The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 39 

The Approved and Disapproved Varieties 
of Ra’y (Personal Opinion) In Islam 

Moharnrnud Hashirn K i m a l i  

While Islam emphasizes conformity to the directives of the Qur’an and 
Sunnah, one finds in the same sources a parallel emphasis on rational inquiry, 
exercise of personal opinion, and judgment. This essay looks into the evidence 
in support of this statement and the extent to which Islam validates the freedom 
to formulate and express an opinioq. It also examines the methodology and 
criteria that ascertain the validity of personal opinion and distinguishs the 
acceptable ru’y from that which is not tolerated. This essay also highlights 
how the detailed classification of ru’y by the ‘Ulama reflects a concern for 
latitude and tolerance on the one hand, balanced on the other by respect 
for recognized authority and values which are deemed essential to Islam. 

Freedom to express an opinion is probably the most important aspect 
of the freedom of speech, which also comprises such other varieties of speech 
as a simple narration of facts, comedy, and fiction. To express an opinion 
on a matter implies a level of involvement, commitment, and competence 
which may or may not be present in the factual narration of an event. This 
may partly explain why the phrase hurrsyah ul-m), (literally, freedom of 
opinion) is used in the Islamic scholastic tradition for freedom of speech, 
in preference to hurriyuh al-quwl, the more precise equivalent of “freedom 
of speech.” That scholars and jurists have consistently used hurriyh ul-my 
for freedom of speech perhaps signifies that ray, or personal opinion, is 
the most important aspect of this freedom. 

Ra ’y has three main classifications -praiseworthy, blameworthy, and 
doubtful personal opinion-which are further subdivided. The main varieties 
of praiseworthy opinion to be discussed here are m), that elaborates the Qur‘an 
and Sunnah, the opinions of the Companions, m), that consists of ijtihiid, 
and ru’y that is arrived at as a result of consultation. Blameworthy opinion 
is also divided into three types, namely bid‘uh (pernicious innovation), h w i i  
(caprice), and bughy (transgression). And, lastly, ru), that is the subject of 
doubt (ray ji mawdi‘ ul-ishtibiih) does not lend itself to classification or 

~~ 

Mohammad Hashim Kamali is an Associate professor in the Faculty of Law at the International 
Islamic University, Selangor, Malaysia. 



40 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

evaluation in advance, and it is this type of my which often gives rise to 
disagreement (ikhtihj) . 

Excluded from the scope of this discussion are certain subjects such as 
$mah (sedition) and such other instances of the violation of the freedom 
of speech such as libel, slander, and contempt. These may have some bearing 
on the abuses of my, yet they are not directly related to the main focus of 
this inquiry-the extent to which freedom of speech relates to the exercise 
of personal opinion in Islam. 

R a y  is defined as opinion on a matter which has not been regulated by 
the Qur’an or the SUM&. It is a considered opinion arrived at as a result 
of thinking and self-exertion on the part of the individual who explores and 
searches for knowledge of something, about which there may exist only signs 
or indications. But the existing signs are such that may lead the investigator 
to different conclusions. There is an element of arbitrariness attached to ruy, 
in the sense that it is self-inspired and unrelated to the text of the Qur’an, 
the SUM&, and definitive ijm3 (consensus of opinion). 

In the usage of the Arabs, ray is applied to things which are not seen 
but are known through the application of reason, intuitive judgment and the 
light of one’s heart. Matters which are regulated by definitive factual or rational 
knowledge and matters on which all the signs are bound to concur such as 
the number of days in a week, or the virtue of telling the truth, are thus 
excluded from the proper application of ray. No one is thus expected to give 
or formulate an opinion over factual or rational matters which require no 
deliberation and thought. It is also clear from the foregoing that my is founded 
on signs and indications (amiiriit) . Hence when a person pronounces an opinion 
concerning a matter pertaining to the realm of the unseen on which there 
are no signs whatsoever, what he or she says is not to be regarded as ruy. 
In this sense, ru5) is a preliminary to knowledge in that it must take its lead 
from signs which are open to investigation and rational conclusions.’ 

A person may express an opinion, arbitrary or otherwise. So long as 
he does not violate the law concerning blasphemy, sedition, etc., he is free 
to advance an opinion. Just as the law tolerates an arbitrary opinion, the 
latter has a role to play in the development of ideas and the quest for knowledge 
and truth. Often a sound opinion is invoked and stimulated by a weak, 
provocative, or misguided one. The juris corpus of fiqh, is, in fact, the 
embodiment of both my and authoritative tradition, but only the latter is 
deemed to provide criteria on which to judge the propriety or otherwise of 
my. As already noted, rayahas a limited role vis-a-vis the clear ordinances 
of divine revelation. But when no such guidance is available in the sources, 

‘Cf. Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah, I‘liim al-Muwaqqi‘iin ‘an Rabb al- ‘Alamln, ed. Muhammad 
Munir al-Dimashqi, (Cairo: Id&ah al-?b$ah al-MunirTyah), 4 vols, n.d., I, 55. 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ray 41 

or when the existing guidance is no more than a sign which is open to 
interpretation and inference, then the matter is open to my. The veracity 
of m), is always judged by its proximity to the letter and spirit of the 
(Qur’an and Hadith) Consensus of opinion (ijml is the only recognized method 
for establishing the validity of my. Apart from i j d ,  which is usually slow 
to materialize and retrospective, there is no method for a prompt evaluation 
of ru), other than r a y  itself. The sound m), in this case declares the arbitrary 
ru), as invalid or weak. This process of sifting through the accuracy and 
veracity of ra), is integral to decision-making and ijtihad. The weak and 
erroneous opinion has thus a role to play in the evolution of correct ijtihad. 
It was perhaps in view of this truism that the beloved prophet of Islam declared 
the mere effort of a competent scholar or mujtuhid at attaining the truth to 
be worthy of reward, whether or not he or she actually succeeds in attaining 
it. This is the purport of a well-known Hadith which proclaims: “When a 
rnujfuhid make exertions and fails to attain the truth, it merits one reward, 
but when a correct decision is reached, then it merits a double reward.”2 

In the scholarly context of early juristic thought, my became increasingly 
associafed with liberality and extrapolation in personal preferences. This was 
the main charge which the partisans of Hadith (i.e., Ahl uZ-Hadith) laid against 
their counterparts, the partisans of opinion, or the AhZ al-k),. This somewhat 
negative connotation of m),, however, underwent a gradual change due mainly 
to sustained efforts by the AhZ uZ-Ray, the Hanafis in particular, who maintained 
that Islam never discouraged recourse to reason and personal opinion, provided 
that such did not violate any of its principles and objectives. To substantiate 
their efforts, the proponents of m), devised methodologies and guidelines 
on the correct use of m), in the forms of analogical reasoning (qiyiis), juristic 
preference (istibiin), blocking the means (smj uZ-dhurii’i), and presumption 
of continuity (isfi&b). These and other principles of usul uZ-fiqh, such as 
the priority given to the Companions’ opinions @wii uZ-&iibih) in preference 
to the opinion of other mujtuhidiin, aimed at establishing a closer identity 
between ru), and the laws and principles of the Qur’an and S ~ n n a h . ~  

There is ample evidence in the sources which validate recourse to personal 
opinion. The Qur’an (al-Shiir5, 42:38) thus authorizes consultation (shirii) 
in public affairs, which consists essentially of the personal opinion of its 
participants. The Qur’an also enjoins Muslims to refer matters upon which 
they disagree for decision-making to the iZu uZ-umr (al-Nisa’, 458). These 
are persons of knowledge and authority who are capable of forming an opinion 
and judgment. This is confirmed further in al-Nisa’ (4:83), which validates 

*Abu Dawud al-Sijistani, S u m  Abu D u d ,  Eng. trans. Ahmad Hasan, (Lahore: Ashraf 
Press, 1984), III, 1013, Hadith No. 3567. 

3The reader might be interested to know that a chapter is devoted to each of these topics 
in my book Principles o f l s h i c  Jurisprudence (Kuala Lumpur: Fklanduk Publications, 1989). 



42 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

inferenee and deduction of the rules of law from the sources by recourse 
to reasoning and my. firthennore, the Hadith of Mu‘adh b. Jabal (q.v., below) 
provides specific authority for my in juridcal matters and the settlement of 
disputes. The Sunnah of the Prophet and the precedent of his companions 
leave no doubt on the point that judges and governors were appointed to 
distant places with the understanding that they would rely on their personal 
ray and ijtihad in matters on which they could not find any guidance in the 
sources.4 

But beyond the scope of specific evidence in support of ray, it will be 
noted that many a principle and institution of the Shari‘ah takes for granted 
the individual freedom to formulate and express an opinion. The right/duty 
of the citizen to promote good and prevent evil (amr bil-mu‘ruf wa w h y  
‘an al-munkar), his or her right to give sincere advice (nasihuh) to persons 
in authority or to anyone else, the right to monitor government activities, 
the right to a vote in electing a leader, and the right to be consulted in public 
affairs could only materialize when a citizen enjoys the freedom to formulate 
and express an opinion. According to one observer, “it would be totally in 
vain and would make no sense to say that the government in Islam is bound 
by the principle of consultation and yet it should have the liberty to deny 
the participants of shiirii (ah1 a1 shiirii), the freedom to express an ~pinion.”~ 
Similarly, it would be impossible to discharge the Qur’anic obligation of 
commandng good and forbidding evil without the freedom of speech and 
the liberty to formulate and voice an opinion. 

