notion of god that i have in mind, as well as the argument i hope to construct, is open to any one of the monotheistic religions to adopt. although i make an indirect reference to the islamic tradition in passing, i leave my argument open for members of the christian and jewish traditions to adopt if they so choose to do so. i initiate my discussion by presenting and arguing for the notion of epistemic relativism. subsequently, i apply the idea of epistemic relativism to various forms of truths in order demonstrate its viability. thereafter, i apply the notion of epistemic relativism to the idea of god, or more precisely to the notion of omnipotence. 1. relativism relativism in general argues that points of view have no absolute truth or validity. instead, they only have relative and subjective value according to differences in perception and consideration. prior to taking a closer look at ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 56 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 this definition it is worth noting that there are two overlapping characterisations of what has been termed ‘relativism’. these include the following: relativism about propositional truth: whether a proposition is true is not an absolute fact. propositions can be true relative to some contexts of assessment, and false relative to others; and, relativism about utterance truth: whether an utterance is true is not an absolute fact. utterances can be true relative to some contexts of assessment, and false relative to others. (shirreff and weatherson 2017, 789) there is a subtle difference parting the two types of relativism; which one of these constitutes a proper form of relativism is disputable. it is not always apparent as to which one of these is being defended or refuted by authors. i suppose it is natural to think that those engaging with relativism are doing so with the first type (relativism about propositional truth) in mind. i too shall engage with this type, since it appears to be the kind which is relativism proper. yet there may be instances where an overlap between the two types becomes unavoidable. krausz, for instance, has presented a definition which appears to represent the former type. he suggests that, relativism claims that truth, goodness, or beauty, is relative to a reference frame, and no absolute overarching standards to adjudicate between competing reference frames exists. (krausz 2010, 13) in regards to these ‘reference frames’, he further suggests, relativists hold that several incompatible non-converging reference frames, in terms of which we perceive and understand the world, could exist. at the boundaries of pertinent reference frames, where grounds for evaluation unique to those frames exhaust themselves, we have no absolutist way to adjudicate between contending frames. no absolute frame-neutral grounds for adjudicating between frames exist. for the relativist, where standards of evaluation are exhausted at the bounds of reference frames, the search for pertinent absolute standards makes no sense. (krausz 2010, 14) not only does this suggest that we cannot have an absolute way of adjudicating between contending frames; it also implies that there exist no grounds for adjudication between frames at all. this would rule out or deny the possibility and acquisition of absolute standards of knowledge. thus, the absolutists’ worry becomes apparent where, if such is the case, then 57 you would be inviting arbitrariness, anarchism, or nihilism. no worthwhile goal of inquiry would exist. i shall return to such objections shortly. at present i shall focus on exactly what a ‘reference frame’ is, prior to investigating whether any grounds for adjudication exist. according to krausz (2010), reference frames come in many varieties and their usage tends to vary upon the interests and purposes of individuals. the comprising elements range from concepts to situations, personal thoughts and ideas to cultural, religious, and historical perspectives. occasionally we may not even be able to distinguish what a particular reference frame consists of (i.e. what content or constituting element it should include and what it should exclude). the boundaries are not clear-cut in any decisive manner. consequently, each and every aspect of that particular reference frame cannot be easily categorized. you may, for instance, have two traditions whose boundaries range from being significantly equivocal, to being partially imprecise, to being difficult to delineate altogether. moreover, the diversity of the issue seems to broaden when some people are relativists in respect to one aspect of a given tradition and not another. for instance, some may adopt a relativist view with respect to conceptual schemas yet not with respect to civilizations or individuals. these relativists are referred to as ‘local’, as they conform to only some reference frames. on the other hand, those who apply a relativist view to all reference frames are referred to as ‘global’. the above-mentioned elements which constitute reference frames are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. rather they can depend on the individual’s experiences, which may significantly vary. some relativists who seek to arbitrate and conform to a method of adjudication may resort to a significantly modified view of kant (1996, 2007). the implication from the latter view is that whatever we experience, it takes on form in virtue of certain reference frames. this suggests that the diverse apprehension and understanding of the many variations of reference frames is a result of the experiences we accumulate in the course of our lives. kant further emphasizes that the mind arranges and enforces concepts on sensory data which determine the form taken by our experiences of the world. basic concepts are provided by the mind with which it organizes and interprets experience. the mind does not merely receive information; it actively organizes it to make sense of this information. consequently, the world as we conceive it represents an order that the mind constructs. this process encapsulates all spatial, temporal, and causal orders which are ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 58 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 manifestations of the logical procedure of all possible forms of judgment. however, despite kant’s understanding of how we conceive and make sense of our experiences of the world, he discards the relativists’ claim that the content of experience is relative to numerous and possible forms of reference frames. for kant, although experiences give rise to various reference frames, it is not relative to those variations. this is because kant thinks that the logical structure of all possible forms of judgement is basic and unique in the sense that it rejects diversity. thus, necessary and universal conditions for the possibility of experience exist, because for kant, although all our knowledge begins with experience, it does not follow that it arises from experience. [he further suggests] … there really exist in our knowledge such necessary and in the strictest sense universal, and therefore pure, a priori judgments. (kant 2007, 37-39) the apprehensions of worldly experience which we encounter are invariably mediated through ‘forms of intuition’ or ‘categories’. these, for kant, are the necessary elements of all knowledge. in the absence of these a priori categories, kant suggests that encountering an experience of the world itself would be impossible. if this is the case, then it should follow that there must exist some method of adjudication between reference frames. that is, even if these a priori categories do determine the fact of actually encountering an experience of the world, as kant puts it, there still, in this case, needs to be some decisive factor which acts as an adjudicating element. however, there just doesn’t seem to be one! the mind, for kant, plays a crucial role in determining how we actually perceive reality. in absence of the mind we really cannot know what is out there. nonetheless, the essential question is not how or what role the mind actually plays in perceiving reality or shaping experiences in a way that allows us to make sense of the world. instead it is whether there is a fixed and decisive way in which we come to perceive reality in the way we do. is there an adjudicating method which our mind refers to when making sense of the world in the way it does? thus, the dispute with kant is not how (in a descriptive sense) the experiences we encounter are actually perceived. rather, it is how (in a prescriptive sense of a fixed method) an indeterminate process of selecting our (certain) experiences gives rise to absolute truths. krausz expresses his contention with kant’s view by suggesting that— although it may provide us with some idea of how we conceive of our experiences—it does not dissolve the relativist’s fundamental issue. that 59 is, kant’s view fails in offering a decisive method of adjudicating between reference frames. krausz writes, even if kant is right that the structure of the world as we experience it is imported into that experienced world by our perceptual and cognitive resources, we would still not have the resources necessary to adjudicate between reference frames. all that kant’s resources would provide are the conditions necessary for us to experience the world at all. while kant’s categories may be necessary and universal for the possibility of experiencing objects as objects that they come to be, it does not follow that those categories determine the characteristics that individuate them or the conditions that adjudicate between admissible and inadmissible objects of knowledge. (krausz 2010, 19) nonetheless, kant’s position would not deter the relativist from their view that no absolute standards of knowledge exist. this is simply because there exist no grounds for adjudication between reference frames. how then might one gauge or determine with any degree of certainty the validity of any proposition? what elementary factors would fundamentally influence such thought processes? the causes for this diversity in the patterns of thought rest on variations in concepts (granted differences in language, historical milieu, culture, economic status, etc.). the possible patterns of thought of an individual who makes any given judgment would depend on that very individual’s ‘conceptual schema’. this involves the cognitive elements of concepts such as beliefs, laws of logic, etc. davidson expresses the role of conceptual schemas as ways of organising experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the passing scene. (davidson 2010, 140) if our ‘cognitive procedures’ (i.e., modes of thought) rely on available and accessible cognitive resources, then to say that truth is relative to patterns of thought would be to say that truth is relative to conceptual schemas. runzo has emphasized the same point by asserting that thought and patterns of thought are only possible in virtue of a background context of presuppositions and assumed concepts. there is no such thing as a (literally) utterly isolated thought. a thought is a thought in the context of other possible thoughts, and of the cognitive resources which make those thoughts possible. (runzo 1986, 35) ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 60 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 however, why might one suppose that truth is relative to conceptual schemas? what reasons would a relativist propose to substantiate such a position? the fundamental idea rests on the presupposition that there is not a singular set of facts about the world (in contrast to william james). james (see runzo 1986) suggests that if there are true ideas (i.e., which correspond to reality), then there must only be one set of facts about the world. irrespective of what is thought to be true by people who happen to think about things differently, “facts about the world” are immutable. from this perspective you shall have some people who uphold true knowledge (in which facts actually correspond to reality), and others who uphold false knowledge (in which facts fail to correspond to reality). it is this success and failure to correspond to reality which, for james, is the determining factor by which we are able to obtain decisive facts about the world. opposing james’ view, a relativist would either have to reject the idea that there is a corresponding relationship between matters of fact and the world (or reality), or that there is only one way the world is. let us focus on the latter of these. the relativist would have to provide evidence that there is not a singular set of facts about the world. let us first ascertain two underlying assumptions upon which this claim would rest: that there exist no neutral facts about the world to which we have access. additionally, similar to what kant proposed, there are no facts which are completely autonomous of minds, even though they may be discovered by minds. in other words, facts are not just simply read off from the world which we perceive and experience, but instead, the world to some extent constitutes the facts as we read them in virtue of our schemas; or that the mind can create more than one adequate construction of the facts about the world. this assumption asserts that while facts are, in part, a construction of the mind, there is no correct or decisive manner in which the mind should actively impose this constructive element. consequently, there is no single correct manner that the facts about the world should actually be. the above assumptions are indicative of at least two matters which are responsible for determining our view of reality. firstly, the possible constituting elements of reality are not merely determined by how the world actually projects itself onto its observer (call this the external factor). instead this needs to be coupled with the manner in which the recipient goes on to perceive the world in virtue of their conceptual scheme (call this the 61 internal factor). one factor cannot be entirely discounted at the cost of the other. this begs a question, bringing us to the second matter. how do our minds (advertently or inadvertently) adjudicate between external and internal factors in a manner that draws the required balance, allowing for us to make sense of reality? that is, if both the external and internal factors are integral in contributing to what we may refer to as perceptive and even conceptual knowledge, then such contributions must in some way be processed in arriving at that knowledge. this means our minds must undergo some process in virtue of which we able to arrive at consistent views of reality which ultimately gives rise to such modes of knowledge. davidson (2010) argues that the whole idea of conceptual schemas is incoherent. the issue rather is one of translation, as he suggests that the initiative for understanding the thought of others is equivalent to the initiative of finding our own words for those thoughts or, in other words, translating the words of others into our own. that is, we can (to some extent) articulate in our own words what others think. what davidson is making apparent here is a linguistic diversity which demonstrates and echoes significant dissimilarities in style and value (although differences in points of view would not make any sense if there is no common coordinating system onto which to plot them). he therefore proposes that we require some considerations that would fix the parameters in order to conceptually contrast one view from another. davidson insists that we need to be able to decisively refer to some set of adjudicating laws. more importantly, such laws are required to authenticate our judgement or knowledge. davidson moves on to suggest that conceptual schemas may be identified with languages—or rather, a set of languages—which express the same schema. thus as conceptual schemas differ, so do languages. (granted, speakers of different languages may share similar or even identical conceptual schemas.) this would imply that studying the art and criteria of translating languages is a way of understanding the criteria of identity for conceptual schemas. nevertheless, he asks, could we say two people have different conceptual schemas if they speak languages which fail to be translated to one another? in reply he states, in what follows, i consider two kinds of case that might be expected to arise: complete, and partial, failures of translatability. there would be complete failure if no significant range of sentences in one language could be translated into one another; there would be partial failure if ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 62 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 some range could be translated and some range could not. (davidson 2010, 142) in regard to the case of complete failure, he writes that, nothing, it may be said, could count as evidence that some form of activity could not be interpreted in our language that was not at the same time evidence that that form of activity was not speech behaviour. (davidson 2010, 142) so for davidson, if one language has the capability of entirely being translated into another, then no real differences of conceptual schemas can lie behind those languages. on the other hand, if one language cannot be fully translated into another, then in such a case a substantive difference of conceptual schemas would be implied. blackburn (2010) quite rightly refers to this position as a kind of “linguistic imperialism”, by which anything said in late-twentieth-century american terms should not make sense whatsoever (simply because speakers of the same language can possess radically different conceptual schemas). consider an english-speaking, late-twentieth-century american astrophysicist who expresses a phrase or a term which may not be entirely understood to an english-speaking, late-twentieth-century american astrologist. alternatively, consider those possessing the same conceptual schema who happen to speak quite different languages in order to express those schemas. the disparity in both cases impedes the sort of correspondence that is sought and seen as necessary in order to communicate. blackburn further highlights the concern of implicit verificationism: the somewhat unpopular philosophical concept which asserts that the possibilities we are unable to verify as obtaining, cannot qualify as real possibilities at all. a more concerning feature of this type of verificationism arises when we are required to translate unverifiable content with the aid of our language. in such cases the manner in which we obtain some adequation of the content of our minds would hinge (although not entirely) on how satisfactorily we are able to linguistically represent that content. for if we consider the enterprise of learning we realize that the art of learning is not merely an act of translating. take for instance a student who would like to verify whether the content taught by the instructor actually makes sense. making sense of the content would not only include translating it into a mediatory language or expressing it in alternative modes. instead, this profound undertaking involves expanding and changing 63 conceptual repertoires. discovering new vocabularies, concepts, and theories and expanding different avenues of understanding various phenomena all contribute towards making sense of what is taught. an exclusive focus on translation would fail to provide meaningful context in being able to make sense of taught and/or acquired knowledge. davidson presents an argument which attempts to undermine each metaphor of this equation. he writes against the idea of a scheme ‘organizing’ experience; quite reasonably, he notes that it is only “pluralities” which get organised. if, for instance, you were tasked to organize smaller sets of shoes and shirts in the absence of a larger set, say a closet, then such a task would be somewhat bewildering. of course, davidson does not mean to imply that such a trivial task would be made impossible in the absence of a closet. rather his analogy seeks to draw our attention to the point that although some languages may contain terms that are not equivalent across other languages, there exists certain features that are common between them. it is the existence of such common features that creates for the possibility to determine and decipher identity claims. despite the fact that you and i may have our own differing ways of strategically and aesthetically organizing the same closet, there exists a common feature making each of us alike in some way, namely, dealing with sets of shoes and shirts. similarly, although you and i may be using different languages to imply the same thing, we in turn would be dealing with the same set of conceptual definitions. in reply to davidson, blackburn says (while attacking the notion of ‘fitting experience’), davidson seems to detach language too far from the detailed, piecemeal procedures of verification that are part and parcel of our lives. he is eventually left with the unconvincing substitute of covering our beliefs with a snowy mantle of truth, leaving their particular and individual footing in experience of no importance (hence the claim to have destroyed any final allure of empiricism). (blackburn 2010, 167-168) blackburn’s reason for making the above claim is based on the assumption that we need not associate the conceptual schemas with the ‘organize’ metaphor. this is because shifts in language and theory do not actually play a part in altering experience. rather, it is experience that shapes experience. take listening to a particular tune that is played using a musical instrument, for instance. you hear and experience a set of fixed notes being played in an arranged manner. thereafter, you have (subconsciously) retained an ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 64 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 experience of the set of notes played in this tune. now suppose you hear the same set of notes being played by the same musical instrument for a second time. however, upon this occasion, the set of notes being played are arranged in a slightly altered manner. consequently, you have retained an experience of a different pattern of notes played. as a result, you have experienced two different tunes composed by the same set of notes and using the same musical instrument. the only difference is that each of the sets of notes were played in different sequences. i could only recognize that a change existed after having heard and retained the experience of hearing at least one of them (irrespective of the order). at each and every instance my experience appears to be the determining factor in demarcating present experiences and previously retained ones. in such cases, change is not really determined or effected by shifts of language, concepts, or theories. rather, it is a former experience which influences and shapes the latter. thus experience seems to take precedence over our conceptual schemas in influencing our experiences. but what is it, then, that makes experiences and utterances of a relativistic nature true? davidson refers to our thoughts being drawn from a minimalist view of truth. this implies that nothing general or abstract can be said about truth. in other words, any given sentence, providing it locates a definite issue, can only be said to be true if it is translatable into my own language (i.e., by the terms which that sentence provides). you may come across a foreign sentence which you cannot translate, and as a result cannot determine its truth or validity; however, you can envisage a translation enabling you to identify the content of that sentence. that would inform you as to what would count as its truth (or truth-maker). however, it is difficult to see how this line of thought yields a standardized truth which offers an association between two different minds. the problem is not with what the minimalist says—that no ‘thing’ makes sentences true, and furthermore that it is also true that i cannot say exactly what makes a foreign language true (or false, for that matter) unless i know what it means. despite whatever certainty these two points carry, neither of them brings us any closer to rejecting the possibility of a significant disassociation between two separate minds. the cognitive processes involved in each would appear to be fixated onto different versions of how they perceive the world. it is these variations in perception which the account of conceptual schemas is attempting to demonstrate in theory. discarding conceptual schemas would imply that some other sort of invariable theoretical 65 framework subsists to which reference can be made for adjudicating and authenticating all experiences and utterances. as a matter of fact, this is precisely what the relativists deny. the relativists’ idea can be represented in the following manner: for all x-judgments, some feature, f, of an x-judgment is relative to y if that is actually the case, suggesting that all judgments (and/or truth) are relative, then the general objections would be those raised by putnam and rorty: if all truth is relative, then the truth of the premises of this argument are only relative. and the conclusion is only true for someone who already holds it, or is inclined to hold it. were this the case, the argument would be inconsequential; and second, it is plausible to suppose that there is more than one adequate way to conceive of what is possible, because of the impressive plurality of conceptual schemas, past and present, and the pragmatic success of so many actual schemas as well as the probable future success of a virtually limitless plethora of possible future schemas. thus it seems most plausible to conclude that there are alternative, adequate sets of facts about the world. (runzo 1986, 38) the first objection emphasizes that relativism is incoherent or rather self-defeating: if it attempts to support its claim relatively, then it would simply beg the question; if it attempts to do so non-relatively, then it would require giving up the concept which it is theorizing. this objection can be represented in the form of the knowability paradox, which can be formalized as follows: the knowability paradox: ∀p (p→◊kp) ⊢ ∀p (p→ kp) if all truths are knowable in principle, then it logically follows that each truth is (at some point in time) known. a proposition stating an unknowable truth would also be knowable. to demonstrate the commonality between the knowability paradox and the objection against relativism as stated above, we can alter the k (the epistemic operator) with r to represent relativism. in such case we would have: the relativism paradox ∀p (p→◊rp) ⊢ ∀p (p→ rp) ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 66 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 if all truths are relative in principle, then it logically follows that each truth is (at some point in time) relative. if all truths are relative in principle then there cannot be any un-relative truths. a proposition stating an un-relative truth would also be relative. the paradox is apparent. in reply to this objection it would be helpful to acknowledge that an argument for relativism would amount to an argument against absolutism. epistemically, absolutism asserts that there is (or exists) only one correct or authoritative fundamental standard (though possibly comprised of various constituting components) for assessing epistemic merit. it further concedes that this manner of assessment has not possibly been adopted by any person in its entirety. thus, this standard seeks to determine epistemic appropriateness, not merely for beliefs but also the rules for adopting particular beliefs. however, it seems almost unavoidable that you shall eventually encounter two competing beliefs (or rules) which appear equally justified. if this is the case, then according to this authoritative standard you would simply have to suspend judgement. this would compel one to abandon the matter at hand whereby no likely resolve would be possible on rational grounds. relativism, however, supports contrasting views while denying epistemic absolutism altogether. ironically, supporting contrasting views against the absolutist does not appear to place the relativist in any better position. for such views, irrespective of whether they are in support of relativism or in opposition to absolutism, would fail to be defensible for determined relativists. conversely, supporting absolutism and opposing relativism would equally fail to be defensible positions for determined relativists. the charge an absolutist may advance against the relativist is that no absolute overriding adjudication standards actually exist. consequently, there would be no worthwhile goal of inquiry. moreover, it would diminish the possibility of progress in knowledge and force the relativist to resort to arbitrariness, anarchism, or nihilism. during this charge, the absolutist may firstly make it apparent that standards of adjudication do exist (for them at least) which the relativists fail to acknowledge. secondly, they may take solace in their optimism toward and perseverance in seeking those standards. thirdly, they may seek to demonstrate the possibility of advancing in knowledge during their pursuit of such standards of adjudication. the relativist, on the other hand, would need to demonstrate that the absolutist’s optimism is, below the surface, nothing more than an epistemic illusion; that it fails to deliver successful results. but how are the relativists 67 to establish such a claim? there is a further issue which makes this demand more difficult to meet: any argument against the absolutist would imply that the relativist is committed to definite claims. at this point it would seem that the best a relativist could hope for in repudiating the absolutist claim is proposing that the absolutist’s position is implausible. such implausibility would be one that significantly rests on indeterminate optimism. that is the kind which appeals to hollow promises and a deep-rooted dissatisfaction in offering substantive adjudicating standards. however, this is far from an easy task. in fact, the likelihood that the relativist would fail the absolutist’s challenge increases. the relativist’s frustration towards the absolutist, however, cannot be trivialized. one way to appreciate this is to consider the distinction between deflationist and inflationist accounts of truth. the deflationist account of truth is representative of an insubstantive truth theory, while the inflationist account of truth is representative of a substantive truth theory. i do not propose a strict analogy between deflationism/inflationism and relativism/ absolutism. nonetheless, relativists may express their frustration about the absolutists by referring to notable features that distinguish deflationism from inflationism. more importantly, i hope to demonstrate that the relativists’ frustration bears epistemic weight against the absolutists. sher presents five central elements of the deflationary theories of truth which are representative of the insubstantive account. these are central elements argued by horwich: 1. frustration with past attempts to develop substantive theories of truth; 2. satisfaction with a trivial theory of truth; 3. identification of the theory of truth with a single and simple definition schema; 4. narrow conception of the role of truth in our cognitive life; and 5. bold adequacy claim (sher 2016, 819-820) the first of these elements, quite frankly, manifests the deep-rooted dissatisfaction that the deflationists have mounted against the inflationists. this is primarily motived by the latter’s ineptitude and failure to provide a substantive theory that captures the underlying essence of truth. the deflationists’ frustration stems from the incompetency of the inflationists in providing satisfactory answers, which were thought to be subtle and profound, to fundamental questions surrounding truth. in fact, according to the deflationists the very pursuit of inquiring into the nature of truth has been exhausted. they have reached the limits of analysis to the extent that ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 68 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 “hardly any progress has been made towards achieving the insight we seem to need” (quoting horwich in sher 2016, 820). the second of these elements can be considered a consequence of the first. given the inflationists’ failure to provide a substantive account of truth, the deflationists’ despair has led them to settle with a trivial account of truth. on this view, we needn’t trouble ourselves with attempting to decipher the underlying essence of truth with the aid of profound philosophical investigation. truth should be considered a vacuous (non-substantive) notion which does not require metaphysical grounding. the third of these elements sheds further light on how the triviality of truth is captured. being able to identify and capture truth instances for the deflationist is simple. the method is confined and neatly expressed by the equivalence schema: (es) <p> is true if and only if p, which is logically expressed as: t ↔ <p>. trivial instances that are expressed by this schema are instances of deflationary truth. a common example is “it is true that snow is white if and only if snow is white.” the fourth of these elements expresses the domain in which deflationary truth bears value. given that deflationary truth is metaphysically vacuous and therefore trivial, its value is exclusively logical. this means that the truth-value which the deflationist would arrive at would possess no more meaning than what the equivalence schema allows. although this helps the deflationist arrive at a truth-value in a particular sense, it is one which would impede us from attaching any significant meaning to the truth-value in question. nonetheless, for the deflationist this is hardly an issue. in fact, this very situation makes the concept of truth invaluable: “for it enables the construction of another proposition, intimately related to the one we can’t identify, which is perfectly appropriate as the alternative object of our attitude” (quoting horwich in sher 2016, 820). the fifth of these elements sums up the implication of the fourth element with a universal claim. “referring to his own version of deflationism, ‘minimalism,’ horwich says: [o]ur thesis is that it is possible to explain all the facts involving truth on the basis of the minimal theory. (ibid.: 6–7, my italics) the entire conceptual and theoretical role of truth may be explained on this basis. (ibid.: 5)” (sher 2016, 820). the deflationist then seems justified in expressing their frustration in the manner they have. of course, i do not propose that the way in which this frustration has been expressed justifies the deflationists’ position. i am making a more modest claim: that such expressions of frustration are not 69 trivial, and cannot be ignored by the inflationist. likewise, the relativists’ objections are not trivial, and cannot be ignored by the absolutist. nevertheless, the relativists still appear disadvantaged, though much of their objections have chastened the absolutist’s confidence. yet they are under no compulsion to meet the demands of the absolutist in substantiating their position. the burden of proof does not solely lie with them. neither of these two positions, strictly speaking, has privilege over the other. it is only when this balance is disrupted that we witness unwarranted demands. this is what happens when the absolutists demand evidence from the relativist. (if and when such demands fail to be met, then the relativist position is declared incoherent.) even so, the relativists are required only to present their position, not to persuade the absolutists. it is unreasonable that a position only becomes coherent if one succeeds in satisfying one’s opponent. krausz (2010) has referred to such a presentation of a position as offering “ampliative” rather than “determinative” reasons. ampliative reasons are those rationales provided without seeking to convince others to adopt the same view, in contrast to determinative reasons. one might argue that the only reason for providing motives of such kind is to convince others. however, due to the fundamentally different frameworks which absolutism and relativism rest upon, it would be near impossible for proponents of either to adopt the other’s views. providing ampliative reasons to substantiate one’s own position is sufficient. however, if the relativists present reasons only good enough to support their own views, which do not on argumentative grounds correspond to any common substratum between them and their opponents, then these reasons would be exclusive to them alone. this would imply that relativism is a somewhat private or personal view rather than an idea which has rational (or empirical) evidence to substantiate its fundamental position and which could appear plausible to others. this would severely restrict the possibility of attaining universal consensus or acceptability. nor should this consideration be limited to the relativist alone. we may accept and adopt a fundamental principle on inadequate grounds of rationale; if that is the case then many notions of thought which we preserve would be private or personal. take religious beliefs, for instance. various beliefs do not follow a strictly logical or rational form of thought. however, the absence of clear logical evidence or rational thought (or any form of evidence) does not eradicate or even diminish its credibility for individuals or groups. we ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 70 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 presume that beliefs need be “justified”, in the sense of presenting an argument to defend and substantiate them. however, goldman quite interestingly proposes that, i do not even assume that when a belief is justified there is something “possessed” by the believer which can be called “justification”. i do assume that a justified belief gets its status of being justified from some processes or properties that make it justified. in short, there must be some justification-conferring processes or properties. but this does not imply that there must be an argument, or reason, or anything else, “possessed” at the time of belief by the believer. (goldman 2008, 334) goldman suggests two points in the above passage. first, there exist some process or properties that make a belief justified. second, justifying a belief would not necessarily mean presenting an argument or a set of reasoning, but rather would mean referring to some process or properties. the believer’s belief would not need to convince his/her opponents but convince the believer him/herself in what he/she believes to be true and thus justified. we can present this in the following manner: if p believes q at t, and q is indubitable for p at t, then p’s belief in q at t is justified again, we have arrived at some sort of personal and private way of thinking, one that does not have to conform with any particular ground rules in order to substantiate its position. we could correctly assume relativism to be in a similar position, not requiring an argument or a certain set of reasons to validate its position. in relation to this, luper (2004) suggests that relativists making a case for relativism need not abide by the non-deadlock principle (i.e., that each side in a dispute must present their argument on the basis of assertions acceptable to the opposing side), whereas the absolutists must in fact abide by it. for the relativists intrinsically suppose that the non-deadlock principle is antithetical to their case, and discard anything that supports it. therefore, accepting the non-deadlock principle would bar the absolutists from asserting that relativism is actually incoherent. the second objection to relativism quite forcefully asserts that the plurality of views which relativism endorses would imply that either, amongst these views there is an absolute or definite way to conceive the world; or, (somehow) the plurality of views together in collaboration with one another would formulate one absolute or definite way to conceive the world. a common feature of both these views is that there exists, among all the 71 alternative modes of thinking about the truth, a fixed set of facts about the world. as much as this objection may appear to be a decisive blow against the relativists, it simply misses the point of what relativism is proposing altogether. relativism does not propose to offer a list of all the possible ways of conceiving the world. neither does it seek out an absolute or definite criterion from among those possibilities for arriving at the actual truth. what this particular epistemic position infers is that the correctness of judgments about matters of truth would vary depending on those who are making the judgments. since each and every individual’s disposition and level of cognition varies, the knowledge perspectives i am exposed to and acquainted with (whether it be gender, class, sexuality, self-understanding, religious belief, aesthetic value, and so on) result in the alternative versions of truth i encounter. the more versions of truth i encounter—whether by stumbling across them in total coincidence or in advancing a strategic inquiry—the more my current position of truth would be challenged. consequently, with there being many alternative versions of truth, there is no set criterion or method of adjudication between such truths that ultimately allows for an absolute truth. 2. the application of relativism thus far i have discussed what relativism proposes and how it manages to uphold its constituting features. i shall now like to discuss the application of relativism and the extent to which it can be applied to statements that are considered true. first, i shall clarify the ‘statuses’ of statements to which we apply a relativistic method. runzo (1986) has categorized the statuses of statements into two groups, namely, first-order and second-order.6 this categorization is in a linguistic context and should not be confused with the logical context. he emphasizes that it is crucial to distinguish a relativist’s conception of truth between these two types of statements. first-order statements are those used in an object language to refer to actual or possible states of affairs. for instance, statements like “today is 21°c” or “if i went to the moon…” are first-order statements. on the other hand, second-order statements are those about the object language rather than in the object language. these statements use a particular language in order to refer to and make statements (whether meta-logical or meta-linguistic) about formal properties of that language. for instance, asserting the law of non-contradiction (no proposition or statement can be both true and false at the same time) is a second-order statement of this type. ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 72 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 in considering these two types of statements, it becomes clear that we can only apply a relativistic account to first-order statements, not to second-order statements. for example, if i stated that “today is 21°c,” then this statement from a relativist’s perspective would only be true depending on the context (i.e., the reference frames as well as the conceptual schemas) in which it is perceived. according to the relativist this statement would not manage to present an absolute fact about the matter it aims to express. this is primarily due to the varying contexts in which it can be perceived. this much a relativist would be able to assert. however, the case with second-order statements is very different. to demonstrate, let us take the example mentioned above (the law of non-contradiction). if such a law is also subjected to a relativistic account, it would compromise the very criteria that constitute relativism. this would include jeopardizing features such as reference frames and conceptual schemas, and would ultimately risk undermining the relativist’s own position. runzo refers to those relativists who are bold enough to apply their account to second-order statements as ‘epistemic relativists’: i will use ‘epistemic relativism’ to refer to any position about second-order statements which holds or implies that the correctness or incorrectness of judgements about the nature of, or the criteria for, truth or for semantic meaning or for how knowledge is acquired varies with who is making the judgment. (runzo 1983, 40) in what follows he further suggests that if the authenticity or correctness of any view is itself relative to one’s own schema, then in consequence, deducing a criterion which aids in successfully building a theory of truth, or defining terms by giving them a meaning, or more generally the acquisition of knowledge, would be futile. it’s not surprising to encounter such futile consequences since epistemic relativism seems to clearly abandon all types of fundamental criteria. if such a position “liberates” itself from all adjudicating criteria it would then bring us back to the arguments previously leveled against relativism, namely, that this line of thought would seem to defeat the whole purpose of having a theory about the nature of truth. so, this form of relativism is abandoned not only because it makes incoherent claims but also because it simply fails to deliver a theory of truth. given such criteria, these severe consequences are apparent in the bold assertion that “all truth is relative”, which intends to relate to every form of truth that may be accessible or known. they are even more explicit when considering modalities (that is, modal instances which are expressive 73 of extensional terms such as possibility and necessity). we resort to these types of statements when we talk of states of affairs that could or must occur (within the domain of possibility and necessity, respectively). the occurrence or non-occurrence of such states could be determined in one of three ways: either in virtue of causal laws and how they (are perceived to) operate and impact the physical world; or in virtue of the laws of logic and how we may think about them; or, more fundamentally, in virtue of how we acquire the meanings of terms and the manner in which we use those terms to denote matters of the world. here are some examples that fall into each of these categories, respectively: causal logical conceptual possibility necessity possibility necessity possibility necessity example: ‘it is possible to dissolve sodium chloride in h²o’ example: ‘it is necessary that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light’ example: ‘it is possible that nothing ever existed in the universe’ example: ‘it is necessary that every giraffe is identical to itself ’ example: ‘it is possible that some animals which we refer to as species of birds are flightless’ example: ‘it is necessary that if john is a bachelor, then he is an unmarried man’ for the sake of relevance let us consider logical and conceptual necessities and possibilities. in order to obtain a somewhat nuanced distinction between both of these categories it would be worth making mention of alternative terms used in the domains of semantics and epistemology. this is not only to make apparent the differences between them but to avoid confusing them with one another. let me begin with the domain in which these terms largely concern us, namely, metaphysics. a necessary statement is a statement that is true in all possible worlds. this is represented in the language of modal logic as: □ a. necessary statements are contrasted with impossible statements. impossible statements are false in all possible worlds. contingent statements, on the other hand, are true in only some possible worlds. this is represented in the language of modal logic as: ◊ a. this is not to be confused with the distinction made between what is analytic and what is synthetic within the domain of semantics. analytic is true in virtue of its meaning while synthetic is true in virtue of the way the world is. likewise, these distinctions are not to be confused with what ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 74 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 is a priori and what is a posteriori within the domain of epistemology. a priori are known to be true independent of experience while a posteriori are known to be true in virtue of experience. this leaves us with logical necessity and possibility. it is more than often agreed that logical necessity and possibility are grounded in metaphysical necessity and possibility. this means that if a statement is considered to be logically true then it is necessarily true and if it is logically false then it is necessarily false in the metaphysical sense. in most cases then logical necessity is what determines metaphysical necessity. we could then say that although the universe could have turned out differently, there are some ways the universe could not have turned out at all. for instance, there are many possible worlds differing from one another; however, it cannot be the case that there is (or we could conceive of ) a world in which 2+2=7. it could not also be the case that you both do exist and do not exist in this (or any other) world. we refer to these types of truths as ‘necessary truths’, because they are necessary in every possible world and cannot be conceived of otherwise. on the other hand, we can say that a state of affairs is logically or conceptually possible, if there is some possible world in which it obtains (or actualizes). take for instance the statement that “all giraffes have short necks in a possible world.” this is logically and conceptually possible. it could very well be the case that all giraffes are short-necked in some world other than this one. the notion of logical possibility is broadly inclusive of conceptual, metaphysical, and causal possibilities. therefore, if something is logically impossible it certainly cannot be conceptually, metaphysically, or causally possible. perhaps a useful way to illustrate the expanse of logical possibility is in virtue of what is called “logical space,” a term drawn from wittgenstein (though he never defined it).7 aranyosi comments, wittgenstein, who introduced the phrase to philosophy in the tractatus, never defines logical space, yet we get a clear and intuitive idea of what it is supposed to be, namely, the space of all possibilities. if that is true, then we are immediately pushed to explain what possibilities are and what it means to say that logical space is the space of all possibilities. traditionally, it is propositions that are taken as bearers of the modal properties of possibility, necessity, impossibility and contingency, and these modal notions are in turn explained by appeal to truth at a possible world. logical space, then, is, according to current orthodoxy, a space of possible worlds, and possibilities are propositions true at some possible 75 world, hence, belonging to logical space. impossibilities will be propositions that are not true at any possible world; hence, they are not in logical space. contingencies will be propositions that are possible but false at some worlds. necessities will be propositions that are true at all possible worlds. (aranyosi 2013, 9) let us now return to epistemic relativism. in light of the modal machinery introduced above, epistemic relativism would have to concede that not all truth is relative. that is because epistemic relativism cannot evade logical space and compromise necessary truths while resorting to variations in conceptual schemas and reference frames. suppose it did (or attempted to) compromise necessary truths in this manner; could it justify the absurdity it results in? let us take a necessary truth, namely, the law of non-contradiction. in the formula ¬ (α ∧ ¬α), regardless of the actual truth value of the variable α, the formula on whole would always be true, simply because a statement and its negation cannot both be true at any one time. irrespective of all conditions, this law is a necessary truth which cannot be otherwise in all possible worlds. we may also say that this law is an absolute truth, for its truth obtains in virtue of the way in which it is conceived by every possible conceiver situated in every possible world. the epistemic relativist may interject at this point by arguing that the law of non-contradiction is actually relative to conceptual schemas and reference frames, and thus not a necessary truth. this would imply that there are possible instances in which the law of non-contradiction can be rejected. but that’s not all. applying epistemic relativism to the law of non-contradiction would not only be rejecting what the law posits but would also be open to accepting truth-value gaps and gluts—kinds of indeterminate semantic values, if you like. this acceptance of truth-value gaps and gluts, which is usually associated with first degree entailment logic (fde), is where the epistemic relativist may find some hope. by being paracomplete and paraconsistent, fde logic is able to entertain the maximum available truth-values in comparison to both classical and alternative sub-classical logics.8 a paracomplete theory is able to sustain some meaningful and declarative statements that are neither true nor false. statements of this kind are referred to as ‘gappy’ since they fall into the gap between truth and falsity. a paraconsistent theory is able to sustain some meaningful and declarative statements that are both true and false. statements of this kind are referred to as ‘glutty’ since they fall into the intersection of truth and falsity. thus, the introduction of non-classical logic affords the epistemic relativist some hope of maintaining their position with ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 76 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 respect to the law of non-contradiction. they are able to maintain their position while circumventing the charge of inconsistency and/or irrationality. of course, an attempt to salvage the consistency and rationality of epistemic relativism by appealing to a system of logic that is able to accommodate truth-value gaps and gluts sounds a little cheap. that is not to say that there is no case to be made for epistemic relativism under the guise of a paraconsistent logic, such as fde logic. i think there is plausible scope for epistemic relativism to explore that route. similarly, there is also plausible scope for epistemic relativism to explore logical nihilism in this regard. logical nihilism can be presented in at least two ways, as cotnoir has stated: logical nihilism 1 there’s no logical consequence relation that correctly represents natural language inference; formal logics are inadequate to capture informal inference. logical nihilism 2 there are no logical constraints on natural language inference; there are always counterexamples to any purportedly valid forms. (cotnoir 2018, 303) he argues for and presents a plausible case for the second type of logical nihilism. a major proponent of that second type is gillian russell, whose argument is as follows: to be a law of logic, a principle must hold in complete generality. no principles hold in complete generality. there are no laws of logic. (russell 2018, 308) my aim is not to reconstruct and represent russell’s or cotnoir’s arguments here. i mean simply to indicate that non-classical logic and/or logical nihilism may provide resources for the epistemic relativist to defend their position. aside from appeals to paraconsistent logic and/or logical nihilism, one of the reasons an epistemic relativist may present in maintaining his/ her position would be the possibility of variation in reference frames and conceptual schemas. according to epistemic relativists, necessary truths irrespective of their status are also subject to conceptual schemas and reference frames. but how would this argument make sense in defying the law of non-contradiction? as mentioned above, necessary truths are particular matters of fact which cannot be conceived of otherwise. to put it differently, they are such 77 truths that once they are acquired, it is impossible by any method of thought to conceive of their converse. the antithesis of the law of non-contradiction, for instance, would be a contradictory instance: a square circle, a four-sided triangle, a married bachelor, or two straight lines that enclose a space. we fail to conjure a mental representation of these contradictory instances, no matter how hard we try. such failure may be a representation of the limits of our thought. alternately, such limits may be a consequence of internal matters to do with how our brains are hard-wired, or a consequence of external matters like how we are socially nurtured. how we comply with the law of non-contradiction here becomes of paramount importance. efforts to contravene this law, under our conventional systems of thought, amount to being illogical and/or irrational—and indeed are equated with rejecting thought altogether. there is little doubt that the law of non-contradiction has been upheld as high orthodoxy throughout western intellectual history,9 with a few notable exceptions.10 the same goes for the most part of islamic intellectual history (see also zolghadr 2019).11 even today this attitude shapes the predominant mode of thought in the anglosphere. aristotle himself postulated a defence of the law of non-contradiction in book γ of the metaphysics. yet for priest (2006), it is not clear what aristotle’s arguments are meant to establish, nor how, exactly, his postulated arguments establish a defence of the law of non-contradiction. regardless of that specific issue, which priest details in an interesting fashion, the history of logic does beg the question of its grounds. that is to ask, what is the basis of these laws’ intuitive appeal? locke speaks of an intuition that grants man the logical capacity to exercise reason without knowing how to construct a syllogism (locke 2015, book iv, paper xvii, §4). we can appreciate this intuition when considering a child who, despite having had no schooling in formal logic, has his/her first encounter with arbitrating in matters of syntactical consistency. given that such a child has had at least some exposure to an environment which is indicative of deductive reasoning, he/she shall possess a “pre-theoretical but still developed sense of what follows from what” as rumfitt (2015) puts it. it is this intuitive sense of deduction that instinctively grants an individual the aptitude to appreciate syntactical consistency. it acts as the pre-theoretical foundation against which one can, in the most generic sense, determine whether a given logical system is syntactically consistent. rumfitt is thus persuaded that classical logic occupies a default status. such logic is then codified by a set of foundational principles which conform to our “intuitive sense of deductions.”12 the conformity between such principles and our “intuitive sense of deductions” allows us to acknowledge the kind ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 78 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 of structure and form in virtue of which we are able to determine what follows from what, namely, syntactical consistency. any attempt to obtain this type of consistency would entail conforming to the laws of logic, simply because defying the laws of logic would lead to syntactical inconsistency. of course, whether this conformity is one which completely corresponds to our intuition or bears epistemological gaps is an interesting question.13 nevertheless, the idea that there exists some association between the laws of logic and our intuition grants a significant status to the laws of logic. this status is particularly espoused by classical logic on the basis that the laws of logic are fundamental axioms in virtue of which it operates. this begs a further question. do the laws of logic actually possess a superior status over other laws? let us take natural laws as an example. the law of universal gravitation, for instance, offers an explanation as to why every object attracts every other object with a force that, for any two objects, is directly proportional to the mass of each object and inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the two objects. this law would thus explain why a marble falls to the ground from any given height. of course, the explanation offered would not account for some discrete form of essence of the marble which would ultimately be responsible for its downward movement. to put it in kant’s terms, the law would not propose to disclose a distinct realm of noumena which would reveal the inherent nature or inner reality of that marble. although the law of gravity succeeds in positing a quantifiable gravitational force acting between all bodies, it does not explain exactly how the force propagates through space. this was precisely newton’s frustration with the law. he was unable to offer a satisfactory explanation as to how the force of gravity so pervasively transmits between bodies that were separated by space. (of course, the force of attraction very much exists, albeit at a distance.) the law of gravity mathematically accounts for the downward movement of the marble every time it is dropped. the explanation offered is empirically successful within what we might call a scientific remit. the law then is a generalization which offers an explanation as to why objects with any given mass are influenced by a downward force. in sum it proposes to express the way in which nature works. the laws of logic are similar in this respect; they are expressed by the calculi in a manner which offers a generalized view as to what ought to follow from what, namely, logical consequence. the laws of logic are formulated to account for and distinguish correct arguments from incorrect ones. does this then mean to suggest that 79 the laws of logic are equally empirical generalizations? in response to such a query, peregrin states, there are two ways in which the rules can be considered normative. first, they are normative in the sense that what they generalize are already rules. their instances are correct arguments—they are correct not because we logicians proclaim them as correct, they are correct before any logical theory is in play; they are such because human linguistic practices are essentially rule-governed. logic is thus supposed to pick up rules that already govern our reasoning, though in their natural form they are implicit, and it is only logical theory that makes them explicit. moreover, the laws of logic are normative also in the second sense, in that they can be used as standards of assessment and criticism of actual argumentation. this is because what we do when we articulate them is not only to bring their implicit predecessors into the open but rather also to “finalize,” streamline, and extrapolate them to the regions where they were not really operative. this is what happens during the process of moving toward a reflective equilibrium. given this, we cannot really say that logic addresses a reality behind the surfaces of natural languages. it builds on some very general rules (proto-rules?) that are constitutive of our linguistic practices but employs its huge apparatus to transform these implicit rules into something clear, unambiguous, and potentially binding … in this sense, i think that the status of the laws of logic is similar to that of natural laws (despite all the other dissimilarities): they do not bring to light a hidden reality behind appearances but rather bring a system to the appearances (to “save” them, as the ancients would put it). of course, the system cannot be chosen deliberately, it must fit the appearances—but there is no reason to think that it was there, as such, all the time already before we established it. (peregrin 2020, 7) peregrin makes an interesting case for how we should think of the laws of logic. such considerations seem to demonstrate that these laws do not possess the realist privilege they are commonly granted. nevertheless, i shall now like to look at what distinguishes the laws of nature from the laws of logic. the former demonstrate how the physical world operates by resorting to regular observations of natural phenomena.14 these ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 80 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 are regularities in the workings of nature; take for instance the three laws formulated by kepler after he discovered the regularities which governed planetary motions. newton introduced the notion of gravitational force, which determines the movement of bodies under the system of forces exerted on them. let us take a general regularity that is categorized as a law of nature, namely, planetary movement in elliptical orbits around the sun. let us very simply conceive of this law in reverse or, more freely, otherwise: that planets don’t revolve around the sun in ellipsis but rather in triangular motions. although this may result in a physical impossibility, it is not a logical one. it is not at all difficult to conceive of the planets in our solar system orbiting the sun in a triangular motion. in contrast, i am not able to conceive of the reverse or negation of the laws of logic at all. so what exactly is the distinguishing factor which allows my mind to transgress the law of nature in any given state of affairs, but not the laws of logic? we observe the laws of planetary motion as absolutely binding on the celestial bodies themselves. they would obtain regardless of whether man had discovered the science of astronomy and formulated these regular observations into symbolic formulae or not. it follows that although man has acquainted himself with the study of astronomy and managed to view the matters of fact with the aid of mathematical calculations, his experience of those laws are known to him solely by observation and therefore are totally independent of his knowledge about them. in other words, acquiring knowledge about these regularities does not influence them in any way whatsoever. however, this is not the case when it comes to the laws of logic. they seem to come into operation as soon as man begins to think. they are directly initiated and influenced by the one who engages in the process of thinking. furthermore, they are unlike the laws of nature, which conform to physical phenomena, in conforming to conceptual matters and the manner in which the thinker thinks. if a law (as in the case of a natural law) is independent of a thinker’s thought altogether, then its reversal can be conceived of; whereas if it is subject or bound to a thinking process, it cannot be conceived of otherwise. a similar criterion is deduced by mansel, whereby he suggests that a law which is not binding upon me as a thinker may at any time be reversed, without affecting my mode of observing the same agents under their new condition. and i have no difficulty in conceiving such a reversal as at any moment possible, because, antecedent to experience, i had no internal bias which required the recognition of the existing law 81 rather than any other. i have only to discard an adventitious knowledge. (mansel 2012, 90) probing why the laws of logic cannot be reversed or conceived of otherwise requires investigation into the nature of thought itself. this means leaving the province of logic or at least considering its interface with language. i might be rationally compelled to say something like my diary cannot have a black and white cover at the same—but the cognitive failure to comprehend such a case would not constrain me from linguistically affirming it. i am able to articulate a postulation of a possible contradiction, though i may not be able to conceive of it. this can be extended to other contradictory matters such as my ability to linguistically affirm the possibility of a square circle, a four-sided triangle, a married bachelor, two straight lines that enclose a space, and so on. if it is the case that i have the capacity to express and articulate logically impossible states, although they are inconceivable to me, could i then go further and articulate an exclusively original thought (or statement)? that is, not the kind which is bound by a logical possibility or impossibility but one that is free from experience altogether? this would be inquiring whether my mind allows me to think independently of the laws of logic. before answering this question it would be important to make a distinction between conception and imagination, as one may be under the impression that to contemplate an anomalous object or thought would be an original thought. in order to have a valid conception of a horse, for instance, i must: a. be acquainted with the various constituting features of the animal and their correct meanings in order to arrive at the definition of a horse; and b. be able to combine those constituting features in a representative manner to form a visualization in my mind in order to adequately conceive of it. the combination of a and b forms a concept which not only lies in my mind but also corresponds to a reality or my previously acquired experience in some way. imagination, on the other hand, is possible without one of these two points (a or b). it can be said to be an arbitrary formulation of memories without conforming to any systematic method. for example, i at this moment in time have in my mind the notion of a centaur. my conception of a centaur is one where i envisage the upper body of a man biologically attached ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 82 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 to the lower body of a horse. this method of thought has violated b, one of the two points which formulate a concept mentioned above. in this case i have combined two known meanings and what they denote in successfully envisaging a biological amalgamation of a human and a horse. therefore, the process of imagining combines known meanings and what they denote in random ways that are devoid of any systematic process. imaginations have no relation to objects that exist in the real world. in the centaur case, i already possess a concept of a man and also of a horse. i randomly take the meanings of these concepts and what they denote and arbitrarily combine them to formulate a thought. the resulting features which make up this thought fail to correspond to this creature as a whole in reality. at the most it remains a mythical creature that is an object of possible perception. we thus come to understand that in order to formulate both conceptions and imaginal objects we fundamentally need to know the meanings of particular properties and objects. both involve arranging properties and objects in certain ways. if the arrangement is systematic and corresponds to reality in some way, then it forms a concept. if the arrangement is random and fails to correspond to reality, then it forms an imaginal object. but what would allow us to apprehend such meanings? we need both objects of knowledge and a means of perceiving them, prior to formulating concepts/ imaginal objects. this is frequently described as requiring some kind of experience (irrespective of its comprehensiveness) of a particular property or object, which would elicit an initial cognitive reaction and subsequently give rise to a concept. this would mean that human thought, on the whole, is subject to one’s experience. having arrived at this point, let us return to the question posed earlier. is it possible to articulate an exclusively original thought, one which is unrestricted by logical possibility or impossibility? that is, is it possible to conceive of an original thought that is free from experience altogether? if the thought we refer to is only operative within the domain of possible experience, as established above in the discussion of conceptualization/imagination, then the answer appears to be negative. this statement may not suffice in presenting a comprehensive insight into the dynamic complexities of exactly how the mind actually operates, i.e. in the causal sense or the varying dispositional states we find ourselves in. nevertheless, it seems sufficient enough to establish the finitude of the human mind and thought processes, in that it makes apparent the limited capacity it bears in a finite terrain of experiences. mansel has also conceded the same point. he emphasizes how the human mind is restricted in its method of thought. he states that, 83 experience tells us what is, but not what must be… if by experience is meant all that is presented in any mode of intuition, matter and form included; and if the question is understood to mean, can we contemplate in thought any object which has never been presented as an element in any mode of intuition? the answer must undoubtedly be given in the negative. (mansel 2012, 245) the term ‘experience’ must be taken in a broader meaning here: it is not confined to external sensory perception but is inclusive of both external and internal modes of human operation. it includes all that which the mind is conscious of from an inner and outer perspective (i.e., referring to the laws of logic as well as the phenomena of matter). in other words, all of knowledge itself is derived from experience. therefore, we can say that there is no thought that can be generated in the mind which is totally independent of experience. however, if experience is the exclusive source in virtue of which we acquire all of our knowledge, and our manner of perceiving these experiences significantly varies due to reference frames and conceptual schemas, then what would we make of intuitive knowledge or a priori statements? are we to abandon them altogether? as i have previously discussed, if an epistemic relativist were to conform to a set of fixed principles (necessary truths) to arrive at absolute truths or statements, he/she would have to discard his/ her own fundamental principles. that position would no longer be strictly relativist. the epistemic relativist thus appears to be in a dilemma between preserving their relativist account or discarding it altogether. although we have already dealt with this objection when discussing first and second order statements, i wish to present a supplementary argument to strengthen the case for the epistemic relativist. this time i shall refer to previously mentioned terms that lie within the domains of semantics and epistemology. let us begin by identifying the distinction between kant’s analytic and synthetic a priori judgments: analytic judgements are those which contain nothing in the predicate but what has already been implied in the subject. for example, “all husbands are men” or “all bodies are extended.” these are second-order statements. synthetic judgments are those in which the predicate contributes to the subject what is not already entailed therein. for example, to take kant’s own examples, “all bodies are heavy” or “all bachelors are happy.” these are first-order statements. ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 84 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 there is much controversy as to whether logical inferences are analytic and a priori. in spite of this controversy let us consider the law of non-contradiction to be analytic and a priori. this is the view of those who are exceptionalists about logic. in this case the law of non-contradiction would be, what we might call, a self-evident truth. one way to consider what a self-evident truth amounts to, is to compare it with the definition of an argument.15 the common way to think of an argument is that it is a combination of a conclusion (a proposition) and reasons (premises) to support that conclusion. carefully considering such arguments, we realize that there can be conclusions that stand completely on their own, independent of any reasons to support them. this would be the case when nothing contravenes the conclusion and therefore it can be upheld without any reasons. this sort of conclusion is referred to as a self-evident truth. the law of non-contradiction has long been deemed such a self-evident truth. more specifically, it is considered a kind of truth which has no opposing reasons to reject it or even call it into question. this means everything supports it while nothing contradicts it. modus ponens and modus tollens are clear examples of this. the validity of such argument-forms serve as basic inferential rules that are representative of the fundamental laws of logic. the validity of both these argument-forms are just as fundamental as the laws of logic that they stand for. moreover, if the conditional premises that make up the forms of these arguments are true, then their conclusion cannot be otherwise. given that the forms of these arguments are clear representations of the laws of logic, their validity is certain. this qualifies the law of non-contradiction and the law of excluded middle as self-evident truths that must always be true and cannot be false. given this, the epistemic relativist would say, if man is bound to such necessary and self-evident truths such as the law of non-contradiction, then surely it must be the case that the necessity of such truths along with their validity can be determined in virtue of themselves (without referring to external premises). but would that even be possible? any attempt to determine the truth of such matters would compel us to transcend the very limits sanctioned by that law we are trying to affirm. it is, as wittgenstein aptly put it, “in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought)” (morris 2008, 352). this would imply that man has the cognitive capacity and the intellectual means to apprehend a knowledge which transcends the absolute itself. the very fact that one can 85 infer that something is absolute or necessary in-and-of-itself would indicate the capability to exceed the boundaries of that absoluteness or necessity (in that one would have to be able to discern whether or not something meets that standard of absoluteness and necessity). however, this is impossible because whatever is presented in “intuition” and represented in thought is nothing more than finite. allow me to cite mansel once more: so long as the relation between subject and object exists in consciousness, so long each must limit the other. the subject is distinct from the object, and the object from the subject, and neither can be the universe. nay, the object itself can only exist, as such, under the conditions of limitation and difference: it can be discerned only as one out of many; as implying the existence of other things besides itself; and hence, again, as a finite portion of the universe. the infinite cannot be an object of human consciousness at all; and it appears to be so only by mistaking the negation of consciousness for consciousness itself. (mansel 2012, 247) the ‘infinite’ then is a term we employ in language which expresses the negation of human thought, or rather makes explicit its limitations. it is much like referring to something as ‘inconceivable’. this does not mean that that which is infinite and inconceivable to us is indeed non-existent. to assert that something is infinite and inconceivable is in actual fact to make apparent the limits of our thought. such assertions would not be matters of fact about the external world but affirmations of the limits of our cognitive capacity. this does not eradicate the possibility for the inconceivable to actually exist. it could be said that terms such as ‘absolute’ and ‘necessary’ are inconceivable in themselves. they are inadequate in providing what are actual absolute and necessary truths. furthermore, the “truths” they infer would only be relative to human thought (derived from experience). synthetic statements and judgments, on the other hand, require more than the concept which stands as the subject. such statements and judgments add to our knowledge in some way. it is said that all empirical statements are synthetic. these types of a priori judgements actually do not trouble the epistemic relativist at all; as we have discussed above, such judgments would be referred to as first-order statements in which relativism can be applied. nevertheless, to substantiate the relativist’s position further, if synthetic judgements are based on empirical data, then they simply cannot represent absolute or necessary truths of any kind. this is because, if any statement is arrived at by observation (however regular or precise), it could be argued that ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 86 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 1. the observer who makes the observation is subject to conceptual schemas. thus, his/her observation would be relative to variations in reference frames and conceptual schemas. 2. the problem of induction, as famously highlighted by popper (1963), who emphasized that such a dogmatic belief in science is explicitly predisposed to a psychological propensity instead of a rational one. popper found the method of induction to be inadequate as a justification for scientific knowledge. 3. lastly, although an empirical law may state for example the alterations of night and day, it does not by any means assert more than an invariable regularity which has been observed to take place. by affirming the observational fact that the earth rotates on its axis once every twenty-four hours and thus we witness the alteration of night and day, it does not imply that my belief in such a continuing and regular motion of observed order or natural phenomenon would be explained to me by these observations alone. it may be some constitution of various thoughts which gives rise to such a belief, or some law of thought which my mental cognition is compelled to abide by. therefore, following this line of thought would mean the law in question is of mind rather than of matter. hence, the epistemic relativist would succeed in establishing that observational or empirical modes of data are subject to personalized experiences (i.e., relative to reference frames and conceptual schemas). the epistemic relativists would then conclude by asserting that our experiences are in essence the exclusive source of acquiring knowledge. as we have demonstrated that all experiences and truth are relative, then so must be the case with our knowledge. more importantly, it must be conceded that there exist laws of logic to which our minds are strictly compelled in conforming to all circumstances. after all, we have no alternative method of thought to resort to. even if (hypothetically speaking) an alternative method does exist, we do not possess the cognitive capacity to embrace such a method of thought, since it would mean transcending the current laws of logic to do so. it would therefore follow that our inferences, which are made in conformity to these laws, would only allow us to conceive and apprehend those thoughts and objects dependent on them. of course, conforming to these laws would by no means imply that that which we cannot conceive of is non-existent. this is because, as i have demonstrated, that statement would only be relative to the laws it was made in accordance to. 87 3. god and logically impossible tasks in virtue of what i have discussed so far, can we then imply that god can do the logically impossible? that is, can epistemic relativism be applied to the idea of god—and more specifically, to the notion of divine omnipotence in a manner that allows for god to do the logically impossible? to determine this, let us begin by the following intuitive thoughts on the matter: either it would be held that god cannot do the logically impossible. in such a case god is constrained by the laws of logic (as well as time and space) just as his creation is; or, god can do the logically impossible. in such a case we cannot conceive of such states of affairs (and how they can actualize). armed with the arguments that i have presented in favor of the epistemic relativist, i shall state the following reasons for the latter position: (i) if our entire mode of thought is subject to certain laws, such as the laws of logic, it would follow that we cannot think otherwise. from this perspective the limitation of thought which we are bound by should not be supposed as one which lies in the object of our thought but rather in the thinking subject itself. thus, if it is implied that according to the laws of logic god cannot accomplish tasks which defy this law (to which our thought is bound), it would be an incoherent statement. this is because when we make a claim of this kind it is based on a demonstrative statement and not a fact. it must be understood that no matter of fact can be a matter of demonstration. what this means is that for ‘demonstration’ it would be essential that its object can be constructed from within. this would be a construct of the various forms inherent in our own mental constitution. take thinking of a particular necessary truth, for example. it would fundamentally involve some cognitive activity in our minds. with the aid of the various experiences that we have acquired over a period of time, we are able to present a demonstrative formula which aims at substantiating the very necessary truth in question. this can only take place with me actually conceiving it to be so. consequently, it is constructed internally. however, a fact is one that subsists independent of me thinking about it in any way. let me take the same example i gave earlier about the planets revolving around the sun in elliptical orbits. this is a fact of nature. regardless of anyone thinking about it or even failing to think about it, it would not influence its state of affairs in any way whatsoever. ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 88 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 if we apply demonstrative matters in order to evaluate and determine god’s omnipotence, then it would imply that this application would require us to construct a creature of the human imagination. irrespective of the kind of god we end up envisaging in this regard, it would be an imaginative process that is bound by the very same laws with the aid of which we could only have formed and conceived of him. such an imitative process would be little more than conjured thoughts amalgamated in virtue of previously-acquired experiences in the course of our finite lives. this would be contrary to god’s actual nature. for if god is absolute and infinite in his essence and his attributes, then our conception cannot apprehend him in any sense. this is because human conception is only possible within the limits of possible intuition and experiential accumulation. (ii) we may attempt to understand the finite limits of human apprehension from another perspective. our thoughts are fundamentally subject to some sort of linear succession. (regardless of whether you consider this a mental succession that is exclusively a product of the mind, or absolute, or even an ordered succession of events, it is nevertheless subject to the concept of time.) every object which we can conceive of and be cognisant of is in some way subsisting through the passage of time. this is why we are able to distinguish a former state from its latter and vice versa, because that object occupies a particular interval in time. when an object succeeds from one state to another in the domain of time, and can be distinguished from its earlier state to its latter by the passage of time itself, then it is contingent and finite. the distinguishing feature between any two given states would be the duration and time that has elapsed. even a pendulum which oscillates between two positions, however precise its return, would be distinguished from its former state by the passage of time. granting this temporal condition, time itself can be apprehended as finite since we can conceive of its parts in successive moments, allowing it to be divisible. we can conclude that all objects conceivable to humans must exist in time. otherwise any object representing the true nature of the absolute or infinite could not be apprehended by the human mind. this would suggest that the true apprehension of god as an infinite and absolute divine being would be impossible for any human mind to truly (fully) apprehend. therefore, if we fail to apprehend god, it would be absurd to suppose that he is unable to do the logically impossible—because something considered ‘impossible’ or even ‘illogical’ would be considered as such by human thought. it would not imply that that thing is ‘impossible’ in itself. 89 (iii) we have previously discussed and concluded that the human mind is incapable of generating exclusively original thought. this is because we are constrained by particular laws of logic. given this, attempting to construct a thought of god or even how he manages to accomplish particular acts which appear logically impossible to us, would result in the negation of thought altogether. it would follow that since we cannot apprehend god (in his true state) by employing our cognitive abilities within the limited confinements of the laws of logic, god must transcend the laws of logic. in other words, god is by no means constrained by such laws in his ability to either exist (in virtue of his essence and attributes alike) or act. for an epistemic relativist such a claim would not be incoherent or irrational. this is because any claim which infers that this is incoherent or irrational would be self-defeating in virtue of the god in question. the one who attempts to criticize the transcendence of god would have to resort to the laws of logic in some way to get off the ground. it is precisely this appeal to logical laws in virtue of the god in question where the epistemic relativist would gain the upper hand. however, if we imply that god is over and above logic, it does give rise to certain difficulties. i shall refer to two of these and provide a brief response to each. 1. it would entail that all logical (and rationally based) proofs of god’s existence would become redundant; and 2. it would further mean that we cannot make any inferences about god at all on rational grounds. god would be unknowable and utterly unique. in response to the first objection i would propose that we require a substantial revaluation of the role of logic in theological matters. this would primarily be an inquiry which seeks to determine questions such as those aptly raised by a.j. cotnoir. for example, how should considerations of the limits of human reason influence our theological methodology? that is a central question spanning the history of theology, of course, but it is particularly pressing in the context of contemporary analytic theology. what is the role of logic in theology? what principles of logic are open to revision based on theological considerations (cotnoir 2019, 508)? to gain a broad view on the position of logic, cotnoir proposes two opposing views: exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism. exceptionalism is the view that logic possesses a special status. it is analytic and always known a priori. anti-exceptionalism is the view that logic does not possess any particular special status. it is not analytic, and isn’t always known a ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 90 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 priori. much of my discussion on epistemic relativism in this paper has clearly favored an anti-exceptionalist view of logic. i believe it is such a view which manages to articulate the correct role of logic in theological discourse. since our thought processes are bound by the rules of logic, the latter should be applied to theological discourse in a procedural sense and not a substantive sense. acknowledging the limits of exceptionalism entails considering the following: an argument’s soundness arises from having valid and true premises; and truth is itself dependent on statements that correspond to reality. it thus appears that the soundness of a logical argument would comprise of (1) demonstrative proofs and (2) facts or truths which correspond to reality. as mentioned earlier, demonstrative proofs that are based on argumentative forms, which possess the ability to prove particular cases, are not equivalent to truths based on correspondence to reality (facts). demonstrative statements are a construct of the various forms inherent in our own mental constitution. therefore, to exclusively apply demonstrative methods in order to arrive at a sound argument would be inadequate. as demonstration is confined to the limits in which our minds are able to think, it would not be plausible to apply such methods of reasoning in proving the existence of god in his true nature, as he is above logic and reason altogether. we have shown that truth is relative to the variations in reference frames and conceptual schemas; and furthermore, that our minds are restrained by particular laws of logic. consequently, we cannot conceive of any cases independent of experience. given this, any logical argument we present would be also be relative. therefore, logic itself would be relative to what we are, and the dimension to which we are referring. this should not be construed to discard the use of logic altogether. instead, it should be taken as giving logic its rightful place. it attempts to show where logical arguments would fail to be applicable and why. in light of what we have mentioned so far, and in the absence of any alternative, it is impossible to simply reject logic—by which after all we are strictly bound and compelled to think. the second objection states that if god transcends logic then we are unable to make any meaningful inferences about him. god, in this sense, shall be unknowable to us. it should be made clear that this objection is not a demand for any specific argument for god's existence. instead, it seeks to inquire how we are to make inferences of any kind about god without the appeal to logic. more specifically, it seeks to know how we can plausibly infer that god can or cannot do the logically impossible if he transcends logic. 91 let us first understand that since we cannot generate an exclusively original thought that is independent from experience, then we must have acquired the notion of god from somewhere. the subsisting idea of god in the conscious mind of man could not be said to have emerged solely from whim or imagination. the reason for this, as we have previously mentioned, is because the process of imagination combines known meanings and properties in random ways that are principally devoid of any systematic process. therefore, in order for the imagination to be able to generate a true idea of god (that is, in his true sense) it must have the ability to apprehend absolute and infinite ideas (since god in his true sense is absolute and infinite). however, this is not possible, as we have demonstrated throughout our discussion. but then from where have we acquired this idea? at this point in our inquiry we may choose to appeal to a (monotheistic) revealed religion. i suppose the appeal would specifically be towards that religion which is inclusive of the following advice: god (great and glorious) is too exalted to be known by the intellect’s [powers of] reflection and rational consideration (naẓar). an intelligent person should empty his heart of reflection when he wants to know god by way of witnessing (mushāhada). the one with high aspiration should not learn this [kind of knowledge] from the world of imagination (‘ālam al-khayāl), which contains embodied lights (al-anwār al-mutajassada) that point to meanings beyond them. for imagination causes intellectual meanings (alma‘ānī al-‘aqliyya) to descend into sensory forms (al-qawālib al-ḥissiyya), just as knowledge [appears] in the form of milk, the qur’ān in the form of a rope, and religion in the form of a shackle. (rustom 2014, 129) conclusion in the course of this paper i have established that all human knowledge is relative. furthermore, this relativity extends far enough to even include absolute and necessary truths. therefore, when one makes the claim that god cannot perform logically impossible tasks because it would defy necessary truths such as the laws of logic—then this claim is only as correct and as valid as the one who asserts it, for man’s mind is limited to the finite and submissive to the particular laws of logic. therefore, the inferences made in conformity to the laws of logic would only allow us to conceive and apprehend those thoughts and objects dependent on them. however, the existence and compulsion in conforming to these laws would by no means imply that that which we cannot conceive of is non-existent. this is ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 92 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 endnotes 1. i refer in particular to two letters; the first addressed to mersenne (dated april 15, 1630) and the second addressed to henry more (written on february 5, 1549). 2. this view, however, is challenged by richard r. la croix (1984), who argues that it is wrong to actually attribute this claim to descartes. i will not dwell on this debate, but i will run with the general thought which is asserted by harry frankfurt (1977), who attributes to descartes the belief that god is “a being for whom the logically impossible is possible.” 3. this is a view that tahko has defended, clearly stating that “i will also defend the status of lnc as the best candidate for a fundamental metaphysical principle—if there are any principles which constrain the structure of reality, then lnc is certainly our most likely candidate” (tahko 2009, 32). 4. the so-called bar-hillel-carnap paradox has already suggested, a half century ago, the clash between the notions of contradiction and semantic information: the less probable a statement is, the more informative it is, and so contradictions carry the maximum amount of information, and in the light of standard logic are, as a famous quote by bar-hillel and carnap has it, “too informative to be true”. this is a difficult philosophical problem for standard logic, which is forced to equate triviality and contradiction, and to regard all contradictions as equivalent, as the following example illustrates. if two auto technicians tell me that the battery of my car is flat, and its electrical system out of order, and add all the (potentially infinite) statements about car electrics, i have an excessive amount of information, including a huge amount of irrelevant information. classically, this trivial amount of information is exactly the same as the information conveyed by the car technicians telling me a contradiction, such as the battery of my car is flat and that it is not flat. however, if one of the car technicians tells me (among his statements) that the battery is flat, and the other that the battery is not flat, between them they are contradictory, but now i know where the problem is! (carnielli and coniglio 2016, 2). 5. i am referring to a letter addressed to mesland in which he makes mention of god not having any limits and our minds being finite. because, as we have demonstrated, that statement would only be relative to the laws it was made in accordance to. hence we learn the important lesson that the provinces of reason and faith are not coextensive; that it is a duty, enjoined by reason itself, to believe in what we cannot comprehend. (mansel 2012, 247) 93 6. it should be noted here that upon this particular instance i have not referred to these statements as a priori analytic and synthetic statements, because i will pursue them as such shortly after. i do not intend to imply that both these notions of truth (i.e., firstand second-order statements and a priori analytic and synthetic statements) are essentially different in any way by discussing them apart. however, in doing so, i only hope to substantiate my position (that of the epistemological relativist) by providing two different replies for the same argument. 7. the notion of “logical space” was first introduced by wittgenstein during his stay in krakow in autumn 1914 while he was serving in the austrian army. the considerations that finally led to the idea of an abstract space whose internal structure represents all the logic that underlies our ordinary language are well preserved in the first two wartime notebooks (ms 101, ms 102). they belong to a rapidly developing series of ideas which also includes an early version of the picture theory of proposition. they form an important part of the preliminary work for the tractatus, the first draft of which—the so-called prototractatus (preserved in ms 104)—wittgenstein started to write down some time later in summer 1915 (pilch 2017, 15-16). 8. fde logic is probably the most versatile model of sub-classical logics, in the sense that it is inclusive of both paracomplete and paraconsistent systems. a logical theory is paracomplete if it recognizes a case c such that c ⊭1 a and c ⊭0 a, for some sentence a. likewise, a logical theory is paraconsistent if it recognizes some case c such that c ⊨1 a and c ⊨0 a, for some a. the terms “paracomplete” and “paraconsistent”, from the greek word “para” (beyond), imply that we are moving beyond having only complete or consistent cases (beall and logan 2017, 178-179). the consequence of being both paracomplete and paraconsistent is that it does not impose exhaustion and exclusion (respectively) on its predicates. classical logic, conversely, imposes both exhaustion and exclusion, significantly constraining its interpretative power with respect to predicates. imposing exhaustion means that classical logic does not recognize any possible instance in which an object fails to be in either extension or anti-extension of a predicate. in such cases there is no possible instance in which a predicate fails to be either true or false of an object. imposing exclusion means that classical logic does not recognize a possible instance in which an object falls into both the extension and anti-extension of a predicate. in such cases there is no possible instance in which a predicate is both true and false of an object. as a result of this classical logic is only admitting of cases that are complete and consistent. this eliminates the possibility of entertaining truth-value gaps and gluts. this is where fde logic has a greater advantage. by being paracomplete and paraconsistent, fde logic is able to entertain the maximum available truth-values, in contrast to both classical and alternative sub-classical logics. a paracomplete theory is able to sustain some meaningful and declarative ahsan: god beyond the boundary-stones of thought 94 the american journal of islam and society 37:3-4 statements that are neither true nor false, that is, statements which are referred to as “gappy”. a paraconsistent theory is able to sustain some meaningful and declarative statements that are both true and false, that is, statements which are referred to as “glutty”. 