proofreading team. what is coming? a forecast of things after the war by h.g. wells 1916 contents 1. forecasting the future 2. the end of the war 3. nations in liquidation 4. braintree, bocking, and the future of the world 5. how far will europe go toward socialism? 6. lawyer and press 7. the new education 8. what the war is doing for women 9. the new map of europe 10. the united states, france, britain, and russia 11. the "white man's burthen" 12. the outlook for the germans i. forecasting the future prophecy may vary between being an intellectual amusement and a serious occupation; serious not only in its intentions, but in its consequences. for it is the lot of prophets who frighten or disappoint to be stoned. but for some of us moderns, who have been touched with the spirit of science, prophesying is almost a habit of mind. science is very largely analysis aimed at forecasting. the test of any scientific law is our verification of its anticipations. the scientific training develops the idea that whatever is going to happen is really here now--if only one could see it. and when one is taken by surprise the tendency is not to say with the untrained man, "now, who'd ha' thought it?" but "now, what was it we overlooked?" everything that has ever existed or that will ever exist is here--for anyone who has eyes to see. but some of it demands eyes of superhuman penetration. some of it is patent; we are almost as certain of next christmas and the tides of the year 1960 and the death before 3000 a.d. of everybody now alive as if these things had already happened. below that level of certainty, but still at a very high level of certainty, there are such things as that men will probably be making aeroplanes of an improved pattern in 1950, or that there will be a through railway connection between constantinople and bombay and between baku and bombay in the next half-century. from such grades of certainty as this, one may come down the scale until the most obscure mystery of all is reached: the mystery of the individual. will england presently produce a military genius? or what will mr. belloc say the day after to-morrow? the most accessible field for the prophet is the heavens; the least is the secret of the jumping cat within the human skull. how will so-and-so behave, and how will the nation take it? for such questions as that we need the subtlest guesses of all. yet, even to such questions as these the sharp, observant man may risk an answer with something rather better than an even chance of being right. the present writer is a prophet by use and wont. he is more interested in to-morrow than he is in to-day, and the past is just material for future guessing. "think of the men who have walked here!" said a tourist in the roman coliseum. it was a futurist mind that answered: "think of the men who will." it is surely as interesting that presently some founder of the world republic, some obstinate opponent of militarism or legalism, or the man who will first release atomic energy for human use, will walk along the via sacra as that cicero or giordano bruno or shelley have walked there in the past. to the prophetic mind all history is and will continue to be a prelude. the prophetic type will steadfastly refuse to see the world as a museum; it will insist that here is a stage set for a drama that perpetually begins. now this forecasting disposition has led the writer not only to publish a book of deliberate prophesying, called "anticipations," but almost without premeditation to scatter a number of more or less obvious prophecies through his other books. from first to last he has been writing for twenty years, so that it is possible to check a certain proportion of these anticipations by the things that have happened, some of these shots have hit remarkably close to the bull's-eye of reality; there are a number of inners and outers, and some clean misses. much that he wrote about in anticipation is now established commonplace. in 1894 there were still plenty of sceptics of the possibility either of automobiles or aeroplanes; it was not until 1898 that mr. s.p. langley (of the smithsonian institute) could send the writer a photograph of a heavier-than-air flying machine actually in the air. there were articles in the monthly magazines of those days _proving_ that flying was impossible. one of the writer's luckiest shots was a description (in "anticipations" in 1900) of trench warfare, and of a deadlock almost exactly upon the lines of the situation after the battle of the marne. and he was fortunate (in the same work) in his estimate of the limitations of submarines. he anticipated sir percy scott by a year in his doubts of the decisive value of great battleships (_see_ "an englishman looks at the world"); and he was sound in denying the decadence of france; in doubting (before the russo-japanese struggle) the greatness of the power of russia, which was still in those days a british bogey; in making belgium the battle-ground in a coming struggle between the mid-european powers and the rest of europe; and (he believes) in foretelling a renascent poland. long before europe was familiar with the engaging personality of the german crown prince, he represented great airships sailing over england (which country had been too unenterprising to make any) under the command of a singularly anticipatory prince karl, and in "the world set free" the last disturber of the peace is a certain "balkan fox." in saying, however, here and there that "before such a year so-and-so will happen," or that "so-and-so will not occur for the next twenty years," he was generally pretty widely wrong; most of his time estimates are too short; he foretold, for example, a special motor track apart from the high road between london and brighton before 1910, which is still a dream, but he doubted if effective military aviation or aerial fighting would be possible before 1950, which is a miss on the other side. he will draw a modest veil over certain still wider misses that the idle may find for themselves in his books; he prefers to count the hits and leave the reckoning of the misses to those who will find a pleasure in it. of course, these prophecies of the writer's were made upon a basis of very generalised knowledge. what can be done by a really sustained research into a particular question--especially if it is a question essentially mechanical--is shown by the work of a frenchman all too neglected by the trumpet of fame--clement ader. m. ader was probably the first man to get a mechanism up into the air for something more than a leap. his _eole_, as general mensier testifies, prolonged a jump as far as fifty metres as early as 1890. in 1897 his _avion_ fairly flew. (this is a year ahead of the date of my earliest photograph of s.p. langley's aeropile in mid-air.) this, however, is beside our present mark. the fact of interest here is that in 1908, when flying was still almost incredible, m. ader published his "aviation militaire." well, that was eight years ago, and men have been fighting in the air now for a year, and there is still nothing being done that m. ader did not see, and which we, if we had had the wisdom to attend to him, might not have been prepared for. there is much that he foretells which is still awaiting its inevitable fulfilment. so clearly can men of adequate knowledge and sound reasoning power see into the years ahead in all such matters of material development. but it is not with the development of mechanical inventions that the writer now proposes to treat. in this book he intends to hazard certain forecasts about the trend of events in the next decade or so. mechanical novelties will probably play a very small part in that coming history. this world-wide war means a general arrest of invention and enterprise, except in the direction of the war business. ability is concentrated upon that; the types of ability that are not applicable to warfare are neglected; there is a vast destruction of capital and a waste of the savings that are needed to finance new experiments. moreover, we are killing off many of our brightest young men. it is fairly safe to assume that there will be very little new furniture on the stage of the world for some considerable time; that if there is much difference in the roads and railways and shipping it will be for the worse; that architecture, domestic equipment, and so on, will be fortunate if in 1924 they stand where they did in the spring of 1914. in the trenches of france and flanders, and on the battlefields of russia, the germans have been spending and making the world spend the comfort, the luxury and the progress of the next quarter-century. there is no accounting for tastes. but the result is that, while it was possible for the writer in 1900 to write "anticipations of the reaction of mechanical progress upon human life and thought," in 1916 his anticipations must belong to quite another system of consequences. the broad material facts before us are plain enough. it is the mental facts that have to be unravelled. it isn't now a question of "what thing--what faculty--what added power will come to hand, and how will it affect our ways of living?" it is a question of "how are people going to take these obvious things--waste of the world's resources, arrest of material progress, the killing of a large moiety of the males in nearly every european country, and universal loss and unhappiness?" we are going to deal with realities here, at once more intimate and less accessible than the effects of mechanism. as a preliminary reconnaissance, as it were, over the region of problems we have to attack, let us consider the difficulties of a single question, which is also a vital and central question in this forecast. we shall not attempt a full answer here, because too many of the factors must remain unexamined; later, perhaps, we may be in a better position to do so. this question is the probability of the establishment of a long world peace. at the outset of the war there was a very widely felt hope among the intellectuals of the world that this war might clear up most of the outstanding international problems, and prove the last war. the writer, looking across the gulf of experience that separates us from 1914, recalls two pamphlets whose very titles are eloquent of this feeling--"the war that will end war," and "the peace of the world." was the hope expressed in those phrases a dream? is it already proven a dream? or can we read between the lines of the war news, diplomatic disputations, threats and accusations, political wranglings and stories of hardship and cruelty that now fill our papers, anything that still justifies a hope that these bitter years of world sorrow are the darkness before the dawn of a better day for mankind? let us handle this problem for a preliminary examination. what is really being examined here is the power of human reason to prevail over passion--and certain other restraining and qualifying forces. there can be little doubt that, if one could canvass all mankind and ask them whether they would rather have no war any more, the overwhelming mass of them would elect for universal peace. if it were war of the modern mechanical type that was in question, with air raids, high explosives, poison gas and submarines, there could be no doubt at all about the response. "give peace in our time, o lord," is more than ever the common prayer of christendom, and the very war makers claim to be peace makers; the german emperor has never faltered in his assertion that he encouraged austria to send an impossible ultimatum to serbia, and invaded belgium because germany was being attacked. the krupp-kaiser empire, he assures us, is no eagle, but a double-headed lamb, resisting the shearers and butchers. the apologists for war are in a hopeless minority; a certain number of german prussians who think war good for the soul, and the dear ladies of the london _morning post_ who think war so good for the manners of the working classes, are rare, discordant voices in the general chorus against war. if a mere unsupported and uncoordinated will for peace could realise itself, there would be peace, and an enduring peace, to-morrow. but, as a matter of fact, there is no peace coming to-morrow, and no clear prospect yet of an enduring universal peace at the end of this war. now what are the obstructions, and what are the antagonisms to the exploitation of this world-wide disgust with war and the world-wide desire for peace, so as to establish a world peace? let us take them in order, and it will speedily become apparent that we are dealing here with a subtle quantitative problem in psychology, a constant weighing of whether this force or that force is the stronger. we are dealing with influences so subtle that the accidents of some striking dramatic occurrence, for example, may turn them this way or that. we are dealing with the human will--and thereby comes a snare for the feet of the would-be impartial prophet. to foretell the future is to modify the future. it is hard for any prophet not to break into exhortation after the fashion of the prophets of israel. the first difficulty in the way of establishing a world peace is that it is nobody's business in particular. nearly all of us want a world peace--in an amateurish sort of way. but there is no specific person or persons to whom one can look for the initiatives. the world is a supersaturated solution of the will-for-peace, and there is nothing for it to crystallise upon. there is no one in all the world who is responsible for the understanding and overcoming of the difficulties involved. there are many more people, and there is much more intelligence concentrated upon the manufacture of cigarettes or hairpins than upon the establishment of a permanent world peace. there are a few special secretaries employed by philanthropic americans, and that is about all. there has been no provision made even for the emoluments of these gentlemen when universal peace is attained; presumably they would lose their jobs. nearly everybody wants peace; nearly everybody would be glad to wave a white flag with a dove on it now--provided no unfair use was made of such a demonstration by the enemy--but there is practically nobody thinking out the arrangements needed, and nobody making nearly as much propaganda for the instruction of the world in the things needful as is made in selling any popular make of automobile. we have all our particular businesses to attend to. and things are not got by just wanting them; things are got by getting them, and rejecting whatever precludes our getting them. that is the first great difficulty: the formal peace movement is quite amateurish. it is so amateurish that the bulk of people do not even realise the very first implication of the peace of the world. it has not succeeded in bringing this home to them. if there is to be a permanent peace of the world, it is clear that there must be some permanent means of settling disputes between powers and nations that would otherwise be at war. that means that there must be some head power, some point of reference, a supreme court of some kind, a universally recognised executive over and above the separate governments of the world that exist to-day. that does not mean that those governments have to disappear, that "nationality" has to be given up, or anything so drastic as that. but it does mean that all those governments have to surrender almost as much of their sovereignty as the constituent sovereign states which make up the united states of america have surrendered to the federal government; if their unification is to be anything more than a formality, they will have to delegate a control of their inter-state relations to an extent for which few minds are prepared at present. it is really quite idle to dream of a warless world in which states are still absolutely free to annoy one another with tariffs, with the blocking and squeezing of trade routes, with the ill-treatment of immigrants and travelling strangers, and between which there is no means of settling boundary disputes. moreover, as between the united states of the world and the united states of america there is this further complication of the world position: that almost all the great states of europe are in possession, firstly, of highly developed territories of alien language and race, such as egypt; and, secondly, of barbaric and less-developed territories, such as nigeria or madagascar. there will be nothing stable about a world settlement that does not destroy in these "possessions" the national preference of the countries that own them and that does not prepare for the immediate or eventual accession of these subject peoples to state rank. most certainly, however, thousands of intelligent people in those great european countries who believe themselves ardent for a world peace will be staggered at any proposal to place any part of "our empire" under a world administration on the footing of a united states territory. until they cease to be staggered by anything of the sort, their aspirations for a permanent peace will remain disconnected from the main current of their lives. and that current will flow, sluggishly or rapidly, towards war. for essentially these "possessions" are like tariffs, like the strategic occupation of neutral countries or secret treaties; they are forms of the conflict between nations to oust and prevail over other nations. going on with such things and yet deprecating war is really not an attempt to abolish conflict; it is an attempt to retain conflict and limit its intensity; it is like trying to play hockey on the understanding that the ball shall never travel faster than eight miles an hour. now it not only stands in our way to a permanent peace of the world that the great mass of men are not prepared for even the most obvious implications of such an idea, but there is also a second invincible difficulty--that there is nowhere in the world anybody, any type of men, any organisation, any idea, any nucleus or germ, that could possibly develop into the necessary over-government. we are asking for something out of the air, out of nothingness, that will necessarily array against itself the resistance of all those who are in control, or interested in the control, of the affairs of sovereign states of the world as they are at present; the resistance of a gigantic network of government organisations, interests, privileges, assumptions. against this a headless, vague aspiration, however universal, is likely to prove quite ineffective. of course, it is possible to suggest that the hague tribunal is conceivably the germ of such an overriding direction and supreme court as the peace of the world demands, but in reality the hague tribunal is a mere legal automatic machine. it does nothing unless you set it in motion. it has no initiative. it does not even protest against the most obvious outrages upon that phantom of a world-conscience--international law. pacificists in their search for some definite starting-point, about which the immense predisposition for peace may crystallise, have suggested the pope and various religious organisations as a possible basis for the organisation of peace. but there would be no appeal from such a beginning to the non-christian majority of mankind, and the suggestion in itself indicates a profound ignorance of the nature of the christian churches. with the exception of the quakers and a few russian sects, no christian sect or church has ever repudiated war; most have gone out of the way to sanction it and bless it. it is altogether too rashly assumed by people whose sentimentality outruns their knowledge that christianity is essentially an attempt to carry out the personal teachings of christ. it is nothing of the sort, and no church authority will support that idea. christianity--more particularly after the ascendancy of the trinitarian doctrine was established--was and is a theological religion; it is the religion that triumphed over arianism, manichseism, gnosticism, and the like; it is based not on christ, but on its creeds. christ, indeed, is not even its symbol; on the contrary, the chosen symbol of christianity is the cross to which christ was nailed and on which he died. it was very largely a religion of the legions. it was the warrior theodosius who, more than any single other man, imposed it upon europe. there is no reason, therefore, either in precedent or profession, for expecting any plain lead from the churches in this tremendous task of organising and making effective the widespread desire of the world for peace. and even were this the case, it is doubtful if we should find in the divines and dignitaries of the vatican, of the russian and british official churches, or of any other of the multitudinous christian sects, the power and energy, the knowledge and ability, or even the goodwill needed to negotiate so vast a thing as the creation of a world authority. one other possible starting-point has been suggested. it is no great feat for a naive imagination to suppose the president of the swiss confederation or the president of the united states--for each of these two systems is an exemplary and encouraging instance of the possibility of the pacific synthesis of independent states--taking a propagandist course and proposing extensions of their own systems to the suffering belligerents. but nothing of the sort occurs. and when you come to look into the circumstances of these two presidents you will discover that neither of them is any more free than anybody else to embark upon the task of creating a state-overriding, war-preventing organisation of the world. he has been created by a system, and he is bound to a system; his concern is with the interests of the people of switzerland or of the united states of america. president wilson, for example, is quite sufficiently occupied by the affairs of the white house, by the clash of political parties, by interferences with american overseas trade and the security of american citizens. he has no more time to give to projects for the fundamental reconstruction of international relationships than has any recruit drilling in england, or any captain on an ocean liner, or any engineer in charge of a going engine. we are all, indeed, busy with the things that come to hand every day. we are all anxious for a permanent world peace, but we are all up to the neck in things that leave us no time to attend to this world peace that nearly every sane man desires. meanwhile, a small minority of people who trade upon contention--militarists, ambitious kings and statesmen, war contractors, loan mongers, sensational journalists--follow up their interests and start and sustain war. there lies the paradoxical reality of this question. our first inquiry lands us into the elucidation of this deadlock. nearly everybody desires a world peace, and yet there is not apparent anywhere any man free and able and willing to establish it, while, on the other hand, there are a considerable number of men in positions of especial influence and power who will certainly resist the arrangements that are essential to its establishment. but does this exhaust the question, and must we conclude that mankind is doomed to a perpetual, futile struggling of states and nations and peoples--breaking ever and again into war? the answer to that would probably, be "yes" if it were not for the progress of war. war is continually becoming more scientific, more destructive, more coldly logical, more intolerant of non-combatants, and more exhausting of any kind of property. there is every reason to believe that it will continue to intensify these characteristics. by doing so it may presently bring about a state of affairs that will supply just the lacking elements that are needed for the development of a world peace. i would venture to suggest that the present war is doing so now: that it is producing changes in men's minds that may presently give us both the needed energy and the needed organisation from which a world direction may develop. the first, most distinctive thing about this conflict is the exceptionally searching way in which it attacks human happiness. no war has ever destroyed happiness so widely. it has not only killed and wounded an unprecedented proportion of the male population of all the combatant nations, but it has also destroyed wealth beyond precedent. it has also destroyed freedom--of movement, of speech, of economic enterprise. hardly anyone alive has escaped the worry of it and the threat of it. it has left scarcely a life untouched, and made scarcely a life happier. there is a limit to the principle that "everybody's business is nobody's business." the establishment of a world state, which was interesting only to a few cranks and visionaries before the war, is now the lively interest of a very great number of people. they inquire about it; they have become accessible to ideas about it. peace organisation seems, indeed, to be following the lines of public sanitation. everybody in england, for example, was bored by the discussion of sanitation--until the great cholera epidemic. everybody thought public health a very desirable thing, but nobody thought it intensely and overridingly desirable. then the interest in sanitation grew lively, and people exerted themselves to create responsible organisations. crimes of violence, again, were neglected in the great cities of europe until the danger grew to dimensions that evolved the police. there come occasions when the normal concentration of an individual upon his own immediate concerns becomes impossible; as, for instance, when a man who is stocktaking in his business premises discovers that the house next door is on fire. a great many people who have never troubled their heads about anything but their own purely personal and selfish interests are now realising that quite a multitude of houses about them are ablaze, and that the fire is spreading. that is one change the war will bring about that will make for world peace: a quickened general interest in its possibility. another is the certainty that the war will increase the number of devoted and fanatic characters available for disinterested effort. whatever other outcome this war may have, it means that there lies ahead a period of extreme economic and political dislocation. the credit system has been strained, and will be strained, and will need unprecedented readjustments. in the past such phases of uncertainty, sudden impoverishment and disorder as certainly lie ahead of us, have meant for a considerable number of minds a release--or, if you prefer it, a flight--from the habitual and selfish. types of intense religiosity, of devotion and of endeavour are let loose, and there will be much more likelihood that we may presently find, what it is impossible to find now, a number of devoted men and women ready to give their whole lives, with a quasi-religious enthusiasm, to this great task of peace establishment, finding in such impersonal work a refuge from the disappointments, limitations, losses and sorrows of their personal life--a refuge we need but little in more settled and more prosperous periods. they will be but the outstanding individuals in a very universal quickening. and simultaneously with this quickening of the general imagination by experience there are certain other developments in progress that point very clearly to a change under the pressure of this war of just those institutions of nationality, kingship, diplomacy and inter-state competition that have hitherto stood most effectually in the way of a world pacification. the considerations that seem to point to this third change are very convincing, to my mind. the real operating cause that is, i believe, going to break down the deadlock that has hitherto made a supreme court and a federal government for the world at large a dream, lies in just that possibility of an "inconclusive peace" which so many people seem to dread. germany, i believe, is going to be beaten, but not completely crushed, by this war; she is going to be left militarist and united with austria and hungary, and unchanged in her essential nature; and out of that state of affairs comes, i believe, the hope for an ultimate confederation of the nations of the earth. because, in the face of a league of the central european powers attempting recuperation, cherishing revenge, dreaming of a renewal of the struggle, it becomes impossible for the british, the french, the belgians, russians, italians or japanese to think any longer of settling their differences by war among themselves. to do so will mean the creation of opportunity for the complete reinstatement of german militarism. it will open the door for a conclusive german hegemony. now, however clumsy and confused the diplomacy of these present allies may be (challenged constantly, as it is, by democracy and hampered by a free, venal and irresponsible press in at least three of their countries), the necessity they will be under will be so urgent and so evident, that it is impossible to imagine that they will not set up some permanent organ for the direction and co-ordination of their joint international relationships. it may be a queerly constituted body at first; it may be of a merely diplomatic pretension; it may be called a congress, or any old name of that sort, but essentially its business will be to conduct a joint fiscal, military and naval policy, to keep the peace in the balkans and asia, to establish a relationship with china, and organise joint and several arbitration arrangements with america. and it must develop something more sure and swift than our present diplomacy. one of its chief concerns will be the right of way through the bosphorus and the dardanelles, and the watching of the forces that stir up conflict in the balkans and the levant. it must have unity enough for that; it must be much more than a mere leisurely, unauthoritative conference of representatives. for precisely similar reasons it seems to me incredible that the two great central european powers should ever fall into sustained conflict again with one another. they, too, will be forced to create some overriding body to prevent so suicidal a possibility. america too, it may be, will develop some pan-american equivalent. probably the hundred millions of latin america may achieve a method of unity, and then deal on equal terms with the present united states. the thing has been ably advocated already in south america. whatever appearances of separate sovereignties are kept up after the war, the practical outcome of the struggle is quite likely to be this: that there will be only three great world powers left--the anti-german allies, the allied central europeans, the pan-americans. and it is to be noted that, whatever the constituents of these three powers may be, none of them is likely to be a monarchy. they may include monarchies, as england includes dukedoms. but they will be overriding alliances, not overriding rulers. i leave it to the mathematician to work out exactly how much the chances of conflict are diminished when there are practically only three powers in the world instead of some scores. and these new powers will be in certain respects unlike any existing european "states." none of the three powers will be small or homogeneous enough to serve dynastic ambitions, embody a national or racial kultur, or fall into the grip of any group of financial enterprises. they will be more comprehensive, less romantic, and more businesslike altogether. they will be, to use a phrase suggested a year or so ago, great states.... and the war threat between the three will be so plain and definite, the issues will be so lifted out of the spheres of merely personal ambition and national feeling, that i do not see why the negotiating means, the standing conference of the three, should not ultimately become the needed nucleus of the world state for which at present we search the world in vain. there are more ways than one to the world state, and this second possibility of a post-war conference and a conference of the allies, growing almost unawares into a pacific organisation of the world, since it goes on directly from existing institutions, since it has none of the quality of a clean break with the past which the idea of an immediate world state and pax mundi involves, and more particularly since it neither abolishes nor has in it anything to shock fundamentally the princes, the diplomatists, the lawyers, the statesmen and politicians, the nationalists and suspicious people, since it gives them years in which to change and die out and reappear in new forms, and since at the same time it will command the support of every intelligent human being who gets his mind clear enough from his circumstances to understand its import, is a far more credible hope than the hope of anything coming _de novo_ out of hague foundations or the manifest logic of the war. but, of course, there weighs against these hopes the possibility that the allied powers are too various in their nature, too biased, too feeble intellectually and imaginatively, to hold together and maintain any institution for co-operation. the british press may be too silly not to foster irritation and suspicion; we may get carsonism on a larger scale trading on the resuscitation of dying hatreds; the british and russian diplomatists may play annoying tricks upon one another by sheer force of habit. there may be many troubles of that sort. even then i do not see that the hope of an ultimate world peace vanishes. but it will be a roman world peace, made in germany, and there will have to be several more great wars before it is established. germany is too homogeneous yet to have begun the lesson of compromise and the renunciation of the dream of national conquest. the germans are a national, not an imperial people. france has learnt that through suffering, and britain and russia because for two centuries they have been imperial and not national systems. the german conception of world peace is as yet a conception of german ascendancy. the allied conception becomes perforce one of mutual toleration. but i will not press this inquiry farther now. it is, as i said at the beginning, a preliminary exploration of one of the great questions with which i propose to play in these articles. the possibility i have sketched is the one that most commends itself to me as probable. after a more detailed examination of the big operating forces at present working in the world, we may be in a position to revise these suggestions with a greater confidence and draw our net of probabilities a little tighter. ii. the end of the war[1] the prophet who emerges with the most honour from this war is bloch. it must be fifteen or sixteen years ago since this gifted pole made his forecast of the future. perhaps it is more, for the french translation of his book was certainly in existence before the boer war. his case was that war between antagonists of fairly equal equipment must end in a deadlock because of the continually increasing defensive efficiency of entrenched infantry. this would give the defensive an advantage over the most brilliant strategy and over considerably superior numbers that would completely discourage all aggression. he concluded that war was played out. [footnote 1: this chapter was originally a newspaper article. it was written in december, 1915, and published about the middle of january. some of it has passed from the quality of anticipation to achievement, but i do not see that it needs any material revision on that account.] his book was very carefully studied in germany. as a humble disciple of bloch i should have realised this, but i did not, and that failure led me into some unfortunate prophesying at the outbreak of the war. i judged germany by the kaiser, and by the kaiser-worship which i saw in berlin. i thought that he was a theatrical person who would dream of vast massed attacks and tremendous cavalry charges, and that he would lead germany to be smashed against the allied defensive in the west, and to be smashed so thoroughly that the war would be over. i did not properly appreciate the more studious and more thorough germany that was to fight behind the kaiser and thrust him aside, the germany we british fight now, the ostwald-krupp germany of 1915. that germany, one may now perceive, had read and thought over and thought out the bloch problem. there was also a translation of bloch into french. in english a portion of his book was translated for the general reader and published with a preface by the late mr. w.t. stead. it does not seem to have reached the british military authorities, nor was it published in england with an instructive intention. as an imaginative work it would have been considered worthless and impracticable. but it is manifest now that if the belgian and french frontiers had been properly prepared--as they should have been prepared when the germans built their strategic railways--with trenches and gun emplacements and secondary and tertiary lines, the germans would never have got fifty miles into either france or belgium. they would have been held at liã©ge and in the ardennes. five hundred thousand men would have held them indefinitely. but the allies had never worked trench warfare; they were unready for it, germans knew of their unreadiness, and their unreadiness it is quite clear they calculated. they did not reckon, it is now clear that they were right in not reckoning, the allies as contemporary soldiers. they were going to fight a 1900 army with a 1914 army, and their whole opening scheme was based on the conviction that the allies would not entrench. somebody in those marvellous maxims from the dark ages that seem to form the chief reading of our military experts, said that the army that entrenches is a defeated army. the silly dictum was repeated and repeated in the english papers after the battle of the marne. it shows just where our military science had reached in 1914, namely, to a level a year before bloch wrote. so the allies retreated. for long weeks the allies retreated out of the west of belgium, out of the north of france, and for rather over a month there was a loose mobile war--as if bloch had never existed. the germans were not fighting the 1914 pattern of war, they were fighting the 1899 pattern of war, in which direct attack, outflanking and so on were still supposed to be possible; they were fighting confident in their overwhelming numbers, in their prepared surprise, in the unthought-out methods of their opponents. in the "victorian" war that ended in the middle of september, 1914, they delivered their blow, they over-reached, they were successfully counter-attacked on the marne, and then abruptly--almost unfairly it seemed to the british sportsmanlike conceptions--they shifted to the game played according to the very latest rules of 1914. the war did not come up to date until the battle of the aisne. with that the second act of the great drama began. i do not believe that the germans ever thought it would come up to date so soon. i believe they thought that they would hustle the french out of paris, come right up to the channel at calais before the end of 1914, and then entrench, produce the submarine attack and the zeppelins against england, working from calais as a base, and that they would end the war before the spring of 1915--with the allies still a good fifteen years behindhand. i believe the battle of the marne was the decisive battle of the war, in that it shattered this plan, and that the rest of the 1914 fighting was germany's attempt to reconstruct their broken scheme in the face of an enemy who was continually getting more and more nearly up to date with the fighting. by december, bloch, who had seemed utterly discredited in august, was justified up to the hilt. the world was entrenched at his feet. by may the lagging military science of the british had so far overtaken events as to realise that shrapnel was no longer so important as high explosive, and within a year the significance of machine guns, a significance thoroughly ventilated by imaginative writers fifteen years before, was being grasped by the conservative but by no means inadaptable leaders of britain. the war since that first attempt--admirably planned and altogether justifiable (from a military point of view, i mean)--of germany to "rush" a victory, has consisted almost entirely of failures on both sides either to get round or through or over the situation foretold by bloch. there has been only one marked success, the german success in poland due to the failure of the russian munitions. then for a time the war in the east was mobile and precarious while the russians retreated to their present positions, and the germans pursued and tried to surround them. that was a lapse into the pre-bloch style. now the russians are again entrenched, their supplies are restored, the germans have a lengthened line of supplies, and bloch is back upon his pedestal so far as the eastern theatre goes. bloch has been equally justified in the anglo-french attempt to get round through gallipoli. the forces of the india office have pushed their way through unprepared country towards bagdad, and are now entrenching in mesopotamia, but from the point of view of the main war that is too remote to be considered either getting through or getting round; and so too the losses of the german colonies and the east african war are scarcely to be reckoned with in the main war. they have no determining value. there remains the balkan struggle. but the balkan struggle is something else; it is something new. it must be treated separately. it is a war of treacheries and brags and appearances. it is not a part of, it is a sequence to, the deadlock war of 1915. but before dealing with this new development of the latter half of 1915 it is necessary to consider certain general aspects of the deadlock war. it is manifest that the germans hoped to secure an effective victory in this war before they ran up against bloch. but reckoning with bloch, as they certainly did, they hoped that even in the event of the war getting to earth, it would still be possible to produce novelties that would sufficiently neutralise bloch to secure a victorious peace. with unexpectedly powerful artillery suddenly concentrated, with high explosives, with asphyxiating gas, with a well-organised system of grenade throwing and mining, with attacks of flaming gas, and above all with a vast munition-making plant to keep them going, they had a very reasonable chance of hacking their way through. against these prepared novelties the allies have had to improvise, and on the whole the improvisation has kept pace with the demands made upon it. they have brought their military science up to date, and to-day the disparity in science and equipment between the antagonists has greatly diminished. there has been no escaping bloch after all, and the deadlock, if no sudden peace occurs, can end now in only one thing, the exhaustion in various degrees of all the combatants and the succumbing of the most exhausted. the idea of a conclusive end of the traditional pattern to this war, of a triumphal entry into london, paris, berlin or moscow, is to be dismissed altogether from our calculations. the end of this war will be a matter of negotiation between practically immobilised and extremely shattered antagonists. there is, of course, one aspect of the bloch deadlock that the germans at least have contemplated. if it is not possible to get through or round, it may still be possible to get over. there is the air path. this idea has certainly taken hold of the french mind, but france has been too busy and is temperamentally too economical to risk large expenditures upon what is necessarily an experiment. the british are too conservative and sceptical to be the pioneers in any such enterprise. the russians have been too poor in the necessary resources of mechanics and material. the germans alone have made any sustained attempt to strike through the air at their enemies beyond the war zone. their zeppelin raids upon england have shown a steadily increasing efficiency, and it is highly probable that they will be repeated on a much larger scale before the war is over. quite possibly, too, the germans are developing an accessory force of large aeroplanes to co-operate in such an attack. the long coasts of britain, the impossibility of their being fully equipped throughout their extent, except at a prohibitive cost of men and material, to resist air invaders, exposes the whole length of the island to considerable risk and annoyance from such an expedition. it is doubtful, though, if the utmost damage an air raid is likely to inflict upon england would count materially in the exhaustion process, and the moral effect of these raids has been, and will be, to stiffen the british resolution to fight this war through to the conclusive ending of any such possibilities. the net result of these air raids is an inflexible determination of the british people rather to die in death grips with german militarism than to live and let it survive. the best chance for the aircraft was at the beginning of the war, when a surprise development might have had astounding results. that chance has gone by. the germans are racially inferior to both french and english in the air, and the probability of effective blows over the deadlock is on the whole a probability in favour of the allies. nor is there anything on or under the sea that seems likely now to produce decisive results. we return from these considerations to a strengthened acceptance of bloch. the essential question for the prophet remains therefore the question of which group of powers will exhaust itself most rapidly. and following on from that comes the question of how the successive stages of exhaustion will manifest themselves in the combatant nations. the problems of this war, as of all war, end as they begin in national psychology. but it will be urged that this is reckoning without the balkans. i submit that the german thrust through the wooded wilderness of serbia is really no part of the war that has ended in the deadlock of 1915. it is dramatic, tragic, spectacular, but it is quite inconclusive. here there is no way round or through to any vital centre of germany's antagonists. it turns nothing; it opens no path to paris, london, or petrograd. it is a long, long way from the danube to either egypt or mesopotamia, and there--and there--bloch is waiting. i do not think the germans have any intention of so generous an extension of their responsibilities. the balkan complication is no solution of the deadlock problem. it is the opening of the sequel. a whole series of new problems are opened up directly we turn to this most troubled region of the balkans--problems of the value of kingship, of nationality, of the destiny of such cities as constantinople, which from their very beginning have never had any sort of nationality at all, of the destiny of countries such as albania, where a tangle of intense tribal nationalities is distributed in spots and patches, or dalmatia, where one extremely self-conscious nation and language is present in the towns and another in the surrounding country, or asia minor, where no definite national boundaries, no religious, linguistic, or social homogeneities have ever established themselves since the roman legions beat them down. but all these questions can really be deferred or set aside in our present discussion, which is a discussion of the main war. whatever surprises or changes this last phase of the eastern empire, that blood-clotted melodrama, may involve, they will but assist and hasten on the essential conclusion of the great war, that the central powers and their pledged antagonists are in a deadlock, unable to reach a decision, and steadily, day by day, hour by hour, losing men, destroying material, spending credit, approaching something unprecedented, unknown, that we try to express to ourselves by the word exhaustion. just how the people who use the word "exhaustion" so freely are prepared to define it, is a matter for speculation. the idea seems to be a phase in which the production of equipped forces ceases through the using up of men or material or both. if the exhaustion is fairly mutual, it need not be decisive for a long time. it may mean simply an ebb of vigour on both sides, unusual hardship, a general social and economic disorganisation and grading down. the fact that a great killing off of men is implicit in the process, and that the survivors will be largely under discipline, militates against the idea that the end may come suddenly through a vigorous revolutionary outbreak. exhaustion is likely to be a very long and very thorough process, extending over years. a "war of attrition" may last into 1918 or 1919, and may bring us to conditions of strain and deprivation still only very vaguely imagined. what happens in the turkish empire or india or america or elsewhere may extend the areas of waste and accelerate or retard the process, but is quite unlikely to end it. let us ask now which of the combatants is likely to undergo exhaustion most rapidly, and what is of equal or greater importance, which is likely to feel it first and most? no doubt there is a bias in my mind, but it seems to me that the odds are on the whole heavily against the central powers. their peculiar german virtue, their tremendously complete organisation, which enabled them to put so large a proportion of their total resources into their first onslaught and to make so great and rapid a recovery in the spring of 1915, leaves them with less to draw upon now. out of a smaller fortune they have spent a larger sum. they are blockaded to a very considerable extent, and against them fight not merely the resources of the allies, but, thanks to the complete british victory in the sea struggle, the purchasable resources of all the world. conceivably the central powers will draw upon the resources of their balkan and asiatic allies, but the extent to which they can do that may very easily be over-estimated. there is a limit to the power for treason of these supposititious german monarchs that western folly has permitted to possess these balkan thrones--thrones which need never have been thrones at all--and none of the balkan peoples is likely to witness with enthusiasm the complete looting of its country in the german interest by a german court. germany will have to pay on the nail for most of her balkan help. she will have to put more into the balkans than she takes out. compared with the world behind the allies the turkish empire is a country of mountains, desert and undeveloped lands. to develop these regions into a source of supplies under the strains and shortages of war-time, will be an immense and dangerous undertaking for germany. she may open mines she may never work, build railways that others will enjoy, sow harvests for alien reaping. the people the bulgarians want in bulgaria are not germans but bulgarians; the people the turks want in anatolia are not germans but turks. and for all these tasks germany must send men. men? at present, so far as any judgment is possible, germany is feeling the pinch of the war much more even than france, which is habitually parsimonious, and instinctively cleverly economical, and russia, which is hardy and insensitive. great britain has really only begun to feel the stress. she has probably suffered economically no more than have holland or switzerland, and italy and japan have certainly suffered less. all these three great countries are still full of men, of gear, of saleable futures. in every part of the globe great britain has colossal investments. she has still to apply the great principle of conscription not only to her sons but to the property of her overseas investors and of her landed proprietors. she has not even looked yet at the german financial expedients of a year ago. she moves reluctantly, but surely, towards such a thoroughness of mobilisation. there need be no doubt that she will completely socialise herself, completely reorganise her whole social and economic structure sooner than lose this war. she will do it clumsily and ungracefully, with much internal bickering, with much trickery on the part of her lawyers, and much baseness on the part of her landlords; but she will do it not so slowly as a logical mind might anticipate. she will get there a little late, expensively, but still in time.... the german group, i reckon, therefore, will become exhausted first. i think, too, that germany will, as a nation, feel and be aware of what is happening to her sooner than any other of the nations that are sharing in this process of depletion. in 1914 the germans were reaping the harvest of forty years of economic development and business enterprise. property and plenty were new experiences, and a generation had grown up in whose world a sense of expansion and progress was normal. there existed amongst it no tradition of the great hardship of war, such as the french possessed, to steel its mind. it had none of the irrational mute toughness of the russians and british. it was a sentimental people, making a habit of success; it rushed chanting to war against the most grimly heroic and the most stolidly enduring of races. germany came into this war more buoyantly and confidently than any other combatant. it expected another 1871; at the utmost it anticipated a year of war. never were a people so disillusioned as the germans must already be, never has a nation been called upon for so complete a mental readjustment. neither conclusive victories nor defeats have been theirs, but only a slow, vast transition from joyful effort and an illusion of rapid triumph to hardship, loss and loss and loss of substance, the dwindling of great hopes, the realisation of ebb in the tide of national welfare. now they must fight on against implacable, indomitable allies. they are under stresses now as harsh at least as the stresses of france. and, compared with the french, the germans are untempered steel. we know little of the psychology of this new germany that has come into being since 1871, but it is doubtful if it will accept defeat, and still more doubtful how it can evade some ending to the war that will admit the failure of all its great hopes of paris subjugated, london humbled, russia suppliant, belgium conquered, the near east a prey. such an admission will be a day of reckoning that german imperialism will postpone until the last hope of some breach among the allies, some saving miracle in the old eastern empire, some dramatically-snatched victory at the eleventh hour, is gone. nor can the pledged allies consent to a peace that does not involve the evacuation and compensation of belgium and serbia, and at least the autonomy of the lost rhine provinces of france. that is their very minimum. that, and the making of germany so sick and weary of military adventure that the danger of german ambition will cease to overshadow european life. those are the ends of the main war. europe will go down through stage after stage of impoverishment and exhaustion until these ends are attained, or made for ever impossible. but these things form only the main outline of a story with a vast amount of collateral interest. it is to these collateral issues that the amateur in prophecy must give his attention. it is here that the german will be induced by his government to see his compensations. he will be consoled for the restoration of serbia by the prospect of future conflicts between italian and jugoslav that will let him in again to the adriatic. his attention will be directed to his newer, closer association with bulgaria and turkey. in those countries he will be told he may yet repeat the miracle of hungary. and there may be also another hungary in poland. it will be whispered to him that he has really conquered those countries when indeed it is highly probable he has only spent his substance in setting up new assertive alien allies. the kaiser, if he is not too afraid of the precedent of sarajevo, may make a great entry into constantinople, with an effect of conquering what is after all only a temporarily allied capital. the german will hope also to retain his fleet, and no peace, he will be reminded, can rob him of his hard-earned technical superiority in the air. the german air fleet of 1930 may yet be something as predominant as the british navy of 1915, and capable of delivering a much more intimate blow. had he not better wait for that? when such consolations as these become popular in the german press we of the pledged allies may begin to talk of peace, for these will be its necessary heralds. the concluding phase of a process of general exhaustion must almost inevitably be a game of bluff. neither side will admit its extremity. neither side, therefore, will make any direct proposals to its antagonists nor any open advances to a neutral. but there will be much inspired peace talk through neutral media, and the consultations of the anti-german allies will become more intimate and detailed. suggestions will "leak out" remarkably from both sides, to journalists and neutral go-betweens. the eastern and western allies will probably begin quite soon to discuss an anti-german zollverein and the co-ordination of their military and naval organisations in the days that are to follow the war. a discussion of a central european zollverein is already afoot. a general idea of the possible rearrangement of the european states after the war will grow up in the common european and american mind; public men on either side will indicate concordance with this general idea, and some neutral power, denmark or spain or the united states or holland, will invite representatives to an informal discussion of these possibilities. probably, therefore, the peace negotiations will take the extraordinary form of two simultaneous conferences--one of the pledged allies, sitting probably in paris or london, and the other of representatives of all the combatants meeting in some neutral country--holland would be the most convenient--while the war will still be going on. the dutch conference would be in immediate contact by telephone and telegraph with the allied conference and with berlin.... the broad conditions of a possible peace will begin to get stated towards the end of 1916, and a certain lassitude will creep over the operations in the field.... the process of exhaustion will probably have reached such a point by that time that it will be a primary fact in the consciousness of common citizens of every belligerent country. the common life of all europe will have become--miserable. conclusive blows will have receded out of the imagination of the contending powers. the war will have reached its fourth and last stage as a war. the war of the great attack will have given place to the war of the military deadlock; the war of the deadlock will have gone on, and as the great combatants have become enfeebled relatively to the smaller states, there will have been a gradual shifting of the interest to the war of treasons and diplomacies in the eastern mediterranean. quickly thereafter the last phase will be developing into predominance, in which each group of nations will be most concerned, no longer about victories or conquests, but about securing for itself the best chances of rapid economic recuperation and social reconstruction. the commercial treaties, the arrangements for future associated action, made by the great allies among themselves will appear more and more important to them, and the mere question of boundaries less and less. it will dawn upon europe that she has already dissipated the resources that have enabled her to levy the tribute paid for her investments in every quarter of the earth, and that neither the germans nor their antagonists will be able for many years to go on with those projects for world exploitation which lay at the root of the great war. very jaded and anaemic nations will sit about the table on which the new map of europe will be drawn.... each of the diplomatists will come to that business with a certain pre-occupation. each will be thinking of his country as one thinks of a patient of doubtful patience and temper who is coming-to out of the drugged stupor of a crucial, ill-conceived, and unnecessary operation ... each will be thinking of labour, wounded and perplexed, returning to the disorganised or nationalised factories from which capital has gone a-fighting, and to which it may never return. iii. nations in liquidation the war has become a war of exhaustion. one hears a great deal of the idea that "financial collapse" may bring it to an end. a number of people seem to be convinced that a war cannot be waged without money, that soldiers must be paid, munitions must be bought; that for this money is necessary and the consent of bank depositors; so that if all the wealth of the world were nominally possessed by some one man in a little office he could stop the war by saying simply, "i will lend you no more money." now, as a matter of fact, money is a power only in so far as people believe in it and governments sustain it. if a state is sufficiently strong and well organised, its control over the money power is unlimited. if it can rule its people, and if it has the necessary resources of men and material within its borders, it can go on in a state of war so long as these things last, with almost any flimsy sort of substitute for money that it chooses to print. it can enrol and use the men, and seize and work the material. it can take over the land and cultivate it and distribute its products. the little man in the office is only a power because the state chooses to recognise his claim. so long as he is convenient he seems to be a power. so soon as the state is intelligent enough and strong enough it can do without him. it can take what it wants, and tell him to go and hang himself. that is the melancholy ultimate of the usurer. that is the quintessence of "finance." all credit is state-made, and what the state has made the state can alter or destroy. the owner and the creditor have never had any other power to give or withhold credit than the credit that was given to them. they exist by sufferance or superstition and not of necessity. it is the habit of overlooking this little flaw in the imperatives of ownership that enables people to say that this war cannot go on beyond such and such a date--the end of 1916 is much in favour just now--because we cannot pay for it. it would be about as reasonable to expect a battle to end because a landlord had ordered the soldiers off his estate. so long as there are men to fight and stuff to fight with the war can go on. there is bankruptcy, but the bankruptcy of states is not like the bankruptcy of individuals. there is no such thing among states as an undischarged bankrupt who is forbidden to carry on. a state may keep on going bankrupt indefinitely and still carry on. it will be the next step in our prophetic exercise to examine the differences between state bankruptcy and the bankruptcy of a subject of the state. the belligerent powers are approaching a phase when they will no longer be paying anything like twenty shillings in the pound. in a very definite sense they are not paying twenty shillings in the pound now. that is not going to stop the war, but it involves a string of consequences and possibilities of the utmost importance to our problem of what is coming when the war is over. the exhaustion that will bring this war to its end at last is a process of destruction of men and material. the process of bankruptcy that is also going on is nothing of the sort. bankruptcy destroys no concrete thing; it merely writes off a debt; it destroys a financial but not an economic reality. it is, in itself, a mental, not a physical fact. "a" owes "b" a debt; he goes bankrupt and pays a dividend, a fraction of his debt, and gets his discharge. "b's" feelings, as we novelists used to say, are "better imagined than described"; he does his best to satisfy himself that "a" can pay no more, and then "a" and "b" both go about their business again. in england, if "a" is a sufficiently poor man not to be formidable, and has gone bankrupt on a small scale, he gets squeezed ferociously to extract the last farthing from him; he may find himself in jail and his home utterly smashed up. if he is a richer man, and has failed on a larger scale, our law is more sympathetic, and he gets off much more easily. often his creditors find it advisable to arrange with him so that he will still carry on with his bankrupt concern. they find it is better to allow him to carry on than to smash him up. there are countless men in the world living very comfortably indeed, and running businesses that were once their own property for their creditors. there are still more who have written off princely debts and do not seem to be a "ha'p'orth the worse." and their creditors have found a balm in time and philosophy. bankruptcy is only painful and destructive to small people and helpless people; but then for them everything is painful and destructive; it can be a very light matter to big people; it may be almost painless to a state. if england went bankrupt in the completest way to-morrow, and repudiated all its debts both as a nation and as a community of individuals, if it declared, if i may use a self-contradictory phrase, a permanent moratorium, there would be not an acre of ploughed land in the country, not a yard of cloth or a loaf of bread the less for that. there would be nothing material destroyed within the state. there would be no immediate convulsion. use and wont would carry most people on some days before they even began to doubt whether so-and-so could pay his way, and whether there would be wages at the end of the week. but people who lived upon rent or investments or pensions would presently be very busy thinking how they were going to get food when the butcher and baker insisted upon cash. it would be only with comparative slowness that the bulk of men would realise that a fabric of confidence and confident assumptions had vanished; that cheques and bank notes and token money and every sort of bond and scrip were worthless, that employers had nothing to pay with, shopkeepers no means of procuring stock, that metallic money was disappearing, and that a paralysis had come upon the community. such an establishment as a workhouse or an old-fashioned monastery, living upon the produce of its own farming and supplying all its own labour, would be least embarrassed amidst the general perplexity. for it would not be upon a credit basis, but a socialistic basis, a basis of direct reality, and its need for payments would be incidental. and land-owning peasants growing their own food would carry on, and small cultivating occupiers, who could easily fall back on barter for anything needed. the mass of the population in such a country as england would, however, soon be standing about in hopeless perplexity and on the verge of frantic panic--although there was just as much food to be eaten, just as many houses to live in, and just as much work needing to be done. suddenly the pots would be empty, and famine would be in the land, although the farms and butchers' shops were still well stocked. the general community would be like an automobile when the magneto fails. everything would be there and in order, except for the spark of credit which keeps the engine working. that is how quite a lot of people seem to imagine national bankruptcy: as a catastrophic jolt. it is a quite impossible nightmare of cessation. the reality is the completest contrast. all the belligerent countries of the world are at the present moment quietly, steadily and progressively going bankrupt, and the mass of people are not even aware of this process of insolvency. an individual when he goes bankrupt is measured by the monetary standard of the country he is in; he pays five or ten or fifteen or so many shillings in the pound. a community in debt does something which is in effect the same, but in appearance rather different. it still pays a pound, but the purchasing power of the pound has diminished. this is what is happening all over the world to-day; there is a rise in prices. this is automatic national bankruptcy; unplanned, though perhaps not unforeseen. it is not a deliberate state act, but a consequence of the interruption of communications, the diversion of productive energy, the increased demand for many necessities by the government and the general waste under war conditions. at the beginning of this war england had a certain national debt; it has paid off none of that original debt; it has added to it tremendously; so far as money and bankers' records go it still owes and intends to pay that original debt; but if you translate the language of â£.s.d. into realities, you will find that in loaves or iron or copper or hours of toil, or indeed in any reality except gold, it owes now, so far as that original debt goes, far less than it did at the outset. as the war goes on and the rise in prices continues, the subsequent borrowings and contracts are undergoing a similar bankrupt reduction. the attempt of the landlord of small weekly and annual properties to adjust himself to the new conditions by raising rents is being checked by legislation in great britain, and has been completely checked in france. the attempts of labour to readjust wages have been partially successful in spite of the eloquent protests of those great exponents of plain living, economy, abstinence, and honest, modest, underpaid toil, messrs. asquith, mckenna, and runciman. it is doubtful if the rise in wages is keeping pace with the rise in prices. so far as it fails to do so the load is on the usual pack animal, the poor man. the rest of the loss falls chiefly upon the creditor class, the people with fixed incomes and fixed salaries, the landlords, who have let at long leases, the people with pensions, endowed institutions, the church, insurance companies, and the like. they are all being scaled down. they are all more able to stand scaling down than the proletarians. assuming that it is possible to bring up wages to the level of the higher prices, and that the rise in rents can be checked by legislation or captured by taxation, the rise in prices is, on the whole, a thing to the advantage of the propertyless man as against accumulated property. it writes off the past and clears the way for a fresh start in the future. an age of cheapness is an old usurers' age. england before the war was a paradise of ancient usuries; everywhere were great houses and enclosed parks; the multitude of gentlemen's servants and golf clubs and such like excrescences of the comfort of prosperous people was perpetually increasing; it did not "pay" to build labourers' cottages, and the more expensive sort of automobile had driven the bicycle as a pleasure vehicle off the roads. western europe was running to fat and not to muscle, as america is to-day. but if that old usurer's age is over, the young usurer's age may be coming. to meet such enormous demands as this war is making there are three chief courses open to the modern state. the first is to _take_--to get men by conscription and material by requisition. the british government _takes_ more modestly than any other in the world; its tradition from magna charta onward, the legal training of most of its members, all make towards a reverence for private ownership and private claims, as opposed to the claims of state and commonweal, unequalled in the world's history. the next course of a nation in need is to _tax_ and pay for what it wants, which is a fractional and more evenly distributed method of taking. both of these methods raise prices, the second most so, and so facilitate the automatic release of the future from the boarding of the past. so far all the belligerent governments have taxed on the timid side. finally there is the _loan_. this mortgages the future to the present necessity, and it has so far been the predominant source of war credits. it is the method that produces least immediate friction in the state; it employs all the savings of surplus income that the unrest of civil enterprise leaves idle; it has an effect of creating property by a process that destroys the substance of the community. in germany an enormous bulk of property has been mortgaged to supply the subscriptions to the war loans, and those holdings have again been hypothecated to subscribe to subsequent loans. the pledged allies with longer stockings have not yet got to this pitch of overlapping. but everywhere in europe what is happening is a great transformation of the property owner into a _rentier_, and the passing of realty into the hands of the state. at the end of the war great britain will probably find herself with a national debt so great that she will be committed to the payment of an annual interest greater in figures than the entire national expenditure before the war. as an optimistic lady put it the other day: "all the people who aren't killed will be living quite comfortably on war loan for the rest of their lives." but part, at least, of the bulk of this wealth will be imaginary rather than real because of the rise in prices, in wages, in rent, and in taxation. most of us who are buying the british and french war loans have no illusions on that score; we know we are buying an income of diminishing purchasing power. yet it would be a poor creature in these days when there is scarcely a possible young man in one's circle who has not quite freely and cheerfully staked his life, who was not prepared to consider his investments as being also to an undefined extent a national subscription. a rise in prices is not, however, the only process that will check the appearance of a new rich usurer class after the war. there is something else ahead that has happened already in germany, that is quietly coming about among the allies, and that is the cessation of gold payments. in great britain, of course, the pound note is still convertible into a golden sovereign; but great britain will not get through the war on those terms. there comes a point in the stress upon a government when it must depart from the austerer line of financial rectitude--and tamper in some way with currency. sooner or later, and probably in all cases before 1917, all the belligerents will be forced to adopt inconvertible paper money for their internal uses. there will be british assignats or greenbacks. it will seem to many financial sentimentalists almost as though great britain were hauling down a flag when the sovereign, which has already disappeared into bank and treasury coffers, is locked up there and reserved for international trade. but great britain has other sentiments to consider than the finer feelings of bankers and the delicacies of usury. the pound british will come out of this war like a company out of a well-shelled trench--attenuated. depreciation of the currency means, of course, a continuing rise in prices, a continuing writing off of debt. if labour has any real grasp of its true interests it will not resent this. it will merely insist steadfastly on a proper adjustment of its wages to the new standard. on that point, however, it will be better to write later.... let us see how far we have got in this guessing. we have considered reasons that seem to point to the destruction of a great amount of old property and old debt, and the creation of a great volume of new debt before the end of the war, and we have adopted the ideas that currency will probably have depreciated more and more and prices risen right up to the very end. there will be by that time a general habit of saving throughout the community, a habit more firmly established perhaps in the propertied than in the wages-earning class. people will be growing accustomed to a dear and insecure world. they will adopt a habit of caution; become desirous of saving and security. directly the phase of enormous war loans ends, the new class of _rentiers_ holding the various great new national loans will find themselves drawing this collectively vast income and anxious to invest it. they will for a time be receiving the bulk of the unearned income of the world. here, in the high prices representing demand and the need for some reinvestment of interest representing supply, we have two of the chief factors that are supposed to be necessary to a phase of business enterprise. will the economic history of the next few decades be the story of a restoration of the capitalistic system upon a new basis? shall we all become investors, speculators, or workers toiling our way to a new period of security, cheapness and low interest, a restoration of the park, the enclosure, the gold standard and the big automobile, with only this difference--that the minimum wage will be somewhere about two pounds, and that a five-pound note will purchase about as much as a couple of guineas would do in 1913? that is practically parallel with what happened in the opening half of the nineteenth century after the napoleonic wars, and it is not an agreeable outlook for those who love the common man or the nobility of life. but if there is any one principle sounder than another of all those that guide the amateur in prophecy, it is that _history never repeats itself_. the human material in which those monetary changes and those developments of credit will occur will be entirely different from the social medium of a hundred years ago. the nature of the state has altered profoundly in the last century. the later eighteenth and earlier nineteenth centuries constituted a period of extreme individualism. what were called "economic forces" had unrestricted play. in the minds of such people as harriet martineau and herbert spencer they superseded god. people were no longer reproached for "flying in the face of providence," but for "flying in the face of political economy." in that state of freedom you got whatever you could in any way you could; you were not your neighbour's keeper, and except that it interfered with the enterprise of pickpockets, burglars and forgers, and kept the dice loaded in favour of landlords and lawyers, the state stood aside from the great drama of human getting. for industrialism and speculation the state's guiding maxim was _laissez faire_. the state is now far less aloof and far more constructive. it is far more aware of itself and a common interest. germany has led the way from a system of individuals and voluntary associations in competition towards a new order of things, a completer synthesis. this most modern state is far less a swarming conflict of businesses than a great national business. it will emerge from this war much more so than it went in, and the thing is and will remain so plain and obvious that only the greediest and dullest people among the pledged allies will venture to disregard it. the allied nations, too, will have to rescue their economic future from individual grab and grip and chance. the second consideration that forbids us to anticipate any parallelism of the history of 1915-45 with 1815-45 is the greater lucidity of the general mind, the fact that all western europe, down to the agricultural labourers, can read and write and does read newspapers and "get ideas." the explanation of economic and social processes that were mysterious to the elect a hundred years ago are now the commonplaces of the tap-room. what happened then darkly, and often unconsciously, must happen in 1916-26 openly and controllably. the current bankruptcy and liquidation and the coming reconstruction of the economic system of europe will go on in a quite unprecedented amount of light. we shall see and know what is happening much more clearly than anything of the kind has ever been seen before. it is not only that people will have behind them, as a light upon what is happening, the experiences and discussions of a hundred years, but that the international situation will be far plainer than it has ever been. this war has made germany the central fact in all national affairs about the earth. it is not going to destroy germany, and it seems improbable that either defeat or victory, or any mixture of these, will immediately alter the cardinal fact of germany's organised aggressiveness. the war will not end the conflict of anti-germany and germany, that will only end when the results of fifty years of aggressive education in germany have worn away. this will be so plain that the great bulk of people everywhere will not only see their changing economic relationships far more distinctly than such things have been seen hitherto, but that they will see them as they have never been seen before, definitely orientated to the threat of german world predominance. the landlord who squeezes, the workman who strikes and shirks, the lawyer who fogs and obstructs, will know, and will know that most people know, that what he does is done, not under an empty, regardless heaven, but in the face of an unsleeping enemy and in disregard of a continuous urgent necessity for unity. so far we have followed this speculation upon fairly firm ground, but now our inquiry must plunge into a jungle of far more difficult and uncertain possibilities. our next stage brings us to the question of how people and peoples and classes of people are going to react to the new conditions of need and knowledge this war will have brought about, and to the new demands that will be made upon them. this is really a question of how far they will prove able to get out of the habits and traditions of their former social state, how far they will be able to take generous views and make sacrifices and unselfish efforts, and how far they will go in self-seeking or class selfishness regardless of the common welfare. this is a question we have to ask separately of each great nation, and of the central powers as a whole, and of the allies as a whole, before we can begin to estimate the posture of the peoples of the world in, say, 1946. now let me here make a sort of parenthesis on human nature. it will be rather platitudinous, but it is a necessary reminder for what follows. so far as i have been able to observe, nobody lives steadily at one moral level. if we are wise we shall treat no man and no class--and for the matter of that no nation--as either steadfastly malignant or steadfastly disinterested. there are phases in my life when i could die quite cheerfully for an idea; there are phases when i would not stir six yards to save a human life. most people fluctuate between such extremes. most people are self-seeking, but most people will desist from a self-seeking cause if they see plainly and clearly that it is not in the general interest, and much more readily if they also perceive that other people are of the same mind and know that they know their course is unsound. the fundamental error of orthodox political economy and of marxian socialism is to assume the inveterate selfishness of everyone. but most people are a little more disposed to believe what it is to their interest to believe than the contrary. most people abandon with reluctance ways of living and doing that have served them well. most people can see the neglect of duty in other classes more plainly than they do in their own. this war has brought back into the everyday human life of europe the great and overriding conception of devotion to a great purpose. but that does not imply clear-headedness in correlating the ways of one's ordinary life with this great purpose. it is no good treating as cynical villainy things that merely exhibit the incapacity of our minds to live consistently. one labour paper a month or so ago was contrasting mr. asquith's eloquent appeals to the working man to economise and forgo any rise in wages with the photographs that were appearing simultaneously in the smart papers of the very smart marriage of mr. asquith's daughter. i submit that by that sort of standard none of us will be blameless. but without any condemnation, it is easy to understand that the initiative to tax almost to extinction large automobiles, wedding dresses, champagne, pã¢tã© de foie gras and enclosed parks, instead of gin and water, bank holiday outings and virginia shag, is less likely to come from the prime minister class than from the class of dock labourers. there is an unconscious class war due to habit and insufficient thinking and insufficient sympathy that will play a large part in the distribution of the burthen of the state bankruptcy that is in progress, and in the subsequent readjustment of national life. and having made this parenthesis, i may perhaps go on to point out the peculiar limitations under which various classes will be approaching the phase of reorganisation, without being accused of making this or that class the villain of an anticipatory drama. now, three great classes will certainly resist the valiant reconstruction of economic life with a vigour in exact proportion to their baseness, stupidity and narrowness of outlook. they will, as classes, come up for a moral judgment, on whose verdict the whole future of western civilisation depends. if they cannot achieve a considerable, an unprecedented display of self-sacrifice, unselfish wisdom, and constructive vigour, if the community as a whole can produce no forces sufficient to restrain their lower tendencies, then the intelligent father had better turn his children's faces towards the new world. for europe will be busy with social disorder for a century. the first great class is the class that owns and holds land and land-like claims upon the community, from the throne downward. this court and land-holding class cannot go on being rich and living rich during the strains of the coming years. the reconstructing world cannot bear it. whatever rises in rent may occur through the rise in prices, must go to meet the tremendous needs of the state. this class, which has so much legislative and administrative power in at least three of the great belligerents--in great britain and germany perhaps most so--must be prepared to see itself taxed, and must be willing to assist in its own taxation to the very limit of its statistical increment. the almost vindictive greed of the landowners that blackened the history of england after waterloo, and brought great britain within sight of revolution, must not be repeated. the british empire cannot afford a revolution in the face of the central european powers. but in the past century there has been an enormous change in men's opinions and consciences about property; whereas we were individualists, now we are socialists. the british lord, the german junker, has none of the sense of unqualified rights that his great-grandfather had, and he is aware of a vigour of public criticism that did not exist in the former time.... how far will these men get out of the tradition of their birth and upbringing? next comes the great class of lawyers who, through the idiotic method of voting in use in modern democracies, are able practically to rule great britain, and who are powerful and influential in all democratic countries. in order to secure a certain independence and integrity in its courts, great britain long ago established the principle of enormously overpaying its judges and lawyers. the natural result has been to give our law courts and the legal profession generally a bias in favour of private wealth against both the public interest and the proletariat. it has also given our higher national education an overwhelming direction towards the training of advocates and against science and constructive statecraft. an ordinary lawyer has no idea of making anything; that tendency has been destroyed in his mind; he waits and sees and takes advantage of opportunity. everything that can possibly be done in england is done to make our rulers micawbers and artful dodgers. one of the most anxious questions that a briton can ask himself to-day is just how far the gigantic sufferings and still more monstrous warnings of this war have shocked the good gentlemen who must steer the ship of state through the strong rapids of the new peace out of this forensic levity their training has imposed upon them.... there, again, there are elements of hope. the lawyer has heard much about himself in the past few years. his conscience may check his tradition. and we have a press--it has many faults, but it is no longer a lawyer's press.... and the third class which has immediate interests antagonistic to bold reconstructions of our national methods is that vaguer body, the body of investing capitalists, the savers, the usurers, who live on dividends. it is a vast class, but a feeble class in comparison with the other two; it is a body rather than a class, a weight rather than a power. it consists of all sorts of people with nothing in common except the receipt of unearned income.... all these classes, by instinct and the baser kinds of reason also, will be doing their best to check the rise in prices, stop and reverse the advance in wages, prevent the debasement of the circulation, and facilitate the return to a gold standard and a repressive social stability. they will be resisting any comprehensive national reconstruction, any increase in public officials, any "conscription" of land or railways or what not for the urgent civil needs of the state. they will have fighting against these tendencies something in their own consciences, something in public opinion, the tradition of public devotion their own dead sons have revived--and certain other forces. they will have over against them the obvious urgent necessities of the time. the most urgent necessity will be to get back the vast moiety of the population that has been engaged either in military service or the making of munitions to productive work, to the production of food and necessary things, and to the restoration of that export trade which, in the case of great britain at least, now that her overseas investments have been set off by overseas war debts, is essential to the food supply. there will be coming back into civil life, not merely thousands, but millions of men who have been withdrawn from it. they will feel that they have deserved well of their country. they will have had their imaginations greatly quickened by being taken away from the homes and habits to which they were accustomed. they will have been well fed and inured to arms, to danger, and the chances of death. they will have no illusions about the conduct of the war by the governing classes, or the worshipful heroism of peers and princes. they will know just how easy is courage, and how hard is hardship, and the utter impossibility of doing well in war or peace under the orders of detected fools. this vast body will constitute a very stimulating congregation of spectators in any attempt on the part of landlord, lawyer and investor to resume the old political mystery dance, in which rents are to be sent up and wages down, while the old feuds of wales and ireland, ancient theological and sectarian jealousies and babyish loyalties, and so forth are to be waved in the eyes of the no longer fascinated realist. "meanwhile," they will say, with a stiff impatience unusual in their class, "about _us_?" ... here are the makings of internal conflict in every european country. in russia the landlord and lawyer, in france the landlord, are perhaps of less account, and in france the investor is more universal and jealous. in germany, where junker and court are most influential and brutal, there is a larger and sounder and broader tradition of practical efficiency, a modernised legal profession, and a more widely diffused scientific imagination. how far in each country will imagination triumph over tradition and individualism? how far does the practical bankruptcy of western civilisation mean a revolutionary smash-up, and a phase that may last for centuries, of disorder and more and more futile conflict? and how far does it mean a reconstruction of human society, within a few score of years, upon sounder and happier lines? must that reconstruction be preceded by a revolution in all or any of the countries? to what extent can the world produce the imagination it needs? that, so far, is the most fundamental question to which our prophetic explorations have brought us. iv. braintree, bocking, and the future of the world will the war be followed by a period of great distress, social disorder and a revolution in europe, or shall we pull through the crisis without violent disaster? may we even hope that great britain will step straight out of the war into a phase of restored and increasing welfare? like most people, i have been trying to form some sort of answer to this question. my state of mind in the last few months has varied from a considerable optimism to profound depression. i have met and talked to quite a number of young men in khaki--ex-engineers, ex-lawyers, ex-schoolmasters, ex-business men of all sorts--and the net result of these interviews has been a buoyant belief that there is in great britain the pluck, the will, the intelligence to do anything, however arduous and difficult, in the way of national reconstruction. and on the other hand there is a certain stretch of road between dunmow and coggeshall.... that stretch of road is continually jarring with my optimistic thoughts. it is a strongly pro-german piece of road. it supports allegations against great britain, as, for instance, that the british are quite unfit to control their own affairs, let alone those of an empire; that they are an incompetent people, a pig-headedly stupid people, a wasteful people, a people incapable of realising that a man who tills his field badly is a traitor and a weakness to his country.... let me place the case of this high road through braintree (bocking intervening) before the reader. it is, you will say perhaps, very small beer. but a straw shows the way the wind blows. it is a trivial matter of road metal, mud, and water-pipes, but it is also diagnostic of the essential difficulties in the way of the smooth and rapid reconstruction of great britain--and very probably of the reconstruction of all europe--after the war. the braintree high road, i will confess, becomes at times an image of the world for me. it is a poor, spiritless-looking bit of road, with raw stones on one side of it. it is also, i perceive, the high destiny of man in conflict with mankind. it is the way to harwich, holland, russia, china, and the whole wide world. even at the first glance it impresses one as not being the road that would satisfy an energetic and capable people. it is narrow for a high road, and in the middle of it one is checked by an awkward bend, by cross-roads that are not exactly cross-roads, so that one has to turn two blind corners to get on eastward, and a policeman, i don't know at what annual cost, has to be posted to nurse the traffic across. beyond that point one is struck by the fact that the south side is considerably higher than the north, that storm water must run from the south side to the north and lie there. it does, and the north side has recently met the trouble by putting down raw flints, and so converting what would be a lake into a sort of flint pudding. consequently one drives one's car as much as possible on the south side of this road. there is a suggestion of hostility and repartee between north and south side in this arrangement, which the explorer's inquiries will confirm. it may be only an accidental parallelism with profounder fact; i do not know. but the middle of this high road is a frontier. the south side belongs to the urban district of braintree; the north to the rural district of bocking. if the curious inquirer will take pick and shovel he will find at any rate one corresponding dualism below the surface. he will find a bocking water main supplying the houses on the north side and a braintree water main supplying the south. i rather suspect that the drains are also in duplicate. the total population of bocking and braintree is probably little more than thirteen thousand souls altogether, but for that there are two water supplies, two sets of schools, two administrations. to the passing observer the rurality of the bocking side is indistinguishable from the urbanity of the braintree side; it is just a little muddier. but there are dietetic differences. if you will present a bocking rustic with a tin of the canned fruit that is popular with the braintree townsfolk, you discover one of these differences. a dustman perambulates the road on the braintree side, and canned food becomes possible and convenient therefore. but the braintree grocers sell canned food with difficulty into bocking. bocking, less fortunate than its neighbour, has no dustman apparently, and is left with the tin on its hands. it can either bury it in its garden--if it has a garden--take it out for a walk wrapped in paper and drop it quietly in a ditch, if possible in the braintree area, or build a cairn with it and its predecessors and successors in honour of the local government board (president â£5,000, parliamentary secretary â£1,500, permanent secretary â£2,000, legal adviser â£1,000 upward, a total administrative expenditure of over â£300,000 ...). in death bocking and braintree are still divided. they have their separate cemeteries.... now to any disinterested observer there lies about the braintree-bocking railway station one community. it has common industries and common interests. there is no _octroi_ or anything of that sort across the street. the shops and inns on the bocking side of the main street are indistinguishable from those on the braintree side. the inhabitants of the two communities intermarry freely. if this absurd separation did not exist, no one would have the impudence to establish it now. it is wasteful, unfair (because the bocking piece is rather better off than braintree and with fewer people, so that there is a difference in the rates), and for nine-tenths of the community it is more or less of a nuisance. it is also a nuisance to the passing public because of such inconvenience as the asymmetrical main road. it hinders local development and the development of a local spirit. it may, of course, appeal perhaps to the humorous outlook of the followers of mr. g.k. chesterton and mr. belloc, who believe that this war is really a war in the interests of the athanasian creed, fatness, and unrestricted drink against science, discipline, and priggishly keeping fit enough to join the army, as very good fun indeed, good matter for some jolly reeling ballad about roundabout and roundabout, the jolly town of roundabout; but to anyone else the question of how it is that this wasteful bocking-braintree muddle, with its two boards, its two clerks, its two series of jobs and contracts, manages to keep on, was even before the war a sufficiently discouraging one. it becomes now a quite crucial problem. because the muddle between the sides of the main road through bocking and braintree is not an isolated instance; it is a fair sample of the way things are done in great britain; it is an intimation of the way in which the great task of industrial resettlement that the nation must face may be attempted. it is--or shall i write, "it may be"? that is just the question i do not settle in my mind. i would like to think that i have hit upon a particularly bad case of entangled local government. but it happens that whenever i have looked into local affairs i have found the same sort of waste and--insobriety of arrangement. when i started, a little while back, to go to braintree to verify these particulars, i was held up by a flood across the road between little easton and dunmow. every year that road is flooded and impassable for some days, because a bit of the affected stretch is under the county council and a bit under the little easton parish council, and they cannot agree about the contribution of the latter. these things bump against the most unworldly. and when one goes up the scale from the urban district and rural district boundaries, one finds equally crazy county arrangements, the same tangle of obstacle in the way of quick, effective co-ordinations, the same needless multiplicity of clerks, the same rich possibilities of litigation, misunderstanding, and deadlocks of opinion between areas whose only difference is that a mischievous boundary has been left in existence between them. and so on up to westminster. and to still greater things.... i know perfectly well how unpleasant all this is to read, this outbreak at two localities that have never done me any personal harm except a little mud-splashing. but this is a thing that has to be said now, because we are approaching a crisis when dilatory ways, muddle, and waste may utterly ruin us. this is the way things have been done in england, this is our habit of procedure, and if they are done in this way after the war this empire is going to smash. let me add at once that it is quite possible that things are done almost as badly or quite as badly in russia or france or germany or america; i am drawing no comparisons. all of us human beings were made, i believe, of very similar clay, and very similar causes have been at work everywhere. only that excuse, so popular in england, will not prevent a smash if we stick to the old methods under the stresses ahead. i do not see that it is any consolation to share in a general disaster. and i am sure that there must be the most delightful and picturesque reasons why we have all this overlapping and waste and muddle in our local affairs; why, to take another example, the boundary of the essex parishes of newton and widdington looks as though it had been sketched out by a drunken man in a runaway cab with a broken spring. this bocking-braintree main road is, it happens, an old stane street, along which roman legions marched to clean up the councils and clerks of the british tribal system two thousand years ago, and no doubt an historian could spin delightful consequences; this does not alter the fact that these quaint complications in english affairs mean in the aggregate enormous obstruction and waste of human energy. it does not alter the much graver fact, the fact that darkens all my outlook upon the future, that we have never yet produced evidence of any general disposition at any time to straighten out or even suspend these fumbling intricacies and ineptitudes. never so far has there appeared in british affairs that divine passion to do things in the clearest, cleanest, least wasteful, most thorough manner that is needed to straighten out, for example, these universal local tangles. always we have been content with the old intricate, expensive way, and to this day we follow it.... and what i want to know, what i would like to feel much surer about than i do is, is this in our blood? or is it only the deep-seated habit of long ages of security, long years of margins so ample, that no waste seemed altogether wicked. is it, in fact, a hopeless and ineradicable trait that we stick to extravagance and confusion? what i would like to think possible at the present time, up and down the scale from parish to province, is something of this sort. suppose the clerk of braintree went to the clerk of bocking and said: "look here, one of us could do the work of both of us, as well or better. the easy times are over, and offices as well as men should be prepared to die for their country. shall we toss to see who shall do it, and let the other man go off to find something useful to do?" then i could believe. such acts of virtue happen in the united states. here is a quotation from the new york _world_ of february 15th, 1916: "for two unusual acts henry bruã¨re may be remembered by new york longer than nine days. early in his incumbency he declared that his office was superfluous and should be abolished, the comptroller assuming its duties. he now abolishes by resignation his own connection with it, in spite of its $12,000 salary." suppose the people of braintree and bocking, not waiting for that lead, said: "but this is absurd! let us have an identical council and one clerk, and get ahead, instead of keeping up this silly pretence that one town is two." suppose someone of that 300,000 pounds' worth of gentlemen at the local government board set to work to replan our local government areas generally on less comic lines. suppose his official superiors helped, instead of snubbing him.... i see nothing of the sort happening. i see everywhere wary, watchful little men, thinking of themselves, thinking of their parish, thinking close, holding tight.... i know that there is a whole web of excuses for all these complicated, wasteful, and obstructive arrangements of our local government, these arrangements that i have taken merely as a sample of the general human way of getting affairs done. for it is affairs at large i am writing about, as i warned the reader at the beginning. directly one inquires closely into any human muddle, one finds all sorts of reasonable rights and objections and claims barring the way to any sweeping proposals. i can quite imagine that bocking has admirable reasons for refusing coalescence with braintree, except upon terms that braintree could not possibly consider. i can quite understand that there are many inconveniences and arguable injustices that would be caused by a merger of the two areas. i have no doubt it would mean serious loss to so-and-so, and quite novel and unfair advantage to so-and-so. it would take years to work the thing and get down to the footing of one water supply and an ambidextrous dustman on the lines of perfect justice and satisfactoriness all round. but what i want to maintain is that these little immediate claims and rights and vested interests and bits of justice and fairness are no excuse at all for preventing things being done in the clear, clean, large, quick way. they never constituted a decent excuse, and now they excuse waste and delay and inconvenience less than ever. let us first do things in the sound way, and then, if we can, let us pet and compensate any disappointed person who used to profit by their being done roundabout instead of earning an honest living. we are beginning to agree that reasonably any man may be asked to die for his country; what we have to recognise is that any man's proprietorship, interest, claims or rights may just as properly be called upon to die. bocking and braintree and mr. john smith--mr. john smith, the ordinary comfortable man with a stake in the country--have been thinking altogether too much of the claims and rights and expectations and economies of bocking and braintree and mr. john smith. they have to think now in a different way.... just consider the work of reconstruction that great britain alone will have to face in the next year or so. (and her task is, if anything, less than that of any of her antagonists or allies, except japan and italy.) she has now probably from six to ten million people in the british isles, men and women, either engaged directly in warfare or in the manufacture of munitions or in employments such as transit, nursing, and so forth, directly subserving these main ends. at least five-sixths of these millions must be got back to employment of a different character within a year of the coming of peace. everywhere manufacture, trade and transit has been disorganised, disturbed or destroyed. a new economic system has to be put together within a brief score or so of weeks; great dislocated masses of population have to be fed, kept busy and distributed in a world financially strained and abounding in wounded, cripples, widows, orphans and helpless people. in the next year or so the lives of half the population will have to be fundamentally readjusted. here is work for administrative giants, work for which no powers can be excessive. it will be a task quite difficult enough to do even without the opposition of legal rights, haggling owners, and dexterous profiteers. it would be a giant's task if all the necessary administrative machinery existed now in the most perfect condition. how is this tremendous job going to be done if every bocking in the country is holding out for impossible terms from braintree, and every braintree holding out for impossible terms from bocking, while the road out remains choked and confused between them; and if every john smith with a claim is insisting upon his reasonable expectation of profits or dividends, his reasonable solatium and compensation for getting out of the way? i would like to record my conviction that if the business of this great crisis is to be done in the same spirit, the jealous, higgling, legal spirit that i have seen prevailing in british life throughout my half-century of existence, it will not in any satisfactory sense of the phrase get done at all. this war has greatly demoralised and discredited the governing class in great britain, and if big masses of unemployed and unfed people, no longer strung up by the actuality of war, masses now trained to arms and with many quite sympathetic officers available, are released clumsily and planlessly into a world of risen prices and rising rents, of legal obstacles and forensic complications, of greedy speculators and hampered enterprises, there will be insurrection and revolution. there will be bloodshed in the streets and the chasing of rulers. there _will_ be, if we do seriously attempt to put the new wine of humanity, the new crude fermentations at once so hopeful and so threatening, that the war has released, into the old administrative bottles that served our purposes before the war. i believe that for old lawyers and old politicians and "private ownership" to handle the great problem of reconstruction after the war in the spirit in which our affairs were conducted before the war is about as hopeful an enterprise as if an elderly jobbing brick-layer, working on strict trade-union rules, set out to stop the biggest avalanche that ever came down a mountain-side. and since i am by no means altogether pessimistic, in spite of my qualmy phases, it follows that i do not believe that the old spirit will necessarily prevail. i do not, because i believe that in the past few decades a new spirit has come into human affairs; that our ostensible rulers and leaders have been falling behind the times, and that in the young and the untried, in, for example, the young european of thirty and under who is now in such multitudes thinking over life and his seniors in the trenches, there are still unsuspected resources of will and capacity, new mental possibilities and new mental habits, that entirely disturb the argument--based on the typical case of bocking and braintree--for a social catastrophe after the war. how best can this new spirit be defined? it is the creative spirit as distinguished from the legal spirit; it is the spirit of courage to make and not the spirit that waits and sees and claims; it is the spirit that looks to the future and not to the past. it is the spirit that makes bocking forget that it is not braintree and john smith forget that he is john smith, and both remember that they are england. for everyone there are two diametrically different ways of thinking about life; there is individualism, the way that comes as naturally as the grunt from a pig, of thinking outwardly from oneself as the centre of the universe, and there is the way that every religion is trying in some form to teach, of thinking back to oneself from greater standards and realities. there is the braintree that is braintree against england and the world, giving as little as possible and getting the best of the bargain, and there is the braintree that identifies itself with england and asks how can we do best for the world with this little place of ours, how can we educate best, produce most, and make our roads straight and good for the world to go through. every american knows the district that sends its congressman to washington for the good of his district, and the district, the rarer district, that sends a man to work for the united states. there is the john smith who feels toward england and the world as a mite feels toward its cheese, and the john smith who feels toward his country as a sheep-dog feels toward the flock. the former is the spirit of individualism, "business," and our law, the latter the spirit of socialism and science and--khaki.... they are both in all of us, they fluctuate from day to day; first one is ascendant and then the other. war does not so much tilt the balance as accentuate the difference. one rich british landowner sneaks off to new york state to set up a home there and evade taxation; another turns his mansion into a hospital and goes off to help serbian refugees. acts of baseness or generosity are contagious; this man will give himself altogether because of a story of devotion, this man declares he will do nothing until sir f.e. smith goes to the front. and the would-be prophet of what is going to happen must guess the relative force of these most impalpable and uncertain things. this braintree-bocking boundary which runs down the middle of the road is to be found all over the world. you will find it in ireland and the gentlemen who trade on the jealousies of the north side and the gentlemen who trade on the jealousies of the south. you will find it in england among the good people who would rather wreck the empire than work honestly and fairly with labour. there are not only parish boundaries, but park boundaries and class and sect boundaries. you will find the bocking-braintree line too at a dozen points on a small scale map of europe.... these braintree-bocking lines are the barbed-wire entanglements between us and the peace of the world. against these entanglements in every country the new spirit struggles in many thousands of minds. where will it be strongest? which country will get clear first, get most rapidly to work again, have least of the confusion and wrangling that must in some degree occur everywhere? will any country go altogether to pieces in hopeless incurable discord? now i believe that the answer to that last question is "no." and my reason for that answer is the same as my reason for believing that the association of the pledged allies will not break up after the war; it is that i believe that this war is going to end not in the complete smashing up and subjugation of either side, but in a general exhaustion that will make the recrudescence of the war still possible but very terrifying. mars will sit like a giant above all human affairs for the next two decades, and the speech of mars is blunt and plain. he will say to us all: "get your houses in order. if you squabble among yourselves, waste time, litigate, muddle, snatch profits and shirk obligations, i will certainly come down upon you again. i have taken all your men between eighteen and fifty, and killed and maimed such as i pleased; millions of them. i have wasted your substance--contemptuously. now, mark you, you have multitudes of male children between the ages of nine and nineteen running about among you. delightful and beloved boys. and behind them come millions of delightful babies. of these i have scarcely smashed and starved a paltry hundred thousand perhaps by the way. but go on muddling, each for himself and his parish and his family and none for all the world, go on in the old way, stick to-your 'rights,' stick to your 'claims' each one of you, make no concessions and no sacrifices, obstruct, waste, squabble, and presently i will come back again and take all that fresh harvest of life i have spared, all those millions that are now sweet children and dear little boys and youths, and i will squeeze it into red pulp between my hands, i will mix it with the mud of trenches and feast on it before your eyes, even more damnably than i have done with your grown-up sons and young men. and i have taken most of your superfluities already; next time i will take your barest necessities." so the red god, mars; and in these days of universal education the great mass of people will understand plainly now that that is his message and intention. men who cannot be swayed by the love of order and creation may be swayed by the thought of death and destruction.... there, i think, is the overriding argument that will burst the proprietorships and divisions and boundaries, the web of ineffectiveness that has held the world so long. labour returning from the trenches to its country and demanding promptness, planning, generous and devoted leaderships and organisation, demanding that the usurer and financier, the landlord and lawyer shall, if need be, get themselves altogether out of the way, will have behind its arguments the thought of the enemy still unsubdued, still formidable, recovering. both sides will feel that. this world is a more illuminated world than 1816; a thousand questions between law and duty have been discussed since then; beyond all comparison we know better what we are doing. i think the broad side of john smith (and sir john smith and john smith, k.c.) will get the better of his narrow ends--and that so it will be with jean dupont and hans meyer and the rest of them. there may be riots here and there; there may be some pretty considerable rows; but i do not think there is going to be a chaotic and merely destructive phase in great britain or any western european country. i cast my guess for reconstruction and not for revolt. v. how far will europe go toward socialism? a number of people are saying that this war is to be the end of individualism. "go as you please" has had its death-blow. out of this war, whatever else emerges, there will emerge a more highly organised state than existed before--that is to say, a less individualistic and more socialistic state. and there seems a heavy weight of probability on the side of this view. but there are also a number of less obvious countervailing considerations that may quite possibly modify or reverse this tendency. in this chapter an attempt is to be made to strike a balance between the two systems of forces, and guess how much will be private and how much public in europe in 1930, or thereabouts. the prophets who foretell the coming of socialism base their case on three sets of arguments. they point out, first, the failure of individual enterprise to produce a national efficiency comparable to the partial state socialism of germany, and the extraordinary, special dangers inherent in private property that the war has brought to light; secondly, to the scores of approaches to practical socialism that have been forced upon great britain--for example, by the needs of the war; and, thirdly, to the obvious necessities that will confront the british empire and the allies generally after the war--necessities that no unorganised private effort can hope to meet effectively. all these arguments involve the assumption that the general understanding of the common interest will be sufficient to override individual and class motives; an exceedingly doubtful assumption, to say the least of it. but the general understanding of the common interest is most likely to be kept alive by the sense of a common danger, and we have already arrived at the conclusion that germany is going to be defeated but not destroyed in this war, and that she will be left with sufficient vitality and sufficient resentment and sufficient of her rancid cultivated nationalism to make not only the continuance of the alliance after the war obviously advisable and highly probable, but also to preserve in the general mind for a generation or so that sense of a common danger which most effectually conduces to the sweeping aside of merely personal and wasteful claims. into the consequences of this we have now to look a little more closely. it was the weaknesses of germany that made this war, and not her strength. the weaknesses of germany are her imperialism, her junkerism, and her intense, sentimental nationalism; for the former would have no german ascendancy that was not achieved by force, and, with the latter, made the idea of german ascendancy intolerable to all mankind. better death, we said. and had germany been no more than her court, her junkerism, her nationalism, the whole system would have smashed beneath the contempt and indignation of the world within a year. but the strength of germany has saved her from that destruction. she was at once the most archaic and modern of states. she was hohenzollern, claiming to be caesar, and flaunting a flat black eagle borrowed from imperial rome; and also she was the most scientific and socialist of states. it is her science and her socialism that have held and forced back the avengers of belgium for more than a year and a half. if she has failed as a conqueror, she has succeeded as an organisation. her ambition has been thwarted, and her method has been vindicated. she will, i think, be so far defeated in the contest of endurance which is now in progress that she will have to give up every scrap of territorial advantage she has gained; she may lose most of her colonial empire; she may be obliged to complete her modernisation by abandoning her militant imperialism; but she will have at least the satisfaction of producing far profounder changes in the chief of her antagonists than those she herself will undergo. the germany of the hohenzollerns had its mortal wound at the marne; the germany we fight to-day is the germany of krupp and ostwald. it is merely as if she had put aside a mask that had blinded her. she was methodical and civilised except for her head and aim; she will become entirely methodical. but the britain and russia and france she fights are lands full of the spirit of undefined novelty. they are being made over far more completely. they are being made over, not in spite of the war, but because of the war. only by being made over can they win the war. and if they do not win the war, then they are bound to be made over. they are not merely putting aside old things, but they are forming and organising within themselves new structures, new and more efficient relationships, that will last far beyond the still remote peace settlement. what this war has brought home to the consciousness of every intelligent man outside the german system, with such thoroughness as whole generations of discussion and peace experience could never have achieved, is a double lesson: that germany had already gone far to master when she blundered into the war; firstly, the waste and dangers of individualism, and, secondly, the imperative necessity of scientific method in public affairs. the waste and dangers of individualism have had a whole series of striking exemplifications both in europe and america since the war began. were there such a thing as a socialist propaganda in existence, were the so-called socialistic organisations anything better than a shabby little back-door into contemporary politics, those demonstrations would be hammering at the mind of everyone. it may be interesting to recapitulate some of the most salient instances. the best illustration, perhaps, of the waste that arises out of individualism is to be found in the extreme dislocation of the privately owned transit services of great britain at the present time. there is no essential reason whatever why food and fuel in great britain should be considerably dearer than they are under peace conditions. just the same home areas are under cultivation, just the same foreign resources are available; indeed, more foreign supplies are available because we have intercepted those that under normal conditions would have gone to germany. the submarine blockade of britain is now a negligible factor in this question. despite these patent conditions there has been, and is, a steady increase in the cost of provisions, coal, and every sort of necessity. this increase means an increase in the cost of production of many commodities, and so contributes again to the general scarcity. this is the domestic aspect of a difficulty that has also its military side. it is not sufficient merely to make munitions; they must also be delivered, great britain is suffering very seriously from congestion of the railways. she suffers both in social and military efficiency, and she is so suffering because her railways, instead of being planned as one great and simple national distributing system, have grown up under conditions of clumsy, dividend-seeking competition. each great railway company and combination has worked its own areas, and made difficulties and aggressions at the boundaries of its sphere of influence; here are inconvenient junctions and here unnecessary duplications; nearly all the companies come into london, each taking up its own area of expensive land for goods yards, sidings, shunting grounds, and each regardless of any proper correlation with the other; great areas of the county of london are covered with their idle trucks and their separate coal stores; in many provincial towns you will find two or even three railway stations at opposite ends of the town; the streets are blocked by the vans and trolleys of the several companies tediously handing about goods that could be dealt with at a tenth of the cost in time and labour at a central clearing-house, did such a thing exist; and each system has its vast separate staff, unaccustomed to work with any other staff. since the war began the government has taken over the general direction of this disarticulated machinery, but no one with eyes who travels about england now can fail to remark, in the miles and miles of waiting loaded trucks on every siding, the evidences of mischievous and now almost insuperable congestion. the trucks of each system that have travelled on to another still go back, for the most part, _empty_ to their own; and thousands of privately owned trucks, which carry cargo only one way, block our sidings. great britain wastes men and time to a disastrous extent in these needless shuntings and handlings. here, touching every life in the community, is one instance of the muddle that arises naturally out of the individualistic method of letting public services grow up anyhow without a plan, or without any direction at all except the research for private profit. a second series of deficiencies that the war has brought to light in the too individualistic british state is the entire want of connection between private profit and public welfare. so far as the interests of the capitalist go it does not matter whether he invests his money at home or abroad; it does not matter whether his goods are manufactured in london or timbuctoo. but what of the result? at the outbreak of the war great britain found that a score of necessary industries had drifted out of the country, because it did not "pay" any private person to keep them here. the shortage of dyes has been amply discussed as a typical case. a much graver one that we may now write about was the shortage of zinc. within a month or so of the outbreak of the war the british government had to take urgent and energetic steps to secure this essential ingredient of cartridge cases. individualism had let zinc refining drift to belgium and germany; it was the luck rather than the merit of great britain that one or two refineries still existed. still more extraordinary things came to light in the matter of the metal supply. under an individualistic system you may sell to the highest bidder, and anyone with money from anywhere may come in and buy. great supplies of colonial ores were found to be cornered by semi-national german syndicates. supplies were held up by these contracts against the necessities of the empire. and this was but one instance of many which have shown that, while industrial development in the allied countries is still largely a squabbling confusion of little short-sighted, unscientific, private profit-seeking owners, in germany it has been for some years increasingly run on far-seeing collectivist lines. against the comparatively little and mutually jealous british or american capitalists and millionaires germany pits itself as a single great capitalist and competitor. she has worked everywhere upon a comprehensive plan. against her great national electric combination, for example, only another national combination could stand. as it was, germany--in the way of business--wired and lit (and examined) the forts at liã©ge. she bought and prepared a hundred strategic centres in individualistic belgium and france. so we pass from the fact that individualism is hopeless muddle to the fact that the individualist idea is one of limitless venality, who can buy, may control. and germany, in her long scheming against her individualist rivals, has not simply set herself to buy and hold the keys and axles of their economic machinery. she has set herself, it must be admitted, with a certain crudity and little success, but with unexampled vigour, to buy the minds of her adversaries. the western nations have taken a peculiar pride in having a free press; that is to say, a press that may be bought by anyone. our press is constantly bought and sold, in gross and detail, by financiers, advertisers, political parties, and the like. germany came into the market rather noisily, and great papers do to a large extent live in glass houses; but her efforts have been sufficient to exercise the minds of great numbers of men with the problem of what might have happened in the way of national confusion if the german attack had been more subtly conceived.... it is only a partial answer to this difficulty to say that a country that is so nationalist and aggressive as germany is incapable of subtle conceptions. the fact remains that in great britain at the present time there are newspaper proprietors who would be good bargains for germany at two million pounds a head, and that there was no effectual guarantee in the individualistic system, but only our good luck and the natural patriotism of the individuals concerned that she did not pick up these bargains before trading with the enemy became illegal. it happened, for example, that lord northcliffe was public-spirited, that was the good luck of great britain rather than her merit. there was nothing in the individualistic system to prevent germany from buying up the entire harmsworth press--_the times, daily mail_, and all--five years before the war, and using it to confuse the national mind, destroy the national unity, sacrifice the national interests, and frustrate the national will. not only the newspapers, but the news-agents and booksellers of both great britain and america are entirely at the disposal of any hostile power which chooses to buy them up quietly and systematically. it is merely a question of wealth and cleverness. and if the failure of the germans to grip the press of the french and english speaking countries has been conspicuous, she has been by no means so unsuccessful in--for example--spain. at the present time the thought and feeling of the spanish speaking world is being _educated_ against the allies. the spanish mind has been sold by its custodians into german control. muddle and venality do not, however, exhaust the demonstrated vices of individualism. individualism encourages desertion and treason. individualism permits base private people to abscond with the national resources and squeeze a profit out of national suffering. in the early stages of the war some bright minds conceived the idea of a corner in drugs. it is not illegal; it is quite the sort of thing that appeals to the individualistic frame of mind as entirely meritorious. as the _new statesman_ put it recently: "the happy owners of the world's available stock of a few indispensable drugs did not refrain from making, not only the various governments, but also all the sick people of the world pay double, and even tenfold, prices for what was essential to relieve pain and save life. what fortunes were thus made we shall probably never know, any more than we shall know the tale of the men and women and children who suffered and died because of their inability to pay, not the cost of production of what would have saved them, but the unnecessarily enhanced price that the chances of the market enabled the owners to exact." and another bright instance of the value of individualism is the selling of british shipping to neutral buyers just when the country is in the most urgent need of every ship it can get, and the deliberate transfer to america of a number of british businesses to evade paying a proper share of the national bill in taxation. the english who have gone to america at different times have been of very different qualities; at the head of the list are the english who went over in the _mayflower_; at the bottom will be the rich accessions of this war.... and perhaps a still more impressive testimony to the rottenness of these "business men," upon whom certain eccentric voices call so amazingly to come and govern us, is the incurable distrust they have sown in the minds of labour. never was an atmosphere of discipline more lamentable than that which has grown up in the factories, workshops, and great privately owned public services of america and western europe. the men, it is evident, _expect_ to be robbed and cheated at every turn. i can only explain their state of mind by supposing that they have been robbed and cheated. their scorn and contempt for their employees' good faith is limitless. their _morale_ is undermined by an invincible distrust. it is no good for mr. lloyd george to attempt to cure the gathered ill of a century with half an hour or so of eloquence. when great britain, in her supreme need, turns to the workmen she has trained in the ways of individualism for a century, she reaps the harvest individualism has sown. she has to fight with that handicap. every regulation for the rapid mobilisation of labour is scrutinised to find the trick in it. and they find the trick in it as often as not. smart individualistic "business experience" has been at the draughtsman's elbow. a man in an individualistic system does not escape from class ideas and prejudices by becoming an official. there is profound and bitter wisdom in the deep distrust felt by british labour for both military and industrial conscription. the breakdown of individualism has been so complete in great britain that we are confronted with the spectacle of this great and ancient kingdom reconstructing itself perforce, while it wages the greatest war in history. a temporary nationalisation of land transit has been improvised, and only the vast, deep-rooted, political influence of the shipowners and coalowners have staved off the manifestly necessary step of nationalising shipping and coal. i doubt if they will be able to stave it off to the end of the long struggle which is still before us if the militarism of germany is really to be arrested and discredited. expropriation and not conscription will be the supreme test of britain's loyalty to her allies. the british shipowners, in particular, are reaping enormous but precarious profits from the war. the blockade of britain, by the british shipowners is scarcely less effective than the blockade of germany by britain. with an urgent need of every ship for the national supplies, british ships, at the present moment of writing this, are still carrying cheap american automobiles to australia. they would carry munitions to germany if their owners thought they had a sporting chance of not getting caught at it. these british shipowners are a pampered class with great political and social influence, and no doubt as soon as the accumulating strain of the struggle tells to the extent of any serious restriction of their advantage and prospects, we shall see them shifting to the side of the at present negligible group of british pacifists. i do not think one can count on any limit to their selfishness and treason. i believe that the calculations of some of these extreme and apparently quite unreasonable "pacifists" are right. before the war is over there will be a lot of money in the pacifist business. the rich curs of the west end will join hands with the labour curs of the clyde. the base are to be found in all classes, but i doubt if they dominate any. i do not believe that any interest or group of interests in great britain can stand in the way of the will of the whole people to bring this struggle to a triumphant finish at any cost. i do not believe that the most sacred ties of personal friendship and blood relationship with influential people can save either shipowners or coalowners or army contractors to the end. there will be no end until these profit-makings are arrested. the necessary "conscriptions of property" must come about in great britain because there is no alternative but failure in the war, and the british people will not stand failure. i believe that the end of the war will see, not only transit, but shipping, collieries, and large portions of the machinery of food and drink production and distribution no longer under the administration of private ownership, but under a sort of provisional public administration. and very many british factories will be in the same case. two years ago no one would have dared to prophesy the tremendous rearrangement of manufacturing machinery which is in progress in britain to-day. thousands of firms of engineers and manufacturers of all sorts, which were flourishing in 1914, exist to-day only as names, as shapes, as empty shells. their staffs have been shattered, scattered, reconstructed; their buildings enlarged and modified; their machinery exchanged, reconstituted, or taken. the reality is a vast interdependent national factory that would have seemed incredible to fourier. it will be as impossible to put back british industrialism into the factories and forms of the pre-war era as it would be to restore the carthaginian empire. there is a new economic great britain to-day, emergency made, jerry-built no doubt, a gawky, weedy giant, but a giant who may fill out to such dimensions as the german national system has never attained. behind it is an _idea_, a new idea, the idea of the nation as one great economic system working together, an idea which could not possibly have got into the sluggish and conservative british intelligence in half a century by any other means than the stark necessities of this war.... great britain cannot retrace those steps even if she would, and so she will be forced to carry this process of reconstruction through. and what is happening to great britain must, with its national differences, be happening to france and russia. not only for war ends, but for peace ends, behind the front and sustaining the front, individualities are being hammered together into common and concerted activities. at the end of this war great britain will find herself with this great national factory, this great national organisation of labour, planned, indeed, primarily to make war material, but convertible with the utmost ease to the purposes of automobile manufacture, to transit reconstruction, to electrical engineering, and endless such uses. france and russia will be in a parallel case. all the world will be exhausted, and none of the allies will have much money to import automobiles, railway material, electrical gear, and so on, from abroad. moreover, it will be a matter of imperative necessity for them to get ahead of the central powers with their productive activities. we shall all be too poor to import from america, and we shall be insane to import from germany. america will be the continent with the long purse, prepared to buy rather than sell. each country will have great masses of soldiers waiting to return to industrial life, and will therefore be extremely indisposed to break up any existing productive organisation. in the face of these facts, will any of the allied powers be so foolish as to disband this great system of national factories and nationally worked communications? moreover, we have already risked the prophecy that this war will not end with such conclusiveness as to justify an immediate beating out of our swords into ploughshares. there will be a military as well as a social reason for keeping the national factories in a going state. what more obvious course, then, than to keep them going by turning them on to manufacture goods of urgent public necessity? there are a number of modern commodities now practically standardised: the bicycle, the cheap watch, the ordinary tradesman's delivery automobile, the farmer's runabout, the country doctor's car, much electric-lighting material, dynamos, and so forth. and also, in a parallel case, there is shipbuilding. the chemical side of munition work can turn itself with no extreme difficulty to the making of such products as dyes. we face the fact, then, that either the state must go on with this production, as it can do, straight off from the signing of peace, converting with a minimum of friction, taking on its soldiers as they are discharged from the army as employees with a minimum waste of time and a minimum of social disorder, and a maximum advantage in the resumption of foreign trade, or there will be a dangerous break-up of the national factory system, a time of extreme chaos and bitter unemployment until capital accumulates for new developments. the risks of social convulsion will be enormous. and there is small hope that the central powers, and particularly industrial germany, will have the politeness to wait through the ten or twelve years of economic embarrassment that a refusal to take this bold but obviously advantageous step into scientific socialism will entail. but the prophet must be on his guard against supposing that, because a thing is highly desirable, it must necessarily happen; or that, because it is highly dangerous, it will be avoided. this bold and successful economic reconstruction upon national lines is not inevitable merely because every sound reason points us in that direction. a man may be very ill, a certain drug may be clearly indicated as the only possible remedy, but it does not follow that the drug is available, that the doctor will have the sense to prescribe it, or the patient the means to procure it or the intelligence to swallow it. the experience of history is that nations do not take the obviously right course, but the obviously wrong one. the present prophet knows only his england, but, so far as england is concerned, he can cover a sheet of paper with scarcely a pause, jotting down memoranda of numberless forces that make against any such rational reconstruction. most of these forces, in greater or less proportion, must be present in the case of every other country under consideration. the darkest shadow upon the outlook of european civilisation at the present time is not the war; it is the failure of any co-operative spirit between labour and the directing classes. the educated and leisured classes have been rotten with individualism for a century; they have destroyed the confidence of the worker in any leadership whatever. labour stands apart, intractable. if there is to be any such rapid conversion of the economic machinery as the opportunities and necessities of this great time demand, then labour must be taken into the confidence of those who would carry it through. it must be reassured and enlightened. labour must know clearly what is being done; it must be an assenting co-operator. the stride to economic national service and socialism is a stride that labour should be more eager to take than any other section of the community. the first step in reassuring labour must be to bring the greedy private owner and the speculator under a far more drastic discipline than at present. the property-owning class is continually accusing labour of being ignorant, suspicious, and difficult; it is blind to the fact that it is itself profit-seeking by habit, greedy, conceited, and half educated. every step in the mobilisation of great britain's vast resources for the purposes of the war has been hampered by the tricks, the failures to understand, and the almost instinctive disloyalties of private owners. the raising of rents in glasgow drove the infuriated workmen of the clyde district into an unwilling strike. it was an exasperating piece of private selfishness, quite typical of the individualistic state of mind, and the failure to anticipate or arrest it on the part of the government was a worse failure than suvla bay. and everywhere the officials of the ministry of munitions find private employers holding back workers and machinery from munition works, intriguing--more particularly through the board of trade--to have all sorts of manufactures for private profit recognised as munition work, or if that contention is too utterly absurd, then as work vitally necessary to the maintenance of british export trade and the financial position of the country. it is an undeniable fact that employers and men alike have been found far readier to risk their lives for their country than to lay aside any scale of profits to which they have grown accustomed. this conflict of individualistic enterprise and class suspicion against the synthesis of the public welfare is not peculiar to great britain; it is probably going on with local variations in germany, russia, italy, france, and, indeed, in every combatant country. because of the individualistic forces and feelings, none of us, either friends or enemies, are really getting anything like our full possible result out of our national efforts. but in germany there is a greater tradition of subordination; in france there is a greater clarity of mind than in any other country. great britain and russia in this, as in so many other matters, are at once close kindred and sharp antithesis. each is mentally crippled by the corruption of its educational system by an official religious orthodoxy, and hampered by a court which disowns any function of intellectual stimulus. neither possesses a scientifically educated _class_ to which it can look for the powerful handling of this great occasion; and each has acquired under these disadvantages the same strange faculty for producing sane resultants out of illogical confusions. it is the way of these unmethodical powers to produce unexpected, vaguely formulated, and yet effective cerebral action--apparently from their backbones. as i sit playing at prophecy, and turn over the multitudinous impressions of the last year in my mind, weighing the great necessities of the time against obstacles and petty-mindedness, i become more and more conscious of a third factor that is neither need nor obstruction, and that is the will to get things right that has been liberated by the war. the new spirit is still but poorly expressed, but it will find expression. the war goes on, and we discuss this question of economic reconstruction as though it was an issue that lay between the labour that has stayed behind and the business men, for the most part old men with old habits of mind, who have stayed behind. the real life of europe's future lies on neither side of that opposition. the real life is mutely busy at present, saying little because of the uproar of the guns, and not so much learning as casting habits and shedding delusions. in the trenches there are workers who have broken with the old slacking and sabotage, and there are prospective leaders who have forgotten profit. the men between eighteen and forty are far too busy in the blood and mud to make much showing now, but to-morrow these men will be the nation. when that third factor of the problem is brought in the outlook of the horoscope improves. the spirit of the war may be counted upon to balance and prevail against this spirit of individualism, this spirit of suspicion and disloyalty, which i fear more than anything else in the world. i believe in the young france, young england, and young russia this war is making, and so i believe that every european country will struggle along the path that this war has opened to a far more completely organised state than has existed ever before. the allies will become state firms, as germany was, indeed, already becoming before the war; setting private profit aside in the common interest, handling agriculture, transport, shipping, coal, the supply of metals, the manufacture of a thousand staple articles, as national concerns. in the face of the manifest determination of the central powers to do as much, the allies will be forced also to link their various state firms together into a great allied trust, trading with a common interest and a common plan with germany and america and the rest of the world.... youth and necessity will carry this against selfishness, against the unimaginative, against the unteachable, the suspicious, the "_old fool_." but i do not venture to prophesy that this will come about as if it were a slick and easy deduction from present circumstances. even in france i do not think things will move as lucidly and generously as that. there will be a conflict everywhere between wisdom and cunning, between the eyes of youth and the purblind, between energy and obstinacy. the reorganisation of the european states will come about clumsily and ungraciously. at every point the sticker will be found sticking tight, holding out to be bought off, holding out for a rent or a dividend or a share, holding out by mere instinct. at every turn, too, the bawler will be loud and active, bawling suspicions, bawling accusations, bawling panic, or just simply bawling. tricks, peculation, obstinacies, vanities--after this war men will still be men. but i do believe that through all the dust and din, the great reasons in the case, the steady constructive forces of the situation, will carry us. i believe that out of the ruins of the nineteenth century system of private capitalism that this war has smashed for ever, there will arise, there does even now arise, in this strange scaffolding of national munition factories and hastily nationalised public services, the framework of a new economic and social order based upon national ownership and service. let us now recapitulate a little and see how far we have got in constructing a picture of the european community as it will be in fifteen or twenty years' time. nominally it will be little more of a socialist state than it is to-day, but, as a matter of fact, the ships, the railways, the coal and metal supply, the great metal industries, much engineering, and most agriculture, will be more or less completely under collective ownership, and certainly very completely under collective control. this does not mean that there will have been any disappearance of private property, but only that there will have been a very considerable change in its character; the owner will be less of controller but more of a creditor; he will be a _rentier_ or an annuitant. the burthen of this class upon the community will not be relatively quite so heavy as it would otherwise have been, because of a very considerable rise in wages and prices. in a community in which all the great initiatives have been assumed by the state, the importance of financiers and promoters will have diminished relatively to the importance of administrative officials; the opportunities of private exploitation, indeed, will have so diminished that there will probably be far less evidence of great concentrations of private wealth in the european social landscape than there was before the war. on the other hand, there will be an enormously increased _rentier_ class drawing the interest of the war loans from the community, and maintaining a generally high standard of comfort. there will have been a great demand for administrative and technical abilities and a great stimulation of scientific and technical education. by 1926 we shall be going about a world that will have recovered very largely from the impoverishment of the struggle; we shall tour in state-manufactured automobiles upon excellent roads, and we shall live in houses equipped with a national factory electric light installation, and at every turn we shall be using and consuming the products of nationalised industry--and paying off the national debt simultaneously, and reducing our burden of _rentiers_. at the same time our boys will be studying science in their schools more thoroughly than they do now, and they will in many cases be learning russian instead of greek or german. more of our boys will be going into the public service, and fewer thinking of private business, and they will be going into the public service, not as clerks, but as engineers, technical chemists, manufacturers, state agriculturists, and the like. the public service will be less a service of clerks and more a service of practical men. the ties that bind france and great britain at the present moment will have been drawn very much closer. france, belgium and england will be drifting towards a french-english bi-lingualism.... so much of our picture we may splash in now. much that is quite essential remains to be discussed. so far we have said scarcely a word about the prospects of party politics and the problems of government that arise as the state ceases to be a mere impartial adjudicator between private individuals, and takes upon itself more and more of the direction of the general life of the community. vi. lawyer and press the riddle of administration is the most subtle of all those that the would-be prophet of the things that are coming must attempt. we see the great modern states confronted now by vast and urgent necessities, by opportunities that may never recur. individualism has achieved its inevitable failure; "go as you please" in a world that also contained aggressive militarism, has broken down. we live in a world of improvised state factories, commandeered railways, substituted labour and emergency arrangements. our vague-minded, lax, modern democracy has to pull itself together, has to take over and administer and succeed with a great system of collective functions, has to express its collective will in some better terms than "go as you please," or fail. and we find the affairs of nearly every great democratic state in the hands of a class of men not specially adapted to any such constructive or administrative work. i am writing here now chiefly of the western allies. russia is peculiar in having her administrative machine much more highly developed in relation to her general national life than the free democratic countries. she has to make a bureaucracy that has not hitherto been an example for efficiency into a bureaucracy that will be constructive, responsive, liberal, scientific, and efficient; the western countries have to do the same with that oligarchy of politicians which, as professor michels has recently pointed out in his striking book on "political parties," is the necessary reality of democratic government. by different methods the eastern and western powers have to attain a common end. both bureaucracy and pseudo-democratic oligarchy have to accomplish an identical task, to cement the pacific alliance of the pledged allies and to socialise their common industrial and economic life, so as to make it invulnerable to foreign attack. now in great britain, which is the democracy that has been most under the close observation of the present prophet, there is at present a great outcry against the "politician," and more particularly against the "lawyer-politician." he is our embarrassment. in him we personify all our difficulties. let us consider the charges against this individual. let us ask, can we do without him? and let us further see what chances there may be of so altering, qualifying, or balancing him as to minimise the evil of his influence. to begin with, let us run over the essentials of the charge against him. it is with a modest blush that the present prophet recapitulates these charges. so early as the year 1902 he was lifting up his voice, not exactly in the wilderness but at least in the royal institution, against the legal as compared with the creative or futurist type of mind. the legal mind, he insisted, looks necessarily to the past. it is dilatory because it has no sense of coming things, it is uninventive and wasteful, it does not create, it takes advantage. it is the type of mind least able, under any circumstances, to organise great businesses, to plan campaigns, to adventure or achieve. "wait and see" crystallises its spirit. its resistance is admirable, and it has no "go." nevertheless there is a tendency for power to gravitate in all democratic countries to the lawyer. in the british system the normal faults of the lawyer are enhanced, and his predominance intensified, by certain peculiarities of our system. in the first place, he belongs to a guild of exceptional power. in britain it happens that the unfortunate course was taken ages ago of bribing the whole legal profession to be honest. the british judges and law officers are stupendously overpaid in order to make them incorruptible; it is a poor but perhaps a well-merited compliment to their professional code. we have squared the whole profession to be individually unbribable. the judges, moreover, in the anglo-saxon communities are appointed from among the leading barristers, an arrangement that a child can see is demoralising and inadvisable. and in great britain all the greatest salaries in the government service are reserved for the legal profession. the greatest prizes, therefore, before an energetic young man who has to make his way in great britain are the legal prizes, and his line of advancement to these lies, for all the best years of his life, not through the public service, but through the private practice of advocacy. the higher education, such as it is, in great britain, produces under the stimulus of these conditions an advocate as its finest flower. to go from the posing and chatter of the union debating society to a university laboratory is, in britain, to renounce ambition. few men of exceptional energy will do that. the national consequences of this state of affairs have been only too manifest throughout the conduct of the war. the british government has developed all the strength and all the weakness of the great profession it represents. it has been uninventive, dilatory, and without initiative; it has been wasteful and evasive; but it has not been wanting in a certain eloquence and dignity, it has been wary and shrewd, and it has held on to office with the concentrated skill and determination of a sucker-fish. and the british mind, with a concentration and intensity unprecedented before the war, is speculating how it can contrive to get a different sort of ruler and administrator at work upon its affairs. there is a disposition in the press, and much of the private talk one hears, to get rid of lawyers from the control of national affairs altogether, to substitute "business men" or scientific men or "experts." that way lies dictatorship and caesarism. and even great britain is not so heedless of the experiences of other nations as to attempt again what has already been so abundantly worked out in national disaster across the channel. the essential business of government is to deal between man and man; it is not to manage the national affairs in detail, but to secure the proper managers, investigators, administrators, generals, and so forth, to maintain their efficiency, and keep the balance between them. we cannot do without a special class of men for these interventions and controls. in other words, we cannot do without a special class of politicians. they may be elected by a public or appointed by an autocrat; at some point they have to come in. and this business of intervening between men and classes and departments in public life, and getting them to work together, is so closely akin to the proper work of a lawyer in dealing between men and men, that, unless the latter are absolutely barred from becoming the former, it is almost unavoidable that politicians should be drawn more abundantly from the lawyer class than from any other class in the community. this is so much the case, that when the london _times_ turns in despair from a government of lawyers and looks about for an alternative, the first figure that presents itself is that distinguished advocate sir edward carson! but there is a difference between recognising that some sort of lawyer-politician is unavoidable and agreeing that the existing type of lawyer who is so largely accountable for the massive slowness, the confused action, the slovenliness rather than the weakness of purpose, shown by great britain in this war, is the only possible type, the british system of education and legal organisation is not the last word of human wisdom in these matters. the real case we british have against our lawyers, if i may adopt an expressive colloquialism, is not that they are lawyers, but that they are such infernal lawyers. they trail into modern life most of the faults of a mediaeval guild. they seem to have no sense of the state they could develop, no sense of the future they might control. their law and procedure has never been remodelled upon the framework of modern ideas; their minds are still set to the tune of mediaeval bickerings, traditionalism, and state blindness. they are mystery dealers, almost unanimously they have resisted giving the common man the protection of a code. in the united kingdom we have had no napoleon to override the profession. it is extraordinary how complete has been their preservation of barbaric conceptions. even the doctor is now largely emancipated from his archaic limitations as a skilled retainer. he thinks more and more of the public health, and less and less of his patron. the more recent a profession the less there is of the individualistic personal reference; scientific research, for example, disavows and forbids every personal reference. but while everyone would be shocked at some great doctor, or some great research institution, in these days of urgent necessity spending two or three weeks on the minor ailments of some rich person's lapdog, nobody is scandalised at the spectacle of sir edward carson and a costly law court spending long days upon the sordid disputes that centre upon young master slingsby's ear--whether it is the slingsby family ear or the ear of a supposititious child--a question that any three old women might be trusted to settle. after that he rests for a fortnight and recuperates, and returns--to take up a will case turning upon the toy rabbits and suchlike trifles which entertained the declining years of a nonagenarian. this, when we are assured that the country awaits sir edward as its deliverer. it is as if lord kitchener took a month off to act at specially high rates for the "movies." our standard for the lawyer is older and lower than it is for other men. there is no more reason nowadays why a lawyer should look to advocacy as a proper use of his knowledge than that a doctor should make private poisoning the lucrative side of his profession. there is no reason why a court of law should ignore the plain right of the commonweal to intervene in every case between man and man. there is every reason why trivial disputes about wills and legitimacy should not be wasting our national resources at the present time, when nearly every other form of waste is being restrained. the sound case against the legal profession in anglo-saxon countries is not that it is unnecessary, but that it is almost incredibly antiquated, almost incredibly careless of the public well-being, and that it corrupts or dwarfs all the men who enter it. our urgent need is not so much to get rid of the lawyer from our affairs as to get rid of the wig and gown spirit and of the special pleader, and to find and develop the new lawyer, the lawyer who is not an advocate, who is not afraid of a code, who has had some scientific education, and whose imagination has been quickened by the realisation of life as creative opportunity. we want to emancipate this profession from its ancient guild restrictions--the most anti-social and disastrous of all such restrictions--to destroy its disgraceful traditions of over-payment and fee-snatching, to insist upon a scientific philosophical training for its practitioners, to make the practice of advocacy a fall from grace, and to bar professional advocates from the bench. in the british trenches now there must be many hundreds of fine young lawyers, still but little corrupted, who would be only too glad to exchange the sordid vulgarities and essential dishonour of a successful lawyer's career under the old conditions for lives of service and statecraft.... no observer of the general trend of events in europe will get any real grasp of what is happening until he realises the cardinal importance of the reactions that centre upon this question. the current development of political institutions and the possible development of a new spirit and method in the legal profession are so intimately interwoven as to be practically one and the same question. the international question is, can we get a new germany? the national question everywhere is, can we get a better politician? the widely prevalent discontent with the part played by the lawyer in the affairs of all the western allies is certain to develop into a vigorous agitation for legal reconstruction. in the case of every other great trade union the war has exacted profound and vital concessions. the british working men, for example, have abandoned scores of protective restrictions upon women's labour, upon unskilled labour, for which they have fought for generations; they have submitted to a virtual serfdom that the nation's needs might be supplied; the medical profession has sent almost too large a proportion of its members to the front; the scientific men, the writers, have been begging to be used in any capacity at any price or none; the ministry of munitions is full of unpaid workers, and so on. the british legal profession and trade union alone has made no sign of any disposition to relax its elaborate restrictions upon the labour of amateurs and women, or to abate one jot or one tittle of its habitual rewards. there has been no attempt to reduce the costly law officers of the government, for example, or to call in the help of older men or women to release law officers who are of military experience or age. and i must admit that there are small signs of the advent of the "new lawyer," at whose possibility i have just flung a hopeful glance, to replace the existing mass of mediaeval unsoundness. barristers seem to age prematurely--at least in great britain--unless they are born old. in the legal profession one hears nothing of "the young"; one hears only of "smart juniors." reform and progressive criticism in the legal profession, unlike all other professions, seem to be the monopoly of the retired. nevertheless, great britain is as yet only beginning to feel the real stresses of the war; she is coming into the full strain a year behind france, germany, and russia; and after the war there lies the possibility of still more violent stresses; so that what is as yet a mere cloud of criticism and resentment at our lawyer-politicians and privileged legal profession may gather to a great storm before 1918 or 1919. i am inclined to foretell as one most highly probable development of the present vague but very considerable revolt against the lawyer in british public life, first, some clumsy proposals or even attempts to leave him out, and use "business men," soldiers, admirals, dictators, or men of science, in his place--which is rather like throwing away a blottesque fountain-pen and trying to write with a walking-stick or a revolver or a flash-light--and then when that is found to be impossible, a resolute attempt to clean and reconstitute the legal profession on modern and more honourable lines; a movement into which, quite possibly, a number of the younger british lawyers, so soon as they realise that the movement is good enough to risk careers upon, may throw themselves. a large share in such a reform movement, if it occurs, will be brought about by the press; by which i mean not simply the periodical press, but all books and contemporary discussion. it is only by the natural playing off of press against lawyer-politician that democratic states can ever come to their own. and that brings me to the second part of this question, which is whether, quite apart from the possible reform and spiritual rebirth of the legal profession, there is not also the possibility of balancing and correcting its influence. in ancient hebrew history--it may be a warning rather than a precedent--there were two great forces, one formal, conservative and corrupting, the other undisciplined, creative, and destructive; the first was the priest, the second the prophet. their interaction is being extraordinarily paralleled in the anglo-saxon democracies by the interaction of lawyer-politician and press to-day. if the lawyer-politician is unavoidable, the press is indispensable. it is not in the clash and manoeuvres and mutual correction of party, but in the essential conflict of political authority on the one hand and press on the other that the future of democratic government apparently lies. in the clearer, simpler case of france, a less wealthy and finer type of lawyer interacts with a less impersonal press. it is in the great contrasts and the essential parallelism of the french and the anglo-saxon democratic systems that one finds the best practical reason for anticipating very profound changes in these two inevitables of democracy, the press and the lawyer-politician, and for assuming that the method of democracy has still a vast range of experimental adjustment between them still untried. such experimental adjustment will be the chief necessity and business of political life in every country of the world for the next few decades. the lawyer-politician and the press are as it were the right and left hands of a modern democracy. the war has brought this out clearly. it has ruptured the long-weakened bonds that once linked this and that newspaper with this and that party. for years the press of all the western democracies has been drifting slowly away from the tradition--it lasted longest and was developed most completely in great britain--that-newspapers were party organs. in the novels of disraeli the press appears as an ambiguously helpful person who is asked out to dinner, who is even admitted to week-end conferences, by the political great. he takes his orders from the whig peers or the tory peers. at his greatest he advises them respectfully. but that was in the closing days of the british oligarchy; that was before modern democracy had begun to produce its characteristic political forms. it is not so very much more than a century ago that great britain had her first lawyer prime minister. through all the napoleonic wars she was still a country ruled by great feudal landlords, and gentlemen adventurers associated with them. the lawyers only came to their own at the close of the great victorian duet of disraeli and gladstone, the last of the political gentlemen adventurers. it is only now, in the jolts and dissatisfactions of this war, that great britain rubs her eyes and looks at her government as it is. the old oligarchy established the tradition of her diplomacy. illiberal at home, it was liberal abroad; great britain was the defender of nationality, of constitutionalism, and of the balance of power against the holy alliance. in the figure of such a gentleman as sir edward grey the old order mingles with the new. but most of his colleagues are of the new order. they would have been incredible in the days of lord melbourne. in its essential quality the present british government is far more closely akin to the french than it is to its predecessor of a hundred years ago. essentially it is a government of lawyer-politicians with no close family ties or intimate political traditions and prejudices. and its natural and proper corrective is the press, over which it fails to exercise now even a shadow of the political and social influence that once kept that power in subjection. it is the way with all human institutions; they remain in appearance long after they have passed away in reality. it is on record that the roman senate still thought rome was a republic in the third century of the christian era. it is nothing wonderful, therefore, that people suppose that the king, the lords, and the commons, debating through a ministry and an opposition, still govern the british empire. as a matter of fact it is the lawyer-politicians, split by factions that simulate the ancient government and opposition, who rule, under a steadily growing pressure and checking by the press. since this war began the press has released itself almost inadvertently from its last association with the dying conflicts of party politics, and has taken its place as a distinct power in the realm, claiming to be more representative of the people than their elected representatives, and more expressive of the national mind and will. now there is considerable validity in this claim. it is easy to say that a paper may be bought by any proprietor and set to put what he chooses into the public mind. as a matter of fact, buying a newspaper is far more costly and public a proceeding than buying a politician. and if on the one hand the public has no control over what is printed in a paper, it has on the other the very completest control over what is read. a politician is checked by votes cast once in several years, a newspaper is checked by sales that vary significantly from day to day. a newspaper with no circulation is a newspaper that does not matter; a few weeks will suffice to show if it has carried its public with it or gone out of influence. it is absurd to speak of a newspaper as being less responsible than a politician. nevertheless, the influence of a great newspaper is so much greater than that of any politician, and its power more particularly for mischief--for the creation of panic conditions, for example--so much swifter, that it is open to question whether the press is at present sufficiently held to its enormous responsibilities. let us consider its weaknesses at the present time, let us ask what changes in its circumstances are desirable in the public interest, and what are likely to come about. we have already reckoned upon the press as a chief factor in the adequate criticism, cleansing, and modernisation of the british lawyer-politician; is there any power to which we may look for the security of the press? and i submit the answer is the press. for while the legal profession is naturally homogeneous, the press is by nature heterogeneous. dog does not eat dog, nor lawyer, lawyer; but the newspapers are sharks and cannibals, they are in perpetual conflict, the press is a profession as open as the law is closed; it has no anti-social guild feeling; it washes its dirty linen in public by choice and necessity, and disdains all professional etiquette. few people know what criticisms of the lord chief justice may have ripened in the minds of lord halsbury or sir edward carson, but we all know, to a very considerable degree of accuracy, the worst of what this great journalist or group of newspaper proprietors thinks of that. we have, therefore, considerable reason for regarding the press as being, in contrast with the legal profession, a self-reforming body. in the last decade there has been an enormous mass of criticism of the press by the press. there has been a tendency to exaggerate its irresponsibility. a better case is to be made against it for what i will call, using the word in its least offensive sense, its venality. by venality i mean the fact, a legacy from the now happily vanishing age of individualism, that in theory and law at least anyone may own a newspaper and sell it publicly or secretly to anyone, that its circulation and advertisement receipts may be kept secret or not as the proprietors choose, and that the proprietor is accountable to no one for any exceptional incomings or any sudden fluctuations in policy. a few years ago we were all discussing who should buy _the times_; i do not know what chances an agent of the kaiser might not have had if he had been sufficiently discreet. this venality will be far more dangerous to the allied countries after the war than during its continuance. so long as the state of war lasts there are prompt methods available for any direct newspaper treason, and it is in the neutral countries only that the buying and selling of papers against the national interest has occurred to any marked extent. directly peace is signed, unless we provide for the event beforehand, our press will pass under neutral conditions. there will be nothing to prevent, for example, any foreseeing foreign power coming into great britain, offering to buy up not only this paper or that, but also, what is far more important, to buy up the great book and newspaper distributing firms. these vitally important public services, so far as law and theory go, will be as entirely in the market as railway tickets at a station unless we make some intelligent preventive provision. unless we do, and if, as is highly probable, peace puts no immediate stop to international malignity, the germans will be bigger fools than i think them if they do not try to get hold of these public services. it is a matter of primary importance in the outlook of every country in europe, therefore, that it should insist upon and secure responsible native ownership of every newspaper and news and book distributing agency, and the most drastic punishment for newspaper corruption. given that guarantee against foreign bribery, we may, i think, let free speech rage. this is so much a matter of common sense that i cannot imagine even british "wait and see" waiting for the inevitable assault upon our national journalistic virtue that will follow the peace. so i spread out the considerations that i think justify our forecasting, in a very changed great britain and a changed europe, firstly, a legal profession with a quickened conscience, a sense of public function and a reformed organisation, and, secondly, a press, which is recognised and held accountable in law and in men's minds, as an estate of the realm, as something implicitly under oath to serve the state. i do not agree with professor michel's pessimistic conclusion that peace will bring back exacerbated party politics and a new era of futility to the democratic countries. i believe that the tremendous demonstration of this war (a demonstration that gains weight with every week of our lengthening effort), of the waste and inefficiency of the system of 1913-14, will break down at last even the conservatism of the most rigidly organised and powerful and out-of-date of all professions. it is not only that i look to the indignation and energy of intelligent men who are outside our legal and political system to reform it, but to those who are in it now. a man may be quietly parasitic upon his mother, and yet incapable of matricide. so much of our national energy and ability has been attracted to the law in great britain that our nation, with our lawyers in modern clothing instead of wigs and gowns, lawyers who have studied science and social theory instead of the spoutings of cicero and the loquacious artfulness of w.e. gladstone, lawyers who look forward at the destiny of their country instead of backward and at the markings on their briefs, may yet astonish the world. the british lawyer really holds the future of the british empire and, indeed, i could almost say, of the whole world in his hands at the present time, as much as any single sort of man can be said to hold it. inside his skull imagination and a heavy devil of evil precedent fight for his soul and the welfare of the world. and generosity fights against tradition and individualism. only the men of the press have anything like the same great possibilities of betrayal. to these two sorts of men the dim spirit of the nation looks for such leading as a democracy can follow. to them the men with every sort of special ability, the men of science, the men of this or that sort of administrative ability and experience, the men of creative gifts and habits, every sort of man who wants the world to get on, look for the removal (or the ingenious contrivance) of obstructions and entanglements, for the allaying (or the fomentation) of suspicion, misapprehension, and ignorant opposition, for administration (or class blackmail). yet while i sit as a prophetic amateur weighing these impalpable forces of will and imagination and habit and interest in lawyer, pressman, maker and administrator, and feeling by no means over-confident of the issue, it dawns upon me suddenly that there is another figure present, who has never been present before in the reckoning up of british affairs. it is a silent figure. this figure stands among the pressmen and among the lawyers and among the workers; for a couple of decades at least he will be everywhere in the british system; he is young and he is uniformed in khaki, and he brings with him a new spirit into british life, the spirit of the new soldier, the spirit of subordination to a common purpose.... france, which has lived so much farther and deeper and more bitterly than britain, knows....