On numerous occasions we note that the Qur’an invites people to investigate 
and explore the world around them and to draw rational conclusions, not 
in the manner of blind imitators who follow and accept what others have 
said, but through intelligent analysis and judgment. “This would not be 
possible,” as Abu Zahrah observes, “without the freedom to express one’s 
opinion and thought.”6 To this we may add the rider that the Qur’an values 
rational endeavor which is accompanied by sincerity in the quest for truth 
and justice. No intellectual inquiry may begin on the premise of denying 
the fundamental truth of monotheism (tawhid) and clear guidance enunciated 
in divine re~elation.~ Provided that these values are observed, rational inquiry 
and the quest for truth must be maintained even in the face of hostility from 
the masses. For the masses may be uninformed and may themselves be in 

4Cf. Malpud Shaltut, Al-Islam, ‘Aqldah wa Shan’ah (Kuwait: Matjbi’ Dir al-Qalam, 

S‘Abd al-Karim Zaydin Majmu‘ah Buhiith Fiqhiyah (Baghdad: Maktabah al-Quds, 

6Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Tan.& al-Islam li al-Mujtama‘(Cairo: Matba‘ah Mukhaymar, 

’Cf. Muhammad al-Bahi, A l - D h  wa al-Dawluh (Beirut: Dir al-Fikr, 1391/1971) p. 376. 

c. 1966), p. 555. 

1407/1986), p. 128. 

n.d.), p. 194. 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of R a y  43 

need of enlightenment. This is the purport of the Qur‘anic ayah which proclaims 
that once clear guidance has been given, a mere conjecture, even if promoted 
by the masses, should not be allowed to obstruct it (al-An‘h, 6:116). 

Notwithstanding the fact that obedience to lawful government is a Qur‘anic 
obligation, the very text which prescribes this duty (al-Nisa’, 4:59) follows 
on to provide in an address to the believers “should you dispute over a matter, 
then refer it to God and to the Messenger.” The Qur’an here anticipates the 
possibility of disputes arising between the ruler and ruled and it affirms that 
the duty of obedience does not overrule the right of the citizens to take issue 
with their leaders and government. 

Disputation or Jidiil is clearly permitted in the Qur’an. Indeed it is one 
of the major themes, as there are 25 occasions where the sacred text is 
expressive of a human being’s inclination as a rational being toward 
argumentation.8’On one such?occasion, the Qur’an refers to the narrative of 
a woman, Khawlah bint Tha‘labah, wife of Aws b. Thabit, who complained 
to the Prophet of abuse and insult she suffered at the hands of her husband. 
The following Qur’anic passage was consequently revealed: ‘Allah heard the 
speech of the woman who disputed with you concerning her husband; she 
complained to Allah and Allah heard your conversation.” (al-MujSdalah, 58:l). 

The woman was consequently granted the right to separate from her 
husband by a form of separation which is referred to as zihiir. In the meantime, 
this iiyuh recognized the right of the individual, a woman in this case, to 
argue her case with the Prophetam-head of state. There are words in this 
iiyuh, such as tujiidiluku (disputes with you), tushtuki (complains), and 
ta?ziiwurukumii (your conversation) which suggest that the plaintiff expressed 
herself forcefully on the occasion. This is perhaps borne out by the fact that 
the whole of the surah which begins with this passage bears the title, 
al-MujSdalah (disputation). The Qur’an also contains declarations which 
confirm differences of opinion or ikhtihf to be an inescapable fact of social 
life: “If God had willed, He would have created the people as one nation, 
but they cease not disagreeing among themselves.” (Hiid, 11:118) The Qur’an 
is also expressive of the limits within which freedom of speech and ikhtiliif 
must operate. One such limit is to avoid hurting others, as the text declares: 

Allah Ioves not public utterance of hurtful speech except by 
one who has been wronged (al-Nid, 4:148). 

But even this limit is dropped, as the text itself provides, in the case 
of an aggrieved person whose cry for justice must not be hindered in any 
way. Hurtfid speech may thus be uttered in public, or in the court of law, 

yA%hab ‘Abd al-Rahr& bint al-Shitj‘, AI-QurZn wa Q @ y i  al-Insin (Fkirut: Dar al- 
‘Itm li d-hlat&-~~, 1982), p. 116. 



44 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

by the defendant if it would help the cause of justice, which must in the 
final analysis take precedence over the avoidance of hurtful speech. This 
is confirmed further by the Hadith which provides that “one who has a right 
has the privilege to speak.”9 Thus a person who has something to say, or 
has a cause or a grievance, is entitled to speak out and his or her effort to 
eliminate injustice may never be obstructed. 

In the political sphere, freedom of speech is also upheld by the Hadith 
which declares that “the best form of jihad (holy struggle) is to utter a word 
of truth to a tyrannical ruler.”l0 This Hadith obviously goes further than merely 
affimmg the freedom of speech, in that it elevates the exercise of such freedom 
for the right cause to the best form of jihad. 

The precedent of Companions is most instructive on the use of this right. 
Upon his election to office, the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, addressed the public 
in his inaugural sermon: “0 people, I have been given authority over you 
but I am not the best of you. Support me if I am right and rectify me when 
I fall in error.”ll This is a clear affirmation of the right of individuals to 
oppose or criticize their political leaders when they deviate from the right 
path. It also indicates that constructive criticism and freedom to express an 
opinion are a source of healthy gmwth and enrichment?* Abu BaWs successor, 
‘Umar b. al-Khattab, is also on record as asking people, in his inaugural 
speech, to “m%fy any aberration” they might see in him. A man in the audience 
responded: “If we see aberration on your part, we shall rectify it by our 
swords.” The Caliph reacted with magnanimity and said “Praise be to God 
that there is someone who will rectify ‘Umar by his sword (in the cause 
of righteousness) .”13 

According to yet another report, a man addressed the Caliph, ‘Umar 
b. al-Khattab, somewhat impudently by telling him “Fear God, 0 ‘Umar!” 
Someone who was present on the occasion reminded the man that he was 

91n its Arabic version, the principle is stated as “inna l i - & z i b  al-?mqq maqil.” S e e  
Muhammad Abu Zahrah, Al-Juritnah wa al- ‘Uq‘ibahfi al-Fiqh al-Islam (Cairo: Dar al-Fikr, 
n.d.), p. 158. 

‘OH& reported by Abu Dawud, Tirmidhi, and Ibn Mzijah, recorded in Muhammad 
b. ‘Abd Allah al-Khatji al-’hbrizi, MisMiSt al-Mq&ih, ed. Muhammad N+ir al-Din 
al-AlW, 2nd edn. (Beirut: al-Maktab a l - I s h i ,  l399/197!3), 11, lO94, Hadith No. J705. 

%bu Muhammad ‘Abd al-Malik Ibn H i s k ,  Al-Simh al-Nabawiyah iCairo: Maktabah 
al-Kulliyyzit al-AzhsrIyah, l392hm) IV, 262. 

Wf. Sa’di Abu Habib. DarcIsah Fi MinZj al-Islam al-SiyGsi (Beirut: Mu’assisah al- 

laAbu Zahrah, Al-Janmah, p. 160; M u s w  al-Siba’i, Ishtid-yzh al-Islam, 2nd edn., 
(Damascus: Dar al-qamTyah, 137p/€960), p. 50; Muhammad Faruq al- Nab&, N i q m  al- 
Hukmfi al-Islam (Kuwait: Matba’iih JGmi’ah al-Kuwait, 1974), p. 245. 

~isalah, i406n935), p. m. 



M. H. Kamali The Approvaband Disapproved Varieties of Ray 45 

being impudent, but the Caliph intervened and said, “It will be no good if 
they did not say so, and no good if we did not listen.”14 

The Qur’an and Sunnah are replete with moral encouragement and 
guidance on the proper use of freedom of speech. While the Qur‘an compares 
pleasant or righteous speech & l i d  &@buh) with a benevolent tree which 
is firm and healthy in both foundation and foliage (Ibriihim, 14:24), the Sunnah 
compares it to charity that every one can afford to give.15 And then the recurrent 
Qur‘anic theme which encourages the uttemnce of courteous and elegant speech 
(quwlun mu‘nifun) to one’s parents (al-IsrZ, 17:23), to the indigent (al-NisZ, 
4:8), to the ignorant (al-NisZ, 4:5), and to the people at large (al-Baqarah, 
2:83; al-IsrZ, 17:53; al-NW, 16:l25; al-‘Ankabiit, 29:46) all in all confirm 
the truism that the law can at best penalize blatant abuse of the freedom 
of speech. Nurturing the proper use of this freedom and attaining beauty 
and excellence in speech in largely a matter of developing good moral and 
cultural standards. The Qur’an calls upon the wisdom and good judgment 
of the believer when he speaks (al-Al@b, 33:7). There may be, for example, 
instances where telling the truth may fail to achieve a good purpose. The 
speaker is therefore urged to be mindful of the end result that his speech 
is likely to obtain.’6 There are in fact instances where the Sunnah permits 
silence in regard to truth or even telling a white lie if it would serve a higher 
objective, such as saving an innocent life from imminent danger. And lastly 
the freedom of speech is subservient to the general principles of justice: “And 
when you speak, then speak with justice, even if it be against those who 
are close to you” (al-An‘h, 6:152). The Qur‘anic guidance here applies equally 
to a witness in the court, to the judge, to the head of the family, and to the 
people at large who are asked to be honest and fair when they speak to, 
or about, one another. 

Varieties of Ra’y 

Although the potential scope and subject matter of my defies the idea 
of a predetermined framework, the ‘Ulama have nevertheless attempted to 
divide ray into various types. To begin with, my is divided into four types, 
namely valid or praiseworthy opinion (ul-ru y ul-&ib), void opinion (ul-m y 

~~ ~ 

“Abu Yuuf Ya‘qub b. IbrtWn, Kit& al-KhatGj, 2nd edn., (Cairo: al-Matba’ah al- 
Salafiyah, l352/1933), p. 13. 