9. this attitude has not merely persisted as part of the intellectual legacy, but is actively reasserted as “an entrenched ‘unassailable dogma’ of western thought” (beall 2004, 3). 10. exceptions can be found in western intellectual history, although with the exception of hegel and his fellow-travellers, and whilst aristotle’s opinion on nearly every other matter has been overturned—or at least challenged—nearly every western philosopher and logician has accepted the authority of aristotle on this matter. there is hardly a defence of the law since aristotle’s, worth mentioning. (priest 2006, 7) however, attempting to locate personalities or remote instances to this end within islamic intellectual history proves unviable. after failing to find some material/resources on this matter, i contacted four foremost historians of islamic philosophy and logic (khaled el-rouayheb, tony street, peter adamson, and ahmed alwishah). i asked whether they could kindly direct me to some reading material on arabic logicians who attempted or actually engaged with a system of logic while either rejecting the law of non-contradiction and/or considering the principle of explosion to be invalid. in their responses, though they noted the importance of the inquiry, they could not suggest any secondary literature or arabic logicians who questioned the principle of non-contradiction outright. (el-rouayheb did comment that some scholars who discussed the liar paradox were willing to suggest that ‘what i say is false’ is both true and false, though this appears to have been a minority opinion.) 11. “according to ibn sīnā, a demonstration transfers truth, certainty and necessity from the premises to the conclusions. premises or first principles are generally divided into two parts, the first principles for all sciences are called common principles (al-uṣūl al-muta‛ārafa), and the first principles for every special science called postulates (al-uṣūl al-mawḍū‛a). for example, “whole is bigger than [its] part” or “contradiction is impossible”, etc are common principles, and “the shortest line between two points is a straight line” is a postulate for the science of geometry. ibn sīnā has a vast investigation in his different writings on the ways common principles are acquired by the mind. a class of these common principles the called as awwaliyyāt, are acquired only through the intellective faculty. these are propositions that are obvious for the intellective faculty and accepting them is necessary. the above two examples of the common principles are of this category. contrary to the 95 common principles, which are certain, the postulates are susceptible of doubt (mashkūk)” (ardeshir 2008, 58). 12. “this, it seems to me, provides the strongest reason for according default status to classical logic, for—with only one class of exceptions—classically valid arguments conform to our intuitive sense of deductions whose conclusions follow from their premisses. setting aside the exceptions, the classical natural deduction rules seem, when we first meet them, to codify norms of deductive reasoning that we have implicitly followed for years” (rumfitt 2015, 15). 13. “weininger, however, thinks that obeying the laws of logic is something we ought to do precisely because it belongs to the strict moral duties we have toward ourselves. he thereby holds that logic is intrinsically categorically normative (and thus falls under 4a), but for reasons quite different from those found in the moral science conception of logic. according to the moral science conception, logic is intrinsically categorically normative because it is based on rationality itself (hence rationality is intrinsic to logic) and is also an integral part of human morality, namely the part that consists in justifying moral judgments and decisions, including direct moral arguments and reflective equilibrium” (hanna 2006, 205-206). 14. “it is important to distinguish between laws of science and laws of nature. laws of nature are those empirical regularities which govern the natural world around us, irrespective of whether or not intelligent beings possess knowledge of these regularities or whether or not an appropriate symbolic representation for at least some of these regularities has been developed... laws of science, by contrast, are those regularities of the natural world which are 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this scholarly article indicates threats to the stability of political systems of consolidated democracies resulting from disinformation . the article presents threats resulting from the effects of disinformation in four areas: state, society, politics and law . the authors demonstrate the exposure of society to manipulative effects of fake news, which affects human emotions, reasoning and behaviour due to the use of created images of reality . it has been pointed out that fake news as a  targeted manipulation tool, while aiming to achieve its goals, exploits the imperfections of the human mind . for this reason, the individual and thus the society need support to protect themselves from the manipulative threat coming from this phenomenon . protection from fake news must be provided with the respect of freedom of expression, the values of society, the individuals’ liberties as well as legal rights . disinformation is not a new phenomenon in itself, but the development of the internet and social media allows for an unprecedented scale of social manipulation . the article also indicates that disinformation is often directed at civil liberties and destabilises the principles of social life and citizens’ trust in public institutions, authorities or the media, regardless of whether its source is third countries or it is “produced” internally . in a democratic state a citizen should be able to make informed decisions and independently assess whether the information encountered in the social media is true or false . keywords: destabilisation, fake news, consolidated democracy, information, disinformation 1. access to information as a determinant of modern democracies while defining the concept of information, it should be noted at the outset that the concept is only seemingly simple, in fact it is complex . there is a  multitude of different approaches to information in the literature, representing various fields and disciplines of science . in addition to scientific theories, the term is also commonly used (ziółkowski, 2007, p . 51), which has considerable significance in political sciences . it can be assumed that the particular concept of information refers to several intuitive understandings . firstly, each piece of information is a  message about something, and secondly, information is acquired by the individual through observation or other mental activities (greniewski, 1967, p . 51) . in scientific terms, information is generally defined either in an objective context or is closer to a subjective context when it is defined in social sciences . it should be noted that information, depending on the content or the adopted reference system, can doi: 10.53116/pgaflr.2020.1.5 mailto:akozlowski@wsb.gda.pl https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5359-192x mailto:kskelnik@wsb.gda.pl mailto:kskelnik@wsb.gda.pl https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2771-3900 https://doi.org/10.53116/pgaflr.2020.1.5 74 artur kozłowski – klaudia skelnik public governance, administration and finances law review • vol. 5. no. 1.  also be interpreted in a broader or narrower sense . broadly speaking, information is understood as a content taken from the outside world in the process of our adaptation to it and the adaptation of our senses (fischer & świerczyńska-głownia, 2006, p . 9) . in a  narrow sense, information refers to the message obtained by humans through observation or mental action, subject to transmission in the sender (human)  –  recipient (human) system (groniewska, 1990, p . 45) . babik (2008), in turn, emphasises the importance of the concept of qualitative and quantitative recognition of the characterised concept . in the first of these ranges, the author points to the existence of qualitative definitions focused not so much on measuring but on describing information . he refers to several most important concepts: according to gregory bateson from the paloalto, information conveyed to students during their education at school is one of the factors that shape people’s perception of the surrounding reality . by contrast, carla f . von weizsäcker perceives information as the signal content that makes sense to the recipient . the quality of information is therefore understood by reference to its content in certain conceptual categories such as: truth, timelines, relevance or usability . qualitative concepts, by emphasising the semantic-pragmatic tendency, are widely used in social sciences with a  particular emphasis on communication science . the precursors of mathematical information theory also fall within this trend . they are norbert wiener, claude shannon and warren, to name but a few . thanks to wiener’s work on cybernetic theories and the complementary theories of c . shannon who cooperated with weaver in 1949, a  mathematical model of signal transmission was created (garcia de torres, 2001, p . 103) – to date being the core concept of the science of communication . russian philosopher arkadij d . ursul (1971) defines information as a  reflection (mapping ) of the diversity that characterises the surrounding reality (object, event, process, phenomenon) . such a variety in biolog y can be a set of signals reaching a living organism, whereas in psycholog y, stimuli received from the external human environment . other specialists express similar opinions: r . hartley – a mathematician, a slightly older colleague of another well-known mathematician c . shannon, stated that information is a very capacious term and proposed to treat information “physically” and not through psychological interpretation . according to r . ashby (1957), an expert in cybernetics, the concept of information is associated with the diversity of the surrounding world . n . wiener (1954), an american mathematician and pioneer of cybernetics, treats information as an appellation deriving from a content taken from the outside world in the process of the adaptation of our senses to a piece of information . a closer analysis of the quoted statements does not give any grounds either for rejecting any of them or for accepting any other concepts as the only correct ones . it can be admitted, however, that these are complementary opinions describing information from different points of view and in different contexts . therefore, none of them can be treated as a  comprehensive interpretation of this concept . it can be compared to a  road seen by drivers in the fog : everyone sees only a  small part of it . it is also worth mentioning l . ciborowski’s monograph the information fight, where he states that “the stimuli affecting the human reception system invoke a mental object in his or her imagination, reflecting the image of a material or abstract entity (subject, process, phenomenon, concept, etc .), which in his or her opinion (consciousness) is, to a  certain extent, associated with these stimuli . 75 public governance, administration and finances law review • 1. 2020 disinformation as a tool aimed at weakening consolidated democracies this means that information is only those experiences that inspire the human mind to a  certain imagination . its existence is relatively related to the existence of man and his mind” (ciborowski, 1999, p . 185) . it is to be admitted that the explanation of the holistic approach to the essential features of the subject of the study, referred to by the term information, is rather difficult . neither claude shannon, the creator of the quantitative information theory, nor stafford beer, the author of one of the first scholarly articles on the use of cybernetics and the general theory of control in management in economic systems, had never defined the term, although they often used it in their arguments . currently many authors are trying to fill this semantic gap, but there is no agreement about this as yet in the formulated views . this can be perceived in the functioning lexical norms as well as in the literature on the subject . in the context of the subject discussed, it is a fundamental statement that information is a  knowledge generating tool but  –  and this should be emphasised – not knowledge per se . information is time related, it may be up-to-date or not . so it has product features and can be sold and bought . knowledge, however, belongs only to a  particular person . in the knowledge society, everyone should be able to navigate freely through waves of information and make its own interpretations . freedom of movement is connected to freedom of expression and is about developing critical thinking skills to distinguish between useful and worthless information . we humans are social beings voluntarily seeking contacts with other people and forced by reality to interact with other people . in these contacts it is information which becomes an indispensable binder of individual entities with their surroundings . this is expressed in the integrative function of information . family relationships are an eloquent example of this role of information: conversations (and thus information exchange) is an indispensable factor integrating family members . it is to be recognised that information should also be sought in the areas where it is used . emphasis can be placed on the role of information in decision-making processes, as it is the case in business operations . however, a human being is a personality that needs to be considered in various dimensions – professional, social, psychological, cultural or historical . in each dimension, one always needs information to play a variety of roles . information, as a  kind of “soft power”, is a  tool for shaping human personality . the reception of information forces each of us to analyse it and stimulates an appropriate response: it forces us to choose the purpose of the action and how to achieve it, especially when it is presented in an attractive and suggestive form . each of us applies various criteria for such assessment: the criterion of usefulness, utility, profitability, moral criteria and others can be applied . then follows an act of evaluating information . a frequent repetition of this sort of act creates the habit of taking action in accordance to specific evaluation criteria . our consciousness formulated appropriately to specific principles and norms of behaviour that shape our personality comes into fray . this is especially relevant with regard to young people . respectively, it is information itself which becomes an instrument of human education despite the fact that there could be diverse categories of recipients of information . as stated by targowski, the governing power is not the one who rules but the one who has the right bits of information in the right memory available at the right time (stefanowicz, 2009, p . 279) . 76 artur kozłowski – klaudia skelnik public governance, administration and finances law review • vol. 5. no. 1.  individuals’ rights to exercise freedom of choice is one of the main principles of liberal democracies . these rights are truly valuable when they are excercised by individuals through rational means . in turn, they can be amplified by the rights to reliable information and freedom of expression . this is why information per se should be considered a determinant shaping modern democracies . information shaping the social context plays an important role in shaping society . information is not just a  force affecting the external environment but also a  subject of influence . the definitions belonging to this trend refer to a very wide range of phenomena and also to processes whose essence is relying on information that is important in creating social reality (braman, 1989, p . 233) . the condition for the development of the democratic community is free access to reliable information enabling the citizen to control the course of events and express his/her opinions (provide information) . it is taken for granted that every citizen’s opinion counts (at least theoretically) in the countries of liberal democracy . it is society that decides who will belong to the political elite . all citizens, through participation in elections, influence the shaping of forces in the parliament . so as to implement these assumptions, genuine information, not fake information, is necessary to help citizens to make conscious election decisions . it is believed the reliable information gives people a chance to express their real opinion on a given political issue . 2. the influence of information on shaping social attitudes the development of computer technolog y has caused an insatiable need for information, whose resource in cyberspace seems infinite . at the same time this situation causes an abstract temptation to control information, a temptation which, in fact, cannot be satisfied (bauman, 2018, p . 55) . information as a  force shaping society plays an important role in creating a social context . information is not only a force affecting the external environment but also a subject of influence . the definitions pertaining to this trend refer to a wide range of phenomena and processes, including those which predominantly depend on conveying information, an important tool for creating social reality . . in the course of the discussion presented in the article, various dimensions of information were revealed . firstly, the communication dimension – information can be transferred (communication is probably the most common activity performed with information) . secondly, the cognitive dimension – information can enrich one’s knowledge (although it is not the only purpose) . third, the physical dimension  –  every piece of information is conveyed through some physical medium . the structural dimension is yet another one  –  each piece of information has a  unique structure; perhaps every structure is information . the role of information as a “spotlight” illuminating a particular situation is expressed in the theorem emphasised by specialists . it is claimed that each of our actions is preceded by making a specific decision . this applies to human participation in public and economic activities as well as in private life . the essence of decision making is or rather should actually be based on informed choices . it is a  process that resembles moving in an unknown terrain . to reach the goal (to solve the problem), one must examine the paths that lead to 77 public governance, administration and finances law review • 1. 2020 disinformation as a tool aimed at weakening consolidated democracies it . without knowing appropriate paths, moving forward will generally be at risk of failure . to avoid it, one must “see” the problem space, which requires an analysis and decision making  –  you need to have the right information to “illuminate” your surroundings . the more accurately this information describes reality, the more it will reduce the uncertainty concerning the effects of actions taken, and will protect a person against possible errors . the decision function means that information is an indispensable element of the decision-making process (both in terms of the decision problem and the procedures used) . therefore, some people argue that the decision itself is one form of information, because it often affects its content . the opinion forming function appears when information helps people in shaping an individuals’ worldview as well as the views of other people who follow the advice of their peers or associates . thereby, they build and hierarchise their own personal system of values (stefanowicz, 2009) . the controlling function is related to the fact that the sender of information, as a result of its transmission, wants to get a specific response from the recipient and influence his or her behaviour, opinions or position . this function is also associated with the decision-making process, because an entity acquiring information from the external environment faces a decision dilemma at a later stage prior to undertaking specific actions . the motivational function, which is performed in connection with providing feedback to a person about the direction of its action, can additionally serve as an incentive to intensify efforts . the human being constantly feels the need to receive new messages . the opinionforming function of information is clearly revealed when a person readily uses information made available by easily available sources: the internet, social media, press, radio and television . this means that the recipient naturally limits his or her knowledge of the world to information published by these sources . in this way one is involuntarily submitting oneself to information manipulation: one pays attention to facts that can be learned from a given source and often remains unaware of the facts that this particular source omits . the mere fact that certain facts are selectively disclosed to the general public as “key information” (an expression heard often on television and radio) draws the recipient’s attention to specific aspects of public life and diverts his or her attention from other manifestations, no less and perhaps more important, but intentionally silenced . properly profiled information affects the attitude of a  person, the actions and decisions taken . it is owing to information captured in the form of a  word, image or film (or any other form) that one can penetrate and influence another person’s mind . as a  consequence, the image of the recipient’s world is shaped to a  certain degree and his views are suggested . no surgery can penetrate the mind of another person to such an extent as information can . such surgical treatments can only change the structure of the brain, which is not equal to changing the thought processes of the individual, his or her criteria for the assessments of reality and preferred values or attitudes . information as a  “soft power” is used to control the environment – to guide other people in the direction desired by a  decision-maker . this is the foundation strateg y for educating or rather shaping the minds of the young generation . commercials which are based on the “soft power” of information provide a  good instance of this strateg y . its purpose is not to provide pure 78 artur kozłowski – klaudia skelnik public governance, administration and finances law review • vol. 5. no. 1.  information about specific products or objects, but it is aimed at convincing potential customers to buy them . this is sometimes done without any hesitation to use social engineering tricks, dishonest though they may be . the effects of such actions are both positive and negative . an example of the latter is the advertisement of tobacco products or alcoholic beverages often perversely presented as a desire to inform potential customers about specific articles available on the market . they also constitute information carrying a negative (aggressive, chauvinistic, homophobic, vulgar) content . the impact of information as a “soft power” is conspicuous in shaping the information society and so are tasks which arise from the development of information technologies and constitute a challenge for information services in new conditions . but it is not the development of new technologies themselves that has such a revolutionary impact on society . the effect achieved is the effect of the synerg y of two interconnected components: information and modern technologies to collect, process and spread it . 3. the fake news phenomenon the so called post-truth era in the world of social media domination seems to have difficulties in verifying information . even though it cannot always be verified, it does not mean it is away from the truth as such . it seems to be more difficult to reach it than it used to be but it is not impossible . actually, it is the truth in spe in which the quality criterion of the received content is beginning to be appreciated . this is why it is important to understand the post-truth phenomenon – its basic tool, its specificity, the most important features and the way it can be influenced . this tool is fake news . the term has its place in the discussion of both phenomena of post-truth and the value of information or the condition of modern media at all . in the new media era we got used to being surrounded by the flow of information . thousands of pieces of information that reach us through various channels of everyday life are nothing extraordinary . the appropriate classification of information becomes the real challenge, and widespread ignorance of how to separate false information from true information further aggravates this phenomenon . the classification and attitude towards information is governed by mathematical algorithms which, instead of us, have begun to select the messages we receive . at the same time a  large proportion of society is unaware of this fact . the flow of information also includes those pieces of information that we call fake news . it is intentionally created for disinformation, entertainment or any other purpose . its frequently shocking content reaches thousands of recipients on a  daily basis . the increase in the popularity of news (including fake news) in the social media dimension is a phenomenon of the last few years . the dissemination of sensational fake news content is still a considerable problem in the mass media and internet users are outdoing each other in creating more and more absurd information . fake news is neither the truth nor a lie, because, although it is based on misinformation, it often contains partly true information . fake news is created and used in situations where the purpose of a  medial publication is not its correspondence with the facts but getting as much interest in the topic as possible (gillin, 2017) . fake news is sometimes constructed to deliberately mislead the recipient so as to achieve, for instance, financial, 79 public governance, administration and finances law review • 1. 2020 disinformation as a tool aimed at weakening consolidated democracies political or even propaganda benefits . the creation of fake news is indeed intentional . intentionality is the key to creating fake news, because the distribution of false contents is deliberately carried out for a  specific purpose defined by the sender using channels that spread and speed up this distribution and expand the number of recipients of the specific contents . the reason why the internet is such a  readily used medium for spreading fake news is that it is often impossible to reach the real source of primary information (gans, 2004 p . 39) . analysing the phenomenon of fake news, which is a tool of the post-truth era, seems important primarily due to the fact that its presence in the media and public discourse has significantly increased . in 2017, the word went to the merriam-webster dictionary published since 1828 (lekach, 2017, p . 41), and in 2018, the phenomenon of fake news aroused extremely high interest among internet users . it is apparent that fake news is overwhelming in the mass media and on the internet (ziółkowska, 2020) . donald a . barclay defines fake news as a  propaganda tool, while brian mcnair goes much farther and notices the reason for the emergence of contemporary social and political trends in this phenomenon . moreover, monther aldwairi and ali alwahedi claim that fake news was created as part of the psychological war (mcnair, 2018) . several classifications of fake news can be identified, among which the most popular but also the most extensive one is based on the content criterion as presented in claire wardle’s classification . he has enumerated the characteristics of seven types of false information: satire or parody, false connection, misleading content, false context, imposter content, manipulated content and fabricated content . some scholars argue that fake news is a response to the needs of recipients . we have to admit that due to the dynamic of fake news’ spread we can clearly distinguish its presence in the media ecosystem . in accordance to the post-truth definition, fake news rely on objective facts which exert less influence on shaping the public, at the same time appealing strongly to human emotions and personal beliefs . so there will be messages that use the emotion or anecdotal arguments as the main persuasive device, and these messages will certainly be perceived as true ones . this information will effectively influence the public opinion by spreading doubts, mockery, hatred, or by the attempted creation of certain needs . the objective facts, the knowledge of reality and its description play a  secondary role in the interpretation of fake news, which do not need to have much to do with the truth itself (kucharski, 2018, p . 47) . considering harold laswell’s model of communication, it is conspicuous that the post-truth, which applies in particular to the content that the recipient receives, goes together with a  complete marginalisation of his or her own person and his or her ability to critically analyse the information received . the expected effect of fake news can be compared to the effects of the persuasion act . the ability to receive specific information, in turn, affects the scale of information-related impact on the recipient of the content (palczewski, 2020, p . 154) . at the same time, referring to objective facts does not necessarily change the mode of thinking about the world . other people’s arguments or opinions will always lose with a  well-grounded belief arising from the core system of values and the accepted perception of the surrounding reality . the fake news phenomenon is the result of many factors, e .g .: civilizational, cultural, economic and social . sometimes the fake news phenomenon is identified with the crisis of 80 artur kozłowski – klaudia skelnik public governance, administration and finances law review • vol. 5. no. 1.  journalism and the relativisation of the concept of truth . tabloidisation or so called softening of news of the mass media comes to the fore when discussing the reasons for the creation and development of the phenomenon of fake news . false information is intentionally created to be attractive, sensational, appealing to recipients, satisfying their curiosity and at the same time diverting their attention from understanding the falsehood of the content they decode . economic reasons are also of great importance . fake news are produced by cheaper and faster means than news based on reliable sources of information . it also brings more profit to the people or media that create or distribute it (palczewski, 2018, p . 157) . for those who are aiming at destabilisation of a  particular country, the use of fake news as a weapon is far more cheaper than any military action . (chlebowski, 2019, p . 169) regrets that it is now possible to publish unconfirmed information as well as forward unofficial contents (without informing the recipient) or just duplicate messages from social platforms . taking into account the disappearance of critical thinking and considering the fact that there is no one, objective truth, it should not surprise us that fake messages are gaining in status and popularity . the technological factor has made fake news even more widespread while creating new areas that have enabled faster distribution of fake information . for some people this situation provides new opportunities to become a  “media personality”, which has urged them to take immediate steps at the medial level (palczewski, 2018, p . 159) . fake news should be perceived as misinformation which is neither the truth nor a  lie but manipulation . when explaining fake news, it is worth noting the statement of the eu commissioner for security sir julian king who stated that “false information and misinformation have become a  weapon, which is a  serious threat to countries’ stability and security . the use of trusted channels to disseminate harmful and divisive content requires a  clear response which should be based on greater transparency, traceability and responsibility” (ec, 2018a) . it is worth emphasising the eurobarometer survey, according to which 83% of the respondents said that false information is a threat to democracy . they express concern that misinformation aims at influencing elections and immigration policy . the study also highlights the importance of high-quality media . respondents perceive traditional media as the most reliable source of information (radio 70%, television 66%, printed press 63%) . internet information sources and online video services were found to be the least reliable with a trust level of 26% and 27% respectively (ec, 2018b) . in addition, the european commission’s joint research centre has published a study (ec, 2018c) on false information and misinformation in which it is pointed out that twothirds of online news readers prefer to access them via algorithm-based platforms such as search engines, news applications, and social networking sites . it has been found that market power and income sources had shifted from news publishers to platform operators, who have an immeasurable amount of data from which they have to appropriately match readers with the articles and advertisements addressed to them . so, as it has already been mentioned, the more dangerous this phenomenon is, the more vulnerable the recipient is to the influence of fake news . to sum up, fake news is the main tool of the post-truth era and is defined as misinformation deliberately misleading the recipient to achieve the goals set by the sender . intentionality is the key to describing this phenomenon . 81 public governance, administration and finances law review • 1. 2020 disinformation as a tool aimed at weakening consolidated democracies 4. the influence of misinformation on consolidated democracies until now the phenomenon of post-truth has been referred to politics . it is gradually covering other domains of social life . we have witnessed the rise of the circumstances in which real facts are not the most important value in shaping public opinion . it affects feelings or influences beliefs, thus plays a key role in moulding public opinion . truthfulness has ceased to be crucial . words and discourse in the public space live more and more their own lives and the sense of the phenomena they describe is distorted or the context of their origin disappears . the system of consolidated democracies is liberal democracy with its democratic rule of law (kozłowski, 2019/2020) . depending on the degree of freedom and the level of its restrictions, the different political systems can be divided into the following categories: consolidated democracy, semi-consolidated democracy, hybrid regime, semi-consolidated authoritarian regime, and, in the most extreme cases, consolidated authoritarian regime .1 according to the authors, formulating an assumption about the impact of fake news as tools of misinformation on consolidated democracies requires describing the impact of information on shaping society . it should be recognised that information with its impact through the content of human sensory and mental experiences represents an enormous strength and value in shaping the functioning of democracy . the human inclination to cheat other people has now been strengthened with new opportunities of expression ensuing from civilisational and technological advancement, with general tolerance for such a  behaviour being increased . even though ethics and morality are still dominant in public discourse, at least on the level of declarations, they do not always realise in practice . allowing half-truths or manipulations to increase the importance of feelings in perceiving the world contributes to far-reaching changes in social structures . people-to-people contacts, attitudes towards authorities and trust in the media are being re-evaluated in a way leading towards an alternative reality in which there are no clear laws systematising the perception of reality . the authors of the article indicate that it is extremely important to create a  secure public space in the sense of freedom from harmful manipulations to ensure the development of democracy . the basic condition for a rational action in all spheres of human existence is always the need to make accurate decisions, which is inextricably linked to the need for relevant, objective and truthful information . this condition indicates that each piece of 1 this article adopts a typology of political systems based on their attitude to the concepts of democracy and authoritarianism, as proposed by andrzej antoszewski and ryszard herbut, who in turn draw on the conceptions put forward by scholars such as larry diamond, joseph schumpeter and robert dahl. antoszewski and herbut emphasise the need to distinguish two sub-categories of democratic systems: consolidated (stable–full) and semiconsolidated (unstable–flawed/limited). consolidated democracies are those that respect the separation of powers, sustain competitive party systems and adequately competitive elections, do not include decision-making centres uncontrolled by voters, impose limits on executive authority, and guarantee civil rights, as reflected in the unfettered development of civil society. semi-consolidated democracies are often “new”, or, as dahl calls them, “newer” or “immature”; diamond describes them as “electoral democracies”. although they meet the basic criteria characteristic of consolidated democracies, there are nevertheless flaws in their practical application. consequently, such democracies must be considered incomplete (antoszewski & herbut, 2001, pp. 18–49). 82 artur kozłowski – klaudia skelnik public governance, administration and finances law review • vol. 5. no. 1.  information has its price proportional to the value of decisions manifested efficiently through the prism of the accuracy of the cost selection . to act efficiently and effectively in all spheres of human existence, one must first get to know the areas and materials of the operational fields . this entails obtaining information about what, where, and when should be done to achieve the desired states and effects . reliable and comprehensive information about this is a  prerequisite for the selection of appropriate instruments, operators and variants of action (ciborowski, 2010), which represents an enormous strength and value in shaping both positive and negative consequences in all spheres of human existence . living and acting in the modern world means the appropriate use of information . this statement consolidates the sense of social, economic, political and educational transformations . a  person involved in various social processes and playing specific social roles from the earliest moments of his or her life is subject to a  stream of diverse information (goban-klas & sienkiewicz, 1999, p . 179) . in human society, everyone should be able to move freely through waves of information . freedom of movement is about developing critical thinking skills to distinguish between useful and worthless information . we receive more and more information and experience it more and more intensively; we, as citizens, are increasingly becoming the object of manipulation understood as actions aimed at convincing us to adopt a  specific behaviour . the fundamental factors constituting the current reality are the flow of information, the intensified pace of life and the growing number of changes (ball, 2000) . however, the excess of information forces the recipient to intensify the effort put into the reception and selection of information . therefore, the information management skills have become crucial . the increasing amount of information should serve the development of the economy, contribute to strengthening democracy or improving the quality of social life . however, the currently observed excess of information can overwhelm the recipient and cause problems with filtering the information . this is, in turn, conducive to the formation of information noise, which is becoming increasingly widespread nowadays . separating facts from opinions and truth from falsehood becomes a challenge that the contemporary consumer of media contents faces on a  daily basis . in such an environment it is extremely easy for fake news to function . the aforementioned phenomena do not contribute to the general development . nevertheless, one can venture a  claim that reliable and comprehensive information, which are a  prerequisite for choosing the right instruments as well as options, should be available to the citizen . 5. conclusions contemporary societies cannot be diagnosed as having a  passive attitude to the changing social reality . the authors believe that ongoing discussions around the post-truth issues and the problems of the increasing amount of fake news force actions that aim at limiting their pervasiveness . such activities are undertaken by several institutions like the european union, the media or ngos . admittedly, online platforms play an important role in 83 public governance, administration and finances law review • 1. 2020 disinformation as a tool aimed at weakening consolidated democracies combating the misuse of their infrastructure by hostile entities and strive to ensure the safety of their users and the public . appropriate control and preventive activities are undertaken by buzzfeed websites dealing with the investigation and verification of false news from a  journalistic perspective or an initiative of the international federation of library associations and institutions (ifla), which has prepared and published a  short guide on how to verify information to guard against fake news . there is a  special polish portal, the konkret24408, whose editors deal with analysing information and detecting fake messages . in thematically segregated sections one can find popular news about politics, health or science which has been verified and properly marked as true or false . another similar portal, acting under the name of antyfake, is a non-governmental organisation that carries out its mission on the facebook platform . preventive actions in this area will bring greater social benefits than just post factum initiatives . such actions are also concerned with decreasing the amount of fake news the general public is fed with . preventing here cannot mean political censorship, but is related rather to checking and verifying information and educational practice . the call for rational thinking comes to the fore and precludes the non-reflective reception of media content . the increasing awareness in this area may result in the general public (the recipients of media content) being more reflective and analytical as regards the nature of the information received . such awareness, in the context of publishing activities explaining this phenomenon, may influence the citizens’ ability to think critically and the will to check the sources or authors of various publications and programmes . in addition, reading the texts and viewing the entire content, instead of a  brief glance at the headline, will allow news recipients to familiarise themselves with the topics properly . beyond doubt, this ability cannot be acquired when one ignores the complexity of society . in reality, it requires support of social education and an active warning about the harm brought about by fake news . this must be conducted at a similar level as we fight addiction to nicotine, alcohol, drugs or road rage . activities that increase awareness of fake news can effectively prevent the spread of misinformation . if the recipient, who, as an active participant in the information society, also becomes a  sender, will think twice before sharing fake news with others, there is a chance that false information will not become popular and will not gain followers and resenders . that is why it is so important to educate the general public about the destructive impact of fake news . this should not be just a small csr project . this should be a highly supported and promoted action financed by supranational organisations free of governments and political control to protect them from intentional and possibly destructive political influence . the recipient of media contents should know that his actions each day affect larger social groups . by clicking on the sensational publication, one satisfies his or her curiosity, but also brings profits to media owners and their associates and employees . the actions of these media owners are often far from ethical activities and are focused on bringing political or financial benefits to certain political and medial circles or are intended to cause disorder by impairing social integration . the one who passes a  particular harmful or dishonest publication on without further checking it will only strengthen the impact of its derogative, offensive or manipulative content . it is as simple as that . thus, education and public discussion are a  basis for effective prevention of disinformation in this context . such 84 artur kozłowski – klaudia skelnik public governance, administration and finances law review • vol. 5. no. 1.  a conscious and active approach of the recipient may result not only in raising the level of the published content but also in increasing the citizens’ knowledge of information in the future . references antoszewski, a ., & herbut, r . 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(2019). genocide against indigenous peoples: the experiences of the truth commissions of canada and guatemala. the international indigenous policy journal, 10(2) . doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 genocide against indigenous peoples: the experiences of the truth commissions of canada and guatemala abstract the truth commission of guatemala stated that a genocide was committed against indigenous peoples in guatemala. the truth commission of canada concluded that a cultural genocide was committed against aboriginal peoples in canada. the article questions the contribution of the truth commissions of guatemala and canada to the recognition of a genocide. their contribution is analyzed in two areas. the article argues that the work of the two truth commissions shows that the context of a country and the perception of the crime influence the findings on genocide. it also states that the work of the two truth commissions on genocide is part of a movement towards an evolution of the 1948 united nations genocide convention. keywords genocide, cultural genocide, indigenous peoples, aboriginal peoples, international law, truth commissions, canada, guatemala acknowledgments i would like to thank the robson hall law school, the national centre for truth and reconciliation, and the persons who help me to conduct my research during my visiting scholarship at the university of manitoba: professor andrew woolford, raymond frogner, matthew renaud, donna sikorsky, helen fallding, and gail mackisey. creative commons license creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license this work is licensed under a creative commons attribution-noncommercial-no derivative works 4.0 license. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/ genocide against indigenous peoples: international law and the experiences of the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions truth commissions are temporary, official, and non-judicial bodies set up by states to examine past violations or crimes, generally to foster lasting peace and/or reconciliation (freeman, 2006; hayner, 2011; united nations secretary general, 2004). they are considered a tool of transitional justice, defined by the united nations secretary general (2004) as “the full range of processes and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempt to come to terms with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, serve justice and achieve reconciliation” (para. 8). the mechanisms of transitional justice, which apart from truth commissions also comprise tools like prosecutions, reparations, reforms, or vetting (united nations secretary general, 2004), are generally created in order to deal with the past in states that are emerging from armed conflict and/or dictatorships. however, the success of truth commissions has led to their use in many states that are not stricto sensu [in a strict sense] in transition or emerging from armed conflict or dictatorships (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015e; greensboro truth and reconciliation commission [north carolina, usa], 2006). truth commissions, created in a transitional or non-transitional period by states struggling to overcome a violent past, have sometimes dealt with indigenous peoples (chilean national commission on truth and reconciliation, 1993; comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico [commission for the historical clarification, guatemala], 1999a; comisión verdad y justicia [truth and justice commission, paraguay], 2008; comisión verdad y reconciliación [truth and reconciliation commission, peru], 2003; the timor-leste commission for reception, truth, and reconciliation, 2013; truth and justice commission [mauritius], 2011; truth, justice and reconciliation commission of kenya, 2013; truth and reconciliation commission [sierra leone], 2004; truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015e; truth and reconciliation commission of liberia, 2009; truth and reconciliation commission of south africa, 1998; see also john, cunningham, & pop, 2013).1 this article explores the role that truth commissions have played in cases of genocide against indigenous peoples. genocide, a concept introduced by raphael lemkin (1944), is a well-recognized crime, defined in the united nations convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (ungc, 1948) as: any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. (article 2) despite this legal definition, there is a difference between genocide as a phenomenon analyzed and experienced in many societies or states and genocide as a crime defined by the ungc. indeed, understandings of genocide can sometimes differ from the international legal definition. some states have their own definitions (schabas, 2009) and many scholars have also constructed definitions of genocide that broaden the scope of the crime—for example, by including groups that are excluded from 1 in this article, i refer to indigenous peoples and aboriginal peoples synonymously. 1 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 the ungc—or restrict it—by limiting the definition to mass murder, for instance (totten & bartrop, 2008). despite these differences, the ungc has remained the most important legal instrument pertaining to genocide and the centrepiece of its recognition. consequently, any discussion of genocide should not ignore the ungc. truth commissions are no stranger to the debate on genocide, either as a phenomenon or an international legal concept. one aspect of this has been their contribution to the recognition of genocide against indigenous peoples. where truth commissions have addressed the perpetration of genocide against indigenous peoples, there are questions to ask regarding how they have dealt with the crime and to what extent they have either used the ungc or gone beyond international legal concepts and norms. the paraguayan truth commission, the truth and justice commission (comisión verdad y justicia, 2008), paid attention to genocide in the context of repression in that country and implicitly followed the ungc definition of genocide. it failed to find evidence to prove that acts committed against indigenous peoples amounted to genocide. after reporting acts committed against an indigenous people (the aché people), including extrajudicial executions and forced sterilization, it stated that even if some of the acts could fall into the category of genocidal acts, the commission was not able to prove one of the core elements of genocide: the perpetrators’ intention to destroy the group. however, the commission asserted that the crimes committed constituted crimes against humanity because of their general and systematic character (comisión verdad y justicia, 2008). unlike the paraguayan truth commission, truth commissions in canada and guatemala used the concept of genocide in different ways to characterize violations committed against indigenous peoples. the truth and reconciliation commission of canada (trc) called what happened to aboriginal peoples (first nations, métis, and inuit) in canadian residential schools a cultural genocide (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015e)—a crime not explicitly recognised in the ungc, as will be discussed in the second section of this article. while in guatemala, the commission for historical clarification (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico [ceh]) reported that genocide was committed against many groups of mayan indigenous peoples in guatemala (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico,1999b). these two truth commissions’ conclusions can be studied comparatively for four main reasons: a. in the histories of both guatemala and canada, indigenous peoples have faced many problems, including poverty, marginalization, and discrimination (carter, 1999; salazar, 2012; woolford, 2015). b. in both countries, the truth commissions tried to address the issue of indigenous peoples’ rights. c. these two truth commissions, unlike others, used the terminology of genocide to name violations committed against indigenous peoples. d. in their reports on genocide against indigenous peoples, the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions insisted on elements that are not included in the ungc’s definition, as will be discussed in the third section of this article. truth commissions are not, of course, the only bodies that have dealt with indigenous peoples and genocide. in australia, the national inquiry into the separation of aboriginal and torres strait islander 2 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 children from their families, which was not stricto sensu a truth commission, published a report that used the terminology of genocide (national inquiry into the separation of aboriginal and torres strait islander children from their families, 1997). in guatemala, a document compiled by the catholic church’s proyecto interdiocesano de recuperación de la memoria histórica [the recovery of historical memory (remhi)], which likewise was not stricto sensu a truth commission, analyzed violations committed by the country’s military government, including those against indigenous peoples, and concluded that what happened had certain genocidal characteristics (proyecto interdiocesano de recuperación de la memoria histórica, 1998). however, while the work of these two inquiries is important, they will not be analyzed in detail here because they fall outside the scope of this article, which is focused mainly on truth commissions. thus, this article focuses on the cases of guatemala and canada as the only truth commissions to date to have extensively considered and examined the perpetration of genocide against indigenous or aboriginal peoples. these cases illustrate the contribution truth commissions can make to both the recognition of genocide against indigenous or aboriginal peoples and the discussion of genocide as a phenomenon and a legal concept. relying mainly on the guatemalan and canadian truth commissions and on the development of international law in the area of genocide, this article draws two lessons that pertain to the differences between genocide as defined by the ungc and genocide as a phenomenon experienced by different societies. first, the work of the two truth commissions shows that the specificities of a country, including the context and the perception of genocide, influence findings on genocide. consequently, the findings of truth commissions on genocide against indigenous peoples may vary. second, despite their differences, both truth commissions tended to insist on elements not included in the ungc and to understand genocide as a phenomenon that does not always fit international legal conceptions. the work of these two truth commissions involving indigenous peoples suggests that it may be appropriate to consider an evolution of international law regarding the crime of genocide to include new elements. after presenting an overview of the guatemalan and canadian truth commissions, this article examines these two lessons. then, the article analyzes developments in the understanding of genocide in each of the two truth commissions’ final reports and underlines their specificities, including the influence of context and the perception of genocide against indigenous peoples on the commissions’ findings. finally, with regard to genocide against indigenous peoples, it examines the potential for an evolution of the ungc based on the findings of the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions. overview of the guatemalan and canadian truth commissions guatemala: the comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico the creation of the guatemalan truth commission was the result of peace negotiations, under the auspices of the united nations, between the guatemalan government and the armed rebel group guatemalan national revolutionary unity [unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca, urng], which had engaged in the civil war that ravaged guatemala from 1962 until 1996 (agreement on a firm and lasting peace, 1996; tomuschat, 2001). before the conclusion of the final peace agreement, both parties signed agreements on several matters (agreement on a firm and lasting peace, 1996). in 1994 in one of those agreements, the parties agreed to establish a truth commission (agreement on the 3 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 establishment of the commission, 1994). the truth commission received the name comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico [the commission for historical clarification]. it was created “to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the guatemalan population to suffer” (agreement on the establishment of the commission, 1994, p. 13). the guatemalan truth commission had three members. a german professor of international law, christian tomuschat, was appointed by the united nations secretariat (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999a). tomuschat subsequently appointed two other members, alfredo balsells tojo, a guatemalan lawyer, and otilia lux de cotí, a guatemalan human rights defender (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999a). the guatemalan truth commission started its activities in 1997. it examined documents, conducted field research and interviews, and collected testimonies from thousands of victims and witnesses (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999a). relying on these elements, the commission wrote a final report, which was published in february 1999. this report, memoria del silencio [memory of silence], emphasized the crimes and violations of both human rights and international humanitarian law that were committed during the armed confrontation and made recommendations to the guatemalan government. among the crimes reported by the commission was the crime of genocide committed against mayan groups, which it identified as indigenous peoples (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b; higonnet, 2009). canada: the truth and reconciliation commission sixteen years later, a canadian truth commission also dealt with genocide against indigenous peoples. the truth and reconciliation commission of canada (trc) is unique because its creation was the result of a lawsuit (niezen, 2013), not government-driven action. the decision to create the trc came after a legal battle engaged by former students in the canadian residential school system against the canadian federal government and the churches involved in administrating the schools (nagy, 2014). many former students and organizations had been criticizing the residential schooling policy whereby aboriginal children were removed from their families by canadian authorities and placed in the schools. these civil legal claims and later class action lawsuits sought to obtain reparation for the harm caused by residential schooling (buti, 2001; cassidy, 2003; olthuis kleer townshend llp, 2012; truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015b). in 2006, the government of canada, the involved churches, the plaintiffs, and representatives of aboriginal peoples signed an agreement (indian residential schools settlement agreement, 2006a). intended to be implemented under court supervision, the agreement set rules regarding the compensation of aboriginal individuals affected by the federally run residential schools.2 the creation of a truth and reconciliation commission was one of the provisions and commitments listed in the 2006 agreement (indian residential schools settlement agreement, 2006b). an order-in-council of the governor general, on the recommendation of the canadian prime minister, established the indian residential schools truth and reconciliation commission in 2008 (order-in-council, 2008a), subsequently known as the truth and reconciliation commission of canada. 2 it is worth noting that the limited scope of the compensation set up by the agreement, which did not cover all aboriginal groups, communities, and family members, has been criticized (see henderson & wakeham, 2009). 4 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 three canadian commissioners were appointed by orders-in-council as members of the trc for a fiveyear term. justice harry laforme, a judge of the ontario court of appeal, was designated chair of the commission (order-in-council, 2008b); claudette dumont-smith, a health expert; and jane brewin morley, a lawyer, were the other commissioners (order-in-council, 2008c, 2008d). shortly after the three commissioners began their work in june 2008, laforme resigned in october 2008, and the two other members resigned in january 2009 (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2012). a selection panel chose three new commissioners, who were appointed for a five-year term. justice murray sinclair, a judge of the court of queen’s bench of manitoba, was appointed chair of the trc (order-incouncil, 2009a). dr. marie wilson, a journalist, and chief wilton littlechild, a lawyer, were appointed as commissioners of the trc (order-in-council 2009b, 2009c). they took office on july 1, 2009. in 2014, at the end of their five-year term, the commissioners were reappointed for an additional year to complete their work (order-in-council, 20014a, 2014b, 2014c). the task assigned to the canadian truth commission was mainly to document and establish an historical record on what happened in the residential schools, including consequences and impacts, in order to foster reconciliation (indian residential school settlement agreement, 2006b). the trc conducted research on canadian residential schools, organized national and community truth and reconciliation events, and collected thousands of documents and testimonies from aboriginal victims, survivors, and witnesses (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015e). it rendered its final report in 2015. in its report, the trc stated that canada committed cultural genocide against aboriginal peoples in the context of residential schools (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015e). because of their different contexts, the creation of the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions took different paths. the two truth commissions shared a common commitment to shedding light on violations of indigenous peoples’ rights that have progressively drawn the attention of international law (anaya, 2009; saul, 2016; thornberry, 2005). in doing so, they mobilized the terminology of genocide to draw different conclusions because of the different contexts of the two countries and their understandings of genocide. the influence of context and understanding of genocide on the characterization of abuses: cultural genocide and genocide the guatemalan and canadian truth commissions used the word genocide to characterize what happened to indigenous peoples in the two countries, and both referred to the ungc. however, in canada, the trc referred to cultural genocide, while in guatemala the ceh referred simply to genocide. in the same vein, the two truth commissions did not use the same reasoning, nor did they give the same importance to the ungc. these differences are rooted in the context of the two states and the understanding of genocide in the two cases. canada: cultural genocide against indigenous peoples in the context of residential schools the canadian truth and reconciliation commission’s relation to genocide can be understood through two main conclusions: first, the trc did not rely explicitly on the ungc to draw its main conclusions about the violations committed against indigenous peoples in the context of residential schools in canada. in the summary of its final report, the trc wrote that canadian federal government’s policies 5 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 regarding aboriginal peoples, including residential schools, amounted to cultural genocide. according to the commission: for over a century, the central goals of canada’s aboriginal policy were to eliminate aboriginal governments; ignore aboriginal rights; terminate the treaties; and, through a process of assimilation, cause aboriginal peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, cultural, religious, and racial entities in canada. the establishment and operation of residential schools were a central element of this policy, which can best be described as “cultural genocide.” (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015b, p. 1) going further, the trc defined cultural genocide. it stated, “cultural genocide is the destruction of those structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a group. states that engage in cultural genocide set out to destroy the political and social institutions of the targeted group” (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015b, p. 1). in these strong statements, which are at the heart of its final report’s main conclusions, the trc’s lack of reference to the ungc is consistent with international law. indeed, the ungc does not recognize cultural genocide. cultural genocide, whose definition stresses the intent to destroy the culture and language of a protected group, was discussed during the drafting process and negotiations which led to the adoption of the ungc.3 but states rejected the idea of incorporating cultural genocide in the convention (schabas, 2009). by not relying on the ungc, the trc implicitly confirmed what had already been established in international law. however, some parts of the trc’s report question whether the non-recognition of cultural genocide is in conformity to international law. this is the second conclusion: in some segments of its report, the trc appeared to conclude that what happened in the context of residential schools in canada could fall under the ungc’s understanding of genocide. in the fifth volume of its report, while criticizing the refusal of the canadian courts to acknowledge wrongdoings committed against aboriginal peoples in canada, the trc wrote: it is difficult to reconcile the refusal of courts to acknowledge the loss of language and culture as being compensable with the very important principle that such acts could constitute acts of genocide, an acknowledged crime against a racial group in breach of the un convention on genocide. (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015c, p. 125) 3 see, for example, the proposition of the ad hoc committee: article iii (‘cultural’ genocide) in this convention genocide also means any deliberate act committed with the intent to destroy the language, religion, or culture of a national, racial or religious group on grounds of national or racial origin or religious belief of its members such as: 1. prohibiting the use of the language of the group in daily intercourse or in schools, or the printing and circulation of publications in the language of the group; 2. destroying or preventing the use of libraries, museums, schools, historical monuments, places of worship or other cultural institutions and objects of the group. (united nations secretary general, 1947, p. 17) 6 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 the trc recognized explicitly that cultural genocide was rejected during the drafting process of the un genocide convention (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015c). however, it noted, “nonetheless, while the term genocide generally refers to the physical destruction of members of a racialized group, the convention [the ungc] contains provisions that appear to contemplate criteria other than immediate physical destruction” (p. 125). after quoting article 2 of the ungc, which defines genocide, the trc report asserted that “articles 2(d) and 2(e) do not require that the victims themselves be ‘destroyed’ but that the measures taken against them be intended to result in the destruction of the ‘national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such’” (p. 125). referring to one of the genocidal acts outlined in article 2(e) of the ungc, the trc added: the forcible removal of children from their racial community in order to be indoctrinated into another racial community and thereby “destroy” their original group would likewise be an act of genocide, even though the children themselves continued to live as members of the new group. (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015c, pp. 125-126) moreover, it argued that it is its view “that if canada were to attempt to do today what it did in the nineteenth century through residential schools, it could face severe international consequences” (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015c, p. 126). elsewhere in the same volume of its report, the trc continued in the same vein by indicating: considering that one element of the un convention on genocide involves recognizing that the forcible removal of children from one group to another group for the purpose of wiping out the racial identity of the children is a crime, it is difficult to understand why courts have not been more willing to recognize at least intentional acts of cultural and racial destruction or deprivation as a compensable tort. (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015c, p. 206) more explicitly, in the sixth volume of its report, the trc made a connection between article 2(e) of the ungc and the canadian state’s policy of removing children from their family. it indicated: it is difficult to understand why the forced assimilation of children through removal from their families and communities—to be placed with people of another race for the purpose of destroying the race and culture from which the children come—is not a civil wrong even though it can be deemed an act of genocide under article 2(e) of the united nations convention on genocide. (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015d, p. 48) this statement by the trc resembles the conclusion of the australian commission of inquiry set up to investigate the transfer of aboriginal children from one group to another—even if, unlike the canadian truth commission, the australian commission was addressing the permanent transfer of children. in its 1997 report bringing them home, the australian commission stated that the removal of aboriginal children from their families constituted genocide, basing its statement on the ungc (national inquiry into the separation of aboriginal and torres strait islander children from their families, 1997). the opinion of the truth and reconciliation commission of canada is also akin to the views of some scholars who suggest that article 2(e) can be interpreted as a recognition of cultural genocide (saul, 2016; thornberry, 2005). 7 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 it seems clear that in the fifth and sixth volume of its report, the trc’s statements converge around the point that the forcible transfer of children, which took place in the context of residential schools in canada, amounts to genocide according to the ungc’s definition—even if the members of the group were not physically destroyed. thus, the canadian trc made two arguments that can give the impression of a contradiction, raising a legitimate question: why does one part of the report state strongly that what occurred was a cultural genocide, a crime not recognized in the ungc, while another part of the report states that some actions directed against aboriginal peoples could fall under the ungc? one could assume that the use of the term “cultural genocide” was meant less as legal term than as a phrase directed towards victims and their process of mourning. to this end, akhavan (2016) sought to understand why aboriginal victims and survivors applauded during the final ceremony of the trc when what happened to them was characterized as a cultural genocide, and to answer the question of whether cultural genocide is a “legal label” or a “mourning metaphor” (p. 245). after examining the complexity and fate of cultural genocide in international law, he concluded that “for the survivors that applauded in ottawa, cultural genocide is above all a song of bereavement, a metaphor for mourning, rebuilding a shattered self-conception through the power of words” (p. 270). indeed, beyond the legal matters that may interest scholars and experts, the stigmatization of past wrongdoings is very important for victims of atrocities. the worse and more profoundly negative the words used to describe the past, the better it may be for the victims. the use of the word “genocide,” sometimes commonly referred to as “the crime of crimes,” alongside the word “cultural” follows this rationale. however, one could legitimately wonder whether most of the survivors at the trc’s final ceremony were applauding the word “genocide” or the word “cultural,” and whether many of them thought that cultural genocide was in fact equivalent to genocide. this question is not irrelevant, since certain facts show that the word “genocide” has been at the heart of discussions regarding aboriginal peoples in canada and beyond: first, some confusion appeared in public discourses in canada about the distinction between genocide as defined by the ungc and cultural genocide. for example, in a 2011 speech canada’s then-minister of aboriginal affairs and northern development canada john duncan declared that “the history of residential schools tells of an education policy gone wrong” (duncan, 2011, para. 7). he also reportedly said: “i don’t view it that way [as an act of cultural genocide], but it was certainly very negative to the retention of culture and if it had extended for another generation or two it might have been lethal, yes” (“saganash calls on duncan,” 2011, para. 6). taken as a whole, this statement by the former canadian minister leads to some inconsistency. cultural genocide does not necessarily imply deaths. genocide, in the ungc definition, implies physical and/or biological destruction, and it has been interpreted in that manner (international law commission, 1996). consequently, without contravening this rationale, one cannot reasonably assert or suggest that a policy could have become a cultural genocide only if deaths occurred. if one looks carefully at the statement of the former minister, one may assume that he meant to say that what happened to aboriginal peoples in canada in the context of residential schools was not a genocide, but that it might have become one had the policy continued for one or two generations with widespread fatalities. in actuality, the former minister’s statement implicitly equates genocide and cultural genocide. it could also be taken to mean that cultural genocide does not always fall under the legal definition of genocide, but 8 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 that sometimes it does. the statement drew criticism; many individuals denounced it for diminishing the violations committed and refusing to name what happened as cultural genocide (“saganash calls on duncan,” 2011). the debate that followed, however, was oriented around understanding genocide, with some condemning the statement by relying on the ungc and linking what happened to aboriginal peoples in canada to its definition of genocide (palmater, 2011). this orientation is questionable, since the ungc does not deal with cultural genocide, the expression used in the statement that caused the controversy. one could consequently conclude that the discussion was not actually about cultural genocide, but about genocide as defined and recognized by the ungc. for the people who condemned the minister’s statement, his refusal to accept the terminology of cultural genocide was seen as minimization. for them, keeping a connection to the legal definition of genocide was important in order to uphold the accuracy of characterizations of the violations committed against aboriginal peoples. rhetorical reference to genocide in discussions about indigenous peoples’ rights is also recurrent at the international level. the united nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples (2007) states that indigenous peoples “shall not be subjected to any act of genocide” (article 7). an observation of the discussions held across many sessions of the united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues shows that the issue of genocide against indigenous peoples was very often emphasized (united nations permanent forum on indigenous issues, 2008, 2011). second, in canada the word “genocide,” without the adjective cultural, had been circulating in debates among aboriginal peoples for several years. before the trc’s work and report, many scholars, indigenous peoples, residential school survivors, and others had been using the word to characterize canadian policy regarding aboriginal peoples, including residential schools, as one of its core elements (akhtar, 2010; “manitoba first nation organization,” 2013; macdonald, 2014; robinson & qinney, 1985; truth commission into genocide in canada, 2001). even the chair of the trc, justice murray sinclair, used the word “genocide” several times in public to characterize the canadian policy regarding residential schools (macdonald, 2015; puxley, 2012). so why did the trc refer to cultural genocide instead of genocide, given that (a) its chair used the term several times in public, and (b) it seemed to fit the perception of aboriginal peoples in canada? pragmatic reasons guided by the canadian context certainly influenced the trc’s decision. as macdonald (2015) has explained, the trc did not conclude that a genocide had not happened, while “invoking genocide would have opened the commission to attack from right-wing activists, armchair lawyers, and others” (para. 9). the trc chose the expression “cultural genocide” so as to avoid harsh criticism and controversies that would have hampered reconciliation. indeed, while the trc was conducting its activities, canada faced multiple challenges around reconciliation. reconciliation between aboriginal peoples and non-aboriginal people in canada was at the heart of the commission’s activities and goals. for many years, canadian federal authorities have been reluctant to use the terminology of genocide to describe the residential school policy. on the one hand, then, the canadian authorities would have been opposed to the qualification of what happened in the context of residential school as genocide. on the other hand, however, aboriginal peoples in canada have been stressing the use of the word “genocide.” 9 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 as such, the expression “cultural genocide” appeared to be the best compromise. aboriginal peoples in canada would find in the expression a recognition of the violations they endured, even if it was reduced and restricted by the designation “cultural.” it would be very difficult for the canadian government to oppose the expression, which has no legal consequences either in canadian law or in international law, without seeming either legalistic or minimizing. here it is worth recalling that canada contributed to the exclusion of cultural genocide from the ungc. according to schabas (2009), during the negotiations for the adoption of the genocide convention, “canada declared that, if the committee were to retain the cultural genocide provision, the canadian government would have to make certain reservations ‘as the canadian constitution limited the legislative powers of the federal government to the benefit of the provincial legislatures’” (p. 212). canada’s delegation to the negotiations was instructed to work towards the suppression of article 3 of the draft genocide convention, which recognized cultural genocide, and eventually to vote against the whole convention if the issue was not resolved (schabas, 2009). with this in mind, one could legitimately wonder if, in 1948, canada was afraid of the legal consequences that the recognition of cultural genocide by an international instrument could have had regarding its own policies against aboriginal peoples. as discussion of whether or not a genocide has been committed against aboriginal peoples is an established national debate in canada, this core fact could not have been ignored by the trc when it wrote its report. guatemala: a genocide against indigenous peoples in the context of a civil armed conflict unlike the trc, the guatemalan commission for historical clarification (ceh) did not encounter large-scale national debates and controversies over naming genocide against indigenous peoples. unlike the trc, the scope of the ceh’s mandate was not limited. it was set up after a bloody civil war in order to examine violations of human rights and acts of violence. the united nations played a role in its establishment, and it had a somewhat international dimension. this context can be considered an element that freed the commission from the kind of concerns that could have led its members to refrain from qualifying the crimes committed as genocide. the perpetration of a genocide against indigenous peoples in guatemala was related to the guatemalan civil war, which broke out in the context of the cold war between the government of guatemala, an ally of the united states of america, and the urng, a leftist armed opposition group. during the armed conflict, mayan groups—indigenous peoples in guatemala who were already both historically discriminated against and victims of racism—were viewed by the government as sympathizers of the urng and thus enemies (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b). government armed forces targeted mayan groups, escalating between 1981 and 1983 (especially in rural areas). many mayan groups were subjected to killings, massacres, torture, mistreatment, forced displacement, and other abuses (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b). in its examination of what happened to indigenous peoples of guatemala during the civil war, the ceh explicitly stated that a genocide was committed against four mayan groups between 1981 and 1983 (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c). the ceh dealt with genocide in two main ways. first, it deliberately based its findings on the ungc and placed the abuses committed against guatemalan indigenous peoples in the context of international norms. the wording of the ungc and international norms were important in the ceh’s report. relying on the definition provided by the 1948 genocide convention, and in an effort to bring its 10 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 conclusions close to its provisions, the ceh both explained why it characterized indigenous groups as victim groups under the protection of the convention and gave explanations of how the guatemalan authorities intended to destroy that group in part or in whole. in identifying the victim group, the ceh faced the challenge of establishing that indigenous peoples fall under the groups named in the ungc. indigenous peoples are not explicitly listed among the protected groups identified by the ungc, which are restricted to national, racial, religious, and ethnic groups. as such, the ceh decided to characterize mayan groups as ethnic groups (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b), strategically using the identification criteria that had been instrumental in determining the existence of a protected group in international criminal law. it affirmed that this determination depended on objective and subjective elements, with the objective elements being stable ones such as language and culture and the subjective elements being the group members’ self-perception of belonging. the ceh accordingly underlined that the constitution of guatemala and one of the agreements signed in the course of the peace negotiations, the accord on the identity and rights of indigenous peoples, recognized mayan indigenous groups as ethnic groups. it also addressed the self-identification criterion, stating that the members of the indigenous mayan groups identified themselves as ethnic groups. the ceh concluded that, in its understanding, mayan ethnic groups were among the indigenous peoples in guatemala, that they identified themselves as such, and were identified as such by others (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b). beyond these legal grounds, the ceh’s decision to assert that indigenous peoples were an ethnic group protected under the ungc can also be viewed as a way of rejecting the narrative from former government officials that identified the groups as political threats to justify targeting them. regarding the determination of the authorities’ intent to destroy, the ceh analyzed and reported the abuses committed between 1981 and 1983 against four mayan peoples in four regions. it selected these regions on the basis of elements such as the availability of information, the identified victim groups, and the intensity and patterns of violence. its analysis found that the guatemalan government had acted with genocidal intent. according to the commission, the discriminatory nature and repetition of the attacks against members of the mayan groups were evidence of intent to destroy the groups (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b; perlin, 2000). the guatemalan commission strongly stated: considering the series of criminal acts and human rights violations which occurred in the regions and periods indicated and which were analyzed for the purpose of determining whether they constituted the crime of genocide, the ceh concludes that the reiteration of destructive acts, directed systematically against groups of mayan population, within which can be mentioned the elimination of leaders and criminal acts against minors who could not possibly have been military targets, demonstrates that the only common denominator for all the victims was the fact that they belonged to a specific ethnic group and makes it evident that these acts were committed “with intent to destroy, in whole or in part” these groups (article ii, first paragraph of the convention). (commission for historical clarification, 1999, p. 39, para. 111; for the original version in spanish, see comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, p. 49, para. 111) the ceh then categorized the genocidal acts under consideration. it wrote that the acts reported amounted to violations of sections (a), (b), (c), (d), and (e) of article 2 of the ungc. for example, the 11 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 ceh linked massacres committed against mayan group to “killings” as mentioned in article 2(a); torture, cruel, and inhumane actions to “serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group” as described in article 2(b); and raids on mayan villages and the bombing of displaced persons to “deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part” in article 2(c) (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, pp. 49-51, paras. 112-122). although the ceh did not refer to acts that violate article 2(d and e) in the conclusion of its report—for reasons that are unclear—other segments dealt with acts that can be linked to article 2(e). for example, it reported the forced transfer of children in its analysis of violations committed in the area it identified as region ii (maya achi; comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b). however, in a second argument, the guatemalan truth commission went beyond the ungc. the ceh wrote that acts not listed in the ungc, but which were part of the same plan, are relevant because they reinforce evidence of the intent to destroy (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b). the ceh included the destruction of goods and crops, forced displacement, and the destruction of cultural elements. it reported attacks against the identity of the maya and the destruction of sacred mayan sites that obliged them to stop their traditional rituals. it pointed out the persecution of mayan priests as part of the destruction of culture and identity. it also considered the killing of a priest as an attempt to destroy the material and physical aspect of the mayan culture (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c). in stressing the destruction of cultural elements of indigenous peoples in its 1999 report, even if it did not say that that destruction amounted to cultural genocide, the ceh was not far from the conclusions drawn many years later by the trc. thus, the work of both commissions shows that the context of the state where the commission occurs influences its findings on genocide. this difference of approach is also based on a dual understanding of genocide, a crime that is both a phenomenon perceived differently by different societies and a notion strictly defined by the ungc. these differences aid in unpacking the dynamic behind identifying genocide or cultural genocide. moreover, the fact that both commissions insisted on elements not included in the ungc shows their participation in a movement towards an evolution of international law in the area of genocide. a new consideration of genocide on the basis of the reports of the two truth commissions the inclusion of culture in international law, the destruction of cultural elements in cases of genocide are only admitted as evidence of the intent to destroy a protected group when such acts have been committed alongside the physical or biological destruction of the protected group (schabas, 2009). the case of guatemala fulfilled that requirement, since the destruction of cultural elements of the mayan indigenous peoples went alongside the physical destruction of the members of the groups. the guatemalan truth commission provided substantial detail about the destruction of mayan culture and the killing of mayan individuals (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999b). the canadian case was different, because the mandate of the trc was restricted. the trc analyzed the destruction of the culture of aboriginal peoples of canada in the context of residential schools. it did not examine the question of an intent to physically or biologically destroy aboriginal peoples of canada. 12 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 however, both commissions shared a common interest in revealing the truth about the destruction of culture in situations of genocide. they also shared the will to place culture, an element not recognized in the ungc, at the heart of the crime of genocide, following a trend that seeks to include culture in international case law and doctrine around genocide. by doing so, they gave weight to culture, an element that was already relevant in raphael lemkin’s (1944) work on genocide (see also woolford, 2015). in this regard, the late international criminal law scholar and judge antonio cassese proposed the deletion of “racial groups” from the definition of genocide in the ungc and the inclusion of “cultural groups.” according to cassese (2009): it would be necessary to delete the old-fashioned and scientifically wrong reference to “race” as the connotation of one of the targeted groups and add instead a reference to “cultural groups.” it should be specified that those attacks on such groups should be banned which are carried out with the intent of destroying the cultural traditions of a group. this ban would aim at protecting the fundamental hallmarks that characterize the habits, rituals, traditions, artistic manifestations etc. of a group, in particular of aboriginal groups of latin america, africa, canada, and australia. (p. 541) similarly, the international criminal tribunal for the former yugoslavia (icty) relied on the destruction of elements of culture in order to prove the intent to destroy a national group before reaching the conclusion that a genocide was committed. it wrote: the trial chamber is aware that it must interpret the convention with due regard for the principle of nullum crimen sine lege [no crime without a law]. it therefore recognises that, despite recent developments, customary international law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical or biological destruction of all or part of the group. hence, an enterprise attacking only the cultural or sociological characteristics of a human group in order to annihilate these elements which give to that group its own identity distinct from the rest of the community would not fall under the definition of genocide. the trial chamber however points out that where there is physical or biological destruction there are often simultaneous attacks on the cultural and religious property and symbols of the targeted group as well, attacks which may legitimately be considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group. in this case, the trial chamber will thus take into account as evidence of intent to destroy the group the deliberate destruction of mosques and houses belonging to members of the group. (prosecutor v. radislav krstić, 2001, para. 580) many scholars have called for the recognition or acknowledgement of cultural genocide in international law (see for example novic, 2016). the two truth commissions’ insistence on including culture in their accounts of genocide supports the argument for such an evolution. the relevance of reparations the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions also dedicated segments of their reports to the reparation of the harm caused by cultural genocide and genocide against indigenous peoples (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c; truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015a). in doing so, they considered an important element not included in the ungc. indeed, the ungc does not contain any provisions on reparations. just as in the case of culture or cultural genocide, the states 13 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 involved rejected the idea of integrating a provision on reparations for victims. the draft convention initially contained an article 8, which stated: when genocide is committed in a country by the government in power or by sections of the population, and if the government fails to resist it successfully, the state shall grant to the survivors of the human group that is a victim of genocide redress of a nature and in an amount to be determined by the united nations. (united nations secretary general, 1947, p. 47) the provision was rejected because, among other reasons, some states held that reparations must be set through judicial proceedings (schabas, 2009). the absence of a reparation provision in the convention has led some scholars to call for the revision of the ungc to include reparations (cassese, 2009). in their reports, both the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions stressed the need for symbolic, individual, and collective reparations. in canada, the trc’s calls to action, which sought “to redress the legacy of residential schools and advance the process of canadian reconciliation” (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015a, p. 1), pointed out measures that the canadian authorities need to implement in the area of reparation. most of the recommended measures amounted to collective and/or symbolic reparations. financial and individual reparations were already a part of the agreement that created the commission, which stipulated that financial compensation would be allowed to victims (indian residential schools settlement agreement. (2006b). several of the trc’s recommendations can be categorized as satisfaction, a form of reparation recognized in international law that includes, among other things, apologies, commemoration, and the search of truth (basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparations, 2005). among the reparations proposed were, for example, various educational measures to be taken in favor of aboriginal peoples; measures pertaining to memorialization, notably in archives and museums; and an apology from the pope, to follow the apology made by the prime minister of canada on june 11, 2008 (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015a). rehabilitation, which includes “medical and psychological care as well as legal and social services” (basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparations, 2005, para. 21), was also an important element in the trc’s calls to action. the document called for health and legal measures to be implemented in order to improve the living conditions of aboriginal peoples in canada. in guatemala, the ceh’s recommendations included many reparatory measures. but unlike in canada, the guatemalan truth commission dealt with victims of an armed conflict. for that reason, the ceh’s recommendations are not specifically dedicated to indigenous peoples. the guatemalan truth commission prescribed the creation of a national reparations program that included restitution, financial compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction for all victims (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c). mayan victims were entitled to the proposed global reparations program. however, the ceh also took into account the particularity of the victimization of indigenous peoples as a collective group. it recommended the active participation of indigenous peoples of guatemala in the “definition, execution and evaluation” of the reparations program (comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, p. 63). in the same vein, as in canada, some reparatory measures amounting to satisfaction were set for indigenous peoples as a collective group. the ceh insisted on memorialization, recommending: 14 the international indigenous policy journal, vol. 10, iss. 2 [2019], art. 6 doi: 10.18584/iipj.2019.10.2.6 that the commemorations and ceremonies for the victims of the armed confrontation take into consideration the multicultural nature of the guatemalan nation, to which end the government and local authorities should promote and authorize the raising of monuments and the creation of communal cemeteries in accordance with the forms of mayan collective memory. (commission for historical clarification, 1999, p. 49, para. 5; for the original version in spanish, see comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, p. 62, para. 5) the commission also recommended “[t]hat the sacred mayan sites violated during the armed confrontation [be] reclaimed and their importance highlighted in accordance with the wishes of the communities affected” (commission for historical clarification, 1999, p. 49, para. 6; for the original version in spanish, see comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, p. 62, para. 6). the work of the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions on genocide against indigenous peoples demonstrate that reparation is an important element to consider in a state after findings of genocide. the need for reconciliation reconciliation is at the heart of the activities of many truth commissions, including those conducted in canada and guatemala. after compiling information about the genocidal abuses committed against indigenous peoples, the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions insisted on the need for reconciliation. yet while the crime of genocide is always a dramatic sign of a deep social split and the disruption of a state’s social fabric, states did not consider reconciliation in the ungc. one could respond that reconciliation is hard to define, that it has a certain degree of abstraction that law cannot easily capture, and that it is characterized by continuous individual and social effort. but still, without reconciliation, a society that has faced large-scale crimes and abuses cannot effectively recover from the past. contrary to the lack of recognition in international law of the importance of reconciliation after a genocide or cultural genocide, reconciliation between indigenous peoples and non-indigenous peoples was at the heart of the work of the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions. in canada, where the commission had the word “reconciliation” in its name, this was a core issue. the trc pointed out in many parts of its report the need for reconciliation in canada between aboriginal and non-aboriginal peoples (truth and reconciliation commission of canada, 2015d). the guatemalan parliament adopted a national reconciliation law in 1996, before the truth commission released its report (decreto del congreso n°145-96, 1996). even if the matter of reconciliation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples was not part of its mandate, the truth commission insisted on it in its recommendations. the ceh’s report rooted the guatemalan armed confrontation in, among other things, the “racism, inequality and exclusion” that it said characterized the relationship between the guatemalan state and indigenous mayan peoples (commission for historical clarification, 1999, p. 55; for the original in spanish, see comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, p. 68). it called for the achievement of “national harmony and reconciliation” by the means of “cultural change…through an active policy of education and peace” (commission for historical clarification, 1999, p. 55; for the original in spanish, see comisión para el esclarecimiento histórico, 1999c, p. 68). fundamentally, examining these commissions and how they examined genocide points to gaps in the ungc. the reports of the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions insist on elements such as 15 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 culture, reparations, and reconciliation, which are important and could be included in the ungc in the future. however, it is not certain that such a reform, in the light of the two truth commissions’ examinations of genocide against indigenous peoples, could realistically take place today. states, especially those with indigenous peoples in their populations, would surely be reluctant to embrace a such a reform of the ungc that uses the terminology of genocide to describe abuses committed against indigenous peoples. even beyond these states, it is not certain that there would be consensus within the states parties of the ungc for a reform. in light of this, a potential strategy could be the adoption of specific legislation on genocide at the national level, which, among other things, could involve the inclusion of indigenous peoples as a victim group and policies around culture, reparation, and reconciliation. in conclusion, the canadian and guatemalan truth commissions contributed to the recognition of genocide against indigenous peoples in several ways. they reached different conclusions because of their different understandings of genocide and the contexts in which they operated. however, both commissions provide a perspective on elements of genocide that remain to be considered in international law. in the area of genocide, international law is still mainly based on the ungc. today, it is difficult to imagine that states will revise the ungc to include new elements. however, the work of the trc in canada and the ceh in guatemala shows that the scope of the ungc is too restrictive, and there is room for changes. references agreement on the establishment of the commission to clarify past human rights violations and acts of violence that have caused the guatemalan population to suffer, the government of the republic of guatemala–the unidad revolucionaria nacional guatemalteca general command, june 23, 1994, a/48/954, s/1994/751. retrieved from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/gt_940623_establishmentcommi ssionclarifypasthumanrightsviolations.pdf agreement on a firm and lasting peace, feb. 7, 1996, a/51/796, s/1994/114. retrieved from https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/gt_961229_agreementonfirma ndlastingpeace.pdf akhavan, p. 