[2] [footnote 2: in "an englishman looks at the world," a companion volume to the present one, which was first published by messrs. cassell early in 1914, and is now obtainable in a shilling edition, the reader will find a full discussion of the probable benefit of proportional representation in eliminating the party hack from political life. proportional representation would probably break up party organisations altogether, and it would considerably enhance the importance and responsibility of the press. it would do much to accelerate the development of the state of affairs here foreshadowed, in which the rã´le of government and opposition under the party system will be played by elected representatives and press respectively.] vii. the new education some few months ago mr. harold spender, in the _daily news_, was calling attention to a very significant fact indeed. the higher education in england, and more particularly the educational process of oxford and cambridge, which has been going on continuously since the middle ages, is practically in a state of suspense. oxford and cambridge have stopped. they have stopped so completely that mr. spender can speculate whether they can ever pick up again and resume upon the old lines. for my own part, as the father of two sons who are at present in mid-school, i hope with all my heart that they will not. i hope that the oxford and cambridge of unphilosophical classics and little-go greek for everybody, don's mathematics, bad french, ignorance of all europe except switzerland, forensic exercises in the union debating society, and cant about the gothic, the oxford and cambridge that turned boys full of life and hope and infinite possibility into barristers, politicians, mono-lingual diplomatists, bishops, schoolmasters, company directors, and remittance men, are even now dead. quite recently i passed through cambridge, and, with the suggestions of mr. spender in my mind, i paused to savour the atmosphere of the place. he had very greatly understated the facts of the case. he laid stress upon the fact that instead of the normal four thousand undergraduates or so, there are now scarcely four hundred. but before i was fairly in cambridge i realised that that gives no idea of the real cessation of english education. of the first seven undergraduates i saw upon the trumpington road, one was black, three were coloured, and one of the remaining three was certainly not british, but, i should guess, spanish-american. and it isn't only the undergraduates who have gone. all the dons of military age and quality have gone too, or are staying up not in caps and gowns, but in khaki; all the vigorous teachers are soldiering; there are no dons left except those who are unfit for service--and the clergy. buildings, libraries, empty laboratories, empty lecture theatres, vestiges, refugees, neutrals, khaki; that is cambridge to-day. there never was before, there never may be again, so wonderful an opportunity for a cleaning-up and sweeping-out of those two places, and for a profitable new start in british education. the cessation of oxford and cambridge does not give the full measure of the present occasion. all the other british universities are in a like case. and the schools which feed them have been practically swept clean of their senior boys. and not a tithe of any of this war class of schoolboys will ever go to the universities now, not a tithe of the war class of undergraduates will ever return. between the new education and the old there will be a break of two school generations. for the next thirty or forty years an exceptional class of men will play a leading part in british affairs, men who will have learnt more from reality and less from lectures than either the generations that preceded or the generations that will follow them. the subalterns of the great war will form a distinct generation and mark an epoch. their experiences of need, their sense of deficiencies, will certainly play a large part in the reconstitution of british education. _the stamp of the old system will not be on them_. now is the time to ask what sort of training should a university give to produce the ruling, directing, and leading men which it exists to produce? upon that great britain will need to make up its mind speedily. it is not a matter for to-morrow or the day after; it is necessary to decide now what it is the britain that is coming will need and want, and to set to work revising the admission and degree requirements, and reconstructing all those systems of public examinations for the public services that necessarily dominate school and university teaching, before the universities and schools reassemble. if the rotten old things once get together again, the rotten old things will have a new lease of life. this and no other is the hour for educational reconstruction. and it is in the decisions and readjustments of schools and lectures and courses, far more than anywhere else, that the real future of great britain will be decided. equally true is this of all the belligerent countries. much of the future has a kind of mechanical inevitableness, but here far more than anywhere else, can a few resolute and capable men mould the spirit and determine the quality of the europe to come. now surely the chief things that are needed in the education of a ruling class are these--first, the selection and development of character, then the selection and development of capacity, and, thirdly, the imparting of knowledge upon broad and comprehensive lines, and the power of rapidly taking up and using such detailed knowledge as may be needed for special occasions. it is upon the first count that the british schools and universities have been most open to criticism. we have found the british university-trained class under the fiery tests of this war an evasive, temporising class of people, individualistic, ungenerous, and unable either to produce or obey vigorous leadership. on the whole, it is a matter for congratulation, it says wonderful things for the inherent natural qualities of the english-speaking peoples, that things have proved no worse than they are, considering the nature of the higher education under which they have suffered. consider in what that educational process has consisted. its backbone has been the teaching of latin by men who can read, write, and speak it rather worse than a third-rate babu speaks english, and of ancient greek by teachers who at best half know this fine lost language. they do not expect any real mastery of either tongue by their students, and naturally, therefore, no real mastery is ever attained. the boys and young men just muff about at it for three times as long as would be needed to master completely both those tongues if they had "live" teachers, and so they acquire habits of busy futility and petty pedantry in all intellectual processes that haunt them throughout life. there are also sterile mathematical studies that never get from "exercises" to practice. there is a pretence of studying philosophy based on greek texts that few of the teachers and none of the taught can read comfortably, and a certain amount of history. the modern history school at oxford, for example, is the queerest collection of chunks of reading. english history from the beginning, with occasional glances at continental affairs, european history for about a century, bits of economics, and--the _politics_ of aristotle! it is not education; it is a jack-daw collection....this sort of jumble has been the essentials of the more pretentious type of "higher education" available in great britain up to the present. in this manner, through all the most sensitive and receptive years of life, our boys have been trained in "how not to get there," in a variety of disconnected subjects, by men who have never "got there," and it would be difficult to imagine any curriculum more calculated to produce a miscellaneous incompetence. they have also, it happens, received a certain training in _savoir faire_ through the collective necessities of school life, and a certain sharpening in the arts of advocacy through the debating society. except for these latter helps, they have had to face the world with minds neither more braced, nor more trained, nor more informed than any "uneducated" man's. surely the first condition that should be laid down for the new education in europe is that whatever is undertaken must be undertaken in grim earnest and done. it is ridiculous to talk about the "character-forming" value of any study that does not go through to an end. manifestly greek must be dropped as a part of the general curriculum for a highly educated man, for the simple reason that now there are scarcely any competent teachers, and because the sham of teaching it partially and pretentiously demoralises student and school alike. the claim of the clergy and so forth to "know" greek is one of the many corrupting lies in british intellectual life. english comic writers never weary of sneering at the hindu who claimed to be a "failed b.a.," but what is the ordinary classical degree man of an english university but a "failed" greek scholar? latin, too, must be either reduced to the position of a study supplementary to the native tongue, or brought up to an honest level of efficiency. french and german in the case of the english, and english in the case of the french and russians, are essentially governess languages; any intelligent boy or girl from a reasonably prosperous home ought to be able to read, write, and speak either before fifteen; they are to be taken by the way rather than regarded as a fundamental part of education. the french, german, or english literature and literary development up to and including contemporary work is, of course, an entirely different matter. but there can be no doubt of the great educational value of some highly inflected and well-developed language _taught by men to whom it is a genuine means of expression_. educational needs and public necessity point alike to such languages as russian or, in the case of great britain, hindustani to supply this sound training. if great britain means business after this war, if she is to do her duty by the eastern world she controls, she will not stick at the petty expense of getting a few hundreds of good russian and hindu teachers into the country, and she will place russian and hindustani upon at least an equal footing with greek in all her university and competitive examinations. moreover, it is necessary to set a definite aim of application before university mathematical teaching. as the first condition of character-building in all these things, the student should do what he ostensibly sets out to do. no degree and no position should be attainable by half accomplishment. of course, languages and mathematics do not by any means round off the education of a man of the leading classes. there is no doubt much exercise in their attainment, much value in their possession. but the essence of the higher education is now, as it always has been, philosophy; not the antiquated pretence of "reading" plato and aristotle, but the thorough and subtle examination of those great questions of life that most exercise and strengthen the mind. surely that is the essential difference of the "educated" and the "common" man. the former has thought, and thought out thoroughly and clearly, the relations of his mind to the universe as a whole, and of himself to the state and life. a mind untrained in swift and adequate criticism is essentially an uneducated mind, though it has as many languages as a courier and as much computation as a bookie. and what is our fundamental purpose in all this reform of our higher education? it is neither knowledge nor technical skill, but to make our young men talk less and think more, and to think more swiftly, surely, and exactly. for that we want less debating society and more philosophy, fewer prizes for forensic ability and more for strength and vigour of analysis. the central seat of character is the mind. a man of weak character thinks vaguely, a man of clear intellectual decisions acts with precision and is free from vacillation. a country of educated men acts coherently, smites swiftly, plans ahead; a country of confused education is a country of essential muddle. it is as the third factor in education that the handling and experience of knowledge comes, and of all knowledge that which is most accessible, most capable of being handled with the greatest variety of educational benefit, so as to include the criticism of evidence, the massing of facts, the extraction and testing of generalisations, lies in the two groups of the biological sciences and the exact sciences. no doubt a well-planned system of education will permit of much varied specialisation, will, indeed, specialise those who have special gifts from a very early age, will have corners for greek, hebrew, sanscrit, philology, archaeology, christian theology, and so on, and so on; nevertheless, for that great mass of sound men of indeterminate all-round ability who are the intellectual and moral backbone of a nation, it is in scientific studies that their best training lies, studies most convenient to undertake and most readily applied in life. from either of the two groups of the sciences one may pass on to research or to technical applications leading directly to the public service. the biological sciences broaden out through psychology and sociology to the theory and practice of law, and to political life. they lead also to medical and agricultural administration. the exact sciences lead to the administrative work of industrialism, and to general economics. these are the broad, clear lines of the educational necessities of a modern community, plain enough to see, so that every man who is not blinded by prejudice and self-interest can see them to-day. we have now before us a phase of opportunity in educational organisation that will never recur again. now that the apostolic succession of the old pedagogy is broken, and the entire system discredited, it seems incredible that it can ever again be reconstituted in its old seats upon the old lines. in these raw, harsh days of boundless opportunity, the opportunity of the new education, because it is the most fundamental, is assuredly the greatest of all. viii. what the war is doing for women section 1 to discuss the effect of this war upon the relations of men and women to each other is to enter upon the analysis of a secular process compared with which even the vast convulsions and destructions of this world catastrophe appear only as jolts and incidents and temporary interruptions. there are certain matters that sustain a perennial development, that are on a scale beyond the dramatic happenings of history; wars, the movements of peoples and races, economic changes, such things may accelerate or stimulate or confuse or delay, but they cannot arrest the endless thinking out, the growth and perfecting of ideas, upon the fundamental relationships of human beings. first among such eternally progressive issues is religion, the relationship of man to god; next in importance and still more immediate is the matter of men's relations to women. in such matters each phase is a new phase; whatever happens, there is no going back and beginning over again. the social life, like the religious life, must grow and change until the human story is at an end. so that this war involves, in this as in so many matters, no fundamental set-back, no reversals nor restorations. at the most it will but realise things already imagined, release things latent. the nineteenth century was a period of unprecedented modification of social relationships; but great as these changes were, they were trivial in comparison with the changes in religious thought and the criticism of moral ideals. hell was the basis of religious thinking in a.d. 1800, and the hangman was at the back of the law; in 1900 both hell and the hangman seemed on the verge of extinction. the creative impulse was everywhere replacing fear and compulsion in human motives. the opening decade of the twentieth century was a period of unprecedented abundance in everything necessary to human life, of vast accumulated resources, of leisure and release. it was also, because of that and because of the changed social and religious spirit, a period of great social disorganisation and confused impulses. we british can already look back to the opening half of 1914 as to an age gone for ever. except that we were all alive then and can remember, it has become now almost as remote, almost as "historical," as the days before the french revolution. our days, our methods and reactions, are already so different. the greater part of the freedom of movement, the travel and going to and fro, the leisure, the plenty and carelessness, that distinguished early twentieth century life from early nineteenth century life, has disappeared. most men are under military discipline, and every household economises. the whole british people has been brought up against such elementary realities of need, danger, and restraint as it never realised before. we discover that we had been living like olympians in regard to worldly affairs, we had been irresponsibles, amateurs. much of that fatness of life, the wrappings and trimmings of our life, has been stripped off altogether. that has not altered the bones of life; it has only made them plainer; but it has astonished us as much as if looking into a looking-glass one suddenly found oneself a skeleton. or a diagram. what was going on before this war in the relations of men and women is going on still, with more rapidity perhaps, and certainly with more thoroughness. the war is accentuating, developing, defining. previously our discussions and poses and movements had merely the air of seeking to accentuate and define. what was apparently being brought about by discursive efforts, and in a mighty controversy and confusion, is coming about now as a matter of course. before the war, in the british community as in most civilised communities, profound changes were already in progress, changes in the conditions of women's employment, in the legal relations of husband and wife, in the political status of women, in the status of illegitimate children, in manners and customs affecting the sexes. every civilised community was exhibiting a falling birth-rate and a falling death-rate, was changing the quality of its housing, and diminishing domestic labour by organising supplies and developing, appliances. that is to say, that primary human unit, the home, was altering in shape and size and frequency and colour and effect. a steadily increasing proportion of people were living outside the old family home, the home based on maternity and offspring, altogether. a number of us were doing our best to apprehend the summation of all this flood of change. we had a vague idea that women were somehow being "emancipated," but just what this word meant and what it implied were matters still under exploration. then came the war. for a time it seemed as if all this discussion was at an end, as if the problem itself had vanished. but that was only a temporary distraction of attention. the process of change swirled into new forms that did not fit very easily into the accepted formulae, swirled into new forms and continued on its way. if the discussion ceased for a time, the process of change ceased not at all. matters have travelled all the farther in the last two years for travelling mutely. the questions between men and women are far more important and far more incessant than the questions between germans and the rest of mankind. they are coming back now into the foreground of human thought, but amended and altered. our object is to state the general nature of that alteration. it has still been "emancipation," but very different in quality from the "emancipation" that was demanded so loudly and incoherently in that ancient world--of 1913! never had the relations of men and women been so uneasy as they were in the opening days of 1914. the woman's movement battered and banged through all our minds. it broke out into that tumult in great britain perhaps ten years ago. when queen victoria died it was inaudible; search _punch_, search the newspapers of that tranquil age. in 1914 it kicked up so great a dust that the germans counted on the suffragettes as one of the great forces that were to paralyse england in the war. the extraordinary thing was that the feminist movement was never clearly defined during all the time of its maximum violence. we begin to perceive in the retrospect that the movement was multiple, made up of a number of very different movements interwoven. it seemed to concentrate upon the vote; but it was never possible to find even why women wanted the vote. some, for example, alleged that it was because they were like men, and some because they were entirely different. the broad facts that one could not mistake were a vast feminine discontent and a vast display of feminine energy. what had brought that about? two statistical factors are to be considered here. one of these was the steady decline in the marriage rate, and the increasing proportion of unmarried women of all classes, but particularly of the more educated classes, requiring employment. the second was the fall in the birth-rate, the diminution in size of the average family, the increase of sterile unions, and the consequent release of a considerable proportion of the energy of married women. co-operating with these factors of release were the economic elaborations that were improving the appliances of domestic life, replacing the needle by the sewing machine, the coal fire and lamp by gas and electricity, the dustpan and brush by the pneumatic carpet cleaner, and taking out of the house into the shop and factory the baking, much of the cooking, the making of clothes, the laundry work, and so forth, that had hitherto kept so many women at home and too busy to think. the care of even such children as there were was also less arduous; crãªche and school held out hands for them, ready to do even that duty better. side by side with these releases from duty was a rise in the standard of education that was stimulating the minds and imaginations of woman beyond a point where the needle--even if there had been any use for the needle--can be an opiate. moreover, the world was growing richer, and growing richer in such a way that not only were leisure and desire increasing, but, because of increasingly scientific methods of production, the need in many branches of employment for any but very keen and able workers was diminishing. so that simultaneously the world, that vanished world before 1914, was releasing and disengaging enormous volumes of untrained and unassigned feminine energy and also diminishing the usefulness of unskilful effort in every department of life. there was no demand to meet the supply. these were the underlying processes that produced the feminist outbreak of the decade before the war. now the debate between the sexes is a perennial. it began while we were still in the trees. it has its stereotyped accusations; its stereotyped repartees. the canterbury pilgrims had little to learn from christabel pankhurst. man and woman in that duet struggle perpetually for the upper hand, and the man restrains the woman and the woman resents the man. in every age some voice has been heard asserting, like plato, that the woman is a human being; and the prompt answer has been, "but such a different human being." wherever there is a human difference fair play is difficult, the universal clash of races witnesses to that, and sex is the greatest of human differences. but the general trend of mankind towards intelligence and reason has been also a trend away from a superstitious treatment of sexual questions and a recognition, so to speak, that a woman's "a man for a' that," that she is indeed as entitled to an independent soul and a separate voice in collective affairs. as brain has counted for more and more in the human effort and brute strength and the advantage of not bearing children for less and less, as man has felt a greater need for a companion and a lesser need for a slave, and as the increase of food and the protection of the girl from premature child-bearing has approximated the stature and strength and enterprise of the woman more and more to that of the man, this secular emancipation of the human female from the old herd subordination and servitude to the patriarchal male has gone on. essentially the secular process has been an equalising process. it was merely the exaggeration of its sustaining causes during the plenty and social and intellectual expansion of the last half-century that had stimulated this secular process to the pitch of crisis. there have always been two extreme aspects of the sexual debate. there have always been the oversexed women who wanted to be treated primarily as women, and the women who were irritated and bored by being treated primarily as women. there have always been those women who wanted to get, like joan of arc, into masculine attire, and the school of the "mystical darlings." there have always been the women who wanted to share men's work and the women who wanted to "inspire" it--the mates and the mistresses. of course, the mass of women lies between these extremes. but it is possible, nevertheless, to discuss this question as though it were a conflict of two sharply opposed ideals. it is convenient to write as if there were just these two sorts of women because so one can get a sharp definition in the picture. the ordinary woman fluctuates between the two, turns now to the western ideal of citizenship and now to the eastern of submission. these ideals fight not only in human society, but in every woman's career. chitra in rabindranath tagore's play, for example, tried both aspects of the woman's life, and tagore is at one with plato in preferring the rosalind type to the houri. and with him i venture to think is the clear reason of mankind. the real "emancipation" to which reason and the trend of things makes is from the yielding to the energetic side of a woman's disposition, from beauty enthroned for love towards the tall, weather-hardened woman with a spear, loving her mate as her mate loves her, and as sexless as a man in all her busy hours. but it was not simply the energies that tended towards this particular type that were set free during the latter half of the nineteenth century. every sort of feminine energy was set free. and it was not merely the self-reliant, independence-seeking women who were discontented. the ladies who specialised in feminine arts and graces and mysteries were also dissatisfied. they found they were not important enough. the former type found itself insufficiently respected, and the latter type found itself insufficiently adored. the two mingled their voices in the most confusing way in the literature of the suffrage movement before the war. the two tendencies mingle confusingly in the minds of the women that this movement was stirring up to think. the vote became the symbol for absolutely contradictory things; there is scarcely a single argument for it in suffragist literature that cannot be completely negatived out of suffragist literature. for example, compare the writings of miss cicely hamilton, the distinguished actress, with the publications of the pankhurst family. the former expresses a claim that, except for prejudice, a woman is as capable a citizen as a man and differing only in her sex; the latter consist of a long rhapsody upon the mystical superiorities of women and the marvellous benefits mankind will derive from handing things over to these sacred powers. the former would get rid of sex from most human affairs; the latter would make what our georgian grandfathers called "the sex" rule the world. or compare, say, the dark coquettings of miss elizabeth robins' "woman's secret" with the virile common sense of that most brilliant young writer, miss rebecca west, in her bitter onslaught on feminine limitations in the opening chapters of "the world's worst failure." the former is an extravagance of sexual mysticism. man can never understand women. women always hide deep and wonderful things away beyond masculine discovery. men do not even suspect. some day, perhaps--it is someone peeping from behind a curtain, and inviting men in provocative tones to come and play catch in a darkened harem. the latter is like some gallant soldier cursing his silly accoutrements. it is a hearty outbreak against that apparent necessity for elegance and sexual specialisation that undercuts so much feminine achievement, that reduces so much feminine art and writing to vapidity, and holds back women from the face of danger and brave and horrible deaths. it is west to miss robins' east. and yet i believe i am right in saying that all these four women writers have jostled one another upon suffrage platforms, and that they all suffered blows and injuries in the same cause, during the various riots and conflicts that occurred in london in the course of the great agitation. it was only when the agitation of the pankhurst family, aided by miss robins' remarkable book "where are you going to ...?" took a form that threatened to impose the most extraordinary restrictions on the free movements of women, and to establish a sort of universal purdah of hostility and suspicion against those degraded creatures, those stealers and destroyers of women, "the men," that the british feminist movement displayed any tendency to dissociate into its opposed and divergent strands. it is a little detail, but a very significant one in this connection, that the committee that organised the various great suffrage processions in london were torn by dispute about the dresses of the processionists. it was urged that a "masculine style of costume" discredited the movement, and women were urged to dress with a maximum of feminine charm. many women obtained finery they could ill afford, to take part in these demonstrations, and minced their steps as womanly as possible to freedom.... it would be easy to overstate the efflorescence of distinctively feminine emotion, dressiness, mysticism, and vanity upon the suffrage movement. those things showed for anyone to see. this was the froth of the whirlpool. what did not show was the tremendous development of the sense of solidarity among women. everybody knew that women had been hitting policemen at westminster; it was not nearly so showy a fact that women of title, working women, domestic servants, tradesmen's wives, professional workers, had all been meeting together and working together in a common cause, working with an unprecedented capacity and an unprecedented disregard of social barriers. one noted the nonsensical by-play of the movement; the way in which women were accustoming themselves to higher standards of achievement was not so immediately noticeable. that a small number of women were apparently bent on rendering the vote impossible by a campaign of violence and malicious mischief very completely masked the fact that a very great number of girls and young women no longer considered it seemly to hang about at home trying by a few crude inducements to tempt men to marry them, but were setting out very seriously and capably to master the young man's way of finding a place for oneself in the world. beneath the dust and noise realities were coming about that the dust and noise entirely failed to represent. we know that some women were shrieking for the vote; we did not realise that a generation of women was qualifying for it. the war came, the jolt of an earthquake, to throw things into their proper relationships. the immediate result was the disappearance of the militant suffragists from public view for a time, into which the noisier section hastened to emerge in full scream upon the congenial topic of war babies. "men," those dreadful creatures, were being camped and quartered all over the country. it followed, from all the social principles known to mrs. and miss pankhurst, that it was necessary to provide for an enormous number of war babies. subscriptions were invited. statisticians are still looking rather perplexedly for those war babies; the illegitimate birth-rate has fallen, and what has become of the subscriptions i do not know. _the suffragette_ rechristened itself _britannia_, dropped the war baby agitation, and, after an interlude of self-control, broke out into denunciations, first of this public servant and then of that, as traitors and german spies. finally, it discovered a mare's nest in the case of sir edward grey that led to its suppression, and the last i have from this misleading and unrepresentative feminist faction is the periodic appearance of a little ill-printed sheet of abuse about the chief foreign office people, resembling in manner and appearance the sort of denunciatory letter, at once suggestive and evasive, that might be written by the curate's discharged cook. and with that the aggressive section of the suffragist movement seems to have petered out, leaving the broad reality of feminine emancipation to go on in a beneficent silence. there can be no question that the behaviour of the great mass of women in great britain has not simply exceeded expectation but hope. and there can be as little doubt that the suffrage question, in spite of the self-advertising violence of its extravagant section, did contribute very materially to build up the confidence, the willingness to undertake responsibility and face hardship, that has been so abundantly displayed by every class of woman. it is not simply that there has been enough women and to spare for hospital work and every sort of relief and charitable service; that sort of thing has been done before, that was in the tradition of womanhood. it is that at every sort of occupation, clerking, shop-keeping, railway work, automobile driving, agricultural work, police work, they have been found efficient beyond precedent and intelligent beyond precedent. and in the munition factories, in the handling of heavy and often difficult machinery, and in adaptability and inventiveness and enthusiasm and steadfastness their achievement has been astonishing. more particularly in relation to intricate mechanical work is their record remarkable and unexpected. there is scarcely a point where women, having been given a chance, have not more than made good. they have revolutionised the estimate of their economic importance, and it is scarcely too much to say that when, in the long run, the military strength of the allies bears down the strength of germany, it will be this superiority of our women which enables us to pit a woman at--the censorship will object to exact geography upon this point--against a man at essen which has tipped the balance of this war. those women have won the vote. not the most frantic outbursts of militancy after this war can prevent them getting it. the girls who have faced death and wounds so gallantly in our cordite factories--there is a not inconsiderable list of dead and wounded from those places--have killed for ever the poor argument that women should not vote because they had no military value. indeed, they have killed every argument against their subjection. and while they do these things, that paragon of the virtues of the old type, that miracle of domestic obedience, the german _haus-frau_, the faithful gretchen, riots for butter. and as i have before remarked, the germans counted on the suffragettes as one of the great forces that were to paralyse england in this war. it is not simply that the british women have so bountifully produced intelligence and industry; that does not begin their record. they have been willing to go dowdy. the mass of women in great britain are wearing the clothes of 1914. in 1913 every girl and woman one saw in the streets of london had an air of doing her best to keep in the fashion. now they are for the most part as carelessly dressed as a busy business man or a clever young student might have been. they are none the less pretty for that, and far more beautiful. but the fashions have floated away to absurdity. every now and then through the austere bustle of london in war time drifts a last practitioner of the "eternal feminine"--with the air of a foreign visitor, with the air of devotion to some peculiar cult. she has very high-heeled boots; she shows a leg, she has a short skirt with a peculiar hang, due no doubt to mysteries about the waist; she wears a comic little hat over one brow; there is something of columbine about her, something of the watteau shepherdess, something of a vivandiere, something of every age but the present age. her face, subject to the strange dictates of the mode, is smooth like the back of a spoon, with small features and little whisker-like curls before the ears such as butcher-boys used to wear half a century ago. even so, she dare not do this thing alone. something in khaki is with her, to justify her. you are to understand that this strange rig is for seeing him off or giving him a good time during his leave. sometimes she is quite elderly, sometimes nothing khaki is to be got, and the pretence that this is desired of her wears thin. still, the type will out. she does not pass with impunity, the last exponent of true feminine charm. the vulgar, the street boy, have evolved one of those strange sayings that have the air of being fragments from some lost and forgotten chant: "she's the army contractor's only daughter, spending it now." or simply, "spending it now." she does not pass with impunity, but she passes. she makes her stilted passage across the arena upon which the new womanhood of western europe shows its worth. it is an exit. there is likely to be something like a truce in the fashions throughout europe for some years. it is in america if anywhere that the holy fires of smartness and the fashion will be kept alive.... and so we come to prophecy. i do not believe that this invasion by women of a hundred employments hitherto closed to them is a temporary arrangement that will be reversed after the war. it is a thing that was going on, very slowly, it is true, and against much prejudice and opposition, before the war, but it was going on; it is in the nature of things. these women no doubt enter these employments as substitutes, but not usually as inferior substitutes; in quite a number of cases they are as good as men, and in many they are not underselling, they are drawing men's pay. what reason is there to suppose that they will relapse into a state of superfluous energy after the war? the war has merely brought about, with the rapidity of a landslide, a state of affairs for which the world was ripe. the world after the war will have to adjust itself to this extension of women's employment, and to this increase in the proportion of self-respecting, self-supporting women. contributing very largely to the establishment of this greatly enlarged class of independent women will be the great shortage for the next decade of marriageable men, due to the killing and disablement of the war. the women of the next decades will not only be able to get along economically without marriage, but they will find it much more difficult to marry. it will also probably be a period in which a rise in prices may, as it usually does, precede the compensating rise in wages. it may be that for some years it will be more difficult to maintain a family. this will be a third factor in the fixation of this class of bachelor women. various writers, brooding over the coming shortage of men, have jumped to the conclusion that polygamy is among the probabilities of the near future. they write in terms of real or affected alarm for which there is no justification; they wallow in visions of germany "legalising" polygamy, and see berlin seeking recuperation, in man power by converting herself into another salt lake city. but i do not think that germany, in the face of the economic ring that the allies will certainly draw about her, is likely to desire a very great increase in population for the next few years; i do not see any great possibility of a specially rich class capable of maintaining numerous wives being sustained by the impoverished and indebted world of europe, nor the sources from which a supply of women preferring to become constituents in a polygamous constellation rather than self-supporting freewomen is to be derived. the temperamental dislike of intelligent women to polygamy is at least as strong as a man's objection to polyandry. polygamy, open or hidden, flourishes widely only where there are women to be bought. moreover, there are considerable obstacles in religion and custom to be overcome by the innovating polygamist--even in germany. it might mean a breach of the present good relations between germany and the vatican. the relative inferiority of the tradition of the german to that of most other european women, its relative disposition towards feminine servitude, is no doubt a consideration on the other scale of this discussion, but i do not think it is one heavy enough to tilt back the beam. so far from a great number of men becoming polygamists, i think it would be possible to show cause for supposing that an increasing proportion will cease even to be monogamists. the romantic excitements of the war have produced a temporary rise in the british marriage rate; but before the war it had been falling slowly and the average age at marriage had been rising, and it is quite possible that this process will be presently resumed and, as a new generation grows up to restore the balance of the sexes, accelerated. we conclude, therefore, that this increase in the class of economically independent bachelor women that is now taking place is a permanent increase. it is probably being reinforced by a considerable number of war widows who will not remarry. we have to consider in what directions this mass of capable, intelligent, energetic, undomesticated freewomen is likely to develop, what its effect will be on social usage, and particularly how it will react upon the lives of the married women about them. because, as we have already pointed out in this chapter, the release of feminine energy upon which the feminist problem depends is twofold, being due not only to the increased unmarriedness of women through the disproportion of the sexes and the rise in the age of marriage, but also to the decreased absorption of married women in domestic duties. a woman, from the point of view of this discussion, is not "married and done for," as she used to be. she is not so extensively and completely married. her large and increasing leisure remains in the problem. the influence of this coming body of freewomen upon the general social atmosphere will be, i venture to think, liberalising and relaxing in certain directions and very bracing in others. this new type of women will want to go about freely without an escort, to be free to travel alone, take rooms in hotels, sit in restaurants, and so forth. now, as the women of the past decade showed, there are for a woman two quite antagonistic ways of going about alone. nothing showed the duplicate nature of the suffragist movement more than the great variety of deportment of women in the london streets during that time. there were types that dressed neatly and quietly and went upon their business with intent and preoccupied faces. their intention was to mingle as unobtrusively as possible into the stream of business, to be as far as possible for the ordinary purposes of traffic "men in a world of men." a man could speak to such women as he spoke to another man, without suspicion, could, for example, ask his way and be directed without being charged with annoying or accosting a delicate female. at the other extreme there was a type of young woman who came into the streets like something precious that has got loose. it dressed itself as feminine loveliness; it carried sex like a banner and like a challenge. its mind was fully prepared by the pankhurst literature for insult. it swept past distressed manhood imputing motives. it was pure hareem, and the perplexed masculine intelligence could never determine whether it was out for a demonstration or whether it was out for a spree. its motives in thus marching across the path of feminine emancipation were probably more complicated and confused than that alternative suggests, and sheer vanity abounded in the mixture. but undoubtedly that extremity is the vanishing extremity of these things. the new freewoman is going to be a grave and capable being, soberly dressed, and imposing her own decency and neutrality of behaviour upon the men she meets. and along the line of sober costume and simple and restrained behaviour that the freewoman is marking out, the married woman will also escape to new measures of freedom. i do not believe that among women of the same social origins and the same educational quality there can exist side by side entirely distinct schools of costume, deportment, and behaviour based on entirely divergent views of life. i do not think that men can be trained to differentiate between different sorts of women, sorts of women they will often be meeting simultaneously, and to treat this one with frankness and fellowship and that one with awe passion and romantic old-world gallantry. all sorts of intermediate types--the majority of women will be intermediate types--will complicate the problem. this conflict of the citizen-woman ideal with the loveliness-woman ideal, which was breaking out very plainly in the british suffrage movement before the war, will certainly return after the war, and i have little doubt which way the issue will fall. the human being is going to carry it against the sexual being. the struggle is going to be extensive and various and prolonged, but in the serious years ahead the serious type must, i feel, win. the plain, well-made dress will oust the ribbon and the decolletage. in every way the war is accelerating the emancipation of women from sexual specialisation. it is facilitating their economic emancipation. it is liberating types that will inevitably destroy both the "atmosphere of gallantry" which is such a bar to friendliness between people of opposite sexes and that atmosphere of hostile distrust which is its counterpart in the minds of the over-sexual suffragettes. it is arresting the change of fashions and simplifying manners. in another way also it is working to the same end. that fall in the birth-rate which has been so marked a feature in the social development of all modern states has become much more perceptible since the war began to tell upon domestic comfort. there is a full-cradle agitation going on in germany to check this decline; german mothers are being urged not to leave the crown prince of 1930 or 1940 without the necessary material for glory at some fresh battle of verdun. i doubt the zeal of their response. but everywhere the war signifies economic stress which must necessarily continue long after the war is over, and in the present state of knowledge that stress means fewer children. the family, already light, will grow lighter. this means that marriage, although it may be by no means less emotionally sacred, will become a lighter thing. once, to be married was a woman's whole career. household cares, a dozen children, and she was consumed. all her romances ended in marriage. all a decent man's romance ended there, too. she proliferated and he toiled, and when the married couple had brought up some of their children and buried the others, and blessed their first grandchildren, life was over. now, to be married is an incident in a woman's career, as in a man's. there is not the same necessity of that household, not the same close tie; the married woman remains partially a freewoman and assimilates herself to the freewoman. there is an increasing disposition to group solitary children and to delegate their care to specially qualified people, and this is likely to increase, because the high earning power of young women will incline them to entrust their children to others, and because a shortage of men and an excess of widows will supply other women willing to undertake that care. the more foolish women will take these releases as a release into levity, but the common sense of the newer types of women will come to the help of men in recognising the intolerable nuisance of this prolongation of flirting and charming on the part of people who have had what should be a satisfying love. nor will there be much wealth or superfluity to make levity possible and desirable. winsome and weak womanhood will be told bluntly by men and women alike that it is a bore. the frou-frou of skirts, the delicate mysteries of the toilette, will cease to thrill any but the very young men. marriage, deprived of its bonds of material necessity, will demand a closer and closer companionship as its justification and excuse. a marriage that does not ripen into a close personal friendship between two equals will be regarded with increasing definiteness as an unsatisfactory marriage. these things are not stated here as being desirable or undesirable. this is merely an attempt to estimate the drift and tendency of the time as it has been accentuated by the war. it works out to the realisation that marriage is likely to count for less and less as a state and for more and more as a personal relationship. it is likely to be an affair of diminishing public and increasing private importance. people who marry are likely to remain, so far as practical ends go, more detached and separable. the essential link will be the love and affection and not the home. with that go certain logical consequences. the first is that the circumstances of the unmarried mother will resemble more than they have hitherto done those of many married mothers; the harsh lines once drawn between them will dissolve. this will fall in with the long manifest tendency in modern society to lighten the disadvantages (in the case of legacy duties, for example) and stigma laid upon illegitimate children. and a type of marriage where personal compatibility has come to be esteemed the fundamental thing will be altogether more amenable to divorce than the old union which was based upon the kitchen and the nursery, and the absence of any care, education, or security for children beyond the range of the parental household. marriage will not only be lighter, but more dissoluble. to summarise all that has gone before, this war is accelerating rather than deflecting the stream of tendency, and is bringing us rapidly to a state of affairs in which women will be much more definitely independent of their sexual status, much less hampered in their self-development, and much more nearly equal to men than has ever been known before in the whole history of mankind.... ix. the new map of europe section 1 in this chapter it is proposed to embark upon what may seem now, with the great war still in progress and still undecided, the most hopeless of all prophetic adventures. this is to speculate upon the redrawing of the map of europe after the war. but because the detailed happenings and exact circumstances of the ending of the war are uncertain, they need not alter the inevitable broad conclusion. i have already discussed that conclusion, and pointed out that the war has become essentially a war of mutual exhaustion. this does not mean, as some hasty readers may assume, that i foretell a "draw." we may be all white and staggering, but germany is, i believe, fated to go down first. she will make the first advances towards peace; she will ultimately admit defeat. but i do want to insist that by that time every belligerent, and not simply germany, will be exhausted to a pitch of extreme reasonableness. there will be no power left as germany was left in 1871, in a state of "freshness" and a dictatorial attitude. that is to say they will all be gravitating, not to triumphs, but to such a settlement as seems to promise the maximum of equilibrium in the future. if towards the end of the war the united states should decide, after all, to abandon their present attitude of superior comment and throw their weight in favour of such a settlement as would make the recrudescence of militarism impossible, the general exhaustion may give america a relative importance far beyond any influence she could exert at the present time. in the end, america may have the power to insist upon almost vital conditions in the settlement; though whether she will have the imaginative force and will is, of course, quite another question. and before i go on to speculate about the actual settlement, there are one or two generalisations that it may be interesting to try over. law is a thin wash that we paint over the firm outlines of reality, and the treaties and agreements of emperors and kings and statesmen have little of the permanence of certain more fundamental human realities. i was looking the other day at sir mark sykes' "the caliph's inheritance," which contains a series of coloured maps of the political boundaries of south-western asia for the last three thousand years. the shapes and colours come and go--now it is persia, now it is macedonia, now the eastern empire, now the arab, now the turk who is ascendant. the colours change as if they were in a kaleidoscope; they advance, recede, split, vanish. but through all that time there exists obstinately an armenia, an essential persia, an arabia; they, too, advance or recede a little. i do not claim that they are eternal things, but they are far more permanent things than any rulers or empires; they are rooted to the ground by a peasantry, by a physical and temperamental attitude. apart from political maps of mankind, there are natural maps of mankind. i find it, too, in europe; the monarchs splash the water and break up the mirror in endless strange shapes; nevertheless, always it is tending back to its enduring forms; always it is gravitating back to a spain, to a gaul, to an italy, to a serbo-croatia, to a bulgaria, to a germany, to a poland. poland and armenia and egypt destroyed, subjugated, invincible, i would take as typical of what i mean by the natural map of mankind. let me repeat again that i do not assert there is an eternal map. it does change; there have been times--the european settlement of america and siberia, for example, the arabic sweep across north africa, the invasion of britain by the low german peoples--when it has changed very considerably in a century or so; but at its swiftest it still takes generations to change. the gentlemen who used to sit in conferences and diets, and divide up the world ever and again before the nineteenth century, never realised this. it is only within the last hundred years that mankind has begun to grasp the fact that one of the first laws of political stability is to draw your political boundaries along the lines of the natural map of mankind. now the nineteenth century phrased this conception by talking about the "principle of nationality." such interesting survivals of the nineteenth century as mr. c.r. buxton still talk of settling human affairs by that "principle." but unhappily for him the world is not so simply divided. there are tribal regions with no national sense. there are extensive regions of the earth's surface where the population is not homogeneous, where people of different languages or different incompatible creeds live village against village, a kind of human emulsion, incapable of any true mixture or unity. consider, for example, central africa, tyrone, albania, bombay, constantinople or transylvania. here are regions and cities with either no nationality or with as much nationality as a patchwork quilt has colour.... now so far as the homogeneous regions of the world go, i am quite prepared to sustain the thesis that they can only be tranquil, they can only develop their possibilities freely and be harmless to their neighbours, when they are governed by local men, by men of the local race, religion and tradition, and with a form of government that, unlike a monarchy or a plutocracy, does not crystallise commercial or national ambition. so far i go with those who would appeal to the "principle of nationality." but i would stipulate, further, that it would enormously increase the stability of the arrangement if such "nations" could be grouped together into "united states" wherever there were possibilities of inter-state rivalries and commercial friction. where, however, one deals with a region of mixed nationality, there is need of a subtler system of adjustments. such a system has already been worked out in the case of switzerland, where we have the community not in countries but cantons, each with its own religion, its culture and self-government, and all at peace under a polyglot and impartial common government. it is as plain as daylight to anyone who is not blinded by patriotic or private interests that such a country as albania, which is mono-lingual indeed, but hopelessly divided religiously, will never be tranquil, never contented, unless it is under a cantonal system, and that the only solution of the irish difficulty along the belt between ulster and catholic ireland lies in the same arrangement. then; thirdly, there are the regions and cities possessing no nationality, such as constantinople or bombay, which manifestly appertain not to one nation but many; the former to all the black sea nations, the latter to all india. disregarding ambitions and traditions, it is fairly obvious that such international places would be best under the joint control of, and form a basis of union between, all the peoples affected. now it is suggested here that upon these threefold lines it is possible to work out a map of the world of maximum contentment and stability, and that there will be a gravitation of all other arrangements, all empires and leagues and what not, towards this rational and natural map of mankind. this does not imply that that map will ultimately assert itself, but that it will always be tending to assert itself. it will obsess ostensible politics. i do not pretend to know with any degree of certainty what peculiar forms of muddle and aggression may not record themselves upon the maps of 2200; i do not certainly know whether mankind will be better off or worse off then, more or less civilised; but i do know, with a very considerable degree of certainty, that in a.d. 2200 there will still be a france, an ireland, a germany, a jugo-slav region, a constantinople, a rajputana, and a bengal. i do not mean that these are absolutely fixed things; they may have receded or expanded. but these are the more permanent things; these are the field, the groundwork, the basic reality; these are fundamental forces over which play the ambitions, treacheries, delusions, traditions, tyrannies of international politics. all boundaries will tend to reveal these fundamental forms as all clothing tends to reveal the body. you may hide the waist; you will only reveal the shoulders the more. you may mask, you may muffle the body; it is still alive inside, and the ultimate determining thing. and, having premised this much, it is possible to take up the problem of the peace of 1917 or 1918, or whenever it is to be, with some sense of its limitations and superficiality. section 2 we have already hazarded the prophecy that after a long war of general exhaustion germany will be the first to realise defeat. this does not mean that she will surrender unconditionally, but that she will be reduced to bargaining to see how much she must surrender, and what she may hold. it is my impression that she will be deserted by bulgaria, and that turkey will be out of the fighting before the end. but these are chancy matters. against germany there will certainly be the three great allies, france, russia and britain, and almost certainly japan will be with them. the four will probably have got to a very complete and detailed understanding among themselves. italy--in, i fear, a slightly detached spirit--will sit at the board. hungary will be present, sitting, so to speak, amidst the decayed remains of austria. roumania, a little out of breath through hurrying at the last, may be present as the latest ally of italy. the european neutrals will be at least present in spirit; their desires will be acutely felt; but it is doubtful if the united states will count for all that they might in the decision. such weight as america chooses to exercise--would that she would choose to exercise more!--will probably be on the side of the rational and natural settlement of the world. now the most important thing of all at this settlement will be the temper and nature of the germany with which the allies will be dealing. let us not be blinded by the passions of war into confusing a people with its government and the artificial kultur of a brief century. there is a germany, great and civilised, a decent and admirable people, masked by imperialism, blinded by the vanity of the easy victories of half a century ago, wrapped in illusion. how far will she be chastened and disillusioned by the end of this war? the terms of peace depend enormously upon the answer to that question. if we take the extremest possibility, and suppose a revolution in germany or in south germany, and the replacement of the hohenzollerns in all or part of germany by a republic, then i am convinced that for republican germany there would be not simply forgiveness, but a warm welcome back to the comity of nations. the french, british, belgians and italians, and every civilised force in russia would tumble over one another in their eager greeting of this return to sanity. if we suppose a less extreme but more possible revolution, taking the form of an inquiry into the sanity of the kaiser and his eldest son, and the establishment of constitutional safeguards for the future, that also would bring about an extraordinary modification of the resolution of the pledged allies. but no ending to this war, no sort of settlement, will destroy the antipathy of the civilised peoples for the violent, pretentious, sentimental and cowardly imperialism that has so far dominated germany. all europe outside germany now hates and dreads the hohenzollerns. no treaty of peace can end that hate, and so long as germany sees fit to identify herself with hohenzollern dreams of empire and a warfare of massacre and assassination, there must be war henceforth, open, or but thinly masked, against germany. it will be but the elementary common sense of the situation for all the allies to plan tariffs, exclusions, special laws against german shipping and shareholders and immigrants for so long a period as every german remains a potential servant of that system. whatever germany may think of the hohenzollerns, the world outside germany regards them as the embodiment of homicidal nationalism. and the settlement of europe after the war, if it is to be a settlement with the hohenzollerns and not with the german people, must include the virtual disarming of those robber murderers against any renewal of their attack. it would be the most obvious folly to stop anywhere short of that. with germany we would welcome peace to-morrow; we would welcome her shipping on the seas and her flag about the world; against the hohenzollerns it must obviously be war to the bitter end. but the ultimate of all sane european policy, as distinguished from oligarchic and dynastic foolery, is the establishment of the natural map of europe. there exists no school of thought that can claim a moment's consideration among the allies which aims at the disintegration of the essential germany or the subjugation of any germans to an alien rule. nor does anyone grudge germany wealth, trade, shipping, or anything else that goes with the politician's phrase of "legitimate expansion" for its own sake. if we do now set our minds to deprive germany of these things in their fullness, it is in exactly the same spirit as that in which one might remove that legitimate and peaceful implement, a bread knife, from the hand of a homicidal maniac. let but germany cure herself of her hohenzollern taint, and the world will grudge her wealth and economic pre-eminence as little as it grudges wealth and economic pre-eminence to the united states. now the probabilities of a german revolution open questions too complex and subtle for our present speculation. i would merely remark in passing that in great britain at least those possibilities seem to me to be enormously underrated. for our present purpose it will be most convenient to indicate a sort of maximum and minimum, depending upon the decision of germany to be entirely hohenzollern or wholly or in part european. but in either case we are going to assume that it is germany which has been most exhausted by the war, and which is seeking peace from the allies, who have also, we will assume, excellent internal reasons for desiring it. with the hohenzollerns it is mere nonsense to dream of any enduring peace, but whether we are making a lasting and friendly peace with germany or merely a sort of truce of military operations that will be no truce in the economic war against hohenzollern resources, the same essential idea will, i think, guide all the peace-desiring powers. they will try to draw the boundaries as near as they can to those of the natural map of mankind. then, writing as an englishman, my first thought of the european map is naturally of belgium. only absolute smashing defeat could force either britain or france to consent to anything short of the complete restoration of belgium. rather than give that consent they will both carry the war to at present undreamt-of extremities. belgium must be restored; her neutrality must be replaced by a defensive alliance with her two western allies; and if the world has still to reckon with hohenzollerns, then her frontier must be thrust forward into the adjacent french-speaking country so as to minimise the chances of any second surprise. it is manifest that every frontier that gives upon the hohenzollerns must henceforth be entrenched line behind line, and held permanently by a garrison ready for any treachery, and it becomes of primary importance that the franco-belgian line should be as short and strong as possible. aix, which germany has made a mere jumping-off place for aggressions, should clearly be held by belgium against a hohenzollern empire, and the fortified and fiscal frontier would run from it southward to include the grand duchy of luxembourg, with its french sympathies and traditions, in the permanent alliance. it is quite impossible to leave this ambiguous territory as it was before the war, with its railway in german hands and its postal and telegraphic service (since 1913) under hohenzollern control. it is quite impossible to hand over this strongly anti-prussian population to hohenzollern masters. but an englishman must needs write with diffidence upon this question of the western boundary. it is clear that all the boundaries of 1914 from aix to bale are a part of ancient history. no "as you were" is possible there. and it is not the business of anyone in great britain to redraw them. that task on our side lies between france and belgium. the business of great britain in the matter is as plain as daylight. it is to support to her last man and her last ounce of gold those new boundaries her allies consider essential to their comfort and security. but i do not see how france, unless she is really convinced she is beaten, can content herself with anything less than a strong franco-belgian frontier from aix, that will take in at least metz and saarburg. she knows best the psychology of the lost provinces, and what amount of annexation will spell weakness or strength. if she demands all alsace-lorraine back from the hohenzollerns, british opinion is resolved to support her, and to go through with this struggle until she gets it. to guess at the direction of the new line is not to express a british opinion, but to speculate upon the opinion of france. after the experience of luxembourg and belgium no one now dreams of a neutralised buffer state. what does not become french or belgian of the rhineland will remain german--for ever. that is perhaps conceivable, for example, of strassburg and the low-lying parts of alsace. i do not know enough to do more than guess. it is conceivable, but i do not think that it is probable. i think the probability lies in the other direction. this war of exhaustion may be going on for a year or so more, but the end will be the thrusting in of the too extended german lines. the longer and bloodier the job is, the grimmer will be the determination of the pledged allies to exact a recompense. if the germans offer peace while they still hold some part of belgium, there will be dealings. if they wait until the french are in the palatinate, then i doubt if the french will consent to go again. there will be no possible advantage to germany in a war of resistance once the scale of her fortunes begins to sink.... it is when we turn to the east of germany that the map-drawing becomes really animated. here is the region of great decisions. the natural map shows a line of obstinately non-german communities, stretching nearly from the baltic to the adriatic. there are poland, bohemia (with her kindred slovaks), the magyars, and the jugo-serbs. in a second line come the great and little russians, the roumanians, and the bulgarians. and here both great britain and france must defer to the wishes of their two allies, russia and italy. neither of these countries has expressed inflexible intentions, and the situation has none of the inevitable quality of the western line. except for the tsar's promise of autonomy to poland, nothing has been promised. on the western line there are only two possibilities that i can see: the aix-bale boundary, or the sickness and death of france. on the eastern line nothing is fated. there seems to be enormous scope for bargaining over all this field, and here it is that the chances of compensations and consolations for germany are to be found. let us first consider the case for poland. the way to a reunited poland seems to me a particularly difficult one. the perplexity arises out of the crime of the original partition; whichever side emerges with an effect of victory must needs give up territory if an autonomous poland is to reappear. a victorious germany would probably reconstitute the duchy of warsaw under a german prince; an entirely victorious russia would probably rejoin posen to russian poland and the polish fragment of galicia, and create a dependent polish kingdom under the tsar. neither project would be received with unstinted delight by the poles, but either would probably be acceptable to a certain section of them. disregarding the dim feelings of the peasantry, austrian poland would probably be the most willing to retain a connection with its old rulers. the habsburgs have least estranged the poles. the cracow district is the only section of poland which has been at all reconciled to foreign control; it is the most autonomous and contented of the fragments. it is doubtful how far national unanimity is any longer possible between the three polish fragments. like most english writers, i receive a considerable amount of printed matter from various schools of polish patriotism, and wide divergences of spirit and intention appear. a weak, divided and politically isolated poland of twelve or fifteen million people, under some puppet adventurer king set up between the hohenzollerns and the tsardom, does not promise much happiness for the poles or much security for the peace of the world. an entirely independent poland will be a feverish field of international intrigue--intrigue to which the fatal polish temperament lends itself all too readily; it may be a battlefield again within five-and-twenty years. i think, if i were a patriotic pole, i should determine to be a slav at any cost, and make the best of russia; ally myself with all her liberal tendencies, and rise or fall with her. and i should do my utmost in a field where at present too little has been done to establish understandings and lay the foundations of a future alliance with the czech-slovak community to the south. but, then, i am not a pole, but a western european with a strong liking for the russians. i am democratic and scientific, and the poles i have met are catholic and aristocratic and romantic, and all sorts of difficult things that must make co-operation with them on the part of russians, ruthenian peasants, czechs, and, indeed, other poles, slow and insecure. i doubt if either germany or russia wants to incorporate more poles--russia more particularly, which has all siberia over which to breed russians--and i am inclined to think that there is a probability that the end of this war may find poland still divided, and with boundary lines running across her not materially different from those of 1914. that is, i think, an undesirable probability, but until the polish mind qualifies its desire for absolute independence with a determination to orient itself definitely to some larger political mass, it remains one that has to be considered. but the future of poland is not really separate from that of the austro-hungarian monarchy, nor is that again to be dealt with apart from that of the balkans. from danzig to the morea there runs across europe a series of distinctive peoples, each too intensely different and national to be absorbed and assimilated by either of their greater neighbours, germany or russia, and each relatively too small to stand securely alone. none have shaken themselves free from monarchical traditions; each may become an easy prey to dynastic follies and the aggressive obsessions of diplomacy. centuries of bloody rearrangement may lie before this east central belt of europe. to the liberal idealist the thought of a possible swiss system or group of swiss systems comes readily to mind. one thinks of a grouping of groups of republics, building up a united states of eastern europe. but neither hohenzollerns nor tsar would welcome that. the arm of democratic france is not long enough to reach to help forward such a development, and great britain is never sure whether she is a "crowned republic" or a germanic monarchy. hitherto in the balkans she has lent her influence chiefly to setting up those treacherous little german kings who have rewarded her so ill. the national monarchs of serbia and montenegro have alone kept faith with civilisation. i doubt, however, if great britain will go on with that dynastic policy. she herself is upon the eve of profound changes of spirit and internal organisation. but whenever one thinks of the possibilities of republican development in europe as an outcome of this war, it is to realise the disastrous indifference of america to the essentials of the european situation. the united states of america could exert an enormous influence at the close of the war in the direction of a liberal settlement and of liberal institutions.... they will, i fear, do nothing of the sort. it is here that the possibility of some internal change in germany becomes of such supreme importance. the hohenzollern imperialism towers like the black threat of a new caesarism over all the world. it may tower for some centuries; it may vanish to-morrow. a german revolution may destroy it; a small group of lunacy commissioners may fold it up and put it away. but should it go, it would at least take with it nearly every crown between hamburg and constantinople. the german kings would vanish like a wisp of smoke. suppose a german revolution and a correlated step forward towards liberal institutions on the part of russia, then the whole stage of eastern europe would clear as fever goes out of a man. this age of international elbowing and jostling, of intrigue and diplomacy, of wars, massacres, deportations _en masse_, and the continual fluctuation of irrational boundaries would come to an end forthwith. so sweeping a change is the extreme possibility. the probability is of something less lucid and more prosaic; of a discussion of diplomatists; of patched arrangements. but even under these circumstances the whole eastern european situation is so fluid and little controlled by any plain necessity, that there will be enormous scope for any individual statesman of imagination and force of will. there have recently been revelations, more or less trustworthy, of german schemes for a rearrangement of eastern europe. they implied a german victory. bohemia, poland, galicia and ruthenia were to make a habsburg-ruled state from the baltic to the black sea. the jugo-slav and the magyar were to be linked (uneasy bedfellows) into a second kingdom, also habsburg ruled; austria was to come into the german empire as a third habsburg dukedom or kingdom; roumania, bulgaria and greece were to continue as independent powers, german ruled. recently german proposals published in america have shown a disposition to admit the claims of roumania to the wallachian districts of transylvania. evidently the urgent need to create kingdoms or confederations larger than any such single states as the natural map supplies, is manifest to both sides. if germany, italy and russia can come to any sort of general agreement in these matters, their arrangements will be a matter of secondary importance to the western allies--saving our duty to serbia and montenegro and their rulers. russia may not find the german idea of a polish _plus_ bohemian border state so very distasteful, provided that the ruler is not a german; germany may find the idea still tolerable if the ruler is not the tsar. the destiny of the serbo-croatian future lies largely in the hands of italy and bulgaria. bulgaria was not in this war at the beginning, and she may not be in it at the end. her king is neither immortal nor irreplaceable. her desire now must be largely to retain her winnings in macedonia, and keep the frontier posts of a too embracing germany as far off as possible. she has nothing to gain and much to fear from roumania and greece. her present relations with turkey are unnatural. she has everything to gain from a prompt recovery of the friendship of italy and the sea powers. a friendly serbo-croatian buffer state against germany will probably be of equal comfort in the future to italy and bulgaria; more especially if italy has pushed down the adriatic coast along the line of the former venetian possessions. serbia has been overrun, but never were the convergent forces of adjacent interests so clearly in favour of her recuperation. the possibility of italy and that strange latin outlier, roumania, joining hands through an allied and friendly serbia must be very present in italian thought. the allied conception of the land route from the west and america to bagdad and india is by mont cenis, trieste, serbia and constantinople, as their north european line to india is through russia by baku. and that brings us to constantinople. constantinople is not a national city; it is now, and it has always been, an artificial cosmopolis, and constantinople and the dardanelles are essentially the gate of the black sea. it is to russia that the waterway is of supreme importance. any other power upon it can strangle russia; russia, possessing it, is capable of very little harm to any other country. roumania is the next most interested country. but roumania can reach up the danube and through bulgaria, serbia or hungary to the outer world. her greatest trade will always be with central europe. for generations the turks held thrace and anatolia before they secured constantinople. the turk can exist without constantinople; he is at his best outside constantinople; the fall of constantinople was the beginning of his decay. he sat down there and corrupted. his career was at an end. i confess that i find a bias in my mind for a russian ownership of constantinople. i think that if she does not get it now her gravitation towards it in the future will be so great as to cause fresh wars. somewhere she must get to open sea, and if it is not through constantinople then her line must lie either through a dependent armenia thrust down to the coast of the levant or, least probable and least desirable of all, through the persian gulf. the constantinople route is the most natural and least controversial of these. with the dwindling of the turkish power, the turks at constantinople become more and more like robber knights levying toll at the pass. i can imagine russia making enormous concessions in poland, for example, accepting retrocessions, and conceding autonomy, rather than foregoing her ancient destiny upon the bosphorus. i believe she will fight on along the black sea coast until she gets there. this, i think, is russia's fundamental end, without which no peace is worth having, as the liberation of belgium and the satisfaction of france is the fundamental end of great britain, and trieste-fiume is the fundamental end of italy. but for all the lands that lie between constantinople and west prussia there are no absolutely fundamental ends; that is the land of _quid pro quo_; that is where the dealing will be done. serbia must be restored and the croats liberated; sooner or later the south slav state will insist upon itself; but, except for that, i see no impossibility in the german dream of three kingdoms to take the place of austro-hungary, nor even in a southward extension of the hohenzollern empire to embrace the german one of the three. if the austrians have a passion for prussian "kultur," it is not for us to restrain it. austrian, saxon, bavarian, hanoverian and prussian must adjust their own differences. hungary would be naturally habsburg; is, in fact, now essentially habsburg, more habsburg than austria, and essentially anti-slav. her gravitation to the central powers seems inevitable. whether the polish-czech combination would be a habsburg kingdom at all is another matter. only if, after all, the allies are far less successful than they have now every reason to hope would that become possible. the gravitation of that west slav state to the central european system or to russia will, i think, be the only real measure of ultimate success or failure in this war. i think it narrows down to that so far as europe is concerned. most of the other things are inevitable. such, it seems to me, is the most open possibility in the european map in the years immediately before us. if by dying i could assure the end of the hohenzollern empire to-morrow i would gladly do it. but i have, as a balancing prophet, to face the high probability of its outliving me for some generations. it is to me a deplorable probability. far rather would i anticipate germany quit of her eagles and hohenzollerns, and ready to take her place as the leading power of the united states of europe. x. the united states, france, britain, and russia section 1 in this chapter i propose to speculate a little about the future development of these four great states, whose destinies are likely to be much more closely interwoven than their past histories have been. i believe that the stars in their courses tend to draw these states together into a dominant peace alliance, maintaining the peace of the world. there may be other stars in that constellation, italy, japan, a confederated latin america, for example; i do not propose to deal with that possibility now, but only to dwell upon the development of understandings and common aims between france, russia, and the english-speaking states. they have all shared one common experience during the last two years; they have had an enormous loss of self-sufficiency. this has been particularly the case with the united states of america. at the beginning of this war, the united states were still possessed by the glorious illusion that they were aloof from general international politics, that they needed no allies and need fear no enemies, that they constituted a sort of asylum from war and all the bitter stresses and hostilities of the old world. themselves secure, they could intervene with grim resolution to protect their citizens all over the world. had they not bombarded algiers?... i remember that soon after the outbreak of the war i lunched at the savoy hotel in london when it was crammed with americans suddenly swept out of europe by the storm. my host happened to be a man of some diplomatic standing, and several of them came and talked to him. they were full of these old-world ideas of american immunity. their indignation was comical even at the time. some of them had been hustled; some had lost their luggage in germany. when, they asked, was it to be returned to them? some seemed to be under the impression that, war or no war, an american tourist had a perfect right to travel about in the vosges or up and down the rhine just as he thought fit. they thought he had just to wave a little american flag, and the referee would blow a whistle and hold up the battle until he had got by safely. one family had actually been careering about in a cart--their automobile seized--between the closing lines of french and germans, brightly unaware of the disrespect of bursting shells for american nationality.... since those days the american nation has lived politically a hundred years. the people of the united states have shed their delusion that there is an eastern and a western hemisphere, and that nothing can ever pass between them but immigrants and tourists and trade, and realised that this world is one round globe that gets smaller and smaller every decade if you measure it by day's journeys. they are only going over the lesson the british have learnt in the last score or so of years. this is one world and bayonets are a crop that spreads. let them gather and seed, it matters not how far from you, and a time will come when they will be sticking up under your nose. there is no real peace but the peace of the whole world, and that is only to be kept by the whole world resisting and suppressing aggression wherever it arises. to anyone who watches the american press, this realisation has been more and more manifest. from dreams of aloofness and ineffable superiority, america comes round very rapidly to a conception of an active participation in the difficult business of statecraft. she is thinking of alliances, of throwing her weight and influence upon the side of law and security. no longer a political thoreau in the woods, a sort of vegetarian recluse among nations, a being of negative virtues and unpremeditated superiorities, she girds herself for a manly part in the toilsome world of men. so far as i can judge, the american mind is eminently free from any sentimental leaning towards the british. americans have a traditional hatred of the hanoverian monarchy, and a democratic disbelief in autocracy. they are far more acutely aware of differences than resemblances. they suspect every englishman of being a bit of a gentleman and a bit of a flunkey. i have never found in america anything like that feeling common in the mass of english people that prevents the use of the word "foreigner" for an american; there is nothing to reciprocate the sympathy and pride that english and irish republicans and radicals feel for the states. few americans realise that there are such beings as english republicans. what has linked americans with the british hitherto has been very largely the common language and literature; it is only since the war began that there seems to have been any appreciable development of fraternal feeling. and that has been not so much discovery of a mutual affection as the realisation of a far closer community of essential thought and purpose than has hitherto been suspected. the americans, after thinking the matter out with great frankness and vigour, do believe that britain is on the whole fighting against aggression and not for profit, that she is honestly backing france and belgium against an intolerable attack, and that the hohenzollern empire is a thing that needs discrediting and, if possible, destroying in the interests of all humanity, germany included. america has made the surprising discovery that, allowing for their greater nearness, the british are thinking about these things almost exactly as americans think about them. they follow the phases of the war in great britain, the strain, the blunderings, the tenacity, the onset of conscription in an essentially non-military community, with the complete understanding of a people similarly circumstanced, differing only by scale and distance. they have been through something of the sort already; they may have something of the sort happen again. it had not occurred to them hitherto how parallel we were. they begin to have inklings of how much more parallel we may presently become. there is evidence of a real search for american affinities among the other peoples of the world; it is a new war-made feature of the thoughtful literature and journalists of america. and it is interesting to note how partial and divided these affinities must necessarily be. historically and politically, the citizen of the united states must be drawn most closely to france. france is the one other successful modern republic; she was the instigator and friend of american liberation. with great britain the tie of language, the tradition of personal freedom, and the strain in the blood are powerful links. but both france and britain are old countries, thickly populated, with a great and ancient finish and completeness, full of implicit relationships; america is by comparison crude, uninformed, explicit, a new country, still turning fresh soil, still turning over but half-explored natural resources. the united states constitute a modern country, a country on an unprecedented scale, being organised from the very beginning on modern lines. there is only one other such country upon the planet, and that curiously enough is parallel in climate, size, and position--russia in asia. even russia in europe belongs rather to the newness that is american than to the tradition that is european; harvard was founded more than half a century before petrograd. and when i looked out of the train window on my way to petrograd from germany, the little towns i saw were like no european towns i had ever seen. the wooden houses, the broad unmade roads, the traffic, the winter-bitten scenery, a sort of untidy spaciousness, took my mind instantly to the country one sees in the back part of new york state as one goes from boston to niagara. and the reality follows the appearance. the united states and russia are the west and the east of the same thing; they are great modern states, developing from the beginning upon a scale that only railways make possible. france and britain may perish in the next two centuries or they may persist, but there can be no doubt that two centuries ahead russia and the united states will be two of the greatest masses of fairly homogeneous population on the globe. there are no countries with whom the people of the united states are so likely to develop sympathy and a sense of common values and common interests as with these three, unless it be with the scandinavian peoples. the scandinavian peoples have developed a tendency to an extra-european outlook, to look west and east rather than southwardly, to be pacifist and progressive in a manner essentially american. from any close sympathy with germany the americans are cut off at present by the hohenzollerns and the system of ideas that the hohenzollerns have imposed upon german thought. so long as the germans cling to the tawdry tradition of the empire, so long as they profess militarism, so long as they keep up their ridiculous belief in some strange racial superiority to the rest of mankind, it is absurd to expect any co-operative feeling between them and any other great people. the american tradition is based upon the casting off of a germanic monarchy; it is its cardinal idea. these sturdy republicans did not fling out the hanoverians and their hessian troops to prepare the path of glory for potsdam. but except for the gash caused by the teutonic monarchy, there runs round the whole world a north temperate and sub-arctic zone of peoples, generally similar in complexion, physical circumstances, and intellectual and moral quality, having enormous undeveloped natural resources, and a common interest in keeping the peace while these natural resources are developed, having also a common interest in maintaining the integrity of china and preventing her development into a military power; it is a zone with the clearest prospect of a vast increase in its already enormous population, and it speaks in the main one or other of three languages, either french, russian, or english. i believe that natural sympathy will march with the obvious possibilities of the situation in bringing the american mind to the realisation of this band of common interests and of its compatibility with the older idea of an american continent protected by a monroe doctrine from any possibility of aggression from the monarchies of the old world. as the old conception of isolation fades and the american mind accustoms itself to the new conception of a need of alliances and understandings to save mankind from the megalomania of races and dynasties, i believe it will turn first to the idea of keeping the seas with britain and france, and then to this still wider idea of an understanding with the pledged allies that will keep the peace of the world. now germany has taught the world several things, and one of the most important of these lessons is the fact that the destinies of states and peoples is no longer to be determined by the secret arrangements of diplomatists and the agreements or jealousies of kings. for fifty years germany has been unifying the mind of her people against the world. she has obsessed them with an evil ideal, but the point we have to note is that she has succeeded in obsessing them with that ideal. no other modern country has even attempted such a moral and mental solidarity as germany has achieved. and good ideals need, just as much as bad ones, systematic inculcation, continual open expression and restatement. mute, mindless, or demented nations are dangerous and doomed nations. the great political conceptions that are needed to establish the peace of the world must become the common property of the mass of intelligent adults if they are to hold against the political scoundrel, the royal adventurer, the forensic exploiter, the enemies and scatterers of mankind. the french, americans, and english have to realise this necessity; they have to state a common will and they have to make their possession by that will understood by the russian people, and they have to share that will with the russian people. beyond that there lies the still greater task or making some common system of understandings with the intellectual masses of china and india. at present, with three of these four great powers enormously preoccupied with actual warfare, there is an opportunity for guiding expression on the part of america, for a real world leadership, such as may never occur again.... so far i have been stating a situation and reviewing certain possibilities. in the past half-century the united states has been developing a great system of universities and a continental production of literature and discussion to supplement the limited press and the new england literature of the earlier phase of the american process. it is one of the most interesting speculations in the world to everyone how far this new organisation of the american mind is capable of grasping the stupendous opportunities and appeals of the present time. the war and the great occasions that must follow the war will tax the mind and the intellectual and moral forces of the pledged allies enormously. how far is this new but very great and growing system of thought and learning in the united states capable of that propaganda of ideas and language, that progressive expression of a developing ideal of community, that in countries so spontaneous, so chaotic or democratic as the united states and the pledged allies must necessarily take the place of the organised authoritative _kultur_ of the teutonic type of state? as an undisguisedly patriotic englishman, i would like to see the lead in this intellectual synthesis of the nations, that _must_ be achieved if wars are to cease, undertaken by great britain. but i am bound to confess that in great britain i see neither the imaginative courage of france nor the brisk enterprise of the americans. i see this matter as a question of peace and civilisation, but there are other baser but quite as effective reasons why america, france, and great britain should exert themselves to create confidences and understandings between their populations and the russian population. there is the immediate business opportunity in russia. there is the secondary business opportunity in china that can best be developed as the partners rather than as the rivals of the russians. since the americans are nearest, by way of the pacific, since they are likely to have more capital and more free energy to play with than the pledged allies, i do on the whole incline to the belief that it is they who will yet do the pioneer work and the leading work that this opportunity demands. section 2 if beneath the alliances of the present war there is to grow up a system of enduring understandings that will lead to the peace of the world, there is needed as a basis for such understandings much greater facility of intellectual intercourse than exists at present. firstly, the world needs a _lingua franca_; next, the western peoples need to know more of the russian language and life than they do, and thirdly, the english language needs to be made more easily accessible than it is at present. the chief obstacle to a frenchman or englishman learning russian is the difficult and confusing alphabet; the chief obstacle to anyone learning english is the irrational spelling. are people likely to overcome these very serious difficulties in the future, and, if so, how will they do it? and what prospects are there of a _lingua franca_? wherever one looks closely into the causes and determining influences of the great convulsions of this time, one is more and more impressed by the apparent smallness of the ultimate directing influence. it seems to me at least that it is a practically proven thing that this vast aggression of germany is to be traced back to a general tone of court thinking and discussion in the prussia of the eighteenth century, to the theories of a few professors and the gathering trend of german education in a certain direction. it seems to me that similarly the language teachers of to-day and to-morrow may hold in their hands the seeds of gigantic international developments in the future. it is not a question of the skill or devotion of individual teachers so much as of the possibility of organising them upon a grand scale. an individual teacher must necessarily use the ordinary books and ordinary spelling and type of the language in which he is giving instruction; he may get a few elementary instruction books from a private publisher, specially printed for teaching purposes, but very speedily he finds himself obliged to go to the current printed matter. this, as i will immediately show, bars the most rapid and fruitful method of teaching. and in this as in most affairs, private enterprise, the individualistic system, shows itself a failure. in england, for example, the choice of russian lesson books is poor and unsatisfactory, and there is either no serviceable russian-english, english-russian school dictionary in existence, or it is published so badly as to be beyond the range of my inquiries. but a state, or a group of universities, or even a rich private association such as far-seeing american, french and british business men might be reasonably expected to form, could attack the problem of teaching a language in an altogether different fashion. the difficulty in teaching english lies in the inconsistency of the spelling, and the consequent difficulties of pronunciation. if there were available an ample series of text-books, reading books, and books of general interest, done in a consistent phonetic type and spelling--in which the value of the letters of the phonetic system followed as far as possible the prevalent usage in europe--the difficulty in teaching english not merely to foreigners but, as the experiments in teaching reading of the simplified spelling society have proved up to the hilt, to english children can be very greatly reduced. at first the difficulty of the irrational spelling can be set on one side. the learner attacks and masters the essential language. then afterwards he can, if he likes, go on to the orthodox spelling, which is then no harder for him to read and master than it is for an englishman of ordinary education to read the facetious orthography of artemus ward or of the _westminster gazette_ "orfis boy." the learner does one thing at a time instead of attempting, as he would otherwise have to do, two things--and they are both difficult and different and conflicting things--simultaneously. learning a language is one thing and memorising an illogical system of visual images--for that is what reading ordinary english spelling comes to--is quite another. a man can learn to play first chess and then bridge in half the time that these two games would require if he began by attempting simultaneous play, and exactly the same principle applies to the language problem. these considerations lead on to the idea of a special development or sub-species of the english language for elementary teaching and foreign consumption. it would be english, very slightly simplified and regularised, and phonetically spelt. let us call it anglo-american. in it the propagandist power, whatever that power might be, state, university or association, would print not simply, instruction books but a literature of cheap editions. such a specialised simplified anglo-american variety of english would enormously stimulate the already wide diffusion of the language, and go far to establish it as that _lingua franca_ of which the world has need. and in the same way, the phonetic alphabet adopted as the english medium could be used as the medium for instruction in french, where, as in the british isles, canada, north and central africa, and large regions of the east, it is desirable to make an english-speaking community bi-lingual. at present a book in french means nothing to an uninstructed englishman, an english book conveys no accurate sound images to an uninstructed frenchman. on the other hand, a french book printed on a proper phonetic system could be immediately read aloud--though of course it could not be understood--by an uninstructed englishman. from the first he would have no difficulties with the sounds. and vice versa. such a system of books would mean the destruction of what are, for great masses of french and english people, insurmountable difficulties on the way to bi-lingualism. its production is a task all too colossal for any private publishers or teachers, but it is a task altogether trivial in comparison with the national value of its consequences. but whether it will ever be carried out is just one of those riddles of the jumping cat in the human brain that are most perplexing to the prophet. the problem becomes at once graver, less hopeful, and more urgent when we take up the case of russian. i have looked closely into this business of russian teaching, and i am convinced that only a very, very small number of french-and english-speaking people are going to master russian under the existing conditions of instruction. if we westerns want to get at russia in good earnest we must take up this russian language problem with an imaginative courage and upon a scale of which at present i see no signs. if we do not, then the belgians, french, americans and english will be doing business in russia after the war in the german language--or through a friendly german interpreter. that, i am afraid, is the probability of the case. but it need not be the case. will and intelligence could alter all that. what has to be done is to have russian taught at first in a western phonetic type. then it becomes a language not very much more difficult to acquire than, say, german by a frenchman. when the learner can talk with some freedom, has a fairly full vocabulary, a phraseology, knows his verb and so on, then and then only should he take up the unfamiliar and confusing set of visual images of russian lettering--i speak from the point of view of those who read the latin alphabet. how confusing it may be only those who have tried it can tell. its familiarity to the eye increases the difficulty; totally unfamiliar forms would be easier to learn. the frenchman or englishman is confronted with cop; the sound of that is sar! for those who learn languages, as so many people do nowadays, by visual images, there will always be an undercurrent toward saying "cop." the mind plunges hopelessly through that tangle to the elements of a speech which is as yet unknown. nevertheless almost all the instruction in russian of which i can get an account begins with the alphabet, and must, i suppose, begin with the alphabet until teachers have a suitably printed set of instruction books to enable them to take the better line. one school teacher i know, in a public school, devoted the entire first term, the third of a year, to the alphabet. at the end he was still dissatisfied with the progress of his pupils. he gave them russian words, of course, words of which they knew nothing--in russian characters. it was too much for them to take hold of at one and the same time. he did not even think of teaching them to write french and english words in the strange lettering. he did not attempt to write his russian in latin letters. he was apparently ignorant of any system of transliteration, and he did nothing to mitigate the impossible task before him. at the end of the term most of his pupils gave up the hopeless effort. it is not too much to say that for a great number of "visualising" people, the double effort at the outset of russian is entirely too much. it stops them altogether. but to almost anyone it is possible to learn russian if at first it is presented in a lettering that gives no trouble. if i found myself obliged to learn russian urgently, i would get some accepted system of transliteration, carefully transcribe every word of russian in my text-book into the latin characters, and learn the elements of the language from my manuscript. a year or so ago i made a brief visit to russia with a "russian self-taught" in my pocket. nothing sticks, nothing ever did stick of that self-taught russian except the words that i learnt in latin type. those i remember as i remember all words, as groups of latin letters. i learnt to count, for example, up to a hundred. the other day i failed to recognise the russian word for eleven in russian characters until i had spelt it out. then i said, "oh, of course!" but i knew it when i heard it. i write of these things from the point of view of the keen learner. some russian teachers will be found to agree with me; others will not. it is a paradox in the psychology of the teacher that few teachers are willing to adopt "slick" methods of teaching; they hate cutting corners far more than they hate obstacles, because their interest is in the teaching and not in the "getting there." but what we learners want is not an exquisite, rare knowledge of particulars, we do not want to spend an hour upon russian needlessly; we want to get there as quickly and effectively as possible. and for that, transliterated books are essential. now these may seem small details in the learning of languages, mere schoolmasters' gossip, but the consequences are on the continental scale. the want of these national text-books and readers is a great gulf between russia and her allies; _it is a greater gulf than the profoundest political misunderstanding could be_. we cannot get at them to talk plainly to them, and they cannot get at us to talk plainly to us. a narrow bridge of interpreters is our only link with the russian mind. and many of those interpreters are of a race which is for very good reasons hostile to russia. an abundant cheap supply, firstly, of english and french books, _in_ english and french, but in the russian character, by means of which russians may rapidly learn french and english--for it is quite a fable that these languages are known and used in russia below the level of the court and aristocracy--and, secondly, of russian books in the latin (or some easy phonetic development of the latin) type, will do more to facilitate interchange and intercourse between russia and france, america and britain, and so consolidate the present alliance than almost any other single thing. but that supply will not be a paying thing to provide; if it is left to publishers or private language teachers or any form of private enterprise it will never be provided. it is a necessary public undertaking. but because a thing is necessary it does not follow that it will be achieved. bread may be necessary to a starving man, but there is always the alternative that he will starve. france, which is most accessible to creative ideas, is least interested in this particular matter. great britain is still heavily conservative. it is idle to ignore the forces still entrenched in the established church, in the universities and the great schools, that stand for an irrational resistance to all new things. american universities are comparatively youthful and sometimes quite surprisingly innovating, and america is the country of the adventurous millionaire. there has been evidence in several american papers that have reached me recently of a disposition to get ahead with russia and cut out the germans (and incidentally the british). amidst the cross-currents and overlappings of this extraordinary time, it seems to me highly probable that america may lead in this vitally important effort to promote international understanding. xi. "the white man's burthen" one of the most curious aspects of the british "pacifist" is his willingness to give over great blocks of the black and coloured races to the hohenzollerns to exploit and experiment upon. i myself being something of a pacifist, and doing what i can, in my corner, to bring about the peace of the world, the peace of the world triumphant and armed against every disturber, could the more readily sympathise with the passive school of pacifists if its proposals involved the idea that england should keep to england and germany to germany. my political ideal is the united states of the world, a union of states whose state boundaries are determined by what i have defined as the natural map of mankind. i cannot understand those pacifists who talk about the german right to "expansion," and babble about a return of her justly lost colonies. that seems to me not pacificism but patriotic inversion. this large disposition to hand over our fellow-creatures to a teutonic educational system, with "frightfulness" in reserve, to "efficiency" on wittenberg lines, leaves me--hot. the ghosts of the thirst-tormented hereros rise up in their thousands from the african dust, protesting. this talk of "legitimate expansion" is indeed now only an exploiter's cant. the age of "expansion," the age of european "empires" is near its end. no one who can read the signs of the times in japan, in india, in china, can doubt it. it ended in america a hundred years ago; it is ending now in asia; it will end last in africa, and even in africa the end draws near. spain has but led the way which other "empires" must follow. look at her empire in the atlases of 1800. she fell down the steps violently and painfully, it is true--but they are difficult to descend. no sane man, german or anti-german, who has weighed the prospects of the new age, will be desirous of a restoration of the now vanished german colonial empire, vindictive, intriguing, and unscrupulous, a mere series of centres of attack upon adjacent territory, to complicate the immense disentanglements and readjustments that lie already before the french and british and italians. directly we discuss the problem of the absolutely necessary permanent alliance that this war has forced upon at least france, belgium, britain and russia, this problem of the "empires" faces us. what are these allies going to do about their "subject races"? what is the world going to do about the "subject races"? it is a matter in which the "subject races" are likely to have an increasingly important voice of their own. we europeans may discuss their fate to-day among ourselves; we shall be discussing it with them to-morrow. if we do not agree with them then, they will take their fates in their own hands in spite of us. long before a.d. 2100 there will be no such thing as a "subject race" in all the world. here again we find ourselves asking just that same difficult question of more or less, that arises at every cardinal point of our review of the probable future. how far is this thing going to be done finely; how far is it going to be done cunningly and basely? how far will greatness of mind, how far will imaginative generosity, prevail over the jealous and pettifogging spirit that lurks in every human being? are french and british and belgians and italians, for example, going to help each other in africa, or are they going to work against and cheat each other? is the russian seeking only a necessary outlet to the seas of the world, or has he dreams of delhi? here again, as in all these questions, personal idiosyncrasy comes in; i am strongly disposed to trust the good in the russian. but apart from this uncertain question of generosity, there are in this case two powerful forces that make against disputes, secret disloyalties, and meanness. one is that germany will certainly be still dangerous at the end of the war, and the second is that the gap in education, in efficiency, in national feeling and courage of outlook, between the european and the great asiatic and african communities, is rapidly diminishing. if the europeans squabble much more for world ascendancy, there will be no world ascendancy for them to squabble for. we have still no means of measuring the relative enfeeblement of europe in comparison with asia already produced by this war. as it is, certain things are so inevitable--the integration of a modernised bengal, of china, and of egypt, for example--that the question before us is practically reduced to whether this restoration of the subject peoples will be done with the european's aid and goodwill, or whether it will be done against him. that it will be done in some manner or other is certain. the days of suppression are over. they know it in every country where white and brown and yellow mingle. if the pledged allies are not disposed to let in light to their subject peoples and prepare for the days of world equality that are coming, the germans will. if the germans fail to be the most enslaving of people, they may become the most liberating. they will set themselves, with their characteristic thoroughness, to destroy that magic "prestige" which in asia particularly is the clue to the miracle of european ascendancy. in the long run that may prove no ill service to mankind. the european must prepare to make himself acceptable in asia, to state his case to asia and be understood by asia, or to leave asia. that is the blunt reality of the asiatic situation. it has already been pointed out in these chapters that if the alliance of the pledged allies is indeed to be permanent, it implies something in the nature of a zollverein, a common policy towards the rest of the world and an arrangement involving a common control over the dependencies of all the allies. it will be interesting, now that we have sketched a possible map of europe after the war, to look a little more closely into the nature of the "empires" concerned, and to attempt a few broad details of the probable map of the eastern hemisphere outside europe in the years immediately to come. now there are, roughly speaking, three types of overseas "possessions." they may be either (1) territory that was originally practically unoccupied and that was settled by the imperial people, or (2) territory with a barbaric population having no national idea, or (3) conquered states. in the case of the british empire all three are present; in the case of the french only the second and third; in the case of the russian only the first and third. each of these types must necessarily follow its own system of developments. take first those territories originally but thinly occupied, or not occupied at all, of which all or at least the dominant element of the population is akin to that of the "home country." these used to be called by the british "colonies"--though the "colonies" of greece and rome were really only garrison cities settled in foreign lands--and they are now being rechristened "dominions." australia, for instance, is a british dominion, and siberia and most of russia in asia, a russian dominion. their manifest destiny is for their children to become equal citizens with the cousins and brothers they have left at home. there has been much discussion in england during the last decade upon some modification of the british legislature that would admit representatives from the dominions to a proportional share in the government of the empire. the problem has been complicated by the unsettled status of ireland and the mischief-making tories there, and by the perplexities arising out of those british dependencies of non-british race--the indian states, for example, whose interests are sometimes in conflict with those of the dominions. the attractiveness of the idea of an imperial legislature is chiefly on the surface, and i have very strong doubts of its realisability. these dominions seem rather to tend to become independent and distinct sovereign states in close and affectionate alliance with great britain, and having a common interest in the british navy. in many ways the interests of the dominions are more divergent from those of great britain than are great britain and russia, or great britain and france. many of the interests of canada are more closely bound to those of the united states than they are to those of australasia, in such a matter as the maintenance of the monroe principle, for example. south africa again takes a line with regard to british indian subjects which is highly embarrassing to great britain. there is a tendency in all the british colonies to read american books and periodicals rather than british, if for no other reason than because their common life, life in a newish and very democratic land, is much more american than british in character. on the other hand, one must remember that great britain has european interests--the integrity of holland and belgium is a case in point--which are much closer to the interests of france than they are to those of the younger britains beyond the seas. a voice in an alliance that included france and the united states, and had its chief common interest in the control of the seas, may in the future seem far more desirable to these great and growing english-speaking dominions than the sending of representatives to an imperial house of lords at westminster, and the adornment of elderly colonial politicians with titles and decorations at buckingham palace. i think great britain and her allies have all of them to prepare their minds for a certain release of their grip upon their "possessions," if they wish to build up a larger unity; i do not see that any secure unanimity of purpose is possible without such releases and readjustments. now the next class of foreign "possession" is that in which the french and belgians and italians are most interested. britain also has possessions of this type in central africa and the less civilised districts of india, but russia has scarcely anything of the sort. in this second class of possession the population is numerous, barbaric, and incapable of any large or enduring political structure, and over its destinies rule a small minority of european administrators. the greatest of this series of possessions are those in black africa. the french imagination has taken a very strong hold of the idea of a great french-speaking west and central africa, with which the ordinary british citizen will only too gladly see the conquered german colonies incorporated. the italians have a parallel field of development in the hinterland of tripoli. side by side, france, belgium and italy, no longer troubled by hostile intrigues, may very well set themselves in the future to the task of building up a congenial latin civilisation out of the tribal confusions of these vast regions. they will, i am convinced, do far better than the english in this domain. the english-speaking peoples have been perhaps the most successful _settlers_ in the world; the united states and the dominions are there to prove it; only the russians in siberia can compare with them; but as administrators the british are a race coldly aloof. they have nothing to give a black people, and no disposition to give. the latin-speaking peoples, the mediterranean nations, on the other hand, have proved to be the most successful _assimilators_ of other races that mankind has ever known. alexandre dumas is not the least of the glories of france. in a hundred years' time black africa, west of tripoli, from oran to rhodesia, will, i believe, talk french. and what does not speak french will speak the closely related italian. i do not see why this latin black culture should not extend across equatorial africa to meet the indian influence at the coast, and reach out to join hands with madagascar. i do not see why the british flag should be any impediment to the latinisation of tropical africa or to the natural extension of the french and italian languages through egypt. i guess, however, that it will be an islamic and not a christian cult that will be talking italian and french. for the french-speaking civilisation will make roads not only for french, belgians, and italians, but for the arabs whose religion and culture already lie like a net over black africa. no other peoples and no other religion can so conveniently give the negro what is needed to bring him into the comity of civilised peoples.... a few words of digression upon the future of islam may not be out of place here. the idea of a militant christendom has vanished from the world. the last pretensions of christian propaganda have been buried in the balkan trenches. a unification of africa under latin auspices carries with it now no threat of missionary invasion. africa will be a fair field for all religions, and the religion to which the negro will take will be the religion that best suits his needs. that religion, we are told by nearly everyone who has a right to speak upon such questions, is islam, and its natural propagandist is the arab. there is no reason why he should not be a frenchified arab. both the french and the british have the strongest interest in the revival of arabic culture. let the german learn turkish if it pleases him. through all africa and western asia there is a great to-morrow for a renascent islam under arab auspices. constantinople, that venal city of the waterways, sitting like asenath at the ford, has corrupted all who came to her; she has been the paralysis of islam. but the islam of the turk is a different thing from the islam of the arab. that was one of the great progressive impulses in the world of men. it is our custom to underrate the arab's contribution to civilisation quite absurdly in comparison with our debt to the hebrew and greek. it is to the initiatives of islamic culture, for example, that we owe our numerals, the bulk of modern mathematics, and the science of chemistry. the british have already set themselves to the establishment of islamic university teaching in egypt, but that is the mere first stroke of the pick at the opening of the mine. english, french, russian, arabic, hindustani, spanish, italian; these are the great world languages that most concern the future of civilisation from the point of view of the peace alliance that impends. no country can afford to neglect any of those languages, but as a matter of primary importance i would say, for the british, hindustani, for the americans, russian or spanish, for the french and belgians and italians, arabic. these are the directions in which the duty of understanding is most urgent for each of these peoples, and the path of opportunity plainest. the disposition to underrate temporarily depressed nations, races, and cultures is a most irrational, prevalent, and mischievous form of stupidity. it distorts our entire outlook towards the future. the british reader can see its absurdity most easily when he reads the ravings of some patriotic german upon the superiority of the "teuton" over the italians and greeks--to whom we owe most things of importance in european civilisation. equally silly stuff is still to be read in british and american books about "asiatics." and was there not some fearful rubbish, not only in german but in english and french, about the "decadence" of france? but we are learning--rapidly. when i was a student in london thirty years ago we regarded japan as a fantastic joke; the comic opera, _the mikado_, still preserves that foolish phase for the admiration of posterity. and to-day there is a quite unjustifiable tendency to ignore the quality of the arab and of his religion. islam is an open-air religion, noble and simple in its broad conceptions; it is none the less vital from nigeria to china because it has sickened in the closeness of constantinople. the french, the italians, the british have to reckon with islam and the arab; where the continental deserts are, there the arabs are and there is islam; their culture will never be destroyed and replaced over these regions by europeanism. the allies who prepare the peace of the world have to make their peace with that. and when i foreshadow this necessary liaison of the french and arabic cultures, i am thinking not only of the arab that is, but of the arab that is to come. the whole trend of events in asia minor, the breaking up and decapitation of the ottoman empire and the euphrates invasion, points to a great revival of mesopotamia--at first under european direction. the vast system of irrigation that was destroyed by the mongol armies of hulugu in the thirteenth century will be restored; the desert will again become populous. but the local type will prevail. the new population of mesopotamia will be neither european nor indian; it will be arabic; and with its concentration arabic will lay hold of the printing press. a new intellectual movement in islam, a renascent bagdad, is as inevitable as is 1950. i have, however, gone a little beyond the discussion of the future of the barbaric possessions in these anticipations of an arabic co-operation with the latin peoples in the reconstruction of western asia and the barbaric regions of north and central africa. but regions of administered barbarism occur not only in africa. the point is that they are administered, and that their economic development is very largely in the hands, and will for many generations remain in the hands, of the possessing country. hitherto their administration has been in the interests of the possessing nation alone. their acquisition has been a matter of bitter rivalries, their continued administration upon exclusive lines is bound to lead to dangerous clashings. the common sense of the situation points to a policy of give and take, in which throughout the possessions of all the pledged allies, the citizens of all will have more or less equal civil advantages. and this means some consolidation of the general control of those administered territories. i have already hinted at the possibility that the now exclusively british navy may some day be a world-navy controlled by an admiralty representing a group of allies, australasia, canada, britain and, it may be, france and russia and the united states. to those who know how detached the british admiralty is at the present time from the general methods of british political life, there will be nothing strange in this idea of its completer detachment. its personnel does to a large extent constitute a class apart. it takes its boys out of the general life very often before they have got to their fourteenth birthday. it is not so closely linked up with specific british social elements, with political parties and the general educational system, as are the rest of the national services. there is nothing so very fantastic in this idea of a sort of world-admiralty; it is not even completely novel. such bodies as the knights templars transcended nationality in the middle ages. i do not see how some such synthetic control of the seas is to be avoided in the future. and now coming back to the "white man's burthen," is there not a possibility that such a board of marine and international control as the naval and international problems of the future may produce (or some closely parallel body with a stronger latin element), would also be capable of dealing with these barbaric "administered territories"? a day may come when tripoli, nigeria, the french and the belgian congo will be all under one supreme control. we may be laying the foundations of such a system to-day unawares. the unstable and fluctuating conferences of the allies to-day, their repeated experiences of the disadvantages of evanescent and discontinuous co-ordinations, may press them almost unconsciously toward this building up of things greater than they know. we come now to the third and most difficult type of overseas "possessions." these are the annexed or conquered regions with settled populations already having a national tradition and culture of their own. they are, to put it bluntly, the suppressed, the overlaid, nations. now i am a writer rather prejudiced against the idea of nationality; my habit of thought is cosmopolitan; i hate and despise a shrewish suspicion of foreigners and foreign ways; a man who can look me in the face, laugh with me, speak truth and deal fairly, is my brother though his skin is as black as ink or as yellow as an evening primrose. but i have to recognise the facts of the case. in spite of all my large liberality, i find it less irritating to be ruled by people of my own language and race and tradition, and i perceive that for the mass of people alien rule is intolerable. local difference, nationality, is a very obstinate thing. every country tends to revert to its natural type. nationality will out. once a people has emerged above the barbaric stage to a national consciousness, that consciousness will endure. there is practically always going to be an egypt, a poland, an armenia. there is no indian nation, there never has been, but there are manifestly a bengal and a rajputana, there is manifestly a constellation of civilised nations in india. several of these have literatures and traditions that extend back before the days when the britons painted themselves with woad. let us deal with this question mainly with reference to india. what is said will apply equally to burmah or egypt or armenia or--to come back into europe--poland. now i have talked, i suppose, with many scores of people about the future of india, and i have never yet met anyone, indian or british, who thought it desirable that the british should evacuate india at once. and i have never yet met anyone who did not think that ultimately the british must let the indian nations control their own destinies. there are really not two opposite opinions about the destiny of india, but only differences of opinion as to the length of time in which that destiny is to be achieved. many indians think (and i agree with them) that india might be a confederation of sovereign states in close alliance with the british empire and its allies within the space of fifty years or so. the opposite extreme was expressed by an old weary indian administrator who told me, "perhaps they may begin to be capable of self-government in four or five hundred years." these are the extreme liberal and the extreme tory positions in this question. it is a choice between decades and centuries. there is no denial of the inevitability of ultimate restoration. no one of any experience believes the british administration in india is an eternal institution. there is a great deal of cant in this matter in great britain. genteel english people with relations in the indian civil service and habits of self-delusion, believe that indians are "grateful" for british rule. the sort of "patriotic" self-flattery that prevailed in the victorian age, and which is so closely akin to contemporary german follies, fostered and cultivated this sweet delusion. there are, no doubt, old ladies in germany to-day who believe that belgium will presently be "grateful" for the present german administration. let us clear our minds of such cant. as a matter of fact no indians really like british rule or think of it as anything better than a necessary, temporary evil. let me put the parallel case to an englishman or a frenchman. through various political ineptitudes our country has, we will suppose, fallen under the rule of the chinese. they administer it, we will further assume, with an efficiency and honesty unparalleled in the bad old times of our lawyer politicians. they do not admit us to the higher branches of the administration; they go about our country wearing a strange costume, professing a strange religion--which implies that ours is wrong--speaking an unfamiliar tongue. they control our financial system and our economic development--on chinese lines of the highest merit. they take the utmost care of our gothic cathedrals for us. they put our dearest racial possessions into museums and admire them very much indeed. they teach our young men to fly kites and eat bird's nest soup. they do all that a well-bred people can do to conceal their habit and persuasion of a racial superiority. but they keep up their "prestige." ... you know, we shouldn't love them. it really isn't a question of whether they rule well or ill, but that the position is against certain fundamentals of human nature. the only possible footing upon which we could meet them with comfortable minds would be the footing that we and they were discussing the terms of the restoration of our country. then indeed we might almost feel friendly with them. that is the case with all civilised "possessions." the only terms upon which educated british and indians can meet to-day with any comfort is precisely that. the living intercourse of the british and indian mind to-day is the discussion of the restoration. everything else is humbug on the one side and self-deception on the other. it is idle to speak of the british occupation of india as a conquest or a robbery. it is a fashion of much "advanced" literature in europe to assume that the european rule of various asiatic countries is the result of deliberate conquest with a view to spoliation. but that is only the ugly side of the facts. cases of the deliberate invasion and spoliation of one country by another have been very rare in the history of the last three centuries. there has always been an excuse, and there has always been a percentage of truth in the excuse. the history of every country contains phases of political ineptitude in which that country becomes so misgoverned as to be not only a nuisance to the foreigner within its borders but a danger to its neighbours. mexico is in such a phase to-day. and most of the aggressions and annexations of the modern period have arisen out of the inconveniences and reasonable fears caused by such an inept phase. i am a persistent advocate for the restoration of poland, but at the same time it is very plain to me that it is a mere travesty of the facts to say that poland, was a white lamb of a country torn to pieces by three wicked neighbours, poland in the eighteenth century was a dangerous political muddle, uncertain of her monarchy, her policy, her affinities. she endangered her neighbours because there was no guarantee that she might not fall under the tutelage of one of them and become a weapon against the others. the division of poland was an outrage upon the polish people, but it was largely dictated by an entirely honest desire to settle a dangerous possibility. it seemed less injurious than the possibility of a vacillating, independent poland playing off one neighbour against another. that possibility will still be present in the minds of the diplomatists who will determine the settlement after the war. until the poles make up their minds, and either convince the russians that they are on the side of russia and bohemia against germany for evermore, or the germans that they are willing to be posenised, they will live between two distrustful enemies. the poles need to think of the future more and the wrongs of poland less. they want less patriotic intrigue and more racial self-respect. they are not only poles but members of a greater brotherhood. my impression is that poland will "go slav"--in spite of cracow. but i am not sure. i am haunted by the fear that poland may still find her future hampered by poles who are, as people say, "too clever by half." an incalculable poland cannot be and will not be tolerated by the rest of europe. and the overspreading of india by the british was in the same way very clearly done under compulsion, first lest the dutch or french should exploit the vast resources of the peninsula against britain, and then for fear of a russian exploitation. i am no apologist for british rule in india; i think we have neglected vast opportunities there; it was our business from the outset to build up a free and friendly indian confederation, and we have done not a tithe of what we might have done to that end. but then we have not done a little of what we might have done for our own country. nevertheless we have our case to plead, not only for going to india but--with the berlin papers still babbling of bagdad and beyond[3]--of sticking there very grimly. and so too the british have a fairly sound excuse for grabbing egypt in their fear lest in its phase of political ineptitude it should be the means of strangling the british empire as the turk in constantinople has been used to strangle the russian. none of these justifications i admit are complete, but all deserve consideration. it is no good arguing about the finer ethics of the things that are; the business of sane men is to get things better. the business of all sane men in all the countries of the pledged allies and in america is manifestly to sink petty jealousies and a suicidal competitiveness, and to organise co-operation with all the intellectual forces they can find or develop in the subject countries, to convert these inept national systems into politically efficient independent organisations in a world peace alliance. if we fail to do that, then all the inept states and all the subject states about the world will become one great field for the sowing of tares by the enemy. [footnote 3: this was written late in february, 1916.] so that with regard to the civilised just as with regard to the barbaric regions of the "possessions" of the european-centred empires, we come to the same conclusion. that on the whole the path of safety lies in the direction of pooling them and of declaring a common policy of progressive development leading to equality. the pattern of the united states, in which the procedure is first the annexation of "territories" and then their elevation to the rank of "states," must, with of course far more difficulty and complication, be the pattern for the "empires" of to-day--so far as they are regions of alien population. the path of the dominions, settled by emigrants akin to the home population, siberia, canada, and so forth, to equal citizenship with the people of the mother country is by comparison simple and plain. and so the discussion of the future of the overseas "empires" brings us again to the same realisation to which the discussion of nearly every great issue arising out of this war has pointed, the realisation of the imperative necessity of some great council or conference, some permanent overriding body, call it what you will, that will deal with things more broadly than any "nationalism" or "patriotic imperialism" can possibly do. that body must come into human affairs. upon the courage and imagination of living statesmen it depends whether it will come simply and directly into concrete reality or whether it will materialise slowly through, it may be, centuries of blood and blundering from such phantom anticipations as this, anticipations that now haunt the thoughts of all politically-minded men. xii. the outlook for the germans section 1 whatever some of us among the allies may say, the future of germany lies with germany. the utmost ambition of the allies falls far short of destroying or obliterating germany; it is to give the germans so thorough and memorable an experience of war that they will want no more of it for a few generations, and, failing the learning of that lesson, to make sure that they will not be in a position to resume their military aggressions upon mankind with any hope of success. after all, it is not the will of the allies that has determined even this resolve. it is the declared and manifest will of germany to become predominant in the world that has created the alliance against germany, and forged and tempered our implacable resolution to bring militarist germany down. and the nature of the coming peace and of the politics that will follow the peace are much more dependent upon german affairs than upon anything else whatever. this is so clearly understood in great britain that there is scarcely a newspaper that does not devote two or three columns daily to extracts from the german newspapers, and from letters found upon german killed, wounded, or prisoners, and to letters and descriptive articles from neutrals upon the state of the german mind. there can be no doubt that the british intelligence has grasped and kept its hold upon the real issue of this war with an unprecedented clarity. at the outset there came declarations from nearly every type of british opinion that this war was a war against the hohenzollern militarist idea, against prussianism, and not against germany. in that respect britain has documented herself to the hilt. there have been, of course, a number of passionate outcries and wild accusations against germans, as a race, during the course of the struggle; but to this day opinion is steadfast not only in britain, but if i may judge from the papers i read and the talk i hear, throughout the whole english-speaking community, that this is a war not of races but ideas. i am so certain of this that i would say if germany by some swift convulsion expelled her dynasty and turned herself into a republic, it would be impossible for the british government to continue the war for long, whether