15Thus we read in a Hadith that ”righteous speech-al-kalimah al-qyibah-is a form 
of charity.” See Mulpyy al-Din al-Nawawi, Riy$ af-*i$n, 2nd ed., Muhammad &ir al- 
Din al-AIba;ni (Beirut: a l - h k t a b  al-Idami; 1404/1984), p. 284, Had& No. 699. 

I61he Hoiy Q u r h ,  T a ,  T m W m  and C o r n w r y  by ‘Abdullah Yusuf ‘Mi, footnote 
No. 9 7 5 .  



.46 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

al-biitil), blameworthy or objectionable opinion (al-ra > al-madhmiim), and 
opinion whose validity is in doubt ( a h >  ji mawdi‘ al- ishtibiih)?’ 

The first, valid ray, is what is in accord with authoritative precedent 
and approved opinion of the ‘Ulama of the past, who have acted in harmony 
with it and accepted it in principle in their awn fatw8 and ijtihad?s In other 
words, its harmony with the accepted norms of Shari‘ah is not in question. 
The test here is necessarily retrospective, in that past authorities of proven 
validity are taken as the criteria on which to evaluate a fresh opinion. It is 
to be noted, however, that an opinion of this type may initially be uncertain 
and doubtful. Only when all doubt as to its p q r i e t y  is eliminated and resolved 
can it be classified as valid. The main process for this form of refinement 
known to the classical methodology of thought in Islam is ijmZ Once an 
opinion is accepted and supported by i j d ,  it becomes authoritative and valid 
beyond question. Ijmii‘ puts the final seal of approval on an opinion which 
might have been disputed but which no longer remains open to it. 

Legislation and judicial decisions of htgher courts in modem times provide 
for a similar process in that once a proposal or opinion is adopted by proper 
legislative/judical authorities, its validity is, for practical purposes at least, 
no longer debatable. Collective and consultative resolutions by professional 
and representative bodies also enhance the authority and wight of an otherwise 
isolated opinion. Public opinion and the press in modem societies may likewise 
serve the purpose of identifying the direction of a possible consensus in favor 
or against a doubtful opinion whose validity cannot be readily ascertained 
by reference to the or ijmif. According to a well-known saying of the 
leading Companion, ‘Abd Allah b. Mas‘ud, ”what the Muslims deem to be 
good is good in the sight of God.”19 Should there be consultation among 
experts or public and representative bodies, and the opinion which emerges 
incorporates the views of the community leaders and the uhl ul-shiirii, the 
weight and authority of that opinion would be enhanced and in line with 
the Qur’anic principle of consultation. 

At the opposite pole of valid opinion stands the void opinion (al-my 
al-biiGl), one which carries no authority at all. Once again Ibn Qayyim wrote 
on a somewhat retrospective note that void opinion is clearly in discord with 
the approved precedent of past ‘Ulama. They would have denounced it in 

“Cf. Ibn Qayyim, rkim, I, 55. 
’%id. 
19This is often quoted to be a Hadith of the Prophet. Both Sayf al-Din al-&nidi ( A l - w m  

I, p. 214, and Abu Islpiq Ibrihim a l - s w b i ,  al-l’tisiim, (Cairo: Matba‘ah al-Manir, l332/1914), 
II,319 refer to it as such. It is, however, more likely to be a saying of the famous Companion, 
‘Abd Allah Ibn Mdiid (see Ahmad Hasan, Ihe Doctrine 0fIjmi‘in Islam, (Islamabad: Islamic 
Research Institute, 1984), p. 37. 

A U@l d - e ,  2nd &., d. ‘Abd al-Razziiq ‘Afifi, (Beit: al-Maktab al-Islami, 1402/1982), 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ra’y 41 

principle and refused to give it any recognition in their juridicial decisions 
and fatwiLZo 

Ibn Qayyim aI-Jawziyah divides the valid ru), into four types, namely 
the ru), of a Companion Gfatawii al-&iibih) m), which interprets and clarifies 
the nu& (ul-m), ul-&$in); consultative my; and m), which consists of ijtihad 
(ul-ru), al-ijtihiidi). 

The ‘Ulama are on the whole in agreement with the special status and 
authority that the fatwl of a Companion enjoys in religious and juridicial 
matters. The Companions are generally held in high esteem as they were 
most knowledgeable of the Qur’an and of the teachugs of the Prophet. Opinions 
that they have formulated and advanced are on the whole considered to come 
close, in order of authority, to the Sunnah of the Prophet. Ibn Qayyim quotes 
Imam al-Shifi‘rs statement in support of his own view to the effect that “the 
ra), of a Companion commands greater merit and is preferable to our own 
opinion.”21 Ibn Qayyim then goes on to cite several examples where the m), 
of a Companion on certain issues was upheld and comborated by the welation 
of the Qur‘an, “a blessing and a privilege that is unparalleled and unique.” 
The conclusion is thus drawn that the fatwH or opinion of a Companion is 
sui generis and any attempt to equate it with that of the generality of ‘Ulama 
is “devoid of substance and ill-conceived.”22 

The second type of valid ru), is one which seeks to interpret the nusky, 
clarify their meaning, and facilitate the deduction of legal rules from them. 
This type of ru), is designed to promote clear understanding of the Qur’an 
and Sunnah and seeks to derive guidance from them on matters affecting 
the life of the community. The hallmark of such opinion is the sincerity, 
knowledge, and devotion of its author to the promotion and understanding 
of the Qur’an and S ~ n n a h . ~ ~  

The third variety of valid or praiseworthy opinion is the consultative 
ray, which is arrived at not by a single individual, but through consultation 
among people, especially those who are competent to give counsel. God 
Almighty has praised “this Ummah for their diligence at consultation in 
community affairs; the Messenger of God has practiced it, and it is one of 
the best forms of M ) , . ’ ’ ~ ~  

The fourth type of praiseworthy opinion is arrived at through correct 
procedures which are characteristic of ijtihad. The proper procedm for anyone 
who attempts to give an opinion on a matter is to look into the Book of 

*OIbn Qayyim, I‘l?m, I, 55. 
zlIbid., I, 67. 
ZzIbid., I, 68. 
z31bid., I, 69. 
241bid., I, 70. 



48 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

God first, and if he or she hils to fmd the necessary guidance, then they 
look into the Sunnah of the Prophet and the precedent of his Companions. 
But if guidance sought still cannot be found then he or she formulates his 
or her own opinion and judgment in the same way as the Companions are 
known to have attempted on many issues. This is, in fact, the proc&ure laid 
down in the Hadith of Mu‘5dh b. Jabal, which is a standard authority on 
ijtihad. An opinion so formulated and expressed may be correct or otherwise, 
or it may appear at the time to be correct but the contrary emerges over 
time. The principle to apply here is that which is expounded in a letter from 
the Caliph ‘Umar b. al-Khattab, when he instructed his judges that “the mere 
fact that you have made a certain decision must not deter you from changing 
it, if it becomes clear to you that it was erroneous in the first place. For 
truth is timeless; nothing must overrule it and it is far better to return to 
the truth rather than persist in falsehood.”25 This principle would seem to 
be of general application to all decisions, judicial or otherwise, and it clearly 
rejects the notions of sacrificing truth at the altar of consistency and the so- 
called credibility of judicial office. But the point that is most emphasized 
in all of this is sincerity and devotion to the cause of truth and justice, the 
essence of beneficience in any praiseworthy opinion. “Anyone who exerts 
himself with the intention of gaining the pleasure of God and benefit to the 
people will be counted as one of the m&iniin, as goodwill and sincerity 
in telling the truth embodies the highest value in t a q ~ i i . ’ ~ ~  

As for m4, whose validity is open to doubt, it is equivalent to a conjecture 
(zunn) . This type of ray is accepted as a basis for judicial decision and legal 
opinion (fatwa) in cases of emergency or where no better alternative may 
be known to exist. Unless it is adopted into a court decision, a doubtful 
opinion or a conjecture does not bind anyone. The ‘Ulama have neither 
approved it nor have they denounced it, but have left open the choice between 
acceptance or rejection.z7 But since we do not always have the necessary 
knowledge of or access to truth, a considered opinion, which may amount 
to no more than a probability or a conjecture, is accepted as a basis of decision- 
making so as to avoid indefinite suspension and delay that the quest for 
knowledge and truth may entail. In the sphere of judicial decisions, however, 
there are checks and balances, especially with regard to the rules that govern 
admissibility of witnesses, which are designed to minimize the possibility 
of error. Decisions and opinions which are formed in conformity with correct 
procedures are therefore deemed to be valid, even if they partake in a measure 
of speculation or individual’bias of a tolerable sort. 

Z5Jbid., I, 72. 
Ybid., 11, 120. 
Z71bid., I, 55: 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ray 49 

From the viewpoint of its subject matter and relative value, m4, is once 
again divided into three types. Firstly, ru4, on a juridicial, or shur'i, matter 
which is validated and accepted only on the strength of the shur'i proof on 
which it is founded, regardless as to whether it is advanced by one person 
or by a multitude. Secondly, m4, concerning specialized matters which require 
technical knowledge, where the people at learge are not expected to be in 
a position to form an enlightened opinion on them. Only the expert opinion 
is to be taken into account on such matters and the value of that opinion 
is determined on an informed basis. And thirdly, ru4, on matters of practical 
nature which require public participation and compliance, such as election 
of the head of state and opinion on public, constitutional, and municipal affairs 
which concern the community as a whole. On matters of this nature, the 
preferred opinion is that of the majority of the people whose action and 
participation is of central importance to the opinion 

Abuses of Rap 

The blameworthy opinion (uZ-ru4, uZ-madhmiim) is a type of ru4, which 
is neither completely false nor totally invalid and yet it is misguided and 
reprehensible. It may occur in the form of a deviant innovation (bid'ah), 
transgression (bughy), or self-seeking desire (hawii). There is yet a fourth 
variety of reprehensible rub which is referred to as juhl (ignorance), as it 
is deemed to be no more than an unfounded extrapolation that originates 
in ignorance. All of these hll under restrictions on freedom of opinion primarily 
because the right to free speech and expression does not extend to these areas. 
The term "restrictions" here does not necessarily mean prohibition. For as 
we shall see, the whole of this field is governed not by legal prohibitions 
as such but by moral sanctions-sincere and persuasive advice. Although 
the precise legal position is not always clear on some forms of bid'& and 
hawii, these are, broadly speaking, nonjustifiable violations of the freedom 
of speech. 