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(2015). this benevolent experiment: indigenous boarding schools, genocide, and redress in canada and the united states. lincoln, nb: university of nebraska press. 23 guematcha: genocide against indigenous peoples in canada and guatemala published by scholarship@western, 2019 the international indigenous policy journal april 2019 genocide against indigenous peoples: the experiences of the truth commissions of canada and guatemala emmanuel guematcha recommended citation genocide against indigenous peoples: the experiences of the truth commissions of canada and guatemala abstract keywords acknowledgments creative commons license genocide against indigenous peoples: the experiences of the truth commissions of canada and guatemala 31.3hitcockedited © david hitchcock. informal logic, vol. 31, no. 3 (2011), pp. 191-228. inference claims david hitchcock department of philosophy mcmaster university hamilton, on l8s 4k1 hitchckd@mcmaster.ca abstract: a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if an acceptable counterfactualsupporting covering generalization of the argument rules out, either definitively or with some modal qualification, simultaneous acceptability of the premisses and non-accepta-bility of the conclusion, even though it does not rule out acceptability of the premisses and does not require acceptability of the conclusion independently of the premisses. hence the reiterative associated conditional of an argument is true if and only it has such a covering generalization, and a supposed unexpressed premiss supplied to make an argument formally valid should be a covering generalization. résumé: une conclusion d’un argument s’ensuit de ses prémisses si et seulement si une proposition vérifonctionnelle acceptable dont l’antécédant est une conjonction de toutes les prémisses de l’argument et dont le conséquent est la conclusion (a) appuie une proposition contrafactuelle et (b) exclut, soit avec certitude ou soit avec réserve par l’usage d’une expression modale, simultanémment l’acceptabilité des prémisses et la non-acceptabilité de la conclusion, même si elle n’exclut pas l’acceptabilité des prémisses et ne requiert pas l’acceptabilité de la conclusion indépendamment des prémisses. donc, une prémisse implicite avancée pour rendre un argument formellement valide doit être une telle proposition vérifonctionnelle. keywords: argument, associated conditional, consequence, counterfactualsupporting generalization, covering generalization, inference, inference claim, material conditional, truth-preservation, truth-transmission 1. introduction as individuals and as communities, we increase our knowledge by making inferences from things we already know. argumentation involves such inferences, and invites its addressees to accept them. the arguer implicitly claims that the conclusion of each constituent argument follows from the reason or reasons from which it is drawn.what is the general form of david hitchcock 192 such inference claims? what does it mean to say that a conclusion follows from a reason or reasons? 2. following as logically necessary truth-preservation: two objections introductory logic texts nowadays identify following with necessary truth-preservation: if the reasons are true, then the conclusion must be true. see for example tarski (2002/1936, pp. 178, 183-184), salmon (1963, p. 18), etchemendy (1990, pp. 81-82), forbes (1994, p. 3), copi and cohen (2001, p. 43), hurley (2006, p. 41), and jeffrey (2006, p. 1). the textbooks go on to explain this necessity as due to a logical form of the argument: if the conclusion follows, it does so because the argument has a contentless form that cannot have an instance with true reasons and an untrue conclusion. (i use the term ‘untrue’ rather than the usual ‘false’ so as to accommodate the possibility of a conclusion that is neither true nor false.) this conception of following, i maintain, is in one respect too broad and in another respect much too narrow. 2.1 too broad it is too broad in counting a conclusion as following merely because the conclusion must be true or merely because the reasons cannot be true. on the contrary, i hold, there must be a connection between the reasons and the conclusion. consider the following medieval example: (1) you are sitting and you are not sitting; therefore tom is in the corner. intuitively, the conclusion does not follow. the principle ex falso quodlibet (from a falsehood anything follows) is at best dubious. similarly, consider the following parallel example: (2) tom is in the corner; therefore, you are not both sitting and not sitting. here too, it seems implausible to hold that the conclusion follows. so the principle ex quolibet verum (from anything a truth follows) is also dubious. rejection of the principles ex falso quodlibet and ex quolibet verum requires revising standard logic, whether classical or intuitionist. tennant (1979, 1980, 1984) has shown one way of doing so, although he modifies the relations of deducibility and entailment rather than the relation of following logically. he treats entailment as the converse of inference claims 193 deducibility, and then puts restrictions on deducibility that simultaneously restrict the extension of the entailment relation. thus, in example (1) above, tennant would say that tom is in the corner follows logically from the premiss you are sitting and you are not sitting but is not entailed by it, because it is not deducible from it once restrictions are imposed on what can count as a proof. if (unlike tennant) we identify being entailed with following logically, then we can capture the force of tennant’s restrictions by requiring for a conclusion to follow logically that the argument has a form that not only cannot have an instance with both true reasons and an untrue conclusion, but also can have an instance with true reasons and can have an instance with an untrue conclusion. we can label the additional requirement a requirement of non-triviality: the ruling out of true reasons and an untrue conclusion must be non-trivial, in the sense that it must not be due merely to the ruling out of true reasons or merely to the ruling out of an untrue conclusion. following standard usage in logic textbooks, let us call an argument in which the conclusion follows logically in this sense a formally valid argument. 2.2 too narrow the received conception of following is much too narrow in forbidding the form that rules out true premisses and an untrue conclusion to have any content. the restriction to logical or contentless forms seems to be an unwarranted prejudice. if an argument has a form that rules out true reasons and an untrue conclusion in a non-trivial way, then why not admit that the conclusion follows, even if the form has some content? consider the hackneyed argument from socrates’ humanity to his mortality: (3) socrates is human, so socrates is mortal. this argument is an instance of many forms. one of them is the form: x is human, so x is mortal. let us suppose that, as a matter of physiological necessity, every human being will eventually die. then the form cannot have an instance with a true premiss and an untrue conclusion. but it can certainly have an instance with a true premiss, as in the case of our example, where the name ‘socrates’ replaces the variable x. and it can have an instance with an untrue conclusion, as when we replace the variable x with the name ‘seven’: seven is not mortal, because numbers are not living organisms and so are not subject to dying. the conclusion that socrates is mortal thus seems to follow nedavid hitchcock 194 cessarily from the premiss that socrates is human, even though the necessity in question is physiological rather than formal or even (i would maintain) semantic. the usual response in the western logical tradition to arguments like that from socrates’ humanity to his mortality is to hold that they have an unexpressed premiss, variously described as ‘unstated’, ‘hidden’, ‘tacit’, ‘suppressed’ or ‘missing’. in the socrates argument of example (3), an argument analyst would attribute to the argument the unexpressed premiss that every human is mortal. with the addition of this premiss, the argument’s conclusion follows purely formally, so the received conception of consequence is vindicated. but of course it is vindicated only because the postulation of an unexpressed premiss presupposes that a conclusion that follows from an argument’s premisses must follow purely formally. to use the existence of an unexpressed premiss that every human is mortal as a reason for holding that the conclusion of the socrates argument follows formally would be to reason in a circle, assuming what is to be proved. further, it is odd to hold that an argument has a premiss that it does not have. like the emperor in the fairy tale of hans christian andersen who had no clothes, the socrates argument does not in fact have as a premiss that every human is mortal. if we look at it carefully, with the eyes of a child uncorrupted by logical indoctrination, we will see that it has just one premiss, that socrates is human. further, why would a person omit a premiss of their argument? the usual explanation, going back to aristotle (rhetoric i.2.1357a16-21) and repeated for example by quine (1972, p. 169), is that arguers omit a premiss for economy of expression, when the addressees can supply the premiss for themselves, as a matter of common knowledge. much human linguistic communication is indeed elliptical, relying on context, both linguistic and extra-linguistic, to provide the addressee with what is required to understand what is said or written. but the difficulty with supposing that arguers routinely suppress a premiss that they conceive their argument as having is that we have no awareness of such a supposedly suppressed premiss, even when we are reasoning things out for ourselves (hitchcock 1985). readers can check this phenomenological fact directly by reflecting on inferences they make for themselves, immediately after making them. it will readily be discovered both that the inference is not formally valid and that there is no awareness of having omitted a premiss. both the reasoning that people use to draw their own conclusions and the arguments that they make to others to support their claims are typically not formally valid. in two collections of arguments selected by random sampling methods, one from books in a university library and the other from calls to phone-in inference claims 195 radio and television talk shows, fewer than 10 percent of the arguments were formally valid, or candidates for being formally valid (hitchcock 2002, 2010a). in the remaining arguments, the conclusion would follow, if at all, in virtue of a form with content that ruled out true premisses and an untrue conclusion in a non-trivial way. the socrates argument of example (3), though artificial, is typical in that respect of how we humans reason and argue. 3. first reformulation: following as necessary truthtransmission if we adjust the received conception of following as formally grounded necessary truth-preservation so as to accommodate the two objections just mentioned, we get an alternative conception of following as what we might call necessary truthtransmission, where the necessity need not be purely formally grounded. on this alternative conception, a conclusion follows from one or more premisses offered in its support if and only if the argument has a form that non-trivially rules out true premisses and an untrue conclusion: no argument of that form can have true premisses and an untrue conclusion, even though an argument of that form can have true premisses and an argument of that form can have an untrue conclusion. the three conditions in this alternative conception can be expressed as conditions on a covering generalization of the argument: there is a generalization of the argument’s associated material conditional (the truthfunctional conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument’s premisses and whose consequent is the argument’s conclusion) that is necessarily true, even though it can have an instance with a true antecedent and can have an instance with an untrue consequent. the received conception of consequence as formally grounded necessary truth-preservation can be articulated in substitutional, model-theoretic or schematic ways. to articulate the alternative conception of consequence as necessary truthtransmission in these ways, one permits treatment of extralogical constants like the name ‘socrates’ in the same way as logical constants like the conjunction operator ‘and’ are treated and one rules out trivial consequences (hitchcock 1998). the substitutional, model-theoretic and schematic articulations of the two conceptions each replace the component of necessity in the original conception with a component of universality. the necessity with which truth is preserved or transmitted disappears, to be replaced by the universality with which a substitution or interpretation or instantiation produces an argument david hitchcock 196 with a true conclusion when it has true premisses—against a background in which the universe is as it is, with no consideration of ways it might otherwise be. equivalently, the impossibility of true premisses and an untrue conclusion disappears, to be replaced by the mere factual absence of a counter-example, where a counter-example is either a parallel argument with true premisses and an untrue conclusion or an interpretation on which the premisses are true and the conclusion untrue or an instance of a scheme of the argument that has true premisses and an untrue conclusion. the modal requirement in the truthtransmission conception that the argument can have true premisses and can have an untrue conclusion is replaced by the factual requirement that as a matter of fact at least one substitution or interpretation or instantiation produces an argument with true premisses and at least one produces an argument with an untrue conclusion. john etchemendy (1990) objected to the replacement of modality by universality. he argued that the model-theoretic conception of logical consequence, which is generally accepted by contemporary logicians as the gold standard against which other conceptions are to be measured, is an incorrect precization of the modal conception, one that both under-generates and over-generates consequences, missing consequences that obtain and inventing consequences where there are none. gila sher (1996) has replied that, because all the extra-logical constants in an argument’s premisses and conclusion are subject to reinterpretation and variation of the domain is possible, the absence of a counter-interpretation is not just a matter of fact, but is a matter of logical necessity. sher’s reply is however not open to defenders of the model-theoretic articulation of the truth-transmission conception of consequence, since on that conception not all the extra-logical constants in the premisses and conclusion of an argument need be subject to interpretation (or equivalently subject to reinterpretation if the extra-logical constants are already interpreted, as in arguments in a natural language). consider for example the argument: (4) napoleon ruled france; napoleon was exiled to elba; so napoleon was short. intuitively, the conclusion of this argument does not follow from its premisses: although napoleon was in fact short, this fact does not follow from the biographical facts mentioned in the premisses. yet the model-theoretic articulation of the truthtransmission conception implies that it does follow, since there is no re-interpretation of the name ‘napoleon’ on which the inference claims 197 premisses are true and the conclusion untrue (because nobody other than napoleon ruled france and was exiled to elba, and napoleon was in fact short), even though the “re-interpretation” of ‘napoleon’ as the name of napoleon produces an argument with true premisses and the re-interpretation of ‘napoleon’ as the name of giscard d’estaing produces an argument with an untrue conclusion. the model-theoretic articulation of the truthtransmission conception of consequence thus over-generates consequences. furthermore, the substitutional and schematic articulations fare no better, since no substitution for the word ‘napoleon’ will produce an argument with true premisses and an untrue conclusion and no instance of the schema ‘person x ruled france; person x was exiled to elba; so person x was short’ has true premisses and an untrue conclusion, even though in each articulation the non-triviality requirement is met. in a previous article (hitchcock 1998, p. 32), i raised but did not answer the question how closely the model-theoretic, substitutional and schematic specifications of the truth-transmission conception of consequence fit our intuitive judgments of when a conclusion follows from stated premisses. the napoleon argument in example (4) makes the answer clear. all three articulations are too loose a fit: they count conclusions as following when intuitively they do not follow. and the articulations are not on solid enough ground to over-rule our intuitive judgments about arguments like the napoleon argument. the crucial question for theoretical purposes is to figure out what is wrong with the napoleon argument. its premisses are impeccable: both true and known (independently of knowledge of the conclusion) to be true. its conclusion is also true. there is also topical overlap, so the premisses cannot be stigmatized as lacking relevance in the sense in which relevance logicians make relevance a necessary condition for entailment. the premisses are evidently irrelevant to the conclusion in some broader sense that still needs theoretical articulation. it does not seem very illuminating, for example, to say that the premisses are not germane to the conclusion and have no bearing on it (johnson and blair 1993, p. 324) or that the truth of the premisses provides no basis for supposing that the conclusion is true, or indeed for supposing that it is false (p. 55). in the context of a conception of following as broader than following logically, we need to know in virtue of what feature of the napoleon argument its premisses are non-germane to its conclusion, have no bearing on it, and provide no basis if they are true for supposing that the conclusion is true. unfortunately, the account of premissary relevance in (hitchcock 1992) is not much help. according to that account, a premiss is irrelevant to a conclusion for which it is offered as david hitchcock 198 support if it cannot ineliminably be put together with other at least potentially accurate information to provide a set of premisses that is sufficient to justify the conclusion (p. 260). but the premisses of the napoleon argument can be put together ineliminably with the argument’s associated material conditional to produce a formally valid argument. and the associated material conditional is not just potentially true; it is actually true and known to be true: a quick check of reputable sources will tell us that the associated material conditional has a true consequent (napoleon was short), and hence is true. if the account of relevance in (hitchcock 1992) is to be rescued, we need some account of why this formally valid expanded argument with premisses known to be true is not sufficient to justify its conclusion. on reflection, the problem appears to be that the added premiss (the material conditional associated with the original napoleon argument) cannot be known to be true independently of knowing that the conclusion is true, so that the argument cannot produce knowledge of the truth of its conclusion. in view of this problem, the account of relevance in (hitchcock 1992) needs to be modified by requiring for relevance that one can discover that the other potentially accurate information is actually correct without assuming the truth of the argument’s conclusion. on the modified account, then, a premiss is relevant to a conclusion for which it is offered as support if and only if there is a set of premisses that (a) when combined with the relevant premiss are sufficient to justify the conclusion, (b) are not jointly sufficient by themselves to justify the conclusion, (c) are at least potentially accurate, and (d) if accurate can be discovered to be accurate without assuming the truth of the conclusion. the question is how to modify or replace the substitutional, model-theoretic and schematic articulations of the truth-transmission account of consequence so as to capture these partly epistemological constraints on relevance. on the surface, the napoleon argument seems to meet the conditions under which a conclusion follows from given premisses. it has a covering generalization that is not only true, but known to be true: every ruler of france who was exiled to elba was short. further, this covering generalization is non-trivially true: there is at least one ruler of france who was exiled to elba (namely, napoleon) and there is at least one person who was not short— for example, giscard d’estaing. but the non-trivial truth of this covering generalization does not license those who know of it to draw the conclusion from the premisses. why not? one salient fact about the argument, already mentioned, is that, if you did not already know that napoleon was short, the argument would give you no reason to believe that he was. this fact corresponds inference claims 199 to the fact that our only basis for knowing that the argument’s associated material conditional is true is that we already know that the conclusion is true. a fortiori, the only way to establish the truth of its generalization is to show for each instance where the antecedent is true that in this case the consequent is also true. one way to test this supposition is to consider a hypothetical case, e.g. another ruler of france who was not short, such as jacques chirac. if chirac were exiled to elba, he would not thereby become short. nor is there any reason for restricting exrulers of france eligible for exile to elba to those who were short. it seems then that a crucial requirement for a conclusion to follow from given premisses is that it has a covering generalization that is not only non-trivially true, but also can be known to be true independently of knowledge of truth of the conclusion. and it appears that we know that an argument has a true covering generalization independently of knowledge of the truth of the argument’s conclusion if and only if we know that the covering generalization holds not just for actual cases that satisfy its antecedent but also for hypothetical cases that might satisfy it. consider another example: (5) abraham lincoln was a president of the united states. so abraham lincoln was a man. as a matter of fact, every previous president of the united states has been a man. but if we require an inference-licensing covering generalization to hold for hypothetical cases that might satisfy its antecedent, the fact that every previous president of the united states has been a man does not license us to infer from abraham lincoln’s presidency that he was a man. for there is no rule against a woman being elected president of the united states. and indeed, counterfactually, if walter mondale had defeated ronald reagan in the 1984 us presidential election, and had then died in office, his running mate geraldine ferraro would not have become a man simply by succeeding him in the office of us president. the generalization that all previous us presidents have been men does not hold for all possible previous us presidents, even though it holds for the actual ones. this limitation corresponds, it seems, to the fact that the only way we can determine that every previous president of the united states has been a man is by discovering, directly or indirectly, about each of the 39 previous presidents that he was a man. the generalization cannot license an inference to the maleness of a particular previous president because our knowledge of its truth rests on already knowing that the particular previous president was a man. david hitchcock 200 it is tempting to identify the requirement that an argument’s true covering generalization supports counterfactual instances with a requirement that the argument has a true lawlike covering generalization. the covering generalization of the socrates argument of example (3), that every human is mortal, is law-like if it is true. and such philosophers of science as ernest nagel have held (1961, pp. 71-72) that a singular counterfactual conditional holds if and only if the indicative form of its consequent follows logically from the indicative form of its antecedent in combination with a law and the requisite initial conditions for the law. the law would thus be a generalization of the indicative counterpart to the singular counterfactual conditional, with its antecedent supplemented by a statement of initial conditions. but requiring a law-like covering generalization may be too demanding. consider the argument: (6) obama lives in the white house, so he lives in washington. intuitively, the conclusion of this argument follows from the premiss: from the fact that someone lives in the white house, we are entitled to conclude that this person lives in washington. the reason, of course, is that the white house is located in washington. however, neither this fact nor the generalization based on it is law-like. the white house, i.e. the residence of the president of the united states, could have been built somewhere else. or the political boundaries might be different, with washington and the district of columbia divided up among the surrounding states, with each of them giving their portion of present-day washington its own name. nevertheless, given that at present the white house is in washington, the generalization that whoever lives in the white house lives in washington supports counterfactuals. if john mccain lived in the white house, he would live in washington. if vladimir putin lived in the (us) white house, he would live in washington. and so on. it should be noted in making these counterfactual judgments that the generalization is being taken to hold only for the present, conceived as a short indefinitely bounded stretch of time surrounding the time of its inscription; it could not license for example an inference from the claim that the 50th president of the united states will live in the white house to the conclusion that he or she will live at that time in washington, dc, since either the location of the president’s residence or the boundaries of washington, dc might have changed between now and then in such a way as to falsify the generalization that whoever lives in the white house lives in washington, dc. the time-boundedness of the covering inference claims 201 generalization of the obama argument immediately shows that it is not a natural law. nevertheless, it supports counterfactual instances. hence, since one could not know that counterfactual instances of a universal generalization were true if one could discover the truth of the generalization only by discovering the truth separately of each of its instances, the covering generalization of the obama argument is known to be true independently of knowledge of the truth of the conclusion that obama lives in washington. if one insists that any covering generalization that licenses an inference must be law-like, then one would be obliged to treat the obama argument as having an unexpressed premiss, assumed to be mutually believed by both arguer and intended audience, that the white house is located in washington, dc. with the addition of this premiss to the stated premiss, the conclusion would follow in virtue of the law-like generalization that whoever lives in a building that is located in a certain municipality lives in that municipality. but there seems to be no theoretical advantage to this approach over the approach of treating non-law-like covering generalizations that support counterfactual instances as licensing inferences, even if the license is temporally constrained. and, practically speaking, it is easier to ask directly whether an argument has a true covering generalization that supports counterfactual instances than to ask whether it can be supplemented with additional correct information in such a way that the expanded argument has a true law-like covering generalization. with this latter approach, for example, one must make sure that the conclusion does not follow from the additional correct information independently of the argument’s stated premisses. further, treating the conclusion of the obama argument in example 6 as following just from the stated premiss corresponds better to the phenomenological fact that one would not use any other premiss than the stated premiss in reasoning for oneself from it to the stated conclusion. 4. second reformulation: following as counterfactualsupporting truth-transmission thus it appears that, in the case of non-logical consequence, we cannot capture the consequence relation through a merely universal condition, whether expressed substitutionally, modeltheoretically or schematically. but, contrary to the position adopted in (hitchcock 2009), the non-logical consequence relation need not hold as a matter of nomic necessity. it is enough if the universal condition holds counterfactually, of any individual supposed to satisfy its antecedent. necessarily true david hitchcock 202 universal covering generalizations do hold counterfactually, and as we have seen the necessity of the generalization need not be semantic but might be for example physiological or constitutional. but, as the obama argument of example (6) shows, some universal covering generalizations hold counterfactually even if they are not nomically necessary. substitutional and model-theoretic articulations of the consequence relation cannot be modified to express the requirement that a universal condition holds counterfactually. but schematic articulations can. we can revise the schematic articulation of the truth-transmission conception of consequence to read as follows: a conclusion is a consequence of given premisses if and only if the argument is an instance of an argument scheme, which may or may not be purely formal, that has no actual or counterfactual instances with true premisses and an untrue conclusion, even though it has an instance with true premisses and an instance with an untrue conclusion. the counterfactual-supporting version of the schematic articulation of the truth-transmission conception of consequence automatically addresses a limitation of standard substitutional and schematic articulations—namely, the limitation that an argument may lack a counter-example because of the limitations of the language in which it is expressed. in opening up a space for instances that are hypothetical rather than actual, we allow that the language may have no name for such merely hypothetical instances. we can accommodate such presently nameless possible instances by allowing the addition of new names to the language in which the argument is expressed. counterfactual-supporting truth-transmission in virtue of an argument scheme depends on the truth of a covering generalization of the argument that will support counterfactual instances. the generalization might be physically contingent, like the generalization that whoever lives in the white house lives in washington. but it must support counterfactual instances. a true contingent generalization that does not support counterfactuals will not license an inference from its antecedent to its consequent. thus the fact that every president of the united states has been a man does not license an inference from abraham lincoln’s having been president of the united states to his having been a man, for the generalization about the sex of american presidents has false counterfactual instances: if walter mondale had been elected u.s. president in 1984 and had died in office, to be succeeded by his running mate geraldine ferraro, she would not have been a man. it would make things theoretically neat if in general knowledge of the truth of true universal generalizations that do not support counterfactual instances had to rest ultimately on knowinference claims 203 ledge of the actual instances that fall under them. but consider the universal generalization that all spheres of gold are less than one mile in diameter, constrasted to the law-like generalization that all spheres of uranium are less than one mile in diameter (carroll 2011). here our belief in the universal generalization does not rest on knowledge of the diameter of all the actual spheres of gold, past, present and future, but on knowledge of facts about the cost, scarcity and uselessness (for all but ornamental and fetishistic purposes) of gold. thus an argument like: (7) this sphere is pure gold, so its diameter is less than a mile. though its conclusion does not follow just from its stated premiss, could be rescued by attributing to it an unexpressed premiss that every sphere of gold has a diameter less than a mile. the requirement that a generalization licensing an inference support counterfactual instances implies an asymmetry in the treatment of real-life arguments. if someone were to argue that abraham lincoln was a man, because he was president of the united states, one could as far as i can see get the conclusion to follow from the premiss only by attributing to the argument an unstated premiss that all previous presidents of the united states were men. but, in contrast to the gold argument in example (7), this maneuver would not make the argument respectable, since any epistemic justification for the added premiss would have to appeal ultimately to the information in the conclusion. the theoretical asymmetry in the treatment of formally invalid arguments is however not as extensive as one might imagine. occasionally people advance arguments whose conclusion follows, if at all, in virtue of a merely contingent generalization. but, rather surprisingly, it seems that these merely contingent generalizations support counterfactuals. consider the following remarks by a caller to a radio phone-in show soon after the invasion of iraq in march 2003, at a time when there were reports of iraqi families being told they will be murdered if they don’t fight: (8) i think you will make a very poor soldier if you put a gun on his head or on his family and say, “go and fight”. we have to acknowledge that the iraqis are fighting an aggression whether rightly or wrongly. they think that they are going to be occupied. and even the us army generals are acknowledging that they are having a stiff resistance. you do not get stiff david hitchcock 204 resistance from soldiers who are under duress. (hitchcock 2010a, p. 41.) the context makes clear that the caller is arguing that the iraqi soldiers are not fighting under duress, a conclusion that follows almost logically from his last two statements. the preceding statements appear to give two additional independent arguments for the same conclusion. if we take the first statement as the premiss of one of those arguments, and supply the implicit conclusion, we get the following argument: (9) …you will make a very poor soldier if you put a gun on his head or on his family and say, “go and fight”; so the iraqi soldiers are not fighting under duress. if we acknowledge the semantic connection between fighting under duress and being told to go and fight with a gun to one’s head or on one’s family, we can see that this argument is an instance of the schema ‘people who are f are very poor soldiers, so the iraqi soldiers are not f’. the universally generalized material conditional associated with this schema turns out to be logically equivalent to the statement that the iraqi soldiers are not very poor soldiers; for the proof, see the appendix. this statement is what a skilled argument analyst would intuitively attribute to the caller as an assumption involved in using his general point about very poor soldiers to support a claim about the iraqi soldiers in particular. but, even though the covering generalization is not law-like, it does support counterfactuals. if the iraqi soldiers are not very poor soldiers, then, if short people were very poor soldiers, then the iraqi soldiers would not be short. and so on. thus, contrary to the approach recommended in (freeman 2011a, pp. 186-189), the fact that an argument lacks a true nomically necessary covering generalization does not require adoption of the unexpressed premiss approach in order to understand and then evaluate the argument. a true nomically contingent covering generalization will license the inference in the stated argument if it supports counterfactual instances. even singular contingent statements can license inferences, as in the iraqi soldiers argument of example (9). in particular, there is no need to revert to an unexpressed premiss in order to understand and evaluate the following artificial argument discussed by freeman (2011a, p. 183): (10) all humans are mortal, so socrates is mortal. inference claims 205 the argument is an instance of the schema: all humans are f, so socrates is f. the corresponding universal covering generalization is that socrates has every property that all humans have. by parallel reasoning to that used for the iraqi soldiers argument of example (9), this generalization is logically equivalent to the contingent singular statement that socrates is human. assuming that this statement is true, it will license the inference in the socrates argument of example (10), provided that the universal generalization to which it is logically equivalent supports counterfactual instances. and in this case it does. if all humans had green skin, socrates would have green skin. if all humans had blue eyes, socrates would have blue eyes. and so on. (the socrates argument of example (10) is of course artificial; it is hard to imagine someone putting it forward seriously in an attempt to establish its conclusion. but one can readily imagine a parallel argument with the name ‘jesus of nazareth’ replacing ‘socrates’ being seriously advanced by a critic of a certain position in christian theology.) as far as i can see, people do not reason and argue in accordance with argument schemes whose corresponding universal generalization does not support counterfactual instances. to put the point another way, for all but one of the arguments i have collected in two rounds of random sampling of arguments (hitchcock 2002, 2010a), resulting in more than 100 inferences for evaluation, i have been able to construct a covering generalization that, if true or otherwise acceptable, would apparently hold for counterfactual instances. to bolster this claim, it would be necessary to get independent and unbiased judgments from at least two people as to whether a given universal generalization if true would support counterfactual instances. such judgments may require real-world knowledge, as in the case of a sphere of gold versus a sphere of uranium. but, despite ongoing disputes about the truth conditions for counterfactual singular conditionals (lewis 1973, pearl 2000, arregui 2009), there seems little disagreement about the truth value of counterfactual instances of a true universal generalization in a world otherwise much like ours or with the same invariant causal relationships as ours. for example, the reader should readily agree that jacques chirac would not be short if he not only was a former ruler of france but also had been exiled to elba; that socrates would have had green skin if all humans had green skin; that a sphere of gold would not have a diameter less than a mile if it had a circumference of four miles; and so on for the other examples in this article. david hitchcock 206 5. elaboration and extensions of counterfactual-supporting truth-transmission on the counterfactual-supporting truth-transmission account, then, a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if the argument is an instance of an argument scheme, which may or may not be purely formal, that has no actual or possible instances with true premisses and an untrue conclusion, even though it has an instance with true premisses and an instance with an untrue conclusion. this account, it turns out, needs elaboration and extension, in four respects. 5.1. restrictions on the range of the variables in an argument’s schema: first, in testing to see whether an argument has a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization that is non-trivially true, we may need to restrict the range of the variables in a generalization under consideration. such restrictions are implicit in the examples of covering generalizations already given, where the range of variables is restricted to persons, countries, places and so on. to take another example: if someone argues that marijuana should be legalized on the dual ground that it is less harmful than alcohol and that alcohol is justifiably legal, it is reasonable to restrict the variables in the covering generalization to psychotropic drugs (hitchcock 1985). such restrictions presuppose the background information that the name or other term over which one generalizes falls within the specified range: napoleon is a person, france is a country, marijuana and alcohol are psychotropic drugs, and so forth. background information of this sort can be treated as an unstated premiss if one wishes, or more accurately as an unstated presupposition: in a debate about legalizing marijuana, one does not need to state that marijuana is a mind-altering drug. 5.2. generalization from truth to acceptability: second, some may balk at assigning truth-values to deontic generalizations. to accommodate such sensitivities, we can replace the word ‘true’ in the articulation of the truth-transmission conception of consequence with a word like ‘acceptable’ or ‘justifiable’ (in their normative senses), treating truth as a property that confers acceptability or justifiability in the intended sense. 5.3. allowance for conclusions that are not assertives: third, allowance needs to be made for conclusions that are not assertives. one can argue for any of the kinds of speech acts distinguished by searle (1979), including commissives, directives, expressives, declaratives and suppositives (hitchcock 2006). for inference claims 207 example, the following exchange on a radio phone-in show about the epidemic of sudden acute respiratory syndrome (sars)1 in toronto in the spring of 2003 concludes with an argument for a question: (11) caller (gina from toronto): ―hi. i wanted to speak about the sars. roy (program host): ―yes. go ahead, please. gina: ―ok. on the weekend they had... were looking for court orders for two people who had not obeyed the quarantine. they now have a student who cut short her quarantine after ten days to write an exam. she’s now ill, and they have now 25 students and a teacher, i believe. so, considering how the government mishandled walkerton2 and the east nile virus, where... it‘s worked out ok with sars, i realize they‘re not saying an epidemic, but last week before they really, really knew and the ttc [toronto transit commission–dh] driver wanted to wear a mask, where was their union? they said their hands were tied, that they can‘t do anything when the board of health says this, but why do people so blindly believe government officials? roy: ―well, you know, i think when it comes to an issue like sars, you do look to official explanations and official sources... gina: ―yes. just like walkerton and the east nile virus, which they mishandled roy: ―west nile. gina: ―west nile virus,3 i‘m sorry. which they mishandled. so why do you want to believe them now? (hitchcock 2010a, p. 55) 1 sars was a new, highly contagious respiratory viral infection that turned out to have a fatality rate of about 15%. public health authorities reacted by imposing a quarantine on anybody suspected of being at risk for contracting the disease. the disease was eventually eradicated as the result of an aggressive world-wide campaign to stamp it out. 2 walkerton is a small town in ontario whose water supply became contaminated in may 2000. almost half the population became ill, and seven people died. a study put the cost of dealing with the tragedy at $64.5 million. (http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/walkerton/; accessed 2011 03 14) 3 in the summer of 2002, 19 people in the southern part of oakville, ontario were hospitalized for diseases caused by the west nile virus, which is transmitted to humans by mosquito bites. (http://www.health.gov.on.ca/english/public/pub/ministry_reports/wnv_rep_2 003/wnv_rep03.html; accessed 2011 03 14). david hitchcock 208 gina’s concluding sub-argument, supporting her question, “why do people so blindly believe government officials?” runs as follows: (12) premiss: the government mishandled walkerton and the west nile virus. intermediate conclusion: why do people so blindly believe government officials <on this public health crisis– dh>? we can construct a covering generalization in the usual way, recognizing the shared background information that walkerton and the west nile virus were public health crises: if a government mishandled two previous public health crises, why do people so blindly believe what officials of the government say on another public health crisis? in evaluating whether this covering generalization is acceptable, we need to judge the force of the ‘why’ question. taken literally, it is a request for an explanation of people’s blind belief in the statements of government officials. what motivates such a request is the presupposition that such blind belief makes no sense. the acceptability of the question is thus a function of the prima facie foolishness of blindly believing statements about a public health crisis by officials of a government that recently mishandled other public health crises. as with this example, one can develop criteria for the acceptability of speech acts of all types, criteria that can be used in judging whether a commissive or directive or expressive or declarative follows from the reasons given in its support. 5.4. allowance for rebuttable inferences: fourth, allowance needs to be made for rebuttable inferences, where the conclusion does not follow definitely from the premisses but is merely made probable or possible or presumptively acceptable by them. such inferences are rebuttable in the sense that further information compatible with the premisses can make the conclusion false or otherwise unacceptable. a conclusion that follows definitely from the premisses, on the other hand, is not rebuttable in this sense; if it is unacceptable, there must be something wrong with at least one premiss. it is however underminable, given the non-triviality requirement for transmission of acceptability. the information that arthur is either a farmer or a grocer but is not a farmer necessitates as a consequence that arthur is a grocer, but additional information that arthur is a farmer undermines the inference. it does not follow necessarily from the premiss set {arthur is a farmer, arthur is not a farmer, arthur is either a farmer or a grocer} that arthur is a grocer. inference claims 209 to signal a rebuttable inference, arguers sometimes use modal auxiliaries or adverbs, as in the following argument from a caller to a phone-in radio show: (13) … when someone is purchasing a puppy, many times they are going to a breeder that‘s just in it for profit, so the puppy‘s already starting out with maybe not a good head start. (hitchcock 2010a, p. 18) the caller acknowledges that not every puppy bought from a breeder just in it for profit lacks a good head start. the qualifier ‘maybe’ reduces the strength of the inference claim, which thus needs for its support only a counterfactual-supporting existential generalization that some animals bought from breeders just in it for profit do not get a good head start. with these four complications, the truth-transmission account, which should now be called an acceptability-transmission account, appears capable of handling all inferences. we can sum it up as follows. a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if an acceptable counterfactual-supporting generalization rules out, either definitively or with some modal qualification, simultaneous acceptability of the premisses and non-acceptability of the conclusion, even though it does not rule out acceptability of the premisses and does not require acceptability of the conclusion independently of the premisses. (the account is framed in terms of the non-acceptability of the conclusion rather than its unacceptability, to allow for the possibility that a conclusion is neither acceptable nor unacceptable, because it is neither worthy or acceptance nor worthy of rejection.) an inference claim is thus the claim that a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization is non-trivially acceptable. this consequence relation has structural properties that deserve investigation. for example, it is transitive only under certain conditions, and obeys the cut rule only under certain conditions. hence it implies restrictions on the chaining of arguments together to support a final conclusion by means of one or more intermediate conclusions drawn along the way. the present paper prescinds from investigation of these restrictions, because of limitations of space and time. in a recent investigation of rebuttable inference, verheij (2010) shows that a non-monotonic consequence relation in “reason-based argumentation” has seven properties, which he calls logical equivalence, restricted reflexivity, antecedence, right weakening, conjunctive cautious monotony, mutual attack and conjunctive cumulative transitivity. it needs to be investigated which of these properties belong to consequence conceived as acceptability-transmission licensed by a non-trivially acceptable counterfactual-supporting covering generalization. david hitchcock 210 if one insists that a conclusion follows from given premisses only if it follows formally from them, then one can treat the inference claim of an argument that is not formally valid as the claim that the argument has as an unstated premiss a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization that is nontrivially acceptable. hence, if one thinks that formally invalid arguments have a gap between premisses and conclusion that needs to be filled by a gap-filling implicit assumption (ennis 1982), then one will supply as the gap-filler the most non-trivially plausible counterfactual-supporting covering generalization of the stated argument. 6. a sceptical rejoinder sceptics can counter that this account of inference claims is unnecessarily complicated, that the inference claim of an argument is just its so-called “associated conditional” (hitchcock 1985), i.e. the singular conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the premisses and whose consequent is the conclusion. doesn’t the connective ‘if’ simply mean that the consequent follows from the antecedent, as stoic logicians long ago maintained (diogenes laertius 7.71)? and don’t theorists of argument reconstruction object that supplying an argument’s associated conditional as its unstated gap-filling premiss is merely reiterative, not really informing us of the substantive assumption used or needed to infer the conclusion? let us grant that in at least one of its uses a singular indicative conditional sentence means that its consequent follows from the antecedent. in fact, in the ancient dispute about the truth-conditions for singular indicative conditionals, it was common ground that a conditional is true when its consequent follows from its antecedent (sextus empiricus 2.112; cf. barnes 2007, pp. 125-126). the dispute was about what it took for this condition of following to be met. the earliest proposal was that of the logician diodorus cronus, who proposed that a true conditional was one that neither could nor can begin from a truth and end in a falsity (sextus empiricus 2.115). this modal conception would imply that a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if it was and is impossible for the premisses to be true and the conclusion false. the present conception of the consequence relation is similar, with the additional requirement that the impossibility be non-trivial (i.e. not due to the impossibility that the premisses are true and not due to the impossibility that the conclusion is false), the clarification that the impossibility need not be logical or semantic (and indeed can be established by any counterfactualinference claims 211 supporting covering generalization), allowance for the ruling out of true premisses and a false conclusion to hold only for a specious present rather than omni-temporally, the expansion of the property of truth to other kinds of acceptability, and the recognition of modally qualified rebuttable consequences. i propose then, following the ancient tradition, to take the present account of the consequence relation to be also an account of the truth conditions of a singular indicative conditional, in at least one of its senses. in this sense, a singular indicative conditional is definitively acceptable if and only if it has a counterfactualsupporting generalization that is non-trivially acceptable. it is acceptable in some qualified way if and only if it has a counterfactual-supporting generalization that is non-trivially acceptable in the same qualified way. of course, some philosophers of language, starting with diodorus’ own pupil philo of megara (sextus empiricus 2.113114) and continuing as recently as in the work of paul grice (1989, pp. 58-85), maintain that the singular indicative conditional is true if and only if it does not have a true antecedent and a false consequent. but, although philo thought that the consequent of a conditional with such truth conditions follows from its antecedent, contemporary logicians and philosophers of language generally reject this claim. they take the medieval conception of a consequentia materialis as a consequence that holds unless the premisses are true and the conclusion false (kneale and kneale 1962, pp. 274-297) to reflect confusion between the truth of a conditional and the validity of an argument from its antecedent to its consequent. likewise, they regard as unfortunate the use by whitehead and russell in principia mathematica (1910-1913) of the phrase ‘material implication’ for the philonian truth-functional conditional, since they generally follow c. i. lewis (1912) in regarding the truth-functional conditional as not capturing the sense in standard english of the word ‘implies’, which signifies the converse of the relation of following. the problem with construing the philonian conditional as expressing the implication of its consequent by its antecedent, it is generally thought, is the so-called “paradoxes of material implication”: a falsehood would imply anything and anything would imply a truth. 7. anti-generalist alternatives some contemporary theorists of argumentation have, however, defended the view that the inference claim of an argument is its associated singular conditional, taken by some of them to be david hitchcock 212 truth-functional (i.e. philonian or “material”) and by others to be sui generis. others have argued, within the unexpressed premiss approach, that either always or sometimes the unexpressed premiss of an argument that is not formally valid is just the argument’s associated singular conditional, whether truthfunctional or sui generis. i shall consider each of the four views. 8.1 bermejo luque: lilian bermejo luque (2006, 2011a) interprets the inference claim made in the complex speech act of arguing as the claim that the argument’s associated material conditional is true. her interpretation seems incorrect on its face, for the mere absence of the circumstance that the argument’s reasons are true and its conclusion untrue seems weaker than the circumstance that the conclusion follows from those reasons. suppose, for example, that someone were to argue: (14) 8 is divisible by 2, so 8 is divisible by 4. this is clearly a bad argument, even though it has a true premiss and a true conclusion. you cannot legitimately infer from the fact that 8 is divisible by 2 that 8 is also divisible by 4, even though as a matter of fact it is true that 8 is divisible by 4. thus the inference claim in the divisibility argument of example (14) is false. but the associated material conditional is true, because it has a true consequent. in this counter-example, the conclusion is known to be true independently of the argument put forward in its support. bermejo-luque tries to ward off this sort of counter-example by remarking that an argument’s associated material conditional is to be valued under the argumentative conditions in which it arises, namely, that the reason alleged in the argument (whose content is the antecedent of the conditional) is supposed to be true or highly acceptable, and also that we have not already independently determined the real value of the claim for which we argue (whose content is the consequent of the conditional). these conditions suffice to free us from the paradoxes of material implication... (bermejo-luque 2006, p. 79; cf. her 2011a, p. 79.) so we are to construe the supposed counter-example as an argument presented in a situation where it is supposed to be true that 8 is divisible by 2, but we have not already determined independently whether 8 is divisible by 4. to make such a situation plausible, let’s vary the example slightly to one where the arithmetical premiss has been determined to be true, the inference claims 213 arithmetical conclusion not yet determined to be true, and the inference is apparently incorrect. an example might be the following argument: (15) 79,974 is divisible by 3, so 79,974 is divisible by 9. according to bermejo-luque, the fact that the premiss of this argument is supposed to be true (and can in fact easily be checked to be true) but that we have not yet determined whether the conclusion is true (because we have not yet tried to divide 79,974 by 9) frees us from the paradoxes of material implication when we come to appraise the argument’s associated material conditional. to avoid confusion with other senses of the conditional, let us consider the situation in terms of the logically equivalent negajunction ‘not both 79,974 is divisible by 3 and 79,974 is not divisible by 9.’ given that we know that the first of the two conjuncts in this negated conjunction is true, the easiest and most direct way to determine whether the negajunction is true is to check whether the second conjunct is also true. if the second conjunct is also true, then the whole conjunction is true, the associated negajunction is false and the conclusion (on bermejo luque’s account) does not follow. if the second conjunct is false, then the whole conjunction is false, the associated negajunction is true and the conclusion (on bermejo luque’s account) does follow. the fact that we have not already determined the value of our conclusion does not bar us, when it comes to appraising the argument’s associated material conditional, from making such a determination independently of the argument offered in its support. if we have a way of making such an independent determination, and that determination yields the result that the conclusion is true, we will rightly conclude that the associated negajunction is true. thus, on bermejo-luque’s account, every act of arguing for a conclusion whose propositional content can be determined to be true independently of the propositional content of its premisses makes a true inference-claim: its conclusion does in fact follow from the premisses offered in its support. this is a clearly unacceptable consequence, as we can readily see by constructing simple examples of arguments with an obviously true conclusion and an obviously irrelevant premiss. consider: (16) snow is white, so grass is green. this is not a good argument, even though both its premiss and its associated negajunction are both known to be true. the conclusion that grass is green simply does not follow from the david hitchcock 214 premiss that snow is white, which is obviously totally irrelevant to the conclusion. the word ‘so’ when used inferentially implies, as part of its meaning and not as some pragmatic implicature of its ordinary use, that the statement preceding it is relevant to the statement following it, in the sense explicated in (hitchcock, 1992) and qualified earlier in the present article, that it helps to establish the truth of the conclusion. the truth of an argument’s associated negajunction is not sufficient to secure such relevance. in a symposium on bermejo-luque’s giving reasons, freeman (2011b) and pinto (2011) raise similar objections to bermejo-luque’s identification of the propositional content of an arguer’s inference claim with the argument’s associated material conditional. in reply, bermejo-luque reiterates and elaborates her position as follows: … following grice’s account of conditionals, i take inference-claims of the form “if 79974 is divisible by 3, then 79974 is divisible by 9” to be conversationally inappropriate, but not false. in other words, i think that an act of arguing such as “79974 is divisible by 3, therefore 79974 is divisible by 9” is semantically correct, but pragmatically flawed because the reason is irrelevant. to my mind, this kind of irrelevance is pragmatic: we put forward a reason in order to show a target claim to be correct, but the reason does not work for this end. on grice’s account, the only circumstances in which it is appropriate to assert a conditional is where the speaker is ignorant of the truth values of r [the reason—dh] and c [the conclusion—dh], but believes that if r happens to be true, c will as well. (bermejo-luque 2011b, pp. 229-230.) this restatement helps to defuse the obvious objection to bermejo-luque’s interpretation of an arguer’s inference-claim as the claim that the argument’s associated material conditional is correct. on her account, a good act of arguing requires not just that the arguer’s inference-claim be true but that the arguer be in a position to assert it. that is, the arguer must have a basis for asserting it other than the denial of the reason or the assertion of the conclusion. bermejo-luque herself acknowledges that this basis can include (2011a, p. 65), and indeed will consist in (p. 198), general rules or general facts from which the material conditional follows. thus in the end her position is not far from that of the present article, except that she rests the claim that an argument has a covering generalization on the pragmatics of advancing the argument rather than on the semantics of inferential particles and phrases. later in this inference claims 215 article, in the discussion in section 8.3 of janne maaike gerlofs’ position, i will return to the question whether justification of a material conditional without using a paradox of material implication requires appeal to some generalization of it. 8.2. verheij: bart verheij (2006, p. 186) also identifies the inference-claim of an argument with its singular, ungeneralized associated conditional. verheij takes an argument to express that its premisses collectively support its conclusion, and takes this support relation to be expressed by the conditional sentence ‘if <the premisses>, then <the conclusion>’. for example, in the following argument: (17) harry was born in bermuda, so harry is a british subject. the claim that the premiss ‘harry was born in bermuda’ supports the conclusion ‘harry is a british subject’ is expressed by the sentence: (18) if harry was born in bermuda, he is a british subject. unlike bermejo-luque, however, verheij refuses to identify an argument’s inference claim with the material conditional, because the material conditional is truth-functional: ...a material conditional is truth-functional: its truth value is determined by the truth values of the conditional’s antecedent and consequent... the conditional ‘if d [data— dh], then c [conclusion—dh]’ implied by an argument ‘d. so c’ should however intuitively reflect some relation between d and c that is not captured by the truth values of d and c alone. (verheij 2006, p. 187.) let us call verheij’s non-material, non-truth-functional singular conditional an ‘inferential conditional,’ since it expresses the condition that an argument’s premisses support its conclusion, i.e. that it is legitimate to infer the conclusion from the premisses. verheij does not give a complete account of the semantics of the inferential conditional. he tells us that it validates modus ponendo ponens; in other words, an argument from an inferential conditional and its antecedent to the consequent of the inferential conditional is formally valid. he tells us that one cannot derive an inferential conditional on the basis of logic alone (e.g. from a deduction of its consequent from its antecedent), but must always base its derivation on premisses. but he says very little about what premisses would david hitchcock 216 entitle us to infer the truth of an inferential conditional. in fact, he claims that, if the logic of the inferential conditional were expressed in a natural deduction system, it would have the standard elimination rule for conditionals, namely modus ponendo ponens, but would have no introduction rule. the only derivation of an inferential conditional that he recognizes as legitimate is its derivation using modus ponendo ponens from a more complex inferential conditional of which the inferential conditional is the consequent. in particular, the inferential conditional associated with a particular argument follows from what he calls (following toulmin (1958)) the argument’s warrant, which is a conditional scheme expressed in ordinary language as a rule statement. for example, the inferential conditional (18) that harry is a british subject if he was born in bermuda follows from the following statement: (19) a person born in bermuda is a british subject. the inferential conditional expressing that this statement (19) supports the original argument’s associated inferential conditional (18) is the following statement: (20) if a person born in bermuda is a british subject, then harry is a british subject if he was born in bermuda. the consequent of this second-order inferential conditional is according to verheij an instance of its antecedent. verheij needs to complete his account of the semantics of the inferential conditional. in particular, since a rule statement like “a person born in bermuda is a british subject” sounds awfully like a generalized material conditional, and the inferential conditional associated with an argument is supposed to be an instance of such a rule statement but not to be a mere material conditional, verheij needs to tell us how a warrant differs from a generalized material conditional. the answer, i suspect, will be an account like the one i have been developing in this paper, that it must be a counterfactual-supporting generalization of the argument’s associated material conditional. in that case, verheij’s singular inferential conditional will have just the meaning that i am attributing to singular indicative conditionals when they signify that their consequent follows from their antecedent. 8.3. gerlofs: janne maaike gerlofs works within the mainstream logical tradition according to which an argument that is not explicitly formally valid is to be reconstructed by supplying an unexpressed premiss whose addition will make the argument forinference claims 217 mally valid. she argues (2009, 2011) that in general the argument analyst should supply as the unexpressed “connecting” premiss the argument’s ungeneralized associated material conditional. (in her (2009), she makes an exception for cases where what she calls the “connecting premise” is explicit. if the stated premiss is a singular indicative conditional and the conclusion is the consequent of that conditional, one needs to supply its antecedent as the unexpressed premiss; an example is the argument, “there is no reason to inform the child protection office. if there is no evidence the father started the fire deliberately to hurt his children, there is no need to do so”, where one should supply as the unexpressed premiss, “there is no evidence the father started the fire deliberately to hurt his children” (p. 86). if the stated premiss is a counterfactual conditional offered in support of the denial of its antecedent, one needs to supply the denial of its consequent as the unexpressed premiss; an example is the argument, “daniel is no athlete. if daniel were an athlete, he would have stamina”, where one should supply as the unexpressed premiss, “daniel does not have stamina.” (p. 103).) in defence of her position, gerlofs points out that the associated material conditional does do the job of transferring acceptability from the expressed premiss to the conclusion, by means of the valid form of argument modus ponendo ponens. given this role, she argues, the associated material conditional is what davies (1979) calls a “knowledge conditional”, defined as a conditional in which the antecedent contains accepted knowledge and the consequent a conclusion “deduced” (i.e. inferred) from this knowledge: in argumentation the antecedent is put forward as already accepted and the connecting premiss (whether expressed or unexpressed) is put forward as a means of transferring acceptability from the non-connecting premiss to the conclusion. further, material conditionals derived using the paradoxes of material implication cannot be used as a connecting premiss. if the author of an argument defends its connecting premiss by appealing to the truth of its consequent, the reasoning is circular if the premiss is being used to transfer acceptability from its antecedent to its consequent and involves a contradiction if the connecting premiss is a counterfactual conditional being used to transfer unacceptability from its consequent to its antecedent (gerlofs (2009), p. 107). similarly, if the author defends the connecting premiss by appealing to the falsehood of its antecedent, the reasoning is circular if the premiss is being used to transfer unacceptability from its consequent to its antecedent and involves a contradiction if it is being used to transfer acceptability from its antecedent to its consequent. thus the paradoxes of material implication are deprived of their sting. david hitchcock 218 an argument’s associated material conditional is the logical minimum among the statements that can be added to make an argument formally valid, in the sense that it follows logically from any statement whose addition as a premiss will make the argument formally valid without making a stated premiss redundant. in her (2011), gerlofs argues that treating the connecting premiss of an argument as this logical minimum has heuristic advantages, in that it enables one to classify critical questions that one can raise about an argument and to determine whether critical questions posed for a given argumentation scheme cover all the points where a particular argument fitting the scheme can be questioned. she points out that the critical reactions to an argument, which correspond to the critical questions belonging to its argument scheme, can concern the acceptability of the argument’s premisses, the ground for the logical minimum or the connection between the ground and the logical minimum. gerlofs’ proposal is carefully articulated and defended, and deserves serious consideration. my suspicion is that, if one investigates the ways in which a singular material conditional can be defended, other than by denying its antecedent or affirming its consequent, one will discover that one needs to appeal to a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization, or to something logically stronger that implies a counterfactualsupporting covering generalization. if so, then, given the pragmatic constraints that gerlofs imposes on the justification of an unexpressed connecting premiss, her position would turn out to be equivalent to mine: the argument as stated implies that it has a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization that is non-trivially acceptable. gerlofs herself proposes (2009, pp. 111-117) to evaluate connecting premisses by means of argument schemes, whose expression as a generalized conditional would provide what she calls the “ground” for the connecting premiss. such schemes are in fact generalizations, at some level of abstraction, of the particular argument taken to fit them, and are taken to hold counterfactually and non-trivially, given satisfactory answers to the “critical questions” associated with them that pertain to the transfer of acceptability from premiss to conclusion (hitchcock 2010b). thus her position turns out to be equivalent to mine. but her only argument for restricting the justification of connecting premisses to an appeal to argument schemes is that an arguer cannot justify a connecting premiss by appealing directly to the truth values of its antecedent and consequent. how can one justify a singular material conditional, other than by denying its antecedent or affirming its consequent? the typical strategy for proving a conditional is to assume its inference claims 219 antecedent and derive its consequent. one can then discharge the assumption and assert the conditional on the basis of the assumptions other than the antecedent that were used in deriving the consequent from the antecedent. in a situation where we are given an argument from the antecedent to the consequent and are treating the material conditional as the logically minimal gap-filler, the assumptions enabling us to derive the consequent from the antecedent would serve as what the pragma-dialectical approach calls the “pragmatic optimum” (van eemeren and grootendorst 1992, pp. 63-64). in general, an argument for some conclusion would transfer acceptability from the stated premisses to the conclusion if and only if the associated singular material conditional follows from acceptable assumptions none of which either are identical to or rely for their support on the conclusion. thus, the inference claim of any argument is the claim that its associated singular material conditional follows from acceptable assumptions that are epistemically independent of the conclusion. it is clear that a generalization of the associated conditional that supports counterfactuals must be based on more than the truth of the consequent or the falsehood of the antecedent. what is not clear is that any assumptions epistemically independent of the conclusion that are sufficient for it to follow logically from the stated premisses must be at least as strong as some counterfactual-supporting generalization. however, two suggestions of epistemically independent assumptions other than a counterfactual-supporting generalization turn out to entail a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization. bermejo-luque suggested (personal correspondence) that a reason for “if you promised, you have to do it” (construed as a material conditional, i.e. a negajunction) may be something like the very definition of “promising”. she also suggested that a reason for “if the litmus paper turned red, then the liquid in which it was dipped is an acid” may be something like a chemical explanation. definitions and chemical explanations, however, although they are not covering generalizations, entail covering generalizations, which support counterfactual instances if the definition or chemical explanation is correct. so reasons of this kind imply that the author of the argument is committed to a covering generalization of its associated negajunction. these two attempts thus failed to find a way of deriving a conclusion from premisses that is epistemically independent of the truth of the conclusion but does not entail a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization. their failure, however, at best justifies a presumption that the approach of gerlofs and the similar approach of bermejo-luque are de facto equivalent to the position of the present article. david hitchcock 220 8.4. ennis: the present account of inference claims implies that all inference is general. if a conclusion follows from given premisses, then a parallel conclusion follows also from relevantly parallel premisses, even ones that are purely hypothetical. the generality of all inference undergirds the strategy sometimes called “refutation by logical analogy” (e.g. by copi and cohen (2001)), of challenging an inference by supplying a parallel argument with true (or otherwise acceptable) premisses and an untrue (or otherwise not acceptable) conclusion, perhaps prefixing one’s challenge with the frame, “you might as well say that ...” on the broader truthtransmission conception of consequence that includes nonlogical consequences, a conclusion that follows from stated premisses does so in accordance with a counterfactualsupporting covering generalization that is non-trivially acceptable. if one restricts consequence to logical consequence or logical/semantic consequence, then one should look for such a generalization to add as an unexpressed premiss when one reconstructs the argument. proponents of the unexpressed premiss approach, however, sometimes object to the insistence that a gap-filling unexpressed premiss must be general by citing examples of what i will call “occasional arguments”, which they claim have only a singular unexpressed premiss. woods (2004, pp. 249-250) cites the argument: (21) it’s raining, so eveline won’t be driving to calgary. although he does not describe the context of utterance of this apparently actual argument, it is a reasonable assumption that no counterfactual supporting covering generalization (such as ‘eveline doesn’t drive when it’s raining’ or ‘unless it’s an emergency, eveline won’t drive long distances when it’s raining’) is acceptable. the conclusion follows, we may suppose, in virtue of particulars of the occasion of utterance of the argument rather than in virtue of some covering generalization. robert ennis claimed about a similar example that the gap-filling unexpressed premiss was the argument’s associated singular conditional: (22) ... when michael scriven and i were trying to find our way to detroit airport in the car he rented, i said at one point, “the sign says ‘chicago’ [to the right], so we should turn right there.” (we were trying to get on i 94 going to the airport.) there was no generalization there (this is clear from the situation) inference claims 221 and i would resist one. it was straight modus ponens, if anything. (e-mail communication, 2009 june 8) ennis later clarified in personal correspondence that he would not interpret the singular associated conditional that he took to be an unexpressed premiss of his argument as a material conditional. aside from assuming that it licenses modus ponens, he did not ascribe truth-conditions to it. much like verheij, he envisaged it as an inferential conditional asserting that the conclusion of the stated argument follows from its premiss. the inference in an occasional argument like those in examples (21) and (22) applies, on its face, only to the particular situation that is the occasion of its utterance. the word ‘occasional’ echoes quine’s use of the phrase ‘occasion sentences’ for sentences whose truth-value is partly a function of the occasion of their utterance (quine, 1960). in the same way, the inferential goodness of occasional arguments is partly a function of the occasion of their utterance. but only partly, i shall argue. once the relevant particular features of the occasion are specified, the conclusion follows if and only if some counterfactual-supporting covering generalization is nontrivially acceptable. to understand an occasional argument, someone not present on the occasion of its utterance needs to know who uttered it, what particular individuals are being referred to by its constituent proper names and definite descriptions, and what background knowledge about those particular individuals is being taken for granted as shared between the arguer and the argument’s addressees. consider for example the argument cited by ennis in example (22): (23) the sign says ‘chicago’ [to the right], so we should turn right there. ennis himself evidently found it necessary (or at least useful) to give part of the relevant background information in his e-mail communication: “michael scriven and i were trying to find our way to detroit airport in the car he rented... we were trying to get on i 94 going to the airport.” to complete the picture, we need to know that they were on i 96, having come across the ambassador bridge from windsor. the sign on the right to which ennis referred is located about half a mile before the exit to i 94. it reads: “i 94 west chicago / i 94 east port huron”. to fully understand the argument of example (23), we should add this additional information as unexpressed premisses mutually believed by both arguer and addressee: david hitchcock 222 (24) we are trying to find our way to detroit airport. we are trying to get on i 94 going to the airport. we are on i 96, having come across the ambassador bridge from windsor. the sign says ‘chicago’ [to the right]. so we should turn right there. thus expanded with the information required for someone not present on the occasion to understand the argument, the argument fits very well the approach of the present article. the argument is an instance of the scheme: (25) x is trying to find x’s way to detroit airport. x is trying to get on i 94 going to the airport. x is on i 96, having come across the ambassador bridge from windsor. the sign says ‘chicago’ [to the right]. so x should turn right there. this argument scheme has no actual or counterfactual instances with true premisses and an untrue conclusion, even though it has an actual instance with true premisses (namely, the argument of example 24) and an actual instance with an untrue conclusion (for example, the instance in which the variable x is replaced with the name of someone at the same spot on i 96 who intends to continue on that freeway past its intersection with i 94). thus, the conclusion of the argument in example 24 follows from its premisses, since it is an instance of the scheme in example 25. the validity of that scheme corresponds to the truth of the covering generalization of the argument that anyone on i 96 who has come across the ambassador bridge from windsor and is trying to get on i 94 going to the detroit airport should turn right where the sign says “chicago” to the right. and this covering generalization is non-trivially true, and supports counterfactual instances, as is required for the conclusion of the argument to follow from its premisses. it should be construed as temporally restricted to a specious present with indefinite boundaries, like the inference-licensing covering generalization of the obama argument of example 6. i suspect strongly that all occasional arguments will yield to a similar treatment. in other words, if the conclusion of an occasional argument intuitively follows from its premisses, it will follow from them in accordance with a non-trivially acceptable counterfactual-supporting covering generalization once the stated premisses are supplemented with the additional information about the occasion of the argument’s utterance that is necessary for someone not present on that occasion to understand the argument. i invite readers to test this claim by inference claims 223 working through an occasional argument that they themselves have experienced as arguer or addressee. occasional arguments exhibit the kernel of truth in the unexpressed premiss approach. such arguments do need gapfilling supplementation by information about the topic of the argument (i.e. the individual person or thing referred to in both premisses and conclusion), information that is taken for granted as known (or at least believed) by both arguer and addressees. but this supplementation usually does not produce an argument that is formally valid. rather, it produces an argument with an inference-claim that is at least arguably correct, in the sense that some non-trivially acceptable counterfactual-supporting covering generalization licenses the drawing of the conclusion from the supplemented premiss set. in general, the function of such context-available information is to narrow the scope of an obvious covering generalization so that it is a plausible candidate for being non-trivially true and supporting counterexamples. in the argument of example 23 about turning right where the sign says “chicago”, for example, the additional premisses narrow the scope of the generalization that one should turn right where the sign says “chicago” from all persons to all persons in a specious present who are travelling from the ambassador bridge on i 96 and trying to get on i 94 going to detroit airport 8. summary contemporary logicians generally construe consequence as formally necessary truth-preservation: a purely formal feature rules out that the implicans is true while the implicatum is untrue. two objections can be raised to this conception. first, it counts something as a consequence simply because a purely formal feature rules out that the implicans is true or simply because a purely formal feature rules out that the implicatum is untrue. second, it rejects something as a consequence when a general but not purely formal feature rules out a true implicans and untrue implicatum. an alternative truth-transmission conception holds that a consequence relation obtains when and only when a general feature rules out that the implicans is true while the implicatum is untrue, even though it does not rule out that the implicans is true and does not rule out that the implicatum is untrue. both conceptions can be given substitutional, model-theoretic or schematic articulations. however, each of these three articulations of the truthtransmission conception has counter-examples where the conclusion of an argument obviously does not follow from its david hitchcock 224 premisses even though the argument satisfies the articulation in question. the remedy is to abandon the substitutional and model-theoretic articulations and to modify the schematic articulation so as to require that it holds in virtue of a counterfactual-supporting covering generalization. this modification introduces an awkward asymmetry into the evaluation of arguments: covering generalizations that hold merely of actual cases have to be treated as unexpressed premisses rather than as principles licensing an inference. the suspicion that the asymmetry indicates something wrong-headed about the whole approach can be countered by noting that people rarely argue for conclusions that follow only in accordance with a covering generalization that if true would not support counterfactual instances; an explanation of their rarity is that to argue in this way is to beg the question at issue. the modified truth-transmission conception of consequence can be elaborated and expanded in four ways: by recognizing the legitimacy of restricting the range of the variables in an argument’s schema, by generalizing from truth to acceptability to cover deontic conclusions, by allowing for conclusions that are not assertives, and by allowing for rebuttable inferences. on the elaborated and expanded account, a conclusion follows from given premisses if and only if an acceptable counterfactual-supporting covering generalization of the argument rules out, either definitively or with some modal qualification, simultaneous acceptability of the premisses and non-acceptability of the conclusion, even though it does not rule out acceptability of the premisses and does not require acceptability of the conclusion independently of the premisses. this elaborated and expanded account is rather complex. a sceptic might find more attractive the simpler view already held by ancient logicians that the inference claim of an argument is just its associated conditional, i.e. the singular conditional whose antecedent is the conjunction of the argument’s premisses and whose consequent is the argument’s conclusion in response to such a sceptic, we may grant that a singular indicative conditional in one of its senses signifies that its consequent follows from its antecedent, but take the expanded acceptabilitytransmission account of the consequence relation to be an account of the truth-conditions of a singular indicative conditional in that sense. the alternative view that the inference claim of an argument is singular rather than general is either subject to objections or equivalent to the expanded acceptability-transmission account. the view that the unexpressed premiss of a formally invalid argument is at least sometimes the argument’s associated conditional is likewise either subject to objections or equivalent to the present account. inference claims 225 appendix the universally generalized material conditional associated with the schema ‘people who are f are very poor soldiers, so the iraqi soldiers are not f’ is logically equivalent to the statement that the iraqi soldiers are not very poor soldiers. proof: (l to r) suppose that, for any f, if people who are f are very poor soldiers, then the iraqi soldiers are not f. then in particular, by universal instantiation, if people who are identical with the iraqi soldiers are very poor soldiers, then the iraqi soldiers are not identical with the iraqi soldiers. but, by the meaning of identity, the iraqi soldiers are identical with the iraqi soldiers. hence, by double negation and modus tollendo tollens, people who are identical with the iraqi soldiers are not very poor soldiers. in other words, the iraqi soldiers are not very poor soldiers. (r to l) suppose that the iraqi soldiers are not very poor soldiers. now suppose, for conditional proof, that for an arbitrarily chosen property f, people who are f are very poor soldiers. suppose, for reductio, that the iraqi soldiers are f. since they are people, they are people who are f, and thus are very poor soldiers, contrary to our original supposition. hence, by reductio ad absurdum, the iraqi soldiers are not f. hence, by conditional proof, if people who are f are very poor soldiers, then the iraqi soldiers are not f. hence, since we have discharged all assumptions about f, by universal generalization, for any f, if people who are f are very poor soldiers, then the iraqi soldiers are not f. qed the proof uses only rules of inference that conform to the truth-transmission sense of consequence. it can be imitated for any argument in which an additional singular premiss would make the argument formally valid. any singular statement is thus equivalent to a second-order universal generalization, which if it supports counterfactual instances can license inferences. acknowledgements: i wish to express particular thanks to lilian bermejo-luque, robert ennis, james freeman and robert pinto for sustained correspondence on issues discussed in this article. i thank as well for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article george boger, ralph johnson, ernest lepore, harvey siegel and mark weinstein. they will not necessarily agree with the result, the responsibility for which is mine. david hitchcock 226 the present article is to appear in slightly different form in the proceedings of a colloquium entitled “inside arguments: logic vs. argumentation theory”, held at the university of coimbra in portugal from march 24 through 26, 2011. i am grateful to the editors of the conference proceedings and of informal logic for permitting the dual publication. references aristotle (1984). rhetoric. in: j. barnes (ed.), the complete works of aristotle, vol. 2 (pp. 2152-2269), princeton: princeton university press. arregui, a. 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(1979). on the semantics of syntax. mood and condition in english. london: croom helm. diogenes laertius (2005/c. 235). lives of eminent philosophers, books vi-x, tr. r.d. hicks. loeb classical library 185. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. eemeren, f.h. van and r. grootendorst (1992). argumentation, communication, and fallacies: a pragma-dialectical perspective. hillsdale, nj: lawrence erlbaum associates. etchemendy, j. (1990). the concept of logical consequence. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. ennis, r.h. (1982). identifying implicit assumptions. synthese 51, 61-86. inference claims 227 forbes, g. (1994). modern logic. new york: oxford university press. freeman, j.b. (2011a). argument structure: representation and theory. dordrecht, the netherlands: springer. freeman, j.b. (2011b). the logical dimension of argumentation and its semantic appraisal in bermejo-luque’s giving reasons. theoria 72, 189-198. gerlofs, j.m. (2009). the use of conditionals in argumentation. diss., university of amsterdam. gerlofs, j.m. (2011). hidden premises, hidden treasures? in: f.h. van eemeren, b. garssen, d.m. godden and g.r. mitchell (eds.), proceedings of the seventh conference of the international society for the study of argumentation. chapter 52, pp. 577-586. cd-rom. amsterdam: sic sat. grice, paul (1989). studies in the way of words. cambridge, ma: harvard university press. hitchcock, d. (1985). enthymematic arguments. informal logic 7(2 and 3), 83-97. hitchcock, d. (1992). relevance. argumentation 6, 251-270. hitchcock, d. (1998). does the traditional treatment of enthymemes rest on a mistake? argumentation 12, 15–37. hitchcock, d. (2002) sampling scholarly arguments: a test of a theory of good inference in: h.v. hansen, c.w. tindale, j.a. blair, r.h. johnson and r.c. pinto (eds.), argumentation and its applications, cd-rom (pp. 1-20, with appendix, pp. 1-58), windsor, on: ossa. hitchcock, d. 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(2004). the death of argument: fallacies in agentbased reasoning. applied logic series, volume 32. dordrecht: kluwer. microsoft word 00 a contents.docx td the journal for transdisciplinary research in southern africa, 6(1) july 2010, pp. 113 138. universal dignity, justice and accountability: protection of human rights and dealing with atrocities m oelofse* abstract the notion that human beings have rights as humans is part of the contemporary world and its politics. with respect to human rights, the united nations (un) plays a major role in promoting, protecting, and expanding internationally accepted rights through establishing several comprehensive agreements and mechanisms since 1945. thus, on a global level, human rights and the violations thereof have become a legitimate concern of international society. however, there is a difference between declaring and practising human rights. consequently, political changes have occurred all over the world in recent years where several repressive regimes have been replaced with democratic or semi-democratic governments. in the process, these regimes are confronted with the question of justice and that accountability is due after atrocity. the widely held belief is that crimes against humanity must be addressed and perpetrators have to be called to account, while justice has to be determined. the article will focus on what is understood by “human rights” and how the un went about to guarantee human rights and eliminate the violations thereof by implementing a network of human rights instruments and mechanisms. the article will also indicate that, in practice, there are certain difficulties with the enforcement of these un conventions. the different options to be considered by countries in dealing with a violent legacy will be examined to explain why many transitional societies prefer to establish a truth commission. keywords: human rights; united nations; conventions to promote and protect human rights; human rights violations; prosecutions; blanket amnesty; truth commissions. disciplines: history, political science, transitional justice, human rights law. 1. introduction the united nations (un) has defined a broad range of internationally accepted human rights and has also established mechanisms to promote and protect these rights and help, as well as * marietjie oelofse is attached to the university of the free state, department of history, po box 339, bloemfontein 9300. tel: 051 401-2276. fax: 051 444-5803. e-mail: oelofsem@ufs.ac.za. the author gratefully acknowledges the financial assistance of the national research foundation of south africa in facilitating this research. opinions expressed and conclusions arrived at, are the author’s own, and are not necessarily to be attributed to the national research foundation. oelofse   114 support governments in enforcing their responsibilities.1 this had led to the situation where human rights have, at present, a greater prominence in foreign policy than at any other time. however, the implementation of these mechanisms remains almost exclusively national.2 thus, instead of being guardians of human rights, states have often become the violators of human rights. as a result, the twenty-first century is characterised by the choices facing societies that emerged from a period of violence, as well as the process in which divided societies struggle to master a heritage of collective violence and severe gross human rights violations. confronted with processes and responses of how to deal with a past of human rights violations, the desire to know the truth of what happened, as well as to remember the past and to establish a clear break with the past, will influence the decisions. knowing what really happened and untangling the web of lies and manipulations may constitute a fundamental role in “coming to terms” with the past. here, acknowledgement in dealing with past wrongs that may lead to healing is considered. justification is made on the grounds that in remembering the past, forgiveness and reconciliation may be considered only when a nation has confronted the full knowledge of the past. when a period of authoritarian rule accompanied with atrocity ends, society as a whole must find a way to move forward, rebuilding shattered lives and recreate a liveable space of national peace, where former enemies reunite, as well as to secure these events in the past. in the comprehensive range of political transformations and within historical context, there is a reflection for a national desire for truth-telling and official truth-seeking.3 furthermore, human rights advocates have been pressurising the un that international human rights treaties must obligate governments to investigate and make public to victims and their families all that can be known and established about crimes against humanity.4 in dealing with a violent legacy, three options may be selected: prosecution, a blanket amnesty which results in national amnesia, or a process of setting up a truth commission. especially since the truth and reconciliation commission in south africa (trc), truth commissions as such have attracted world-wide attention and have gained ground. however, it must be noted that truth commissions are part of the broader field of transitional justice and are only one tool among others available to help societies to confront a violent past through a transitional justice process. the article will focus on what is understood by “human rights” and how the un went about to guarantee human rights and eliminate the violations thereof by implementing a network of human rights instruments and mechanisms. the article will also indicate that, in practice, there are certain difficulties with the enforcement of these un conventions, resulting sometimes in human rights violations. the different options to be considered by countries in dealing with a 1 united nations, “human rights”, <http://www.un.org/rights/morerights.htm>, 2000, (accessed 30/3/2009). 2 j. donnelly, universal human rights in theory & practice (second edition), pp. 34, 172. 3 p.b. hayner, unspeakable truths. facing the challenge of truth commissions, p. 4. 4 ibid., p. 106. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 115 violent legacy will be examined to explain why many transitional societies prefer to establish a truth commission. 