it wanted to do so or not. the forces in favour of reconciliation would be too strong. there would be a complete revulsion from the present determination to continue the war to its bitter but conclusive end. it is fairly evident that the present german government understands this frame of mind quite clearly, and is extremely anxious to keep it from the knowledge of the german peoples. every act or word from a british source that suggests an implacable enmity against the germans as a people, every war-time caricature and insult, is brought to their knowledge. it is the manifest interest of the hohenzollerns and prussianism to make this struggle a race struggle and not merely a political struggle, and to keep a wider breach between the peoples than between the governments. the "made in germany" grievance has been used to the utmost against great britain as an indication of race hostility. the everyday young german believes firmly that it was a blow aimed specially at germany; that no such regulation affected any goods but german goods. and the english, with their characteristic heedlessness, have never troubled to disillusion him. but even the british caricaturist and the british soldier betray their fundamental opinion of the matter in their very insults. they will not use a word of abuse for the germans as germans; they call them "huns," because they are thinking of attila, because they are thinking of them as invaders under a monarch of peaceful france and belgium, and not as a people living in a land of their own. in great britain there is to this day so little hostility for germans as such, that recently a nephew of lord haldane's, sir george makgill, has considered it advisable to manufacture race hostility and provide the hohenzollerns with instances and quotations through the exertions of a preposterous anti-german league. disregarding the essential evils of the prussian idea, this mischievous organisation has set itself to persuade the british people that the germans are diabolical _as a race_. it has displayed great energy and ingenuity in pestering and insulting naturalised germans and people of german origin in britain--below the rank of the royal family, that is--and in making enduring bad blood between them and the authentic british. it busies itself in breaking up meetings at which sentiments friendly to germany might be expressed, sentiments which, if they could be conveyed to german hearers, would certainly go far to weaken the determination of the german social democracy to fight to the end. there can, of course, be no doubt of the good faith of sir george makgill, but he could do the kaiser no better service than to help in consolidating every rank and class of german, by this organisation of foolish violence of speech and act, by this profession of an irrational and implacable hostility. his practical influence over here is trivial, thanks to the general good sense and the love of fair play in our people, but there can be little doubt that his intentions are about as injurious to the future peace of the world as any intentions could be, and there can be no doubt that intelligent use is made in germany of the frothings and ravings of his followers. "here, you see, is the disposition of the english," the imperialists will say to the german pacifists. "they are dangerous lunatics. clearly we must stick together to the end." ... the stuff of sir george makgill's league must not be taken as representative of any considerable section of british opinion, which is as a whole nearly as free from any sustained hatred of the germans as it was at the beginning of the war. there are, of course, waves of indignation at such deliberate atrocities as the _lusitania_ outrage or the zeppelin raids, wittenberg will not easily be forgotten, but it would take many sir george makgills to divert british anger from the responsible german government to the german masses. that lack of any essential hatred does not mean that british opinion is not solidly for the continuation of this war against militarist imperialism to its complete and final defeat. but if that can be defeated to any extent in germany by the germans, if the way opens to a germany as unmilitary and pacific as was great britain before this war, there remains from the british point of view nothing else to fight about. with the germany of _vorwaerts_ which, i understand, would evacuate and compensate belgium and serbia, set up a buffer state in alsace-lorraine, and another in a restored poland (including posen), the spirit of the allies has no profound quarrel at all, has never had any quarrel. we would only too gladly meet that germany at a green table to-morrow, and set to work arranging the compensation of belgium and serbia, and tracing over the outlines of the natural map of mankind the new political map of europe. still it must be admitted that not only in great britain but in all the allied countries one finds a certain active minority corresponding to sir george makgill's noisy following, who profess to believe that all germans to the third and fourth generation (save and except the hanoverian royal family domiciled in great britain) are a vile, treacherous, and impossible race, a race animated by an incredible racial vanity, a race which is indeed scarcely anything but a conspiracy against the rest of mankind. the ravings of many of these people can only be paralleled by the stuff about the cunning of the jesuits that once circulated in ultra-protestant circles in england. elderly protestant ladies used to look under the bed and in the cupboard every night for a jesuit, just as nowadays they look for a german spy, and as no doubt old german ladies now look for sir edward grey. it may be useful therefore, at the present time, to point out that not only is the aggressive german idea not peculiar to germany, not only are there endless utterances of french chauvinists and british imperialists to be found entirely as vain, unreasonable and aggressive, but that german militarist imperialism is so little representative of the german quality, that scarcely one of its leading exponents is a genuine german. of course there is no denying that the germans are a very distinctive people, as distinctive as the french. but their distinctions are not diabolical. until the middle of the nineteenth century it was the fashion to regard them as a race of philosophical incompetents. their reputation as a people of exceptionally military quality sprang up in the weed-bed of human delusions between 1866 and 1872; it will certainly not survive this war. their reputation for organisation is another matter. they are an orderly, industrious, and painstaking people, they have a great respect for science, for formal education, and for authority. it is their respect for education which has chiefly betrayed them, and made them the instrument of hohenzollern folly. mr. f.m. hueffer has shown this quite conclusively in his admirable but ill-named book, "when blood is their argument." their minds have been systematically corrupted by base historical teaching, and the inculcation of a rancid patriotism. they are a people under the sway of organised suggestion. this catastrophic war and its preparation have been their chief business for half a century; none the less their peculiar qualities have still been displayed during that period; they have still been able to lead the world in several branches of social organisation and in the methodical development of technical science. systems of ideas are perhaps more readily shattered than built up; the aggressive patriotism of many germans must be already darkened by serious doubts, and i see no inherent impossibility in hoping that the mass of the germans may be restored to the common sanity of mankind, even in the twenty or thirty years of life that perhaps still remain for me. consider the names of the chief exponents of the aggressive german idea, and you will find that not one is german. the first begetter of nietzsche's "blond beast," and of all that great flood of rubbish about a strange superior race with whitish hair and blue eyes, that has so fatally rotted the german imagination, was a frenchman named gobineau. we british are not altogether free from the disease. as a small boy i read the history of j.r. green, and fed my pride upon the peculiar virtues of my anglo-saxon blood. ("cp.," as they say in footnotes, carlyle and froude.) it was not a german but a renegade englishman of the englishman-hating whig type, mr. houston stewart chamberlain, who carried the gobineau theory to that delirious level which claims dante and leonardo as germans, and again it was not a german but a british peer, still among us, lord redesdale, who in his eulogistic preface to the english translation of chamberlain's torrent of folly, hinted not obscurely that the real father of christ was not the jew, joseph, but a much more germanic person. neither clausewitz, who first impressed upon the german mind the theory of ruthless warfare, nor bernhardi, nor treitschke, who did as much to build up the emperor's political imagination, strike one as bearing particularly german names. there are indeed very grave grounds for the german complaint that germany has been the victim of alien flattery and alien precedents. and what after all is the prussian dream of world empire but an imitative response to the british empire and the adventure of napoleon? the very title of the german emperor is the name of an italian, caesar, far gone in decay. and the backbone of the german system at the present time is the prussian, who is not really a german at all but a germanised wend. take away the imported and imposed elements from the things we fight to-day, leave nothing but what is purely and originally german, and you leave very little. we fight dynastic ambition, national vanity, greed, and the fruits of fifty years of basely conceived and efficiently conducted education. the majority of sensible and influential englishmen are fully aware of these facts. this does not alter their resolution to beat germany thoroughly and finally, and, if germany remains hohenzollern after the war, to do their utmost to ring her in with commercial alliances, tariffs, navigation and exclusion laws that will keep her poor and powerless and out of mischief so long as her vice remains in her. but these considerations of the essential innocence of the german do make all this systematic hostility, which the british have had forced upon them, a very uncongenial and reluctant hostility. pro-civilisation, and not anti-german, is the purpose of the allies. and the speculation of just how relentlessly and for how long this ring of suspicion and precaution need be maintained about germany, of how soon the german may decide to become once more a good european, is one of extraordinary interest to every civilised man. in other words, what are the prospects of a fairly fundamental revolution in german life and thought and affairs in the years immediately before us? â§2 in a sense every european country must undergo revolutionary changes as a consequence of the enormous economic exhaustion and social dislocations of this war. but what i propose to discuss here is the possibility of a real political revolution, in the narrower sense of the word, in germany, a revolution that will end the hohenzollern system, the german dynastic system, altogether, that will democratise prussia and put an end for ever to that secretive scheming of military aggressions which is the essential quarrel of europe with germany. it is the most momentous possibility of our times, because it opens the way to an alternative state of affairs that may supersede the armed watching and systematic war of tariffs, prohibitions, and exclusions against the central empires that must quite unavoidably be the future attitude of the pledged allies to any survival of the hohenzollern empire. we have to bear in mind that in this discussion we are dealing with something very new and quite untried hitherto by anything but success, that new germany whose unification began with the spoliation of denmark and was completed at versailles. it is not a man's lifetime old. under the state socialism and aggressive militarism of the hohenzollern regime it had been led to a level of unexampled pride and prosperity, and it plunged shouting and singing into this war, confident of victories. it is still being fed with dwindling hopes of victory, no longer unstinted hopes, but still hopes--by a sort of political bread-card system. the hopes outlast the bread-and-butter, but they dwindle and dwindle. how is this parvenu people going to stand the cessation of hope, the realisation of the failure and fruitlessness of such efforts as no people on earth have ever made before? how are they going to behave when they realise fully that they have suffered and died and starved and wasted all their land in vain? when they learn too that the cause of the war was a trick, and the russian invasion a lie? they have a large democratic press that will not hesitate to tell them that, that does already to the best of its ability disillusion them. they are a carefully trained and educated and disciplined people, it is true[4]; but the solicitude of the german government everywhere apparent, thus to keep the resentment of the people directed to the proper quarter, is, i think, just one of the things that are indicative of the revolutionary possibilities in germany. the allied governments let opinion, both in their own countries and in america, shift for itself; they do not even trouble to mitigate the inevitable exasperation of the military censorship by an intelligent and tactful control. the german government, on the other hand, has organised the putting of the blame upon other shoulders than its own elaborately and ably from the very beginning of the war. it must know its own people best, and i do not see why it should do this if there were not very dangerous possibilities ahead for itself in the national temperament. [footnote 4: a recent circular, which _vorwaerts_ quotes, sent by the education officials to the teachers of frankfurt-am-main, points out the necessity of the "beautiful task" of inculcating a deep love for the house of hohenzollern (crown prince, grin and all), and concludes, "all efforts to excuse or minimise or explain the disgraceful acts which our enemies have committed against germans all over the world are to be firmly opposed by you should you see any signs of these efforts entering the schools."] it is one of the commonplaces of this question that in the past the germans have always been loyal subjects and never made a revolution. it is alleged that there has never been a german republic. that is by no means conclusively true. the nucleus of swiss freedom was the german-speaking cantons about the lake of lucerne; tell was a german, and he was glorified by the german schiller. no doubt the protestant reformation was largely a business of dukes and princes, but the underlying spirit of that revolt also lay in the german national character. the anabaptist insurrection was no mean thing in rebellions, and the history of the dutch, who are, after all, only the extreme expression of the low german type, is a history of the most stubborn struggle for freedom in europe. this legend of german docility will not bear close examination. it is true that they are not given to spasmodic outbreaks, and that they do not lend themselves readily to intrigues and pronunciamentos, but there is every reason to suppose that they have the heads to plan and the wills to carry out as sound and orderly and effective a revolution as any people in europe. before the war drove them frantic, the german comic papers were by no means suggestive of an abject worship of authority and royalty for their own sakes. the teaching of all forms of morality and sentimentality in schools produces not only belief but reaction, and the livelier and more energetic the pupil the more likely he is to react rather than accept. whatever the feelings of the old women of germany may be towards the kaiser and his family, my impression of the opinion of germans in general is that they believed firmly in empire, kaiser and militarism wholly and solely because they thought these things meant security, success, triumph, more and more wealth, more and more germany, and all that had come to them since 1871 carried on to the _n_th degree.... i do not think that all the schoolmasters of germany, teaching in unison at the tops of their voices, will sustain that belief beyond the end of this war. at present every discomfort and disappointment of the german people is being sedulously diverted into rage against the allies, and particularly against the english. this is all very well as long as the war goes on with a certain effect of hopefulness. but what when presently the beam has so tilted against germany that an unprofitable peace has become urgent and inevitable? how can the hohenzollern suddenly abandon his pose of righteous indignation and make friends with the accursed enemy, and how can he make any peace at all with us while he still proclaims us accursed? either the emperor has to go to his people and say, "we promised you victory and it is defeat," or he has to say, "it is not defeat, but we are going to make peace with these russian barbarians who invaded us, with the incompetent english who betrayed us, with all these degenerate and contemptible races you so righteously hate and despise, upon such terms that we shall never be able to attack them again. this noble and wonderful war is to end in this futility and--these graves. you were tricked into it, as you were tricked into war in 1870--but this time it has not turned out quite so well. and besides, after all, we find we can continue to get on with these people." ... in either case, i do not see how he can keep the habitual and cultivated german hate pointing steadily away from himself. so long as the war is going on that may be done, but when the soldiers come home the hate will come home as well. in times of war peoples may hate abroad and with some unanimity. but after the war, with no war going on or any prospect of a fresh war, with every exploiter and every industrial tyrant who has made his unobtrusive profits while the country scowled and spat at england, stripped of the cover of that excitement, then it is inevitable that much of this noble hate of england will be seen for the cant it is. the cultivated hate of the war phase, reinforced by the fresh hate born of confusion and misery, will swing loose, as it were, seeking dispersedly for objects. the petty, incessant irritations of proximity will count for more; the national idea for less. the hohenzollerns and the junkers will have to be very nimble indeed if the german accomplishment of hate does not swing round upon them. it is a common hypothesis with those who speculate on the probable effects of these disillusionments that germany may break up again into its component parts. it is pointed out that germany is, so to speak, a palimpsest, that the broad design of the great black eagle and the imperial crown are but newly painted over a great number of particularisms, and that these particularisms may return. the empire of the germans may break up again. that i do not believe. the forces that unified germany lie deeper than the hohenzollern adventure; print, paper and the spoken word have bound germany now into one people for all time. none the less those previous crowns and symbols that still show through the paint of the new design may help greatly, as that weakens under the coming stresses, to disillusion men about its necessity. there was, they will be reminded, a germany before prussia, before austria for the matter of that. the empire has been little more than the first german experiment in unity. it is a new-fangled thing that came and may go again--leaving germany still a nation, still with the sense of a common fatherland. let us consider a little more particularly the nature of the mass of population whose collective action in the years immediately ahead of us we are now attempting to forecast. its social strata are only very inexactly equivalent to those in the countries of the pledged allies. first there are the masses of the people. in england for purposes of edification we keep up the legend of the extreme efficiency of germany, the high level of german education, and so forth. the truth is that the average _elementary_ education of the common people in britain is superior to that of germany, that the domestic efficiency of the british common people is greater, their moral training better, and their personal quality higher. this is shown by a number of quite conclusive facts of which i will instance merely the higher german general death-rate, the higher german infantile death-rate, the altogether disproportionate percentage of crimes of violence in germany, and the indisputable personal superiority of the british common soldier over his german antagonist. it is only when we get above the level of the masses that the position is reversed. the ratio of public expenditure upon secondary and higher education in germany as compared with the expenditure upon elementary education is out of all proportion to the british ratio. directly we come to the commercial, directive, official, technical and professional classes in germany, we come to classes far more highly trained, more alert intellectually, more capable of collective action, and more accessible to general ideas, than the less numerous and less important corresponding classes in britain. this great german middle class is the strength and substance of the new germany; it has increased proportionally to the classes above and below it, it has developed almost all its characteristics during the last half-century. at its lower fringe it comprehends the skilled and scientifically trained artisans, it supplies the brains of social democracy, and it reaches up to the world of finance and quasi-state enterprise. and it is the "dark horse" in all these speculations. hitherto this middle class has been growing almost unawares. it has been so busy coming into existence and growing, there has been so much to do since 1871, that it has had scarcely a moment to think round the general problem of politics at all. it has taken the new empire for granted as a child takes its home for granted, and its state of mind to-day must be rather like that of an intelligent boy who suddenly discovers that his father's picturesque and wonderful speculations have led to his arrest and brought the brokers into the house, and that there is nothing for it but to turn to and take control of the family affairs. in germany, the most antiquated and the most modern of european states, the old dynastic germany of the princes and junkers has lasted on by virtue of exceptional successes and prestige into the world of steel and electricity. but their prestige has paled before the engineering of krupp; their success evaporates. a new nation awakens to self-consciousness only to find itself betrayed into apparently irreconcilable hostility against the rest of mankind.... what will be the quality of the monarch and court and junkerdom that will face this awaking new germany? the monarch will be before very long the present crown prince. the hohenzollerns have at least the merit of living quickly, and the present emperor draws near his allotted term. he will break a record in his family if he lives another dozen years. so that quite soon after the war this new disillusioned germany will be contemplating the imperial graces of the present crown prince. in every way he is an unattractive and uninspiring figure; he has identified himself completely with that militarism that has brought about the european catastrophe; in repudiating him germany will repudiate her essential offence against civilisation, and his appears to be the sort of personality that it is a pleasure to repudiate. he or some kindred regent will be the symbol of royalty in germany through all those years of maximum stress and hardship ahead. through-out the greater part of germany the tradition of loyalty to his house is not a century old. and the real german loyalty is racial and national far more than dynastic. it is not the hohenzollern over all that they sing about; it is deutschland. (and--as in the case of all imperfectly civilised people--songs of hate for foreigners.) but it needed a decadent young american to sing: "thou prince of peace, thou god of war," to the dismal rhetorician of potsdam. real emperors reconcile and consolidate peoples, for an empire is not a nation; but the hohenzollerns have never dared to be anything but sedulously national, "echt deutsch" and advocates of black-letter. they know the people they have to deal with. this new substantial middle mass of germany has never been on friendly terms with the germany of the court and the landowner. it has inherited a burgerlich tradition and resented even while it tolerated the swagger of the aristocratic officer. it tolerated it because that sort of thing was supposed to be necessary to the national success. but munich, the comic papers, herr harden, _vorwaerts_, speak, i think, for the central masses of german life far more truly than any official utterances do. they speak in a voice a little gross, very sensible, blunt, with a kind of heavy humour. that german voice one may not like, but one must needs respect it. it is, at any rate, not bombastic. it is essentially honest. when the imperial eagle comes home with half its feathers out like a crow that has met a bear; when the surviving aristocratic officers reappear with a vastly diminished swagger in the biergartens, i believe that the hitherto acquiescent middle classes and skilled artisan class of german will entirely disappoint those people who expect them to behave either with servility or sentimental loyalty. the great revolutionary impulse of the french was passionate and generous. the revolutionary impulse of germany may be even more deadly; it may be contemptuous. it may be they will not even drag emperor and nobles down; they will shove them aside.... in all these matters one must ask the reader to enlarge his perspectives at least as far back as the last three centuries. the galaxy of german monarchies that has over-spread so much of europe is a growth of hardly more than two centuries. it is a phase in the long process of the break-up of the roman empire and of the catholic system that inherited its tradition. these royalties have formed a class apart, breeding only among themselves, and attempting to preserve a sort of caste internationalism in the face of an advance in human intelligence, a spread of printing, reading, and writing that makes inevitably for the recrudescence of national and race feeling, and the increasing participation of the people in government. in russia and england these originally german dynasties are meeting the problems of the new time by becoming national. they modify themselves from year to year. the time when britain will again have a queen of british race may not be very remote. the days when the affairs of europe could be discussed at windsor in german and from a german standpoint ended with the death of queen victoria, and it is only in such improvised courts as those of greece and bulgaria that the national outlook can still be contemplated from a foreign standpoint and discussed in a foreign tongue. the age when the monarchical system made the courts of three-quarters of europe a german's fatherland has ended for ever. and with that, the last rational advantage of monarchy and royalist sentimentality disappears from the middle-class german's point of view. so it seems to me that the following conclusions about the future of germany emerge from these considerations. it is improbable that there will be any such revolution as overthrew french imperialism in 1871; the new prussian imperialism is closer to the tradition of the people and much more firmly established through the educational propaganda of the past half-century. but liberal forces in germany may nevertheless be strong enough to force a peace upon the hohenzollern empire so soon as any hopes of aggressive successes die away, before the utmost stage of exhaustion is reached, early in 1917, perhaps, or at latest in 1918. this, we suppose, will be a restrictive peace so far as germany is concerned, humiliating her and hampering her development. the german press will talk freely of a _revanche_ and the renewal of the struggle, and this will help to consolidate the pledged allies in their resolve to hold germany on every front and to retard her economic and financial recovery. the dynasty will lose prestige gradually, the true story of the war will creep slowly into the german consciousness, and the idea of a middle-class republic, like the french republic, only defensively militant and essentially pacific and industrial, will become more and more popular in the country. this will have the support of strong journalists, journalists of the harden type for example. the dynasty tends to become degenerate, so that the probability of either some gross scandals or an ill-advised reactionary movement back to absolutism may develop a crisis within a few years of the peace settlement. the mercantile and professional classes will join hands with the social democrats to remove the decaying incubus of the hohenzollern system, and germany will become a more modern and larger repetition of the third french republic. this collapse of the germanic monarchical system may spread considerably beyond the limits of the german empire. it will probably be effected without much violence as a consequence of the convergence and maturity of many streams of very obvious thought. many of the monarchs concerned may find themselves still left with their titles, palaces, and personal estates, and merely deprived of their last vestiges of legal power. the way will thus be opened for a gradual renewal of good feeling between the people of germany and the western europeans. this renewal will be greatly facilitated by the inevitable fall in the german birth-rate that the shortage and economies of this war will have done much to promote, and by the correlated discrediting of the expansionist idea. by 1960 or so the alteration of perspectives will have gone so far that historians will be a little perplexed to explain the causes of the great war. the militarist monomania of germany will have become incomprehensible; her _welt politik_ literature incredible and unreadable.... such is my reading of the german horoscope. i doubt if there will be nearly so much writing and reading about the great war in the latter half of the twentieth century as there was about napoleon at the end of the nineteenth. the great war is essentially undramatic, it has no hero, it has no great leaders. it is a story of the common sense of humanity suppressing certain tawdry and vulgar ideas and ambitions, and readjusting much that was wasteful and unjust in social and economic organisation. it is the story of how the spirit of man was awakened by a nightmare of a war lord.... the nightmare will fade out of mind, and the spirit of man, with revivified energies, will set about the realities of life, the re-establishment of order, the increase of knowledge and creation. amid these realities the great qualities of the germans mark them for a distinguished and important rã´le. â§3 the primary business of the allies is not reconciliation with germany. their primary concern is to organise a great league of peace about the world with which the american states and china may either unite or establish a permanent understanding. separate attempts to restore friendship with the germans will threaten the unanimity of the league of peace, and perhaps renew the intrigues and evils of the germanic dynastic system which this war may destroy. the essential restoration of germany must be the work of german men speaking plain sense to germans, and inducing their country to hold out its hand not to this or that suspicious neighbour but to mankind. a militarist germany is a germany self-condemned to isolation or world empire. a germany which has returned to the ways of peace, on the other hand, will be a country that cannot be kept out of the system of civilisation. the tariff wall cannot but be lowered, the watchful restrictions cannot but be discontinued against such a germany. europe is a system with its heart half used, so long as germany is isolated. the german population is and will remain the central and largest mass of people in europe. that is a fact as necessary as the indianism of india. to reconstruct modern civilisation without germany would be a colossal artificial task that would take centuries to do. it is inconceivable that germany will stand out of europeanism so long as to allow the trade routes of the world to be entirely deflected from her. her own necessities march with the natural needs of the world. so that i give the alliance for the isolation of germany at the outside a life of forty years before it ceases to be necessary through the recovered willingness of the germans to lay aside aggression. but this is not a thing to be run at too hastily. it may be easily possible to delay this national general reconciliation of mankind by an unreal effusion. there will be no advantage in forcing the feelings of the late combatants. it is ridiculous to suppose that for the next decade or so, whatever happens, any frenchmen are going to feel genial about the occupation of their north-east provinces, or any belgians smile at the memory of dinant or louvain, or the poles or serbs forgive the desolation of their country, or any english or russians take a humorous view of the treatment their people have had as prisoners in germany. so long as these are living memories they will keep a barrier of dislike about germany. nor is it probable that the ordinary german is going to survey the revised map of africa with a happy sense of relief, or blame no one but himself for the vanished prosperity of 1914. that is asking too much of humanity. unless i know nothing of germany, germany will bristle with "denkmals" to keep open all such sores. the dislike of germany by the allied nations will be returned in the hostility of a thwarted and disappointed people. not even the neutrals will be aloof from these hostilities and resentments. the world will still, in 1950 or so, be throwing much passion into the rights and wrongs of the sinking of the _lusitania_. there will be a bitterness in the memories of this and the next generation that will make the spectacle of ardent frenchmen or englishmen or belgians or russians embracing germans with gusto--unpleasant, to say the least of it. we may bring ourselves to understand, we may bring ourselves to a cold and reasonable forgiveness, we may suppress our sir george makgills and so forth, but it will take sixty or seventy years for the two sides in this present war to grow kindly again. let us build no false hopes nor pretend to any false generosities. these hatreds can die out only in one way, by the passing of a generation, by the dying out of the wounded and the wronged. our business, our unsentimental business, is to set about establishing such conditions that they will so die out. and that is the business of the sane germans too. behind the barriers this war will have set up between germany and anti-germany, the intelligent men in either camp must prepare the ultimate peace they will never enjoy, must work for the days when their sons at least may meet as they themselves can never meet, without accusation or resentment, upon the common business of the world peace. that is not to be done by any conscientious sentimentalities, any slobbering denials of unforgettable injuries. we want no pro-german leagues any more than we want anti-german leagues. we want patience--and silence. my reason insists upon the inevitableness and necessity of this ultimate reconciliation. i will do no more than i must to injure germany further, and i will do all that i can to restore the unity of mankind. none the less is it true that for me for all the rest of my life the germans i shall meet, the german things i shall see, will be smeared with the blood of my people and my friends that the wilfulness of germany has spilt. available by internet archive (https://archive.org) note: images of the original pages are available through internet archive. see https://archive.org/details/wherearewegoing00lloy where are we going? by the right honourable david lloyd george o.m., p.c., m.p. british prime minister 1916-1922 [illustration: logo] new york george h. doran company copyright, 1923, by george h. doran company [illustration: logo] where are we going? ii printed in the united states of america preface the chapters collected in this book represent a running comment on the european situation during the past ten months. although in the haze that covers the continent it is difficult always to see clearly what is happening, and still more difficult to forecast what is likely to occur, i have not deemed it necessary to revise any of the estimates i made from time to time in these periodic reviews on the position. in the period covered by them peace has gone back perceptibly and unmistakably. of the years immediately after the end of the great war it may be said that up to the present year each showed a distinct improvement over its predecessor. the temper of the warring nations showed a gradual healing and improvement, and east and west there was a return to reason and calm in their attitude towards each other. in the cannes discussions of january 1922 the atmosphere of hostility which poisoned the spa discussions in 1920 had largely disappeared, and the applause which greeted herr rathenau's fine speech at genoa in april 1922 was cordial and general. the electric messages from paris failed to provoke a thunderstorm, and one of the speakers, at the last meeting of the assembly, drawing an illustration from the weather outside, said the conference had broken up under blue skies and a serene firmament. that was in may 1922. those words, when used, met with cheering approval: if used to-day they would be greeted with scoffing laughter. the present year has been one of growing gloom and menace. the international temper is distinctly worse all round. a peace has been patched up with the turkish empire. no one believes it can endure long. the only question is, how long? there may be other patched-up treaties between struggling nations before the year is out. there is only one prediction concerning them which can at this stage be safely made--they will leave european peace in a more precarious plight than ever. a peace wrung by triumphant force out of helplessness is never a good peace. that is why i view with apprehension the character of the settlement which may soon be wrung out of german despair in the ruhr and imposed on greek impotence in the adriatic. the fiume settlement may turn out to be more satisfactory in spite of threatening omens. the jugo-slavs are a formidable military proposition to be tackled by any power. the war proved them to be about the best fighting material in europe. they are also fairly well equipped with modern weapons, and if unhappily the need arose their deficiencies in this respect would soon be supplied from the workshops of czecho-slovakia and elsewhere. i am, therefore, still hopeful that fiume may be remitted for settlement to diplomatists and not to gunmen. international right in these turbulent days seems to depend, not on justice, but on a reckoning of chances. the slavs are ready to defend their rights and can do so. there is, therefore, some talk of conferences and even arbitration in their case. germany and greece cannot put up a fight. unconditional surrender is, therefore, their lot. all the same, this is not only a wrong but a miscalculation. unjust concessions, extracted by violence, are not settlements; they are only postponements. unfortunately, the decisions at the next great hearing of the cause are just as likely to be provisional--and so the quarrel will go on to the final catastrophe unless humanity one day sees the light and has the courage to follow it. but that day must not be too distant, otherwise it will come too late to save civilisation. the last conflict between great nations has exposed the devastating possibilities of modern science. henceforth progress in the destructiveness of the apparatus of war has been, and will continue to be, so rapid that a conflict to-morrow would spread ten times the desolation caused by the great war of 1914-18. there is a concentration of much scientific and mechanical skill on strengthening the machinery of devastation. incredible progress--if progress be the word--has been made within the last three or four years in perfecting and increasing the shattering power of this kind of devilry. what will it be like five, ten, twenty years hence! whilst nations are piling up, perfecting and intensifying their explosives, they are also saturating the ground with the inflammable passions which one day will precipitate the explosion. injustice, insult, insolence, distilled into the spirit of revenge, is everywhere soaking into the earth. i have never doubted that france could impose terms on germany. it was clear that she could starve germany into submission to any conditions dictated to her. it is astonishing that the germans should have held out so long. what i have steadily predicted in these articles is that those terms will not produce as much reparation as a more conciliatory course would have brought--that to operate them will be a source of constant friction, and that the methods employed to impose and execute them will rouse a spirit of patriotic wrath which will in the end bring disaster to the victor of to-day. when the invasion of the ruhr was decided upon, the shortage in the promised coal deliveries upon which default was declared was barely 10 per cent. a little better organisation of the wagon service on the french side would have made up that deficiency in a very short time. during the months of the occupation the french and belgians have not succeeded in collecting one-sixth the tonnage delivered during the corresponding months last year. it will take weeks after passive resistance has collapsed to restore railways and collieries to working order. the new _régime_ will have to liquidate arrears of at least 15,000,000 tons before it begins its regular monthly deliveries. what about cash payments? it is not too much to say that germany is much less able to meet her obligations in this respect than she was before the invasion. her credit has been blown out of sight into infinite space. it will take a long time to pull it back from its wanderings and set its feet once more firmly on european earth. there are only four ways in which the huge sum due from germany can be liquidated:- (1) by handing over to the allies the gold reserves of germany and of germans either at home or on deposit abroad. the former is negligible; the amount of the latter is disputable. much of it is essential to enable germany to purchase abroad the raw material and food necessary to her existence. the worse german credit becomes the larger must this deposit be. as for the foreign securities and deposits which are not strictly necessary for trading, they cannot all be made available, for nothing will induce some of the depositors to part with the whole of these securities. the sum, therefore, derivable from this source would amount to but a small percentage of the total figure payable for reparations. (2) deliveries of coal, timber, potash, dyes and other raw material. with the exception of timber, these deliveries have been, on the whole, satisfactory--since the spa agreement. it did not require the pressure of armed invasion to improve these deliveries, including the timber demands of the allies. (3) a percentage levied on german exports. these are paid for in gold or its equivalent, and the levy would therefore be remitted in gold. a levy of 20 per cent. on german exports would have produced between £40,000,000 and £50,000,000 a year on the basis of last year's exports. when german trade returned to normal it would yield £100,000,000. this sum, added to the value of the material delivered, would cover interest and sinking fund on the £2,500,000,000 which is now the accepted maximum of german capacity. (4) the restoration of german credit with a view to the immediate raising of a loan on reparation account. this would help the allies over their urgent financial difficulties. these four methods of payment are the only known and knowable means of obtaining reparations. they would have been more immediately fruitful if so much time, money and resource had not been wasted over this ill-judged invasion. the apologists of french action in the ruhr contend that france was driven to these extremes by the refusal of britain to co-operate with her in bringing legitimate pressure to bear on germany to carry out the treaty. those who put forward this contention argue in ignorance of the proposals submitted by the british government to the allied conference in august 1922. these would have exploited all the methods above set forth to the limit of their productiveness. these proposals were substantially accepted by all the allies except france. repeated efforts have been made this year in parliament to induce the government to publish this scheme. both the present and the late prime minister gave favourable if not definite answers to the request for publication. but so far the august proceedings have not made their public appearance. why this reluctance to give the whole facts to the public? the discussions at the november and january conferences have been published in full. these meetings were only adjournments from the august conference. the story of the fateful conference is, therefore, incomplete if august is suppressed. ought not the world to know the proposals which france rejected in august 1922? in the absence of official publication i will take the responsibility now of giving a summary. it was proposed:- (1) that germany should be called upon to take such measures as the reparations commission should stipulate, in order to balance her budget and restore her financial stability. (2) that the reichsbank should be made independent of government control. (3) that 26 per cent. of the total value of german exports should be collected in gold or foreign currencies and paid into a separate account in the reichsbank in the name of the sub-committee of the reparations commission known as the committee of guarantees. (4) that the produce of all german import and export duties other than the levy should be paid monthly to a special account at the reichsbank, which should be under the scrutiny of the committee of guarantees. the german government should have the disposal of the sums standing to the credit of this account so long as the reparations commission was satisfied that it fulfilled the obligations imposed upon it. if at any time the commission was not satisfied that this was the case the committee of guarantees should have the right to take over the sums standing to the credit of this account and to secure the payment to it of the produce of these duties thereafter. (5) there were stern provisions for supervision of german finance by the committee of guarantees and for preventing the export of german capital. (6) there were provisions for supervision over state mines and forests in the event of their being a failure in delivery of coal or timber as the case might be. a moratorium up to december 1922 was to be given conditionally on the acceptance of the above terms by the german government, and the reparations commission were then to proceed to fix the further annual payments. had these drastic proposals been adopted and enforced by the allies, what would have been the result? deliveries of coal and timber would have been ensured up to the full quota arranged. by means of the levy on exports, £50,000,000 would have been already collected in gold and paid into allied account. the mark would have been stabilised, and could have been made the basis of a considerable loan. as german trade gradually recovered the export levy would bring in larger amounts. this year would certainly have produced a yield of between £60,000,000 and £70,000,000. this is what would have been effected for reparations if the plan put forward by the british government had been accepted and put into execution in august. by the settlement of this most troublous question, the great cost and the still greater irritation of the ruhr episode would have been avoided, trade would have continued its convalescence, and the peace of europe would have been established. what would have happened if germany had refused these terms? we should certainly have heard what objections or counter-proposals germany had to offer. but we were resolved to have a settlement that would put an end to the fiscal chaos inside germany, and having thus put her in a position to pay we were equally resolved that she should pay up to the limit of her capacity. we, therefore, undertook, if germany rejected the terms finally agreed upon, to join france and the other allies in any coercive measures deemed advisable to compel acceptance. m. poincaré refused to agree. his refusal alone rendered that conference fruitless. over a year has elapsed since then. he has pursued a different policy. so far it has brought him nothing. i am bold enough to predict that in future it will bring france considerably less than the august 1922 plan would have yielded. if he is out for reparations his policy will inevitably fail in comparison with that he so rashly threw over. but if he is out for trouble it has been a great success, and in future it will be an even greater triumph for his statesmanship. a permanent garrison in the ruhr has possibilities of mischief which it does not require any special vision to foresee. enduring peace can only rest on a foundation of justice. it is just that germany should exert herself to the limit of her strength to repair the damage wrought by her armies. she was the aggressor; she was the invader. her aggression inflicted serious hurt on her neighbours. by the established precepts of every civilised law in the world she ought to pay up. a peace which did not recognise that obligation would be unjust and provoke a righteous resentment in the breasts of the wronged. that sentiment would have been inimical to the good understanding that is one of the essentials of peace. moreover, it is not conducive to good behaviour amongst nations that they should be allowed to ravage and destroy without paying the penalty of their misdeeds. that is why i do not agree with those who would wipe out the claim for reparations entirely. on the other hand, civilised jurisprudence has also advanced to the stage where it forbids the creditor to attach his debtor's freedom and independence as security for the payment of the debt. the law that permitted a debtor to be sold into bondage for an unliquidated liability has now been voted barbarous by the more humane usage and wont of the day. that is why i protest against using armed force to occupy and control a country whilst the scourge of starvation is being used to whip its workmen into toiling for payment of a foreign debt. as mr. gladstone once said: "justice means justice to all." the main difficulty of a just settlement of reparations comes from the growing disposition to take sides blindly in this dispute. one party sees nothing but the outrage of 1914-18, the costly vindication of right, and the just claim of the victims to compensation for their losses. the other party sees nothing but the harsh fury with which the victors in the cause press their verdict to execution. peace can only be restored by a full recognition of the equities as well as the humanities--of the humanities as well as the equities. i have sought in these pages to deal fairly with both. d. lloyd george. _september 13th, 1923._ contents chapter page i: the great peril 25 post-war europe revisited--impoverishment and taxation--race hatreds unchanged--how war is begun--vengeance is the lord's--the churches and the league of nations. ii: europe still arming 51 marshal foch and the cause of the great war--navies for defence--strength of europe's armies--europe more militant than ever. iii: the eruption in the mediterranean 59 dropping hot cinders in the balkans--seeing war in pictures--force the arbiter of right and wrong--limiting the activities of the league--bottling up the adriatic. iv: is the league of nations a success? 68 triumphs of the league--all great powers should be in it--america and the league--treaty and the league--ending the arbitrament of the sword. v: the treaty of versailles and its critics 81 treaty criticised but not read--america and the treaty--labour and the treaty--treaty and league of nations interwoven. vi: 1922 95 war dance still in the world--ultimatum instead of conference--cannes and genoa--enemies at council table--talk of an american loan. vii: what is france after? 104 clemenceau and the rhine--annexation and revenge--anglo-american guarantee to france--poincaré and the rhine. viii: what is france after? 116 versailles treaty and the rhine frontier--foch and the political frontier--american and british pressure--sham republic of the rhine. ix: what is france after? 130 bonar law and poincaré--productive sanctions and reparations--moratorium for germany fails--britain stands aside. x: reparations 136 reparations and the treaty--capacity to pay--reparations commission changed--america's vacant chair--worthless "c" bonds for britain. xi: mr. hughes's new haven speech 147 secretary hughes's new haven speech, a timid deliverance--impartial tribunal of experts--offer of american help. xii: the french invasion of the ruhr 156 what germany has paid--"in technical default"--wrong way to make germany pay--ruining german industry--france's secret aim. xiii: lost opportunities 167 french failure in the ruhr--wild oats of reparation--the ruhr and the league of nations--the bankers' conference. xiv: french schemes 175 italy and the ruhr--iron ore of lorraine and german coal deposits--loucheur and hugo stinnes--german workmen in bondage. xv: the quicksand 183 loucheur and the ruhr--lack of leader in france--disregard of allies--aggression and security--failure of bonar law. xvi: the first german offer 191 does france seek a settlement?--demand for submission in the ruhr--german offer inadequate--keeping america out--treaty idea not followed. xvii: the second german note 202 german offer and the loan to germany--can berlin assent to invasion?--reintroducing america--weakening debtors ability to pay. xviii: the napoleonic dream 213 european mind unhinged--what every frenchman knows--pickwick follows snodgrass--germany may collapse--undoing the work of bismarck. xix: is it peace? 225 stresemann man of energy--chaos ahead for germany--british unemployment--france a self-contained country--balfour's note a generous offer. xx: what next? 234 pen-and-ink jousting--tory "diehards" and france--poincaré and the dove of peace--what "pay and stay" means--france's minimum and britain's surrender. xxi: the british debt to america 244 borrowing for allies--british taxpayer's burden--creditor nation now debtor--britain must pay her way--her currency not discredited--inter-allied debts. xxii: inter-allied debts 252 discovery of the middle west--legend of british wealth--1,400,000 unemployed--the balfour note--can britain afford to be more generous than america? xxiii: the british elections 264 minority rule and moral authority--national liberals at the polls--danger of england's electoral system--labour's prospects--warring liberal factions. xxiv: how democracy works 282 growth of britain's electorate--women suffrage--new voters without a party--absentees from the polls--freaks of the group system. xxv: political realities 291 post-war legislation--the irish cauldron--labour and capital--agriculture and industry--socialism courting fascism. xxvi: should we make peace with russia? 301 pre-revolutionary russia--corruption and betrayal--"shaking hands with murder"--if turkey, why not russia?--need for russia's exports. xxvii: palestine and the jews 312 stupidity of anti-semitism--blighting rule of the turk--the jew as a cultivator--race equality in palestine--zionist declaration. xxviii: the treaty of lausanne 322 turkish fezzes in the air--blow of prestige of the west--massacres and misgovernment--fertile country a wilderness--had wilson succeeded--lausanne a milestone, not a terminus. xxix: the signing of the irish treaty 339 gladstone's home-rule fight--scene in no. 10 downing street--griffith and collins--to sign or not to sign--childers, sullen and disappointed--treaty a pillar of hope for future. xxx: prohibition 350 the lesson from russia--britain not convinced--experiments difficult--public uneducated--outlook not encouraging. xxxi: unofficial publication of "official" information 361 julius cæsar began it--self defence and secret information--the versailles decision--general rules and special cases. where are we going? i the great peril if a man on a bright july morning in 1914 had sailed abroad and had the misfortune to be wrecked on a desert island, returning to civilisation a week ago, the change which europe presented to him would be sufficient to induce him to believe that his long solitude had unhinged his mind. to him it would have appeared as the stuff of which dreams are made. he would have remembered a german empire with an august head, ruling with autocratic sway a population striding with giant steps into prosperity and wealth, possessing a matchless army, whose tread terrified europe; with a fleet that provoked articles and novels and agitations about the invasion of england; with vast possessions across the seas. in its place he would see germany, instead of being a confident, powerful, arrogant empire, a timid, nervous, and apologetic republic presided over by a respectable and intelligent workman, her minister issuing notes to propitiate belgium, and having them sent back like the stupid exercises of a backward schoolboy to be rewritten in accordance with the pleasure of the taskmaster; the great army reduced to a force one-half the size of that of serbia; the menacing fleet at the bottom of the sea; the watch on the rhine kept by french, british, and belgian soldiers. he would see the krupp works in french occupation; not a german colony left. russia he would have recollected as a powerful autocracy rooted in a superstitious belief by the peasantry in the divinity of its head. he would find it now a revolutionary area ruled by the exiles of yesterday, shunned by the rest of the world because of the violence of its communistic doctrines; tsardom, with its gilded retinue of splendour, flung into a hideous doom, and the sceptre of peter the great enforcing the doctrines of karl marx. he would see the austrian empire as much a thing of the past as the empire of nebuchadnezzar, a poor province lifted out of beggary by the charity of her foes: new states, which had been dead and buried for centuries, risen from the dead, casting off their shrouds, marching in full panoply; trieste an italian port; the dolomites an italian bastion. the turk alone quite unchanged, a few more amputating operations performed upon him, but still preserving sufficient vitality to massacre christians irrespective of denomination or race, and to become a sore trial and perplexity to the rest of the world. if our returned voyager travelled through europe he would find even more fundamental changes in the world of finance, trade and commerce. he would find impoverishment, dislocation; the elaborate and finely-spun web of commerce rent to pieces, and its torn threads floating in the wind. with a few sovereigns in his pocket, he would expect in return 25 francs, 20 marks, and about 26 lire. instead of that, with a paper sovereign he would find that he could buy 70 francs, nearly 100 lire, 250,000 german marks, 300,000 austrian kronen, and millions of russian roubles. the money-changers who once prospered on decimal fractions now earning a precarious livelihood in the flights of the multiplication table. that would give him a better indication perhaps of the reality of the change than even the fall of empires. on his journeys he would travel through prosperous provinces rutted and overturned as by a gigantic earthquake; he would pass vast cemeteries where 10,000,000 young men fallen in the great war were having their last sleep; he would see on all hands signs of mutilation of men who had been engaged in the great struggle. taxation everywhere quintupled with nothing but debt to show for it; industry with its back bent under a burden of taxation which when he left existed only in the nightmares of the dyspeptic rich. he would then be able to realise something of the tremendous upheaval that had taken place in the world. but what would surprise him more than all these amazing and bewildering transformations would be the one thing in which there was no change. he would naturally expect that after such terrifying experiences, the world would have learnt its lesson, turned its back finally on war, its crimes and its follies, and set its face resolutely toward peace. it is the one thing he discovers has not changed--the world has not learned one single syllable. suspicions amongst nations exist just as ever, only more intense; hatreds between races and peoples, only fiercer; combinations forming everywhere for the next war; great armies drilling; conventions and compacts for joint action when the tocsin sounds; general staffs meeting to arrange whether they should march, where they should march, how they should march, and where they should strike; little nations only just hatched, just out of the shell, staggering under the burden of great armaments, and marching along towards unknown battlefields; new machinery of destruction and slaughter being devised and manufactured with feverish anxiety; every day science being brought under contribution to discover new methods to destroy human life--in fact, a deep laid and powerfully concerted plot against civilisation, openly organised in the light of the sun. and that after his experience of four or five years ago! man the builder, and man the breaker, working side by side in the same workshop, and apparently on the best of terms with each other, playing their part in the eternal round of creation and dissolution, with characteristic human energy. what a complex creature is man! it is little wonder that god gave him up repeatedly in despair. he is unteachable. i wonder whether it is realised that if war were to break out again, the calamity would be a hundredfold greater than that of the last experience. next time, cities will be laid waste. possible, and i am sorry to say, probable enemy nations are more closely intertwined, and the engines of havoc are becoming more and more terrible. i have called attention repeatedly to the developments which took place during the late war, in the variety, the range, and the power of destructive weapons. compare the aëroplane at the beginning of the war, and its small bomb which could easily be manhandled, with the same machine at the end. by the end of the war machines had been built, and but for the armistice would have been used, the devastating power of which was terrific. since then the power of the machine, the weight of the explosive, and the incendiary material it drops, have grown, and are still growing. science is perfecting old methods of destruction, and searching out new methods. one day, in its exploration, it may hit on something that may make the fabric of civilisation rock. can anything be done to avert this approaching catastrophe? that is the problem of all problems for those who love their fellowmen. i warn you that it is madness to trust to the hope that mankind, after such an experience, will not be so rash as to court another disaster of the same kind. the memory of the terrors, the losses, the sufferings of the war, will not restrain men from precipitating the world into something which is infinitely worse, and those who think so, and, therefore, urge that it is not necessary to engage in a new crusade for peace, have not studied the perverse, the stubborn, and the reckless nature of man. there is the danger that the last war may even make some nations believe in war. i have talked to many young soldiers who were fortunate enough to have passed unscathed through some of the worst experiences of the war, to many who suffered mutilation in some of these experiences; they have given me one common impression that the memory of fear is evanescent, and that they cannot now re-create in their own minds the sensations of terror through which they passed. if that is true of those who went through the furnace, what of the multitudes who simply looked on?--the multitudes of those who were too young to take part, and can only recall the excitement produced by the conflict and the glory of victory? the recollection of the headaches of an orgy never lasts as long as that of its pleasures. it is useless to recall memories of the terror and torture of the war, and expect them to crusade for peace. memory is a treacherous crusader. it starts with a right purpose fresh and hot on its path, but its zeal gets fainter as the days roll past, and it ends by handing over its banner to the foe. you can only redeem mankind by appealing to its nobler instincts. fear is base, and you cannot lift mankind by using it as a lever. the churches alone can effectively rouse the higher impulses of our nature. that is where their task comes in. there is another reason why we cannot regard the danger as having passed away. you have all the elements which made for the great war of 1914 more potent than ever to-day. the atmosphere of europe is charged with them. what made the last war? armed international dislikes, rivalries, and suspicions. the dislikes were based on age-long racial feuds stimulated by memories of recent wrongs. celt and teuton disliking each other; slav and teuton suspicious of each other; the hatred of the slav for the teuton intensified by the arrogance with which germany humiliated russia at the moment of her weakness immediately after the japanese war, when she was peculiarly sensitive to insult. you will recollect the peremptoriness and the insolence of her gesture over the bosnian annexation, and insolences are always more painful than wrongs and rankle longer. they corrode the flesh, and burn into the soul of a nation, keeping its anger aflame. i wish nations always remembered that. there was the hatred of the celt for the teuton deepened by the annexation of alsace-lorraine, and by the incidents inseparable from the invasion of a foreign soil. there was germany suspecting that every railway constructed by russia was aimed at her heart. there was france convinced that germany was only waiting her opportunity to pick a quarrel which would enable her to deprive france of her much-coveted colonies. there was england watching with vigilant insight and increasing anger the growth of germany's great fleet, which she was convinced was aimed at her shores. there were great armies in every continental country ready to march at a moment's notice, fully equipped, each commander firmly persuaded that his own legions were irresistible. you had there all the conditions that made for war. had it come of set purpose? i have read most of the literature concerning the events that led up to that war, and it is full of warning as to how wars happen. they do not come because the majority of those who are concerned are bent upon bloodshed, not even the majority who have the decisive voice if they exercised it in time. had a plebiscite been taken in every country in europe a week before war was declared as to whether they wished to engage in a european conflict, the proposal would have been turned down by a majority so overwhelming as to show that the proposition was one that no nation had the slightest idea of entertaining. that is not the reason why it came. but you have always in control of the affairs of nations some men who hesitate; many who are apathetic, many who are merely inefficient and stupid; and then most men, even in a government, have their minds concentrated on their own immediate tasks. i will give you an illustration of how war is begun, once you have the predisposition to quarrel, without anybody wanting it and with the vast majority of the people who are to be engaged in it opposed to it. austria issued an ultimatum to serbia. there is nothing a big bully likes better than to hector a little man who is near the point of his toe. serbia was so near the boot that austria was constantly tempted to give it a kick, and it did. it issued an ultimatum, which was a very insolent one. the serbian reply was a practical acceptance of the austrian demands. this is the note the kaiser wrote on it: "a brilliant performance this. but with it disappears"--listen to this written by the kaiser of germany just a few days before war was declared--"but with it disappears every reason for war, and the austrian minister ought to have remained quietly in belgrade. after that i would never have given orders for mobilisation." in three days there was war. let me give another illustration. admiral tirpitz said he saw von jagow two days after the austrian reply. von jagow, the german foreign minister, was so little interested in the austro-serbian conflict that he confessed to the german ambassador to austria on july 27th, two days after the reply had been received, that he had not yet found time to read the serbian reply to austria. here is the document on which ten million young men who had no responsibility for it have been slain, homes have been desolated, and a debt of taxation, confusion and sorrow incurred which will not be wiped out as long as this generation lasts. it is inconceivable, if one had not some knowledge of the carelessness and the procrastination which are bred in official circles by long practice. that was only three days before war was declared. this high official in the wilhelmstrasse, who subsequently agreed to the fateful decision to declare war against russia, had not even read the critical document which ought to have averted the struggle. but there are always the vigilant few, the very few resolute men whose whole mind and energy and skill is engaged ceaselessly in driving forward the chariots of war. whilst others are asleep, they are craftily dodging the traffic, and stealing along unawares, slowly getting their chariots into position for the next push forward. whilst others are asleep, they lash the fiery steeds along their destructive course. in the press, on the platform, in the council chambers, in the chancelleries, in society of all kinds, high and low, they are always pressing along. when the precipice is reached, they dash through the feeble resistance of the panic-stricken mob of counsellors and officials, and nations are plunged into the abyss before they know it. this is the way most wars come. read the history of the war of 1870. it came about in the same confused, clumsy, purposeless way. in all these cases there is always in the background the sinister figure of that force for mischief which used to be known by our puritan fathers as the devil. have these hatreds and suspicions abated? are there no rivalries to-day? are there no men whose one joy is in war? was the devil numbered amongst the slain in the last war? i have never seen his name in any casualty list. look around. his agents are more numerous, more active, more pressing and efficient than ever. europe to-day is a cauldron of suspicions and hatreds. it is well to speak frankly. celt and teuton are now interlocked in a conflict which is none the less desperate because one of the parties is disarmed. there is a suppressed savagery which is but ill concealed, and there are new hatreds which, if they have not been brought into existence during the war, have at any rate come to the surface. mankind has learnt no lesson from the four or five years of war, although it has been scourged with scorpions. there was nothing that contributed more to the last catastrophe than the annexation by germany of alsace-lorraine. as long as that act of folly remained uncorrected there was no real peace possible in europe. the nations concerned were just abiding their opportunity, and the opportunity came. now you have two alsace-lorraines at least. there is the annexation of vilna by force; there is the annexation of galicia by force, by violence, by the use of arms against the will of the population. elsewhere you have the german and the pole quarrelling over silesia; the russian and the pole over doubtful boundaries; the czech and the magyar; the serbian and the bulgarian; the russian and the rumanian; the rumanian and the magyar. there is the age-long feud between greek and turk. all have an air of biding opportunity, all are armed ready for slaughter. europe is a seething cauldron of international hates, with powerful men in command of the fuel stores feeding the flames and stoking the fires. it is no use blaming the treaty of versailles. this state of things has nothing to do with treaties. here it is the spirit that killeth and not the letter. sometimes wrongs are imaginary. where the wrongs are imaginary time will heal the sense of hurt, but sometimes they are real, and time will fester the wound, but everywhere and always the hatreds are real enough. can nothing be done? if it can, let it be done in time. let it be done at once. yet, once more i remind you that if the gun is loaded--and it is loaded in every land--when the quarrel begins it is apt to go off, not because the trigger is deliberately pulled, but because some clumsy fellow in his excitement stumbles against it. in a continent which is nominally christian, the churches surely are not impotent. when the west was all catholic, and it had the good fortune to have a high-minded and capable occupant of the throne of st. peter, many a struggle was averted by his intervention. can the churches not once more display their power? they can only do so by moving together, not merely every denomination in britain, but every christian community throughout europe--catholic and protestant--catholics even more than protestants, for the countries where the peril is most imminent are more under the domination of the catholic churches than of the protestant faiths. if all the heroism of millions, their sacrifice and their sufferings, are to be thrown away, it will be the most colossal, criminal and infamous waste ever perpetrated in human history. millions of men endangered their lives willingly. millions lost their lives for the sake of establishing peace on earth on the basis of international right. a temple to human right was built with material quarried out of all that is choicest in the soul of man. but its timbers are being drenched with the kerosene of hatred, and one day a match will be lit by some careless or malignant hand which will set fire to this magnificent edifice; its splendour will be reduced to black embers, and the hope of mankind will be once more laid in ashes. the task of the churches is to put forth the whole of their united strength to avert that catastrophe. peace is only possible when you introduce into the attitude of nations towards each other principles which govern the demeanour of decent people in a community towards their neighbours. if international methods were introduced into the dealings of neighbours with each other life would become intolerable--the unconcealed suspicions, distrusts and ill-will which rule everywhere, the eternal expectancy of and preparation for blows, the readiness of the strong to use violence, either to enforce his will on his weaker neighbour or to deprive him of his liberty or his possessions, or even his life, to satisfy anger, revenge, or greed. had this been the rule in private affairs, we should all have to live in caves, or in castles, according to our means. as a matter of fact, man is only half civilised. in international matters he is still a savage, in his heart he recognises no law but that of force. the savage has his restraints. his instinct warns him not to pounce save when he thinks he can do so effectively and with impunity, and for some purpose which he thinks worth his while. whether he hates or covets, he has no other restraint. i wish i could say that in essence nations to-day obey any other impulse. man must be civilised in his international relations, otherwise wars will go on as long as mankind remains on this earth. i have seen a city wrenched from its people. i have seen a whole province appropriated against the protests of its people, and all within the last four years, since the great war to establish international right. there was no conceivable justification for either of these depredations except that both the city and the province were desirable, were at hand, were very tempting, and that the owners were too feeble to resist their pillagers. the lesson must be taught that larceny does not diminish in turpitude as it increases in the scale of its operations. a nation that feloniously steals, takes, and carries away a city or province is just as criminal as the thief sentenced to imprisonment for robbery by violence on the high-road. and these national felonies will assuredly bring trouble one day. they invariably do so, and unfortunately international trouble is never confined to the felon. human retribution, once it begins, is as indiscriminating and uncontrollable as a prairie fire. the flames consume the wheat as well as the tares. hell fire administered by the hand of man scorches the innocent equally with the guilty. the doom of germany involved millions in its tortures who were outside her gates, abominated her crimes, and did all they could to prevent their perpetration. that is why it is written: "'vengeance is mine, i will repay,' saith the lord." it is the supreme duty of the churches to teach nations to understand that the moral law is just as applicable to them in their corporate capacity as it is to the individuals who compose them; to teach them that hatred is just as unseemly between nations as it is between individuals, and far more dangerous. goodwill must be assiduously cultivated between nations. it must be ingeminated in every way--in schools, in the press, in sermons, in classes. the men who are always sowing distrust and dislike of men of other races and lands should be picked out, condemned, shown up, hunted by the scorn, the contempt and the wrath of their fellowmen. they are more dangerous than the incendiary who burns down an occasional hay-rick or habitation. let the best side of every nation be better known. each nation has made its contribution to the sum of human greatness. dwell on that, and not on the failings and the deficiencies, the errors, and the crimes which are unhappily common to all nations. name me the land that has no stain on its record. there is no end to the resourcefulness of hate. its variety is infinite. i recollect, not so long ago, a time when you were not a patriot if you were pro-french; the fact that you were pro-french stamped you as a little englander. france was supposed to be a busy and malignant foe of britain all the world over, scheming everywhere against british interests. she stood for all that was unpleasant and repugnant to the british mind--in her thought, her literature, her politics, and her manners. france heartily reciprocated our dislike. there were at least two occasions when war between the two countries was apprehended, was openly talked of, and was even likely. the atmosphere of the press in both capitals was charged with brimstone. now it is to germany you must not utter one word of toleration or even fair play. i am not counselling the abandonment of the just measure of our national rights as against either of these two countries, but they are both great nations. they are both nations that have contributed richly of the things that make for the elevation, for the happiness, for the splendour of mankind. if germany is the land of bismarck with its blood and iron, all protestants will remember that she is also the land of luther and the reformation. if she fought in the late war for four years to establish a military domination in europe, she fought for thirty years with enduring valour and much suffering to establish the freedom of conscience in europe. she has given to the world great literature, great painters, great philosophers, great explorers in all the continents of thought. she is the land of unrivalled song. even in the middle of the bloody conflict with germany, every sunday we praised god in our churches to the notes of german music. let us give credit for these things in our efforts to reconstitute the reign of goodwill. and if we feel angry with france, let us remember her dazzling array of great writers, her gigantic struggles for liberty, the penetrating imagination devoted to scientific research, which has brought incalculable blessings to humanity. let us not judge france by the fussy little men that give expression to her petulance in the fits of temper that overtake every nation, but by the great men who have given noble expression to her immortal soul. france is the land of victor hugo, of pascal, of renan, and many another teacher who has taken humanity by the hand along the upward road. everything depends on a consistent, determined, continuous inculcation of the principles and the ideal of goodfellowship, between nations. goodwill on earth means to think well of and dwell on the best side of others, and goodwill on earth and peace have been linked together. without the one you will not have the other. let us, therefore, cultivate the spirit of brotherhood amongst men. the church must appeal to the noblest sentiments of the human heart. mankind can only be redeemed by an appeal to those higher instincts. not by an appeal to ignoble fear. war means terror, war means death, war means anguish. that will not prevent war, and never has. man is the most fearless of god's creatures, and when his passions are roused there is no fear that will restrain him. the fire of his passion burns the restraints of self-preservation like bands of tow, so that fear will not restrain the nations and make peace among them. war destroys trade, it brings unemployment. look at all the losses, reckoning them up in cash. that will not prevent war: it never has. selfish interests have a means of deluding themselves. greed has a blind side. do not trust to selfishness and selfish interest to ensure peace. selfishness will ensure nothing which is worth keeping in the world. selfishness pays good dividends, but it wastes capital. the nation or the individual that makes self-love the managing-director of the soul will end in bankruptcy--bankruptcy of respect, bankruptcy of ideals--bankruptcy of honour--bankruptcy of friendships. what is it that germany is suffering from now? her great tragedy is not her indemnity, not even her gigantic casualties, not even the destruction of her trade. the one great tragedy of germany is that she has lost the respect of mankind. it affects her trade, it affects her business, it makes it difficult for her to climb to the pitch whence she fell. the rope is gone. she has done things of which she herself is now ashamed. her people--i can see it when i meet them--are ashamed. that is the tragedy. they are a gallant people, they are a brave people, they fought bravely, but they are broken-spirited. why? they have lost their self-respect because they have done something that they know in their hearts was wrong. these are the things that have to be taught to nations. a public opinion must be worked up that will be strong enough to sustain international right. no law is possible without an active public opinion for its enforcement, least of all international law. without it the league of nations is a farce. you might as well have a wooden cannon; however splendidly mounted it may be, however imposing its appearance, every one knows that the moment it is fired it will burst. unless the world is taught to respect its authority, it will become a butt of derision. it is no use keeping up pretences. pretences never delude events. the league of nations may gather together representatives of all the great powers of the earth, and yet it may be a futile, barren, costly nothing unless it has behind it the spirit of the people who constitute those nations. the real danger of the moment is lest the league of nations should become a mere make-believe, whilst the same old intrigues, the same old schemes, the same old international greed and hatred, should be working their will freely outside. the decision of the league of nations has been, within the last two or three years, openly flouted by a member of that league, a member which owes its national independence to the treaty which founded that league. another nation, one of the principal authors of the league, refuses to refer a question in which is it concerned, and in which europe is concerned, to the arbitrament of the league. both these nations prefer to resort to force. the rest of the world looks on feebly with indifference, accepting the rebuff to their league in each case. why? because there is no public opinion in the recalcitrant countries to bring pressure to bear on the respective governments, and there is no public opinion strong enough outside to exercise the necessary insistence. the churches alone can remedy this. there ought to be an international movement of all the churches, catholic and protestant, protestant and catholic. i know it is difficult to compass. the divisions in christendom are too often fatal to common action for the attainment of common aims. they ought to be overcome. they must be overcome. there was a time in the middles ages when religion exercised a direct as well as an indirect influence in the domain of government and social relations. it helped to win for englishmen their great charter. it gradually emancipated the serfs. it preserved the peace of europe many a time when it was gravely imperilled by the quarrels of kings. in the days of puritanism, and the days of the covenant, the partnership between religion and politics won for us the two great boons of parliamentary liberty and liberty of conscience. when methodism spurred the conscience of england, its influence was felt in the political movement that emancipated the slaves throughout the british empire. that was one of the greatest feats of disinterested righteousness ever exhibited by a nation. the tasks awaiting religion to-day in the sphere of government are even greater--emancipation of the worker from the tyrannies of economic greed, the saving of the nation from the curse of alcohol, and the spreading of the angels' message heard on the hills of bethlehem until the obdurate heart of man shall at last re-echo it: "peace on earth and goodwill amongst men." ii europe still arming marshal foch once told me that he considered the german army of 1914 the finest army the world ever saw, in numbers, organisation, training, and equipment. what set that army in motion? much has been written and spoken as to the origin of the great war, and as to who and what was responsible for so overwhelming a cataclysm. no one ever believed that it was the assassination of a royal archduke. some said it was the working out of the pan-german scheme to rule the earth; some contended it was the german fear of the growing power of russia, the nervous apprehension of what looked like an encircling movement by russia, france and britain. the great french marshal's dictum is the real explanation. unless due weight is given to this outstanding fact the diplomatic muddle of july, 1914, becomes unintelligible. were it not that the german army was more perfect and more potent than either the french or the russian army--were it not that every german officer was convinced that the german military machine was superior to all its rivals--there would have been no war, whatever emperors, diplomatists, or statesmen said, thought, or intended. all nations have their ambitions, but they are not tempted to impose them upon their neighbours if the hazard is too obviously great. but a sense of overpowering force behind national aims is a constant incitement to recklessness, to greed, and to ambitious patriotism. the more one examines, in the growing calm, the events of july, 1914, the more one is impressed with the shrinking of the nominal rulers of the attacking empires as they approached the abyss, and with the relentless driving onward of the military organisation behind these terror-stricken dummies. navies are essentially defensive weapons. no capital in the world can be captured by navies alone, and no country can be annexed or invaded by a fleet. but armies are grabbing machines. a transcendent army has always led to aggression. no country can resist the lure of an easy military triumph paraded before its eyes for two successive generations. the inference is an obvious one. to ensure peace on earth nations must disarm their striking forces. without disarmament, pacts, treaties, and covenants are of no avail. they are the paper currency of diplomacy. that is the reason why all the friends of peace are filled with despair when they see nations still arming and competing in armies whilst trusting to mere words and signatures to restrain the irresistible impetus of organised force. a statistical survey of european armies to-day is calculated to cause alarm. europe has not learnt the lesson of the war. it has rather drawn a wrong inference from that calamity. there are more men under arms in europe to-day than there were in 1913-14, with none of the justification or excuse which could be pleaded in those days. in pre-war times the statesmen of each country could make a parliamentary case for their military budgets by calling attention to the menace of prodigious armies across their frontiers. germany and austria built up great armaments because their frontiers were open to the attack of two great military powers who had engaged to pool their resources in the event of war. france and russia raised huge armies because germany possessed the most redoubtable army in the world, and could rely in the case of war upon the assistance of the not inconsiderable forces of the austrian empire. and both austria and france had always the uncertain factor of italy, with her army of 3,000,000, to reckon with. but since the war these mutual excuses no longer exist. the two great military empires of central europe have disappeared. germany, which before the war had a peace establishment of 800,000 men and reserves running into millions, has to-day a total army of 100,000 men--about one-third the size of the polish army. the formidable german equipment which for four years pounded the cities and villages of northern france to dust is either destroyed or scattered for display amongst the towns and villages of the victors. the austrian army, which had in 1913-14 a peace establishment of 420,000 men and a reserve of two or three millions of trained men, has to-day been reduced to a tiny force of 30,000 men. in spite of these facts france has still an army of 736,000 men now under arms, with a trained reserve of two or three millions more. she is strengthening and developing her air force as if she feared--or contemplated--an immediate invasion. in 1914 france had an air force of 400 aëroplanes; to-day she has 1,152.[1] but numbers signify little. the size, the power, and the purpose of the machines signify much. amongst the 1,152 air machines of to-day will be found bombers of a destructiveness such as was not dreamt of in 1914. should human folly drift once more into war these preparations are full of evil omen as to the character of that conflict. a single bomb dropped from one of the new bombers contains more explosive material than one hundred of those carried by the old type. and the size of the machine and of its bombs is growing year by year. where is it to stop? and what is it all for? where is the enemy? where is the menace which demands such gigantic military developments? not one of the neighbours of france has to-day a force which reaches one-fourth the figures of her formidable army. germany no longer affords a decent pretext. the population of germany is equal to the aggregate population of poland, rumania, jugo-slavia, and czecho-slovakia, but her army barely numbers one-seventh of the aggregate peace establishment of these four countries. rumania alone, with a population of 15,000,000, has an army twice the size of that allowed by the treaty of versailles to germany with her population of 60,000,000. these countries have in addition to their standing armies reserve forces of millions of trained men, whilst the young men of germany are no longer permitted to train in the use of arms. her military equipment is destroyed, and her arsenals and workshops are closely inspected by allied officers lest a fresh equipment should be clandestinely produced. an army of 700,000 is, therefore, not necessary in order to keep germany within bounds. the only other powerful army in europe is the russian army. it is difficult to gather any reliable facts about russia. the mists that arise from that unhealthy political and economic swamp obscure and distort all vision. the statistics concerning her army vary according to the point of view of the person who cites them. the latest figure given by the russians themselves is 800,000. on paper that indicates as formidable a force as that possessed by the french. but the events of the past few years show clearly that the russian army is powerful only for defence, and that it is valueless for purposes of invasion. it has neither the transport that gives mobility nor the artillery that makes an army redoubtable in attack. the polish invasion of 1923 was a comedy, and as soon as the poles offered the slightest resistance the bolsheviks ran back to their fastnesses without striking a parthian blow at their pursuers. the state of russian arsenals and factories under bolshevism is such that any attempt to re-equip these armies must fail. the russian army, therefore, affords no justification for keeping up armaments in europe on the present inflated scale. the fact is that europe is thoroughly frightened by its recent experience, and, like all frightened things, does not readily listen to reason, and is apt to resort to expedients which aggravate the evils which have terrified it. militarism has reduced it to its present plight, and to save itself from a similar disaster in future it has become more militarist than ever. every little state bristles with guns to scare off invaders. meanwhile no country in europe pays its way, except britain, with her reduced army and navy. but by means of loans and inflated currencies they all, even the smallest of them, contrive to maintain larger armies than frederick the great or the grand monarque ever commanded in their most triumphant years. and the cost of armaments to-day has grown vastly out of proportion to the numbers of the units that compose them. france--in many ways the richest country in europe--displays a gaping and a growing rent in her national finance which has to be patched up by paper. the deficit grows in spite of the fact that a large part of her army is quartered on germany to the detriment of reparations, and that the german contribution conceals much of the cost of that large army. a good deal of the borrowing is attributable to the cost of repairing her devastated area, but the burden of maintaining so huge an army is responsible for a considerable share of the deficiency. the economic recovery of europe is seriously retarded by the cost of the new militarism. the old continent is throwing to the dogs of war with both hands the bread that should feed her children. one day those dogs will, in their arrogant savagery, turn upon the children and rend them. _algeciras, december 26th, 1922._ footnote: [1] 1,152 refers to when this chapter was written, _i. e._, january 6th, 1923. the figure has increased since then. iii the eruption in the mediterranean the shores of the mediterranean have from time immemorial been the scene of eruptions and earthquakes. they generally break out without warning. sometimes they are devastating in their effects, destroying life and property over wide areas and on a vast scale. sometimes they provide a brilliant spectacular display, terrifying in appearance, but not causing much destruction. to which of these two categories does the last eruption of mussolini belong? to drop hot cinders in the balkans is a dangerous experiment. the soil is everywhere soaked with naphtha and it floats about in uncharted pools and runlets which easily catch fire. a cinder flung from vienna started a conflagration which spread over continents. that was only nine years ago. the ground is still hot--the smoke blinds and stifles. you cannot see clearly or breathe freely. now and again there is a suspicious ruddiness in the banks of smoke which proves that the fire is not yet out. and yet there are statesmen flinging burning faggots about with reckless swagger. the temper of europe may be gauged from the reception accorded to these heedless pyrotechnics on the part of national leaders by their own countrymen. every time it occurs, whether in france, italy or turkey, and whether it be poincaré, mussolini, or mustapha kemal who directs the show, applause greets the exhibition. i remember the first days of the great war. there was not a belligerent capital where great and enthusiastic crowds did not parade the streets to cheer for war. in those days men did not know what war meant. their conception of it was formed from the pictures of heroic--and always victorious--feats, hung in national galleries and reproduced in the form of the cheap chromos, engravings, and prints, which adorn the walls in every cottage throughout most lands. the triumphant warriors on horseback with the gleaming eye and the flourishing sabre are their own countrymen; the poor vanquished under the crashing hoofs are the foe. hurrah for more pictures! the crown prince denies that he ever used the phrase "this jolly war." his denial ought to be accepted in the absence of better proof than is yet forthcoming as to the statement ever having been made. but the phrase represented the temper of millions in those fateful days. it used to be said that in wars one lot cheered and the other fought. but the cheering mobs who filled the streets in august were filling the trenches in september, and multitudes were filling graves ere the year was out. but when they cheered they had no realisation of the actualities of war. they idealised it. they only saw it in pictures. but the cheerers of to-day know what war means. france lost well over a million lives in the last fight. italy lost 600,000, and there are men in every workshop in both countries who know something of the miseries as well as the horrors of war and can tell those who do not. what, then, accounts for the readiness, at the slightest provocation, to rush into all the same wretchedness over again? the infinite capacity of mankind for deluding itself. last time, it is true, it was a ghastly affair. this time it will be an easy victory. then you had to fight a perfectly armed germany, or austria; now it is a very small affair indeed--in one case a disarmed germany which cannot fight, or, in the other case, a miserable little country like greece with no army or navy to talk of. so hurrah for the guns! a bloodless victory, except, of course, to the vanquished. more pictures for the walls to show our children what terrible people we are when provoked! this episode may end peaceably, but it was a risk to take, and quite an unnecessary risk under the circumstances of the case. italy was indignant, and naturally indignant, at the murder of her emissaries in cold blood on greek territory and, although it took place in a well-known murder area--on the albanian border where comitadjis and other forms of banditti reign--still, greece was responsible for giving adequate protection to all the boundary commissioners who were operating within her frontiers. italy is, therefore, entitled to demand stern reparation for this outrage. this greece promptly concedes. not merely has greece shown her readiness to pay a full indemnity, but she has offered to salute the italian flag by way of making amends for the offence involved to the italian nation in this failure to protect italian officers transacting legitimate business on greek soil. mussolini's answer to the greek acknowledgment of liability is to bombard a defenceless town, kill a few unarmed citizens, and enter into occupation of a greek island. does any one imagine, if the incident had occurred on french soil, and the french government had displayed the same willingness to express regret and offer reparation, that, without further parley, he would have bombarded ajaccio? or, had it been britain, would he have shelled cowes and occupied the isle of wight? but greece has no navy. that, i suppose, alters the merits of the case! force is still the supreme arbiter of right and wrong in international affairs in europe. it is worth noting how a new code of international law is coming into existence since the war. the french armies invade a neighbour's territory, occupy it, establish martial law, seize and run the railways, regulate its press, deport tens of thousands of its inhabitants, imprison or shoot down all who resist, and then proclaim that this is not an act of war. it is only a peaceful occupation to enforce rights under a peace treaty. signor mussolini shells a town belonging to a country with whom he is at peace, and forcibly occupies part of its territory, and then solemnly declares that it is not an act of war, but just a reasonable measure of diplomatic precaution. once force decides the issue it also settles the rules. there was a time when english and spaniards fought each other in the west indies whilst their governments at home were ostensibly at peace. and french and english fought in india without any diplomatic rupture between versailles and st. james's. but in those days these lands were very remote and the control of the centre over events at these distances was intermittent and occasionally feeble. and sometimes it suited governments to ignore what was taking place on the fringe of empire. but even in those days an attack on the homeland meant war, and it would mean war to-day were the attacked countries not powerless. i have heard it said that there is one law for the rich and another for the poor. there is no doubt one international law for the strong and another for the weak. what about the league of nations? this is pre-eminently a case for action under the covenant. italy and greece are both parties. how can they, consistently with the terms of the treaty they so recently signed, refuse to leave this dispute to be dealt with by the league? italy had a special part in drafting the treaty and in imposing it upon germany and austria. she cannot now in decency repudiate its clauses. it is suggested in some quarters that, the dignity of italy being involved in the dispute, she cannot possibly consent to leave it in the hands of the league. that surely is a fatal limitation on the activities of the league of nations. every dispute involving right implicates the national honour and as every nation is the judge of its own honour, ultimately all differences would be ruled out of the covenant which it did not suit one country or the other to refer. the league is not allowed to touch reparations. if this quarrel also is excluded from the consideration of the league, it is no exaggeration to say that this valuable part of the treaty of versailles becomes a dead letter. it is one of the gross ironies of the european situation that the treaty of versailles is being gradually torn to pieces by the countries which are not only the authors but have most to gain by its provisions. france has already repudiated the first and most important part of the treaty by declaring that it will refer no question arising between herself and her neighbours under the treaty itself to the league of nations. she has further invaded and occupied her neighbour's territory in defiance of the provisions of the treaty. if italy also declines to respect the first part of that treaty, then nothing is left of it except what it suits nations to enforce or obey. and if the framers do not owe allegiance to the treaty they drafted, why should those who only accepted it under duress bow to its behests? the victors are busily engaged in discrediting their own charter. it would have been a more honourable course for the nations to pursue if they had followed the example of america by refusing to ratify the whole treaty. to sign a contract and then to pick and choose for execution the parts of it that suit you is unworthy of the honour of great nations which profess to lead the world towards a higher civilisation. there are ugly rumours of possible complications arising out of this unfortunate incident. it does not need a vivid imagination to foretell one or two possible results of a disastrous character. in this country they would be deplored, not only for their effect on european peace, but for the damage they must inevitably inflict on the best interests of italy. she has had enough of victory. what she needs now--what we all need--is peace. there is no country which has more genuine goodwill for italy's prosperity and greatness than great britain. it is an old and tried friendship. the two nations have many common interests: they have no rivalries. hence, the deep anxiety of britain that italy should not commit a mistake which will mortgage her future even if it does not imperil her present. there are no doubt strategic advantages for italy in holding corfu. it enables them to "bottle up" the adriatic. but it is greek and it menaces slavonia, and this introduction of foreign elements into the body of a state for strategic reasons always provokes inflammatory symptoms injurious to the general health of a community. they tend to become malignant and sooner or later they bring disaster. bosnia ultimately proved to be the death of the austrian empire. when the bosnian cancer became active the evil of italia irredenta broke out once more, and between them they laid the empire of the hapsburgs in the dust. italy has played a great part in the work of civilisation, and so has greece. they have still greater tasks awaiting them--one on a great and the other necessarily on a smaller scale. it would be a misfortune to humanity if they spent their fine enthusiasm on hating and thwarting each other. _london, september 3rd, 1923._ iv is the league of nations a success? is the league of nations a success? it is impossible to answer the question candidly without giving offence to rival partisans. if you indicate successes already placed to the account of the league, opponents deny or minimise these triumphs, and suggest that you are blinded by attachment to a chimera. if you point to shortcomings, the extreme zealots of the league get angry and hint that you are a secret enemy. i mean nevertheless to attempt an answer, for much depends on a fearless examination of progress made or missed. my first answer would be that it is scarcely fair to pose this question just yet. the league was founded only three years ago--much too short a period to afford a test of the working of a gigantic, complex, but very delicate and sensitive human machine. there has been hardly time enough even to catalogue and chart the myriads of nerves that thread its system. you cannot move a finger at the councils of geneva without touching some hidden nerve and setting it in a condition of quivering protest. the league has, however, been long enough in existence to reveal its strength and its weaknesses, its power, its potentialities and its perils. it has already achieved triumphs of which its founders may well be proud. the restoration of austria to life when it seemed to have been hopelessly submerged in the deluge of economic, financial and political disaster which had overwhelmed it, is a notable feat of artificial respiration. the successful effort organised by the league to stamp out typhus in eastern europe and prevent its spread to the west is also a success worthy of record. but for this intelligently conducted campaign that terrible disease would have ravaged russia and central europe and laid low millions out of populations so enfeebled by hunger and privation as to become easy victims to its devastating assaults. the labour branch of the league has also been specially active and energetic, and its persistent endeavours to raise and co-ordinate the standards of toil in all countries are producing marked and important results. in addition great credit is due to the league for the splendid work it has accomplished in alleviating the distress which prevailed amongst the famine-stricken areas of eastern europe and amongst the refugees who fled from the horrors of victorious bolshevism in russia, and the still greater horrors of turkish savagery in asia minor. but these humanitarian tasks, praiseworthy though they be, were not the primary objects of the foundation of the league. its main purpose was the averting of future wars by the setting up of some tribunal to which nations would be bound by their own covenant and the pressure of other nations to resort in order to settle their differences. its failure or success as an experiment will be judged by this test alone. how does it stand in this respect? it succeeded in effecting a settlement of a dangerous dispute between sweden and finland over the possession of the aaland islands. that success was on the line of its main purpose. here the methods of the league gave confidence in its complete impartiality. so much can, unfortunately, not be said of another question where it was called in and gave its decision. its silesian award has been acted upon but hardly accepted by both parties as a fair settlement. that is due to the manner adopted in reaching judgment. instead of following the aaland precedent in the choice of a tribunal, it pursued a course which engendered suspicion of its motives. it created a regrettable impression of anxiety to retain a certain measure of control over the decision. there was a suspicion of intrigue in the choice of the tribunal and the conduct of the proceedings. in the aaland case no great power was particularly interested in influencing the conclusions arrived at either way. but here two powers of great authority in the league--france and poland--were passionately engaged in securing a result adverse to germany. the other party to the dispute had no friends, and was moreover not a member of the league. britain stood for fair play, but she was not a protagonist of the claims of germany. poland had a powerful advocate on the league--a country with a vital interest in securing a pro-polish decision. in these circumstances the league ought to have exercised the most scrupulous care to avoid any shadow of doubt as to its freedom from all bias. had it chosen distinguished jurists outside its own body to undertake at least a preliminary investigation as it did in the aaland case, all would have been well. it preferred, however, to retain the matter in its own hands. hence the doubts and misgivings with which the judgment of the league has been received not only by the whole of germany, but by many outside germany. this decision, and the way poland has flouted the league over vilna served to confirm the idea which prevails in russia and germany that france and poland dominate the league. the silesian award may be just, but the fact remains that it will take a long series of decisions beyond cavil to restore or rather to establish german and russian confidence in the league. it is unfortunate that countries which cover more than half europe should feel thus about a body whose success depends entirely on the confidence reposed in its impartiality by all the nations which may be called upon to carry out its decrees, even though these may be adverse to their views or supposed interests. the vilna fiasco, the armenian failure, the suspicions that surround the silesian award, the timidity which prevents the tackling of reparations, which is the one question disturbing the peace of europe to-day, the futile conversations and committees on disarmament which everyone knows, will not succeed in scrapping one flight of aëroplanes or one company of infantry. all these disappointments arise from one predominating cause. what is it? undoubtedly the great weakness of the league comes from the fact that it only represents one half the great powers of the world. until the others join you might as well call the holy alliance a league of nations. the ostensible purpose of that combination was also to prevent a recurrence of the wars that had for years scorched europe, and to establish european peace on the firm basis of a joint guarantee of delimited frontiers. but certain powers with selfish ambitions dictated its policy. they terrorised europe into submission and called that peace. no historical parallel is quite complete, but there is enough material in the occurrences of to-day to justify the reference. the league to be a reality must represent the whole civilised world. that is necessary to give it balance as well as authority. that was the original conception. to ask why that failed is to provoke a bitter and a barren controversy. i do not propose to express any opinion as to the merits of the manoeuvres which led to the defeat of the treaty in america. whether the senate should have honoured the signature of an american president given in the name of his country at an international conference, or whether the commitment was too fundamentally at variance with american ideas to justify sanction--whether the amendments demanded as the condition of approval would have crippled the league and ought to have been rejected, or whether they were harmless and ought to have been accepted--these are issues which it would serve no helpful purpose for me to discuss. but as to the effect of the american refusal to adhere to the league, there can be no doubt. it robbed that body of all chance of dominating success in the immediate future. it is true that three great powers remained in the league, but russia was excluded, germany was not included, and when america decided not to go in, of the great powers, britain, france and italy alone remained. the effect has been paralysing. where these three powers disagree on important issues upon which action is required, nothing is done. the smaller powers cannot, on questions where one or more of the great powers have deep and acute feeling, impose their will; and no two great powers will take the responsibility of overruling the third. hence questions like reparations which constitute a standing menace to european peace are not dealt with by the league. had america been in, even with an amended and expurgated constitution, the situation would have been transformed. america and britain, acting in concert with an openly sympathetic italy and a secretly assenting belgium, would have brought such pressure to bear on france as to make it inevitable that the league should act. the success of the league depends upon the readiness of nations great and small to discuss all their differences at the council table. but no great power has so far permitted any international question in which it has a direct and vital interest to be submitted to the league for decision. it has been allowed to adjudicate upon the destiny of the aaland islands, over the fate of which sweden and finland had a controversy. it has taken cognisance of disputes between poland and lithuania about vilna, although even here its decision has been ignored by the parties. but the acute and threatening quarrel which has broken out between france and germany over the question of reparations the former resolutely declines to submit to consideration by the league. the treaty of versailles is so wide in its application and so comprehensive and far-reaching in its character that it touches international interests almost at every point. so that the french refusal to agree to a reference of any problems in which they are directly concerned which may arise out of this treaty has had the effect of hobbling the league. as long as that attitude is maintained, the league is impotent to discharge its main function of restoring and keeping peace. the dispute over reparations clouds the sky to-day, and until it is finally settled it will cause grave atmospheric disturbances for a whole generation. it is not an impossibility that it may end in the most destructive conflict that ever broke over the earth. it is churning up deadly passions. if ever there was an occasion which called for the intervention of an organisation set up for the express purpose of finding peaceable solutions for trouble-charged international feuds, surely this is pre-eminently such a case. not only do the french government decline to entertain the idea of putting the covenant which constitutes the first and foremost part of the treaty of versailles into operation: they have gone so far as to intimate that they will treat any proposal of the kind as an unfriendly act. the constitution of the league stipulates that it will be the friendly duty of any power to move that any international dispute which threatens peace shall be referred to the league. nevertheless, one leading signatory rules out of the covenant all the questions which vitally affect its own interests. this is the power which has invaded the territory of another because the latter has failed to carry out one of the provisions of the same treaty! this emphatic repudiation of a solemn contract by one of its promoters has been acquiesced in by all the other signatories. repudiation and acquiescence complete the electrocuting circuit. this limitation of the activities of the league is the gravest check which it has yet sustained in its career. i do not believe it would have occurred had america, with or without article 10, been an active member of this body. its great authority, added to that of britain and italy, would have made the pressure irresistible, and its presence on the council would have helped materially to give such confidence in the stability and impartiality of the league that germany would have accepted the conclusions arrived at without demur and acted upon them without chicane. a rational settlement of the reparations problem by the league would have established its authority throughout the world. germany, russia and turkey, who now treat its deliberations with distrust and dislike tinctured with contempt, would be forced to respect its power, and would soon be pleading for incorporation in its councils. the covenant would thus become a charter--respected, feared, honoured and obeyed by all. there would still be injustice, but redress would be sought and fought for in the halls of the league. there would still be oppression, but freedom would be wrung from the clauses of the covenant. argument, debate and intercession would be the recognised substitutes for shot, shell and sword. wars would cease unto the ends of the earth, and the reign of law would be supreme. wherein lies the real power of the league, or to be more accurate, its possibility of power? it brings together leading citizens of most of the civilised states of the world to discuss all questions affecting or likely to affect peace and concord amongst nations. the men assembled at geneva do not come there of their own initiative, nor do they merely represent propagandist societies engaged in preaching the gospel of peace. they are the chosen emissaries of their respective governments. they are the authorised spokesmen of these governments. when in doubt they refer to their governments and receive their instructions, and the proceedings are reported direct to the governments. they meet often and regularly, and they debate their problems with complete candour as well as courtesy. it is in itself a good thing to accustom nations to discuss their difficulties face to face in a public assembly where reasons have to be sought and given for their attitude which will persuade and satisfy neutral minds of its justice and fairness. it is a practice to be cultivated. it is the practice that ended in eliminating the arbitrament of the sword in the internal affairs of nations. it is only thus that international disputes will gradually drift into the debating chamber instead of on to the battlefield for settlement. wars are precipitated by motives which the statesmen responsible for them dare not publicly avow. a public discussion would drag these emotives in their nudity into the open where they would die of exposure to the withering contempt of humanity. the league by developing the habit amongst nations of debating their differences in the presence of the world, and of courting the judgment of the world upon the merits of their case, is gradually edging out war as a settler of quarrels. that is the greatest service it can render mankind. will it be allowed to render that service? if not, then it will perish like many another laudable experiment attempted by mankind in the effort to save itself. but if it dies, the hope of establishing peace on earth will be buried in the same tomb. _london, april 2nd, 1923._ v the treaty of versailles and its critics i have had recently special opportunities for appreciating the extent to which the treaty of versailles has not been read by those who have formed very definite opinions concerning its qualities. there is no justification for a failure to peruse this great international instrument. it is the most important document of modern times. it has reshaped for better or for worse much of the geography of europe. it has resurrected dead and buried nationalities. it constitutes the deed of manumission of tens of millions of europeans who, up to the year of victory, 1918, were the bondsmen of other races. it affects profoundly the economics, the finance, the industrial and trade conditions of the world; it contains clauses upon the efficacy of which may depend the very existence of our civilisation. nevertheless there are few who can tell you what is in the treaty of versailles. you might have thought that although men differed widely as to its merits, there would have been no difficulty in securing some measure of agreement as to its actual contents. every endeavour was made to give full publicity to the draft when it was first presented to the germans, and to the final document when signed. even before the form of the draft was ever settled, the actual decisions were reported from day to day. never was a treaty so reported and so discussed in every article and every particle of its constitution, and to-day you can procure an official copy of it from any bookseller for the moderate price of 2_s._ 6_d._ in spite of that no two men who happen to profess diverse opinions as to its justice or injustice can agree as to its contents. a visitor to england in the year 1713 probably experienced the same perplexity in seeking information from a whig and a tory respectively as to the treaty of utrecht. so this treaty has become one of those fiercely debated subjects, as to which the contestants deliberately refuse to regard any testimony, or recognise the existence of any fact, which is in the least inconsistent with their particular point of view. it has come to pass that the real treaty of versailles has already disappeared, and several imaginary versions have emerged. it is around these that the conflict rages. in france there exist at least two or three schools of thought concerning the versailles treaty. there is one powerful section which has always regarded it as a treasonable pact, in which m. clemenceau gave away solid french rights and interests in a moment of weakness under pressure from president wilson and myself. that is the poincaré-barthou-pertinax school. that is why they are now, whilst in form engaged in enforcing the treaty, in fact carrying out a gigantic operation for amending it without consulting the other signatories. this has come out very clearly in the remarkable report from a french official in the rhineland which was disclosed in the london _observer_. it is obvious from this paper that whilst the french government have worked their public into a frenzied state of indignation over the failure of germany to carry out the treaty of versailles, they were the whole time deliberately organising a plot to overthrow that treaty themselves. their representative on the rhine was spending french money with the consent of the french government to promote a conspiracy for setting up an independent republic on the rhine under the protection of france. it was a deliberate attempt by those who disapproved of the moderation of the treaty of versailles to rewrite its clauses in the terms of the militarist demands put forward by marshal foch at the peace conference. marshal foch, the soul of honour, wanted to see this done openly and straightforwardly. what he would have done like the gentleman he is, these conspirators would have accomplished by deceit--by deceiving their allies and by being faithless to the treaty to which their country had appended its signature. that is one french school of thought on the treaty of versailles. it is the one which has brought europe to its present state of confusion and despair. there is the second school which reads into the treaty powers and provisions which it does not contain, and never contemplated containing. these critics maintain stoutly that m. briand, and all other french prime ministers, with the exception of m. poincaré, betrayed their trust by failing to enforce these imaginary stipulations. they still honestly believe that m. poincaré is the first french minister to have made a genuine attempt to enforce french rights under the treaty. in the background there is a third school which knows exactly what the treaty means, but dares not say so in the present state of french opinion. perhaps they think it is better to bide their time. that time will come, and when it does arrive, let us hope it will not be too late to save europe from the welter. in america there are also two or three divergent trends of opinion about this treaty. one regards it as an insidious attempt to trap america into the european cockpit, so as to pluck its feathers to line french and english bolsters. if anything could justify so insular an estimate it would be the entirely selfish interpretation which is put upon the treaty by one or two of the allied governments. the other american party, i understand, defends it with vigour as a great human instrument second only in importance to the declaration of independence. there may be a third which thinks that on the whole it is not a bad settlement, and that the pity is a little more tact was not displayed in passing it through the various stages of approval and ratification. this party is not as vocal as the others. in england we find at least three schools. there are the critics who denounce it as a brutal outrage upon international justice. it is to them a device for extorting incalculable sums out of an impoverished germany as reparation for damages artificially worked up. then there is the other extreme--the "die-hard" section--more influential since it became less numerous, who think the treaty let germany off much too lightly. in fact they are in complete agreement with the french chauvinists as to the reprehensible moderation of its terms. in britain also there is a third party which regards its provisions as constituting the best settlement, when you take into account the conflicting aims, interests, and traditions of the parties who had to negotiate and come to an agreement. but take all these variegated schools together, or separately, and you will find not one in a thousand of their pupils could give you an intelligent and comprehensive summary of the main principles of the treaty. i doubt whether i should be far wrong in saying there would not be one in ten thousand. controversialists generally are satisfied to concentrate on the articles in the treaty which are obnoxious or pleasing to them as the case may be, and ignore the rest completely, however essential they may be to a true judgment of the whole. most of the disputants are content to take their views from press comments and denunciatory speeches. unhappily the explanatory speeches have been few. some there are who have in their possession the full text--nominally for reference; but you will find parts of the reparations clauses in their copies black with the thumb-marks which note the perspiring dialectician searching for projectiles to hurl at the object of his fury. the clauses which ease and modify the full demand are treated with stern neglect, and the remainder of the pages are pure as the untrodden snow. you can trace no footprints of politicians, publicists, or journalists, in whole provinces of this unexplored treaty. the covenant of the league of nations is lifted bodily out of the text, and is delivered to the public as a separate testament for the faithful so that the saints may not defile their hands with the polluted print which exacts justice. they have now come to believe that it never was incorporated in the treaty of versailles, and that it has nothing to do with that vile and sanguinary instrument. and yet the first words of this treaty are the following: "the high contracting parties, "in order to promote international co-operation and to achieve international peace and security, "by the acceptance of obligations not to resort to war, "by the prescription of open, just and honourable relations between nations, "by the firm establishment of the understandings of international law as the actual rule of conduct among governments, and "by the maintenance of justice and a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations in the dealings of organised peoples with one another, "agree to this covenant of the league of nations." then follow the articles of the debated covenant. a speaker who took part recently in a university debate on the subject told me that the undergraduates exhibited the greatest surprise when he informed them that the league of nations was founded by the versailles treaty. a few days ago i had a similar experience at the oxford union. i was speaking against a motion framed to condemn the principles of the treaty as unwise and unjust. in its defence i recalled some of its outstanding features. but as most of my narrative had no bearing on reparations it was greeted with impatience and cries of "question" from a group of anti-versaillists. they honestly thought i was travelling outside the motion in giving a short summary of the other sections of the treaty. to them it is all condensed in mr. keynes's book, and other hostile commentaries. anything which is inconsistent with these, or supplements the scanty or misleading statements they make, is deemed to be tainted and biassed. to refer to the text itself they regard as unfair, and as playing into the hands of the defenders of a wicked and oppressive pact. the actual treaty has been already put by them out of bounds, and you wander into its forbidden clauses on pain of being put into the guardroom by one or other of the intolerant factions who patrol the highways and byways of international politics. in all the debates on the subject in the house of commons i have only once heard the treaty itself quoted by a critic, and strangely enough that was by way of approval. i have indicated one important section of the treaty to which is accorded something of the reverence due to holy writ by an influential section of the public. this group would be shocked were they reminded that their devotion is given to a chapter in the hateful treaty. there is yet another large and important section which is completely ignored by the critics--that which reconstructs central europe on the basis of nationality and the free choice of the people instead of on the basis of strategy and military convenience. this is the section that liberated poland from the claws of the three carnivorous empires that were preying on its vitals, and restored it to life, liberty and independence. it is the section that frees the danes of schleswig and the frenchmen of alsace-lorraine. for these oppressed provinces the treaty of versailles is the title-deed of freedom. why are these clauses all suppressed in controversial literature? here is another of the ignored provisions--that which sets up permanent machinery for dealing with labour problems throughout the world, and for raising the standard of life amongst the industrial workers by means of a great international effort. no more beneficent or more fruitful provision was ever made in any treaty. it is so momentous and so completely overlooked in general discussion, that i think it worth while to quote at length the general principles laid down by a provision which will one day be claimed as the first great international charter of the worker. "the high contracting parties recognise that differences of climate, habits and customs, of economic opportunity and industrial tradition, make strict uniformity in the conditions of labour difficult of immediate attainment. but, holding as they do, that labour should not be regarded merely as an article of commerce, they think that there are methods and principles for regulating labour conditions which all industrial communities should endeavour to apply so far as their special circumstances will permit. "among these methods and principles, the following seem to the high contracting parties to be of special and urgent importance:- "_first._--the guiding principle above enunciated that labour should not be regarded merely as a commodity or article of commerce. "_second._--the right of association for all lawful purposes by the employed as well as by the employers. "_third._--the payment to the employed of a wage adequate to maintain a reasonable standard of life as this is understood in their time and country. "_fourth._--the adoption of an eight-hour day or forty-eight hour week as the standard to be aimed at where it has not already been attained. "_fifth._--the adoption of a weekly rest of at least twenty-four hours, which should include sunday wherever practicable. "_sixth._--the abolition of child labour and the imposition of such limitations on the labour of young persons as shall permit the continuation of their education and assure their proper physical development. "_seventh._--the principle that men and women should receive equal remuneration for work of equal value. "_eighth._--the standard set by law in each country with respect to the conditions of labour should have due regard to the equitable economic treatment of all workers lawfully resident therein. "_ninth_.--each state should make provision for a system of inspection in which women should take part, in order to ensure the enforcement of the laws and regulations for the protection of the employed." it will take long before the principles propounded in the covenant of the league under the labour articles are fully and faithfully carried out, but in both a good deal of quiet and steady progress have already been attained. m. albert thomas is an admirable chief for the labour bureau. he has zeal, sympathy, tact, energy and great organising talent. he is pressing along with patience, as well as persistence. but that is another question. it raises grave issues as to the execution of the treaty. what i have to deal with to-day is the misunderstandings which exist as to the character of the treaty itself. the british public are certainly being deliberately misled on this point. why are those sections which emancipate oppressed races, which seek to lift the worker to a condition above destitution and degradation, and which build up a breakwater against the raging passions which make for war, never placed to the credit of the treaty of versailles? the type of controversialist who is always advertising his idealism has made a point of withholding these salient facts from the public which he professes to enlighten and instruct. there is no more unscrupulous debater in the ring than the one who affects to be particularly high-minded. i do not mean the man who is possessed of a really high mind, but the man who is always posing as having been exalted by grace above his fellows. he is the pharisee of controversy. beware of him, for he garbles and misquotes and suppresses to suit his arguments or prejudices in a way that would make a child of this world blush. that is why i venture to put in a humble, although i fear belated, plea for the reading of the text, the whole text, and nothing but the text, of the treaty of versailles. herein lies the only fair way of arriving at a just conclusion on the merits of a treaty which holds in its hands the destiny of europe for many a generation. vi 1922 the year nineteen hundred and twenty-two witnessed a genuine struggle on the part of the nations to re-establish peace conditions in the world. during 1919-20 and 1921 "the tarantella was still in their blood." the mad war dance was still quivering in their limbs and they could not rest. the crackle of musketry was incessant and made needful repose impossible. there was not a country in europe or asia whose troops were not firing shots in anger at some external or internal foe. america rang down the fire curtain until this hysterical frenzy had burnt itself out. was she right? it is too early yet to give the answer. the case is but yet "part heard"--many witnessing years whose evidence is relevant have not yet entered the box: it will, therefore, be some time before the verdict of history as to her attitude can be delivered. but 1922 testifies to many striking symptoms of recovering sanity on the part of the tortured continents. before 1922 you had everywhere the querulity of the overstrained nerve. the slightest offence or misunderstanding, however unintentional, provoked a quarrel, and almost every quarrel was followed by a blow. it was a mad world to live in. the shrieks of clawing nations rent the european night and made it hideous. a distinguished general declared that at one period--i think it was the year of grace 1920--there were thirty wars, great and small, proceeding simultaneously. who was to blame? everybody and nobody. mankind had just passed through the most nerve-shattering experience in all its racking history, and it was not responsible for its actions. millions of young men had for years marched through such a pitiless rain of terror as had not been conceived except in milton's description of the battle scenes when the fallen angels were driven headlong to the deep. and when the angel of peace led the nations out from the gates of hell, no wonder it took them years to recover sight and sanity. nineteen twenty-two was a year of restored composure. the outward visible sign was seen in the changed character of the international conferences held during the year. the ultimatum kind of conference gave way to the genuine peace conference. the old method insisted upon by french statesmen was to hammer out demands on the conference anvil and send them in the form of an ultimatum to nations who, in spite of peace treaties, were still treated as enemies; the new method was to discuss on equal terms the conditions of appeasement. germany, having no fleet in the pacific, was not invited to the washington conference, and russia was excluded for other reasons. but at cannes germany was represented, and at genoa both germany and russia had their delegates. the washington conference was, in some respects, the most remarkable international conference ever held. it was the first time great nations commanding powerful armaments had ever sat down deliberately to discuss a voluntary limitation of their offensive and defensive forces. restrictions and reductions have often been imposed in peace treaties by triumphant nations upon their beaten foes. the versailles treaty is an example of that operation. but at washington the victors negotiated a mutual cutting-down of navies built for national safety and strengthened by national pride. the friends of peace therefore have solid ground for their rejoicing in a contemplation of substantial reductions already effected in the naval programmes of the most powerful maritime countries in the world--britain, the united states of america, and japan--as a direct result of the washington negotiations. american statesmanship has given a lead of which it is entitled to boast, and 1922 is entitled to claim that this triumph of good understanding has brought a measure of glory which will give it a peculiar splendour amongst the years of earth's history. the gatherings at cannes and genoa can also claim outstanding merit in the large and growing family of international conferences. at washington the allies alone foregathered. at cannes and genoa nations came together which had only recently emerged out of deadly conflict with each other. at each conference i met on both sides men who had but just recovered from severe wounds sustained in this struggle. at cannes french, belgian, italian, japanese, as well as british ministers and experts, sat down in council with german ministers and experts to discuss the vexed question of reparations without taunt or recrimination. there was a calm recognition not only of the needs of the injured countries, but also of the difficulties of the offending state. outside and beyond the german problem there was a resolve to eliminate all the various elements of disturbance, political and economic, that kept europe in a ferment and made its restoration impossible. here it was decided to summon all the late belligerent nations to a great conference at genoa to discuss reconstruction. to these were added the neutral nations of europe. it was a great decision. there were three obstacles in the way of realising the programme. the first was the stipulation of france that the specific problems raised by the treaty of versailles should be excluded altogether from the purview of the conference. this was a grave limitation of its functions and chances. still, if the cannes sittings had continued, an arrangement might have been arrived at with the germans which would have helped the deliberations of genoa. the second obstacle was the refusal of america to participate in the discussions. why did the american government refuse? there were probably good reasons for that refusal, but the recording angel alone knows them all fully and accurately. the third obstacle was the fall of the briand ministry, and the substitution of a less sympathetic administration. in spite of all these serious drawbacks genoa accomplished great things. it brought together into the same rooms enemies who had not met for years except on the battlefield. they conferred and conversed around the same table for weeks--at conferences, committees, and sub-committees. they broke bread and drank wine together at the same festive boards. before the conference came to an end there was an atmosphere of friendliness which was in itself a guarantee of peaceable relations, for the delegates who represented the nations at genoa were all men of real influence in their respective countries. but however important the intangible result, there was much more achieved. the thirty nations represented in the assembly entered into a solemn pact not to commit any act of aggression against their neighbours. when they entered the conference there were few of them who were not oppressed with suspicions that these neighbours meditated violence against their frontiers. when they arrived at genoa they were all anxious for peace, but apprehensive of impending war. genoa dispelled those anxieties. one of the most promising results of the pact and the improved atmospheric conditions out of which it arose is the substantial reduction in the bolshevik army. it has already been reduced to the dimensions of the french army, and we are now promised a further reduction. that removes a real menace to european peace. if the reduction of armies in the east of europe is followed by a corresponding reduction in the west the reign of peace is not far distant. this is not the time to dwell upon the important agreements effected at genoa on questions of exchange, credit, and transport. all the recommendations made depend for their successful carrying out on the establishment of a real peace and a friendly understanding between nations. peace and goodwill on earth is still the only healing evangel for idealists to preach and statesmen to practise. without it plans and protocols must inevitably fail. where does peace stand? the weary angel is still on the wing, for the waters have not yet subsided. she may perhaps find a foothold in the great west, and britain is fairly safe--not yet ireland. but the continent of europe is still swampy and insecure. the debate in the french chamber on reparations is not encouraging. the only difference of opinion in the discussion was that displayed between those who advocated an advance into the ruhr, and the seizure of pledges further into german territory, and those who preferred "developing" the left bank of the rhine. occupying, controlling, developing, annexing--they all mean the same thing; that the province to the left bank of the rhine is to be torn from germany and grafted into france. there is no peace in this talk. it is a sinister note on which to end the pacific music of 1922. you must interpret it in connection with another event of 1922--the russo-german agreement. since then chicherin--a spirit of mischief incarnate--has almost made berlin his abode. the men who are devoting their ingenuity to devising new torments for germany are preparing new terrors for their own and their neighbours' children. the year ends with rumours of great american projects for advancing large sums of money to all and sundry in the hope of settling the vexed question of german reparation. the loan, it is surmised, will be accompanied by guarantees on the part of france not to invade further german territory. some go so far as to conjecture that it is to be an essential condition of participation in this christmas bounty of madame rumour that france is to reduce her armies and to undertake not to exceed washington limits for her navies. nobody seems to know, and i am only repeating the gossip of the press. but if the £350,000,000 loan is likely to materialise, its projectors are wise in imposing conditions that would afford them some chance of receiving payment of a moderate interest in the lifetime of this generation. no prudent banker would lend money on the security of a flaming volcano. _london, december 20th, 1922._ vii what is france after? _1. the rhine_ m. clemenceau, in the remarkable series of speeches delivered in the united states of america, implies a breach of faith on the part of britain in reference to the pact to guarantee france against the possibility of german aggression. england has no better friend in the whole of france than m. clemenceau. throughout a strenuous but consistent career he has never varied in his friendship for england. many a time has he been bitterly assailed for that friendship. french journalists are not sparing of innuendo against those they hate. they hate fiercely and they hit recklessly, and m. clemenceau, a man of scrupulous integrity, at one period in his stormy political life was charged by certain organs of the paris press with being in the pay of england. if, therefore, he now does an injustice to britain i am convinced it is not from blind hatred of our country, but from temporary forgetfulness of the facts. he states the facts with reference to the original pact quite fairly. it was proffered as an answer to those who claimed that the left bank of the rhine should be annexed to france. there was a strong party in france which urged m. clemenceau to demand that the rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat of germany to extend the boundaries of france to that fateful river. for unknown centuries it has been fought over and across--a veritable river of blood. if french chauvinism had achieved its purpose at the paris conference the rhine would within a generation once more overflow its banks and devastate europe. the most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a proposal that the german provinces on the left bank of the rhine should remain in french occupation until the treaty had been fulfilled. that meant for ever. reparations alone--skilfully handled by the quai d'orsay--would preclude the possibility of ever witnessing fulfilment. the argument by which they supported their claim was the defencelessness of the french frontier without some natural barrier. france had been twice invaded and overrun within living memory by her formidable neighbour. the german military power was now crushed, and rich and populous provinces of the german empire had been restored to france and poland, but the population of germany was still fifty per cent. greater than that of france and it was growing at an alarming rate, whilst the french population was at a standstill. german towns and villages were clamant with sturdy children. you cannot talk long to a frenchman without realising how this spectre of german children haunts france and intimidates her judgment. these children, it is said, are nourished on vengeance: one day the struggle will be resumed, and france has no natural defence against the avenging hordes that are now playing on german streets and with the hum of whose voices german kindergartens resound. we were told the rhine is the only possible line of resistance. providence meant it to play that part, and it is only the sinister interference of statesmen who love not france that deprives frenchmen of this security for peace which a far-seeing nature has provided. the fact that this involved the subjection to a foreign yoke of millions of men of german blood, history, and sympathies, and that the incorporation of so large an alien element, hostile in every fibre to french rule, would be a constant source of trouble and anxiety to the french government, whilst it would not merely provide an incentive to germany to renew war but would justify and dignify the attack by converting it into a war of liberation--all that had no effect on the rhenian school of french politics. this school is as powerful as ever. in one respect it is more powerful, for in 1919 there was a statesman at the head of affairs who had the strength as well as the sagacity to resist their ill-judged claims. but what about 1922? where is the foresight and where is the strength? there is a real danger that the fifteen years' occupation may on one pretext or another be indefinitely prolonged. when it comes to an end will there be a ministry in france strong enough to withdraw the troops? before the fifteen years' occupation is terminated will there be a ministry or a series of ministries strong enough to resist the demand put forward without ceasing in the french press that the occupation should be made effective? upon the answer to these questions the peace of europe--the peace of the world, perhaps the life of our civilisation--depends. the pressure to do the evil thing that will once more spill rivers of human blood is insistent. the temptation is growing, the resistance is getting feebler. america and britain standing together can alone avert the catastrophe. but they can do so only by making it clear that the aggressor--whoever it be--will have the invincible might of these two commonwealths arrayed against any nation that threatens to embroil the world in another conflict. there are men in germany who preach vengeance. they must be told that a war of revenge will find the same allies side by side inflicting punishment on the peace-breakers. there are men in france who counsel annexation of territories populated by another race. they must be warned that such a step will alienate the sympathies of britain and america, and that when the inevitable war of liberation comes the sympathies of america and britain will be openly ranged on the side of those who are fighting for national freedom. the time has come for saying these things, and if they are not said in high places humanity will one day call those who occupy those places to a reckoning. the pact was designed to strengthen the hands of m. clemenceau against the aggressive party which was then and still is anxious to commit france to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always been purely german. m. clemenceau knows full well that britain has been ready any time during the last three years up to a few months ago to take upon herself the burden of that pact with or without the united states of america. at cannes early this year i made a definite proposal to that effect. it was a written offer made by me on behalf of the british government to m. briand, who was then prime minister of france. i was anxious to secure the co-operation of france in a general endeavour to clear up the european situation and establish a real peace from the urals to the atlantic seaboard. french suspicions and french apprehensions constituted a serious difficulty in the way of settlement, and i thought that if it were made clear to france that the whole strength of the british empire could be depended upon to come to her aid in the event of threatened invasion french opinion would be in a better mood to discuss the outstanding questions which agitate europe. international goodwill is essential to the re-establishment of the shattered machinery of international commerce. with a great country like france, to which the issue of the war had given a towering position on the continent of europe, in a condition of fretfulness, it was impossible to settle europe. hence the offer which was made by the british government. m. briand was prepared to welcome this offer and to proceed to a calm consideration of the perplexities of the european situation. it was agreed to summon a conference at genoa to discuss the condition of european exchange, credit and trade. it was also resolved that an effort should be made to establish peace with russia and to bring that great country once more inside the community of nations. a great start was made on the path of genuine appeasement. the german government were invited to send their chief minister to the cannes conference in order to arrive at a workable settlement of the vexed question of reparations. the invitation received a prompt response, and dr. rathenau, accompanied by two or three leading ministers and a retinue of financial experts, reached cannes in time to take part in the discussions. the negotiations were proceeding helpfully, and another week might have produced results which would have pacified the tumult of suspicious nations and inaugurated the promise of fraternity. but, alas, satan is not done with europe. a ministerial crisis in france brought our hopes tumbling to the ground. the conference was broken up on the threshold of fulfilment. suspicion once more seized the tiller, and europe, just as she seemed to be entering the harbour of goodwill, was swung back violently into the broken seas of international distrust. the offer made by britain to stand alone on the pact of guarantee to france was rejected with disdain. we were told quite brutally that it was no use without a military convention. this we declined to enter into. europe has suffered too much from military conventions to warrant the repetition of such a disastrous experiment. the pact with britain lies for the moment in the waste-paper basket. but we never flung it there. m. clemenceau ought to have made his complaint in paris against men of his own race and not in new york against englishmen. with the pact went the effort to make peace in europe. the history of genoa is too recent to require any recapitulation of its features. the new french ministry did not play the part of an inviting government responsible for pressing to a successful end the objects of cannes, but rather that of the captious critic who had to be persuaded along every inch of the road and who threatened at every obstacle to turn back and leave the rest of europe to struggle along with its burden, amid the mocking laughter of france. i am not complaining of m. barthou. he did his best under most humiliating conditions to remain loyal to the conference which his government had joined in summoning. but his task was an impossible one. he was hampered, embarrassed and tangled at every turn. whenever he took any step forward he was lassoed by a despatch from paris. i have good authority for stating that he received over eight hundred of these communications in the course of the conference! what could the poor man do under such bewildering conditions? the other european countries were perplexed and distracted. they were anxious that genoa should end in a stable peace. there was no doubt about the sincerity, the passionate sincerity, of the desire for peace throughout europe, but european nations could not help seeing that one of the great powers was working for a failure. they had a natural anxiety not to appear to take sides. it is a marvel that in spite of this unfortunate attitude adopted by the french government a pact was signed which has, at any rate, preserved the peace in eastern europe for several months. before the conference we heard of armies being strengthened along frontiers and of movements of troops with a menacing intent from the baltic to the black sea. genoa at least dispelled that cloud. but a permanent peace has not yet been established and the pact with russia will soon expire. i am, however, hopeful that the spirit of genoa will stand between contending armies and prevent the clash of swords. all this, however, is leading me away from an examination of m. clemenceau's suggestion that britain did not keep faith in the matter of guaranteeing france against german aggression. the offer was definitely renewed at cannes, and m. poincaré has not accepted it. i have my own opinion as to why he has not done so. it is not merely that he does not wish to set the seal of his approval upon a predecessor's achievement. i am afraid the reason is of a more sinister kind. if france accepts britain's guarantee of defence of her frontier every excuse for annexing the left bank of the rhine disappears. if this is the explanation, if french ministers have made up their minds that under no conditions will they, even at the end of the period of occupation, withdraw from the rhine, then a new chapter opens in the history of europe and the world, with a climax of horror such as mankind has never yet witnessed. the german provinces on the left bank of the rhine are intensely german--in race, language, tradition and sympathies. there are seventy millions of germans in europe. a generation hence there may be a hundred millions. they will never rest content so long as millions of their fellow-countrymen are under a foreign yoke on the other side of the rhine, and it will only be a question of time and opportunity for the inevitable war of liberation to begin. we know what the last war was like. no one can foretell the terrors of the next. the march of science is inexorable, and wherever it goes it is at the bidding of men, whether to build or to destroy. is it too much to ask that america should, in time, take an effective interest in the development along the rhine? to that extent i am in complete accord with m. clemenceau. neither britain nor america can afford to ignore the manoeuvres going on along its banks. it is a far cry from the rhine to the mississippi, but not so far as it used to be. there are now graves not far from the rhine wherein lies the dust of men who, less than six years ago, came from the banks of the mississippi, with their faces towards the rhine. _london, december 2nd, 1922._ viii what is france after? _2. the rhine_ (continued) the breakdown of the london conference, and especially the reason for that breakdown, proves the warning i uttered in my last chapter was necessary and timely. m. poincaré demanded the occupation of the only rich coalfield left to germany as a guarantee for the carrying out of impossible terms. it is because i am profoundly convinced that the policy represented by this project will lead to trouble of the gravest kind for europe and the world that i felt moved to sound a note of warning. i knew it would provoke much angry misrepresentation. i am accustomed to that. i deemed it to be my duty to face it. the statement i made in my last chapter about the existence of a strong party in france which regarded the rhine as the natural barrier of that country has provoked a storm of denial, repudiation and indignation. it is denounced as a wicked invention. some are amazed at the impudence of the calumny. where is the party? france knows nothing of it. is it not a monster which has emanated from the brain of the enemy of france? repudiations have their value, especially if they come from men of authority, and i shall bear invective with the fortitude to which all men who wish to be happy though politicians should be hardened provided i elicit denials which may render future international mischief difficult. but a further perusal of the evidence on which i based my statement has served to deepen my apprehensions. what was the statement? let me quote the actual words i used:- "there was a strong party in france which urged m. clemenceau to demand that the rhine should be treated as the natural frontier of their country, and that advantage should be taken of the overwhelming defeat of germany to extend the boundaries of france to that fateful river. "the most moderate and insidious form this demand took was a proposal that the german provinces on the left bank of the rhine should remain in french occupation until the treaty had been fulfilled. that meant for ever. reparations alone--skilfully handled by the quai d'orsay--would preclude the possibility of ever witnessing fulfilment. "the pact was designed to strengthen the hands of m. clemenceau against the aggressive party which was then, and still is, anxious to commit france to the colossal error of annexing territory which has always been purely german." what was the basis on which i made this assertion? it was thoroughly well known to all those who were engaged in the operations of the peace conference. the rhine was the background of all manoeuvre for weeks and months. whether the subject matter was the league of nations, the german fleet, or the status of fiume, we knew that the real struggle would come over the rhine. on one hand, how much would france demand? on the other, how much would the allies concede? there was a subconscious conflict about the rhine throughout the whole discussion, however irrelevant the topic under actual consideration happened to be. but unrecorded memories are of little use as testimony unless corroborated by more tangible proofs. do such proofs exist? i will recall a few. there was a party which considered the rhine to be the only natural frontier of france. it was a strong party, with a strong man as its spokesman--in many ways the strongest in france--marshal foch. his splendid services in the war gave him a position such as no soldier in france or in any other country could command. the soldier who, by his genius, leads a nation to victory, possesses a measure of influence on the public opinion of the people he has saved from destruction such as no other individual can aspire to--as long as his services are fresh in the memory of his fellow-countrymen. that, i admit, is not very long. gratitude is like manna--it must be gathered and enjoyed quickly, for its freshness soon disappears. but in the early months of 1919 marshal foch was still sitting at the banquet table of popular favour enjoying the full flavour of grateful recognition. his word on all questions affecting the security and destiny of france was heard with a deference which no other man in france could succeed in securing. he has also a quality which is not usually an attribute of generalship: he is a lucid, forceful and picturesque speaker. he was, therefore, listened to for what he was, for what he said, and for the way he said it. what did he say? he said a good deal on the subject of the rhine frontier and i cannot quote it all. i will take a few germane sentences out of his numerous utterances on the subject. on the 19th day of april, 1919, there appeared in the london _times_ an interview with marshal foch. from that interview i take these salient passages:- "'and now, having reached the rhine, _we must stay there_,' went on the marshal very emphatically. 