It will be noted at the outset that the whole of this classification is 
somewhat overlapping and scholars have sometimes used these terms almost 
interchangeably, presumably because the concepts of, for example, ignorance 
or transgression are often deemed to be present in some measure in the case 
of a carpricious opinion (hawii) and a pernicious innavation (bid'&). The 
main difference between the last two would appear to be that hwzi consists 
of a strong element of selfishness and pursuit of one's desire in disregard 
of clear guidance. Bid'uh, on the other hand, is distinguished by an attempt 

*Tf. Mahmud 'AM al-Majid a l - m i d i ,  AZ-ShGrC, (Beirut: Drlr al-Jil, 1404/1984), p. 91. 



50 The American Journal of Iskamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

at distoring the principles of Islam or misinterpreting them out of good intention 
and the desire to explore the unexplored. The word "bid'ah" is generally 
used in contradistinction with "Sunnah," that is the normative and familiar 
practice. In this sense, bid'ah signifies a deviation from, or superimposition 
on, the Sunnah of the Prophet. An opinion which amountk to bid'ah may 
or may not be motivated by self-seeking interest, and as such, it is not always 
distinguishable from hawii. Note, for example, the distinction between the 
two forms of divorce in Islamic law, known as tuliiq al-sunnah and <ahq 
ul-bid'ah respectively. The hrmer signifies the type of divorce which conforms 
with the law and established precedent. The latter is labeled as tuliiq al- 
bid'ah primarily because of its departure from the legal norm which requires 
that the maximum of three pronouncements of @ Z & q  are each uttered within 
a clean period (@hr);t that is the period between two menstruations. ghq 
ul-bid'uh ignores this and combines the three pronouncements of @Zuq to 
be uttered all at once. As for the question, however, whether this form of 
laluq also partakes in a measure of self-seeking desire (huwii) on the part 
of the husband, the answer is not always clear but is likely to be in the 
affirmative. Hence the distinction between the concepts under discussion is 
expected to be in broad outline and not necessarily exclusive. 

Bughy may be distinguished from both bidah and huwii in that it indulges 
in self-righteousness and an attempt at imposing one's own opinion on others, 
often denouncing all those who oppose it. Beyond these shades of differences, 
however, the concepts under discussion have much in common between them 
and are often used interchangeably. The Qur'an uses the term haw5 in a 
somewhat generic sense which could include both bid'uh and bughy. We also 
find that mapy scholars have used the term bid'ah so widely as to include 
all varieties of reprehensible opinion. Furthermore, none of these are confined 
to the realm of opinion but apply equally to acts which may quallfy the attendant 
description and attributes of each. 

Bid'ah and Hawe 

Literally, bid'ah means innovation that could not be vindicated by 
authoritative precedent, a pernicious innovation which is far removed from 
the norm and its established practice. 29 It is defined as innovation in religion, 
resembling that which'the Shari'ah has expressly approved, and is intended 
to fulfdl the proclaimed objectives of Sha~?ah.~O It will be Goted in'this 

29Cf. C.A.Q. Nieuenhuijze, 7he Lifestyles of Islam, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1985), p. 155. 
30Al-Sha;tibi, Al-l'ti@m, I, 29. The Arabic definition of bid'ah reads as follows: al-bid'ah 

[ a r i q d f i  al-din mukhtari'ah t+hi al-shari'ah, yuqJid bi a l - s u u  'ahyhii m i  yuqsid bi al- 
[ariqh al-shar'iyah. 



M. H. &ali The Appmval and Disapproved Varieties of Ra'y 51 

definition that the resemblance between bid'uh violates the established norms 
of Shari'ali. 

The defurtion also indicates that the intention behind bid'ah does not 
deviate fkom the norms of Shari'ah in the sense that the rules of Shari'ah 
are generally intended to achieve benefits (mu@il@) and this is precisely what 
the innovator intends to do. The good intentions behind bid'ah are, however, 
of no account, as al-shfttjbi explains, because the innovator amgates to himself 
the authority of the Lawgiver in such a manner as to frustrate the objectives 
of the law.31 

Bid'ah is divided into two types, namely genuine bid'ah (al-bid'ah al- 
k i q i y a h )  , for which no justification or support could be found in the Qur'an, 
S-, or ijma', nor in any precedent or opinion of the learned, neither 
wholly nor in part. It is in other words an innovation in the true sense of 
the word. The second type of bid'ah is known as al-bid'ah al-@fiyah, or 
partial innovation, which has tvm facets, one being identical with the genuine 
bid'ah in that it is unprecedented and indefensible. But there is another side 
to this type of bid'uh for which support can be fbund in the established m m .  
That is, bid'ah as an ambivalent innovation which can be accepted as part 
of the authoritative Sunnah or rejected completely, depending on how it is 
viewed. 32 

Bid'ah i s  once again divided into two types, namely bid'& of abandonment 
(al-bid'ah al-tarkiyah), which consists of abandoning something, such as, 
for example, when a person abandons, or advises others to abandon, Somethrng 
which is lawful under the rules of Shari'ah. The opposite of this is al-bid'ah 
ghayr al-tarkiyh, that is innovation, "which does not consist of abandoning 
anything; it may involve a change or advance a different perspective which 
amounts to innovation but not a b a n d ~ n m e n t . ~ ~  

The hallmark of bid'uh is the pursuit of capricious and whimsical opinion 
(hawii) in preference to divine guidance. Thus we read in the Qur'an in an 
address to Prophet David: 

0 David, we &we made you a virr?gerent in the earth, so rule 
mng people righteously and follcrw not the dictates of haw6 which 
lead you astray from the path of God. (!$%I, 38:26). 

and 

Who is more misguided than one who follows his own h w i i  in 
disregard of the guidance that God has revealed? (al-Qws, 28:50) 

'%id., I, 50. 
32ibid., I, 54. 
3 3 b i d . ,  I, 38. 



52 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

And then a person who chooses to follow the vagaries of haw5 is not 
to be obeyed by others, as the Qur‘an proclaims: 

Obey not the one whose heart is negligent of our remembrance 
(‘an dhikrinii), one who follows his haw& and one who has 
exceeded all limits. (al-Kahf, 18:28) 

While quoting the foregoing, al-shiiubi points out that in all of the three 
the matter is confined to two things, namely following the guidance (h&, 
dhikr), or following caprice (haw5). The innovator (mubtadi’) has chosen 
the latter; hence he or she is utterly misguided while thinking otherwise of 
their personal intent. The same author goes on to quote another Qur’anic 
passage which denounces those who attempt to confuse the meaning of the 
Qur’an through misguided and self-styled interpretation: 

He it is who has sent down to thee the Book. In it are iiyiit which 
are perspicuous; they are the foundation of the Book: Others are 
allegorical. But those in whose hearts is perversity follow the part 
which is allegorical, seeking discord fltnah) and searching for 
its hidden meanings . . . (Al-‘Imriin, 3:7) 

It is reported from ‘A’ishah that the Prophet read this ayah 
and then said: “when you see those who argue and dispute about 
the Qur‘an these are the ones that God has meant, and they should 
be shunned.” To this al-ShiiGbi adds: “The disputation that the 
Prophet has referred to concerns the pursuit of the Mutashiibih 
(intricate) in the Qur’an.” Disputation of this kind leads to disunity 
and deviation from the guidance of the Qur’an, in which we read 
further: 

This is My way, leading straight, so follow it and follow not the 
paths which will scatter you away from it (al-An‘am, 6:W3) 

The phrase “follow not the paths,” according to Qur’an commentators, 
refers to the ways of those who have deviated from the straight path and 
these are the innovators and the skeptics, the ah1 al-bida‘ wa al-shubhiit). 34 

.While elaborating on some of these statements, al-Shiiubi adds: “the 
innovators distort the Shari‘ah in various ways, such as by upholding the 
manifest or appamt ( q z d t i r )  in the Qur’an without looking into the objectives 
and intentions of the Lawgiver.” In a reference to the Kharijites, the same 

341bid., II, 54. 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ra'y 53 

author notes that they upheld the intricate portions (Mutashiibihiit) of the 
Qur'an in preference to the perspicuous ( M W )  thmin; that they declared 
as infidel most of the Companions of the Prophet; they also held the view 
that in the event the Imam becomes an infidel, all of his subjects automatically 
become infidels; that the adulterer is not liable to the punishment of mjm 
(stoning to death); that the prescribed punishment of qudhf (slanderous 
accusation) applies to those who accuse women of non-chastity but not to 
those who charge men of similar conduct; that ignorance of theficm' (detailed 
rules of fiqh) is an excuse; that God will send a Prophet from among the 
' u j m  (i.e. non-Arabs), who will bring a book and the Shari'ah of Mulpmmad 
will then be abandoned; that the S i i f i  Yusuf (i.e., chapter XII of the standard 
text) is not a part of the Qur'an; and so on; views which are contrary to 
the principles and established tenets of Islam.35 