2. the evolution of global human rights on a global and regional level, there are numerous conventions in relation to various human rights where different states assert to these instruments and mechanisms while non-governmental organisations make its liturgy their aim. it is a fact that human rights and the violations thereof have become more and more prominent in international discourse. the twenty-first century is marking a new epoch for the invention of new and distinctive legal forms of response against mass violence and atrocities.5 what does it mean to have a right as a human being? stewart claims that the term “human rights” is difficult to define and that no consensus exists as to what these rights should be. it seems as if the idea of human rights is not an obvious one. habibi focuses on the term “rights” and define it as protections or entitlements that individuals hold against other individuals, the state, or some other community. in turn, the rights conferrers have a corresponding obligation to non-interference or to enable the rights holders to exercise their rights.6 human rights are described as rights that we hold by virtue of the fact that we are human beings.7 for stewart, human rights are regarded generally as those “ fundamental and inalienable rights which are essential for life and which the international community recognizes as belonging to all individuals by the very fact of their humanity.8 consequently, human rights are seen as universal, thus transcending culture and place. it is categorical and without exception, which means that everyone has human rights and no one can take them away. furthermore, these rights are inalienable, indefeasible, and indefatigable as every human being is of infinite worth and dignity and should be treated as an end and never as a means only. the primary qualification for holding human rights is to belong to the human race.9 5 m. minow, between vengeance and forgiveness. facing history after genocide and mass violence, p. 1. 6 d.a. habibi, “human rights and politicized human rights: a utilitarian critique” in journal of human rights 6, 2007, p. 6. see also r.j. vincent, human rights and international relations, pp. 7-9, where the author explains the idea of rights. 7 habibi, p. 6. 8 n.f. stewart, “international protection of human rights: the united nations system” in the international journal for human rights 12 (1), february 2008, p. 89. 9 habibi, p. 7; vincent, p. 10. oelofse   116 everyone has human rights by virtue of their humanity, which are based on an appeal to our human nature. accordingly, human rights must be enjoyed not only universally, but also equally by all people, irrespective of race, gender or belief. it seems also that all basic human rights have three correlative duties which in turn will trigger each of these duties, namely, duties to avoid depriving, duties to protect from deprivation and duties to aid the deprived.10 human rights are divided further into first-generation rights, namely civil and political rights, which include the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and expression, and equality before the law. second-generation human rights comprise economic and cultural rights in nature. these relate to the equal treatment of citizens such as the right to employment, healthcare, housing, and protection. third-generation rights are not directly part of the universal declaration of human rights, but are consecutive instruments stated in multilateral declarations such as the stockholm declaration on human development (1972) and the rio declaration on the environment and development (1992).11 to violate the most basic human rights, is to deny individuals their essential moral entitlements, in other words, to treat an individual less than a human being as if he/she does not deserve respect and dignity. when any state or non-state actor breaches any part of the universal declaration of human rights, international treaties or other international human rights or humanitarian law, human rights violations occur. abuse of human rights often leads to conflict resulting in human rights violations. these violations are monitored by the un committees, national institutions, governments and various non-governmental organisations.12 the idea of human rights pre-dates the un. however, modern international human rights law is a post-world war ii phenomenon. during and after the second world war, more focus was given to the protection of individuals and the guarantee of human rights. human rights became a factor in public political debate. this tendency became reality when the founders of the un responded to the severe human rights violations during the second world war by giving universal and formal recognition to human rights in 1945 through the charter of this organisation.13 the preamble of the charter of the united nations declares: … to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of the nation large and small …. 10 vincent, pp. 11, 13. 11 j. akokpari, “human rights and human security in post-9/11 africa” in j. akokpari & d.s. zimbler (eds), africa’s human rights architecture, p. 69. compare this also with bryan hehir’s explanation that human rights legislation in international relations has moved through three stages in harvard law school human rights program, truth commissions: a comparative assessment. an interdisciplinary discussion held at harvard law school in may 1996, p. 13. 12 beyond intractability, “human rights violations”, http://www.beyondintractability.org/essay/human_rights_violations/, 2007, (accessed 30/3/2009). 13 t. buergental, international human rights in a nutshell (second edition), p. 21; united nations, “fiftieth anniversary of the universal declaration of human rights”, <http://www.un.org/rights/50/broch.htm>, 1998, (accessed 30/3/2009). protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 117 in this preamble, the states and peoples of the un are committed to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war. furthermore, the un charter imposes obligations upon members to protect human rights as set out in article 1 of the charter in the purposes of its organisation in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. article 13(1) of the charter emphasises that, in all of this, the general assembly shall initiate studies and make recommendations for this purpose. articles 55, 56 and 59 of the un charter set the tone further for its members concerning legal obligations (even where applicable to initiated negotiations), to promote universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. again this notion is reflected in article 76, where the international trusteeship system is set out.14 thus, the un takes as its purpose the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the members pledge to take separate and joint action in cooperation with the un to accomplish this goal.15 through the charter, the un “internationalised” human rights by making it an international concern. a new era had begun with the commitment to promoting and expanding the ideals of human rights. however, the un charter does not define and specify what is meant by “human rights and fundamental freedoms” and does not establish any specific way to ensure implementation in member states. an effort had to be made in the following years by the un to define and codify these rights.16 over the following years, a network of human rights instruments and mechanisms would be developed to safeguard the primacy of human rights and to eliminate and confront human rights violations where they occurred. following the charter, a principal policy-making body for human rights within the un system was established in 1946. this un commission on human rights reviewed human rights issues, develops and codifies new international norms and makes recommendations to governments.17 this was followed by the general assembly’s adoption of the universal declaration of human rights (udhr) on 10 december 1948. this declaration remains the first pillar of twentieth century human rights law and remains the cornerstone of the universal human rights movement, as well as the best known and most cited human rights document in the world.18 the declaration covers a comprehensive list of political, civil, economic, social, and cultural rights in 30 distinct and concise articles. for the first time the rights and freedoms of individuals were set forth in detail. it is built on the fundamental principle that human rights are based on 14 i. brownlie (ed.), basic documents on human rights (third edition), pp. 3-14; buergenthal, pp. 23-26; vincent, pp. 92-93. 15 vincent, pp. 92-93. 16 buergental, pp. 22-28. 17 donnelly, pp. 129, 132-133; united nations, “fiftieth anniversary …”. 18 donnelly, pp. 22-23. oelofse   118 the “inherent dignity and equal and inalienable rights” of every person. this dignity, as well as the rights to freedom and equality deriving thereof, are undeniable and have been proclaimed “as the highest aspiration of the people”.19 although the declaration was adopted as a resolution and does not have the binding force of a treaty, it has acquired universal acceptability. notwithstanding, the declaration played an important role in the adoption of a series of multilateral treaties, conventions and declarations concluded through the un on human rights, and inspired human rights activism and legislation all over the world.20 buergental emphasises the following view: the declaration … is now considered to be an authoritative interpretation of the un charter … it has joined the charter as part of the constitutional structure of the world community. the declaration, as an authoritative listing of human rights, has become a basic component of international customary law, binding all states, not only members of the united nations.21 the declaration gives equal importance to civil rights and political liberties (articles 3 to 21), as well as to economic, social and cultural rights (articles 22 to 27), and affords them the same degree of protection.22 the first two articles23 lay the universal foundation of human rights: human beings are equal because of their shared essence of human dignity; human rights are universal not because of any state or international organization, but because they belong to all of humanity. the two articles assure that human rights are the birthright of every one, not privileges of a select few, nor privileges to be granted or derived.24 article 28 to 30 adds to a larger protective framework in which all human rights are to be enjoyed universally.25 in addition to the human rights provisions of the un charter and of the universal declaration of human rights, the international bill of rights consists of the two international covenants on human rights and the optional protocols to the international covenant on civil and political 19 united nations, “universal declaration of human rights. a united nations priority”, <http://www.un.org/rights/hrtoday/declar.htm>, s.a, (accessed 30/3/2009). 20 stewart, p. 91; united nations, “fiftieth anniversary …”; united nations, “universal declaration …”. 21 buergental, p. 37. 22 centre for human rights, human rights. a compilation of international instruments, vol. 1, pp. 1-7. 23 article 1: “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. they are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood”. article 2: “everyone is entitled to all rights and freedoms set forth in this declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status”. see centre for human rights, p. 2. 24 stewart, p. 92. 25 centre for human rights, pp. 6-7; united nations, “universal declaration …”. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 119 rights.26 these two international covenants are the broadest legally binding human rights agreements negotiated under un auspices. it includes the international covenant on economic, social, and cultural rights (icescr)27 and the international covenant on civil and political rights (iccpr).28 both covenants were adopted in 1966 but only entered into force in 1976, making many of the provisions of the universal declaration effectively binding for states that ratified them. the preambles and articles 1, 2, 3 and 5 are virtually identical in both international covenants.29 in the following years, several human rights treaties and declarations became part of the un’s aim to deal with specific types of human rights violations. apart from the icescr and the iccpr, there are more international human rights instruments, which include: convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (adopted by the un in 1948 and entered into force in 1951);30 convention relating to the status of refugees (adopted by the un in 1951 and entered into force in 1954); convention relating to the status of stateless persons (adopted by the un in 1954 and entered into force in 1960); convention on the reduction of statelessness (adopted by the un in 1961 and entered into force 1975); convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination (adopted by the un in 1965 and entered into force in 1969);31 convention on the suppression and the punishment of 26 the optional protocol to the international covenant on civil and political rights enables private parties, claiming to be victims of a violation of the covenant, to file complaints with the human rights committee. the second optional protocol aims at the abolition of the death penalty. see centre for human rights, pp. 41-49; buergental, pp. 48-51. 27 economic and social rights include the right to work and for a just reward; the right to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work; the right to form and join trade unions; the right to rest and leisure, and to periodic holidays with pay; the right to a standard of living adequate to health and well-being; the right to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health; the right to social security, including social insurance; the right to the protection of the family; the right to education; and the right to participation in the cultural life of a community. vincent, p. 11. 28 civil and political rights include the rights to life, liberty, security of the person, privacy and property; the rights to marry and found a family; the rights to fair trial; freedom from slavery, torture and arbitrary arrest; freedom of movement and to seek asylum: the right to a nationality; freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; freedom of assembly and association; and the right to free elections, universal suffrage and participation in public affairs. vincent, p. 11. 29 centre for human rights, pp. 8-40; united nations, “universal declaration …”. 30 the convention declares that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or time of war, is a crime under international law for which the individual perpetrator is punishable. the genocide convention is considered as the centerpiece of international law that applies to the protection of rights of groups to exist as groups, either as minorities or majorities. article 2 sets out the acts constituting genocide. buergental, pp. 58-61; brownlie, pp. 31-34; united nations, “convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide”, <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/genocide.html>, 1997, (accessed 30/3/2009). 31 racial discrimination is prohibited through this convention. article 1 defines racial discrimination as “any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing oelofse   120 the crime of apartheid (adopted by the un in 1973 and entered into force in 1976);32 convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (adopted by the un in 1979 and entered into force in 1981);33 convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (adopted by the un in 1984 and entered into force in 1987);34 convention on the rights of the child (adopted by the un in 1989 and the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life”. article 2(1)(d) also requires from each state to “prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any person, group or organization”. centre for human rights, pp. 66-79; buergental, pp. 61-67; office of the high commissioner for human rights, “international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination”, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/d_icerd.htm> s.a, (accessed 30/3/2009). 32 this convention suppresses and punishes apartheid as it is proclaims as “a crime against humanity”. it further declares all inhuman acts attributable to the policies and practices of apartheid “crimes violating the principles of international law”. centre for human rights, pp. 80-86; buergental, pp. 67-68. 33 the convention is often described as an international bill of rights for women. it defines what constitutes discrimination against women and sets up an agenda for national action to put an end to such discrimination. in its preamble, the convention explicitly acknowledges that “extensive discrimination against women continues to exist”. discrimination against women is defined in article 1 as “any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made on the basis of sex” that diminishes the “recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field”. in article 2 the state parties undertake “to embody the principle of equality of men and women in their national constitutions or other appropriate legislation” and to adopt laws or other measures “including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination against women”. cedaw (the committee on the elimination of discrimination against women) also addresses a wide range of problems encountered by women in their struggle for equality. centre for human rights, pp. 150-163; buergental, pp. 68-72; united nations, “convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women”, <http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cdw.html>, 1997, (accessed 30/3/2009). 34 the convention defines ‘torture’ as “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes, inter alia, of “obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession” (article 1(1)). this convention covers torture inflicted by government officials, as well as by private individuals or groups whose conduct such officials encourage or tolerate. thus, the convention is designed to prevent and punish torture committed “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity”. article 8 states that the state parties are required to treat torture as an extraditable offense. it is also notable that the convention affirms that there are “no exceptional circumstances whatsoever” to justify torture and that no orders from superior officers or a public authority may be validly invoked as a justification. (articles 2(2) and 2(3)). the un declared 26 june as the annual international day in support of victims of torture. centre for human rights, pp. 293-307; buergental, pp. 72-76; office of the high commissioner for human rights, “convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/h_cat39.htm>, s.a, (accessed 30/3/2009). see also j.h. burgers and h. danelius, the united nations convention against torture. a handbook on the convention against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 121 entered into force in 1990); and international convention on the protection of the rights of all migrant workers and members of their families (adopted by the un in 1990 and entered into force in 2003). many of these conventions established a special commission or committee directed towards monitoring the treaty’s provisions. the universal principles of human rights were also implemented on a regional basis, as this was encouraged by the un. these regions, notably in western europe, america and africa, have in turn identified themselves as the local bearers of human rights institutions in their own areas.35 western europe took the lead in the regional guarantee of human rights with the european convention on human rights and fundamental freedoms, which entered into force in 1953. this convention sought to guarantee rights, as well as to state them. a commission and a court of human rights were established for this specific purpose.36 in america, the american convention on human rights entered into force in 1978, where a commission and court, similar to those in europe, were established.37 under the auspices of the former organisation of african unity, the african charter on human and people’s rights entered into force in 1986.38 where the authors provide a comprehensive commentary on the convention, as well as its background in the context of other international efforts to the eradication of torture. 35 vincent, p. 95. 36 the council of europe, a regional inter-governmental organisation founded in 1949 by a group of western european nations, was committed to the protection of human rights and the preservation of individual freedom and democracy. the council’s human rights system has its legal source in two treaties, namely the european convention of human rights, guaranteeing basic civil and political rights, and the european social charter, proclaiming a register of economic and social rights. the rights guaranteed by the convention have been expanded by additional protocols. according to article 19 of the convention two institutions were established, namely the european commission of human rights and the european court of human rights. buergental, pp. 102-106; council of europe, “convention of human rights and fundamental freedoms”, <http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/treaties/htm/0905. htm>, s.a, (accessed 30/3/2009). 37 the organisation of american states (oas) is a regional inter-governmental organisation that has established law and institutions to promote and protect human rights. two distinct legal sources form part of the inter-american human rights systems: one is based on the charter of the oas and the other is based on the american convention on human rights. the convention also provides for the establishment of the inter-american commission on human rights and the inter-american court of human rights. the rights guaranteed by the convention have been expanded by additional protocols. buergental, pp. 174-175, 194-195, 198; department of international law. organization of american states, washington d.c., “american convention on human rights ‘pact of san jose, costa rica’”, <http://www.oas.org/juridico/english/treaties/b-32.html>, s.a, (accessed 30/3/2009). 38 the african charter on human and peoples’ rights is the regions principal human rights instrument and provides a system for the protection and promotion of human rights that is intended to function within the institutional framework of the former oau (it was replaced in 2002 with the au). according to buergental the african charter differs from the european and american conventions on human rights in a number of aspects. for example, the african charter promulgates not only rights but also duties, and the treaty is drafted in a form that allows the state parties to impose very broad limitations and restrictions on the execution of the oelofse   122 there are at present no asian organisations or conventions to promote and protect human rights. countries vary at large in their account of human rights protection and their approach thereto. consequently, there are also no regional approaches or agreements on human rights for oceania. on 20 december 1993, the post of un high commissioner for human rights was created. the high commissioner coordinates the un human rights programme and promotes universal respect for human rights. according to resolution 48/141 (1994) paragraph 4(f), the most important function of the un high commissioner is spelled out as to play an active role in removing the current obstacles and in meeting the challenges to the full realisation of all human rights and in preventing the continuation of human rights violations throughout the world.39 thus, this permits the high commissioner to tackle any human rights problem and to be actively engaged in endeavours to prevent human rights violations. the activities with regard to human rights are coordinated by the office of the high commissioner for human rights in geneva, where the office services the un commission on human rights and most un human rights treaty bodies.40 the vienna declaration and programme of action adopted by the world conference on human rights in 1993 gave high priority to preserving the integrity of the universal declaration. it stresses the universal nature of human rights and the need to fight all forms of racism, discrimination, xenophobia, and other forms of intolerance. it also emphasises the rights of women, children, minorities, and indigenous people. importantly the vienna declaration states, for the first time explicitly, that all organs, programmes, and specialised agencies of the un system should have a central role in strengthening human rights.41 rights it proclaims. the charter also places great emphasis on african historical tradition. furthermore, the charter makes provision for the establishment of an african commission on human and peoples’ rights, which has promotional and quasi-judicial functions. the protocol to the charter on the establishment of an african court on human and peoples’ rights was adopted in 1998. in 2003 the protocol to the charter on the rights of women in africa, was also adopted. buergental, pp. 228-230, 239-240; brownlie, pp. 551-566. 39 united nations general assembly a/res/48/141, “high commissioner for the promotion and protection of all human rights”, <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/48/a48r141.htm>, s.a, (accessed 31/3/2009). 40 buergental, pp. 95-97; donnelly, p. 135. 41 the declaration notes that: “all human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent and interrelated. the international community must treat human rights globally in a fair and equal manner, on the same footing, and with the same emphasis. while the significance of national and regional particularities and various historical, cultural, and religious backgrounds must be borne in mind, it is the duty of states, regardless of their political, economic and cultural systems, to promote and protect all human rights and fundamental freedoms.” united nations, “world conference on human rights, vienna, 14-25 june 1993. vienna declaration and programme of action”, <http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(symbol)/a.conf.157.23.en?opendoc>, 2000, (accessed 30/3/2009); united nations, “fiftieth anniversary …”; united nations, “universal declaration …”. see also office of the high commissioner for human rights, protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 123 this declaration was further underlined by the united nations millennium declaration in 2000 where the heads of state and government reaffirmed their commitment to the purposes and principles of the un charter. they also rededicated themselves to support all efforts and uphold respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as respect for the equal rights of all without distinction between race, sex, language, or religion. certain fundamental values were underlined such as freedom, equality, and tolerance. clause v of the millennium declaration elaborated on human rights, democracy, and good governance.42 in 1998, the international community met in rome to adopt a treaty establishing the international criminal court (icc) in the hague. the icc’s purpose is to prosecute individuals accused of crimes against humanity, genocide, war crimes and aggression. the icc’s jurisdiction stretches to the states where the crimes are committed or the home states of the accused that have ratified the rome treaty. further, the icc will only pursue cases after 1 july 2002 when it entered into force, and when states possessing jurisdiction are unable or are unwilling to prosecute. thus, the icc is to be complementary to national criminal jurisdiction. this court does not form part of the un and is accountable to countries that ratify its statute. its statute ensures against unwarranted prosecutions. the future aim of the icc is to assist in ending impunity and deter potential war criminals.43 the icc preamble states clearly that millions of children, women, and men have been victims of unimaginable atrocities which threaten the peace and well-being of the world. it further affirms that these “serious crimes must not go unpunished” and is, therefore, determined to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of these crimes and contribute to the prevention of such crimes.44 article 7 sets out certain acts that, when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, will constitute a “crime against humanity”.45 “five-year review of the implementation of the vienna declaration and programme of action”, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/50th/vdparev.htm>, s.a, (accessed 30/3/2009). 42 office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights, “united nations millennium declaration”, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/millennium.htm>, 2007, (accessed 30/3/2009). 43 s. turner, “the dilemma of double standards in u.s. human rights policy” in peace & change 28(4), october 3003, p. 543; office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights, “rome statute of the international criminal court”, <http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/criminalcourt.htm>, 2007, (accessed 30/3/2009); stewart, p. 100. 44 office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights, “rome statute …”. 45 see article 7 (1 & 2) of the rome statute of the icc for the list and explanations of acts that means ‘crime against humanity’. office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights, “rome statute …”. oelofse   124 until 2006, the un commission on human rights (unchr) was the main organ in the un for achieving the purpose of its charter, namely to promote respect for human rights and make it a general part of the business of international society at large. already in 2005, the former un secretary-general, kofi annan, argued for reforms: [t]he commission’s ability to perform its tasks has been overtaken by new needs, and undermined by the politicization of its sessions and the selectivity of its work. we have reached a point at which the commission’s declining credibility has cast a shadow on the reputation of the united nations system as a whole, and where piecemeal reforms will not be enough.46 he further called for the formation of a new human rights council that would be a society of the committed, an institution that is populated by governments that have a solid record of commitment to the highest human rights standards.47 the united nations human rights council, created at the 2005 world summit, replaced the unchr on 15 march 2006. this council has a mandate to promote and protect human rights around the globe and to investigate and address gross and systematic violations of human rights and make recommendations. thus, the council works in close cooperation in the field of human rights with a variety of governments, organisations, institutions, as well as civil society.48 apart form the un, various governmental and independent non-governmental organisations (ngos) were established to deal with human rights. since 1945, non-governmental organisations have contributed extensively to the un’s work on human rights. with this, human rights took on a “moral aura” for interpreting international humanitarian law and for judging nations. these organisations collect evidence and provide information of alleged human rights violations, highlighting these violations and contribute to the global protection thereof by applying pressure to enforce human rights laws.49 in essence, every un body and specialised agency is involved, to some degree, in the protection of human rights. for the first time in history, the creation of a comprehensive body of human 46 j.h. lebovic and e. voeten, “the politics of shame: the condemnation of country human rights practices in the unchr” in international studies quarterly 50, 2006, pp. 861-862; l. rahmani-ocora, “giving the emperor real clothes: the un human rights council” in global governance 12, 2006, p. 15. 47 ibid. 48 united nations high commissioner for human rights, “resolution establishing the council” in international debates, 4(5), may 2006, pp. 137-139. 49 habibi, p. 6. see also how habibi criticizes in this article the leading organisations of the international human rights movement that have lost sight of their own professed values and follow the politicised un. amnesty international, founded in britain in 1961, remains with it 2.2 million members the world’s largest organisation dedicated to the cause of human rights. other non-governmental organisations focusing on human rights include: human rights watch, international federation of human rights, world organisation against torture, freedom house, international freedom of expression exchange and anti-slavery international, to name but a few well-known ngos. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 125 rights law, which provides the international community with a universal and internationally protected code of human rights, one to which all nations can subscribe and to which all people can aspire, is a great achievement.50 kofi annan publicly identified human rights as a cross-cutting issue and vital component of all aspects of the un’s work including humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts.51 the affirmation of the centrality of human rights to all un programmes was further underlined by annan, stating that: i fully agree … on the centrality of human rights to united nations peace activities and on the need to integrate human rights more effectively into prevention, peacekeeping, and peace-building strategies.52 however, despite a growing awareness assisted by mass communications, of the importance and urgency for the respect of human rights, there are people around the world who, on a daily basis, suffer from some serious violation of their human rights. in practice, an immense gap exists between declaring and practising human rights. conditions are not always created whereby society may enjoy these rights as set out by the un. in theory, the un has the authority, ability, and action to respond effectively to human rights violations. unfortunately, in practice there are certain gaps and difficulties that are encountered. the next step after acknowledging human rights should be the enforcement thereof. herein lays the problem. signature and ratification of conventions do not always imply allegiance to them. the absence of any real prospect of enforcement leads to doubt in the existence of human rights, as some governments, for variety of reasons, cannot keep and enforce these rights. thus, ratification of international instruments may not even be a guide to the actual guarantee and commitment to human rights.53 it must be taken into account that international human rights accountability can only be translated into reality if authority, ability, and action are taken on a national level as the primary responsibility for implementing human rights lies with governments.54 according to amnesty international, only a few countries do not commit significant human rights violations. the amnesty international report of 2008 (covering the period januarydecember 2007), reveals the state of the world’s human rights and how far the world has to go before people truly are free from fear and human rights violations. the report indicates that the human rights promised in the universal declaration are far from being a reality for all the people in the world. human rights violations still continue, while economic and social rights remain illusory for many people. internal armed conflicts continue accompanied by abuses including 50 united nations, “human rights”, <htpp://www.un.org/rights/morerights.htm>, 2000, (accessed 30/3/2009). 51 f.d. gaer, “human rights ngos in un peace operations” in international peacekeeping 10(1), spring 2003, p. 80. 52 ibid., p. 85. 53 vincent, pp. 10, 99. 54 stewart, pp. 102-104. oelofse   126 unlawful killings, torture and rape. women’s human rights are abused and been discriminated against. consequently, the report indicates that those responsible for human rights abuses often escape being held accountable.55 the challenge facing a society confronted with human rights violations is the manner in which it treats and faces these abuses. it must be done in such a way that the culture of impunity can be ended, resulting in accountability for past violations and securing a just future. 3. to remember or forget? how to deal with atrocities of the past the question that needs to be answered about “what to do about the past” is how to deal with the atrocities of the past. it is important to deal with the past in the correct way, as one is also dealing with the future. the way one deals with the past impacts upon the shape of the future, while aiming at establishing a new political and moral order. it is, on the one hand, the political and ethical demand to confront past atrocities and on the other hand the desire to bury the past. in addition, international law allows an affirmative obligation on the part of states to investigate and punish gross violations of human rights.56 this issue of how to deal with the past raises serious questions. can entire nations be considered guilty for the acts which were committed by a minority of the population and if so, where does it end? who should ultimately be held responsible – the elite, the masses or both? should the past be exhumed, preserved, apologised for and acknowledged? whether and how do the people of a country want to remember and preserve their past – especially those who have suffered directly from past human rights abuses? how can the repetition of the atrocities of the past be prevented in the future? once the damage has been done, how will it be repaired? how will societies heal? how can a balance be reached between too much forgetting and too much remembering? questions arise concerning citizenship, responsibility, and guilt and ultimately, the question that needs to be answered: what would be the best way to deal with the past?57 to answer these questions, the debate is centred on whether truth should be the aim of accountability or whether justice should be the aim of accountability. kenneth christie and patricia hayner argue that for many political scientists the notion of ‘coming to terms with the past and dealing with it’ is fundamental to the process of democratisation in post-authoritarian governments and states which appear to be undergoing traumatic changes.58 christie indicates further that, with the aim of producing some form of 55 amnesty international, amnesty international report 2008. the state of the world’s human rights. 56 k. christie, the south african truth commission, p. 63; a.m. omar, “foreword” in m.r. rwelamira and g. werle (eds), confronting past injustices. approaches to amnesty, punishment, reparation and restitution in south africa and germany, p. ix; sunday times, 12.6.1994, p. 20. 57 christie, p. 39; hayner, p. 267; minow, p. 4; sowetan, 9.6.1994, p. 8; rapport, 26.6.1994, p. 23. 58 christie, p. 63; hayner, p. 11. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 127 collective memory of a traumatic history, the emerging democratic dispensation often sought to respond to the previous regime, typically by dismantling their apparatus of control, punishing or giving amnesty to the old officials of those regimes, providing some form of reparation for survivors and victims commemorating their struggle and sacrifice through monuments, statues and the renaming of streets and avenues in their honour.59 dealing with past injustices and human rights violations become both a political and ethical task. thus, it becomes commonplace where the past needs to be “got over” and perhaps more crucially, needs to be seen to be “got over”.60 justice in the courts is usually the most prominent of demands in how to deal with past atrocities. it is argued that truth produced by trials is much more precise and trials produce better quality information as the information has been subjected to the rigours of the legal process and the rules of evidence. in other words, the highly developed rules of evidence, procedure, and proof that rule a trial ensure that a fact established in such a setting is more likely to be true. these rules are designed to reduce the possibility of a false positive to an acceptable level, but do not claim to eliminate such a risk entirely.61 furthermore, the proponents of prosecutions believe that the population in general could benefit from a process of prosecutions as it helps to restore citizens’ dignity after years of defencelessness, based on state terror. it may also be an efficient way of ascertaining the truth where the legal process ensures that the fact-finding will be thorough and reasonably impartial. prosecutions will lead to a clear declaration of fault where the guilty will be punished or at least stigmatised. the prosecution process may also be useful in re-establishing the rule of law and providing a warning that future transgressions will not be excused.62 those in favour of prosecutions for human rights violations, such as professor stephan landsman, argue that prosecuting these human rights violations may enhance implicitly the chances of establishing the rule of law and signalling that no individual is outside the reach of legal accountability. in this sense and based on the theory that a society cannot forgive what it cannot punish, it is argued that prosecutions may be fundamental to the healing of social wounds 59 christie, pp. 63-64. 60 ibid., pp. 1, 64. compare christie’s arguments for confronting the past with the reasons set out by aryeh neier in a. boraine, et al., (eds), dealing with the past. truth and reconciliation in south africa, p. 3. 61 r.c. slye, “amnesty, truth, and reconciliation: reflections on the south african amnesty process” in r.i. rotberg and d. thompson (eds), truth v. justice. the morality of truth commissions, pp. 173-174. 62 n. roht-arriaza, “introduction” in n. roht-arriaza, (ed.), impunity and human rights in international law and practice, pp. 8-9. see also c.l. sriram, confronting past human rights violations. justice vs peace in times of transition, pp. 7-10 for a discussion on the practical and ethical bases for punishment. oelofse   128 caused by serious violations.63 the idea is to follow the nuremberg trial paradigm that was used after the second world war in the case of the defeated nazis. people in favour of this option are of the opinion that all perpetrators of gross human rights violations should bear the full brunt of the normal judicial process. they argue that, technically, pardon or amnesty should not be extended to crimes against humanity. in their view these crimes constitute an international crime that requires some form of punitive retribution and retributive justice.64 in principle, human rights watch is also opposed to granting immunity. they argue strongly that governments have a duty under international law to prosecute those guilty of gross violations of human rights. likewise, amnesty international points out that amnesty cannot be granted in cases of crimes against humanity, as well as torture and similar offences.65 a senior legal counsel at human rights watch, wilder taylor, argues that as a matter of principle, this international obligation to investigate the truth allows no caseby-case exceptions.66 however, trials are not always a workable model, taking into account several factors. firstly, the very difficult question of “who would be put on trial?” has to be answered, which in turn could place an intolerable burden on an already strained judicial system and the resources available for such a process. secondly, the time factor could also become a deterrent factor because airing details from cases of human rights abuse for too long could be distressing for many and too disruptive for the fragile peace and stability in a country. lastly, a criminal court requires the evidence produced in a case to pass the most severe scrutiny, as well as investigation and to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. in many cases, there is a lack of evidence because crimes were committed a long time ago.67 according to hayner, the attempts to prosecute and punish those responsible for severe abuses under a prior regime, are the most difficult and have seen little success. even if there is a functioning and trustworthy judicial system and no limits are placed on prosecuting the wrongdoers, which is rare, it is clear that domestic judicial systems cannot cope with the great 63 minow, pp. 57-58. see also s.p. huntington, “the third wave: democratization in the late twentieth century” in n.j. kritz (ed.), transitional justice. how emerging democracies reckon with former regimes, vol. 1, pp. 68-69 for arguments in favour of prosecutions. 64 d.m. tutu, no future without forgiveness, pp. 24, 27; christie, pp. 14, 23; m. du preez, “the price of truth” in the unesco courier 52(12), december 1999, p. 24. 65 l.s. graybill, “pursuit of truth and reconciliation in south africa” in africa today 44(1), january-march 1998, p. 114; m.r. rwelamira, “punishing human rights violations: considerations in the south african context” in rwelamira and werle, p. 8; sriram, p. 7; the natal witness, 13.12.1997, p. 7. 66 hayner, p. 183. 67 tutu, pp. 27-28; a. boraine, a country unmasked. inside south africa’s truth and reconciliation commission, pp. 281-283; christie, p. 53; j. sarkin, “the trials and tribulations of south africa’s truth and reconciliation commission” in south african journal on human rights 12(4), 1996, pp. 618-619; sriram, pp. 7-8; the cape times, 9.6.1994, p. 6. see also huntington, pp. 68-69 for arguments opposed to prosecution, as well as m. freeman, truth commissions and procedural fairness, p. 10 outlining the reasons why criminal trials alone are not sufficient. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 129 demands of accountability for massive crimes. thus, it is recognised that courts have limited reach. in addition, even successful prosecutions do not resolve the conflict and pain associated with past abuses. furthermore, trials in international courts have also been limited.68 martha minow justifies these statements further by explaining that the reasons for relinquishing prosecution relate to the inherent limitations of trials, rather than to the limitations and failures of the nation’s capacity to conduct trials.69 paul van zyl argues that trials are mostly about establishing guilt in specific instances, not about broader explanations or culpability. for him, trials have limited explanatory value. they’re about individual culpability, not about the system as a whole. a trial is not about our complicity. it makes it look they’re guilty, not us.70 lastly, tina rosenberg adds: trials that seek to do justice on a grand scale risk doing injustice on a small scale; their goal must not be justice but justice bit by bit by bit. trials, in the end, are ill suited to deal with the subtleties of facing the past.71 furthermore, it is no simple matter to obtain a conviction in a court of law. a strong possibility is that the accused may be found not guilty because of a lack of evidence. this can be a set-back for those wanting prosecutions. the malan trial especially, raised questions over the capacity and effectiveness of the criminal trials system in south africa. during 1996 former minister of defence, magnus malan and nineteen others were accused of planning and carrying out a massacre in january 1987 of thirteen people in kwamakhutha in the former hocymeland of kwazulu, now kwazulu-natal. the murder happened when a hit-squad attack was carried out on the home of anti-apartheid activist victor ntuli. after a difficult trial, all defendants were acquitted. the case collapsed because of a lack of evidence linking malan directly to the killings. since the accused was a former state employee, the state was obliged to cypay the costs of the legal defence. the costs of this seven-month trial exceeded r12 million.72 this is underlined by samuel huntington: do not attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights violations. the political costs of such efforts will outweigh any moral gains.73 68 hayner, pp. 11, 12, 14, 251. see hayner, pp. 88-89 for the many reasons why so few trials of rights abuses take place. see also j. tempelhoff, “menseregte, boetedoening en die kultuurhistoriese toe-eieningsproses” in p.h. kapp (ed.), die suid-afrikaanse verlede en die skuldvraagstuk. verslag van ‘n simposium oor die afrikaanse geskiedskrywing en die toewysing van skuld, pp. 6-7. 69 minow, p. 58. 70 hayner, p. 101. 71 minow, p. 51. 72 b. hamber and s. kibble, from truth to transformation, the truth and reconciliation commission in south africa, p. 8; hayner, p. 101. 73 a. boraine, “introduction” in boraine, et al., (eds), p. xvi. oelofse   130 a dilemma with prosecution that needs to be considered by transitional states is the fact that it could lead to political violence and/or civil war, which could weaken an already vulnerable democratic system. in other words, it may destabilise a fragile transitional government resulting in prolonged political instability or even a return of dictatorship.74 carlos s. nino warns that the consequences of attempting to punish all or some of those responsible for human rights violations may be dangerous for the stability of the democratic regime and ultimately for the preservation of those very human rights in the future.75 on the other hand, there are those who oppose the trial option and suggest that a country should rather let bygones be bygones, forget and bury the past and move on, expressing a desire to turn the page and focus on a new future. this option makes provision for a blanket or general amnesty.76 for those who want to leave the past alone, it is a case of no, we do not want to enter into the morass of conflict, hatred, and pain. we want to focus on the future, for now, the past is too much part of the present for us to examine its details. for now, we prefer silence over confrontation, over renewed pain. while we cannot forget, we would like to pretend that we can.77 for some people, this option is not so much ignoring the atrocities of the past, but rather of concern for a newly emerging democracy and a way to protect it. to point to the guilty by digging up the details of past atrocities could aggravate the situation it sought to address and lead to more pain and further divisions in society. by dwelling on the past, a deeply divided society will be unable to overcome its divisions and move forward. in other words, official investigations may do more harm than good.78 apart from these arguments, there is strong criticism against this option, which is, in effect, a call for collective amnesia. minow argues strongly that it is wrong to do nothing and that dwelling in the frozen space of inability and incapacity is unacceptable, unresponsive to victims, unavailing to the waiting future.79 archbishop desmond tutu states that, if the past is not recognised and kept quiet or lied about, it is “embarrassingly persistent, and will return and haunt us unless it has been dealt with 74 christie, pp. 62-63; roht-arriaza, “introduction” in roht-arriaza, (ed.), p. 9; the cape times, 13.2.1995, p. 2. 75 boraine, “introduction” in boraine, et al., (eds), p. xvi. 76 tutu, pp. 30-31; boraine, p. 4; k. asmal, “coping with the past. a truth commission for south africa” in mayibuye, february 1994, p. 27. see tina rosenberg’s criticism on this kind of reconciliation in t. rosenberg, “reconciliation and amnesty – latin america” in boraine, et al., (eds), pp. 66-68. 77 hayner, p. 185. see also hayner, pp. 185-186 where the author sets out the four elements that seem to be common in certain countries for a lack of desire to formally establish the truth. 78 sarkin, p. 620; roht-arriaza, “introduction” in roht-arriaza, (ed.), p. 8. 79 minow, p. 4. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 131 adequately. unless we look the beast in the eye, we will find that it returns to hold us hostage.”80 judge richard goldstone agrees, stating that: it is a recipe for national discontent and almost certainly will result in past abuses being repeated.81 there are examples of countries that made the choice for the option of simply ignoring the legacy of past crimes. for example, in mozambique there has been almost no attention given to the accountability for past crimes and the accepted belief is that the less we dwell on the past, the more likely reconciliation will be.82 however, according to richard carver, african rights expert, several countries in africa have suffered by making such a choice with distinct negative long-term consequences from failing to come to terms with the crimes of the past. he suggests different ways to address and document the past, not necessarily through a truth commission only, but as long as there are always some form of truth-telling processes.83 thus, despite calls for a process of amnesia, emphasis is placed rather on the necessity of remembering the past. philosopher george santayana explains it as follows: those who cannot remember the past, are condemned to repeat it.84 richard von weizsacker, former president of west germany, goes further: whoever closes his eyes to the past becomes blind to the present. whoever does not wish to remember inhumanity becomes susceptible to the dangers of new infection.85 archbishop desmond tutu, chairperson of the south african truth and reconciliation commission, explains that unless our past was acknowledged and dealt with adequately, it could blight our future.86 furthermore, for kader asmal the danger of not dealing with the past lies in the fact that we are thereby ripping the foundations of justice from beneath new generations.87 80 tutu, pp. 30-32. 81 sunday times, 17.4.1994, p. 3. 82 hayner, pp. 186-195. 83 hayner, p. 184. see also b. baker, “twilight of impunity for africa’s presidential criminals” in third world quarterly 25(8), 2004, pp. 1487-1500 where the author examines the degree to which changes in international law, international judicial institutions and public opinion since the end of the cold war have contributed to changes in the treatment of african tyrants who have been accused of crimes against humanity. 84 tutu, p. 32. 85 boraine, p. 366. 86 tutu, p. 32. oelofse   132 for patricia hayner, the inevitable question with which any country with past atrocities is confronted is whether a society can build a democratic future on a foundation of blind, denied, or forgotten history.88 if all the arguments are taken into account, it seems that criminal trials may be unfeasible and sometimes practically impossible and that blanket amnesty is unacceptable. it is then that a third option may be considered, where a truth commission would be the “middle-road” between the alternatives of pardon or prosecution and blanket amnesty or national amnesia. in evaluating truth commissions in general and their role against a process of prosecution, minow comes to the conclusion that truth commissions are not a second best alternative to prosecutions. according to her assessment of these two processes, truth commissions emphasize the experiences of those victimized; the development of a detailed historical record; and the priority of healing for victims and entire societies after the devastation to bodies, memories, families, friendships, and politics caused by collective violence. a truth commission could generate the evidence to support prosecutions. or, when the fullest accounts and participation are sought in a nation marked by deep and historic divisions, a truth commission represents a potential alternative to prosecutions.89 allen indicates that recognition is indeed the business of law and criminal justice, as well as of truth commissions. the recognition afforded by truth commissions should serve as a complement and auxiliary to legal recognition.90 kiss accentuates these arguments, clarifying that truth commissions have demonstrated convincingly that it is not just a “second best” process to past abuses. on the contrary, truth commissions can provide a much fuller account of human rights violations of the past and establish greater accountability among perpetrators than prosecutions are able to do realistically.91 thus, trials focus more closely on identifying individual legal responsibility for specific crimes and punishing those found guilty. truth commissions have no power to initiate trials and generally investigate and report. courts and truth commissions may work with some of the same 87 a. krog, country of my skull (second edition), p. 268. see also boraine, p. 4 where he quotes lev tolstoy from cathleen smith’s book remembering stalin’s victims, where her argument follows the same lines: “people say: why recall the past? what is the good of remembering what has been swept away? what is the good of irritating the nation? how can one ask such questions? if i suffered from a serious and dangerous disease and recovered or was cured from it, i would recollect the fact with joy. i would be disturbed by it only if i was still ill or if i’d taken a turn for the worse and wanted to deceive myself”. 88 hayner, p. 5. 89 minow, p. 90. see also how this author sets out twelve more overlapping goals/aspirations with truth commissions in minow, pp. 87-88. 90 j. allen, “between retribution and restoration: justice and the trc” in south african journal of philosophy 20(1), 2001, p. 29. 91 e. kiss, “moral ambition within and beyond political constraints: reflections on restorative justice” in rotberg and thompson (eds), p. 91. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 133 material in focusing on describing the broad pattern of events, and commissions may make judicial-like decisions, but their goals, structures, and powers are contrary to one another.92 boraine and hayner argue that there are compelling reasons for the establishment of a truth commission that might contribute to justice. they set out certain points to be considered. the past cannot be ignored as it could make reconciliation even more difficult; for a forgiveness process, it is important to know what evil is being forgiven and who caused it; if dignity is to be restored to victims, knowledge of these violations have to be made known to the public; to establish an accurate record of a country’s past and thus reclaiming a country’s history and to open it for public review; to compensate victims, there must be knowledge and details of violations; knowledge of the truth must also be acknowledged officially by the state and people of a country; to contribute to accountability for perpetrators; to outline institutional responsibility and recommend reforms; if victims do not believe that their violations have been acknowledged and feel that justice will never be done, private acts of vengeance and retribution may follow; appraising the role of the courts as a whole in the system of repression and analysing what needs to change; promoting the rule of law and fulfilling international obligations.93 ratner and abrams are of the opinion that, while truth commissions as such may not provide as rigorous a determination of, or as serious a punishment for an individual’s culpability as with prosecutions, in many cases it represents the best or only alternative. truth commissions as a form of accountability may serve as valuable precursors or complements to criminal trials.94 thus, many transitional societies choose a truth commission for a variety of reasons. it seems as if it has emerged as a popular tool for dealing with a legacy of human rights abuses in postconflict situations. such a truth body may provide a more comprehensive record of a contested past, rendering an authoritative account of a specific period and/or of a specific regime, while determining the central causes of the violence and violations. in the end, such a commission of truth may make recommendations to prevent the future repetition of human rights violations. although the focus is on human rights violations that occurred, truth commissions in general have very different aims, mandates, perceptions and resources available, as well as approaches to the kind of “truth” they are searching for. this has a definite influence on a commission’s activities and on the end report and findings. consequently, if truth commissions are empowered efficiently, they can assist to accomplish some of the state’s obligations under international law to answer to human rights violations. a truth commission could be the “bridge-building process”, leading the nation away from a divided 92 hayner, p. 88. see freeman pp. 71-86, where the author debates about the significant differences and similarities between courts and truth commissions. 93 boraine, pp. 33-34; hayner, pp. 24-31, 102-106; sunday times, 17.4.1994, p. 3; the cape times, 8.6.1994, p. 8; die volksblad, 5.7.1994, p. 7. compare also these arguments of boraine with k. asmal et al., reconciliation through truth. a reckoning of apartheid’s criminal governance (second edition), pp. 10-11, 28, where the authors provide a detailed layout of how a process of collective memory will in turn, move people towards a number of crucial goals. see also freeman, pp. 37-40 setting out in detail the perceived advantages and disadvantages of truth commissions. 94 s.r. ratner and j.s. abrams, accountability for human rights atrocities in international law. beyond the nuremberg legacy, p. 193. oelofse   134 past to promoting a future based on peace and stability, the recognition of human rights and dignity, as well as national unity. to date, most truth commissions have been established in latin america and africa. the nature of political violence in latin america and africa differs. in the former it is usually between right and left political sectors, with the military and security forces who have engaged in severe, violent repressive tactics. in africa, political violence is in the form of conflict between ethnic ‘tribal’, social and religious groups. here the violent conflict is often the result of the deliberate manipulation of group identities by political leaders.95 a brief overview of certain truth commissions that have been created in specifically latin america and africa will be included to accentuate the processes, methods, successes and failures of some of these more well-known truth commissions. on 28 october 1982 the first latin american truth commission was created in bolivia, a few days after the return to democratic rule. although they were able to locate some of the remains of missing people, no cases were definitively investigated. difficulties such as limited financial support from the government, a lack of sufficient resources and political support, led to an incomplete process. after three years the commission disbanded without producing a final report.96 argentina’s truth commission was the first from the 1980s onwards to hold trials involving human rights violators. argentina moved to a democratic rule in 1983 as the military retreated from power. the argentines wanted to create a commission to investigate the violence of the seven-year military regime from 1976-1983. through the “national commission on the disappeared”, 8 960 people who had disappeared were documented and a list of 365 former torture centres were reported and published. however, though the commission submitted more than 1 800 cases for prosecution, justice was limited. from the previous military juntas that had ruled argentina, nine members were prosecuted and five were convicted. when carlos saul menem succeeded as president in 1989, he exonerated the five junta members who had already been convicted, as well as officers awaiting trial.97 the parliament of uruguay created the “investigative commission on the situation of ‘disappeared’ people and its causes” in april 1985, following eleven years of military rule. after seven months the commission reported and provided evidence on 164 disappearances and the involvement of the uruguayan security forces, which was handed to the supreme court. however, much more common than disappearances, was torture and illegal imprisonment. the limited mandate of the commission prevented it from officially investigating and documenting 95 p.b. hayner, “fifteen truth commissions – 1974 to 1994: a comparative study” in human rights quarterly 16(4), 1994, pp. 653-654. 96 ibid., pp. 613-614; hayner, unspeakable truths …, pp. 52-53. 97 hayner, unspeakable truths …, pp. 33-34; hayner, “fifteen truth commissions …”, pp. 614-615; c. smulovitz, “commissions of truth and reconciliation – argentina” in a. boraine and j. levy (eds), the healing of a nation?, pp. 56-57; j. malamud-goti, “punishing human rights abuses in fledging democracies: the case of argentina” in n. roht-arriaza, (ed.), pp. 161-170. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 135 these practices. it is self-evident that a truth commission’s mandate cannot exclude abuses that represent a large portion of the victims experiences, if it aims to be successful.98 in chile, general augusto pinochet overthrew the civilian government in september 1973, brutally repressing all opponents and ruled chile for seventeen years. president patricio aylwin assumed the presidency in march 1990 and established the “national commission on truth and reconciliation”. within nine months the commission thoroughly investigated the 2 920 cases within its mandate. the final report of 1 800 pages received wide recognition from the public and especially from human rights organisations. however, there was no real condemnation of the role of the top leadership (i.e. general augusto pinochet). the reason for this lay in pinochet’s action in 1978 when he instituted an amnesty law, which barred prosecution for almost all human rights crimes that occurred after he had taken control. the commissioners further refused to reveal the names of the perpetrators and no attempt was made to prosecute individuals. another commission, the “reconciliation and compensation corporation” was established in 1990 to further investigate the abuses under the pinochet regime, 1972-1990. a report published in 1996 found a further 899 cases of people who disappeared or died, which brought the total number of victims of political repression in chile to 3 197.99 the discussed truth commissions from latin america tended to be quite substantial affairs, where each country had different responses to its transitional process and the quest for justice, depending on local governing factors and dynamics. significantly, these latin american truth commissions interacted and affected one another by addressing the injustices of the past. many of the truth-seeking bodies in africa have tended to be smaller, less successful and sometimes less prominent. this is often the result of limited resources in the form of funds and staff. some truth commissions in african countries are also faced with political bias and/or ethnic or group-identity antagonism. uganda went through two government sponsored truth commissions. the first commission came into being in 1974 in response to the increasing public pressure to investigate the accusations of disappearances at the hands of military forces during the first years of the idi amin government. the commission faced considerable practical difficulties and operated in an unfavourable political climate. the commission had minimum impact on the practices of the government of amin and abuses by his forces increased considerably in subsequent years. the conclusion was that the commission was set up without any political will or responsibility for real change in human rights practice or policy. twelve years later, in 1986 a second commission of inquiry was established to investigate human rights violations from 1962 to 1986. major funding constraints 98 hayner, unspeakable truths …, pp. 53-54; hayner, “fifteen truth commissions …”, pp. 616-617; l. weschler, “acknowledgement, truth & justice – uruguay” in boraine, et al., (eds), pp. 41-46. 99 hayner, unspeakable truths …, pp. 35-38; hayner, “fifteen truth commissions …”, pp. 621-623; m. popkin and n. roth-arriaza, “truth as justice: investigatory commissions in latin america” in law and society inquiry: journal of the american bar foundation 2, 1995, pp. 84-86; j. correa, “dealing with past human rights violations: the chilean case after dictatorship” in notre dame law review 67, 1992, pp. 1455-1485. oelofse   136 limited and slowed the work of this commission, but a report was published in 1995, after nine years of investigation.100 rwanda presented an altogether new truth commission model. the commission was funded and entirely sponsored by international non-governmental organisations. although the government did not hinder the investigation during 1993, the government forces began killing in the days after the commission left the country and murdered an estimated 300-500 people. the final report was positively received in rwanda and internationally. however, the rwandan government reacted by launching a publicity attack on the rebels to make known their human rights violations. after this commission, rwandans engaged in 1994 in the fastest recorded genocide in history. this time the international criminal tribunal for rwanda (ictr) was authorised through the un security council resolution 955 in november 1994, to prosecute acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and violations of the geneva convention that were committed between january and december 1994.101 a commission of inquiry was established in 1985 in zimbabwe. the aim was to investigate the killing and governmental repression of an estimated 1 500 political dissidents and other civilians in the matabeleland region of the country. the commission worked under the authority of the president and was presided over by a zimbabwean lawyer. after several months of investigation, a report was submitted directly to the president. to date, the report has not been made public by the government and no one outside the government has seen it.102 from the examples used, it is clear that human rights investigations vary remarkably, both in their political context and in their legal composition, as well as in their specific investigatory mandates and powers. it is self-evident that procedures and models which are appropriate at a specific time and place will not necessarily be appropriate for another country. each country must shape a process of transition out of its own historical, political and cultural context. it was against these examples that south africa took certain guidelines in the ‘truth recovery’ from former commissions, incorporated lessons from these commissions, but used them even more as warnings. with the establishment of a truth commission, south africa had to balance the requirements of justice, stability, peace, the restoration of dignity to victims, accountability and reconciliation. means of reaching this would be to institute a commission, not on the grounds of vengeance or retribution, but one that may serve a reconciliatory, nation-building function. thus, there was decided upon a unique truth commission for south africa with the granting of amnesty to individuals, in exchange for full disclosure of the truth relating to the crime for which amnesty 100 hayner, unspeakable truths …, pp. 51-52; hayner, “fifteen truth commissions …”, pp. 611-613; 618-620; r. carver, “called to account: how african governments investigate human rights violations” in african affairs 89(355), pp. 397-400, christie, p. 62. 101 hayner, “fifteen truth commissions …”, pp. 629-632; l.s. graybill, “pardon, punishment, and amnesia: three african post-conflict methods” in third world quarterly 25(6), 2004, pp. 1120-1124; l. graybill and k. lanegran, “truth, justice, and reconciliation in africa: issues and cases” in african studies quarterly 8(1), fall 2004, pp. 8-9. 102 hayner, unspeakable truths …, p. 55; hayner, “fifteen truth commissions …”, pp. 617-618; r. carver, “zimbabwe: drawing the line through the past” in roht-arriaza, (ed.), pp. 258269. protecting  human  rights   td, 6(1), july 2010, pp. 113 – 138. 137 was being sought. it would also give an opportunity to ordinary people to tell their stories, allowing them to remember and empowering them in the process. in the end, especially from the victim’s point of view, it seems as if the truth and reconciliation commission of south africa (trc) endeavour was important and necessary. with its thorough and far-reaching investigations and inquiries, the trc is described as the largest survey of human rights violations conducted anywhere in the world. the trc was arguably the most ambitious to date and has been used as an example in many parts of the world as a new model for confronting a tormented and divisive history. however, the existence of a truth commission is no assurance that the repetition of human rights abuses will necessarily deter future occurrences thereof. it also does not necessarily indicate a commitment to real change. truth commissions as such should not be perceived as something of a panacea. at least the intention of most truth commissions is to reduce the possibility of the reoccurrence of these atrocities in the future. the hope exists that, with the publishing of an honest, accurate record of the violence, a society will learn from its past, and its more knowledgeable citizens will recognise the signs and prevent any future abuses, especially where specific recommendations for reform form part of a truth commission’s final report and contributions to constructive changes for the future can be made. it is true that truth commissions are not perfect. many times it is a high risk exercise in the political history of a country. however, one cannot ignore the fact that truth commissions contribute to the cause of justice and the protection and promotion of human rights. the functions performed by truth commissions focus on the promotion of a just, democratic and open society and they endeavour to restore the collective dignity of a state and its people. this finds an echo in international humanitarian law. 4. conclusion it cannot be denied that over the years the un has intensified its efforts to protect and promote human rights by assisting member states and monitoring human rights violations. the world has come a far way since 1945. however, the prime responsibility for implementation and enforcement of these human rights instruments as laid down by the un, remains with governments. no clear answer is possible as to which is the better way to deal with atrocities: either retributive or restorative justice. each country is different and an approach must be sought that will suit the specific situation. this requires a case-by-case, country-by-country analysis where competing interests should be taken into account before making choices. the particular context and the purposes and aims should be checked and balanced against the advantages and disadvantages of both forms of justice. nevertheless, being more thorough, revealing and in a sense successful, truth commissions may provide useful cases for analysis as catalysts of justice in specific circumstances of transitional justice. it must be realised that achieving justice with accountability is a long and difficult process. truth commissions are by no means perfect, because the stakes in dealing with the past and settling accounts are remarkably high and seldom result in an adequate satisfactory conclusion accepted oelofse   138 by all. at least transitional justice processes, including truth commissions, may make a valuable contribution to justice and democracy, as well as history. transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 300 transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights florabel quispe remón1 abstract: the article begins by analyzing the origin and evolution of the concept "transitional justice", determining its characteristics, the context in which it was born and developed, as well as the role of the state in this process. then it focuses attention on analyzing the development of this figure in the jurisprudence of the inter-american human rights system, through the work that the inter-american court has been carrying out since its operation, interpreting in a broad way and always pro homini, the american convention of human rights. throughout its years of operation, it has ruled on the state's obligation to protect and guarantee human rights and to carry out the pertinent investigations in the event of their violation; as well as the recognition of the status of victims to the victims' families and their pronouncement of the right to the truth, not as an autonomous human right, but rather as a right of the victims and their next of kin. undoubtedly, these are aspects that have gone beyond the american convention. keywords: transitional justice, human rights, inter-american court, truth, victim. summary: 1. introduction. 2. origin and evolution of transitional justice in international law. 2.1. background and development of transitional justice. 2.2. concept of transitional justice and its relationship with international human rights law. 2.3. characteristics of transitional justice. 2.3.1. determination of victims and investigations after a dictatorship or armed conflict. 2.3.2. establishment of mechanisms to alleviate the consequences of serious and systematic violations of human rights seen from practice. 2.4. recognition of transitional justice at the united nations. 2.5. the chicago principles on transitional justice. 3. transitional justice in the inter-american human rights system. 3.1. brief reference to the creation of transitional justice in latin america and the inter-american human rights system. 3.2. the inter-american court and its development of transitional justice elements. 3.2.1. the next of kin of victims and their consideration as victims by the inter-american court. 3.2.2. the right of victims to the right to the truth according to the inter-american court. 4. final reflections. 5. bibliography. 1. introduction the great internal and/or international conflicts, armed or not, and the dictatorships in various parts of the world have as a consequence led to, on the one hand, great suffering for human beings, and on the other hand, the adoption in many cases of amnesty laws, synonymous with forgetting and abandoning people who have experienced such suffering brought about by the state and, why not say it, also by society. that is what impunity means. there are many states, among others, chile, paraguay, uruguay, that did not 1. professor of public international law. universidad carlos iii de madrid, spain (fquispe@der-pu.uc3m.es). this article has been written within the framework of the research project ods, derechos humanos y derecho internacional (pgc 2018-095805-b-100). mailto:fquispe@der-pu.uc3m.es florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 301 carry out relevant investigations and pursue consequences, unlike argentina, which has singled out and prosecuted the military for their role in repression (pion-berlin, 1995, p. 82) in a democratic state, the state is in charge of protecting human rights (human rights) of all people who are under its jurisdiction regardless of their nationality. after all, human rights are the limit to the absolute will of the states. the state has the obligation to guarantee the effective enjoyment of human rights, and for this, it must have adequate and honest mechanisms, which, if applicable, carry out pertinent investigations to find those responsible for the violations, prosecute them, with the necessary corresponding guarantees and condemn them. this contributes to the fight against impunity and makes the victims trust their protection system and feel the state is on their side. however, in practice, we note that one of the characteristics of dictatorships or conflicts is the absence of respect for human rights. in this context, taking into account the progress and increasing commitment by the international community to the establishment and consolidation of democratic societies, and due to the recognition and respect of human rights, the figure known as “transitional justice” (tj) of the state arises in the protection of their rights, that is, for the victims. for this reason, certain authors have defined it “as the conception associated with periods of political change”, a justice that arises and is applied between one political regime and another (o'donnelll & schemitter, 2003, p. 69). a justice that seeks to recognize the victims, investigate the facts and redress them, if it is the case, in some way all the suffering experienced. however, there is no single recipe for the measures to be adopted, nor a specific omnipotent authority to decide which measures to adopt after the “storm”, which leads to the discussion of what measures should be applied and who is authorized to know what is really needed or to meet the needs of the victims and the population in general. méndez, taking into account what has been experienced in latin america (la) and in other parts of the world in the attempt to restore truth and justice, includes certain principles that are generally applied, and disagrees with the affirmation that democratic leaders are the ones who best know the needs of their society at a given moment, and thus, not suitable to impose rules about what to do with the recent past (méndez, 1997, p. 255). he argues that democratic leaders should only fight to restore the truth of the recent past and, "in general, avoid any attempt to restore justice, at least through criminal proceedings. as mentioned before, from the point of view of international human rights law, states have the obligation to protect the rights of all persons who are under their jurisdiction from the moment of ratification of international instruments. however, we must bear in mind that these international instruments do not refer to “transitional justice”, although both are aimed at human being; and in this context, it is of interest to know the position or interpretation of the human rights protection bodies of the human rights treaties with reference to transitional justice. therefore, given the importance of the subject for demanding rights and / or obtaining justice, the present work aims, first of all, to briefly analyze, given the limitations of the scope of the work, the figure of jt, examining its origins, its evolution, its characteristics, its scope and its relationship with victims and human rights; and secondly, once the issue has been contextualized, analyze its treatment in international law, specifically in the jurisprudence of the inter-american court of human rights (inter-american court of human rights) to see how this judicial body of the inter-american human rights system (ihrs) has interpreted / developed the jt, with special emphasis on the justice transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 302 element. the analysis of the jurisprudence of the inter-american court is important, first, because a large part of the states that are now part of the iasr, and have assumed the contentious jurisdiction of the court, have suffered dictatorships or armed conflicts, where application of a jt was necessary; and second, because in the latin american regions the jurisprudence of the inter-american court, due to the development of conventionality control by the inter-american court, acquires special relevance because the states that assumed the jurisdiction of the court would be obliged to incorporate their jurisprudence into their domestic law. for this, it is necessary to resort to the authorized doctrine, to some resolutions of international organizations such as the united nations, and especially to the jurisprudence of the inter-american court, the main objective of our study. this is done through legal dogmatic methodology, first addressing the general framework of transitional justice, and then addressing its development in international law, especially in the interpretation that the inter-american court has developed of this figure, under the american convention of human rights. the analysis goes from the general to the specific, to finalize with some conclusions. 2. origin and evolution of transitional justice in international law 2.1. background and development of transitional justice this is an expression coined in the 1990s by us academics, "to refer to the different ways that countries had to solve the problems that arose when a government came to power after its predecessors committed massive rights violations”2. this ended up having repercussions especially in the us "due to the great interest that there was in knowing how the former countries of the soviet bloc would deal with the legacy of totalitarianism"3. thus, in the words of roht-arriaza, “the study of how societies emerging from periods of civil war or dictatorships deal with the legacies of the past became a full-fledged subject of academic inquiry and human rights activism during the 1990s” (roht-arriaza, 2006, p. 1). some authors have referred to three phases in the evolution of tj. teitel locates its origin in the first world war, but the three phases they mention are located in contemporary international law. these are summarized in the following figure (fig. 1): in these phases, the mention of what happened in la is missing. for the international center for transitional justice (ictj), the approach that we have today came about in the late 1980s and early 1990s, in response to political changes and demands for justice in this region and in eastern europe to face the great and serious systematic violations of human rights of the previous regimes, but without jeopardizing the political 2. a broad development on the origin and evolution can be found in: the international center for transitional justice. available at: https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional (accessed: 22 march 2021). see also (teitel, 2000). 3. idem https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 303 figure 1 source: own elaboration based on (sersale di cerisano, 2013) and (teitel, 2003). transformations put in place. "given that these changes were popularly known as transitions to democracy," this new multidisciplinary field began to be called "transitional justice."4 aspects established by governments at that time have become basic approaches to tj, such as criminal prosecutions, truth commissions, reparation programs, a gender approach to justice, legal and institutional reforms, and commemoration initiatives.5 thus, many agree that since the mid-1980s there has been an interest in transitional justice linked to a series of political transitions from authoritarian to democratic regimes. as of that year, a wave of democratization spread throughout latin america marked by shouts of "never again”, demanding accountability for human rights abuses under authoritarian regimes in argentina, chile and elsewhere. the lesson of the latin american experience extended to democratic transitions in other parts of the world (williams, et al., 2012, p. 3). “accountability for past abuses among human rights activists was taken up at the international level, where the focus on political change as “transition to democracy” helped to legitimate those claims to justice that prioritized legality. institutional reforms and responses such as punishing leaders, vetting abusive security forces, and replacing state secrecy with truth and transparency on other claims to justice that we oriented toward social justice and redistribution” (paige, 2009, pp. 321-322). so much so that "in 4. available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ictj-global-transitional-justice-2009-spanish.pdf, p.1 (accessed 17 march 2020). along these lines, see (paige, 2009). 5. idem https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ictj-global-transitional-justice-2009-spanish.pdf transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 304 central and south america, many countries began processes of change from systematic repression to greater openness and democratic participation."6 this contributed, what is more, to creating criminal proceedings, truth commissions, reparation policies and commemoration mechanisms, civil society and local human rights groups, exerting social pressure. on the other side of the atlantic, in eastern and central europe, governments developed initiatives linked to greater breadth of public debate, commemoration, opening of security files and the implementation of administrative notes known as "purging" or "disabling". these tj strategies emerged from the bottom up as a derivation of popular movements and in response to local experiences or demands.7 the truth is that the phases and what happened in al have been oriented to the protection of human beings, recognizing their status as victims and their dignity, redressing the consequences of the violations and punishing, where appropriate, those responsible for said violations. it was about rendering accounts of the past, an essential aspect for a peaceful coexistence, trying to overcome grudges and resentments, and for strengthening of the rule of law. in this process, it contributes to the development of human rights protection systems, which creates obligations for the states to recognize and guarantee human rights. the context in which the tj “paradigm” arises, according to de greiff, former truth and justice rapporteur, has two characteristics; first, the measures were applied in countries with relatively high degrees of both horizontal and vertical institutionalization, although this was not enough to prevent abuses. it was a breakdown of the institutionality and therefore part of the objective of the transition could be understood as the recovery of interrupted traditions and institutions; second, the measures were adopted in response to a certain type of violation, that is, those associated with the abusive exercise of power. this shows the deep connections between these two factors; only relatively institutionalized and efficient states can commit violations of a certain degree of magnitude, but above all, of systematicity” (de grieff, 2011, p. 17). likewise, this author characterizes the context in which the jt measures operate and points out that the term jt finds its natural place in “a very imperfect world”, understood as one in which there is no spontaneous generalized compliance with even a basic norm. furthermore, he states, “it is characterized not just by the massive and systematic violations of norms but also by the fact that there are huge and predictable costs associated with the very effort to enforce compliance. at the limit, in such a world, that effort puts at risk the very existence of the system that is trying to enforce its own norms”. this, according to what de grieff believes, is the main domain for application of the term transitional justice (de grieff, 2012, p. 35). 6. cfr. the chicago principles on transitional justice, a joint project of the ““international human rights law institute”, “chicago council on global affaire”, instituto superiore internazionale di scienze criminali” y la “association internationale de droit pénal”, dirigido por m. cheriff bassiouni, p. 8-9. available at: .https:// biblioteca.iidh-jurisprudencia.ac.cr/index.php/documentos-en-espanol/verdad-justicia-y-reparacion/1312los-principios-de-chicago-sobre-justicia-transicional/file (accessed 2 april 2021). 7. idem. https://biblioteca.iidh-jurisprudencia.ac.cr/index.php/documentos-en-espanol/verdad-justicia-y-reparacion/1312-los-principios-de-chicago-sobre-justicia-transicional/file https://biblioteca.iidh-jurisprudencia.ac.cr/index.php/documentos-en-espanol/verdad-justicia-y-reparacion/1312-los-principios-de-chicago-sobre-justicia-transicional/file https://biblioteca.iidh-jurisprudencia.ac.cr/index.php/documentos-en-espanol/verdad-justicia-y-reparacion/1312-los-principios-de-chicago-sobre-justicia-transicional/file florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 305 2.2. concept of transitional justice and its relationship with international human rights law however, pointing out that the term jt is itself a bit slippery, roht-arriaza defines it as the “conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes” (rohtarriaza, 2006, p. 1). jeremy weber observes that transitional justice deals with situations in which a society goes from a state of injustice to justice, from an oppressive government to a government that respects the rule of law, from authoritarianism to democracy. it deals with the administration of justice through such a regime change. hence, its central questions: to what extent and according to what standards is it appropriate to judge the events that occurred during the previous regime? what kind of process, what forms of recovery from punishment, are appropriate in such circumstances (weber, 2012, p. 98)? the truth is that the jt seeks recognition of the dignity of people, the recognition of rights violations, justice, truth, reparation, and non-repetition. the tj and international law of human rights were both created almost in parallel, but the development of the international protection systems for human rights has been much faster. both human rights and international criminal law (icl) contribute to its consolidation. the application of the tj occurs after a dictatorship or armed conflict (colombian case)8, generally by the new authority or the transitional government through the adoption of new mechanisms or reactivating existing ones that were not applied during the dictatorship and / or conflict. however, as zalaquett pointed out, at the beginning, dealing with transitional political situations was a new part of human rights practice that raised some complex ethical, legal and practical questions. for the most part, zalaquett states, human rights organizations have entered this new area by applying, by extension, the normative standards and techniques they used when fighting current abuses by governments. this author wonders, among others questions, if a set of standards can be inferred from international norms and general legal principles, to be applicable to the problem of addressing past human rights abuses. under what circumstances, if there are any, can a government excuse itself from complying with such obligations on the grounds that it is not in its power to do so? and based on a generalized opinion of academics and professionals, it indicates that it must maximize the responsibilities of the new government. therefore, he says, the trend is: to emphasize the responsibility of governments, regardless of whether they actually have real power or are simply the holders of power; insist on the continuity of the state's obligations despite changes in government, especially with regard to the promotion and respect of human rights; argue that governments also have indirect responsibility when non-governmental groups commit abuses, to the extent that it is their duty to maintain order and enforce the law. this approach is, in principle, the correct one, insofar as it is based on the bias that any attempt to dilute the responsibility of the government could weaken the protection of human rights and the rule of international law (zalaquett, 1995, p. 3). 8. on jt in colombia see among others (guembe & olea, 2006). transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 306 progress in this regard in recent decades has been enormous. it is understood that it is the responsibility of government to assume past human rights violations by adopting the necessary mechanisms to clarify the facts. the mechanisms can be judicial, such as the creation of ad hoc tribunals to investigate and convict those responsible, or non-judicial ones, such as truth commissions, to investigate the facts, thus recognizing the rights of the forgotten victims during the period of the violations. it is the stage in which the state assumes the commitment to “heal the wounds” and seek reconciliation in society between “those who have injured and the injured”, it is to seek peace. it is about doing justice, seeking the truth, investigating the facts, and making amends to the victims. it is “a response to systematic or generalized human rights violations. its objective is to recognize the victims and promote initiatives for peace, reconciliation and democracy. it is not a special form of justice, but rather justice adapted to societies that transform themselves after a period of generalized violation of human rights. in some cases, these transformations happen from one moment to the next; in others, they can take place after many decades”9. de grieff points out that it is a set of measures that can be implemented to address the legacy of massive human rights abuses, where “addressing the legacy” means demonstrating the validity of human rights regulations that were systematically violated through criminal prosecution, the search for the truth, reparations and institutional reform (de grieff, 2011, p. 28). for this author, the tj that was created in practice and crystallized in the southern cone, in order to solve specific problems, has become a "universal tool" that apparently solves diverse problems, regardless of the context.10 in the words of dorado, it is a movement that in its beginnings was fed by the experiences of latin america and eastern europe and “that has been learning about new developments and incorporating the consideration and treatment of deeper and more complete conflicts such as those in rwanda, the former yugoslavia, east timor, sierra leone, democratic republic of the congo, colombia, etc. ”. the reality and challenges that tj processes must face have been changing, “introducing more complex situations that directly relate transitional justice mechanisms to peace and conflict resolution practices and the need to promote social and economic development, good governance or ways to include affected groups in the reconstruction process” (dorado, 2015, p. 193). along the same line as (schabas, 2006). the truth is that the ultimate goal of the tj is to promote justice, although it will depend, as de grief says, on the concept that justice is given. in sum, its three purposes are the recognition of victims, promoting civic trust and strengthening the norm of democratic law (de grieff, 2011, p. 28). 9. available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ictj-global-transitional-justice-2009-spanish.pdf, p.1 (accessed 17 march 2020) 10. idem, p.17. https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ictj-global-transitional-justice-2009-spanish.pdf florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 307 2.3. characteristics of transitional justice 2.3.1. determination of victims and investigations after a dictatorship or armed conflict the end of dictatorships or conflicts or the transition to democracy do not automatically imply the beginning of the tj, nor is it immediate; it takes time and can take many years or even never happen. as roht-arriaza points out, in practice the "transition" may span many decades and may last longer for some issues than others (rohtarriaza, 2006, p. 1). for this reason, tj should not be limited to a formal approach since they are not sufficient to meet the needs of the victims and of society in general, “it should be thought of as a multifaceted and interdisciplinary whole, and the design should be carried out with social, cultural, historical and political sensitivity”. the measures must include judicial proceedings, truth commissions, reparations, investigation, sanctions and administrative measures, commemoration, education and archives and institutional reform (sersale di cerisano, 2013, p. 117). the reality and the particularities of the population in which it is applied must always be taken into account. the study of the context is essential, "the political, social and legal conditions of the country will determine what can be done and when", as well as cultural aspects and religious beliefs (kasapas, 2008, p. 59). creativity and innovation are not enough, but other important aspects, which increase the chances of success of the tj. rigid approaches and the to-do lists should be avoided11. a body should be created to carry out the pertinent investigations to find out the truth and identify the victims, and another to help and facilitate the lives of victims and those who live in difficult contexts. these bodies must meet the basic requirements such as knowing the context, reality, language, and empathizing with the population's problems. they must inspire confidence and independence in the population. it could be a truth commission or any other body whose purpose is to search for the truth and have a list of victims. mechanisms should be established to carry out the pertinent police and judicial investigations, with the corresponding guarantees, in order to avoid impunity. in addition, resources should be allocated to provide adequate health, social and economic care to the victims and / or their families. recognition by the state of what happened is relevant, as is recording for history what happened through collection of information from the past together with the necessary measures to vindicate the dignity of the victims, since it is in charge of assuming the events of the past and facing them in a way that guarantees reparation to the victims, focusing attention on the eradication of human suffering regardless of the reasons (wars or dictatorships) that have created the violation. nevertheless, there is no formula applicable to all cases, each case is unique, although taking into account its development, a common denominator can be established. the aspects that characterize the tj, among others, are the investigations to determine identification of the victims, and determination of responsibilities and reparations. always assuming there is no perfect solution, the limited scope of each of the measures that are part of a jt policy must be recognized, as de grief affirms, from the outset. “in fact, there is no transitional country that can legitimately claim great 11. https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional (accessed 17 march 2020) https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 308 successes in this area. that is, there is no country that has undergone a transition that has prosecuted each and every perpetrator of human rights violations (let alone punished them in proportion to the gravity of the harm they caused); that has implemented a truthseeking strategy that disclosed the fate of each and every victim or thoroughly identified the structures that made the violations possible; that has established a reparations program providing each and every victim with benefits proportional to the harm he or she suffered; or that, particulary in the short run, has reformed each and every institutions that was implicated in the violations in question” (de grieff, 2012, p. 35). 