'impress that upon your fellow-countrymen. it is our only safety, their only safety. we must have a barrier. we must double-lock the door. democracies like ours, which are never aggressive, must have strong _natural military frontiers_. remember that those seventy millions of germans will always be a menace to us. do not trust the appearances of the moment. their natural characteristics have not changed in four years. _fifty years hence_ they will be what they are to-day.' * * * * * * * "from the table at the other end of the room marshal foch brought a great map, six or eight feet square, on which the natural features of this part of western europe were marked. the rhine was a thick line of blue. to the west of the river the marshal had drawn in pencil a concave arc representing the new frontier that france will receive under the peace treaty. it was clearly an arbitrary political boundary conforming to no natural feature of the land. "'look at that,' said marshal foch. 'there is no natural obstacle along that frontier. is it there that we can hold the germans if they attack us again? no. here! here! here!' and he tapped the blue rhine with his pencil. "'here we must be ready to face our enemies. this is a barrier which will take some crossing. if the germans try to force a passage over the rhine--ho! ho! but here'--touching the black pencilled line running north-west from lorraine past the saar valley to the belgian frontier--'here there is nothing.' * * * * * * * "'no; if you are wise you insist on having your locks and your wall, and we must have our armies on the rhine. some people object that it will take many troops to hold the rhine. not so many as it would take to hold a political frontier. for the rhine can be crossed only at certain places, whereas the new political frontier of france can be broken anywhere and would have to be held in force along its entire length.'" he expounded his doctrine in greater detail in an official memorandum which, as commander-in-chief of the allied armies, he submitted to m. clemenceau:- "to stop the enterprises towards the west of this nation, everlastingly warlike, and covetous of the good things belonging to other people, only recently formed and pushed on to conquest by force regardless of all rights and by ways the most contrary to all law, seeking always the mastery of the world, _nature has only made one barrier--the rhine. this barrier must be forced on germany. henceforward the rhine will be the western frontier of the germanic peoples...._" he repeated this demand in a subsequent memorandum. many of us recall his dramatic irruption into the placid arena of the peace conference in may, 1919, still brandishing the same theme. it may be said that marshal foch is not and does not pretend to be a statesman. he is only a great soldier. nevertheless, his political influence was so great that even in 1920 he overthrew the most powerful statesman in france within a month of his triumphant return at the polls with a huge supporting majority in the french parliament. it was marshal foch who, by his antagonism, was responsible for m. clemenceau's defeat at the presidential election of 1920. but for marshal foch's intervention m. clemenceau would have been to-day president of the french republic. why was he beaten, at the height of his fame, by a candidate of infinitely less prestige and power? the wrath of marshal foch and his formidable following was excited against m. clemenceau because the latter had, under pressure from the allies, gone back on the agreed french policy about the rhine. m. tardieu, as is well known, was one of the two most prominent ministers in m. clemenceau's administration, and closely associated with his chief in the framing of the peace treaty. he has written a book, and in that book he gives at length a document which he handed to the allies on march 12th, 1919, containing the following proposal:- "in the general interest of peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of the league of nations, the western frontier of germany is fixed at the rhine. consequently germany renounces all sovereignty over, as well as any customs union with, the territories of the former german empire on the left bank of the rhine." there is a sardonic humour about the words "in the general interest of peace and to assure the effective working of the constituent clause of the league of nations." but it demonstrates that at that date m. clemenceau and his minister had become converts to the doctrine of the rhine as the natural boundary of germany. american and british pressure subsequently induced him to abandon this position and, as i said in a previous chapter, the pact was part of the argument addressed to him. but the party of the rhine never forgave. hence his failure to reach the presidential chair. it was an honourable failure and will ever do him credit. the reasons assigned for that defeat by the _annual register_, 1919-20--certainly not a partisan authority--prove that even an unexcitable chronicler laboured then under the delusion--if it be a delusion--which possessed me when i wrote the offending article. explaining the remarkable defeat the _annual register_ says:- " ... clemenceau's supporters contended that the terms of the treaty of versailles were satisfactory from the french point of view; his opponents declared that he had given way too much to the american and british standpoints and that the peace was unsatisfactory, particularly in respect of the guarantees for the reparations due to france _and in the matter of the french eastern frontier. it will be remembered that a large body of french opinion had desired that france should secure the line of the rhine as her eastern frontier._" i can if necessary quote endless leading articles in french journals and writings and speeches of french politicians. men of such divergent temperaments and accomplishments as m. franklin bouillon and m. tardieu gave countenance to this claim that germany should be amputated at the rhine. one carried the theme along on the torrent of his clattering lava and the other on the dome of an iceberg. later on at the reception of marshal foch when he was elected a member of the french academy, m. poincaré, turning at one moment in his discourse to the marshal, said in reference to the veteran general's well-known attitude on the peace treaty, "ah, monsieur le maréchal, if only your advice had been listened to." has he also gone back on an opinion so histrionically expressed? let us hope for the best. i know it will be said that although the boundaries of germany were to end at the rhine, the province on the left bank was not to be annexed, but to be reconstituted into an "independent" republic. what manner of independence and what kind of republic? all german officers were to be expelled; it was to be detached by special provision from the economic life of germany upon which it is almost entirely dependent for its existence. it was not to be allowed to associate with the fatherland. the rhine which divided the new territory from germany was to be occupied in the main by french troops: the territories of the independent republic were to be occupied by foreign soldiers. its young men were to be conscripted and trained with a view to absorbing them into french and belgian armies to fight against their own countrymen on the other side of the rhine. the whole conditions of life in the "free and independent republic" were to be dictated by an "accord" between france, luxemburg and belgium, and, in the words of marshal foch, "britain would be ultimately brought in." but i am told that these proposals did not mean annexation. then what else did they mean? you do not swallow the oyster. you only first give it an independent existence by detaching it from its hard surroundings. you then surround it on all sides and absorb it into your own system to equip you with added strength to prey on other oysters! what independence! and what a republic! it would have been and was intended to be a sham republic. had the plan been adopted it would have been a blunder and a crime, for which not france alone but the world would later on have paid the penalty. in the face of these quotations and of these undoubted facts, can any one say that i calumniated france when i said there was a powerful party in that country which claimed that the rhine should be treated as the natural barrier of germany, and that the peace treaty should be based upon that assumption? let it be observed that i never stated that this claim had the support of the french democracy. the fact that the treaty, which did not realise that objective, secured ratification by an overwhelming majority in the french parliament and subsequently by an emphatic verdict in the country, demonstrates clearly that the french people as a whole shrank with their invincible good sense from following even a lead they admired on to this path of future disaster. but the mere fact that there are potent influences in france that still press this demand, and take advantage of every disappointment to urge it forward, calls for unremitting vigilance amongst all peoples who have the welfare of humanity at heart. in conclusion i should like to add that to denounce me as an enemy of france because i disagree with the international policy of its present rulers is a petulant absurdity. during the whole of my public career i have been a consistent advocate of co-operation between the french and british democracies. i took that line when it was fashionable in this country to fawn on german imperialism. during the war i twice risked my premiership in the effort to place the british army under the supreme command of a french general. to preserve french friendship i have repeatedly given way to french demands, and thus have often antagonised opinion in this country. but i cannot go to the extent of approving a policy which is endangering the peace of the world, even to please one section of a people for whose country i have always entertained the most genuine affection. _london, december 9th, 1922._ ix what is france after? _3. the paris conference_ the third conference with m. poincaré over reparations has ended, like its two predecessors, in a complete breakdown. the first was held in august, the second in december, and the third fiasco has just been witnessed. i congratulate mr. bonar law on having the courage to face a double failure rather than agree to a course of policy which would in the end prove disappointing, and probably disastrous. agreement amongst allies is in itself a desirable objective for statesmen to aim at, but an accord to commit their respective countries to foolishness is worse than disagreement. france and britain must not quarrel, even if they cannot agree; but if french ministers persist in the poincaré policy, the companionship of france and britain over this question will be that of parallel lines which never meet, even if they never conflict. what is the object of this headstrong policy? reparations? there is no financier of repute, in any quarter of the globe, who will agree that these methods will bring the allies any contributions towards their impoverished resources. at the august conference all the experts were in accord on this subject, but whilst these methods will produce no cash, they will produce an unmistakable crash. my recollections of the august discussions enable me to follow with some understanding the rather confused reports which have so far reached me here.[2] it is common ground amongst all the allies that germany cannot under present conditions pay her instalments. it is common ground that she must be pressed to put her finances in order, and by balancing her budget restore the efficiency of her currency, so as to meet her obligations. but m. poincaré insisted that, as a condition of granting the moratorium, pledges inside german territory should be seized by the allies. these pledges consisted of customs already established, and of new customs to be set up on the rhine and around the ruhr, so that no goods should be permitted to pass from these german provinces into the rest of germany without the payment of heavy customs dues. the other proposed pledges were the seizure of german forests, of german mines, and of 60 per cent. of the shares in certain german factories. mr. bonar law, judging by his official _communiqué_ after the breakdown of the conference, seems to have raised the same objections to these pledges as i put forward at the august conference. they would bring in nothing comparable to the cost of collection; they would provoke much disturbance and irritation and might lead to consequences of a very grave character. in fact, these pledges are nothing but paper and provocation. the customs barrier on the rhine was tried once before, and was a complete failure. it was tried then as a sanction and not as a means of raising money. for the former purpose it may have achieved some measure of success, but from the point of view of collecting money it was a ludicrous fiasco. there are at the present moment hundreds of millions of paper marks collected at these new tollhouses still locked up in the safe of the reparations commission. they are admittedly worthless. as long as these tolls lasted, they were vexatious; they interfered with business; they dealt lightly with french luxuries working their way into germany, but laid a heavy hand on all useful commodities necessary to the industry and life of the people. they were ultimately withdrawn by consent. m. poincaré now seeks to revive them. the seizure of german forests and mines will inevitably lead to even more serious consequences. the allied control established in the far interior of germany would require protection. protection means military occupation in some shape or other. military occupation of these remote areas means incidents, and incidents quickly ripen into more serious complications. hence the reluctance of the british government of which i was the head to concur in this dangerous policy. hence the refusal of mr. bonar law's government to accept the responsibility for sanctioning such a policy. even logically it is indefensible. there are only two alternative points of view. one is that germany cannot pay under present conditions until her finances are restored, and that a moratorium ought to be granted for a period which will enable that financial restoration to mature. the second is that germany can pay, that she is only shamming insolvency, and that all that you have to do is to apply the thumbscrew firmly and cash will be forthcoming. logically i can understand either of these two alternatives, but i fail to comprehend the reason for a proposal that will grant a moratorium on the ground that germany cannot pay, and at the same time apply the thumbscrew until she pays. i am glad the british prime minister has had the wisdom not to associate himself with a policy which will bring inevitable discredit upon those who share the responsibility of enforcing it. meanwhile, the prospects of europe's recovery are once more to be retarded by the vain stubbornness of some of her rulers. _ronda (spain), january 6th, 1923._ footnote: [2] this chapter was written at ronda (spain). x reparations what is the reparations problem? why does it appear to be further from solution than ever? the great public in all lands are perplexed and worried by its disturbing insolubility. it keeps them wondering what may happen next, and that is never good for a nerve-ridden subject like postwar europe. the real trouble is not in solving the problem itself, but in satisfying the public opinion which surrounds it. i do not mean to suggest that it is an easy matter to ascertain what payments germany can make, or for germany to pay and keep paying these sums once they have been ascertained. but if the difficulty were purely financial it could be overcome. the heart of the problem lies in the impossibility at present of convincing the expectant, indignant, hard-hit and heavily burdened people of france that the sums so fixed represent all that germany is capable of paying. the question of compelling a country to pay across its frontiers huge sums convertible into the currency of other countries is a new one. at first it was too readily taken for granted that a wealth which could bear a war debt of £8,000,000,000 could surely afford to bear an indemnity of £6,000,000,000 provided that this smaller sum were made a first charge on the national revenues; and it took time for the average mind to appreciate the fundamental difference between payment inside and transmission outside a country. when i think of the estimates framed in 1919 by experts of high intelligence and trained experience as to germany's capacity to pay cash over the border i am not disposed to complain of the impatience displayed by french taxpayers at the efforts made at successive conferences to hew down those sanguine estimates to feasible dimensions. i am content to point with pride to the fact that the common sense of the more heavily burdened british taxpayer has long ago taught him to cut his loss and keep his temper. when his example is followed all round, the reparations question is already solved. when public opinion in all the allied countries has subsided into sanity on german reparations, as it already has in britain, financiers can soon find a way out, and trade and commerce will no longer be scared periodically from their desks by the seismic shocks given to credit every time a french minister ascends the tribune to make a statement on reparations. regarding the payment of reparations solely from the point of view of finance, the issues can be stated simply, and i think solved readily. it is always assumed by those who have never read the treaty of versailles, and the letter that accompanied it, that this much-abused and little-perused document fixed a fabulous indemnity for payment by germany. the treaty may have its defects; that is not one of them, for it fixed no sum for payment, either great or small. it stipulated that a reparations commission should be set up in order, _inter alia_, to assess the damage inflicted by germany on allied property and the compensation for injury to life and limb in allied countries. in the second place--and this is also overlooked--it was to ascertain how much of that claim germany was capable of paying. on both these questions germany is entitled to be heard before adjudication. it is in accordance with all jurisprudence that as germany was the aggressor and the loser she should pay the costs. but it would be not only oppressive but foolish to urge payment beyond her capacity. the amount of damage was to be ascertained and assessed by may, 1921. capacity was to be then determined and revised from time to time, according to the varying conditions. even so fair a controversialist as the eminent italian statesman signor nitti has ignored the latter provision in the versailles treaty. no wonder that he should, for there are multitudes who treat every alteration in the annuities fixed in may, 1921, as if it were a departure from the treaty of versailles to the detriment of the victors; whereas every modification made was effected under the provisions and by the machinery incorporated in the treaty for that express purpose. but there has undoubtedly been a departure from the treaty--a fundamental departure. it has, however, been entirely to the detriment of the vanquished. in what respect? i propose to explain, for the whole trouble has arisen from this change in the treaty. the treaty provided that the body to be set up for deciding the amount to be paid in respect of reparations should consist of a representative each of the united states of america, the british empire, france, italy, and belgium. with the exception of the united states of america, all these powers are pecuniarily interested in the verdict. at best it was therefore on the face of it not a very impartial tribunal. still, britain, as a great trading community, was more interested in a settlement than in a few millions more or less of indemnity wrung out of germany; and italy also was a country which had large business dealings with germany and would not therefore be tempted to take a violently anti-german view on the commission. the presence therefore of the united states of america, britain and italy together on the commission constituted a guarantee for moderation of view. now the only disinterested party has retired from the tribunal. the most interested party is in the chair, with a casting vote on certain questions. that is not the treaty signed by germany. if you sign an agreement to pay a sum to be awarded by a, b, c, d, and e, trusting for a fair hearing largely to the influence of a, who is not only very powerful but who is the only completely disinterested referee and a then retires from the board of arbitrators, you are entitled to claim that the character of the agreement is changed. the representatives of france and belgium on the reparations commission are honourable men who are most anxious to do justice, but they are watched by a jealous, vigilant and exacting opinion constantly ready to find fault with concession and to overpower moderating judgment. the balance of the treaty has therefore been entirely upset. what is really needed is to restore that balance so as to secure a fair verdict on the only question in issue--how much germany can pay. when you come to consider that issue you must view the claim for reparations as you would any ordinary debt. you must make up your mind whether you wish to ruin the debtor or to recover the cash. if there are no sufficient realisable assets, then, if you want your money, you must keep your debtor alive. if you want beef from your cow you must forgo the milk. if your object is to destroy your debtor, you press for payment of more than he can be reasonably expected to pay, and then seize his house, his lands, and his chattels, whether they can be disposed of or not. on the other hand, if you want your money, you will find out what he can pay, and then proceed judiciously, patiently, and firmly to recover that amount. by that i do not mean what he can pay by condemning himself to a life of servitude and poverty. no brave nation will stand that long. that is not a method of recovering an old debt, but of creating a new one. i mean, what a nation can be expected to pay steadily without revolt for a whole generation. if you scrape the butter from the bread of every german child for thirty years you may add to the sum of your indemnity a milliard or two of gold marks. that is not what was intended by the treaty of versailles. hungry faces make angry hearts, and the anger spreads further than the hunger. i mean, what germany can pay without condemning a generation of workers to egyptian bondage, and their children to semi-starvation. every oppression, if persisted in, ultimately ends in the ruin of the red sea for the oppressors. europe has only just escaped with great loss from its waters. we do not want to be overwhelmed in another. how are you to arrive at the exact figure of the annuities germany can reasonably be expected to pay without creating these intolerable conditions for her people? that is the question. the answer was given in the treaty as signed: by setting up a commission to inquire and determine. that commission has been weakened, and its character almost destroyed by the defection of the united states of america. is it possible to find a substitute? i am afraid a reference of that question to a new committee of experts would not advance matters, for each country would demand a representative on that committee, and that would only mean the reparations commission over again under another name. the only hope of a fair and final decision is to secure the presence of a representative of the united states of america on the adjudicating body, whatever it may be. is that impossible? i need hardly say that i am not venturing to express any opinion as to the american refusal to ratify the treaty as a whole. i am only stating quite frankly my view that, unless america takes a hand in reparations, real settlement will be postponed until the hour of irreparable mischief strikes. if for reasons of which i am not competent to judge america cannot occupy her vacant chair on the tribunal which may decide fateful issues for humanity, i despair of any real progress being made. allied ministers can accept from a body representing the leading powers who won the war decisions they dare not take on their own responsibility. that is the essence of the matter. it is no use blaming politicians. if they of their own initiative attempt to ride down public sentiment, which alone confers authority upon them, they will inevitably fail. in every country there are plenty of itching partisans ready to take advantage of tactical blunders committed by political opponents or personal rivals. but the judgment of an international tribunal is another matter, and statesmen can accept it and act upon it without being taxed with responsibility for its conclusions. british opinion cannot and will not accept a settlement based on the assumption that abatements in the sum claimed for reparations, if and when made, must be discounted by the british taxpayer alone. france undoubtedly suffered more severely from the ravages of war than any other belligerent. but that is recognised in the proportion allocated to her of the reparations payments. she is to be paid 52 per cent. of the total, _i. e._, more than all the other allied countries put together. britain comes next in the damage sustained by her people, and she is given 22 per cent. in many respects she has suffered more heavily than any other allied country, especially in taxation and in trade. she is willing to stand in with the allies for loss as well as for profit, but she will resent bitterly the suggestion that the loss must necessarily be her share, whilst such profit as there is belongs to others. the american people, who receive no part of the compensation awarded and collected, will _a fortiori_ take the same view of their obligations in the matter. they certainly will not see the force of a settlement to be made at their expense, as if they had been condemned to pay an indemnity. the question is not what remission or indulgence shall be granted to germany, but what payment she is capable of making. if germany can pay a large indemnity france gets 52 per cent. of that, and britain only 22 per cent. if germany can only make a disappointing payment, france still gets 52 per cent. and britain 22 per cent. there is, therefore, no ground for debiting britain and america with the cost of reduced expectations. the offer to hand over the worthless "c" bonds to the british empire in return for her claims is an insult to the intelligence of the british public. let us get away from these shifts on to the straight road. back to the treaty--that is the real remedy. there is no need to revise it--all that is required is to restore it. if america reappears on the arbitrating tribunal she need not accept the rest of the treaty. then a fair and enduring settlement would soon ensue, this irritating sore would rapidly heal, and the condition of the world would steadily improve. _algeciras, january 1st, 1923._ xi mr. hughes's new haven speech the preceding chapter was written at algeciras on january 2nd, 1923. on january 3rd there appeared in the spanish papers a compressed report of the speech delivered by the american secretary of state, mr. hughes, at new haven. it made suggestions on the subject of reparations which were obviously intended for consideration at the forthcoming paris conference. i knew the chairman of that conference, m. poincaré, would not be too anxious to bring these proposals to the notice of his colleagues, but i had some hope that the british, italian, and belgian premiers might do so. i therefore cabled the following message to the british and american press:- "i have read with gladness secretary hughes's important speech. as far as i can judge from compressed report appearing in the local paper of this remote corner of spain his suggestions and mine travel in same direction. earnestly hope paris conference will give american proposals priority of consideration. all other expedients will but postpone mischief which will in the end have to be redeemed with compound interest at usurious rates by an embarrassed europe." i constantly refer to this speech in subsequent articles, and as it has been suggested that the interpretation i placed on it is not borne out by the text, i append the full report which appeared in _the times_ of december 30th, 1922:- "mr. hughes, the secretary of state, in a speech which he delivered before the american historical association at new haven, connecticut, to-night lifted yet another corner of the veil which has shrouded the immediate plans of the united states government. much of his address concerned the washington conference of 1921, but it ended with a discussion of economic conditions in europe which are of prime importance. "mr. hughes began with the admission that 'we cannot dispose of these problems by calling them european, for they are world problems, and we cannot escape the injurious consequences of failure to settle them.' they were, however, european problems in the sense that they cannot be solved without the consent of the european governments, and the _crux_ of the situation lay in the settlement of reparations. 'there will be no adjustment of other needs, however pressing, until a definite and accepted basis for the discharge of reparations claims has been fixed. it is futile to attempt to erect any economic structure in europe until the foundation is laid.' "then followed a passage referring to the attempts to link up the debts owed to the united states with the question of reparations or with projects of cancellation, attempts which had been steadily resisted. it led up to a discussion of the attitude of the united states towards reparations, 'standing, as it does, a distinct question, and as one which cannot be settled unless the european governments concerned are able to agree.' first came a denial that america desired to see germany relieved of her responsibility for the war, or of her just obligations, or that america wished that france should lose 'any part of her just claims.' on the other hand, america did not wish to see a prostrate germany. some americans had suggested that the united states should assume the _rôle_ of arbitrator, but mr. hughes did not think 'we should assume such a burden of responsibility.' "from this point the speech deserves quotation in full: "'but the situation,' said mr. hughes, 'does call for a settlement upon its merits. the first condition of a satisfactory settlement is that the question should be taken out of politics. statesmen, have their difficulties, their public opinion, the exigencies they must face. it is devoutly to be hoped that they will effect a settlement among themselves, and that the coming meeting in paris will find a solution. but if it does not, what should be done? "'the alternative of forcible measures to obtain reparations is not an attractive one. no one can foretell the extent of the serious consequences which might ensue from such a course. apart from political results, i believe that the opinion of experts is that such measures will not produce reparation payments, but might tend to destroy the basis of those payments, which must be found in economic recuperation. if, however, statesmen cannot agree, and such an alternative is faced, what can be done? is there not another way out? the fundamental condition is that in this critical moment the merits of the question as an economic one must alone be regarded. sentiment, however natural, must be disregarded; mutual recriminations are of no avail; reviews of the past, whether accurate or inaccurate, promise nothing; assertions of blame on the one hand and excuses on the other come to naught. "'there ought to be a way for statesmen to agree upon what germany can pay, for no matter what claims may be made against her that is the limit of satisfaction. there ought to be a way to determine that limit and to provide a financial plan by which immediate results can be obtained and european nations can feel that the foundations have been laid for their mutual and earnest endeavours to bring about the utmost prosperity to which the industry of their people entitles them. "'if statesmen cannot agree and the exigencies of public opinion make their course difficult, then there should be called to their aid those who can point the way to a solution. "'why should they not invite men of the highest authority in finance in their respective countries--men of such prestige, experience, and honour that their agreement upon the amount to be paid and upon the financial plan for working out payments would be accepted throughout the world as the most authoritative expression obtainable? the governments need not bind themselves in advance to accept the recommendations, but they can at least make possible such an inquiry with their approval and free the men who may represent their country in such a commission from any responsibility to foreign offices and from any duty to obey political instructions. "'in other words, they may invite an answer to this difficult question from men of such standing and in such circumstances of freedom as will ensure a reply prompted only by knowledge and conscience. i have no doubt that distinguished americans would be willing to serve on such a commission. if the governments saw fit to reject the recommendation upon which such a body agreed they would be free to do so, but they would have the advantage of impartial advice and of an enlightened public opinion. the peoples would be informed that the question would be rescued from assertion and counter-assertion and the problem put upon its way to solution. "'i do not believe that any general conference would answer the purpose better, much less that any political conference would accomplish a result which prime ministers find it impossible to reach. but i do believe that a small group, given proper freedom of action, would be able soon to devise a proper plan. it would be time enough to consider forcible measures after such opportunity had been exhausted.' "mr. hughes's closing words were: "'there lies the open broad avenue of opportunity, if those whose voluntary action is indispensable are willing to take advantage of it. and once this is done, the avenues of american helpfulness cannot fail to open hopefully.'" the argument developed by mr. hughes in this speech is identical with that upon which i based my appeal in the previous chapter for an impartial investigation into germany's capacity, and he concludes with a proposal which is in effect identical with mine. he does not state categorically that the american government would be prepared to be officially represented on the commission. but when he says, "i have no doubt that distinguished americans would be willing to serve on such a commission," it means that the government would be indirectly represented. the allied governments would certainly have consulted the government of the u.s.a. as to the american representative nominated to sit on the commission, and no american expert would be appointed without full assurance that he was acceptable to the government of his country. it is a misfortune that such important proposals should have been put forward so timorously that those who wished to ignore them could easily pretend they had never heard them made. speeches delivered even by secretaries of state at an academic function in a small provincial town might very well be overlooked in foreign chancelleries, whose postbags bulge with weighty despatches from many lands, without any suggestion of studied neglect. it was clear from mr. bonar law's subsequent attitude in the course of the debate in the house of commons on the ruhr invasion that he at any rate had not seen mr. hughes's new haven deliverance. timid diplomatic flutterings make no impression in a great situation, and so lead to nothing. this is an excellent example of how not to speak if you wish to be heard, and of how to speak if you have no desire to be heeded. _london, july 4th, 1923._ xii the french invasion of the ruhr france has once more jumped on the prostrate form of germany, and the sabots have come down with a thud that will sicken the hearts of multitudes on both sides of the atlantic whose friendship for france stood the losses and griefs of a four years' war. germany having been overthrown and disarmed after a prodigious effort, involving a strain upon the combined strength of america, italy, and the whole british empire, as well as france, and her arms bound with the thongs of a stern treaty, the process of dancing upon her while she is down can at any time now be performed with complete impunity by any one of these powers alone. the spectacle every time it is repeated, provides much satisfaction to those who indulge in the barren delights of revenging the memory of past wrongs. there is no doubt some joy for the unsportsmanlike mind in kicking a helpless giant who once maltreated you and who, but for the assistance of powerful neighbours, would have done so a second time. but what good will it bring devastated france or her overtaxed allies? the additional coal and timber that will be wrung out of germany will barely cover the direct cost of collection. although germany bears the extra cost, the expense of these punitive measures must all in the end diminish the means of reparation, and therefore fall on the victor. how many students of the problem of reparations have ever taken the trouble to ascertain the extent to which the maintenance of allied armies of occupation has already drained the resources of germany? between direct cash payments, the cost of supplies, and outlay in labour and material for building huge barracks, these armies have already cost germany 6,000,000,000 gold marks--roughly 1,200,000,000 dollars, or over £300,000,000. how much better it would have been if most of this money had gone towards rebuilding the devastated area! it is not without significance, now that war is being waged against germany for what the american representative in paris termed her technical default, to recollect that, between the expense of the army of occupation and contributions already made towards reparations, germany has already paid to the allies over three times the amount of the total indemnity exacted by bismarck in 1871. this is without making any allowance for the vast and highly developed colonies which she surrendered. let, therefore, no one approach this problem as if he were dealing with a recalcitrant country that is deliberately refusing to acknowledge any of her obligations under a treaty which she has signed. the costs of the last war are acknowledged to be irrecoverable. it is difficult enough to find the means for payment of damages. who will pay the growing cost of this new war? so far i have referred only to the direct outlay upon these aggressive measures. the indirect cost to victor and vanquished alike will be crushing. it is already accumulating. the mere threat has depreciated the value of the franc, and thus reduced its purchasing capacity abroad. this loss must be borne by the french consumer. there may be a rally; but i shall be surprised if the improvement is more than temporary. all that is obvious for the moment to the untrained eye is the way in which the mark is dragging the french and belgian franc slowly along its own downward course. as the distance between them lengthens and the invisible cord which ties them together becomes more and more attenuated, it may ultimately snap and the franc be released from this dangerous association. that i doubt, for a bankrupt germany means a country to which even the most hopeful cannot look as a means of redeeming french deficits. once that is clear to the french peasant he will not so readily part with his savings, and the real difficulties of french finance will begin at that stage. a policy, therefore, which demoralises the german currency is one which is also fatal to the solvency of french finance. let us follow the probable sequence of events. the terrified german mark is rushing headlong to the bottom of the pit where the austrian krone is already lost beyond rescue. as long as reparation coal is dug out by bayonets, and reparation timber is cut down by swords, it is idle to talk of restoring the mark by putting german finance in order. no tariff, however nimble, can keep pace with the runaway mark. it would baffle the most resourceful finance minister to adapt his budget to a currency which disappears beyond the horizon while he is sitting at his desk to pen his proposals. if the mere threat of force has produced such a panic, what will be the effect of the actual measures? it is safe to predict that the advance of french troops into germany will not restore the composure of the frightened mark and arrest its flight. what, then, becomes of the hope of renewed payments of the annuity? at best germany could only be expected to pay when her foreign trade was so improved that she could provide a margin out of her exports with which to pay her annuities. her foreign trade is largely dependent upon her foreign exchanges. these are now destroyed beyond prospect of recovery for years. britain proposed a voluntary moratorium for a short term of years in order to place germany in a position where she could at the end of that term pay a reasonable annuity. the french government have in effect substituted a compulsory moratorium for an indefinite period with no prospect of payment in sight. the only chance of securing an early instalment of reparation payments was by pressing germany to put her finances in order and giving her fair time in which to do so. the only chance of negotiating a loan on german security to assist france to pay for the repair of her devastated provinces, and to enable her to put her own finances in order, was by restoring the stability of german currency. french statesmen have deliberately thrown both these chances away. the effect on the value of their own currency must be grave, and frenchmen will have to pay in increased cost of living for a venture dictated by short-sighted and short-tempered statesmanship. when one thinks of the consequences one is driven to ask whether french politicians are really seeking reparations or are pursuing another purpose quite incompatible with the recovery of money payments under the treaty. this is the wrong road to reparations. it leads in exactly the opposite direction. whither, then, does it lead? there is no doubt that its effect will be ruinous as far as german industry is concerned. i have already dealt with its disastrous influence upon german currency, and with the indirect effect of a rapidly depreciating currency upon german foreign trade. the seizure of the ruhr mines will have another serious effect. even now the result of the compulsory alienation of so much of germany's coal supply in the ruhr, in silesia, and the saar, from german industry, has diminished german productiveness. the fuel deficiency thereby created inside germany has been partially supplied by purchases of coal from outside sources. the necessity for providing gold to pay for foreign coal has added considerably to germany's financial difficulties. a still larger foreign purchase will be the inevitable result of the forcible diversion of large quantities of ruhr coal to france and italy, with further financial embarrassments as a consequence. that is bad enough. but i fear worse. will the german miner work with the same regularity and efficiency for a foreign master as he does for a german employer? is there the least possibility of the production being maintained at its present level? the influence of this added muddle on world trade is incalculable. nobody gains; everybody is a loser by the move. how is a germany whose embarrassed finances are made still more involved--how is a germany whose industry becomes more and more difficult--how is a germany reduced to despair to be of the slightest use to france, belgium, italy, or anybody else? the feather-headed scribes who have advocated this rash policy assume that france will be helped because germany will thus be reduced to impotence. for how long? the disintegration of germany is not an unlikely consequence of this move. i know that is the expectation. frenchmen still hanker after the days when saxons and bavarians and wurtembergers were allies, and almost vassals, of france against prussia. it was the lure that led the third napoleon to his ruin. it is the attraction which is now drawing france once more to a sure doom. the policy will bring no security to france in the future. it deprives her of all hope of reparations in the immediate present. there will no longer be a germany to pay. it would be too hopeless a task to attempt recovery from each of the severed states. but what of increased security? nothing can keep germans permanently apart. they will, at the suitable moment reunite under more favourable conditions, freed from external as well as internal debt. france will have lost her reparations and only retained the hatred of an implacable foe become more redoubtable than ever. how would europe have fared in the interval whilst france was learning from events what every other country can see now? there is no knowing what will happen when a brave people of 60,000,000 find themselves faced with utter ruin. whether they turn to the left or to the right will depend on questions of personal leadership, which are not yet determined. all we can be sure of is that they can hardly go on as they are, maintaining an honest struggle for ordered freedom and democratic self-government. the french proclamation, with its threat of "severest measures in case of recalcitrancy," is ominous of much that may happen. no people accustomed to national independence have ever been able long to tolerate a foreign yoke. chancellor cuno's action is the first manifestation of the spirit of revolt. it will certainly grow in intensity. the lash will then fall, sooner or later, and germany will be inevitably driven to desperate courses. a communist germany would infect europe. european vitality is so lowered by exhaustion that it is in no condition to resist the plague. would a reactionary germany be much better--brooding and scheming vengeance? russia, with her incalculable resources of men and material, is at hand, needing all that germany can best give and best spare. the bolshevik leaders only require what germany is so well fitted to supply in order to reorganise their country and convert it into the most formidable state in europe or asia. nations hard pressed on the east have in the past moved forward irresistibly to the west. in obedience to the same law a people hard pressed on the west will look to the east. when the french troops marched on essen they began a movement the most far-reaching, and probably the most sinister in its consequences, that has been witnessed for many centuries in europe. and these are the people who, after fifty years of patient and laborious waiting, have demonstrated to the world in 1918 the stupidity of abusing victory in 1871. if the teacher so soon forgets his own special lesson the pupil is not likely to remember when fury overcomes terror. _algeciras, january 15th, 1923._ xiii lost opportunities the french government, having conspicuously failed to win its anticipated coup, is doubling the stakes each time it loses. when will it end? and where will it end? it is ill gambling with human passions. they are all engaged in this wild venture--on both sides of the table. pride, greed, vanity, obstinacy, temper, combativeness, racial antagonisms, but also patriotism, love of justice, hatred of wrong and high courage. each side draws from the same arsenal of fiery human emotions. unless some one steps in to induce a halt i fear the result will be devastating. france has now abandoned all hope of being able to run the mines, railways, and workshops of the ruhr by military agencies. in these days you cannot shoot every worker who fails to excavate so many hundredweights of coal per diem, or who refuses to fill a wagon or drive a locomotive when and by whomsoever he is told to do so. france cannot provide the necessary complement of miners and railwaymen from outside to fill vacancies created by sulky workers. and even if she could it would take many months ere they become sufficiently accustomed to their new conditions to work without peril to themselves. so a new policy has been improvised. it is nothing less than the siege of germany. sixty millions of germans are to be starved into surrender. that is a long business, as every one knows who has been engaged on the difficult operations of strike breaking. we have often witnessed workers with little support or sympathy from the rest of the community hold out for weeks after their funds have been exhausted. in germany all classes are united in resistance. the national pride fortifies endurance and incites to sacrifice. and the ports are still open. meanwhile incidents may happen, developments may occur which will create a situation that will baffle all the resources the invaders can command. it is very little use looking backward. but there are many who are disposed to say that the invasion of the ruhr was bound to come and the sooner the safer. the ruhr coal mines were the wild oats of reparation. get it over quickly. the headache will bring repentance and france will then settle down to a quiet life. that is the argument. i must enter an emphatic protest against this view. if this ill-judged enterprise had been put off for a few more months i do not believe any french government would have embarked upon it. there is no french statesman of any standing who, in his heart, believes in its wisdom. now that the credit of france is involved in its success they will all support it. but french opinion, as a whole, was moving with startling rapidity from this policy. the parisian pulse was still feverish, but the provinces had completely calmed down. vacancies occurring in the senate, the chamber of deputies and the provincial assemblies during several months have afforded an opportunity of testing real french opinion and the results have been sensational. at election after election, fought in typical constituencies all over france, the champions of ruhrism have been beaten by emphatic majorities. masses of french workmen have always opposed this policy. the peasant in every land always moves slowly. but there can be no doubt that the french peasant has had enough of military adventures. his sons were never numbered amongst the "exempts," and the losses in the peasant homes of france were appalling. driving through the villages in agricultural france you find yourself asking, "where are the young men?" the answer invariably comes, "this village suffered severely in the war." you will receive the same answer in the next village, and the next. we cannot wonder, therefore, that by-elections in rural as well as in urban france display an unmistakable weariness of plans which involve the marching of armed frenchmen into hostile territory. the sorrowing people of france have good reason to shrink from any course of action that leads to further shedding of blood. for these reasons i have steadily favoured every scheme that had the effect of postponing decision as to the ruhr. delay meant ultimate defeat for the chauvinists. that is why they strove so hard to rush their government into this precipitate action. the abrupt termination of the paris conference was their opportunity and they seized it with tingling fingers. until then there had never been a clean break on which violence could be founded. the friends of moderation both here and on the continent had seen to that. there had been reference of questions for the scrutiny of experts and calming adjournments to await their report. when it arrived there were endless suggestions and counter-suggestions to meet difficulties. in the end europe was saved from the catastrophe of once more handing over its destinies to the guidance of blind force. unhappily, weariness or impatience induced the paris negotiators in a few hours to drop the reins which had for at least four years held the furies from dashing along their career of destruction. there were many alternative plans that might have been discussed. there was the proposal to refer the whole question to the league of nations. it is true that when i suggested it in august last m. poincaré summarily rejected it. but the allies also rejected m. poincaré's proposals by a majority of four to one at that conference. that did not prevent his repeating them in january--and this time he succeeded in winning over the majority to his view. a little more persistence and less pessimism might have persuaded belgium, italy and japan to aid our appeals to france to trust rather to the league of nations than to the uncertainties of war. what is still more inexplicable is the failure of the conference to take any note of mr. secretary hughes's new haven speech. neglected opportunities litter the path of this troublesome question. there were the cannes conversations, broken off just as they were reaching fruition. had they been continued another week they would have ended in a helpful settlement which would have brought reparations to france, confidence to germany, and peace to europe. they struck on one of the many sunken reefs which bestrew the french political seas, and it will not surprise me to find that the whole cargo of reparations disappeared then beyond salvage into the deep with these shipwrecked negotiations. again, germany threw away a great opportunity at genoa when all the nations of europe came together for the first time to discuss their troubles in the spirit of equality and amity. it is true that reparations were excluded at the instance of france from the programme of the conference. but the spirit engendered by a friendly settlement of all other outstanding questions would have rendered a reasonable and temperate consideration of reparations inevitable. germany, by its foolish staging of its russian agreement, made all that impossible. resentment and suspicion were once more equipped with a scourge and they used it relentlessly to drive out all goodwill for germany from the purlieus of that great congress. another lost opportunity. then there was the bankers' committee, appointed to consider the question of raising an international loan to help france to finance the repair of her devastated area and also to assist germany to restore her demoralised currency. i remember how eager poor rathenau was to float that loan and how sanguine he was that it would succeed. he was confident that the german nationals who have invested their gold in other lands could be induced to subscribe heavily to the loan. the bankers concerned--all were of the highest reputation in the financial world--were confident that if german reparations were fixed at a reasonable sum investors throughout the world would gladly put their money into a great international loan which would help to restore europe. the french government testily declined to consider the essential conditions indicated by the bankers. another lost opportunity, and europe once more lumbered along its dreary way to seek another. it came with mr. hughes's famous speech. it was clearly the result of prolonged consideration. for weeks there had been rumours of much consultation in washington on the state of europe, and we were encouraged to hope that america meant business. the result was mr. secretary hughes's offer. it was made four days before the paris conference and was obviously intended to be discussed by the allies there. an endeavour has been made to minimise the importance of this american approach to europe, but it is incomprehensible to me how so momentous a pronouncement has been treated as if it were merely the casual utterance of a politician who had to find some topic of more or less interest with which to illuminate a discourse. another opportunity lost--perhaps the greatest--perhaps the last. never has luck striven so hard to save stupidity. but luck loses its temper easily and then it is apt to hit hard. _london, february 15th, 1923._ xiv french schemes "french troops occupying fresh german territory." "further advance into germany." "reinforcements." "french cut off the british bridgehead on the rhine." "proposals for new coinage in the ruhr." what is it all leading to? is it really reparations? signor nitti, who has made a thorough study of all the documents bearing on french designs against germany, has come definitely to the conclusion that these measures have no reference to the recovery of damages for the devastated area, but that they are all taken in the execution of a vast project for securing french control over all the coal and iron of continental europe. he supplies chapter and verse for his theory. something has undoubtedly roused the suspicions of signor mussolini. they come rather late in the day to be effective. he naturally does not relish the idea of an italy whose coal and steel supplies are placed at the mercy of a gigantic trust directed from paris. italy has no coal and iron of her own. her interest is, therefore, in a free market. hence signor mussolini's alarm. is there any ground for it? let those who imagine that italian statesmen are unnecessarily disturbed read the discussions in the french press leading up to the speeches recently delivered by m. millerand, m. barthou, and m. poincaré. with regard to m. barthou's intervention, i feel i must, as one of the founders of the reparations commission, say a word. there were important questions of amount, method, and time which could not be determined before the signature of the peace treaty and could not be settled at all without giving germany a full opportunity of being heard. hence the appointment of the reparations commission. it was called into existence to settle these questions after hearing evidence and deliberating on its effect. of this commission m. barthou is now chairman. he, therefore, presides over a body which has committed to its charge judicial functions of a momentous character. he has to adjudicate from time to time on the case presented by germany under a multitude of different heads. inflammatory speeches on the very subjects upon which he has to preserve judicial calm are quite incompatible with his position. when he occupied the same post m. poincaré ultimately recognised that he could not continue to write controversial articles on questions which might come before him for decision as a judge. he, therefore, very properly resigned his commissionership. but to revert to the speeches delivered by these eminent statesmen. if they mean what the actual words convey, then france means to stick to the ruhr. not by way of annexation. oh, no. that, according to m. barthou, is a "foolish, mendacious and stupid" lie. but france means to hang on to the _gages_ until reparation is paid. what are the _gages_? the industries of the ruhr. if the french government is to control the industries which represent the life of this prosperous area for thirty years it assumes greater authority over the district than it exercises over the mining area of the pas de calais. in its own mining districts no government takes upon itself--except during a war--to give directions as to the destination and distribution of the coal produced. but there are indications that the control over the ruhr industries is to be of a much more far-reaching character than this. and this is where the hints--broad hints--thrown out by the french press come in. france, in order to secure the payment of the reparation instalments in future, is to be given shares in these great mines and industries. what proportion of shares? amongst the _gages_ demanded by m. poincaré in august of last year were sixty per cent. of the shares in certain pivotal german industries in the rhine area. now the ruhr industries are clearly to be included within the scope of the demand. france has the iron ore of lorraine and the coal of the saar valley. her financiers have been engaged in buying up coal mines in silesia. if she can secure the controlling interest in the ruhr mines and belgium and poland can be persuaded to join in the deal, then the continent of europe will be at the mercy of this immense coal and iron combine. i said in the previous chapter that the ports were still open. as long as they are, central europe can protect itself to a certain extent against this gigantic trust, for the products of britain and america will be available. but that possibility is to be provided against. nothing is to be left to chance. one of the _gages_ is to be control over german customs. how can germany balance her budget without a revenue? how can she raise a revenue without a tariff? what more productive tariff than a duty on foreign coal and metal manufactures? and thus all competitive products will be excluded from the german markets. the combine will be supreme. it is true that if this cynical scheme comes off there is an end of reparations--for the independence of german industry is strangled and its life will soon languish. but there are signs that french enterprise has abandoned all idea of recovering reparations and that it is now brooding upon loot--on an immense scale. for the discussions in the french press contemplate even wider and more far-reaching developments than those involved in the control of german industries. italy, poland, and even russia are to be brought in. the high line taken for years by the parisian papers about "no traffic with murder" is being given up. instead we have much sentimental twaddle about restoring the old friendly relations between france and russia--of course, for a consideration. russia is to buy; germany is to manufacture; france is to profit. these proposals, which have for some time been in the air, are now actually in type. now the type is ordinary black--later on it may be red. twenty lives have already been lost over the preliminaries of execution. i fear there will be many more as the difficulties become more apparent. it is not without significance that the terms which germany is to be called upon to accept in the event of her submission have never been formulated. no ultimatum was issued before invasion. if germany were to-morrow to throw up her hands what conditions would she have to comply with? who can tell? germany clearly does not know. the british government does not know. they were never discussed at the paris conference. m. poincaré has only asserted with emphasis that he "will not accept promises." if the ruhr is to be evacuated promises must be accepted at some stage, for germany cannot deliver ten years' coal instalments in advance, and she cannot pay fifty milliards of gold marks over the counter. so, if m. poincaré's statement means anything, then the control of ruhr industries must be vested in france until the whole of the mortgage has been redeemed. hence the vast plan for the exploitation of germany, and through germany of europe. a pretty scheme, but--like most plans which make no allowance for human nature--bound to fail. how long would italy and russia consent to be exploited for the enrichment of french capitalists? italy has already made it clear that she has no intention of walking into the trap. russia may or may not have been approached. it is not improbable that there have been informal soundings. it is not easy to reckon what the bolshevists may or may not do in any circumstances. but one can be fairly assured that they will not place their heads in the jaws of a rapacious capitalistic crocodile of this character. brigands are not made of that simple stuff. will german statesmen consent to sell their country into political and economic bondage for an indefinite period? it is incredible. no doubt there had been feelers between french and german capitalists for some time before the ruhr invasion. m. loucheur and herr stinnes are credited with having had conversations on the subject of amalgamating the interests of lorraine iron ore and ruhr coal. but the ruhr invasion has awakened the patriotism of germany from its stupor. a potent new element has therefore been introduced into the calculation. this element does not mix well with international finance. it may be depended upon to resist to the last any effort to put german industry under foreign control, and without control the _gage_ is worthless. then there is the german workman who must be taken into account. the miner and the engineer in all countries are proverbially independent. they take no orders even from their own governments. during the war they had to be reasoned with before they could be persuaded to take a course urged upon them by the government of the day in the interests of their own country. they will view the commands of a syndicate controlled by foreign governments with suspicion and repugnance. should disputes arise--and they are more likely than ever to arise constantly under these conditions--who will be responsible for the protection of life, liberty, and property? will foreign troops operate? or will the german army and police act practically under orders given from paris? the popular sympathy will be with the strikers. it is a fantastic idea born of failure and, therefore, bound itself to be a failure. _london, march 1st, 1923._ xv the quicksand when you have walked some distance into a quicksand, and are sinking deeper and deeper with every step you take, it is always difficult to decide whether you are more likely to reach firm ground by pressing forward or by going backward. you must do one or other. you cannot just stand fast, for that is inevitable destruction. the french government clearly are of opinion that safety lies in marching further into the quagmire. so three more german cities have been occupied, more burgomasters and officials expelled, more men and boys shot in the streets, more black troops imported, more regulations and more decrees issued; there are more depressions of french, belgian and italian exchanges, more confusion in everybody's business in central europe--in a sentence, everywhere there is more quaking sand and less solid coal. the total shortage in deliveries as compared with the promises of spa was only eight per cent. had it not been for this fatuous invasion, france during the past six or seven weeks would have already received from the ruhr nearly 3,000,000 tons in coal and in coke. france has actually received 50,000 tons during this period. a swarm of engineers, railwaymen, bargemen, officials of all kinds, and hotel waiters, supported by a formidable army have in six weeks produced this ridiculous output. no doubt the amount will later on be increased by further pressure and by pouring in more railwaymen, but it will be a long time ere france receives her spa quota minus eight per cent., and then there will be some months' arrears to make up. no wonder that m. loucheur stated flatly in the french chamber that he did not approve of the ruhr enterprise. he has one distinct advantage over the ruhr plungers--he does know something about business. he can boast also of another gift, the possession of which is not without significance when you consider his present attitude. he is an admirable judge of to-morrow's weather. that is a rare endowment amongst politicians. any simpleton can tell you which way the wind is blowing to-day, but it requires a man of special insight and experience in these matters to forecast the direction of the wind to-morrow. m. loucheur is one of those exceptionally well-equipped weather prophets. so he satisfies the opinion of to-day by giving his support to m. poincaré, and he safeguards his position against the morrow's change by stating clearly that he does not approve the policy he supports. i have read no declaration from any french statesman of eminence--with the doubtful exception of m. barthou--indicating a belief in the wisdom of the venture. and yet french courage, french pride, french loyalty, french patriotism--and maybe french blood and treasure--are committed irretrievably to a reckless gamble which most of the responsible statesmen who led france by their wisdom through her great troubles regard with doubt, anxiety and apprehension. will the french government try to extricate themselves from the difficulties into which they have precipitated their country and europe? i fear not. heedlessness rushes a man into danger; it needs courage to get out. and when getting out involves an admission of blame there are few men who possess that exalted type of courage. there are other reasons why the present government of france will flounder further into the quicksand. when governments make mistakes in england, the threat of a parliamentary defeat or a couple of adverse by-elections pulls them out roughly but safely, and the governments start on a new course amid the general satisfaction of friend and foe. the willesden, mitcham, and liverpool elections rescued the government from one of the most hopeless muddles into which any administration has ever contrived to get its affairs. in similar circumstances in france a change of government is negotiated with amazing dexterity and celerity. but you cannot arrange the preliminary overthrow of an existing government unless there is some one in the background ready and willing to form the next. there are generally two or three outstanding men of high repute prepared to serve their country in any emergency. the trouble to-day in france is that every alternative leader disapproves of this enterprise and believes it must ultimately fail. on the other hand, there is no prominent figure in french politics prepared to take upon himself the odium of sounding the retreat. it would always be said that success was in sight, and that had it not been for the new minister's cowardice and perfidy france would have emerged triumphantly out of all her financial worries. the _drapeau_ would have been lowered and betrayed. no french statesmen dare face that deadly accusation. so the present french government is tied to the saddle of its charger and is forced to go on. another explanation of the difficulty of withdrawing is to be found in the increasing fury of the original fomenters of this rashness. the more fruitless the enterprise the greater the energy they display in spurring the government further into its follies. in the previous article i gave a summary of the ambitious plans they had conceived for syndicating european resources under french control. the industries of europe controlled from paris--that is their magnificent dream. now they propound a new treaty which is to supersede the treaty of versailles. boundaries are to be revised, rich provinces and towns practically annexed, the ruhr coal is to be harnessed to lorraine coal, and germany, having been further mutilated and bound, is to be reduced to a state of complete economic subjection. there has been nothing comparable to these ideas since the norman conquest, when the saxons, having first of all been disarmed, were reduced to a condition of economic thraldom for the enrichment and glorification of their new masters. needless to say britain and america are not to be invited to attend this new peace conference. they are to be graciously informed of the conditions of the new peace when finally established by french arms. the british empire, which raised millions of men to liberate french soil from the german invaders and which lost hundreds of thousands of its best young lives in the effort, is not even to be consulted as to the settlement which its losses alone make possible. america, who came to the rescue with millions of its bravest, is barely worth a sentence in these ravings of brains intoxicated with an unwholesome mixture of hatred, greed and military arrogance. the french government are not committed by any overt declarations to these schemes; but it is ominous that they issue from the pens whose insistent prodding has driven this government on to its present action. up to the present no repudiation has come from the head of the government or from any of his subordinates. the very vagueness of his published aims would leave him free to adopt any plans. pledges for reparation and security will cover a multitude of aggressions. the british government have just issued as a parliamentary paper a full report of the proceedings of the paris conference. it is an amazing document. as far as i can see no real endeavour was made by any of its members to prevent a break-up. at the first failure to secure agreement the delegates threw up their hands in despair and sought no alternatives. they agreed about nothing except that it was not worth while spending another day in trying to agree. even m. theunis, the resourceful belgian premier, had nothing to suggest. a blight of sterility seems to have swept over the conference. on this aspect of the fateful and fatal conference of paris i do not now propose to dwell. i wish to call attention to it for another purpose. i have perused the blue book with great care. i was anxious to find out exactly what m. poincaré proposed to demand of germany as a condition of submission to the french will. what was germany to do if she was anxious to avert the fall of the axe? i have read his speeches and annexes in vain for any exposition of these terms. it is true he was never asked the question. that sounds incomprehensible. but every one engaged was in such a hurry to break up the conference and thus put an end to disagreeable disagreements that it never seems to have occurred to them to ask this essential question. and the party principally concerned was not represented. the result is that no one knows the terms upon which the french army is prepared to evacuate the ruhr. mr. bonar law could not explain when questioned in the house of commons. i am not surprised, for no one has ever told him and he never asked. i am sure that by this time m. poincaré has quite forgotten why he ever went into the ruhr. for that, amongst other reasons, he will remain there until something happens that will provide us with an answer. most human tragedy is fortuitous. _london, march 10th, 1923._ xvi the first german offer the french and belgian governments have slapped another opportunity in the face. to make that slap resound as well as sting, they have accompanied their rejection of the german offer by a savage sentence of fifteen years' imprisonment on the head of the greatest industrial concern in the ruhr, if not in europe. what for? because he ordered the works' syren to sound "cease work" for one day when the french troops occupied the place. there is a swagger of brutality about that sentence which betokens recklessness. it came at a moment when the german government had just made an offer of peace, and when that ally of france who had made the deepest sacrifices in the war to save her and belgium from ruin was urging the french government to regard that offer at least as a starting-point for discussion. the answer was to treat the german note as an offence, to promulgate that penal sentence which outrages every sense of decency throughout the world, and to refuse to permit an ally, who had been so faithful in the time of trouble for france and belgium, even the courtesy of a discussion on the tenor of the reply to be given to a note that so vitally concerned the interest of all the allies without exception. prussian arrogance in its crudest days can furnish no such example of clumsy and short-sighted ineptitude. it gives point to lord robert cecil's observation in the house of commons that it is very difficult to reconcile the french attitude with a conception that the french government, with the opinion behind it, desires a settlement. what is the german offer? it proposes to limit the total obligations of germany in cash and in kind to thirty milliards of gold marks (£1,500,000,000) to be raised by loans on the international money markets at normal conditions in instalments of:- 20 milliards up to july 1, 1927. 5 milliards up to july 1, 1929. 5 milliards up to july 1, 1931. there are provisions for payment of interest from july, 1923, onward, and the agreements entered into for delivery of payments in kind on account of reparations are to be carried out in accordance with the arrangements already made. then comes this important provision. after a paragraph in which it is argued that the above figures would strain the resources of germany to the utmost it adds:- "should others not share this opinion, the german government propose to submit the whole reparations problem to an international commission uninfluenced by political considerations, as suggested by state secretary hughes." they further state that the german government are prepared to devise suitable measures in order that the whole german national resources should participate "in guaranteeing the service of the loan." guarantees are also offered for deliveries in kind. in order to ensure a permanent peace between france and germany they propose an agreement that all contentious questions arising between them in future should be referred to arbitration. the note finally stipulates that the evacuation of the ruhr "within the shortest space of time" and the restoration of treaty conditions in the rhineland constitute "an essential leading up to negotiations on basis of above ideas." the above represents the substance of the german proposals. the french and belgian governments in their reply stand by the may, 1921, schedule of payments and decline to forego even the very problematical "c" bonds of £4,250,000,000. hitherto it has been common ground that £2,500,000,000 is the figure which germany can be expected to pay. the french and belgian governments are now insisting on the full measure of the £6,600,000,000 award. the hughes proposal they scoff at and treat its putting forward by germany as part of "an expression of a systematic revolt against the treaty of versailles." the real temper and purpose of this intransigeant attitude is to be found in two sentences. here is the first. alluding to the resistance offered in the ruhr to the french attempt to exploit its resources the note says: "the belgian and french governments cannot take into consideration any german proposal whilst the resistance continues." that is, however complete and satisfactory a proposal may be in itself, it would be rejected unless preceded by abject surrender to french designs in the ruhr. then later on comes this significant sentence emphasising the moral of the first:- "the belgian government and the french government have decided that they will only evacuate the newly occupied territories according to the measure and in proportion to the payments effected. they have nothing to alter in this resolution." an impossible payment is to be insisted upon--costs of occupation are to be added to that, and until both are liquidated french armies are to remain in possession of the richest areas in germany. meanwhile the british empire and the united states of america, who, at a prodigious cost in life and treasure, saved france from a similar humiliation to that which she is now inflicting on germany, are practically told when they venture to offer suggestions to mind their own business. no interference will be tolerated from meddlers of any sort. the sum offered by germany in settlement of reparations is no doubt inadequate. it cannot be accepted by any of the allies in discharge of the german obligations under the treaty. the german government must make a very substantial advance on that offer before they can hope to come to terms with the allied governments. i have no doubt the german government fully realise that fact, and i am sure they did not put forward these figures as their final tender. they meant them to be taken as a beginning and a basis for negotiation. in fact they say so. when you enter into negotiations your lawyer, if he knows his business, never starts with the figure he is authorised ultimately to propose. nor does the client always communicate to his advocate the last figure he would be prepared to pay if he had to decide between that and a continuation of the struggle, with its costs and its complications. once pourparlers begin the original figure disappears, and disappears quickly. that is the history of all negotiation, private and public. a refusal to meet in conference until the figure proposed is acceptable rules out discussion between parties as a means of coming to terms on the main question in a dispute. i have taken part in the settlement of probably more industrial differences than most politicians. in every case i have started with an _impasse_. the first meeting of the parties always revealed an apparently unbridgeable chasm between their respective positions; but perseverance and an honest endeavour on both sides to find a solution usually ends in agreement. goodwill can bridge any abyss. unconditional surrender if insisted upon between independent bodies is a sure prelude to fresh disputes. the mere fact, therefore, that germany put forward a proposal which falls short of the needs and equities of the case is not a sufficient reason for declining to meet her representatives at a conference to determine what the right sum should be, and the best method of liquidating it. but there is another and a stronger reason why the german offer should not have been so peremptorily rejected. it did not end with a submission of an inadequate amount in discharge of reparations claims. had it done so the french government might perhaps contend that germany must make up her mind, before she is allowed to confer, to raise that figure to something which at least approximates to the region of acceptability. but even if the french contention in that respect were reasonable, it is ruled out by the circumstance that in this note the german government have proposed an alternative if the figure they offer is considered unacceptable. that alternative changes the whole character of the note, when you come to judge of the question of its _bona fides_. this proposition consists in the complete and categorical acceptance by the german government of mr. secretary hughes's famous new haven suggestions. it will be recollected that, as a way out of the reparations entanglement, he proposed that an international expert commission should be set up to inquire into the question of the amount which germany is capable of paying, and the best method of discharging her obligations once they were fixed. mr. hughes made it clear that the united states of america were prepared to assist in such an inquiry. it is this that lent such significance and importance to his speech. when i first read that speech i thought it of such moment that i cabled from spain to the british and american papers my earnest hope that the allies, about to sit in conference in paris, would immediately consider its terms, and act upon it. it seemed to me the supreme opportunity for placing the vexed question which is fretting europe almost into nervous paralysis on a pathway which must inevitably lead to a real settlement. the more i think of that proposal, the more am i convinced that it was right, and the more am i perplexed by the rude indifference with which it was treated by the allied governments. to this hour i am baffled to explain why those who are anxious for a conclusion never brought this momentous declaration of american readiness to take a hand to the notice of the conference. i can suggest explanations, but none which is not a grave reflection on the way in which the proceedings of that conference were handled. i can understand those who wish to exploit reparations for ulterior purposes being anxious to keep america out of the business. but why did britain, italy and belgium neglect this chance of securing the association of the one power which could be helpful to the allies in reaching a fair and sound decision, and what is equally important, helpful in all subsequent operations for cashing that decision? now germany states categorically that, if her cash tender is unacceptable to the allies, she is willing to leave the question of the amount she is capable of paying to an international tribunal on which america is represented, and to abide by the decision of that tribunal, whatever it may be. that is in substance mr. secretary hughes's suggestion. how can a note containing so reasonable a proposal, and a proposal originally emanating from so powerful and so friendly a quarter, be treated as if it were an insult to the dignity of france--and of belgium! to declare--as the french note does--that the hughes proposition is an abrogation of the treaty of versailles is to ignore the provisions of that treaty. as a matter of fact it would be a restoration of the treaty. as i have repeatedly pointed out, that treaty delegated the question of the amount which germany has to pay in respect of reparations to an allied commission on which the united states of america was to be represented. the function of this commission was to assess the amount of the damages for which germany is responsible under the treaty, and then to adjudicate on the capacity of germany to pay those damages in whole or in part. the commission was authorised to fix the amount of the annual payments to be demanded of germany on the double basis of liability and capacity. the withdrawal of the only country which had no direct interest in reparations from the treaty left the commission a lop-sided and highly prejudiced tribunal. the reparations commission no longer carries out the treaty idea. its character has completely changed. it is essential in order to adhere to the treaty of versailles that america should have a representative on the tribunal that fixes the payments to be exacted from germany. the german government now offer to submit the fate of their country to the unaltered clauses of the treaty which was signed in the galerie des glaces in june, 1919. france and belgium have no right in honour to demand submission to any other. because they insist on enforcing something which is entirely different from the contract entered into by them with germany in 1919, europe is disquieted and international relations are saturated with the inflammable spirit of resentment, hatred, and revenge. no wonder marshal foch is touring central europe to put the allied armies in order! he seems to me to be the one man in france who has an understanding of what all this is leading up to. _london, may 14th, 1923._ xvii the second german note the germans have tried another note. inasmuch as all the allied press without exception are agreed in describing it as a great improvement over the first, it is hardly worth while taking up time and space to demonstrate how the essentials of this more favoured document were contained in its reprobated predecessor. psychologically it is a decided advance on the first note. it is crisp and condensed, and does not indulge in the irritating processes of an argument. you should never attempt to argue with an angry man who is brandishing a bludgeon--unless you are at a safe distance from him. germany is in this case at his feet. the second german note therefore is wise in avoiding the provocation of an appeal to reason. it makes its offer simply and uncontentiously. it also suggests a number of substantial guarantees for the payment of interest on the loans to be raised for reparations purposes. i cannot pretend to assess the value that would be attached to these _gages_ by prospective borrowers. i have no doubt they would add materially to the security of the investment. but this array of securities standing alone will not entice the investor to risk his money on a german reparations loan. he will look at germany as a whole, and not in parts. he will want to know what is likely to happen to that great country during the coming years, and to its industry, its finance, its politics, and its people. a railway which collects its rates and fares in a corrupt currency is of no use as a security for any loan--a customs revenue collected in a fugitive coin is equally worthless. the only reliable basis for a loan is a stable germany. you can have no stable germany until you settle reparations. that is, therefore, the first essential preliminary to all discussions on _gages_ be they _productifs_ or otherwise. hence the propositions that really matter in the german note are not those which give a schedule of guarantees, but those which bear on the fixation of the amount which germany is to be called upon to pay. on this question the note does not increase the sum which the first note estimated as the limit of german capacity. but it reaffirms the readiness of the german government to submit the consideration of the capacity of germany to pay to an impartial tribunal. it offers to place at the disposal of this body all the material which is necessary to enable it to arrive at a just conclusion. it proceeds to suggest that all further discussion on the subjects at issue between the parties should take place at a conference rather than by interchange of notes. how can any unprejudiced person refuse to recognise the essential reasonableness of this part of the offer? it is common ground that the annuities imposed upon germany in may, 1921, demand modification. even m. poincaré proceeds on that assumption. there is, therefore, a most important and highly difficult figure to be ascertained. what annuity can germany pay? and when will she be in a position to pay? is it unreasonable to propose that this question which involves a most searching examination into german assets should be referred to a tribunal which would be capable of giving it calm and judicial consideration? and what objection can there be to discussing the matter at a conference where germany as well as all the allies would be represented? if this were a business or a trade dispute these two proposals would be regarded as eminently sensible and fair, and the party that rejected them would be condemned by public opinion. what are the objections to acceptance formulated by the french press? up to the date of writing this article the french government have not officially expressed their views on the german note. but one may safely assume from past experience that parisian journalists consulted the quai d'orsay before writing their critical articles. the first is that the french government will discuss no proposals emanating from germany until the latter withdraw its passive resistance to french and belgian exploitation of the ruhr. what does this exactly mean? if it imports--as a preliminary condition to conference or consideration of terms--an acquiescence by germany in the occupation and exploitation by france and belgium of the ruhr valley until reparations be fully paid, then the position is hopeless. a german government may submit to such an occupation because it has no force at its command to offer resistance. but no german government can give assent to such an invasion of its territories. a peace signed on such terms would inevitably be repudiated at the first favourable opportunity. meanwhile there would be constant friction and trouble in the ruhr. i can hardly believe that this is what the french government mean to insist upon, in spite of an article in the _temps_ which bears that interpretation. but they may only ask that whilst terms are being discussed an armistice shall be concluded, the first condition of which will be that all obstacles now interposed in the way of supplying france, belgium, and italy with reparation coal and coke shall be withdrawn. an armistice on those terms ought not to be difficult to arrange, especially if the french and belgian authorities withdraw the ban they have placed on the export of ruhr products to the unoccupied parts of germany. unless the terms are mutually accommodating, i surmise that the german government will experience an insurmountable difficulty in persuading the stubborn miners and railway operatives of the ruhr to assist in furnishing to france the products of their labour which are denied to their own fellow-countrymen. it is too readily taken for granted that the ruhr workmen will obey any behest that comes from berlin. governments in germany have ceased to receive that kind of obedience. it is one of the indirect consequences of the great disaster that the decrees of wilhelmstrasse no longer command the respect which attached to them in pre-war days. still, a conference at which all the interests concerned were represented would experience no difficulty in fixing up stipulations which would make it possible for france to enter a conference on reparations without any suspicion being attached to her ministers that they had lowered the national flag on entering the room. i trust that good sense will prevail over temper and exaggerated pride--on both sides. should this preliminary point of honour be disposed of, then what remains? the fixation of the annuities and the guarantees for their payment. what are the objections to accepting the method put forward in the german note for these two points? it is not the german method--it is the american method adopted by the german government. a conference with an impartial tribunal if conference fails. i know of no other way except a resort to blind force. it is objected that the treaty of versailles has already provided such a tribunal in the reparations commission for the specific purpose of adjudicating upon germany's liability and germany's capacity, and that to set up another for exactly the same purpose would be to supersede that treaty. there are two answers to this contention. the first is that the reparations commission as at present constituted is not the body to which germany agreed to refer these questions so vital to her existence. it is not the body which britain and the other allies contemplated. the withdrawal of america from the commission--after germany had already signed the treaty--has completely changed the balance and therefore the character of this tribunal. no man in his senses can pretend that in its mutilated form it is either impartial in its composition or judicial in its methods. m. poincaré does not conceal the fact that the french government issues orders to its representative on that "judicial" body. the chairman is an eminent french deputy who has played and still plays a conspicuous and influential part in french politics, and is looking forward to pursuing his career as a politician whithersoever it may lead. ever since he has been chairman he has delivered speeches in public denouncing the party of whose case he is supposed to be the chief judge. all his colleagues represent powers who have a direct pecuniary interest in the result of their decisions. the only disinterested power has retired from the commission. the american proposal is very moderate. it implies the restoration of the treaty by reintroducing america to the body that settles reparations. if france objects to the appointment of a separate commission why should it not be agreed between the allies that their representatives on the body of experts to be set up shall be the men who now constitute the reparations commission? to these the american government could add their nominee. germany has a right under the treaty to present her case. the whole question of capacity could then be gone into in the light of the experience acquired during the last four years, and a settlement could thus be effected on a sound basis. such settlement would have a much better chance of being workable, and therefore more durable than terms imposed by force on a people who only accept under duress. but whatever the french view may be of the suggested annuities or guarantees, or of the impartial commission, it is inconceivable that they should reject the conference. it is the surest road to reparations. at spa the method of pelting the bewildered reich with demand notes was for a time abandoned, and that of conference at the same table was substituted. the results were admirable. the process of disarmament made immediate strides towards satisfactory completion, and the coal deliveries became fuller and steadier. at cannes last year the allies once more started to confer with german ministers. all those who were present at those discussions--without exception--admit that satisfactory progress was being made towards a comprehensive settlement when the conferees were scattered by a bomb. it is too early yet to estimate the loss which inured to europe through that explosion. but all idea of discussion between the parties has since been loftily and petulantly dismissed as an exhibition of pernicious weakness. what has been substituted for it? for twelve months we had rather a ridiculous display of feather-rustling about the farmyard to inspire terror. threatening speeches full of ominous hints of impending action were delivered at intervals in different parts of france. these produced nothing but increased confusion and incapacity to pay. every speech cost france milliards in postponed reparations. french opinion not unnaturally insisted on some action being taken. hence this rash invasion. at cannes a two-year moratorium would have been accepted as a settlement. already a year and a half of that period would by now have elapsed. german finances would, under the strict allied supervision which was conceded, by now have been restored to soundness--the mark would have been stabilised, and a loan could have been negotiated which would have provided the allies with substantial sums towards lightening the burdens they are all bearing. confidence would have been restored in europe, and for the first time there would have been real peace. one can see what the alternative has produced. whatever the final terms may be, germany is not in a financial position to pay what she was able to offer then. these eighteen months have been devoted to reducing assiduously german capacity to pay allied debts, and the value of the german security for such payment. at cannes the mark stood at 770 to the pound sterling. it now stands at 500,000. germany will need an extended moratorium to recover from the clumsy mishandling of the past year and a half. the mark has to be picked up out of the abyss into which it has been thrown by those whose interest it was to lift it out of the depression wherein it lay. a debtor on whose restored health and nerve payment entirely depends has been violently pushed down several flights of stairs. it will take him a long time to recover from the bruises, the shake, and the loss of blood. what an achievement in scientific debt collecting! if reparations are ever to be paid the allies must retrace their steps and get back to conference. once the parties--all the parties--sit round the table i feel assured that the common sense of most will in the end prevail. we shall never get back what has been lost during 1922-23, but we shall get something that will help. it will take some time to set up the tackle for hoisting the mark out of the crevass and some to do the winding. but the sooner a start is made the less winding there will be to do. so for everybody's sake it is high time to stop the strutting and get back to business. xviii the napoleonic dream what a muddle it all is! france and germany are both anxious to settle in the ruhr, but are too proud to admit it. the struggle, therefore, goes on, and will continue to the detriment of both. belgium is sorry she ever entered the ruhr, but cannot get out of it. every time she tries to get away france pulls her back roughly by the tail of her coat, so she has to do sentry-go at essen whilst her franc is leading a wild life at home. italy has forgotten that she ever sanctioned the occupation, and her moral indignation is mounting rapidly, although it has not yet risen to a height which is visible across the alps. great britain is growling futile notes of dissatisfaction with everybody--france and germany alike. the confusion of tongues is deafening and paralysing, and no one is quite happy except the spirit of mischief who is holding his sides with ghoulish laughter. he never had such a time--not since the tower of babel. and this time it may end in a second deluge. the horror of the great war seems to have unhinged the european mind. nations do not think normally. the blood pressure is still very high. the excitement over the ruhr does not tend to improve it. when some of the articles written and speeches delivered to-day come to be read by the diligent historian a generation hence, he will recognise there the ravings of a continent whose mental equilibrium has been upset by a great shock. the real issue involved in all this struggle is a comparatively simple one. how much can germany pay and in what way can she pay? america, britain, italy and germany are all agreed that the only way to settle that question is to appoint competent experts to investigate and report upon it. the pope also has blessed this reasonable suggestion. france, on the contrary, says it is a question to be determined by guns and generals--both equally well fitted for that task. germany must present her accounts to the mitrailleuse and argue her case before the soixante-quinze. it is a mad world. every one is interested in one question--or perhaps two. how will it all end and how soon is that end coming? although i have nothing to fear from recalling the predictions of my early articles on this subject, i hesitate to hazard a fresh forecast. but one may review the possibilities and note the drift of the whirling currents. in assessing the chances, you must begin with some knowledge of the man who will decide the event. m. poincaré is possessed of undoubted ability and patriotism, but he is also a man who lives in a world of prejudices so dense that they obscure facts. you have but to turn to one statement in his last note where he says the conferences and ultimatums of the past four years secured nothing from germany. what are the facts? during the three and a half years that preceded the ruhr invasion, germany paid to the allies in cash and in kind over ten milliards of gold marks,--£500,000,000 in sterling, 2,000,000,000 in dollars--a considerable effort for a country which had but lately emerged out of the most exhausting of wars and whose foreign trade was down sixty to seventy per cent. you might imagine that a man who had taken the grave step of ordering armies to invade a neighbour's territories would also have taken the trouble to ascertain the elementary facts of his case. part of this gigantic sum went to pay for armies of occupation; part for reparations, but it all came out of german assets. will the next three and a half years bring anything approximating that figure to the allied coffers? it is a safe statement to make that no one in charge of the french movements anticipated a resistance approaching in its stubbornness to that which they have encountered. the friendly press, both in france and in england, foretold a speedy collapse of the german opposition, and on this assumption all the french plans were based. during the first days of the occupation an englishman asked a french officer how long he thought it would take. the answer is indicative of the spirit in which the venture started: "optimists think it will take a fortnight," he said; "pessimists think it may take three weeks." a reference to the january telegrams from paris and düsseldorf will show that this officer accurately expressed the general sentiment of those who were responsible for the ruhr invasion. soldiers estimate the chances of resistance in terms of material and trained men, and statesmen too often build their hopes on the same shallow foundation. they never allow for the indomitable reserves of the human heart, which do not figure in army lists or statesmen's annuals. the resistance of paris in 1870 was as confounding to bismarck as the stubbornness of the ruhr miners is to poincaré to-day. the last regular army had been destroyed, all docketed food stores exhausted, and still the struggle of the devoted citizens went on for months. there were few men in england who thought the boer peasants could continue their resistance for more than three months after our armies reached south africa. the three months ran into three years and only then capitulated on honourable terms. the northern states of america never contemplated the possibility of a five years' struggle with a blockaded, starved and overwhelmed confederacy. the war of 1914-18 is littered with miscalculations attributable to the blind refusal of rulers and their advisers to recognise the moral element as a factor in the reckoning. the ruhr tragedy is not the first, nor indeed may it be the last, to be initiated by facile memoranda framed by general staffs and civilian functionaries, drawing their inspiration from pigeonholes. whatever may transpire in the ruhr it is already clear that the estimates of military men, of transport officials, of intelligence departments, and of presiding ministers, have been hopelessly falsified. many more soldiers have been sent into the ruhr than had been thought necessary: a great deal less coal has come out of the ruhr than had been confidently expected. there are already as many frenchmen in the ruhr as napoleon commanded at waterloo; and they have succeeded in sending across the frontier in six months only as much coal as the germans delivered in one month during the period of "default" which provoked the invasion. desperate efforts have been made at great cost to increase the yield with a view to satisfying french and foreign opinion that resistance is gradually breaking down. rubbish is shovelled into wagons in order anyhow to swell the quota. coal is seized anywhere, even in the streets. and monsieur trocquer, the bluff and genial breton in charge of the transport arrangements, breezily challenges all the critics to look at the mounting pyramids of his dustcart collection and rejoice with him in the triumph of french organisation under his control. alas, the celtic fire of monsieur trocquer, even when fed by the sweepings of the ruhr, cannot keep going the blast furnaces of lorraine! so we find disappointment and discontent amongst the forge-masters of france. but there is a limit to human endurance. either france or germany must give way in the end. which will it be, and when will it come--and how? in answering these questions one must remember that for france the honour of her flag is involved in success. failure would irretrievably damage her prestige. every frenchman knows that. that is why french statesmen who disapprove of the invasion support the government in all their proposals for bringing it to a successful end. and here france has a legitimate complaint against her allies. it is useless for italy now to counsel wisdom. signor mussolini was present at the "hush conference" which sanctioned the invasion. he fixed the price of assent in coal tonnage. that price has been regularly paid. belgium is now becoming scared at the swelling magnitude of the venture. but she committed her own honour as well as that of france to carrying it through. i regret to think that britain is not free from responsibility in the matter. it is true that her representatives disapproved of the enterprise, but not on grounds of right or justice. on the contrary, whilst expressing grave doubt as to the ultimate success of the invasion they wished the french government well in the undertaking on which they were about to embark. not one of the allies is in a position with a clean conscience to urge france to haul down her flag. there is only one course which could be urged on the french government as being consistent with french honour, and that is the reference of the dispute to the league of nations. such a reference would be an enforcement of the treaty of versailles. that suggestion the british government have refused to press on france. the struggle must, therefore, proceed to its destined end. it may be assumed that the british government will not intervene effectively. how about the ministerial declarations? surely these strong words must be followed by strong action! those who rely on that inference know nothing of the men who use the words or of the forces upon which they depend for their ministerial existence. it is true that some weeks ago mr. snodgrass took off his coat and proclaimed cryptically, but fearlessly, that unless peace was restored on his terms something would happen. the french government, unperturbed, replied that they meant to persist in their course. so last week mr. snodgrass takes off his waistcoat. but do not be alarmed: there will be no blows: his friends will hold him back. meanwhile, mr. winkle has left for paris in order to lunch with one of the combatants. next week he will be followed by mr. pickwick, who will call on another, and the week after mr. tupman proposes to pay another propitiatory visit. it will be an incalculable advantage to m. poincaré that they each represent a different and conflicting point of view. the french have accurately taken the measure of the mind and muscle of those who indulge in these spectacular exhibitions of ball punching in westminster with cakes and ale at rambouillet. we may therefore assume that whatever conversations take place at these general gatherings or ensue from them, the french will not be talked out of the ruhr. from the emphatic declarations made by the head of the french government it is gathered that france will insist at all costs on enforcing her will. she has put forward two demands. the first is that germany shall abandon passive resistance as an essential preliminary to negotiation. the second is that her forces should remain in the ruhr until the last payment is made. will the german government accept these conditions? a settlement on these terms is only possible on two assumptions. the first is that a german government can be found strong enough to accept them and to survive their acceptance. the second is that there is a french government wise enough to give a liberal interpretation to these demands. the first depends to a large extent on the second. the events of the past few months have added immeasurably to the difficulties of negotiation. incidents inseparable from a foreign occupation in any land have exasperated german opinion and reached depths of hatred which had never been stirred even by the great war--the deportation of 75,000 germans from their homes in the ruhr area, the repression, the shooting, the starving, the holding up of food trains until essential supplies rot. the myriad insolences of unchallengeable force, the passions which make french policy so intractable are entirely attributable to the german occupation of france. frenchmen are now sowing the same seeds of anger in the german breast. hatreds are bad negotiators. that is why i despair of a real settlement. but germany may collapse. she might even break up, temporarily. the authority of the central government has already largely disappeared. there is practically no collection of taxes. the mark has gone down in a little over a week from 1,000,000 to the £ to 27,000,000.[3] how can any government collect taxes in such a fugitive and attenuated currency? you might as well try to collect land taxes on the tail of a comet. the state of the currency is but a symptom of the general disintegration. berlin has ceased to wield any influence in bavaria, and the monarchy might be restored in that province at no distant date. there is a movement in the rhineland to set up a republic freed from the dominion of prussia. this movement is fostered by french agencies and financed by french subventions. if it is declared prussia will not be allowed to suppress it. we may, therefore, soon witness a rhineland republic whose glorious freedom and independence will be jealously guarded against internal as well as external foes by the coloured warriors of senegal and cochin-china. saxony might be captured by communists and prussia be torn between monarchist and communist. these are not unlikely happenings. is it too much to say they are not altogether out of the computation of french statesmanship? if germany dissolves, then the rhineland and the ruhr would remain under the dominion of france. france would not secure reparations, but she would enjoy security, and she would, so it is conjectured, enormously enhance her power in the world. an old french dream would be realised. the work of bismarck would be undone and the achievement of napoleon would be restored and perpetuated. there is an old welsh adage which says that it is easy to kindle a fire on an old hearthstone. this idea of a rhineland under french domination is the old hearthstone of charlemagne. mazarin sought to relight its flames. napoleon the first kindled on it a blaze that scorched europe. napoleon the third had hopes of warming his chilling fortunes at the glow of its embers, and now the great victory of 1918 has set french ambitions once more reviving the fires on the old hearthstone of a rhineland ruled by the frank. altogether it is a bad look-out for europe. _london, august 6th, 1923._ footnote: [3] since this was written the mark has fallen far beyond. xix is it peace? the charleville speech[4] and m. poincaré's reply to lord curzon's despatch[5] leave things exactly where they were. rumour said the reply would be long and logical. for once rumour hath not lied. m. poincaré regards this exchange of bolstered notes as a pillow fight which he is quite prepared to prolong in order to gain time whilst the real struggle is developing to its destined end. the prominence given in the press to the fact that this rigid reply is "courteous" is significant of the pitiable condition to which the entente has been brought by these maladroit negotiations. what will mr. stanley baldwin and lord curzon do next? much depends for europe on that next step, and something for them also hangs upon their action or inaction. one is reminded of the answer given by émile ollivier to the question addressed to him as to his opinion of one of napoleon the third's experiments in constitutional government: "si c'est une fin, vous êtes perdu; si c'est un commencement, vous êtes fondé." that sage comment is equally applicable to the curzon note. we can only "wait and see," first for the french official reply, and second for the decision of the british government upon that note. the only new factor in the situation that may have a determining influence on events is the accession of herr stresemann to the german chancellorship.[6] i know nothing of him beyond newspaper report, but he is generally supposed to be a man of energy, courage and resource. if that be true, his appointment to the official leadership of the german people may be an event of the first magnitude. we shall soon know what he is made of. germany has suffered more from weak or misguided leadership in recent years than any great country in the world. it blundered her into the war, it blundered through the war, it blundered into the armistice, it blundered during the peace negotiations, and it has blundered her affairs badly after the peace. but no one can predict what germany is capable of with a wise and strong leadership. herr stresemann has a responsibility cast upon him and an opportunity afforded him such as have not been given to any statesman since the days of stein and his coadjutors for regenerating his country and lifting her out of the slough of despond in which she has been sinking deeper and deeper. those who ignore the effect which powerful and magnetic personalities may have upon the fortunes of nations in despair must have forgotten their history books. the fall of dr. cuno and the rise of herr stresemann may well turn out to be a more decisive event than the despatch or the publication of the curzon note. but if he lacks those rare qualities which alone can inspire a people in an emergency to heroic action and endurance, then there is nothing but chaos ahead of germany. for the moment it is more important to keep a discerning eye on herr stresemann than to watch this endless fencing between downing street and the quai d'orsay. it is not often i find myself in agreement with m. poincaré, but when he states that british unemployment is not attributable to the occupation of the ruhr i am substantially in accord with him. in july last[7] i called the attention of the house of commons to world conditions which injuriously affected our export trade and made unemployment on a large scale inevitable in the british labour market for some time to come. we are more dependent on our overseas trade, export, entrepôt, shipping and incidental business than any country in the world. almost half our industrial and commercial activities are associated with outside trade in all its forms. that is not a full statement of the case, for if this important section of our business were to languish, the home trade would also necessarily suffer by the consequential diminution in the purchasing capacity of our people. before the french ever entered the ruhr our overseas trade was down to 75 per cent. of its pre-war level. our population has increased by two millions since 1913; our taxation has increased fourfold; our national debt tenfold; but our business is down 25 per cent. to what is this fall in our outside sales and services attributable? it is the direct consequence of the war. our customers throughout europe are impoverished. what is just as bad, our customers' customers are impoverished. so that neither can buy at our stalls the quantities or the qualities which they could be relied upon to purchase before the war. until europe can buy, australia, canada, india and china cannot pay, as the prime minister pointed out in his last speech in the house of commons. germany, before the war, bought australian wool, canadian grain, indian jute and tea, and the proceeds as often as not went to pay for goods bought by those countries in british markets. the same observation applies to russia, austria, and the levantine countries. the purchasing capacity of europe must, therefore, be replenished, a process which will, at best, take years of patient industry. the mischief of the ruhr lies not in the creation of bad trade, but in retarding the process of recovery. it has undoubtedly had that effect. before the french entered the ruhr trade was gradually if slowly improving all round. the prices of 1922 were lower than those of 1921; therefore, the contrast in sterling was not as apparent as it became on the examination of weights and measures. the export figures, notably in manufactured goods, show a decided increase on those of the preceding year. this advance is reflected in the statistics of unemployment. during the first ten months of 1922 there was a reduction of over 500,000 in the numbers of the registered unemployed. the succeeding ten months give only a slight improvement. something has happened to arrest the rate of progress towards better times. this is where the ruhr comes in. even if it is not, to quote the prime minister, a penknife stuck in the watch and stopping the works, it is certainly more than a grain of dust which has perceptibly slowed the action of the sensitive machinery of trade. the effect of the ruhr disturbance would continue for some time if the penknife were removed now. for the moment m. poincaré is wedging it in more deeply and firmly. even if he withdrew it now, the works would not recover their normal steadiness for a long while. during these last disturbing months germany has become appreciably poorer. her wealth production has been depressed throughout most of her industrial areas. to a certain extent lorraine and belgium have also been affected adversely. the reservoir of wealth upon which industry draws has not been filling up as it ought if the world is ever to recover. these things are hidden from france. she is a more self-contained country than britain--perhaps also a more self-centred country. even after the napoleonic wars, which drained her best manhood and exhausted her fine nervous virility, she suffered from no interval of economic depression. her great and victorious rival across the channel lumbered painfully through fifteen years of misery, poverty and distress. her own population, basking in the sunshine of prosperity, regarded across the narrow waters, with a natural contentment, the dark fogs that enveloped and drenched their old enemies. commiseration or sympathy from them at that time was not to be expected. we had fought them for twenty years with an inveterate pertinacity and at last beaten them to the ground and occupied their capital. to-day we suffer because we helped to save their capital from foreign occupation and their country from being humbled to the dust by a foreign foe. neither in french speeches, notes, nor articles is there any appreciation shown of that cardinal fact in the situation. all that is clear at the moment is the stubbornness of the french attitude. m. poincaré has not so far receded one millimetre from his original position. threats and cajoleries alike are answered by a repetition of the same formulæ, with the slight variations in word or phrase which one would expect from a practised writer. but the theme is always the same and the application is identical to the point of monotony. he is not winning much coal out of his discourses and literary exercises, but to do him justice he is getting something for his country. last year lord balfour, in the note he sent to the allies on behalf of the british government, offered to forego all claims for debts and reparations if britain were secured against payment of the american debt. that meant a surrender of claims aggregating over £3,000,000,000 in return for an assured £1,000,000,000. a very handsome and generous offer. the curzon note proposes to surrender all our claims for a precarious return of £710,000,000. the ruhr occupation has already brought down the british claim against the allies by £290,000,000. m. poincaré may not be able to extract reparations out of germany, but in seven months he has succeeded in forcing £290,000,000 out of great britain. he will certainly ask for more--and probably receive it. mr. bonar law was right when he said that under certain conditions great britain would be the only country to pay a war indemnity. those conditions have arisen under his successors. _criccieth, august 20th, 1923._ footnotes: [4] m. poincaré's speech at charleville on august 19th, on the subject of french policy in the ruhr. [5] the british note was sent to france, august 13th, 1923, and m. poincaré's reply was received on august 23rd. [6] the german government fell on august 13th, 1923, and herr stresemann succeeded dr. cuno as chancellor. [7] house of commons, july 16th, 1923. xx what next?[8] the pen-and-ink joust is suspended for a fortnight, whilst the figures of british unemployment are leaping upwards. when the exhausted british knights have been reinvigorated by french waters they will once more charge full tilt at the french champion--at least, they will have made up their minds by then whether they will shiver another fountain-pen against his blotting-pad. this is the advice ponderously and pompously tendered them in inspired articles. so far, the french nation is jubilant that m. poincaré has scored heavily on points. he is a defter penman, and, moreover, he does not delegate his draughtsmanship to a committee of ministers, all holding irreconcilable views as to how to proceed, when to proceed, and whither to proceed, and amongst whom there is no agreement except on one point--that no one quite knows what action to propose. up to this last reply they cherished the vain delusion that the french could be shelled out of the ruhr by reproaches which were both querulous and apologetic. that is not the way to shift continental statesmanship from its purpose. the french foreign office is better informed as to cabinet divisions in this country than are the british public. it knows that the prime minister and foreign secretary dare not take measures which will hamper french action in the ruhr. when the tory diehards placed co-operation with france in the forefront of their programme they honestly meant it. for them it was not a mere manoeuvre to unhorse the coalition. they cannot, therefore, support an attitude of resistance to french pressure on germany. a refusal to join france in squeezing germany is to them a continuation of the evil of the coalition they overthrew with the help of mr. stanley baldwin and lord curzon. they will not tolerate it. that explains the impotence of british diplomacy in a situation which is so critical to our existence as a great commercial people. the cabinet can agree on wordy notes; they are hopelessly divided as to action. they have, therefore, dispersed far and wide to search for fortuitous guidance hither and thither--some in the tranquillity of their english country houses; some in the healing springs of france; some in the mists of scottish moorlands. mayhap one of them will bring home a policy acceptable to his colleagues. it is all very humiliating to the empire that raised ten millions of men and spent £10,000,000,000 of its treasure to win the war. the net result of the voluminous correspondence on which our rulers have concentrated months of anxious wisdom and unwearying hesitancy is that the allies whom we saved from destruction refuse to move one inch out of their road to secure our friendly companionship. they are marching resolutely in one direction, whilst we are shambling along in another. we have travelled long distances from each other since january last, and we are now altogether out of sight of the position we held in common when we met the germans at cannes early last year.[9] the entente has never been more cordial than it was then--it has never shown more promise of hopeful partnership for the peace of the world. we were on the point of securing an amicable and businesslike arrangement with germany for the payment of reparations and of concluding an agreement for protecting the frontiers of france and belgium against the possibility of future invasion. from these starting-points it was proposed that britain, france, italy, and belgium should advance together to a general settlement of european problems in east and west--political, financial, economic and transport. this we had agreed to do and, with the unity and goodwill which then prevailed, could have accomplished. but m. poincaré had no use for the dove of peace. he wanted to fly his falcon. he had trained and bred it in the french farmyard, and there it had brought down many a domestic bird successfully. when his chance came he flew it at the wounded german eagle. it is poor sport, and somewhat cruel, but it evidently gives great joy to frenchmen of a sort. the best are ashamed of it, but their voices are drowned in the clamour of the unthinking. if the helpless bird is torn to pieces, there is nothing in that for french or belgian larders. quite unintentionally the hawk has brought down the entente also. it may not be dead, but it has made its last flight. henceforth international arrangements will be on a less exclusive basis. france is irrevocably committed to the exploitation of the ruhr by force. that is what "pay or stay" means. to that policy the majority in this country are definitely opposed. if the diehards in the cabinet were by any chance to win, and either mr. baldwin surrendered or resigned in favour of a poincarist administration in this country, neither he nor any possible successors could carry the country along into the ruhr venture. some of them around the prime minister who have so suddenly assumed pro-french sentiments as the shortest cut to higher altitudes than those to which they have yet succeeded in climbing, know full well that, although they may use the diehards for their own ends, if they succeeded in their somewhat sinister purpose they could not carry out the diehard policy. they are, therefore, endeavouring to provide for contingencies by negotiating on their own a fresh understanding with france. but british premiers are not appointed at rambouillet nor do they draw their authority from the quai d'orsay. whatever may be thought of mr. bonar law or of mr. stanley baldwin by political partisans, no one suggests that they derived their promotion from other than purely british sources. but for a fortnight nothing is to happen--except the spread of unemployment in britain and of despair in germany. at the end of the fortnight will there be a surrejoinder to m. poincaré's rejoinder? or will there be another conference? both m. poincaré and the present parliamentary régime in britain came into power on the cry of "enough of these eternal conferences; let us return to the good old diplomatic methods that prevailed before the war"--and, they might add, "which helped to make it possible." nevertheless, mr. bonar law's administration during its short tenure of six months participated in four european conferences, and m. poincaré, during his eighteen months' official career, has found it necessary to take part, directly, in five conferences, and directly and indirectly in eight. the french press are urging him on to add another to a record which already beats that of m. briand in the matter of "joy-riding"--to quote the contemptuous diehard name for international conferences during coalition days. it is a suspicious circumstance that those who were once resentful and scornful of conferences should now be clamouring for one both here and in france. the reason is scarcely concealed by ardent advocates of the resumption of "picnic diplomacy." at the old conferences, so it is contended, france was invariably forced to give way. now she can and will command the situation. there is a new note of confidence ringing through french despatches and echoed in the french press. france must get what she wants; britain must take what she is given. the french share of reparations must first be assured--debts due to britain can come out of what is left. it is rather greedy, but characteristic, of the british that they should expect to be paid what is owing to them! with their smug and hypocritical puritan temperament and outlook they insist that contracts should be respected! france, for the sake of the entente, will make a concession even to british cupidity and pharisaism. it will permit the british empire to collect--not the whole of what is due to her, but a much-reduced claim out of germany once the french demand for reparations is cashed or as good as cashed! to me this is a new france. during my years of discussion with french statesmen i never heard this voice. i had three or four talks with m. poincaré, and i never heard him speak in these supercilious tones. impunity has developed them since to their present pitch of stridency. belgium is to suggest a meeting of the premiers. when it comes the french minimum terms are to be rigid and unequivocal. here they are:- 1. france must be paid her irreducible minimum of £1,300,000,000 in respect of reparations, whatever happens to any one else. 2. belgium is also to have her priority of £100,000,000. 3. as germany cannot raise these huge sums immediately, france and belgium are to hold the ruhr until they are paid. hints have been thrown out by the more conciliatory french journals that the french government might consider an early retirement from the ruhr if the payment of reparations were made the subject of an international guarantee. that implies britain and america becoming sureties for payment of the german indemnity! 4. as to the rest, france and belgium have no objection, subject to the above conditions, to great britain collecting £700,000,000, _i.e._, about 23 per cent., of her international claims (debts and reparations) from germany. but this munificent concession is to be made on the distinct understanding that she forgoes entirely the remaining 77 per cent. of her bonds. the allies and germany between them owe great britain £3,000,000,000. the french and belgian governments are willing that great britain should collect £700,000,000 of that amount from germany, provided the remaining £2,300,000,000 is for ever cancelled--and always provided that the £1,400,000,000 due to france and belgium has been satisfactorily guaranteed. 5. these handsome terms can only be propounded if germany first of all withdraws all passive resistance in the ruhr. that is an essential preliminary. the french government have stated these terms with such precision and such emphasis, and repeated them with such undeviating insistence, that any departure from them on the french side seems impossible. the hope of a conference rests entirely on the confidence in a british surrender. there is a dismal "joy-ride" in prospect for the british prime minister and his foreign secretary. is it conceivable they can contemplate such a capitulation? i do not see how the present government, after all it has said and written, can so far submit to french dictation as to make it likely that further discussions would lead to agreement. what is the alternative? herr stresemann can alone answer that question. it is not yet clear what he means to do. perhaps he is feeling his way to a decision. _london, august 27th, 1923._ footnotes: [8] london, august 27th, 1923. [9] the cannes conference, january, 1922. xxi the british debt to america as i roll homeward along the coast of spain a wireless message announces that the british government have accepted the american debt terms. the details which i have received are not sufficient to enable me to form an opinion regarding the character of those terms, or their bearing on allied indebtedness to britain as to the terms of payment. i know nothing of the steps taken by mr. baldwin and the government of which he is a member to make this the first step in an all-round settlement of inter-allied debts. that is a matter of infinite moment to us, and i assume that this is somewhere--and effectively--in the arrangement. as to the payment of our own debt, the government represent the real sentiment of the nation as a whole. the british taxpayer is no doubt fully alive to the fact that this heavy debt was incurred by him during the war in the main in order to finance american supplies to our allies. we could have paid for all the supplies we required for our own use without resort to any loan from the american government. nevertheless, the money was advanced by the lender on our credit and our signature. our credit as a nation, therefore, demands that we should pay. whether we can collect enough money from our own debtors to meet this charge becomes increasingly doubtful, as it is becoming increasingly needful. britain is alone in thinking she is under any moral obligation to pay the external liabilities incurred for the effective prosecution of the war. the attitude of the late and of the present government is identical in this respect. why have the british public taken a different view of their national obligations towards external war debts from that adopted by other allies? in giving the answer i do not wish to dwell on obvious ethical considerations which must weigh whenever you consider whether you will carry out an engagement which you have entered into with another who has already performed his part of the engagement on the strength of your promise. these ought to be conclusive; but to urge them might be deemed to be an unworthy reflection on the honour of those who take a different view of their national duty. i have no desire to offer censure or criticism upon their decision. they, no doubt, have their reasons for the course they are adopting. we have certainly overwhelming reasons for showing an honest readiness to pay our debts. the settling up of accounts is always an unpleasant business, especially amongst friends. strangers expect it and prepare for it--and there is no resentment when the bill arrives. but a man hates reminding his friend at the end of a business in which both have been engaged in warm amity that there is "a little balance" to be paid up. he has been expecting the friend to mention the matter to him. so he puts off introducing the unpleasant topic from year to year. but the friend disappoints his expectations. not a hint comes from that quarter of any realisation that there is anything due. it soon looks as if it had been forgotten altogether. the friend is most insistent on collecting the business accounts due to himself. he is angry at all delays in payment of his own bills. but his conscience is blind on the side of the debts he himself owes. it is not an uncommon experience, and we are suffering from it to-day. the war left us a creditor nation to the extent of over 2,000 million pounds, and a debtor nation to the extent of about half that amount. we readily accepted an invitation from our creditor to discuss the repayment of the debt we owe. our debtors have displayed an invincible reluctance to enter into a similar discussion with us. that ought not to influence our final decision. britain is the greatest of all international traders, and her credit rests on the reputation she has well earned--that her bond is a sacred trust which her people always honour and redeem without counting the cost in toil and treasure. i remember when war broke out the panic which seized bankers and brokers as they contemplated the obligations incurred by british firms with their support to finance world trade. these liabilities ran into hundreds of millions sterling, and the only security for repayment was represented by a bundle of flimsy paper, criss-crossed with the signatures of men most of whom no british banker had ever seen, many of them dwelling in countries with whom we were actually at war. there was one signature, however, on each paper which was known to bankers and carried with it the good name of britain throughout the world; and it was that of some well-known british firm. traders in far-distant lands parted with their produce on the credit of that signature and of the country with which it was associated. it is true that the government had no responsibility for any of these transactions; but the honour of britain was involved in seeing that the foreign merchants should not suffer ruin because they put their trust in british commercial integrity. for that reason the british government of the day shouldered the burden, took all the risk, and although it meant a liability of between four hundred and five hundred millions sterling, not a voice was raised in protest. the action then taken, though quite unprecedented, was not only honourable; it was wise. it saved british pride from a reproach; it also saved british credit from a blow from which it would not have recovered for a generation. during that generation this lucrative business would have passed into other hands. as soon as the war was over the people of britain, with an instinctive impulse that required no persuasion to stimulate its activity, set about the task of restoring their war-battered credit. government, bankers, merchants, brokers, manufacturers, and workers of all kinds were of one mind; borrowing must come to an end; britain must pay her way--whatever the sacrifice. expenditure was ruthlessly cut down. the army and navy were reduced below pre-war dimensions. other services were curtailed. heavy taxation was imposed--taxation such as no other country bears. the budget at home must balance. debts to other countries must be paid off. already large sums have been paid abroad. it required courage and constancy to pursue such a policy; but the endurance of the nation was beyond praise. it is now calmly facing the liquidation of this heavy debt to the united states of america; but no party has yet arisen, or is likely to arise, to demand that the hand of the negotiators should be arrested. britain means to pay the last of her debts without a murmur. we are already reaping some of the reward. the purchasing value of our currency has already risen under its burdens, and, as a consequence, the cost of living has fallen steadily, while other countries who have pursued a different policy find the cost of living for their people ascending month by month. a short time ago we were taunted in the french chamber of deputies by the president of the council that our unsound financial policy had been responsible for our unemployment. it is true that if we had gone on borrowing instead of paying our way--if we had defied our foreign creditors instead of paying them--we also, like many other european countries, might have fostered an artificial prosperity by means of a discredited currency. but british credit would have rapidly disappeared beyond recovery and british trade would soon have followed. meanwhile, the cost of living in great britain would have been double what it is to-day. we all therefore dismissed that policy from our minds without paying it the tribute of a discussion. trust is the only soil in which credit flourishes. had that trust been forfeited british buyers and consequently british consumers would to-day have been paying more for their wheat, their meat, their cotton, and their wool. the burden of repayment to the united states will be infinitely less than that of the indirect burden involved in large purchases with a discredited currency. the government are therefore right in arranging with the american treasury without loss of time for the liquidation of a debt incurred by this country. i am taking for granted that they have made every effort to see that the agreement shall form a part of an all-round settlement of inter-allied debts. but as to our own debt the moral obligation must remain whatever our allies do or fail to do. why it was incurred, the circumstances in which it was entered into, the purposes for which the money was advanced, were open to the consideration of the american government in arranging terms. that, however, was their privilege; ours is to honour our signature. xxii inter-allied debts a cold shiver ran down the back of england when it was announced officially that the british government had definitely agreed to pay over £30,000,000 a year for sixty years to the united states in respect of debts incurred by us on behalf of our allies without seeking a contribution from our debtors to protect the taxpayers of this country. it is not that anyone dreamt the evil dream of repudiation. that was never woven into the texture even of the worst nightmare out of the many that have disturbed our repose since the greatest nightmare of all left the world a quivering nervous wreck. nor did we expect remission of our debts. whenever we were tempted to exaggerate the bounds of human charity paragraphs appeared that reminded us of the attitude of the "middle west." america was discovered by europe centuries ago, but the "middle west," as a political entity, is to untutored europeans a discovery of the war. we were then told by returning explorers that it was the seat of the american conscience--inexorable, intractable, but irresistible when engaged in any enterprise. how potent this conscience was, as a world force, the war demonstrated. from the heights it hurled an avalanche of force against germany that overwhelmed the last hope of resistance. unfortunately for us when it came to debts we struck against the hard side of the middle west conscience. our hope was therefore not in remission. there were, however, many other possibilities. we were not the only debtors of the american government. other allies had borrowed not merely indirectly through us, but directly from america. we had every confidence that the united states government would not mete out to britain severer treatment than it was prepared to accord to our allies. we had to contend, it is true, with legends of our inexhaustible wealth. apart from our great coal deposits, and a climate which leaves those who endure it no alternative but activity, we have no treasure except the industry, the resources and the inherited skill of our people. we have nothing like the rich plains and the fertilising and ripening sunshine of france, which maintain sixty per cent. of its population. our sources of wealth--apart from coal--are precarious, for they depend more largely than any other country on conditions outside our own. we are international providers, merchants and carriers. a sixty-year contract to pay large sums across the seas is in many respects a more serious consideration for us than for countries whose riches are inherent in their soil and are, therefore, more self-contained. the demoralised condition of the world markets has left us with a larger proportion of our industrial population unemployed than any other european country. i hear tales of unemployment in the united states of america, but the reports that reach us here on american unemployment are so contradictory that i can build no argument upon them. but, as to the gigantic dimensions of our unemployed problem there can be no doubt. we have 1,400,000 workmen on the unemployed register drawing unemployment pay in one form or another. the annual cost to the nation of feeding its workless population runs to over £100,000,000--almost the figure of the annuity demanded from germany as a war indemnity. although there are signs of improvement the omens point to a prolonged period of subnormal trade. continuous depression for years will mean that britain will suffer more from the devastation to her trade caused by the war than france from the devastation of her provinces. our country, anxious about its means of livelihood, with a million and a half of its workmen walking the streets in a vain search for work, has to bear the heaviest burden of taxation in the world. why? because it has not only to pay interest on its own heavy war debts, but also on £3,000,000,000 which it either advanced to the allies or incurred on their behalf. that is why we felt hopeful that the united states would not discriminate against a nation so situated. when i talk of debts the allies owe to us, i want to emphasise the fact that these debts are not paper myths nor tricks of accountancy. they are onerous facts representing a real burden borne at this hour by the bent and panting taxpayer of britain. if these loans had never been made the weight on his shoulders to-day would have been lighter by over two shillings in the pound. he is every year paying to the actual lenders--some british, some american--that proportion of his income. it is a weight he undertook to carry for his allies during the war on the sacred pledge of those allies that they would take it over after the war. the american government borrowed from their public to make advances to great britain, and have called upon the british taxpayer to redeem his pledge. we make no complaint, for the demand is a mitigation of the strict letter of the bond. but that amount is in substance part of the debt owing by the allies to britain. and the british taxpayer naturally feels it is hard on him to have to bear not only his own legitimate burdens but that he should in addition have to carry the debts of his less heavily taxed brethren in continental countries. he naturally inferred that if equal pressure had been administered on all debtors alike it would have forced an all-around consultation which would have terminated in an all-round settlement. that was the real purport of the balfour note. the true significance of that great document has been entirely misunderstood--sometimes carelessly, sometimes purposely, sometimes insolently. i guarantee that not one per cent. of its critics if confronted suddenly with an examination on its contents would secure one mark out of a hundred. it has suffered the same fate as the treaty of versailles. opinion is sharply divided as to both between those who rend without reading and those who read without rending. most men have received their impressions of the balfour note from denunciatory phrases penned by writers who received their ideas about it from men who gave instructions to condemn it without ever reading it. the men who really understood both the versailles treaty and the balfour note have been too busy to find time to inform, to interpret, and to explain. but the time has come when the public attention should be once more drawn to the remarkable and far-reaching proposals of the balfour note. they constitute an offer on the part of britain to measure the amount of her claims against her allies by the extent of her obligations to the united states of america. the british government even offered to include the claim of their country against germany in this generous concession. what does that mean in reference to present conditions? that if the allies and germany between them found the £30,000,000 a year which britain has undertaken to pay america, she would forgo her claim to the £3,300,000,000 due to her under contract and treaty. it was a great offer and if accepted would have produced results beneficent beyond computation. britain, which would have been the heaviest direct loser, would have profited indirectly through the world recovery that would have ensued. how was it received? some criticised it because it asked too little--some because it demanded too much. many criticised because they were determined to approve nothing that emanated from such a government, but most of its censors condemned it because they never took the trouble to understand it, and the shrillest among the street cries happened to denounce it. the government that propounded it soon after left the seat of authority, and the administration that succeeded put forward a new scheme which attracted even less acceptance. so this great project which would have settled for ever the question which above all others is vexing peace and unsettling minds in europe was pigeon-holed where it was not already basketed. but surely this is not the end of all endeavours to reach a settlement of the question of inter-allied debts. we cannot rest satisfied with an arrangement which effectively binds us to pay without prospect of the slightest contribution from our debtors. what america cannot indulge in we cannot afford. the gold of europe now lies in its coffers. who are we--plunged in the mire of debt up to our nostrils--to give ourselves airs of generosity superior to the only golden land left in this war-stripped earth? if there is to be a general jubilee in which all alike participate in order to give the world a new start, then i feel sure britain will play her part bravely and nobly. but a jerry-mandered jubilee which frees france, italy and belgium from all their debts whilst leaving britain sweating to pay off debts incurred for her allies on the strength of their bond--that we cannot bear. i trust the government will insist on an arrangement with our allies which, even if it is not a replica of our contract with the american government, will at any rate ensure us a contribution that will safeguard us against loss under that contract. it is i fear hopeless to expect that we should be recouped the 2_s._ in the pound which interest on allied debts costs our taxpayers, but at any rate we might be guaranteed against the 6_d._ in the pound which the american instalments involve. i feel the effort is beset with difficulties and that the outlook is not hopeful. there have of late been a few discouraging symptoms. one is the reception accorded at the recent paris conference to the british prime minister's liberal offer regarding inter-allied debts. it was a tactical error to open the conference with such a scheme and the effect was singularly unfortunate. had i been disposed to press my criticisms on the conduct of the recent negotiations in paris it would have been that they were so managed that for the first time since the war britain has been completely isolated at a european conference. that is a misfortune, for it encouraged the french government to rash action. up to the last conference britain and italy had remained in substantial accord even when france and belgium took a different view, and belgium had never before quitted any of the gatherings in complete disagreement with great britain. so france, always tempted as she was to occupy the ruhr, hesitated to do so in the face of so formidable an allied resistance. what is relevant, however, to the subject of this article is the cause of our unwonted isolation on the occasion of the last conference. the british premier started the negotiations by tabling proposals which promised forgiveness of most of the indebtedness of these countries to britain, but which implied immediate arrangements for beginning repayment of the rest. this suggestion of repayment instantly consolidated opposition to the whole of the british plan. it became clear that existing governments on the continent had no intention, unless firmly pressed, of paying the smallest percentage of the debt they incurred on the faith of a solemn engagement to repay the loan when that was possible, and to pay interest meanwhile. if we point to the fact as we did in the balfour note, that we have undertaken to repay the united states of america the heavy debt incurred by us on behalf of the allies, they simply shrug their shoulders and say in effect: "that is your affair. we repay neither britain nor america, and there is an end of it." the other unpleasant incident is a speech delivered by m. poincaré in the french chamber in the course of which he dealt casually with the subject of inter-allied indebtedness. the french prime minister then announced categorically that france had no intention of paying her debts until she has first received her share of reparations from germany. what does that mean in effect? that the france represented by m. poincaré has no intention of ever paying her debts. when the colossal figure of german reparations is taken into account thirty years is a moderate estimate of the period required for its liquidation. is the french debt to lie dormant carrying no interest meanwhile? if it is, then the debt is practically wiped out, for the present value of £500,000,000 debt payable thirty years hence is insignificant. the present government of france have therefore declared they do not mean to pay what france owes. surely the time to dictate the conditions of your repayment of a loan--when you propose to pay, how much you propose to pay, or whether you mean to pay at all--is when you are borrowing and not after you have spent the money. and yet in the same speech in which m. poincaré serves up hot platitudes for senatorial palates about the sanctity of national obligations, he dismisses france's faithful ally with the cold comfort that france is too busy collecting the accounts due to her to attend to the debts she owes. i believe in my heart that there is a france of which he is not the spokesman--a great france which will not treat shabbily a faithful friend who stood by her in the hour of despair and who is now staggering under unparalleled burdens incurred in the discharge of the obligations of friendship. all this makes it more necessary that the situation should be cleared up without undue delay. having just completed negotiations for liquidating our own war indebtedness to america we are in a position to insist on a settlement with those on whose behalf we incurred that indebtedness. if nothing is done the conditions will harden against us. we shall be assumed to have accepted the poincaré repudiation. i do not know what conditions the government have made with the united states government as to the marketability of the securities to be created in funding our debt. if they are to be placed on the market the chance of any future deal is destroyed. ere that be done we must know where we are in reference to our own claims. i trust the government will act promptly. delay was justifiable so long as we were in the same position in reference to what we owed as what we claimed. the baldwin settlement has altered all that. if we do not insist on an arrangement now the british taxpayer will have the fate of issachar--that of the poor beast between two burdens--his own and that of the allies. xxiii the british elections it is the duty of every patriotic citizen, in view of the difficulties with which the country is confronted, to assist the government of the day by every means at his disposal. factious criticism disturbs judgment and tends to unnerve. governments to-day require full command of mind and nerve to enable them to arrive at sound decisions and to persevere in them. faction is, therefore, treason to the country. that does not, however, preclude a calm survey of the elections and their meaning. quite the contrary, for we must think of the future and prepare for it. the result of the elections has fully justified those who maintained that no party standing alone could hope to secure the measure of public support which will guarantee stable government. it is true that the conservatives have succeeded in obtaining the return of a majority of members to the new parliament. but the most notable feature of the elections is the return of a decisive majority of members by a very definite minority of the electors. i observe that the prime minister, in returning thanks to the nation, claims that he has received a vote of confidence from the people of this country. out of a total poll of fifteen millions his candidates secured less than six million votes. making full allowance for uncontested seats, this figure cannot be stretched out to a height much above six millions. that means that only two-fifths of the electorate voted confidence in the administration, whilst three-fifths voted confidence in other leaders or groups. a party which has a majority of three millions recorded against it on a national referendum can hardly claim to have received a national vote of confidence. it might be argued that when the question of confidence or no confidence comes to be stated, the national liberals having promised co-operation, the votes recorded by them ought not to be placed on the debit side of the confidence account. the basis of the appeal made by the national liberal candidates for support is practically that stated by me in my manchester speech: "the supreme task of statesmanship at this hour is the pacification of the nations, so that the people shall have leisure to devote themselves to the peaceful avocations of life, to fill up the depleted reservoirs from which we all draw. "my course is a clear one. i will support with all my might any government that devotes itself and lends its energy to that task with single-mindedness, fearlessness, and with resolution--provided it does not embark upon measures which inflict permanent injury upon the country, whether these measures be reactionary or revolutionary. that does not mean that i pledge myself to support inefficiency, vacillation, or infirmity in any government or in any party. but any government that does not pursue that course i will resist with all my might. that is my policy." i have perused the addresses of many national liberal candidates and i have addressed many meetings in their constituencies, and i find that their attitude towards the government is defined in these terms, with purely verbal variations. the address of mr. j. d. gilbert, who won central southwark, is a very fair sample taken out of the bulk: "if you honour me again with your confidence i will support any progressive measures brought forward by the present government or any other government. i shall not offer factious opposition or nagging criticism while our country is in difficulties at home or abroad." there may be one or two who went further, but none expressed confidence. i have made some inquiries as to the number of conservative votes polled by national liberal candidates. i am informed that on an average it represents less than one-third of the total. at the last election 167 national liberal candidates were put up. they polled an aggregate of 1,652,823 votes, that is, an average of 9,897 per candidate. what proportion of this vote was conservative? there is a good practical method of testing this question. in sixty-two seats national liberals were fought by conservative as well as by other candidates. in these cases the average vote polled by national liberals was 6,820. that means that where the conservatives supported national liberal candidates their votes would represent about 30 per cent. of the poll for these candidates. on the other hand, the number of liberal votes polled by conservatives, where a compact existed, at least balances this account, for although the total in each constituency does not equal the figures of the conservative support in national liberal constituencies, still, that support was spread over many more constituencies. the prime minister and his chief electioneering manager both emphatically repudiated the suggestion that there was any pact between conservatives and national liberals, and urged that there were only local arrangements made between the candidates of the two parties for their mutual convenience. as the head of the national liberal group i expressed grave doubts as to the composition of the ministry, and much apprehension as to the language in which its policy was defined. that represents the general attitude of the national liberals toward the government. their support, therefore, cannot be claimed in totalling the votes recorded for the government. the fact, therefore, remains that those who voted confidence in the government represent only forty per cent. of those who went to the poll and twenty-five per cent. of the total electorate. i place this fact in the forefront, because it is bound to have a profound effect upon the course of events during--maybe beyond--the lifetime of this parliament. it is the first time, certainly since the reform act, that a pronounced minority of the electorate has succeeded in securing the control of parliament and the government of the country. it would be idle to pretend that in a democratic country like ours, thoroughly imbued with the spirit of representative government, this does not weaken the moral authority of the government of the day. therefore, if the government is wise it will bear that fact in mind and will not commit itself to policies which challenge the nine millions who between them represent a majority of the people of this country. it is not a very good beginning to claim these striking figures as a vote of confidence. i sincerely trust it does not indicate a resolve to ignore, if not to defy, what is an obvious and ought to be a governing factor in the policy of the government. a corollary to this curious working of our electoral system is to be found in the under-representation of the other parties in the present parliament, and unless representative government is to be discredited altogether, the present parliament ought at once to devote its mind and direct its energies to the discovery of some method and machinery which will avert the danger which clearly arises from the working of the present system. the parliament of 1918 undoubtedly gave a larger majority to the government than the figures warranted. but the majority of votes cast for government candidates was so overwhelming that under any system of voting there would have been a larger working majority for the government than that which the present government can command. so when trouble arose it was not open to any section of the community to object that the government had no authority because it did not represent the electorate of this country. we are faced with a new danger to constitutional government. what has happened at this election may be repeated at the next--but not necessarily in favour of the same party. if we are to be governed by a succession of administrations who rule in spite of the protest of a majority of the people, the authority of government will be weakened beyond repair. the luck of the electoral table has this time favoured the conservatives. next time it may turn in favour of the labour party. they have at this election secured 55 seats out of a total of 141 by a minority of votes. the conditions were, in many respects, against them. their funds were exhausted by the prolonged period of heavy unemployment. the trade union movement was passing through an ebb tide in its prosperity, both in funds and in members. there was a good deal of discontent with the trade union leaders. many workmen felt they had been let down badly by some of their activities in industrial disputes. moreover, labour has been committed by visionaries to a rash experiment which handicapped it severely in the election. next time may be the spring tide of labour. they have learnt their lesson at the polls, and are not likely to repeat the blunder of november, 1922. this time the votes cast for them have attained the gigantic aggregate of four millions and a quarter. supposing under those conditions they add another two millions to their poll. although the other groups may secure between them nine millions of votes, labour may have the same luck as the conservatives at the last election and be placed in power by a decisive majority of members elected by a minority of votes. i am not going to speculate as to what may happen under those conditions; the kind of legislation that may be proposed; the action of the house of lords in reference to it, provoking, as it undoubtedly will, a fierce class conflict; or the turn given to administration in the various departments of government. of one thing i am, however, certain. that is, that as a minority administration in 1922 and onwards will help to discredit government with certain classes of the community, a minority labour administration would weaken the respect of other classes for representative government, and between them an atmosphere will be created inimical to the moral authority of all government in this country. i have many a time warned the public that, in spite of appearances, this country is in many respects very top-heavy. it is over-industrialised. its means of livelihood are in some ways precarious, and depend on conditions over which we have very little control, and once something happens which may have the effect of causing a lean-over either in one direction or in the other, it will be more difficult to recover than in lands where the population depends in the main for its livelihood upon the cultivation of the soil and the development of the natural resources of the country. i therefore earnestly trust that in the interests of stability and good government, which must be based on the goodwill and co-operation of the community as a whole, this parliament will apply its mind seriously to finding some means of preventing a repetition either in one direction or another of this freak of representative government. another feature of the election is the heavy vote polled by liberal candidates in spite of untoward circumstances. whatever the difficulties of the labour party might be in this election they were not comparable to those under which liberalism fought the campaign. it was divided by bitter internecine conflicts. the leaders of one section seemed to be more intent on keeping representatives of the other section out of parliament than on fighting for the common cause. the bulk of their speeches was devoted to attacks on the leaders of the other liberal group, and there was not much room left for a statement of the liberal case. what happened in manchester is typical. here the rank and file took the matter in hand and enforced agreement. lord grey was brought down to bless it. but the whole of his benedictory speech consisted of a thin and dreary drip of querulous comment on the leaders of the other group, with a distinct hint that the return of a conservative government would be by no means a bad thing in the interests of the country. the speech was hailed by a tory journal with the heading "lord grey supports mr. bonar law." he then went straight to support mr. mckinnon wood as candidate with a repetition of the same speech. thence he rushed off to reiterate the same performance at bedford in support of lady lawson, and he finished off by reciting it for two days at meetings in support of mr. walter runciman. no wonder that he succeeded in damping liberal enthusiasm to such an extent that his unfortunate protégés surprised even their opponents in the poverty of the support given them at the polls. as soon as the coalition broke up the leaders of this liberal section met to consider the situation. the one positive result of their deliberations was not the issue of a ringing appeal for unity on the basis of liberal principles, but a peevish intimation through the press that efforts at unity were to be discouraged at the election. it was clearly ordained that the coalition liberals should be crushed out. the conservatives spurned them, and the independent liberals gave notice that they had no use for them. they were destined for extinction. lord crewe's speech proceeded on the same lines. may i say how sincerely i rejoice in the tribute to the "amateur diplomatist" which is implied in the conferring by a conservative government of the blue ribbon of diplomacy upon the leader of the independent liberals in the house of lords? this precipitate and lamentable decision lost at least forty liberal seats, gave to the conservatives their majority, and what is equally important established the labour party as his majesty's official opposition in the house of commons. the latter is much the most serious practical result of the decisions of the independent leaders to debar united action at the last election. if liberals had united when the coalition came to an end, liberalism might have polled five million votes. it would have now held a powerful second position in parliament, and the country and the nation would have looked to it in the future as it has hitherto done in the past for the alternative to "toryism." instead of that it is a poor split third. how could they expect to win at the polls? the national liberals were pursued into their constituencies. thirty-five national liberal seats were assailed by independent liberal candidates. i am not making a complaint, but offering an explanation. whatever the views of the national liberal leaders might have been on the subject of liberal unity they were given no chance to effect it, and although they entered into no national compact with the conservatives their followers in certain areas had no option but to negotiate local arrangements with the conservatives for mutual support. the implacable attitude of the independent liberals left them no choice in the matter. what was the inevitable result? no real fight was put up for liberal principles on either side. the independent liberals were tangled by the personal preoccupation of their leaders. they had accumulated enormous dumps of ammunition for the day of battle on the assumption that the main attack would be on the coalition liberals, and, although the conservatives now lined the opposite trenches, anger dominated strategy, and the guns were still fired at their old foes, whilst the tory government was only bombarded with bouquets. on the other hand, the national liberal leaders were embarrassed by the engagements into which their followers had been driven by the action of the independent liberal leaders and the two warring factions. the national liberals, in spite of their enormous difficulties, have not been exterminated. i am not going to enter into a barren inquiry as to whether their numbers are or are not greater than those of mr. asquith's followers. let it be assumed that they are equal. the marvel is that under these fratricidal conditions so many liberals of any complexion have been returned. i am not setting forth these unhappy facts in order to prolong the controversy which has poisoned liberalism for years, but in order to call attention to the vitality which, in spite of these depressing conditions, can bring up 4,100,000 voters to the polls. electorally liberalism is the balancing power, and if it casts its united strength against either reaction or subversion its influence must be decisive, whatever the composition of this parliament may be. it is common knowledge that the independent liberals confidently anticipated the return of at least 120 members of their group. the fact that they only succeeded in securing the return of about fifty is naturally to them a source of deep disappointment. if the failure of high hopes leads to contemplation of the real causes of that failure and a sincere desire is manifested to substitute co-operation for conflict my colleagues and i will welcome it. we cannot force our society on an unwilling company. during the campaign i repeatedly expressed the hope that one outcome of this election would be to bring moderate men of progressive outlook in all parties to see the wisdom of acting together. but progressive minds are by no means confined to the liberal party. i have met and worked with them in the conservative party, and the election will have taught many men and women in the labour party that violent and extravagant proposals impede progress. if the limits are not too narrowly drawn, this parliament may witness the effective association of men of many parties who are genuinely concerned in the advancement of mankind along the paths of peace and progress for the attainment of their common ideals. if that end is achieved, the coming years will not be spent in vain. one word as to the national liberals. when the dissolution came no party was ever placed in a more embarrassing and even desperate situation. the conservatives have at their disposal a great political machine. the labour party could command the support of all the trade unions, with their elaborate machinery for organising the wage-earning population. the independent liberals had in england and in scotland captured the liberal machine almost in its entirety, and had spent six years in perfecting it, their leaders having no other occupation. the national liberal leaders inherited no political machinery, and were too preoccupied with great world affairs to be able to devote any time to the improvisation of an effective new organisation. conservatives, independent liberals, and labour all alike attacked national liberal seats where they thought any advantage might be gained for their respective parties by doing so. the conservatives only refrained from attack in cases where they thought there was more to be gained by arrangement. there was a great volume of popular sentiment behind our group. i visited britain, north, south, east, west, and i have never witnessed such crowds nor such enthusiasm at any electoral contest in which i have ever taken part; but there was no organisation to convert acclamation into electoral power, and you could not build up a vast political machine in three weeks. our supporters were not provided with an opportunity to test their strength in two-thirds of the constituencies. in nearly three hundred constituencies they could not do so without impairing the chances of liberal candidates. a compact with conservatives ruled them out of others. it is a wonder that, in spite of these adverse and even paralysing conditions our numbers are twice those of the independent liberals in 1918. we have now for the first time full opportunity for placing our case and point of view before the country and organising support for them. it is our duty to do so. every month will contribute its justification for the course we have hitherto pursued, and for the counsel we have steadfastly given to a country struggling through abnormal difficulties. _london, november 20th, 1922._ xxiv how democracy works the startling english by-elections of the last few weeks have called attention to the working of the new electorate in great britain and set men pondering about its possibilities in a way a general election failed to make them think. democracy in the sense of government of a great state by the absolute and unfettered authority of the majority of its own citizens of all ranks and conditions is a modern experiment. the united states of america are the oldest democracy in the world to-day. how many realise that britain became a democracy for the first time in 1917? until then the majority of its adult population had no voice in the making or administration of the laws that ruled their lives. the united states of america, france and italy have adopted universal suffrage as the basis of authority for many a year. so have the british dominions, but britain herself, the pioneer of representative institutions, until recently shrank from the experiment of adult suffrage. before the reform act of 1832 the total electorate of this country numbered only 3 per cent. of the population. the distribution of power amongst this small percentage was so arranged that even the 3 per cent. represented in effect no more than at best 1 per cent. a generation of turmoil and agitation, almost culminating in revolution, succeeded in forcing through a measure which increased the 3 per cent. to 4.5 per cent. of the population! it is true that the distribution of votes was more equitable, but even with that improvement to call this ridiculous percentage a democracy would be absurd. another generation of growing agitation ensued. this also ended in violence. then mr. disraeli, one of the boldest and most venturesome of british statesmen, in 1867 doubled the electorate. his measure increased the number of voters to 9 per cent. of the population. disraeli's audacious plunge horrified some of his aristocratic supporters and shocked many whigs. "bob" lowe had already foretold calamities that would follow gladstone's more cautious proposals. seven years later saw the election of the first tory parliament since 1841. so much for the prophecies of the men who always fear evil must flow from justice. fifteen years after the disraeli measure the gladstone administration added another 7 per cent. to the electorate. the gladstone proposals, which raised the number of voters to 16 per cent., were so vehemently contested that they nearly precipitated a constitutional crisis of the first magnitude. ultimately, however, they were carried, and there the franchise remained until the war. the electorate that, through its representatives, accepted the german challenge in 1914, and was therefore responsible for involving the country in the most costly and sanguinary war it ever waged, represented one-sixth of the population and about one-third of the adults. the conscription act converted the country to the injustice of this state of things. millions of men were forced to risk their lives for a policy which they had no share in fashioning. millions of women faced anxieties and tortures worse than death in pursuit of the same policy, and yet no woman was allowed to express any opinion as to the selection of the rulers who led them to this sacrifice. it was felt to be so unjust that in the exaltation of war, which lifted men to a higher plane of equity, this obvious wrong was redressed. hence the greatest of all the enfranchisement acts, the act of 1917, that for the first time converted the british system of government into a democracy. how has it worked? it is too early to speak of its results. mr. austen chamberlain in a letter[10] has called attention to one aspect of its operation. he emphasises a fact which is already known to every man who has passed through the experience of a contested election, that nearly one-half the new electorate is unattached to any political party. if you deduct out of the total the numbers of the old electorate which had already formed ties of a party character, you will find from the result of the elections that more than half the new electorate is free and floating about without any anchor or rudder and ready to be towed by the first party that succeeded in roping them. millions of the new electors are too indifferent or too undecided about political issues to take sides at the polling booths. in the hotly contested election of january, 1910, 92 per cent. of the voters went to the poll. at the second election which took place in the same year the percentage was 89. the slight difference between the two elections would be accounted for by the fact that in the second election the register was old. compare these results with the two elections which have occurred since the 1917 enfranchisement. at the 1918 election 64 per cent. only of the voters could be induced to make the acquaintance of the ballot-boxes. this might be explained by the inevitable political apathy which follows a great war. the pulse of party beat feebly and irregularly. the old party organisations had, through five years of neglect, fallen into complete disrepair--the new party had not yet had time to perfect its machinery. hence the failure of competitive effort to induce at least 6,000,000 of the new voters to take a sufficient interest in their new privileges to exercise them at the election. the next four years were a period of growing political activity. the new party was especially energetic. their chief organiser, mr. arthur henderson, m.p., is one of the most gifted party managers of this generation, and his achievement is an outstanding feature of political organisation in this country. the old parties also had time to repair their machinery; by the time the election was called their organisations were in full working order. the only party which had no organisation worth speaking of was the national liberal party. the others were ready for the struggle. nevertheless, when the election came in november nearly 5,000,000 of the electors were not sufficiently interested in the contest to take the trouble to record their votes. it showed an improvement of 10 per cent. on the previous election, but there still remained nearly 20 per cent.