While commenting on the subject of Mutushiibih (intricate portions) Ibn 
Qayyim al-Jawziyah writes that a particular form of huwii in connection with 
the Qur'an is to uphold the Mutashiibih in preference to the Mu&m 
(perspicuous) so as to advance and substantiate a particular point of view. 
What is even more hideous, he notes, is that when the morbid attempt to 
find a Mutushiibih with which to reject the Muhkum fails, attempts are then 
made to find some weakness in the Mz.&kum itself and thereby downgrade 
it to the level of Mutushiibih and in this way try to suspend its definitive 
import. Ibn Qayyim also makes references to the Jahm-yah and Qadariyah 
(subdivisions of the Mu'tazilah) and their views on the meaning of certain 
portions of the Qur'an. The author concludes his discussion by saying that 
the c o m t  approach which the Companions and the leading jurists and scholars 
have adopted is precisely the opposite: The Mutushiibih must be read in light 
of the M u & z m ,  not vice versa, so as to maintain internal harmony and 
consistency in interpreting the Qur'an. 36 

References are also made in this context to the views and beliefs of the 
Biitiniyah (also known as Isma'iliyah), in particular the meaning they have 
given to some of the key words of the Qur'an, such as qaliih, zakiih, eawm, 
etc., meanings which are very different from what is normally understood 
by the majority of 'Ulama. They have thus interpreted salah to be referring 
to the Prophet, for example in the Qur'anic ayah that "surely $uliih keeps 
one away from indecency and evil" (al- 'Ankabiit, 29:44). Since it is the Prophet 
who forbids evil not the ~aliih as such. Similarly zakih (legal alms) according 
to the Biitiniyah means purification of the soul, and s u m  (fasting) means 
abstaining from evil; junnuh (paradise) is held to mean the sweet smell of 

35Abu Ism Ibrahim al-shitjbi, Al-Muwiijhqiitfi Vqd al-m, ed., Mdpmmad Hasanayn 

361bn Qayyim, Z'kzm, II, 230. The author discusses the sectarian views of the JahmTyah 
MMd, (Cairo: a l - M W a h  al-Sal&iyyah, l34M923 A.H.), IV, #x) I d a . ,  d-Z'ti@n, 240-80. 

etc., and their tamperings with the Qur'in in some detail at pp. 220-31. 



54 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

the human body; wudu'(ab1ution) is said to mean following the awaited Imam, 
and tayammum (ablution with clean earth where no water could be found) 
is held to mean obedience to the deputy of the Imam in the absence of the 
Imam himself; whereas ghusl (bathe) is held to mean renewal of one's pledge 
of allegiance to the Imam.a7 It is perhaps due to thw and similar remote 
and allegorical interpretations they have given to the Qur'an that the 
Biitjdyah (proponents of the esoteric and the hidden) have derived their name. 

A more recent form of bid'ah, embraced by some Muslims, is to deny 
the authority of Sunnah and to take the view that the Qur'an, being self- 
contained, authentic, and comprehensive, is the only source of Shari'ah. This 
is the view taken by a faction calling itself al-Firqah al-Qur'm-yah (partisans 
of the Qur'an) whose views are known to have spread and found adherents 
in some Arab countries like Egypt and Libya.s8 

Whereas some scholars have accepted the notion of a good bid'uh, Ibn 
Taym-yah refutes the division of bid'ah into good and evil, as he maintains 
that all bid'ah is evil. People have held different views on bid'& and some 
have divided it into two types, namely bid'uh qubiw and bid'uh &sun&, 
saying that not all bid'ah is evil, that when a bid'ah is accepted and generally 
approved by the community of believers it is no longer bid'uh. Ibn Taym-yah 
then goes on to refute this by saying that these views came into being only 
after the 3rd/lOth century; that all bid'uh is evil and that the Sunnah is 
completely clear on this point. The author then quotes three e t h  which 
are: "All bid'& is misguided-kull bid'uh &diilah," "every innovation is 
bid'ah-kull ?m&hthuh bid'",'' and "the worst of things are the novel among 
them - innu shun- al%mi;rr n u . & h t W  ." The examples which Ibn Bym-yah 
has given of bid'uh in this context pertain mainly to rituals of the faith, such 

and festive celebrations (u'yiid) other thm those which are commonly 

The view that some bid'ah is good originates in the precedent of 'Umar 
b. al-Khathb, who is on record to have welcomed s&t al-tamwilz during 
Ramadan and r e f e e d  to it as nf'inul bid'uh (what a good bid'ah!). To this 
Ibn Taym-yah responds that tamw$z was not an innovation at all; rhat it 
originated in the Sunnah of the Prophet and the Companions had practiced 
it, but that the Prophet abandoned it after awhile k r  fear of it lxxmnhg 
obligatory. Hence what 'Umar Ibn al-Khattab is quoted to have said does 
not at all contradict the Hdith that "all bid'uh is misguided." Ibn 'bym-yah 

as h t h g  on certain days of the year, unaubrized prayer (@ al-- ), 

recognized.39 

37Ahmad b. Hajar al-Bu$rni al-Ban", ZbMhir al-Muslimin 'an al-Ibtdci' wa al-Bid'ah 

3*Ibid., p. 41. 
'Taqi al-Din Ibn m - y a b ,  Iqti&'al-Sinit al-MIlstaqm li-Mukhla&h &?Gb al-Ja?im, 

ji al-DSn, (Doha, Qatar): Matjib? 'Ali b. ' M ,  ?402fi983), pp. 3738. 

ed., N&ir b. 'Abd a l - b i m  d- 'Aql, ( R i y a ,  1404 A.H.), I, 55. 



I %  

M. H. Kamali The Approval a n d ' D i s a p p d  Varieties of Ray 55 

concludes that 'Umar must have used the word bid'& in its linguistic sense 
of welcoming something that was forgotten; that he did not use the word 
in the sense of a bid'uh sh~r'iyah.~O I 

A l - G h d i  divides the mubtadi' into tvm types: one who invites others 
to bid'uh, and the other who remains silent out of fear or personal choice. 
The first type of mubkdi'may be propagating somethmg which does not 
amount to infidelity (ht) in which caie the matter rests between him or 
her and God (fu umruh buynah WQ b u y  Allah). But if that person invites 
the people to what may amount to hp, he or she can be even more harmful 
than the ka$r ub initio. For the evil of the latter is not contagious in the 
sense that the person is known as a n0n;believer and as such the believers 
are not likely to pay aitention. But the mubradi'who actively propagates bid'uh 
has a claim to righteousness and tries to spread corruption under the guise 
of truth and that kind of evil is contagious. This kind of mubfudi' must be 
denounced, his or her evil exposed, and people shopld openly show their 
disapproval; they should turn away from him and refuse to respond to his 
greeting (salam) in public and should m i d  helping or cooperating with that 
person. 

As for the commoner who indulges in bid'uh (ul-mubfudi' al- 'Zuni) but 
is unable to persuade others and is unlikely to command any folluwing, he 
or she should, instead of stem treatmefit and humiliation, be given good 

1 counsel (nuqi?zuh) and kind advice. But if ~ i ( u z h  proves futile and shunning 
i'raci) is called for, then this should be done. For if bid'uh is not denounced, 

it is likely to spread and give rise to evil in society.41 
Al-Shiitibi advises reticence vis-a-vis b i d i t  whose truth or falsehood 

is not known: "we are commanded not to disseminate such views until the 
truth emerges.42 In response to the suggestions by some 'Ulama that mubtadi'ibt 
who propagage bid'uh should be severely p ~ s h e d ,  al-Shitibi observes that 
they should be treated in accordance with the enormity of their conduct. 
If the bid'uh is a minor one, they should be punished lightly, but if it amounts 
to a grave violation, the punishment should be proportionately increased. 
Al-Sh5tjbi also records the hint that the early scholars (rm&qa&&) divided 
bid'uh into two types: that which is reprehensible (malauh) and bid'ah which 
falls under the category of h a m  (forbidden). The author then concludes 
that bid'uh is not a monolithic concept, nor is it a singular offense; that each 
bid'uh should be viewed and evaluated individually; and that treatment or 

\ 

I( - 

401bid., I, 56; idem, Malmu' ah IpltGwCi Shaywl al-Islam Ibrt Taymlyah, ed., 'AM al- 
m n  b. Qkim, (Beirut: Mu'assisah al-Ridah, 1398 A.H.), X, 37l. 

41Abu Himid Mulpmmad a l - G h d i ,  Kitab &b a1-S- wa al-Mu'rsshamh Ma' 
&&if al-Khalq, ed. M- Sa'udal-Mu'ini, (BagMad: Matba'ah al- 'h, 1984), pp. 201-4. 

4ZAl-Shi%.ibi, Al-Muw2faqGt, IV, 104. 



56 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

reprimand accorded to its perpetrator must strictly be determined on this 
basis.43 

Although in its literal sense, huwii can mean a passing whim, inclination, 
or desire without necessarily leading to either the formulation or expression 
of an opinion, the ‘Ulama have nevertheless used it to imply an opinion which 
originates in these impules. This usage, which is basically a metaphor using 
the cause for the effect, is probably motivated by the frequent recurrenc of 
the word huwii and its derivatives in the Qur’an. Huwii has been defined 
as “the pleasure seeking inclination of the soul (nafs) toward that which is 
not permitted by the Sha~Tah.”~~ 

As already indicated, the Qur’an refers to huwii in contradistinction to 
guidance (M, dhikr), and deviation from the truth which the Qur’an itself 
has expounded. It is in this sense that the Qur’an warns the believers, on 
no less than 25 occasions, against the dangers, incitement, and temptations 
of huwii and the hold that it can have on the hearts and minds of people.45 
The phrase uhl ul-haw6 typically refers to those who say what they please, 
who violate the truth by indulging in corrupt and distorted interpretations 
which are unacceptable to the mind and heart of the believer. Whenever opinion 
is allowed to follow personal prejudice and desire, it leads to divergence from 
truth and even outright falsehood. 