2.3.2. establishment of mechanisms to alleviate the consequences of serious and systematic violations of human rights seen from practice the measures following the major human rights violations by the authority in power, to "heal the wounds of the past" and close the cycle, can be “oblivion” or measures to avoid impunity and recognizing the dignity of the victims. 2.3.2.1. mechanisms oriented to forgetting its objective is to close one stage and start another, under the slogan "blot and clean slate" and protected by impunity. these are the amnesty laws and prescriptions for those responsible for systematic violations, which have caused harm to direct and indirect victims of violations, preventing investigations of large and serious human rights violations in the world. today, fortunately, they do not fit in a democratic society because they are incompatible with the international law of human rights12. the consolidation of all the democracies in the world and the development of human rights allow the cases to be reactivated and removed from oblivion, to initiate an investigation (huntington, 1994, p. 263)13. according to the cijt, the tj describes different approaches in different places, not a coherent concept or practice”, then in the 1990s and 2000s new approaches and practices were born, based on the recognition of principles related to human rights where it was unthinkable to ignore their violation. mechanisms such as judicial processes, investigations (or “truth-clarification” initiatives), reparation programs and reform proposals were linked to this, which were considered the most effective in materializing that respect for human rights”14. today, in the midst of 2021, it is difficult to apply the mechanism of forgetting, a “blot and clean slate”here, international human right treaties and their development play an important role through the interpretation made by them, their bodies, judicial or not, as well as international actors, making the problem visible and pressing for the adoption of measures to repair the events of the past and avoid impunity by the state of transition. 12. fortunately, international human rights bodies have had the opportunity to pronounce that amnesties and human rights requirements are incompatible with the obligations of states to investigate human rights violations. (i/a court hr, 2011b), (un, human rights committee, 1992) cf. i/a court hr of human rights, among others, gelman v. uruguay, february 24, 2011, human rights committee, general comment no. 20, 44 period of sessions, 1992. 13. although "in 1990, approximately two-thirds of the countries of the world did not have democratic regimes." 14. https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional (accessed 17 march 2020) https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 309 2.3.2.2. mechanisms aimed at remembering and claiming rights these may or may not be judicial, as we mentioned above, with a single purpose, to achieve justice, which involves recognizing the dignity of the victims and the fight against impunity. today, a large part of the world states have assumed the obligation to recognize, protect and guarantee human rights through the ratification of international rights, and in this context they are obliged to carry out the pertinent investigations to avoid impunity. according to mendez, in a few years there has been great progress regarding the recognition that serious and systematic violations generate obligations of the state towards the victims and society. however, considerable disagreements remain about the content of these obligations and how they should be fulfilled. for this author, the obligations are multifaceted and can be fulfilled separately, but in no case should they be seen as alternatives to one another. “the different obligations are not a menu from which the government can choose a solution; they are in fact different obligations, each of which must be fulfilled in accordance with the best possibilities available to the government. it considers judicial processes with all the guarantees essential in any serious effort to accountability” (méndez, 1997, pp. 255-256). faced with crimes against humanity, states must: “investigate, prosecute and punish the perpetrators; reveal to the victims, their families and the whole of society everything that can be reliably clarified about these events; offer the victims the reparations due; and separate the fully identified executioners from the security forces and other positions of authority”. their obligation to those who have acquired a specific right consisting of: the right of victims to receive justice, know the truth, receive compensation and other forms of non-monetary restitution, and the right to new, reorganized and responsible institutions. these are rights that not only benefit the victim, but also society as a whole (méndez, 1997, pp. 261-262) 2.4. recognition of transitional justice at the united nations the tj was incorporated into the united nations by the secretary general in 2004 through the report entitled "the rule of law and transitional justice in societies that suffer or have suffered conflicts" (united nations, general secretariat, 2004). it shows the interest of the un in addressing the issue and in the actions to be taken, highlighting the need to reach a common foundation for international norms and standards. it highlights the importance of commitment to and investing in justice, not resorting to mere formulas, which are the same for all, nor importing foreign models, but taking into account each reality, needs, aspirations and the participation of the countries themselves. in this process, the states play a fundamental role and, in this context, it is committed to promoting the technical capacity for reform, as well as the political will to implement it. it makes it clear that justice, peace and democracy are not mutually exclusive but rather imperatives that reinforce one another. for this reason, it considers it essential for achievement of these three objectives “a strategic planning, a careful integration and a sensible sequence of activities. it would be useless to focus exclusively on a certain institution or to dismiss civil society or victims. in the justice sector, we must pay full attention to all its interdependent institutions, take into account the needs of key groups transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 310 and not forget the need for transitional justice mechanisms to be complementary. our main role is not to create international mechanisms to replace national structures, but to help build national capacity in the field of justice”15. along the same lines, the security council in 2010 showed its position against impunity for the commission of serious violations of ihl and human rights standards, and advocated for the defense of accountability through the use of means, such as national, international and mixed criminal courts and tribunals, truth and reconciliation commissions, national reparation programs for victims, institutional reforms and traditional dispute resolution mechanisms. this affects the responsibility of the state to put an end to impunity and its obligation to “seek sustainable peace, justice, truth and reconciliation”16, as well as their willingness "to ensure that all un activities aimed at restoring peace and security respect and promote the rule of law". in 2005, the un general assembly approved the basic principles and guidelines on the right of victims of gross violations of international human rights standards and serious violations of ihl to file remedies and obtain reparations17. an instrument that focuses its attention on the rights of victims and the obligations of states18. in september 2011, the human rights council appointed, through resolution 18/7, a special rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-repetition in order to deal with transitional situations of an authoritarian regime or from a conflict where there have been serious human rights violations and flagrant violations of ihl. today fabian salvioli is in charge. 2.5. the chicago principles on transitional justice taking into account what has happened in the world and the experiences of tj, in 2007 the “chicago principles on transitional justice” were adopted”19 that today play an important role in the adoption of public policies by states to deal with serious crimes and have been used in various transition processes20. although they are soft laws, they are important because they constitute parameters to be taken into account and a frame of reference regarding where to go. 15. cfr. https://undocs.org/es/s/2004/616, p.1 (accessed 17 march 2020) 16. https://undocs.org/es/s/prst/2010/11, p. 2 (accessed 19 march 2020) 17. https://undocs.org/es/a/res/60/147, 21 march 2006. 18. see also: report by diane orentlicher, independent expert charged with updating the set of principles for the fight against impunity updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through the fight against impunity, file:///c:/users/fquispe/downloads/e_cn.4_2004_88-es.pdf, of february 27, 2004. https://undocs.org/ pdf?symbol=es/e/cn.4/2005/102, of february 18, 2005. 19. this is a joint project of the “international human rights law institute”, “chicago council on global affairs”, istituto superiore internazionale di scienze criminali” andthe “association internationale de droit pénal”. 20. https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional. (last visit march 20, 2020) https://undocs.org/es/s/2004/616 https://undocs.org/es/s/prst/2010/11 https://undocs.org/es/a/res/60/147 https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=es/e/cn.4/2005/102 https://undocs.org/pdf?symbol=es/e/cn.4/2005/102 https://www.ictj.org/es/que-es-la-justicia-transicional florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 311 3. transitional justice in the inter-american human rights system 3.1. brief reference to the creation of transitional justice in latin america and the inter-american human rights system as we have seen previously in the latin american region, unfortunately as a consequence of the great and serious violations of human rights, it has played an important role in the origin and development of the concept of transitional justice. argentina under the government of jorge videla, from 1976 to 1981, lived through a dictatorship, where human rights were violated, although the reorganization process lasted until december 5, 1983 because there were still military boards that were definitively dissolved on december 5, 1983. on december 15, 1983, argentina pioneered in the creation of the national commission on the disappearance of persons, known today as truth commissions, a characteristic feature of transitional justice, whose impact has source: own elaboration these principles are: transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 312 been long lasting at the global and regional level21. many agree on the contribution of this country to the development of the jt because it was often the instigator of new specific mechanisms and not a mere recipient of justice (sikkink & walling, 2006, p. 308). chile also learned about the consequences of the repression by augusto pinochet's military regime from september 1973 to march 1990. in april 1990, chilean president patricio aylwin also formed a national commission for truth and reconciliation (smith, 2009, p. 99)22. on the other side of the world, in south africa, after the serious consequences that the regime of racial segregation (apartheid) had for human beings, in 1995 the government of south africa created the truth and reconciliation commission. with this act, it publicly acknowledged past human rights violations for the first time23. given this background, later different types of commissions have been created more frequently. this is the case for el salvador, peru, haiti, guatemala, morocco, sierra leone, among others (hayner, 2006, p. 18) 24. in latin america and in other parts of the world, truth commissions have revealed the atrocities of the predecessor regime. today, these serious and great violations of human rights are not forgotten and the states face this problem, adopting political, economic and social measures aimed at the restoration of justice, reconciliation and the maintenance of peace. the truth commission emerged as an antidote to impunity and an analogue to amnesty. “throughout the americas -argentina, chile, el salvador, honduras, haiti and guatemalawherever the violence was massive in relation to the population, mitigating the possibility of criminal reprisals, the truth commission became a central mechanism for the possibility of political transition”25. this does not mean in any case that these commissions are perfect. hayner analyzes in detail more than twenty truth commissions created in different parts of the world, for which the great challenges and various problems that these commissions face are noted (hayner, 2008, p. 432). unfortunately, in many cases decades have elapsed for the state to accept the mistakes of the past and look to the future, recognizing rights. a large part of the violations of the 21. after the argentine truth commission, four other truth commissions were established before the end of the decade. during the 1990s, thirteen new truth commissions were created and sixteen truth commissions were inaugurated between 2000 and mid-2004, including the first truth commission in the middle east and north africa region (morocco 2004). cfr. sikkink, kathryn and walling booth, argentina´s contributions to global trends in transitional justice, p.301-324, p.308 in transitional justice in the twenty…, ob.cit. an extensive work on truth commissions can be seen at: kritz, neil, transitional justice, volume iii, laws, ruling, and reports, united state institute of peace press, washington, d.c. 1995. pp. 834. 22. however, their training was not intended to "gather ammunition for legal proceedings against army officers, but simply to document the truth and clear the air". 23. ventura, maría, reflections on the work of the south african truth and reconciliation commission, social sciences magazine, nueva época, no. 33, october 2012-march 2013, pp. 142-159; picker, ruth, the sessions of the south african truth and reconciliation commission perspectives from the victims, in right to memory, gomez isa, felipe (dir.), 2006, pp. 113-138. 24. see his work on truth commissions. 25. teitel, ruti g., transitional justice, 2000, oxford university press, 2000, p. 79. florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 313 seventies and eighties of the past century has been characterized by impunity and the neglect of the victims. let us not forget that impunity is the breeding ground for all violations. for many years and in different parts of the world it was affirmed from a pragmatist conception “that in transition situations it is necessary to accept large doses of impunity, to recognize the impossibility of prosecuting, judging and punishing the great perpetrators of human rights violations. and admit that the application of national or international justice is impossible”, and this was done in post-franco spain, in portugal, brazil, the countries of the southern cone of latin america, the philippines, countries in africa and the end of the civil wars in central america. this was due to the active participation during the negotiations of the members of the previous regime in the definition of power relations (cortés rodas, 2007, p. 65). since the end of the 20th century, there has been an almost generalized commitment to the establishment of democratic societies where respect for human rights and recognition of the victims prevail. the intention has been to build democratic societies that respond to the needs of the victims. to this, it contributes to the development of human rights protection systems and the development of international criminal law. the vast majority of these systems have bodies, judicial or not, that are aware of human rights violations and over the years they have spoken out about these violations. among them, there is what is known as the inter-american human rights system. the inter-american system is understood to be all the normative production on human rights that has been carried out by an initiative of the states within the framework of the organization of american states (oas) since 1948. added to this is the production through resolutions and judgments of the organs of the inter-american system for the protection of human rights, the commission and the inter-american court, created in 1959 and 1969, respectively (quispe remón, 2019, p. 34). many people who are under the jurisdiction of the states that are now part of the iahrs have suffered serious violations (chile, argentina, peru, colombia, etc.). the sidh was created with the adoption of the american declaration of the rights and duties of man in 1948 and is consolidated with the adoption of the american convention on human rights in 1969 (achr), a binding instrument that creates the commission and the inter-american court as organs of the system (quispe remón, 2010, pp. 297343), (quispe remón, 2019, pp. 34-73) . the inter-american court began its operation in 1978, almost in parallel with the great dictatorships in the latin american region. this means that said body did not have the support of all the states in the region26. at the end of the period of the dictatorships, 26. for example. argentina signed and ratified the american convention on human rights in february 1984, while chile signed the american convention in 1969, but only ratified it in october 1990; paraguay and uruguay signed the convention in 1969 but ratified it in august 1989 and march 1985, respectively; brazil signed and ratified in 1992. transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 314 the states have gradually joined the ihrs. today we find many pronouncements of the court on the violation of human rights that occurred in that period. although it is true that international law is not retroactive, the court resorted to continuing crimes to learn about the events that occurred, even prior to their existence, and to condemn the states (i/a court hr, 2006a) (i/a court hr, 2006b) (i/a court hr, 2011a). the court throughout its existence has always issued very progressive and pro homini judgments and advisory opinions. it is worth highlighting its resounding pronouncement, from the barrios altos case against peru (2001), on the inadmissibility of the amnesties27 pardons, prescriptions or other exclusion of responsibility whose objective is to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations (quispe remón, 2010, p. 359). however, in the mozote v. el salvador case (2012), it makes an exception, and performs an analysis of compatibility of the general amnesty law for the consolidation of peace with the international obligations of the achr in light of additional protocol ii to the geneva conventions of 1949. it is taken into account that it is a general amnesty law that refers to acts committed in the context of an internal armed conflict, and indicates that according to international humanitarian law, the issuance of amnesty laws for the cessation of hostilities in non-international armed conflicts to enable a return to peace” (i/a court hr, 2012a, 284-285 pars). since the castillo petruzzi v. peru case (1999) it has also been arguing that the military courts are not competent to hear cases on human rights violations in any case (quispe remón, 2010, pp. 379-386), inasmuch as, the court says, they are incompatible with the american convention. 3.2. the inter-american court and its development of transitional justice elements the protection bodies of the ihrs, the commission and the inter-american court have played and continue to play an important role in the development of the search for the truth and the recognition of the rights of the victims, essential elements of the tj. however, this article only focuses its attention on the role of the judicial organ of the interamerican system, the inter-american court28. 27. although this firmness over time has been relativized, in the case of el mozote. 28. the inter-american commission has repeatedly ruled on transitional justice. as an example, one of the latest actions can be cited. in 2019, it created the rapporteur ship on memory, truth and justice. in 2019, it adopted resolution 3/2019 in which it recognizes the 16 “principles on public policies on memory in the americas”: comprehensive approach to memory, participation of victims, involvement of civil society, suitability of persons in charge of memory policies, interdisciplinarity, intercultural approach and focus, regional integration, financing, design and implementation of memory initiatives, regulatory framework, identification and signaling, construction or recovery and preservation, sustainable management, creation or recovery, preservation and sustainable management, accessibility of state archives, restrictions on access to information in state archives. florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 315 in jurisprudence, we will not find an explicit reference to the term transitional justice, but a broad development on the elements or characteristics of transitional justice described in the first part of the work. the court, whose purpose is not to condemn the state, nor to assume its obligations, but to protect the rights recognized in the achr for individuals and to rule on the matter and, where appropriate, determine whether or not the state was responsible for the violation of the achr, issued its first judgment in the velásquez rodríguez case (i/a court hr, 1988) a decade after its operation. despite being the first sentence, it is, for the purposes of the tj, a valuable contribution because it establishes that all states parties have a legal duty to: adopt the necessary measures to reasonably prevent human rights violations; investigate in a responsible and serious manner with the means at its disposal the violations committed within the scope of its jurisdiction in order to identify those responsible; impose the pertinent sanctions on those responsible for the violations and guarantee adequate reparation for the victims (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 174). aspects that have been and are developed by states in transition stages. for the court, states have the obligation to respect the rights and freedoms recognized in the achr in such a way that any action or omission of any public authority that undermines human rights is attributable to the state (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 164). this implies the organization of the entire state apparatus and all the structures, through which public power manifests itself, so that they are capable of legally ensuring the free and full exercise of human rights. “as a consequence of this obligation, the states must prevent, investigate and punish any violation of the rights recognized by the convention and also seek the reestablishment, if possible, of the violated right and, where appropriate, the reparation of the damage caused by the violation of human rights” (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 164). for the court, it is a principle of international law that the state responds “for the acts of its agents carried out under their official status and for their omissions, even if they act outside the limits of their jurisdiction or in violation of domestic law”. (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 170). this principle is perfectly suited to the nature of the convention, which is violated in all situations in which public power is used to harm human rights recognized in it. otherwise, the protection system established in the convention would become illusory (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 171). the court says that the obligation to prevent, investigate and punish human rights violations does not end solely for actions of the public powers, but also for illegal acts that violate human rights that are not directly attributable to a state, "for example, because it was the work of an individual or because the perpetrator of the transgression was not identified, due to lack of due diligence to prevent the violation or treat it in accordance with the convention ”(i/a court hr, 1988, para. 172). thus, the obligation to investigate and to prevent is an obligation of means or behavior that is not breached just because the investigation does not have positive results. the state must do so seriously and not as a mere formality, condemned in advance to be unsuccessful. it must assume it as its own legal duty and not as a simple management of transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 316 private interests, "which depends on the procedural initiative of the victim or their next of kin or the private contribution of evidence, without the public authority actually searching for the truth”. "this assessment is valid regardless of the agent to whom the violation may eventually be attributed, even individuals, because, if their facts are not seriously investigated, they would be, in a certain way, aided by the public power, which would compromise international responsibility of the state” (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 177). in velásquez rodríguez, the court turns to the principle of international law of the identity or continuity of the state and affirms that the responsibility subsists regardless of changes of government over time and, specifically, between the moment in which the wrongful act is committed that generates responsibility and the one in which it is declared. this is valid, says the court, also in the field of human rights, although from an ethical or political point of view, the attitude of the new government is much more respectful of these rights than that of the government at the time when the violations occurred” (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 184). since then it has made reference to various concepts that today are developed as essential elements of tj. this is the case of the right to the truth that the victims and the victims' next of kin must obtain29, as well as the concept of victim that goes beyond the person who has directly suffered the violation of their human rights and the responsibility that the state has in the prevention and protection of human rights of all those who are under its jurisdiction. it makes it clear that the states are those most responsible for protecting and guaranteeing the effective exercise of the rights recognized in the achr to all people, they are in charge of not leaving the violation of human rights unpunished. it is also true that the court makes a broad interpretation of the achr, since from the literal text it is difficult to notice the developments that we find today in its decisions regarding elements of transitional justice such as the right to truth, reparations and its modalities or the extension and recognition of certain rights of the victims' next of kin, etc. 3.2.1. the next of kin of victims and their consideration as victims by the inter-american court the actions of the tj will always assume serious violations of human rights, which have left victims who have suffered "in their own flesh" the torture, disappearances, etc., (direct victims) and others who have suffered as a result of these violations, parents, children, etc. (indirect victims). the achr warns that the human rights recognized in it are for any person whose rights have been violated, and that once domestic remedies have been exhausted, it can activate the competence of the protection bodies. the person or group of people 29. a concept that is difficult to define, which arose at the national, regional and international levels and refers to the obligation of the states with respect to the victims, their next of kin and society as a whole to provide information on the circumstances in which the violations of human rights were committed. (naqvi, p., 2006) florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 317 whose rights have been violated are called victims. the achr does not classify victims as direct and indirect, but it follows that the rights embodied in it are for people whose rights have been directly violated. there is no concept of victim. in this context, the inter-american court, taking into account the reality of the region and the great violations of human rights, makes a broad interpretation of the achr and extends various human rights to the families of the victims. in the blake v. guatemala case, for the first time, it extends human rights recognized in the achr to the victims' next of kin, pointing out that article 8.1 of the achr, referring to judicial guarantees / due process, “must be interpreted in a broad manner so that said interpretation is based both on the literal text of that norm and on its spirit, and must be appreciated in accordance with article 29, paragraph c) of the convention, according to which no provision of the same can be interpreted with exclusion of the other rights and guarantees inherent to the human being or derived from the representative democratic form of government”(i/a court hr, 1998, para. 96). it concludes that article 8.1 also includes the right of the victim's next of kin to judicial guarantees, since “any act of forced disappearance removes the victim from the protection of the law and causes him serious suffering, the same than his family”. this right confers on mr. blake's next of kin the right to have his disappearance and death effectively investigated by the guatemalan authorities; to follow a process against those responsible for these crimes; that the pertinent sanctions be imposed on them, and that the damages suffered by said next of kin be compensated” (i/a court hr, 1998, para. 97)30. a year earlier, in the castillo páez case against peru, it had already been mentioned that it is the obligation of the state to investigate the facts, despite the internal order difficulties that may exist, until they are fully complied with, since “the right of the victim’s next of kin subsists to know what their fate was and, where appropriate, where their remains are found”31. added to this duty to investigate is that of preventing the possible commission of forced disappearances and punishing those responsible for them (i/a court hr, 1997, para. 90). it condemned the peruvian state for the violation of article 5 of the achr, to the detriment of mr. castillo páez and his next of kin, referring to the right to an effective recourse before the competent national judges or courts, the state having to make reparations for the consequences of the violations and compensate the victims’ next of kin. for the court, the violation of the mental and moral integrity of the next of kin is a direct consequence of forced disappearance, since it generates suffering and anguish, as well as a feeling of insecurity, frustration and impotence in the face of the abstention of the public authorities from investigating facts. in addition, in the blake case, it pointed out that the cremation of the mortal remains with the aim of destroying evidence that violated the cultural values inherited from generation to generation in guatemala, intensified the pain of the relatives. therefore, this suffering to the detriment of the mental and moral 30. this criterion has been reiterated in subsequent cases, among others, (i/a court hr, 1999); (i/a court hr, 2000a, para. 130); (i/a court hr, 2011b, para.187); (i/a court hr, 2005c, para. 63); (i/a court hr, 2011a, para. 120); (i/a court hr, 2012d, para. 199) 31. criterion that is later repeated, among others, in (i/a court hr, 2002, para. 114). transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 318 integrity of the family members constitutes a violation by the rule of law established in art. 5 of the achr (i/a court hr, 1998, para. 114-115).32 in many cases, it has ruled on the violation of this article to the detriment of the victims' next of kin. in the mapiripán massacre case, it stated that the victim’s relatives not only have had their physical and psychological integrity affected, but also their social and work relationships, and the dynamics of their families altered, and, in some cases, the life and personal integrity has been put at risk (i/a court hr, 2005a, para 212). for the court, the evidence in situations of serious violations is irrelevant, "no evidence is needed to demonstrate the serious effects on the mental and emotional integrity of the next of kin of the victims" (i/a court hr, 2005a, para. 212). in addition, given the circumstances of the case in which it was not possible to have more information on other relatives of the victims, it was considered reasonable "to presume that all of them, identified and unidentified, suffered the extreme circumstances of the massacre or its consequences" (i/a court hr, 2005a, para. 212). it declared all the next of kin (individualized or not) victims of the violation of the right to personal integrity. in the myrna mack chang case, it also considered the immediate family members victims of violation of personal, mental and moral integrity, due to the threats and harassment suffered since the beginning of the investigation of the extrajudicial execution, and the pattern of obstructions of the investigations through mechanisms that even affected justice operators (i/a court hr, 2003a, para. 232). in villagrán morales, it once again points out that victims of human rights violations or their family members must have “ample opportunities to be heard and act in the process projects, both in seeking to clarify the facts and punish the responsible parties, as well as seeking due reparation” (i/a court hr, 1999). it affects the suffering of mothers as a result of the negligence of the authorities who did not make adequate efforts to locate the families of the victims and notify them of the deaths in order to bury them33. the treatment given to the bodies of the victims (abandonment in an uninhabited area and exposure to inclement weather and the action of animals), which were sacred to their relatives, especially their mothers, was cruel and inhumane treatment. it links the continuous deprivation of the truth about the disappearance of the detainee with cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment for close relatives (i/a court hr, 2002, para. 114). although the court has mentioned family members in general, throughout its jurisprudence it has perfected and outlined this concept, incorporating guidelines from the jurisprudence of the european court of human rights (echr), which also considers family members as victims of human rights violations. in the bámaca velásquez case, it includes the elements that the echr establishes in the case of kurt v. turkey, of may 25, 1998. the echr ruled on the condition of victim of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment of a mother 32. criterion reiterated in (i/a court hr, 2004a, 210-211 par.) in this case, the court also pronounces on the pain and uncertainty of the next of kin by not knowing the whereabouts and by not being able to honor their remains in accordance with their beliefs and customs (para. 212). 33. criterion that is reiterated in (i/a court hr, 2003c, para. 102) florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 319 whose son had been detained and disappeared, assessing the circumstances of the case, the seriousness of the mistreatment and the fact that she did not have official information to clarify the facts. it concluded by considering the mother as the victim and attributed to the state the violation of 3 of the european convention on human rights (echr) (i/a court hr, 2000b, para. 162). subsequently, the inter-american court refers to the cakici and timurtas cases, both against turkey, of 1999 and 2000, respectively, in which the echr mentions other elements, to be taken into account for the classification of victim, such as “the proximity of the family bond, the particular circumstances of the relationship with the victim, the degree to which the relative witnessed the events related to the disappearance, the way in which the relative became involved regarding attempts to obtain information about the disappearance of the victim and the response offered by the state to the proceedings initiated” (i/a court hr, 2000b, para. 163). thus, the court, assessing the circumstances of the case and taking into account the continuous obstruction of the family member's efforts to learn the truth of the facts, especially about the concealment of the body of bámaca velásquez, as well as the obstacles by the authorities to the exhumation attempts and the official refusal to provide the corresponding information, considered that the sufferings the family member was subjected to constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment (articles 5.1 and 5.2 of the achr). added to this is the deep anguish of their next of kin for not knowing their whereabouts, which is why they are considered victims of the violation of article 5.1 and 5.2 of the achr (i/a court hr, 2000b, para. 165). in 2006, in the heliodo portugal case, it stated six criteria to determine the condition of victims of the violation of the right to mental and moral integrity due to the suffering they have suffered and due to the subsequent actions or omissions of the authorities in the face of the facts. these are: “1) existence of a close family bond; 2) the particular circumstances of the relationship with the victim; 3) the way in which the family member became involved in the search for justice; 4) the response offered by the state to the steps taken; 5) the context of a “regime that prevented free access to justice”, and 6) the permanent uncertainty in which the victim's next of kin were involved as a consequence of the ignorance of his whereabouts” (i/a court hr, 2008b, para. 163). knowing what happened to the disappeared person, the facts, the whereabouts of his mortal remains constitutes for the next of kin a measure of reparation, "and therefore an expectation that the state must satisfy the next of kin of the victim and society as a whole" (i/a court hr, 2002, para. 114)34. it is an act of justice and reparation in itself, to 34. along the same lines in (i/a court hr, 2014, para. 481) transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 320 deliver the mortal remains in the case of disappeared detainees. “it is an act of justice to know the whereabouts of the disappeared, and it is a form of reparation because it allows dignifying the victims, since the mortal remains of a person deserve to be treated with respect towards their relatives and in order that they can give him an adequate burial” (i/a court hr, 2002, para. 115). thus, it recognizes certain human rights to the families of the victims, such as the right to the truth. 3.2.2. the right of victims to the right to the truth according to the inter-american court the achr does not recognize the right to the truth as a human right, but given the context of the region, the court has been introducing this concept, especially in crimes related to forced disappearance, even pointing out that it is a right of the victims and their families35. already in its first sentence it refers to the obligation of the public authority to effectively seek the truth about the events that occurred (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 177). the state must satisfy the right of the victim's next of kin to know where he is and, if necessary, indicate the place of his remains (i/a court hr, 1988, para. 181). the court, taking into account the decisions of the human rights committee and the un human rights commission, in the bámaca velásquez case, recognizes that the right that everyone has to the truth has been developed by international human rights law (i/a court hr, 2000b, para. 76), and in the case of myrna mack chang, it held that “everyone, including the next of kin of victims of serious human rights violations, has the right to the truth (i/a court hr, 2003a, para. 274)36. the court does not consider that this right is an autonomous right set forth in articles 8, 13, 25 and 1.1 of the achr, but rather that it is a right “subsumed in the right of the victim or their next of kin to obtain from the competent organs of the state the clarification of the violating facts and the corresponding responsibilities, through the investigation and prosecution” (i/a court hr, 2005b, para. 62). it reiterates in its sentences the importance of knowing the truth about what happened on the part of the victim of serious human rights violations and their next of kin, to know the whereabouts of their remains and their recognition, since they can constitute an important means of reparation. for the court, the right to the truth is part of the right of access to justice, that is, it is framed within this right “as an expectation that the state must satisfy the victims of human rights violations and their next of kin and as a form of reparation (i/a court hr, 2006c, para. 219)37. therefore, in its jurisprudence it has analyzed the right to the truth within articles 8 and 25 of the convention, as well as in the chapter on other forms of 35. in the universal sphere, we find the antecedent to this right in resolution 9/11 of september 24, 2008. human rights council. the right to the truth, a / hrc / res / 9/11. 36. along the same lines, among others, in (i/a court hr, 2002, para. 114); (i/a court hr, 2004b, para. 81); (i/a court hr, 2004a, para. 26); (i/a court hr, 2004c, para. 230); (i/a court hr, 2004d, para. 257); (i/a court hr, 2004e, para. 97); (i/a court hr, 2004f, para. 128); (i/a court hr, 2005c, para. 62). 37. along the same lines in (i/a court hr, 2009, para. 118); (i/a court hr, 2010, para. 201) florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 321 reparation” (i/a court hr, 2006c, para. 219). the truth is subsumed in the right of the victim or his next of kin to obtain from the competent organs of the state the clarification of the violating facts and the corresponding responsibilities, through the investigation and prosecution that articles 8 and 25 of the achr provide (i/a court hr, 2007, para. 147). the power to access justice must ensure in a reasonable time that the victims and their next of kin know the truth of what happened, ensure an investigation, prosecution, and, where appropriate, the punishment of those responsible (i/a court hr, 2003b, para. 114) (i/a court hr, 2006d, para. 382)38. it has linked the right to know the truth "with the ordinary action filed by the next of kin, which is linked to access to justice and the right to seek and receive information enshrined in article 13 of the american convention" (i/a court hr, 2010, para. 201). for the court, the right to the truth is part of access to justice and is broad in nature, the violation of which may affect various rights recognized in the achr depending on the context and circumstances of the case (i/a court hr, 2015, para. 265). the court has adopted decisions on the basis of noting the existence of rights such as the right to truth or the right to water based on the content of others that arise from applicable conventional texts (i/a court hr, 2020b, para. 211). in the gudiel álvarez case, the court relies on the opinion of the united nations regarding the importance of determining the truth regarding human rights violations for the consolidation of peace and reconciliation, an argument that finds support in ihl that recognizes that the next of kin have the right to know the truth about the fate of the disappeared victims, including victims of forced disappearances, both in international and non-international armed conflicts (i/a court hr, 2012b, para. 299)39. for the court, not knowing the truth about the fate of a disappeared person constitutes a form of cruel and inhumane treatment for close relatives (i/a court hr, 2011b, para. 133). in a democratic society, the truth about the serious human rights violations that occurred must be made known, since this constitutes a just expectation that the state must satisfy (i/a court hr, 2012c, para. 194). the inherent obligations of the right to the truth in cases of serious human rights violations require the adoption of institutional designs that allow this right to be carried out in the most suitable, participatory and complete way possible and not face legal or practical obstacles that make it illusory. the court emphasizes that the satisfaction of the collective dimension of the right to the truth requires the determination of the most complete possible historical truth, which includes the judicial determination of the patterns of joint action and all the persons who in various ways participated in violations and their responsibilities (i/a court hr, 2007, para. 195)40. 38. along the same lines in the case (i/a court hr, 2012c, para. 191); and recently in (i/a court hr, 2020a, para. 173) 39. along the same lines in (i/a court hr, 2015, para. 262). the recognition within the un, through its various human rights protection bodies, of the victims' right to the truth is highlighted. an imprescriptible truth. 40. along the same lines in (i/a court hr, 2008c, para. 102) and in (i/a court hr, 2008a, para. 454) transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 322 4. final reflections unfortunately, the world has experienced innumerable and grave human rights violations over the past centuries. many of these events have gone unnoticed by the governments that came after violations by the previous regime, despite their gravity . in many cases, precisely in order not to activate or carry out investigations in the future and to leave violations unpunished, amnesty laws have been adopted, avoiding giving answers about the facts and events to the direct and indirect victims, who probably still suffer from the absence or the disappearance of their loved ones for which there was no action by the state. in this context, the concept of transitional justice arises in order to avoid impunity, recognize the dignity of the victims, the right to know, to know the truth about what happened and that someone in the name of the state assumes that responsibility and makes reparation for the damages. after all, representing a state implies assuming the good and the bad. it is a step aimed at healing wounds where the state plays the leading role, paving the way, adopting the necessary mechanisms to avoid forgetting the great and serious violations of human rights. this involves the adoption of judicial mechanisms that facilitate access to justice for vulnerable groups, taking into account, if applicable, their needs; that they are in charge of investigating, punishing and condemning those responsible for human rights violations, or non-judicial ones, such as the establishment of suitable bodies, in charge of gathering information about the victims and the facts, leaving a record of what happened, always knowing the reality of the victims and empathizing with them; as well as the appointment of truth commissions, whose members must be suitably equipped to carry out said work, and their composition must take into account the knowledge of the reality of the victims and their needs and their idiosyncrasies. the ultimate goal of tj is to obtain justice, understood as giving everyone what is their due. it is the obligation of the state at this stage to regain the trust of the population through proven institutions. the development of international human rights law through international systems for the protection of human rights, whether at the universal or regional level, constitutes a retaining wall against impunity and represents a space of hope for the victims. human rights constitute a limit to the absolute will of the states in the past and an obligation to guarantee and protect the rights of all persons under their jurisdiction. in this context, the bodies for the protection of human rights play an important role, especially the interamerican court, which has been developing a broad interpretation of the american convention to protect the victims and recognize certain human rights, such as the right to the truth and to the right to reparation, among others, linked to other rights, although their pronouncements have not been framed in transition processes. this allows victims to activate the jurisdiction of international bodies on the one hand and, specifically of the inter-american system, on the other, the obligation of the state to comply with the decisions emanating from the inter-american court, applying the conventionality control that the court requires of the states that have assumed its contentious jurisdiction. undoubtedly, thanks to the application of transitional justice and according to the realities, we will be able to speak of a reconciled society, where respect for the human florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 323 rights of the victims is a priority, on the one hand, and on the other, the fight against timpunity that has caused so much harm to thousands of people in the world, creating deep-rooted resentment and preventing peaceful coexistence. 5. bibliography cortés rodas, f., 2007. los derechos de las víctimas de la violencia política a la verdad, la reparación y la justicia. reflexiones sobre cuatro casos en américa latina. estudios políticos, issue 31. de grieff, p., 2011. algunas reflexiones acerca del desarrollo de la justicia transicional. anuarios de derechos hmanos de la universidad de chile, issue 7, pp. 17-39. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.5354/0718-2058.2011.16994" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.5354/0718-2058.2011.16994 de grieff, p., 2012. theorizing transitional justice. in: m. williams, r. nagy & j. elster, eds. transitional justice. new york: new york university press, pp. 3177. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814794661.003.0002" \t "_ blank" https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814794661.003.0002 dorado, j., 2015. justicia transcional. eunomía revista en cultura de la legalidad, issue 8. guembe, m. j. & olea, h., 2006. no justice, no peace: discussion of a legal framework regarding the demobilization of non-state armed groups in colombia. in: n. rohtarriaza & j. mariezcurrena, eds. transitional justice in the twenty-first century. beyond truth versus justice. cambridge: cambridge university press, pp. 120142. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.007" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.007 hayner, p., 2006. comisiones de la verdad: resumen esquemático. international review of the cross red, issue 862, pp. 1-18. hayner, p., 2008. verdades innombrables: el reto de las comisiones de la verdad. ciudad de méxico: fondo de cultura económica. huntington, s., 1994. la tercera ola, la democratización a finales del siglo xx. barcelona: paidós. i/a court hr, 1988. caso velásquez rodríguez vs. honduras, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 1997. caso castillo páez vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 1998. caso blake vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 1999. caso “niños de la calle” (villagrán morale y otros) vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2000a. caso durand y ugarte vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. https://doi.org/10.5354/0718-2058.2011.16994 https://doi.org/10.5354/0718-2058.2011.16994 https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814794661.003.0002 https://doi.org/10.18574/nyu/9780814794661.003.0002 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.007 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.007 transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 324 i/a court hr, 2000b. caso bámaca velásquez vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2002. caso trujillo oroza vs. bolivia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2003a. caso myrna mack chang vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2003b. caso bulacio vs. argentina, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2003c. caso juan humberto sánchez vs. honduras, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2004a. caso 19 comerciantes vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2004b. casso molina theissen vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2004c. caso hermanos gómez paquiyauri vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2004d. caso tibi vs. ecuador, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2004e. caso masacre plan de sánchez vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2004f. caso carpio nicolle vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2005a. caso masacre de mapiripán vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2005b. caso blanco romero y otros vs. venezuela, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2005c. caso hermanas serrano cruz vs. el salvador, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2006a. caso almonacid arellano vs. chile, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2006b. caso goiburú vs. paraguay, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2006c. caso masacre de pueblo bello vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2006d. caso penal castro castro vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2007. caso masacre de la rochela vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2008a. caso gonzáles y otras vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 325 i/a court hr, 2008b. caso heliodoro portugal vs. panamá, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2008c. caso valle jaramillo y otros vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2009. caso anzualdo castro vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2010. caso gomes lund y otros (“guerrilha do araguaja) vs. brasil, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2011a. caso barbini duarte y otros vs. uruguay, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2011b. caso gelman vs. uruguay, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2012a. caso masacre de el mozote y lugares aledaños vs. el salvador, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2012b. caso gudiel álvarez y otros (“diario militar”) vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2012c. caso masacre de río negro vs. guatemala, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2012d. caso nadage dorzema y otros vs. república dominicana, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2014. caso rodríguez vera y otros (desaparecidos del palacio de justicia) vs. colombia, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2015. caso comunidad campesina de santa bárbara vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2020a. caso azul rojas marín y otra vs. perú, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. i/a court hr, 2020b. caso comunidades indígenas miembros de la asociación lhaka honhat (nuestra tierra) vs. argentina, san josé de costa rica: i/a court hr. kasapas, g., 2008. an introduccion to the concept of transitional justice: wester balcans and ue conditional. unision disscusion papers, issue 18, pp. 59-76. méndez, j., 1997. accountability for past abuses. human rights quarterly, 19(2), pp. 255-282. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.1997.0018" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.1997.0018 naqvi, p., 2006. el derecho a la verdad en el derecho internacional: ¿ficción o realidad?. international review of the red cross, issue 862. o'donnelll, g. & schemitter, p., 2003 spring. transitions from authoritarian rule: tentative cinclusions about uncertain democracies in transitional justice geneology. harvard human rights journal, volume 16, p. 69. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.1997.0018 https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.1997.0018 transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-american system of human rights the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 326 paige, a., 2009. how "transitions" reshaped human rights: a conceptual history of transitionl justice. human rights quaterly, 31(2), pp. 321-376. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.1353/ hrq.0.0069 pion-berlin, d., 1995. to prosecute or to pardon? humans right decision in the latin amercican souther cone. in: n. kritz, ed. transitional justice. volumen i general consideration. washington dc: united states institute of peace press, pp. 82-103. quispe remón, f., 2010. el debido proceso en el derecho internacional y en el sitema interamericano. valencia: tirant lo blanch. quispe remón, f., 2019. los derecho humanos en el sistema interamericano. valencia: tirant lo blanch. roht-arriaza, n., 2006. the new landscape of transitional justice. in: n. rohtarriaza & j. mariezcurrena, eds. transitional justice in the twenty-first century. beyond truth versus justice. cambridge: cambridge university press, pp. 1-16. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.001" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.001 schabas, w., 2006. the sierra leona truth and reconcilation commission. in: n. roht-arriaza & j. mariezcurrena, eds. transitional justice in the twenty-first century. beyond truth versus justice. cambridge: cambridge university press, pp. 21-42. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.003" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.003 sersale di cerisano, f., 2013. justicia transicional en las américas. el impacto del sitema interamericano. revista iidh, issue 57, pp. 115-136. sikkink, k. & walling, b., 2006. argentina's contribution to global trends in transitional justice. in: n. roht-arriaza & j. mariezcurrena, eds. transitional justice in the twenty-first century. beyond truth versus justice. cambridge: cambridge university press, pp. 301-324. hyperlink "https://doi. org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.015" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.1017/ cbo9780511617911.015 smith, p., 2009. la democratización em américa latina (traducción de carmen martínrz gimeno). madrid: marcial pons. hyperlink "https://doi.org/10.2307/j. ctv10rrb5z" \t "_blank" https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv10rrb5z teitel, r., 2000. transitional justice. oxford: oxford university press. teitel, r., 2003. transitional justice geneology. harvard human rights journal, volume 16, pp. 69-94. un, general secretariat, 2004. informe del secretario general al consejo de seguridad, s/2004/616, nueva york: s.n. un, human right committe, 1992. observacion general nº 20, 44 período de sesiones, ginebra: s.n. https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069 https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069 https://doi.org/10.1353/hrq.0.0069 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.001 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.001 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.003 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.003 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.015 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.015 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.015 https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511617911.015 https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv10rrb5z https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv10rrb5z https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv10rrb5z florabel quispe remón the age of human rights journal, 17 (december 2021) pp. 300-327 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v17.6440 327 weber, j., 2012. forms of transitional justice. in: transitional justice. new york: new york university press. williams, m., nagy, r. & elster, j., 2012. transitional justice. new york: new york university press. zalaquett, p., 1995. confronting human rights violations commited by former goverments: principles and political constraints. in: n. kritz, ed. transitional justice. volumen i general considerations. washington dc: united states institute of peace press, pp. 3-31. received: june 22nd 2021 accepted: october 19th 2021 transitional justice, victims and human rights in the light of international law and the inter-am abstract 1. introduction 2. origin and evolution of transitional justice in international law 2.1. background and development of transitional justice 2.2. concept of transitional justice and its relationship with international human rights law 2.3. characteristics of transitional justice 2.3.1. determination of victims and investigations after a dictatorship or armed conflict 2.3.2. establishment of mechanisms to alleviate the consequences of serious and systematic violatio 2.3.2.1. mechanisms oriented to forgetting 2.3.2.2. mechanisms aimed at remembering and claiming rights 2.4. recognition of transitional justice at the united nations 2.5. the chicago principles on transitional justice 3. transitional justice in the inter-american human rights system 3.1. brief reference to the creation of transitional justice in latin america and the inter-america 3.2. the inter-american court and its development of transitional justice elements 3.2.1. the next of kin of victims and their consideration as victims by the inter-american court 3.2.2. the right of victims to the right to the truth according to the inter-american court 4. final reflections 5. bibliography iberica 13 ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 issn: 1139-7241 / e-issn: 2340-2784 abstract emotion is part and parcel of all kinds of human experience and as such plays an important role in all discourse types, including professional discourse. in the 21st century more than ever, the proper channeling and expression of our emotions at the workplace has come to be considered a sign of emotional intelligence, powerful leadership, and (harmless) persuasion skills. however, persuasion can also be used as a weapon to lie and manipulate people’s emotions. meibauer (2018) notes that lying and deception play an important role in business and trade, and this is obviously the case in the business of fake news. in this article we analyze the genre of fake news within professional journalistic discourse. we carry out a qualitative sociopragmatic analysis of samples of political and scientific fake news in english, and show how this kind of journalism aims at manipulating readers’ emotions not only through the use of prototypical lies (i.e. assertions whose content the speaker believes to be false, uttered with the intention of deceiving the hearer), but mainly by means of complex discourse-pragmatic strategies such as the skillful manipulation of the three chief evaluative subsystems, attitude, engagement and graduation (martin & white, 2005), the triggering of false inferences and the display of misleading images, thus playing with the scalarity of lying. this in turn leads us to some important conclusions showing that the fact that the linguistic expression of falsity can be scalar is intimately connected with the concepts of “bullshit” (frankfurt, 2005) and “post-truth” (keyes, 2004): a good story that somehow touches readers’ emotions, even if it is deceiving, prevails over a true story, because the readers choose to accept as true what makes them “feel good”. keywords: emotion, persuasion, manipulation, fake news, post-truth, bullshit, scalarity of lying. emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse: the case of fake news laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie uned (spain), vu amsterdam (netherlands) lalba@flog.uned.es, lachlan_mackenzie@hotmail.com 17 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 17 ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie resumen e m oc i ón , me n ti ra s y “ b ul l s h i t” e n e l d is c urs o p e ri od ís t ic o : e l c as o d e l a s n ot ic i as f a l s as / f al s e a d as o “ f a k e n e ws ” la emoción forma parte de todas las formas de la experiencia humana, y, como tal, juega un papel importante en todos los tipos de discurso, incluyendo el discurso profesional. en el siglo xxi más que en ninguna otra época, la canalización y expresión apropiadas de las emociones en entornos laborales se ha convertido en un signo de inteligencia emocional, gran liderazgo e (inocuas) habilidades de persuasión. a pesar de ello, la persuasión se puede usar también para manipular las emociones de las personas. meibauer (2018) explica que la mentira y el engaño juegan un papel importante en los negocios y el comercio, lo cual es obviamente el caso del negocio de las noticias falsas (o mejor dicho, falseadas) o “fake news”. en este artículo investigamos el género de las noticias falseadas a través del análisis cualitativo sociopragmático de ejemplos de este tipo de noticias en inglés, y mostramos cómo esta forma de periodismo apunta a la manipulación de las emociones de los lectores, no solamente mediante mentiras prototípicas (es decir, aseveraciones cuyo contenido el hablante cree falso, pero que son producidas con la intención de engañar al oyente), sino también y principalmente con estrategias pragmático-discursivas complejas, tales como la manipulación hábil de los tres subsistemas evaluativos principales, actitud, compromiso y graduación (martin y white, 2005), la activación de inferencias falaces o el uso de imágenes engañosas, jugando así con la escalaridad de la mentira. esto, a su vez, nos lleva a sacar conclusiones importantes que muestran que el hecho de que la expresión de lo falseado puede ser escalar tiene una conexión estrecha con los conceptos de “bullshit” (frankfurt, 2005) y “posverdad” (keyes, 2004): una buena historia que de alguna manera toque las emociones de los lectores, aun si es engañosa, prevalece sobre la historia verdadera porque los lectores eligen aceptar como verdadero aquello que apela a sus pasiones y, por tanto, los hace “sentir bien”. palabras clave: emoción, persuasión, manipulación, noticias falsas/falseadas, posverdad, bullshit, escalaridad de la mentira. “the decision to tell the truth or to lie is a pragmatic decision.” jörg meibauer (2018: 370) 1. introduction it has now been established (see mackenzie & alba-juez, 2019, for examples of recent work) that emotion permeates all discourse genres, from everyday 18 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 18 conversation to journalistic discourse (cf. alonso belmonte, 2019) or even scientific discourse (cf. sancho-guinda, 2019). emotion is inextricably linked to persuasion, as can be clearly perceived in journalistic discourse, where persuasion can be used to heighten readers’ sensitivity to a given issue, or on the contrary, to manipulate their emotions, stances and beliefs. the first kind of persuasion works with what cockcroft et al. (2014: 85) refer to as the “emotion which deepens and illuminates our understanding”, and the latter with “the emotion that clouds an issue”, what cicero referred to as perturbatio. journalists who are good persuaders are also skillful instigators of emotion because they know that the way we feel about something influences our rational judgement (alba-juez, forthcoming). the relation between persuasion and emotion is double-edged, however: on the one hand, we cannot think properly unless we also feel as a prior condition (damasio, 1999), but on the other, as cockcroft et al. (2014: 85) have pointed out, “there is also the contradictory assumption that emotion tends to distort the truth of our perceptions”. this emotionally driven distortion of truth is precisely what seems to be happening when certain journalists produce what has been called “fake news”. in this study we will examine fake news on the web as a discourse genre1 which has its own distinctive linguistic and sociopragmatic features, given not only by the genre itself but also by the medium through which it is spread (in this case, the internet). as we will show, a key identifying feature of fake news is its lack of concern with the truth, so what makes this genre distinctive has much less to do with the literal meaning of the language used than with the discursive-pragmatic strategies deployed in order to cheat or mislead the reader, such as the manipulation of the different sub-systems of appraisal (martin & white, 2005) or the triggering of deceptive inferences by means of fallacies and the like. a distinction needs to be drawn between fake news that (like a counterfeit banknote) appears to be genuine and what is nowadays called infotainment, which blatantly makes no effort to tell the truth or give objective information, but which aims above all to entertain the audience, irrespective of ethics or reliability. however, with the rise of social media as the principal source of both information and amusement, for many members of the public the distinction between malicious and merely entertaining communication has become blurred. the most salient feature of the texts emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 19 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 19 that result from this blend of apparent seriousness and unabashed flippancy is that their creators are playing with shared cultural knowledge, the information and emotions conveyed in the text, the emotions triggered in the audience, and the consequent emotional implicatures (e-implicatures, schwarz-friesel, 2010, 2015) that are sparked off. regarding the latter, it appears to be the case that infotainment-style fake news triggers eimplicatures of the “you’ll like this news and feel good about it” kind, in certain cases appealing to some of human beings’ basest instincts, such as feeling good when somebody else fails or suffers (in german, schadenfreude),2 or feeling good because one is different from someone who is supposedly corrupt or evil. readers’ emotional response to this kind of text may render them susceptible to the confirmation bias fallacy3 (barclay, 2018), which leads them to accept some information as good and true simply because it aligns with their own thoughts and beliefs, without first considering whether it may be false or fake. this kind of manipulation of the truth is very much connected to such concepts as bullshit (frankfurt, 2005) or post-truth (keyes, 2004; harari, 2018: 231-244). the manipulators, in producing their deceptive discourse, are playing, as we shall see, with the scalarity and imprecision of lying (meibauer, 2018). the corpus used for our analysis consists of samples of fake news, both in english and in spanish, from different online newspapers, magazines and social networks. in our analysis of emotion in this news, we have looked into its linguistic manifestations, paying special attention to the discourse and sociopragmatic aspects because both the expression of emotion and the decision to tell the truth, lie or deceive are intersubjective in nature and therefore constitute pragmatic phenomena. we have taken our own definition of “emotion in discourse” as our point of departure: […] we view emotion as a (dynamical) system of language which interacts with the system of evaluation but whose main function is the expression of the speaker’s feelings, mood or affective experience. it is a multimodal discourse process, which permeates all linguistic levels but also manifests itself in non-verbal ways, presenting different stages and forms (influenced by variables such as pragmatic expectations or common-ground knowledge) according as the discursive situation and interaction changes and evolves. (alba-juez & mackenzie, 2019: 18). thus, in our corpus we have examined not only the literal meaning of the texts but also the different kinds of inferential meaning triggered by the words used, laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5020 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 20 as well as the macrostructure of the text, the pictures included, and any other accompanying semiotic variables, all of which contribute to the fulfilment of the writers’ intentions to manipulate the readers’ emotions and stance for their own (political, financial, etc.) benefit. this eventually has led us to reflect upon and then taxonomize the different kinds of manipulation deployed in the genre of fake news, as will be shown in section 5. in the remainder of this article we shall first present some theoretical considerations about the genre of fake news (section 2) and the deployment of emotion, persuasion and manipulation in journalistic discourse (section 3), to be followed by an account of the methodology adopted (section 4), the analysis of two samples of fake news in english (section 5) and finally, our conclusions. 2. journalistic discourse, fake news, lies, bullshit and post-truth 2.1. journalistic discourse at the end of the 20th century, norman fairclough (1995) was already warning his readers about the great power of the mass media to influence knowledge, beliefs, values, social relations and social identities, and because of this conviction he advocated for the recognition of the analysis of media discourse as an important element within contemporary research. fairclough also called our attention to the fact that reporter/audience identities and relations are more complex than might seem at first sight for, among other things, “in addition to the knowledgeable reporter informing the interested citizen, there is an element […] of the media artist entertaining the viewer as consumer” (1995: 4). this element has brought about a tension between information and entertainment, which is indicative of the tendency for the media to become increasingly conversationalized4 and “marketized” (1995: 10), a phenomenon that nowadays is associated with the above-mentioned notion of “infotainment”. for these reasons, fairclough argues in favor of the idea that the analysis of texts cannot be treated in isolation from the analysis of discursive and sociocultural practices, an idea to which we adhere in the research presented here. indeed, we see the discourse genre of fake news as a sociocultural practice which in the 21st century presents specific features that are affected and influenced by the explosion of social media emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 21 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 21 and internet communication in general. ethical norms of objectivity and impartiality are paramount in good journalism, but the explosion of the internet has paved the way for a kind of journalism that is prone and sometimes even compelled to deviate from these norms, and which therefore has developed its own distinctive features. in consonance with genre theory, then, we understand that “texts which are doing different jobs in the culture will unfold in different ways, working through different stages or steps” (eggins & martin, 1997: 236). our aim in this work is to unravel those different “jobs and ways” in the genre of fake news. 2.2. but… what is fake news? is fake news just news which is false? the answer is not simple: fabricators of fake news play with variables such as human emotions, the shared knowledge between journalists and audiences, and the different dimensions of language and discourse. in most cases, fake news is not totally false, but rather a distorted version of something that really happened or a manipulated account of true facts. in his study of the role of lying in the evolution of language, dor (2017: 46) distinguishes between what we could call “bad lying” (i.e. lying with the exploitative intention of making a profit at the expense of other individuals) and “good lying” (i.e. lying with non-exploitative, pro-social intentions, normally connected with politeness). even though, as we shall see, fake news does not always involve a complete lie, it can be said to belong to the former kind of linguistic interaction, and it is therefore a subgenre characterized by deceitful communication. dor does not write about fake news, but his reflections on lying and human language are largely applicable to the role that lying and cheating play in fake news. interestingly, he argues (2017: 44) that “every system of honest communication also allows for cheating, which from the point of view of natural selection seems to be a more advantageous strategy than honest communication”. there must exist, indeed, certain payoffs to the production of fake news at both ends of the communication process. dor explains that “language is deceivers’ heaven” (2017: 50), and when the participants’ interests converge, there is normally no need for honest signaling, and therefore they will work together, disregarding the possibility that their coordinated action may involve partial or even rampant lying. again, this is what seems to happen in the fake news situation: the reader may or may not know or suspect that the news is fake, but if it aligns with her political/philosophical/personal views and makes her “feel good”, laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5022 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 22 she will accept it and tune into it: “what is required is a good story: an object for imagination” (dor, 2017: 50), regardless of its veracity. as asr and taboada (2019a) point out, one of the most recent incarnations of fake news was is to be found in the articles that favored or attacked either hillary clinton or donald trump during the 2016 us presidential election, but in fact present-day fake news is not only about politics, but also about health (notably the supposed dangers of vaccination), celebrities or practically anything else that could interest the public at large. lazer et al. (2017: 1094) accordingly define 21st-century fake news broadly as “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent”. fake news comes in different forms, but there is no universal agreement as to which these forms are. barclay (2018) divides fake news into three broad categories, namely: 1) mercenary fake news: this has no political agenda and is created for the purpose of making money (in the digital market owners of websites that include paid ads receive a certain amount of money each time someone clicks on one of their pages). clickbait articles with sensationalistic headlines which have a flimsy connection with the actual content of the article also belong to this category. 2) fake news with an agenda: this category includes propagandistic fake news which has been intentionally created to promote a specific agenda (political, social, etc.). conspiracy theories are found within this type of fake news. 3) satirical fake news: this is an entirely different subgenre of fake news, which consists of satirical, humorous stories, in many cases including a political or social commentary. among several current websites, the onion (www.theonion.com) in the us and el mundo today (www.elmundotoday.com) in spain are leading sites of satirical fake news. the danger of this kind of news is that despite being satirical, it can be misunderstood as “serious” by certain readers.5 this third category will not be discussed in this work, because in line with dance (2019), we believe it cannot be considered as “authentic” fake news. dance defines fake news as “intentionally factually incorrect news that is published to deceive and misinform its reader”, and he points out that a) it emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 23 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 23 is the component of intentionality that separates fake news from misreported news, which is a normal phenomenon in journalism and is corrected once the error is detected; b) the “factually incorrect” component of the definition is the essence of fake news, and c) the third component, “deceive and misinform”, is what separates fake news from parody and satire, as neither of these intends to deceive their reader nor do they intend to be treated as fact. as for the themes of fake news, golbeck et al. (2018) identify the following: 1) hyperbolic position against one person or group (e.g. trump, clinton, obama, islam, refugees). 2) hyperbolic position in favor of one person or group (e.g. trump, clinton, obama, islam, refugees). 3) discrediting a normally credible source. 4) racist messaging. 5) paranormal theories. 6) conspiracy theories. golbeck et al.’s (2018) list of themes, however, is not exhaustive. in our own investigation we have found that nowadays any topic can be subject to distortion in a piece of fake news. the practice of fabricating information, however, is nothing new from the historical point of view. people have been inventing stories ever since human beings appeared on planet earth, but what makes the problem most serious nowadays is the great speed with which fake news spreads through the internet and the social media, as shown by recent research such as that of vosoughi et al. (2018), who in their study of the spread of stories through twitter found that fake news diffuses and goes viral significantly faster and with a wider reach than true stories. their results show that a false story was 70% more likely to be retweeted than a true one. one possible explanation for this is that fake news tends to be more striking or shocking and therefore appeals to the human tendency to pay more attention to sensational negative events (cf. sachsman, 2017). also, as harari (2018b) wittily states, the truth is, truth has never been high on the agenda of homo sapiens. if you stick to unalloyed reality, few people will follow you. false stories laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5024 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 24 have an intrinsic advantage over the truth when it comes to uniting people. 2.3. bullshit all of the above considerations have led us to believe that the practice of fabricating news has indisputable connections with the practice of bullshitting (frankfurt, 2005). in some significant way, fabricators of fake news are trying to bullshit their audiences. in his philosophical approach to the theoretical study of bullshit, frankfurt bases his definition of the term on black’s (1982) definition of humbug, which he considers to be a politer synonym of bullshit. black (1982: 23) defines humbug as “deceptive misrepresentation, short of lying, especially by pretentious word or deed, of somebody’s own thoughts, feelings or attitudes”. and frankfurt (2005) adds that apart from sharing all these characteristics with humbug, the concept of bullshit involves the following additional features: bullshitters have a lack of concern with truth: it is not that they fail to get things right, they in fact do not even care about getting them right. bullshitting involves a kind of bluff.6 the essence of bullshit is not that it is false, but that it is fake and phony. people tend to be more tolerant with bullshit than with lies: the bullshitter may not deceive us about the facts, but what s/he necessarily attempts to deceive us about is his/her enterprise, what s/he is up to. in the work of the bullshitter there is a kind of laxity which resists or eludes discipline and rigor. frankfurt (2005: 6) observes that “the realms of advertising and of public relations, and the nowadays closely related realm of politics, are replete with instances of bullshit so unmitigated that they can serve among the most indisputable and classic paradigms of the concept”. and we would like to add that the realm of fake news, too, can be considered a paradigmatic case of bullshit, for it is clear that it meets all the above requirements: it shows a lack of concern with the truth, it involves some kind of bluff, its essence lies in the fact that it is fake (not necessarily false) and therefore lacks rigor, and it allows the bullshitters to hide their real intentions, given the fact that emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 25 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 25 people are more tolerant of bullshit than of plain lies. as frankfurt points out, the words of one of the characters (mr. simpson) in eric ambler’s dirty story (ambler, 1967) illustrate this point: although i was only seven when my father was killed, i still remember him very well and some of the things he used to say.... one of the first things he taught me was, “never tell a lie when you can bullshit your way through.” the very essence of bullshit lies in the lack of a commitment to being truthful, in an indifference to how things really are (frankfurt, 2005: 8-9), both of which are distinctive features of fake news. rather than having an interest in deliberate lying (which would involve an intentional violation of truth), manufacturers of fake news feel themselves to be exempt from the constraints of the truths surrounding the point in question, and therefore are prepared to fake the context and whatever else in order to deceive their audiences, which, according to frankfurt, “is less a matter of craft than of art. hence the familiar notion of the ‘bullshit artist’” (2005: 13). for all of the above reasons, bullshit can be a greater enemy of the truth than lies. frankfurt warns his readers about the implications of the contemporary proliferation of bullshit, reflected in various forms of postmodernist skepticism which deny that we can have any reliable access to an objective reality. and here is where the concept of post-truth, which has widely been associated with fake news, comes to the fore. 2.4. post-truth harsin (2018: 1) points out that post-truth “is sometimes posited as a social and political condition whereby citizens or audiences and politicians no longer respect truth (e.g. climate science deniers or birthers)7 but simply accept as true what they believe or feel”. although this condition has been identified by ethicists for millennia, the specific contours of post-truth are a 21st-century phenomenon whose recent origins can be found in “the anxious elite negotiation of mass representative liberal democracy with proposals for organizing and deploying mass communication technologies” (harsin, 2018: 1). like many other concepts, post-truth presents definitional problems: it is paradoxically not interpreted as a kind of truth, but rather as something that is beyond truth; truth is left behind as a phenomenon of the past. experts and, in particular, scientists who are committed to rational argumentation, are dismissed as irrelevant and possibly obstructive. laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5026 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 26 post-truth communication is usually divided into two types: disinformation and misinformation (stahl, 2010). misinformation refers to the spreading of inaccurate or false information while one mistakenly thinks one is sharing accurate information, while disinformation involves the deliberate spreading of false or inaccurate information. however, both concepts are closely linked, for “disinformers may produce misinformers” (harsin, 2018: 7). fake news is a subcategory of disinformation which in many cases differs from false information or lies in the sense that its core propositions may be contextualized by real facts. harsin explains that promotional culture is another factor in the post-truth cultural ambience, arguing that culture and social relations have been powerfully transformed by the role of communication in new forms of consumer capitalism – the latter’s hyperpromotional stage, with no small effects on perceptions of honesty, truth claims and trust-granting (harsin, 2018: 12). he, too, associates post-truth with frankfurt’s (2005) notion of bullshit, given the observation that bullshit-friendly communication has become accepted in a broad array of human practices. harsin also points out that the synergistic agencies of post-truth favor highly emotional communication, in that the participants in the post-truth culture put their trust (i.e. an emotional commitment) in what is being communicated. the promotional industries, politics and now even some forms of journalism (by means of fake news) are taking advantage of this trust/truth identification to target their audiences emotionally and thereby to attain their political or financial aims. müller-thyssen (2018) pertinently extends the definition of post-truth to put the focus on its recipients. he argues that all definitions of post-truth leave aside the fundamental aspect of the openness of consumers of news to being influenced (= bullshitted) even when they know consciously that reality is being faked. “in this crazy world”, müller-thyssen points out, posttruth manufacturers appeal directly to the philias and phobias of their audiences, who are bored and confused by data and statistics, and who are even thankful for a good story that transforms the truth of the facts into a manipulated truth of the passions [our translation] (müller-thyssen, 2018: 65). emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 27 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 27 in the light of the connections between fake news, bullshit, post-truth, emotion and persuasion, let us in the next section turn more specifically to the implications for journalistic discourse. 3. emotion, persuasion and manipulation in journalistic discourse sancho-guinda (2019) notices that although emotion has traditionally been associated with the arts, it is nowadays linked to other fields such as architecture, politics, science and journalism, a phenomenon which can be characterized as a change of paradigm: there has been an emotional turn in the professions. within the journalistic profession, the use of persuasion and the appeal to readers’ emotions are not limited to fake news but are acknowledged characteristics of journalistic discourse in general. newsworthiness has many aspects, eight of which have been recognized by bednarek (2019): eliteness, personalization, impact, recency, consonance, positivity, negativity, and proximity, but one of the most important is the extent to which the news can impress, surprise or shock readers. good persuaders are normally skillful instigators of emotions: they know that the way their audiences feel about something will influence their rational judgements and even the decisions they make. but how does the persuasion used in “true” and serious journalism differ from that used by fake news manufacturers? cockcroft et al.’s (2014: 85) account of the distinction, mentioned in section 1, between the “emotion that tends to distort the truth of our perceptions” and that “which illuminates and deepens our understanding of it” seems to be key to answering this question. alongside the positive kind of persuasion which tries to build credibility by using logical arguments and appealing to emotions that will clarify an issue rather than cloud it, there is also persuasion that depends on emotions that undermine reliable understanding. the negative character of the latter’s appeal to emotions puts it on a par with the practice of manipulation, a discourse/rhetorical strategy that we view as an essential component of the characterization of fake news as a genre. from a discourse-analytical sociopragmatic perspective, in order for a discourse to be considered “manipulative”, it is of the utmost importance to examine the different types of context surrounding the communicative event in question, including the broad cultural, personal, cognitive, social, laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5028 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 28 and emotive contexts. it is therefore crucial to contemplate, among other things, the socio-emotional relationship between speaker and audience, the different footings or roles taken by each of them at different moments, the purpose of the event, the shared knowledge of the participants, and the cognitive frames within which their interaction is being carried out. from a cognitive (relevance-theoretical) perspective, maillat and oswald (2011: 7-8) view manipulation as “an attempt at controlling the context selection process of an utterance u by making a set of assumptions c so salient as to make them inescapable from a cognitive point of view”. the so-called “flashbulb contexts” (brown & kulik, 1977) are very pertinent here: these refer to highly salient memories which are extremely emotional and subjectively permanent in nature (e.g. the 9/11 attacks on the usa in 2001) and which are used by skillful manipulators in the knowledge that they are overwhelming and thus inescapable. in her lesson about the elements of persuasion, díezprados (2019, module 9) warns us about this when she points out: “make sure that emotion is used ethically”, and “beware that a speaker may use your emotions for his/her own profit, not yours”. maillat and oswald (2011) present two main kinds of fallacies or rhetorical devices used for manipulative purposes: 1) the ad verecundiam fallacy and 2) the ad populum fallacy. the former consists in resorting to the voice of an individual deceptively introduced as an “expert” to present an argument as indisputable, and the latter in presenting an argument as strong just because “everybody says so”. manufacturers of fake news have recourse to both these fallacies, as we will show in our analysis when, for instance, a piece of fake news about climate change hinges on the testimony of supposed experts to rebut and discredit serious scientific articles on the matter, or when a piece of fake news is repeated, republished or retweeted numerous times (e.g. the news that associated hillary clinton with the murder-suicide of an fbi agent in 2016) on the assumption that if “everybody says so”, it must inevitably be valid. barclay (2018: 92) includes several other kinds of fallacies present in the discourse of fake news, such as the ad hominem fallacy (which focuses on some flaw in a person rather than on his/her opinion or arguments), confirmation bias (i.e. the above-mentioned tendency to focus only on information that supports what you already believe) or the divine fallacy (which involves attributing anything that cannot be readily explained to some supernatural power). there are cognitive explanations for people’s susceptibility to being deceived by these fallacies. in researching the phenomenon of misinformation, schwarz emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 29 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 29 (2004) and ecker et al. (2014) have observed that metacognitive attributes such as “ease of retrieval” or “familiarity of information” are used by individuals as heuristics to assess likelihood. this implies that, for instance, when some news is tightly integrated into the network of a reader’s beliefs, it is likely to be easily accessible and have greater subjective plausibility. in the same light, wolfe and griffin (2018: 297) show the importance of understanding “belief influences”, because “they introduce a number of potential factors that can influence processing and mental representation of information” (2018: 298), and they suggest that beliefs and the knowledge, emotions and goals they trigger could have their greatest impact in situations where readers choose which texts to read and when to read them, as well as how they will elaborate on and think about those texts, as is the case with fictional narratives or – we deem it appropriate to add – (fake) news. 4. methodology the study presented here is qualitative in nature, attempting to examine the social practice of fake news and to elucidate the discourse-pragmatic features that characterize it as a journalistic subgenre within the broad context of 21stcentury mass and social media digital communication. as such, our approach is complementary to other methodologies in the area of fake news, such as computational detection (e.g. shu, sliva, wang, tang & liu, 2018), datamining (e.g. asr & taboada, 2019a) or initiatives like the training of journalists and other stakeholders to combat fake news (e.g. rehm, 2018; peters, rider, hyvönen & besley, 2018). 4.1. research questions and main hypothesis this article should be seen as our first attempt to find answers to the following research questions: 1) what are the discourse-pragmatic strategies used by the writers of fake news and the contextual elements that characterize it as a genre? 2) how is emotion expressed, handled and manipulated in the discourse of fake news? 3) how are the different subsystems of appraisal (martin & white, 2005) used and combined in fake news? laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5030 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 30 4) what is the relationship between truth, post-truth, lies and “bullshit” (frankfurt, 2005) in the discourse of fake news? 5) what types of manipulation are found in the discourse of fake news? in tackling these questions, we have noticed that the answers will be more complex than might have been expected, for our results show that fake news is a multifarious genre that not only includes news that is merely false. in most cases it cannot be said that the journalist is simply lying or not telling the truth, for the engineered discourse-pragmatic strategies go in many more complex directions than that, extending from the manipulation of true facts in order to trigger false implicatures or presuppositions, to the skillful combination of the different subsystems of appraisal (where manipulated affect and emotion play an important part) and the different variables involved, and the use of misleading images or videos accompanying the headline or body of the news. our working hypothesis, derived from the above questions, is the following: the identifying features of the social discursive practice of fake news are mainly found in a combination of textual and contextual variables, such as the management and manipulation of the stance and emotion systems, the alignments (footing) of the participants within their frame, the (cultural/social/political/emotional) expectations of these participants, and the inferences triggered from and drawn out of this news. 4.2. the corpus used as asr and taboada (2019a) point out, the first question we need to answer in addressing fake news is what we consider to be a representative instance. taking into account the above definitions (lazer et al., 2018; dance, 2019) of fake news in which the aspects of intentionality and deception are crucial, when sorting out the news to be analyzed in this study we considered only fake news that belongs to barclay’s (2018) first two categories, i.e. mercenary fake news and fake news with an agenda, because although his third category (satirical fake news) may also be misinterpreted as true or serious news by some readers, it lacks the “intention to deceive” component which, in our view, is essential to this kind of social practice. one significant issue related to fake news is the problem of sourcing. as bråten, stadler and salmerón (2018: 141) point out, “professional emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 31 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 31 gatekeeping is essentially lacking on the internet, with posted documents often lacking explicit review policies and quality control”. other studies, such as andreassen and bråten (2013) or gottlieb and wineburg (2012), suggest that people’s prior values and attitudes play a role in the critical evaluation of source information, which was a particularly important issue in our search for fake news to build our corpus. when engaged in this endeavor, we found two main obstacles: first, it was somewhat problematic to distinguish fake from true content, and second, it was not easy to trace the origin of the news or to find instances of “authentic fake news” on the web or social media, given that in many cases (as for example when the news was published on facebook) it was deleted very shortly thereafter, once it had been identified as fake. considering all of the above, we resorted to fact-checking sites such as www.snopes.com or egregious fake news sites such as www.whatdoesitmean.com. in addition, we collected several pieces that we received via whatsapp or found on twitter and other social networks. we also considered the now defunct fake news site the denver guardian. another source has been asr and taboada’s (2019b) corpus of fake news (containing a total of 1,380 news articles), which includes articles from different sites, such as the us election dataset, the buzzfeed dataset (collected from nine facebook pages), and a great amount of news from the above-mentioned www.snopes.com as well. in their search for this news, asr and taboada (2019a) explain that –as we had also noticed in our own explorations– some of the links on the snopes site do not actually point to the source article; they just provide contextual information for fact-checking the claim in the fake news, without making the original source available. for the sake of testing our hypothesis, however, we did not analyze all the news in the asr and taboada corpus, for such an enterprise would exceed the purposes of this study. 4.3. assessing the validity of our hypothesis in order to test our hypothesis, we performed a discourse-pragmatic analysis of many samples of fake news from the corpus covering different themes (e.g. politics, climate change, the gossip press) and different formats (e.g. online newspaper, whatsapp video, facebook post). we looked into the different types of manipulation and distortion of the truth and the way bullshit (as described in section 2.3) was ‘administered’ by means of discursive and (socio-)pragmatic resources. the following were the main aspects scrutinized (though not the only ones): laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5032 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 32 the way emotion is expressed at the different linguistic levels in persuasion of the negative type, be it in an invoked (i.e. covert) or inscribed (i.e. overt) manner; the use and combination of the various dimensions of evaluation/appraisal (martin & white, 2005) and the emotion processes (alba-juez & mackenzie, 2019) expressed and intended to be awakened in the readers; the alignments or footing (goffman, 1981) taken by the journalists and other participants; the different ways in which facts and people’s stances and emotions are manipulated by means of linguistic and sociopragmatic strategies (e.g. the use of logical fallacies, or the triggering of misleading implicatures). 