--making allowance for death, sickness, removals, etc.--who stayed at home, and could not be persuaded by personal or public appeal or pressure exercised by three or four great organisations, to walk a few hundred yards out of their way in order to place a simple cross on the ballot paper that was awaiting them. the municipal elections tell a still more dismal story of apathy. but that is an old story. it was with difficulty that the old electorate, with all its long training, could be cajoled to visit the polling booths where the good government of the towns in which they breathed, lived, toiled, enjoyed themselves, and rested was being determined. at their worst, however, they made a better show than the newly enfranchised voters. how does the record compare with democracy in other lands? france is no better. on the whole, i understand it is worse. the voting in the united states of america fluctuates according to the interest excited by the particular election. in this respect america does not differ from britain. i cannot lay my hand on the percentage of the poll at the last presidential election, but i gather it was higher than ours at the general election. the germans polled at their last election 89 per cent. of their electorate; in italy the percentage was much lower. with an unpolled and unticketed electorate of over 4,000,000 anything may happen. they have clearly no interest in the ordinary political conflicts that engage the minds of their fellow-citizens; otherwise, the excitement of two general elections would have roused them to such faint exhibition of partisanship as is implied in the choosing of a candidate out of the two or three who have taken the trouble to send along their pictures. but one day an issue may arise which will wake up the most lethargic. what will it be? and what view will they take of it when it comes? and who will succeed in catching the eye of the slumbering multitude when it opens? much depends on the answer to these questions. they may rally to the defence of property menaced by rapacious creeds. they may rush to the protection of their homes threatened by avaricious wealth. even those who have already voted are liable to sudden and devastating changes of opinion. witness mitcham, willesden, and edgehill. these three seats were regarded as being amongst the safest in england, and were selected for that very reason. amongst many disquieting factors there is one which ought to be dealt with ere another election arrive. under the present system a minority of electors may usurp absolute dominion over the fortunes of this kingdom for fully five years. this is one of the freaks of the group system. the present parliamentary majority has been elected by an aggregate vote which represents something a little better than one-fourth of the total electorate and one-third of those who recorded their votes. if mitcham and edgehill are a foretaste of what is to happen at the "general," labour will be the lucky third. a similar turnover of votes in every constituency would place them easily in that position. america has brought its vast electorate under what seems to us to be a perfect discipline. but in the process it has passed through much tribulation, including the furnace of a terrible civil war. italy has been impelled to correct the working of democratic institutions by a display of force. britain may mobilise and drill its electoral forces with less trouble. but it has a socialist party, which has grown by millions within less than a decade--and is still growing. this week its most eloquent member has proposed, in the house of commons, a solemn motion for the abolition of private property. deputies chosen by four and a quarter million of british electors will vote for this proposal, and if, four years hence, they add another million and a half to their poll, they will be in a position to place that motion on the statute book. their increase between 1918 and 1922 was greater than that. footnote: [10] see the _times_, march 14, 1923. xxv political realities a few weeks ago i predicted that the comparative calm which has prevailed in the political seas of britain during the past few years was coming to an end. recent parliamentary scenes leave no doubt that the prolonged political depression is to be followed by a period of storms--it may be hurricanes. no amount of organisation or propaganda can excite real feeling in an electorate over trivial and unreal issues. why did the coalition of 1915 fall? and why did the liberal party split in 1916? who was responsible? should the general election have taken place in 1918 or 1919? ought open and declared opponents of the government of the day to have then received government support or at least government neutrality? these are questions which agitate a few who are personally interested, but they leave the nation cold. the war was real enough. but the war was supported by men of all parties, and, therefore, provoked no political controversy. the minority which opposed it was negligible, and challenged no parliamentary discussion on the question. the treaty of peace was, on the whole, accepted by all parties when it was first submitted to parliament. the leaders of the opposition parties in the lords and commons at the time of its presentation offered no serious criticism of its provisions. the legislation proposed by the coalition, although in ordinary seasons much of it would have aroused angry passions, coming as it did after the war had exhausted emotion, passed with no more than a feeble murmur of protest. take, for instance, such controversial topics as adult suffrage, the enfranchisement of women, the wholesale reductions in hours of labour, representative government in india, and notably the conferring upon ireland of a measure of home rule more complete than any proposed by gladstone. any one of these measures proposed before the war would have led to heated discussion throughout the land. the case of ireland is perhaps the most significant of the changed temper of the nation immediately after the great war. the conflict over irish home rule has now culminated in a treaty accepted by the nation as a whole and acquiesced in by the most violent amongst its opponents. but fiercer political passions were stirred up by the struggle between parties over ireland than by any political question of modern times. the causes underlying the conflict dealt with two of the most powerful motives which make the human heart throb--race and religion. there was the old feud between saxon and gael extending over at least seven centuries. it drenched the moors of ireland with the blood of both races before a keener edge was given to its hatreds by the introduction of an acute religious quarrel. after the reformation the religious differences which rent europe with fratricidal wars added fresh fury to the racial enmities which made poor ireland a cauldron of perpetual strife. when mr. gladstone proposed to settle this raging tumult by wresting supremacy from a race which had been dominant in that island for 700 years and a faith which had been supreme there for 400 years and transferring it to the race and religion which all that time had been in a condition of servitude, and when in order to attain his ends he had to secure the adhesion of men of the ruling blood and creed to his proposals, the passions raised were deeper and angrier than any witnessed in british politics for many a day. it led for the first time in the history of parliament to scenes of physical violence on the floor of the house. it shows what we may expect when there are genuine divisions of opinion which profoundly move masses of men and women in a democracy. those who recall the tropical heat of parliamentary debates in 1893 naturally regard their voyage through the frigid proceedings of the last parliament as they would a sail through arctic seas. that voyage is now over, and there are signs that the waters will soon be lashed into fury. for years political controversy between parties has been suspended in the presence of a common danger. reaction was inevitable, and the greater the suppression the more violent the rebound. that does not, however, altogether account for the visible omens of a coming struggle unprecedented in its gravity. fundamental issues have been raised of such moment to millions that they cannot be settled without a struggle that will rock society. the scene enacted in the commons a few days ago was by no means as exciting as that which some of us witnessed in 1893. but it gave me an uneasy feeling that the period of calm is definitely over, and that parliament henceforth must expect gusts and gales--and worse. emotions are once more welling up, and there are signs of a great stir coming in british politics. the cause is easily explained. the sense of exhaustion is passing away, and issues containing a serious challenge to the privileges and rights of powerful classes in the community and vital to the interests of all classes have been raised by one of the great political parties that divide britain. the momentous character of that challenge may be gathered from the terms of the motion submitted by mr. philip snowden to the judgment of the house of commons:- "that in view of the failure of the capitalist system to adequately utilise and organise natural resources and productive power, or to provide the necessary standard of life for vast numbers of the population, and believing that the cause of this failure lies in the private ownership and control of the means of production and distribution, this house declares that legislative effort should be directed to the gradual supersession of the capitalist system by an industrial and social order based on the public ownership and democratic control of the instruments of production and distribution." this motion will receive the full support of every member of the labour party. a few men outside the socialist party who have acquainted themselves with the publications of that party were quite prepared for this demand of a complete change in the organisation of society. and as they saw that party grow with startling rapidity they knew we should not have long to wait before these subversive ideas would be formulated in the house of commons. still, even for the students of socialist literature, the actual tabling of the resolution on behalf of the second largest party in the state came as a surprise and a shock. too much credit was given to the restraining influence of the trade union section of the party. sir lynden macassey, in his informing book on "labour policy, false and true," points out that it was in 1885 that the avowed advocates of this proposal for the abolition of private property and for the nationalisation of all the means of production and distribution first stood for parliament. there were only two candidates standing on this platform, and they polled 32 and 29 votes respectively. last election the aggregate socialist poll reached the imposing figure of 4,251,011 votes. the party that secured a majority of members in the house of commons only polled 5,457,871 votes. mr. ramsay macdonald states categorically that he knows that the independent liberal members--exclusive of their leaders--favour nationalisation and the capital levy. if that be an accurate statement of the views of the majority of these gentlemen, and of those who elect them, nearly one-half the british electorate are already prepared to assent to socialism by easy stages--which is the purport of mr. philip snowden's motion. on that assumption we are on the eve of greater and more fundamental changes affecting the lives of every class and condition of men and women than have yet been seen in this country. hence the new sense of struggle with which the political atmosphere is palpitating. capitalism is to be arraigned before the supreme court of the nation, condemned, sentenced, and executed by instalments--chinese fashion. the composition of that court is not to-day favourable to the prosecution. but who will be the judge after the next general election? it is customary in political controversy to state that the election which is for the moment impending will be the most epoch-making in history. without exaggeration, the next british election may well turn out to be so. the british people, with their inherited political instinct, are beginning to realise that grave decisions must then be taken. hence the greater keenness shown by the voters at by-elections--hence the new interest taken by the public in the proceedings of parliament. there is still a good deal of apathy and indifference. the average comfortable citizen is still inclined to think these socialist schemes so crazy as to be impossible. they cannot believe that 21,000,000 of sane people can possibly contemplate giving their sanction to such fantasies. there are two cardinal facts which are constantly overlooked by the complacent. the men and women who have no property for the state to seize constitute an overwhelming majority of the electors of the country. the second fact to note is the great preponderance of the industrial population over the steadier and more stolid agricultural population. america, in spite of its gigantic manufacturing and distributing industries, still retains 60 per cent. of its population on the land. the same proportion of the french and italian populations is agrarian. barely 10 per cent. of the british workers are engaged in cultivating the soil. most of our workers breathe and have their being in the crowded and excitable atmosphere of factories, workshops, and mines. the air is filled with germs of all kinds, and isolation in these thronging areas is impossible. hence the rapidity with which the fever has spread. can it be arrested? nothing will be done until the danger is visible to every eye. to vary the metaphor, no one will believe in the flood until it is upon us. trained weather prophets who forecast its coming will be laughed at or told they have a personal or party interest in ark building. it is an old tale--as old as the dawn of history. "as in the days before the flood, they were eating and drinking and knew not until the flood came and took them all away." the trouble can only be averted in two ways. one is the systematic inculcation of sound doctrines of economic truth into the minds of the working people of this country. the second, and the more important, is the rooting out of the social evils which furnish the revolutionary with striking and indisputable object-lessons of the failure of the capitalistic system as an agent of human happiness. without the latter the former effort will be futile. arguments in favour of the existing order will be refuted by glaring and painful facts. meanwhile, let the champions of that order take note of the efforts put forth by the socialists to advertise their eagerness to redress the wrongs of the ex-service men and to soften the asperities of discipline for the soldier. the socialist leaders have shrewdly taken note of the causes that produced the overthrow of their italian brethren, and they mean to take such steps as will ensure that if fascism comes in britain it will be an ally, and not a foe. _london, april 16th, 1923._ xxvi should we make peace with russia? i am frankly delighted that negotiations between lord curzon and the soviet government seem to indicate a genuine desire on the part of both parties to establish a more satisfactory understanding between this country and russia. the bolshevist episode, like all revolutionary terrors, has been at times a shrieking nightmare which has made the world shudder. it did render one supreme service to civilisation--it terrified democracy back into sanity just at the time when the nervous excitability that followed the war was bordering on mental instability. in our attitude towards the soviet government we must, however, constantly bear in mind one consideration. what matters to us is not so much the russian government as the people of russia, and for the moment the bolshevist administration represents the only medium for dealing with that mighty nation. as long as it remains the only constituted authority in russia, every act of hostility against it injures russia. as we discovered in 1919, you cannot wage war against the government for the time being of a country without devastating the land and alienating its people. you cannot refuse to trade with it now without depriving its people of commodities--and especially of equipments--essential to their well-being. it is the people, therefore, who would suffer, and it is the people who would ultimately resent that suffering. governments come and go, but the nation goes on for ever. the russian people deserve--especially at the hands of all the allied nations--every sympathetic consideration we can extend to them. not only because they have to endure the sway of a tyrannical oligarchy imposing its will by ruthless violence, but even more for the reasons that led to the establishment of that tyranny. if the fruit is bitter we must bear in mind how the tree came to be planted in the soil. it may sound like quoting ancient history to revert to the events of eight or nine years ago, but no one can understand russia, or do justice to its unhappy people, without recalling the incidents that led to the great catastrophe. those who denounce any dealings with the existing order seem to have persuaded themselves that pre-revolutionary russia was governed by a gentle and beneficent despotism which conferred the blessings of a tolerant and kindly fatherland upon a well-ruled household. in no particular is this a true picture of the _ancien régime_. the fortress of peter and paul was not erected, nor its dungeons dug, by the bolshevists. siberia was not set up as a penal settlement for political offenders for the first time--if at all--by the bolshevists. in 1906 alone 45,000 political offenders were deported to endure the severities of siberia. persecution of suspected religious leaders was not started by the soviets. to them does not belong the discredit of initiating the methods of pogromism. under the "paternal" reign of the tsars dissent from the orthodox faith was proscribed and persecuted, and the jews were hunted like vermin. let us not forget also that beyond all these circumstances the revolution was rendered inevitable by the ineptitude and corruption of the old system, and especially by the terrible suffering and humiliation which that state of things inflicted on russia in the great war. any one who has read the _memoirs of an ambassador_, by m. paléologue, will find a complete explanation in its pages of the savage hatred with which the russian revolutionaries view all those who were associated in any degree with the old order. he tells the story of how the gallant army found itself at the critical hour without ammunition, rifles, transport, and often without food. no braver or more devoted men ever fought for their country than the young peasants who made up the russian armies of 1914-15-16. with little and often no artillery support, they faced without faltering the best-equipped heavy artillery in the world. they were mown down by shell fire and machine guns by the million. their aggregate casualties up to september, 1916, even according to the reluctant admissions of the tsarist generals of the day, were five millions. in reality they were much heavier. often they went into action with sticks, as the russian war office had no rifles with which to arm them. they picked up as they advanced rifles dropped by fallen comrades. there is nothing in the war comparable to the trustful heroism of these poor peasants. we know now why there were no rifles, or shells, or wagons. the wholesale corruption of the _régime_ has been exposed to the world by irrefutable documentary evidence. here are a few extracts from m. paléologue's interesting book. one extract from his diary reads:- "the lack of ammunition means that the rôle of the artillery in battle is necessarily insignificant. the whole burden of the fighting falls on the infantry and the result is a ghastly expenditure of human life. a day or two ago one of the grand duke sergius's collaborators, colonel englehardt, said to major wehrlin, my second military attaché: 'we're paying for the crimes of our administration with the blood of our men.'" about the same date talking about the deplorable state of things, the grand duke sergius, who was inspector-general of artillery, said to the french ambassador, "when i think that this exhibition of impotence is all that our aristocratic system has to show, it makes me want to be a republican." when a grand duke talked like that early in 1915, what must a peasant soldier have thought by the spring of 1917, after many more millions of his comrades had been slaughtered as a result of the same "exhibition of impotence." it is no use pointing to the fact that our army was also short of ammunition at that date. the british army was a small army organised on the basis of a maximum expeditionary force of six divisions. the russian army was a great conscript force organised on the basis of a hundred divisions in the field. i recollect well our own military reports from the russian fronts. they provided much distressing reading. they filled you with compassion for the millions of gallant men who were the victims of corruption and stupidity in high places. i recall one statement made to our general which betrays the callous indifference with which men in authority seemed to treat the appalling sacrifice of life amongst loyal soldiers who were facing death without a murmur, because the "little father" willed it. whenever anxious inquiries were directed by our officer as to the gigantic losses in men which filled him with dismay as well as horror, the usual reply was, "don't worry yourself. thank god, of men at all events we have enough." an answer which sends a thrill of horror through you when you read it. that is why at the end of two and a half years the patient men in the field at last mutinied. that is why their parents and brothers in the fields supported them. the "little father" had failed them, and his minions had betrayed them. it is a sordid and horrid tale of peculation, maladministration, and cruel treachery. millions of british and french money went in shameless and open bribery, whilst the soldiers in the field, for need of what the money could buy, were opposing bare breasts covering brave hearts to the most terrible artillery in the world. if the rest of the money had been well spent, what was left after providing for profuse graft would still have sufficed to save that gallant army from destruction. but unhappily no real interest was taken in anything beyond the amount and the payment of the pocket-money. that seemed to be the main purpose of the transaction. nothing was well managed except the inevitable bribe. there were honourable and upright men who did their duty by their distracted and plundered country, but they were helpless in the torrent of corruption. no wonder a great russian industrialist engaged in the ministry of war, in dwelling on the sad failure of tsarism and its probable results in june, 1905, predicted a revolution with "ten years of the most frightful anarchy." "we shall," he added, "see the days of pugatchef[11] again and perhaps worse"--a striking prophecy verified with appalling accuracy. it is not pleasant to recall these dreadful episodes, which reveal the betrayal of a devotion faithful unto death. but this story is essential to the right appreciation of events. there is no savagery like that of a trustful people which finds that its trust was being imposed upon the whole time. here the retribution has been hideous in all its aspects. but the provocation was also revolting from every point of view. to judge russia fairly that must be taken into account. i think the government are, therefore, taking the right view of their responsibilities when through their foreign secretary they open negotiations with the representative of the soviet government in this country. you can easily evoke resounding cheers amongst the thoughtless by declaring melodramatically that you will never "shake hands with murder." in practice this policy has always been a failure. mr. pitt in a famous passage declined to assent to that doctrine when he was attacked for trying to open negotiations with the "assassins" of the french revolution. he was driven out of this calm and rational attitude by the inflammable rhetoric of burke, aided by the arrogance of the victorious revolutionaries. nevertheless, the sequel proved he was right. french bolshevism was not defeated by foreign armies, nor starved out by the british blockade. but it was driven into the arms of napoleon, and europe suffered bitterly for the folly of the hotheads on both sides. it would have been better for that generation had it listened to the wise counsel of william pitt. if you decline to treat with russia as long as its present rulers remain in power, then you ought to place turkey in the same category. the military junta that governed turkey has been guilty of atrocities at least as vile as any committed by the bolshevists. but at lausanne we ostentatiously stretched the friendly hand of britain to the authors of the armenian massacres. and france, italy--yes, and america also--tendered the same warm handshake. i am not criticising the offer of amity made as a condition of peace. we must make peace in the world, and you cannot do so if you put whole nations off your visiting list because of the misconduct of those who govern them. once you begin you are not quite sure where it will end. in these cases the innocent suffer the most. a refusal to trade with russia would not deprive the soviet commissaries of a single necessity or comfort of life. the communists are quite strong enough to take care of themselves. but the peasants--who are not communists--would continue to suffer, and their sufferings would increase as their reserves of clothing and other essentials became completely exhausted. and the people of this country who need the produce of russia for their own use would also suffer to a certain extent. america can afford this exalted aloofness. she does not need the russian grain and timber. she is an exporter of those commodities. but we cannot do as well without them, and we also sadly need russian flax for our linen industries, which are languishing for the want of it. last year there were quite considerable imports of russian produce into this country. this year owing to the prospects of an improved harvest these imports will be much larger. they are greatly needed here for our own consumption, and they pay for exports of machinery and textiles which the russian on his part urgently requires. but beyond and above all these material considerations, the world needs peace. in the old days conveyancing attorneys in this country kept a property transaction going by interminable requisitions on the title of the other party. they exercised all their ingenuity and invoked the added ingenuity of trained counsel to probe for defects in the right of the vendor to deal. those were leisurely days, and men could afford to dawdle. even then these exercises often ended in ruinous litigation. to-day time presses and the atmosphere is dangerous for the plying of irritating interrogatories. it is time we made up our minds that the soviets have come to stay, whether we like it or no, and that one or other of the formidable men who rule russia to-day are likely to rule it for some time to come. the sooner we have the courage to recognise this fact, the sooner will real peace be established. footnote: [11] pugatchef was the pretender who led a revolt of the peasants in the reign of catherine and spread rapine and carnage through the provinces bordering the volga and ural. xxvii palestine and the jews "what's his reason? i am a jew." _the merchant of venice._ of all the bigotries that savage the human temper there is none so stupid as the anti-semitic. it has no basis in reason; it is not rooted in faith; it aspires to no ideal; it is just one of those dank and unwholesome weeds that grow in the morass of racial hatred. how utterly devoid of reason it is may be gathered from the fact that it is almost entirely confined to nations who worship jewish prophets and apostles, revere the national literature of the hebrews as the only inspired message delivered by the deity to mankind, and whose only hope of salvation rests on the precepts and promises of the great teachers of judah. yet in the sight of these fanatics the jews of to-day can do nothing right. if they are rich they are birds of prey. if they are poor they are vermin. if they are in favour of a war it is because they want to exploit the bloody feuds of the gentiles to their own profit. if they are anxious for peace they are either instinctive cowards or traitors. if they give generously--and there are no more liberal givers than the jews--they are doing it for some selfish purpose of their own. if they do not give--then what could one expect of a jew but avarice? if labour is oppressed by great capital, the greed of the jew is held responsible. if labour revolts against capital--as it did in russia--the jew is blamed for that also. if he lives in a strange land he must be persecuted and pogrommed out of it. if he wants to go back to his own he must be prevented. through the centuries in every land, whatever he does, or intends, or fails to do, he has been pursued by the echo of the brutal cry of the rabble of jerusalem against the greatest of all jews--"crucify him!" no good has ever come of nations that crucified jews. it is poor and pusillanimous sport, lacking all the true qualities of manliness, and those who indulge in it would be the first to run away were there any element of danger in it. jew-baiters are generally of the type that found good reasons for evading military service when their own country was in danger. the latest exhibition of this wretched indulgence is the agitation against settling poor jews in the land their fathers made famous. palestine under jewish rule once maintained a population of 5,000,000. under the blighting rule of the turk it barely supported a population of 700,000. the land flowing with milk and honey is now largely a stony and unsightly desert. to quote one of the ablest and most far-sighted business men of to-day, "it is a land of immense possibilities, in spite of the terrible neglect of its resources resulting from turkish misrule. it is a glorious estate let down by centuries of neglect. the turks cut down the forests and never troubled to replant them. they slaughtered the cattle and never troubled to replace them." it is one of the peculiarities of the jew-hunter that he adores the turk. if palestine is to be restored to a condition even approximate to its ancient prosperity, it must be by settling jews on its soil. the condition to which the land has been reduced by centuries of the most devastating oppression in the world is such that restoration is only possible by a race that is prepared for sentimental reasons to make and endure sacrifices for the purpose. what is the history of the jewish settlement in palestine? it did not begin with the balfour declaration. a century ago there were barely 10,000 jews in the whole of palestine. before the war there were 100,000. the war considerably reduced these numbers, and immigration since 1918 has barely filled up the gaps. at the present timorous rate of progress it will be many years before it reaches 200,000. jewish settlement started practically seventy years ago, with sir moses montefiore's experiment in 1854--another war year. the sultan had good reasons for propitiating the jews in that year, as the allies had in 1917. so the jewish resettlement of palestine began. from that day onward it has proceeded slowly but steadily. the land available was not of the best. prejudices and fears had to be negotiated. anything in the nature of wholesale expropriation of arab cultivators, even for cash, had to be carefully avoided. the jews were, therefore, often driven to settle on barren sand dunes and malarial swamps. the result can best be given by quoting from an article written by mrs. fawcett, the famous woman leader. she visited palestine in 1921 and again in 1922, and this is her account of the jewish settlements: "so far from the colonies and the colonists draining the country of its resources they have created resources which were previously non-existent; they have planted and skilfully cultivated desert sands and converted them into fruitful vineyards and orange and lemon orchards; in other parts they have created valuable agricultural land out of what were previously dismal swamps producing nothing but malaria and other diseases. the colonists have not shrunk from the tremendous work and the heavy sacrifices required. many of the early arrivals laid down their lives over their work; the survivors went on bravely, draining the swamps, planting eucalyptus trees by the hundred thousand so that at length the swamp became a fruitful garden, and the desert once more blossomed like the rose." everywhere the jew cultivator produces heavier and richer crops than his arab neighbour. he has introduced into palestine more scientific methods of cultivation, and his example is producing a beneficent effect on the crude tillage of the arab peasant. it will be long ere canaan becomes once more a land flowing with milk and honey. the effects of the neglect and misrule of centuries cannot be effaced by the issue of a declaration. the cutting down of the trees has left the soil unprotected against the heavy rains and the rocks which were once green with vineyards and olive groves have been swept bare. the terraces which ages of patient industry built up have been destroyed by a few generations of turkish stupidity. they cannot be restored in a single generation. great irrigation works must be constructed if settlement is to proceed on a satisfactory scale. palestine possesses in some respects advantages for the modern settler which to its ancient inhabitants were a detriment. its one great river and its tributaries are rapid and have a great fall. for power this is admirable. whether for irrigation, or for the setting up of new industries, this gift of nature to palestine is capable of exploitation only made possible by the scientific discoveries of the last century. the tableland of judea has a rainfall which if caught in reservoirs at appropriate centres would make of the "desert of judea" a garden. if this be done arab and jew alike share in the prosperity. there are few countries on earth which have made less of their possibilities. take its special attractions for the tourist. i was amazed to find that the visitors to palestine in the whole course of a year only aggregate 15,000. it contains the most famous shrines in the world. its history is of more absorbing interest to the richest peoples on earth, and is better taught to their children, than even that of their own country. some of its smallest villages are better known to countless millions than many a prosperous modern city. hundreds of thousands ought to be treading this sacred ground every year. why are they not doing so? the answer is: turkish misrule scared away the pilgrim. those who went there came back disillusioned and disappointed. the modern "spies" on their return did not carry with them the luscious grapes of escol to thrill the multitude with a desire to follow their example. they brought home depressing tales of squalor, discomfort, and exaction which dispelled the glamour and discouraged further pilgrimages. settled government gives the holy land its first chance for 1900 years. but there is so much undeveloped country demanding the attention of civilisation that palestine will lose that chance unless it is made the special charge of some powerful influence. the jews alone can redeem it from the wilderness and restore its ancient glory. in that trust there is no injustice to any other race. the arabs have neither the means, the energy, nor the ambition to discharge this duty. the british empire has too many burdens on its shoulders to carry this experiment through successfully. the jewish race with its genius, its resourcefulness, its tenacity, and not least its wealth, can alone perform this essential task. the balfour declaration is not an expropriating but an enabling clause. it is only a charter of equality for the jews. here are its terms: "his majesty's government view with favour the establishment in palestine of a national home for the jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-jewish communities in palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by jews in any other country." the declaration was subsequently endorsed and adopted by president wilson and the french and italian foreign ministers. the zionists ask for no more. it has been suggested by their enemies that they are seeking to establish a jewish oligarchy in palestine that will reduce the arab inhabitant to a condition of servitude to a favoured hebrew minority. the best answer to that charge is to be found in the memorandum submitted by the zionist association to the league of nations. "the jews demand no privilege, unless it be the privilege of rebuilding by their own efforts and sacrifices a land which, once the seat of a thriving and productive civilisation, has long been suffered to remain derelict. they expect no favoured treatment in the matter of political or religious rights. they assume, as a matter of course, that all the inhabitants of palestine, be they jews or non-jews, will be in every respect on a footing of perfect equality. they seek no share in the government beyond that to which they may be entitled under the constitution as citizens of the country. they solicit no favours. they ask, in short, no more than an assured opportunity of peacefully building up their national home by their own exertions and of succeeding on their merits." it is a modest request which these exiles from zion propound to the nations. and surely it is just that it should be conceded, and if conceded then carried out in the way men of honour fulfil their bond. there are fourteen millions of jews in the world. they belong to a race which for at least 1900 years has been subjected to proscription, pillage, massacre, and the torments of endless derision--a race that has endured persecution, which for the variety of torture, physical, material and mental, inflicted on its victims, for the virulence and malignity with which it has been sustained, for the length of time it has lasted, and more than all for the fortitude and patience with which it has been suffered, is without parallel in the history of any other people. is it too much to ask that those amongst them whose sufferings are the worst shall be able to find refuge in the land their fathers made holy by the splendour of their genius, by the loftiness of their thoughts, by the consecration of their lives, and by the inspiration of their message to mankind? xxviii the treaty of lausanne[12] the vanquished have returned to their spiritual home at angora throwing their fezzes in the air. the victors have returned with their tails well between their legs. all tragedies have their scenes of comedy, and the lausanne conference is one of those amusing episodes interpolated by fate to relieve the poignancy of one of its greatest tragic pieces--the turk and civilisation. the turk may be a bad ruler, but he is the prince of anglers. the cunning and the patience with which he lands the most refractory fish once he has hooked it is beyond compare. what inimitable play we have witnessed for six months on the shores of lake leman! once the fish seemed to have broken the tackle--that was when the first conference came to an abrupt end. it simply meant, however, that the wily oriental was giving out plenty of line. time never worries him, he can sit and wait. he knew the moment would come when they would return with the hook well in their gullets, and the play begin once more--the reeling in and the reeling out, the line sometimes taut and strained but never snapping. time and patience rewarded him. at last the huge tarpon are all lying beached on the banks--britain, france, italy, and the united states of america--high and dry, landed and helpless, without a swish left in their tails, glistening and gasping in the summer sun. it is little wonder that ismet had a smile on his face when all was over. reports from angora state that the peace is hailed there as a great turkish triumph; and so it is. the turk is truly a great fisherman. if he could govern as well as he angles, his would be the most formidable empire in the world. unfortunately he is the worst of rulers, hence the trouble--his own and that of those who unhappily have drawn him as governor in the lottery of life. the able correspondent of the _daily telegraph_ at the lausanne conference has supplied us from time to time with vivid pen pictures of the four greatest powers of the world struggling in the toils of the squalid and broken remains of an empire with an aggregate population equal to that of a couple of english counties that i could name. this is what he wrote about this conference, which constitutes one of the most humiliating incidents in the history of western civilisation:- "the records of the present conference present an even more marvellous series of concessions and surrenders. what was frayed before is threadbare now. the allies have whittled away their own rights with a lavish hand in the cause of peace. they have also--and this is a graver matter, for which it seems they will have to give an account in the not distant future--gone back on their promises to small races, which are none the less promises because the small races have not the power to enforce their performance. the figure that the european delegates are cutting in lausanne, and the agents of the _concessionnaires_ in angora--all alike representatives of the west--has been rendered undignified as much by the manner as the matter of their worsting." since those distressing words were written the powers have sunk yet deeper into the slough of humiliation. _the times_ correspondent wiring after the agreement writes in a strain of deep indignation at the blow inflicted on the prestige of the west by this extraordinary treaty. in order to gauge the extent of the disaster to civilisation which this treaty implies it is only necessary to give a short summary of the war aims of the allies in turkey. they were stated by mr. asquith with his usual succinctness and clarity in a speech which he delivered when prime minister at the guildhall on november 9th, 1914:- "it is not the turkish people--it is the ottoman government that has drawn the sword, and which, i venture to predict, will perish by the sword. it is they and not we who have rung the death-knell of ottoman dominion, not only in europe but in asia. with their disappearance will disappear as i, at least, hope and believe, the blight which for generations past has withered some of the fairest regions of the earth." in pursuance of the policy thus declared by the british premier on behalf of the allies a series of agreements was entered into in the early months of 1915 between france, russia, and ourselves, by which the greater part of turkey, with its conglomerate population, was to be partitioned at the end of the war. cilicia and syria were allocated to france; mesopotamia to britain; armenia and constantinople to russia. palestine was to be placed under the joint control of britain and france. arabia was to be declared independent and a territory carved largely out of the desert--but including some famous cities of the east, damascus, homs and aleppo--was to be constituted into a new arab state, partly under the protection of france and partly of britain. smyrna and its precincts were to be allotted to greece if she joined her forces with those of the allies in the war. the straits were to be demilitarised and garrisoned. when italy came into the war later on in 1915, it was stipulated that in the event of the partition of turkey being carried out in pursuance of these agreements, territories in southern anatolia should be assigned to italy for development. what was the justification for breaking up the turkish empire? the portions to be cut out of turkey have a population the majority of which is non-turkish. cilicia and southern anatolia might constitute a possible exception. in these territories massacres and misgovernment had perhaps succeeded at last in turning the balance in favour of the turk. but in the main the distributed regions were being cultivated and developed before the war by a population which was western and not turanian in its origin and outlook. this population represented the original inhabitants of the soil. the experiences, more especially of the past century, had demonstrated clearly that the turk could no longer be entrusted with the property, the honour, or the lives of any christian race within his dominions. whole communities of armenians had been massacred under circumstances of the most appalling cruelty in lands which their ancestors had occupied since the dawn of history. and even after the war began 700,000 of these wretched people had been done to death by these savages, to whom, it must be remembered, the great powers so ostentatiously proffered the hand of friendship at the first lausanne conference. even while the conference was in session, and the handshaking was going on, the turks were torturing to death scores of thousands of young greeks whom they deported into the interior. as "a precautionary measure" 150,000 greeks of military age, of whom 30,000 were military prisoners, were last year driven inland to the mountains of anatolia. on the way they were stripped of their clothes, and in this condition were herded across the icy mountains. it is not surprising that when an agreement was arrived at for the exchange of military prisoners, the turks found the greatest difficulty in producing 11,000, and of the total 150,000 it is estimated that two-thirds perished. the allied powers had every good reason for determining, as they hoped for all time, that this barbarian should cease to shock the world by repeated exhibitions of savagery against helpless and unarmed people committed to his charge by a cruel fate. apart from these atrocities the fact that great tracts of country, once the most fertile and populous in the world, have been reduced by turkish misrule and neglect to a condition which is indistinguishable from the wilderness, alone proves that the turk is a blight and a curse wherever he pitches his tent, and that he ought in the interests of humanity to be treated as such. when a race, which has no title to its lands other than conquest, so mismanages the territories it holds by violence as to deprive the world of an essential contribution to its well-being, the nations have a right--nay, a duty--to intervene in order to restore these devastated areas to civilisation. this same duty constitutes the reason and justification for the white settlers of america overriding the prior claims of the indian to the prairies and forests of the great west. on the shores of the mediterranean are two races with a surplus population of hard-working, intelligent cultivators, both of them belonging to countries which had themselves in the past been responsible for the government of the doomed lands covered by the turkish empire. greece and italy could claim that under their rule this vast territory throve and prospered mightily. they now pour their overflow of population into lands far away from the motherland. yet they are essentially mediterranean peoples. the history of the mediterranean will for ever be associated with their achievements on its shores and its waters. the derelict wastes of asia minor need them. valleys formerly crowded with tillers are now practically abandoned to the desert weeds. irrigation has been destroyed or neglected. the italian engineers are amongst the best in the world, and once they were introduced into asia minor would make cultivation again possible. there is plenty of scope in the deserts of anatolia for both italian and greek. i was hoping for a peace that would set them both working. had such a settlement been attained, a generation hence would have witnessed gardens thronging with happy men, women, and children, where now you have a wilderness across which men, women, and children are periodically hunted down into nameless horror. yet another reason for the allied decision was the bitter resentment that existed at the ingratitude displayed by the turk towards britain and france. they were naturally indignant that he should have joined their foes and slammed the gate of the dardanelles in their face, and by that means complicated and prolonged their campaign and added enormously to their burdens, their losses, and their dangers. but he had not the thankfulness even of the beast of prey in the legend towards the man who had cured his wounded limb. france and britain had many a time extracted the thorn from the turkish paw when he was limping along in impotent misery. they had done more. they had often saved the life of that empire when the russian bear was on the point of crushing it out of existence; and yet without provocation, without even a quarrel, he had betrayed them to their enemies. i have set out shortly what the war policy of the allies was in reference to turkey. the treaty of sèvres considerably modified that policy in many vital aspects. by that treaty, constantinople, cilicia, and southern anatolia were left to the turk; armenia was created into an independent state. there were many objections which could be raised to the original proposals of 1915, as it might be argued that they contemplated handing over in cilicia and southern anatolia populations which in the main were turkish and moslem to christian rulers. but in substance the modified plan of sèvres was sound, and if carried out would have conduced to the well-being of the millions to be liberated by its terms for ever from turkish rule. the world at large also would have benefited by the opportunity afforded to the industrious and intelligent armenian and greek populations of turkey to renew the fertility of this land, once so bountiful in its gifts, thus enriching man's store of good things. the barbarian invasion which withered that fertility was pushed back into the interior by the treaty of sèvres. the treaty of lausanne has extended and perpetuated its sway from the black sea to the mediterranean. i have explained the why and wherefore of sèvres. but why lausanne? it is a long and painful story--a compound of shortsightedness, disloyalty, selfishness, and pusillanimity amongst nations and their statesmen. and more than all, fate happened to be in its grimmest mood when dealing with this problem. the russian revolution eliminated that great country from the solution of the problem on the lines of protection for the oppressed races of turkey, and instead cast its might on the side of the oppressor. president wilson was inclined to recommend that the united states of america should undertake the mandate for the armenians. had he succeeded, what a different story would now have been told! what a different story the generations to come would also tell! but his health broke down at the vital moment and america would have none of his humanitarian schemes. then came the departure of sonnino from the quirinal. with him went for a momentous while the old dreams of italian colonisation, which in the past had done so much to spread civilisation in three continents. his successors were homelier men. i have still my doubts as to whether they served italy best by the less adventurous and more domesticated policy they pursued. the future may decide that issue. but whatever the decision, the time for action passed away, and unless and until there is another break up in turkey, the chance italy has lost since 1919 will not be recovered. will it ever come back? there followed the french check in cilicia, and the negotiations at angora with mustapha kemal, which were both single-handed and under-handed; for the allies were not even informed of what was going on. this was a fatal step, for it broke up the unity which alone would enable the western powers to deal effectively with the turk. this unity was never fully re-created. there can be no reunion without confidence. there can be no trust in the west that is broken in the east. much of the recent mischief in the entente came from the clandestine negotiations at angora. the last fatal change was the greek revolt against venizelos. it is often said that he is the greatest statesman thrown up by that race since pericles. in all he has undertaken he has never failed his people. disaster has always come to them when they refused to follow his guidance. when king alexander was killed by a monkey, the greeks were called upon to decide between constantine and venizelos. their choice was ruinous to their country. no greater evil can befall a nation than to choose for its ruler a stubborn man with no common sense. before the advent of constantine, greece, with no aid and little countenance from the powers, was able to hold the forces of mustapha kemal easily at bay and even to drive him back into the fastnesses of anatolia. in encounter after encounter the greek army, led by men chosen for their military gifts and sufficiently well equipped, inflicted defeat after defeat on the armies of angora. but with constantine came a change. in the greek army, courtiers were substituted for soldiers in the high command. french, british and italian public opinion, with the memory of constantine's treachery during the war still fresh in their minds, altered their attitude towards the greeks who had elevated him to the throne in defiance of allied sentiment. indifferent powers became hostile; hostile powers became active. the final catastrophe began with the heroic but foolish march of the greek army into the defiles of asia minor, followed by the inevitable retreat. it was consummated when constantine for dynastic reasons appointed to the command of the troops in asia minor a crazy general whose mental condition had been under medical review. the greeks fight valiantly when well led, but like the french, once they know they are not well led, confidence goes, and with confidence courage. before the kemalist attack reached their lines the greek army was beaten and in full retreat. with attack came panic, with panic the complete destruction of what was once a fine army. with the disappearance of that army vanished the last hope for the salvation of anatolia. that the history of the east, and probably the west, should have been changed by the bite of a monkey is just another grimace of the comic spirit which bursts now and again into the pages of every great tragedy. all that could be done afterwards was to save the remnants of a great policy. western civilisation put up its last fight against the return of savagery into europe, when in september and october of last year british soldiers and sailors, deserted by allies and associates alike, saved constantinople from hideous carnage. the pact of mudania was not sèvres, but it certainly was better than lausanne. from sèvres to mudania was a retreat. from mudania to lausanne is a rout. what next? lausanne is not a terminus, it is only a milestone. where is the next? no one claims that this treaty is peace with honour. it is not even peace. if one were dealing with a regenerated turk, there might be hope. but the burning of smyrna, and the cold-blooded murders of tens of thousands of young greeks in the interior, prove that the turk is still unchanged. to quote again from the correspondent of _the times_ at lausanne:- "all such evidence as can be obtained here confirms the belief that the new turk is but the old, and that the coming era of enlightenment and brotherly love in turkey, for which it is the correct thing officially to hope, will be from the foreigners' point of view at best a humiliating, and at worst a bloody, chaos." the amazing legend that the turk is a gentleman is dying hard. that legend has saved him many a time when he was on the brink of destruction. it came to his aid in october last when the policy of this country was changed by the revolt of the turcophile against the coalition. the turk has massacred hundreds of thousands of armenians, and dishonoured myriads of christian women who trusted to his protection. nevertheless the turk is a gentleman! by his indolence, his shiftiness, his stupidity, and his wantonness, he has reduced a garden to a desert. what better proof can there be that he is a real gentleman? for a german bribe he sold the friends who had repeatedly saved his wretched life. all the same, what a gentleman he is! he treated british prisoners with a barbarous neglect that killed them off in hundreds. still, he is such a gentleman! he plunders, he slays, and outrages those who are unable to defend themselves. he misgoverns, cheats, lies, and betrays. for all that, the turk is a gentleman! so an agitation was engineered with perverse tenacity to save this fine old oriental gentleman from the plebeian hands that sought his destruction. hence the black treaty of lausanne. _london, july 25th, 1923_ footnote: [12] london, july 25th, 1923. the treaty of lausanne, between the allies and the turks, was signed on july 24th, 1923. xxix the signing of the irish treaty when a few days ago i was half-way through the speech i delivered in the house of commons on the land system the faithful commons were summoned in the manner consecrated by centuries of tradition to the bar of the house of lords to hear the royal assent being given to the bill for the constitution of the irish free state. notwithstanding a natural preoccupation with my interrupted speech two scenes came to my mind during my short journey to and from the upper chamber. the first was the spectacle of a crowded house of commons nearly thirty years ago. when the doors were opened for prayers there was the unwonted sight of a throng of hustling m.p.'s pressing through the swing doors to secure seats. i need hardly say this was not the symptom or the outcome of any religious revival amongst our legislators. it was entirely due to the ancient custom that confers upon a member occupying a seat at prayers the unchallengeable right to that seat for the rest of the sitting. rows of chairs were arrayed on the floor of the house. that was an innovation never since followed. what was it all about? there sat in the middle of the treasury bench huddled up and almost hidden by more stalwart and upright figures an old man of 83 years, to all appearances in the last stage of physical decrepitude and mental lassitude. his name was william ewart gladstone, the greatest parliamentary gladiator of all time. the lifelong champion of oppressed nationalities was to-day to inaugurate his final effort to give freedom to the irish race trodden for centuries by ruthless force. the last remnant of his strength was to be consecrated to the achievement of irish liberty, and hundreds of eager legislators to whom peel and russell, palmerston and disraeli were but historical names, were avid competitors for seats from which they could better listen to a man who had sat in governments with the first three and crossed swords with the fourth. it was a memorable sight. the preliminary questions which precede all parliamentary business were by common consent postponed, and a deep and solemn silence thrilling with expectancy fell upon the humming assembly as mr. speaker peel in his sonorous voice called out "the prime minister." the inert heap which was the centre of all gaze sprang to the table an erect and alert figure. the decrepitude was cast off like a cloak--the lassitude vanished as by a magician's wand, the shoulders were thrown back, the chest was thrown forward, and in deep, ringing tones full of music and force the proposed new irish charter was expounded for three unwearying hours by the transfigured octogenarian rejuvenated by the magic of an inspired soul. i had a seat just opposite the great orator. i was one of the multitude who on that occasion listened with marvel to that feat of intellectual command and physical endurance. it was more than that. it was an unrivalled display of moral courage, rare in political conflict. mr. gladstone had only just emerged out of a general election where, in spite of six years of his eloquent advocacy, the voice of great britain had declared emphatically against his irish policy, and the poor parliamentary majority at his back was made up out of the preponderating irish vote in favour of home rule. he was confronted with the most formidable parliamentary opposition ever ranged against a minister, redoubtable in debating quality, still more redoubtable in its hold on british pride. he was eighty-three years of age, but he never quailed, and through the sultry summer months of 1893 he fought night by night with mighty strokes the battle of irish emancipation. he did not live to carry the cause through to victory, but he planted the banner so firmly in the soil that no assault could succeed in tearing it down, and on the day when i stood with mr. bonar law at the bar of the house of lords i saw this banner flourished in triumph from the steps of the throne by a unionist lord chancellor. that was the first memory that flashed through my brain. the next was of a dreary december night just one year ago when on one side of the cabinet table in 10 downing street sat four representatives of great britain and on the other five irish leaders. it was the famous room wherein british cabinets have for generations forged their irish policies. coercion and concession alike issued from that chamber. pitt's act of union was discussed there, and so were gladstone's home rule bills, the decision to use british soldiers to throw irish tenants out of their houses with battering ram and torch and equally the bill which made every irish tenant lord and master of his home at the expense of the british treasury--all issued forth from this simple and unadorned council chamber. and now came the final treaty of peace. would it be signed? it was an anxious moment charged with destiny for the two great races who confronted each other at that green table. the british representatives who were associated with me on the occasion were mr. austen chamberlain; [i recall now how he sat by the side of his doughty father, mr. joseph chamberlain, in 1893, during the famous nightly duel between him and mr. gladstone. how strangely little thirty arduous years have changed his personal appearance!] lord birkenhead, who, in 1893 was carving for himself a brilliant career as a student at oxford and as a debater in the union; mr. winston churchill who was then a cadet at sandhurst whilst his father was engaged in the last great parliamentary struggle of his dazzling but tragic career; sir gordon hewart, now lord hewart, the man who has risen on the pinions of a powerful intelligence to the height of lord chief justice of england. my recollection is that the other two british delegates--sir laming worthington-evans and sir hamar greenwood--were stricken with illness and were unable to be present. after weeks of close investigation the climax of decision had been reached. britain had gone to the limit of concession. no british statesman could have faced any assembly of his countrymen had he appended his signature to a convention that placed ireland outside that fraternity of free nations known as the british empire or freed her from that bond of union which is represented by a common fealty to the sovereign. it is not easy to interpret the potency of this invisible bond to those who are brought up to venerate other systems. it is nevertheless invincible. would the irish leaders have the courage to make peace on the only conditions under which peace was attainable--liberty within the empire? opposite me sat a dark, short, but sturdy figure with the face of a thinker. that was mr. arthur griffith, the most un-irish leader that ever led ireland, quiet to the point of gentleness, reserved almost to the point of appearing saturnine. a man of laconic utterance, he answered in monosyllables where most men would have considered an oratorical deliverance to be demanded by the dignity of the occasion. but we found in our few weeks' acquaintance that his yea was yea and his nay meant nay. he led the irish deputation. he was asked whether he would sign. in his abrupt, staccato manner he replied, "speaking on my own behalf i mean to sign." by his side sat a handsome young irishman. no one could mistake his nationality. he was irish through and through, in every respect a contrast to his taciturn neighbour. vivacious, buoyant, highly strung, gay, impulsive, but passing readily from gaiety to grimness and back again to gaiety, full of fascination and charm--but also of dangerous fire. that was michael collins, one of the most courageous leaders ever produced by a valiant race. nevertheless he hesitated painfully when the quiet and gentle little figure on his left had taken his resolve. both saw the shadow of doom clouding over that fateful paper--their own doom. they knew that the pen which affixed their signature at the same moment signed their death-warrant. the little man saw beyond his own fall ireland rising out of her troubles a free nation and that sufficed for him. michael collins was not appalled by the spectre of death, but he had the irishman's fear of encountering that charge which comes so readily to the lips of the oppressed--that of having succumbed to alien wile and betrayed their country. patriots who cheerfully face the tyrant's steel lose their nerve before that dread accusation. it was the first time michael collins ever showed fear. it was also the last. i knew the reason why he halted, although he never uttered a word which revealed his mind, and i addressed my appeal to an effort to demonstrate how the treaty gave ireland more than daniel o'connell and parnell had ever hoped for, and how his countrymen would be ever grateful to him not only for the courage which won such an offer, but for the wisdom that accepted it. he asked for a few hours to consider, promising a reply by nine o'clock. nine passed, but the irish leaders did not return. ten. eleven, and they were not yet back. we had doubts as to whether we should see them again. then came a message from the secretary of the irish delegation that they were on their way to downing street. when they marched in it was clear from their faces that they had come to a great decision after a prolonged struggle. but there were still difficulties to overcome--they were, however, difficulties not of principle but of detail. these were discussed in a businesslike way, and soon after one o'clock in the morning the treaty was complete. a friendly chat full of cheerful goodwill occupied the time whilst the stenographers were engaged in copying the draft so disfigured with the corrections, interpolations and additions, each of which represented so many hours of hammering discussion. outside in the lobby sat a man who had used all the resources of an ingenious and well-trained mind backed by a tenacious will to wreck every endeavour to reach agreement--mr. erskine childers, a man whose slight figure, whose kindly, refined and intellectual countenance, whose calm and courteous demeanour offered no clue to the fierce passions which raged inside his breast. at every crucial point in the negotiations he played a sinister part. he was clearly mr. de valera's emissary, and faithfully did he fulfil the trust reposed in him by that visionary. every draft that emanated from his pen--and all the first drafts were written by him--challenged every fundamental position to which the british delegates were irrevocably committed. he was one of those men who by temperament are incapable of compromise. brave and resolute he undoubtedly was, but unhappily for himself he was also rigid and fanatical. when we walked out of the room where we had sat for hours together, worn with tense and anxious labour, but all happy that our great task of reconciliation had been achieved, we met mr. erskine childers outside sullen with disappointment and compressed wrath at what he conceived to be the surrender of principles he had fought for. i never saw him after that morning. michael collins and arthur griffith i met repeatedly after the signature of the treaty, to discuss the many obstacles that surged up in the way of its execution, and i acquired for both a great affection. poor collins was shot by one of his own countrymen on a bleak irish roadside, whilst he was engaged in restoring to the country he had loved so well the order and good government which alone enables nations to enjoy the blessings of freedom. arthur griffith died worn out by anxiety and toil in the cause he had done so much to carry to the summit of victory. erskine childers was shot at dawn for rebellion against the liberties he had helped to win. truly the path of irish freedom right up to the goal is paved with tragedy. but the bloodstained wilderness is almost through, the verdant plains of freedom are stretched before the eyes of this tortured nation. ireland will soon honour the name of the green isle, and i am proud to have had a hand in erecting the pillar which will for ever mark the boundary between the squalor of the past and the hope of the future. _london, december 16th, 1922._ xxx prohibition four years ago the united states of america, by a two-thirds majority, voted prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquors. the british house of commons have just voted down a bill for the same purpose by a majority of 236 to 14. america treats prohibition as one of its greatest moral triumphs. britain treats it as a joke. what accounts for this remarkable disparity in the attitude of the two great english-speaking communities towards one of the most baffling and elusive problems civilisation has to deal with? it cannot be a fundamental difference in temperament or in moral outlook. the men who engineered prohibition in america are of our own race and kind, bred in the puritan traditions that came originally from our shores. if the evils of excessive drinking had been more apparent in america than in britain i could understand the states of the union deciding to take more drastic action than has been thought necessary in our country. but the facts are exactly the reverse. the consumption of alcohol in the united kingdom some years before the war per head of the population was higher than that of the united states. the poverty, disease, and squalor caused by alcohol was much greater in britain than in america. what, then, accounts for the readiness of america to forbid the sale and the reluctance of britain even seriously to restrict it? i would not care to dogmatise on the subject, but i will hazard two or three possible explanations. i set aside the suggestion that property owners are frightened by the sequel to prohibition in russia. i have heard it argued that the prohibition ukase of the tsar was responsible for the russian revolution. that is probably true, for a people stupefied by alcohol will stand anything. the inefficiency and corruption of the tsarist régime was so appalling that no sober nation could have tolerated it without rebellion for a single year, and when the fumes of vodka ceased to muddle and blind the _moujik_, he rebelled against the autocracy that had betrayed his country into disaster. the russian experiment in drink, therefore, contains no warning against prohibition, except a very limited one, that those who wish to misrule a country in safety must first of all drench it with alcohol. there is, of course, the ready explanation that old countries are very conservative, and do not take kindly to change. their joints are stiff with age, and they creak along well-worn paths slowly and painfully, but they lack the suppleness of limb that tempts younger communities to sprint across untrodden country. that is the argument. i am afraid this explanation will not hold. old countries when thoroughly moved can leap like the hart. the french revolution demonstrated how vigorously one of the oldest nations of europe could tear along unbroken tracks when impelled by a new passion. and i saw britain spring to arms in 1914, when five millions of men joined the colours without the lash of compulsion to stir their blood. england renewed her youth, and her movements had the energy, the audacity, and the endurance of a people untired by a march of centuries. this people, if stirred by a call which reaches its heart or conscience, is capable of action as bold as that which wrested magna charta out of a despot in the twelfth century, overthrew an ancient religion in the fifteenth century, led a king to the scaffold in the seventeenth century, or challenged the greatest military empires in the world in the sixteenth, the nineteenth, and the twentieth centuries. and if they were convinced that the liquor traffic must be destroyed, they would execute it with as little compunction or hesitation as they displayed in suppressing the mass or in decapitating charles i. at the present moment the british people are not in the least persuaded that the evils of alcohol for a minority of the population cannot be dealt with effectively without resorting to the very drastic expedient of forbidding its consumption by the majority who use it in moderation. are they likely to be convinced? that depends on the failure or success of all other expedients to exterminate the evil of alcoholism. that brings me to another explanation. america reached prohibition by the path of experiment. the federal system lent itself to the trial of every form of remedy, including prohibition. for well over half a century you have had almost every form of temperance expedient ever suggested in actual working in some state or other of the american republic. when i was a lad i heard debates and addresses in welsh about the comparative merits of the "maine law" and high license. high license, reduction of licenses, local option, prohibition, have all been tried. they have all been in operation quite long enough to enable the american public to form a judgment on their merits. statistical results over long periods constitute a reliable basis for inference. american federalism furnished the opportunity, and the states took full advantage of it. hence the prohibition law. to the practical man the figures in the prohibition states looked attractive from a business point of view. he hesitated, but the moral wave that swept over america carried him over the bar. but without the experience at his door i doubt whether the american business man would have assented to prohibition. the british constitution does not lend itself to these valuable experiments. otherwise, london might have tried one experiment, lancashire another, yorkshire a third, scotland a fourth, and wales a fifth. the whole legislative power of the united kingdom was until quite recently vested in the imperial parliament. ireland has now a legislature of its own. in theory, what suited one part of the kingdom must do for the whole, and what did not suit the more populous parts could not be permitted to others. as far as scotland, ireland, and wales are concerned, there was in practice a certain relaxation of this rule. but as far as the liquor laws went, any serious alteration in any part of the kingdom was difficult to secure if it offended the prejudices or damaged the interests of the rest. it took years to get it through parliament even in a mutilated condition. there was no real freedom of experiment. the scottish local veto act is a compromise modified to suit english sentiment. even as it is, it took thirty years of scottish insistence to carry. wales has been unable to secure local option, although it has been demanded by four-fifths of its representatives for over a generation. we have, therefore, in this country been denied the practical experience which has guided america to so dramatic a conclusion. in the absence of such experience it has been found impossible to educate and organise public opinion throughout britain to the point of concentrating attention and pressure on this one issue. other issues always cut across and jam the current. you cannot secure unanimity of action on temperance reform even amongst the religious forces. if they were united in their demand, and prepared to enforce it at elections, nothing could resist their power. between elections they seem agreed in their policy; but no sooner does the party bugle sound than they all fall into rank in opposite armies, and the temperance banner is hurriedly packed into the cupboard for use after the polls have been declared. it is then once more brought out to wave over the tabernacle, and its wrinkles are straightened out in the breeze. i have seen the fiercest champions of local option supporting brewers at elections because they were the official opponents of irish home rule in the contest. i remember being told by an eminent scottish divine, who was a strong temperance advocate, but who had hitherto supported anti-temperance candidates because of his inveterate opposition to gladstone's home rule, that, unless his party carried a measure of local option for scotland soon, he would have to abandon them, home rule or no home rule. he died without redeeming his promise. the time never came for him. the irish issue dominated elections for nearly a generation. free trade played a great part also. if the exigencies of party conflict had permitted the same consistent propaganda work, extending over the same number of years, to be devoted to the drink problem as was given to the wrongs of ireland or free trade, no doubt public opinion could have been educated up to the point of supporting drastic reform. but this has not been found practicable by political parties owing to the distraction of other issues. this is the main reason why british opinion is so far behind american opinion on the temperance question. in america the battle of sobriety was fought on the state platform, whilst the national platform was left free for other conflicts. the war, however, enabled the british government to effect reforms which have materially reduced the consumption of alcohol in this kingdom. these results have been achieved by an enormous increase in the taxation of alcoholic liquors, and by a considerable reduction in the hours of sale. the taxation of beer was raised from £13,000,000 in 1913 to £123,000,000 in 1921. the duty on spirits in 1913 yielded £22,000,000, in 1921 it gave the revenue £71,000,000. one of the effects has been an appreciable reduction in the alcoholic strength of the beverage sold. the hours of sale in the morning and afternoon have been curtailed appreciably. by this measure the workman is prevented from starting his day by drinking alcohol, and the afternoon break prevents the drinker from soddening all day. the effect of these combined measures has been highly beneficial. the quantity of beer sold fell from 34,152,739 barrels of 36 gallons at standard gravity of 10.55 in 1913, to 23,885,472 standard barrels in 1921. spirits fell from 30,736,088 proof gallons in 1913 to 20,162,395 in 1921. these figures represent a remarkable and almost sensational reduction in the quantity of alcohol consumed by the population. convictions for drunkenness fell from 188,877 in 1913 to 77,789 in 1921. deaths from alcoholic diseases were more than halved during the same period. this is the most distinct advance in the direction of effective temperance reform hitherto taken by the british parliament, and the effect is striking in its encouragement. it would be a serious national misfortune if the admirable results attained by these war measures were lost by relaxations. most of the pressure exerted upon parliament has up to the present been in the direction of easing the grip of the state on the traffic. most candidates in all parties at the last election were forced to pledge themselves to support reduction in the beer duty. clubs, even more than "pubs," have urged extensions in drinking hours. the beer duty has already been reduced. it is anticipated that the reduction will have the effect of increasing consumption. this is regrettable, for it means so much reclaimed land once more sinking into the malarial swamp. there is one consolation, however, that the women will claim the next turn in reduction of taxation. sugar and tea will then provide effective barriers in the way of a further cheapening of alcoholic liquors just yet. but all this is a long, long way off prohibition. a majority of 20 to 1 against mr. scrymgeour's prohibition bill, and a majority of 4 to 1 in favour of cheaper beer--both recorded in the same parliamentary week--is not encouraging to those who would suppress alcohol in britain. temperance reformers here are, therefore, watching the progress of america's bold bid for sobriety with hopeful, if anxious, eyes, and with longing hearts. what britain does next will depend entirely on the success or failure of what america is doing now. xxxi unofficial publication of "official" information a storm is working up over the publication by public servants of information which came into their possession in the course of their official careers. the immediate occasion is mr. winston churchill's story of the war. angry questions are being asked in parliament, and it is publicly announced that the cabinet have appointed a committee of its members to consider the whole problem. it is rather late in the day to make all this fuss about the publication of war documents, for generals, admirals, and ministers in all lands, including ours, have during the last three years been inundating the european and american public with a flood of reminiscences, explanations, criticisms, attacks and defences on the conduct of operations, either of the great war or the great peace, in which they were engaged. warriors on land and on sea have displayed an unprecedented eagerness to inform the public as to their own share in the great victory, and as to how much more brilliant that share would have been but for the wrongheadedness or stupidity of some collaborator. like julius cæsar, they mean to live in history not merely through their battles, but also through their commentaries upon them. on the other hand, statesmen have been engaged in disclaiming responsibility for particular parts of the treaty of versailles, and where blame has been attached to them, either by opponents or supporters, for the form in which those parts were cast, they have striven hard to prove that it was attributable to pressure which they were unable to resist from other actors in the drama. in each case highly confidential information is disclosed, secret documents are used, cabinet and council proceedings are published, without the slightest regard to precedent. one disclosure has led to another, one revelation has rendered another inevitable. a general, admiral or minister criticises on the strength of half-disclosed minutes or documents some other public functionary, military, naval, or political. what is the latter to do? his reputation is at stake. is he not to be allowed to repair the omission or to correct the misquotation? take the case of ministers who played an important part in the conduct of the war or the peace, and whose actions have been subjected to malignant and persistent misrepresentation. in attacking these ministers statements are made which, if accepted by the public, would irretrievably damage or even destroy their reputation. in formulating the attack a document is partially quoted, or the report of a council or cabinet meeting is misquoted. the minister knows that a full and fair quotation would clear his good name of the imputation sought to be cast upon it. is he not to be allowed, in those circumstances, to publish it? a mere denial would carry no weight. a full revelation would settle the dispute in his favour. the publication cannot conceivably affect any public interest, it would supply no information which could serve any possible enemy of his country. is he not to be allowed to use the only means available to redeem his credit from the ruin of accepted calumny? his critic has been allowed to disclose secret information without protest. is he to be forbidden to do so in self-defence? he claims that he served his country faithfully to the best of his powers in time of crisis and peril. for that he is defamed by men who had access to secret information and use it freely without criticism, censure or demur. why should his country deny him the same privilege for his protection? that is the case which the cabinet committee will have to consider. whatever general rules may be laid down they must in all fairness take into account these exceptional circumstances. those who are now taking a prominent part in emphasising the enormity of giving to the public documents which were acquired in the public service had not a word to say when portions of those documents were used for purposes with which they were in sympathy. is it not rather late for them to protest now? there is such a thing as fair play even when politicians are attacked. so far as the british are concerned the writing of the books of the type alluded to was started, i think, by field-marshal lord french of ypres, in his book, _1914_. this work is of the nature of an apologia; and the writer, to assist in establishing his case, alludes to discussions with the cabinet and does not hesitate to quote textually secret memoranda and dispatches written by himself and others. the late admiral of the fleet, lord fisher, gives in his book, _memories_, examples of his own intervention at the war council meetings. in his autobiography, _from private to field-marshal_, which appeared some time later, field-marshal sir william robertson, who was for over two years the confidential adviser of the cabinet and as such attended all war councils and most war cabinet meetings, when it suits his argument gives to the public his version of what passed at these highly secret conclaves. though he does not quote secret documents textually, he describes the proceedings and deliberations of the supreme war council, inter-allied conferences and the war cabinet, and refers to the opinions of individuals. in his recent speeches he has gone even further. a still more recent work, _sir douglas haig's command_, is the result of collaboration by two authors of whom one, at least, held an official position during the war, being sir douglas haig's private secretary when he was commander-in-chief of the british army in france. this book is even less reticent. it, also, is essentially an apologia and justification of an individual. to establish their case, the writers not only summarise some of the secret proceedings of the supreme war council and war cabinet, but give extracts of their decisions. these extracts are freely used as the basis of animadversion on the council and cabinet of that day. it is true that some of the quotations are stated to be taken from french books previously published, but others are not, which arouses curiosity as to the source of the knowledge displayed. in addition there have been endless articles in magazines and newspapers, some signed, some written anonymously, all attacking either ministers, generals or admirals, and most of them clearly supplied with secret information by men who must have acquired it in their official capacity. as to all these disclosures protest has hitherto been silent. but when it is indicated that replies are forthcoming and that these replies will reveal the real nature of the misquoted documents or proceedings, the wrath of the assailants and their sympathisers knows no bounds. what happened in reference to the consultations held in connection with the framing of the peace treaty affords an illustration of the way these revelations occur. the question of the publication of these proceedings was definitely discussed at versailles, after the signature of the peace treaty with germany on the 28th june, 1919, by president wilson, representing the united states, m. clemenceau and m. simon, representing france, m. sonnino, representing italy, m. makino, representing japan, and myself. this is what occurred on that occasion. for the first time i quote from my own notes written at the time: "president wilson was strongly of opinion that these documents ought to be treated as purely private conversation, and he objected to the communication of the accounts given in the notes of the private conversations, in which all present had spoken their minds with great freedom, as improper use might afterwards be made of these documents. on the other hand, he did not object to the notes being communicated to special individuals in the personal confidence of members of the council. though he looked upon certain statements, the conclusions and the actions as being official, and therefore available in the appropriate offices, the actual conversations were private. in the united states no one had the right to claim documents of this kind. president wilson's view was that each government should take the course traditional in its own country with the clear and distinct understanding that no one should under any circumstances make the _procès verbal_ public. m. clemenceau did not think that such documents should be regarded as private property, whilst m. sonnino thought they need not be considered as official documents. "for my own part i was anxious to know what the precedents were. i also felt bound to enter a caveat that if attacks should be made on the political heads i might be forced in particular cases to refer to these notes, and i gave warning that i might have to do so unless a protest was then made. m. clemenceau agreed so far, that it might be impossible to refuse extracts from the _procès verbaux_ to prove particular facts." it will be observed from this record that i was the first to safeguard the interest of persons who, i felt certain, would be attacked for their share in the treaty. i am the last to take advantage of the proviso. what followed? m. clemenceau was bitterly attacked by his political opponents for surrendering french rights to the treaty. president wilson was also attacked by his political opponents for his assent to other provisions of the treaty. in self-defence they authorised the publication of the secret reports of the paris meeting. m. clemenceau entrusted his defence to m. tardieu. m. tardieu, in his book _the truth about the treaty_, gives most of his attention to the drawing up of that international instrument, but deals with the last portion of the war period and quotes from the proceedings of inter-allied conferences, and also of the supreme war council, giving the opinions of individuals. he does the same with the deliberations of the peace conference. in fact the whole book is based on international proceedings of a secret nature. m. poincaré, in maligning his rivals, has not refrained from making full use of information which came to his knowledge as president of the republic. for example, in his article, _souvenirs et documents_, in the _temps_ of the 12th september, 1921, he quotes _in extenso_ a letter of april, 1919, from himself as president of the republic to the president of the council, m. clemenceau, and a letter from me in reply to the president of the council. my consent was not even asked to the publication of my letter. this correspondence referred to the period proposed to be placed on the occupation by the allies of the left bank of the rhine. according to signor nitti, m. poincaré makes somewhat similar disclosures in his articles published in the _revue des deux mondes_. all these disclosures were partial, truncated and, therefore, misleading. they did not give the public a complete account of what occurred. the impression created was, therefore, unfair to the other actors in that great drama. that is undoubtedly what impelled ex-president wilson to hand over his documents to mr. ray baker with a view to the presentation of the case from the standpoint of the american delegation. hence his book, _woodrow wilson and world settlement_. it is mostly based on the secret minutes of the supreme war council, numerous extracts from which are given. signor nitti, the late italian premier, on the other hand, expressly states that he does not publish any document which was not intended for publication. nevertheless, he prints a memorandum written by myself for the peace conference in march, 1919, under the title of _some considerations for the peace conference before they finally draft their terms_, and also m. clemenceau's reply, both of which are secret documents. but he excuses his action in this case because extracts from this memorandum had already been published. i only mention these matters, not by way of arraignment of these various distinguished men for divulging secrets they ought to have kept under lock and key. that is not in the least my object. i do so in order to point out that general rules as to the conditions under which confidential material can be used are not applicable to circumstances of the great war and the peace that ensued. disclosures already made largely for purposes of criticism and aspersion upon individuals or bodies of individuals have given the assailed parties a special position which cannot in justice be overlooked. _london, march 17th, 1923._ the expansion of europe the culmination of modern history by ramsay muir professor of modern history in the university of manchester second edition to my mother preface the purpose of this book is twofold. we realise to-day, as never before, that the fortunes of the world, and of every individual in it, are deeply affected by the problems of world-politics and by the imperial expansion and the imperial rivalries of the greater states of western civilisation. but when men who have given no special attention to the history of these questions try to form a sound judgment on them, they find themselves handicapped by the lack of any brief and clear resume of the subject. i have tried, in this book, to provide such a summary, in the form of a broad survey, unencumbered with detail, but becoming fuller as it comes nearer to our own time. that is my first purpose. in fulfilling it i have had to cover much well-trodden ground. but i hope i have avoided the aridity of a mere compendium of facts. my second purpose is rather more ambitious. in the course of my narrative i have tried to deal with ideas rather than with mere facts. i have tried to bring out the political ideas which are implicit in, or which result from, the conquest of the world by western civilisation; and to show how the ideas of the west have affected the outer world, how far they have been modified to meet its needs, and how they have developed in the process. in particular i have endeavoured to direct attention to the significant new political form which we have seen coming into existence, and of which the british empire is the oldest and the most highly developed example--the world-state, embracing peoples of many different types, with a western nation-state as its nucleus. the study of this new form seems to me to be a neglected branch of political science, and one of vital importance. whether or not it is to be a lasting form, time alone will show. finally i have tried to display, in this long imperialist conflict, the strife of two rival conceptions of empire: the old, sterile, and ugly conception which thinks of empire as mere domination, ruthlessly pursued for the sole advantage of the master, and which seems to me to be most fully exemplified by germany; and the nobler conception which regards empire as a trusteeship, and which is to be seen gradually emerging and struggling towards victory over the more brutal view, more clearly and in more varied forms in the story of the british empire than in perhaps any other part of human history. that is why i have given a perhaps disproportionate attention to the british empire. the war is determining, among other great issues, which of these conceptions is to dominate the future. in its first form this book was completed in the autumn of 1916; and it contained, as i am bound to confess, some rather acidulated sentences in the passages which deal with the attitude of america towards european problems. these sentences were due to the deep disappointment which most englishmen and most frenchmen felt with the attitude of aloofness which america seemed to have adopted towards the greatest struggle for freedom and justice ever waged in history. it was an indescribable satisfaction to be forced by events to recognise that i was wrong, and that these passages of my book ought not to have been written as i wrote them. there is a sort of solemn joy in feeling that america, france, and britain, the three nations which have contributed more than all the rest of the world put together to the establishment of liberty and justice on the earth, are now comrades in arms, fighting a supreme battle for these great causes. may this comradeship never be broken. may it bring about such a decision of the present conflict as will open a new era in the history of the world--a world now unified, as never before, by the final victory of western civilisation which it is the purpose of this book to describe. besides rewriting and expanding the passages on america, i have seized the opportunity of this new issue to alter and enlarge certain other sections of the book, notably the chapter on the vital period 1878-1900, which was too slightly dealt with in the original edition. in this work, which has considerably increased the size of the book, i have been much assisted by the criticisms and suggestions of some of my reviewers, whom i wish to thank. perhaps i ought to add that though this book is complete in itself, it is also a sort of sequel to a little book entitled nationalism and internationalism, and was originally designed to be printed along with it: that is the explanation of sundry footnote references. the two volumes are to be followed by a third, on national self-government, and it is my hope that the complete series may form a useful general survey of the development of the main political factors in modern history. in its first form the book had the advantage of being read by my friend major w. l. grant, professor of colonial history at queen's university kingston, ontario. the pressure of the military duties in which he is engaged has made it impossible for me to ask his aid in the revision of the book. r. m. july 1917 contents preface i. the meaning and the motives of imperialism ii. the era of iberian monopoly iii. the rivalry of the dutch, the french, and the english, 1588-1763 (a) the period of settlement, 1588-1660 (b) the period of systematic colonial policy, 1660-1713 (c) the conflict of french and english, 1713-1763 iv. the era of revolution, 1763-1825 v. europe and the non-european world, 1815-1878 vi. the transformation of the british empire, 1815-1878 vii. the era of the world states, 1878-1900 viii. the british empire amid the world-powers, 1878-1914 ix. the great challenge, 1900-1914 x. what of the night? i the meaning and the motives of imperialism one of the most remarkable features of the modern age has been the extension of the influence of european civilisation over the whole world. this process has formed a very important element in the history of the last four centuries, and it has been strangely undervalued by most historians, whose attention has been too exclusively centred upon the domestic politics, diplomacies, and wars of europe. it has been brought about by the creation of a succession of 'empires' by the european nations, some of which have broken up, while others survive, but all of which have contributed their share to the general result; and for that reason the term 'imperialism' is commonly employed to describe the spirit which has led to this astonishing and world-embracing movement of the modern age. the terms 'empire' and 'imperialism' are in some respects unfortunate, because of the suggestion of purely military dominion which they convey; and their habitual employment has led to some unhappy results. it has led men of one school of thought to condemn and repudiate the whole movement, as an immoral product of brute force, regardless of the rights of conquered peoples. they have refused to study it, and have made no endeavour to understand it; not realising that the movement they were condemning was as inevitable and as irresistible as the movement of the tides--and as capable of being turned to beneficent ends. on the other hand, the implications of these terms have perhaps helped to foster in men of another type of mind an unhealthy spirit of pride in mere domination, as if that were an end in itself, and have led them to exult in the extension of national power, without closely enough considering the purposes for which it was to be used. both attitudes are deplorable, and in so far as the words 'empire,' 'imperial,' and 'imperialism' tend to encourage them, they are unfortunate words. they certainly do not adequately express the full significance of the process whereby the civilisation of europe has been made into the civilisation of the world. nevertheless the words have to be used, because there are no others which at all cover the facts. and, after all, they are in some ways entirely appropriate. a great part of the world's area is inhabited by peoples who are still in a condition of barbarism, and seem to have rested in that condition for untold centuries. for such peoples the only chance of improvement was that they should pass under the dominion of more highly developed peoples; and to them a european 'empire' brought, for the first time, not merely law and justice, but even the rudiments of the only kind of liberty which is worth having, the liberty which rests upon law. another vast section of the world's population consists of peoples who have in some respects reached a high stage of civilisation, but who have failed to achieve for themselves a mode of organisation which could give them secure order and equal laws. for such peoples also the 'empire' of western civilisation, even when it is imposed and maintained by force, may bring advantages which will far outweigh its defects. in these cases the word 'empire' can be used without violence to its original significance, and yet without apology; and these cases cover by far the greater part of the world. the words 'empire' and 'imperialism' come to us from ancient rome; and the analogy between the conquering and organising work of rome and the empire-building work of the modern nation-states is a suggestive and stimulating analogy. the imperialism of rome extended the modes of a single civilisation, and the reign of law which was its essence, over all the mediterranean lands. the imperialism of the nations to which the torch of rome has been handed on, has made the reign of law, and the modes of a single civilisation, the common possession of the whole world. rome made the common life of europe possible. the imperial expansion of the european nations has alone made possible the vision--nay, the certainty--of a future world-order. for these reasons we may rightly and without hesitation continue to employ these terms, provided that we remember always that the justification of any dominion imposed by a more advanced upon a backward or disorganised people is to be found, not in the extension of mere brute power, but in the enlargement and diffusion, under the shelter of power, of those vital elements in the life of western civilisation which have been the secrets of its strength, and the greatest of its gifts to the world: the sovereignty of a just and rational system of law, liberty of person, of thought, and of speech, and, finally, where the conditions are favourable, the practice of self-government and the growth of that sentiment of common interest which we call the national spirit. these are the features of western civilisation which have justified its conquest of the world[1]; and it must be for its success or failure in attaining these ends that we shall commend or condemn the imperial work of each of the nations which have shared in this vast achievement. [1] see the first essay in nationalism and internationalism, in which an attempt is made to work out this idea. four main motives can be perceived at work in all the imperial activities of the european peoples during the last four centuries. the first, and perhaps the most potent, has been the spirit of national pride, seeking to express itself in the establishment of its dominion over less highly organised peoples. in the exultation which follows the achievement of national unity each of the nation-states in turn, if the circumstances were at all favourable, has been tempted to impose its power upon its neighbours,[2] or even to seek the mastery of the world. from these attempts have sprung the greatest of the european wars. from them also have arisen all the colonial empires of the european states. it is no mere coincidence that all the great colonising powers have been unified nation-states, and that their imperial activities have been most vigorous when the national sentiment was at its strongest among them. spain, portugal, england, france, holland, russia: these are the great imperial powers, and they are also the great nation-states. denmark and sweden have played a more modest part, in extra-european as in european affairs. germany and italy only began to conceive imperial ambitions after their tardy unification in the nineteenth century. austria, which has never been a nation-state, never became a colonising power. nationalism, then, with its eagerness for dominion, may be regarded as the chief source of imperialism; and if its effects are unhappy when it tries to express itself at the expense of peoples in whom the potentiality of nationhood exists, they are not necessarily unhappy in other cases. when it takes the form of the settlement of unpeopled lands, or the organisation and development of primitive barbaric peoples, or the reinvigoration and strengthening of old and decadent societies, it may prove itself a beneficent force. but it is beneficent only in so far as it leads to an enlargement of law and liberty. [2] nationalism and imperialism, pp. 60, 64, 104. the second of the blended motives of imperial expansion has been the desire for commercial profits; and this motive has played so prominent a part, especially in our own time, that we are apt to exaggerate its force, and to think of it as the sole motive. no doubt it has always been present in some degree in all imperial adventures. but until the nineteenth century it probably formed the predominant motive only in regard to the acquisition of tropical lands. so long as europe continued to be able to produce as much as she needed of the food and the raw materials for industry that her soil and climate were capable of yielding, the commercial motive for acquiring territories in the temperate zone, which could produce only commodities of the same type, was comparatively weak; and the european settlements in these areas, which we have come to regard as the most important products of the imperialist movement, must in their origin and early settlement be mainly attributed to other than commercial motives. but europe has always depended for most of her luxuries upon the tropics: gold and ivory and gems, spices and sugar and fine woven stuffs, from a very early age found their way into europe from india and the east, coming by slow and devious caravan routes to the shores of the black sea and the mediterranean. until the end of the fifteenth century the european trader had no direct contact with the sources of these precious commodities; the supply of them was scanty and the price high. the desire to gain a more direct access to the sources of this traffic, and to obtain control of the supply, formed the principal motive for the great explorations. but these, in their turn, disclosed fresh tropical areas worth exploiting, and introduced new luxuries, such as tobacco and tea, which soon took rank as necessities. they also brought a colossal increment of wealth to the countries which had undertaken them. hence the acquisition of a share in, or a monopoly of, these lucrative lines of trade became a primary object of ambition to all the great states. in the nineteenth century europe began to be unable to supply her own needs in regard to the products of the temperate zone, and therefore to desire control over other areas of this type; but until then it was mainly in regard to the tropical or sub-tropical areas that the commercial motive formed the predominant element in the imperial rivalries of the nation-states. and even to-day it is over these areas that their conflicts are most acute. a third motive for imperial expansion, which must not be overlooked, is the zeal for propaganda: the eagerness of virile peoples to propagate the religious and political ideas which they have adopted. but this is only another way of saying that nations are impelled upon the imperial career by the desire to extend the influence of their conception of civilisation, their kultur. in one form or another this motive has always been present. at first it took the form of religious zeal. the spirit of the crusaders was inherited by the portuguese and the spaniards, whose whole history had been one long crusade against the moors. when the portuguese started upon the exploration of the african coast, they could scarcely have sustained to the end that long and arduous task if they had been allured by no other prospect than the distant hope of finding a new route to the east. they were buoyed up also by the desire to strike a blow for christianity. they expected to find the mythical christian empire of prester john, and to join hands with him in overthrowing the infidel. when columbus persuaded queen isabella of castile to supply the means for his madcap adventure, it was by a double inducement that he won her assent: she was to gain access to the wealth of the indies, but she was also to be the means of converting the heathen to a knowledge of christianity; and this double motive continually recurs in the early history of the spanish empire. france could scarcely, perhaps, have persisted in maintaining her far from profitable settlements on the barren shores of the st. lawrence if the missionary motive had not existed alongside of the motives of national pride and the desire for profits: her great work of exploration in the region of the great lakes and the mississippi valley was due quite as much to the zeal of the heroic missionaries of the jesuit and other orders as to the enterprise of trappers and traders. in english colonisation, indeed, the missionary motive was never, until the nineteenth century, so strongly marked. but its place was taken by a parallel political motive. the belief that they were diffusing the free institutions in which they took so much pride certainly formed an element in the colonial activities of the english. it is both foolish and unscientific to disregard this element of propaganda in the imperialist movement, still more to treat the assertion of it by the colonising powers as mere hypocrisy. the motives of imperial expansion, as of other human activities, are mixed, and the loftier elements in them are not often predominant. but the loftier elements are always present. it is hypocrisy to pretend that they are alone or even chiefly operative. but it is cynicism wholly to deny their influence. and of the two sins cynicism is the worse, because by over-emphasising it strengthens and cultivates the lower among the mixed motives by which men are ruled. the fourth of the governing motives of imperial expansion is the need of finding new homes for the surplus population of the colonising people. this was not in any country a very powerful motive until the nineteenth century, for over-population did not exist in any serious degree in any of the european states until that age. many of the political writers in seventeenth-century england, indeed, regarded the whole movement of colonisation with alarm, because it seemed to be drawing off men who could not be spared. but if the population was nowhere excessive, there were in all countries certain classes for which emigration to new lands offered a desired opportunity. there were the men bitten with the spirit of adventure, to whom the work of the pioneer presented an irresistible attraction. such men are always numerous in virile communities, and when in any society their numbers begin to diminish, its decay is at hand. the imperial activities of the modern age have more than anything else kept the breed alive in all european countries, and above all in britain. to this type belonged the conquistadores of spain, the elizabethan seamen, the french explorers of north america, the daring dutch navigators. again, there were the younger sons of good family for whom the homeland presented small opportunities, but who found in colonial settlements the chance of creating estates like those of their fathers at home, and carried out with them bands of followers drawn from among the sons of their fathers' tenantry. to this class belonged most of the planter-settlers of virginia, the seigneurs of french canada, the lords of the great portuguese feudal holdings in brazil, and the dominant class in all the spanish colonies. again, there were the 'undesirables' of whom the home government wanted to be rid--convicts, paupers, political prisoners; they were drafted out in great numbers to the new lands, often as indentured servants, to endure servitude for a period of years and then to be merged in the colonial population. when the loss of the american colonies deprived britain of her dumping-ground for convicts, she had to find a new region in which to dispose of them; and this led to the first settlement of australia, six years after the establishment of american independence. finally, in the age of bitter religious controversy there was a constant stream of religious exiles seeking new homes in which they could freely follow their own forms of worship. the puritan settlers of new england are the outstanding example of this type. but they were only one group among many. huguenots from france, moravians from austria, persecuted 'palatines' and salzburgers from germany, poured forth in an almost unbroken stream. it was natural that they should take refuge in the only lands where full religious freedom was offered to them; and these were especially some of the british settlements in america, and the dutch colony at the cape of good hope. it is often said that the overflow of europe over the world has been a sort of renewal of the folk-wandering of primitive ages. that is a misleading view: the movement has been far more deliberate and organised, and far less due to the pressure of external circumstances, than the early movements of peoples in the old world. not until the nineteenth century, when the industrial transformation of europe brought about a really acute pressure of population, can it be said that the mere pressure of need, and the shortage of sustenance in their older homes, has sent large bodies of settlers into the new lands. until that period the imperial movement has been due to voluntary and purposive action in a far higher degree than any of the blind early wanderings of peoples. the will-to-dominion of virile nations exulting in their nationhood; the desire to obtain a more abundant supply of luxuries than had earlier been available, and to make profits therefrom; the zeal of peoples to impose their mode of civilisation upon as large a part of the world as possible; the existence in the western world of many elements of restlessness and dissatisfaction, adventurers, portionless younger sons, or religious enthusiasts: these have been the main operative causes of this huge movement during the greater part of the four centuries over which it has extended. and as it has sprung from such diverse and conflicting causes, it has assumed an infinite variety of forms; and both deserves and demands a more respectful study as a whole than has generally been given to it. ii the era of iberian monopoly during the middle ages the contact of europe with the rest of the world was but slight. it was shut off by the great barrier of the islamic empire, upon which the crusades made no permanent impression; and although the goods of the east came by caravan to the black sea ports, to constantinople, to the ports of syria, and to egypt, where they were picked up by the italian traders, these traders had no direct knowledge of the countries which were the sources of their wealth. the threat of the empire of genghis khan in the thirteenth century aroused the interest of europe, and the bold friars, carpini and rubruquis, made their way to the centres of that barbaric sovereign's power in the remote east, and brought back stories of what they had seen; later the poli, especially the great marco, undertook still more daring and long-continued journeys, which made india and cathay less unreal to europeans, and stimulated the desire for further knowledge. the later mediaeval maps of the world, like that of fra mauro (1459),[3] which incorporate this knowledge, are less wildly imaginative than their predecessors, and show a vague notion of the general configuration of the main land-masses in the old world. but beyond the fringes of the mediterranean the world was still in the main unknown to, and unaffected by, european civilisation down to the middle of the fifteenth century. [3] simplified reproductions of this and the other early maps alluded to are printed in philip's students' atlas of modern history, which also contains a long series of maps illustrating the extra-europeans activities of the european states. then, suddenly, came the great era of explorations, which were made possible by the improvements in navigation worked out during the fifteenth century, and which in two generations incredibly transformed the aspect of the world. the marvellous character of this revelation can perhaps be illustrated by the comparison of two maps, that of behaim, published in 1492, and that of schoener, published in 1523. apart from its adoption of the theory that the earth was globular, not round and flat, behaim's map shows little advance upon fra mauro, except that it gives a clearer idea of the shape of africa, due to the earlier explorations of the portuguese. but schoener's map shows that the broad outlines of the distribution of the land-masses of both hemispheres were already in 1523 pretty clearly understood. this astonishing advance was due to the daring and enterprise of the portuguese explorers, diaz, da gama, cabral, and of the adventurers in the service of spain, columbus, balboa, vespucci, and--greatest of them all--magellan. these astonishing discoveries placed for a time the destinies of the outer world in the hands of spain and portugal, and the first period of european imperialism is the period of iberian monopoly, extending to 1588. a papal award in 1493 confirmed the division of the non-european world between the two powers, by a judgment which the orthodox were bound to accept, and did accept for two generations. all the oceans, except the north atlantic, were closed to the navigators of other nations; and these two peoples were given, for a century, the opportunity of showing in what guise they would introduce the civilisation of europe to the rest of the globe. pioneers as they were in the work of imperial development, it is not surprising that they should have made great blunders; and in the end their foreign dominions weakened rather than strengthened the home countries, and contributed to drag them down from the high place which they had taken among the nations. the portuguese power in the east was never more than a commercial dominion. except in goa, on the west coast of india, no considerable number of settlers established themselves at any point; and the goanese settlement is the only instance of the formation of a mixed race, half indian and half european. wherever the portuguese power was established, it proved itself hard and intolerant; for the spirit of the crusader was ill-adapted to the establishment of good relations with the non-christian peoples. the rivalry of arab traders in the indian ocean was mercilessly destroyed, and there was as little mercy for the italian merchants, who found the stream of goods that the arabs had sent them by way of the red sea and the persian gulf almost wholly intercepted. no doubt any other people, finding itself in the position which the portuguese occupied in the early sixteenth century, would have been tempted to use their power in the same way to establish a complete monopoly; but the success with which the portuguese attained their aim was in the end disastrous to them. it was followed by, if it did not cause, a rapid deterioration of the ability with which their affairs were directed; and when other european traders began to appear in the field, they were readily welcomed by the princes of india and the chieftains of the spice islands. in the west the portuguese settlement in brazil was a genuine colony, or branch of the portuguese nation, because here there existed no earlier civilised people to be dominated. but both in east and west the activities of the portuguese were from the first subjected to an over-rigid control by the home government. eager to make the most of a great opportunity for the national advantage, the rulers of portugal allowed no freedom to the enterprise of individuals. the result was that in portugal itself, in the east, and in brazil, initiative was destroyed, and the brilliant energy which this gallant little nation had displayed evaporated within a century. it was finally destroyed when, in 1580, portugal and her empire fell under the dominion of spain, and under all the reactionary influences of the government of philip ii. by the time this heavy yoke was shaken off, in the middle of the seventeenth century, the portuguese dominion had fallen into decay. to-day nothing of it remains save 'spheres of influence' on the western and eastern coasts of africa, two or three ports on the coast of india, the azores, and the island of magao off the coast of china. the spanish dominion in central and south america was of a different character. when once they had realised that it was not a new route to asia, but a new world, that columbus had discovered for them, the spaniards sought no longer mainly for the riches to be derived from traffic, but for the precious metals, which they unhappily discovered in slight quantities in hispaniola, but in immense abundance in mexico and peru. it is impossible to exaggerate the heroic valour and daring of cortez, pizarro, hernando de soto, orellana, and the rest of the conquistadores who carved out in a single generation the vast spanish empire in central and south america; but it is equally impossible to exaggerate their cruelty, which was born in part of the fact that they were a handful among myriads, in part of the fierce traditions of crusading warfare against the infidel. yet without undervaluing their daring, it must be recognised that they had a comparatively easy task in conquering the peoples of these tropical lands. in the greater islands of the west indies they found a gentle and yielding people, who rapidly died out under the forced labour of the mines and plantations, and had to be replaced by negro slave-labour imported from africa. in mexico and peru they found civilisations which on the material side were developed to a comparatively high point, and which collapsed suddenly when their governments and capitals had been overthrown; while their peoples, habituated to slavery, readily submitted to a new servitude. it must be recognised, to the honour of the government of charles v. and his successors, that they honestly attempted to safeguard the usages and possessions of the conquered peoples, and to protect them in some degree against the exploitation of their conquerors. but it was the protection of a subject race doomed to the condition of helotage; they were protected, as the jews were protected by the kings of mediaeval england, because they were a valuable asset of the crown. the policy of the spanish government did not avail to prevent an intermixture of the races, because the spaniards themselves came from a sub-tropical country, and the mexicans and peruvians especially were separated from them by no impassable gulf such as separates the negro or the australian bushman from the white man. central and southern america thus came to be peopled by a hybrid race, speaking spanish, large elements of which were conscious of their own inferiority. this in itself would perhaps have been a barrier to progress. but the concentration of attention upon the precious metals, and the neglect of industry due to this cause and to the employment of slave-labour, formed a further obstacle. and in addition to all, the spanish government, partly with a view to the execution of its native policy, partly because it regarded the precious metals as the chief product of these lands and wished to maintain close control over them, and partly because centralised autocracy was carried to its highest pitch in spain, allowed little freedom of action to the local governments, and almost none to the settlers. it treated the trade of these lands as a monopoly of the home country, to be carried on under the most rigid control. it did little or nothing to develop the natural resources of the empire, but rather discouraged them lest they should compete with the labours of the mine; and in what concerned the intellectual welfare of its subjects, it limited itself, as in spain, to ensuring that no infection of heresy or freethought should reach any part of its dominions. all this had a deadening effect; and the surprising thing is, not that the spanish empire should have fallen into an early decrepitude, but that it should have shown such comparative vigour, tenacity, and power of expansion as it actually exhibited. not until the nineteenth century did the vast natural resources of these regions begin to undergo any rapid development; that is to say, not until most of the settlements had discarded the connection with spain; and even then, the defects bred into the people by three centuries of reactionary and unenlightened government produced in them an incapacity to use their newly won freedom, and condemned these lands to a long period of anarchy. it would be too strong to say that it would have been better had the spaniards never come to america; for, when all is said, they have done more than any other people, save the british, to plant european modes of life in the non-european world. but it is undeniable that their dominion afforded a far from happy illustration of the working of western civilisation in a new field, and exercised a very unfortunate reaction upon the life of the mother-country. the conquest of portugal and her empire by philip ii., in 1580, turned spain into a colossus bestriding the world, and it was inevitable that this world-dominion should be challenged by the other european states which faced upon the atlantic. the challenge was taken up by three nations, the english, the french, and the dutch, all the more readily because the very existence of all three and the religion of two of them were threatened by the apparently overwhelming strength of spain in europe. as in so many later instances, the european conflict was inevitably extended to the non-european world. from the middle of the sixteenth century onwards these three peoples attempted, with increasing daring, to circumvent or to undermine the spanish power, and to invade the sources of the wealth which made it dangerous to them; but the attempt, so far as it was made on the seas and beyond them, was in the main, and for a long time, due to the spontaneous energies of volunteers, not to the action of governments. francis i. of france sent out the venetian verazzano to explore the american shores of the north atlantic, as henry vii. of england had earlier sent the genoese cabots. but nothing came of these official enterprises. more effective were the pirate adventurers who preyed upon the commerce between spain and her possessions in the netherlands as it passed through the narrow seas, running the gauntlet of english, french, and dutch. more effective still were the attempts to find new routes to the east, not barred by the spanish dominions, by a north-east or a north-west passage; for some of the earlier of these adventures led to fruitful unintended consequences, as when the englishman chancellor, seeking for a north-east passage, found the route to archangel and opened up a trade with russia, or as when the frenchman cartier, seeking for a north-west passage, hit upon the great estuary of the st. lawrence, and marked out a claim for france to the possession of the area which it drained. most effective of all were the smuggling and piratical raids into the reserved waters of west africa and the west indies, and later into the innermost penetralia of the pacific ocean, which were undertaken with rapidly increasing boldness by the navigators of all three nations, but above all by the english. drake is the supreme exponent of these methods; and his career illustrates in the clearest fashion the steady diminution of spanish prestige under these attacks, and the growing boldness and maritime skill of its attackers. from the time of drake's voyage round the world (1577) and its insulting defiance of the spanish power on the west coast of south america, it became plain that the maintenance of spanish monopoly could not last much longer. it came to its end, finally and unmistakably, in the defeat of the grand armada. that supreme victory threw the ocean roads of trade open, not to the english only, but to the sailors of all nations. in its first great triumph the english navy had established the freedom of the seas, of which it has ever since been the chief defender. since 1588 no power has dreamt of claiming the exclusive right of traversing any of the open seas of the world, as until that date spain and portugal had claimed the exclusive right of using the south atlantic, the pacific, and the indian oceans. so ends the first period in the imperial expansion of the western peoples, the period of spanish and portuguese monopoly. meanwhile, unnoticed in the west, a remarkable eastward expansion was being effected by the russian people. by insensible stages they had passed the unreal barrier between europe and asia, and spread themselves thinly over the vast spaces of siberia, subduing and assimilating the few and scattered tribes whom they met; by the end of the seventeenth century they had already reached the pacific ocean. it was a conquest marked by no great struggles or victories, an insensible permeation of half a continent. this process was made the easier for the russians, because in their own stock were blended elements of the mongol race which they found scattered over siberia: they were only reversing the process which genghis khan had so easily accomplished in the thirteenth century. and as the russians had scarcely yet begun to be affected by western civilisation, there was no great cleavage or contrast between them and their new subjects, and the process of assimilation took place easily. but the settlement of siberia was very gradual. at the beginning of the eighteenth century the total population of this vast area amounted to not more than 300,000 souls, and it was not until the nineteenth century that there was any rapid increase. iii the rivalry of the dutch, the french and the english, 1588-1763 the second period of european imperialism was filled with the rivalries of the three nations which had in different degrees contributed to the breakdown of the spanish monopoly, the dutch, the french, and the english; and we have next to inquire how far, and why, these peoples were more successful than the spaniards in planting in the non-european world the essentials of european civilisation. the long era of their rivalry extended from 1588 to 1763, and it can be most conveniently divided into three sections. the first of these extended from 1588 to about 1660, and may be called the period of experiment and settlement; during its course the leadership fell to the dutch. the second extended from 1660 to 1713, and may be called the period of systematic colonial policy, and of growing rivalry between france and england. the third, from 1713 to 1763, was dominated by the intense rivalry of these two countries, decadent spain joining in the conflict on the side of france, while the declining power of the dutch was on the whole ranged on the side of britain; and it ended with the complete ascendancy of britain, supreme at once in the west and in the east. (a) the period of settlement, 1588-1660 the special interest of the first half of the seventeenth century is that in the trading and colonial experiments of this period the character of the work which was to be done by the three new candidates for extra-european empire was already very clearly and instructively displayed. they met as rivals in every field: in the archipelago of the west indies, and the closely connected slaving establishments of west africa, in the almost empty lands of north america, and in the trading enterprises of the far east; and everywhere a difference of spirit and method appeared. the dutch, who made a far more systematic and more immediately profitable use of the opportunity than either of their rivals, regarded the whole enterprise as a great national commercial venture. it was conducted by two powerful trading corporations, the company of the east indies and the company of the west indies; but though directed by the merchants of amsterdam, these were genuinely national enterprises; their shareholders were drawn from every province and every class; and they were backed by all the influence which the states-general of the united provinces--controlled during this period mainly by the commercial interest--was able to wield. the company of the east indies was the richer and the more powerful of the two, because the trade of the far east was beyond comparison the most lucrative in the world. aiming straight at the source of the greatest profits--the trade in spices--the dutch strove to establish a monopoly control over the spice islands and, in general, over the malay archipelago; and they were so successful that their influence remains to-day predominant in this region. their first task was to overthrow the ascendancy of the portuguese, and in this they were willing to co-operate with the english traders. but the bulk of the work was done by the dutch, for the english east india company was poor in comparison with the dutch, was far less efficiently organised, and, in especial, could not count upon the steady support of the national government. it was mainly the dutch who built forts and organised factories, because they alone had sufficient capital to maintain heavy standing charges. not unnaturally they did not see why the english should reap any part of the advantage of their work, and set themselves to establish a monopoly. in the end the english were driven out with violence. after the massacre of amboyna (1623) their traders disappeared from these seas, and the dutch supremacy remained unchallenged until the nineteenth century. it was a quite intolerant commercial monopoly which they had instituted, but from the commercial point of view it was administered with great intelligence. commercial control brought in its train territorial sovereignty, over java and many of the neighbouring islands; and this sovereignty was exercised by the directors of the company primarily with a view to trade interests. it was a trade despotism, but a trade despotism wisely administered, which gave justice and order to its native subjects. on the mainland of india the dutch never attained a comparable degree of power, because the native states were strong enough to hold them in check. but in this period their factories were more numerous and more prosperous than those of the english, their chief rivals; and over the island of ceylon they established an ascendancy almost as complete as that which they had created in the archipelago. they were intelligent enough also to see the importance of good calling-stations on the route to the east. for this purpose they planted a settlement in mauritius, and another at the cape of good hope. but these settlements were never regarded as colonies. they were stations belonging to a trading company; they remained under its complete control, and were allowed no freedom of development, still less any semblance of self-government. if cape colony grew into a genuine colony, or offshoot of the mother-country, it was in spite of the company, not by reason of its encouragement, and from first to last the company's relations with the settlers were of the most unhappy kind. for the company would do nothing at the cape that was not necessary for the eastern trade, which was its supreme interest, and the colonists naturally did not take the same view. it was this concentration upon purely commercial aims which also prevented the dutch from making any use of the superb field for european settlement opened up by the enterprise of their explorers in australia and new zealand. these fair lands were left unpeopled, largely because they promised no immediate trade profits. in the west the enterprises of the dutch were only less vigorous than in the east, and they were marked by the same feature of an intense concentration upon the purely commercial aspect. while the english and (still more) the french adventurers made use of the lesser west indian islands, unoccupied by spain, as bases for piratical attacks upon the spanish trade, the dutch, with a shrewd instinct, early deserted this purely destructive game for the more lucrative business of carrying on a smuggling trade with the spanish mainland; and the islands which they acquired (such as curayoa) were, unlike the french and english islands, especially well placed for this purpose. they established a sugar colony in guiana. but their main venture in this region was the conquest of a large part of northern brazil from the portuguese (1624); and here their exploitation was so merciless, under the direction of the company of the west indies, that the inhabitants, though they had been dissatisfied with the portuguese government, and had at first welcomed the dutch conquerors, soon revolted against them, and after twenty years drove them out. on the mainland of north america the dutch planted a single colony--the new netherlands, with its capital at new amsterdam, later new york. their commercial instinct had once more guided them wisely. they had found the natural centre for the trade of north america; for by way of the river hudson and its affluent, the mohawk, new york commands the only clear path through the mountain belt which everywhere shuts off the atlantic coast region from the central plain of america. founded and controlled by the company of the west indies, this settlement was intended to be, not primarily the home of a branch of the dutch nation beyond the seas, but a trading-station for collecting the furs and other products of the inland regions. at orange (albany), which stands at the junction of the mohawk and the hudson, the dutch traders collected the furs brought in by indian trappers from west and north; new amsterdam was the port of export; and if settlers were encouraged, it was only that they might supply the men and the means and the food for carrying on this traffic. the company of the west indies administered the colony purely from this point of view. no powers of self-government were allowed to the settlers; and, as in cape colony, the relations between the colonists and the governing company were never satisfactory, because the colonists felt that their interests were wholly subordinated. the distinguishing feature of french imperial activity during this period was its dependence upon the support and direction of the home government, which was the natural result of the highly centralised regime established in france during the modern era. only in one direction was french activity successfully maintained by private enterprise, and this was in the not very reputable field of west indian buccaneering, in which the french were even more active than their principal rivals and comrades, the english. the word 'buccaneer' itself comes from the french: boucan means the wood-fire at which the pirates dried and smoked their meat, and these fires, blazing on deserted islands, must often have warned merchant vessels to avoid an ever-present danger. the island of tortuga, which commands the passage between cuba and hispaniola through which the bulk of the spanish traffic passed on its way from mexico to europe, was the most important of the buccaneering bases, and although it was at first used by the buccaneers of all nations, it soon became a purely french possession, as did, later, the adjoining portion of the island of hispaniola (san domingo). the french did, indeed, like the english, plant sugar colonies in some of the lesser antilles; but during the first half of the seventeenth century they attained no great prosperity. for the greater enterprises of trade in the east and colonisation in the west, the french relied almost wholly upon government assistance, and although both henry iv. in the first years of the century, and richelieu in its second quarter, were anxious to give what help they could, internal dissensions were of such frequent occurrence in france during this period that no systematic or continuous governmental aid was available. hence the french enterprises both in the east and in the west were on a small scale, and achieved little success. the french east india company was all but extinct when colbert took it in hand in 1664; it was never able to compete with its dutch or even its english rival. but the period saw the establishment of two french colonies in north america: acadia (nova scotia) on the coast, and canada, with quebec as its centre, in the st. lawrence valley, separated from one another on land by an almost impassable barrier of forest and mountain. these two colonies were founded, the first in 1605 and the second in 1608, almost at the same moment as the first english settlement on the american continent. they had a hard struggle during the first fifty years of their existence; for the number of settlers was very small, the soil was barren, the climate severe, and the red indians, especially the ferocious iroquois towards the south, were far more formidable enemies than those who bordered on the english colonies. there is no part of the history of european colonisation more full of romance and of heroism than the early history of french canada; an incomparable atmosphere of gallantry and devotion seems to overhang it. from the first, despite their small numbers and their difficulties, these settlers showed a daring in exploration which was only equalled by the spaniards, and to which there is no parallel in the records of the english colonies. at the very outset the great explorer champlain mapped out the greater part of the great lakes, and thus reached farther into the continent than any englishman before the end of the eighteenth century; and although this is partly explained by the fact that the st. lawrence and the lakes afforded an easy approach to the interior, while farther south the forest-clad ranges of the alleghanies constituted a very serious barrier, this does not diminish the french pre-eminence in exploration. nor can anything in the history of european colonisation surpass the heroism of the french missionaries among the indians, who faced and endured incredible tortures in order to bring christianity to the barbarians. no serious missionary enterprise was ever undertaken by the english colonists; this difference was in part due to the fact that the missionary aim was definitely encouraged by the home government in france. from the outset, then, poverty, paucity of numbers, gallantry, and missionary zeal formed marked features of the french north american colonies. in other respects they very clearly reproduced some of the features of the motherland. their organisation was strictly feudal in character. the real unit of settlement and government was the seigneurie, an estate owned by a frenchman of birth, and cultivated by his vassals, who found refuge from an indian raid, or other danger, in the stockaded house which took the place of a chateau, much as their remote ancestors had taken refuge from the raids of the northmen in the castles of their seigneur's ancestors. and over this feudal society was set, as in france, a highly centralised government wielding despotic power, and in its turn absolutely subject to the mandate of the crown at home. this despotic government had the right to require the services of all its subjects in case of need; and it was only the centralised government of the colony, and the warlike and adventurous character of its small feudalised society, which enabled it to hold its own for so long against the superior numbers but laxer organisation of its english neighbours. a despotic central power, a feudal organisation, and an entire dependence upon the will of the king of france and upon his support, form, therefore, the second group of characteristics which marked the french colonies. they were colonies in the strictest sense, all the more because they reproduced the main features of the home system. nothing could have differed more profoundly from this system than the methods which the english were contemporaneously applying, without plan or clearly defined aim, and guided only by immediate practical needs, and by the rooted traditions of a self-governing people. their enterprises received from the home government little direct assistance, but they throve better without it; and if there was little assistance, there was also little interference. in the east the english east india company had to yield to the dutch the monopoly of the malayan trade, and bitterly complained of the lack of government support; but it succeeded in establishing several modest factories on the coast of india, and was on the whole prosperous. but it was in the west that the distinctive work of the english was achieved during this period, by the establishment of a series of colonies unlike any other european settlements which had yet been instituted. their distinctive feature was self-government, to which they owed their steadily increasing prosperity. no other european colonies were thus managed on the principle of autonomy. indeed, these english settlements were in 1650 the only self-governing lands in the world, apart from england herself, the united provinces, and switzerland. the first english colony, virginia, was planted in 1608 by a trading company organised for the purpose, whose subscribers included nearly all the london city companies, and about seven hundred private individuals of all ranks. their motives were partly political ('to put a bit in the ancient enemy's (spain's) mouth'), and partly commercial, for they hoped to find gold, and to render england independent of the marine supplies which came from the baltic. but profit was not their sole aim; they were moved also by the desire to plant a new england beyond the seas. they made, in fact, no profits; but they did create a branch of the english stock, and the young squires' and yeomen's sons who formed the backbone of the colony showed themselves to be englishmen by their unwillingness to submit to an uncontrolled direction of their affairs. in 1619, acting on instructions received from england, the company's governor summoned an assembly of representatives, one from each township, to consult on the needs of the colony. this was the first representative body that had ever existed outside europe, and it indicated what was to be the character of english colonisation. henceforth the normal english method of governing a colony was through a governor and an executive council appointed by the crown or its delegate, and a representative assembly, which wielded full control over local legislation and taxation. 