Among the instances of haw6 one is the personal desire to be the winner 
at all costs regardless of the merit of one’s case or concern for the well-being 
of others. One of the worst forms of haw6 is when such presonal craving 
for superiority and power is masqueraded with specious reasoning and plausible 
argumentation in the name of justice, piety, and truth. The hold that huwii 
can have on the minds and lives of people is depicted in the Qur’an, where 
the believers are asked the question, “Did you see the fate of one who took 
as his god his own vain desire-huwii-and his god led him astray! (al- 
Jithiyah, 45:23). 

Elsewhere we find evidence in the Qur‘an which clearly forbids the pursuit 
of haw6 and indulgence in sensuous and hedonistic desires: “Follow not the 
huwii as it would lead you astray from the path of God (Sad, 38:26).” Huwii 
occurs in the Qur’an in contradistinction to Shari’ah, as in the following passage: 

Thus we gave you a Shari‘ah (i.e., a path) in religion, so follow 
it, and follow not the desire (ahwg) of those who know not. 
(al-Jithiyah, 45:18) 

431bid. 
44‘Adnin Darwish and Muhammad al-Misri, Al-Kulliyyiit, Mu‘jam fi al-Mus[alahiit wa 

4sAbu Habib, Darasah, p. 454. 
al-Furuq al-lughawiyah, (Damascus: Wizirah al-Irshid, 1974), V, 38. 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Wieties of Ra’y 57 

A-zamakhshari elaborates the meaning of this Ijah: Follow the Shari’ah 
which is founded in proof and evidence and let not yourself be tempted by 
the views and arguments of the ignorant which are founded in caprice and 
pernicious innovation (hawii wu bid‘~h).~~ Furthermore, the prophet is on 
record to have addressed his followers that “None of you can be a true believer 
unless your desire (hawii) is made subservient to (the guidance) I have brought 
forth.” According to another Hadith, “Nothing that is worshipped on this earth 
is hated by God more intensely than h ~ w i i . ” ~ ~  

Another instance ofhawa that is clearly forbidden is when a person believes 
in the legality or prohibition of something, and then ignores it when it applies 
to himelf or his friends. To illustrate this, a person may be demanding his 
right of preemption (shun while believing in its validity, but when someone 
else demands the same right of him, he ignores it and claims that it is unproven 
and advances an opinion to that effect.48 On a similar note, a person may 
denounce another for a certain activity such as listening to music, but when 
his friends do the same, he claims that the prohibition of such activity is 
not proven and that the subject remains open to ijtihad.49 

The jurists have not specified any punitive measures for hawii and no 
particular punishment for the perpetrator of bid‘uh either, except for a form 
of social boycott (u2-hijr, also referred to as i‘m that is signified by refusing 
to greet, speak to, or approve of the views of such a person. The ‘Ulama 
have spoken of hijr as a moral obligation of the community regardless as 
to whether the perpetrator of bid‘uh is a relative, a neighbor, or a stranger, 
especially when the bid‘uh concerns the community at large and violates 
what is referred to as the Right of God (Huqq Allah). But if the bid‘uh relates 
to private rights (such as consisting of a form of slander or libel), then greeting 
is permitted and hijr is not required. There is no maximum limit on the 
duration of hijr and it continues until the person repents and corrects him 
or herself. The community is under moral obligation to denounce the bid’uh; 
those who are able to produce evidence for its refutation, and those who 
are in possession of authority and able to put an end to it, must do 

The ‘Ulama have held it to be a duty of the head of state to prevent 
bid‘uh and hawii in the business of government. This is a part of the general 
obligation of the head of state to hcilitate transmission and dissemination 

4 6 J i r  Allah Mahmud al-Zamakhshari, Al-Kashshrf ‘an Haqi’iq al-Tan& (Beirut: D i r  
al-Ma‘rifah, n.d.), III, 511. 

(’Both Hadiths are quoted by Abu ‘Abd Allah Muhammad al-Qurtubi in his Ta$ir al- 
Q u v u b i ,  (Cairo: Dar al-Kutub al- ‘Arabiyah, 1387/1967), XVI, 167. 

4sZaydan, Majmu‘ah, p. 298; al-Sibi‘i, Zshtiraklyah, p. 54. 
49Shams al-Din b. ‘ A M  Allah Muhammad b. Malfal! al-Maqdisi al-Hanbali, A l - k i i b  

al-Shar‘iyah wa a l - M i d  al-Mar‘iyah, 2 vols., (Cairo: Matba‘ah a l - M e ,  1348 A.H.), I, 183. 
Tbid., pp. 237, 269. 



58 The American Jaurnal of Islamic Social Sciences Wl. 7, No. 1, 1990 

of knowledge whenever necessary or when it is in the intemt (muqal&zh) 
of the community. Dissemination of knowledge, as a duty of the head of 
state, comprises the following: (a) propagation of the hith by dekndmg it , 
against doubts and bid'uh and offering an adequate response to the promoters 
of bid'& and huwii. (b) Inviting the disbelievers and the misguided to 
righteousness and truth. (c) Investigating and bringing together the various 
views concerning bid'ah and huwii and trying to resolve disputes over them 
by validating or authorizing a view that seems best. Whenever the Imam 
exercises this form of ijtihad, or when he selects the ijtihad of others for 
the purpose of general practice, even if that ijtihad is of disputed validity, 
it becomes authoritative nevertheless and action upon it becomes obligatory. 51 

Baghy (Transgression) And Zkhtiiiif (Disagreement) 

Bughy means lawlessness, refusing to acknowledge the truth, and exceedmg 
the limits of things with corrupt intention, dishonesty, and arrogance.52 Bughy 
is also the opposite of obedience (@'ah) to lawful government. In this sense, 
bughy is defined as refusing to obey the lawful Imam who is not indulging 
in sin (ma>iyzh), whether or not such disobedience is based on an interpxetation 
or a particular point of view which is believed to be the truth.53 

An instance of bughy which is frequently encountered is when a person 
or group of persons are engaged in a lawful pursuit but they are denounced 
for wrongdoing by their opponents. In the sphere of religious rituals such 
as the call to prayer (iidhiin), standing to prayer (iqiimah) , and even the contents 
of the ritual prayer, the followers of different madhiihib observe them with 
shght variations. Basically all the variations are permissible as they all subscribe 
to the tenet of 'ibiidah; a mere difference of form does not justify any claim 
of superiority or preference of one over the other. And yet, owing to bughy, 
the follwers of some rmdhidzib have denounced and abused their counterparts 
in others for not following the rituals that they have themselves adopted. 
This is not even confined to rituals: in certain other spheres we know, for 
example, that the mystic has often criticized the jurist for the latter's zeal 
over the externalities of religion. The jurist has, in turn, criticized the mystic 

"Yahyi Ism$& Manhaj 61-Sunnahfi a l -  'Akiqah Bay al-H&im wa a l - M & k h ,  (Cairo: 
Dar al-Waf2, 1406/1986), pp. 330-32. 

52Zaydk, Majmu'ah, p. 295. 
53While the Hanbali definition of baghy includes disobedience to an unjust ruler, the 

Hanafi's define it as disobedience to a just or lawful Imam only. See Mu&mmad Am-n Ibn 
'Abidin, Radd al-MukhtGr ;41a al-Durml al-Mukhtir (also known as HGshiyah Ibn 'Abidn, 
2nd edn., (Cairo: Matbdah al-Biibbi al-Halabi, 1386/1966), 111, 426; Y@yi I s d i l ,  Manhaj 
al-Swvlahfi al- W I a q a h  Bayn al-H&m wa al-M-, (Cairo: Dir al-Wafi', 1406/1986), p. 147. 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Wetics of Ra’y 59 

for his esoteric approach to religion and to some of the rules and doctrines 
of Shari‘ah. Each has thus denounced the other in disregard of their respective 
merits. Their views partake in transgression, as they both indulge in self- 
righteousness and unwarranted denunciation of the views of their o p n e n t s .  
The correct approach in such cases wuld be for both sides to assess the 
merit and demerit of each view and acknowledge them accordingly without 
transgression and prejudice. All other considerations which are external to 
the essence of the matter such as the desire to expose the ignorance of one’s 
opponent or establish one’s own superiority and power, etc., must be excluded 
from the quest for truth and assessment or criticism of the opinion of others. 54 

Disagreement (iwltififi over the rituals of ‘ibSrdiit, including variation 
in the forms of the call to prayer (iidhiin and iqzimah), the ‘Id prayer, and 
prayer at times of fear for one’s safety (saZur aZ-khawjO and other such rituals 
which vary in form but unite in the essence of worship are, according to 
Ibn Taym-yah, a variety of ikhZiZiif al-tanawwu: that is variation which is 
devoid of substance. As opposed to ifitifif aZ-ru&d (disagreement over 
substance amounting to contradiction), tkhtifif u1-tanawwu‘ consists basically 
of preference for one of the two or many of equally valid views over others, 
which should be presented and evaluated as such. The essence of preference 
(rarph), according to Ibn Taym-yah, is in the recognition of the basic validity 
of two views, one of which may be recommended while the other is neither 
denounced nor f a € ~ i f i e d . ~ ~  The author then quotes the fdlowing Hadith, 
reported by ‘Abd Allah b. Mas‘ud: “I heard a man reciting an iiyuh (of the 
Qur’an) which differed with what I had heard the Prophet reciting. So I took 
his hand and we went to the Prophet and reported the matter. Then I noticed 
signs of displeasure on his face and the Prophet said: “Both of you are 
right-kiliikumii rnz&in-and neither of you should disagree over this. For, 
many a ’people who came before you met with destruction because of 
disagreement over trivialitie~.”~~ 

Ibn Tqm-yah continues: The Prophet forbade disagreement which 
consisted of juM, that is, denial of the truth and veracity of the opinion or 
conduct of the other party. This was the case in the foregoing Hadith where 
the Prophet explained that disagreement which was devoid of substance was 
basically destructive. The parties were both reciting the Qur’an in different 
dialects, which was why the Prophet declared them both to be &in (doing 
some- good or beautiful) but they fell in error when they denounced 
and denied the validity of each other’s 

%f. Zaydb, Majm‘ah, pp. 2l1, 295. 
551bn Taym-yah, Iqti+i; p. 130. 
9 b i d . ,  p. 123; Ai-Tabrizi, Mishkiir, ed,’al-Aibiini, I, 677; Hadith No. 2212. 
571bid., pp. 124-5. 