5. sample analysis 5.1. total fake: the ‘denver guardian’ clinton article a prototypical instance of a conspiracy theory within the type of fake news that has a political agenda was the very popular untrue story posted on the now no longer existent denver guardian8 site on november 5, 2016, three days before the us presidential election of that year. the article, which was entitled “fbi agent suspected in hillary email leaks found dead in apparent murder-suicide”, went viral on facebook (with more than half a million shares) and alleged that an fbi agent investigating clinton had been found dead in a house fire in maryland. (see the whole text of the article in appendix 1.). the denver guardian site was registered anonymously and built using wordpress, but it was later found out that the site was operated by jestin coler (the founder and ceo of disinfomedia and owner of several other fake news sites), who on his personal website (http://jestincoler.com) openly admits doing morally questionable but legal things, such as writing and publishing fake news articles for payment. the article scrutinized here thus is not only “fake news with an agenda”, but also belongs to the “mercenary” type described in section 2.2. despite being totally fake, this news is believed to have strongly influenced the election and to have been one of the main causes of clinton’s failure and trump’s consequent success. among other things, coler himself acknowledges on the first page of his site that the fbi emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 33 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 33 agent was a fictional character. furthermore, the news quoted “walkerville police chief pat frederick” in maryland, and it was later confirmed that there is no town called walkerville in maryland, but walkersville, and that this town did not have a police department. as can be seen, coler was here playing with the cognitive fact that when we read we go for the general meaning and do not stop to check every single letter, and that even if the readers noticed that there was a missing ‘s’ in the name, the normal deduction would have been that this was a typo. the first thing that stands out in the eyes of a discourse analyst when reading the headline is that the writer of the article is trying to bullshit (frankfurt 2005) the reader by making use of the pragmatic mechanism of inference. and we use the term “bullshit” and not “lie to” here because the journalist is not saying directly that hillary clinton was implicated in the (supposed) murder but guides the reader towards inferring that this must have been the case. as we saw in section 2.3, the bullshitter may deceive us about the facts, but their main aim is to deceive us about their enterprise, something that coler has also clearly accomplished here by hiding his identity, the political agenda and the financial aims behind his writing. coler thus resorts to several misleading strategies that affect both form and meaning such as: misspelling of words. use of capital letters in the headline. use of strong emotional words (e.g. murder-suicide), thereby creating a negative semantic prosody associated with hillary clinton. deceit of the readers by making them believe some fictional characters (the fbi agent) or places (the town) are real. inclusion of false or misleading photos accompanying the headline (in this case the picture of a house on fire and two firefighters). use of “sub-headlines” in the middle of the text, also in capitals, with sensational words and in a different color (breaking: president obama to issue hillary a “blanket pardon” to avoid future prosecution). use of a “flashbulb context” (brown & kulik, 1977) like that of a murder-suicide and a fire. laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5034 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 34 manipulation of language, people and facts: in order to influence the readers’ emotions and stance towards the topic in question, the following kinds of manipulation are found in the article: a) manipulation of the appraisal systems: in what pertains to the general intended meaning of the article, it is clear that coler manipulates the engagement system to issue an indirect judgement, so that he cannot be accused of having made the judgement himself and thus indirectly implying that the clintons may have been behind all this. thus, as seen in the excerpts below, he resorts to heteroglossic engagement (“investigators believe” use of inverted commas, attribution of the belief to conspiracy theories, etc.) to let the audience make the judgement themselves. this is of course very ironic, considering that coler himself is the conspirator who made up the whole story. notice the negative prosody as well (in the terms between quotes): investigators believe fbi agent, michael brown, 45, “shot and killed” his 33-year-old wife, susan brown, late friday night before “setting the couple’s home on fire and then turning the gun on himself ”. conspiracy theories are running rampant throughout many alt-right media outlets, leading many to believe this was another “hit job” by the clintons in “retaliation” for the fbi email leaks so close to the presidential election. media outlets like alex jones’ infowars and wnd are running with the theory that globalist “assassins”, working for the clintons, had the brown family “murdered” and their home “burned to destroy” any possible evidence. b) manipulation of footing: the way engagement is handled has a close relationship with the footing or alignments of the participants in the article. coler does not commit himself to saying this really happened and therefore cannot be said to be the principal (i.e. the participant responsible for talk in goffman’s 1981 terms) because he is not asserting that the clintons are behind this but rather attributing this thought to “conspiracy theories” or what other people believe, thus emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 35 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 35 making use and abuse of the ad populum fallacy, in the knowledge that most people will not verify whether this is true or not and will therefore spread the news and make it sell. thus, the principal role here is attributed to an unreliable source which may not be identified as such by the common reader, who will therefore simply accept this news as true. in addition, the author role (i.e. the one who creates talk) is hidden, for at the time the article was published, coler’s name was not included in the news. the only role that could be (partially) identified was that of the animator (i.e. the participant that produces talk), which in this case was the denver guardian online newspaper, which as we know, was also fake. c) manipulation of the source of information: fake quotes are frequently accompanied by false source information in order to make them appear legitimate (in this case, the writer refers to infowars as a reliable source of information, when in fact infowars is itself a producer of fake news; see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/infowars). by using the ad verecundiam fallacy, coler is here literally making fun of his readers. d) manipulation of the pragmatic meanings inferred: as taboada (2019, personal communication) has confirmed, it is very difficult to characterize fake news by its “purely linguistic” features only. the characteristic which we have found common to all the instances analyzed is not so much the language used, but the fact that its authors play with the cultural knowledge shared between them and the readers, the inferences triggered, the emotions conveyed in the text and those triggered in the audience, and the consequent emotional implicatures sparked off. in this case, as we have seen, the writer plays with the indirect meanings that are deduced from the text of the article and the negative emotions that will be aroused in the readers after thinking that the clintons could have been the instigators of this (fake) murder-suicide. thus, trump’s followers will be more convinced to vote for their candidate, by means of the confirmation bias fallacy, and some undecided people will probably be influenced to at least position themselves against clinton, which leads us to the next kind of manipulation found in this article and in fake news in general. laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5036 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 36 e) manipulation of stance: the manipulation of the inferences triggered by the text aims at a subsidiary kind of manipulation, namely manipulation of the readers’ stance. there is a constant invoked negative evaluation of clinton’s reputation which attempts to manipulate the readers’ stance in a negative direction. f) manipulation of frame: goffman’s (1974) concept of frame (i.e. the way in which social actors organize their experience in terms of recognizable activities) is also useful for the present analysis, for it pushes beyond the simple speaker/hearer dyad and explores a deeper reality which includes multi-party talk and multi-party audiences. indeed, fairclough (1995: 39) points out that in media discourse we not only have reporters and their audience, but “various categories of public domain ‘third party’ who may be involved” (politicians, trade unionists, scientists and experts of various other types, academics and so forth), as well as ordinary people who may act as witnesses or represent typical behaviors or reactions, commonly referred to as “vox pop”. a key question is how these participants’ identities are constructed within their frames of action. as we have seen, some of the activities of the different social actors involved in the clinton news are hidden or distorted. first of all, cole hides his identity (it was only after the elections that he came to be known as the author and principal of the news), and the real activities of the denver guardian are hidden as well. in addition, many of the activities described in the article are not simply distorted but entirely made up, including their social actors (the fbi agent, the town, the police department). hillary clinton is however a real social actor, but the inferences triggered about her activities are totally misleading. having considered a particularly gross example of manipulative fake news, let us now turn to a rather different and more subtle type of manipulation, in which the news is presented as though it were scientifically justified. 5.2. fake science: an attack on valid climate change research the online article shown in appendix 2 was published on the breitbart site, described on wikipedia as “a far-right syndicated american news, opinion emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 37 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 37 and commentary website founded in mid-2007 by conservative commentator andrew breitbart”, and is available at http://archive.is/vsrus. the standard far-right viewpoint on climate change is that it is a hoax devised by forces in society whose aim is to undermine the free operation of industry and markets. these anti-capitalist forces, it is contended, are aided and abetted by influential scientists who conspire with them because of their own political leanings. the author james delingpole can thus be seen as defending a conspiracy theory which explains scientists’ warnings about unbridled global warming as deriving from a sinister attempt to undermine the welfare and comfort we currently enjoy (or are supposed to enjoy). firstly, before progressing to analyzing the different types of manipulation present in the article, let us consider its linguistic properties. it is worthwhile observing that the author betrays his lack of scholarly credentials in his mixing of style levels and in his inability to handle complex sentences grammatically. consider the sentence in fact, the magnitude of their historical data adjustments, that removed their cyclical temperature patterns, are totally inconsistent with published and credible u.s. and other temperature data. here the author not only fails to use correct subject-verb agreement or the correct relative pronoun for a non-restrictive relative clause (which, not that) but also is illogical in comparing the consistency of a “magnitude” with “data”, i.e. a comparison of like with unlike. just as ‘spam mail’ is often given away by the poor use of grammar and spelling, so fake articles – which have not gone through the rigorous processes of peer-reviewing and editing to which all scientific papers are submitted – often inadvertently reveal their spuriousness to the critical reader. as mentioned above, however, many readers do not have the time or interest to read with this degree of discernment. poor writing, it seems, does not detract from an article’s power to manipulate its readers. let us now consider how this is done. a) manipulation of stance, the source of information and the subsystems of appraisal: the stance adopted by the author is already apparent in the title, which states that “much of ” recent global warming is a “fabrication”, i.e. intentionally invented disinformation. this is typical of current exchanges in which the purveyors of fake news are at pains to accuse honest communicators, e.g. scientists, of being fake: in this way, the fakers wish the readers to draw the inference that they are in fact providing genuine and correct information. the stance taken by the writer thus aligns with the overall goals of the website where the article appeared, and the piece is designed to inflame the laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5038 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 38 emotions of the average consumer of the breitbart site, who is expected to reject “establishment” warnings about the devastating effects of climate change and indeed to ignore the increasingly obvious ongoing extreme weather events. what the author is doing here, then, is to manipulate the stance of the reader in this respect. b) manipulation of genre: the tone of the article is generally serious and is entirely lacking in the obvious trappings of infotainment-style fake news. what the author is doing is to manipulate the discourse genre of popular-scientific articles: several aspects of the text are reminiscent of genuine, emotionally neutral texts designed to make scientific findings accessible to a lay audience. among these are the use of a graph, the repeated references to data, the claim that the article is derived from a “peer-reviewed study”, the provision of a hyperlink to that study, as well as a scholarly style of writing that involves nominalizations and abstractions (adjustment, magnitude, …) as well as technical expressions and their abbreviations, as in global average temperature datasets (gast).9 c) manipulation of the readers’ emotions: the author also seeks to manipulate the emotions of the readership. under the veneer of scientific objectivity, various emotions make themselves manifest to the reader, both inscribed (i.e. explicit) and invoked (i.e. implicit, but palpably present). this is apparent in the author’s strategy of personalizing the debate, pitting three individually named scientists on the climate change denial side, with whom he aligns, against what is implied to be the mighty orthodoxy of three large organizations, in this way characterizing the two sides of the debate in emotionally charged heroic and anti-heroic terms (invoking our emotional solidarity with the underdog in a david and goliath situation). one of these “heroic” scientists is described (inscribed) as “a veteran statistician” (with all the positive valence of the word veteran in the us), and positive invoked emotion attaches to the suggestion of interdisciplinary cooperation among experts from different fields, a “meteorologist”, a “statistician” and a “climate scientist”. the scientists are said to have achieved “conclusive findings”, with the positively valenced implication that these are unimpeachably true.10 in all these ways, the author uses e-implicatures to align the reader with the cause he supports. emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 39 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 39 d) manipulation of frame and the semantic-pragmatic meanings inferred: delingpole uses the negative semantic prosody associated with the words he chooses to provoke unfavorable feelings towards climatologists and the organizations they work for by not dignifying them with the neutral title “scientist” but dismissing them as “alarmists”, highlighting with this choice of word their supposed appeal to citizens’ emotions, in particular imputing to them an ignoble desire to make the population unnecessarily afraid. in this way, the author also disguises his own emotional strategy, since by ascribing emotional motivations to his opponents, he can position himself as neutral and reliable. there is also an element of ad hominem in the author’s mockery of their imagined speech patterns (“hottest evah”), where the implied pronunciation of ever is designed to suggest a lack of seriousness, like spoilt valley girls whose response to everything is “whatevah”. even organizations that generally have been held in high regard, like nasa (whose scientific and engineering credentials are second to none), noaa (the [us] national oceanic and atmospheric administration) and the uk’s met office, are bundled together and again categorized as “alarmist”, i.e. as organizations with a subjective rather than objective message. they are accused of using “adjusted” or “corrupted” data, as opposed to what is objectively true of the data they use, which is that, in keeping with the best scientific practice, they are “corrected” or “updated” as new information becomes available. the words adjusted and corrupted, as well as fabricated in the headline, have negative connotations, especially the latter because of the association with corrupt, possibly suggesting immoral or illegal influence on their work, and their use will spark off negative emotions among the readership. in these ways, the framing of the entire article is such that it bespeaks a manichean us-and-them mentality, in which “we” (the climate change skeptics) are pitted against “them” (the establishment with its supposedly nefarious agenda). e) manipulation of source: the article has been analyzed for its accuracy at the above-mentioned factchecking site snopes (https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/climatologyfraud-global-warming/) and a number of falsehoods and falsifications have emerged: (a) the “study” referred to in the article was in fact never peerreviewed in the sense that is standard in science (see (d)) and was never published in a journal but was simply a post on the personal blog of the “meteorologist” ; (b) the “meteorologist” in question does not have a phd but an ‘honorary doctorate’; (c) “cato institute climate scientist craig idso” laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5040 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 40 is an adjunct scientist at the libertarian cato institute, but the institute has not published the “study”; (d) seven scientists are mentioned in the report itself as ‘agreeing with’ the conclusions of the paper, but only one answered an approach from the fact-checking site, stating that he had only peerreviewed the paper in the sense of discussing it with the first author (and anyway it should be recalled that “peer reviewing” does not mean “approving” or “agreeing with”); (e) the article interprets the graph as showing adjustments to raw data (where “raw data” has the connotation of “true data” – which again is scientifically incorrect), but the graph in fact shows changes brought about by updates to already corrected data as a result of scientific advances and the addition of ever more data from disparate sources, including better coverage of the entire planet, not just the us or the northern hemisphere. the fact-checking site shows that the overall effect of the many corrections has actually (and ironically) been to reduce the figures for “dramatic and unprecedented” climate change. what we have seen here, then, is an example of how particular views of economic interests and the associated emotions, principally fear of losing certain luxuries, drive certain authors to dress up those views and emotions as apparently objective science, while in fact manipulating the readers’ knowledge and feelings toward rejecting properly sourced and peer-reviewed science. 6. conclusions our examination of a corpus of fake news, exemplified in section 5 with regard to fake news in politics and in science, has revealed that the authors’ persuasive intention in this subgenre of journalistic discourse is strongly linked to the manipulation of readers’ emotions, although this manipulation is to some extent disguised by the authors’ use of language that does not differ markedly from more honest, objective reporting. as a result, we have been forced to consider the pragmatic strategies at work in the composition of these texts, analyzing them in their sociocultural contexts. what we have found is that the news does not so much contain falsehoods as fallacies and distortions, subtle blends of truths and lies, often designed more to entertain than to inform. this has led us to invoke the concept of “bullshit”, as theorized by frankfurt (2005), as well as that of “post-truth” (harari, 2018a: 231-244), with its blurring or even dissolution of the dividing line between reality and fiction. emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 41 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 41 the data we have briefly considered here have borne out our hypothesis that fake news flourishes thanks to the deliberate rigging of the various systems that underlie communication, notably the system of emotions, and especially such negative feelings as fear, envy and hatred. the defining characteristics of fake news lie less in the linguistic properties of the texts than in the subtle exploitation of alignments and expectations in order to induce inferences that resonate with the perspectives and prejudices of the anticipated readership. we have accordingly observed how fabricators of fake news do not hesitate to abuse not only language, at all levels of analysis, but also other semiotic resources such as images, photos and videos – often presented outside their original context – as well as typography. however, the deepest effects arise from the manipulation of what martin & white (2005) have identified as the subsystems of appraisal, notably by misrepresenting engagement to make a judgement, but also by tampering deceptively with footings and framings in sense of goffman (1974, 1981). purveyors of fake news are also not honest or clear about the sources of their alleged information. they rely heavily on (e-)implicatures to spark off inferences for which there is no literal evidence in their words, for example capitalizing on semantic prosodies to do the work for them. if we are to understand the hold that fake news has on us, we will have to admit that our cognitive and emotional vulnerabilities are being exploited, and it is only by using the tools of pragmatics to unmask this deliberate manipulation that we can hope to combat its nefarious effects. and to conclude, one of harari’s witty reflections: as a species, humans prefer power to truth. we spend far more time and effort on trying to control the world than on trying to understand it – and even when we try to understand it, we usually do so in the hope that understanding the world will make it easier to control it. therefore, if you dream of a society in which truth reigns supreme and myths are ignored, you have little to expect from homo sapiens. better try your luck with chimps. (harari, 2018a: 242). acknowledgements we want to give maite taboada our heartfelt thanks for sending us her excel file of the misinfotext corpus, as well as her 2019 article, co-written with fatemeh torabi asr, on the topic of fake news. we would also like to thank laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5042 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 42 the spanish journalist carlos garcía-hirshfeld for providing us with samples of ‘authentic’ spanish fake news and for guiding us in the decision to classify a piece of news as either fake or true. and last but not least, we owe a debt of gratitude to carmen sancho guinda and ruth breeze for their valuable and insightful comments on the first manuscript of this article. article history: received 15 july 2019 received in revised form 8 october 2019 accepted 11 october 2019 references emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 43 alba-juez, l. 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(2010). militainment, inc.: war, media, and popular culture. new york: routledge. 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 44 j. lachlan mackenzie is emeritus professor of functional linguistics at vu amsterdam. he moved with his edinburgh phd to the netherlands, ultimately devoting himself to the development of functional discourse grammar. editor of functions of language, with research interests ranging over grammar, pragmatics and discourse analysis. key publications: functional discourse grammar (2008) and pragmatics: cognition, context and culture (2016). laura alba-juez is full professor of linguistics at the uned in madrid, spain, with academic experience in five different countries (argentina, mexico, usa, uk and spain) and research interests in discourse analysis, pragmatics and functional linguistics. she has been the principal investigator of several funded projects, and has published fourteen books and numerous scientific articles. latest books: evaluation in context (2014), pragmatics: cognition, context and culture (2016) and emotion in discourse (2019). notes 1 fake news may be considered a variant of journalese, and it could also be said that it somehow “hijacks” the conventional news genre in order to hide certain mercenary or ideological intentions. what is beyond doubt for us is that these facts do not invalidate its character as a distinctive discourse genre. 2 schadenfreude is a complex emotion, where rather than feeling sympathy towards someone’s misfortune, the experiencer feels pleasure, joy, or self-satisfaction that comes from learning about or witnessing their troubles, failures, or humiliation. 3 confirmation bias describes the (very human) tendency to focus only on information that supports what you already believe. while ignoring information that contradicts your beliefs (barclay 2018: 94). 4 fairclough (1995: 14) explains that the conversationalization of media discourse has helped to democratize technology and the language of specialized genres in general by making them more accessible to people, thereby creating more “people power”, even if this power is systematically manipulated by the media. 5 by way of example, in march 2017 several chinese publications reported as serious news a satirical story about president donald trump that was originally published as humor in the new yorker. 6 lying and bluffing are both modes of deception, but while the liar is someone who deliberately promulgates a falsehood, the bluffer is typically devoted to conveying (by means of inference) something false. bluffing is more a matter of fakery than of falsity, and hence our certainty of the importance of analyzing fake news and its bullshit from a discourse-pragmatic perspective. emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 45 vosoughi, s., d. roy & s. aral (2018). “the spread of true and false news online”. science 359(6380): 1146-1151. wolfe, m.b. & t.d. griffin (2018). “beliefs and discourse processing” in m.f. schober, d. n. rapp & a. britt (eds.), 295-314. 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 45 7 people who subscribe to or promote the incorrect belief that former us president barack obama was born outside the united states and was therefore ineligible to be president under the provisions of the us constitution. 8 the denver post (https://www.denverpost.com/) later uncovered a series of lies found in the denver guardian site, such as the fact that it claimed to be the “oldest” news source, when in fact it was discovered that it had been registered only a few months before (in july 2016). also, the address listed for the denver guardian newsroom was actually a parking lot (https://www.denverpost.com/2016/11/05/there-is-nosuch-thing-as-the-denver-guardian/). 9 this should be global average surface temperature (gast) datasets. 10 it scarcely needs adding that science is not concerned with “conclusive findings” or “unimpeachable truth”, although this is arguably what a lay readership is hoping to find. in contending that this is what is offered by the three “experts”, the author is, possibly disingenuously, undermining his own claim to scientific validity. laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5046 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 46 appendix 1 https://web.archive.org/web/20161115023815/http://denverguardian.com/2016/11/05/fbi-agent-suspected-hillary -email-leaks-found-dead-apparent-murder-suicide/ fbi agent suspected in hillary email leaks found dead in apparent murder-suicide photo by ada be (cc by 4.0) walkerville, md – an fbi agent believed to be responsible for the latest email leaks “pertinent to the investigation” into hillary clinton’s private email server while she was secretary of state, was found dead in an apparent murder-suicide early saturday morning, according to police. breaking: president obama to issue hillary a “blanket pardon” to avoid future prosecution investigators believe fbi agent, michael brown, 45, shot and killed his 33-year-old wife, susan brown, late friday night before setting the couple’s home on fire and then turning the gun on himself. brown was a 12 year veteran of the washington d.c. metropolitan police department before spending the last six years in the fbi. neighbors saw smoke coming from the brown residence and called 9-1-1 at approximately 11:50 p.m. by the time fire crews arrived on scene minutes later, the entire house was engulfed in flames. “mrs. brown’s death was caused by a gunshot wound prior to the house fire,” walkerville police chief pat frederick said, “while mr. brown’s single-bullet head wound appears to have been self-inflicted.” “the totality of the evidence leads us to believe this is a murder-suicide. we believe he killed her, set the house on fire and then took his own life,” frederick said. the findings support conclusions by investigators saturday that the couple perished in a murder-suicide during which the 4,000-square foot house was intentionally set on fire. authorities outlined a likely scenario based on interviews with neighbors and comments posted on mr. brown’s facebook page. brown is believed to have started the gasoline-fueled fire but spared the life of his beloved beagle, dixie. “prior to the fire, he dropped off the dog at a neighbor’s house,” frederick said. “he put the dog in a neighbor’s backyard.” a neighbor told whag that brown appeared “panicked” though it is unclear whether his wife was dead before or after the dog was removed from their home. the motive behind the killing is still being investigated, but police say brown was a highly respected agent with the fbi and very well liked in the community. “what leads someone to this level of anger and violence with your wife, your loved one, who knows,” said an fbi official who knew the brown family. conspiracy theories are running rampant throughout many alt. right media outlets, leading many to believe this was another “hit job” by the clintons in retaliation for the fbi email leaks so close to the presidential election. media outlets like alex jones’ infowars and wnd are running with the theory that globalist assassins, working for the clintons, had the brown family murdered and their home burned to destroy any possible evidence. fbi director james comey refused to comment at this time but asked for privacy and prayer as the bureau comes to terms with losing “two very close friends.” this is a developing story. emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 47 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 47 appendix 2 http://archive.is/vsrus breitbart 9 july 2017 by james delingpole delingpole: ‘nearly all’ recent global warming is fabricated, study finds much of recent global warming has been fabricated by climate scientists to make it look more frightening, a study has found. the peer-reviewed study by two scientists and a veteran statistician looked at the global average temperature datasets (gast) which are used by climate alarmists to argue that recent years have been “the hottest evah” and that the warming of the last 120 years has been dramatic and unprecedented. what they found is that these readings are “totally inconsistent with published and credible u.s. and other temperature data.” that is, the adjusted data used by alarmist organizations like nasa, noaa, and the uk met office differs so markedly from the original raw data that it cannot be trusted. this chart gives you a good idea of the direction of the adjustments. the blue bars show where the raw temperature data has been adjusted downwards to make it cooler; the red bars show where the raw temperature data has been adjusted upwards to make it warmer. note how most of the downward adjustments take place in the early twentieth century and most of the upward take place in the late twentieth century. according to meteorologist joe d’aleo, who co-authored the study with statistician james wallace and cato institute climate scientist craig idso, this has the effect of exaggerating the warming trend: “nearly all of the warming they are now showing are in the adjustments.” “each dataset pushed down the 1940s warming and pushed up the current warming.” “you would think that when you make adjustments you’d sometimes get warming and sometimes get cooling. that’s almost never happened.” what this means, the report concludes, is that claims by nasa, noaa, and the uk met office that the world is experiencing unprecedented and dramatic warming should be taken with a huge pinch of salt: they all use the same corrupted global average temperature (gast) data. the conclusive findings of this research are that the three gast data sets are not a valid representation of laura alba-juez & j. lachlan mackenzie ibérica 38 (2019): 17-5048 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 48 reality. in fact, the magnitude of their historical data adjustments, that removed their cyclical temperature patterns, are totally inconsistent with published and credible u.s. and other temperature data. thus, it is impossible to conclude from the three published gast data sets that recent years have been the warmest ever – despite current claims of record setting warming. emotion, lies, and “bullshit” in journalistic discourse ibérica 38 (2019): 17-50 49 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 49 00-2 iberica 38_iberica 13 13/1/20 21:41 página 50 book reviews/comptes rendus 9s anything outside the scope of deliberation, including our ends. richardson's problem, which is our moral problem today, comes from the confrontation ofthose two distinct kinds of practical reason. i began by suggesting that both reason and the good suffer from the segregation imposed on them by instrumental reasoning, which makes reasoning amoral and the good irrational. richardson exhibits the rationality of goodness as he shows how rational our understanding and even choice of ends can be. readers of this journal will hope for a sequel which addresses the converse problem and shows how practical reasoning can be ethical. eugene garver, regents professor of philosophy, saint john's university, collegeville, mn 56321 u.s.a. egarver@csbsju.edu knowledge and belief by frederick f. schmitt london and new york: routledge, 1992. pp. x + 278. isbn 0-415-03317-9. cloth us $ 55. truth: a primer by frederick f. schmitt boulder, san francisco and oxford: westview press, 1995. pp. xi + 251. isbn isbn 0-8133-2000-3. cloth us $ 49.95. isbn 0-8133-2001-1. paper us $ 16.95. reviewed by harvey siegel although quite different from each other in subject matter and level of sophistication, these two books by frederick f. schmitt will both be of interest to portions of the readership of informal logic. knowledge and belief offers a complex and elaborate defense of externalism in epistemology, and (more specifically) of a reliabilist theory of epistemic justification. it will be ofinterest mainly to theorists, in particular to those informal logicians and argumentation theorists most concerned with the epistemological dimensions and presuppositions ofthese fields. truth: a primer is an introductory discussion of the main philosophical theories of truth, which defends a version of the correspondence theory. it would be useful in courses in informallogiciargumentation (as well as in philosophy) seeking a richer discussion of truth than those offered in standard texts. the former is really a book for specialists in epistemology; the latter a clear (albeit sophisticated) introduction, suitable for a range of introductory courses. since the field of informa.llogic includes both those 96 informal logic concerned with epistemology and those engaged with the design and teaching of such courses-and of course these two groups overlap to a considerable extentboth of these books will be of interest to (at least some) members of the informal logic community. knowledge and belief appears in the excellent book series, "the problems of philosophy: their past and present," published by routledge under the general editorship of ted honderich. like the other books in this series, this one places contemporary philosophical discussions in their historical context, and demonstrates the relevance of earlier discussions to contemporary treatment of basic philosophical issues. schmitt propounds a radical historical thesis: that, contrary to virtually uniform common opinion, the history of western epistemology is dominated by externalist rather than internalist theorizing, and that cartesian skepticism, rather than being representative of mainstream epistemology in the west, is actually an atypical "extreme internalist moment in the substantially externalist history of skepticism" (p. 9). schmitt's complex defense of this provocative historical thesis, and his readings of plato, the great majority of greek epistemologists, and hume, as (albeit mainly unselfconscious) externalists and reliabilists, are well worth the reader's attention. but schmitt is not content to defend only this historical thesis. he also defends externalism and reliabilism as the correct epistemic positions. i cannot here provide a detailed account of schmitt' s position and arguments, but i will try to give brief characterizations of them; the reader is urged to consult the text for the details. roughly, then: schmitt begins by identifying the central problem of epistemology as that of clarifying the nature of justified belief, and the relationship between it and true belief. he offers an instrumentalistic conception ofjustification, according to which justified belief "contributes to the [epistemically good] end of true belief' (2). if justified belief is seen as a means to true belief, then it is natural to think of it as "reliably formed belief, or belief that results from the exercise of a reliable cognitive belief-forming process, a process that tends to yield true beliefs" (3). schmitt argues that reliabilism is the historically dominant position in the western tradition, the frequent characterization of that tradition as cartesian, a prioristic, internalist and foundationalist to the contrary notwithstanding. he defends his own version of reliabilism, which is developed in the context of detailed analyses of contemporary defenders and critics of it. reliabilism is externalist in the sense that the justificatory status of a belief is a function (according to the reiiabiiist) solely of the tendency of the process which produces the belief to yield a sufficiently high proportion of true beliefs; the (non)existence of this tendency is a fact about the world which is external to the believer and independent of her appraisal of the justificatory status of the belief. accordingly, my belief that p is justified if and only if it is produced by such a process; whether i believe that it is so produced, or believe that the relevant process is a reliable one, or have any (meta)belief at all concerning the justificatory status of my belief that p, is irrelevant to that status: my belief s justificatory status is com. pletely independent of the presence, absence, or correctness of any such (meta)beuef book reviewslcomptes rendus 97 concerning it. externalism thus takes issue with intemalism, according to which my beliefs justificatory status depends in some way on my having access to that status-for example, by being aware of its relation to a body of evidence which supports it. different internalists fill out this notion of access in different ways, of course. but the general idea that to be justified in believing something, the believer must have access to the conditions of justified belief, and must believe that her belief meets those conditions, is a powerful one which many contemporary epistemologists find at least plausible. consequently, one of schmitt's main aims is to offer a detailed criticism of internalism, in particular the version schmitt labels "accessibility internalism," according to which a subject's being justified in believingp "is accessible to her in the sense that she can tell by reflection alone ... that she is. .. justified in believing p" (84). his discussion is wide-ranging, distinguishing between descartes' antecedent skepticism (which is based not on any assumptions about the world, but rather on what might conceivably be the case), and consequent skepticism (the sort addressed by the greeks, hume and quine), which is based on claims about the world, in particular those concerning the reliability of our actual belief forming processes. his main thesis here is that, descartes to the contrary notwithstanding, justified belief does not require an answer to antecedent skepticism, because this sort of skepticism requires, but there is no reason to accept, accessibility internalism. whatever one thinks of his fmal conclusions, schmitt's linking of the internalisml externalism controversy to these distinct, historically important forms of skepticism is illuminating. en passant, he also addresses related important contemporary positions; of p~cular interest is his defense of (humean) "naturalized epistemology" (67-83). his discussion of alston's treatment of justification, and of the latter's explicit linking of justification with argumentation practices (110-15), will be of interest to many readers of this journal. and the final chapter, on the instrumental value of the evaluation of beliefs in terms of their justificatory status, is original and provocative. as with any such book, a reviewer is bound to have some reservations; while i won't try to defend my doubts here, i should at least mention them. besides the controversial nature of schmitt's historical thesis and analyses, i find his criticism of internalism problematic, for two reasons. first, he argues that accessibility internalism is deficient because it "bars any account of justified belief capable of explaining the value we ascribe to justified belief' (89), but i find his arguments for this conclusion uncompelling, because his discussion of this point fails to distinguish the value of justified belief from its character: while the internalist doesn't analyze justification in terms of truth, she can surely value justified belief because of its tie to truth; insofar, she can explain the value of justified belief in exactly the same terms as the externalist. seconci, schmitt's criticism of internalism, and his positive defense of reliabilism, suffer because of the conflicting argumentative strategies he relies upon in his development of them. in many places he relies, in standard "analytic epistemology" 98 informal logic fashion, on intuitions about cases (e.g., 111, 167, 176); but in other places he rejects such intuitions in favor of theoretical concerns (e.g., 197). this ambivalence (discussed more fully in moser (1994» between relying on intuitions in some cases and rejecting them in others strikes me as arbitrary and ad hoc. the ad hoc nature of schmitt's argumentative strategy is also evident in his solution to one of the key problems facing reliabilism, that of individuating the cognitive processes relevant to justification. he offers a series of five constraints to be utilized in determining the relevance, to the evaluation of the justificatory status of beliefs, of the various processes that were at work in the forming of the belief; these constraints are to guide our decision to individuate the relevant processes broadly (e.g., the process of perception) or narrowly (e.g., a certain sort of perceptual process, operative in such-and-so circumstances). the constraints are motivated by the consideration that evaluating beliefs in terms of their justificatory status helps to achieve the epistemic end of attaining true beliefs-a plausible enough motivation for the reliabilist. but while schmitt's proposed resolution of the individuation problem in terms of his constraints is novel and in some ways promising, the apparatus appears to me to be ad hoc in that the constraints point in opposite directions-some recommend a broad individuation of processes, others a narrow individuation-and the theorist can always handle troublesome counterexamples by strategically allowing the right constraint(s) to govern the example at hand. by this expedient, it appears that reliabilism cannot lose: there will always be an individuation of processes such that reliabilism yields the right (intuitive) answer to the question of a beliefs justificatory status. but schmitt's attempt to provide a principled way of selecting constraints in particular cases, and thereby individuating processes, does not i think succeed. as should be clear, knowledge and belief offers a very rich, complex discussion of fundamental epistemological issues. the preceding description of its contents is selective and superficial; there is much more to the book than i've been able to indicate here. it is not for the faint of heart, or for those unfamiliar with contemporary scholarship in the theory of knowledge. but for those who (like myself) regard epistemology as fundamental to argumentation and its theory, or who are interested in a radical interpretation of some ofthe key historical figures in the western epistemological tradition, this is a book bound to reward and enlighten the careful reader. truth: a primer is, in the author's words, "a brisk introduction to philosophical thinking about truth" (ix). it contains introductory discussions of the main extant theories of truth, and of the related issues of realism vs. idealism, and absolutism vs. relativism. the discussion is indeed brisk; as schmitt says, "[t]or each theory i have gone immediately to the heart of the matter and treated only the most central points" (ix). his discussions begin with a characterization of each main theory's "intuitive idea about the nature of truth" (for the correspondence theory the "intuitive idea is that truth is a relation of correspondence between a proposition and the way the world is"; for the pragmatic theory "the idea is that truth is essentially book reviews/comptes rendus 99 related to useful belief," etc.) (3), after which he presents and evaluates the most central arguments offered for and against each theory. schmitt sees the various theories of truth as agreeing "that truth involves a relation to thinkers" (3), but as disagreeing on just what that relation is; this disagreement is, in his view, "the central point of contention between classical theories of truth" (4), and attention to it serves to organize and unify the discussions of each theory. each chapter is highly focussed, dealing with only a small number of basic arguments for and against each theory; this focus makes the book especially useful as a supplementary text in courses in which the main concern lies elsewhere. given the briskness and focus of the chapters, one might easily feel that schmitt's discussions are a bit too quick: for example, can relativism really be decisively rejected (and absolutism established) in twenty-two pages, on the basis of consideration of three objections to it, one of which ("the platonic objection") is ineffectual but the other two of which ("the meaning objection" and "the regress objection") are not? the same worry might be raised about schmitt's discussion of the coherence theory, which finds that theory wanting in nineteen pages on the basis of two arguments for and six against, and for the other theories discussed. many readers will think that schmitt has dismissed their favored positions too quickly; even where they agree with his conclusions, many will find the discussions too fast and superficial. schmitt may well agree; as he points out, the book is a "primer," designed to introduce and comment upon a handful of positions, issues and arguments, rather than a comprehensive treatment. in any case the cleanness and briskness of the discussion is well-suited to introduce students to this basic but difficult subject. i should note that, despite its briskness, schmitt's book is not always easyhis defense of(hartry field's version of) the correspondence theory, for example, and his discussions more generally, are philosophically sophisticated, and will challenge unprepared students (and instructors). but the difficult aspects of the arguments and positions considered benefit from schmitt's streamlined presentation. schmitt's four-page conclusion addresses recent criticisms of truth, put forward by a variety of voices in the contemporary academy, to the effect that the notion of truth functions as a tool of oppression, domination, and cultural imperialism, and, in light of its unsavory political effects, ought to be exorcised from the philosophical lexicon. schmitt's defense of truth against these charges is a model of clarity, moravpolitical sensitivity, and good sense, and will by itself make a worthy contribution to undergraduate courses reference moser, paul k. (1994). review of knowledge and belief, by frederick f. schmitt. philosophia, vol. 23, pp. 387-392. harvey siegel, department of philosophy, university of miami coral gables, fl 33124 u.s.a. hsiegel@umiami.ir.miami.edu microsoft word jardine2final.docx corresponding author: david w. jardine email: jardine@ucalgary.ca journal of applied hermeneutics july 16, 2012 the author(s) 2012 the descartes lecture david w. jardine a brief foreword after the fact we ought to be like elephants in the noontime sun in summer, when they are tormented by heat and thirst and catch sight of a cool lake. they throw themselves into the water with the greatest pleasure and without a moment’s hesitation. in just the same way, for the sake of ourselves and others, we should give ourselves joyfully to the practice. kunzang pelden (b.1862, tibet) the nectar of manjushri’s speech (2007, p. 255) i felt compelled to introduce this lecture transcription with this passage because, well, it’s hilarious and true, and might serve to offset some of the necessary dourness in what follows. it really does capture something of the sheer buoyancy and joy of interpretive work, despite all its setbacks and suffering and difficulty, despite the dark shadows that sometimes surround it, and how it, necessarily and unavoidably, summons the lord of death. because these elephants, just like us, are living beasts, so, just like us, neither the torment nor the great pleasure will last forever. even so, i understand that great snorfling, that parched grey meat, hot sun and cracking skin, that trumpeting pleasure, and the coolness of that plunge. it certainly is strange, however, to read a written transcript of an extemporaneous talk whose breath has passed into thin air. i must say that, reading this, i feel a bit like a grandparent who got to drop in and get the grandkids all excited, but then gets to leave when the hard work sets in. the students in this class might have found parts of this talk arousing, amusing or inciting, but, as h.g. gadamer (1989, p. 299) said, so simply and so clearly, understanding is only just barely beginning when something addresses us and catches our attention. then, the difficult work of composing yourself and composing your thoughts, of writing, of speaking, of shaping and forming, of finding out what the ancients have taught us about the locales of our living, and making a case for the truths and falsehoods of those teachings, of now, here, in these difficult times, telling the truth about what you've witnessed--all these set in hard and fast and linger far after the thrill is gone. that elephant abandon is very attractive at first blush, but it is one great image of the dangers of the pretty, deceptive face of interpretive work. this work makes you susceptible to becoming "like the leading edge of water running downhill--you go anywhere you are led, taking anything said to be true, wantjardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 2 ing to cry when you see others crying, wanting to laugh when you see others laugh" (tsong-kha-pa [1357-1419], 2004, p. 222). no matter how long i do this work, i still can fall prey so easily to such furtiveness and distraction, a sort of floating, brainstem-storming connectionism that, in the end is simply selfindulgent, self-aggrandizing, and, frankly, cowardly. i know this too well: "using only joyous perseverance you will end up exhausted" (tsong-kha-pa, 2002, p. 62) and exhausting the patience and good will of your friends and of your work itself. practice is needed that seeks wisdom in the midst of this onrush. after the gold rush "something awakens our interest that is really what comes first!" (gadamer, 2001, p. 50)--hermeneutics faces us with the deep, scholarly question: what the hell is going on? it rears up as a path that must be followed, a lead that must be trailed, a task that must now be undertaken, of finding out, of investigating, of questioning and facing the afflictions that swirl around the topic, the topography i have chosen to travel--my own deeply personal afflictions in terrible concert with the afflictions of the world i am investigating. it comes on like a summons with my name on it, my life at stake. "do not place your hopes on sheer determination" (tsong-kha-pa, 2002, p. 62). only repeated practice will help, full of citatiousness, study, and a deepening knowledge of the ancestral lineages that we have often unwittingly inherited, that need to get committed to memory or written out and savored and read to friends and neighbors. hermeneutics, thus, involves a dedication to the careful, suspicious reading and re-reading, interpreting and re-interpreting the texts and textures of our individual and common lives and worlds. and then, in the middle of all that, hermeneutics demands that i take on the task of composing myself while composing something about this world, while writing a "hermeneutic study." "i compose this in order to condition my own mind" (tsong-kha-pa, 2000, p. 111) and through such conditioning and composition, i always hope to provide some relief to the suffering and affliction that has spellbound me and my chosen profession. this is the unspoken vow. and this is a warning that knows no heed: once you catch sight of that water and its promise of relief, you might find that you can't turn back, that you can't undo the glimpse, that you've taken the vow without knowing it and that you're tethered to it even if you can't then fulfill what that vow demands. one common, lovely, terrifying complaint: there are signs everywhere. everywhere. how do i get it to stop? remember, then, this is not just a matter of quelling the rampaging elephant with calmness and quiet: "no matter how long you cultivate serenity, you can only suppress manifest afflictions; you cannot eradicate their seeds. you need to cultivate insight" (tsongkha-pa, 2002, p. 22). hermeneutics demands that we go through these afflictions (erfharung) and seek the aid of those who have gone before (vorfahrung) and in this, seek insight, wisdom. hermeneutic work is meant to induce and encourage others on this way. this is why it whiles and gathers and waits. this is why there is something pedagogical about it. one more corkscrew, then. after all that, hermeneutics slams us with this: there are so many things that could be said, so many possibilities, so much that could be read and learned, so much of an overwhelming cascade--everywhere! what should i do? well, welcome to grad school, that most opulent life of leisure and opportunity (latin schola, meaning "leisure," root of "scholar" and "school"). i'm reminded of how the great tsong-kha-pa (2000, pp. 117-128) berates readers for wasting this rare gift lost in the flurry of more meager things. to paraphrase jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 3 george harrison, that is not what we are here for. here, where, despite the often-gnawing circumstances that surround us, we face the question of what needs to be said here, now, right in the middle of these troubling causes and conditions: we should have no illusion. bureaucratized teaching and learning systems dominate the scene, but nevertheless it is everyone’s task to find his free space. the task of our human life in general is to find free spaces and learn to move therein. in research this means finding the question, the genuine question. you all know that as a beginner one comes to find everything questionable, for that is the privilege of youth to seek everywhere the novel and new possibilities. one then learns slowly how a large amount must be excluded in order to finally arrive at the point where one finds the truly open questions and therefore the possibilities that exist. perhaps the most noble side of the enduring independent position of the university—in political and social life—is that we with the youth and they with us learn to discover the possibilities and thereby possible ways of shaping our lives. there is this chain of generations which pass through an institution, like the university, in which teachers and students meet and lose one another. students become teachers and from the activity of the teachers grows a new teaching, a living universe, which is certainly more than something known, more than something learnable, but a place where something happens to us. i think this small academic universe still remains one of the few precursors of the grand universe of humanity, of all human beings, who must learn to create with one another new solidarities. (gadamer, 1986, p. 59) but here is the good news, and a bit of a hermeneutic secret. all that hard, scholarly, detailed, difficult work, all that effort of practice, and reading and re-reading, of struggling to understand, to open up free spaces, real possibilities of shaping our lives, where understanding might grow and compassion might last, of underlining and hunting for sources, of page numbers and names and seeking out bibliographic trace-lines, and thus slowly composing oneself while composing an interpretive work-all this ends up cultivating and deepening your ability to experience and share precisely that elephant abandon and joyousness. "[this world] compels over and over, and the better one knows it, the more compelling it is" (gadamer, 2007, p. 115). only now, we experience that joy and abandon as it really is, in the full knowledge of the flesh and its passing. hermeneutic work treats its topics like works of art that gather up our festive returns, topics that, in return for our attention and devotion, begin to glow in response to the attention we have bestowed upon them: hugh [of st. victor (1096-1141)] begins to explain what wisdom does. the sentence begins, sapientia illuminat hominem, "wisdom illuminates man" . . .ut seipsum agnoscat, "so that he may recognize himself." once again, in this rendering, translation and exegesis are in conflict, and the english words chosen could easily veil the sense that interpretation can reveal. enlightenment in hugh's world and what is understood as enlightenment now are two different things. the light, which in hugh's metaphoric usage illuminates, is the counterfoil of the eighteenth-century light of reason [a child of the cartesian lineage talked about below]. the light of which hugh speaks here brings man to a glow. approaching wisdom makes the reader radiant. the studious striving that jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 4 hugh teaches is a commitment to engage in an activity by which the reader's own "self" will be kindled and brought to sparkle. (illich, 1993, p. 17) what wonderful images and ideas. what joy to know that it will take me years, maybe more years than i have, to be equal to a text like this. this is love and affection. that texts and topics and works become more radiant and compelling the more we experience them and take care of them, until finally they start to stand there without us, "works" in whose light we are then cast. what in the world would we do if this were true? how would our lives be lived if this were a possible way of shaping ourselves? just imagine trying to seek out this sort of experience and trying to practice it. that is what hermeneutics requires of us. it requires reading as if our lives depended on it. so right here, that frankly stupid divide between scholarship and practice, between academic work and "the field" finally starts to let go of its grip. "all texts are instructions for practice" (tsong-kha-pa 2000, p. 52): it is like showing a horse the racecourse before you race. once you have shown it, you then race there. it would be ridiculous to show the horse one racecourse and then race on another. similarly, why would you determine one thing by means of study and reflection, and then, when you go to practice, practice something else? (p. 52) here's one more secret about hermeneutics. it culminates, slowly, into the insight that this world will be fine without me, and the great sense of relief that can slowly come from this insight, the great sense of setting down the panicky task of mastering things and feeling somehow essential to their continuance. that is what it means to truly understand something in the hermeneutic sense. this is part of the elephant's cool plunge. all this is cast in the shadow of my own impermanence and mortality and there is relief to be had in this insight, this admission. "take this feeling of letting go as your refuge" (chah 1987). if we were not finite, none of this wonderful, ambivalent work of loving attention and composure would be necessary. if we were not finite, none of this would be possible: that which is not split does not have to be rejoined, thus going by way of ambivalence circumvents coniunctio efforts of the ego ["a hitherto concealed experience that transcends thinking from the position of subjectivity" (gadamer, 1989, p. 100), …hermeneutic experience] because by bearing ambivalence, one is in the coniunctio itself ["the true locus of hermeneutics is this in-between." (gadamer, 1989, p. 295)]. this way works at wholeness not in halves but through wholeness from the start. the way is slower, action is hindered, and one fumbles foolishly in the half-light. this way finds echo in many familiar phrases from lao tzu, but especially: "soften the light, become one with the dusty world." (hillman 2005, p. 41) so, "cultivate love for those who have gathered to listen" (tsong-kha-pa, 2000, p. 64), but a great part of this love means taking some care, warning, chiding, admiring, not abandoning those who are just beginning, working through what are slowly becoming known to be intimate afflictions tied to deep sources, causes and conditions, and sometimes overwhelming consequences. hermeneutics, like these buddhist sources i've been citing, is adamant about the importance of finding a teacher (tsong-kha-pa, 2000, p. 6992) and about taking refuge in a community of others seeking to do this work (in budjardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 5 dhism, this is one of the "three jewels": community, sangha), whether these be classmates, or, for me this summer, tsong-kha-pa, my own light summer reading that i've re-read, now, seven times. again, be careful. as a teacher in tsong-kha-pa's lineage warns, watch out for that pretty face and that rushing cool lake allure: "the more intense the practice, the more intense the demons," this from patrul rinpoche (1808-1887) in his the words of my perfect teacher (patrul, 1998, p. 189). all this, of course, is why what happened next in this graduate class in the faculty of nursing where this talk was held, is the real site of all the hard, meticulous and sometimes agonizing work involved in cultivating a genuine, sustainable and livable love for those who have gathered. this, in fact, is why this text ends so abruptly, because what happened next is itself a sort of un-shareable secret. it is the time of all those small back-and-forth words, small gestures, little referentialities, silences, little ventures and retreats, looks of panic, great laughter and relief, patience, anger, and on and on, where things start to happen and gather and work. pedagogy. it is when tales of abuse, of addiction, of children dying, of overwhelming busyness, of black humor, of strokes, and family gatherings and hope and love and despair come forward into the open space, and the tough work, the real work, of building new solidarities begins. two quick words of thanks, then, to end this foreword. first my sincere thanks to shelagh mcconnell for having the great patience to transcribe this talk with great skill. you saved me the unbearable task of hearing my own voice sound like a stranger's. and second, to nancy moules who has given me so many leisurely opportunities to practice these words that still seem to come out so half-clumsy, so, well, elephantine, too often with little cool water in sight. our friendship and our shared dedication are a great comfort and a great refuge. the descartes lecture i’ve been working here in the faculty of education since 1986. the types of work that have evolved in those intervening years have been really an interesting thing to witness. i expect that all of you in different ways have seen something of this in your own professions and own ways through the world, how some sort of shift seems to be in the air or wants to be in the air-about what knowledge is, how knowledge works, who is in charge of it, what it means to demonstrate what you know, what counts, what is needed in these strange and rushing times, and so on. this has been set up in the past, as you all know, as paradigm wars or the old, exhausted quantitative/qualitative arguments and debates. the good news is: that fight is over. because part of that fight was premised on an attempt for the interpretive disciplines to demonstrate a certain legitimacy to, you know, figure out how to get "dad" to love and respect me. there was some headway made in certain quarters, and in other quarters, he just got more and more pissed off. so you know, the really interesting news after all these years for me is that interpretive work needs to be good, but it doesn’t need to demonstrate to those who don’t want to do this type of work that it should exist. if you do a statistically based study, you don't have to prove to me that statistics is a worthwhile discipline. you don’t. it’s taken for granted that, well, too bad, there it is. same with interpretive work. you don’t have to justify its very existence, even though, with some granting agencies, some tenure and promotion review boards, and some supervisory committees, this demand still arises. jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 6 you know: "tell me about this 'hermeneutics.' i’ve never heard of it." oh well, okay, i guess that will be my problem….again. it’s only been around for 115 years in its contemporary version. but you know, patience is apparently a virtue, even though having always to be the patient one is a pain in the ass, but you know, anyway, this is the situation we are in, always feeling like the upstart. this isn't just an accident of circumstance, because, of course, hermes was a trickster, an annoyance who would never lie but never tell the whole truth either, a bit of a flit, a bit of a flirt. this is but one more sign of the continuing dominance of natural-scientific work, that it can always demand that other forms of work "show their papers" like at a border crossing, but it never has to show its own papers. hermes was the god of borders, but his role, much to the annoyance of the border patrols, was to keep the gates open. the type of work you’re dealing with in this interpretive research course didn’t just arrive in the world. it has an immediate legacy that goes back to 1900 and just before, maybe 1870: dilthey, schleiermacher, and so on. and it has a mediated history that goes back perennially from there to all those moments of facing the world and our peculiar lot in it, of needing to read the sacred text for some signs of how to understand our contemporary woes. midrash. part of what we all face, in this faculty and in mine, is that we live in a world in which some forms of discourse have become dominant. and we all know that natural science discourse has become powerful and predominant. and for good reason--it's so confident, so sure of itself, it has lead to such spectacular things. look, see…computer. it's actually taping my voice and will download onto a thing that you can carry in your pocket. it has found cures. and so pervades the predominance of natural science discourse, its forms of knowing, methodologies, its presumptions, its hopes, its desires, and so on. this isn't and shouldn't be a surprise to any of us. and it’s not an issue. natural scientific research methodologies and discourses are not an issue. this isn’t an argument about quantitative work versus qualitative work. but there is an argument that needs to be understood and articulated. it’s an argument about dominance and what falls into shadow under such dominance, what has been lost, forgotten. because, as ecology has taught us in this past several decades and as many of us knew far before then, having a dominant or invasive, or pernicious, or exotic species in a certain place can sometimes take over and choke out the possibility of anything else. and, therefore, in the long run, in a lot of those cases, it can come to choke out the conditions of its own survival through its very act of domination. monocultures are unsustainable. being concerned about the dominance of naturalscientific discourse is therefore an act of love, an act directed at sustaining its well-being. it has lost any sense of proportion, any sense of having a place in our lives. it has taken over and become, well, monstrous. this is a very, very interesting phenomenon. ivan illich called it counter-productivity: up to a certain point such "advancements" and "progress" and "expansion" and "standardization" and "centralization" are sensible. but after a certain point, the way he put it was, the various ways of working in the world begin to create the very thing that they were designed to solve or to resolve. they begin to create the very thing they are trying to fix. that’s why school is producing ignorance, hospitals are producing super-bugs, and deerfoot trail is producing traffic congestion. it was great for a while, right? however, these things reach a certain level where, because of their predominance, they start to unwittingly work against jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 7 the very conditions under which they were working in the first place. so what i want to talk to you about today is not natural science methodology, quantitative methodology, but its dominance and how that dominance has affected us and affects what you want to do in this class, what it means then to try to articulate something other than that dominant paradigm. one of the things about a dominant discourse that is important to remember is that those caught up in that dominant discourse don't have to understand any of this. but there is something more troubling at work here. not only does a dominant discourse get to speak, and to get funded, to act and to be in positions of power and judgment which marginalize other forms of work, other ways of speaking and thinking and researching. a dominant discourse displays the depth of its dominance in its ability to define and shape the nature and limits of any resistance to that dominance. its dominance is had in its unquestioned ability to characterize and speak on behalf of that which it is not. just like the british got to speak about africans, or teacher gets to name children and their special needs and no one gets to speak back (speaking back simply indicates that that child has "oppositional defiance disorder"). it is a very interesting relationship which hints at how all this is not simply an issue of "research methodologies" at all, but something older, more dangerous, and pervasive. i want to elaborate this phenomenon of dominance one step further at the front end here because this will, you'll find, be where the really difficult work in this class will have to be done if you are going to understand interpretive work. because of the dominance of natural-scientific discourse, that discourse provides a lingering image of what it would mean to do any other sort of work. all too often over these past 25 years i've see professors and students working with an illinformed image of interpretive work that is simply a projection of what the dominant voice of natural-scientific work allows alternatives to be. it's about telling your story. it's about people's experiences. we all have our own point of view. it's subjective, its personal, touchy-feely, wholeness, mush, and it's easy because you just say what you think, right? all of that and much more, is the dominant discourse’s story about what you could possibly do if you don’t do natural scientific research. if we are objective, you guys must be subjective. if we are hard, you are soft, if we have outcomes, you have poetic suggestions and temptations, and so on. but here is where it gets awful. those doing interpretive work start to fall for this. then what happens is that interpretive work starts weakly parroting concerns that are not indigenous to its difference: how many people should i interview? how do you look for themes? what about generalizability? how do you prove that this is not just "your interpretation"?...and so on. because we've understood our own work weakly in the shadow of quantitative work, we fall prey to further weakening by the questions that then arise out of that weakness. and so part of the alertness that i expect this course is about and that good interpretive work must take on as part of the work itself, is about working on our own ability to remember what has happened to us in our attempts to do something different than the dominant discourse allows. this is why you'll find that in interpretive work there is a vivid interest in history, not in order to "understand the past" but to decode our present circumstances and revive our current memory loss. because the ditch that is really easy for this work to fall into is wide and powerful to the extent that we give way and if we don’t remain alert, we can end up falling for precisely the meager and weakened caricature version of what we do in jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 8 interpretive work that has been "granted" to us by the presumptions of the sort of work we wish to step away from. this is just like nurses falling prey to the caricatures that doctors can have of them and their work, or teachers falling prey to the belittling of their practical knowledge in the face of standardized provincial examinations and the fraser institute's calls for accountability. in other words, this class isn't just about research methodologies, but about a structure of our lives, our living, that we have inherited and need to start decoding. just a warning, then, that this isn't a situation that you fix up at the front end of an interpretive study so that you can then proceed free and clear of it. you never get free and clear of the world. it is persistent--what is this about, where did this come from, how did we end up speaking like this in this world of ours, what do we do now? this ongoing decoding and the stumbles and recoveries it requires, is the work itself. in my profession for example, the troubled child that can’t pay attention is named that way by the very system for whom troubledness is already pathologized from the outset and so we don’t actually need to listen to that child because we already know what they could possibly legitimately say--this "code" or that one. we once named them "wild and willful" so they could be punished and have their wills broken (see alice miller's work on "black pedagogy"). we now name them adhd so they can be medicated. and that’s what dominance does i already know in advance what you can possibly say to me, so you really don’t need to say anything because you’ll either say what i already know or you’ll be wrong. the only reason for you to speak is so that i can find the right slot, not so i can ever question that slotting itself. that is a given, the "outcome" of research. the only issue now is "which slot." i will admit that that slotting might be in error or that i've mischaracterized the slots and perhaps there should be more or less or different ones, but the correcting of that error means that in the future, it will be less likely for correction to be needed--the goal being to put an end, via dominance, of that which resists that dominance, either through sacrifice (you will be eliminated if you resist--kicked out of school, put in a home, medicated into oblivion) or salvation--you will be saved if you don't resist. resistance is futile because even resistance has been coded. this reminds me of why libraries were burned down by christian and muslim groups back in the 11th century in northern africa and southern europe. they realized that all the books in there either say the same things as the bible/koran, and therefore the library's collection was not necessary, or those books say something different than the bible/koran and, therefore, that collections were heretical. either way, just burn them down. differently put, interpretive work is very interested in normativity, dominance, issues of identity (cultural, linguistic, personal, gendered, even the great divide of the ill and the well, the quick and the dead) and how these things gets sorted out, and by whom, and to what ends, and so on. the sheer naive innocence we have about words, ideas, images, has to be interrupted, as does the sheer confidence that this is just a technical problem, and that technology will save us, or science or medicine or education. people will die and stupidity will win out almost every time. these are our real circumstances. everything is contaminated, embedded, interdependent, and nothing is what it seems on the calm surface. that is why interpretive work is interested in things like the leveling of thinking and idle chatter and how familiarity can breed contempt, and the like. that is why interpretive work has helped us understand that not only is natural-scientific work dominant on the scene of research. it is an act of domination--knowledge as dominion. and again, any form of thinking and study jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 9 that is not premised on dominion gets cast as fuzzy, soft, feminine, weak, emotional, subjective, and, in the end, self-indulgent. just like hermeneutics! okay, so i want to talk today then a bit about our amnesia. one thing that happens in a lot of research methodologies is that we believe at the outset that they are simply something that someone can tell you how to "do": here’s how you do it and then you do it. right? and we find ourselves in a position at the university and in schools, and then lots of other quarters, that if a research methodology asks something more than that of me than that, then something weird is going on. and one of the things about interpretive work that is so painful is that at the outset it demands that we stop thinking about what to do and start to think about what’s already been done to us and how it’s ended up this way and why we talk about kids or patients or clients like this or that, and where those images and names and taken-for-granted practices came from and what they are dragging along with them. like david smith said, underneath the calm and cool and familiar and taken-for-granted surface of things, whether life itself has a chance, or whether the surface is all there is. but what very often happens in our culture is that we orient to simply what's next to accomplish and skip from surface to surface. everything seems to be about just staying calm and afloat on the surface. just letting it go by and saying, well, as a high school teacher said to me recently (and i’ve heard this dozens of times), "you don’t understand, this is just the real world. this is just the way things are." right? it’s just the way things are. you're reading too much into it because there isn't anything really there. the surface is all there is. and all we can do is keep going because if you slow down, you're sunk. well, one of the fundamental beliefs in interpretive work is that this isn't simply "the way things are." this is how things turned out, and there are reasons that things turned out this way and not some other way--there are voices there, stories, things that have been forgotten and silenced and marginalized, hopes that have atrophied or been suppressed. not thinking about these matters, exploring them, "researching" them, doesn't mean that the world is not full of implications on our very lives and the lives of our students and patients and friends. and because of that, the very confidence with which we do what we do is surrounded by failure, by exclusion, by erasure, by lost dependents, by amnesia. and, therefore, to actually understand what we’re doing is to try to wake up and understand the fixes we are in, where they came from, and what might now be possible, what freedom or refuge we might want or need in the middle of all this. wanting to try to wake up from this amnesiac state is a life-long task. and it’s also the definition of the tragedy of human life because, you know, now, at this is the tail-end of my career, i’m now starting to figure out that schools are pretty much the same as they were when i started thinking and writing about these things. there is a strange message here, that this work of thinking about our lives--well, not everyone is interested, not everyone is up to that task, and this has always and everywhere been true. you are here in this opulent position of grad school, where you've decided, whether you know it or not, to stop slumbering. and even though part of what comes to consciousness is that this venture is joyfully hopeless, even though we know we won't somehow finally succeed, still, that is the direction that interpretive work deliberately and bloody-mindedly faces: trying, again and again, to remember these threads of inheritance that we’re dragging with us, what they’ve done to us, and how our work gets shaped by those things whether we know it or not, whether we like it or not, whether we exjardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 10 perience it or not, whether we care or not. that’s why this work isn’t about telling me about your experiences. because our experiences are manipulated and designed and destined to forget very often. this is why this work isn't about securing some safe place from which to launch a methodology, because it is about being implicated without having meant or intended to be, without knowing it, without deserving it. this is why hermeneutics infuses in phenomenology's interest in "lived experience" the terrifying prospect of "false consciousness," where lived experience often hides darkness under its bright presence. so i want to start off by sketching out a very simple example that comes from a scenario in the classroom. think of a situation of a teacher who’s been in a school for quite a while and has taught in that school for several years and a new student comes into the classroom and the teacher automatically recognizes she taught the older sibling of this new student three years ago when the two children’s parents were breaking up. things didn't go well. so up wells the strife of that past event and becomes something of the surrounding of this new student, and even the efforts to hold this at bay have their own complex surroundings of past experiences-professional development seminars bent on detailing how to deal with such uprisings in yourself as a teacher-"ten tips for tough teaching," and so on. even the old saw of "every child is an individual" is profoundly full of ancestral ideas, voices, controversies and the like, even though we might not experience these immediately, they are the undergrowth that is part of the fertility in the soil we inhabit. so when the separate and single event of this one child arriving occurs, we all know that there is no such thing, actually. echoes from the classroom across the hall where this child was taught last year; a blue file folder with too much and too little information, faint memories of staff room conversations long forgotten. it may take a long time to work through, to work out or unravel, and so the memories of the teacher and the presumptions of the teacher and the past experiences of the teacher all get tangled and ignited under the auspices of what was supposed to be a single event. now that other teacher who taught this new child last year across the hall was once a friend of the principal who has since transferred, and last year's vice-principal is now the principal. it was she, as vice-principal, who had to "deal with" this student last year, troublesome, with a file "this thick" and they had an ipp (individual program plan) for him as prescribed by alberta education, mandated under a program of studies written by "those guys" up in edmonton (whom the nowtransferred principal slavishly admired and the new principal wants to set to the side in favor of a more "inquiry based" approach to teaching and learning). and, of course, surrounding those guys in edmonton, as well as this "new" thing, "inquiry," are tangled in arrays of influences, affiliations, research, histories old and new, sob-stories, exaggerations, frustrations, success stories, hopes and desires and fears, and the like. causes and conditions all the way down. now yet another new student comes in the room with his parents, and we all know, intimately and with great familiarity, that this doesn't simply add "one more thing" into the mix but in fact cascades through that already tumultuous mix, making each of the already roiling arisings tangle and untangle and thread and unthread, all over again. it's just like a new child in my family wasn't just "one more," but actually rattled back through those relations that were already ongoing, and actually transformed me into a father and my father into a grandfather and made my father's fathering of me an issue that it hadn't quite been before. nothing is every just "itself." jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 11 now, there’s no sense going on and on about an example like this because it’s all too ordinary for words in some ways-at each moment, we end up with these clusters of dependent co-arising that rise and fall, come forward and recede, undulating, remembered, forgotten, resolved. and we all know that you can become practiced in finding your way through these things artfully, professionally and well. it is like imagining running down a crowded sidewalk. you can't exactly give rules for how to do it, but it can be done, and even if you run into someone, we know, within negotiated parameters, how to correct this error and carry on--apologize, explain, and off we go. the principal relates to the ministry, the ministry's mandates guide the teaching of the child, the child relates to the new child, the new child is in the school of the principal, the parents, the leg bone's connected . . . thigh bone, hip replacement. it’s so ordinary, that its fabric and its workings, fall from sight very easily. it’s just normal, right? now it’s hard to believe, but this phenomenon was downright revolutionary when it entered explicitly into the history of research/philosophy around 1900. edmund husserl, in 1902, wrote the logical investigations--one of the founding documents of contemporary phenomenology, and he formulated the idea of--this is the technical term he uses: it is called everyday life. or in german: the life-world, lebenswelt. the life world… like, well, this. just everyday, ordinary, simple, negotiated, complex, multivocal, populated sites of action and agency, of words and images and ideas and projections and secrets, of past experiences and desires, of market manipulations and media events, kings and queens and great urban bustles, and hospitals and schools...great big institutions forged with forgotten memories and hopes and aspirations, with all the ordinary charts and graphs, political suasions, issues of advocacy and accountability, cultures and multicultures, gender roles and disputes, heat and little light, economic pressures, lies and truths, facts and fictions, and on and on and on. all this mess. so in walks this second child into the classroom [laughs]. this is what husserl got a glimpse of, that even the small event of a child walking into a classroom happens right in the middle of this whole tumultuous world with all the implicate orders of causes and conditions, all the mixed cultural memories, all the old decisions about schools and grades and everything all jumbled and all attached. ordinary. the life world. and you can add in here too all the arrays of labels that can be used to name this kid—i love the latest one, "oppositional defiant disorder," where you not agreeing with me labeling you has a label. or "learning delayed" or "gifted." and then even the controversies that these labels are not meant to be casually used like this. . . but husserl identified a thing he called "flowing in," where the specialized discourses produced of the natural sciences' sorting mechanisms start to become part of the ordinary coinage of everyday life. like "normal." and with this also comes the swirl of things we've given up: "retarded," for example...we still carrying the entrails of what we've left behind, so we add "wellness" to "health" because it seems like a good idea, and we know beyond a shadow of a doubt that these terms, too, will wear out, and like beehive hairdos or discoballs, we'll wonder what in god's name we were thinking sometime in the foreseeable future and that this will happen no matter what we do. so you can see how even our language ("that kid must be gifted") --that terms like these in elementary school or high school just waft out into the world and become common coinage as if we don’t need to think about anything. we come to believe that words are jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 12 innocent. it’s just "oh he’s gifted…oh, right." and everybody knows exactly what you mean until you start talking about it and then it gets complicated. that’s why the familiarity of the life-world is such an interesting thing. when you ask people to actually give an account of what another person means when they say "gifted" you end up getting a glimpse of this thick, contentious, ambiguous, contradictory fabric of the life world--what husserl called sedimented layers of sense pile one atop the other and completely obvious until some interruption occurs. the stories start rolling out about the troubles people have had with these labels, and these stories are always more variegated, ambiguous, multiple and heated than the labels themselves. and then, even when some interruption of this familiarity does occur, we tend, for the most part, to do our best to do repair work so we can get back to not thinking about it anymore, get back to finding it obvious. just get better labels so we can get back to not having to think about these things. now, this is where i want to talk particularly about some threads of this complex, contradictory inheritance that we’re all living in the middle of. how did it turn out that, in the midst of all this, natural-scientific discourse became dominant? and, therefore, what is interpretive work, anyway? we need to go back to around 1640. two things. first, remember that we're searching for something about the dominances and amnesia we've learned to live with and have inherited. second, from what we've already seen, there really is no such beginning date, actually. because to actually pinpoint where these ideas would have originated is both important to do and fruitless at the same time. it has this funny aspect to it, because every time you turn around, things unravel and get away again. the gate gets left open. but the reason i am pointing out 1640 is because there was a very clear articulation of a very important shift, philosophically, in europe and in this is buried something vitally important about our current lot. rene descartes' meditations on first philosophy and his discourse on method were both composed around this time. and he had a very interesting purpose for writing these treatises. we have to remember that trying to name this purpose and trying to explore its consequences is not an attempt to find out who the bad guy was, but to find out who our relatives are. genealogy. because descartes' purpose was actually really interesting. he looked out into the world he inhabited and the shifts and changes that were at hand--the shifting power of the church, the burgeoning arising of new sciences, world wide exploration and rising self-consciousness of modern europe, and suggested that if we’re going to understand what’s happening to us and if we’re going to provide some continuity and stability to these freshly emerging new ventures (in particular, what became known as modern science), we’re going to have to find out how to stabilize our relationship to these matters, and find some sort of solid, reliable foundation, some platform, something on which our work can reliably rest. because, as goes the ancient adage, if you don’t build on a foundation then everything you build will be as weak or as solid as the foundation you build it on. and so if we don’t find a solid foundation for this new human venture, we’re going to end up having it collapse on us in all sorts of random and different ways. we’re not going to get anywhere because it’s going to keep eroding itself and so on. so, right off the bat, descartes is interested in the foundations that lie at the advent of modern science, what we've inherited as quantitative research natural science research. his initiating gesture was to ask jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 13 "what is the foundation upon which we should build?" sound familiar? now the interesting thing to realize is that the initiating concern of descartes was an ancient initiating concern. what’s first? what’s most reliable? what’s most solid? what’s most true? what’s most unshakeable? so, in fact, we get in descartes’ work, an echo of ancient religious traditions trying to find out what the foundation of the world is. as we all know, the wise man doesn’t build his house upon the sand. do you remember that old hymn? i can just barely remember it. he builds it on the rock. in other words, foundations are important and they always have been, and even though descartes' efforts were directed towards erasing any old reliances; those very efforts are themselves old and reliant. this is an old, old story, this story of starting anew, and this new story of starting anew casts a new light on something that is age old and makes us able to look at this old thing anew. ta-da! hermeneutics! okay, so, here at the origin of modern science you have the equivalent of a religious invocation. where is my rock? my wife just told me, by the way, jesus decided to build his church with peter (petros) as its foundation--which is the same root as “petrified” meaning "rock. " i just found that out a couple of weeks ago. this is why interpretive work is often really, oh hell, i just thought it was the guy’s name. but it’s not. and what a coincidence that jesus would have picked him, eh? on this rock i will build my church. in other words, right in the presence of all that seriousness that we've lived with ever since, including all the literal-mindedness of fundamentalism, was a beautiful, funny play on words. it’s a good joke actually. i’ll build the church on petros. of course! like i said, that was two weeks ago. this is what you have to get used to when you do interpretive work. that the world has these infinite layers of meaningfulness, that nothing is what it appears to be, and you'll have to get used to being humiliated over and over and over again. humility, humor, humus, being human, earthiness, laughter. when the laughter arises, it's like a secret clue that something is going on beneath the surface calm. like the little anecdotes told in the staff room, or the "there was this patient, once . . . ". yep! all that too! clues. the good news here is that everything, everything, is more interesting than it appears to be. so now descartes is in this conundrum. in education, we call this conundrum the debate over going "back to the basics." and there’s something good about that call. there’s something good about saying “what are we doing?” "should we keep doing this?" "or are we in trouble, on the wrong track?" this, again, is an old story in the life-world, repeated in many ways, and even schools are organized to "start all over again" every september, or every january 1st--clean slates, square one, washing away sins. dead ordinary, this. going back to basics. great thesis topic. what's basic in pediatric oncology, that firm spot where all this rests? not just drugs, not just treatments, not just families and the shadow of death over the young, not just that parents should die before their children, not just that everyone is going to live forever or die eventually. where is peter? so remember, right there at the advent of modern science was something akin to a religious invocation. this is why fundamentalism and foundationalism are of so much interest in interpretive work and why interpretive work is not fundamentalist or foundationalist. it knows that any claim for something being first is familiar, familial, an old story ambiguously akin to other. one more "once upon a time" caught in the fabric of the life world. jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 14 so descartes took upon himself this really interesting, brand new age-old task. he decided that he would examine everyday life and all the forms of knowledge and appearances of knowledge and the interdependencies of knowledge and claims to knowledge that he came upon, all the opinions and evidence and superstitions and worries and declarations. all of them. he did this in order to find out whether there was something in everyday life that could be relied on as an unshakeable foundation of how to proceed. he decided to do this in a way that seems abstract at first. he said "i’m going to look at all of these oneby-one"-he called this process "methodical doubt." his premise here was simple but important to stress: if it’s possible to doubt this or that form of knowledge, we’d better not use it. so, i’m walking over here and i’m assuming that the chair is where i see it to be, right? it would be goofy to be walking over here to doubt that, or to doubt that that water bottle i'm reaching for isn't there. but it’s possible to doubt it. i could be hallucinating; i could be dreaming. last night i dreamt about doing this class and i was as convinced then as i am now. so you look out into everyday life and you go…okay we’d better not place our confidence on everyday perception, because if you get drunk or you put one hand in cold water and one hand in warm water and then put them both in the…right? one hand will feel cold, right? so perception is…no, you have to be careful! it can mislead. it can't be trusted because it is possible to be misled. i might be dreaming all this. it's possible. so this is what he did. okay, then he said "well, well, what about everything my parents told me? " anybody want to guess? i don’t know about your parents…[student: "they were wrong?" (laughter)]. it's even worse that than! they may have been right and i could have simply misunderstood them. i could be wrong about them being wrong! it could have been me! you see, that doubt is possible. they could have been perfect in their knowledge, but i don’t know for sure that i understood them properly. and they could have been imperfect in their knowledge, right? so he says, oh you can’t do that…. this won't provide a solid foundation on which to build, what my parents taught me. what about everything we read from the ancients? aristotle, plato, all those texts that we have inherited. well, there could have been bad errors when the text was translated from greek into latin, and so on. they may have been deluded. i might be incapable of understanding, may have read it the wrong way. and even if i've read the commentaries, this or that commentator may have been nuts, or motivated by lust or desire or selfaggrandizement. so descartes kept going through all of this. what about everything my teachers told me? what about everything that people say on the street? go back to that example in the classroom. what the principal says? what the former principal says? what the parents contend? the child's experience? the education textbooks? the ministry of education? the latest research? older research? the newspaper? the fraser institute? my own opinions? what? who? the doctor, the patient, the drug salesman, the janitor? i can't even be trusted to read the word of god in a way that is beyond doubt...literacy, translations from aramaic, the interventions of the church in editing things, my own feeble memory! all these familiar ways of the life world can’t be relied on unshakably and as you can see…guess what? descartes discovered that the foundation of the world is not in the world. sound familiar? every single religious tradition has said this…just remember, again, we’re at the advent of modern science. just don’t forget that. that’s why this is so interesting. i cannot find the