'our present happiness,' said the virginian assembly in 1640, 'is exemplified by the freedom of annual assemblies and by legal trials by juries in all civil and criminal causes.' the second group of english colonies, those of new england, far to the north of virginia, reproduced in an intensified form this note of self-government. founded in the years following 1620, these settlements were the outcome of puritan discontents in england. the commercial motive was altogether subsidiary in their establishment; they existed in order that the doctrine and discipline of puritanism might find a home where its ascendancy would be secure. it was indeed under the guise of a commercial company that the chief of these settlements was made, but the company was organised as a means of safe-guarding the colonists from crown interference, and at an early date its headquarters were transferred to new england itself. far from desiring to restrict this freedom, the crown up to a point encouraged it. winthrop, one of the leading colonists, tells us that he had learnt from members of the privy council 'that his majesty did not intend to impose the ceremonies of the church of england upon us; for that it was considered that it was the freedom from such things that made people come over to us.' the contrast between this licence and the rigid orthodoxy enforced upon french canada or spanish america is very instructive. it meant that the new world, so far as it was controlled by england, was to be open as a place of refuge for those who disliked the restrictions thought necessary at home. the same note is to be found in the colony of maryland, planted by the roman catholic lord baltimore in 1632, largely as a place of refuge for his co-religionists. he was encouraged by the government of charles i. in this idea, and the second lord baltimore reports that his father 'had absolute liberty to carry over any from his majesty's dominions willing to go. but he found very few but such as ... could not conform to the laws of england relating to religion. these declared themselves willing to plant in this province, if they might have a general toleration settled by law.' maryland, therefore, became the first place in the world of western civilisation in which full religious toleration was allowed; for the aim of the new englanders was not religious freedom, but a free field for the rigid enforcement of their own shade of orthodoxy. thus, in these first english settlements, the deliberate encouragement of varieties of type was from the outset a distinguishing note, and the home authorities neither desired nor attempted to impose a strict uniformity with the rules and methods existing in england. there was as great a variety in social and economic organisation as in religious beliefs between the aristocratic planter colonies of the south and the democratic agricultural settlements of new england. in one thing only was there uniformity: every settlement possessed self-governing institutions, and prized them beyond all other privileges. none, indeed, carried self-government to so great an extent as the new englanders. they came out organised as religious congregations, in which every member possessed equal rights, and they took the congregational system as the basis of their local government, and church membership as the test of citizenship; nor did any other colonies attain the right, long exercised by the new englanders, of electing their own governors. but there was no english settlement, not even the little slave-worked plantations in the west indian islands, like barbados, which did not set up, as a matter of course, a representative body to deal with problems of legislation and taxation, and the home government never dreamt of interfering with this practice. already in 1650, the english empire was sharply differentiated from the spanish, the dutch, and the french empires by the fact that it consisted of a scattered group of self-governing communities, varying widely in type, but united especially by the common possession of free institutions, and thriving very largely because these institutions enabled local needs to be duly considered and attracted settlers of many types. (b) the period of systematic colonial policy, 1660-1713 the second half of the seventeenth century was a period of systematic imperial policy on the part of both england and france; for both countries now realised that in the profitable field of commerce, at any rate, the dutch had won a great advantage over them. france, after many internal troubles and many foreign wars, had at last achieved, under the government of louis xiv., the boon of firmly established order. she was now beyond all rivalry the greatest of the european states, and her king and his great finance minister, colbert, resolved to win for her also supremacy in trade and colonisation. but this was to be done absolutely under the control and direction of the central government. until the establishment of the german empire, there has never been so marked an instance of the centralised organisation of the whole national activity as france presented in this period. the french east india company was revived under government direction, and began for the first time to be a serious competitor for indian trade. an attempt was made to conquer madagascar as a useful base for eastern enterprises. the sugar industry in the french west indian islands was scientifically encouraged and developed, though the full results of this work were not apparent until the next century. france began to take an active share in the west african trade in slaves and other commodities. in canada a new era of prosperity began; the population was rapidly increased by the dispatch of carefully selected parties of emigrants, and the french activity in missionary work and in exploration became bolder than ever. pere marquette and the sieur de la salle traced out the courses of the ohio and the mississippi; french trading-stations began to arise among the scattered indian tribes who alone occupied the vast central plain; and a strong french claim was established to the possession of this vital area, which was not only the most valuable part of the american continent, but would have shut off the english coastal settlements from any possibility of westward expansion. these remarkable explorations led, in 1717, to the foundation of new orleans at the mouth of the great river, and the organisation of the colony of louisiana. but the whole of the intense and systematic imperial activity of the french during this period depended upon the support and direction of government; and when colbert died in 1683, and soon afterwards all the resources of france were strained by the pressure of two great european wars, the rapid development which colbert's zeal had brought about was checked for a generation. centralised administration may produce remarkable immediate results, but it does not encourage natural and steady growth. meanwhile the english had awakened to the fact that england had, almost by a series of accidents, become the centre of an empire, and to the necessity of giving to this empire some sort of systematic organisation. it was the statesmen of the commonwealth who first began to grope after an imperial system. the aspect of the situation which most impressed them was that the enterprising dutch were reaping most of the trading profits which arose from the creation of the english colonies: it was said that ten dutch ships called at barbados for every english ship. to deal with this they passed the navigation act of 1651, which provided that the trade of england and the colonies should be carried only in english or colonial ships. they thus gave a logical expression to the policy of imperial trade monopoly which had been in the minds of those who were interested in colonial questions from the outset; and they also opened a period of acute trade rivalry and war with the dutch. the first of the dutch wars, which was waged by the commonwealth, was a very even struggle, but it secured the success of the navigation act. cromwell, though he hastened to make peace with the dutch, was a still stronger imperialist than his parliamentary predecessors; he may justly be described as the first of the jingoes. he demanded compensation from the dutch for the half-forgotten outrage of amboyna in 1623. he made a quite unprovoked attack upon the spanish island of hispaniola, and though he failed to conquer it, gained a compensation in the seizure of jamaica (1655). and he insisted upon the obedience of the colonies to the home government with a severity never earlier shown. with him imperial aims may be said to have become, for the first time, one of the ruling ends of the english government. but it was the reign of charles ii. which saw the definite organisation of a clearly conceived imperial policy; in the history of english imperialism there are few periods more important. the chief statesmen and courtiers of the reign, prince rupert, clarendon, shaftesbury, albemarle, were all enthusiasts for the imperial idea. they had a special committee of the privy council for trade and plantations,[4] and appointed john locke, the ablest political thinker of the age, to be its secretary. they pushed home the struggle against the maritime ascendancy of the dutch, and fought two dutch wars; and though the history-books, influenced by the whig prejudice against charles ii., always treat these wars as humiliating and disgraceful, while they treat the dutch war of the commonwealth as just and glorious, the plain fact is that the first dutch war of charles ii. led to the conquest of the dutch north american colony of the new netherlands (1667), and so bridged the gap between the new england and the southern colonies. they engaged in systematic colonisation, founding the new colony of carolina to the south of virginia, while out of their dutch conquests they organised the colonies of new york, new jersey, and delaware; and the end of the reign saw the establishment of the interesting and admirably managed quaker colony of pennsylvania. they started the hudson bay company, which engaged in the trade in furs to the north of the french colonies. they systematically encouraged the east india company, which now began to be more prosperous than at any earlier period, and obtained in bombay its first territorial possession in india. [4] it was not till 1696, however, that this board became permanent. more important, they worked out a new colonial policy, which was to remain, in its main features, the accepted british policy down to the loss of the american colonies in 1782. the theory at the base of this policy was that while the mother-country must be responsible for the defence of all the scattered settlements, which in their weakness were exposed to attack from many sides, in she might reasonably expect to be put in possession of definite trade advantages. hence the navigation act of 1660 provided not only that inter-imperial trade should be carried in english or colonial vessels, but that certain 'enumerated articles,' including some of the most important colonial products, should be sent only to england, so that english merchants should have the profits of selling them to other countries, and the english government the proceeds of duties upon them; and another act provided that imports to the colonies should only come from, or through, england. in other words, england was to be the commercial entrepot of the whole empire; and the regulation of imperial trade as a whole was to belong to the english government and parliament. to the english government also must necessarily fall the conduct of the relations of the empire as a whole with other powers. this commercial system was not, however, purely one-sided. if the colonies were to send their chief products only to england, they were at the same time to have a monopoly, or a marked advantage, in english markets. tobacco-growing had been for a time a promising industry in england; it was prohibited in order that it might not compete with the colonial product; and differential duties were levied on the competing products of other countries and their colonies. in short, the new policy was one of imperial preference; it aimed at turning the empire into an economic unit, of which england should be the administrative and distributing centre. so far the english policy did not differ in kind from the contemporary colonial policy of other countries, though it left to the colonies a greater freedom of trade (for example, in the 'non-enumerated articles') than was ever allowed by spain or france, or by the two great trading companies which controlled the foreign possessions of holland. but there is one respect in which the authors of this system differed very widely from the colonial statesmen of other countries. though they were anxious to organise and consolidate the empire on the basis of a trade system, they had no desire or intention of altering its self-governing character, or of discouraging the growth of a healthy diversity of type and method. every one of the new colonies of this period was provided with the accustomed machinery of representative government: in the case of carolina, the philosopher, john locke, was invited to draw up a model constitution, and although his scheme was quite unworkable, the fact that he was asked to make it affords a striking proof of the seriousness with which the problems of colonial government were regarded. in several of the west indian settlements self-governing institutions were organised during these years. in the frame of government which penn set forth on the foundation of pennsylvania, in 1682, he laid it down that 'any government is free where the laws rule, and where the people are a party to these rules,' and on this basis proceeded to organise his system. according to this definition all the english colonies were free, and they were almost the only free communities in the world. and though it is true that there was an almost unceasing conflict between the government and the new england colonies, no one who studies the story of these quarrels can fail to see that the demands of the new englanders were often unreasonable and inconsistent with the maintenance of imperial unity, while the home government was extremely patient and moderate. above all, almost the most marked feature of the colonial policy of charles ii. was the uniform insistence upon complete religious toleration in the colonies. every new charter contained a clause securing this vital condition. it has long been our habit to condemn the old colonial system as it was defined in this period, and to attribute to it the disruption of the empire in the eighteenth century. but the judgment is not a fair one; it is due to those whig prejudices by which so much of the modern history of england has been distorted. the colonial policy of shaftesbury and his colleagues was incomparably more enlightened than that of any contemporary government. it was an interesting experiment--the first, perhaps, in modern history--in the reconciliation of unity and freedom. and it was undeniably successful: under it the english colonies grew and throve in a very striking way. everything, indeed, goes to show that this system was well designed for the needs of a group of colonies which were still in a state of weakness, still gravely under-peopled and undeveloped. evil results only began to show themselves in the next age, when the colonies were growing stronger and more independent, and when the self-complacent whigs, instead of revising the system to meet new conditions, actually enlarged and emphasised its most objectionable features. (c) the conflict of french and english, 1713-1763 while france and england were defining and developing their sharply contrasted imperial systems, the dutch had fallen into the background, content with the rich dominion which they had already acquired; and the spanish and portuguese empires had both fallen into stagnation. new competitors, indeed, now began to press into the field: the wildly exaggerated notions of the wealth to be made from colonial ventures which led to the frenzied speculations of the early eighteenth century, john law's schemes, and the south sea bubble, induced other powers to try to obtain a share of this wealth; and austria, brandenburg, and denmark made fitful endeavours to become colonising powers. but the enterprises of these states were never of serious importance. the future of the non-european world seemed to depend mainly upon france and england; and it was yet to be determined which of the two systems, centralised autocracy enforcing uniformity, or self-government encouraging variety of type, would prove the more successful and would play the greater part. two bodies of ideas so sharply contrasted were bound to come into conflict. in the two great wars between england and louis xiv. (1688-1713), though the questions at issue were primarily european, the conflict inevitably spread to the colonial field; and in the result france was forced to cede in 1713 the province of acadia (which had twice before been in english hands), the vast basin of hudson's bay, and the island of newfoundland, to which the fishermen of both nations had resorted, though the english had always claimed it. but these were only preliminaries, and the main conflict was fought out during the half-century following the peace of utrecht, 1713-63. during this half-century britain was under the rule of the whig oligarchy, which had no clearly conceived ideas on imperial policy. under the influence of the mercantile class the whigs increased the severity of the restrictions on colonial trade, and prohibited the rise of industries likely to compete with those of the mother-country. but under the influence of laziness and timidity, and of the desire quieta non movere, they made no attempt seriously to enforce either the new or the old restrictions, and in these circumstances smuggling trade between the new england colonies and the french west indies, in defiance of the navigation act and its companions, grew to such dimensions that any serious interference with it would be felt as a real grievance. the whigs and their friends later took credit for their neglect. george grenville, they said, lost the colonies because he read the american dispatches; he would have done much better to leave the dispatches and the colonies alone. but this is a damning apology. if the old colonial system, whose severity, on paper, the whigs had greatly increased, was no longer workable, it should have been revised; but no whig showed any sign of a sense that change was necessary. yet the prevalence of smuggling was not the only proof of the need for change. there was during the period a long succession of disputes between colonial governors and their assemblies, which showed that the restrictions upon their political freedom, as well as those upon their economic freedom, were beginning to irk the colonists; and that self-government was following its universal and inevitable course, and demanding its own fulfilment. but the whigs made no sort of attempt to consider the question whether the self-government of the colonies could be increased without impairing the unity of the empire. the single device of their statesmanship was--not to read the dispatches. and, in the meanwhile, no evil results followed, because the loyalty of the colonists was ensured by the imminence of the french danger. the mother-country was still responsible for the provision of defence, though she was largely cheated of the commercial advantages which were to have been its recompense. after 1713 there was a comparatively long interval of peace between britain and france, but it was occupied by an acute commercial rivalry, in which, on the whole, the french seemed to be getting the upper hand. their sugar islands in the west indies were more productive than the british; their traders were rapidly increasing their hold over the central plain of north america, to the alarm of the british colonists; their intrigues kept alive a perpetual unrest in the recently conquered province of acadia; and away in india, under the spirited direction of francois dupleix, their east india company became a more formidable competitor for the indian trade than it had hitherto been. hence the imperial problem presented itself to the statesmen of that generation as a problem of power rather than as a problem of organisation; and the intense rivalry with france dwarfed and obscured the need for a reconsideration of colonial relations. at length this rivalry flamed out into two wars. the first of these was fought, on both sides, in a strangely half-hearted and lackadaisical way. but in the second (the seven years' war, 1756-63) the british cause, after two years of disaster, fell under the confident and daring leadership of pitt, which brought a series of unexampled successes. the french flag was almost swept from the seas. the french settlements in canada were overrun and conquered. with the fall of quebec it was determined that the system of self-government, and not that of autocracy, should control the destinies of the north american continent; and britain emerged in 1763 the supreme colonial power of the world. the problem of power had been settled in her favour; but the problem of organisation remained unsolved. it emerged in an acute and menacing form as soon as the war was over. during the course of these two wars, and in the interval between them, an extraordinary series of events had opened a new scene for the rivalry of the two great imperial powers, and a new world began to be exposed to the influence of the political ideas of europe. the vast and populous land of india, where the europeans had hitherto been content to play the part of modest traders, under the protection and control of great native rulers, had suddenly been displayed as a field for the imperial ambitions of the european peoples. ever since the first appearance of the dutch, the english, and the french in these regions, northern india had formed a consolidated empire ruled from delhi by the great mogul dynasty; the shadow of its power was also cast over the lesser princes of southern india. but after 1709, and still more after 1739, the mogul empire collapsed, and the whole of india, north and south, rapidly fell into a condition of complete anarchy. a multitude of petty rulers, nominal satraps of the powerless mogul, roving adventurers, or bands of mahratta raiders, put an end to all order and security; and to protect themselves and maintain their trade the european traders must needs enlist considerable bodies of indian troops. it had long been proved that a comparatively small number of troops, disciplined in the european fashion, could hold their own against the loose and disorderly mobs who followed the standards of indian rulers. and it now occurred to the ambitious mind of the frenchman dupleix that it should be possible, by the use of this military superiority, to intervene with effect in the unceasing strife of the indian princes, to turn the scale on one side or the other, and to obtain over the princes whose cause he embraced a commanding influence, which would enable him to secure the expulsion of his english rivals, and the establishment of a french trade monopoly based upon political influence. this daring project was at first triumphantly successful. the english had to follow suit in self-defence, but could not equal the ability of dupleix. in 1750 a french protege occupied the most important throne of southern india at hyderabad, and was protected and kept loyal by a force of french sepoys under the marquis de bussy, whose expenses were met out of the revenues of large provinces (the northern sarkars) placed under french administration; while in the carnatic, the coastal region where all the european traders had their south-eastern headquarters, a second french protege had almost succeeded in crushing his rival, whom the english company supported. but the genius of clive reversed the situation with dramatic swiftness; the french authorities at home, alarmed at these dangerous adventures, repudiated and recalled dupleix (1754), and the british power was left to apply the methods which he had invented. when the seven years' war broke out (1756), the french, repenting of their earlier decision, sent a substantial force to restore their lost influence in the carnatic, but the result was complete failure. a british protege henceforward ruled in the carnatic; a british force replaced the french at hyderabad; and the revenues of the northern sarkars, formerly assigned for the maintenance of the french force, were handed over to its successor. meanwhile in the rich province of bengal a still more dramatic revolution had taken place. attacked by the young nawab, siraj-uddaula, the british traders at calcutta had been forced to evacuate that prosperous centre (1756). but clive, coming up with a fleet and an army from madras, applied the lessons he had learnt in the carnatic, set up a rival claimant to the throne of bengal, and at plassey (1757) won for his puppet a complete victory. from 1757 onwards the british east india company was the real master in bengal, even more completely than in the carnatic. it had not, in either region, conquered any territory; it had only supported successfully a claimant to the native throne. the native government, in theory, continued as before; the company, in theory, was its subject and vassal. but in practice these great and rich provinces lay at its mercy, and if it did not yet choose to undertake their government, this was only because it preferred to devote itself to its original business of trade. thus by 1763 the british power had achieved a dazzling double triumph. it had destroyed the power of its chief rival both in the east and in the west. it had established the supremacy of the british peoples and of british methods of government throughout the whole continent of north america; and it had entered, blindly and without any conception of what the future was to bring forth, upon the path which was to lead to dominion over the vast continent of india, and upon the tremendous task of grafting the ideas of the west upon the east. such was the outcome of the first two periods in the history of european imperialism. it left central and south america under the stagnant and reactionary government of spain and portugal; the eastern coast of north america under the control of groups of self-governing englishmen; canada, still inhabited by frenchmen, under british dominance; java and the spice islands, together with the small settlement of cape colony, in the hands of the dutch; a medley of european settlements in the west indian islands, and a string of european factories along the coast of west africa; and the beginning of an anomalous british dominion established at two points on the coast of india. but of all the european nations which had taken part in this vast process of expansion, one alone, the british, still retained its vitality and its expansive power. iv the era of revolution, 1763-1825 'colonies are like fruits,' said turgot, the eighteenth-century french economist and statesman: 'they cling to the mother-tree only until they are ripe.' this generalisation, which represented a view very widely held during that and the next age, seemed to be borne out in the most conclusive way by the events of the sixty years following the seven years' war. in 1763 the french had lost almost the whole of the empire which they had toilsomely built up during a century and a half. within twenty years their triumphant british rivals were forced to recognise the independence of the american colonies, and thus lost the bulk of what may be called the first british empire. they still retained the recently conquered province of french canada, but it seemed unlikely that the french canadians would long be content to live under an alien dominion: if they had not joined in the american revolution, it was not because they loved the british, but because they hated the americans. the french revolutionary wars brought further changes. one result of these wars was that the dutch lost cape colony, ceylon, and java, though java was restored to them in 1815. a second result was that when napoleon made himself master of spain in 1808, the spanish colonies in central and south america ceased to be governed from the mother-country; and having tasted the sweets of independence, and still more, the advantages of unrestricted trade, could never again be brought into subordination. by 1825 nothing was left of the vast spanish empire save the canaries, cuba, porto rico, and the philippine islands; nothing was left of the portuguese empire save a few decaying posts on the coasts of africa and india; nothing was left of the dutch empire save java and its dependencies, restored in 1815; nothing was left of the french empire save a few west indian islands; and what had been the british american colonies were now the united states, a great power declaring to europe, through the mouth of president monroe, that she would resist any attempt of the european powers to restore the old regime in south america. it appeared that the political control of european states over non-european regions must be short-lived and full of trouble; and that the influence of europe upon the non-european world would henceforth be exercised mainly through new independent states imbued with european ideas. imperial aspirations thus seemed to that and the next generation at once futile and costly. of all these colonial revolutions the most striking was that which tore away the american colonies from britain (1764-82); not only because it led to the creation of one of the great powers of the world, and was to afford the single instance which has yet arisen of a daughter-nation outnumbering its mother-country, but still more because it seemed to prove that not even the grant of extensive powers of self-government would secure the permanent loyalty of colonies. indeed, from the standpoint of realpolitik, it might be argued that in the case of america self-government was shown to be a dangerous gift; for the american colonies, which alone among european settlements had obtained this supreme endowment, were the first, and indeed the only, european settlements to throw off deliberately their connection with the mother-country. france and holland lost their colonies by war, and even the spanish colonies would probably never have thought of severing their relations with spain but for the anomalous conditions created by the napoleonic conquest. the american revolution is, then, an event unique at once in its causes, its character, and its consequences; and it throws a most important illumination upon some of the problems of imperialism. it cannot be pretended that the revolt of the colonists was due to oppression or to serious misgovernment. the paltry taxes which were its immediate provoking cause would have formed a quite negligible burden upon a very prosperous population; they were to have been spent exclusively within the colonies themselves, and would have been mainly used to meet a part of the cost of colonial defence, the bulk of which was still to be borne by the mother-country. if the colonists had been willing to suggest any other means of raising the required funds, their suggestions would have been readily accepted. this was made plain at several stages in the course of the discussion, but the invitation to suggest alternative methods of raising money met with no response. the plain fact is that britain, already heavily loaded with debt, was bearing practically the whole burden of colonial defence, and was much less able than the colonies themselves to endure the strain. as for the long-established restrictions on colonial trade, which in fact though not in form contributed as largely as the proposals of direct taxation to cause the revolt, they were far less severe, even if they had been strictly enforced, than the restrictions imposed upon the trade of other european settlements. it is equally misleading to attribute the blame of the revolt wholly to george iii. and the ministers by whom he was served during the critical years. no doubt it is possible to imagine a more tactful man than george grenville, a more far-seeing and courageous statesman than lord north, a less obstinate prince than george iii. himself. but it may be doubted whether any change of men would have done more than postpone the inevitable. the great whig apologists who have dictated the accepted view of british history in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries have laboured to create the impression that if only burke, chatham, and charles fox had had the handling of the issue, the tragedy of disruption would have been avoided. but there is no evidence that any of these men, except perhaps burke, appreciated the magnitude and difficulty of the questions that had been inevitably raised in 1764, and must have been raised whoever had been in power; or that they would have been able to suggest a workable new scheme of colonial government which would have met the difficulty. if they had put forward such a scheme, it would have been wrecked on the resistance of british opinion, which was still dominated by the theories and traditions of the old colonial system; and even if it had overcome this obstacle, it would very likely have been ruined by the captious and litigious spirit to which events had given birth among the colonists, especially in new england. the root of the matter was that the old colonial system, which had suited well enough the needs of the colonies as they were when it was devised by the statesmen of charles ii.'s reign, was no longer suitable to their condition now that they had become great and prosperous communities of freemen. they enjoyed self-government on a scale more generous than any other communities in the world outside of britain; indeed, in one sense they enjoyed it on a more generous scale than britain herself, since political rights were much more widely exercised in the colonies, owing to the natural conditions of a new and prosperous land, than they were to be, or could be, in britain until nearly a century later. no direct taxation had as yet been imposed upon them without their own consent. they made the laws by which their own lives were regulated. they were called upon to pay no tribute to the home government, except the very indirect levy on goods passing through england to or from their ports, and this was nearly balanced by the advantages which they enjoyed in the british market, and far more than balanced by the protection afforded to them by the british fleet. they were not even required to raise troops for the defence of their own frontiers except of their own free will, and the main burden of defending even their landward frontier was borne by the mother-country. but being british they had the instinct of self-government in their blood and bones, and they found that the control of their own affairs was qualified or limited in two principal ways. in the first place, the executive and judicial officers who carried out the laws were not appointed by them but by the crown in england: the colonies were not responsible for the administration of their own laws. in the second place, the regulations by which their foreign trade was governed were determined, not by themselves, but by the british parliament: they were not responsible for the control of their own traffic with the outside world. it is true that the salaries of the executive officials and the judges depended upon their grant, and that any governor who acted in the teeth of colonial opinion would find his position quite untenable, so that the colonists exercised a real if indirect control over administration. it is true also that they accepted the general principles of the commercial system, and had reaped great benefits from it. but it is the unfailing instinct of the citizens in a self-governing community to be dissatisfied unless they feel that they have a full and equal share in the control of their own destinies. denied responsibility, they are apt to become irresponsible; and when all allowance has been made for the stupidities of governors and for the mistakes of the home authorities, it must be recognised that the thirteen american colonial legislatures often behaved in a very irresponsible way, and were extremely difficult to handle. they refused to vote fixed salaries to their judges in order to make their power felt, simply because the judges were appointed by the crown, although in doing so they were dangerously undermining judicial independence. they refused in many cases to supply anything like adequate contingents for the war against the french and their indian allies, partly because each legislature was afraid of being more generous than the others, partly because they could trust to the home government to make good their deficiencies. yet at the same time they did nothing to check, but rather encouraged, the wholesale smuggling by which the trade regulations were reduced to a nullity, though these regulations were not only accepted in principle by themselves, but afforded the only compensation to the mother-country for the cost of colonial defence. it is as unscientific to blame the colonists and their legislatures for this kind of action, as it is to blame the british statesmen for their proposals. it was the almost inevitable result of the conditions among a free, prosperous, and extremely self-confident people; it was, indeed, the proof that in this young people the greatest political ideal of western civilisation, the ideal of self-government, had taken firm root. the denial of responsibility was producing irresponsibility; and even if the stamp act and the tea duties had never been proposed, this state of things was bound to lead to increasing friction. nor must it be forgotten that this friction was accentuated by the contrast between the democratic conditions of colonial life, and the aristocratic organisation of english society. it ought to have been obvious, long before grenville initiated his new policy in 1764, that the colonial system was not working well; and the one circumstance which had prevented serious conflict was the danger which threatened the colonists in the aggressive attitude of the french to the north and west. since the individual colonies refused to raise adequate forces for their own defence, or to co-operate with one another in a common scheme, they were dependent for their security upon the mother-country. but as soon as the danger was removed, as it was in 1763, this reason for restraint vanished; and although the great majority of the colonists were quite sincerely desirous of retaining their membership of the british commonwealth, the conditions would inevitably have produced a state of intensifying friction, unless the whole colonial system had been drastically reconstructed. reconstruction was therefore inevitable in 1764. the whig policy of simply ignoring the issue and 'not reading the dispatches' could no longer be pursued; it was indeed largely responsible for the mischief. george iii. and grenville deserve the credit of seeing this. but their scheme of reconstruction not unnaturally amounted to little more than a tightening-up of the old system. the trade laws were to be more strictly enforced. the governors and the judges were to be made more independent of the assemblies by being given fixed salaries. the colonists were to bear a larger share of the cost of defence, which fell so unfairly on the mother-country. if the necessary funds could be raised by means approved by the colonists themselves, well and good; but if not, then they must be raised by the authority of the imperial parliament. for the existing system manifestly could not continue indefinitely, and it was better to have the issue clearly raised, even at the risk of conflict, than to go on merely drifting. when the colonists (without suggesting any alternative proposals) contented themselves with repudiating the right of parliament to tax them, and proceeded to outrageous insults to the king's authority, and the most open defiance of the trade regulations, indignation grew in britain. it seemed, to the average englishman, that the colonists proposed to leave every public burden, even the cost of judges' salaries, on the shoulders of the mother-country, already loaded with a debt which had been largely incurred in defence of the colonies; but to disregard every obligation imposed upon themselves. a system whereunder the colony has all rights and no enforcible duties, the mother-country all duties and no enforcible rights, obviously could not work. that was the system which, in the view of the gentlemen of england, the colonists were bent upon establishing; and, taking this view, they cannot be blamed for refusing to accept such a conclusion. there was no one, either in britain or in america, capable of grasping the essentials of the problem, which were that, once established, self-government inevitably strives after its own fulfilment; that these british settlers, in whom the british tradition of self-government had been strengthened by the freedom of a new land, would never be content until they enjoyed a full share in the control of their own affairs; and that although they seemed, even to themselves, to be fighting about legal minutiae, about the difference between internal and external duties, about the legality of writs of assistance, and so forth, the real issue was the deeper one of the fulfilment of self-government. could fully responsible self-government be reconciled with imperial unity? could any means be devised whereby the units in a fellowship of free states might retain full control over their own affairs, and at the same time effectively combine for common purposes? that was and is the ultimate problem of british imperial organisation, as it was and is the ultimate problem of international relations. but the problem, though it now presented itself in a comparatively simple form, was never fairly faced on either side of the atlantic. for the mother and her daughters too quickly reached the point of arguing about their legal rights against one another, and when friends begin to argue about their legal rights, the breach of their friendship is at hand. so the dreary argument, which lasted for eleven years (1764-75), led to the still more dreary war, which lasted for seven years (1775-82); and the only family of free self-governing communities existing in the world was broken up in bitterness. this was indeed a tragedy. for if the great partnership of freedom could have been reorganised on conditions that would have enabled it to hold together, the cause of liberty in the world would have been made infinitely more secure. the revolution gave to the americans the glory of establishing the first fully democratic system of government on a national scale that had yet existed in the world, and of demonstrating that by the machinery of self-government a number of distinct and jealous communities could be united for common purposes. the new american commonwealth became an inspiration for eager liberals in the old world as well as in the new, and its successful establishment formed the strongest of arguments for the democratic idea in all lands. unhappily the pride of this great achievement helped to persuade the americans that they were different from the rest of the world, and unaffected by its fortunes. they were apt to think of themselves as the inventors and monopolists of political liberty. cut off by a vast stretch of ocean from the old world, and having lost that contact with its affairs which the relation with britain had hitherto maintained, they followed but dimly, and without much comprehension, the obscure and complex struggles wherein the spirit of liberty was working out a new europe, in the face of difficulties vastly greater than any with which the americans had ever had to contend. they had been alienated from britain, the one great free state of europe, and had been persuaded by their reading of their own experience that she was a tyrant-power; and they thus found it hard to recognise her for what, with all her faults, she genuinely was--the mother of free institutions in the modern world, the founder and shaper of their own prized liberties. all these things combined to persuade the great new republic that she not only might, but ought to, stand aloof from the political problems of the rest of the world, and take no interest in its concerns. this attitude, the natural product of the conditions, was to last for more than a century, and was to weaken greatly the cause of liberty in the world. although the most obvious features of the half-century following the great british triumph of 1763 were the revolt of the american colonies and the apparently universal collapse of the imperialist ambitions of the european nations, a more deeply impressive feature of the period was that, in spite of the tragedy and humiliation of the great disruption, the imperial impetus continued to work potently in britain, alone among the european nations; and to such effect that at the end of the period she found herself in control of a new empire more extensive than that which she had lost, and far more various in its character. having failed to solve one great imperial problem, she promptly addressed herself to a whole series of others even more difficult, and for these she was to find more hopeful solutions. when the american revolt began, the canadian colonies to the north were in an insecure and unorganised state. on the coast, in nova scotia and newfoundland, there was a small british population; but the riverine colony of canada proper, with its centre at quebec, was still purely french, and was ruled by martial law. accustomed to a despotic system, and not yet reconciled to the british supremacy, the french settlers were obviously unready for self-government. but the quebec act of 1774, by securing the maintenance of the roman catholic religion and of french civil law, ensured the loyalty of the french; and this act is also noteworthy as the first formal expression of willingness to admit or even welcome the existence, within the hospitable limits of the empire, of a variety of types of civilisation. in the new british empire there was to be no uniformity of kultur. the close of the american struggle, however, brought a new problem. many thousands of exiles from the revolting colonies, willing to sacrifice everything in order to retain their british citizenship, poured over the borders into the canadian lands. they settled for the first time the rich province of ontario, greatly increased the population of nova scotia, and started the settlement of new brunswick. to these exiles britain felt that she owed much, and, despite her own financial distress, expended large sums in providing them with the means to make a good beginning in their new homes. but it was impossible to deny these british settlers, and the emigrants from britain who soon began to join them, the rights of self-government, to which they were accustomed. their advent, however, in a hitherto french province, raised the very difficult problem of racial relationship. they might have been used as a means for anglicising the earlier french settlers and for forcing them into a british mould; it may fairly be said that most european governments would have used them in this way, and many of the settlers would willingly have fallen in with such a programme. but that would have been out of accord with the genius of the british system, which believes in freedom and variety. accordingly, by the act of 1791, the purely french region of quebec or lower canada was separated from the british region of ontario or upper canada, and both districts, as well as the coastal settlements, were endowed with self-governing institutions of the familiar pattern--an elected assembly controlling legislation and taxation, a nominated governor and council directing the executive. thus within eighteen years of their conquest the french colonists were introduced to self-government. and within nine years of the loss of the american colonies, a new group of self-governing american colonies had been organised. they were sufficiently content with the system to resist with vigour and success an american invasion in 1812. while the american controversy was proceeding, one of the greatest of british navigators, captain cook, was busy with his remarkable explorations. he was the first to survey the archipelagoes of the pacific; more important, he was the real discoverer of australia and new zealand; for though the dutch explorers had found these lands more than a century earlier, they had never troubled to complete their explorations. thus a vast new field, eminently suitable for european settlement, was placed at the disposal of britain. it was utilised with extraordinary promptitude. the loss of the american colonies had deprived britain of her chief dumping-ground for convicts. in 1788, six years after the recognition of their independence, she decided to use the new continent for this purpose, and the penal settlement of botany bay began (under unfavourable auspices) the colonisation of australia. but the most important, and the most amazing, achievement of britain in this period was the establishment and extension of her empire in india, and the planting within it of the first great gift of western civilisation, the sovereignty of a just and impartial law. this was a novel and a very difficult task, such as no european people had yet undertaken; and it is not surprising that there should have been a period of bewildered misgovernment before it was achieved. that it should have been achieved at all is one of the greatest miracles of european imperialism. by 1763 the east india company had established a controlling influence over the nawabs of two important regions, bengal and the carnatic, and had shown, in a series of struggles, that its control was not to be shaken off. but the company had not annexed any territory, or assumed any responsibility for the government of these rich provinces. its agents in the east, who were too far from london to be effectively controlled, enjoyed power without responsibility. they were privileged traders, upon whom the native governments dared not impose restrictions, and (as any body of average men would have done under similar circumstances) they gravely abused their position to build up huge fortunes for themselves. during the fifteen years following the battle of plassey (1757) there is no denying that the political power of the british in india was a mere curse to the native population, and led to the complete disorganisation of the already decrepit native system of government in the provinces affected. it was vain for the directors at home to scold their servants. there were only two ways out of the difficulty. one was that the company should abandon india, which was not to be expected. the other was that, possessing power, of which it was now impossible to strip themselves, they should assume the responsibility for its exercise, and create for their subjects a just and efficient system of government. but the company would not see this. they had never desired political power, but had drifted into the possession of it in spite of themselves. they honestly disliked the idea of establishing by force an alien domination over subject peoples, and this feeling was yet more strongly held by the most influential political circles in england. the company desired nothing but trade. their business was that of traders, and they wanted only to be left free to mind their business. so the evils arising from power without responsibility continued, and half-hearted attempts to amend them in 1765 and in 1769 only made the conditions worse. the events of the years from 1757 to 1772 showed that when the superior organisation of the west came in contact with the east, mere trading exploitation led to even worse results than a forcibly imposed dominion; and the only solution lay in the wise adaptation of western methods of government to eastern conditions. thus britain found herself faced with an imperial problem of apparently insuperable difficulty, which reached its most acute stage just at the time when the american trouble was at its height. the british parliament and government intervened, and in 1773 for the first time assumed some responsibility for the affairs of the east india company. but they did not understand the indian problem--how, indeed, should they?--and their first solution was a failure. by a happy fortune, however, the east india company had conferred the governorship of bengal (1772) upon the greatest englishman of the eighteenth century, warren hastings. hastings pensioned off the nawab, took over direct responsibility for the government of bengal, and organised a system of justice which, though far from perfect, established for the first time the reign of law in an indian realm. his firm and straightforward dealings with the other indian powers still further strengthened the position of the company; and when in the midst of the american war, at a moment when no aid could be expected from britain, a combination of the most formidable indian powers, backed by a french fleet, threatened the downfall of the company's authority, hastings' resourceful and inspiring leadership was equal to every emergency. he not only brought the company with heightened prestige out of the war, but throughout its course no hostile army was ever allowed to cross the frontiers of bengal. in the midst of the unceasing and desolating wars of india, the territories under direct british rule formed an island of secure peace and of justice. that was hastings' supreme contribution: it was the foundation upon which arose the fabric of the indian empire. hastings was not a great conqueror or annexer of territory; the only important acquisition made during his regime was effected, in defiance of his protests, by the hostile majority which for a time overrode him in his own council, and which condemned him for ambition. his work was to make the british rule mean security and justice in place of tyranny; and it was because it had come to mean this that it grew, after his time, with extraordinary rapidity. it was not by the desire of the directors or the home government that it grew. they did everything in their power to check its growth, for they shrank from any increase to their responsibilities. they even prohibited by law all annexations, or the making of alliances with indian powers.[5] but fate was too strong for them. even a governor like lord cornwallis, a convinced supporter of the policy of non-expansion and non-intervention, found himself forced into war, and compelled to annex territories; because non-intervention was interpreted by the indian powers as a confession of weakness and an invitation to attack. non-intervention also gave openings to the french, who, since the outbreak of the revolution, had revived their old indian ambitions; and while bonaparte was engaged in the conquest of egypt as a half-way house to india (1797), french agents were busy building up a new combination of indian powers against the company. [5] india act of 1784 this formidable coalition was about to come to a head when, in 1798, there landed in india a second man of genius, sent by fate at the critical moment. in five years, by an amazing series of swiftly successful wars and brilliantly conceived treaties, the marquess wellesley broke the power of every member of the hostile coalitions, except two of the mahratta princes. the area of british territory was quadrupled; the most important of the indian princes became vassals of the company; and the great mogul of delhi himself, powerless now, but always a symbol of the over-lordship of india, passed under british protection. when wellesley left india in 1805, the east india company was already the paramount power in india south-east of the sutlej and the indus. the mahratta princes, indeed, still retained a restricted independence, and for an interval the home authorities declined to permit any interference with them, even though they were manifestly giving protection to bands of armed raiders who terrorised and devastated territories which were under british protection. but the time came when the mahrattas themselves broke the peace. then their power also was broken; and in 1818 britain stood forth as the sovereign ruler of india. this was only sixty years after the battle of plassey had established british influence, though not british rule, in a single province of india; only a little over thirty years after warren hastings returned to england, leaving behind him an empire still almost limited to that single province. there is nothing in history that can be compared with the swiftness of this achievement, which is all the more remarkable when we remember that almost every step in the advance was taken with extreme unwillingness. but the most impressive thing about this astounding fabric of power, which extended over an area equal to half of europe and inhabited by perhaps one-sixth of the human race, was not the swiftness with which it was created, but the results which flowed from it. it had begun in corruption and oppression, but it had grown because it had come to stand for justice, order, and peace. in 1818 it could already be claimed for the british rule in india that it had brought to the numerous and conflicting races, religions, and castes of that vast and ancient land, three boons of the highest value: political unity such as they had never known before; security from the hitherto unceasing ravages of internal turbulence and war; and, above all, the supreme gift which the west had to offer to the east, the substitution of an unvarying reign of law for the capricious wills of innumerable and shifting despots. this is an achievement unexampled in history, and it alone justified the imposition of the rule of the west over the east, which had at first seemed to produce nothing but evil. it took place during the age of revolution, when the external empires of europe were on all sides falling into ruin; and it passed at the time almost unregarded, because it was overshadowed by the drama of the revolutionary and napoleonic wars. the construction of the indian empire would of itself suffice to make an age memorable, but it does not end the catalogue of the achievements of british imperialism in this tremendous period. as a result of the participation of holland in the war on the side of france, the dutch colony at the cape of good hope was occupied by britain. it was first occupied in 1798, restored for a brief period in 1801, reoccupied in 1806, and finally retained under the treaty settlement of 1815. the cape was, in fact, the most important acquisition secured to britain by that treaty; and it is worth noting that while the other great powers who had joined in the final overthrow of napoleon helped themselves without hesitation to immense and valuable territories, britain, which had alone maintained the struggle from beginning to end without flagging, actually paid the sum of 2,000,000 pounds to holland as a compensation for this thinly peopled settlement. she retained it mainly because of its value as a calling-station on the way to india. but it imposed upon her an imperial problem of a very difficult kind. as in canada, she had to deal here with an alien race of european origin and proud traditions; but this racial problem was accentuated by the further problem of dealing with a preponderant and growing negro population. how were justice, peace, liberty, and equality of rights to be established in such a field? it was, then, an astonishing new empire which had grown up round britain during the period when the world was becoming convinced that colonial empires were not worth acquiring, because they could not last. it was an empire of continents or sub-continents--canada, australia, india, south africa--not to speak of innumerable scattered islands and trading-posts dotted over all the seas of the world, which had either survived from an earlier period, or been acquired in order that they might serve as naval bases. it was spread round the whole globe; it included almost every variety of soil, products, and climate; it was inhabited by peoples of the most varying types; it presented an infinite variety of political and racial problems. in 1825 this empire was the only extra-european empire of importance still controlled by any of the historic imperial powers of western europe. and at the opening of the nineteenth century, when extra-european empires seemed to have gone out of fashion, the greatest of all imperial questions was the question whether the political capacity of the british peoples, having failed to solve the comparatively simple problem of finding a mode of organisation which could hold together communities so closely akin as those of america and the parent islands, would be capable of achieving any land of effective organisation for this new astounding fabric, while at the same time securing to all its members that liberty and variety of development which in the case of america had only been fully secured at the cost of disruption. v europe and the non-european world 1815-1878 when the european peoples settled down, in 1815, after the long wars of the french revolution, they found themselves faced by many problems, but there were few europeans who would have included among these problems the extension of western civilisation over the as yet unsubjugated portions of the world. men's hearts were set upon the organisation of permanent peace: that seemed the greatest of all questions, and, for a time, it appeared to have obtained a satisfactory solution with the organisation of the great league of peace of 1815. but the peace was to be short-lived, because it was threatened by the emergence of a number of other problems of great complexity. first among these stood the problem of nationality: the increasingly clamorous demand of divided or subject peoples for unity and freedom. alongside of this arose the sister-problem of liberalism: the demand raised from all sides, among peoples who had never known political liberty, for the institutions of self-government which had been proved practicable by the british peoples, and turned into the object of a fervent belief by the preachings of the french. these two causes were to plunge europe into many wars, and to vex and divide the peoples of every european country, throughout the period 1815-78. and to add to the complexity, there was growing in intensity during all these years the problem of industrialism--the transformation of the very bases of life in all civilised communities, and the consequent development of wholly new, and terribly difficult, social issues. preoccupied with all these questions, the statesmen and the peoples of most european states had no attention to spare for the non-european world. they neglected it all the more readily because the events of the preceding period seemed to demonstrate that colonial empires were not worth the cost and labour necessary for their attainment, since they seemed doomed to fall asunder as soon as they began to be valuable. yet the period 1815-78 was to see an extension of european civilisation in the non-european world more remarkable than that of any previous age. the main part in this extension was played by britain, who found herself left free, without serious rivalry in any part of the globe, to expand and develop the extraordinary empire which she possessed in 1815, and to deal with the bewildering problems which it presented. so marked was the british predominance in colonial activity during this age that it has been called the age of british monopoly, and so far as trans-oceanic activities were concerned, this phrase very nearly represents the truth. but there were other developments of the period almost as remarkable as the growth and reorganisation of the british empire; and it will be convenient to survey these in the first instance before turning to the british achievement. the place of honour, as always in any great story of european civilisation, belongs to france. undeterred by the loss of her earlier empire, and unexhausted by the strain of the great ordeal through which she had just passed, france began in these years the creation of her second colonial empire, which was to be in many ways more splendid than the first. within fifteen years of the fall of napoleon, the french flag was flying in algiers. the northern coast of africa, from the gulf of syrtis to the atlantic, which has been in modern times divided into the three districts of tunis, algeria, and morocco, forms essentially a single region, whose character is determined by the numerous chains of the atlas mountains. this region, shut off from the rest of africa not only by the atlas but by the most impassable of all geographical barriers, the great sahara desert, really belongs to europe rather than to the continent of which it forms a part. its fertile valleys were once the homes of brilliant civilisations: they were the seat of the carthaginian empire, and at a later date they constituted one of the richest and most civilised provinces of the roman empire. their civilisation was wrecked by that barbarous german tribe, the vandals, in the fifth century. it received only a partial and temporary revival after the mahomedan conquest at the end of the seventh century, and since that date this once happy region has gradually lapsed into barbarism. during the modern age it was chiefly known as the home of ruthless and destructive pirates, whose chief headquarters were at algiers, and who owned a merely nominal allegiance to the sultan of turkey. ever since the time of khair-ed-din barbarossa, in the early sixteenth century, the powers of europe have striven in vain to keep the barbary corsairs in check. charles v., philip ii., louis xiv. attacked them with only temporary success: they continued to terrorise the trade of the mediterranean, to seize trading-ships, to pillage the shores of spain and italy, and to carry off thousands of christians into a cruel slavery; robinson crusoe, it may be recalled, was one of their victims. the powers at vienna endeavoured to concert action against them in 1815. they were attacked by a british fleet in 1816, and by a combined british and french fleet in 1819. but all such temporary measures were insufficient. the only cure for the ill was that the headquarters of the pirate chiefs should be conquered, and brought under civilised government. this task france was rather reluctantly drawn into undertaking, as the result of a series of insults offered by the pirates to the french flag between 1827 and 1830. at first the aim of the conquerors was merely to occupy and administer the few ports which formed the chief centres of piracy. but experience showed that this was futile, since it involved endless wars with the unruly clansmen of the interior. gradually, therefore, the whole of algeria was systematically conquered and organised. the process took nearly twenty years, and was not completed until 1848. in all the records of european imperialism there has been no conquest more completely justified both by the events which led up to it and by the results which have followed from it. peace and law reign throughout a country which had for centuries been given over to anarchy. the wild tribesmen are unlearning the habits of disorder, and being taught to accept the conditions of a civilised life. the great natural resources of the country are being developed as never since the days of roman rule. no praise can be too high for the work of the french administrators who have achieved these results. and it is worth noting that, alone among the provinces conquered by the european peoples, algeria has been actually incorporated in the mother-country; it is part of the french republic, and its elected representatives sit in the french parliament. in the nature of things the conquest of algeria could not stand alone. algeria is separated by merely artificial lines from tunis on the east and morocco on the west, where the old conditions of anarchy still survived; and the establishment of order and peace in the middle area of this single natural region was difficult, so long as the areas on either side remained in disorder and war. in 1844 france found it necessary to make war upon morocco because of the support which it had afforded to a rebellious algerian chief, and this episode illustrated the close connection of the two regions. but the troops were withdrawn as soon as the immediate purpose was served. france had not yet begun to think of extending her dominion over the areas to the east and west of algeria. that was to be the work of the next period. further south in africa, france retained, as a relic of her older empire, a few posts on the coast of west africa, notably senegal. from these her intrepid explorers and traders began to extend their influence, and the dream of a great french empire in northern africa began to attract french minds. but the realisation of this dream also belongs to the next period. in the far east, too, this was a period of beginnings. ever since 1787--before the revolution--the french had possessed a foothold on the coast of annam, from which french missionaries carried on their labours among the peoples of indo-china. maltreatment of these missionaries led to a war with annam in 1858, and in 1862 the extreme south of the annamese empire--the province of cochin-china--was ceded to france. lastly, the french obtained a foothold in the pacific, by the annexation of tahiti and the marquesas islands in 1842, and of new caledonia in 1855. but in 1878 the french dominions in the non-european world were, apart from algeria, of slight importance. they were quite insignificant in comparison with the far-spreading realms of her ancient rival, britain. on a much greater scale than the expansion of france was the expansion of the already vast russian empire during this period. the history of russia in the nineteenth century is made up of a series of alternations between a regime of comparative liberalism, when the interest of government and people was chiefly turned towards the west, and a regime of reaction, when the government endeavoured to pursue what was called a 'national' or purely russian policy, and to exclude all western influences. during these long intervals of reaction, attention was turned eastward; and it was in the reactionary periods, mainly, that the russian power was rapidly extended in three directions--over the caucasus, over central asia, and in the far east. before this advance, the huge russian empire had been (everywhere except on the west, in the region of poland) marked off by very clearly defined barriers. the caucasus presented a formidable obstacle between russia and the turkish and persian empires; the deserts of central asia separated her from the moslem peoples of khiva, bokhara and turkestan; the huge range of the altai mountains and the desert of gobi cut off her thinly peopled province of eastern siberia from the chinese empire; while in the remote east her shores verged upon ice-bound and inhospitable seas. hers was thus an extraordinarily isolated and self-contained empire, except on the side of europe; and even on the side of europe she was more inaccessible than any other state, being all but land-locked, and divided from central europe by a belt of forests and marshes. the part she had played in the napoleonic wars, and in the events which followed them, had brought her more fully into contact with europe than she had ever been before. the acquisition of poland and finland, which she obtained by the treaties of 1815, had increased this contact, for both of these states were much influenced by western ideas. russia had promised that their distinct national existence, and their national institutions, should be preserved; and this seemed to suggest that the russian empire might develop into a partnership of nations of varying types, not altogether unlike the form into which the british empire was developing. but this conception had no attraction for the russian mind, or at any rate for the russian government; and the reactionary or pure-russian school, which strove to exclude all alien influences, was inevitably hostile to it. hence the period of reaction, and of eastward conquest, saw also the denial of the promises made in 1815. poland preserved her distinct national organisation, in any full degree, only for fifteen years; even in the faintest degree, it was preserved for less than fifty years. finland was allowed a longer grace, but only, perhaps, because she was isolated and had but a small population: her turn for 'russification' was to come in due course. the exclusion of western influence, the segregation of russia from the rest of the world, and the repudiation of liberty and of varieties of type thus form the main features of the reactionary periods which filled the greater part of this age; and the activity of russia in eastward expansion was in part intended to forward this policy, by diverting the attention of the russian people from the west towards the east, and by substituting the pride of dominion for the desire for liberty. hence imperialism came to be identified, for the russian people, with the denial of liberty. but it is a very striking fact that each of the three main lines of territorial advance followed by russia in asia during this period led her to overstep the natural barriers which had made her an isolated and self-dependent empire, brought her into relation with other civilisations, and compelled her to play her part as one of the factors in world-politics. russia had begun the conquest of the wild caucasus region as early as 1802; after a long series of wars, she completed it by the acquisition of the region of kars in 1878. the mastery of the caucasus brought her into immediate relation with the armenian province of the turkish empire, which she henceforward threatened from the east as well as from the west. it brought her into contact also with the persian empire, over whose policy, from 1835 onwards, she wielded a growing influence, to the perturbation of britain. and besides bringing her into far closer relations with the two greatest mahomedan powers, it gave her a considerable number of mahomedan subjects, since some of the caucasus tribes belonged to that faith. again, the conquest of central asia led her to overstep the barrier of the kirghiz deserts. the wandering kirghiz and turkoman tribes of this barren region lived largely upon the pillage of caravans, and upon raids into neighbouring countries; they disposed of their spoil (which often included russian captives) mainly in the bazars of bokhara, khiva, samarkand and khokand--mahomedan khanates which occupied the more fertile areas in the southern and south-eastern part of the desert region. the attempt to control the turkoman raiders brought russia into conflict with these outposts of islam. almost the whole of this region was conquered in a long series of campaigns between 1848 and 1876. these conquests (which covered an area 1200 miles from east to west and 600 miles from north to south) made russia a great mahomedan power. they also brought her into direct contact with afghanistan. russian agents were at work in afghanistan from 1838 onwards. the shadow of her vast power, looming over persia and the persian gulf on the one hand, and over the mountain frontiers of india on the other, naturally appeared highly menacing to britain. it was the direct cause of the advance of the british power from the indus over north-western india, until it could rest upon the natural frontier of the mountains--an advance which took place mainly during the years 1839-49. and it formed the chief source of the undying suspicion of russia which was the dominant note of british foreign policy throughout the period. another feature of these conquests was that, taken in conjunction with the french conquest of algeria and the british conquest of india, they constituted the first serious impact of european civilisation upon the vast realm of islam. until now the regions of the middle east which had been subjugated by the followers of mahomed had repelled every attack of the west. more definite in its creed, and more exacting in its demands upon the allegiance of its adherents, than any other religion, mahomedanism had for more than a thousand years been able to resist with extraordinary success the influence of other civilisations; and it had been, from the time of the crusades onwards, the most formidable opponent of the civilisation of the west. under the rule of the turk the mahomedan world had become stagnant and sterile, and it had shut out not merely the direct control of the west (which would have been legitimate enough), but the influence of western ideas. all the innumerable schemes of reform which were based upon the retention of the old regime in the turkish empire have hopelessly broken down; and the only chance for an awakening in these lands of ancient civilisation seemed to depend upon the breakdown of the old system under the impact of western imperialism or insurgent nationalism. it has only been during the nineteenth century, as a result of russian, french, and british imperialism, that the resisting power of islam has begun to give way to the influence of europe. the third line of russian advance was on the pacific coast, where in the years 1858 and 1860 russia obtained from china the amur province, with the valuable harbour of vladivostok. it was an almost empty land, but its acquisition made russia a pacific power, and brought her into very close neighbourhood with china, into whose reserved markets, at the same period, the maritime powers of the west were forcing an entrance. at the same time russian relations with japan, which were to have such pregnant consequences, were beginning: in 1875 the japanese were forced to cede the southern half of the island of sakhalin, and perhaps we may date from this year the suspicion of russia which dominated japanese policy for a long time to come. thus, while in europe russia was trying to shut herself off from contact with the world, her advances in asia had brought her at three points into the full stream of world-politics. her vast empire, though for the most part very thinly peopled, formed beyond all comparison the greatest continuous area ever brought under a single rule, since it amounted to between eight and nine million square miles; and when the next age, the age of rivalry for world-power, began, this colossal fabric of power haunted and dominated the imaginations of men. a demonstration of the growing power of western civilisation, even more impressive than the expansion of the russian empire, was afforded during these years by the opening to western influence of the ancient, pot-bound empires of the far east, china and japan. the opening of china began with the anglo-chinese war of 1840, which led to the acquisition of hong-kong and the opening of a group of treaty ports to european trade. it was carried further by the combined franco-british war of 1857-58, which was ended by a treaty permitting the free access of european travellers, traders, and missionaries to the interior, and providing for the permanent residence of ambassadors of the signatory powers at the court of pekin. all the european states rushed to share these privileges, and the westernising of china had begun. it did not take place rapidly or completely, and it was accompanied by grave disturbances, notably the taiping rebellion, which was only suppressed by the aid of the british general gordon, in command of a chinese army. but though the process was slow, it was fully at work by 1878. the external trade of china, nearly all in european hands, had assumed great proportions. the missionaries and schoolmasters of europe and america were busily at work in the most populous provinces. shanghai had become a european city, and one of the great trade-centres of the world. in a lame and incompetent way the chinese government was attempting to organise its army on the european model, and to create a navy after the european style. steamboats were plying on the yang-tse-kiang, and the first few miles of railway were open. chinese students were beginning to resort to the universities and schools of the west; and although the conservatism of the chinese mind was very slow to make the plunge, it was already plain that this vast hive of patient, clever, and industrious men was bound to enter the orbit of western civilisation. meanwhile, after a longer and stiffer resistance, japan had made up her mind to a great change with amazing suddenness and completeness. there had been some preliminary relations with the western peoples, beginning with the visits of the american commodore perry in 1853 and 1854, and a few ports had been opened to european trade. but then came a sudden, violent reaction (1862). the british embassy was attacked; a number of british subjects were murdered; a mixed fleet of british, french, dutch, and american ships proved the power of western arms, and japan began to awaken to the necessity of adopting, in self-defence, the methods of these intrusive foreigners. the story of the internal revolution in japan, which began in 1866, cannot be told here; enough that it led to the most astounding change in history. emerging from her age-long isolation and from her contentment with her ancient, unchanging modes of life, japan realised that the future lay with the restless and progressive civilisation of the west; and with a national resolve to which there is no sort of parallel or analogy in history, decided that she must not wait to be brought under subjection, but must adopt the new methods and ideas for herself, if possible without shedding too much of her ancient traditions. by a deliberate exercise of the will and an extraordinary effort of organisation, she became industrial without ceasing to be artistic; she adopted parliamentary institutions without abandoning her religious veneration for the person of the mikado; she borrowed the military methods of the west without losing the chivalrous and fatalist devotion of her warrior-caste; and devised a western educational system without disturbing the deep orientalism of her mind. it was a transformation almost terrifying, and to any western quite bewildering, in its deliberation, rapidity, and completeness. europe long remained unconvinced of its reality. but in 1878 the work was, in its essentials, already achieved, and the one state of non-european origin which has been able calmly to choose what she would accept and what she would reject among the systems and methods of the west, stood ready to play an equal part with the european nations in the later stages of the long imperial struggle. one last sphere of activity remains to be surveyed before we turn to consider the development of the new british empire: the expansion of the independent states which had arisen on the ruins of the first colonial empires in the new world. of the spanish and portuguese states of central and south america it is not necessary to say much. they had established their independence between 1815 and 1825. but the unhappy traditions of the long spanish ascendancy had rendered them incapable of using freedom well, and central and south america became the scene of ceaseless and futile revolutions. the influence of the american monroe doctrine forbade, perhaps fortunately, the intervention of any of the european states to put an end to this confusion, and america herself made no serious attempt to restrain it. it was not until the later years of our period that any large stream of immigration began to flow into these lands from other european countries than spain and portugal, and that their vast natural resources began to be developed by the energy and capital of europe. but by 1878 the more fertile of these states, argentina, brazil, and chili, were being enriched by these means, were becoming highly important elements in the trade-system of the world, and were consequently beginning to achieve a more stable and settled civilisation. in some regards this work (though it belongs mainly to the period after 1878) constitutes one of the happiest results of the extra-european activities of the european peoples during the nineteenth century. it was carried on, in the main, not by governments or under government encouragement, but by the private enterprises of merchants and capitalists; and while a very large part in these enterprises was played by british and american traders and settlers, one of the most notable features of the growth of south america was that it gave play to some of the european peoples, notably the germans and the italians, whose part in the political division of the world was relatively small. far more impressive was the almost miraculous expansion which came to the united states during this period. when the united states started upon their career as an independent nation in 1782, their territory was limited to the lands east of the mississippi, excluding florida, which was still retained by spain. only the eastern margin of this area was at all fully settled; and the population numbered at most 2,000,000, predominantly of british blood. in 1803, by a treaty with napoleon, the french colony of louisiana, with vast and ill-defined claims to the territory west of the mississippi, was purchased from france. meanwhile the stream of immigrants from the eastern states, and in a less degree from europe, was pouring over the alleghany mountains and occupying the great central plain; and by 1815 the population had risen to almost 9,000,000, still mainly of british stock, though it also included substantial french and german elements, as well as large numbers of negro slaves. in 1819 florida was acquired by purchase from spain. in 1845-48 a revolution in texas (then part of mexico), followed by two mexican wars, led to the annexation of a vast area extending from the gulf of mexico to the pacific coast, including the paradise of california; while treaties with britain in 1818 and 1846 determined the northern boundary of the states, and secured their control over the regions of washington and oregon. thus the imperialist spirit was working as irresistibly in the democratic communities of the new world as in the monarchies of europe. not content with the possession of vast and almost unpeopled areas, they had spread their dominion from ocean to ocean, and built up an empire less extensive indeed than that of russia, but even more compact, far richer in resources, and far better suited to be the home of a highly civilised people. into this enormous area there began to pour a mighty flood of immigration from europe, as soon as the napoleonic wars were over. by 1878 the population of the states had risen to about 50,000,000, and was greater than that of any european state save russia. a new world-state of the first rank had arisen. it was made up of contributions from all the european peoples. those of british stock, especially the irish, still predominated throughout this period, but the germans and the scandinavians were becoming increasingly numerous, and the italians, greeks, poles, czechs, russian jews, and other stocks were beginning to form very substantial elements. it was a melting-pot of races, which had to be somehow welded into a nation by the moulding-power of the traditions implanted by the earlier british settlers. it may fairly be said that no community has ever had imposed upon it a more difficult task than the task imposed by fate upon the american people of creating a national unity out of this heterogeneous material. the great experiment was, during this period, singularly successful. the strength of the national sentiment and of the tradition of freedom was very powerfully exhibited in the strain of the great civil war (1861-65) which maintained at a great cost the threatened unity of the republic, and brought about the emancipation of the negro slaves. and the civil war produced in abraham lincoln a national hero, and an exponent of the national character and ideals, worthy to be set beside washington. the america of lincoln manifestly stood for liberty and justice, the fundamental ideals of western civilisation. but in this great moulding tradition of freedom there was one dubious and narrowing element. accustomed to regard herself as having achieved liberty by shaking off her connection with the old world, america was tempted to think of this liberty as something peculiar to herself, something which the 'effete monarchies' of the old world did not, and could not, fully understand or share, something which exempted her from responsibility for the non-american world, and from the duty of aiding and defending liberty beyond her own limits. in the abounding prosperity of this fortunate land, liberty was apt to be too readily identified merely with the opportunity of securing material prosperity, and the love of liberty was apt to become, what indeed it too often is everywhere, a purely self-regarding emotion. the distance of the republic from europe and its controversies, its economic self-sufficiency, its apparent security against all attack, fostered and strengthened this feeling. while the peoples of the old world strove with agony and travail towards freedom and justice, or wrestled with the task of sharing their own civilisation with the backward races of the globe, the echo of their strivings penetrated but faintly into the mind of america, like the noises of the street dimly heard through the shuttered windows of a warmed and lighted room. to the citizens of the middle west and the far west, especially, busy as they were with the development of vast untapped resources, the affairs of the outer world necessarily appeared remote and insignificant. even their newspapers told them little about these far-off events. naturally it appeared that the function of the republic in the progress of the world was to till its own garden, and to afford a haven of refuge to the oppressed and impoverished who poured in from all lands; and this idea was strengthened by the great number of immigrants who were driven to the new world by the failure of the successive european revolutions of the nineteenth century, and by the oppressive tyranny of the habsburg monarchy and the russian despots. this attitude of aloofness from, and contempt, or, at the best, indifference, to the old world was further encouraged by the traditional treatment of american history. the outstanding event of that story was, of course, the breach with britain, with which the independent existence of the republic began, and which constituted also almost its only direct contact with the politics of the old world. the view of this conflict which was driven into the national mind by the school-books, by the annual celebrations of the fourth of july, and by incessant newspaper writing, represented the great quarrel not as a dispute in a family of free communities, in which a new and very difficult problem was raised, and in which there were faults on both sides, but as one in which all the right was on one side, as a heroic resistance of free men against malevolent tyranny. this view has been profoundly modified by the work of american historians, whose researches during the last generation have transformed the treatment of the american revolution. to-day the old one-sided view finds expression, in books of serious pretensions, only in england; and it is to american scholars that we must have recourse for a more scientific and impartial treatment. but the new and saner view has scarcely yet made its way into the school-books and the newspapers. if britain, the mother of political liberty in the modern world, the land from which these freemen had inherited their own liberties and the spirit which made them insist upon their enlargement, was made to appear a tyrant power, how could it be expected that the mass of americans, unversed in world-politics, should follow with sympathy the progress of liberty beyond the limits of their own republic? it was in the light of this traditional attitude that the bulk of americans regarded not only the wars and controversies of europe, but the vast process of european expansion. all these things did not appear to concern them; they seemed to be caused by motives and ideas which the great republic had outgrown, though, as we have already seen, and shall see again, the republic had by no means outgrown them. the strength of this traditional attitude, fostered as it was by every circumstance, naturally made the bulk of the american people slow to realise, when the great challenge of germany was forced upon the world, that the problems of world-politics were as vitally important for them as for all other peoples, and that no free nation could afford to be indifferent to the fate of liberty upon the earth. at one moment, indeed, almost at the beginning of the period, it appeared as if this narrow outlook was about to be abandoned. the league of peace of the great european powers of 1815[6] had, by 1822, developed into a league of despots for the suppression of revolutionary tendencies. they had intervened to crush revolutionary outbreaks in naples and piedmont; they had authorised france to enter spain in order to destroy the democratic system which had been set up in that country in 1820. britain alone protested against these interventions, claiming that every state ought to be left free to fix its own form of government; and in 1822 canning had practically withdrawn from the league of peace, because it was being turned into an engine of oppression. it was notorious that, spain once subjugated, the monarchs desired to go on to the reconquest of the revolting spanish colonies in south america. britain could not undertake a war on the continent against all the continental powers combined, but she could prevent their intervention in america, and canning made it plain that the british fleet would forbid any such action. to strengthen his hands, he suggested to the american ambassador that the united states might take common action in this sense. the result was the famous message of president monroe to congress in december 1823, which declared that the united states accepted the doctrine of non-intervention, and that they would resist any attempt on the part of the european monarchs to establish their reactionary system in the new world. [6] see "nationalism and internationalism," p. 155 ff. in effect this was a declaration of support for britain. it was so regarded by monroe's most influential adviser, thomas jefferson. 'great britain,' he wrote, 'is the nation which can do us the most harm of any one, or all, on earth, and with her on our side we need not fear the whole world. with her, then, we should the most sedulously cherish a cordial friendship; and nothing would tend more to knit our affection than to be fighting once more side by side hi the same cause.' to be fighting side by side with britain in the same cause--the cause of the secure establishment of freedom in the world--this seemed to the democrat jefferson an object worth aiming at; and the promise of this seemed to be the main recommendation of the monroe doctrine. it was intended as an alliance for the defence of freedom, not as a proclamation of aloofness; and thus america seemed to be taking her natural place as one of the powers concerned to strengthen law and liberty, not only within her own borders, but throughout the world. the monroe doctrine was rapidly accepted as expressing the fundamental principle of american foreign policy. but under the influence of the powerful tradition which we have attempted to analyse, its significance was gradually changed; and instead of being interpreted as a proclamation that the great republic could not be indifferent to the fate of liberty, and would co-operate to defend it from attack in all cases where such co-operation was reasonably practicable, it came to be interpreted by average public opinion as meaning that america had no concern with the politics of the old world, and that the states of the old world must not be allowed to meddle in any of the affairs of either american continent. the world of civilisation was to be divided into water-tight compartments; as if it were not indissolubly one. yet even in this rather narrow form, the monroe doctrine has on the whole been productive of good; it has helped to save south america from becoming one of the fields of rivalry of the european powers. but it may be doubted whether the mere enunciation of the doctrine, even in this precise and definite form, has of itself been sufficient to secure this end. there is good reason to believe that the doctrine would not have been safe from challenge if it had not been safeguarded by the supremacy of the british fleet. for throughout the last half-century all the world has known that any defiance of this doctrine, and any attack upon america, would bring britain into the field. during all this period one of the factors of world-politics has been the existence of an informal and one-sided alliance between britain and america. the alliance has been informal, because it has not rested upon any treaty or even upon any definite understanding. it has been one-sided, because while average opinion in america has been distrustful of britain, has been apt to put unfavourable constructions upon british policy, and has generally failed to appreciate the value and significance of the work which britain has done in the outer world, britain, on the other hand, has always known that america stood for justice and freedom; and therefore, however difficult the relations between the two powers might occasionally become, britain has steadfastly refused to consider the possibility of a breach with america, and with rare exceptions has steadily given her support to american policy. the action of the british squadron off the philippines in 1898, in quietly interposing itself between the threatening german guns and the american fleet, has, in fact, been broadly typical of the british attitude. this factor has not only helped to preserve the monroe doctrine from challenge, it has indirectly contributed to deepen the american conviction that it was possible, even in the changed conditions of the modern world, to maintain a complete isolation from the political controversies of the powers. during the period 1815-1878, then, while the greater part of europe was still indifferent to extra-european affairs, america had developed into a vast state wherein freedom and law were enthroned, a huge melting-pot wherein diverse peoples were being gradually unified and turned into a new nation under the moulding power of a great tradition of liberty. but her geographical position, and certain elements in her tradition, had hitherto led her to abstain from, and even to repudiate, that great part in the shaping of the common destinies of civilisation to which she was manifestly called by her wealth, her numbers, her freedom, and her share in the traditions of all the european peoples. in the nature of things, whatever some americans might think, this voluntary isolation could not continue for ever. it was to be brought to an end by the fevered developments of the next era, and by the great challenge to the liberties of the world in which it culminated. vi the transformation of the british empire, 1815-1878 mighty as had been the achievements of other lands which have been surveyed in the last section, the main part in the expansion of european civilisation over the world during the first three-quarters of the nineteenth century was played by britain. for she was engaged in opening out new continents and sub-continents; and she was giving an altogether new significance to the word 'empire.' above all, she was half-blindly laying the foundations of a system whereby freedom and the enriching sense of national unity might be realised at once in the new and vacant lands of the earth, and among its oldest civilised peoples; she was feeling her way towards a mode of linking diverse and free states in a common brotherhood of peace and mutual respect. there is no section of the history of european imperialism more interesting than the story of the growth and organisation of the heterogeneous and disparate empire with which britain entered upon the new age. this development appeared, on the surface, to be quite haphazard, and to be governed by no clearly grasped theories or policy. it is indeed true that at all times british policy has not been governed by theory, but by the moulding force of a tradition of ordered freedom. the period produced in britain no imperialist statesman of the first rank, nor did imperial questions play a leading part in the deliberations of parliament. in fact, the growth of the british empire and its organisation were alike spontaneous and unsystematic; their only guide (but it proved to be a good guide) was the spirit of self-government, existing in every scattered section of the people; and the part played by the colonists themselves, and by the administrative officers in india and elsewhere, was throughout more important than the part played by colonial secretaries, east indian directors, parliamentarians and publicists at home. for that reason the story is not easily handled in a broad and simple way. enjoying almost a monopoly of oversea activity, britain was free, in most parts of the world, to expand her dominions as she thought fit. her statesmen, however, were far from desiring further expansion: they rightly felt that the responsibilities already assumed were great enough to tax the resources of any state, however rich and populous. but, try as they would, they could not prevent the inevitable process of expansion. several causes contributed to produce this result. perhaps the most important was the unexampled growth of british trade, which during these years dominated the whole world; and the flag is apt to follow trade. a second cause was the pressure of economic distress and the extraordinarily rapid increase of population at home, leading to wholesale emigration; in the early years of the century an extravagantly severe penal code, which inflicted the penalty of death, commonly commuted into transportation, for an incredible number of offences, gave an artificial impetus to this movement. the restless and adventurous spirit of the settlers in huge and unexplored new countries contributed another motive for expansion. and in some cases, notably in india, political necessity seemed to demand annexations. over a movement thus stimulated, the home authorities found themselves, with the best will in the world, unable to exercise any effective restraint; and the already colossal british empire continued to grow. it is no doubt to be regretted that other european nations were not able during this period to take part in the development of the non-european world in a more direct way than by sending emigrants to america or the british lands. but it is quite certain that the growth of british territory is not to be attributed in any degree to the deliberate policy, or to the greed, of the home government, which did everything in its power to check it. in india the russian menace seemed to necessitate the adoption of a policy towards the independent states of the north-west which brought an extension of the frontier, between 1839 and 1849, to the great mountain ranges which form the natural boundary of india in this direction; while a succession of intolerable and quite unprovoked aggressions by the burmese led to a series of wars which resulted in the annexation of very great territories in the east and north-east: assam, aracan, and tenasserim hi 1825; pegu and rangoon in 1853; finally, in 1885-86, the whole remainder of the burmese empire. in north america settlers found their way across the rocky mountains or over the isthmus of panama into the region of british columbia, which was given a distinct colonial organisation in 1858; and the colonisation of the red river settlement, 1811-18, which became hi 1870 the province of manitoba, began the development of the great central plain. in south africa frontier wars with the kaffirs, and the restless movements of boer trekkers, brought about an expansion of the limits of cape colony, the annexation of natal, and the temporary annexation of the orange river settlement and the transvaal; but all these additions were most reluctantly accepted; the orange river settlement and the transvaal soon had their independence restored, though the former, at any rate, accepted it unwillingly. in australia, drafts of new settlers planting themselves at new points led to the organisation of six distinct colonies between 1825 and 1859; and this implied the definite annexation of the whole continent. new zealand was annexed in 1839, but only because british traders had already established themselves in the islands, were in unhappy relations with the natives, and had to be brought under control. but it was not the territorial expansion of the british empire which gave significance to this period in its history, but, in a far higher degree, the new principles of government which were developed during its course. the new colonial policy which gradually shaped itself during this age was so complete a departure from every precedent of the past, and represented so remarkable an experiment in imperial government, that its sources deserve a careful analysis. it was brought into being by a number of distinct factors and currents of opinion which were at work both in britain and in the colonies. in the first place, there existed in britain, as in other european countries, a large body of opinion which held that all colonies were sure to demand and obtain their independence as soon as they became strong enough to desire it; that as independent states they could be quite as profitable to the mother-country as they could ever be while they remained attached to her, more especially if the parting took place without bitterness; and that the wisest policy for britain to pursue was therefore to facilitate their development, to place no barrier in the way of the increase of their self-government, and to enable them at the earliest moment to start as free nations on their own account. this was not, indeed, the universal, nor perhaps even the preponderant, attitude in regard to the colonies in the middle of the nineteenth century. but it was pretty common. it appeared in the most unexpected quarters, as when disraeli said that the colonies were 'millstones about our necks,' or as when the times advocated in a leading article the cession of canada to the united states, on the ground that annexation to the great republic was the inevitable destiny of that colony, and that it was much better that it should be carried out in a peaceable and friendly way than after a conflict. it is difficult to-day to realise that men could ever have entertained such opinions. but they were widely held; and it must at least be obvious that the prevalence of these views is quite inconsistent with the idea that britain was deliberately following a policy of expansion and annexation in this age. men who held these opinions (and they were to be found in every party) regarded with resentment and alarm every addition to what seemed to them the useless burdens assumed by the nation, and required to be satisfied that every new annexation of territory was not merely justifiable, but inevitable. a second factor which contributed to the change of attitude towards the colonies was the growing influence of a new school of economic thought, the school of adam smith, ricardo, and malthus. their ideas had begun to affect national policy as early as the twenties, when huskisson took the first steps on the way to free trade. in the thirties the bulk of the trading and industrial classes had become converts to these ideas, which won their definite victories in the budgets of sir robert peel, 1843-46, and in those of his disciple gladstone. the essence of this doctrine, as it affected colonial policy, was that the regulation of trade by government, which had been the main object of the old colonial policy, brought no advantages, but only checked its free development. and for a country in the position which britain then occupied, this was undeniably true; so overwhelming was her preponderance in world-trade that every current seemed to set in her direction, and the removal of artificial barriers, originally designed to train the current towards her shores, allowed it to follow its natural course. the only considerable opposition to this body of economic doctrine came from those who desired to protect british agriculture; but this motive had (at this period) no bearing upon colonial trade. the triumph of the doctrine of free trade meant that the principal motive which had earlier led to restrictions upon the self-government of the colonies--the desire to secure commercial advantages for the mother-country--was no longer operative. the central idea of the old colonial system was destroyed by the disciples of adam smith; and there no longer remained any apparent reason why the mother-country should desire to control the fiscal policy of the colonies. an even more important result of the adoption of this new economic doctrine was that it destroyed every motive which would lead the british government to endeavour to secure for british traders a monopoly of the traffic with british possessions. henceforth all territories administered under the direct control of the home government were thrown open as freely to the merchants of other countries as to those of britain herself. the part which britain now undertook in the undeveloped regions of her empire (except in so far as they were controlled by fully self-governing colonies) was simply that of maintaining peace and law; and in these regions she adopted an attitude which may fairly be described as the attitude, not of a monopolist, but of a trustee for civilisation. it was this policy which explains the small degree of jealousy with which the rapid expansion of her territory was regarded by the rest of the civilised world. if the same policy had been followed, not necessarily at home, but in their colonial possessions, by all the colonising powers, the motives for colonial rivalry would have been materially diminished, and the claims of various states to colonial territories, when the period of rivalry began, would have been far more easily adjusted. these were negative forces, leading merely to the abandonment of the older colonial theories. but there were also positive and constructive forces at work. first among them may be noted a new body of definite theory as to the function which colonies ought to play in the general economy of the civilised world. it was held to be their function not (as in the older theory) to afford lucrative opportunities for trade to the mother-country: so far as trade was concerned it seemed to matter little whether a country was a colony or an independent state. but the main object of colonisation was, on this view, the systematic draining-off of the surplus population of the older lands. this, it was felt, could not safely be left to the operation of mere chance; and one of the great advantages of colonial possessions was that they enabled the country which controlled them to deal in a scientific way with its surplus population, and to prevent the reproduction of unhealthy conditions in the new communities, which was apt to result if emigrants were allowed to drift aimlessly wheresoever chance took them, and received no guidance as to the proper modes of establishing themselves in their new homes. the great apostle of this body of colonial theory was edward gibbon wakefield; and his book, a view of the art of colonisation (1847), deserves to be noted as one of the classics of the history of imperialism. he did not confine himself to theory, but was tireless in organising practical experiments. they were carried out, in a curious revival of the methods of the seventeenth century, by means of a series of colonising companies which wakefield promoted. the settlement of south australia, the first considerable settlement in the north island of new zealand, and the two admirably designed and executed settlements of canterbury and otago in the south island of new zealand, were all examples of his methods: with the exception of the north island settlement, they were all very successful. nor were these the only instances of organised and assisted emigration. in 1820 a substantial settlement, financed by government, was made in the eastern part of cape colony, in the region of grahamstown and port elizabeth, and this brought the first considerable body of british inhabitants into south africa, hitherto almost exclusively dutch. an unsuccessful plantation at swan river in west australia may also be noted. systematic and scientific colonisation was thus being studied in britain during this period as never before. in the view of its advocates britain was the trustee of civilisation for the administration of the most valuable unpeopled regions of the earth, and it was her duty to see that they were skilfully utilised. so high a degree of success attended some of their efforts that it is impossible not to regret that they were not carried further. but they depended upon crown control of undeveloped lands. with the growth of full self-government in the colonies the exercise of these crown functions was transferred from the ministry and parliament of britain to the ministries and parliaments of the colonies; and this transference put an end to the possibility of a centralised organisation and direction of emigration. a second constructive factor very potently at work during this age was the humanitarian spirit, which had become a powerful factor in british life during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. it had received perhaps its most practical expression in the abolition of the slave-trade in 1806, and the campaign against the slave-trade in the rest of the world became an important object of british policy from that time onwards. having abolished the slave-trade, the humanitarians proceeded to advocate the complete abolition of negro slavery throughout the british empire. they won their victory in 1833, when the british parliament declared slavery illegal throughout the empire, and voted 20,000,000 pounds--at a time when british finance was still suffering from the burdens of the napoleonic war--to purchase from their masters the freedom of all the slaves then existing in the empire. it was a noble deed, but it was perhaps carried out a little too suddenly, and it led to grave difficulties, especially in the west indies, whose prosperity was seriously impaired, and in south africa, where it brought about acute friction with the slave-owning boer farmers. but it gave evidence of the adoption of a new attitude towards the backward races, hitherto mercilessly exploited by all the imperialist powers. one expression of this attitude had already been afforded by the organisation (1787) of the colony of sierra leone, on the west african coast, as a place of refuge for freed slaves desiring to return to the land of their fathers. it was principally through the activity of missionaries that this new point of view was expressed and cultivated. organised missionary activity in britain dates from the end of the eighteenth century, but its range grew with extraordinary rapidity throughout the period. and wherever the missionaries went, they constituted themselves the protectors and advocates of the native races among whom they worked. often enough they got themselves into bad odour with the european traders and settlers with whom they came in contact. but through their powerful home organisations they exercised very great influence over public opinion and over government policy. the power of 'exeter hall,' where the religious bodies and the missionary societies held their meetings in london, was at its height in the middle of the nineteenth century, and politicians could not afford to disregard it, even if they had desired to do so. this influence, supporting the trend of humanitarian opinion, succeeded in establishing it as one of the principles of british imperial policy that it was the duty of the british government to protect the native races against the exploitation of the european settlers, and to guide them gently into a civilised way of life. it is a sound and noble principle, and it may fairly be said that it has been honestly carried out, so far as the powers of the home government rendered possible. no government in the world controls a greater number or variety of subjects belonging to the backward races than the british; no trading nation has had greater opportunities for the oppressive exploitation of defenceless subjects. yet the grave abuse of these opportunities has been infrequent. there have been in the history of modern british imperialism sporadic instances of injustice, like the forced labour of kanakas in the pacific. but there have been no congo outrages, no putumayo atrocities, no pequena slave scandals, no merciless slaughter like that of the hereros in german south-west africa. the principle of the protection of backward peoples has, however, sometimes had an unfortunate influence upon colonial policy; and there was no colony in which it exercised a more unhappy effect than south africa. here the boer farmers still retained towards their native neighbours the attitude which had been characteristic of all the european peoples in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries: they regarded the negro as a natural inferior, born to servitude. it is not surprising that no love was lost between the boers and the missionaries, who appeared as the protectors of the negroes, and whose representations turned british opinion violently against the whole boer community. this was in itself a sufficiently unfortunate result: it lies largely at the base of the prolonged disharmony which divided the two peoples in south africa. the belief that the boers could not be trusted to deal fairly with the natives formed, for a long period, the chief reason which urged the british government to retain their control over the boers, even when they had trekked away from the cape (1836) and established themselves beyond the orange and the vaal rivers; and the conflict of this motive with the desire to avoid any increase of colonial responsibilities, and with the feeling that if the boers disliked the british system, they had better be left in freedom to organise themselves in their own way, accounts for the curious vacillation in the policy of the period on this question. at first the trekkers were left to themselves; then the lands which they had occupied were annexed; then their independence was recognised; and finally, when, at the end of the period, they seemed to be causing a dangerous excitement among the zulus and other native tribes, the transvaal was once more annexed; with the result that revolt broke out, and the majuba campaign had to be fought. again, tenderness for the natives led to several curious and not very successful experiments in organisation. the annexation of natal was long delayed because it was held that this area ought to form a native reserve, and fruitless attempts were made to restrict the settlement of europeans in this empty and fertile land. an attempt was also made to set up a series of native areas under british protection, from which the white settler was excluded. british kaffraria, griqualand east and griqualand west were examples of this policy, which is still represented, not unsuccessfully, by the great protected area of basutoland. but, on the whole, these experiments in the handling of the native problem in south africa did more harm than good. they were unsuccessful mainly because south africa was a white man's country, into which the most vigorous of the native races, those of the bantu stock (kaffirs, zulus, matabili, etc.), were more recent immigrants than the white men themselves. owing to their warlike character and rapidly growing numbers they constituted for a long time a very formidable danger; and neither the missionaries nor the home authorities sufficiently recognised these facts. perhaps the most unhappy result of this friction over the native question, apart from the alienation of boer and briton which it produced, was the fact that it was the principal cause of the long delay in establishing self-governing institutions in south africa. the home government hesitated to give to the colonists full control over their own affairs, because it distrusted the use which they were likely to make of their powers over the natives; even the normal institutions of all british colonies were not established in cape colony till 1854, and in natal till 1883. but although in this case the new attitude towards the backward races led to some unhappy results, the spirit which inspired it was altogether admirable, and its growing strength accounts in part for the real degree of success which has been achieved by british administrators in the government of regions not suited for the settlement of europeans in large numbers. indeed, this spirit has come to be one of the outstanding features of modern british imperialism. it was not only in the treatment of backward races that the humanitarian spirit made itself felt. it was at work also in the government of the highly developed civilisations of india, where, during this period, british power began to be boldly used to put an end to barbarous or inhumane practices which were supported or tolerated by the religious beliefs or immemorial social usages of india. such practices as thagi, or meria sacrifices, or female infanticide, or, above all, sati, had been left undisturbed by the earlier rulers of british india, because they feared that interference with them would be resented as an infraction of indian custom or religion. they were now boldly attacked, and practically abolished, without evil result. alongside of this new courage in measures that seemed to be dictated by the moral ideas of the west, there was to be seen growing throughout this period a new temper of respect for indian civilisation and a desire to study and understand it, and to safeguard its best features. the study of early indian literature, law, and religious philosophy had indeed been begun in the eighteenth century by sir william jones and nathaniel halhed, with the ardent encouragement of warren hastings. but in this as in other respects hastings was ahead of the political opinion of his time; the prevalent idea was that the best thing for india would be the introduction, so far as possible, of british methods. this led to the absurdities of the supreme court, established in 1773 to administer english law to indians. it led also to the great blunder of cornwallis's settlement of the land question in bengal, which was an attempt to assimilate the indian land-system to that of england, and resulted in an unhappy weakening of the village communities, the most healthy features of indian rural life. in the nineteenth century this attitude was replaced by a spirit of respect for indian traditions and methods of organisation, and by a desire to retain and strengthen their best features. the new attitude was perhaps to be seen at its best in the work of mountstuart elphinstone, a great administrator who was also a profound student of indian history, and a very sympathetic observer and friend of indian customs and modes of life. but the same spirit was exemplified by the whole of the remarkable generation of statesmen of whom elphinstone was one. they established the view that it was the duty of the british power to reorganise india, indeed, but to reorganise it on lines in accordance with its own traditions. above all, the principle was in this generation very definitely established that india, like other great dependencies, must be administered in the interests of its own people, and not in the interests of the ruling race. that seems to us to-day a platitude. it would not have seemed a platitude in the eighteenth century. it would not seem a platitude in modern germany. and it may safely be said that the enunciation of such a doctrine would have seemed merely absurd in any of the earlier historical empires. in 1833 an official report laid before the british parliament contained these remarkable words: 'it is recognised as an indisputable principle, that the interests of the native subjects are to be consulted in preference to those of europeans, wherever the two come in competition.' in all the records of imperialism it would be hard to find a parallel to this formal statement of policy by the supreme government of a ruling race. when such a statement could be made, it is manifest that the meaning of the word empire had undergone a remarkable transformation. no one can read the history of british rule in india during this period without feeling that, in spite of occasional lapses, this was its real spirit. but the most powerful constructive element in the shaping of the new imperial policy of britain was the strength of the belief in the idea of self-government, as not only morally desirable but practically efficacious, which was to be perceived at work in the political circles of britain during this age. self-government had throughout the modern age been a matter of habit and practice with the british peoples; now it became a matter of theory and belief. and from this resulted a great change of attitude towards the problems of colonial administration. the american problem in the eighteenth century had arisen ultimately out of the demand of the americans for unqualified and responsible control over their own affairs: the attitude of the englishman in reply to this demand (though he never clearly analysed it) was, in effect, that self-government was a good and desirable thing, but that on the scale on which the americans claimed it, it would be fatal to the unity of the empire, and the unity of the empire must come first. faced by similar problems in the nineteenth century, the englishman's response generally was that self-government on the fullest scale was the right of all who were fit to exercise it, and the most satisfactory working solution of political problems. therefore the right must be granted; and the unity of the empire must take care of itself. no doubt this attitude was more readily adopted because of the widespread belief that in fact the colonies would all sooner or later cut their connection with the mother-country. but it was fully shared by men who did not hold this view, and who believed strongly in the possibility and desirability of maintaining imperial unity. it was shared, for example, by wakefield, a convinced imperialist if ever there was one, and by that great colonial administrator, sir george grey. it was shared by lord durham and by lord john russell, who were largely responsible for the adoption of the new policy. their belief and hope was that the common possession of free institutions of kindred types would in fact form the most effective tie between the lands which enjoyed them. this hope obtained an eloquent expression in the speech in which, in 1852, russell introduced the bill for granting to the australian colonies self-government on such a scale as amounted almost to independence. it is not true, as is sometimes said, that the self-governing institutions of the colonies were established during this period owing to the indifference of the home authorities, and their readiness to put an end to the connection. the new policy of these years was deliberately adopted; and although its acceptance by parliament was rendered easier by the prevalence of disbelief in the permanence of the imperial tie, yet, on the part of the responsible men, it was due to far-sighted statesmanship. the critical test of the new colonial policy, and the most dramatic demonstration of its efficacy, were afforded by canada, where, during the thirties, the conditions which preceded the revolt of the american colonies were being reproduced with curious exactness. the self-governing institutions established in the canadian colonies in 1791 very closely resembled those of the american colonies before the revolution: they gave to the representative houses control over taxation and legislation, but neither control over, nor responsibility for, the executive. and the same results were following. incomplete self-government was striving after its own fulfilment: the denial of responsibility was producing irresponsibility. these was the same unceasing friction between governors and their councils on the one hand, and the representative bodies on the other hand; and the assemblies were showing the same unreasonableness in refusing to meet manifest public obligations. this state of things was becoming steadily more acute in all the colonies, but it was at its worst in the province of quebec, where the constitutional friction was embittered by a racial conflict, the executive body being british, while the great majority of the assembly was french; and the conflict was producing a very dangerous alienation between the two peoples. the french colonists had quite forgotten the gratitude they had once felt for the maintenance of their religion and of their social organisation, and there was a strong party among them who were bent upon open revolt, and hoped to be able to establish a little isolated french community upon the st. lawrence. this party of hotheads got the upper hand, and their agitation culminated in the rebellion of papineau in 1837. in the other colonies, and especially in upper canada, the conditions were almost equally ominous; when papineau revolted in quebec, william mackenzie led a sympathetic rising in ontario. the situation was quite as alarming as the situation in the american colonies had been in 1775. it is true that the risings were easily put down. but mere repression formed no solution, any more than a british victory in 1775 would have formed a solution of the american question. realising this, the whig government sent out lord durham, one of their own number, to report on the whole situation. durham was one of the most advanced liberals in britain, a convinced believer in the virtues of self-government, and he took out with him two of the ablest advocates of scientific colonisation, edward gibbon wakefield and charles buller. durham's administrative work was not a success: his high-handed deportation of some of the rebel leaders was strongly condemned, and he was very quickly recalled. but he had had time to study and understand the situation, and he presented a masterly report on canada, which is one of the classics in the history of british imperialism. his explanation of the unhappy condition of canadian politics was not (as some were tempted to say) that the colonists had been given too much liberty, but that they had not been given enough. they must be made to feel their responsibility for the working of the laws which they adopted, and for the welfare of the whole community. as for the conflict of races, its only cure was that both should be made to feel their common responsibility for the destinies of the community in which both must remain partners. lord durham's recommendations were fully carried into effect, partly in the canada act of 1840, but more especially by a simple instruction issued to governors, that their ministries must henceforward be chosen, in the british fashion, on the ground that they commanded the support of a majority in the elected house; and that the governors themselves must be guided by their advice. a crucial test of this new policy came in 1849, when the ministers and the parliamentary majority proposed to vote compensation for property destroyed in 1837. this to many seemed compensation for rebels, and the indignant loyalists were urgent that the governor, lord elgin, should veto it. he firmly declined to do so; and thus gave an invaluable lesson to both parties. the canadian people, acting through their representatives, were now responsible for their actions. if they chose to vote for irresponsible and dangerous devices, they must henceforward realise that they must themselves answer for the consequences. thus, within a few years of the outbreak of rebellion in two provinces, full power had been entrusted to the rebels themselves. it was a daring policy, only to be justified by a very confident belief in the virtues of self-government. but it was completely and triumphantly successful. henceforward friction between the canadian colonies and the mother-country ceased: if there were grounds for complaint in the state of canadian affairs, the canadians must now blame their own ministers, and the remedy lay in their own hands. and what was the outcome? twenty years later the various colonies, once as full of mutual jealousies as the american colonies had been before 1775, began to discuss the possibility of federation. with the cordial approval and co-operation of the home government, they drew up a scheme for the formation of a united dominion of canada, including distant british columbia and the coastal colonies of nova scotia, new brunswick, and prince edward island; and the adoption of this scheme, in 1867, turned canada from a bundle of separate settlements into a great state. to this state the home government later made over the control of all the vast and rich lands of the north-west, and so the destinies of half a continent passed under its direction. it was a charge, the magnitude and challenge of which could not but bring forth all that there was of statesmanship among the canadian people; and it has not failed to do so. one feature of canadian constitutional development remains to be noted. it might have been expected that the canadians would have been tempted to follow the political model of their great neighbour the united states; and if their development had been the outcome of friction with the mother-country, no doubt they would have done so. but they preferred to follow the british model. the keynote of the american system is division of power: division between the federal government and the state governments, which form mutual checks upon one another; division between the executive and the legislature, which are independent of one another at once in the states and in the federal government, both being directly elected by popular vote. the keynote of the british system is concentration of responsibility by the subordination of the executive to the legislature. the canadians adopted the british principle: what had formerly been distinct colonies became, not 'states' but 'provinces,' definitely subordinated to the supreme central government; and whether in the federal or in the provincial system, the control of government by the representative body was finally established. this concord with the british system is a fact of real import. it means that the political usages of the home-country and the great dominion are so closely assimilated that political co-operation between them is far easier than it otherwise might be; it increases the possibility of a future link more intimate than that of mere co-operation. not less whole-hearted or generous than the treatment of the problems of canadian government was the treatment of the same problem in australia. here, as a matter of course, all the colonies had been endowed, at the earliest possible date, with the familiar system of representative but not responsible government. no such acute friction as had occurred in canada had yet shown itself, though signs of its development were not lacking. but in 1852 an astonishing step was taken by the british parliament: the various australian colonies were empowered to elect single-chamber constituent assemblies to decide the forms of government under which they wished to live. they decided in every case to reproduce as nearly as possible the british system: legislatures of two chambers, with ministries responsible to them. thus, in australia as in canada, the daughter-peoples were made to feel the community of their institutions with those of the mother-country, and the possibility of intimate and easy co-operation was increased. two years later, in 1854, new zealand was endowed with the same system. among all the british realms in which the white man was predominant, only south africa was as yet excluded from this remarkable development. the reasons for this exclusion we have already noted: its consequences will occupy our attention in later pages. very manifestly the empire which was developing on such lines was not an empire in the old sense--a dominion imposed by force upon unwilling subjects. that old word, which has been used in so many senses, was being given a wholly new connotation. it was being made to mean a free partnership of self-governing peoples, held together not by force, but in part by common interests, and in a still higher degree by common sentiment and the possession of the same institutions of liberty. in the fullest sense, however, this new conception of empire applied only to the group of the great self-governing colonies. there were many other regions, even before 1878, included within the british empire, though as yet it had not incorporated those vast protectorates over regions peopled by backward races which have been added during the last generation. there were tropical settlements like british honduras, british guiana, sierra leone, and cape coast castle; there were many west indian islands, and scattered possessions like mauritius and hong-kong and singapore and the straits settlements; there were garrison towns or coaling-stations like gibraltar, malta, aden, st. helena. to none of these were the institutions of full responsible self-government granted. some of them possessed representative institutions without responsible ministries; in others the governor was assisted by a nominated council, intended to express local opinion, but not elected by the inhabitants; in yet others the governor ruled autocratically. but in all these cases the ultimate control of policy was retained by the home government. and in this general category, as yet, the south african colonies were included. why were these distinctions drawn? why did the generation of british statesmen, who had dealt so generously with the demand for self-government in canada and australia, stop short and refuse to carry out their principles in these other cases? it is characteristic of british politics that they are never merely or fully logical, and that even when political doctrines seem to enjoy the most complete ascendancy, they are never put into effect without qualifications or exceptions. the exceptions already named to the establishment of full self-government were due to many and varying causes. in the first place, there was in most of these cases no effective demand for full self-government; and it may safely be asserted that any community in which there is no demand for self-governing institutions is probably not in a condition to work them with effect. some of these possessions were purely military posts, like gibraltar and aden, and were necessarily administered as such. others were too small and weak to dream of assuming the full privileges. but in the majority of cases one outstanding common feature will appear on closer analysis. nearly all these territories were tropical or semi-tropical lands, whose british inhabitants were not permanent settlers, but were present solely for the purposes of trade or other exploitation, while the bulk of the population consisted of backward peoples, whose traditions and civilisation rendered their effective participation in public affairs quite impracticable. in such cases, to have given full political power to the small and generally shifting minority of white men would have been to give scope to many evils; and to have enfranchised, on a mere theory, the mass of the population would have been to produce still worse results. it would have sentenced these communities to the sort of fate which has befallen the beautiful island of hayti, where the self-government of a population of emancipated negro slaves has brought nothing but anarchy and degradation. in such conditions the steady reign of law is the greatest boon that can be given to white settlers and coloured subjects alike; and the final authority is rightly retained by the home government, inspired, as british opinion has long required that it should be, by the principle that the rights of the backward peoples must be safeguarded. under this system, both law and a real degree of liberty are made possible; whereas under a doctrinaire application of the theory of self-government, both would vanish. but there remains the vast dominion of india, which falls neither into the one category nor into the other. though there are many primitive and backward elements among its vast population, there are also peoples and castes whose members are intellectually capable of meeting on equal terms the members of any of the ruling races of the west. yet during this age, when self-government on the amplest scale was being extended to the chief regions of the british empire, india, the greatest dominion of them all, did not obtain the gift of representative institutions even on the most modest scale. why was this? it was not because the ruling race was hostile to the idea, or desired merely to retain its own ascendancy. on the contrary, both in britain and among the best of the british administrators in india, it was increasingly held that the only ultimate justification for the british power in india would be that under its guidance the indian peoples should be gradually enabled to govern themselves. as early as 1824, when in europe sheer reaction was at its height, this view was being strongly urged by one of the greatest of anglo-indian administrators, sir thomas munro, a soldier of distinction, then serving as governor of madras. 'we should look upon india,' he wrote, 'not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices, and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the british control over india should be gradually withdrawn. that the desirable change contemplated may in some after age be effected in india, there is no cause to despair. such a change was at one time in britain itself at least as hopeless as it is here. when we reflect how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of governments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk into barbarism, while others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highest point of civilisation, we shall see no reason to doubt that if we pursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our indian subjects as to make them able to govern and protect themselves.' in other words, self-government was the desirable end to be pursued in india as elsewhere; but in india there were many and grave obstacles to its efficient working, which could only slowly be overcome. in the first place, india is more deeply divided in race, language, and religion than any other region of the world. nowhere else is there such a medley of peoples of every grade of development, from the almost savage bhil to the cultivated and high-bred brahmin or rajput or mahomedan chief. there are sharp regional differences, as great as those between the european countries; but cutting across these there are everywhere the rigid and impermeable distinctions of caste, which have no parallel anywhere else in the world. the experience of the austro-hungarian empire, whose confusion of races is simplicity itself in comparison with the chaos of india, affords a significant demonstration of the fact that parliamentary institutions, if they are established among deeply divided peoples, must almost inevitably be exploited for the purpose of racial ascendancy by the most vigorous or the best-organised elements among the people; and a very ugly tyranny is apt to result, as it has resulted in austro-hungary. this consequence would almost certainly follow the establishment of a full representative system in india. in the cities of mediaeval italy, when the conflict of parties became so acute that neither side could expect justice from the other, the practice grew up of electing a podesta from some foreign city to act as an impartial arbiter. the british power in india has played the part of a podesta in restraining and mediating between the conflicting peoples and religions of india. but again (and this is even more fundamental), for thousands of years the history of india has been one long story of conquests and tyrannies by successive ruling races. always might has been right, so that the lover of righteousness could only pursue it, like the mediaeval ascetic, by cutting himself off from the world, abjuring all social ties, and immolating the flesh in order to live by the spirit. always law had been, in the last resort, the will of the stronger, not the decree of impartial justice. always the master-races, the predatory bands, the ruling castes, had expected to receive, and the mass of the people had been accustomed to give, the most abject submission; and these habits were difficult to overcome. 