60 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

As for ikhtilijf uZ-@iiid, which amounts to contradiction, the two views 
at issue are diametrically opposed to one another in regards to either essentials 
or subsidiary detail or both. The majority opinion on this type of disagreement 
is that only one of the opposing views could be right and declared as such, 
but not both. Examples of this type of ikhtilijfamong the scholars are found 
over the issue of free will and determination, on the attributes of companions, 
and in the views and beliefs of the different faction's of the jurists and the 
m m q u w @  (mystics). The matter is different in ikhtihf ul-tanawwu: where 
each of the two parties are undoubtedly right but blame falls on one who 
exceeds the limits and resorts to bughy over the In Ibn Taym-yah's 
assessment, by far the greatest part of the differences of opinion among the 
Ummah is of this type: they consist of mere variations and amount to no 
more than a difference of perspective or a way of looking at reality and truth, 
and yet they still lead to hostility and conflict. This is because neither of 
the disputing parties acknowledge the merit in the views of the opponent 
and both persist in pursuing self-righteousness and superiority over the other. 5 9  

Religious and sectarian fanaticism of the type that lays exclusive claim 
to righteousness is, as one observer explains, a deviation from the valid 
precedent of Companions and a form of bid'uh/bughy, which is found among 
the followers of different m u d h b s .  The exponents of such transgression 
among the Hanafis are often people who lay claim to piety and knowledge 
and yet they propagate fanaticism in such ways as to proclaim invalid the 
juhh of one who performs it behind a non-Hanafi Imam; they also vehemently 
denounce the raising of hands during ritual prayer upon descending to ruku' 
(bowing), which is normal practice among the Shaflis. There are, in fact, 
fanatics of this type in every mudhhab, including the Shafi'i, Miiliki, and 
Hanbali, who see the truth as a prerogative of the school or their own following 
only. Even outside the sphere of 'iblidiit, in matrimonial matters, for example, 
they engage in transgression and bid'uh when they forbid their daughters 
from marrying a Muslim who is not a follower of their own d h h a b . 6 0  
They are indeed deviating from the consensus of all the leading Imams, who 
have urged their followers to adhere to the teachings of the Qur'an and Sunnah 
and abandon individual or scholastic opinions which do not conform to the 
authority of these sources. 

Al-Shahristani has held that istibdiid bi ul-ray, or imposing one's own 
opinion over others without clear authority, is transgression and a bid'uh 
which contradicts the precedent of the pious and upright 'Ulama of the past. 
The same author adds that isribdiid bi uZ-my is not a bid'& when it is founded 

581bid., pp. 130-1. 
591bid., p. 134. 
60Al-Ban'ali, Ezh&r, p. 61. 



M. H .  Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ray 61 

on knowledge and reason; it is only so when views of doubtful provenance 
and validity are inflicted on others.61 

One of the manifestations of istibdiid bi uZ-ru), which often partakes in 
transgression and ignorance is the assumption that one’s own knowledge, 
opinion, and belief is all that counts; that everyone must follow it; and that 
anyone who differs with it should be denounced. The person who persists 
in such an attitude has little regard for knowledge and truth and tends to 
ignore merit and reason in the opinion of others. This could only lead to 
hostility and abuse, and no benefit can be expected as a result.62 

And finally Ibn Qayyim al-Jawziyah includes under the category of 
reprehensible opinion, over-indulgence in personal preference (istihsiin) , 
advancement of analogies, and speculative argumentation which verge on 
haw6 and seek to circumvent the Shari‘ah. This kind of my pays little attention 
to the origin and proper causes of the u&im of Shari‘ah and often deviates 
from their objectives. Over-indulgence in this type of m), leads to “suspension 
of the Sunnah, to ignorance and confusion in the correct meaning of the 
Book of God, and to their ultimate neglect.63 The author includes in this 
category argumentation and opinion which originate in excessive questioning 
and highly theoretical issues which have little bearing on reality and practical 
experience. There is evidence that the Qur’an and Sunnah discourage over- 
indulgence in such questions. Ibn Qayyim then quotes the relevant evidence 
and draws the conclusion that Islam is basically a religion of authority which 
encourages humility and submission on the part of the believer and shuns 
over-indulgence in opinions and questions that smack of a libertine attitude 
toward the authority of divine revelation. This is borne out, the same author 
adds, by the accepted principles of usiiZ uZ-$qh on which the various schools 
are in agreement: Even a weak Hadith is to be given priority over both m), 
and analogy (qiyiis). But this only refers, Ibn Qayyim hastens to observe, 
to “that type of m), and qiyas which the generality of ‘Ulama have discouraged 
because they diverge from the Qur’an and SUM&.” As for ru), whose 
conformity to, or divergence from, the Book of God and the Sunnah are 
not known, this type of ru), may be adopted as basis of action only when 
necessary but it carries no binding authority on anyone.64 

6’Abu al-Fath Muhammad b. ‘Abd al-Karb al-Shahrisdni, Al-Milal wa al-Ni&l, ed., 
‘Abd al- ‘Azk Muhammad, al-Walul, (Cairo: Mu’assisah al-Halabi, 1378/1%8), p. 1045; Yahyi 
Ismgil, Manhaj al- Alcsqah Bay al-Hdcim wa al-Ma?diim, (Cairo: D~ir al-Wafs, 1406/1986), 
p. 106. 

6zIbn Taymiyah, Iqtiqii: p. 127, Zaydin, Mahmu‘ah, p. 299. 
631bn Qayyim, I‘Lim, I, 57. 
641bid., I, 64. 



62 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences Vol. 7, No. 1, 1990 

Conclusion 

While juristic doctrine and scholarly opinion will continue to influence 
the outlook and attitude of contemporary Muslim individuals and societies, 
it is always instructive to refer back to the Qur‘an and Sunnah: Not only 
because these are the locus of recognized authority but also because m), 
is often subjective and circumstantial - so much so that its author may derive 
a fresh message from these sources that would relate to his own point of 
view. This is also true because of society’s changeable perception of reality 
and outlook over time and the bearing it might have on its standards of 
acceptability and tolerance. What the society and ‘Ulama of the Middle Ages 
perceived as unacceptable may today fall within tolerable limits and vice-versa. 

The tradition of Muslim scholarship in relation to freedom of opinion 
and ijtihad is, on the whole, indicative of latitude and tolerance. This is borne 
out by their reluctance to bring pernicious innovation (bid‘uh) into the sphere 
of punishable offenses. Despite some difference of opinion on this point the 
dominant view is that bid‘uh or any innovation and idea for which no support 
could be found in the sources should be tolerated until the truth emerges. 
Or else that it should be discouraged only through persuasive measures, unless 
it is manifestly harmful, in which case the harm must be prevented. 

There is some disagreement as to the veracity of the so-called closure 
of the door of ijtihad. It seems true nevertheless that independent ijtihad 
of the type which was practiced by the Companions and leading Imams was 
severely restricted, if not totally halted, following the crystallization of the 
d M b  at around the beginning of the 4th century Hijrah. In view of the 
overwhelming diversity of juristic and theological thought and the emergence 
of schools, sects, and groups h u g h o u t  the Islamic lands, a climate of opinion 
began to prevail that fresh inquiry, ray, and ijtihad were to be discouraged. 
It seems that the primary motive behind the so-called closure of the door 
of ijtihad was not so much to deny others the freedom of expression and 
opinion as to protect the unity of the Ummah, to prevent confusion, and 
to defend the purity of Islamic heritage. 