foundation of the jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 15 world in the world because everything in the world can possibly be doubted. so i can’t go to the world to find the foundation of the knowledge of the world i am trying to build. so this puts descartes in a really interesting position because now he’s sitting by his fire going, well--i remember doing this several time in the sixties--uh-oh, now what am i going to do? because that very thing, the ordinariness of everyday life, that, when i was part of it, was so ordinarily reliable, ends up, because of its very ordinariness, to not be what i need. what do i do? why am i doing this process? this is crazy. i’m going to go nuts. uh-oh. every tether to the world is not to be trusted. he became cut off from every worldly recourse, isolated, severed. in retrospect, this sounds a little crazy, but it’s also an amazingly courageous thought experiment. it’s partially a recapitulation of what most teenagers go through or what everyone goes through when a kid dies, or a parent dies, or a job is lost, or when you leave home and find yourself adrift form all those old comforts. very ordinary, but descartes radicalized this process. where you have this collapse of the familiar certainty that used to cocoon you and make you feel comfortable and it all of a sudden evaporates. it's ecclesiastes. descartes, like that old text, is doing this to himself on purpose. it’s very, very interesting to have done—to try to be deliberate about this. it really is the sort of courageousness that any spiritual discipline requires. shedding the vestments of the world, cutting away, burning away, washing anything that cannot withstand this methodical doubt. purification rituals. baptismal images. umbilical severances of old reliances. old stories, these. so he ends up going, "okay, maybe i should push this further. maybe all of that confidence i have about going through this process of doubt should also be cast into doubt. maybe that’s not reliable either. maybe i’m just nuts. maybe i’m just crazy." and so he ended up in this spot that kept getting smaller and smaller. and he ended up saying, "maybe i’m not doing this process at all. maybe i’m not even doubting the world. " and he got stuck, as we all know, in this really tight curve. "i doubt that i'm going through this process, but i am doubting that i’m going through this process. okay, maybe i should doubt that, but if i do that…?" so it ended up that i can’t doubt that i’m doing this because if i’m doubting that i'm doing this, then i'm doing this, and i can’t get out of that because if i try to get out of that, then i’m trying to get out of it. it sounds like a parlor trick: if i doubt that i'm doubting, then i’m doubting, so i can't doubt it. this is where the old saw that everyone knows about descartes then comes from: he said "i doubt" and doubting is a form of thinking, and therefore, i am thinking and even if i doubt, it is still true. therefore, i am thinking. "i think, therefore, i am. " cogito--like cognition--and ergo [therefore] "i am," in latin, sum. this is kind of like the mona lisa of philosophy-that painting that has become such a visual cliché that's really hard to actually see anymore. everybody’s heard this thing so often, cogito ergo sum, "i think, therefore, i am," that it’s become almost laughable to hear, but in fact it was a really interestingly, weirdly accomplished outcome of trying to find an unshakeable, indubitable foundation. after doubting every single thing in the world, his own doubting of the world showed itself to be indubitable. only once he had completely cut himself off from every escape route through the world did he find the foundation, deep inside himself, inside this abstract presence of himself to himself, "i am." because even if i affirm that "i am not," i am affirming and therefore i am. so what we ended up inheriting from descartes was this really interesting new thing that hadn't quite been imagined this way before: an experience of "myself" as a jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 16 "subject," an "i" that is present to itself with great clarity and distinctness, that is "worldless" and that assuredly is even if everything else is erased. this is new. and yet it is not new. this echoes, of course, the idea of a soul that is "in" the body but not "of" the body. right at the moment of trying to found natural science, descartes hit deep well water. so, now, descartes starts to look at the characteristics of this foundation that he has found through methodical doubt. it is clear and it is distinct. it is singular, it’s selfidentical, and is not confusable with anything else, not attached to anything else, separate, severed off from anything else, decontaminated (mary douglas said that the unclear is the unclean). remember that all descartes is affirming here is "i am." i may not know who i am beyond a shadow of a doubt. i may have a fairly good idea, but not beyond a shadow of a doubt. i may not know what i am. i am not even sure i know where i am, but i always and unshakably do know that i am. in other words, sheer self-identical existence with no properties. i am. singular, univocal, clear, present, without contradiction or duplicity. whatever i am, i am. so you get this really weird abstract version of identity that has no substance to it: whatever this identity might turn out to be (since we don't know what it is, let's simply call it "x"), i know beyond a shadow of a doubt that x=x and this is singular, self-identical, pure and clean and clarified. sheer self-identicalness. okay, old testament, exodus 3:13-3:14. coming down from the mount with the commandments, moses asked god who shall i say has sent me? "and god said unto moses, i am that i am: and he said, thus shalt thou say unto the children of israel, i am hath sent me unto you." just a reminder this is the origin of modern science. just thought i’d mention that again. so what we get in descartes’ work is a reaffirmation of an old story at the same time as we get an affirmation of something "otherworldly," purged of everything old and worldly--sheer existence: i am. so now he’s got himself inside of himself, completely detached from the world and its ways, having found the unshakeable foundation. now it’s not like the world actually ceased to exist in this whole process of methodical doubt. it just slowly and methodically turned into something increasingly unreliable and shaky. so, now here, right here, is the big turn. these new sciences of his time are purporting to investigate the world and they need a foundation that is solid. but the world they are investigating isn't going to give it to them. descartes realized that he can turn his attention back to the world, but now he has to be very careful not to lose what he has won. we don’t want to turn our attention back to the world and get re-absorbed back into that fray of the world and its amnesia, into its forgetfulness, its contingencies, and ambiguities, into its presumptions and start acting on the basis of that because that’s not true to the foundation that has been established. in other words, if i’m going to go out into the world, i have to go out into the world with an eye to the foundation that i have found in my process of methodical doubt, this x=x clarity. if i am going to find any "truth" in the world, i have to demand of the world the same thing i demanded of myself with methodical doubt. what the world really is in truth is not that messy fray of ambiguity and doubt and interrelatedness. if i go out into the world and see something shakable or dubitable, then it’s not real, it's "unfounded." if i go out into the world and see something ambiguous, it’s not real. because to be real is to sit on the foundation and to sit on the foundation is to sit on a self-identical clarity that’s unambiguous and uncontaminated. therefore, anything in the world that admits of ambiguity, multiplicity, jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 17 interrelatedness, interdependence, metaphor, analogy, all those forms of…. well, shall we say, mess? no! truth is not a mess but is rather clear and distinct. therefore if there is any truth to be had about the world, the truth of the world is not a mess. because the truth has to live up to something that is not a mess-the foundation. therefore, when i find my way back out into the world, i have this new demand now that i make upon everything i meet. i do to everything that i meet in the world the same thing that i did to myself. anything that’s doubtable is eradicated; anything that’s ambiguous is eradicated; everything multiple or attached to something else is eradicated. everything has to become, like i did, "itself" and not something else. whatever this thing is that i am investigating in the world, it is what it is and it is not something else. as with my own purified self-identity, i demand such purification from the things i meet: x=x, whatever else may be. so just like a new (but not so new) image of the human subject appeared in the world, now something else new arrives: "objects." in other words, only things which can stand up against methodological doubt (the latin is something like thrown against, oband -iacere) are real, because only they replicate the hard-won truth of the "i am"-singular, separate, clean, clear, distinct, without contaminating relations. so what now happens of course is that descartes starts to say whatever there is in the world, in truth it is self-identical, self-contained, not attached to anything else. descartes ends up quoting aristotle. the term for this in greek philosophy is "substance." "a substance is that which requires nothing except itself in order to exist." that’s his paraphrase of aristotle 3rd century b.c. metaphysics. a "substance" is that which requires nothing else except itself to be what it is in truth. therefore, the initiating presumption of our ventures out into the world is that if we want to know about the truth of that world, we have to cleave off everything we want to investigate from everything it is attached to, every relation it has made, in order to try to get some determination of what the truth of that thing is, and all the subsequent relations of that thing with other things themselves have to be clear and distinct. because its truth is its substance, its self-identicalness, its "x=x." now, just on the side here, this is sounding a little abstract [laughs]. just a little…. this poor child [points to a student in the class] was having trouble learning to read and you [points to another student] were her teacher last year and i’m her teacher this year. and her parents have just come in and they want to know what’s going on. i make a case for her trouble being one thing and you make a case citing some other things. the principal who is also in the room, because that’s what they do, says, "well look, you said one thing, you said another. whatever her reading trouble is, it is what it is. right?" everybody knows that: it is what it is (x=x, even if we can't agree on what this "x" might be). so if it is what it is, and the two teachers contradict one another, the contradiction can’t be in the thing because the thing is what it is. if the thing is what it is, then the contradiction…the contra is in the diction. not in the thing. either you’re right or i’m right or both of us are wrong or we have specified things enough, but things are what they are. the actual trouble in learning to read can’t be ambiguous-it is what it is. that’s what this means. it’s a weird kind of common sense confidence that when we run into ambiguity, something with multiple versions or debates, that it can’t actually be. it must be a mistake of some sort. or lack of diligence or all sorts of stuff. sensible in its own way. so here’s what happens in education. in 1900, somebody publishes an essay called "the child. " a week later, somebody says, jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 18 you know, young kids are like that, but that’s not a really good description of older kids. contradiction. the contradiction can’t be in the thing because things are what they are. there must be two things. so the next week two books get published: "the young child" and "the older child." you can see where we’re headed, right? and then somebody says, well young boys are like that, but young girls aren’t exactly like that. contradiction. there can’t be a contradiction in the thing. there must be two things. next week, four books get published: "young girls," "young boys," "older girls," "older boys." actually, you know, the description you have for young boys is appropriate for boys of a lower socioeconomic status. but in rich families… so what starts to happen then is a process of investigation that purports something, finds a contradiction, bifurcates the thing, and causes two new studies or four or eight or twelve. in other words, now, if you look in quantitative journals in education, you’ll get papers like "the sub-nominal coding level of storyschemata structure in young boys of aboriginal decent in urban settings from 1915 to 1918: new wine in old bottles? " --i made that up, but you wouldn’t quite know it! so what you get in an attempt to protect the purity of the origin from getting contaminated, you get (in your profession more than mine) these titles that become more and more exotic trying to describe something more and more simple, singular and ordinary. more and more particular and straight forward. more and more carefully divided off from anything else. the simple logic of substance, x=x, finds, in travelling the world, that it must constantly divide. so you get this really weird condition of constantly having to qualify your work in order to preserve the purity of the first principle. because if you didn’t have "aboriginal" in the title you’d be confusing one thing for another and things themselves, in principle, aren’t confused so there must be two things. so what we get is this proliferation, which is in the natural sciences, that the natural sciences are profoundly good at. proliferation of specification all with an eye to preserving this first principle, x=x. this is why natural-scientific research must always be "up to date," because it is constantly shedding the encumbrances of ambiguity and hidden contradictions. oh i didn’t mention this. see this baby here [x=x]? this is called the principle of identity. it’s the central principle of formal logic, aristotelian logic. and until speculations about set-theory in the 1930s, it’s the first principle of mathematics. the first principle of mathematics: if you come across an x, x is always x. you might not know what x is, but x is x is x. in working through an algebraic equation, x stays steady inside that equation when you go to another equation, this equation is not that equation, but inside this new equation, x is x--an unknown (not sure what x is) constant (x is x). the principle of identity unfolds into the principle of non-contradiction (something cannot both be x and not be x), which unfolds into the principle of excluded middle, from which unfolds the whole discipline of mathematics. starting with the principle of identity, every step in a mathematical proof participates in the clarity and distinctness of that first principle. each step is clear and distinct. therefore--finally, we've ended up with the origins of quantitative research that dominate our professions--if i go out into the world armed with mathematics, i take with me that hard-won truth of the cogito. as long as i can proceed mathematically, every step participates in the clarity and distinction of the first step. you have to mathematize anything you meet in the world in order for the world to live up to the foundation you have won. welcome to the origin of quantitative research. based on the origin of "i am." if someone asks about the legitimacy of a quantitative study, all you need to say is "i am has sent me." there's just one more hint regarding some of the heat that comes off jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 19 this silly quantitative/qualitative debate. interpretive work seems chaotic, like all hell breaking loose, heathen, pagan--both these mean "of the fields," by the way, outside of the capital (where the sovereign "i am" holds sway). okay, so, just a few more little steps. well, sort of little steps. because the logic we’re talking about here, this logic of doubt, withdrawal, self-clarification, and the subsequent dispensation of that clarity as a demand made upon things--this is far more widespread than in the natural sciences. it’s important then to realize that this movement of condensation, the collecting together of confidence then issuance of confidence with great confidence has analogies historically and philosophically that we need to face up to because the dominant discourse of the natural sciences has kin and brethren that it doesn’t know it has and i just want to talk a little bit about what those are. we've got to explore something of the terrible heat we often feel when we try to interrupt this cartesian logic. okay, remember that i’m doing this for the world’s own good. if this selfidenticalness is actually the world’s foundation of truth, then demanding this of the world is an attempt to help the world live up to its own truth and to help it discard those elements that are not part of what it truly is. or to put it differently, the world is full falseness and fallenness, amnesia and sin and carnality, lies, deception, ambiguity, messiness, contradiction. and in order to understand the truth of the world is to save it from itself by demanding that it shed that which is not essential to its substance. i come in the name of truth. so there is, in this movement, an often hidden sense of its beneficence behind all of it. or to put it another way, i’m doing this for your own good. i’m trying to save you from your own encumbrance that you don't even know that you have. you all know the term used when you have something in your quantitative research design that you forgot to control for and your results end up with this uncontrolled thing in them messing up your results? contamination--your results can easily be contaminated. so, all of this is a type of purification ritual -descartes' methodical doubt was a purification ritual. descartes sought the foundation of modern science in something akin to a purification ritual, as does every natural-scientific study that follows it. the life-world needs rescue from itself. more strongly put, these studies are salvational in their design and intent. okay, so, purification, salvation, decontamination, the getting-rid-of outliers, the pulling of things into line, eradicating that which will not submit. as if this is the way that the world actually exists…separate, selfidentical substances, whose relationships to one another are all post-hoc. remember that? objects. then we have to realize that in order to get the world to be like this, we may need to render it like this in order to save it from its untruth and render it into its truth. steps. i know what’s true. i know what the foundation is. i know what’s most real. i know what it is to be a human being and venture properly in the world and be concerned after its truth. therefore, when i venture out into the world and i run into people who do not understand this, it is my moral obligation to take with me something of this lesson i’ve learned--to india or to africa or to north america. and, for their own good, i must let these people i meet know that if they mistakenly feel at home here in this mess, they are not actually, really "home." you’re actually away from home, immersed in the blood body of the world, without the "i am" to guide you. home is actually "over there," in england, under the crown (like the crown of consciousness, victoria as the "i am" of the empire). so out here in the wilds, i’ll put in a home office, and you’ll have to get a pass that requires you to jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 20 home in on where home really is, that marks you as being protected under the crown--like a pass-port to pass through the portal, showing your "identity," your "identification." now i’m doing this for your own good. i’m helping you to become civilized. i’m helping you cleave to the truth of things. and so, one the analogies that we’re dealing with here is colonialism. a couple of centuries earlier than descartes, just prior to isabella giving the contract to columbus in 1492, the jews and the moors were expelled from the south of spain because isabella realized that until we become ourselves and no others (until a=a), we won’t be strong. only when we become strong can we then head out and build an empire. and so we "self-clarify" by purging ourselves of everything we are not--we become a self-identical nation-state purged of all contamination. so we kick out all the jews and the moors or worse, sometimes we kept them here and kicked them out in a different way-the inquisition was a purification ritual demanding singularity. we do this for their own good of course, too. by the way, two weeks after columbus got his contract with isabella to sail west, a guy named nebrija, whose name is still on many libraries in spain, a grammarian who went to isabella and said, basically, that until you have a single language in your kingdom, you cannot have an empire. and, therefore, you need to standardize, clarify and decontaminate and universalize castilian spanish and make it mandatory for everyone in your purview to give up the vernacular in order to be considered part of the kingdom. so to speak. so language itself was standardized by becoming singular, unambiguous, not multiple anymore, and this was done as a way to launch the colonial confidence of spain westward. language becomes singular and self-identical. x=x. this is exactly the same as the move to strip first nations kids of their language and their family names, again for their own good. it is exactly the same. and we'll have no moors and jews in our midst, no "others." purification, with, like descartes methodical doubt, a move inwards towards the clean and clear and distinct self-identity requisite of this new phenomenon in the world: the nation-state. the very idea of a nation-state is premised on this state of singularization, and dumping our contingent relationships to the diversity and multiplicity in our midst, telling it to either smarten up or leave. this is canada, mr. singh, you better either become one of "us" or go back where you came from. so, purification, standardization, expulsion, what else? this founding of the nation-state in spain doesn’t just back away into itself. it backs away, "founds" or "grounds" itself, and then launches back out into the world. this is the same analogous movement as the origin and launching of modern science. because modern science will go out and demand mathematicity from the world in the same way that the spanish would go out and say "christian or not?" enrique dussel talks about the dual myths that arise here: the myth of sacrifice or the myth of salvation: i will save you (by making you into me) or i will kill you (but sacrificing you will be for your own good, so sacrificing you will save you, because if you're not me, you're already living in untruth anyway). george bush: you are either with us, or you are with the terrorists. okay, so now, purification, colonialism, standardization. through clarification, "we" control the right of passage to the truth--the "colon" through which you must pass in order to pass. so then, when the british empire starts collapsing and retreating, what happens? all sorts of brown people pass with their passports through the portal and "come home." they show up at england's door saying "hi mom. we're home!" yes, that’s a rite of passage, that things must "pass through" the narrows of mathejardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 21 matics--colon. in fact, “christophe colon” is columbus’s real name, which is just unbelievable. but in order to be a citizen of the world, his name had to be latinized. because of the roman empire and the centrality of latin, latin made you a citizen, civilized-these colonizing demands are age-old. carolus linne became linnaeus right, because you weren’t a citizen of the world until your name, even your name, was rendered under a universal standard, latinized. this is why learning latin was linked to be a civilized and educated person--still at work in my own days at school, this still lingered. (the grammar of our civility (pearcy, 2005)--very interesting book by the way). so this is a really old, interesting story. to find out that this guy linnaeus wasn’t really linnaeus, it was linne. and he had to give that up in order for him to properly be himself. which, again, is why first nations children in canada had their names and language removed as an act of beneficently saving them from themselves. it is also why their land was privatized, because then, land gets linked to ownership, and ownership is linked to rights of governance or domination over that land, so property ownership became identified, in the us, for example, with the right to vote. only as a property owner is the dominance of my "i am" able to manifest. ok, so, yes, copyright laws. okay, let’s just keep going a little bit further here. it’s not that i and things in the world don’t have relationships, but they’re all post-hoc. they’re all "after the fact" of things and selves existing separately, divided off. that is existing indivisibly. that is individually. as with descartes, we now take these truths to be self-evident. contemporary notions of individualism, this is where it starts. this is what the autonomy and selfdetermination and individuality that underwrites contemporary democracy, this is where it comes from. so, now, if you go back and see all these autonomous beings all of whose relationships are post-hoc, and that is after the fact of their autonomy, everything is revocable and provisional, including your culture, right? so this is where we get modern versions of multiculturalism. where your culture becomes a "choice" made by someone who is really and truly autonomous individual, not really a moslem or a jew. you’re an individual and then, in "our" culture (which now isn't a culture among others, but simply an expression of the way things truly are), you get to choose the practices of your culture or not. but these choices are now post hoc, after the fact, simply personal and subjective, because only the relationships that themselves can be mathematized are "real" or "true" relationships. so then you not only get frequency and repeatability of relationships or they’re not real, you also get the enumeration or mathematization, of all these relationships. these are all zero sum relations that can be quantified. in other words, the community is full of autonomous "x=x"s and the real relationships between these autonomous individuals are only those that can be mathematized. so, first of all, everyone gets one vote and then we add them up. it's only fair. it has nothing to do with who you are, what you know, whether you have any sense at all regarding what a good choice might be. after all, who am i to say? i'm just one more voter, and whoever gets the most wins. parallel to this, community becomes identified with the market, because now you get relationships of ownership (by an "i am") and then the only "real" relationships are those that can be measured, so community becomes commerce between autonomous "i am" owners-persons. that’s why you guys are called clients and customers of the university and it’s all about choice and individual freedom. this is where the discourse is coming from…so you also get the market, and you also get capitalism as a standardized system of exchange that slowly jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 22 starts to replace the messiness of barter and the commons. check out the history of the enclosure movement in europe, privatization, taxation, where commoners who worked the commons became tax paying employees, and the land became owned. market economies and capitalism are premised on this new sense of individuality. purification, colonialism, individuality, privatization, democracy, market economies, multiculturalism. but then, because of all this--and we're still experiencing this day to day-we get these strange senses of alienation from our community and from our work that now has become distant, disembodied, standardized rulefollowing, so you end up with karl marx critiquing the alienation of workers. and also, given that we’re all, in reality and in truth standing separately from each other, we also now need a mathematized/medicalized understanding of our sinful and lusty relations to each other or our sense of depression and alienation. freud: no more fucking in the bushes! well, you’re still fucking in the bushes, but now you’re unhappy about it because you all know that it’s contamination, but it is no longer a church matter full of snakes-in-thetrees storytelling superstition reprimands, but is now medicalized syndromes that have mathematized our sin, coded it into identifiable dsm-iv slots. wellness! a personal matter. even better! self-improvement is sold back to us as a cure for the ails that that selling has caused. colonialism, capitalism, democracy, individualism, psychologism, market economy… oh and by the way, i live in bragg creek and for your own good we’re going to cut those paths wider to prevent forest fires. to prevent forest fires means to prevent a waste of capital--new initiatives for clear cutting were fronted by forestry companies, so the material of the forest will still be logged safely, and so insurance companies are satisfied. so we have the beginnings of an ecological disaster here as well, severed from the world and then unhesitatingly ravaging the earth for its own good into board feet of consumable lumber. like quantitative research will invade the classroom and save the messy life worlds of children and teachers by building subdivisions. that wild itself has no truth in it. it becomes true only when it is civilized, when the rough beast of the bush becomes a trimmed british garden. only when the earth submits to god's command that we, in his name, have dominion over the earth--only then is it truly itself. so there it is again, ecologists sound romantic, hysterical, "spiritual" (i.e., messed up), but not in any sense true (since the criteria of truth is that things exist independently of one another, and claiming dependent co-arising cannot be true, only a blurring of what has been made clear-cut). just like these brown newcomers and their constant complaints about canada. shape up or ship out. okay, ecological ravaging is colonial is cartesian is the root of quantitative methodologies. the earth is private property because only when it is owned is it brought under the measure of an "i am" and only then is it in truth what it really is. native people are wrong and need to be saved from their silly ideas. they need to learn reserve. i know, it's not funny. okay, three more. if this is the way that people actually exist, then i’m just going to add a really interesting thing that happened in 1540 or about, and that is the printing press. which meant a couple of things. the ability to disseminate the written word quickly and easily. then you get the rise of literacy and an increasing suspicion of orality, storytelling, things passed from breath to breath, women talking in the woods, conspiracy. those nurses telling tales during the break, those teachers in the staffroom full of messy little anecdotes--nothing true there, onjardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 23 ly mostly women talking and talking. so the move from orality to literacy and the increased suspicion of muttering. literacy as a way to tame the wild, become civilized, civil. and also, right here, put up your hand if you’re a lutheran. any lutherans? okay… luther took it upon himself to translate the bible into german, into the vernacular and away from the standardization of the church because believers are individuals and must work out individually their relationship to god and its saving grace. no longer mediated through the mess of the world and churchy control, no longer through the line of saints and commentators and mediators or priests as your stand-in. so, thank you printing press, we’re going to give you each a german bible if you’re a german so that you can read it yourself. so you put a bible in each of these houses. to put it differently, protestantism doesn’t make sense without these: individuality, autonomy, "i am," and so on. protestantism needs cartesianism's loosing of individuality in a new way. this is why protestant churches have empty crosses and not crucifixes. the body of christ, the world-body, is now risen, absent. no more worldly images, no more statues and portraits, no more working our way through the bloody corpse of the life world. or to put it differently, that old life-world mess of a diagram that we were looking at before was very catholic. old council of nicaea arguments, back to 767 ce, about images and their dangerous allures--not just false, this, as we all sit groggy in front of the latest news. it's the trouble of danish cartoonists as well. remember this is the origin of modern science. okay, so protestantism and islamic iconophobias. the glance looking for truth must look "upwards" to the heavenliness of the "i am" and away from the mess of the flesh. and of course, if you’re going to put a bible in every house and have people read the bible themselves, they had better be able to read because it’s really, really important and if you can’t, you’re really in bad trouble. some origins of modern schooling began here and so now we’re back to the kid who is having trouble reading. meanwhile, of course, we've also become a culture that is simply slathered with rapid, seductive images and we think, now, that we can just toy with these things, like naive innocents, that somehow our "individuality" and "choice" is going to protect us from being led astray. hah! hilarious. we get alienated, severed from our surroundings and our earth selves and then, full of guilt, get emotionally caught up in reality tv as a sort of pornoreplacement for living a life. just like with the shows of african kids with flies on their eyes and sad faces: arms-length guilt-manipulated poverty porn. one more convoluted thread. last one, i promise. remember how nice it was when we started out and everything was fine? looks funny now--we just talked with one another, got our cups of coffee, joked, and settled in, and what starts to happen is that this ordinariness starts to look peculiar. this dominant discourse of the natural sciences starting to cast a shadow over the everyday life from which it has withdrawn and which it then renders into the objective world by mathematization. anything not mathematized starts to look different, look, well…wild and woolly and out of control, and chaotic--individual, personal, subjective, fanciful, random, idiosyncratic, and so on. so in schools if you talk about pursuing an adventurous inquiry with students, you're saying that the kids can now to whatever they want, right? because that’s what this means now, right? you do what you’re told (quantitative research) or you do whatever you want (qualitative research). these now seem like the only alternatives and this infests interpretive work itself: either jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 24 i just passively let my participants tell their story, or i tell mine. us and them. if we let go of mathematization, all hell breaks loose. see what just happened? if the opposite of doing what you’re told is to do whatever you want, you’ve left in place the idea of individuality, left in place that the only way out of individuality is mathematization, and then simply dropped the math. if you do this, any story that someone tells you is their own personal property and only they get to say what it means. so in attempting to get away from the dominant logic of the natural sciences, we leave it in place, accept all its premises, and then opt for the only opposite that that dominant logic leaves available. this is this weird double logic where the dominant discourse starts to say, “nurses, all they do is hang around and tell each other stories…and they just clean up after people and take care of them. they don’t know anything in that actual practice of nursing except what medical science has taught them. there is no knowledge in the life-world, just messy, uncivilized exchanges.” same goes for teachers: no sense talking to them about their classroom and what is going on because they are involved in it, caught up in its messy flesh, and therefore don't and can't know, in truth, what is occurring there. they are contaminated. so even if i collect these stories together in my interpretive research, i have to distill (purify) them into themes that are repeated, because repeatedness means (ac)countability, and frequency means some truth is there, something reliable. but the truth is not in the telling, but in the renderable essence that can be gleaned from it providing you speak with a statistically significant number of "participants." so students who want to do hermeneutics ask me, how many participants should i talk to? so you get all of these stories told by the dominant discourse of the natural sciences, not just about itself, but what you possibly could be doing if you weren’t doing that. this is the trick you have to remember. because when that happens, when we try to do interpretive work, we start to take on the language that the dominant discourse has left us with. if we’re not objective, what are we? subjective! and a lot of us go, "yep, you betcha, that's us." because what interpretive work must be, we are told, it’s subjective. and the dominant discourse, meanwhile is going, “oh, this is fantastic. perfect." because, in doing this, you have, in your very attempt to get away from the dominant discourse, confirmed that dominance by accepting the description of your own work that is supposed to be the alternative to the dominant discourse. remember, the dominant discourse of the natural sciences is not simply predominant. it is about knowledge-as-domination. or to put it differently, here's the difficult part of this course you're taking: interpretive work is not subjective, it’s not about personal experiences, it’s not about people telling their story and finding themes, that is all a crappy version of quantitative research that is found in almost every single book about how to do qualitative research. it is simply falling for the shadow-version of interpretive work that the natural sciences allow. hook, line, and sinker. you can look in textbook after textbook after textbook. they are simply full of nothing more than weak quantitative work in the guise of fuzziness, softness, resonance, feeling, emotion, or other such stupid things. women's work. touchy-feely. nurse-y stuff. interpretive work is about how to approach the life-world and understand its life without threatening it, and domination and demand. so, then, that last one i've promised too often, and then we can have a break. this is the one i always don’t want to talk about, but i am going to. on the one hand, material, the material world, the messy life world, blood and guts, trails of implication jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 25 and interrelation, innuendo, stories, fabrics, like text and textile, and we're caught up in this world, defined by it in ways that have already taken hold of us before we try to get ahold of them. implicated--like gadamer says, beyond our wanting and doing. materiality. and then, on the other, we have the pattern-the self-identical, the autonomous, the rendered into a=a, the clear and distinct and morally correct. mathematics is based on the recognition and clear and distinct repetition of pattern, right, replicability? repeated standardizable pattern is the only path to reliability. otherwise one's results are not reliable. materiality is unreliable. and remember, in such mathematization, "i" become "one." "i" must become anyone in order for my research results to be true. otherwise, i have contaminated those results. the methodology must be wielded anonymously. i must be completely and utterly replaceable. only when i am replaceable are the results i have found detachable from my finding of them. only then are then "objective." but we have to remember what this logic has left us with, that material needs pattern in order to understand its own truth. left to itself, the materiality of the world has no indigenous truth because it is simply caught up in its messy interdependences. it is blind, mute, unknowing, stupid, dull, full of torpid familiarities. unless the pattern of material can be gleaned, then we don’t know anything true about material. it’s just subjective then, right? or accidental, or anecdotal or whatever. so it’s important, it’s a moral necessity that pattern demand of material that the material live up to the demand that the pattern makes on it. and if it doesn’t, then it is refusing to be in truth, refusing to recognize its own truth, refusing to give up that which is not true of it, its accidentalness, its contingency, its earthboundedness. therefore, it is the moral obligation of pattern, if it has to, to impose itself on the material of the world for the good of the material of the world. not because it wants to be dominating or anything, but because it doesn’t understand this forceful imposition as an act of domination. it’s an act of salvation, of liberation. the colonizers in north america were always smiling. they always had good news, if you would only shut up and listen. the forceful imposition of pattern on material. so let's erase the letters that hide the truth here: pattern, pater, material, mater. at the advent of modern science, we have the old and familiar adage, that if she would only have fucking listened to me, i wouldn’t have had to hit her, but she just kept fucking talking and she wouldn’t do what i asked her to do, she kept talking back and kept fucking with me. so i had to stop her. i didn't want to, but it was for her own good. during his methodical meditations, outside of descartes' window, women were being burned as witches … . . . maybe we should get some coffee. references chah, a. (1987). our real home: a talk to an aging lay disciple approaching death. access to insight. retrieved from http: // www. accesstoinsight. org/ lib/thai/chah/bl111.html. hillman, j. (2005). senex and puer: an aspect of the historical and psychological present. in senex and puer (pp. 30-70). putnam, ct: spring publications. jardine journal of applied hermeneutics 2012 article 8 26 gadamer, h.g. (1986). the idea of the university--yesterday, today, tomorrow. in d. misgeld & g. nicholson (eds. & trans.), hans-georg gadamer on education, poetry, and history: applied hermeneutics (pp. 47-62). albany, ny: suny. gadamer, h.g. (1989). truth and method. new york, ny: continuum books. gadamer, h.g. (2001). gadamer in conversation: reflections and commentary, (r. palmer, ed. & trans.) new haven, ct: yale university press. illich, i. (1993). in the vineyard of the text: a commentary on hugh's didascalicon. chicago, il: university of chicago press. kunzang pelden, k. (2007). the nectar of manjushri’s speech. boston, ma: shambhala books. rinpoche, p. (1998). the words of my perfect teacher. boston, ma: shambhala books. pearcy, l.t. (2005). the grammar of our civility. waco, tx: baylor university press tsong-kha-pa (2000). the great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment (lam rim chen mo). volume one. ithaca, ny: snow lion publications. tsong-kha-pa (2002). the great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment (lam rim chen mo). volume two. ithaca, ny: snow lion publications. tsong-kha-pa (2004). the great treatise on the stages of the path to enlightenment (lam rim chen mo). volume three. ithaca, ny: snow lion publications. the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 73 legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday josefa-dolores ruiz-resa1 abstract: almost 50 years ago, in the events that happened during the so-called bloody sunday (derry 1972, 30th january), 13 catholic civilians were killed because of the actions of the british army during a civil rights march against internment without trial in northern ireland. other 13 civilians were injured. while the circumstances were unclear, these civilians were considered to be terrorists, which seemed to justify the gunfire. the findings on bloody sunday from two tribunals of inquiry (1972 and 1998-2010), and the reactions that their resulting reports raised are an excellent example of cultural impregnation in law. in this regard, it is possible to find a general notion of justice as truth. guaranteeing such notion (or, at least, the willingness to ensure it) seemed to facilitate the peace process in northern ireland. under the light of these events, the following pages aim to analyse how that legal culture of justice as truth is displayed in the two bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry as well as its contribution to the contestation of the british legal system or its legitimacy. this paper starts by reviewing previous studies about the conceptual framework of the analysis—it examines the concept of “legal culture” and the understanding of justice as truth, as well as the definition of tribunal of inquiry. next, it argues cultural perceptions regarding bloody sunday inquiries. the conclusions exposed reveal that the legal culture of justice as truth is also embodied in legalism and colonialism. keywords: legal culture, bloody sunday, tribunal of inquiry, justice, truth, legalism, colonialism, legitimacy. summary: 1. introduction. 2. conceptual frame. 2.1. legal culture. 2.2. truth as part of justice. 2.3. the tribunal of inquiry as part of public inquiries. 3. legal culture and bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry. 3.1. context. 3.2. trauma, anger and disappointment: legal culture on widgery inquiries during the 70s and 80s. 3.3. to set the truth: the justice campaign and other expressions of legal culture during the 1990s. 3.4 legal culture on the saville tribunal and report: legalism, colonialism and new legitimation for british law. conclusion 1. introduction margo harkin’s documentary ‘bloody sunday – a derry diary’ (final version, 2010)2 has a scene where a large crowd in front of the guildhall in derry—the symbol of the unionist domination—is watching prime minister david cameron on an enormous tv screen3. he is addressing the house of commons, reading his statement on the day 1 facultad de derecho, universidad de granada, spain (jruizr@ugr.es). 2 benson productions. available from: http://www.besomproductions.co.uk/sunday.html [retrieved 20/02/2020] 3 available on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kcsig8l7xa8 [retrieved 20/02/2020] legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 74 when the report of the second bloody sunday tribunal of inquiry, chaired by lord saville, was published. bloody sunday is the name given to the events that happened on 30th january 1972, when the british army killed 13 people and injured other 13 during a civil rights march in derry (londonderry, according to its british official name). it was a march against internment without trial in northern ireland. the march and the shootings happened in the contexts of the conflicts called the troubles. nonetheless, the report of the first tribunal of inquiry, chaired by lord widgery, sowed the suspicion that the killed and wounded people were terrorists, which explained the soldiers’ action as legitimate and justified the soldiers’ shootings. in his speech, mr cameron states (2010): ‘(…) mr speaker, i am deeply patriotic. i never want to believe anything bad about our country. i never want to call into question the behaviour of our soldiers and our army, who i believe to be the finest in the world. and i have seen for myself the very difficult and dangerous circumstances in which we ask our soldiers to serve. but the conclusions of this report are absolutely clear. there is no doubt, there is nothing equivocal, there are no ambiguities. what happened on bloody sunday was both unjustified and unjustifiable. it was wrong (…) the government is automatically responsible for the conduct of the army forces and for that, on behalf of the government, indeed on behalf of the country, i am deeply sorry’. suddenly, the audience watching the tv in the streets cheered and applauded. as mentioned above, the saville report was the result of the findings made by a second tribunal of inquiry about bloody sunday. it is considered that the setting up of this tribunal in 1998 led to the agreement of belfast, also known as the good friday agreement. a peace process between northern ireland and the british state just commenced. the goal of a tribunal of inquiry is not the judgments of guilt or innocence, but to find the truth about those situations or events that alarm people. however, the following and final scenes of the documentary show the victims’ families acquitting the victims themselves, as if they were judges, making the streets become a court, proclaiming the final judgment of “innocence”. thus, what ordinary people consider justice to be seems very different from what the law enacts. this proves that there is a “popular” sense of justice and a social culture of the legal and the fair. it is clear that since the second decade of 20th century, civil rights have included a collective dimension. this dimension links the idea of justice to the representations not only of the official or state legal culture but also the popular legal culture. this legal culture can be clearly observed in the bloody sunday’s events, with special emphasis on its inquiries, which are also progressively reverberating and being supported within films, poetry, pieces of theatre or tv documentaries, like harkin’s. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 75 the specific events that triggered bloody sunday revealed a background of increasing political tension and violence in northern ireland that started in 1968, when the protest against the situation spread out, leading to civilians being killed by the british army as riots intensified. many people were arrested and taken to camps at that time. it was a measure adopted by the unionist government of northern ireland (the stormont government) on 9 august 1971, and the british government supported it. according to british irish rights watch (1994, paragraph 2.2), “by the end of 1971 around 900 people, virtually all of them nationalists, were imprisoned, in violation of international norms on the right to a fair trial”. thus, internment must be understood within the framework of the troubles (the northern ireland political conflict), as this region continued to be part of the united kingdom but not of the republic of ireland. on the other hand, the troubles must be understood within the widespread political and social discrimination against catholics in northern ireland for centuries4. the anti-internment protests brought more riots and violence, more civilians shot dead by the british army or taken away for internment, as well as british soldiers, officers and other civilians shot dead by the irish republican army (ira). finally, on 10th january 1972, the prime minister of northern ireland, brian faulkner, banned all marches in northern ireland until the end of the year. however, an anti-internment march was organized by the northern ireland civil rights association (nicra), leading to the specific episode that is the object of this paper. the members of the nicra had organized a march in derry to protest against internment without trial in northern ireland. in derry, catholics lived in the districts of creggan and the bogside, which were republican no-go areas (they were called free derry). this place was under the effective control of the irish republic army (ira), which was considered to be a terrorist organization. it is no wonder that british security forces were unhappy with this and that the commander land forces in northern ireland, general ford, had ordered his troops “to recreate the state of law in the creggan and bogside” (british iris rights watch 1994: 2.3). the march was allowed to proceed in the catholic areas. however, it should not reach the guildhall square, as the organizers had planned. meanwhile, general ford ordered the 1st battalion parachute regiment (1st paras)—the toughest regiment in the army—to travel to derry to arrest rioters. thousands of people took to the streets. the march went peacefully until it arrived at the junction of william street and roseville street. a barrier in william street prevented protesters from venturing beyond it. at least 26 barriers surrounded the creggan and bogside to cordon them off from the rest of the city. nonetheless, about 200 marchers broke away from the procession and started to throw stones at the soldiers, turning the march into an “illegal demonstration” (british irish rights watch, 1994, p. 2). the soldiers fired rubber bullets and water cannon in return, and the parachute regiment started the arrest operation. in only a few minutes, the troops began the shooting that resulted in 13 civilians killed (most of them were young 4 a more comprehensive study about this can be found in neumann, 2003. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 76 men and even teenagers)5 and 13 injured6. among the wounded, there was one person who passed away from a brain tumour not long after the event. given that the trauma was thought to have contributed to the decease of this individual, his death was acknowledged as the 14th of bloody sunday7. none of the soldiers involved in the firing was killed nor slightly injured (british irish rights watch, pp. 6, 7). a tribunal of inquiry was immediately set up after the events, and the lord chief justice of england, lord widgery, was appointed chairman. having the lord chief justice handling this responsibility (that is, the head of judiciary of england and wales and the president of the courts of england and wales)8 revealed that the british government was taking the matter very seriously. nevertheless, some members of parliament had doubts about him being the sole member of the tribunal. the widgery tribunal did its work in a few months, and the final report was delivered 10th april with less than 100 pages. the immediate inquiries, collected in the widgery report, exposed that “none of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb” (report of the tribunal 1972), while the conclusions in the report stated that the soldiers were not the first to open fire, meaning that they were not responsible for the victims. on the other hand, it concluded that, although some of the dead were “wholly acquitted of complicity in [handling a firearm or bomb], (…) there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons or handling bombs”9. relatives saw this as an offence against the victims because it implicitly entailed the fact that they were considered terrorists. however, photographs and eyewitnesses revealed that nobody was armed. in order to understand the families’ sorrow, it is necessary to take into account that new details came to light later on10, such as, the case of 22-year-old james wray, who was killed while lying wounded; the fact that william mckinney was killed when he was bending towards an injured person and that bernard mcguigan was killed when he tried to assist a wounded man, even though he was waving a white handkerchief in his hand. during the following years after the end of the widgery tribunal, new evidence brought out the troops’ actions, revealing that they might have shot at unarmed people, as 5 they were 17-year-old gerard donaghy, michael kelly, kevin mcelhinney, jack duddy and hugh gilmore, 19-year-old william nash, 20-year-old michael mcdaid, 22-year-old james wray, 26-year-old william mckinney, 31-year-old patrick doherty, 35-year-old gerard mckinney and 41-year-old bernard mcguigan. 6 john johnson, damien donaghy, michael bridge, michael quinn, patrick o’donnell, patrick mcdaid, alexander nash, margaret deer, michael bradley, patrick campbell, joseph friel, and daniel mcgowan. 7 john johnson. 8 the equivalent concept in spain would be the president of the supreme court and consejo general del poder judicial. 9 according to the conclusions of the report (1972), “10. none of the deceased or wounded is proved to have been shot whilst handling a firearm or bomb. some are wholly acquitted of complicity in such action. however, there is a strong suspicion that some others had been firing weapons or handling bombs in the course of the afternoon and that yet others had been closely supporting them”. 10 it is important to consider the investigations managed by civil rights associations, journalists, eyewitness and families. these investigations will be addressed later. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 77 well as that 3 victims were shot from the walls and not from the ground, which indicated that the soldiers did not open fire as a defensive action against armed demonstrators11. on the other hand, the use of terms like “acquitted” or “found not guilty” made people think that widgery tribunal ended up becoming a sort of trial of the victims, based on the adversarial system, rather than a tribunal of inquiry that is supposed to search for the truth from an inquisitorial approach. according to walsh (1997), certain elements led to this result: “it was chaired by the lord chief justice, it identified two adversarial protagonists… it left the presentation of evidence largely to these two parties, it conducted its proceeding along the lines of an adversarial trial and it delivered its report in a judicial style which found in favour of one party or the another on most issues”. in any case, victims, families and many other people would have preferred criminal charges against the shooters, but the evidence to warrant the criminal prosecution were considered insufficient12. on the other hand, the adversarial procedure did not seem a solid guarantee either, since it led to significant mistakes associated to other well-known cases likewise related to the troubles, like the guilford four and birmingham six. this very situation brought about important reforms to the adversarial procedures in england and wales during the last years of the 20th century, as van koppen and penrod (2003, p. 1) point out. many of these reforms concerned the guarantee for the right to a fair trial and, especially, the right to be heard by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. trials seemed as biased as the widgery tribunal, which took the army’s side instead of acting as arbitrator. bearing this context in mind, the following pages aim to illustrate how the legal culture of justice connects justice to truth and how that connection impacts on the legitimacy of the states and their legal systems. in order to do so, this paper will analyse the events regarding the bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry. they are a paradigmatic example of how law, justice and legal culture are interconnected. the paper will also analyse the importance of truth as main content of justice in order to achieve a more legitimate social, political and legal system from a practical point of view13. the analysis will allow to come to the conclusion that justice and truth also interact with legalism and colonialism, which are likewise part of the legal culture. however, they demean in some way the victims and families’ claims and the peace process in northern ireland. the structure of the article goes as follows: after revising the studies about the conceptual framework of analyses—the notion of legal culture and justice as truth, as well 11 see circumstances in which people were killed, available at https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bsunday/ circum.htm 12 the civil action for damages, the victims’ families received a modest payment because the victims were found not guilty of being shot while handling a firearm or a bomb. to know more about the judicial review of the event of bloody sunday, including the remedies from the international law and their little success, see walsh 2000, p. 284-313. 13 as it is well known, the importance of social acceptance of law to enforce it was pointed out by legal realism (ross, olivecrona, holmes, pound, frank). legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 78 as the definition of tribunal of inquiry—an analysis of the cultural perception about the tribunals of inquiries is introduced along with an evaluation of how legal culture dealt with the bloody sunday inquiries. the methodology of the article is based on the analysis of texts from different scholars addressing the concepts (legal culture, justice as truth) that will be applied to the analysis of documents that are related to bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry and to the presence of legal culture within them14. the analysis will not be performed from the scope of cultural theory, media studies, visual arts or social memory studies. instead, it will be based on legal philosophy, insofar as it is linked to its standard sections: the theory of law (assuming that law includes not only norms and institutions but also a cultural component), the methodology of legal knowledge (agreeing that the search for the truth is an intrinsic principle within the theory of procedure), and the theory of justice (considering truth as part of justice and political accountability within democracies). all three will provide a broader debate for connecting the theory of human rights to the fields of legal epistemology, ontology and ethics15. 2. conceptual frame 2.1. legal culture the idea of legal culture was mainly developed by lawrence friedman (1969, 1977), who inspired the law & society movement. he defended a social theory of law and considered that law was made up of three kinds of components: substantive, structural and cultural. more specifically, friedman (1969, p. 34) explains that16: “a working legal system can be analyzed further into three kinds of components. some are structural. the institutions themselves, the forms they take, the processes that they perform: these are structure. structure includes the number and types of courts, presence or absence of a constitution, presence or absence of federalism or pluralism, division of powers between judges, legislators, governors, kings, juries, administrative officers; modes of procedure in various institutions, and the like. other components are substantive. this is the output side of the legal system. 14 many of these documents are classified and available on cain (conflict archive on the internet, located at the university of ulster) web site https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/index.html, especially at https://cain.ulster. ac.uk/cgi-bin/dbase.pl. the bibliography consulted is temporarily related to the years between the two inquiries (1972-2010), especially, as well as to the echo that the second report had on public opinion and scholars during the following five or six years, which currently seems to be weakened. the forthcoming 50th anniversary is likely to make new studies arise. 15 those are considered the three fields within the legal philosophy. see legaz y lacambra, 1953, p. 30-34; bobbio, 1980, p. 91-101; salguero, 2014, p. 192-199. 16 this extended quotation is included in the present paper because friedman uses a list of situations, procedures, kind of people and set of prescriptive and descriptive statements in order to define the three components. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 79 these are the laws themselves –the rules, doctrines, statutes and decrees, to the extent they are actually used by the rulers and the ruled; and, in addition, all other rules and decisions which govern, whatever their formal status. other elements in the system are cultural. these are the values and attitudes which bind the system together, and which determine the place of the legal system in the culture of the society as a whole. what kind of training and habits do the lawyers and judges have? what do people think of law? do groups or individuals willingly go to court? for what purposes do people turn to lawyers; for what purposes do they make use of other officials and intermediaries? is there respect for law, government, tradition? what is the relationship between class structure and the use or non use of legal institutions? what informal social controls exist in addition to or in place of formal ones? who prefers which kind of control, and why? 17 these aspects of law –the legal culture-, influence all of the legal system. but they are particularly important, as the source of demands made on the system. it is the legal culture, that is, the network of values and attitudes relating to law, which determines when and why and where people turn to law or government, or turn away (…) the living law of a society, its legal system in this revised sense (…) is the way in which structural, cultural and substantive elements interact”. friedman also distinguished between internal legal culture, which refers to the knowledge degree of legal practitioners on law and external legal culture, or the knowledge degree of people who are not lawyers. the distinctions between one type of culture and another have sparked to some controversy, just like the various meanings friedman assigned to this term in the second half of the 20th century. and yet, he admitted in later works that external legal culture is equivalent to legal consciousness, as it identifies with the opinions, values and expectations that ordinary citizens hold regarding the legal system. although it may seem obvious that lawyers have a different—and, apparently, isolated—view on law and themselves as compared to ordinary people (for they receive a specialised education), it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between internal and external legal cultures. thus, when jurists are learning and use internal legal culture, it should not be inferred that all vestiges of external or popular culture are eliminated. the reason why this happens is that the interpretation of texts (including legal ones) is seen as the way of bringing the meaning of the texts to the fore and updating it, which occurs when interpreters translate the texts following the culture at that time. gadamer (1977) highlighted this point when he said that the interpreters of a legal text are not limited to reproducing it; instead, they adapt it to their own historical time and social values. apart from the distinction of external and internal legal culture, friedman (1989, p. 1578-1579)18 distinguishes between legal culture and popular legal culture. by “legal culture” he means “ideas, attitudes, values and opinions about law held by people in 17 also in friedman, 1977, p. 6 and 7. 18 he referred to it in similar words in friedman, 1969 and 1994. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 80 society”. popular legal culture would mean, on the one hand, law-related ideas and attitudes held by ordinary people or, more generally speaking, by laypeople. in other words, it takes into account the opinion and attitude of ordinary people towards the substantive and structural components involved in legal systems. on the other hand, popular legal culture refers to “books, songs, movies, plays and tv shows (…) about law or lawyers and aimed at a general audience”. many studies have shown that modern “ordinary people” know very little about the law and legal systems. on many occasions, tv programs and movies become law educators. nowadays, tv trials are one of the most important tools for ordinary people’s legal education. trials are, according to friedman (1989, p. 1594), “boundary-maintaining devices” and help to “cement social solidarity by redefining and proclaiming the norm”. following vygotskii’s ideas on the intermediation of culture in our cognition (2010), jerome bruner (1990, 1996) highlighted how culture takes part in it and how school education and learning is a way of internalising cultural norms and values. bruner then pointed out how the law, as part of the culture, contributes to education through the legal narrative, including the stories that norms and case law narrate about political institutions, people out or within the law and also out or within societies (2003). indeed, a significant number of the most recalled films or tv series—one of the most important cultural expressions—deal with trials. examples include the well-known films twelve angry men, directed by lumet; judgment at nuremberg, by kramer; or witness for the prosecution, by wilder; and also have musicals like chicago (ebb, fosse & kander). in any case, trials have been and still are a kind of theatrical or ritualized display of law. friedman emphasized how the three components—structural, substantive and cultural—influence each other, and how, ultimately, the effectiveness of laws depends on the legal culture, both internal (that of practitioners and law theorists) and external or popular (the rest of the citizens). every meaning or dimension of the legal system rests, as friedman affirmed (1989, p. 1589), on sociocultural norms: habits, stereotypes, costumes, morality. either implicitly or explicitly, these norms are part of the components—structural, substantive or cultural—of every legal system. they also function as both unwritten and unconscious norms that bring cohesion in our societies and govern them (aristodemou, 2014, p. 5). in any case, the concept of legal culture should be regarded under the influence of the debate concerning the contradictory theoretical approaches to the concept of culture. there are, indeed, other conceptions of law rooted in—or involving—more metaphysical understandings of culture, such as those based on modern german philosophers like herder, fichte19, or postmodernist conservative ones20. considering that modern law is connected to the development of modern nation-states, the fact that legal cultures are also seen as expressions and tools for the spread of national cultures is not surprising. 19 about the conception of culture within them, see bueno, 2000 20 see gilroy 1995. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 81 on the other hand, a map can be drawn out of the conceptions of “culture” and “popular culture”, according to storey (2018). first, “popular culture” seems to be defined from the contrasts or connections to other theoretical categories such as folk culture, mass culture, high culture, working-class culture. second, it should be noted that the definition of culture itself is also very complicated and discussed. as to raymond williams (1983) put it, the term in english would mean “a general process of intellectual, spiritual and aesthetic development”, “a particular way of life, whether a people, a period or a group”, and “the works and practices of intellectual and especially artistic activity”21—texts and practices that produce meanings. “popular culture” would, therefore, be associated to the second and third meanings of culture, according to which, the concept of popular culture includes christmas celebrations and youth subculture, as well as soap operas, comics and pop music. third, the term “culture” is traditionally close to “ideology” and at times even interchangeable. this closeness allows “culture” and “popular culture” to approach certain meanings provided by marxism, such as masking the distortion of reality by producing false consciousness and particular images of the world chosen by one of the sides in a social conflict. consequently, this would mean that all texts are somehow political. as barthe’s work explains, “ideology” can be seen, as a producer or bearer of connotations— secondary unconscious meaning, including general words like “man” that would express the normal, the natural, the universal, in contrast to other human beings. nevertheless taking althusser’s approach, “ideology” could refer not only ideas but also material practices. keeping in mind the thoughts above, the concept of “popular culture” is much more than entertainment or leisure. it also implies political and social struggle (storey, 2018). fourth, “popular culture” is usually a complex combination of various meanings, according to williams: “well-liked by many people”, “inferior kinds of work”, “work deliberately setting out to win favour with the people”, and “culture made by the people for themselves”22. all possible combinations lead to different definitions of “popular culture”: that which is imported (typically from the usa) and opposed to culture as something coming from a lost or ideal folk or organic community, and that which is not high culture considered as difficult. this assumption results in oppositions such as popular press vs. quality press, popular cinema vs. art cinema, popular entertainment vs. art. a different combination leads to consider “popular culture” as “mass culture”—a mass-produced and mass-consumed culture—and “commercial culture” (storey 2018). finally, there is the conception of “popular culture” linked to the idea of hegemony (according to gramsci), which reflects the political and social struggles between dominant and subordinate groups [which in turn can be understood as cultural minorities or groups, according to, for example, the theories of justice as recognition]. the former would try to assimilate the latter into their ideas and world organization, while the latter would try to resist. therefore, “popular culture” is not a mass commercial culture, but a culture of spontaneous opposition by the people constituting the subordinate groups (storey, 2018). 21 quoted in storey, 2018. 22 quoted in storey, 2018. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 82 as a result, it is inevitable to accept a dynamic notion of culture, based on its meanings and samples (texts, practices, technologies, objects), but also on its producers: individual human beings gathered in social, political, legal and historical changing groups. this is where complex shifting power relations can occur, and they can shift through struggles and negotiations between groups and individuals within those groups. from this wide range of interpretations, one may derive certain assumptions that could refine the categories of legal culture and popular legal culture. thus, regarding high legal culture as high culture in terms of difficulty and rationality, as well as quality and minority—since it is available to very few people—, high legal culture might be including legal scholars’ works and practitioners’ writings. this should also be regarded as internal legal culture (in the sense of “lawyerly” produced or produced by lawyers). within the understanding of high legal culture, other manifestations of what is considered high culture can be added, like some forms of art and literature—poetry, theatre, novels, picture, sculpture, classical music, and even art cinema or jazz music. however, those would also involve external legal culture (“not lawyerly” produced or not produced by lawyers). on the other hand, popular legal culture would include forms of culture that are currently considered simpler, like products without intellectual quality. today these can be texts and other works like comics, murals, pop music—and its different styles including rock or rap—, soap-operas and other forms of culture represented through the mass media (television, press). these cultural manifestations can respond to mass and commercial culture to a certain extent, meaning quantity over quality, and they can also portray an idea of the law as a kind of resistance against the dominant legal culture and its ideas of law (traditionally supported and guarded by legal operators who are specifically trained). under the light of this meaning, popular legal culture can also include demonstrations, marches, memorials, tributes and many other actions that can be contemplated as articulated or spontaneous political activism. the meaning of high and popular legal culture could change if society changes what is historically and dialectically considered to be intellectually difficult. on this basis, the numerous studies available on law and literature include works that range from those contemplated within the western canon23, such as the merchant of venice, by shakespeare, to the comics about daredevil, a blind lawyer who became a marvel hero thanks to stan lee and bill everett. similar remarks can be made regarding law and film studies. 2.2. truth as part of justice seeing truth as a fundamental content of justice is a regular debate within the theory of justice, but also within the theory of legal procedure and social and political theory. in all these fields, truth is considered to be a vital value in justice, as it is well 23 see pérez 2006. about the western canon literature, see bloom, 1995. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 83 noticed by michele taruffo (2010, pp. 114-153). from the legal point of view, taruffo (2010, pp. 135-136) stresses that the procedure will not work by taking into account only the formal aspects because a fair resolution of a case implies an accurate determination of the facts. moreover, determining the truth of the facts through dynamic behaviour is the way for judges to be neutral or impartial. on the other hand, taruffo (2010, pp. 138-140) reminds us that justice as truth is a principal social value, because the truth is ethics as opposed to lies, as many moral philosophers like aquino or kant pointed out. more recently, other philosophers like b. williams and m. p. lynch have highlighted that truth matters as a necessary tool for social life (taruffo, 2010, pp. 110-111). according to language and communication researchers like paul grice, the main principle within social communication is truth. truth is necessary within the relations between a democratic state and its citizens, unlike dictatorships, totalitarian regimes and any sort of tyrant systems, where lies are the standard common tool (2010, pp. 111-114). furthermore, truth is an essential and traditional goal in inquisitorial legal procedures in order to ensure that there is no impunity but accountability. relying on the judge’s control, it is typical within civil law systems. adversarial legal procedures are rather based on the conflicting evidence and points of view of the parties, where the judge acts as an arbitrator—it is typically seen in common law systems (van koppen and penrod, 2003). in this context, truth is linked to persuasion and is mainly the result of negotiation or transition between the parties. therefore, it involves giving equal value to different views on the actual events. on the other hand, truth is the first step towards achieving reparation, and guarantees non-recurrence, which also needs to be remembered, mourned and retrieved as part of a so-called social or historical memory. as it is known, in september 2011, the special rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence was appointed by the united nations human rights council (resolution 8/11). a task requested by the council to this special rapporteur is “[t]o gather relevant information on national situations, including on normative frameworks, national practices and experiences, such as truth and reconciliation commissions and other mechanisms, relating to the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence in addressing gross violations of human rights and serious violations of international humanitarian law (…)”24. undoubtedly, truth and justice have also become deeply connected today from the perspective of international legal institutions. currently, all these contents are also essential within transitional justice, considered to be “the conception of justice associated with periods of political change, characterized by legal responses to confront the wrongdoings of repressive predecessor regimes”, as teitel (2003, p. 69) points out. according to her (2003), there are three different phases within transitional justice: the post-war phase, which goes from 1945 to 24 see the mandate of the special rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence, available on https://www.ohchr.org/en/issues/truthjusticereparation/pages/mandate. aspx. last retrieved 19/02/2020). legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 84 the end of the cold war, is symbolized by nuremberg trials; the second phase or postcold war phase, which lasts to the last years of the 20th century, is focused on the truth commission rather than on trials; and the third phase or current phase, where transitional justice is extended and generalized. “a truth commission is”, according to teitel (2003, p. 78), “an official body often created by a national government to investigate, document and report upon human rights abuses within a country over a specific period of time”. although not part of the criminal justice systems or the judiciary, transitional justice entails a formal legal state initiative that also involves informal forms of dialogue and negotiation between victims and perpetrators. according to teitel, truth is juxtaposed to justice during the second phase, but truth commissions already existed but were called by different names, such as “tribunal of inquiry” in great britain. this second phase includes the human rights vocabulary and claims the rights to the truth as opposed to the duty of states to guarantee them. in any case, teitel (2003, p. 81) emphasizes the idea that there are conflicting relations among truth, justice and memory. in any event, it is possible nowadays to state that the right to the truth and its connection to the idea of justice are part of international human rights soft law. according to the report of the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (2006)25, the concept of this right roots in international humanitarian law (para. 5) and the current legal basis for the right to truth and the state duties related to it can be found within several legal documents, like for example (para. 4), the principles 2 (the inalienable right to the truth), 4 (the victims’ right to know) and 1 (general obligations of states to take effective action to combat impunity) set forth in the updated set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through action to combat impunity (2005)26. in any event, the enforced disappearances in the 1970s drove to pay more attention to the concept of the right to the truth (para. 8). since then, the general assembly has addressed issues related to it in numerous reports and resolutions like for example 3220 (xxix), 33/173, 45/165, and 47/132, which refer to “the desire to know” as “a basic human need” (para. 12). the commission has also referred to it (para. 16)27. van boven (2010) also reminds that the basic principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law (general assembly, resolution 60/147 of 16 december 2005)28 have included the search for the truth as a form of reparation to victims (principles 22 and 24). the right to the truth has been recognized as well at the american and european regional level. according to the report of the inter-american commission on human 25 rights study on the right to the truth (e/cn.4/2006/91 8 february 2006). available on https://documentsdds-ny.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g06/106/56/pdf/g0610656.pdf?openelement 26 commission on human rights, 8 february 2005 (e/cn.4/2005/102/add.1) 27 other nu resolutions, reports and documents about truth and justice are available at https://www.ohchr. org/en/issues/truthjusticereparation/pages/internationalinstruments.aspx#truth 28 (a/60/509/add.1). josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 85 rights (2014)29, the legal framework of this right can be found in the articles xviii and xxiv of the american declaration on the rights and duties of man and articles 8 and 25 of the american convention on human rights, which are in some occasions connected (par. 69) to the right of access to information (article iv of the american declaration and article 13 of the american convention). its development is considered as a response to the phenomenon of forced disappearance, as a common practice within latin american dictatorships (para. 55 ff), and it implies the obligation to investigate and punish those responsible (para. 61 ff) and the obligation to establish the truth of what happened (para. 68 ff). according to navqi (2006) and lópez guerra (2018), the european court of human rights has inferred the right of the truth as part of several rights that are set forth in the european convention of human right: the right to be free from torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (article 3), the right to an effective remedy (article 13), the right to an effective investigation and to be informed of the results (article 10), the right to life (article 2)30 and the right to liberty and security (article 7). regarding the contents of the right to the truth, the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (2006: par. 38) considers that it implies to seek and obtain information on “the causes leading to the person’s victimization; the causes and conditions pertaining to the gross violations of international human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law; the progress and results of the investigation; the circumstances and reasons for the perpetration of crimes under international law and gross human rights violations; the circumstances in which violations took place; in the event of death, missing or enforced disappearance, the fate and whereabouts of the victims; and the identity of perpetrators”. similarly, the inter-american commission (2014: par. 70) considers the following contents: “to know the truth about the events that led to serious violations of human rights, and the right to know the identity of those who played a role in those violations (…) and, depending on the circumstances of each case, to guarantee access to the information available in state facilities and files concerning serious human rights violations”31. finally, and taking into account the entitlement to the right to the truth, it is alleged to have two dimensions in the international and american framework: individual 29 the right to truth in the americas (oea/ser.l/v/ii.152 doc. 2 13 august 2014). 30 according to naqvi (2006: 257), this is displayed in several judgments like for example, judgment of 25 may 1998, kurt v. turkey, application no. 24276/94; judgment of 14 november 2000, tas v. turkey, application no. 24396/94; judgment of 10 may 2001, cyprus v. turkey, application no. 25781/94; judgment of 10 may 2001, cyprus v. turkey, application no. 25781/94, para. 136; judgment of 18-121996, aksoy v. turkey, application no. 21987/93; and judgment of 28 march 2000, kaya v. turkey, application no. 22535/93). this also applies where non-state parties may be involved: tanrikulu v. turkey, 1999-iv eur. ct. h.r. 459 (1999). 31 the inter-american commission (2014: 36) has summarized some important judgments that have determined these contents, since i/a court h.r., case of velásquez rodríguez v. honduras. judgment of july 29, 1988. series c no. 4, para. 181. see also bernales rojas 2016: 279-281. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 86 (referred to the victims and their families) and social (all society)32, but in the european framework, the social dimension only implies the right to be informed (lópez guerra: 25-29). 2.3. the tribunal of inquiry as part of public inquiries the tribunal of inquiry is part of the tradition of british public inquiry and accountability in public life. it is vested with all the powers of the high court. although it meets in public, it does not exercise its function in the same way as the high court exercises its criminal or civil jurisdiction in the adversarial system. in such cases, the opposing parties present the evidence, according to which the courts make a final decision. on the contrary, the tribunal of inquiry’s duty is to find evidence of what happened, to search for the truth. for this reason, the tribunal does not accuse individuals or institutions. according to the public administration committee publications of the uk parliament (2005), parliament has traditionally made such inquiries into government failures, but ensuring independence from political parties was not easy. however, after the impact of the committee’s investigations on the marconi wireless and telegraph company agreement (which chesterton said “had concluded [in 1913] as such affairs always conclude in modern england, with a formal verdict and a whitewashing committee”), the tribunal of inquiry (evidence) act 192133 was passed. many of those tribunals were now chaired by judges, who were considered more independent than members of parliament. this act was in force until the inquiries act 2005 was passed34. the search for truth is so important that act 1921 imposed no limitations on the tribunal’s control over its procedure, deadline and rules of evidence. it also operates under the inquisitorial approach in which truth is the fundamental goal, and it is the members of the tribunal and not those from the parties who are responsible for finding it (walsh, 1997). this was very well explained by lord saville (1998) during his opening statement of the second bloody sunday inquiry: “an inquiry like the present inquiry is quite different. here the tribunal takes the initiative in trying to ascertain the truth. unlike an adversarial contest, it is for the tribunal to seek all the relevant material. its task is not to decide the matter in favour of one party or side or another. indeed, from the point of view of the tribunal, there are no parties or sides. there will, of course, be those who have material evidence to give or who have a legitimate interest in challenging such evidence, but the tribunal will not treat them as sides or parties in an adversarial contest, but rather as a means of seeking out the truth”. about the first tribunal of inquiry, its chair, lord widegery (1972), said in his report: “(…) the inquiry was essentially a fact32 see the inter-american commission (2014: para. 70 and 71) and the office of the united nations high commissioner for human rights (2006: para. 35 and 36). 33 available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/geo5/11-12/7/section/1/enacted (last retrieved 19/02/2020). 34 available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/12/contents (last retrieved 19/02/2020). josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 87 finding exercise (…) the bloody sunday first tribunal was not concerned with making moral judgments; its task was to try and form an objective view of the events”. in other words, there is no litigation neither plaintiff nor defendant, neither prosecutor nor accused (blom-cooper 2019). sir ian kennedy, chair of the bristol royal infirmary inquiry (1998-2001), summarised the functions that the inquiry had regularly accomplished under the act 1921: “the recognition and identification of different, genuine perceptions of the truth; learning; healing; catharsis; prescribing; and accountability”35. the “six cardinal principles” to be applied to the procedure of these tribunals were set out by lord salmond (1966, p. 17-18) in the report on these tribunals that he presented to parliament36: 1. “before any person becomes involved in an inquiry, the tribunal must be satisfied that there are circumstances which affect them and which the tribunal proposes to investigate. 2. before any person who is involved in an inquiry is called as a witness, they should be informed of any allegations made against them and the substance of the evidence in support of them. 3. they should be given an adequate opportunity to prepare their case and of being assisted by legal advisers and their legal expenses should normally be met out of public funds. 4. they should have the opportunity of being examined by their own solicitor or counsel and of stating their case in public at the inquiry. 5. any material witnesses they wish to call at the inquiry should, if reasonably practicable, be heard. 6. they should have the opportunity of testing by cross-examination conducted by their own solicitor or counsel any evidence which may affect them”. these principles were not statutorily enforceable, and yet they were adopted. according to blom-cooper (2019), these principles “carried strong overtones of adversarial litigation”, as sir richard scott (lord justice of appeal) had already stated in his report of the inquiry into the export of defence equipment and dual-use goods to iraq and related prosecutions (1996). the reason for this was the presence of either a cross-examination or lawyers representing their clients’ interests, which made tribunals of inquiries turn into lis. on the other hand, lord salmond (1966, p. 29) had made another recommendation that emphasised the perception that the tribunal of inquiries is sliding to the judiciary: the tribunal should be chaired by “a judge of high standing”. 35 see purdue (2009: 952). 36 lord salmond proposed them after the critics that lord denning’s inquiry into the profumo affair (1963) made arise. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 88 a strong legalism can be detected within the perception of a tribunal of inquiry. according to judith shklar37: first, judges are more reliable than politicians because the former are considered to be acting under the law, while the latter are considered to be acting under sectarian political ideologies; second, the law is thought to be neutral and objective, while politics seem uncontrolled; third, the law aims for justice, while politics for expediency. for these reasons, the law and the judges are considered “intrinsically virtuous” and, thus, superior to politics. in order to statutorily clarify the method of the tribunal of inquiry, ensure the inquisitorial approach, and move away from the adversarial system and the gravity field of the judiciary, the inquiries act 2005 was passed. it included, according to blom-cooper (2019, conclusions), two crucial reforms: “the establishment of a commission of inquiry that determines how and why the event concerned happened; and does not duplicate the finding of culpability of any individuals which is the remit of established courts of law. second, the 2005 act adopted the changed practice of investigation without any right of the witness to be alerted to potential criticism before giving evidence”. 3. legal culture and bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry 3.1. context truth is a fundamental claim of the gender, racial or national groups that have suffered severe violations of their rights, as in northern ireland (lawther, 2014; mcevoy, 2013; and campbell & ní aoláin, 2002). considering teitel’s classification of transitional justice, bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry showed the evolution of transitional justice from the second to the third phase within european territory, the results of which have impacted the global notion and current practice of transitional justice. in any case, the transitional justice system does not replace the adversarial criminal justice system, and families and human rights organizations are still waiting for formal accusations of murder or manslaughter against the soldiers and officers involved in the bloody sunday shootings38. nevertheless, the truth about how and why it happened—which is what a tribunal of inquiry is supposed to achieve—remains as important as determining public and individual accountability for it. as ulpiano once stated, justice is “the firm and continuous will to give each one his own”. establishing the truth is, therefore, the first step towards it, and this objective will be a shared claim among many cultural expressions surrounding the bloody sunday inquiries. the two bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry were settled under the act 1921. according to the act, this occurs on “rare occasions”, which explains its exceptional nature. a tribunal of inquiry had to be set up, according to lord salmond, chair of the royal commission on tribunals of inquiry (1966, p. 16), “when crises of public 37 quoted by blom-cooper 2019, conclusions. 38 at the moment, only one soldier is going to be charged, but none of the officers. https://www.theguardian. com/uk-news/2019/mar/14/bloody-sunday-trial-will-test-limits-justice-northern-ireland (last retrieved 09/03/2020). josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 89 confidence occur, the evil, if it exists, shall be exposed so that it may be rooted out; or if it does not exist, the public shall be satisfied that in reality there is no substance in the prevalent rumours and suspicions by which they have been disturbed”. this crisis is “about the alleged misconduct of ministers or other public servants” (royal commission on tribunals of inquiry, 1966, p. 10) and, certainly, the bloody sunday events constituted one of those rare occasions: it was the first time that the british government publicly applied such violence during a peaceful march (campbell, 2013). although the tribunals of inquiries are not courts and the procedures within them are not trials under the adversarial system, they have been acting similarly, which was particularly evident in the bloody sunday inquiries. it seems that the presence of judges and certain procedural principles brought the tribunal of inquiries closer to courts and trials. if, as in the following pages, trials (understood within its broad sense) can be considered important tools for maintaining and transmitting legal culture while contributing to binding the system together39, it was clear that the widgery tribunal and its report did not contribute to that. instead, they fuelled the conflict in northern ireland by exposing the futility of peaceful civil rights marches against internment and peaceful political associations. the result was that people preferred the ira’s solutions over constitutional politics and law (campbell 2013). this was the situation that saville tribunal should resolve. with these points in mind, the following pages will focus on the legal culture in the two bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry, as well as the importance of establishing the truth as an essential part of justice, revealing different ways and features throughout history. legal culture expressions must be understood within a remarkable amount of high, popular, commercial or minority legal culture expressions that also include complaints, protest and resistance against the conflict in northern ireland. they refer to the independence of the republic of ireland, the conflict in northern ireland, the troubles and, even more specifically, the bloody sunday events40. studies have been carried out all of them within the scope of cultural theory, media studies, visual arts, and the emerging field of social memory studies41. regarding bloody sunday in particular, they list different types of cultural expressions such as films, dramas, poetry, visual arts like willie doherty’s work or the murals of bogside artist (the brothers tom and william kelly, and kevin hasson), among others. on the other hand, a list of 39 this idea is defended by friedman, 1969 and brunner 2003, as can be seen infra. it is taken as a central premise in this article. 40 in any event, talking about the “irish culture” is very complicated, according to the studies about these cultural expressions on the conflict in northern ireland. it can push us to a metaphysical idea of nation frequently rooted in hegemonic visions of it. however, it drives to omit the plurality and richness of individual and social points of view on it and to fall often in unilateral hegemonic visions of the history of one community, pretending to be the standard or universal face to other visions. this idea of national culture is rejected, for example, in gillespie 2008 regarding irish cinema and the irish-themed films. 41 see among others gleitman (2001), herron and lynch (2007), campbell and herron (2008), gillespie (2008: 212 ff), conway 2010, moi (2011), pötzsh (2011), clark (2012). legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 90 tv programmes about the troubles and bloody sunday is available at cain42. margo harkin’s tv documentary bloody sunday – a derry diary (2010 final version) can be considered part of them. even pop-music echoed the event—see john lennon and yoko ono’s sunday bloody sunday (1972), from the album some time in new york city (1972). they criticized the internments and shootings during the march of 30th january 1972. lennon’s album included one more song on the internment, the luck of the irish, which was inspired by a civil march in london (1971) he had attended. however, lennon thought that a new song denouncing the bloody sunday events was necessary. bloody sunday also inspired paul and linda mccartney to write give ireland back to the irish (1972)43. sunday bloody sunday is also the title of a u2’s song, in the album war (1983). the lyrics approach the end of the violence in northern ireland, and u2 members always stated that “this is not a rebel song”. still, u2’s song is played at the end of the film bloody sunday by greengrass, which was released at the sundance festival in 2002. it was the same year that sunday, by macdougall and mcgovern, was also released. both films are seen as two memories-making movies intended to search for the truth, although their perspective on the events is different (pötzsch, 2011, pp. 211-213). bloody sunday was mainly inspired by mullan’s book eyewitness bloody sunday (1997)44. this work focuses on the events of 30th of january and coincides with the widgery findings45, endorsing all responsibility for bloody sunday to the parachute regiment and exempting political and military leaders. on the contrary, sunday comes to the opposite conclusion. the directors went further, also addressing the years before bloody sunday by conducting a thorough investigation over three years. the research allowed them to understand bloody sunday within a wider historical context46, and to conclude that high political and military levels were involved in the military operation. as a cover-up, the widgery tribunal was thought to have denied justice to the victims and their families, which fuelled the conflict in northern ireland during the following years (pötzsh 2011, pp. 215-218)47. 