'in england,' says sir thomas munro, 'the people resist oppression, and it is their spirit which gives efficacy to the law: in india the people rarely resist oppression, and the law intended to secure them from it can therefore derive no aid from themselves. ... it is in vain to caution them against paying by telling them that the law is on their side, and will support them in refusing to comply with unauthorised demands. all exhortations on this head are thrown away, and after listening to them they will the very next day submit to extortion as quietly as before.' how could representative institutions be expected to work under such conditions? they would have lacked the very foundation upon which alone they can firmly rest: respect for law, and public co-operation in the enforcement of it. thus the supreme service which the government of india could render to its people was the establishment and maintenance of the reign of law, and of the liberty which it shelters. in such conditions representative government would be liable to bring, not liberty, but anarchy and the renewal of lawless oppression. but although the extension of the representative system to india neither was nor could be attempted in this age, very remarkable advances were made towards turning india in a real sense into a self-governing country. it ceased to be regarded or treated as a subject dominion existing solely for the advantage of its conquerors. that had always been its fate in all the long centuries of its history; and in the first period of british rule the trading company which had acquired this amazing empire had naturally regarded it as primarily a source of profit. in 1833 the company was forbidden to engage in trade, and the profit-making motive disappeared. the shareholders still continued to receive a fixed dividend out of the indian revenues, but this may be compared to a fixed debt-charge, an annual payment for capital expended in the past; and it came to an end when the company was abolished in 1858. apart from this dividend, no sort of tribute was exacted from india by the ruling power. india was not even required to contribute to the upkeep of the navy, which protected her equally with the rest of the empire, or of the diplomatic service, which was often concerned with her interests. she paid for the small army which guarded her frontiers; but if any part of it was borrowed for service abroad, its whole pay and charges were met by britain. she paid the salaries and pensions of the handful of british administrators who conducted her government, but this was a very small charge in comparison with the lavish outlay of the native princes whom they had replaced. india had become a self-contained state, whose whole resources were expended exclusively upon her own needs, and expended with the most scrupulous honesty, and under the most elaborate safeguards. they were expended, moreover, especially during the later part of this period, largely in equipping her with the material apparatus of modern civilisation. efficient police, great roads, a postal service cheaper than that of any other country, a well-planned railway system, and, above all, a gigantic system of irrigation which brought under cultivation vast regions hitherto desert--these were some of the boons acquired by india during the period. they were rendered possible partly by the economical management of her finances, partly by the liberal expenditure of british capital. above all, the period saw the beginning of a system of popular education, of which the english language became the main vehicle, because none of the thirty-eight recognised vernacular tongues of india either possessed the necessary literature, or could be used as a medium for instruction in modern science. in 1858 three universities were established; and although their system was ill-devised, under the malign influence of the analogy of london university, a very large and increasing number of young graduates, trained for modern occupations, began to filter into indian society, and to modify its point of view. all speaking and writing english, and all trained in much the same body of ideas, they possessed a similarity of outlook and a vehicle of communication such as had never before linked together the various races and castes of india. this large and growing class, educated in some measure in the learning of the west, formed already, at the end of the period, a very important new element in the life of india. they were capable of criticising the work of their government; they were not without standards of comparison by which to measure its achievements; and, aided by the large freedom granted to the press under the british system, they were able to begin the creation of an intelligent public opinion, which was apt, in its first movements, to be ill-guided and rash, but which was nevertheless a healthy development. that this newly created class of educated men should produce a continual stream of criticism, and that it should even stimulate into existence public discontents, is by no means a condemnation of the system of government which has made these developments possible. on the contrary, it is a proof that the system has had an invigorating effect. for the existence and the expression of discontent is a sign of life; it means that there is an end of that utter docility which marks a people enslaved body and soul. india has never been more prosperous than she is to-day; she has never before known so impartial a system of justice as she now possesses; and these are legitimate grounds of pride to her rulers. but they may even more justly pride themselves upon the fact that in all her history india has never been so frankly and incessantly critical of her government as she is to-day; never so bold in the aspirations for the future which her sons entertain. the creation of the new class of western-educated indians also facilitated another development which the british government definitely aimed at encouraging: the participation of indians in the conduct of administration in their own land. the act of 1833 had laid it down as a fundamental principle that 'no native of the said territories ... shall by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent, or any of them, be disabled from holding any place, office, or employment.' the great majority of the minor administrative posts had always been held by indians; but until 1833 it had been held that the maintenance of british supremacy required that the higher offices should be reserved to members of the ruling race. this restriction was now abolished; but it was not until the development of the educational system had produced a body of sufficiently trained men that the new principle could produce appreciable results; and even then, the deficiencies of an undeveloped system of training, combined with the racial and religious jealousies which the government of india must always keep in mind, imposed limitations upon the rapid increase of the number of indians holding the higher posts. still, the principle had been laid down, and was being acted upon. and that also constituted a great step towards self-government. india in 1878 was governed, under the terms of a code of law based upon indian custom, by a small body of british officials, among whom leading indians were gradually taking their place, and who worked in detail through an army of minor officials, nearly all of indian birth, and selected without regard to race or creed. she was a self-contained country whose whole resources were devoted to her own needs. she was prospering to a degree unexampled in her history; she had achieved a political unity never before known to her; she had been given the supreme boon of a just and impartial law, administered without fear or favour; and she had enjoyed a long period of peace, unbroken by any attack from external foes. here also, as fully as in the self-governing colonies, membership of the british empire did not mean subjection to the selfish dominion of a master, or the subordination to that master's interests of the vital interests of the community. it meant the establishment among a vast population of the essential gifts of western civilisation, rational law, and the liberty which exists under its shelter. empire had come to mean, not merely domination pursued for its own sake, but trusteeship for the extension of civilisation. the period of practical british monopoly, 1815-1878, had thus brought about a very remarkable transformation in the character of the british empire. it had greatly increased in extent, and by every test of area, population, and natural resources, it was beyond comparison the greatest power that had ever existed in the world. but its organisation was of an extreme laxity; it possessed no real common government; and its principal members were united rather by a community of institutions and ideas than by any formal ties. moreover, it presented a more amazing diversity of racial types, of religions, and of grades of civilisation, than any other political fabric which had existed in history. its development had assuredly brought about a very great expansion of the ideas of western civilisation over the face of the globe, and, above all, a remarkable diffusion of the institutions of political liberty. but it remained to be proved whether this loosely compacted bundle of states possessed any real unity, or would be capable of standing any severe strain. the majority of observers, both in britain itself and throughout the world, would have been inclined, in 1878, to give a negative answer to these questions. vii the era of the world-states, 1878-1900 the congress of berlin in 1878 marks the close of the era of nationalist revolutions and wars in europe. by the same date all the european states had attained to a certain stability in their constitutional systems. with equal definiteness this year may be said to mark the opening of a new era in the history of european imperialism; an era of eager competition for the control of the still unoccupied regions of the world, in which the concerns of remote lands suddenly became matters of supreme moment to the great european powers, and the peace of the world was endangered by questions arising in china or siam, in morocco or the soudan, or the islands of the pacific. the control of europe over the non-european world was in a single generation completed and confirmed. and the most important of the many questions raised by this development was the question whether the spirit in which this world-supremacy of europe was to be wielded should be the spirit which long experience had inspired in the oldest of the colonising nations, the spirit of trusteeship on behalf of civilisation; or whether it was to be the old, brutal, and sterile spirit of mere domination for its own sake. on a superficial view the most obvious feature of this strenuous period was that all the remaining unexploited regions of the world were either annexed by one or other of the great western states, or were driven to adopt, with greater or less success, the modes of organisation of the west. but what was far more important than any new demarcation of the map was that not only the newly annexed lands, but also the half-developed territories of earlier european dominions, were with an extraordinary devouring energy penetrated during this generation by european traders and administrators, equipped with railways, steam-boats, and all the material apparatus of modern life, and in general organised and exploited for the purposes of industry and trade. this astonishing achievement was almost as thorough as it was swift. and its result was, not merely that the political control of europe over the backward regions of the world was strengthened and secured by these means, but that the whole world was turned into a single economic and political unit, no part of which could henceforth dwell in isolation. this might have meant that we should have been brought nearer to some sort of world-order; but unhappily the spirit in which the great work was undertaken by some, at least, of the nations which participated in it has turned this wonderful achievement into a source of bitterness and enmity, and led the world in the end to the tragedy and agony of the great war. the causes of this gigantic outpouring of energy were manifold. the main impelling forces were perhaps economic rather than political. but the economic needs of this strenuous age might have been satisfied without resort to the brutal arbitrament of war: their satisfaction might even have been made the means of diminishing the danger of war. it was the interpretation of these economic needs in terms of an unhappy political theory which has led to the final catastrophe. on a broad view, the final conquest of the world by european civilisation was made possible, and indeed inevitable, by the amazing development of the material aspects of that civilisation during the nineteenth century; by the progressive command over the forces of nature which the advance of science had placed in the hands of man, by the application of science to industry in the development of manufacturing methods and of new modes of communication, and by the intricate and flexible organisation of modern finance. these changes were already in progress before 1878, and were already transforming the face of the world. since 1878 they have gone forward with such accelerating speed that we have been unable to appreciate the significance of the revolution they were effecting. we have been carried off our feet; and have found it impossible to adjust our moral and political ideas to the new conditions. the great material achievements of the last two generations have been mainly due to an intense concentration and specialisation of functions among both men of thought and men of action. but the result of this has been that there have been few to attempt the vitally important task of appreciating the movement of our civilisation as a whole, and of endeavouring to determine how far the political conceptions inherited from an earlier age were valid in the new conditions. for under the pressure of the great transformation political forces also have been transformed, and in all countries political thought is baffled and bewildered by the complexity of the problems by which it is faced. to this in part we owe the dimness of vision which overtook us as we went whirling together towards the great catastrophe. it is only in the glare of a world-conflagration that we begin to perceive, in something like their true proportions, the great forces and events which have been shaping our destinies. in the future, if the huge soulless mechanism which man has created is not to get out of hand and destroy him, we must abandon that contempt for the philosopher and the political thinker which we have latterly been too ready to express, and we must recognise that the task of analysing and relating to one another the achievements of the past and the problems of the present is at least as important as the increase of our knowledge and of our dangerous powers by intense and narrow concentration within very limited fields of thought and work. in the meantime we must observe (however briefly and inadequately), how the dazzling advances of science and industry have affected the conquest of the world by european civilisation, and why it has come about that instead of leading to amity and happiness, they have brought us to the most hideous catastrophe in human history. science and industry, in the first place, made the conquest and organisation of the world easy. in the first stages of the expansion of europe the material superiority of the west had unquestionably afforded the means whereby its political ideas and institutions could be made operative in new fields. the invention of ocean-going ships, the use of the mariner's compass, the discovery of the rotundity of the earth, the development of firearms--these were the things which made possible the creation of the first european empires; though these purely material advantages could have led to no stable results unless they had been wielded by peoples possessing a real political capacity. in the same way the brilliant triumphs of modern engineering have alone rendered possible the rapid conquest and organisation of huge undeveloped areas; the deadly precision of western weapons has made the western peoples irresistible; the wonderful progress of medical science has largely overcome the barriers of disease which long excluded the white man from great regions of the earth; and the methods of modern finance, organising and making available the combined credit of whole communities, have provided the means for vast enterprises which without them could never have been undertaken. then, in the next place, science has found uses for many commodities which were previously of little value, and many of which are mainly produced in the undeveloped regions of the earth. some of these, like rubber, or nitrates, or mineral and vegetable oils, have rapidly become quite indispensable materials, consumed by the industrial countries on an immense scale. accordingly, the more highly industrialised a country is, the more dependent it must be upon supplies drawn from all parts of the world; not only supplies of food for the maintenance of its teeming population, but, even more, supplies of material for its industries. the days when europe, or even america, was self-sufficient are gone for ever. and in order that these essential supplies may be available, it has become necessary that all the regions which produce them should be brought under efficient administration. the anarchy of primitive barbarism cannot be allowed to stand in the way of access to these vital necessities of the new world-economy. it is merely futile for well-meaning sentimentalists to talk of the wickedness of invading the inalienable rights of the primitive occupants of these lands: for good or for ill, the world has become a single economic unit, and its progress cannot be stopped out of consideration for the time-honoured usages of uncivilised and backward tribes. of course it is our duty to ensure that these simple folks are justly treated, led gently into civilisation, and protected from the iniquities of a mere ruthless exploitation, such as, in some regions, we have been compelled to witness. but western civilisation has seized the reins of the world, and it will not be denied. its economic needs drive it to undertake the organisation of the whole world. what we have to secure is that its political principles shall be such as will ensure that its control will be a benefit to its subjects as well as to itself. but the development of scientific industry has made european control and civilised administration inevitable throughout the world. it did not, however, necessarily follow from these premises that the great european states which did not already possess extra-european territories were bound to acquire such lands. so far as their purely economic needs were concerned, it would have been enough that they should have freedom of access, on equal terms with their neighbours, to the sources of the supplies they required. it is quite possible, as events have shown, for a european state to attain very great success in the industrial sphere without possessing any political control over the lands from which its raw materials are drawn, or to which its finished products are sold. norway has created an immense shipping industry without owning a single port outside her own borders. the manufactures of switzerland are as thriving as these of any european country, though switzerland does not possess any colonies. germany herself, the loudest advocate of the necessity of political control as the basis of economic prosperity, has found it possible to create a vast and very prosperous industry, though her colonial possessions have been small, and have contributed scarcely at all to her wealth. her merchants and capitalists have indeed found the most profitable fields for their enterprises, not in their own colonies, which they have on the whole tended to neglect, but in a far greater degree in south and central america, and in india and the other vast territories of the british empire, which have been open to them as freely as to british merchants. all that the prosperity of european industry required was that the sources of supply should be under efficient administration, and that access to them should be open. and these conditions were fulfilled, before the great rush began, over the greater part of the earth. if in 1878, when the european nations suddenly awoke to the importance of the non-european world, they had been able to agree upon some simple principle which would have secured equal treatment to all, how different would have been the fate of europe and the world! if it could have been laid down, as a principle of international law, that in every area whose administration was undertaken by a european state, the 'open door' should be secured for the trade of all nations equally, and that this rule should continue in force until the area concerned acquired the status of a distinctly organised state controlling its own fiscal system, the industrial communities would have felt secure, the little states quite as fully as the big states. moreover, since, under these conditions, the annexation of territory by a european state would not have threatened the creation of a monopoly, but would have meant the assumption of a duty on behalf of civilisation, the acrimonies and jealousies which have attended the process of partition would have been largely conjured away. in 1878 such a solution would have presented few difficulties. for at that date the only european state which controlled large undeveloped areas was britain; and britain, as we have seen, had on her own account arrived at this solution, and had administered, as she still administers, all those regions of her empire which do not possess self-governing rights in the spirit of the principle we have suggested. why was it that this solution, or some solution on these lines, was not then adopted, and had no chance of being adopted? it was because the european states, and first and foremost among them germany, were still dominated by a political theory which forbade their taking such a view. we may call this theory the doctrine of power. it is the doctrine that the highest duty of every state is to aim at the extension of its own power, and that before this duty every other consideration must give way. the doctrine of power has never received a more unflinching expression than it received from the german treitschke, whose influence was at its height during the years of the great rush for extra-european possessions. the advocate of the doctrine of power is not, and cannot be, satisfied with equality of opportunity; he demands supremacy, he demands monopoly, he demands the means to injure and destroy his rivals. it would not be just to say that this doctrine was influential only in germany; it was in some degree potent everywhere, especially in this period, which was the period par excellence of 'imperialism' in the bad sense of the term. but it is certainly true that no state has ever been so completely dominated by it as germany; and no state less than britain. it was in the light of this doctrine that the demands of the new scientific industry were interpreted. hag-ridden by this conception, when the statesmen of europe awoke to the importance of the non-european world, it was not primarily the economic needs of their countries that they thought of, for these were, on the whole, not inadequately met: what struck their imagination was that, in paying no attention to the outer world, they had missed great opportunities of increasing their power. this oversight, they resolved, must be rectified before it was too late. for when the peoples of western and central europe, no longer engrossed by the problems of nationalism and liberalism, cast their eyes over the world, lo! the scale of things seemed to have changed. just as, in the fifteenth century, civilisation had suddenly passed from the stage of the city-state or the feudal principality to the stage of the great nation-state, so now, while the european peoples were still struggling to realise their nationhood, civilisation seemed to have stolen a march upon them, and to have advanced once more, this time into the stage of the world-state. for to the east of the european nations lay the vast russian empire, stretching from central europe across asia to the pacific; and in the west the american republic extended from ocean to ocean, across three thousand miles of territory; and between these and around them spread the british empire, sprawling over the whole face of the globe, on every sea and in every continent. in contrast with these giant empires, the nation-states of europe felt themselves out of scale, just as the italian cities in the sixteenth century must have felt themselves out of scale in comparison with the new nation-states of spain and france. to achieve the standard of the world-state, to make their own nations the controlling factors in wide dominions which should include territories and populations of varied types, became the ambition of the most powerful european states. a new political ideal had captivated the mind of europe. these powerful motives were reinforced by others which arose from the development of affairs within europe itself. in the first place, the leading european states had by 1878 definitely abandoned that tendency towards free trade which had seemed to be increasing in strength during the previous generation; and, largely in the hope of combating the overwhelming mercantile and industrial supremacy of britain, had adopted the fiscal policy of protection. the ideal of the protectionist creed is national self-sufficiency in the economic sphere. but, as we have seen, economic self-sufficiency was no longer attainable in the conditions of modern industry by any european state. only by large foreign annexations, especially in the tropical regions, did it seem possible of achievement. but when a protectionist state begins to acquire territory, the anticipation that it will use its power to exclude or destroy the trade of its rivals must drive other states to safeguard themselves by still further annexations. it was, indeed, this fear which mainly drove britain, in spite of, or perhaps because of, her free trade theories, into a series of large annexations in regions where her trade had been hitherto predominant. again, the most perturbing feature of the relations between the european powers also contributed to produce an eagerness for colonial possessions. europe had entered upon the era of huge national armies; the example of prussia, and the rancours which had been created by her policy, had set all the nations arming themselves. they had learned to measure their strength by their available man-power, and in two ways the desire to increase the reserve of military manhood formed a motive for colonisation. in the first place, the surplus manhood of a nation was lost to it if it was allowed to pass under an alien flag by emigration. those continental states from which emigration took place on a large scale began to aspire after the possession of colonies of their own, where their emigrants could still be kept under control, and remain subject to the obligations of service. germany, the state which beyond all others measures its strength by its fighting man-power, was most affected by this motive, which formed the chief theme of the colonial school among her politicians and journalists, and continued to be so even when the stream of her emigrants had dwindled to very small proportions. in a less degree, italy was influenced by the same motive. in the second place, conquered subjects even of backward races might be made useful for the purposes of war. this motive appealed most strongly to france. her home population was stationary. she lived in constant dread of a new onslaught from her formidable neighbour; and she watched with alarm the rapid increase of that neighbour's population, and the incessant increases in the numbers of his armies. at a later date germany also began to be attracted by the possibility of drilling and arming, among the negroes of central africa, or the turks of asia minor, forces which might aid her to dominate the world. thus the political situation in europe had a very direct influence upon the colonising activity of this period. the dominant fact of european politics during this generation was the supreme prestige and influence of germany, who, not content with an unquestioned military superiority to any other power, had buttressed herself by the formation (1879 and 1882) of the most formidable standing alliance that has ever existed in european history, and completely dominated european politics. france, having been hurled from the leadership of europe in 1870, dreaded nothing so much as the outbreak of a new european war, in which she must be inevitably involved, and in which she might be utterly ruined. she strove to find a compensation for her wounded pride in colonial adventures, and therefore became, during the first part of the period, the most active of the powers in this field. she was encouraged to adopt this policy by bismarck, partly in the hope that she might thus forget alsace, partly in order that she might be kept on bad terms with britain, whose interests seemed to be continually threatened by her colonising activity. but she hesitated to take a very definite line in regard to territories that lay close to europe and might involve european complications. bismarck himself took little interest in colonial questions, except in so far as they could be used as a means of alienating the other powers from one another, and so securing the european supremacy of germany. he therefore at first made no attempt to use the dominant position of germany as a means of acquiring extra-european dominions. but the younger generation in germany was far from sharing this view. it was determined to win for germany a world-empire, and in 1884 and the following years--rather late in the day, when most of the more desirable territories were already occupied--it forced bismarck to annex large areas. after bismarck's fall, in 1890, this party got the upper hand in german politics, and the creation of a great world-empire became, as we shall see, the supreme aim of william ii. and his advisers. the formidable and threatening power of germany began to be systematically employed not merely for the maintenance of supremacy in europe, which could be secured by peaceful means, but for the acquisition of a commanding position in the outer world; and since this could only be attained by violence, the world being now almost completely partitioned, the new policy made germany the source of unrest and apprehension, as she had earlier been, and still continued to be, the main cause of the burden of military preparation in europe. among the other powers which participated in the great partition, russia continued her pressure in two of the three directions which she had earlier followed-south-eastwards in central asia, eastwards towards china. in both directions her activity aroused the nervous fears of britain, while her pressure upon china helped to bring japan into the ranks of the militant and aggressive powers. but russia took no interest in the more distant quarters of the world. nor did austria, though during these years her old ambition to expand south-eastwards at the expense of turkey and the balkan peoples revived under german encouragement. italy, having but recently achieved national unity and taken her place among the great powers, felt that she could not be left out of the running, now that extra-european possessions had come to appear an almost essential mark of greatness among states; and, disappointed of tunis, she endeavoured to find compensation on the shores of the red sea. spain and portugal, in the midst of all these eager rivalries, were tempted to furbish up their old and half-dormant claims. even the united states of america joined in the rush during the fevered period of the 'nineties. lastly, britain, the oldest and the most fully endowed of all the colonising powers, was drawn, half unwilling, into the competition; and having an immense start over her rivals, actually acquired more new territory than any of them. she was, indeed, like the other states, passing through an 'imperialist' phase in these years. the value attached by other countries to oversea possessions awakened among the british people a new pride in their far-spread dominions. disraeli, who was in the ascendant when the period opened, had forgotten his old opinion of the uselessness of colonies, and had become a prophet of empire. an imperial federation society was founded in 1878. the old unwillingness to assume new responsibilities died out, or diminished; and the rapid annexations of other states, especially france, in regions where british influence had hitherto been supreme, and whose chieftains had often begged in vain for british protection, aroused some irritation. the ebullient energy of the colonists themselves, especially in south africa and australia, demanded a forward policy. above all, the fact that the european powers, now so eager for colonial possessions, had all adopted the protectionist policy aroused a fear lest british traders should find themselves shut out from lands whose trade had hitherto been almost wholly in their hands; and the militant and aggressive temper sometimes shown by the agents of these powers awakened some nervousness regarding the safety of the existing british possessions. hence britain, after a period of hesitancy, became as active as any of the other states in annexation. throughout this period her main rival was france, whose new claims seemed to come in conflict with her own in almost every quarter of the globe. this rivalry produced acute friction, which grew in intensity until it reached its culminating point in the crisis of fashoda in 1898, and was not removed until the settlement of 1904 solved all the outstanding difficulties. it would be quite untrue to say that britain deliberately endeavoured to prevent or to check the rapid colonial expansion of france. the truth is that british trading interests had been predominant in many of the regions where the french were most active, and that the protectionist policy which france had adopted stimulated into a new life the ancient rivalry of these neighbour and sister nations. towards the colonial ambitions of germany, and still more of italy, britain was far more complaisant. it is difficult to give in a brief space a clear summary of the extremely complicated events and intrigues of this vitally important period. but perhaps it will be easiest if we consider in turn the regions in which the strenuous rivalries of the powers displayed themselves. the most important was africa, which lay invitingly near to europe, and was the only large region of the world which was still for the most part unoccupied. here all the competitors, save russia, japan, and america, played a part. western asia formed a second field, in which three powers only, russia, germany, and britain, were immediately concerned. the far east, where the vast empire of china seemed to be falling into decrepitude, afforded the most vexed problems of the period. finally, the pacific islands were the scene of an active though less intense rivalry. it is a curious fact that africa, the continent whose outline was the first outside of europe itself to be fully mapped out by the european peoples, was actually the last to be effectively brought under the influence of european civilisation. this was because the coasts of africa are for the most part inhospitable; its vast interior plateau is almost everywhere shut off either by belts of desert land, or by swampy and malarious regions along the coast; even its great rivers do not readily tempt the explorer inland, because their course is often interrupted by falls or rapids not far from their mouths, where they descend from the interior plateau to the coastal plain; and its inhabitants, warlike and difficult to deal with, are also peoples of few and simple wants, who have little to offer to the trader. hence eight generations of european mariners had circumnavigated the continent without seriously attempting to penetrate its central mass; and apart from the anglo-dutch settlements at the southern extremity, the french empire in algeria in the north, a few trading centres on the west coast, and some half-derelict portuguese stations in angola and mozambique, the whole continent remained available for european exploitation in 1878. what trade was carried on, except in egypt, in algeria, and in the immediate vicinity of the old french settlements on the west coast, was mainly in the hands of british merchants. over the greater part of the coastal belts only the british power was known to the native tribes and chieftains. many of them (like the sultan of zanzibar and the chiefs of the cameroons) had repeatedly begged to be taken under british protection, and had been refused. during the two generations before 1878 the interior of the continent had begun to be known. but except in the north and north-west, where french explorers and a few germans had been active, the work had been mainly done by british travellers. most of the great names of african exploration--livingstone, burton, speke, baker, cameron and the anglo-american stanley--were british names. these facts, of course, gave to britain, already so richly endowed, no sort of claim to a monopoly of the continent. but they naturally gave her a right to a voice in its disposal. only the french had shown anything like the same activity, or had established anything like the same interests; and they were far behind their secular rivals. but these facts bring out one feature which differentiated the settlement of africa from that of any other region of the non-european world. it was not a gradual, but an extraordinarily rapid achievement. it was based not upon claims established by work already done, but, for the most part, upon the implicit assumption that extra-european empire was the due of the european peoples, simply because they were civilised and powerful. this was the justification, in a large degree, of all the european empires in africa. but it was especially so in the case of the empire which germany created in the space of three years. this empire was not the product of german enterprise in the regions included within it; it was the product of germany's dominating position in europe, and the expression of her resolve to create an external empire worthy of that position. africa falls naturally into two great regions. the northern coast, separated from the main mass of the continent by the broad belt of deserts which runs from the atlantic to the red sea, has always been far more ultimately connected with the other mediterranean lands than with the rest of africa. throughout the course of history, indeed, the northern coast-lands have belonged rather to the realms of western or of asiatic civilisation than to the primitive barbarism of the sons of ham. in the days of the carthaginians and of the roman empire, all these lands, from egypt to morocco, had known a high civilisation. they were racially as well as historically distinct from the rest of the continent. they had been in name part of the turkish empire, and any european interference in their affairs was as much a question of european politics as the problems of the balkans. two countries in this area fell under european direction during the period with which we are concerned, and in each case the effects upon european politics were very great. in 1881 france, with the deliberate encouragement of bismarck, sent armies into tunis, and assumed the protectorate of that misgoverned region. she had good grounds for her action. not only had she large trade-interests in tunis, but the country was separated from her earlier dominion in algeria only by an artificial line, and its disorders increased the difficulty of developing the efficient administration which she had established there. unhappily italy also had interests in tunis. there were more italian than french residents in the country, which is separated from sicily only by a narrow belt of sea. and italy, who was beginning to conceive colonial ambitions, had not unnaturally marked down tunis as her most obvious sphere of influence. the result was to create a long-lived ill-feeling between the two latin countries. as a consequence of the annexation of tunis, italy was persuaded in the next year (1882) to join the triple alliance; and france, having burnt her fingers, became chary of colonial adventures in regions that were directly under the eye of europe. isolated, insecure, and eternally suspicious of germany, she could not afford to be drawn into european quarrels. this is in a large degree the explanation of her vacillating action in regard to egypt. in egypt the political influence of france had been preponderant ever since the time of mehemet ali; perhaps we should say, ever since the time of napoleon. and political influence had been accompanied by trading and financial interests. france had a larger share of the trade of egypt, and had lent more money to the ruling princes of the country, than any other country save england. she had designed and executed the suez canal. but this waterway, once opened, was used mainly by british ships on the way to india, australia, and the far east. it became a point of vital strategic importance to britain, who, though she had opposed its construction, eagerly seized the chance of buying a great block of shares in the enterprise from the bankrupt khedive. thus french and british interests in egypt were equally great; greater than those of all the rest of europe put together. when the native government of egypt fell into bankruptcy (1876), the two powers set up a sort of condominium, or joint control of the finances, in order to ensure the payment of interest on the egyptian debt held by their citizens. to bankruptcy succeeded political chaos; and it became apparent that if the rich land of egypt was not to fall into utter anarchy, there must be direct european intervention. the two powers proposed to take joint action; the rest of europe assented. but the sultan of turkey, as suzerain of egypt, threatened to make difficulties. at the last moment france, fearful of the complications that might result, and resolute to avoid the danger of european war, withdrew from the project of joint intervention. britain went on alone; and although she hoped and believed that she would quickly be able to restore order, and thereupon to evacuate the country, found herself drawn into a labour of reconstruction that could not be dropped. we shall in the next chapter have more to say on the british occupation of egypt, as part of the british achievement during this period. in the meanwhile, its immediate result was continuous friction between france and britain. france could not forgive herself or britain for the opportunity which she had lost. the embitterment caused by the egyptian question lasted throughout the period, and was not healed till the entente of 1904. it intensified and exacerbated the rivalry of the two countries in other fields. it made each country incapable of judging fairly the actions of the other. to wounded and embittered france, the perfectly honest british explanations of the reasons for delay in evacuating egypt seemed only so many evidences of hypocrisy masking greed. to britain the french attitude seemed fractious and unreasonable, and she suspected in every french forward movement in other fields--notably in the eastern soudan and the upper valley of the nile--an attempt to attack or undermine her. thus egypt, like tunis, illustrated the influence of european politics in the extra-european field. the power that profited most was germany, who had strengthened herself by drawing italy into the triple alliance, and had kept france at her mercy by using colonial questions as a means of alienating her from her natural friends. it was, in truth, only from this point of view that colonial questions had any interest for bismarck. he was, as he repeatedly asserted almost to the day of his death, 'no colony man.' but the time was at hand when he was to be forced out of this attitude. for already the riches of tropical africa were beginning to attract the attention of europe. the most active and energetic of the powers in tropical africa was france. from her ancient foothold at senegal she was already, in the late 'seventies, pushing inland towards the upper waters of the niger; while further south her vigorous explorer de brazza was penetrating the hinterland behind the french coastal settlements north of the congo mouth. meanwhile the explorations of livingstone and stanley had given the world some conception of the wealth of the vast exterior. in 1876 leopold, king of the belgians, summoned a conference at brussels to consider the possibility of setting the exploration and settlement of africa upon an international basis. its result was the formation of an international african association, with branches in all the principal countries. but from the first the branches dropped all serious pretence of international action. they became (so far as they exercised any influence) purely national organisations for the purpose of acquiring the maximum amount of territory for their own states. and the central body, after attempting a few unsuccessful exploring expeditions, practically resolved itself into the organ of king leopold himself, and aimed at creating a neutral state in central africa under his protection. in 1878 h. m. stanley returned from the exploration of the congo. he was at once invited by king leopold to undertake the organisation of the congo basin for his association, and set out again for that purpose in 1879. but he soon found himself in conflict with the active french agents under de brazza, who had made their way into the congo valley from the north-west. and at the same time portugal, reviving ancient and dormant claims, asserted that the congo belonged to her. it was primarily to find a solution for these disputes that the berlin conference was summoned in december 1884. meanwhile the rush for territory was going on furiously in other regions of africa. not only on the congo, but on the guinea coast and its hinterland, france was showing an immense activity, and was threatening to reduce to small coastal enclaves the old british settlements on this coast. only the energy shown by a group of british merchants, who formed themselves into a national african company in 1881, and the vigorous action of their leader, mr. (afterwards sir) george taubman goldie, prevented the extrusion of british interests from the greater part of the niger valley, where they had hitherto been supreme. in madagascar, too, the ancient ambitions of france had revived. though british trading and missionary activities in the island were at this date probably greater than french, france claimed large rights, especially in the north-east of the island. these claims drew her into a war with the native power of the hovas, which began in 1883, and ended in 1885 with a vague recognition of french suzerainty. again, italy had, in 1883, obtained her first foothold in eritrea, on the shore of the red sea. and germany, also, had suddenly made up her mind to embark upon the career of empire. in 1883 the bremen merchant, luderitz, appeared in south-west africa, where there were a few german mission stations and trading-centres, and annexed a large area which bismarck was persuaded to take under the formal protection of germany. this region had hitherto been vaguely regarded as within the british sphere, but though native princes, missionaries, and in 1868 even the prussian government, had requested britain to establish a formal protectorate, she had always declined to do so. in the next year another german agent, dr. nachtigal, was commissioned by the german government to report on german trade interests on the west coast, and the british government was formally acquainted with his mission and requested to instruct its agents to assist him. the real purpose of the mission was shown when nachtigal made a treaty with the king of togoland, on the guinea coast, whereby he accepted german suzerainty. a week later a similar treaty was made with some of the native chiefs in the cameroons. in this region british interests had hitherto been predominant, and the chiefs had repeatedly asked for british protection, which had always been refused. a little later the notorious karl peters, with a few companions disguised as working engineers, arrived at zanzibar on the east coast, with a commission from the german colonial society to peg out german claims. in the island of zanzibar british interests had long been overwhelmingly predominant; and the sultan, who had large and vague claims to supremacy over a vast extent of the mainland, had repeatedly asked the british government to take these regions under its protectorate. he had always been refused. peters' luggage consisted largely of draft treaty-forms; and he succeeded in making treaties with native princes (usually unaware of the meaning of the documents they were signing) whereby some 60,000 square miles were brought under german control. the protectorate over these lands had not been accepted by the german government when the conference of berlin met. it was formally accepted in the next year (1885). far from being opposed by britain, the establishment of german power in east africa was actually welcomed by the british government, whose foreign secretary, earl granville, wrote that his government 'views with favour these schemes, the realisation of which will entail the civilisation of large tracts over which hitherto no european influence has been exercised.' and when a group of british traders began to take action further north, in the territory which later became british east africa, and in which peters had done nothing, the british government actually consulted the german government before licensing their action. thus before the meeting of the conference of berlin the foundations of the german empire in africa were already laid; the outlines of the vast french empire in the north had begun to appear; and the curious dominion of leopold of belgium in the congo valley had begun to take shape. the conference of berlin (dec. 1884-feb. 1885), which marks the close of the first stage in the partition of africa, might have achieved great things if it had endeavoured to lay down the principles upon which european control over backward peoples should be exercised. but it made no such ambitious attempt. it prescribed the rules of the game of empire-building, ordaining that all protectorates should be formally notified by the power which assumed them to the other powers, and that no annexation should be made of territory which was not 'effectively' occupied; but evidently the phrase 'effective occupation' can be very laxly interpreted. it provided that there should be free navigation of the congo and niger rivers, and freedom of trade for alienations within the congo valley and certain other vaguely defined areas. but it made no similar provision for other parts of africa; and it whittled away the value of what it did secure by the definite proviso that should parts of these areas be annexed by independent states, the restriction upon their control of trade should lapse. it recognised the illegality of the slave-trade, and imposed upon annexing powers the duty of helping to suppress it; this provision was made much fuller and more definite by a second conference at brussels in 1890, on the demand of britain, who had hitherto contended almost alone against the traffic in human flesh. but no attempt was made to define native rights, to safeguard native customs, to prohibit the maintenance of forces larger than would be necessary for the maintenance of order: in short, no attempt was made to lay down the doctrine that the function of a ruling power among backward peoples is that of a trustee on behalf of its simple subjects and on behalf of civilisation. that the partition of africa should have been effected without open war, and that the questions decided at berlin should have been so easily and peacefully agreed upon, seemed at the moment to be a good sign. but the spirit which the conference expressed was not a healthy spirit. after 1884 the activity of the powers in exploration, annexation and development became more furious than ever. britain now began seriously to arouse herself to the danger of exclusion from vast areas where her interests had hitherto been predominant; and it was during these years that all her main acquisitions of territory in africa were made: rhodesia and central africa in the south, east africa and somaliland in the east, nigeria and the expansion of her lesser protectorates in the west. to these years also belonged the definite, and most unfortunate, emergence of italy as a colonising power. she had got a foothold in eritrea in 1883; in 1885 it was, with british aid, enlarged by the annexation of territory which had once been held by egypt, but had been abandoned when she lost the soudan. but the italian claims in eritrea brought on conflict with the neighbouring native power of abyssinia. in spite of a sharp defeat at dogali in 1887, she succeeded in holding her own in this conflict; and in 1889 abyssinia accepted a treaty which italy claimed to be a recognition of her suzerainty. but the abyssinians repudiated this interpretation; and in a new war, which began in 1896, inflicted upon the italians so disastrous a defeat at adowa that they were constrained to admit the complete independence of abyssinia--the sole native state which has so far been able to hold its own against the pressure of europe. meanwhile in 1889 and the following years italy had, once more with the direct concurrence of britain, marked out a new territory in somaliland. the main features of the years from 1884 to 1900 were the rapidity with which the territories earlier annexed were expanded and organised, more especially by france. in the 'nineties her dominions extended from the mediterranean to the guinea coast, and she had conceived the ambition of extending them also across africa from west to east. this ambition led her into a new and more acute conflict with britain, who, having undertaken the reconquest of the egyptian soudan and the upper valley of the nile, held that she could not permit a rival to occupy the upper waters of the great river, or any part of the territory that belonged to it. hence when the intrepid explorer, marchand, after a toilsome expedition which lasted for two years, planted the french flag at fashoda in 1898, he was promptly disturbed by kitchener, fresh from the overthrow of the khalifa and the reconquest of khartoum, and was compelled to withdraw. the tension was severe; no episode in the partition of africa had brought the world so near to the outbreak of a european war. but in the end the dispute was settled by the anglo-french agreement of 1898, which may be said to mark the conclusion of the process of partition. it was the last important treaty in a long series which filled the twenty years following 1878, and which had the result of leaving africa, with the exception of morocco, tripoli, and abyssinia, completely divided among the chief european states. africa was the main field of the ambitions and rivalries of the european powers during this period; the other fields may be more rapidly surveyed. in central asia and the near east the main features of the period were two. the first was the steady advance of russia towards the south-east, which awakened acute alarms in britain regarding india, and led to the adoption of a 'forward policy' among the frontier tribes in the north-west of india. the second was the gradual and silent penetration of turkey by german influence. here there was no partition or annexation, but germany became the political protector of the turk; undertook the reorganisation of his armies; obtained great commercial concessions; bought up his railways, ousting the earlier british and french concerns which had controlled them, and built new lines. the greatest of these was the vitally important project of the bagdad railway, which was taken in hand just before the close of the period. it was a project whose political aims outweighed its commercial aims. and it provided a warning of the gigantic designs which germany was beginning to work out. but as yet, in 1900, the magnitude of these designs was unperceived. and the problems of the middle east were not yet very disturbing. the turkish empire remained intact; so did the persian empire, though both were becoming more helpless, partly owing to the decrepitude of their governments, partly owing to the pressure of european financial and trading interests. as yet the empires of the middle east seemed to form a region comparatively free from european influence. but this was only seeming. the influence of europe was at work in them; and it was probably inevitable that some degree of european political tutelage should follow as the only means of preventing the disintegration which must result from the pouring of new wine into the old bottles. in the far east--in the vast empire of china--this result seemed to be coming about inevitably and rapidly. the ancient pot-bound civilisation of china had withstood the impact of the west in the mid-nineteenth century without breaking down; but china had made no attempt, such as japan had triumphantly carried out, to adapt herself to the new conditions, and her system was slowly crumbling under the influence of the european traders, teachers, and missionaries whom she had been compelled to admit. the first of the powers to take advantage of this situation was france, who already possessed a footing in cochin-china, and was tempted during the colonial enthusiasm of the 'eighties to transform it into a general supremacy over annam and tonking. as early as 1874 she had obtained from the king of annam a treaty which she interpreted as giving her suzerain powers. the king of annam himself repudiated this interpretation, and maintained that he was a vassal of china. china took the same view; and after long negotiations a war between france and china broke out. it lasted for four years, and demanded a large expenditure of strength. but it ended (1885) with the formal recognition of french suzerainty over annam, and a further decline of chinese prestige. ten years later a still more striking proof of chinese weakness was afforded by the rapid and complete defeat of the vast, ill-organised empire by japan, the youngest of the great powers. the war gave to japan formosa and the pescadores islands, and added her to the list of imperialist powers. she would have won more still--the liao-tang peninsula and a sort of suzerainty over korea--but that the european powers, startled by the signs of china's decay, and perhaps desiring a share of the plunder, intervened to forbid these annexations, on the pretext of defending the integrity of china. russia, france and germany combined in this step; britain stood aloof. japan, unwillingly giving way, and regarding russia as the chief cause of her humiliation, began to prepare herself for a coming conflict. as for unhappy china, she was soon to learn how much sincerity there was in the zeal of europe for the maintenance of her integrity. in 1896 she was compelled to permit russia to build a railway across manchuria; and to grant to france a 'rectification of frontiers' on the south, and the right of building a railway through the province of yunnan, which lies next to tonking. the partition of china seemed to be at hand. britain and america vainly urged upon the other powers that china should be left free to direct her own affairs subject to the maintenance of 'the open door' for european trade. the other powers refused to listen, and in 1897 the beginning of the end seemed to have come. germany, seizing on the pretext afforded by the murder of two german missionaries, stretched forth her 'mailed fist,' and seized the strong place and admirable harbour of kiao-chau, the most valuable strategic position on the chinese coast. that she meant to use it as a base for future expansion was shown by her lavish expenditure upon its equipment and fortification. russia responded by seizing the strong place of port arthur and the liao-tang peninsula, while every day her hold upon the great province of manchuria was strengthened. foreseeing a coming conflict in which her immense trading interests would be imperilled, britain acquired a naval base on the chinese coast by leasing wei-hai-wei. thus all the european rivals were clustered round the decaying body of china; and in the last years of the century were already beginning to claim 'spheres of influence,' despite the protests of britain and america. but the outburst of the boxer rising in 1900--caused mainly by resentment of foreign intervention--had the effect of postponing the rush for chinese territory. and when britain and japan made an alliance in 1902 on the basis of guaranteeing the status quo in the east, the overwhelming naval strength of the two allies made a european partition of china impracticable; and china was once more given a breathing-space. only russia could attack the chinese empire by land; and the severe defeat which she suffered at the hands of japan in 1904-5 removed that danger also. the far east was left with a chance of maintaining its independence, and of voluntarily adapting itself to the needs of a new age. the last region in which territories remained available for european annexation consisted of the innumerable archipelagoes of the pacific ocean. here the preponderant influence had been in the hands of britain ever since the days of captain cook. she had made some annexations during the first three quarters of the century, but had on the whole steadfastly refused the requests of many of the island peoples to be taken under her protection. france had, as we have seen, acquired new caledonia and the marquesas islands during the previous period, but her activity in this region was never very great. the only other european power in possession of pacific territories was spain, who held the great archipelago of the philippines, and claimed also the numerous minute islands (nearly six hundred in number) which are known as micronesia. when the colonial enthusiasm of the 'eighties began, germany saw a fruitful field in the pacific, and annexed the bismarck archipelago and the north-eastern quarter of new guinea. under pressure from australia, who feared to see so formidable a neighbour established so near her coastline, britain annexed the south-eastern quarter of that huge island. during the 'nineties the partition of the pacific islands was completed; the chief participators being germany, britain, and the united states of america. the entry of america into the race for imperial possessions in its last phase was too striking an event to pass without comment. america annexed hawaii in 1898, and divided the samoan group with germany in 1899. but her most notable departure from her traditional policy of self-imposed isolation from world-politics came when in 1898 she was drawn by the cuban question into a war with spain. its result was the disappearance of the last relics of the spanish empire in the new world and in the pacific. cuba became an independent republic. porto rico was annexed by america. in the pacific the micronesian possessions of spain were acquired by germany. germany would fain have annexed also the philippine islands. but america resolved herself to assume the task of organising and governing these rich lands; and in doing so made a grave breach with her traditions. her new possession necessarily drew her into closer relations with the problems of the far east; it gave her also some acquaintance with the difficulty of introducing western methods among a backward people. during these years of universal imperialist excitement the spirit of imperialism seemed to have captured america as it had captured the european states; and this was expressed in a new interpretation of the monroe doctrine, put forth by the secretary of state during the venezuela controversy of 1895. 'the united states,' said mr. olney, 'is practically sovereign on this continent (meaning both north and south america), 'and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition.' no such gigantic imperial claim had ever been put forward by any european state; and it constituted an almost defiant challenge to the imperialist powers of europe. it may safely be said that this dictum did not represent the settled judgment of the american people. but it did appear, in the last years of the century, as if the great republic were about to emerge from her self-imposed isolation, and to take her natural part in the task of planting the civilisation of the west throughout the world. had she frankly done so, had she made it plain that she recognised the indissoluble unity and the common interests of the whole world, it is possible that her influence might have eased the troubles of the next period, and exercised a deterrent influence upon the forces of disturbance which were working towards the great catastrophe. but her traditions were too strong; and after the brief imperialist excitement of the 'nineties, she gradually relapsed once more into something like her old attitude of aloofness. it is but a cursory and superficial view which we have been able to take of this extraordinary quarter of a century, during which almost the whole world was partitioned among a group of mighty empires, and the political and economic unity of the globe was finally and irrefragably established. few regions had escaped the direct political control of european powers; and most of these few were insensibly falling under the influence of one or other of the powers: turkey under that of germany, persia under that of russia and britain. no region of the earth remained exempt from the indirect influence of the european system. the civilisation of the west had completed the domination of the globe; and the interests of the great world-states were so intertwined and intermingled in every corner of the earth that the balance of power among them had become as precarious as was the european balance in the eighteenth century. the era of the world-states had very definitely opened. it remained to be seen in what spirit it was to be used, and whether it was to be of long duration. these two questions are one; for no system can last which is based upon injustice and the denial of right. at this point we may well stop to survey the new world-states which had been created by this quarter of a century of eager competition. first among them, in extent and importance, stood the new empire of france. it covered a total area of five million square miles, and in size ranked third in order, coming after the older empires of russia and britain. it had been the result of the strenuous labours of three-quarters of a century, dating from the first invasion of algiers; it included also some surviving fragments of the earlier french empire. but overwhelmingly the greater part of this vast dominion had been acquired during the short period which we have surveyed in this chapter; and its system of organisation and government had not yet had time to establish itself. it had been built only at the cost of strenuous labour, and many wars. yet the french had shown in its administration that they still retained to the full that imaginative tact in the handling of alien peoples which had stood them in good stead in india and america during the eighteenth century. once their rule was established the french had on the whole very little trouble with their subjects; and it is impossible to praise too highly the labours of civilisation which french administrators were achieving. so far as their subjects were concerned, they may justly be said to have regarded themselves as trustees. so far as the rest of the civilised world was concerned, the same praise cannot be given; for the french policy in the economic administration of colonies was definitely one of monopoly and exclusion. the french empire fell into three main blocks. first, and most important, was the empire of northern africa, extending from algiers to the mouth of the congo, and from the atlantic to the valley of the nile. next came the rich island of madagascar; lastly the eastern empire of annam and tonking, the beginnings of which dated back to the eighteenth century. a few inconsiderable islands in the pacific and the west indies, acquired long since, a couple of towns in india, memories of the dreams of dupleix, and the province of french guiana in south america, which dated back to the seventeenth century, completed the list. for the most part a recent and rapid creation, it nevertheless had roots in the past, and was the work of a people experienced in the handling of backward races. next may be named the curious dominion of the congo free state, occupying the rich heart of the african continent. nominally it belonged to no european power, but was a recognised neutral territory. in practice it was treated as the personal estate of the belgian king, leopold ii. subject to closer international restrictions than any other european domain in the non-european world, the congo was nevertheless the field of some of the worst iniquities in the exploitation of defenceless natives that have ever disgraced the record of european imperialism. international regulations are no safeguard against misgovernment; the only real sanction is the character and spirit of the government. for the congo iniquities leopold ii. must be held guilty at the bar of posterity. when he went to his judgment in 1908 this rich realm passed under the direct control of the belgian government and parliament, and an immediate improvement resulted. the least successful of the new world-states was that of italy. its story was a story of disaster and disappointment. it included some two hundred thousand square miles of territory; but they were hot and arid lands on the inhospitable shores of the red sea and in somaliland. italy had as yet no real opportunity of showing how she would deal with the responsibilities of empire. the most remarkable, in many respects, of all these suddenly acquired empires was that of germany. for it was practically all obtained within a period of three years, without fighting or even serious friction. it fell almost wholly within regions where germany's interests had been previously negligible, and british trade predominant. yet its growth had not been impeded, it had even been welcomed, by its rivals. this easily-won empire was indeed relatively small, being not much over one million square miles, little more than one-fifth of the french dominions. but it was five times as large as germany itself, and it included territories which were, on the whole, richer than those of france. the comparative smallness of its area was due to the fact that germany was actually the last to enter the race. she took no steps to acquire territory, she showed no desire to acquire it, before 1883; if she had chosen to begin ten years earlier, as she might easily have done, or if she had shown any marked activity in exploring or missionary work, without doubt she could have obtained a much larger share of african soil. these rich lands afforded to their new masters useful supplies of raw materials, which were capable of almost indefinite expansion. they included, in east and south-west africa, areas well suited for white settlement; but german emigrants, despite every encouragement, refused to settle in them. an elaborately scientific system of administration, such as might be expected from the german bureaucracy, was devised for the colonies; officials and soldiers have from the beginning formed a larger proportion of their white population than in any other european possessions. undoubtedly the government of the german colonies was in many respects extremely efficient. but over-administration, which has its defects even in an old and well-ordered country, is fatal to the development of a raw and new one. although germany has, in order to increase the prosperity of her colonies, encouraged foreign trade, and followed a far less exclusive policy than france, not one of her colonies, except the little west african district of togoland, has ever paid its own expenses. in the first generation of its existence the german colonial empire, small though it is in comparison with the british or the french, actually cost the home government over 100,000,000 pounds in direct outlay. the main cause of this was that from the first the germans showed neither skill nor sympathy in the handling of their subject populations. the uniformed official, with his book of rules, only bewilders primitive folk, and arouses their resentment. but it was not only official pedantry which caused trouble with the subject peoples; still more it was the ruthless spirit of mere domination, and the total disregard of native rights, which were displayed by the german administration. the idea of trusteeship, which had gradually established itself among the rulers of the british dominions, and in the french colonies also, was totally lacking among the germans. they ruled their primitive subjects with the brutal intolerance of zabern, with the ruthless cruelty since displayed in occupied belgium. this was what made the rise of the german dominion a terrible portent in the history of european imperialism. the spirit of mere domination, regardless of the rights of the conquered, had often shown itself in other european empires; but it had always had to struggle against another and better ideal, the ideal of trusteeship; and, as we have seen, the better ideal had, during the nineteenth century, definitely got the upper hand, especially in the british realms, whose experience had been longest. but the old and bad spirit reigned without check in the german realms. and even when, in 1907, it began to be seriously criticised, when its disastrous and unprofitable results began to be seen, the ground on which it was challenged in discussions in germany was mainly the materialist ground that it did not pay. the justification for these assertions is to be found in the history of the principal german colonies. in the cameroons the native tribes, who had been so ready to receive european government that they had repeatedly asked for british protection, were driven to such incessant revolts that the annals of the colony seem to be annals of continuous bloodshed: forty-six punitive expeditions were chronicled in the seventeen years from 1891--long after the establishment of the german supremacy, which took place in 1884. the record of east africa was even more terrible for the ferocity with which constant revolts were suppressed. but worst of all was the story of south-west africa. there were endless wars against the various tribes; but they culminated in the hideous herero war of 1903-6. the hereros, driven to desperation by maltreatment, had revolted and killed some white farmers. they were punished by an almost complete annihilation. the spirit of this hideous slaughter is sufficiently expressed by the proclamation of the governor, general von trotha, in 1904. 'the herero people must now leave the land. within the german frontier every herero, with or without weapon, with or without cattle, will be shot. i shall take charge of no more women and children, but shall drive them back to their people, or let them be shot at.' ten thousand of these unhappy people, mainly old men, women and children, were driven into the desert, where they perished. there is no such atrocious episode in the history of european imperialism since pizarro's slaughter of the incas; if even that can be compared with it. the causes of these ceaseless and ruinous wars were to be found partly in the total disregard of native custom, and in the hide-bound pedantry with which german-made law and the prussian system of regimentation were enforced upon the natives; but it was to be found still more in the assumption that the native had no rights as against his white lord. his land might be confiscated; his cattle driven away; even downright slavery was not unknown, not merely in the form of forced labour, which has been common in german colonies, but in the form of the actual sale and purchase of negroes. herr dernburg, who became colonial secretary in 1907, himself recorded that he met in east africa a young farmer who told him that he had just bought a hundred and fifty negroes; he also described the settlers' pleasing practice of sitting beside the wells with revolvers, in order to prevent the natives from watering their cattle, and to force them to leave them behind; and he noted that officials nearly always carried negro whips with them. these practices, indeed, were condemned by the german government itself, but only after many years, and mainly because they were wasteful. government representatives have told the reichstag, as herr schleitwein did in 1904, that they must pursue a 'healthy egoism,' and forswear 'humanitarianism and irrational sentimentality.' 'the hereros must be forced to work, and to work without compensation and for their food only. ... the sentiments of christianity and philanthropy with which the missionaries work must be repudiated with all energy.' this is what is called realpolitik. is it too much to say that the appearance of the spirit thus expressed was a new thing in the history of european imperialism? is it not plain that if this spirit should triumph, the ascendancy of europe over the non-european world must prove to be, not a blessing, but an unmitigated curse? yet the nation which had thus acquitted itself in the rich lands which it had so easily acquired was not satisfied; it desired a wider field for the exhibition of its kultur, its conception of civilisation. from the beginning it was evident that the colonial enthusiasts of germany had no intention of resting satisfied with the considerable dominions they had won, but regarded them only as a beginning, as bases for future conquests. the colonies were not ends in themselves, but means for the acquisition of further power; and it was this, even more than the ruthlessness with which the subject peoples were treated, which made the growth of the german dominions a terrible portent. for since the whole world was now portioned out, new territories could only be acquired at the cost of germany's neighbours. this was, indeed, at first the programme only of extremists; the mass of the german people, like bismarck, took little interest in colonies. but the extremists proved that they could win over the government to their view; the german people, most docile of nations, could be gradually indoctrinated with it. and because this was so, because the ugly spirit of domination and of unbridled aggressiveness was in these years gradually mastering the ruling forces of a very powerful state, and leading them towards the catastrophe which was to prove the culmination of european imperialism, it is necessary to dwell, at what may seem disproportionate length, upon the development of german policy during the later years of our period. filled with pride in her own achievements, believing herself to be, beyond all rivalry, the greatest nation in the world, already the leader, and destined to be the controller, of civilisation, germany could not bring herself to accept a second place in the imperial sphere. she had entered late into the field, by no fault of her own, and found all the most desirable regions of the earth already occupied. now that 'world-power' had become the test of greatness among states, she could be content with nothing short of the first rank among world-states; if this rank could not be achieved, she seemed to be sentenced to the same sort of fate as had befallen holland or denmark: she might be ever so prosperous, as these little states were, but she would be dwarfed by the vast powers which surrounded her. but the german world-state was not to be the result of a gradual and natural growth, like the russian, the british or the american world-states. the possibility of gradual growth was excluded by the fact that the whole world had been partitioned. greatness in the non-european world must be, and might be, carved out in a single generation, as supremacy in europe had been already attained, by the strong will, efficient organisation, and military might of the german government. it was natural, perhaps inevitable, that a nation with the history of the german nation, with its ruling ideas, and with its apparently well-tried confidence in the power of its government to achieve its ends by force, should readily accept such a programme. the date at which this programme captured the government of germany, and became the national policy, can be quite clearly fixed: it was in 1890, when bismarck, the 'no colony man,' was driven from power, and the supreme direction of national affairs fell into the hands of the emperor william ii. an impressionable, domineering and magniloquent prince, inflated by the hereditary self-assurance of the hohenzollerns, and sharing to the full the modern german belief in german superiority and in germany's imperial destiny, william ii. became the spokesman and leader of an almost insanely megalomaniac, but terribly formidable nation. during the first decade of his government the new ambitions of germany were gradually formulated, and became more distinct. they were not yet very apparent to the rest of the world, in spite of the fact that they were expounded with vigour and emphasis in a multitude of pamphlets and books. the world was even ready to believe the emperor's assertion that he was the friend of peace: he half believed it himself, because he would have been very ready to keep the peace if germany's 'rights' could be attained without war. but many episodes, such as kiao-chau, and the philippines, and the ceaseless warfare in the german colonies, and the restless enterprises of pan-german intrigue, provided a commentary upon these pretensions which ought to have revealed the dangerous spirit which was conquering the german people. it is difficult, in the midst of a war forced upon the world by german ambition, to take a sane and balanced view of the aims which german policy was setting before itself during these years of experiment and preparation. what did average german opinion mean by the phrase weltmacht, world-power, which had become one of the commonplaces of its political discussions? we may safely assume that by the mass of men the implications of the term were never very clearly analysed; and that, if they had been analysable, the results of the analysis would have been widely different in 1890 and in 1914, except for a few fanatics and extremists. was the world-power at which germany was aiming a real supremacy over the whole world? in a vague way, no doubt, important bodies of opinion held that such a supremacy was the ultimate destiny of germany in the more or less distant future; and the existence of such a belief, however undefined, is important because it helped to colour the attitude of the german mind towards more immediately practical problems of national policy. but as a programme to be immediately put into operation, world-power was not conceived in this sense by any but a few pan-german fanatics; and even they would have recognised that of course other states, and even other world-powers, would certainly survive the most successful german war, though they would have to submit (for their own good) to germany's will. again, did the demand for world-power mean no more than that germany must have extra-european territories, like britain or france? she already possessed such territories, though on a smaller scale than her rivals. did the claim mean, then, that her dominions must be as extensive and populous as (say) those of britain? such an aim could only be obtained if she could succeed in overthrowing all her rivals, at once or in succession. and if she did that, she would then become, whatever her intentions, a world-power in the first and all-embracing sense. it is probably true that the german people, and even the extreme pan-germans, did not definitely or consciously aim at world-supremacy. but they had in the back of their minds the conviction that this was their ultimate destiny, and in aiming at 'world-power' in a narrower sense, they so defined their end as to make it impossible of achievement unless the complete mastery of europe (which, as things are, means the mastery of most of the world) could be first attained. certainly the ruling statesmen of germany must have been aware of the implications of their doctrine of world-power. they were aware of it in 1914, when they deliberately struck for the mastery of europe; they must have been aware of it in 1890, when they began to lay numerous plans and projects in all parts of the world, such as were bound to arouse the fears and suspicions of their rivals. it is necessary to dwell for a little upon these plans and projects of the decade 1890-1900, because they illustrate the nature of the peril which was looming over an unconscious world. it would be an error to suppose that all these schemes were systematically and continuously pursued with the whole strength of the german state. they appealed to different bodies of opinion. some of them were eagerly taken up for a time, and then allowed to fall into the background, though seldom wholly dropped. but taken as a whole they showed the existence of a restless and insatiable ambition without very clearly defined aims, and an eagerness to make use of every opening for the extension of power, which constituted a very dangerous frame of mind in a nation so strong, industrious, and persistent as the german nation. in spite of the disappointing results of colonisation in africa, the german colonial enthusiasts hoped that something suitably grandiose might yet be erected there: if the belgian congo could somehow be acquired, and if the portuguese would agree to sell their large territories on the east and west coasts, a great empire of tropical africa might be brought into being. this vision has not been abandoned: it is the theme of many pamphlets published during the course of the war, and if germany were to be able to impose her own terms, all the peoples of central africa might yet hope to have extended to them the blessings of german government as they have been displayed in the cameroons and in the south-west. in the 'nineties there seemed also to be hope in south africa, where use might be made of the strained relations between britain and the boer republics. german south-west africa formed a convenient base for operations in this region: it was equipped with a costly system of strategic railways, far more elaborate than the commerce of the colony required. there is no doubt that president kruger was given reason to anticipate that he would receive german help: in 1895 (before the jameson raid) kruger publicly proclaimed that the time had come 'to form ties of the closest friendship between germany and the transvaal, ties such as are natural between fathers and children'; in 1896 (after the jameson raid) came the emperor's telegram congratulating president kruger upon having repelled the invaders 'without recourse to the aid of friendly powers'; in 1897 a formal treaty of friendship and commerce was made between germany and the orange free state, with which the transvaal had just concluded a treaty of perpetual alliance. and meanwhile german munitions of war were pouring into the transvaal through delagoa bay. but when the crisis came, germany did nothing. she could not, because the british fleet stood in the way. south america, again, offered a very promising field. there were many thousands of german settlers, especially in southern brazil: the pan-german league assiduously laboured to organise these settlers, and to fan their patriotic zeal, by means of schools, books, and newspapers. but the monroe doctrine stood in the way of south american annexations. perhaps germany might have been ready to see how far she could go with the united states, the least military of great powers. but there was good reason to suppose that the british fleet would have to be reckoned with; and a burglarious expedition to south america with that formidable watchdog at large and unmuzzled was an uninviting prospect. in the far east the prospects of immediate advance seemed more favourable, since the chinese empire appeared to be breaking up. the seizure of kiao-chau in 1897 was a hopeful beginning. but the anglo-japanese alliance of 1902 formed a serious obstacle to any vigorous forward policy in this region. once more the british fleet loomed up as a barrier. yet another dream, often referred to by the pamphleteers though never brought to overt action by the government, was the dream that the rich empire of the dutch in the malay archipelago should be acquired by germany. holland herself, according to all the political ethnologists of the pan-german league, ought to be part of the german empire; and if so, her external dominions would follow the destiny of the ruling state. but this was a prospect to be talked about, not to be worked for openly. it would naturally follow from a successful european war. a more immediately practicable field of operations was to be found in the turkish empire. it was here that the most systematic endeavours were made during this period: the berlin-bagdad scheme, which was to be the keystone of the arch of german world-power, had already taken shape before our period closed, though the rest of the world was strangely blind to its significance. abstractly regarded, a german dominion over the wasted and misgoverned lands of the turkish empire would have meant a real advance of civilisation, and would have been no more unjustifiable than the british control of egypt or india. this feeling perhaps explained the acquiescence with which the establishment of german influence in turkey was accepted by most of the powers. they had yet to realise that it was not pursued as an end in itself, but as a means to further domination. but neither the great berlin-bagdad project, nor any of the other dreams and visions, had been definitely put into operation during the decade 1890-1900. germany was as yet feeling the way, preparing the ground, and building up her resources both military and industrial. perhaps the main result which emerged from the tentative experiments of these years was that at every point the obstacle was the sprawling british empire, and the too-powerful british fleet. the conviction grew that the overthrow of this fat and top-heavy colossus was the necessary preliminary to the creation of the german world-state. this was a doctrine which had long been preached by the chief political mentor of modern germany, treitschke, who died in 1896. he was never tired of declaring that britain was a decadent and degenerate state, that her empire was an unreal empire, and that it would collapse before the first serious attack. it would break up because it was not based upon force, because it lacked organisation, because it was a medley of disconnected and discordant fragments, worshipping an undisciplined freedom. that it should ever have come into being was one of the paradoxes of history; for it was manifestly not due to straightforward brute force, like the german empire; and the modern german mind could not understand a state which did not rest upon power, but upon consent, which had not been built up, like prussia, by the deliberate action of government, but which had grown almost at haphazard, through the spontaneous activity of free and self-governing citizens. treitschke and his disciples could only explain the paradox by assuming that since it had not been created by force, it must have been created by low cunning; and they invented the theory that british statesmen had for centuries pursued an undeviating and machiavellian policy of keeping the more virile states of europe at cross-purposes with one another by means of the cunning device called the balance of power, while behind the backs of these tricked and childlike nations britain was meanly snapping up all the most desirable regions of the earth. according to this view it was in some mysterious way britain's fault that france and germany were not the best of friends, and that russia had been alienated from her ancient ally. but the day of reckoning would come when these mean devices would no longer avail, and the pampered, selfish, and overgrown colossus would find herself faced by hard-trained and finely tempered germany, clad in her shining armour. then, at the first shock, india would revolt; and the dutch of south africa would welcome their german liberators; and the great colonies, to which britain had granted a degree of independence that no virile state would ever have permitted, would shake off the last shreds of subordination; and the ramshackle british empire would fall to pieces; and germany would emerge triumphant, free to pursue all her great schemes, and to create a lasting world-power, based upon force and system and upon 'a healthy egoism,' not upon 'irrational sentimentalities' about freedom and justice. these were the doctrines and calculations of realpolitik. they were becoming more and more prevalent in the 'nineties. they seem definitely to have got the upper hand in the direction of national policy during the last years of the century, when germany refused to consider the projects of disarmament put forward at the hague in 1899, when the creation of the german navy was begun by the navy acts of 1898 and 1900, and when the emperor announced that the future of germany lay upon the water, and that hers must be the admiralty of the atlantic. at the moment when the conquest of the world by european civilisation was almost complete, two conceptions of the meaning of empire, the conception of brutal domination pursued for its own sake, which has never been more clearly displayed than in the administration of the german colonies, and the conception of trusteeship, which had slowly emerged during the long development of the british empire, stood forth already in sharp antithesis. the dreadful anticipation of coming conflict weighed upon the world. france, still suffering from the wounds of 1870, was always aware of it. russia, threatened by german policy in the balkans, was more and more clearly realising it. but britain was extraordinarily slow to awaken to the menace. as late as 1898 mr. joseph chamberlain was advocating an alliance between britain, germany, and america to maintain the peace of the world; and cecil rhodes, when he devised his plan for turning oxford into the training-ground of british youth from all the free nations of the empire, found a place in his scheme for german as well as for american students. the telegram to president kruger in 1896 caused only a passing sensation. the first real illumination came with the extraordinary display of german venom against britain during the south african war, and with the ominous doubling of the german naval programme adopted in the midst of that war, in 1900. but even this made no profound impression. the majority of the british people declined to believe that a 'great and friendly nation,' or its rulers, could deliberately enter upon a scheme of such unbridled ambition and of such unprovoked aggression. viii the british empire amid the world-powers, 1878-1914 throughout the period of rivalry for world-power which began in 1878 the british empire had continued to grow in extent, and to undergo a steady change in its character and organisation. in the partition of africa, britain, in spite of the already immense extent of her domains, obtained an astonishingly large share. the protectorates of british east africa, uganda, nigeria, nyasaland, and somaliland gave her nearly 25,000,000 new negro subjects, and these, added to her older settlements of sierra leone and the gold coast, whose area was now extended, outnumbered the whole population of the french african empire. but besides these tropical territories she acquired control over two african regions so important that they deserve separate treatment: egypt, on the one hand, and the various extensions of her south african territories on the other. when the partition of africa was completed, the total share of britain amounted to 3,500,000 square miles, with a population of over 50,000,000 souls, and it included the best regions of the continent: the british empire, in africa alone, was more than three times as large as the colonial empire of germany, which was almost limited to africa. it may well be asked why an empire already so large should have taken also the giant's share of the last continent available for division among the powers of europe. no doubt this was in part due to the sentiment of imperialism, which was stronger in britain during this period than ever before. but there were other and more powerful causes. in the first place, during the period 1815-78 british influence and trade had been established in almost every part of africa save the central ulterior, and no power had such definite relations with various native tribes, many of which desired to come under the protectorate of a power with whom the protection of native rights and customs was an established principle. in the second place, britain was the only country which already possessed in africa colonies inhabited by enterprising european settlers, and the activity of these settlers played a considerable part in the extension of the british african dominions. and in the third place, since the continental powers had adopted the policy of fiscal protection, the annexation of a region by any of them meant that the trade of other nations might be restricted or excluded; the annexation of a territory by britain meant that it would be open freely and on equal terms to the trade of all nations. for this reason the trading interests in britain, faced by the possibility of exclusion from large areas with which they had carried on traffic, were naturally anxious that as much territory as possible should be brought under british supremacy, in order that it might remain open to their trade. it is the main justification for british annexations that they opened and developed new markets for all the world, instead of closing them; and it was this fact chiefly which made the acquisition of such vast areas tolerable to the other trading powers. the extension of the british empire was thus actually a benefit to all the non-imperial states, especially to such active trading countries as italy, holland, scandinavia, or america. if at any time britain should reverse her traditional policy, and reserve for her own merchants the trade of the immense areas which have been brought under her control, nothing is more certain than that the world would protest, and protest with reason, against the exorbitant and disproportionate share which has fallen to her. only so long as british control means the open door for all the world will the immense extent of these acquisitions continue to be accepted without protest by the rest of the world. in the new protectorates of this period britain found herself faced by a task with which she had never had to deal on so gigantic a scale, though she had a greater experience in it than any other nation: the task of governing justly whole populations of backward races, among whom white men could not permanently dwell, and whom they visited only for the purposes of commercial exploitation. the demands of industry for the raw materials of these countries involved the employment of labour on a very large scale; but the native disliked unfamiliar toil, and as his wants were very few, could easily earn enough to keep him in the idleness he loved. slavery was the customary mode of getting uncongenial tasks performed in africa; but against slavery european civilisation had set its face. again, the ancient unvarying customs whereby the rights and duties of individual tribesmen were enforced, and the primitive societies held together, were often inconsistent with western ideas, and tended to break down altogether on contact with western industrial methods. how were the needs of industry to be reconciled with justice to the subject peoples? how were their customs to be reconciled with the legal ideas of their new masters? how were these simple folk to be taught the habits of labour? how were the resources of their land to be developed without interference with their rights of property and with the traditional usages arising from them? these were problems of extreme difficulty, which faced the rulers of all the new european empires. the attempt to solve them in a high-handed way, and with a view solely to the interests of the ruling race, led to many evils: it produced the atrocities of the congo; it produced in the german colonies the practical revival of slavery, the total disregard of native customs, and the horrible sequence of wars and slaughters of which we have already spoken. in the british dominions a long tradition and a long experience saved the subject peoples from these iniquities. we dare not claim that there were no abuses in the british lands; but at least it can be claimed that government has always held it to be its duty to safeguard native rights, and to prevent the total break-up of the tribal system which could alone hold these communities together. the problem was not fully solved; perhaps it is insoluble. but at least the native populations were not driven to despair, and were generally able to feel that they were justly treated. 'let me tell you,' a herero is recorded to have written from british south africa to his kinsmen under german rule, 'let me tell you that the land of the english is a good land, since there is no ill-treatment. white and black stand on the same level. there is much work and much money, and your overseer does not beat you, or if he does he breaks the law and is punished.' there was a very striking contrast between the steady peace which has on the whole reigned in all the british dominions, and the incessant warfare which forms the history of the german colonies. the tradition of protection of native rights, established during the period 1815-78, and the experience then acquired, stood the british in good stead. during the ordeal of the great war it has been noteworthy that there has been no serious revolt among these recently conquered subjects; and one of the most touching features of the war has been the eagerness of chiefs and their peoples to help the protecting power, and the innumerable humble gifts which they have spontaneously offered. much remains to be done before a perfect solution is found for the problems of these dominions of yesterday. but it may justly be claimed that trusteeship, not domination, has been the spirit in which they have been administered; and that this is recognised by their subjects, despite all the mistakes and defects to which all human governments must be liable in dealing with a problem so complex. administrative problems of a yet more complex kind were raised in the two greatest acquisitions of territory made by britain during these years, in egypt and the soudan, and in south africa. the events connected with these two regions have aroused greater controversy than those connected with any other british dominions; the results of these events have been more striking, and in different ways more instructive as to the spirit and methods of british imperialism, than those displayed in almost any other field; and for these reasons we shall not hesitate to dwell upon them at some length. the establishment of british control over egypt was due to the most curious chain of unforeseen and unexpected events which even the records of the british empire contain. nominally a part of the turkish empire, egypt had been in fact a practically independent state, paying only a small fixed tribute to the sultan, ever since the remarkable albanian adventurer, mehemet ali, had established himself as its pasha in the confusion following the french occupation (1806). mehemet ali had been an extraordinarily enterprising prince. he had created a formidable army, had conquered the great desert province of the soudan and founded its capital, khartoum, and had nearly succeeded in overthrowing the turkish empire and establishing his own power in its stead: during the period 1825-40 he had played a leading role in european politics. though quite illiterate, he had posed as the introducer of western civilisation into egypt; but his grandiose and expensive policy had imposed terrible burdens upon the fellahin (peasantry), and the heavy taxation which was necessary to maintain his armies and the spurious civilisation of his capital was only raised by cruel oppressions. the tradition of lavish expenditure, met by grinding the peasantry, was accentuated by mehemet's successors. it inevitably impoverished the country. large loans were raised in the west, to meet increasing deficits; and the european creditors in course of time found it necessary to insist that specific revenues should be ear-marked as a security for their interest, and to claim powers of supervision over finance. the construction of the suez canal (opened 1869), which was due to the enterprise of the french, promised to bring increased prosperity to egypt; but in the meanwhile it involved an immense outlay. at the beginning of our period egypt was already on the verge of bankruptcy, and the khedive was compelled to sell his holding of suez canal shares, which were shrewdly acquired for britain by disraeli. but financial chaos was not the only evil from which egypt suffered. there was administrative chaos also, and this was not diminished by the special jurisdictions which had been allowed to the various groups of europeans settled in the country. the army, unpaid and undisciplined, was ready to revolt; and above all, the helpless mass of the peasantry were reduced to the last degree of penury, and exposed to the merciless and arbitrary severity of the officials, who fleeced them of their property under the lash. all the trading nations were affected by this state of anarchy in an important centre of trade; all the creditors of the egyptian debt observed it with alarm. but the two powers most concerned were france and britain, which between them held most of the debt, and conducted most of the foreign trade, of egypt; while to britain egypt had become supremely important, since it now controlled the main avenue of approach to india. when a successful military revolt, led by arabi pasha, threatened to complete the disorganisation of the country (1882), france and britain decided that they ought to intervene to restore order, the other powers all agreeing. but at the last moment france withdrew, and the task was undertaken by britain single-handed.[7] in a short campaign arabi was overthrown; and now britain had to address herself to the task of reconstructing the political and economic organisation of egypt. it was her hope and intention that the work should be done as rapidly as possible, in order that she might be able to withdraw from a difficult and thankless task, which brought her into very delicate relations with the other powers interested in egypt. but withdrawal was not easy. the task of reorganisation proved to be a much larger and more complicated one than had been anticipated; and it was greatly increased when the strange wave of religious fanaticism aroused by the preaching of the mahdi swept over the soudan, raised a great upheaval, and led to the destruction of the egyptian armies of occupation. britain had now to decide whether the revolting province should be reconquered or abandoned. reconquest could not be effected by the utterly disorganised egyptian army; if it was to be attempted, it must be by means of british troops. but this would not only mean a profitless expenditure, it would also indefinitely prolong the british occupation, which britain was desirous of bringing to an end at the earliest possible moment. [7] see above, p. 164 the romantic hero, gordon, was therefore sent to khartoum to carry out the withdrawal from the soudan of all the remaining egyptian garrisons. on his arrival he came to the conclusion that the position was not untenable, and took no steps to evacuate. there was much dangerous delay and vacillation; and in the end gordon was besieged in khartoum, and killed by the bands of the mahdi, before a relief force could reach him. but this triumph of mahdism increased its menace to egypt. the country could not be left to its own resources until this peril had been removed, or until the egyptian army had been fully reorganised. so the occupation prolonged itself, year after year. the situation was, in fact, utterly anomalous. egypt was a province of turkey, ruled by a semi-independent khedive. britain's chief agent in the country was in form only in the position of a diplomatic representative. but the very existence of the country depended upon the british army of occupation, and upon the work of the british officers who were reconstructing the egyptian army. and its hope of future stability depended upon the work of the british administrators, financiers, jurists, and engineers who were labouring to set its affairs in order. these officials, with sir evelyn baring (lord cromer) at their head, had an extraordinarily difficult task to perform. their relations with the native government, which they constantly had to overrule, were difficult enough. but besides this, they had to deal with the agents of the other european powers, who, as representing the european creditors of the egyptian debt, had the right to interfere in practically all financial questions, and could make any logical financial reorganisation, and any free use of the country's financial resources for the restoration of its prosperity, all but impossible. yet in the space of a very few years an amazing work of restoration and reorganisation was achieved. financial stability was re-established, while at the same time taxation was reduced. the forced labour which had been exacted from the peasantry was abolished; they were no longer robbed of their property under the lash; they obtained a secure tenure in their land; and they found that its productive power was increased, by means of great schemes of irrigation. an impartial system of justice was organised--for the first time in all the long history of egypt since the fall of the roman empire. the army was remodelled by british officers. schools of lower and higher grade were established in large numbers. in short, egypt began to assume the aspect of a prosperous and well-organised modern community. and all this was the work, in the main, of some fifteen years. meanwhile in the soudan triumphant barbarism had produced an appalling state of things. it is impossible to exaggerate the hideousness of the regime of mahdism. a ferocious tyranny terrorised and reduced to desolation the whole of the upper basin of the nile; and the population is said to have shrunk from 12,000,000 to 2,000,000, although exact figures are of course unattainable. one of the evil consequences of this regime was that it prevented a scientific treatment of the flow of the nile, on which the very life of egypt depended. scientific irrigation had already worked wonders in increasing the productivity of egypt, but to complete this work, and to secure avoidance of the famines which follow any deficiency in the nile-flow, it was necessary to deal with the upper waters of the great river. on this ground, and in order to remove the danger of a return of barbarism, which was threatened by frequent mahdist attacks, and finally in order to rescue captives who were enduring terrible sufferings in the hands of the mahdi, it appeared that the reconquest of the soudan must be undertaken as the inevitable sequel to the reorganisation of egypt. it was achieved, with a wonderful efficiency which made the name of kitchener famous, in the campaigns of 1896-98. the reconquered province was nominally placed under the joint administration of britain and egypt; but in fact the very remarkable work of civilisation which was carried out in it during the years preceding the great war was wholly directed by british agents and officers. the occupation of the soudan necessitated a prolongation of the british occupation of egypt. but, indeed, such a prolongation was in any case inevitable; for the beneficial reforms in justice, administration, finance, and the organisation of the country's resources, which had been effected in half a generation, required to be carefully watched and nursed until they should be securely rooted: to a certainty they would have collapsed if the guardianship of britain had been suddenly and completely withdrawn. the growing prosperity of egypt, however, and still more the diffusion of western education among its people, has naturally brought into existence a nationalist party, who resent what they feel to be a foreign dominance in their country, and aspire after the institutions of western self-government. but it has to be noted that the classes among whom this movement has sprung up are not the classes who form the bulk of the population of egypt--the fellahin, who from the time of the pharaohs downwards have been exploited and oppressed by every successive conqueror who has imposed his rule on the country. this class, which has profited more than any other from the british regime, which has, under that regime, known for the first time justice, freedom from tyranny, and the opportunity of enjoying a fair share of the fruits of its own labour, is as yet unvocal. accustomed through centuries to submission, accepting good or bad seasons, just or unjust masters, as the gods may send them, the fellah has not yet had time even to begin to have thoughts or opinions about his place in society and his right to a share in the control of his own destinies; and if the rule which has endeavoured to nurture him into prosperity and self-reliance were withdrawn, he would accept with blind submissiveness whatever might take its place. the classes among whom the nationalist movement finds its strength are the classes which have been in the past accustomed to enjoy some degree of domination; the relics of the conquering races, arabs or turks, who have succeeded one another in the rule of egypt, the small traders and shopkeepers of the towns, drawn from many different races, the students who have been influenced by the knowledge and the political ideas of the west. it is natural and healthy that a desire to share in the government of their country should grow up among these classes: it is in some degree a proof that the influence of the regime under which they live has been stimulating. but it is also obvious that if these classes were at once to reassume, under parliamentary forms, the dominance which they wielded so disastrously until thirty years ago, the result must be unhappy. they are being, under british guidance, gradually introduced to a share in public affairs. but the establishment of a system of full self-government and national independence in egypt, if it is to be successful, must wait until not only these classes, but also the classes beneath them, have been habituated to the sense of self-respect and of civic obligation by a longer acquaintance with the working of the reign of law. since the great war broke out, the british position in egypt has been regularised by the proclamation of a formal british protectorate. perhaps the happiest fate which can befall the country is that it should make that gradual progress in political freedom, which is alone lasting, under the guidance of the power which has already given it prosperity, the ascendancy of an impartial law, freedom from arbitrary authority, freedom of speech and thought, and emancipation from the thraldom of foreign financial interests; and in the end it may possibly be the destiny of this ancient land, after so many vicissitudes, to take its place as one among a partnership of free nations in a world-encircling british commonwealth of self-governing peoples. the most vexed, difficult, and critical problems in the history of the british empire since 1878--perhaps the most difficult in the whole course of its history--have been those connected with the south african colonies. in 1878 there were four distinct european provinces in south africa, besides protected native areas, like basutoland. all four had sprung from the original anglo-dutch colony of the cape of good hope. in two of them--cape colony and natal--the two european peoples, british and dutch, dwelt side by side, the dutch being in a majority in the former, the british in the latter; but in both the difficulty of their relationship was complicated by the presence of large coloured populations, which included not only the native african peoples, hottentots, kaffirs, zulus, and so forth, but also a large number of asiatics, malays who had been brought in by the dutch before the british conquest, and indians who had begun to come in more recently in large numbers, especially to natal. difference of attitude towards these peoples between the british authorities and the dutch settlers had been in the past, as we have seen, a main cause of friction between the two european peoples, and had caused the long postponement of full self-government. in the other two provinces, the transvaal and the orange free state, the white inhabitants were, in 1878, almost exclusively dutch. the native populations in these states were no longer in a state of formal slavery, but they were treated as definitely subject and inferior peoples: a law of the transvaal laid it down that 'there shall be no equality in church or state between white and black.' thus the mutual distrust originally aroused by the native question still survived. it was intensified by ill-feeling between the boers and british missionaries. when livingstone, the british missionary hero, reported the difficulties which the boers had put in his way, british opinion was made more hostile than ever. of the two boer republics, the orange free state had enjoyed complete independence since 1854; and no serious friction ever arose between it and the british government. but the transvaal, which had been turbulent and restless from the first, had been annexed in 1878, largely because it seemed to be drifting into a war of extermination with the zulus. as a consequence, britain was drawn into a badly managed zulu-war; and when this dangerous tribe had been conquered, the transvaal revolted. the boers defeated a small british force at majuba; whereupon, instead of pursuing the struggle, the british government resolved to try the effect of magnanimity, and conceded (1881 and 1884) full local independence to the transvaal, subject only to a vague recognition of british suzerainty. this was the beginning of many ills. the transvaal boers, knowing little of the world, thought they had defeated britain; and under the lead of paul kruger, a shrewd old farmer who henceforth directed their policy with all but autocratic power, began to pursue the aim of creating a purely dutch south africa, and of driving the british into the sea. kruger's policy was one of pure racial dominance, not of equality of rights. it was a natural aim, under all the conditions. but it was the source of grave evils. inevitably it stimulated a parallel movement in cape colony, where dutch and british were learning to live peaceably together. the boer extremists also began to look about for allies, and were tempted to hope for aid from germany, who had just established herself in south-west africa. full of pride, the transvaalers, though they already held a great and rich country which was very thinly peopled, began to push outwards, and especially to threaten the native tribes in the barren region of bechuanaland, which lay between the transvaal and the german territory. to this britain replied by establishing a protectorate over bechuanaland (1884) at the request of native chiefs: the motive of this annexation was, not suspicion of germany, for this suspicion did not yet exist, but the desire to protect the native population. kruger's vague project of a dutch south africa would probably have caused little anxiety so long as his resources were limited to the strength of the thinly scattered boer farmers. but the situation was fundamentally altered by the discovery of immense deposits first of diamonds and then of gold in south africa, and most richly of all in the rand district of the transvaal. these discoveries brought a rapid inrush of european miners, financiers, and their miscellaneous camp-followers, and in a few years a very rich and populous european community had established itself in the transvaal, and had created as its centre the mushroom new city of johannesburg (founded 1884). these immigrants, who came from many countries, but especially from britain, changed the situation in the transvaal; it seemed as though the majority among the white men in that state would soon be british. a simple and primitive organisation of government, such as sufficed for the needs of boer farmers, was manifestly inadequate for the needs of the new population, which included, in the nature of things, many undesirable elements; and it was natural that the mining population should desire to be brought under a more modern type of government, or to obtain an effective share in the control of their own affairs. but this was precisely what the boers of kruger's way of thinking were determined to refuse them. they were resolved that boer ascendancy in the transvaal should not be weakened. they therefore denied to the new immigrants all the rights of citizenship, and would not even permit them to manage the local affairs of johannesburg. at the same time kruger imposed heavy taxation upon the gold industry and the people who conducted it; and out of the proceeds he was able not only to pay the expenses of government without burdening the boer farmers, but to build up the military power by means of which he hoped ultimately to carry out his great project. thus the 'uitlanders' found themselves treated as an inferior race in the land which their industry was enriching. they practically paid the cost of the government, but had no share in directing it. the policy of racial ascendancy has seldom been pursued in a more mischievous or dangerous form. one cannot but feel a certain sympathy with the boers' desire to maintain boer ascendancy in the land which they had conquered. yet it must be remembered that they were themselves very recent immigrants: the whole settlement of the transvaal had taken place in paul kruger's lifetime. the diamonds and the gold of the recent discoveries had produced in south africa a new element of power: the power of great wealth, wielded by a small number of men. some of these were, of course, mean and sordid souls, to whom wealth was an end in itself. but among them one emerged who was more than a millionaire, who was capable of dreaming great dreams, and had acquired his wealth chiefly in order that he might have the power to realise them. this was cecil rhodes, an almost unique combination of the financier and the idealist. if he was sometimes tempted to resort to the questionable devices that high finance seems to cultivate, and if his ideals took on sometimes a rather vulgar colour, reflected from his money-bags, nevertheless ideals were the real governing factors in his life. he dreamed of a great united state of south africa; it was to be a british south africa; but it was to be british, not in the sense in which kruger wished it to be dutch, but in the sense that equality of treatment between the white races should exist within it, as in all the british lands. he dreamed also of a great brotherhood of british communities, or communities governed by british ideals, girdling the world, perhaps dominating it (for rhodes was inclined to be a chauvinist), and leading it to peace and liberty. as a lad fresh from oxford, in long journeyings over the african veldt, he had in a curious, childlike way thought out a theology, a system of politics, and a mode of life for himself; having reached the conclusion that the british race had on the whole more capacity for leading the world successfully than any other, he had resolved that it should be his life's business to forward and increase the influence of british ideas and of british modes of life; and he had systematically built up a colossal fortune in order that he might have the means to do this work. at the roots of this strange medley of poetry and chauvinism which filled his mind was an unchanging and deep veneration for the outstanding memory of his youth, oxford, which in his mind stood for all the august venerable past of england, and was the expression of her moral essence. when he died, after a life of money-making and intrigue, in a remote and half-developed colony, it was found that most of his immense fortune had been left either to enrich the college where he had spent a short time as a lad, or to bring picked youths from all the british lands, and from what he regarded as the two great sister communities of america and germany, so that they might drink in the spirit of england, at oxford, its sanctuary. his immediate task lay in south africa, where, from the moment of his entry upon public life, he became the leader of the british cause as kruger was the leader of the dutch: millionaire-dreamer and shrewd, obstinate farmer, they form a strange contrast. the one stood for south african unity based upon equality of the white races: the other also for unity, but for unity based upon the ascendancy of one of the white races. in the politics of cape colony rhodes achieved a remarkable success: he made friends with the dutch party and its leader hofmeyr, who for a long time gave steady support to his schemes and maintained him in the premiership. it was a good beginning for the policy of racial co-operation. but rhodes's most remarkable achievement was the acquisition of the fertile upland regions of mashonaland and matabililand, now called rhodesia in his honour. there were episodes which smelt of the shady practices of high finance in the events which led up to this acquisition. but in the result its settlement was well organised, after some initial difficulties, by the chartered company which rhodes formed for the purpose. now one important result of the acquisition of rhodesia was that it hemmed in the transvaal on the north; and, joined with the earlier annexation of bechuanaland, isolated and insulated the two dutch republics, which were now surrounded, everywhere except on the east, by british territory. from cape town up through bechuanaland and through the new territories rhodes drove a long railway line. it was a business enterprise, but for him it was also a great imaginative conception, a link of empire, and he dreamed of the day when it should be continued to join the line which was being pushed up the nile from cairo through the hot sands of the soudan. but rhodes's final and most unhappy venture was the attempt to force, by violent means, a solution of the transvaal problem. he hoped that the uitlanders might be able, by a revolution, to overthrow kruger's government, and, perhaps in conjunction with the more moderate boers, to set up a system of equal treatment which would make co-operation with the other british colonies easy, and possibly bring about a federation of the whole group of south african states. he was too impatient to let the situation mature quietly. he forced the issue by encouraging the foolish jameson raid of 1895. this, like all wilful resorts to violence, only made things worse. it alienated and angered the more moderate boers in the transvaal, who were not without sympathy with the uitlanders. it aroused the indignation of the cape colony boers, and embittered racial feeling there. it put the british cause in the wrong in the eyes of the whole world, and made the boers appear as a gallant little people struggling in the folds of a merciless python-empire. it increased immensely the difficulty of the british government in negotiating with the transvaal for better treatment of the uitlanders. it stiffened the backs of kruger and his party. the german kaiser telegraphed his congratulations on the defeat of the raid 'without the aid of friendly powers,' and the implication that this aid would be forthcoming in case of necessity led the boers to believe that they could count on german help in a struggle with britain. so every concession to the uitlanders was obstinately refused; and after three years more of fruitless negotiation, during which german munitions were pouring into the transvaal, the south african war began. it may be that the war could have been avoided by the exercise of patience. it may be that the imperialist spirit, which was very strong in britain at that period, led to the adoption of a needlessly high-handed tone. but it was neither greed nor tyranny on britain's part which brought about the conflict, but simply the demand for equal rights. the war was one in which all the appearances were against britain, and the whole world condemned british greed and aggression. it was a case of goliath fighting david, the biggest empire in the world attacking two tiny republics; yet the weaker side is not necessarily always in the right. it seemed to be a conflict for the possession of gold-mines; yet britain has never made, and never hoped to make, a penny of profit out of these mines, which remained after the war in the same hands as before it. it was a case of the interests of financiers and gold-hunters against those of simple and honest farmers; yet even financiers have rights, and even farmers can be unjust. in reality the issue was a quite simple and straightforward one. it was the issue of racial ascendancy against racial equality, and as her traditions bade her, britain strove for racial equality. it was the issue of self-government for the whole community as against the entrenched dominion of one section; and there was no question on which side the history of britain must lead her to range herself. whatever the rest of the world might say, the great self-governing colonies, which were free to help or not as they thought fit, had no doubts at all. they all sent contingents to take part in the war, because they knew it to be a war for principles fundamental to themselves. the war dragged its weary course, and the boers fought with such heroism, and often with such chivalry, as to win the cordial respect and admiration of their enemies. it is always a pity when men fight; but sometimes a fight lets bad blood escape, and makes friendship easier between foes who have learnt mutual respect. four years after the peace which added the transvaal and the orange free state as conquered dominions to the british empire, the british government established in both of these provinces the full institutions of responsible self-government. as in canada sixty years earlier, the two races were bidden to work together and make the best of one another; because now their destinies were freely under their own control. yet this was even a bolder experiment than that of canada, and showed a more venturesome confidence in the healing power of self-government. how has it turned out? within five years more, the four divided provinces which had presented such vexed problems in 1878, were combined in the federal union of south africa, governed by institutions which reproduced those of britain and her colonies. in handing over to the now united states of south africa the unqualified control of their own affairs, britain necessarily left to them the vexed problem of devising a just relation between the ruling races and their subjects of backward or alien stocks; the problem which had been the source of most of the difficulties of south africa for a century past, and which had long delayed the concession of full self-government. nowhere in the world does this problem assume a more acute form than in south africa, where there is not only a majority of negroes, mostly of the vigorous bantu stock, but also a large number of immigrants mainly from india, who as subjects of the british crown naturally claim special rights. south africa has to find her own solution for this complex problem; and she has not yet fully found it. but in two ways her association with the british empire has helped, and will help, her to find her way towards it. if the earlier policy of the british government, guided by the missionaries, laid too exclusive an emphasis upon native rights, and in various ways hampered the development of the colony by the way in which it interpreted these rights, at least it had established a tradition hostile to that policy of mere ruthless exploitation of which such an ugly illustration was being given in german south-west africa. an absolute parity of treatment between white and black must be not only impracticable, but harmful to both sides. but between the two extremes of a visionary equality and a white ascendancy ruthlessly employed for exploitation, a third term is possible--the just tutelage of the white man over the black, with a reasonable freedom for native custom. 'a practice has grown up in south africa,' says the greatest of south african statesmen,[8] 'of creating parallel institutions, giving the natives their own separate institutions on parallel lines with institutions for whites. it may be that on these lines we may yet be able to solve a problem which may otherwise be insoluble.' it is a solution which owes much to the british experiments of the previous period; and the principle which inspires it was incorporated in the act of union. this is one of the innumerable fruitful experiments in government in which the british system is so prolific. again, the problem of the relationship between indian immigrants and white colonists is an acutely difficult one. it cannot be said to have been solved. but at least the fact that the south african union and the indian empire are both partners in the same british commonwealth improves the chances of a just solution. it helped to find at least a temporary adjustment in 1914; in the future also it may contribute, in this as in many other ways, to ensure that a fair consideration is given to both sides of the thorny question of inter-racial relationship. [8] general smuts, may 22, 1917. the events which led up to, and still more the events which followed, the south african war had thus brought a solution for the south african problem, which had been a continuous vexation since the moment of the british conquest. it was solved by the british panacea of self-government and equal rights. who could have anticipated, twenty years or fifty years ago, the part which has been played by south africa in the great war? is there any parallel to these events, which showed the gallant general of the boer forces playing the part of prime minister in a united south africa, crushing with boer forces a revolt stirred up among the more ignorant boers by german intrigue, and then leading an army, half boer and half british, to the conquest of german south-west africa? the south african war had proved to be the severest test which the modern british empire had yet had to undergo. but it had emerged, not broken, as in 1782, but rejuvenated, purged of the baser elements which had alloyed its imperial spirit, and confirmed in its faith in the principles on which it was built. more than that, on the first occasion on which the essential principles or the power of the empire had been challenged in war, all the self-governing colonies had voluntarily borne their share. apart from a small contingent sent from australia to the soudan in 1885, british colonies had never before--indeed, no european colony had ever before--sent men oversea to fight in a common cause: and this not because their immediate interests were threatened, but for the sake of an idea. for that reason the south african war marks an epoch not merely in the history of the british empire, but of european imperialism as a whole. the unity of sentiment and aim which was thus expressed had, however, been steadily growing throughout the period of european rivalry; and doubtless in the colonies, as in britain, the new value attached to the imperial tie was due in a large degree to the very fact of the eagerness of the other european powers for extra-european possessions. imperialist sentiment began to become a factor in british politics just about the beginning of this period: in 1878 the imperial federation society was founded, and about the same time disraeli, who had once spoken of the colonies as 'millstones around our necks,' was making himself the mouthpiece of the new imperialist spirit. to this wave of feeling a very notable contribution was made by sir john seeley's brilliant book, "the expansion of england." slight as it was, and containing no facts not already familiar, it gave a new perspective to the events of the last four centuries of british history, and made the growth of the empire seem something not merely casual and incidental, but a vital and most significant part of the british achievement. its defect was, perhaps, that it concentrated attention too exclusively upon the external aspects of the wonderful story, and dwelt too little upon its inner spirit, upon the force and influence of the instinct of self-government which has been the most potent factor in british history. the powerful impression which it created was deepened by other books, like froude's "oceana" and sir charles dilke's "greater britain," the title of which alone was a proclamation and a prophecy. it was strengthened also by the wonderful imperial pageants, like nothing else ever witnessed in the world, which began with the two jubilee celebrations of 1887 and 1897, and were continued in the funerals of queen victoria and edward vii., the coronations of edward vii. and george v., and the superb durbars of delhi. the imaginative appeal of such solemn representations of a world-scattered fellowship of peoples and nations and tongues must not be underestimated. at first there was perhaps a suggestion of blatancy, and of mere pride in dominion, in the way in which these celebrations were received; the graver note of kipling's 'recessional,' inspired by the jubilee of 1897, was not unneeded. but after the strain and anxiety of the south african war, a different temper visibly emerged. more important than the pageants were the conferences of imperial statesmen which arose out of them. the prime ministers of the great colonies began to deliberate in common with the statesmen of britain; and the discussions, though at first quite informal and devoid of authority, have become more intimate and vital as time has passed: a beginning at least has been made in the common discussion of problems affecting the empire as a whole. and alongside of, and in consequence of, all this, imperial questions have been treated with a new seriousness in the british parliament, and the offices which deal with them have ceased to be, as they once were, reserved for statesmen of the second rank. the new attitude was pointedly expressed when in 1895 mr. joseph chamberlain, the most brilliant politician of his generation, who could have had almost any office he desired, deliberately chose the colonial office. his tenure of that office was not, perhaps, memorable for any far-reaching change in colonial policy, though he introduced some admirable improvements in the administration of the tropical colonies; but it was most assuredly memorable for the increased intensity of interest which he succeeded in arousing in imperial questions, both at home and in the colonies. the campaign which he initiated, after the south african war, for the institution of an imperial zollverein or a system of colonial preference was a failure, and indeed was probably a blunder, since it implied an attempt to return to that material basis of imperial unity which had formed the core of the old colonial system, and had led to the most unhappy results in regard to the american colonies. but at least it was an attempt to realise a fuller unity than had yet been achieved, and in its first form included an inspiring appeal to the british people to face sacrifices, should they be necessary, for that high end. whether these ideas contribute to the ultimate solution of the imperial problem or not, it was at least a good thing that the question should be raised and discussed. one further feature among the many developments of this era must not be left untouched. it is the rise of a definitely national spirit in the greater members of the empire. to this a great encouragement has been given by the political unity which some of these communities have for the first time attained during these years. national sentiment in the dominion of canada was stimulated into existence by the federation of 1867. the unification of australia which was at length achieved in the federation of 1900 did not indeed create, but it greatly strengthened, the rise of a similar spirit of australian nationality. a national spirit in south africa, merging in itself the hostile racial sentiments of boer and briton, may well prove to be the happiest result of the union of south africa. in india also a national spirit is coming to birth, bred among a deeply divided people by the political unity, the peace, and the equal laws, which have been the greatest gifts of british rule; its danger is that it may be too quick to imagine that the unity which makes nationhood can be created merely by means of resolutions declaring that it exists, but the desire to create it is an altogether healthy desire. on the surface it might appear that the rise of a national spirit in the great members of the empire is a danger to the ideal of imperial unity; but that need not be so, and if it were so, the danger must be faced, since the national spirit is too valuable a force to be restricted. the sense of nationhood is the inevitable outcome of the freedom and co-operation which the british system everywhere encourages; to attempt to repress it lest it should endanger imperial unity would be as short-sighted as the old attempt to restrict the natural growth of self-government because it also seemed a danger to imperial unity. the essence of the british system is the free development of natural tendencies, and the encouragement of variety of types; and the future towards which the empire seems to be tending is not that of a highly centralised and unified state, but that of a brotherhood of free nations, united by community of ideas and institutions, co-operating for many common ends, and above all for the common defence in case of need, but each freely following the natural trend of its own development. that is the conception of empire, unlike any other ever entertained by men upon this planet, which was already shaping itself among the british communities when the terrible ordeal of the great war came to test it, and to prove as not even the staunchest believer could have anticipated, that it was capable of standing the severest trial which men or institutions have ever had to undergo. ix the great challenge, 1900-1914 at the opening of the twentieth century the long process whereby the whole globe has been brought under the influence of european civilisation was practically completed; and there had emerged a group of gigantic empires, which in size far surpassed the ancient empire of rome; each resting upon, and drawing its strength from, a unified nation-state. in the hands of these empires the political destinies of the world seemed to rest, and the lesser nation-states appeared to be altogether overshadowed by them. among the vast questions which fate was putting to humanity, there were none more momentous than these: on what principles, and in what spirit, were these nation-empires going to use the power which they had won over their vast and varied multitudes of subjects? what were to be their relations with one another? were they to be relations of conflict, each striving to weaken or destroy its rivals in the hope of attaining a final world-supremacy? or were they to be relations of co-operation in the development of civilisation, extending to the whole world those tentative but far from unsuccessful efforts after international co-operation which the european states had long been endeavouring to work out among themselves?[9] at first it seemed as if the second alternative might be adopted, for these were the days of the hague conferences; but the development of events during the first fourteen years of the century showed with increasing clearness that one of the new world-states was resolute to make a bid for world-supremacy, and the gradual maturing of this challenge, culminating in the great war, constitutes the supreme interest of these years. [9] see the essay on internationalism (nationalism and internationalism, p. 124 ff.). the oldest, and (by the rough tests of area, population, and natural resources) by far the greatest of these new composite world-states, was the british empire, which included 12,000,000 square miles, or one-quarter of the land-surface of the globe. it rested upon the wealth, vigour, and skill of a population of 45,000,000 in the homeland, to which might be added, but only by their own consent, the resources of five young daughter-nations, whose population only amounted to about 15,000,000. thus it stood upon a rather narrow foundation. and while it was the greatest, it was also beyond comparison the most loosely organised of all these empires. it was rather a partnership of a multitude of states in every grade of civilisation than an organised and consolidated dominion. five of its chief members were completely self-governing, and shared in the common burdens only by their own free will. all the remaining members were organised as distinct units, though subject to the general control of the home government. the resources of each unit were employed exclusively for the development of its own welfare. they paid no tribute; they were not required to provide any soldiers beyond the minimum needed for their own defence and the maintenance of internal order. this empire, in short, was not in any degree organised for military purposes. it possessed no great land-army, and was, therefore, incapable of threatening the existence of any of its rivals. it depended for its defence firstly upon its own admirable strategic distribution, since it was open to attack at singularly few points otherwise than from the sea; it depended mainly, for that reason, upon naval power, and secure command of the sea-roads by which its members were linked was absolutely vital to its existence. only by sea-power (which is always weak in the offensive) could it threaten its neighbours or rivals; and its sea-power, during four centuries, had always, in war, been employed to resist the threatened domination of any single power, and had never, in time of peace, been employed to restrict the freedom of movement of any of the world's peoples. on the contrary, the freedom of the seas had been established by its victories, and dated from the date of its ascendancy. the life-blood of this empire was trade; its supreme interest was manifestly peace. the conception of the meaning of empire which had been developed by its history was not a conception of dominion for dominion's sake, or of the exploitation of subjects for the advantage of a master. on the contrary, it had come to mean (especially during the nineteenth century) a trust; a trust to be administered in the interests of the subjects primarily, and secondarily in the interests of the whole civilised world. that this is not the assertion of a theory or an ideal, but of a fact and a practice, is sufficiently demonstrated by two unquestionable facts: the first that the units which formed this empire were not only free from all tribute in money or men, but were not even required to make any contribution towards the upkeep of the fleet, upon which the safety of all depended; the second that every port and every market in this vast empire, so far as they were under the control of the central government, were thrown open as freely to the citizens of all other states as to its own. finally, in this empire there had never been any attempt to impose a uniformity of method or even of laws upon the infinitely various societies which it included: it not merely permitted, it cultivated and admired, varieties of type, and to the maximum practicable degree believed in self-government. because these were the principles upon which it was administered, the real strength of this empire was far greater than it appeared. but beyond question it was ill-prepared and ill-organised for war; desiring peace beyond all things, and having given internal peace to one-quarter of the earth's population, it was apt to be over-sanguine about the maintenance of peace. and if a great clash of empires should come, this was likely to tell against it. the second oldest--perhaps it ought to be described as the oldest--of the world-empires, and the second largest in area, was the russian empire, which covered 8,500,000 square miles of territory. its strength was that its vast domains formed a single continuous block, and that its population was far more homogeneous than that of its rivals, three out of four of its subjects being either of the russian or of kindred slavonic stock. its weaknesses were that it was almost land-locked, nearly the whole of its immense coastline being either inaccessible, or ice-bound during half of the year; and that it had not adopted modern methods of government, being subject to a despotism, working through an inefficient, tyrannical, and corrupt bureaucracy. in the event of a european war it was further bound to suffer from the facts that its means of communication and its capacity for the movement of great armies were ill-developed; and that it was far behind all its rivals in the control of industrial machinery and applied science, upon which modern warfare depends, and without which the greatest wealth of man-power is ineffective. at the opening of the twentieth century russia was still pursuing the policy of eastward expansion at the expense of china, which the other western powers had been compelled to abandon by the formation of the anglo-japanese alliance. able to bring pressure upon china from the landward side, she was not deterred by the naval predominance which this alliance enjoyed, and she still hoped to control manchuria, and to dominate the policy of china. but these aims brought her in conflict with japan, who had been preparing for the conflict ever since 1895. the outcome of the war (1904), which ended in a disastrous russian defeat, had the most profound influence upon the politics of the world. it led to an internal revolution in russia. it showed that the feet of the colossus were of clay, and that her bureaucratic government was grossly corrupt and incompetent. it forbade russia to take an effective part in the critical events of the following years, and notably disabled her from checking the progress of german and austrian ascendancy in the balkans. above all it increased the self-confidence of germany, and inspired her rulers with the dangerous conviction that the opposing forces with which they would have to deal in the expected contest for the mastery of europe could be more easily overthrown than they had anticipated. to the russian defeat must be mainly attributed the blustering insolence of german policy during the next ten years, and the boldness of the final challenge in 1914. the third of the great empires was that of france, with 5,000,000 square miles of territory, mostly acquired in very recent years, but having roots in the past. it rested upon a home population of only 39,000,000, but these belonged to the most enlightened, the most inventive, and the most chivalrous stock in christendom. as france had, a hundred years before, raised the standard of human rights among the european peoples, so she was now bringing law and justice and peace to the backward peoples of africa and the east; and was finding in the pride of this achievement some consolation for the brutality with which she had been hurled from the leadership of europe. the fourth of the great empires was america, with some 3,000,000 square miles of territory, and a vague claim of suzerainty over the vast area of central and south america. her difficult task of welding into a nation masses of people of the most heterogeneous races had been made yet more difficult by the enormous flood of immigrants, mainly from the northern, eastern, and south-eastern parts of europe, which had poured into her cities during the last generation: they proved to be in many ways more difficult to digest than their predecessors, and they tended, in a dangerous way, to live apart and to organise themselves as separate communities. the presence of these organised groups made it sometimes hard for america to maintain a quite clear and distinctive attitude in the discussions of the powers, most of which had, as it were, definite bodies of advocates among her citizens; and it was perhaps in part for this reason that she had tended to fall back again to that attitude of aloofness towards the affairs of the non-american world from which she seemed to have begun to depart in the later years of the last century. although she had herself taken a hand in the imperialist activities of the 'nineties, the general attitude of her citizens towards the imperial controversies of europe was one of contempt or undiscriminating condemnation. her old tradition of isolation from the affairs of europe was still very strong--still the dominating factor in her policy. she had not yet grasped (indeed, who, in any country, had?) the political consequences of the new era of world-economy into which we have passed. and therefore she could not see that the titanic conflict of empires which was looming ahead was of an altogether different character from the old conflicts of the european states, that it was fundamentally a conflict of principles, a fight for existence between the ideal of self-government and the ideal of dominion, and that it must therefore involve, for good or ill, the fortunes of the whole globe. she watched the events which led up to the great agony with impartial and deliberate interest. even when the war began she clung with obstinate faith to the belief that her tradition of aloofness might still be maintained. it is not surprising, when we consider how deep-rooted this tradition was, that it took two and a half years of carnage and horror to convert her from it. but it was inevitable that in the end her still more deeply rooted tradition of liberty should draw her into the conflict, and lead her at last to play her proper part in the attempt to shape a new world-order. we cannot stop to analyse the minor world-states, italy and japan; both of which might have stood aside from the conflict, but that both realised its immense significance for themselves and for the world. last among the world-states, both in the date of its foundation and in the extent of its domains, was the empire of germany, which covered considerably less than 1,500,000 square miles, but rested upon a home population of nearly 70,000,000, more docile, more industrious, and more highly organised than any other human society. the empire of germany had been more easily and more rapidly acquired than any of the others, yet since its foundation it had known many troubles, because the hard and domineering spirit in which it was ruled did not know how to win the affections of its subjects. a parvenu among the great states--having only attained the dignity of nationhood in the mid-nineteenth century--germany has shown none of that 'genius for equality' which is the secret of good manners and of friendship among nations as among individuals. her conversation, at home and abroad, had the vulgar self-assertiveness of the parvenu, and turned always and wholly upon her own greatness. and her conduct has been the echo of her conversation. she has persuaded herself that she has a monopoly of power, of wisdom, and of knowledge, and deserves to rule the earth. of the magnitude and far-reaching nature of her imperialist ambitions, we have said something in a previous chapter. she had as yet failed to realise any of these vaulting schemes, but she had not for that reason abandoned any of them, and she kept her clever and insidious preparations on foot in every region of the world upon which her acquisitive eyes had rested. but the exasperation of her steady failure to achieve the place in the world which she had marked out as her due had driven her rulers more and more definitely to contemplate, and prepared her people to uphold, a direct challenge to all her rivals. the object of this challenge was to win for germany her due share in the non-european world, her 'place in the sun.' her view of what that share must be was such that it could not be attained without the overthrow of all her european rivals, and this would bring with it the lordship of the world. it must be all or nothing. though not quite realising this alternative, the mind of germany was not afraid of it. she was in the mood to make a bold attempt, if need be, to grasp even the sceptre of world-supremacy. the world could not believe that any sane people could entertain such megalomaniac visions; not even the events of the decade 1904-14 were enough to bring conviction; it needed the tragedy and desolation of the war to prove at once their reality and their folly. for they were folly even if they could be momentarily realised. they sprang from the traditions of prussia, which seemed to demonstrate that all things were possible to him who dared all, and scrupled nothing, and calculated his chances and his means with precision. by force and fraud the greatness of prussia had been built; by force and fraud prussia-germany had become the leading state of europe, feared by all her rivals and safe from all attack. force and fraud appeared to be the determining factors in human affairs; even the philosophers of germany devoted their powers to justifying and glorifying them. by force and fraud, aided by science, germany should become the leader of the world, and perhaps its mistress. never has the doctrine of power been proclaimed with more unflinching directness as the sole and sufficient motive for state action. there was practically no pretence that germany desired to improve the condition of the lands she wished to possess, or that they were misgoverned, or that the existing german territories were threatened: what pretence there was, was invented after war began. the sole and sufficient reason put forward by the advocates of the policy which germany was pursuing was that she wanted more power and larger dominions; and what she wanted she proposed to take. on the surface it seemed mere madness for the least and latest of the great empires to challenge all the rest, just as it had once seemed madness for frederick the great, with his little state, to stand up against all but one of the great european powers. but germany had calculated her chances, and knew that there were many things in her favour. she knew that in the last resort the strength of the world-states rested upon their european foundations, and here the inequality was much less. in a european struggle she could draw great advantage from her central geographical position, which she had improved to the highest extent by the construction of a great system of strategic railways. she could trust to her superbly organised military system, more perfect than that of any other state, just because no other state has ever regarded war as the final aim and the highest form of state action. she commanded unequalled resources in all the mechanical apparatus of war; she had spared no pains to build up her armament works, which had, indeed, supplied a great part of the world; she had developed all the scientific industries in such a way that their factories could be rapidly and easily turned to war purposes; and having given all her thoughts to the coming struggle as no other nation had done, she knew, better than any other, how largely it would turn upon these things. she counted securely upon winning an immense advantage from the fact that she would herself fix the date of war, and enter upon it with a sudden spring, fully prepared, against rivals who, clinging to the hope of peace, would be unready for the onset. she hoped to sow jealousies among her rivals; she trusted to catch them at a time when they were engrossed in their domestic concerns, and in this respect fate seemed to play into her hands, since at the moment which she had predetermined, britain, france, and russia were all distracted by domestic controversies. she trusted also to her reading of the minds and temper of her opponents; and here she went wildly astray, as must always be the fate of the nation or the man who is blinded by self-complacency and by contempt for others. but, above all, she put her trust in a vast political combination which she had laboriously prepared during the years preceding the great conflict: the combination which we have learned to call mittel-europa. none of us realised to how great an extent this plan had been put in operation before the war began. briefly it depended on the possibility of obtaining an intimate union with the austro-hungarian empire, a control over the turkish empire, and a sufficient influence or control among the little balkan states to ensure through communication. if the scheme could be carried out in full, it would involve the creation of a practically continuous empire stretching from the north sea to the persian gulf, and embracing a total population of over 150,000,000. this would be a dominion worth acquiring for its own sake, since it would put germany on a level with her rivals. but it would have the further advantage that it would hold a central position in relation to the other world-powers, corresponding to germany's central position in relation to the other nation-states of europe. russia could be struck at along the whole length of her western and south-western frontier; the british empire could be threatened in egypt, the centre of its ocean lines of communication, and also from the persian gulf in the direction of india; the french empire could be struck at the heart, in its european centre; and all without seriously laying open the attacking powers to the invasion of sea-power. it was a bold and masterful scheme, and it was steadily pursued during the years before the war. austro-hungary was easily influenced. the ascendancy of her ruling races--nay, the very existence of her composite anti-national empire--was threatened by the nationalist movements among her subject-peoples, who, cruelly oppressed at home, were more and more beginning to turn towards their free brothers over the border, in serbia and rumania; and behind these loomed russia, the traditional protector of the slav peoples and of the orthodox faith. austro-hungary, therefore, leant upon the support of germany, and her dominant races would be very willing to join in a war which should remove the russian menace and give them a chance of subjugating the serbs. this latter aim suited the programme of germany as well as it suited that of austria, since the railways to constantinople and salonika ran through serbia. serbia, therefore, was doomed; she stood right in the path of the juggernaut car. the acquisition of influence in turkey was also comparatively easy. constantinople is a city where lavish corruption can work wonders. moreover turkey was, in the last years of the nineteenth century, in bad odour with europe; and germany was able to earn in 1897 the lasting gratitude of the infamous sultan abdul hamid by standing between him and the other european powers, who were trying to interfere with his indulgence in the pastime of massacring the armenians. turkey had had many protectors among the european powers. she had never before had one so complaisant about the murder of christians. from that date germany was all-powerful in turkey. the turkish army was reorganised under her direction, and practically passed under her control. most of the turkish railways were acquired and managed by german companies. and presently the great scheme of the bagdad railway began to be carried through. the young turk revolution in 1908 and the fall of abdul hamid gave, indeed, a shock to the german ascendancy; but only for a moment. the young turks were as amenable to corruption as their predecessors; and under the guidance of enver bey turkey relapsed into german suzerainty. thus the most important parts of the great scheme were in a fair way of success by 1910. one of the merits of this scheme was that as the sultan of turkey was the head of the mahomedan religion, the german protectorate over turkey gave a useful mode of appealing to the religious sentiments of mahomedans everywhere. twice over, in 1898 and in 1904, the kaiser had declared that he was the protector of all mahomedans throughout the world. most of the mahomedans were subjects either of britain, france, or russia--the three rival empires that were to be overthrown. as general bernhardi put it, germany in her struggle for weltmacht must supplement her material weapons with spiritual weapons. to obtain a similar ascendancy over the balkan states was more difficult; for the turk was the secular enemy of all of them, and austria was the foe of two of the four, and to bring these little states into partnership with their natural enemies seemed an all but impossible task. yet a good deal could be, and was, done. in two of the four chief balkan states german princes occupied the thrones, a hohenzollern in rumania, a coburger in bulgaria; in a third, the heir-apparent to the greek throne was honoured with the hand of the kaiser's own sister. western peoples had imagined that the day had gone by when the policy of states could be deflected by such facts; especially as the balkan states all had democratic parliamentary constitutions. but the germans knew better than the west. they knew that kings could still play a great part in countries where the bulk of the electorate were illiterate, and where most of the class of professional politicians were always open to bribes. their calculations were justified. king carol of rumania actually signed a treaty of alliance with germany without consulting his ministers or parliament. king ferdinand of bulgaria was able to draw his subjects into an alliance with the turks, who had massacred their fathers in 1876, against the russians, who had saved them from destruction. king constantine of greece was able to humiliate and disgrace the country over which he ruled, in order to serve the purposes of his brother-in-law. these sovereigns may have been the unconscious implements of a policy which they did not understand. but they earned their wages. there were, indeed, two moments when the great scheme came near being wrecked. one was when italy, the sleeping partner of the triple alliance, who was not made a sharer in these grandiose and vile projects, attacked and conquered the turkish province of tripoli in 1911, and strained to breaking-point the loyalty of the turks to germany. the other was when, under the guidance of the two great statesmen of the balkans, venizelos of greece and pashitch of serbia, the balkan league was formed, and the power of turkey in europe broken. if the league had held together, the great german project would have been ruined, or at any rate gravely imperilled. but germany and austria contrived to throw an apple of discord among the balkan allies at the conference of london in 1912, and then stimulated bulgaria to attack serbia and greece. the league was broken up irreparably; its members had been brought into a sound condition of mutual hatred; and bulgaria, isolated among distrustful neighbours, was ready to become the tool of germany in order that by her aid she might achieve (fond hope!) the hegemony of the balkans. this brilliant stroke was effected in 1913--the year before the great war. all that remained was to ruin serbia. for that purpose austria had long been straining at the leash. she had been on the point of making an attack in 1909, in 1912, in 1913. in 1914 the leash was slipped. if the rival empires chose to look on while serbia was destroyed, well and good: in that case the berlin-bagdad project could be systematically developed and consolidated, and the attack on the rival empires could come later. if not, still it was well; for all was ready for the great challenge. we have dwelt at some length upon this gigantic project, because it has formed during all these years the heart and centre of the german designs, and even to-day it is the dearest of german hopes. not until she is utterly defeated will she abandon it; because its abandonment