But whatever explanation that one might be able to offer, closure of the 
door of ijtihad could hardly be justified in principle. It was basically a 
situational response that the ‘Ulama gave to a certain development and it 
ought to have been regarded as such. However it soon became dominant 
practice and the tide of taqrrd (imitation) carried many so far as to say that 
there was no further need to interpret the Qur’an and sunnah after the closure 
of the door of ijtihad. ‘Ulama and scholars, including al-Shawkani, Abu 
Zahrah, and Muhammad Iqbal, among others, have rejected the validity in 
principle of the closure of the door of ijtihad. Abu Zahrah makes the point 



M. H. Kamali The Approval and Disapproved Varieties of Ru’y 63 

clearly that God Almighty granted human beings the gift of reason and has 
encouraged rational inquiry into His creation. How is it possible that only 
the ‘Ulama of the first three centuries of Islam were entitled to the formulation 
of opinion and ijtihad and the rest were deprived of this freedom? In Abu 
Zahrah‘s phrase “nothing is farther from the truth and we seek refuge in God 
from such e~aggerations.”~~ 

In modern times, constitutional provisions and statutory legislation on 
the freedom of speech, press, and assembly in Muslim countries have granted 
this freedom to the citizens, often without discrimination on grounds of 
language, race, or religion. Statutory legislation in many Muslim countries 
has in the meantime specified the various violations of the freedom of speech 
and their legal consequences.66 The substance and broad outline of such 
legislation is, I believe, in harmony with the objectives of Islam and its principal 
message of human dignity, equality, and freedom. The realities of day-to-day 
life in many Muslim countries are, however, a far cry from the guidelines 
that are found in the Shari‘ah or their own statutory legislation. Freedom 
of speech, opinion, and expression is yet to become a reality of social and 
political life in many present-day Muslim s~cieties.~’ 

But the issue can only partially be tackled on legislative grounds. Social 
tolerance and the capacity of a community to enable those of its members 
to speak when they have something to say without fear of calling upon 
themselves the wrath of society or government is largely related to healthy 
public opinion and progress in the spheres of education and culture. It will 
be borne in mind in the meantime that no total and unrestricted freedom 
of expression could be expected in any society. But the attempt to balance 
and refine the use of this freedom against its possible abuses qitomim society‘s 
educational and cultural achievement. Only in an atmosphere of security and 
tolerance, coupled with the tacit assurance that sincere and constructive 
contribution and criticism by individuals and groups are gracefully received 
and tolerated, could such contribution be positively encouraged. 

6SMuhammad Abu Zahrah, U$ al-Fiqh, (Cairo: Dir al-Fikr al- ‘Arabi, 1377/1958), p. 
318. See also MuIymmad b. ‘Ali al-Shawkaini, ZrsW al-F&lil min T4qiq al-Haqq ilii ‘Ilm 
al-U$, (Cairo: Dir al-Fikr, n.d.), p. 254; bluhammad Iqbal, R e  Reconstruction of ReIigious 
Thought in Islam, (Lahore: The Book House, n.d.), p. 178. 

66For information on the freedom of speech in Malaysia see John A. Lent, Tocial Change 
and the Human Rights of Freedom of Expression in Malaysia,” Universal H w ~ n  Rights, 
Iiii (l979), 51-56); Ahmad Ibrahim, ’Freedom of Speech and Expression Under the Federal 
Constitution-Sedition and Contempt of Court,” Law Znfb (a Law Society publication of the 
International Islamic University, Malaysia), September B89, pp. 7-20 

67For information on civil liberties in Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq see James 
Dudley, “Human Rights Practices in the Arab States: The Modem Impact of Shari’ah Values,” 
Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law I2 (1982), 55-93. 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (AMSS 

Theme: 
“Social Sciences in the 20th Century and Beyond: 

An Islamic Perspective” 

Sponsored By: 

The Association of Muslim Social Scientists; 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought; Hamdard University; 

Madinat-ul-mat; and The International Islamic University, Islamabad 

Jurnada a/ Akhirah 1410lJan. 8-15, 1991 

Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan 
ABSTRACTS July 1, 199O/FULL PAPERS August 30, 1990 

General President 
of the Conference 

Hakim Muhammad Said of the Hamdard Foundation 

Committees 
The Islamabad Committee: 

Dr. Anwar Siddiqi, Vice-President. 
Planning and Development, International 
Islamic University (IIU) ’ Islamabad 
(Convener); Dr. zafar Ishaq Ansari, IIU; 
Dr. Anis Ahmad, IIU; Director, 
Hamdard Center, Islamabad; Dr. Fateh 
Mohammad, Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad. 

The Karachi Committee: 
Dr. Rashida Said, Vice President, 

Hamdard Foundation. Karachi 
(Convener); Dr. Ehsan Rashid, former 
Vice-Chancellor, University of Kamchi; 
Dr. Rashid A. Shah, Vice-Chancellor, 
Sind University, Jamshom; Dr. Manzoor 
Ahmad, Dean of Arts, University of 
Karachi; Mr. Sohail Shamsi, Director of 
Programs, Hamdard Foundation, 
Karachi; Mr. Air Hassan, Director of 
Planning and Development, Hamdard 
Foundation, Karachi. 

ABSTRACTS & PAPERS 

Dr. Mushtaqur Rahman 
2817 Pinehurst Circle 
Ames, IA 50010, USA 
(515) 292-9398 (hm) 
(515) 294-6145 (Wk) 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (AMSS 

Theme: 
“Social Sciences in the 20th Century and Beyond: 

An Islamic Perspective” 

Sponsored By: 

The Association of Muslim Social Scientists; 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought; Hamdard University; 

Madinat-ul-mat; and The International Islamic University, Islamabad 

Jurnada a/ Akhirah 1410lJan. 8-15, 1991 

Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan 
ABSTRACTS July 1, 199O/FULL PAPERS August 30, 1990 

General President 
of the Conference 

Hakim Muhammad Said of the Hamdard Foundation 

Committees 
The Islamabad Committee: 

Dr. Anwar Siddiqi, Vice-President. 
Planning and Development, International 
Islamic University (IIU) ’ Islamabad 
(Convener); Dr. zafar Ishaq Ansari, IIU; 
Dr. Anis Ahmad, IIU; Director, 
Hamdard Center, Islamabad; Dr. Fateh 
Mohammad, Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad. 

The Karachi Committee: 
Dr. Rashida Said, Vice President, 

Hamdard Foundation. Karachi 
(Convener); Dr. Ehsan Rashid, former 
Vice-Chancellor, University of Kamchi; 
Dr. Rashid A. Shah, Vice-Chancellor, 
Sind University, Jamshom; Dr. Manzoor 
Ahmad, Dean of Arts, University of 
Karachi; Mr. Sohail Shamsi, Director of 
Programs, Hamdard Foundation, 
Karachi; Mr. Air Hassan, Director of 
Planning and Development, Hamdard 
Foundation, Karachi. 

ABSTRACTS & PAPERS 

Dr. Mushtaqur Rahman 
2817 Pinehurst Circle 
Ames, IA 50010, USA 
(515) 292-9398 (hm) 
(515) 294-6145 (Wk) 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (AMSS 

Theme: 
“Social Sciences in the 20th Century and Beyond: 

An Islamic Perspective” 

Sponsored By: 

The Association of Muslim Social Scientists; 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought; Hamdard University; 

Madinat-ul-mat; and The International Islamic University, Islamabad 

Jurnada a/ Akhirah 1410lJan. 8-15, 1991 

Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan 
ABSTRACTS July 1, 199O/FULL PAPERS August 30, 1990 

General President 
of the Conference 

Hakim Muhammad Said of the Hamdard Foundation 

Committees 
The Islamabad Committee: 

Dr. Anwar Siddiqi, Vice-President. 
Planning and Development, International 
Islamic University (IIU) ’ Islamabad 
(Convener); Dr. zafar Ishaq Ansari, IIU; 
Dr. Anis Ahmad, IIU; Director, 
Hamdard Center, Islamabad; Dr. Fateh 
Mohammad, Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad. 

The Karachi Committee: 
Dr. Rashida Said, Vice President, 

Hamdard Foundation. Karachi 
(Convener); Dr. Ehsan Rashid, former 
Vice-Chancellor, University of Kamchi; 
Dr. Rashid A. Shah, Vice-Chancellor, 
Sind University, Jamshom; Dr. Manzoor 
Ahmad, Dean of Arts, University of 
Karachi; Mr. Sohail Shamsi, Director of 
Programs, Hamdard Foundation, 
Karachi; Mr. Air Hassan, Director of 
Planning and Development, Hamdard 
Foundation, Karachi. 

ABSTRACTS & PAPERS 

Dr. Mushtaqur Rahman 
2817 Pinehurst Circle 
Ames, IA 50010, USA 
(515) 292-9398 (hm) 
(515) 294-6145 (Wk) 



THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
THE ASSOCIATION OF MUSLIM SOCIAL SCIENTISTS (AMSS 

Theme: 
“Social Sciences in the 20th Century and Beyond: 

An Islamic Perspective” 

Sponsored By: 

The Association of Muslim Social Scientists; 
The International Institute of Islamic Thought; Hamdard University; 

Madinat-ul-mat; and The International Islamic University, Islamabad 

Jurnada a/ Akhirah 1410lJan. 8-15, 1991 

Karachi and Islamabad, Pakistan 
ABSTRACTS July 1, 199O/FULL PAPERS August 30, 1990 

General President 
of the Conference 

Hakim Muhammad Said of the Hamdard Foundation 

Committees 
The Islamabad Committee: 

Dr. Anwar Siddiqi, Vice-President. 
Planning and Development, International 
Islamic University (IIU) ’ Islamabad 
(Convener); Dr. zafar Ishaq Ansari, IIU; 
Dr. Anis Ahmad, IIU; Director, 
Hamdard Center, Islamabad; Dr. Fateh 
Mohammad, Quaid-i-Azam University, 
Islamabad. 

The Karachi Committee: 
Dr. Rashida Said, Vice President, 

Hamdard Foundation. Karachi 
(Convener); Dr. Ehsan Rashid, former 
Vice-Chancellor, University of Kamchi; 
Dr. Rashid A. Shah, Vice-Chancellor, 
Sind University, Jamshom; Dr. Manzoor 
Ahmad, Dean of Arts, University of 
Karachi; Mr. Sohail Shamsi, Director of 
Programs, Hamdard Foundation, 
Karachi; Mr. Air Hassan, Director of 
Planning and Development, Hamdard 
Foundation, Karachi. 

ABSTRACTS & PAPERS 

Dr. Mushtaqur Rahman 
2817 Pinehurst Circle 
Ames, IA 50010, USA 
(515) 292-9398 (hm) 
(515) 294-6145 (Wk)