42 available at https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/media/tv10yrs.htm cain has also compiled a list of films on the conflict in northern ireland, including the troubles and bloody sunday. available at https://cain. ulster.ac.uk/images/cinema/nimovies.htm (last retrieved 09/03/2020). the list also features films covering the guilford four (sheridan’s in the name of the father, 1993) and the birmingham six (beckham’s the investigation: inside a terrorist bombing, 1990). both are related to their corresponding trials too. 43 it was released as a single and recorded by the new mccartney’s band, the wings. it was considered proira and banned in the uk. 44 mullan was himself an eyewitness of bloody sunday massacre; he was 15 years old. 45 according to pötzsh (2011, p 214): “the killings were entirely unjustified (…) were carried out by an elite army unit out of control that bears sole responsibility for the fateful events. the soldiers lied about their conduct, yet without endorsement by military command or state authorities. none of the dead and wounded were armed. even though the ira did fire some shots that day, these shots did not influence the course of events in any way (…) the killings exacerbated the conflict (…)”. 46 it is interesting to underline that most of the scenes were filmed in the areas and streets in derry where bloody sunday happened. 47 campbell (2013) remembers that 1972 was the bloodiest year in a thirty-year struggle: 445 people were killed from february till december. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 91 now that the context is clear, the expressions of the legal culture revolving around the bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry will be discussed below. these expressions were mainly reports, marches and demonstrations, but also in poems and even theatre plays. they came from national and international civil rights organizations, political activists, bloody sunday’ victims and their families, people who attended the march in derry on 30th january, as well as journalists, legal scholars or scientists, legal practitioners and legislators. they all placed truth as the main content of justice, and judges as the best positioned to establish the truth. although they shared this starting point, their objectives and results differed. 3.2. trauma, anger and disappointment: legal culture on widgery inquiries during the 70s and 80s as mentioned above, the widgery tribunal and its report brought deceit and, thus, profound frustration. many people who attended the march on 30th january 1972 and the human rights association were unhappy with the widgery report, and the families of the injured and dead felt humiliated and offended as well (mccann 2006). however, they were not only in moral pain or trauma48, but also had to deal with being considered terrorists49. one of the earliest reactions to the widgery report was the document elaborated by the civil rights movement “to tell the world, through the eyes of derry citizens, what happened in their city on sunday 30th january 1972” (1972). this document can be seen as an example of the counter-hegemonic legal culture at that time since it represented the response of subordinate groups (ethnic-nationalist or gender groups like black people and women) against the legal culture of dominant groups (male, white, colonialist). however, they were connected to the international civil rights movement rather than to specific nationalist movements. this document stated: “the establishment of the widgery inquiry was meant to inhibit publication of eyewitness accounts and comment, shield those responsible and hide from the world descriptions of the terrible slaughter of innocent defenceless people. in speeches announcing the establishment of the inquiry both mr. reginald maudling, the british home secretary, and mr. edward heath, the british prime minister, publicly condoned the action of the british army. this pamphlet aims at telling the world, through the eyes of derry citizens, what happened to thirteen of their number on derry's bloody sunday”. there were strong suspicions that widgery tribunal was biased in order to avoid criticism about the violence that the british government applied to maintain its dominance in northern ireland. a book published by the photojournalist grimaldi (1972, 1998) was also beneficial to show these biases. grimaldi witnessed the events, and the photos that he and other 48 the deep trauma can also be explained from the violent and discriminatory environment where those people lived. about that, see hayes and campbell 2005. 49 see the families’ testimonies collected by campbell 2013. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 92 photojournalists took were essential to denounce widgery’s incomplete and biased inquiry, as noted by barcat (2014). these works can be seen as part of non-lawyerly legal culture that relied on the methods and tools provided by mass media workers, rather than those provided by lawyerly legal culture. during the first years after bloody sunday, other interesting expressions of this external legal culture emerged, revolving around those events. they also originated poetry or theatre. among several poems on bloody sunday50, a noted case in point is thomas kinsella’s butcher’s dozen: a lesson for the octave of widgery (1979)51, which is the one most closely related to the widgery inquiry and report. the title is a play on words between the popular idiom “a baker’s dozen”, which actually means 13 [it is said that during the middle ages bakers first started to add an extra thirteenth loaf of bread to ensure the correct weight by law52] while making a reference to the 13 people killed by the parachute regiment [making a carnage, as if they were butchers] during bloody sunday. the poem is “a pamphlet” written “in response to the report of the widgery tribunal… [i]n the white heat of anger”, as kinsella (dublin 1928) remarked. the poem satirically refers to the widgery tribunal and report (“a great insult”), which exonerated those responsible for the shootings53. the interesting point for our analysis is that kinsella makes the dead tell their story in court: according to the widgery report, the victim gerald donaghy was found with nail bombs in his pockets. however, in kinsella’s poem, donaghy resurrects to defend himself against this false accusation: “when a bullet stopped my breath/a doctor sought the cause of death. /he upped my shirt, undid my fly/twice he moved my limbs awry, / and notice nothing. by and by/ a soldier, with his sharper eye,/beheld the four elusive rockets/stuffed in my coat and trouser pockets./yes, they must be strict with us, /even in death so treacherous!”. although widgery blocked the testimony of many important bloody sunday witnesses, kinsella was calling “to the stand” the impossible witnesses, the dead, to reveal the hidden truth that widgery did not allow to come to light. 50 as manifestations of poetry on specific bloody sunday events we have several poems: the road to derry, by seamus heaney, written like a song after the funeral of the 13 dead people during bloody sunday but not published until 1997, in derry journal, in commemoration of 25th anniversary of that [available at https:// issuu.com/derryjournal/docs/savillereport/28]. heaney defended in his essay place and displacement that “poets did bear a “political responsibility” and that form was a powerful way of fulfilling this responsibility” (quoted in clark, 2012, p. 285). it is also derek mahon’s derry morning (1982); paul muldoon’s the year of the sloes, for ishi, a poem about bloody sunday but where muldoon talks about the last tribe of californian indians; seamus deane’s after derry, 30th january 1972, written in 1972 and published in 1988; gerry dorrity’s one sunday or i remember, by sharon meenan and killian mullan’s, among others. many of these poems are available at http://www.troublesarchive.com/artforms/poetry/piece/. a wider selection of poetry about bloody sunday must be found on campbell and herron, 2008. 51 available at https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bsunday/kinsella.htm and http://www.troublesarchive.com/ artforms/poetry/piece/butchers-dozen-a-lesson-for-the-octave-of-widgery this poem was published firstly in 1972, in dublin. 52 this is the most accepted explanation about the origin of this expression, according to encyclopaedia britannica. available at https://www.britannica.com/story/why-is-a-bakers-dozen-13 53 quoted in clark, 2012, p. 379. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 93 regarding its content, the poem accuses lord justice widgery of not doing his job correctly by siding with the british army and then leaving the other party—the victims— without their chances to speak their truth. it is, therefore, the poet who helped them to do so. however, he delves into the improper adversarial approach of the inquiry. as for the form, by using a couplet, kinsella ironically criticizes british rationality and order. as clark (2012, p. 381) says, “kinsella’s use of couplet, whose high point came in the eighteenth century, mocks an enlightenment sensibility that cherished the values of freedom, tolerance and ordervirtues the british associate with the national character but which, kinsella implies, have undermined by imperial greed. thus the sense of order in the rhymes is ironic; kinsella satirizes the tribunal’s attempt to bring order to an event that in reality is too complex for simple verdicts”. similarly, the widgery tribunal and report served to frame the play the freedom of the city: a play in two acts, first performed in 1973 and written by brian friel (knockmoyle, northern ireland, 1929 greencastle, ireland, 2015)54. russell (2013, p. 101) believes that the work contains a “balanced critic of both brutal british imperialism and violent myth-imbued irish republicanism”. although friel had taken part in the civil rights march on 30th january in derry, he was feeling increasingly disappointed by irish nationalism55. inspired by bloody sunday and subsequent research, friel’s play tells a story that starts in 1970. it does not uniquely recreate or criticise the widgery tribunal, but also tries to show and reflect on how “brute facts” are transformed “into myth” through the experience of three civil rights protesters—lily, skinner and michael—that are eventually murdered during the march, as well as through “the extravagant distortions of those events conjured by various ‘witnesses’” (gleitman, 2001: 94). among these “witnesses” friel included the participants in a tribunal investigating the three marchers’ death. the writer wrote his play while the widgery tribunal was investigating the events and widgery himself can be recognised in the judge character, when he quotes real widgery’s words “a fact-finding exercise” to answer the question “did the security forces initiate the shooting or did they merely reply to it?” however, friel takes the findings beyond the tribunal of inquiry into a more comprehensive social investigation and discussion on recent irish history. 3.3. to set the truth: the justice campaign and other expressions of legal culture during the 1990s as mentioned above, one of the most important reasons for launching a second inquiry was the impulse generated by the justice campaign and investigations promoted by the very victims and their families in order to “set the truth” (campbell, 2013) and for the subsequent acquittal on terrorism charges. this initiative would serve to heal the “double injury” caused by the massacre and lies that the british authorities imposed on these events (herron and lynch 2007, p. 6). it also drew the world’s attention to what 54 carthaginians, by mcguiness, also deals with bloody sunday but not directly with the tribunal of inquiry. 55 according to richard rankin russell (2013: 101), his father has served on the derry corporation as a nationalist councillor. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 94 happened on 30th january in the streets of derry and the biased and unfair nature of the widgery tribunal and the resulting report56. this justice campaign is a moving display of popular legal culture claiming truth as the main content of justice57. at the same time, it provided a peaceful and non-sinn féin-influenced announcement of the fact that britain’s dominant legal culture had lost its credibility and political legitimacy. however, the justice campaign started and spread later, during the 1990s. until then, the annual events in derry (conway 2010) commemorating the bloody sunday victims can also be found as a form of popular legal culture. the main goal of these events was to maintain their memories alive. nicra organized the first memorial march in 1973, but they had lost social influence, so sinn féin organised the following commemorations until the end of the 1980s. however, many families of the victims were not happy with the presence of sinn féin and walked away from these commemorations. they also seemed to have got used to the injustice and trauma that come from being seen as families of terrorists (campbell 2013). these tributes can be understood as part of the spontaneous popular legal culture to which sinn féin gave a political nuance of counter-hegemonic reaction against british dominance in northern ireland. the justice campaign began when the families tried to take control of the bloody sunday commemorations. the first step in this direction was the bloody sunday initiative (bsi), encouraged by some victims’ families like tony doherty and political activists like robin perceval (born in liverpool) or, later, ewan mccann. mccann was in bogside and witnessed the massacre. the first meeting was organized with the help of a paper written by percival in collaboration with doherty, the bloody sunday trust (1989), addressing the ruling body of derry sinn féin, and declared its intention to draw national and international attention on bloody sunday “as a justice issue” (campbell 2013). in the end, they decided to name the new organization the bloody sunday initiative (bsi). the first decision of this new organization was to commission mccann to write a report on what happened during that fateful 30th january. mccann researched and collected families and friends’ interviews and memories. the book, entitled bloody sunday in derry: what really happened, was published in 1992, coinciding with the 20th anniversary. they also planned the 1990 anniversary as part of a weekend dedicated to human rights, but it turned out to be a terrible tragedy when the ira bombed british army patrols during the march, killing one protester. despite the shock, the bsi scheduled another weekend of events in 1991. the events were entitled “towards justice”. interestingly, they planned different activities such as debates on women and inequality, christians and oppression or censorship and a dramatization, as well as discussions “on knowing your rights when arrested or 56 including english people like labor party mp, jeremy corbyn, singers like peter gabriel, actors, among others. see campbell, 2013. 57 see once again the 4,29 minutes of marko hankin’s bloody sunday -a derry diary, available at http:// www.besomproductions.co.uk/sunday.html previously, the marchers have broken a big banner with the image of the front page of the widgery report. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 95 harassed on the streets”. a turning point in the process of engaging families in a justice campaign came when the release of the birmingham six was broadcasted on tv, the six of them brimming with joy in front of the central criminal court at old bailey (london). this event proved that justice campaigns could be successful. the context at that time illustrated a new pro-human rights era, especially in the uk, which contributed to bringing attention to the severe injustices committed against northern irish people and to the biased trials that resulted in charges of terrorism and many years of prison sentences. the bestknown cases were the guilford four and the birmingham six. their release provided a new impulse to revive the public attention concerning the bloody sunday events and raise the possibility that the victims and their families were not terrorists. the bloody sunday justice campaign (bsjc) was born in 1992 independent of the bsi, and had three specific demands: “the repudiation of widgery and the institution of a new inquiry; a formal acknowledgement of innocence of all the victims; and the prosecution of those responsible for the death and injuries”. members added: “we welcome into membership anyone who supports our objectives irrespective of religion or political persuasion” (campbell 2013). therefore, the justice campaign was not nationalistic, religious or politically biased but transversal, gathering all the people who were willing to share and work for those goals (campbell 2013). on the other hand, it showed an idea of justice as truth that finally included the demand for the entire acquittal of the informal charges of terrorism of the bloody sunday victims and their families, as a result of the widgery report. this is precisely what margo harkin filmed in her documentary bloody sunday – a derry diary. the increasing interest in what really happened on bloody sunday had led to other vital investigations that reflect the growing international legal culture of human rights and the connection between justice and truth. a case in point is the researches contained in the report submitted to the special rapporteur on summary and arbitrary executions by the british irish right watch (1994) and, especially, in walsh’ study (1997)58. a nongovernmental organization presented the former while a legal scholar presented the latter, but both pointed to the numerous biases in the widgery tribunal and report. among the situations that gave the tribunal a biased image in favour of the army, walsh and the british irish rights watch pointed out the composition of the tribunal: widgery was not only the lord chief justice of england but also a former officer of the british army. his military past might explain some of his statements (report of the tribunal 1972), such as: “though i hesitate to make a positive finding against a deceased man, i was much impressed by sergeant k’s evidence”. another example would be when he (widgery) explained why none of the soldiers got injured, even if they were cross-shooting: “the soldiers escaped injury by reasons of their superior field-craft and training”. 58 along those years, many books or reports were published containing the investigations that private individuals like journalists, legal scholars and other kinds of researcher, families of the victims and human rights associations made. among them: mccafferty (1989); mccann, shields and hannigang (1992); british iris right watch (1994); mcclean (1997); mullan (1997); walsh (1997, 2000), pringle and jacobson (2000); hayes and campbell (2005) (the book list is available at https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bsunday/read.htm). legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 96 furthermore, the location where the sittings took place threw some doubts about its impartiality: the tribunal did not sit in derry but coleraine, a mostly protestant town, because they believed that the lives of the soldiers involved in bloody sunday were in danger. for this reason, the soldiers remained anonymous, which did not apply to the other eyewitnesses—catholics in a protestant town. many important eyewitnesses were also excluded, such as the members of the demonstration’s security committee. according to the terms of reference (which focus only on “the streets of londonderry on the afternoon of sunday 30 january”), there were many restrictions related to the time or space of the findings. for example, only the shootings in the streets where the riots took place were considered. however, according to lord widgery, the tribunal was “essentially a fact-finding exercise” on one particular question: “who fired first?” to which widgery responded: “i am entirely satisfied the first firing in the courtyard was directed at the soldiers”. it is also important to note that the tribunal oddly collected from the evidence the police files of the deceased and some wounded in order to ascertain whether they had been convicted or suspected of firearms offences or paramilitary activities. it was eventually discovered that the secretary of the tribunal privately influenced the substance and presentation of the tribunal’s report. 3.4. legal culture on the saville tribunal and report: legalism, colonialism and new legitimation for british law the large social reaction and mobilisation analysed above proved that widgery’s findings and final report were biased, preventing a better understanding of the bloody sunday facts and reasons59. twenty-six years later, in 1998, the british government admitted that the first tribunal of inquiry was not impartial, and set up a new tribunal while recognising the influence of the protest and campaign asking for justice as truth. it happened when tony blair was prime minister of the united kingdom. in his statement to the house of commons—establishing a new inquiry into bloody sunday on thursday 29th january 1998—mr blair said (1998)60: “bloody sunday was a tragic day for all concerned. we must all wish it had never happened. our concern now is simply to establish the truth, and close this painful chapter once and for all. madam speaker, members of the families of the victims (…), have conducted a long campaign to this end. i have heard some of their remarks over recent years and have been struck by their dignity. most do not want recrimination. they do not want revenge. but they do want the truth. i believe that it is in the interests of everyone that the truth is established, 59 like on many other occasions, this tribunal of inquiry was also accused of whitewashing. 60 available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmhansrd/vo980129/debtext/80129-06. htm and at https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bsunday/tb29198.htm. josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 97 and told. it is also the way forward to the necessary reconciliation which will be such an important part of building a secure future for the people of northern ireland. i ask all sides of the house to support our proposal for this inquiry”. on this occasion, three members formed the second tribunal, all of whom were judges: lord saville, an english law lord, and other two non-english judges from commonwealth countries: edward somers, from new zealand, and william hoyt, from canada61. the second tribunal of inquiry took 12 years to complete its report62, which was compiled in 10 volumes. compared to the widgery report, these new findings and report were clearly different in terms of extension and duration, contributing, thus, to highlighting again that the widgery tribunal and report were biased. the saville report concluded that the bloody sunday victims were not the first to shoot63, meaning they were not terrorists. nevertheless, blom-cooper (2019) insists on that the saville tribunal also opted for an investigation of the facts in the form of a courtroom, just like the widgery tribunal, therefore making the tribunal of inquiry drift from investigation to litigation, from a truth commission to a court. as saville was a lawyer, he could not prevent his lawful mindset from conducting the findings “lawyerly”, and the legalism of adversarial procedures in criminal or civil trials was always present64. this fact implies the continuity of legalism within lawyers themselves as part of the legal culture even when it comes to this kind of tribunals, and also explains the long duration of the inquiry. in any case, the saville inquiry also inspired cultural expressions in art, like bloody sunday. scenes from the saville report, a play written by mark norton-taylor (buckinghamshire, uk, 1944). although it mainly addresses the saville inquiry and its hearings, it also refers to the widgery inquiry at some points. the play was released in 2005, five years before the saville’s final report was published, and is considered a piece of verbatim theatre that follows the documentary theatre tradition. also, it is written using real words and opinions (lachman, 2007; monks, 2013). trials are a common topic in verbatim theatre, which puts the theatrical procedure of law on the stage of a real theatre. the work scenes from the saville report is part of a series of tribunal plays at the tricycle theater (london). in this case, norton-taylor 61 cain: events of bloody sunday-chronology. available on https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/events/bsunday/ chron.htm 62 available at http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20101103103930/http://report.bloody-sunday -inquiry.org/ [retrieved 17/03/2017] 63 saville report is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/report-of-the-bloody-sunday -inquiry 64 “the elaborate preparation of written statements from potential witnesses, prepared by professional lawyers contracted out by the inquiry team; the oral examination of witnesses by counsel to the inquiry; crossexamination by counsel for interested parties (…); and constant legal submissions by counsel, resulting in applications to the courts for judicial review on two aspects of the inquiry –the anonymity of soldier witness and the venue for the oral evidence of former soldier” (blom-cooper, 2019, conclusions) legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 98 deals with a tribunal of inquiry. no matter how non-judiciary its nature was (especially when even its members used to not to care about it), in the end, it was just another way of showing law in action, besides getting it performed on stage. in norton-taylor’s scenes from the saville report, there is also a peculiar encounter between the theatrical dimensions of tribunals—even if they are not part of the judiciary— and their display on stage. it is the theatre of law, in its strictest sense, that reinforces the legal education of the audience, beyond legal texts, institutions, and schools. this piece was not the only verbatim work on the saville inquiry. mccann’s interviews to victims’ families who took part in those inquiries—collected in the book bloody sunday inquiry-the families speak out (2006)—inspired another documentary play entitled heroes with their hands in the air (2007), by brady. the play allows to revoice and re-witness events like bloody sunday and brings them back to life65. it seems that the saville report (2010) made the british government recognise that soldiers and officers did not do well, and apologised. it also ended with prime minister cameron publicly acknowledging the damage and humiliation that the british government had unnecessarily inflicted on the victims of the bloody sunday and their families. on the other hand, blair and cameron’s speeches gave the impression of a serious commitment to the rule of law and human rights in northern ireland, as a guarantee of justice, not only from a cultural perspective but also from its structural and substantive component. thus, it was considered very necessary to restore people’s confidence in the law. according to walsh (2000, pp. 283-284): “…not only did the law fail to protect 28 innocent civilians from being shot dead or wounded by soldiers, but it also appears that the judicial process was deployed to cover up the full extent of the culpability of the soldiers and their military and political masters. it cannot be assumed, however, that bloody sunday was totally unique… indeed at one level, bloody sunday might be considered as the most example of the rule of law being shamelessly prostituted in the service of the partisan security and narrow political interest of the state (…) in the light of the good friday peace agreement it would appear that effort are finally being made to lay the foundations for restoration of the rule of law and justice in northern ireland (…) the failure of law and justice encapsulated by bloody sunday is so fundamental in its nature and extend that it is seared into the collective consciousness of the nationalist community a fundamental distrust in the capacity of the law and judicial process to protect them against hostile force…”. 65 according to mccormick (2013/2014, p. 14), “the re-witnessing of events during heroes allows the exposition of the audience’s own memories that surround 30th january 1972, and the events that followed. these memories, together with new ones produced through the experience of the documentary theatre, cannot help but increase the audience’s involvement in the subject matter.” josefa-dolores ruiz-resa the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 99 taking into account the second inquiry and its results towards the truth, the recognition and the re-evaluation of the victims, their families and the catholic northern irish community seem to have taken a good step towards a peace process that remains66. nevertheless, the strong colonial and elitist british accent—british/english dominant culture—remaining in the peace process and the set-up of the saville inquiry has been criticised (bentley, 2016): it was once again chaired by an english lord justice, ignoring that the british government itself ordered the shootings. this fact eventually contaminated the neutrality and impartiality of the search for truth. the sincerity of the government’s apologies has also been questioned, not only cameron’s (2010) but also blair’s (1998) during the statement that established the second inquiry67. they both contributed to maintaining the archetypal colonial discourse because it is another sign of the fantasy or idealisation of british military chivalry and heroism. moreover, the colonialist aspect helps to maintain the peace process as a permanent, yet never-ending situation (a “process”, indeed) where the never-ending conflict between two nationalist religious communities can now be managed without violence. hence, the british government imposes the idea that northern ireland is divided into two irreconcilable ethnic-national identities between which it is the arbitrator that brings understanding and peace. northern ireland seems to be inhabited by irrational uncivilised sectarian people who would kill each other and need someone to guide them68. but this depiction seems to be more imaginary than real, and the british state cannot be the arbitrator or ruler of anything related to the conflict in northern ireland, as it so much a part of it. therefore, the second inquiry and the peace process are still suspected of bias, condescending and manipulating colonialism (bentley, 2016). conclusions the events and inquiries around bloody sunday allow concluding that truth is an idea closely linked to justice and law and that it has an important social dimension. likewise, justice as truth is strongly connected to judges’ functions insofar as they are considered to be more neutral and impartial than politicians. this conception is especially accepted in cases of serious human rights violations. in any case, such ideas are part of legalism, which is also very widespread within the popular and high legal culture. 66 the positive impact of the second tribunal of inquiry on the peace process has been analysed in aiken 2015. the author assesses to what extent this inquiry has permitted to advance important aspects related to truth and justice. in any event, as said at the beginning of the article, the bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry did not mean the renouncement to the criminal justice system in order to charge those who shot the victims. see walsh 2000, p. 284-312. 67 it was clear that the goal was not to charge anyone of murder or something like that, as mr blair himself stated (1998): “madam speaker, let me make clear that the aim of the inquiry is not to accuse individuals or institutions or invite fresh recriminations but to establish the truth about what happened on that day, so far as that can be achieved at 26 years' distance”. 68 the irrationality and less civilization within irish or scottish are part of racist and classist prejudices very rooted in english, who consider themselves civilized and morally superior and then legitimated to rule the others. they are present even in very well english defenders of human liberties like john stuart mill. however, mill showed expressly his worry about the iniquities that english inflicted to irish. see mill, 1891, pp. 300-302. legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday the age of human rights journal, 15 (december 2020) pp. 73-104 issn: 2340-9592 doi: 10.17561/tahrj.v15.5777 100 legalism also makes truth commissions lean towards the judiciary and uses some essential principles of adversarial procedures when they are chaired by judges. however, judges sometimes fail to do their job, especially during widgery inquiries, which are suspected of being biased into justifying the british politics on northern ireland. even the saville inquiries did not escape from the suspicion of partiality, meaning a kind of undercover colonialism, which is not repressive now, and which accepts and regrets the terrible mistakes of the past. despite its limitations, the saville tribunal and report might never have happened without the varied social reactions against the widgery tribunal and report. these reactions expressed, remembered and claimed an indelible social idea or value about justice as truth that authorities cannot forget as long as they want the law to be considered legitimate and, subsequently, respected. in any case, legal culture does not only work as passive acceptance but also as formal or informal actions in the pursuit of justice, by using the legal means available and adapting them or forcing new ones. references aiken, n. t. 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(2000) bloody sunday and the rule of law in northern ireland. palgravemacmillan uk. williams, r. (1983, 1991) writing in society. london: verso. received: april 29th 2020 accepted: june 25th 2020 articles josefa-dolores ruiz-resa legal culture on justice and truth: the tribunals of inquiry about bloody sunday 1. introduction 2. conceptual frame 2.1. legal culture 2.2. truth as part of justice 2.3. the tribunal of inquiry as part of public inquiries 3. legal culture and bloody sunday tribunals of inquiry 3.1. context 3.2. trauma, anger and disappointment: legal culture on widgery inquiries during the 70s and 80s 3.3. to set the truth: the justice campaign and other expressions of legal culture during the 1990s 3.4. legal culture on the saville tribunal and report: legalism, colonialism and new legitimation for british law conclusions references corresponding author: james c field, phd werklund school of education university of calgary email: jfield@ucalgary.ca journal of applied hermeneutics march 12, 2017 the author(s) 2017 losing the so-called paradigm war: does our confusion, disarray, and retreat contribute to the advance? james c field abstract in this article, i argue that what is commonly lamented as the decline of qualitative research might be because of our own inability to reveal something true about being-in-the-world. four problems with qualitative work are identified: making what is obvious inescapable, confusion around what constitutes qualitative research and phenomenology, uniformed and disrespectful mixing of methods, and devolution into “little t” truth. i finish by calling for bold, evocative interpretation, and posing the question: what is the nature of the revolution that hermeneutics can foment? keywords qualitative research, hermeneutics, phenomenology mixed methods, bricoleur, multiple realties, truth after being a coauthor on an article in the journal of applied hermeneutics recently about the resurgence of positivist science, framed in terms of losing the war, i was left with a niggling feeling that has grown into an awful question that “cannot possibly be true, but just might be true.” it sits uncomfortably between knowing and not knowing, hope and dread. so, in this spirit, let me ask this dreadful question: what if the fact that qualitative research is “losing the war” is not simply because of some hostile take-over from science, or a creeping form of alt-right totalitarianism, (although i am sorely tempted to go with this interpretation), but because of our own failure, in far too many cases, to reveal, and to claim, boldly, courageously, something true, something that matters about being in the world and doing interpretive work? i can hear the howl that will go up in response to this question-assertion, and rightly so perhaps, from good field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 2 folks who do good work. i submit this piece under a “guilty as charged” verdict, and i will have to wait; indeed, i look forward to what the “sentencing” might be. the trial is not over, i am sure. however, since i call for courage in doing interpretive work, i think it is time i heeded my own council. so, let me ask that we consider, briefly, the possibility that the enemy might be within. like the democratic party in the united states, perhaps it is time we stopped laying the blame for qualitative research’s decline entirely on someone or something else, and took a good, hard look at ourselves. i offer here an initial foray into what might be termed “the crimes we ourselves have committed.” making what is patently obvious completely inescapable, and/or finding exactly what we are looking for i remember the sting of the first phrase on one of my first graduate papers, from a supervisor whose style has long since disappeared: “this is all very literate,” he wrote in the margin of the third page, “the trouble is that you have made what is patently obvious completely inescapable.” an unkind remark perhaps, made over 30 years ago, but i think it is still a relevant and appropriate critique of far too much qualitative work. i read too many qualitative studies that end with “insights” like this: teachers need to develop relationships with their students; students need to trust their teachers; classrooms need to be safe spaces; principals need to support their teachers; and, hang on to your hats, staffs need to talk to each other. in short, a lot of wha t we know gets confirmed, but nothing new is revealed. part of the problem here might spring from devoting too much time and space in interpretive work to scientific verification, (or should i say lincoln and guba-fication?) and not enough to interpretive revelation. note what norylk and harder (2010) have to say about their review of 37 articles on phenomenological research: it is remarkable that many of the articles reviewed in our study drew on lincoln and guba’s criteria (1985) to evaluate or justify their research. these criteria are generic to qualitative research, and were not specifically developed to evaluate phenomenological work. (p. 428) yet they are. so, it raises the question of what we are up to when we do things like this, but it also might contribute to the “much ado about nothing “charge leveled earlier. could we be squeezing out controversies, contradictions, differences, and suddenly appearing, startling insights methodologically, through things like “member checking”? i see this procedure liberally employed in qualitative work, without much thought as to what it assumes convergence around a single point and, at the same time, what it might prevent. something happens when we switch our attention from the phenomenon (die sache selbst) to the method used to generate and or confirm the truth of die sache. oddly, the very thing that has to fall way, the procedure, so that what is revealed, the substance of the matter at hand can come into view, is brought back squarely into the field of vision. we switch our attention away from the truth, “the gleaming, glistening, shining forth,” to the how and the who of the truth. in these instances, we have failed to pull out the bottom card of the scientific enterprise: that it is method and tools that yield truth. personally, i have never understood how “member checking” establishes truth or rigor. it seems to me to sail too easily past a set of questions that should trouble us these days: have we checked field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 3 for truth, or simply switched to detailing our relationship with our participants? if everyone agrees, then can we assume that it is the truth, or a truth we have found? what happens if there is disagreement, especially between the participants and the researcher? how do i treat that as a researcher? do i assume that either what i think or what my participants think, feel, or see is false? underneath these questions is the troubling question of authority: can i draw my own conclusions or insights as a researcher, or is what i have to say about a particular phenomenon confined only to what my participants attest to or agree with? i wonder if we have made the mistake of unwittingly ascribing to a simple formula: meaning=agreement= significance=truth? have we blocked a way to deeper understanding because “we are so accustomed in the contemporary world to think that the human being is the source of all ‘saying’” (capobianco, 2014, p. 92)? i think this state of affairs is exacerbated by too many of us doing research with folks who think, feel, see, and act exactly as we do: as members of the choir, we do research on the choir. little wonder, i suppose, that we often end up simply singing along, with the same old self. in this case, the projection of our pre-understandings are simply confirmed by the interpretations that return. we connect, we develop rapport, we commiserate, we become a community, and it all “resonates deeply,” to use a favorite term. but nothing happens in the research: there is no “thwarting of previous expectations,” gadamer’s now famous criterion for having any kind of experience, or dare i say, research “worthy of the name.” we may know more, as a result of the study, but do we understand differently? have we been clear about and committed to the difference? it seems to me that far too often, as researchers, we conduct our research unscathed, our viewpoints remain--expanded perhaps, but fundamentally intact. put differently, the inquiry turns out to be event-less. it constitutes research with others like the self, to find what we all deeply desire: the self-same. we ride our interpretive horses around the hermeneutic ranch without the experience of, in husserl’s evocative phrase, “being thrown from the saddle.” i think we have drifted too far away from the “life force of being,” (phusis) that ought to show up in our work, what heidegger repeatedly described as the gleaming, glistening, glimmering, glittering, glowing that is the manifestness of being to humans--the phos (light) at the very core of phainesthei (spontaneous emergence of the truth of being)—that calls forth from us wonder and astonishment and great joy, brightens, lightens and opens us, inclines our thinking toward thanking. (capobianco, 2014, p. 37) mixed (up) paradigms, approaches, and methods i use the phrase “mixed up” here, a little tongue in cheek, in three senses: first, there is a proliferation and confusion of approaches, paradigms, and methods within the so called “paradigm” of “qualitative research.” second, this condition exists within even a single tradition like phenomenology. third, it seems to me that there is a growing tendency to throw or stitch traditions together, in too many cases hastily and naively, and call the result “a mixed methods approach.” there is a kind of repetition at work here –manifesting itself in different ways. field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 4 the first sense of mixed up comes from using the term “qualitative” to represent or claim a singular paradigm (given, 2017), or a “unified field” (denzin & lincoln, 2005). i cannot see how qualitative research qualifies as a paradigm--much less a side in a war--if by paradigm we mean, a single “disciplinary matrix-commitments, beliefs, values, methods, outlooks, and so forth, shared across a discipline” (schwandt, 2007, p. 217). it is a mistake to think that “qualitative research” represents any kind of commonly shared ontology, epistemology, or cosmology, given the contradictory mix of positivistic and interpretivist approaches housed within, given the cacophony of incommensurate ideas about what constitutes truth, reality, the object of study, even who the researcher and the participants are. i think the variance “within” qualitative research is just as deep and broad as the variance “between” the so called qualitative and quantitative paradigms. put a little more strongly, and bringing the “fight” and the “fault” home, the war is within, and not just between. perhaps i am being too harsh in my judgement here, but i think the term “qualitative” has become meaningless in signaling anything of significance when paired with the word “research.” worse, its use causes confusion for anyone seeking insight into the nature of interpretive work, especially in understanding what constitutes good work that one could depend upon. the second sense of mixed up is a particular instance of the first, i think, and arises from a deepening plurality of approaches, even within a particular discipline like phenomenology. sometimes the so-called authoritative qualitative sources simply get it wrong. here is the definition of phenomenology from the sage handbook of qualitative research: “phenomenology brings the observer’s equipment to the fore and makes it part of the equation of meaningful construction and participation” (p. 1007). now whose phenomenology would that be? certainly not husserl’s, nor heidegger’s, nor sartre’s, nor merleau-ponty’s, nor gadamer’s. when did phenomenology, even when it took its interpretive, hermeneutic turn with heidegger, shift its attention from the life-world to “my equipment”? as readers, we do not know—there is not a tradition, or traditions, or a lineage of ideas/thinking laid out for us. instead, we get this laundry list of people that is supposed to count, at least in the index, as a definition: “phenomenology is a complex system of ideas associated with the works of husserl, heidegger, sartre, merleau-ponty and alfred schutz” (p. 27). yes, i agree, it is —and where is it that we get to see, and thus come to know, this “system of ideas”? it is nowhere to be found. the point is that even the folks who should know, our qualitative neighbors and friends, do not know, or if they do, then worse, they have treated phenomenology badly, have disrespected its traditions, and failed to acknowledge its revelatory power. if our friends do not respect us, why would we expect our “enemies” to? related to this is what happens in the field with phenomenological research, illustrated by the norlyk and harder (2010) study, which set out to answer the question: what makes a phenomenological study phenomenological? apparently, we cannot tell: the analysis reveals considerable variation, ranging from brief to detailed descriptions of the chosen phenomenological approach, and from inconsistencies to methodological clarity and rigor. variations, apparent inconsistencies, and omissions make it unclear what makes a phenomenological study phenomenological. there is a need for clarifying how the principles of the phenomenological philosophy are implemented in a study before publishing. (p. 429) field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 5 there it is again—that feeling of hope and despair. hope for the “methodological clarity and rigor” that exists, but despair for the variations, inconsistencies, and omissions that make it impossible to tell what makes for good phenomenological work. heidegger’s (1999) charge comes roaring back across the ages: “phenomenological research has sunk to the level of wishywashiness, to the level of the philosophical noise of the day…everything absorbs phenomenology… it is impossible to make out anything [definitive] about phenomenology” (p. 58). i am not arguing for sticking to or striving for some kind of non-existent, unattainable purity in doing phenomenological work. nor do i think we should be enslaved by our traditions -context, purpose, and people matter, and should make a difference to the why, what, and how of interpretive work. but i worry about the loss of identity and sense of goodness that seems to be occurring. something is wrong when phenomenological work confuses phenomenologists. we do not do ourselves any favors by publishing work that is not rigorous and clear, and i am not talking about the lincolning and gubafication of interpretive work, i am talking about doing work where the goodness “gleams, glistens, glitters, and glows,” where it “opens us,” and where it “inclines our thinking toward thanking.” the third sense of “mixed up,” as in mixed methods, is constituted by the mixing of techniques (in-depth interviews and surveys), approaches (phenomenology and grounded theory are a favorite, for example), and philosophical traditions (in the former instance, german idealism and quibbling, symbolic interactionists). the latter “mix,” between barney glasser and richard strauss, was in trouble from the start, and tellingly, did not last. but i digress. the point here is that such mixes-number charts and narratives, concrete particulars and abstract categories, existentialism and positivism, practical wisdom and scientific propositions, are often tossed together, at will it seems. all of this is apparently accomplished by an increasingly popular hero figure in qualitative research, the free-wheeling bricoleur, a qualitative researcher licensed, somehow, to deploy “whatever strategies, methods, and empirical materials are at hand” (lincoln & denzin, 2005, p. 4), someone who “stitches, edits, and puts slices of reality together” (p. 5). note: “the bricoleur explores the use of ethnography, pinarian currere, historiography, genre studies, psychoanalysis, rhetorical analysis, discourse analysis, content analysis, ad infinitum” (kinchloe, 2001, p. 687, my emphasis). in this superhuman capacity for ad infiintum, marvel at the bricoleur, the perspective-shifting, place-shifting, tradition mixing, tool-wielding, nietzschean “oberman,” an “action-hero” if ever there was one. should we be asking what it is that disciplines or should discipline the seemingly all powerful bricoleur? to whom or what do they answer or serve? what is it, if anything, that interrupts their will to power? does the “thing itself,” the world, have a voice, or vitality, or integrity that we need to preserve and be in the service of? to what extent does the world compose us, or are we the all-powerful “mix-masters”? where is the commitment from the bricoleur to “becoming indigenous to place” (kimmerer, 2015, p. 205)? on the other side of this, pointing not to the mixer but to the mixed, is the question of what is it that is being mixed? how? what does the mix produce—is it a whole or just the sum of disparate, conflicting parts? or am i being naïve here is something whole and integral too much to ask field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 6 for in this post-modern, post-human, and now, post-truth world? has any sense of what bennett (2001) called “cosmological coherency” been abandoned? has the “fractured future” arrived, as denzin and lincoln (2005, p. 1123) claimed it would, and is it here to stay? if we are confused and fractured why would anyone look to or depend upon us? i do not agree with charmaz (2006), however popular she has become, when she attempts to stitch grounded theory together with constructivism and, in doing so, claims to be “marrying two contrasting and competing traditions” (p. 6). in such cases, we all should be asking, what kind of marriage is it that is based on competition and contrast? is it a marriage at all, or just conflictridden co-habitation? do in-depth interviews produce the same kind of knowledge as likert scale surveys? do they proceed from the same assumptions about the way human beings are? do they treat the object of study the same, or are there different objects of study entirely? do the mixes and mix-masters simply add up-is that what the verb “to mix” means? is “mixing” the right thing to do at all? i do not think so. i want to be clear: seemingly different things do fit together, numbers can inform interpretation, or vice-versa, for example. but i do want things to be carefully braided or woven, and not simply mixed or loosely stitched. i want fine cloth to be the result, and not some hastily sewn together swatches of wool and polyester. most importantly, i want the braider/weaver to be able to explain, as all good weavers can, the why, what, and how of the weft and the weave. a wonderful example of this, where the research traditions are carefully, knowingly, and respectfully combined, in startling, poetic fashion, is robin kilmmerer’s (2015), braiding sweetgrass: indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge and the teaching of plants. it gleams, it glistens, and it shines forth. forfeiting ground to the march of “constructed, multiple realities” and “small t” truth there is also, embedded in this representation of the qualitative researcher as the bricoleur, the image of a reality constructed wholly by humans, a world of what latour (1993) calls quasi – objects, apparently subject to slicing, editing, and stitching according to human will. this is the problem that frightens me the most, and is the most life-threatening, in my opinion. it arises, partly at least, from playing it fast and loose with notions like “reality” and “truth.” the term “multiple realities” has become quite popular in the literature on qualitative research (see the assertion, commonly expressed in the theories of constructivism, for example). in most instances, i see it asserted, but rarely scrutinized or clarified, much less justified. i am afraid of statements, by researchers claiming to do interpretive work, like this: “the way we as researchers come to know reality constructs the reality we come to know” (usher, 1996, p. 39). hmm--what is it that the term “reality” refers to here? additionally, this seems to me to be a vicious circle, not a virtuous one, with no way out. even if there was a way out, how would we know if we simply and only construct the reality we know, and we can only know the reality we construct? forgotten in talk like this is the way history and reality construct us. are we prepared to give history, and the animate world, with its life-giving gifts, their due, and call them all constructivists? but hang-on, whose world, and whose reality am i talking about here—are there not multiple realities? field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 7 my first encounter with the notion of “multiple realities” was with alfred schutz (1967), in his work on the phenomenology of the life world. schutz had something specific in mind when he used the term— “as finite provinces of meaning” (p. 232). he did not mean separate, distinct mental states, multiple, individual consciousnesses, or entirely separate, independently existing worlds. there was no “this is my reality” and “that is your reality” with schutz. that is, he was careful and discriminating when he used the term: the finite provinces of meaning are not separated states of mental life in the sense that passing from one to the other would require a transmigration of the soul…they are merely names for different tensions in one and the same consciousness, and it is the same life, the mundane life, unbroken from birth to death, which is attended to in different modification. (schutz, 1967, p. 232) quite often the “multiple realities” talk is paired with assertions like this in qualitative work: “there is no ‘big t truth’ anymore, it is all ‘little t truth.’” in the face of a statement like this, i want to ask: whose “little t” truth is the truth and reconciliation commission’s? is that a mistake in the title, flowing from an erroneous ontology it should be a small t instead of a capital t? should we treat what we are hearing in the testimony about the genocide of a people, as just one version of the truth among many versions? because if this is true, then what is my ethical obligation to the other and the call to action? if it is just “their truth,” how am i enjoined to and by the other, as ricoeur (1992) asked, “over and above my willing and wanting” (gadamer, 1960/ 1996, p. xvii) to respond? let me try to come at this a little differently. what truth is gadamer (1960/1996) calling for when he asserted that i should know myself such that “the text can present itself in all its otherness, and thus assert its own truth” (p. 269)? and what truth is it that gadamer speaks to when he asserted that the critical task of hermeneutics is “to know what is asked by the distinction in operating between true prejudices or those which guarantee understanding, and false prejudices, which bring in misunderstanding,” (quoted in grondin, 2003, p. 89)? is this just another “little t” assertion, or is it the case, because i have “my own truth,” that i get to decide that what gadamer is referring to is just one more “little t” truth among many? the trouble is that individuals, with their “own reality”, and their “own truth,” in an era of “post-truth,” do get to decide—that all muslims are dangerous, that women are second class citizens, that children are sketchy, deficient beings, that meningitis can be cured with hot peppers, onions, garlic, and horseradish, and that the world is simply there as standing reserve for our projects. but there are real consequences—there is that word again—culturally devastating, life, and planet threatening ones. so, at the risk of sounding like a closet positivist, let me make another bold claim: it is big t trouble that we are all in the face of our little t truths, because donald trump has been elected president of the united states, and we are living out our lives on a dying planet. admittedly, there is a complicated, dynamic relationship between big t and little t truth, one that needs to be carefully explored and worked through, but denying one and embracing the other does not get us any further down the road in deciding how to live well together on a planet and with people we are systematically degrading and extinguishing. but there i go again making big t claims. field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 8 this brings me to the final (re)turn. i agree with the translators of the latest collection of gadamer’s work when they say: our societies are faced with this challenge where violence has become one of the arts of ‘praxes’ within traditional liberal democracies. this may be a challenge harder to face than the challenge of the sciences. can gadamer’s reading of history deal with alternate ‘readings’ and respond to them or engage them? (vandevelde & iyer, 2016, p. xxxv) how do we deal with alternate readings and understandings that are artfully and violently opposed? when interpretive conflict turns deadly, then what? should we all retreat into our own “little t” truths, or has this already happened? to some degree, i think it has. i see a real reluctance in interpretive work to defend any position fiercely and courageously, however dependent on time, place, and values it is, to draw a strong conclusion, even in the face of differing conclusions, to make any kind of bold ethical declaration about an “ought” or a “should,” however positional and contestable it might be. when we retreat, like a slow, fleeing army, from the world into the safe haven of “this is just my interpretation,” the “fading ethical intelligibility” (kroker, 2014, p. 43) of such a stance leads all too quickly to the ethical abandonment represented in the next set of statements: “who am i to judge?,” and “who am i to say?” the reasons offered for this kind of “refusal to be” are multiple: “it is hard to say, because it is all very complex,” and “things change so rapidly, that nothing holds,” and “there is no real solid ground anymore,” and “it all depends on your worldview.” i take all of these statements to be true, and i am not arguing for a lack of caution in making claims, or that tact and civility are not essential, or that being aware of the finitude and fallibility of being human is unnecessary, or that the claim the other makes on us is not tantamount to interpretive work, or even that it is not the case that truth occurs with untruth, to borrow from heidegger. but, by granting all of this, i do not think we have to make all our interpretations weak and wobbly in advance, or take back everything we say, in anticipation that we might have to change, or refuse to be bold, courageous, and evocative, because there might be another view. and please, please let us stop saying that we cannot generalize because our sample size is too small. how would we know, anyway? would that not require “a transmigration of the soul” (schutz, 1967, p. 232) to other places and times, to see and know if, in fact, what we had to say did or did not obtain? and have we not, in claiming this, made the kind of sweeping generalization that we were trying desperately to avoid in the first place? worse perhaps, does that mean we should put every sentence we utter in scare quotes? i understand that “giving oneself up to the argument of the other is an act of attentiveness” (davey 2007, p. 169), and that being attentive and open is a primary feature of interpretive work. i also understand that, in being attentive, something essential to hermeneutic understanding takes place in that “one is able to forget one’s own purposes” (gadamer, 1960/1996, p. 124). but i worry, especially in times like these, about “forgetting one’s purposes,” and constantly “giving oneself up to the argument of the other,” because it just might be that such a position, field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 9 accepts, embraces and makes light of just what it should resist. it is tolerant of that which it should raise its voice in protest. it accepts just what it should defy. it lets violence off too easy. its notion of the justice of strife is that of a weak-willed judge. it has no nerve for a real fight, which means to resist the wasteful effects of suffering. (caputo, 1987, p. 285) perhaps it is time to consider what hermeneutics might look like in an era of post-truth, where the signs of a budding totalitarianism are unmistakable, in “a society whose members act and react according to the rules of a fictitious world” (arendt, 1948/1968, p. 62). perhaps it is time that any research “worthy of the name” of hermeneutics leads not to sunny skies and safe pastures, but to thunderstorms, as caputo, (1987, p. 214) has urged, steered not by the “calm hand that guides the ship through the waves” (gadamer, 1999, p. 246), but rather by heraclitus’s lightning bolt that flashes and takes our breath away (but does not make us run away). it is in this spirit that vandevelde and iyer’s (2016) posed their not-so-friendly question: “what is the nature of the revolution that hermeneutics, lying between philosophy and history, can foment” (p. xxxv)? references arendt, h. (1948/1968). the origins of totalitarianism, part three. new york, ny: harcourt. bennett, j. (2001). the enchantment of modern life: attachments, crossings and ethics. princeton, nj: princeton university press. capobianco, r. (2014). heidegger’s way of being. toronto, on, canada: toronto university press. caputo, j. (1987)). radical hermeneutics. indianapolis, il: indiana university press. charmaz, k. (2006). constructing grounded theory. thousand oaks, ca: sage. davey, n. (2007). unquiet understanding: gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. new york, ny: suny press. denzin, n., & lincoln, y. (eds.). (2005). the sage handbook of qualitative research. thousand oaks, ca: sage. gadamer, h-g. (1999). heraclitus studies. in d.c. jacobs (ed.), the presocratics after heidegger (pp. 203-247). new york, ny: suny press. gadamer, h-g. (1960/1996). truth and method (j. weinsheimer & d.g. marshall, trans.). new york, ny: continuum. given, l. (2017). it’s a new year…so let’s stop the paradigm wars. international journal of qualitative methods, 16, 1-2. field journal of applied hermeneutics 2017 article 5 10 grondin, j. (2003). the philosophy of gadamer. montréal, qc: mcgill-queen’s university press. heidegger, m. (1988) ontology—the hermeneutics of facticity. bloomington, in: indiana university press. kimmerer, r. (2105). braiding sweetgrass: indigenous wisdom, scientific knowledge and the teaching of plants. minneapolis, mn: milkweed editions. kinchloe, j. (2001). describing the bricolage: conceptualizing new rigor in qualitative research. qualitative inquiry, 7(6), 679-692. kroker, a. (2014). exits to the posthuman future. cambridge, ma: polity press. latour, b. (1993). we have never been modern. cambridge, ma: cambridge university press. norlyk, a., & harder, i. (2010). what makes phenomenological work phenomenological? advancing qualitative methods, 20(3), 420-431. ricoeur, p. (1992). oneself as another. chicago, il: university of chicago press. schutz, a. (1967). collected papers, vol. 1. the hague, netherlands: martin nijhof. schwandt, t. (2007). the sage dictionary of qualitative inquiry. los angeles, ca: sage. usher, r. (1996). textuality and reflexivity in research. in d. scott & r. usher (eds.), understanding educational research (pp. 33-51). new york, ny: routledge. vandevelde, p., & iyer, a. (2016). translator’s introduction: hermeneutics at the crossroads between history and philosophy. in h-g gadamer, hermeneutics between history and philosophy: the selected writings of hans-georg gadamer, vol. 1 (p. vandevelde & a. iyer, trans, pp. xvi-xxxv). new york, ny & london, uk: bloomsbury. viii. 2, spri ng 1987 informal logic ellipsis: history and prospects e.p . brandon university of the west indies this paper is intended to bring the notion of ellipsis to the conscious attention of philosophers. i expose the notion to the light because i believe it is a fruitful one, especially for informal logic. it is curious that in the thousands of years in which philosophers have had access to, and have used, the notion of ellipsis no one has, as far as i know, given it an account, explication, theory, criteria for recognition, or any of the other desiderata for terms of art in philosophical logic .[1] in fact those authors who make use of the term rarely offer anything by way of explaining or justifying what they are doing. it would seem that the notion is employed as a piece of obvious common-sense that can be invoked when necessary, an unproblematic borrowing or adaptation of a traditional notion in grammatical or stylistic studies. perhaps this location in another specialty may help to account for philosophical insouciance, though in the twentieth century at least one would not expect a philosopher to assume that he can borrow from traditional grammar in a logical discussion without even the slightest explanation or justification . i intend to sketch the broad outlines of the use of ellipsis both in traditional grammar and in recent philosophy, and then to turn to its role for us now. the survey of other people's usage will necessari iy be somewhat lengthy, but it should illustrate the fecundity of the notion. the greek etymon of 'ellipsis' (latinized as detractio) was a part of the stock analytical vocabulary of rhetoric and was glossed as the omission of words that could be understood from the context. thus georgius choeroboscus, a minor rhetorician, tells us that a homeric phrase, kopton amphoterais (od. 18, 28), literally 'striking with both', is elliptical for 'striking with both hands' (for this and other examples, see lausberg, 1960, p . 346) . and ellipsis was often invoked by greek and latin writers to account for syntactic structures that appeared incomplete, such as subject-predicate sentences without a copula. omissions that can be understood constitute a fairly mixed bunch, with imprecise boundaries. these difficulties with the notion are clearly revealed, for instance, in quintilian's institutes. he notes that other writers classify ellipsis with synecdochepart for whole or whole for part (viii. vi. 21) or with aposiopesis-the breaking off of a sentence in mid-stream(ix . iii. 60) but for him ellipsis is a more regular phenomenon 'where the word omitted may be clearly gathered from the context' .[2] he offers an example of the historic infinitive which was supposed to require a finite verb, and he also claims that obvious omissions of indelicate expressions can be subsumed under the same concept. as a sub-species, he notes cases of syntac94 ep. brandon tic yoking together such as the ciceronian 'lust conquered shame, boldness fear, madness reason' .[3] jumping two thousand years, we can find the same types of case and the same uncertainties about ellipsis in a recent generation of grammarians. jespersen may serve as an example, both of a strict tradition in grammatical analysis and of a bridge to the conception of ellipsis used by philosophers. with respect to the first point, jespersen is sharply critical of what he considered abuses of the idea of ellipsis to defend preconceived notions of grammatical structure against obviously normal sentences that fail to conform. thus in a long footnote he attacks sweet's account of sentences such as (1): (1) what you say is true. sweet had claimed that the word 'what' was doing duty here for two words, one the object of 'say', the other the subject of 'is'. jespersen objects that the subject of 'is true' cannot be 'what' (nor presumably any other word hidden within it)[4] but only the whole clause 'what you say'. he rejects this 'kind of pseudo-grammatical analysis . .. one of the numerous uncalled-for fictions which have vitiated and complicated grammar without contributing to a real understanding of the facts of language' (1924, pp. 103-4). he does, however, concede a place for ellipsis, but only 'where ... absolutely necessary, and where there can be no doubt as to what is understood' (p. 307). one of his examples of genuine ellipsis is (2) : (2) he is rich, but his brother is not / /. elsewhere he allows that answers and retorts permit (indeed often all but require) words or phrases to stand alone that otherwise could not do so . both these kinds of ellipsis continue to feature in popular guide books (e.g . fowler, 1983) and in standard transformational grammars .[5] another traditional kind of example that deserves separate mention is provided by the semantics of some words or phrases, usually nominal. thus ullmann mentions the preceding cases of ellipsis but concentrates on examples such as 'a daily' meaning a daily newspaper, or the doubly elliptical and apparently aberrant 'un premiere de lyon' which abbreviates 'un billet de premiere c/asse de lyon' (1962, pp. 222-3) . he also notes the strong tendency for such things to happen among specialized groups-lawyers will understand 'action' as a legal action, students will interpret' a paper' as an examination paper, and soon (pp. 161-2). these three rough groups-responses, some compressed structures, abbreviated phrases seem to exhaust acceptable examples of ellipsis for much traditional grammar, and i shall lump them together under the label 'grammatical ellipsis'. they do not include the forced attempts to save preconceptions such as jespersen attacked, and they keep close to his admonition to be in no doubt about what has been elided. they are also in large part based on syntactic considerations.[6]i want to group these cases together because i intend to contrast them with other cases that jespersen also mentions and that have, i believe, much more in common with the philosophical appropriation of the notion that i shall sketch below. these other cases are semantically inspired and appeal to what i hope are intuitively 'deeper' considerations than the grammatical ellipses. the first group are something of a bridge between grammatical ellipsis and the philosophers' kind-they arise from semantic reflection on syntax of the sort typical of transformationalist 'deep' structure, and in fact jespersen's examples seem to belong among allerton's (1975) 'obligatory deletions' . after noting some of the cases of simple grammatical ellipsis allowed in dialogue where only one of the two notions joined in what he calls a 'nexus' is expressly mentioned, jespersen goes on to apply the same analysis to 'the great majority of cases in which we use either an infinitive or a nexus-substantive' where 'there is no necessity expressly to indicate who or what is the subject of the nexus' (1924, p. 143). thus he claims that in (3) : (3) i like to travel. an 'i ' must be understood as subject of the verb ' to travel'. after all, i'm not claiming to like the fact that people travel ; ilike my travelling . in (4) : (4) to travel is easy nowadays . he says that the 'generic person' is understood: for one to travel is easy nowadays. jespersen offers some evidence for the unexpressed existence of such items, but without entering into these grammatical arguments, i think we can see that fundamentally this sort of ellipsis is semantically motivated . but in these cases there need be no simple way in which the elided elements can be inserted into the surface structure, though (5) is perhaps not very ungrammatical : (5) *llike me to travel. invoking elided subjects for subjectless infinitive verbs might seem dangerously close to the evasions j espersen had condemned in others, but what he forbids in criticism of ellipsis he gives back in much more generous measure in his concluding remarks on ' suppression' . leaving aside detailed grammatical analysis for some general remarks about how we convey meaning in speech and writing, he says: in all speech activity there are three things to be distinguished, expression, suppression, and impression . expression is what the speaker gives, suppression is what he does not give, though he might have given it, and impression is what the hearer receives ... . suggestion is impression through suppression. only bores want to express everything, but even bores find it impossible to express everything. not only is the writer's art rightly said to consist largely in knowing what to leave in the inkstand , but in the most everyday remarks we suppress a great many things which it would be pedantic to say expressly . .. . compound nouns state two terms, but say nothing of the way the relation between them is to be understood .. .. ellipsis as in the structure of compounds , so also in the structure of sentences much is left to the sympathetic imagination of the hearer, and what from the point of view of the trained thinker, or the pedantic schoolmaster, is only part of an utterance, is frequently the only thing said, and the only thing required to make the meaning clear to the hearer. (p . 309) 95 here we have a classic expression of what i shall call 'semantic ellipsis ' , the kind that philosophers have appropriated . but it is noteworthy that like most appeals to the importance of context it fails to specify how such omis sions are to be restored or how our grasp of such sketchy sentences is to be understood . jespersen ' s remarks come after all the detai led work has been done; they remind us of the vast background that work has ignored , but they leave it as obvious and not to be analyzed . ii from one perspective , the idea of ellipsis , or jespersen's suppression , could be seen as imbuing virtually all philosophy or logic. as altham remarks, many have thought that a central task for logic is to make ' explicit what is implicit in informal usage' (1971, p. 77), and philosophers continually seek to make the hidden visible, to reveal apparent qualities as really relations, to uncover what we are implicitly committed to, and in many other ways to fill in some of the complexity we either leave to each other's sympathetic imaginations or are ourselves unable normally to conceive. but while my enquiry could easily flow into this trackless expanse, i think it worthwhile to ask what exactly those philosophers who have borrowed the terminology of ellipsis have made of it. as noted above , philosophers seem not to treat ellipsis as a central concept to be explained or justified, but simply as something they can invoke when it suits th em. there is apparently at least one tradition of recent philosophical writing in which ellipsis occurs as an 96 e.p. brandon opening gambit: the philosophy of probability. ever since keynes at least writers have claimed that in som~ cases our use of the word 'probable' is elliptical . thus keynes himself: when in ordinary speech we name some opinion as probable without further qualification, the phrase is generally elliptical . we mean that it is probable when certain considerations, implicitly or explicitly present to our minds at the moment, are taken into account. we use the word for the sake of shortness, just as we speak of a place as being three miles distant, when we mean three miles distant from where we are then situated, or from some startingpoint to which we tacitly refer. (1921, p.7) a very similar doctrine was expounded by kneale (1949, p. 10), only to be rejected by toulmin (1956). more recently ayer has also said that these ordinary judgments of probability, or what he calls 'credibility', are not to be understood in the keynes-kneale manner'they are not judgements about the evidence on which they are based' (1972, p. 58)-but he continues the tradition in his own way by remarking that 'judgements of probability, in the statistical sense, turn out to be elliptical' (p. 54) . ayer's own account of what ordinary non-statistical probability judgments do mean seems not to arrive at any precise conclusion (pp. 58-61), but his position seems close to mackie's view of what he calls 'simple probability' (the 'good reasons' end of informal probability): one particularly tricky point is that simple probability is relative but not relational. the simple probability that i ought to assign to a proposition depends upon what information i have and what i have not: it is relative to my state of mixed knowledge and ignorance. in saying 'probably p' or 'ii is x% probable that p' or 'there is an n to 1 chance that p' i am speaking from a certain point of view; but it is p itself that i am speaking about, not the relation between p and the knowledge-ignorance mixture that fixes this point of view .. .. the simple probability statement takes one's present state of knowledge and ignorance as setting the framework, as fixing the universe of possibilities under consideration. (1973, p. 173) we shall return later to the significance of mackie's distinction between relative and relational . keyne's analogy with distance indicates another branch of philosophy in which we can find explicit mention of ellipsis. swinburne, for instance, argues that claims about distance assume a frame of reference, so that most talk of distance is elliptical in a deeper way than keynes suggests. while swinburne says that such a frame of reference need not be explicitly stated in most ordinary cases, because it is patently obvious which frame is being used, he invokes the notion of ellipsis when he considers a case in which it is not clear which frame of reference is in question'here indeed 'distance' is elliptical and we need explicit specification of the frame in which it is to be measured before we can say how far apart are the places' (1968, p. 80). it seems that swinburne would say that (6): (6) a is 10 metres from b. is not elliptical when we all know which frame of reference is left unstated, but becomes elliptical when we do not. while this contrast is important, it does not seem helpful to make it in this way . sentences such as (6) are elliptical (so keynes' example is doubly elliptical) but in ordinary uses unambiguous and determinate, since we all know which frame is being suppressed . but when we do not know this, their ellipsis makes them ambiguous or indeterminate. often, especially in criticism, it is only in the second sort of case that one wishes to insist on the ellipsis, but, as swinburne's argument shows, important philosophical points can arise in the first sort of case too. the awkwardness due to people's lack of anything definite 'in mind surfaces in two interestingly similar analyses of 'ought', sloman (1970) and wertheimer (1972) . sloman unhesitatingly invokes ellipsis and discovers in (7): (7) it ought to be the case that p . the two elided elements restored in (8) : (8) considering the possibilities in z, p ought to be the case relative to the basis, b. since he claims that sentences like (7) involve a choice among possibilities made on some basis, he asks how all this connects with what is going on in people ' s minds . apart from 'considered attempts to say something true or false', his answer is that what people have in mind may be more or less unclear, but instructively he concludes that it is 'less important here to give a strictly accurate account of what people actually do say than to suggest what they might say if only they knew how' (1970, p. 394) . while wertheimer es chews the term ' ellipsis', i do not think there is any difference of substance between his kind of analysis of the verbal auxiliaries in terms of an understood ' system' and that offered by sloman; and he too has to say how his understood system connects with ordinary people.[7] and similarly i would suggest that the kind of analysis of causal language that appeals to the notion of a causal field [8] can reasonably be construed along the lines of sloman's outright use of ellipsis . but to continue our sampling of philosophical uses of ellipsis, let us note a chapter in platts ' discussion of a davidsonian theory of meaning, a chapter on adjectives (1979, ch. vii) . ellipsis is continually invoked, but with a sense of its lack of the appropriate rigour (it does not appear in the index) : consider the sentences: (9) theo is large. (9) and (10) rudy is attractive. until we know, or form beliefs about, the appropriate filling, we have no complete understanding of these sentences. we know (up to a point) the meanings ellipsis of the words they contain, and (perhaps) their syntactic structure ; but we have no idea which conditions would make the sentences true or false . this (vague) thought is what i mean by saying that (9) and (10) are elliptical. it also explains why 'thing' is a dummy filling, since such filling effects no change in the deficiency. (pp. 167-8) 97 platts has given us to believe that theo is a flea, and he later argues that if we try to understand (9) as involving a comparison between theo and other fleas we sti ii have an ell i ps i s of the respect(s) in which theo is larger than the others (d . p . 182ff). he also suggests that rudy may be attractive to look at, to have dinner with, as a ballet-dancer , or what-have-you . i refrain from pursuing the fascinating issues platts has raised, but it is worth entering a doubt about (10)-it is unspecific, but should we regard it as elliptical? platts ' example confronts us with a problem that has bedevilled the notion of ellipsis since the greeks: the relation of a useful notion of ellipsis to lack of specificity. we always leave some things unsaid, and often such details can easily be restored by a sympathetic hearer; should we then say that such details are elided? this problem has been viewed as a fundamental objection to the kind of elliptical analyses we have been examining. according to hamblin ' s history of logical inattention to fallacy, boethius noted that some grammatical contradictions were only apparent, because of the suppression of different relata, as for instance: (11) socrates is on the right-hand side / /. and (12) socrates is not on the right-hand side / /. hamblin later suggests a formal treatment of this and other examples in terms of ellipsis, but rejects it in these words: the odious feature of our formal theory, considered as a remedial device, is its insistence that what we have called 98 e.p. brandon 'incomplete' predicates are deficient and need to be completed .. .. that there are certain respects in which it is un· specific is an essential characteristic of any utterance whatsoever . (1970, p . 212) but this criticism is beside the point, for genuinely elliptical examples such as (11) and (12) , if not for some of the other cases hamblin considers. we need a distinction between truth the whole truth, and the lack of suffi~ient detail to start enquiring about truth . thus in the case of (11), we cannot begin to judge whether what it says is true until we have fixed the perspective (e.g., looking north from where pericles is standing), but once that has been fixed its truth or falsity needs no more detai i, although of course there is an unlimited amount of such detail that it omits-is socrates standing or sitting, asleep or awake, .. . . as platts says, and as swinburne's example shows , there is a certain amount of vagueness about this contrast, but by no means enough to put it out of action . this brief survey of what some philosophers have made of the notion of ellipsis shows, i hope, several things : their concept is an extension of the one found in traditional grammar and rhetoric; it tends to focus on what must be restored for there to be a determinately true or false proposition asserted; its users are not always clear about how this indeterminacy relates to a general lack of specificity; and there is a question how far the theory of ellipsis is intended to be a true description of linguistic behaviour and how far a normative replacement for it. but the range, and importance, of the examples also suggests that it would be salutary to clarify these issues and evaluate the contribution the notion of ellipsis can make to philosophical and logical enquiry . iii have suggested that the core idea of semantic ellipsis in philosophy is that in some, but by no means all, sentences certain items are left unspecified which are required in order for the sentence to be evaluated for truth or falsity . ellipsis gives certain sentences a truth-value indeterminacy. but we must immediately distinguish this source of indeterminacy from the worki ngs of proper names, token-reflexives , or non-designating referring expressions. any use of sentence (13): (13) ronald reagan is walking. requires us to supplement it with knowledge of which ronald reagan is in question and with knowledge of which extent of space-time is in question, but these ways in which the contributions of the context are mediated are well known and can be taken for granted here. once they are given, (13) provides us with all we need to determine its truth on an occasion of utterance (leaving aside odd borderline forms of locomotion), though of course there is much that it leaves unsaid about the walking. but (14) : (14) ronald reagan needs to walk more / / . still cannot be evaluated after we have deciphered the clues offered by proper names and occasion of utterance unless we know at least for what end or purpose he needs to walk more. for his health , it may not be true, but to stand a chance of winning the white house staff walking race it may well be (see my 1980 for a fuller discussion of the verb 'need') . it is worth noting here that one cannot resolve the ellipsis in (14) by appeal to some existentially quantified itema needs x for some y or other-since virtually all such claims would then be true . but we do not treat such claims in this way. still, there are items that involve elided existential quantifications (e.g. 'is married') but i would suggest that they not be regarded as cases of semantic ellipsis; rather i would be inclined to put the implicit quantification into the meaning of the predicate. similarly agent deletions with passives (e .g . 'john was murdered', given that bill murdered john) and analogous transformational deletions are not to be regarded as semantic ellipses. but where the kind of quantificiation is left unspecified, i think we can usefully invoke ellipsis (see my 1982 for a discussion of 'truth is worth pursuing' in such terms). these cases, like example (10), reveal the imprecise boundaries of the conception of ellipsis i have adumbrated, but i think they suggest a need for collaborative effort rather than for a rejection of the whole approach. besides looking directly at how much must be restored for anything true or false to be in question, one can also follow boethius, sloman, and wertheimer in using what appear to be logical irregularities as symptoms of ellipsis. thus the fact that it might be true both that mary can go to the office party (her car is back on the road) and that she can't (she has promised to babysit) suggests very strongly that there is more logical structure than meets the eye. in the spirit of the andersonmackie causal fields mentioned earlier, one might suggest here that in using 'can' we elliptically invoke various 'obstacle fields' -as far as physical obstacles go, there is nothing to prevent mary attending the party, but as far as moral obstacles go, there is one, since she has agreed to baby-sit. boethius and i have offered examples of apparent contradictions; sloman has a section looking at apparent failures of simple patterns of valid inference. the moral is the same: logical regularity can be restored by postulating el ided structure, by specifying what mackie might have called the 'logical cues' governing our normal use of language (1973, p. 7). if an ellipsis is suspected, how is it to be restored? the rough question one is trying to answer is fairly clear: what else, over and above the workings of proper names and token-reflexives, do we need to know to begin to ascertain the truth value of the sentence in question? but is there any special way to answer it? the question of the methods of logical investigation seems not ellipsis 99 to have been much discussed. i am fairly sure we have no special roads to the truth here; i have elsewhere (1978) suggested an analogy with a lakatosian research programme, but it was just a hint. so, unhelpfully, one can only say that the way to find the best characterization of talk of needs or spatial position is yet another process of conjecture and refutation, even if some of the conjectures are pretty obvious. talk of left and right obviously has something to do with a perspective; it is not so clear whether it is the speaker's (which would generate a kind of tokenreflexivity) or a more variable frame of reference. another way in which this answer is unhelpful, though true, is that the analyses it describes will depend on a vast amount of background knowledge about what is in fact required to determine truth or falsehood. we can see this in the contrast between keynes' view of talk of distance and that advocated by swinburne: in the i ight of relativity theory, we now see the need to specify a frame of reference to measure distance, so a hitherto unsuspected ellipsis is revealed in our use of language.[10) if this characterization of ellipsis in philosophy is on the right lines, it may help to explain the disinclination to focus on the notion that i mentioned at the beginning. in cases of ellipsis people omit crucial components of a determinate meaning. their words, the language they make publicly available, does not contain the whole story . proper names and token-reflexivity are so pervasive that we do not usually worry overmuch about how accurately our theories of these phenomena capture the reality of language use and thought. in describing real language use we can hardly avoid noticing the phenomena i grouped together as grammatical ellipsis, but these are equally of little or no philosophical concern. the philosophically interesting cases are precisely those where the specification of elided elements is more speculative. but talk of ellipsis offers a fairly precise way of specifying the contributions usually sloughed off 100 e.p. brandon into context. it all but forces one to face the possibility, acknowledged, as we have seen, by both sloman and wertheimer, that many people have not in fact got any determinate meaning in mind . as swinburne claims, we may all know which frame of reference is being elided in our normal talk of places and distances; but what are we agreeing to omit in talk &hout equality or needs? in such cases, it is very plausible to think that what many people mean is simply incomplete; they have no clear idea either of what they are saying or of what would be relevant criticism or support thereof. an accurate account of what is meant is almost beyond us. this is somewhat similar to mackie's position on some probability statements. people are ascribing a predicate to an opinion; it is relative in that its ascription can only be tested by reference to some body of evidence, as keynes suggested, but the claim itself is not a relational claim, linking, either explicitly or implicitly, this opinion to the background of mixed knowledge and ignorance. what is consciously entertained is indeterminate, perhaps confused, an attempt to think a relational property as an intrinsic one. altham's alternatives, 'either attributive plurality assertions are inherently unclear, and have no determinate logic, or the predicates are implicitly ordered' (1971, p. 76), may present too extreme a contrast, but it captures the perplexity; have been trying to suggest. if the contrast is appropriate, the only option for a philosopher or logician would seem to be to work with his expl icit theory -one cannot do much with inherent unclarity and indeterminacy-so there would be little encouragement to spend much time on the failure of ordinary language to come up to scratch. but that is precisely what the notion of ellipsis does; it returns you to the ordinary language with the bland assurance that all will be well when a few holes have been filled in. a somewhat similar situation can be found in the failure of logicians to take the theorizing of fallacies seriously, a failure well argued by hamblin (1970) and johnson and blair (1980). it is no doubt hard enough to get logic right without worrying overmuch about what exactly is going on when people get it wrong. even closer to my topic is the similarly off-hand treatment meted out to enthymemes-suppressions of whole sentences rather than their components-and implicit assumptions generally (for which see ennis, 1982). not only does ellipsis return our attention to what is, philosophically, a somewhat inadequate natural language, but as i have suggested, it does so in a very simple way. it supposes that an adequate semantic story can be told simply by inserting a few elements into what is already a grammatical sentence. but very many philosophical analyses can hardly be regimented in this way . russell's theory of definite descriptions, or c.j .f . williams' theory of truth (1976), which treat natural language sentences as existentially quantified conjunctions, change the whole shape of the natural language they analyse. when they invoke elements not visible on the ordinary language surface there need not be any obvious gap in which to insert them. of course, over the centuries logicians have contorted natural languages in various ways, so it might be possible to provide an analysis in terms of ellipsis, but such an analysis might well not have the attractions of those we have been considering. i have indicated some reasons the notion of ellipsis might seem uncongenial or inadequate to philosophers. can we add anything in defence? i think at least two points can be made. the first is perhaps the less important, philosophically, though it might be more attractive to linguists and those philosophers currently trying to offer fragments of a theory of meaning for a natural language. linguistic theory, at least since early chomsky, has been plagued by its apparent power. any number of very differently organized rule systems could, in principle, generate the observed sentences of a language. of course, it is logically possible to have unlimited numbers of alternative theories that account for our data in any area; but for all its philosophical interest, this is hardly a live issue in most of the sciences . but linguistics has seemed less able to cope than these other areas. one reaction has been the rejection of the contrast of 'deep' and 'surface' structures (found, for instance, in matthews, 1970, and hudson, 1976) which would seem to require linguistic analyses to keep very close to what is actually said. in an associated semantic theory, it would not be surprising to find ellipses playing a major role: in arguing that deletions have no place in syntax, i shall of course be implying that . understood' elements are to be identified in the semantics, which seems the right place for them to be. (hudson, 1976, p . 126) but while ellipsis might still be a fruitful concept in linguistics, i think that, for philosophy and informal logic, a stronger defence can be given. whatever the technical virtuosity it may permit, i do not believe that perfecting a theory of comparative adjectives is the most important end of philosophical inquiry (ef. mackie, 1977). rather, the most useful point of much philosophical logic is critical and normative. in this light, to talk of ellipsis is, as sloman suggests, more a critical move than an attempt to elucidate what people have in mind. it says, 'if you want to say something determinately true or false, you must be understood as adding .... ' ellipsis can provide a way of understanding valid and invalid inferences more perspicuously; it can account for many of the nuances usually attributed to an unanalyzed context or shunted off into pragmatics; it can illuminate the ways ideology and unclarity persist (ef. my 1984b); and the varied examples we have glanced at should indicate the range over which it can make these sorts of contribution. for these critical purposes we do not need the final truth, the full story . indeed, its baroque complexity may well make it positively unhelpful in ellipsis 101 these areas . aristotle's logic, or euler's diagrams, may not capture any part of any natural language in its complexity; but one could hardly deny their contributions to clearer thought. (nor, of course, can one deny that it is possible to use them to pervert and hinder thought.) i have elsewhere (1984a) advocated such a brico/eur approach to philosophical analysis generally, in which one uses what tools are to hand and able to do the job (as i have been using traditional grammatical categories in this discussion) . ellipsis seems to me a peculiarly simple and powerful tool to elucidate context dependencies, equivocations, and confusions of thought, whether or not it will form part of our final grand theory of meaning . whatever the motivations of philosophers of language, logicians, and especially informal logicians, are usually concerned with the implicit logic of expressions not for its own sake but rather as a means of exposing and correcting incoherence and invalidity . as a central part of the ordinary language philosopher's arsenal, ellipsis might too obviously have falsified that illusory neutrality some such philosophers aspired to (ef . graham, 1977, ch. ii), but its affinity for such critical uses should make it very welcome in the informal logician ' s camp where values are somewhat more conspicuous. i hope this survey of its uses , attempt to clear up some of its problems, and indication of a few of its ramifications, will inspire further work both on and with the notion, and also in assessing its pedagogical utility in the promotion of critical thinking. notes [1) i cannot claim to have searched exhaustively for such an account, but i could try the patience of my readers with a long list of likely works in which such silence reigns. thus, in the encyclopedia of philosophy (edwards , 1967), the term d2 e.p. brandon appears neither in the general index nor in the catalogue of logical terminology; the kneales do not treat of it, though they casually remark that /statements of relative necessity or possibility are often made elliptically and may for this reason be misunderstood as statements of absolute necessity or possibility' (kneale and kneale, 1962/ p. 93); alston/s (1964) introduction to the philosophy of language discusses various ways in which words may be vague but does not mention the indeterminacy of phrases or sentences due to ellipsis; and so one could go on . [2) /cum subtractum verbum aliquod satis ex ceteris intelligitur' (1921/ ix. iii. 58; trans. h.e. butler) . [3) / vicit pudorem libido, timorem audacia, rationem amentia' / a quotation given by quintilian from cicero's pro cluent. vi . 15. translation by h.e. butler. [4) some arguments go on and onhow wou id jespersen react to h udson/s recent remark 'here what seems to act as both relative pronoun and antecedent-like a compressed version of that which' (1976/ p. 135)? hudson does not, i think, endorse quite this analysis, and his surrounding discussion is explicitly tentative, but it testifies to the attractiveness of sweet's analysis. [5) there they, and various other phenomena to be mentioned later, are usually handled by deletion rules, though such grammarians are much more aware of the frightening complexity of such rules when explicitly stated. for deletions in transformational grammar see, for instance, akmajian and heny (1975/ esp. ch. 7), allerton (1975)/ and hudson (1976/ esp. ch. 3.9) . a wide-ranging discussion can be found in matthews (1981) . [6) the third type of case, abbreviated phrases, is semantically motivated/ but ellipsis here has usually been seen as part of a historical account of the genesis of new meanings for a word or phrase. the elided element is usually obvious and is of ten , but not always/ marked by syntactic oddities (such as the clash of genders in the french example). [7) what he does say is: for a speaker to mean some system/ he need not actively think about the system. nor need he be able to say much about the system or even know what a system is. to say that he has a certain system in mind is only to say that he is inclined to accept certain kinds of reasons in support or criticism of his utterance, and to regard other kinds of reasons as irrelevant. if he is unable to do such things even in a rough-andready way, then the truth of what he says cannot be assessed, for there is no way to determine what, if any thing, he means . (1972/ p.95) [8) 'we are concerned not with relations between a and b in general but with relations within certain limits or in a certain 'field'; ... a cause is always a cause within a field' (anderson, 1938/ p. 130). this notion has been used by mackie in several places in discussions of causality and responsibility. [9) i have altered the numbering of examples to fit this paper's sequence. 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