must involve the abandonment of every hope of a renewed attempt at world-supremacy, after an interval for reorganisation and recovery. not until the german control over austria and turkey, more complete to-day, after two and a half years of war, than it has ever been before, has been destroyed by the splitting up of austria among the nationalities to which her territory belongs, and by the final overthrow of the turkish empire, will the german dream of world-dominion be shattered. but while this fundamentally important project was being worked out, other events, almost equally momentous in their bearing upon the coming conflict, were taking place elsewhere. it was the obvious policy of germany to keep her rivals on bad terms with one another. the tradition of bismarck bade her isolate each victim before it was destroyed. but the insolence and the megalomania of modern germany made this difficult. german writers were busily and openly explaining the fate marked out for all the other powers. france was to be so crushed that she would 'never again be able to stand in our path.' the bloated and unconsolidated empire of britain was to be shattered. the russian barbarians were to be thrust back into asia. and what the pamphleteers and journalists wrote was expressed with almost equal clearness in the tone of german diplomacy. in face of all this, the clumsy attempts of the german government to isolate their rivals met with small success, even though these rivals had many grounds of controversy among themselves. france knew what she had to fear; and the interpolation of a few clumsy bids for her favour amid the torrent of insults against her which filled the german press, were of no avail; especially as she had to look on at the unceasing petty persecution practised in the lost provinces of alsace-lorraine. russia had been alienated by the first evidences of german designs in the balkans, and driven into a close alliance with france. britain, hitherto obstinately friendly to germany, began to be perturbed by the growing german programmes of naval construction from 1900 onwards, by the absolute refusal of germany to consider any proposal for mutual disarmament or retardation of construction, and above all by the repeated assertions of the head of the german state that germany aspired to naval supremacy, that her future was on the sea, that the trident must be in her hands. should the trident fall into any but british hands, the existence of the british empire, and the very livelihood of the british homeland, would rest at the mercy of him who wielded it. so, quite inevitably, the three threatened empires drew together and reconciled their differences in the franco-british agreement of 1904 and the russo-british agreement of 1907. these agreements dealt wholly with extra-european questions, and therefore deserve some analysis. in the franco-british agreement the main feature was that while france withdrew her opposition to the british position in egypt, britain on her side recognised the paramount political interest of france in morocco. it was the agreement about morocco which counted for most; because it was the beginning of a controversy which lasted for seven years, which was twice used by germany as a means for testing, and endeavouring to break, the friendship of her rivals, and which twice brought europe to the verge of war. morocco is a part of that single region of mountainous north africa of which france already controlled the remainder, tunis and algeria. peoples of the same type inhabited the whole region, but while in tunis and algeria they were being brought under the influence of law and order, in morocco they remained in anarchy. only a conventional line divided morocco from algeria, and the anarchy among the tribesmen on one side of the line inevitably had an unhappy effect upon the people on the other side of the line. more than once france had been compelled, for the sake of algeria, to intervene in morocco. it is impossible to exaggerate the anarchy which existed in the interior of this rich and wasted country. it was, indeed, the most lawless region remaining in the world: when mr. bernard shaw wished to find a scene for a play in which the hero should be a brigand chief leading a band of rascals and outlaws from all countries, morocco presented the only possible scene remaining in the world. and this anarchy was the more unfortunate, not only because the country was naturally rich and ought to have been prosperous, but also because it lay in close proximity to great civilised states, and on one of the main routes of commerce at the entrance to the mediterranean. in its ports a considerable traffic was carried on by european traders, but this traffic was, owing to the anarchic condition of the country, nothing like as great as it ought to have been. in 1905, 39 per cent. of it was controlled by french traders, 32 per cent. by british traders, 12 per cent. by german traders, and 5 per cent. by spanish traders. manifestly this was a region where law and order ought to be established, in the interests of civilisation. the powers most directly concerned were in the first place france, with her neighbouring territory and her preponderant trade; in the second place britain, whose strategic interests as well as her trading interests were involved; in the third place spain, which directly faced the morocco coast; while germany had only trading interests involved, and so long as these were safeguarded, had no ground of complaint. if any single power was to intervene, manifestly the first claim was upon france. in 1900 france had directed the attention of europe to the disorderly condition of morocco, and had proposed to intervene to restore order, on the understanding that she should not annex the country, or interfere with the trading rights of other nations. some states agreed; germany made no reply, but made no objection. but owing to the opposition of britain, who was then on bad terms with france and feared to see an unfriendly power controlling the entrance to the mediterranean, no action was taken; and in the next years the chaos in morocco grew worse. by the agreement of 1904 britain withdrew her objection to french intervention, and recognised the prior political rights of france in morocco, on the condition that the existing government of morocco should be maintained, that none of its territory should be annexed, and that 'the open door' should be preserved for the trade of all nations. but, of course, it was possible, and even probable, that the existing moroccan government could not be made efficient. in that case, what should happen? the possibility had to be contemplated by reasonable statesmen, and provided against. but to do so in a public treaty would have been to condemn beforehand the existing system. therefore a hypothetical arrangement was made for this possible future event in a secret treaty, to which spain was made a party; whereby it was provided that if the arrangement should break down, and france should have to establish a definite protectorate, the vital part of the north coast should pass under the control of spain. to the public part of these arrangements, which alone were of immediate importance, no objection was made by any of the other powers, and the german chancellor told the reichstag that german interests were not affected. france accordingly drew up a scheme of reforms in the government of morocco, which the sultan was invited to accept. but before he had accepted them the german kaiser suddenly came to tangier in his yacht, had an interview with the sultan in which he urged him to reject the french demands, and made a public speech in which he declared himself the protector of the mahomedans, asserted that no european power had special rights in morocco, and announced his determination to support the 'independence and integrity' of morocco--which in existing circumstances meant the maintenance of anarchy. what was the reason for this sudden and insolent intervention--made without any previous communication with france? the main reason was that france's ally, russia, had just been severely defeated by japan, and would not be able to take part in a european war. therefore, it appeared, france might be bullied; britain might not be willing to risk war on such an issue; the entente of 1904 might be destroyed; the extension of french influence might be prevented; and the preservation of a state of anarchy in morocco would leave open the chance of a seizure of that country by germany at a later date, thus enabling her to dominate the entrance to the mediterranean, and to threaten algeria. but this pretty scheme did not succeed. the entente held firm. britain gave steady support to france, as indeed she was bound in honour to do; and in the end a conference of the powers was held at algeciras (spain). at this conference the predominating right of france to political influence in morocco was formally recognised; and it was agreed that the government of the sultan should be maintained, and that all countries should have equal trading rights in morocco. this was, of course, the very basis of the franco-british agreement. on every point at which she tried to score a success over france, germany was defeated by the votes of the other powers, even her own ally, italy, deserting her. but the german intervention had had its effect. the sultan had refused the french scheme of reform. the elements of disorder in morocco were encouraged to believe that they had the protection of germany, and the activity of german agents strengthened this belief. the anarchy grew steadily worse. in 1907 sir harry maclean was captured by a brigand chief, and the british government had to pay 20,000 pounds ransom for his release. in the same year a number of european workmen engaged on harbour works at casablanca were murdered by tribesmen; and the french had to send a force which had a year's fighting before it reduced the district to order. in 1911 the sultan was besieged in his capital (where there were a number of european residents) by insurgent tribesmen, and had to invite the french to send an army to his relief. this was seized upon by germany as a pretext. morocco was no longer 'independent.' the agreement of algecras was dead. therefore she resumed her right to put forward what claims she pleased in morocco. suddenly her gunboat, the panther, appeared off agadir. it was meant as an assertion that germany had as much right to intervene in morocco as france. and it was accompanied by a demand that if france wanted to be left free in morocco, she must buy the approval of germany. the settlement of morocco was to be a question solely between france and germany. the entente of 1904, the agreement of 1906, the moroccan interests of britain (much more important than those of germany), and the interests of the other powers of the algeciras conference, were to count for nothing. germany's voice must be the determining factor. but germany announced that she was willing to be bought off by large concessions of french territory elsewhere--provided that britain was not allowed to have anything to say: provided, that is, that the agreement of 1904 was scrapped. this was a not too subtle way of trying to drive a wedge between two friendly powers. it did not succeed. britain insisted upon being consulted. there was for a time a real danger of war. in the end peace was maintained by the cession by france of considerable areas in the congo as the price of german abstention from intervening in a sphere where she had no right to intervene. but morocco was left under a definite french protectorate. we have dwelt upon the morocco question at some length, partly because it attracted a vast amount of interest during the years of preparation for the war; partly because it affords an extraordinarily good illustration of the difficulty of maintaining peaceable relations with germany, and of the spirit in which germany approached the delicate questions of inter-imperial relationships--a spirit far removed indeed from that friendly willingness for compromise and co-operation by which alone the peace of the world could be maintained; and partly because it illustrates the crudity and brutality of the methods by which germany endeavoured to separate her intended victims. it is improbable that she ever meant to go to war on the moroccan question. she meant to go to war on whatever pretext might present itself when all her preparations were ready; but in the meanwhile she would avoid war on all questions but one: and that one was the great berlin-bagdad project, the keystone of her soaring arch of empire. she would fight to prevent the ruin of that scheme. otherwise she would preserve the peace, she would even make concessions to preserve the peace, until the right moment had come. in that sense germany was a peace-loving power: in that sense alone. on the agreement between russia and britain in 1907 it is unnecessary to dwell with such fulness. the agreement turned mainly upon the removal of causes of friction in the middle east--in persia and the persian gulf, and in tibet. these were in themselves interesting and thorny questions, especially the question of persia, where the two powers established distinct spheres of interest and a sort of joint protectorate. but they need not detain us, because they had no direct bearing upon the events leading up to the war, except in so far as, by removing friction between two rivals of long standing, they made it possible for them to co-operate for their common defence against a menace that became more and more apparent. from 1907 onwards germany found herself confronted by united defensive action on the part of the three empires whose downfall she intended to compass. it was not (except as regarded france and russia) a formal alliance which bound these powers. there was no fixed agreement between them as to military co-operation. france and britain had indeed, in 1906 and in 1911, consulted as to the military steps they should take if they were drawn into war, as seemed likely in those years, but neither was in any way bound to help the other under all circumstances. france and britain had also agreed that the french fleet should be concentrated in the mediterranean, the main british fleet in the north sea. this arrangement (which was universally known, and, indeed, could not be concealed) put britain under a moral obligation to defend france against naval attack, but only if france were the object of aggression. it was, therefore, actually a safeguard of peace, since it ensured that neither france nor, consequently, her ally, russia, would begin a war without being sure of the concurrence of britain, the most pacific of powers. as the diplomatic records show, at the opening of the great war they were not sure of this concurrence, even for naval purposes, until august 1, when the die was already cast. the triple entente, therefore, was not an alliance; it was only an agreement for common diplomatic action in the hope of averting a terrible menace. until 1911 germany, or some elements in germany, seem to have hoped that she could get her own way by bullying and rattling her sabre, and that by these means she could frighten her rivals, make them mutually distrustful, and so break up their combination and deal with them in detail. those who held this view were the peace-party (so-called), and they included the kaiser and his chancellor. they would probably not themselves have accepted this description of their policy, but in practice this is what it meant. but there was always a formidable and influential party in germany which had no patience with these hesitations, and was eager to draw the sabre. it included the men of the general staff, backed by the numerous pan-german societies and newspapers. the issue of the morocco question in 1911, which showed that the policy of bullying had failed, played into the hands of the men of violence; and from this moment began the last strenuous burst of military preparation which preceded the war. in 1911 was passed the first of a series of army acts for the increase of the already immense german army, and still more for the provision of vast equipment and the scientific apparatus of destruction; two further acts for the same purpose followed in 1912 and in 1913. in 1911 also was published general bernhardi's famous book, which defined and described the course of future action, and the aim which germany was henceforth to pursue with all her strength: weltmacht oder niedergang, world-power or downfall. the events in the balkans in 1912 and 1913 completed the conversion of those who still clung to the policy of peaceful bullying. the formation and triumph of the balkan league in 1912 formed a grave set-back for the berlin-bagdad project, which would be ruined if these little states became strong enough, or united enough, to be independent. the break-up of the balkan league and the second balkan war of 1913 improved the situation from the german point of view. but they left serbia unsatisfactorily strong, and serbia distrusted austria, and controlled the communications with constantinople. serbia must be destroyed; otherwise the berlin-bagdad project, and with it the world-power of which it was to be the main pillar, would be always insecure. austria was for attacking serbia at once in 1913. germany held her back: the widening of the kiel canal was not completed, and the fruits of the latest army acts were not yet fully reaped. but all was ready in 1914; and the great challenge was launched. it would have been launched at or about that time even if an unpopular austrian archduke, significantly unguarded by the austrian police, had not been most opportunely murdered by an austrian subject on austrian territory. the murder was only a pretext. the real cause of the war was the resolution of germany to strike for world-supremacy, and her belief that the time was favourable for the great adventure. meanwhile, what had the threatened empires been doing during the years of strenuous german preparation which began in 1911? their governments could not but be aware of the enormous activity which was taking place in that country--which was unthreatened on any side--though they probably did not know how thorough and how elaborate it was. what steps did they take to guard against the danger? russia was busy constructing strategic railways, to make the movement of troops easier; she was erecting new munition factories. but neither could be quickly got ready. france imposed upon the whole of her manhood the obligation of serving for three instead of for two years in the army. britain reorganised her small professional army, created the territorial force, and began the training of a large officer class in all the universities and public schools. but she did not attempt to create a national army. if she had done so, this would have been a signal for the precipitation of the war. besides, britain obstinately clung to the belief that so monstrous a crime as germany seemed to be contemplating could never be committed by a civilised nation; and she trusted mainly to her fleet for her own security. but britain unquestionably laboured with all her might to conjure away the nightmare. from 1906 onwards she had made, in vain, repeated attempts to persuade germany to accept a mutual disarmament or retardation of naval construction. in 1912 she resolved upon a more definite step. the german newspapers were full of talk about the british policy of 'encircling' germany in order to attack and destroy her, which they attributed mainly to sir edward grey. it was a manifest absurdity, since the franco-russian alliance was formed in 1894, at a time when britain was on bad terms with both france and russia, and the agreements later made with these two countries were wholly devoted to removing old causes of dispute between them. but the german people obviously believed it. perhaps the german government also believed it? britain resolved to remove this apprehension. accordingly in 1912 lord haldane was sent to germany with a formal and definite statement, authorised by the cabinet, to the effect that britain had made no alliance or understanding which was aimed against germany, and had no intention of doing so. that being so, since germany need have no fear of an attack from britain, why should not the two powers agree to reduce their naval expenditure? the german reply was that to stop the naval programme was impossible, but that construction might be delayed, on one condition--that both powers should sign a formal agreement drawn up by germany. each power was to pledge itself to absolute neutrality in any european war in which the other was engaged. each power was to undertake to make no new alliances. but this agreement was not to affect existing alliances or the duties arising under them. this proposal was an obvious trap, and the german ministers who proposed it must have had the poorest opinion of the intelligence of english statesmen if they thought it was likely to be accepted. for observe that it left germany, in conjunction with austria, free to attack france and russia. it left the formidable triple alliance unimpaired. but it tied the hands of britain, who had no existing european alliances, enforced neutrality upon her in such a war, and compelled her to look on idly and wait her turn. in the present war, germany could have pleaded that she was bound to take part by the terms of her alliance with austria, who began it; but britain would have been compelled to stand aloof. a very convenient arrangement for germany, but not an arrangement that promised well for the peace of the world! even this rebuff did not dishearten britain. feeling that germany might have some reasonable ground of complaint in the fact that her share of the extra-european world was so much less than that of france or of britain herself, britain attempted to come to an agreement on this head, such as would show that she had no desire to prevent the imperial expansion of germany. a treaty was proposed and discussed, and was ready to be submitted to the proper authorities for confirmation in june 1914. it has never been made public, because the war cancelled it before it came into effect, and we do not know its terms. but we do know that the german colonial enthusiast, paul rohrbach, who has seen the draft treaty, has said that the concessions made by britain were astonishingly extensive, and met every reasonable german demand. this sounds as if the proposals of the treaty, whatever they were, had been recklessly generous. but this much is clear, that the government which had this treaty in its possession when it forced on the war was not to be easily satisfied. it did not want merely external possessions. it wanted supremacy; it wanted world-dominion. one last attempt the british government made in the frenzied days of negotiation which preceded the war. sir edward grey had begged the german government to make any proposal which would make for peace, and promised his support beforehand; he had received no reply. he had undertaken that if germany made any reasonable proposal, and france or russia objected, he would have nothing further to do with france or russia. still there was no reply. imagining that germany might still be haunted by what bismarck called 'the nightmare of coalition,' and might be rushing into war now because she feared a war in the future under more unfavourable conditions, he had pledged himself, if germany would only say the word which would secure the peace, to use every effort to bring about a general understanding among the great powers which would banish all fears of an anti-german combination. it was of no use. the reply was the suggestion that britain should bind herself to neutrality in this war on the following conditions: (a) that germany should be given a free hand to violate the neutrality of belgium (which britain was bound by treaty to defend), on the understanding that belgium should be reinstated after she had served her purpose, if she had offered no resistance; belgium, be it noted, being bound in honour to offer resistance by the very treaty which germany proposed to violate; and (b) that after france had been humiliated and beaten to the earth for the crime of possessing territories which germany coveted, she should be restored to independence, and germany should be content to annex her 5,000,000 square miles of colonies. in return for this undertaking britain was to be--allowed to hold aloof from the war, and await her turn. there is no getting over these facts. the aim of germany had come to be nothing less than world-supremacy. the destiny of the whole globe was to be put to the test. surely this was the very insanity of megalomania. x what of the night? the gigantic conflict into which the ambitions of germany have plunged the world is the most tremendous event in human history, not merely because of the vast forces engaged, and the appalling volume of suffering which has resulted from it, but still more because of the magnitude of the principles for which it is being fought. it is a war to secure the right of communities which are linked together by the national spirit to determine their own destinies; it is a war to maintain the principles of humanity, the sanctity of formal undertakings between states, and the possibility of the co-operation of free peoples in the creation of a new and better world-order; it is a war between two principles of government, the principle of military autocracy and the principle of self-government. with all these aspects of the mighty struggle we are not here immediately concerned, though they have an intimate bearing upon our main theme: some of them have been analysed elsewhere.[10] but what does concern us most directly, and what makes this war the culmination of the long story which we have endeavoured to survey, is that this is a war in which, as in no earlier war, the whole fate and future of the now unified world is at stake. for just because the world is now, as never before, an indissoluble economic and political unity, the challenge of germany, whatever view we may take of the immediate aims of the german state, inevitably raises the whole question of the principles upon which this unified world, unified by the victory of european civilisation, is to be in future directed. and the whole world knows, if vaguely, that these vast issues are at stake, and that this is no merely european conflict. that is why we see arrayed upon the fields of battle not only french, british, russian, italian, serbian, belgian, rumanian, greek and portuguese soldiers, but canadians, australians, new zealanders, south africans, indians, algerians, senegalese, cambodians; and now, alongside of all these, the citizens of the american republic. that is why brazil and other states are hovering on the edge of the fray; why japanese ships are helping to patrol the mediterranean, why arab armies are driving the turk from the holy places of mahomedanism, why african tribesmen are enrolled in new levies to clear the enemy out of his footholds in that continent. almost the whole world is arrayed against the outlaw-power and her vassals. and the ultimate reason for this is that the whole world is concerned to see this terrible debate rightly determined. [10] in nationalism and internationalism and in national self-government. for the issue is as simple as this. now that the world has been made one by the victory of western civilisation, in what spirit is that supremacy to be used? is it to be in the spirit expressed in the german doctrine of power, the spirit of mere dominion, ruthlessly imposed and ruthlessly exploited for the sole advantage of the master-power? that way ruin lies. or is it to be in the spirit which has on the whole, and in spite of lapses, guided the progress of western civilisation in the past, the spirit of respect for law and for the rights of the weak, the spirit of liberty which rejoices in variety of type and method, and which believes that the destiny towards which all peoples should be guided is that of self-government in freedom, and the co-operation of free peoples in the maintenance of common interests? britain, france, and america have been the great advocates and exponents of these principles in the government of their own states: they are all ranged on one side to-day. britain, also, as we have tried to show, has been led by fate to take a chief part in the extension of these principles of western civilisation to the non-european regions of the world; and, after many mistakes and failures, has in the direction of her own wide dominions found her way to a system which reconciles freedom with unity, and learned to regard herself as being only the trustee of civilisation in the government of the backward peoples whom she rules. for the just and final determination of such gigantic issues not even the terrible price we are paying is too high. the issue of the great conflict lies still upon the lap of the gods. yet one thing is, we may hope, already assured. although at the beginning of the war they came near to winning it, the germans are not now likely to win that complete victory upon which they had calculated, and which would have brought as its prize the mastery of the world. we can now form some judgment of the extent of the calamity which this would have meant for humanity. there would have remained in the world no power capable of resisting this grim and ugly tyrant-state, with its brute strength and bestial cruelty as of a gorilla in the primaeval forest, reinforced by the cold and pitiless calculus of the man of science in his laboratory; unless, perhaps, russia had in time recovered her strength, or unless america had not merely thrown over her tradition of aloofness and made up her mind to intervene, but had been allowed the time to organise her forces for resistance. of the great empires which the modern age has brought into being, the russian would have survived as a helpless and blinded mammoth; the french empire would have vanished, and the proud and noble land of france would have sunk into vassalage and despair; the british empire would assuredly have dissolved into its component parts, for its strength is still too much concentrated in the motherland for it to be able to hold together once her power was broken. after a few generations, that will no longer be the case; but to-day it is so, and the dream of a partnership of free nations which had begun to dawn upon us would have been shattered for ever by a complete german victory. some of the atoms of what once was an empire might have been left in freedom, but they would have been powerless to resist the decrees of the master-state. there would have been one supreme world-power; and that a power whose attitude towards backward races has been illustrated by the ruthless massacre of the hereros; whose attitude towards ancient but disorganised civilisations has been illustrated by the history of kiao-chau and by the celebrated allocution of the kaiser to his soldiers on the eve of the boxer expedition, when he bade them outdo the ferocity of attila and his huns; whose attitude towards kindred civilisations on the same level as their own has been illustrated before the war in the treatment of danes, poles, and alsatians, and during the war in the treatment of belgium, of the occupied districts in france, of poland and of serbia. the world would have lain at the mercy of an insolent and ruthless tyranny, the tyranny of a kultur whose ideal is the uniformity of a perfect mechanism, not the variety of life. such a fate humanity could not long have tolerated; yet before the iron mechanism could have been shattered, if once it had been established, there must have been inconceivable suffering, and civilisation must have fallen back many stages towards barbarism. from this fate, we may perhaps claim, the world was saved from the moment when not britain only, but the british empire, refused to await its turn according to the german plan, threw its whole weight into the scale, and showed that, though not organised for war, it was not the effete and decadent power, not the fortuitous combination of discordant and incoherent elements, which german theory had supposed; but that freedom can create a unity and a virile strength capable of withstanding even the most rigid discipline, capable of enduring defeat and disappointment undismayed; but incapable of yielding to the insolence of brute force. it is still possible that the war may end in what is called an inconclusive peace; and as it is certain that of all her unrighteous gains that to which germany will most desperately cling will be her domination over the austrian and turkish empires, with the prospect which it affords of a later and more fortunate attempt at world-power, an inconclusive peace would mean that the whole world would live in constant dread of a renewal of these agonies and horrors in a still more awful form. what the effect of this would be upon the extra-european dominions of powers which would be drained of their manhood and loaded with the burden of the past war and the burden of preparation for the coming war, it is beyond our power to imagine. but it seems likely that the outer world would very swiftly begin to revise its judgment as to the value of that civilisation which it has, upon the whole, been ready to welcome; and chaos would soon come again. finally, it is possible that the evil power may be utterly routed, and the allied empires, tried by fire, may be given the opportunity and the obligation of making, not merely a new europe, but a new world. if that chance should come, how will they use it? one thing at least is clear. the task which will face the diplomats who take part in the coming peace-congress will be different in kind as well as in degree from that of any of their predecessors at any moment in human history. they will be concerned not merely with the adjustment of the differences of a few leading states, and not merely with the settlement of europe: they will have to deal with the whole world, and to decide upon what principles and to what ends the leadership of the peoples of european stock over the non-european world is to be exercised. whether they realise it or not, whether they intend it or not, they will create either a world-order or a world-disorder. and it will inevitably be a world-disorder which will result unless we do some hard thinking on this gigantic problem which faces us, and unless we are prepared to learn, from the history of the relations of europe with the outer world, what are the principles by which we ought to be guided. we are too prone, when we think of the problems of the future peace, to fix our attention almost wholly upon europe, and, if we think of the non-european world at all, to assume either that the problem is merely one of power, or that the principles which will guide us in the settlement of europe can be equally applied outside of europe. both of these assumptions are dangerous, because both disregard the teachings of the past which we have been surveying. if, on the one hand, we are content to regard the problem as merely one of power, and to divide out the non-european world among the victors as the spoils of victory, we shall indeed have been conquered by the very spirit which we are fighting; we shall have become converts to the german doctrine of power, which has brought upon us all these ills, and may bring yet more appalling evils in the future. the world will emerge divided among a group of vast empires which will overshadow the lesser states. these empires will continue to regard one another with fear and suspicion, and to look upon their subject-peoples merely as providing the implements for a war of destruction, to be waged by cut-throat commercial rivalry in time of peace, and by man-power and machine-power in war. if that should be the result of all our agonies, the burden which must be laid upon the peoples of these empires, and the intolerable anticipation of what is to come, will make their yoke seem indeed a heavy one; will probably bring about their disintegration; and will end that ascendancy of western civilisation over the world which the last four centuries have established. and justly; since western civilisation will thus be made to stand not for justice and liberty, but for injustice and oppression. such must be the inevitable result of any settlement of the non-european world which is guided merely by the ambitions of a few rival states and the doctrine of power. on the other hand, we are urged by enthusiasts for liberty, especially in russia, to believe that imperialism as such is the enemy; that we must put an end for ever to all dominion exercised by one people over another; and that outside of europe as within it we must trust to the same principles for the hope of future peace--the principles of national freedom and self-government--and leave all peoples everywhere to control freely their own destinies. but this is a misreading of the facts as fatal as the other. it disregards the value of the work that has been done in the extension of european civilisation to the rest of the world by the imperial activities of the european peoples. it fails to recognise that until europe began to conquer the world neither rational law nor political liberty had ever in any real sense existed in the outer world, and that their dominion is even now far from assured, but depends for its maintenance upon the continued tutelage of the european peoples. it fails to realise that the economic demands of the modern world necessitate the maintenance of civilised administration after the western pattern, and that this can only be assured, in large regions of the earth, by means of the political control of european peoples. above all this view does not grasp the essential fact that the idea of nationhood and the idea of self-government are both modern ideas, which have had their origin in europe, and which can only be realised among peoples of a high political development; that the sense of nationhood is but slowly created, and must not be arbitrarily defined in terms of race or language; and that the capacity for self-government is only formed by a long process of training, and has never existed except among peoples who were unified by a strongly felt community of sentiment, and had acquired the habit and instinct of loyalty to the law. assuredly it is the duty of europe and america to extend these fruitful conceptions to the regions which have passed under their influence. but the process must be a very slow one, and it can only be achieved under tutelage. it is the control of the european peoples over the non-european world which has turned the world into an economic unit, brought it within a single political system, and opened to us the possibility of making a world-order such as the most daring dreamers of the past could never have conceived. this control cannot be suddenly withdrawn. for a very long time to come the world-states whose rise we have traced must continue to be the means by which the political discoveries of europe, as well as her material civilisation, are made available for the rest of the world. the world-states are such recent things that we have not yet found a place for them in our political philosophy. but unless we find a place for them, and think in terms of them, in the future, we shall be in danger of a terrible shipwreck. if, then, it is essential, not only for the economic development of the world, but for the political advancement of its more backward peoples, that the political suzerainty of the european peoples should survive, and as a consequence that the world should continue to be dominated by a group of great world-states, how are we to conjure away the nightmare of inter-imperial rivalry which has brought upon us the present catastrophe, and seems to threaten us with yet more appalling ruin in the future? only by resolving and ensuring, as at the great settlement we may be able to do, that the necessary political control of europe over the outer world shall in future be exercised not merely in the interests of the mistress-states, but in accordance with principles which are just in themselves, and which will give to all peoples a fair chance of making the best use of their powers. but how are we to discover these principles, if the ideas of nationality and self-government, to which we pin our faith in europe, are to be held inapplicable to the greater part of the non-european world? there is only one possible source of instruction: our past experience, which has now extended over four centuries, and which we have in this book endeavoured to survey. now while it is undeniably true that the mere lust of power has always been present in the imperial activities of the european peoples, it is certainly untrue (as our study ought to have shown) that it has ever been the sole motive, except, perhaps, in the great german challenge. and in the course of their experience the colonising peoples have gradually worked out certain principles in their treatment of subject peoples, which ought to be of use to us. the fullest and the most varied experience is that of the british empire: it is the oldest of all the world-states; it alone includes regions of the utmost variety of types, new lands peopled by european settlers, realms of ancient civilisation like india, and regions inhabited by backward and primitive peoples. it would be absurd to claim that its methods are perfect and infallible. but they have been very varied, and quite astonishingly successful. and it is because they seem to afford clearer guidance than any other part of the experiments which we have recorded that we have studied them, especially in their later developments, with what may have seemed a disproportionate fulness. what are the principles which experience has gradually worked out in the british empire? they cannot be embodied in a single formula, because they vary according to the condition and development of the lands to which they apply. but in the first place we have learnt by a very long experience that in lands inhabited by european settlers, who bring with them european traditions, the only satisfactory solution is to be found in the concession of the fullest self-governing rights, since these settlers are able to use them, and in the encouragement of that sentiment of unity which we call the national spirit. and this involves a recognition of the fact that nationality is never to be defined solely in terms of race or language, but can arise, and should be encouraged to arise, among racially divided communities such as canada and south africa. any attempt to interpret nationhood in terms of race is not merely dangerous, but ruinous; and such endeavours to stimulate or accentuate racial conflict, as germany has been guilty of in brazil, in south africa, and even in america, must be, if successful, fatal to the progress of the countries affected, and dangerous to the peace of the world. in the second place we have learnt that in lands of ancient civilisation, where ruling castes have for centuries been in the habit of exploiting their subjects, the supreme gift which europe can offer is that of internal peace and a firmly administered and equal law, which will render possible the gradual rise of a sense of unity, and the gradual training of the people in the habits of life that make self-government possible. how soon national unity can be established, or self-government made practicable in any full sense, must be matter of debate. but the creation of these things is, or ought to be, the ultimate aim of european government in such countries. and in the meantime, and until they become fully masters of their own fate, these lands, so our british experience tells us, ought to be treated as distinct political units; they should pay no tribute; all their resources should be devoted to their own development; and they should not be expected or required to maintain larger forces than are necessary for their own defence. at the same time, the ruling power should claim no special privileges for its own citizens, but should throw open the markets of such realms equally to all nations. in short it should act not as a master, but as a trustee, on behalf of its subjects and also on behalf of civilisation. in the third place we have learnt that in the backward regions of the earth it is the duty of the ruling power, firstly, to protect its primitive subjects from unscrupulous exploitation, to guard their simple customs, proscribing only those which are immoral, and to afford them the means of a gradual emancipation from barbarism; secondly, to develop the economic resources of these regions for the needs of the industrial world, to open them up by modern communications, and to make them available on equal terms to all nations, giving no advantage to its own citizens. in spite of lapses and defects, it is an undeniable historical fact that these are the principles which have been wrought out and applied in the administration of the british empire during the nineteenth century. they are not vague and utopian dreams; they are a matter of daily practice. if they can be applied by one of the world-states, and that the greatest, why should they not be applied by the rest? but if these principles became universal, is it not apparent that all danger of a catastrophic war between these powers would be removed, since every reason for it would have vanished? thus the necessary and advantageous tutelage of europe over the non-european world, and the continuance of the great world-states, could be combined with the conjuring away of the ever-present terror of war, and with the gradual training of the non-european peoples to enjoy the political methods of europe; while the lesser states without extra-european dominions need no longer feel themselves stunted and reduced to economic dependence upon their great neighbours. thus, and thus alone, can the benefits of the long development which we have traced be reaped in full; thus alone can the dominion of the european peoples over the world be made to mean justice and the chance for all peoples to make the best of their powers. but it is not only the principles upon which particular areas outside of europe should be governed which we must consider. we must reflect also upon the nature of the relations that should exist between the various members of these great world-empires, which must hence-forward be the dominating factors in the world's politics. and here the problem is urgent only in the case of the british empire, because it alone is developed to such a point that the problem is inevitably raised. whatever else may happen, the war must necessarily bring a crisis in the history of the british empire. on a vastly greater scale the situation of 1763 is being reproduced. now, as then, the empire will emerge from a war for existence, in which mother and daughter lands alike have shared. now, as then, the strain and pressure of the war will have brought to light deficiencies in the system of the empire. now, as then, the most patent of these deficiencies will be the fact that, generous as the self-governing powers of the great dominions have been, they still have limits; and the irresistible tendency of self-government to work towards its own fulfilment will once more show itself. for there are two spheres in which even the most fully self-governing of the empire-nations have no effective control: they do not share in the determination of foreign policy, and they do not share in the direction of imperial defence. the responsibility for foreign policy, and the responsibility, and with it almost the whole burden, of organising imperial defence, have hitherto rested solely with britain. until the great war, foreign policy seemed to be a matter of purely european interest, not directly concerning the great dominions; nor did the problems of imperial defence appear very pressing or urgent. but now all have realised that not merely their interests, but their very existence, may depend upon the wise conduct of foreign relations; and now all have contributed the whole available strength of their manhood to support a struggle in whose direction they have had no effective share. these things must henceforth be altered; and they can be altered only in one or other of three ways. either the great dominions will become independent states, as the american colonies did, and pursue a foreign policy and maintain a system of defence of their own; or the empire must reshape itself as a sort of permanent offensive and defensive alliance, whose external policy and modes of defence will be arranged by agreement; or some mode of common management of these and other questions must be devised. the first of these solutions is unlikely to be adopted, not only because the component members of the empire are conscious of their individual weakness, but still more because the memory of the ordeal through which all have passed must form an indissoluble bond. yet rashness or high-handedness in the treatment of the great issue might lead even to this unlikely result. if either of the other two solutions is adopted, the question will at once arise of the place to be occupied, in the league or in the reorganised super-state, of all those innumerable sections of the empire which do not yet enjoy, and some of which may never enjoy, the full privileges of self-government; and above all, the place to be taken by the vast dominion of india, which though it is not, and may not for a long time become, a fully self-governing state, is yet a definite and vitally important unit in the empire, entitled to have its needs and problems considered, and its government represented, on equal terms with the rest. the problem is an extraordinarily difficult one; perhaps the most difficult political problem that has ever faced the sons of men. but it is essentially the same problem which has continually recurred in the history of british imperialism, though it now presents itself on a vastly greater scale, and in a far more complex form, than ever before: it is the problem of reconciling unity with liberty and variety; of combining nationality and self-government with imperialism, without impairing the rights of either. and beyond any doubt the most tremendous and fascinating political question which now awaits solution in the world, is the question whether the political instinct of the british peoples, and the genius of self-government, will find a way out of these difficulties, as they have found a way out of so many others. patience, mutual tolerance, willingness to compromise, will be required in the highest measure if the solution is to be found; but these are the qualities which self-government cultivates. 'a thing that is wholly a sham,' said treitschke, speaking of the british empire, 'cannot in this world of ours, endure for ever.' why did this empire appear to treitschke to be 'wholly a sham'? was it not because it did not answer to any definition of the word 'empire' to be found in german political philosophy; because it did not mean dominion and uniformity, but liberty and variety; because it did not rest upon force, as, in his view, every firmly established state must do; because it was not governed by a single master, whose edicts all its subjects must obey? but for 'a thing that is wholly a sham' men do not lay down their lives, in thousands and in hundreds of thousands, not under the pressure of compulsion, but by a willing self-devotion; for the defence of 'a thing that is wholly a sham' men will not stream in from all the ends of the earth, abandoning their families and their careers, and offering without murmur or hesitation themselves and all they have and are. there must be a reality in the thing that calls forth such sacrifices, a reality of the kind to which realpolitik, with its concentration upon purely material concerns, is wholly blind: it is the reality of an ideal of honour, and justice, and freedom. and if the germans have been deceived in their calculations of realpolitik, is it not perhaps because they have learnt to regard honour, and justice, and freedom as 'things that are wholly shams'? this amazing political structure, which refuses to fall within any of the categories of political science, which is an empire and yet not an empire, a state and yet not a state, a super-nation incorporating in itself an incredible variety of peoples and races, is not a structure which has been designed by the ingenuity of man, or created by the purposive action of a government; it is a natural growth, the product of the spontaneous activity of innumerable individuals and groups springing from among peoples whose history has made liberty and the tolerance of differences their most fundamental instincts; it is the outcome of a series of accidents, unforeseen, but turned to advantage by the unfailing and ever-new resourcefulness of men habituated to self-government. there is no logic or uniformity in its system, which has arisen from an infinite number of makeshifts and tentative experiments, yet in all of these a certain consistency appears, because they have been presided over by the genius of self-government. it is distributed over every continent, is washed by every ocean, includes half the dust of islands that nature has scattered about the seas of the world, controls almost all the main avenues of the world's sea-going commerce, and is linked together by ten thousand ships perpetually going to and fro. weak for offensive purposes, because its resources are so scattered, it is, except at a few points, almost impregnable against attack, if its forces are well organised. it includes among its population representatives of almost every human race and religion, and every grade of civilisation, from the australian bushman to the subtle and philosophic brahmin, from the african dwarf to the master of modern industry or the scholar of universities. almost every form of social organisation and of government known to man is represented in its complex and many-hued fabric. it embodies five of the most completely self-governing communities which the world has known, and four of these control the future of the great empty spaces that remain for the settlement of white men. it finds place for the highly organised caste system by which the teeming millions of india are held together. it preserves the simple tribal organisation of the african clans. to different elements among its subjects this empire appears in different aspects. to the self-governing dominions it is a brotherhood of free nations, co-operating for the defence and diffusion of common ideas and of common institutions. to the ancient civilisations of india or of egypt it is a power which, in spite of all its mistakes and limitations, has brought peace instead of turmoil, law instead of arbitrary might, unity instead of chaos, justice instead of oppression, freedom for the development of the capacities and characteristic ideas of their peoples, and the prospect of a steady growth of national unity and political responsibility. to the backward races it has meant the suppression of unending slaughter, the disappearance of slavery, the protection of the rights and usages of primitive and simple folk against reckless exploitation, and the chance of gradual improvement and emancipation from barbarism. but to all alike, to one quarter of the inhabitants of the world, it has meant the establishment of the reign of law, and of the liberty which can only exist under its shelter. in some degree, though imperfectly as yet, it has realised within its own body all the three great political ideas of the modern world. it has fostered the rise of a sense of nationhood in the young communities of the new lands, and in the old and decaying civilisations of the most ancient historic countries. it has given a freedom of development to self-government such as history has never before known. and by linking together so many diverse and contrasted peoples in a common peace, it has already realised, for a quarter of the globe, the ideal of internationalism on a scale undreamt of by the most sanguine prophets of europe. truly this empire is a fabric so wonderful, so many-sided, and so various in its aspects, that it may well escape the rigid categories of a german professor, and seem to him 'wholly a sham.' now is the crisis of its fate: and if the wisdom of its leaders can solve the riddle of the sphinx which is being put to them, the great war will indeed have brought, for a quarter of the world, the culmination of modern history. american world policies by walter e. weyl author of "the new democracy," etc. new york the macmillan company 1917 copyright, 1917, by the macmillan company set up and electrotyped. published february, 1917. the macmillan company new york -boston -chicago -dallas atlanta -san francisco macmillan & co., limited london -bombay -calcutta -melbourne the macmillan co. of canada, ltd. toronto table of contents part i our idealistic past chapter page i america among the nations . . . . . . . . . . 1 ii the skeleton of war . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 iii peace without effort . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 iv an unripe imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 v facing outward . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 part ii the root of imperialism vi the integration of the world . . . . . . . . . 75 vii the root of imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . 85 viii imperialism and war . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99 ix industrial invasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116 x the revolt against imperialism . . . . . . . . 126 xi the appeal of imperialism . . . . . . . . . . 140 xii the american decision . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 part iii towards economic internationalism xiii natural resources and peace . . . . . . . . . 169 xiv an antidote to imperialism . . . . . . . . . . 186 xv american interests abroad . . . . . . . . . . 201 xvi pacifism static and dynamic . . . . . . . . . 217 xvii towards international government . . . . . . . 231 xviii the freedom of the seas . . . . . . . . . . . 246 xix the higher imperialism . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 xx the forces of internationalism . . . . . . . . 270 xxi an immediate programme . . . . . . . . . . . . 288 index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 {1} part i our idealistic past american world policies chapter i america among the nations the great war has thrown america back upon itself. it has come as a test and challenge to all our theories. suddenly, yet subtly, it has shaken our optimism and undermined our faith in the peaceful progress of humanity. our isolation is gone, and with it our sense of security and self-direction. americans, who a few days ago would have dared to abolish army and navy as a supreme earnest of good faith, reluctantly agree to arm. "self-defence," they now say, "comes before progress. we must lay aside our hopes of a world at peace and must guard our gates." doubtless there is some exaggeration in our change of mood. men speak as though a miracle had swept away the atlantic ocean, leaving us stranded on europe's western shore. fortunately the ocean, always america's ally, still lies there, narrowed and curbed, yet three thousand miles of storm-swept water. physically and morally, however, our isolation has dwindled. dreadnaughts, submarines and airships can now reach us and our commerce, industry and national ambitions are interwoven with those of europe. we shall never again stand aloof from the world. {2} to americans this change has come so suddenly, though it has been long preparing, that we fail to visualise the new situation. we glibly repeat that our isolation is gone, but do not ask ourselves what is the nature of the bond that has ended our isolation. is it amity or enmity? are we to become one of a dozen clutching, struggling, fighting nations, seeking to destroy each other, or are we to contribute to a solution of the problems that now divide nations into warring groups? though our isolation is gone, we still preserve a latitude of action. we may choose between two foreign policies, between nationalistic imperialism and internationalism. we may elect to fight for our share of the world's spoils or to labour, and, if necessary, to fight for a world peace and for just international relations, upon which alone a permanent peace can be based. such a choice involves for americans the main trend of our civilisation; for europe it is hardly less vital. our influence upon europe, like hers upon us, has grown with the shrinking of the earth's surface. our bulk, our resources and our remnant of inaccessibility give us a weight in world affairs far in excess of our military power. we are advancing in population, wealth and general education, and our future progress in these directions is likely to be more rapid than that of western europe. moreover we are the only strong nation not tied up in existing international enmities. our hands are unbound. how we shall act, therefore, whether we shall add to the complications of europe or aid in disentangling them, is a world as well as a national problem. in the main such national determinations are dependent upon great economic forces, acting upon the nation from within and without. these economic forces, however, do not work upon stones but upon those loose bundles of {3} instincts, reactions, ideals and prejudices that we call men. we need not dig deep into american history to uncover the human elements that will influence our decision. on the surface of our life appear two strong tendencies pulling in opposite directions. it is easier to describe than to define these tendencies. the first we might perhaps call pacifism, liberalism, humanitarianism, democracy, though none of these words exactly defines the generous, somewhat ineffectual, peace ideal, which has grown up in a democratic people with no hostile neighbours. at this moment by the light of the european camp-fires we are likely to belittle this easy do-nothing idealism. we find our idealists prosaic. they are not gaunt fanatics consumed by their own passion, but hard-working, self-respecting, religiously inclined men, asking good prices and high wages, eating good food, wearing good clothes and perhaps running a ford automobile. to some of these meliorists, europe seems almost as distant as china, but towards the peoples of both places they preserve a vague and benevolent missionary attitude. they want peace with europe and peace for europe, and would even be willing to pay for it, as they pay for relief for belgium and martinique. there is little passion in this good-will but there is even less hypocrisy. one may ridicule this cornfed, tepid idealism, but it is none the less the raw material out of which great national purposes are formed. the present desire of americans for a world peace is no vaguer or more ineffectual than was the seemingly faint sense of the wickedness of slavery, as it existed in our northern states in the days of the missouri compromise. yet out of that undirected, crude and luke-warm emotion, there burst forth within a generation the white-hot flame, which consumed the detested institution and freed the millions of negro slaves. {4} but not all americans are idealists even of this commonplace sort. in our ultra-keen capitalistic competition we have evolved an american of different type. self-centred, speculative, narrow, measuring success by the dollars gained and spent, this individualist has a short way with idealisms and larger ends. to him our involuntary _rapprochement_ with europe is an opportunity not for service but for gain. war is good or bad as it is profitable or the reverse. he is a realist, as is the mole, attached to the earth and not worrying about the skies. his ideal is that of a selfish nation dominated by selfish, social classes. here then we have the two americanisms, both of them native and redolent of the soil, both vital and growing. both have appeared in many of our national controversies, in the philippine question, in porto rico, in our relations with mexico. the one is liberal, democratic, often visionary, though confident because many of its visions have come true; the other is concrete, short-sighted, intense but with a low moral sensibility. each appeals to a patriotism formed in the image of the patriot. it is upon this divided america that there comes the sense of the impinging of europe. these men of two opposed types (with innumerable intermediate variations) suddenly perceive that the great war is being fought not only near our shores but even within our borders. they dimly perceive that the war is but an incident in a greater, though less spectacular contest, that it is in reality a phase of a long drawn-out economic struggle in which we too have blindly played our part. to both groups, to all americans, the war comes close. it is being fought with motives like our motives and ideals like our ideals. it is a conflict which proves to us that international peace is still very far from attainment. war on a scale never before known: war--deliberate, organised, scientific--fought {5} by combatants and noncombatants alike, reveals itself as one of the central facts of our modern life, a fact not to be ignored or preached or argued away, a fact which for us on this side of the ocean, whatever our instincts and our philosophies, has its deep and permanent significance. our changed relation to this central fact of war constitutes one of the gravest problems that we face to-day. growing up in a peaceful environment we had imbibed the idea that war was a thing alien to us, monarchial, european. we had come to hold that a nation could avoid war by not desiring it, by not preparing for it, by minding its own business. we believed that what share in the world we had and wanted was what every reasonable nation would willingly concede us, and if certain powers proved refractory and unreasonable--a most improbable contingency--we could always send forth our millions of minute men, armed with patriotism and fowling-pieces. with european conflicts we had no concern; we might deplore the senseless brutality of such wars, but need not take part in their conduct or in their prevention. in due course europe would learn from america the lessons of republicanism, federalism and international justice and the happiness and wisdom of an unarmed peace. ourselves unarmed, we could peacefully wrest the weapons from europe's hand. the sheer, unthinking optimism of this earlier american attitude ended abruptly on the outbreak of the present war. it is not surprising that our first reaction towards this war, after its full sweep and destructiveness were visible, was one of fear. if a peaceful nation like belgium could suddenly be overrun and destroyed, it behooved us also to place ourselves on guard, to be ready with men and ships to repel a similarly wanton attack. the result was a demand for preparedness, an instinctive demand, {6} not based on any definite conception of a national policy, but intended merely to meet a possible, not clearly foreseen, contingency. the whole preparedness controversy revealed this rootlessness. it was in part at least an acrid discussion between careless optimists and unreasonable scare-mongers, between men who held positions no longer tenable and others who were moving to positions which they could not locate. our ideas were in flux. whether we should arm, against whom we should arm, how we should arm, was decided by the impact of prejudices and shadowy fears against an obstinate and optimistic credulity. nothing was more significant of the externality of these debates than the fact that they seemed to ignore everything that we had cared about before. the case for armament was presented not as a continuation of earlier national policies but as a sort of historical interlude. past interests were forgotten in the insistence upon the immediate. until the war broke in upon us we had been groping, both in foreign and domestic policies, towards certain forms of national expression; arbitration, international justice, democracy, social reform. throughout a century, we had believed that we had blundered towards these goals, and that our history revealed an aspiration approaching fulfilment. we had settled a continent, built an ordered society, and amid a mass of self-created entanglements, were striving to erect a new civilisation upon the basis of a changed economic life. now it was assumed that all this stubbornly contested progress was forever ended by the conflict engulfing the world. this whole idealistic phase of american life was disparaged by our sudden ultra-patriots. these men, with a perhaps unconscious bias, opposed their brand new martial idealism to what they falsely believed was a purely {7} materialistic pacifism. actually both advocates and opponents of increased armaments were contending under the stress of a new and bewildering emotion. for decades we had concerned ourselves with our own affairs, undisturbed by events which convulsed europe. but the present war, because of its magnitude and nearness, had set our nerves jangling, excited us morbidly, dulled us to horror and made us oversensitive to dread. we read of slaughter, maiming, rape and translated the facts of belgium and servia into imaginary atrocities committed against ourselves. we wanted to be "doing something." not that we wished war, but rather the chance to rank high according to the standards in vogue at the hour. while hating the war, we had insensibly imbibed the mental quality of the men who were fighting. we were tending to think as though all future history were to be one continuing cataclysm. for the moment, like the rest of the world, we were hypnotised. upon our minds a crude picture had been stamped. we were more conscious of peril than before the war, though the peril was now less. our immediate danger from invasion was smaller than it had been in june, 1914; yet while we were perhaps foolishly unafraid in 1914, in 1916 we trembled hypnotically. it was to this state of the american mind that all sorts of appeals were made. those who wanted universal conscription and the greatest navy in the world argued not only from dread of invaders but from the necessity of a united nation. they wanted "americanism," pure, simple, undiluted, straight. there was to be no hyphen, no cleavage between racial stocks, no line between sections or social classes. america was to be racially, linguistically, sectionally one. it was an ideal, good or bad, according to its {8} interpretation. a more definitely integrated america, with a concrete forward-looking internal and foreign policy, could aid disinterestedly in untying the european tangle. in the main, however, the demand for americanism took on an aggressive, jingoistic, red-white-and-blue tinge. out of it arose an exaggerated change of mood toward the "hyphenate," the american of foreign, and especially german, lineage. newspapers teemed with attacks upon this man of divided allegiance. in other ways our agitation for a united america took a reactionary shape. though a pacific nation, we experienced a sudden revulsion against pacifism and hague tribunals, as though it were the pacifists who had brought on the war. contempt was expressed for our industrialism, our many-tongued democracy, our policy of diplomatic independence. those most opposed to prussianism, as it has been defined, were most stubbornly prussian in their proposals. we heard praises of the supreme education of the german barracks, and a clamour arose for universal service, not primarily industrial or educational but military in character. a decaying patriotism of americans was deplored quite in the manner of bernhardi. more than ever there was talk of national honour, prestige, the rights of america. our former attitude of abstention from european disputes was called "provincial," and we were urged to fight for all manner of reasons and causes. even though we cravenly desired peace, we were to have no choice. an impoverished germany, beaten to her knees, was to pay her indemnity by landing an army in new york and holding that city for ransom. around such futilities did many american minds play. all this appeal would have been more convincing had it not been most insistently urged by influential financial groups. the extent of certain financial interests in large {9} armaments, in a spirited foreign policy and in other widely advertised new doctrines, was obvious. the war had built up a vast armament industry, war stocks had been widely distributed, and upon the advent of peace these properties would shrink in value unless america made purchases. more important was the complex of financial interests, likely to be created in latin america and elsewhere. speculators were dreaming of great foreign investments for american capital. we were to become a creditor nation, an imperialistic power, exploiting the backward countries of the globe. we were to participate in international loans, more or less forced, and to make money wherever the flag flew. for such a policy there was needed the backing of a patriotic, united, disciplined and armed nation, and to secure such arms, any excuse would suffice. at the most, of course, these financial adventurers were merely leaders in a movement that arose out of the peculiar conditions of the moment. the roots of our sudden desire for armament and for an aggressive foreign policy ran far deeper than the interests of any particular financial group. a sense that american ideals were in peril of being destroyed by a new barbarism impelled us to new efforts. we dimly perceived that we must solve new problems, accept new responsibilities, and acquit ourselves worthily in new crises. the most obvious result of this campaign for preparedness was a largely increased expenditure for armies and navies. its deeper significance, however, lay in the fact that it marked the end of our former theory that war can be ended by precept and example and that no nation need fear war or prepare for war so long as its intentions are good. hereafter the size and character of our national armament was to be determined in relation to the possibility of war with europe and of war in europe. the {10} campaign for military preparation is not ended. it will not end until some relation is established between our new armament and the national policy which that armament is to serve. so long as these preparedness debates lasted we believed that the fundamental cleavage in american sentiment was between those who wished to arm and those who did not. yet the proposal to increase the army and navy was defended by men of varying temperaments and opinions, by liberals and conservatives, by workmen and capitalists, by members of peace societies and representatives of the navy league. as the first stage of mere instinctive arming passes, however, it suddenly appears as though the true cleavage in american thought and feeling runs perpendicular to the division between those who favour and those who oppose armament. the real issue is the purpose to which the arms are to be put. we may use our armed strength to secure concessions in china or mexico, to "punish" small nations, to enter the balance of power of europe or to aid in the promotion of international peace. we may use our strength wisely or unwisely, for good or for ill. we began to arm before we knew for what we were arming, before we had a national policy, before we knew what we wanted or how to get it. our problem to-day is to determine upon that policy, to create out of the constituent elements forming american public opinion a national policy, determined by our situation and needs, limited by our power, and in conformity with our ideals. it is the problem of adjusting american policy to the central fact of international conflict and war. as we approach this problem we discover that the two great elements in our population tend to pull in contrary directions. in the question of defence the one instinctively follows the lead of european nations, piling up {11} armies and navies and attempting to make us the most formidable power in the world; the second seeks by understandings with other nations to prevent disagreements and to avert wars. the first group emphasises american rights on "land and sea," the property rights of americans, our financial interests in backward countries, and the military force necessary to secure our share; the second thinks of establishing international relations in which such rights may be secured to all nations without the constant threat of force. both of these elements are national in the sense that they desire to preserve the country's interest, but while the first group envisages such interest as separate and distinct from others, to be defended for itself alone as a lawyer defends his client, the other sees the national interest in relation to the interests of other nations and seeks to secure international arrangements by which conflicting claims can be adjusted. the first element lays stress upon the legalistic attitude, upon our honour, our rights, our property; the second is less jingoistic, less aggressive, less jealous in honour. which of these two elements in our population will secure the ascendency and dictate our foreign policy, or which will contribute more largely to the decision, will be determined chiefly by the course of our internal evolution and especially by our economic development. whether we are to go into international affairs to get all we can--concessions, monopolies, profits--will depend upon how great is the internal economic strain pressing us outward, upon whether our conditions are such that the gains from a selfish national aggrandisement will outweigh the large, slow gains of international co-operation. ideals will also count, as will tradition and precedent. even chance enters into the decision. if, for example, by some change in the internal affairs of germany we are thrown into an alliance {12} with england, france and russia, a direction will be given to our international policy which it may take years to change. the accident which found admiral dewey in asiatic waters on a certain day in april, 1898, has not been without its influence upon the ensuing foreign policy of the united states. for those who wish to use our armed forces to secure special advantages (trade, monopolies, fields for investment), the road is broad and clearly marked. they have only to do what other aggressive and imperialistic nations have done--prepare the means of fighting and threaten to fight either alone or with allies whenever a favouring opportunity offers. but for those of us who desire to make america an agency in the creation of international peace the problem is infinitely more difficult. peace and internationalism cannot be secured by fervent wishes or piety but only by persistent effort and measureless patience. that for which men have sought in vain during so many centuries will not fall like ripe fruit into our laps. towards this goal of internationalism all that is best in america aspires. the american tradition points towards internationalism. our early settlers, as also many of our later immigrants, came to these shores to escape political and religious warfare, and brought with them a broad humanitarian ideal, an ideal of peace, internationalism, freedom and equality. they also brought an antipathy towards those monarchical and aristocratic institutions, with which in america we still associate conceptions of imperialism and war. the simplicity and inherent equality of our frontier life, its self-government and its local independence, tended to reinforce our leaning towards a peaceful internationalism. our large spaces, our ease of movement, our freedom from the militaristic and excessively nationalistic traditions of the european continent {13} influenced us in a like direction, as did also the merging of many peoples into one nation. we were not disillusioned by any conflict with harder-pressed nations, desiring what we had or having what we desired. we believed vaguely in an inevitable beneficent internationalism, which would bring all nations into harmony and banish war from the world. actually our pacifists and internationalists have accomplished little, if anything, towards a realisation of this ideal. what has hampered them, apart from the overwhelming difficulty of the problem, has been the fact that they did not realise how distant was the goal towards which they were marching. their approach to the problem was not realistic. they conceived of the world as a group of nations in all fundamentals like america and of peace as a process by which these other nations would approximate to the united states. the great solvents of war were democracy, education and industrialism. democracy would take from the ruling classes the right to declare wars; education would destroy in the people the last vestiges of bellicosity and international prejudice, while industrialism would in the end overcome militarism, and turn battleships and howitzers into steam-ploughs and electric cranes. the triumphant progress throughout the world of democracy, education and industrialism would speedily bring about peace and a firm internationalism. unfortunately the problem of imperialism and war is far more intricate than this popular theory assumes. all these forces tend perhaps in the general direction of peace but they do not bring about peace automatically and in many cases actually intensify and augment the impulse towards war. our present age of advancing democracy, education and industrialism has been, above all other periods, the age of imperialism, of exaggerated nationalism {14} and of colonial wars. democratic peoples have not been cured of nationalistic ambition, and education, in many countries at least, has aided in the creation of an imperialistic and militaristic spirit. even our unguided industrialism has not ended wars or brought their end perceptibly nearer. there is no easy road to internationalism and peace, and those who strive for these ends without understanding the genesis and deep lying causes of war are striving in vain. if in america therefore, we are to contribute to the promotion of internationalism and peace, we must recognise that war is not a mere accident or vagary but a living thing growing out of the deepest roots of our economic life. it is not caused alone by human unreason, by the pride of individuals, the greed of social classes, the prejudices of races and nationalities, but is closely intertwined with those economic ideals upon which the best as well as the worst in our civilisation is reared. we had believed that industrialism and militarism were mutually opposed and that the factory would automatically destroy the army. to-day we see how each of these has entered into the spirit of the other and how each helps the other. the army is industrialised and the national industry is put upon a military, fighting basis. the same forces that impel a nation to develop its trade, increase its output, improve its industrial technique, also impel it to raise large armies and to fight for the things for which men work. to divorce economic ambition from the national aggression that leads to war will not be easy. it is a sobering task which faces those who wish to use america's influence in the cause of peace. whatever our course of action, however, whether we strive for an american imperialism or for internationalism, one thing is certain: it cannot be instinctive, fluctuating, {15} undirected. we cannot revolutionise our international relations with each new administration or with each change of the moon. nor can we stay at home and, ignorant of the causes of war, content ourselves with a long-distance preaching of peace to the menaced nations of europe. each of the two courses open to us involves self-direction, valour and strength. if we are to enter upon a struggle for place, power and profits, we must prepare for a dangerous contest: if we are to labour for a new international harmony, for peace and good-will and the delicate adjustments without which these are but words, we shall also need courage--and infinite patience. without knowledge we shall accomplish nothing. to enter upon an international career without a sense of the conditions underlying peace and war, is to walk in darkness along a dangerous path. {16} chapter ii the skeleton of war to ascribe world events to the action of a single individual is a naã¯ve yet persistent manner of thought. all over europe men blamed the war upon a wicked kaiser, a swaggering, immature crown prince, a weak-fisted von berchtold, a sinister tisza, a childish poincarã©, an unscrupulous sir edward grey, an abysmally astute sasonof. we in america blamed everything on von tirpitz and the irrepressible reventlow. in all countries, millions of men drifted helplessly toward a war, which they believed was due to the evil machinations of a man. so long as the belief holds that one man can set the world on fire, there can be no reasonable theory of war or peace. it is a conception which makes world destiny a plaything, unmotived in any large sense, accidental and incalculable. on the other hand, those who regard war as merely irrational, a general human idiocy, are equally far from any true approach to the problem. we are being deluged to-day with books and newspaper articles describing war as a reversion of mankind to a lower type, a betrayal of reason, a futile, revolting struggle, creating no rights, settling no problems and serving no useful purpose except, in lord salisbury's phrase, "to teach people geography." let us be rational and adult, cry these authors, adjuring an insane world to return to its sanity. no wonder that there is prejudice against this particular variety of abstract pacifism. it is a negative {17} doctrine, anã¦mic and thin-haired, with a touch of gentle intolerance and a patient disregard of facts. it does not recognise the real motives to war, upon which alone a theory of peace may be based. it defeats itself because ultra-rationalistic. for if war, though irrational, has always been, would it not follow that man himself is irrational, that the fighting instinct is deeper than reason, and that to-morrow, as to-day, men will fight for the joy of killing? if this were true, pacifism might as well resign. in truth, this interpretation of war as a mere expression of man's fighting instincts is no more adequate than is the personal devil theory. war has outgrown the fighting instinct. it has become deliberate, businesslike, scientific. it demands sacrifices from those to whom fighting is an abomination. how many red-blooded warriors could the german emperor or the french president have enrolled, had there been no appeal to national interest, duty, justice, indignation? war is won to-day by peace-loving men, who abhor the arms in their hands. the closer we study its motives, incentives and origins, the more deeply do we find the elements of this problem imbedded in the very foundations of national or group life. war depends upon growth in population, emigration, the use of natural resources, agricultural progress, trade development, distribution of wealth, taxation. it is never unrelated to the economic web in which the people live their lives; it is seldom unaffected by the necessity of expanding and the opposition of neighbours, the desire for bread and the longing for luxuries. war and peace are functions of the national life, steps in national progress or retrogression. peace and war are two paths leading often in the same general direction, and whether we may take one path or must take the other is often determined for us long before we reach this parting of the ways. {18} at first glance this economic or business side of war is obscured. we find tribes and nations fighting for women and heads and scalps, to please the gods, to destroy sorcerers, to slay heretics, to show prowess, and for other reasons which seem equally remote from an economic motive. a nation will go to war "to save its face," or to annihilate the "hereditary enemy," as well as to improve its position in the world. yet these diverse human motives are related to, though not fully absorbed in, the omnipresent economic motive. the "hereditary enemy" usually is no other than the tribe or nation that blocks our way; the "gods" enjoin war against neighbours who occupy the lands we need or can furnish us tribute; the women, whom we capture, are tame and pleasant beasts of burden, who help to swell our numbers. as for pride and tribal vanity, which so often precipitate war, these are a powerful social bond, which by holding the tribe together permits it to conquer the things it needs. a war for prestige is often a war for economic gain once removed. there remains a residue of martial emotion, not so closely united with the desire for economic gain, but all these derivative motives do not prevent the economic factor from remaining preponderant. remove the economic factors leading to war, give men more than enough, and the chief incentive to war disappears. the modern historical trend has been towards a fuller recognition of the influence of this potent, though often disguised, motive to war. historians are recognising that the mainspring of social action is not an emperor's dream or soldier's ambition, but the demand of vast populations for food, clothing and shelter, then for better food, clothing and shelter, and finally for the rights, privileges and institutions which will make such economic progress assured. ancient war, which seemed so empty and causeless, is now {19} revealed as a half-conscious effort of human societies to adjust themselves to changing economic conditions. it is a struggle for bread. indeed, so complete has been this change in our theories that we often exaggerate this economic influence, and speak as though no emotion save hunger impelled humanity. but such exclusion of other motives is not necessary to an economic interpretation. we can emphasise the influence of economic desires, which modern americans and germans share with ancient greeks and babylonians, while still admitting the influence of other factors. race, creed, language, geographical position, increase national friendship or animosity. while these factors influence wars, however, they are less universal, if not less potent than is the economic motive. the significance of this economic motive to war can hardly be overstated. if wars are in the main due to fundamental, economic conflicts, then we cannot end or limit war unless we discover some alternate way to compose such economic differences. we cannot hope that the human race will stop wanting things. men have never lived like the lilies of the field, nor wished to live so. according to our every-day morality, wanting and getting are ethical and wise, and not-wanting is unethical and decivilising. our whole intricate, complex civilisation depends upon the physical well-being and the economic ambition of our populations, and morally, as well as physically, a beggared nation tends to decline. we may trace this degeneration of impoverished groups in some of our mountainous districts, where communities, shut off from the main productive energies of the nation, brutalise and decay. all the conditions of our life impel nations, like individuals, to advance economically, to fructify labour, to gain. if, however, the nation in its struggle for new wealth clashes with other nations, intent also upon gain, if {20} these mobilised, economic ambitions necessarily lead to destructive wars, then we must cease declaiming against war's immorality, and seek instead to discover whether economic readjustments cannot circumscribe or even prevent wars. to a modern business man or to a city workman this theory of the economic cause of wars is not unsatisfactory. he may quite properly introduce more idealistic elements, a desire for independence, a love of conquest, the influence of personal prejudices, dynastic affiliations, racial antagonism and religious hatreds, but in the end he will apply to this business of war the same canons of judgment that he applies to his own business. "whom does it pay? what is 'in it' for the nations or for classes or individuals within the nations?" and if you tell him that in the present war servian hatred was intensified because austria discriminated against servian pigs, or that germany was embittered because of russian tariffs and french colonial policies, if you speak to him in these economic terms, you are immediately intelligible. economic motive is one of the obvious facts of life. it is the transcendentalists who interpret war in more idealistic terms. in every country, but especially in germany, there is a whole school of historical and pseudo-historical romanticists, who defend war by elevating it high above the reach of reason. you cannot shake the convictions of such writers by an account of war atrocities, of slaughter, pillage, rape, mutilations and the spitting of infants upon lances, just as you cannot deter murderers by the sight of public executions. all these horrors are but a part of war's terrible fascination. "in war," writes the late professor j. a. cramb, one of the most eloquent of these war mystics, "man values the power which it affords to life of rising above life, the power which the spirit of man possesses to pursue the ideal." there is, and can be, {21} in his view, no reason for war; war transcends reason. in spite of its unreason, war, which has always governed the world, always ruled the lives of men, always uplifted the strong and deposed the weak, will remain beautifully terrible, immortally young. as in ancient days, in india, babylon, persia, china, hellas and rome, so to-day, men will choose "to die greatly and with a glory that will surpass the glories of the past." men are always greater than the earthly considerations that seem to guide their lives. as patriotism ruled the hosts of rome and carthage, as the ideal of empire drove forth the valorous englishmen who conquered india, so to-day, to-morrow and until the end of time high and noble ideas, far above the comprehension of mere rationalists, will impel men to war, "to die greatly." it may seem importunate to reason with men upon a subject which they include among the mysteries, beyond reason. yet if we analyse the instances, which professor cramb and others cite of wars waged for great ideal purposes, we stumble incontinently upon stark economic motives. carthage and rome did not fight for glory but for food. the prize was the fertile wheat fields of sicily. there was nothing transcendental in the wars between athens and sparta, but a naked conflict for commerce and exploitative dominion. as for the british conquest of india, the "ideal of empire" was perfectly translatable into a very acute desire for trade. we shall make little progress unless we understand this business or economic side of war, for to see war truly we must see it naked. all its romanticism is but the gold lace upon the dress uniform. the idealism of the individual is a mere derivative of those crude appetites of the mass that drive nations into the conflict. wherever we open the book of history, and read of marching and counter-marching, of {22} slaughter and rapine, we discover that the tribes, clans, cities or nations engaged in these bloody conflicts were not fighting for nothing, whatever they themselves may have believed, but were impelled in the main by the hope of securing economic goods--food, lands, slaves, trade, money. it is a wide digression from the immediate problems of our closely knit world of to-day to the blind, animal instincts that ruled the destinies of endless successions of hunting tribes, exterminating each other in the savage forest. yet among hunting tribes, at all times, the raw conflict of economic motive, which we find more decently garbed in modern days, appears crude and stark. to kill or starve is the eternal choice. since population increases faster than food, war becomes inevitable, for the tribe that hunts on _our_ land, and eats _our_ food, is our hereditary enemy. to pastoral nations, war is equally necessary, unless babies and old people are to be ruthlessly sacrificed. to fill new mouths larger flocks are necessary, to feed larger flocks new pastures are required; and there is only one way to obtain fresh pastures. there comes a period of drought, and the hunger-maddened nation, accompanied by its flocks, hurls itself suddenly upon feebler agricultural peoples, destroying empires and founding them. these are the great _vã¶lkerwanderungen_, the restless migrations of mobile pastoral nations in search of food. it is the eternal bloody quest. nor are agricultural populations immune. not only must they defend their patches of cultivated land, but, as numbers increase, must strike out for new lands. when the growing population makes conditions intolerable, youths are chosen, perhaps by religious rites, to adventure, sword in hand, and carve out new territory or die fighting. there are always more than there is place for, and it is always possible for a young fortinbras to shark up "a list of {23} lawless resolutes for food and diet, to some enterprise that hath a stomach in 't." all the interminable battling of the early middle ages reveals this effort of fecund agricultural populations to solve the problem of over-breeding by slaughter. even the crusades partake of this economic character. among the crusaders were exalted souls, who wished to rescue their lord's sepulchre, but there were many more who dreamed of free lands, gold and silver, and the beautiful women of the orient. the religious motive was present; it was strong and intolerant, though it did not in the later crusades prevent christians from attacking christians. at bottom, however, certain strong economic factors forced on the struggle. there had been famine in lorraine and pestilence from flanders to bohemia, and all the discontent, hunger and ambition of western europe answered to urbano's call. "a stream of emigration set towards the east, such as would in modern times flow towards a newly discovered gold-field--a stream carrying in its turbid waters much refuse, tramps and bankrupts, camp-followers and hucksters, fugitive monks and escaped villains, and marked by the same motley grouping, the same fever of life, the same alternations of affluence and beggary, which mark the rush for a gold-field to-day."[1] not until it was seen that they no longer paid did the crusades end; not heavenly but earthly motives inspired most of these soldiers of christ. it was business, the business of a crudely organised, over-populated, agricultural europe. even with the development of commerce, the motive does not change in character, though its form becomes different. all through history we find maritime cities and states fighting for the control of trade routes, the exploitation of {24} markets and peoples, the right to sell goods and keep competitors from selling. athens, venice, genoa, pisa, florence, holland, england--it is all the same story. undoubtedly, with the development of commerce, wealth takes a new form. land is no longer the sole wealth, and successful warriors need no longer be paid in land and live off the land, as they are forced to do in every feudal society. a money economy, a conversion of values into money, changes the technique of war by creating professional mercenary armies. but the business goes on as before. rival groups fight for a monopoly of trade as they once fought for land. there is still not enough to go around, and no way of deciding between rival claimants except by the arbitrament of war. perhaps it will be objected that an analysis of war such as this leaves us merely with the dead body of facts while killing the soul of truth. surely, it may be urged, war is more than a sordid calculation; a roland or bayard does not weigh his danger against booty. of course that is so. economic motive is only the skeleton of war; the flesh and skin are of a totally different texture. idealism, nobility, heroism exist in war, and are no less sincere because based upon the gross facts of economic necessity and desire. without such idealism, manufactured or evolved, you can no more win wars, especially in these latter days, than without ammunition. idealism is a weapon with which we kill our enemies. yet if we read our history rightly, we shall find less of this luminous nobility among warriors than our annalists pretend. the greeks of the trojan war were not patriots but free-booters. those great english sailors, drake, morgan and the rest, who ravaged the caribbean and smashed the spanish sea-power, were pirates, unashamed of their piracy. as for the heroic warriors of the scotch border, would they not to-day be {25} jailed as cattle-thieves? look where you will, at the great wars and at the blood-tracked colonising movements of history, and always you will find two kinds of men: the stone-blind idealist, and the crass, open-eyed, fleshly man. one fights for ideals, the other for something else worth fighting for. both, however, are in reality impelled by economic motive, working upon them either directly and consciously, or transmuted into ideals through the medium of a people's thought. nor does this fighting for things, to be obtained only by fighting, involve moral turpitude. nothing could be more grotesque than the moralistic tone in which we industrious moderns lecture the ancient fighting peoples. they did what we do, gained the things they wanted in the only way they could. men will fight or work rather than starve, and whether they fight or work depends upon which, in the given circumstances, is the feasible mode of accumulation. perhaps these peoples loved fighting and praised fighting more than we do. but as fighting was their _mã©tier_ and the measure of their success, their minds, like their muscles, became habituated, and their morality discovered virtue to be the thing at which the moralists were adept. nothing can be wrong that is necessary to survival. warfare is not immoral until there is an alternative. such an alternative might easily have arisen with the vast impetus given to accumulation by the discovery of america and of the new route to the east. but these events not only did not end but actually intensified war, while bringing out more sharply its preponderatingly economic character. for three generations europe was enmeshed in the italian wars, in which great rival nations sought to control italian wealth and the dominion of the mediterranean. there followed the so-called religious {26} wars, in which sweden played for control of the baltic, holland for the east indian colonies, and england for trade supremacy, while catholic france, to strengthen her position at the expense of austria, came to the aid of protestant germany. for another century, from the peace of westphalia in 1648 to the peace of paris in 1763, there was a succession of commercial wars, in which england wrested from holland and then from france the mastery of the sea as well as the control of asia and america. during all this period the rising commercial classes of england were brutally "upon the make." markets were gained in america and valuable commercial rights obtained from portugal, while in the famous contract, known as the "_assiento_," english merchants secured from spain the lucrative privilege of shipping one hundred and forty-four thousand negro slaves to the spanish colonies of america. of such was the texture of the complex european diplomacy that held the world in war. in all these conflicts there was precious little idealism. the astute councillors of elizabeth, of james, of louis xiv, did not waste their august sovereign's time upon discourses concerning britain's honour and the grandeur of france, but talked trade, privileges, monopolies, colonies to be exploited, money to be made. so too the napoleonic wars, those great conflicts between democracy and absolutism, reveal themselves as a continuation of the commercial wars of the eighteenth century. it was all the same process, the ranging of the nations, as formerly of tribes and of cities, for the conquest, first, of the means to live, and, second, of a preferred economic position in the world. such is the business of war, and it is the oldest business in the world. it is aided by patriotism, prejudice, uncharitableness and a whole calendar of ugly tribal virtues, {27} which enjoin us to love the means by which we get and hate the men from whom we take. it is aided by racial scorn, a thing as deep as life, yet subject on the whole to that more impelling factor, economic motive. the history of war and peace is a history of the overriding of sentimental considerations by imperious economic needs. during the revolutionary war, no love was lost between the rigid, race-conscious englishman and the despised red-skin, yet both joined hands to scalp americans in the lonely settlements along our frontier. to-day german and turk, italian and russian, frenchman and senegambian, briton and japanese, love each other at least temporarily because pursuing like interests. not that the influence of race and nationality upon those mutual repulsions which lead to war can be brushed aside in a paragraph. they are potent, modifying factors, with a certain independence of action, and serving, with regard to economic motives, as accelerators, intensifiers or, to change the illustrations, as containers. yet it is no great exaggeration to say that no racial antagonism can wholly sunder allies joined by a vital economic bond, and no racial sympathy firmly unite nations who want one indivisible thing. the "anglo-saxon cousins" now live in concord, but not solely because they are anglo-saxons. as for religious differences, which have in the past so often exacerbated the war spirit, this influence is less than appears. even the godly live on bread and butter. the protestant princes of the reformation hated the scarlet woman because of the real presence, but they also hated her because of the golden stream that flowed from germany to rome. the english reformation had less to do with mistress anne boleyn than with the wealth of the monasteries. especially among modern industrial nations, with their increasing theological {28} apathy, are religious differences of relatively small importance in determining wars. it is the economic motive which tells.[2] considering all these facts of history, so hastily reviewed, considering that in practically all countries and at all times economic impulses have tended to push men into war, is the conclusion forced upon us that we shall have war so long as we have economic desires, and that in the future mankind will continue to drag itself along a blood-stained path? can we change in human nature that desire for material things, which has always been the great survival virtue of the race? to many men the answer points to perpetual war. they believe that nations will fight so long as they are hungry, and they will always be hungry. war and birth are the twin immortals; there will always be more babies than can be fed and there will always be war. as well preach against death as against war, since the peaceful, abstaining nations are doomed to extinction and the war-like nations survive and determine the character of humanity. the meek nations do not inherit the earth. they go down in the ceaseless struggle between the living and the dying peoples. during the last one hundred and fifty years, however, a more optimistic conviction has struggled for expression. the industrial revolution has enormously increased the wealth of the world, and has enabled over-populated industrial countries to secure their food from agricultural {29} lands thousands of miles away. there has grown up a vast complementary trade between old and new countries, and even competing manufacturing nations find it profitable to trade with one other. the hope has therefore arisen that perhaps this war-breeding, economic motive may hereafter lead to peace and away from war. admitted that peoples once had to fight, may it not in this new world of industry be "good business" to live and let live, to agree with your competitor, to trade amicably? may not the industrial transformations, undreamed of in past centuries, permit a world-population to live off its labour, immune from the necessity of killing? have we not here an alternative to war? the doctrine is that of _laissez-faire_, untrammelled competition, free trade. from adam smith down to the present day, it has been preached to us that each man's enlightened selfishness, unguided and unimpeded, will work out to the welfare of each society and to peace between all societies. the interests of nations in trade is held to be reciprocal. buyer and seller both gain, so that england cannot prosper unless germany prospers, and england cannot suffer without germany suffering. you need not fight for commerce. trade does not follow the flag but the line of greatest mutual advantage, as was shown, it is claimed, when britain after losing political control of america doubled her commerce with america. it does not pay to fight for colonies, since colonials if left alone will buy in the cheapest and sell in the dearest market. with nothing to fight for, peace and prosperity will come with free trade, which the nations will adopt as soon as they perceive their own interests. there is no economic reason for warfare, which like other superstitions will vanish as men emerge from the darkness of ignorance. it is a pacifying theory, and yet something seems wrong {30} with it. the optimistic forecasts have been belied; the nations have not acclaimed free trade, but rear tariff walls higher than ever. nor do the nations abjure colonial expansion, but fight for colonies and "spheres of influence" and lands for "peaceful penetration," as tribes once fought for pastures, and cities for trade-routes. the national spirit, instead of succumbing to an era of peaceful individualism and cosmopolitanism, is stronger and more embittered than ever. armaments pile up. colonial disputes become more acrid, international jealousies more acute, until in the end we are cast into the pit of the long-dreaded world war. we do not know that this is the last world war. we are not sure that the same inveterate, millennium-old struggle for food, the same bitter "business" which has always meant war, is yet finished and done for. even if war does not cease, however, may we not at least be exempt from the scourge on this safe side of the broad atlantic? though it rains outside, may we not keep dry beneath our big umbrella? we americans are accustomed to think of ourselves as a peace-loving, unaggressive people, envying no nation its dominion or wealth, and incurring the enmity of no nation. let the peoples of europe destroy themselves in ceaseless, insane conflicts, but let us, by keeping to our side of the ocean, save ourselves from slaughter as lot was saved from the fate of gomorrah. it is not a noble caution that thus disregards the fate of the world and seeks only the national safety. nor is it in truth a wise caution. those who are too circumspect incur the greatest danger, and those who trust to their own unoffending reckon on a doubtful factor. why should we alone, among the nations be exempt from economic forces, which drive peace-loving nations into war? have we by our rapid expansion, to say nothing of our monroe declaration and other pretensions, failed to give offence in a world, {31} in which mere having is aggression and mere growing a menace? has our peace in the past been due to our own meekness and unaggressiveness, or has it been the gift of a fortunate economic condition, which may pass? before we rely upon the continuance of a peace of mere isolation, we shall do well to inquire into the economic conditions which so long gave us peace. [1] ernest barker. crusades. encyclopedia britannica, eleventh edition, vol. vii, p. 526. [2] for a sketch of the economic influences bearing upon war, see the brilliant essay of prof. edward van dyke robinson, "war and economics in history and theory," _political science quarterly_, vol. xv, pp. 581-622. reproduced in "sociology and social progress," compiled by prof. thomas nixon carver (1905), pp. 133-173. in the present chapter i have borrowed extensively from professor robinson's essay. {32} chapter iii peace without effort to the average american of a few years ago the maintenance of peace seemed as natural and easy as breathing. except for our brief and episodical conflict with spain we had had no war with a european power for a hundred years and we saw no reason why we should go to war in any of the coming centuries. peace was merely an abstention from war, a not doing something, which we had no desire to do. we had no reason to provoke war, no foreign nation had a legitimate grievance against us. in any case we were inherently different from europe. we were peaceful while europe was war-like. so long as we tended to our own affairs---and that was our intention--peace was assured. believing thus in our intrinsic peacefulness, it was in no spirit of humility that we met the outbreak of the great war. we did not put ourselves in the place of the fighting nations, and acknowledge that in their circumstances we too might have been struggling in the dust. rather we boasted of our restraining democracy, and of our perfect co-operative union, which protected us from the european anarchy. we, a people unassailed, talked loudly of our superior merit, and, as we looked over the broad oceans and saw no enemy, thanked god that he had not made us as other nations. our compassion for the peoples of europe was tinged with a bland, self-righteous arrogance. it is not pleasant to-day to read the homilies which {33} america, during those early months of the war, preached to unheeding europe. throughout runs a note of subdued self-exaltation. we, the americans, so ran the boast, are not ruled by kaiser or czar, and cannot be stampeded into war against our will. we do not extend our national territory by force. of all nations we are the one that has best compounded economic differences and best dissolved racial hatreds. we live in amity with all the world, and with piety preach our lessons to the war-mad races. how fundamentally insolent, though well-intentioned, was this message of one of our leading citizens to germany. "the american people cry with one voice to the german people, like ezekiel to the house of israel: 'turn ye, turn ye, from your evil ways; for why will ye die?'" even in our churches we made the same unconscious boast. on sunday, october 4, 1914, at the request of the president of the united states, millions of americans went down on their knees, and prayed god no longer to scourge the peoples of europe. it was a sincere prayer, evoked by real compassion. yet nothing could more clearly have revealed our moral detachment, our obliviousness to the fact that the passions which brought forth this war were human, not european passions. we, the virtuous, interceded for the vicious; our prayer was "deliver them from evil." with malice toward none, with charity towards all, envying no nation its treasures, content to enjoy in peace what god had given us, america folded its hands in prayer. to a sceptical european, accustomed to the cant of international protestations, this boasted peacefulness of ours seems suspicious. "have you," he might ask, "always been peaceful? did you not fight england, mexico and spain? have you not taken advantage of your neighbours' necessities?" such a european might not regard {34} americans as a nation, divinely appointed to bring peace to a world rent by war. he might not acknowledge that we are more law-abiding than other peoples, freer from race hatreds, gentler towards the unfortunates of our own race. he might point to our lynchings and riots; to our unpunished murders of chinese, italians and mexicans; to the system of repression, by which the southern whites terrorized the freedmen after the civil war. if europe did not solve the balkan problem in peace, did americans end slavery without resort to arms? we may not like these imputations, but it would be hard to deny that in certain national crises we have not been impossibly virtuous. we have not always subordinated our national interests to the ideal of setting a righteous example. what we wanted and could get we got, whether it was florida, texas, california or panama. we were not above the twisting or even the breaking of a treaty, we did not discourage filibustering expeditions too rigorously, and we were never, never meek. thus in 1818, to take a single example, we addressed to spain a polite communication in which we asserted that "the united states can as little compound with impotence as with perfidy, and that spain must immediately make her election, either to place (an adequate) force in florida or cede to the united states a province, of which she retains nothing but the nominal possession." many of our communications to mexico, chile, spain, and even england were equally arrogant. the truth is that our peace has been a peace of circumstances, due to a favouring geographical and economic situation. our peacefulness came down to us like our rivers, farms and cities, a heritage of exceptional conditions. we were inaccessible to european armies. we were supreme on a fertile, sparsely settled continent. we could afford peace. our resources were immensely great and if {35} we did not reach out for more, it was because we already had as much as we could handle. what we did need we could take from weak peoples, and a nation which fights weak peoples need not be martial, just as a man who robs orphans need not be a thug. it might have been different. had our westward progress been opposed by millions of indians, had france been able to resist our march beyond the appalachians, or mexico stood like a disciplined germany between us and the westward ocean, we should have developed a military civilisation. as our growing population pressed upon our narrow frontiers, we should have had our war scares, our border conflicts, our national hatreds, our huge standing army, and the whole paraphernalia of militarism. still another element, besides our geographical isolation and our economic self-sufficiency, contributed to our intactness and security and permitted us to indulge in the luxury of pacifism. europe protected us from europe. we were one and the european powers many. so delicate was the balance that the european nations could not hazard a really serious trans-atlantic venture. they had little to gain and much to lose by fighting us, as we had nothing to gain by fighting them. our interest in such european affairs as the independence of greece, hungary and poland was purely sentimental. towards europe we were peaceful as we were peaceful towards mars. true, our safe orators delighted in twisting the lion's tail and upbraiding the czar of all the russias. during the eighty-three years between 1815 and 1898, however, we were never at war with a european nation. it was not that we loved europe too well. england we detested and hardly a decade passed without some acrid boundary dispute. we thought her arrogant, greedy, supercilious, and she thought us arrogant, greedy and {36} coarse. millions of irish immigrants intensified this animosity and our national vanity did the rest. but though we hated england she was too formidable to be attacked. therefore we bluffed and she bluffed, and in the end we compromised. with other countries it was still easier to keep at peace. prussia, austria and the smaller german states were too distant to affect our interests. for russia we had a vague attachment, and except on one occasion, she never threatened our ambitions. with france we were on good terms except during our civil war. we disliked spain and despised her, but events prevented our going to war with her. it was because it paid that we kept at peace; any other policy would have been wasteful, even suicidal. our future depended upon our ability to keep out of war. a sparse population on the edge of a vast continent, our hope of national success lay in an isolation, which would give us strength for future struggles. our mission was to settle the empty lands to the west before other nations could pre-empt them. to embroil ourselves with strong powers was to court disaster, while even to interest ourselves in european politics would divert our mind from our own imperative task. our first american foreign policy, therefore was disentanglement. we often speak as though america passively abstained from entering european politics. we were, however, already a part of the unsteady balance of power, and warring france and england sought our aid, much as the two coalitions might seek the aid of a bulgaria, not loving her but needing her help. it was a bold and above all a positive policy that washington established when he broke the french treaty and declared our neutrality. though denounced as dishonourable, this policy was {37} essential to our welfare and peace, for the country was more dangerously divided in 1793 than in 1916. how intimately our peace has depended upon our economic development is revealed by the early failure of this policy of disentanglement. prior to 1812 our immediate economic interests overhung our territory and transcended our sovereignty. all europe being at war, we were the neutral carriers of the world. our ships brought merchandise to france from her colonies and allies, and goods from the west indies and south america to all parts of europe. in the decade ending 1801 our foreign trade, which was dependent upon the indulgence of europe, more than quadrupled. the profits on our carrying trade were immense. our shipbuilding industry increased, and not only were orders filled for our own foreign trade but many ships were manufactured for export. the prices of agricultural products almost doubled and our meat, flour, cotton and wool found a ready market in europe. our prosperity depended upon this newly created foreign trade. sail-makers, ship-builders, draymen, farmers, merchants were dependent upon a trade which menaced the commercial supremacy of great britain and upon which even france looked with jealous apprehension. it was this conflict of our interests with those of a stronger nation that brought on the bitter controversies with great britain, and resulted in the tedious war of 1812. we were more dependent upon europe than europe upon us, as was shown by the fiasco of our embargo policy. england, determined to kill our commerce, would have fought many years to accomplish this purpose. but it did not prove necessary. our commercial progress, that had been merely an incident in a european war, lessened after the peace. for us this was fortunate. our future lay in our own continent, and not on the high sea where as {38} a relatively weak nation, we should have been forced to compete with the world and war continually with england. to-day, one hundred years later we are still pacific, because of the direction taken by our economic development since 1815. while we developed agriculture, constructed turnpikes, canals and railroads, manufactured for the home market, and filled up the country from the appalachians to the pacific, our american-borne commerce and our shipbuilding declined; by 1846, our american tonnage in foreign trade was less than in 1810. but the profits of this carrying trade were no longer necessary, since in exchange for our imports from europe we could now export cotton. we were no longer competitors with europe, but had become contributors to european prosperity. prior to 1815 england looked upon us as a commercial rival; after 1815 we became the unconscious economic allies of all the industrial nations. the extent to which our economic system had become complementary to the european economic system is illustrated by a study of the statistics of our foreign commerce. of our exports one-half was raw cotton, and upon a steady supply of this fibre a great european industry depended. later we shipped huge quantities of food which was also needed by the manufacturers across the sea. as our cotton area extended, as our wheat and meat exports increased, european, and especially british, industry profited. at the same time, despite our high tariffs we furnished an increasing market for wares manufactured in europe, while our own manufactures did not largely compete in the world markets. moreover the rapid development of our internal resources furnished lucrative investment opportunities to european capital. a source of raw material, a market for manufactured products, a field for profitable investment, {39} america was europe's back-yard, an economic colony, though politically independent. in the midst of this almost colonial development, there occurred one startling interlude. about 1840 we developed a new type of sailing vessel, the american clipper ship. soon we had control of the china trade and by 1861 our shipping (including domestic trade and the fisheries) about equalled that of great britain. after the civil war, however, our chance of competing with great britain either in ship-building or carrying disappeared. the iron steamship had arrived, and, in the manufacture of such vessels, we were no match for the english. even without the civil war we should have been beaten; the southern privateers, outfitted in english ports, merely hastened an inevitable decay. we were not yet to enter upon a competition with england for commercial supremacy. there being thus no economic basis for war our outstanding questions with european nations, and with england especially, were peacefully settled. the canadian fisheries and the maine boundary dispute gave rise to much bitter feeling but were not worth a war. even the monroe doctrine did not bring on a clash. though great britain hated its assumptions she was content with its practical workings. what the united states gained was immunity from the settlement of latin america by powerful military nations; what england gained was a profitable trade (denied her by spain) together with opportunities for investing capital. the immediate force behind the monroe doctrine was the self-interest and naval power of a nation, which did not recognise the doctrine. our westward expansion, which obliterated boundaries and overran the possessions of other powers, also failed to bring war with europe. doubtless this expansion was not {40} entirely welcome to france, england and spain. but just as napoleon, though dreaming of a french empire on our western border, had been compelled to sell us louisiana to prevent its falling into british hands, so later england resigned herself to our almost instinctive growth. it was believed in the forties that england not only wished to prevent our acquiring california but desired the territory for herself, and it was known that her interests in oregon were in the sharpest conflict with american claims. england would also have preferred that texas remain politically independent of the united states and commercially dependent upon herself. fortunately for us, however, an aggressive colonial policy, such as that which during the last forty years has partitioned africa, was not yet popular in europe. england was thinking in terms of free trade and commercial expansion, of a world rather than a colonial market. at bottom, moreover, this american expansion was to the relative advantage of europe. when spain was cajoled and worried into selling florida; when texas, and later california, arizona and new mexico were taken from a nation too weak almost to feel resentment, the result was a better use of the territory and a greater production of the things which europe needed. if europe was not to control these regions, it was at least better for her to have them pass to us rather than remain with mexico. so long as we held politically aloof, sold europe cotton and wheat, bought from her manufactured products and gave her the chance to invest in our railroads, so long as we did not compete on the sea or in the world markets, europe, though she envied us our easy expansion, had no interest in opposing it by war. england would possibly have fought us had we taken nicaragua and almost certainly had we taken canada, but she was less concerned about the fate of mexico, the chief victim of our expansion. {41} this complementary relation of ours with european nations was as useful to us as to them. besides furnishing us with necessary capital europe sent us immigrants, who made our march across the continent rapid and irresistible. in the end this immigrant population contributed to our peaceful attitude. as the number of our alien stocks increased, the desirability of going to war with any european nation diminished. to get the immigrant's vote, we spoke highly, and in the end almost thought highly, of the nations from which they had come. by admitting the children of europe we had given hostages to peace. in the main, however, we paid no attention to europe. we forgot about her. lost in contemplation of our own limitless future, we turned our eyes westward towards our ever receding frontier. in foreign, as in home relations, we developed a frontier mind, and even to-day, long after our last frontier has been reached, we are still thinking of europe, as of so many of our internal problems, in terms of this great colonising adventure. the individualist, who pushed his way across the continent, left on america the impress of a simple philosophy, a belief that there was a chance for all, that it was better to work than to fight, that arbitration and the splitting of the difference were the best policy. to the average american, with his frontier mind, wars seemed unnecessary, and all the class distinctions, inseparable from militarism, a mere frippery. wars, he held, are for the crowded old peoples of europe, with their dynastic superstitions, their cheating diplomacy, their ancient rancours, their millions of paupered subjects, condemned to a life of subordination. wars are not for the free and equal americans who live in the wide spaces of a continent and, having no neighbours, hate no man and fear no man. it is out of this frontier mind that we have evolved our {42} present american notion of war and foreign policy. peace is common sense; war, foolishness, a superstition like the belief in kings, emperors and potentates, a calamity caused by the refusal of the petty european nations to join into one great united states. for it must be remembered that americans, whatever their sentimental attachments, are really more contemptuous than are germans of little nations that insist upon surviving. we ridicule the european customs barriers, which the express train strikes every few hours, and associate national greatness with territorial size. even great britain, france, germany and austria are ignorantly regarded as "little nations," which would be all the better for a wholesome amalgamation. the frontier mind believes stubbornly that short of such a union, these "little" peoples should develop their own resources in peace. in other words, our attitude towards europe, which is a result of our elbow room and our economic self-sufficiency, is vaguely missionary, with not the slightest tinge of hypocrisy. we have no concern with europe and no duty to interfere, beyond expressing our belief in our own superior institutions and the hope that europe will learn by our example. the development of our manufacturing industries, until recently at least, did not alter these views concerning our proper attitude to europe. the new industries, chiefly designed for a home market, made on the whole for peace. nor did we need a foreign outlet for capital. no one wished to go to war for the dubious privilege of investing in peru or china when our own iron mills, cotton factories and railroads were clamouring for capital, to say nothing of our farmers in oklahoma and the dakotas. psychologically, also, this self-poised industrialism, this domestic stay-at-home business of ours, which prevailed until a few decades ago, worked powerfully for peace. {43} we became a highly individualistic manufacturing nation, composed of millions of self-seeking, money-making men. as "business men" we hated wars as we hated strikes and whatever else "interfered with business." our ideal was a strenuous life of acquisition, in which dollars were added to dollars, and the prosperity of all depended upon the bank account of each. wars were like earthquakes and other interruptions of the ordained process of accumulation; you could no more win a war than you could win an earthquake. america's manifest destiny was to multiply and increase. we were to mind our own business and live in peace with neighbours, whom we did not know and rather despised. since everything worth exploiting was in our own country, since europe left us alone and had nothing that we were willing to fight for, we were free to ignore all foreign relations. the diplomacy which accompanied and aided this development, though not heroic, was at least successful. it enabled us to grow strong and hold strong enemies away. not always consistent, not always able, not always honest, our diplomacy maintained a certain unity, kept us aloof from european quarrels, guarded us from threatened intervention during the civil war crisis, warned europe against the conquest of latin america, and above all--permitted us to grow. from 1815 to 1898 our population increased from eight to seventy-two millions, while that of the united kingdom increased only from some twenty to forty-one millions and that of france from twenty-nine to thirty-nine millions. our wealth increased at a more rapid rate than that of any other nation. small wonder that in the last decades of this period our diplomacy sank to the lowest level of incapacity. having grown strong without europe's aid or hindrance, having reached that pleasant degree of independence in which {44} diplomacy seemed a mere international formality, we came to believe that the best diplomacy was none at all. we did not require in our ambassadors knowledge or astuteness; any fool would do. our diplomats were often despised, but since we were not dependent upon europe's favour, it did not matter. economic forces, stronger than the diplomats of all the world, were making for peace between america and europe. but even while we were sending political adventurers to some of the great capitals of europe, a change was impending. all at once the united states found itself at war with a european power, and, a few months later, in surprised, not to say embarrassed, possession of tropical asiatic islands. suddenly we discovered that we were feared and disliked; that there were points of controversy between us and various european countries; that europe somehow did not regard the monroe doctrine as a divine dispensation, which it would be impious to oppose. we heard talk of international competition, world power, "the american menace." beneath the surface there appeared indications that our long mutuality of economic interest with europe was no longer complete. the easy instinctive peace which had enabled us to attain our ends without considering europe seemed about to end. {45} chapter iv an unripe imperialism it was in the year 1898 that the united states made its earliest plunge into imperialism. then for the first time we secured "dominions beyond the sea"; dominions too thickly populated to be adapted for purposes of colonisation. by our earlier conquests and purchases (louisiana, florida, texas, california, new mexico), we had secured relatively empty territories which a flow of emigrants from our eastern states could rapidly americanise. but in porto rico, the philippines and hawaii, there was neither prospect nor intention of colonising. the impulse that led to their taking was the desire to possess their wealth, to rule and "civilise" them, and above all not "to haul down the flag." it was an impulse not very different from that which led to the european partition of africa.[1] the change in our policy was startling. we had seemed, after the civil war, to have reached a stage of satiety, to be through with expansion. henceforth the ocean was to be our boundary; we were not, like the slave-owners before the war, to scheme for new lands in central {46} america and the caribbean. when in 1867 russia offered us a territory almost three times as large as germany for a sum about equal to the value of the equitable building, we accepted only to oblige russia and because we believed that we were in honour bound to buy. we refused to purchase st. thomas and st. johns, although denmark offered to sell cheap, and we declined to annex san domingo or to entertain sweden's proposal to purchase her west indian possessions. again in 1893, instead of annexing hawaii, we vainly sought to bolster up the sovereignty of a native queen. then suddenly porto rico, the philippines and guam were annexed; hawaii was incorporated and samoa was divided up with germany. in part this change in foreign policy was due to military considerations. the possession of hawaii, panama and guantanamo in cuba was obviously necessary for the defence of our coasts. just as the monroe doctrine was intended to protect us from the approach of great military powers, so these new acquisitions were desired to pre-empt near-lying bases, from which, in enemy possession fleets might assail our trade or cut off our communications.[2] such strategic considerations, however, do not explain the whole of our new imperialistic policy. economic motives played their part. we changed our foreign policy because at the same time we were undergoing a commercial and industrial revolution. as a result of this industrial change our merchants had begun to think in terms of foreign markets and our financiers in terms of foreign investments. we had passed {47} through the stage in which our industrial life was completely self-sufficing. we were becoming a manufacturing nation, requiring markets for the disposal of surplus products. we were, it appeared, being drawn into a great international competition, in which markets in china, south america and backward countries were the prizes. simultaneously our foreign commerce had changed. our growing population had made increasing demands upon our food products, leaving less to be exported, and at the same time our exports of manufactures had increased. in 1880 we exported manufactures (ready for consumption) to the value of ninety-three millions of dollars; in 1898 to the value of two hundred and twenty-three millions. other industrial factors tended also to bring about a change in our national ideals. we were beginning to believe in the economic efficiency of trust organisation, and our industry, conducted on a larger scale, was being increasingly concentrated. a new class was in financial control of our great industries. the trust magnate, the new conductor of vast industrial enterprises, was looking forward toward a strong unified banking control over industries and a definite expansion of american trade in foreign countries. american capitalists were beginning to believe that their economic needs were the same as those of the european capitalists, who were enticing their nations into imperialism. psychologically, also, we were ripe for any imperialistic venture, for we enormously exaggerated the progress we had made towards industrialisation, and were thinking in terms of europe. we suddenly believed that we too were over-filled with capital and compelled to find an outlet for investments and trade. innumerable editorials appeared, presenting the arguments for imperialism that had been {48} urged ad nauseam in europe. we could not resist, it was argued, the ubiquitous economic tendency toward expansion. in all countries, including america, capital was to become congested. an over-saving of capital, invested in manufacturing plants, produced far in excess of the possible consumption of the people. we had reached a stage of chronic over-production, in which increased saving and increased investment of capital would permanently outstrip consumption. everywhere wealth was being heaped up; the savings-banks overflowed; the rate of interest fell and capital sought desperately for new investments. the capitalist system must either expand or burst. certain superficial developments in the united states formed the groundwork of these gloomy prophecies. we had just passed through a commercial depression, during which prices and interest rates fell and great numbers of workers were left unemployed. these facts were exploited by political leaders and industrial magnates, who thought in terms of the subordination of american foreign policy to the needs of big business. it is not surprising therefore that they became infected with the new imperialism, which in europe had been growing steadily for over fifteen years, and that they came to the conclusion that america could not hold hands off while the markets and investment fields of the world were divided up among her rivals. "the united states," wrote charles a. conant, one of the intellectual leaders of this movement (in 1898), "cannot afford to adhere to a policy of isolation while other nations are reaching out for the command of new markets. the united states are still large users of foreign capital, but american investors are not willing to see the return upon their investments reduced to the european level. interest rates have greatly declined here within the last {49} five years. new markets and new opportunities for investment must be found if surplus capital is to be profitably employed." like so many of the pamphleteers of 1898, mr. conant was convinced that imperialism offered the only cure "for the enormous congestion of capital." no civilised state, he contended, would accept the doctrine that saving should be abandoned. and while human desires were expansible, he doubted whether the demand for goods could possibly increase with sufficient rapidity to absorb the new productive capacities of the nation. "there has never been a time," he writes, "when the proportion of capital to be absorbed has been so great in proportion to possible new demands. means for building more bicycle factories than are needed, and for laying more electric railways than are able to pay dividends, have been taken out of current savings within the last few years, without producing any marked effect upon their amount and without doing more, at the most, than to stay the downward course of the rate of interest." it therefore follows conclusively that the american conquest of markets and fields for investment must go on. the method of such a conquest is of little importance. "in pointing out," he says, "the necessity that the united states shall enter upon a broad national policy, it need not be determined in just what manner that policy shall be worked out. whether the united states shall actually acquire territorial possessions, shall set up captain generalships and garrisons, whether they shall adopt the middle ground of protecting sovereignties nominally independent, or whether they shall content themselves with naval stations and diplomatic representations as the basis for asserting their rights to the free commerce of the east, is a matter of detail." {50} i have quoted mr. conant at length because he is so largely typical of the state of mind of the american plutocracy in the year 1898. it would have been easily possible, however, to have presented any amount of confirmatory material of exactly the same nature. an article by w. dodsworth in the october, 1898 number of the _nineteenth century_ is along the same lines. here again we read of an unprecedented industrial revolution during the preceding half century and a vast increase in foreign trade and accumulated wealth. again we read of the falling rate of interest and of the failure of trusts and combines to resist the outside pressure of necessitous capital, seeking to force its way into industries. it was held quite impossible for consumption to absorb the products of an over-fertile industry. "i am no pessimist," writes mr. dodsworth, "but i cannot conceal my deep conviction that, if this relief is not forthcoming, a stage of grave industrial collapse, attended with the agitation of equally grave political issues, becomes only too probable, and the energies of our seventy-five millions of producers may have to be restrained until we learn to appreciate the penalty of our neglect of foreign enterprise." such were the arguments with which in 1898 the united states plunged into imperialism. we were to break out of the narrow circle which confined our economic life to become the work-shop of the world as england had once been, to export and export and ever increasingly export until all the nations should be our debtors. our capital, like our wares, was to go to all countries. it flattered our pride when, a few years later, europe trembled at the spectre of an american commercial invasion and even england wondered whether she could withstand the flood of cheap manufactured american goods, dumped on her {51} shores. we pictured a vastly increasing trade with our new colonial possessions and with china; we envisaged opportunities, not only of an immense american investment, but of an even greater american trade. what we believed of ourselves, europe only too credulously believed of us. leading european economists and publicists were completely convinced that the united states was irrevocably embarked on "the sea of imperialism." "the recent entrance of the powerful and progressive nation of the united states of america upon imperialism," wrote prof. john a. hobson in 1902, "... not only adds a new formidable competitor for trade and territory, but changes and complicates the issue. as the focus of political attention and activity shifts more to the pacific states, and the commercial aspirations of america are more and more set upon trade with the pacific islands and the asiatic coast, the same forces which are driving european states along the path of territorial expansion seem likely to act upon the united states."[3] professor hobson and other foreign observers believed that our great trusts, which were being formed with reckless suddenness, would enormously increase the capital seeking an outlet, and that new imperialistic ventures would result. "cuba, the philippines, hawaii," he insisted, "are but the _hors d'oeuvre_ to whet an appetite for an ampler banquet."[4] this development toward a congestion of capital, though confidently anticipated both in the united states and in europe, did not take place. about the end of the century an enormous extension of the general field for foreign investment raised interest rates all over the world. the demand for capital grew with astonishing rapidity. in {52} part this was due to british, french and german foreign investments, but it was also the result of a quickened economic tempo in all countries. new industries were created, wages rose (though in most countries not so rapidly as prices) and the outlets for the supposed superfluous capital were greater than ever. especially in the united states was the development contrary to that which had been anticipated. capital was not rendered idle because of any slackening in the nation's consuming capacity, for the men of average and small income were able to purchase more than ever before. the farmers alone, whose property increased in value from twenty and a half billions of dollars in 1900 to forty-one billions in 1910 (an increase of over 100 per cent. as compared with less than 28 per cent. in the previous decade) added stupendously to a new demand for goods of all sorts. of automobiles, unknown in 1898, there are in 1916 almost three millions. innumerable other industries arose and expanded; the anticipated arrest of accumulation did not occur. the result of this economic development soon made itself apparent. we discovered, fortunately for us, that we were not at this time to become the work-shop of the world. we could not continue to produce articles cheaper than england or germany, and undersell these countries in their home markets. we discovered that our own country still furnished an admirable field for investment. while our foreign commerce increased, it continued to form only a small part of our whole trade. so long as vast new opportunities for the investment of capital in the united states presented themselves, we ceased to worry about foreign or colonial outlets, and for every dollar of american money invested in porto rico and the philippines, hundreds of dollars were invested in the states. our capital {53} though accumulating at an ever-increasing rate, did not equal the demand.[5] in other words, the conditions in america did not yet warrant an imperialistic policy. we were economically younger than we had thought; more elastic, with greater capacity for internal growth. as a result of this discovery, our sudden enthusiasm for dominions beyond the seas died down. we were disgusted and bored by the philippine war; we hated the rã´le of oppressors, in which we unwillingly found ourselves. we hated the water cure, punitive expeditions, and the endless controversies over the status of filipinos under american law. the anti-imperialistic elements in america, men whose interests did not lie in foreign trade and speculation, stolidly opposed the retention of the islands. had the election of 1900 been fought upon this single issue it would probably have been won by the anti-imperialists. even though we kept the islands, we set definite limitations to our imperialistic ventures. we secured for the philippines an administration which prevented the exploitation of the natives and the importation of chinese labour. we set our faces against any policy of sacrificing the interests of the indigenous population to the interests of american financiers. and to-day, could we do it with due regard to the interests of the filipinos, we would retire from the archipelago. as we look over this experiment, we cannot help recognising that it was a precocious, an unripe imperialism. for us it was too early to secure asiatic islands; too early {54} to worry about american investments in foreign lands. it was an imperialism carried out somnambulistically. our taking the philippines was an accident, unforeseen and undesired.[6] our hope of being the work-shop and banking centre of the world, of being the heart of a great empire like that of britain, and of doing all this within a short period, was a dream, which vanished with the new demands made upon american capital by an increasing economic expansion. the truth is that this unripe imperialism did not represent the interests of the majority nor even of any considerable group of our capital owners. it was doomed to disappearance once the revival of american industry offered opportunities, not only for the ordinary capitalist, but for that more speculative investor, who in other countries clamours for imperialism. the experiment revealed, however, that the same forces which act upon capital in europe act also upon capital in america, and that the united states, given the right conditions, is liable to the same ambitions as are imperialistic countries and is as likely to engage in war to satisfy these ambitions. the imperialistic trend acts upon all nations at a given stage in their economic development. it cannot be stopped by traditions of peacefulness or by mere protestations, however sincere. it is a part of the great economic strife, out of which devastating wars arise. [1] "early in the year 1901, a foreign ambassador at washington remarked in the course of a conversation that, although he had been in america only a short time, he had seen two different countries, the united states before the war with spain, and the united states since the war with spain. this was a picturesque way of expressing the truth, now generally accepted, that the war of 1898 was a turning point in the history of the american republic."--"the united states as a world power," by archibald gary coolidge. new york, 1912. [2] for a study of these strategic considerations see "the interest of america in sea power, present and future," by captain (later rear-admiral) a. t. mahan, a series of articles written between 1890 and 1897. boston, 1911. [3] john a. hobson, "imperialism," p. 23. london, 1902. [4] _op. cit._, p. 83. [5] in 1914, twenty-six years after the cession of the islands our combined import to and export from the philippines amounted to only $51,246,128, or less than 1/75 of our entire foreign commerce. our commerce with china, which was to have been opened by our possession of the philippines was less than one-half of that with brazil and less than one-twelfth of that with great britain. [6] "at the beginning of the war (with spain) there was perhaps not a soul in the whole republic who so much as thought of the possibility of this nation becoming a sovereign power in the orient."--"world politics," by prof. paul i. reinsch, new york, 1913, p. 64. {55} chapter v facing outward while the imperialistic venture of 1898 was premature and did not lead, as had been expected, to a conscious participation of america in the international scramble for colonies, it affected our national thinking and forced us to re-consider the position of america in relation to the ambitions and plans of other great nations. our acquisition of new dependencies led us to recognise that we were at last a world power, with the responsibilities of a world power. we were obliged to learn from england and other imperialistic nations the lessons of colonial administration. year by year we were drawn into closer relations with the west indies and the caribbean countries, and were compelled to assume financial control of hayti and san domingo in the interest both of foreign capital and of the countries themselves. the completion of the panama canal increased our sense of international danger and international responsibility. finally the revolution in mexico proved to us that whatever our positive action we could not remain passive. our monroe doctrine also, which had always seemed our charter of independence of europe, forces us in the end to come to an understanding with europe. we had set our faces against european conquest in the americas, and therefore against any punitive expedition, likely to lead to permanent occupation. but if we protected hayti and san domingo from europe, we assumed a certain {56} responsibility for the actions of these countries. in the existing state of international law, a nation assumes the right to protect its citizens from spoliation and to compel debtor countries to meet their obligations. in this right to collect debts by force of arms, which has been the excuse for innumerable imperialistic extensions, all the great creditor nations are interested. had the united states refused to intervene in san domingo, while forbidding the great powers to secure redress by threats, we might possibly have been forced to fight against overwhelming odds in defence of a people and cause, for which we had little sympathy. by its very prohibitions the monroe doctrine compels us increasingly to intervene between the weaker latin-american countries and the warlike creditor nations of europe. the gradual extension of the doctrine, moreover, vastly increases our possible area of friction with europe. originally planned to prevent european nations from conquering parts of the americas, the doctrine has now been extended to forbid foreign corporations subsidised or controlled by an old world government to acquire any land in the americas which might menace the safety or communications of the united states. our action in mexico indicates that we are determined not only to prevent europe from introducing monarchical institutions into american countries, but to insist that those countries themselves adhere to the outward forms of popular government. secretary olney was speaking no doubt largely for home consumption when he declared that "the united states is practical sovereign on this continent (hemisphere), and its fiat is law upon the subject to which it confines its interpretation." nevertheless the extension of control either by the united states or some group of powers is almost inevitable, and with the widening of the monroe {57} doctrine, as a result of closer relations between latin america and the old world, the necessity for some arrangement between the united states and the great european powers becomes increasingly obvious. our possession of hawaii and the philippines acts in the same manner. in a military sense the philippines are indefensible; we cannot secure them against a near-lying military power. nor can we in the present stage of national feeling permit them to be conquered. consequently we watch the actions of japan with quite different feelings than if we had not given her provocation and a bait. the building of the panama canal equally increases our international liabilities. it contributes a vast new importance to the caribbean sea and adds a new weak point to american territory. having built and fortified the canal, we are compelled to think of ways and means of defending it, of armies, navies, _ententes_ and alliances. while all these factors, however, have contributed to our changed point of view, it was the world war which most completely revealed to americans the necessity of accommodating our national development to that of other countries. the war proved that we were in a military sense vulnerable; that undisciplined citizen soldiery was no match for trained armies; that mere distance is no complete safety, and that the initial advantage, which accrues to the prepared nation is out of all proportion more valuable than later victories. the war showed that unarmed neutrality and a mere lack of hostile intention does not always save a nation from invasion. moreover, we discovered that our interests were affected favourably or adversely by a conflict, in which we had no direct part. we, who had always conceived ourselves as a supremely disinterested nation, a remote island in the blue sea, began {58} to ask whether it was to our advantage to have france defeated, belgium destroyed, germany crushed, the british empire disintegrated. we began to ask how our national interest was affected by the international competition for colonies, by the freedom or unfreedom of the seas, by the extension of the right of blockade, by the abrogation of established laws of warfare; and what the effect upon us would be of an economic alliance against germany by the allied western powers. in other words, we discovered a real national interest in international arrangements created by the war or to be established after the war. our first preoccupation was naturally one of defence. we looked outward, but only saw armed nations ready to seize upon our wealth and territory. responsible authors predicted that the victor in this war would at his leisure move across the ocean and despoil the united states. from ponderous puerilities of this sort to the lurid descriptions of massacre and pillage, vouchsafed us by magazine and moving picture writers, was a short step. more serious arguments prevailed, and in the end a large addition was made to our military and naval forces. but the whole campaign was based solely upon the theory of defence, and the theory so formulated, was merely a continuation of the policy of isolation. it involved the idea that we were to act alone and protect ourselves alone against all nations. it did not concern itself with our national aims. it was not based upon a definition of our relations to europe and to the several nations of europe. as our preparations increase, however, and as we realise how insufficient our force must be against a european coalition, we shall be faced with the alternative of entering into agreements or alliances (to make our defence real) or into some other policy, which might make defence unnecessary. in either case we must face outward, must {59} look at the world as it is and is to be, and define our relation to europe. we must substitute a positive for a negative policy. this we are forced to do even though we may have no immediate friction points with europe. the economic interpenetration of all nations involves us in conflicts of interest and adjustments, which require a positive national policy. it is our economic development that most strongly pushes us in this direction. we are gradually destroying the complementary industrial system which formerly held us to europe; we are competing with european countries for world markets and have even begun to compete for investment opportunities in backward countries. we are exporting manufactures, and this exportation is likely to increase. of the six chief requisites of a great manufacturing nation--coal, iron, copper, wood, cotton and wool--we are the greatest single producer of all except the last, and to this advantage of cheap raw materials, there is added an efficient manufacturing organisation and a large manufacturing capital. from 1880 to 1910 that capital increased six and a half fold (from 2.8 to 18.4 billions of dollars). it is therefore no wonder that we are exporting tools, sewing-machines, locomotives, typewriters, automobiles and electrical apparatus. these products compete increasingly with similar products from england and germany and invade the markets which europe desires for herself. our total exports to latin america, for example, have almost quadrupled in twenty-two years, increasing from 77 millions of dollars in 1890 to 296 millions in 1912. the significance of this competition, as it exists to-day and will exist to-morrow, is greater for europe than for us. our fundamental welfare does not absolutely depend {60} upon this exportation; we could lose a part of this trade, as we lost our shipping, without fatal results, for we should still have our cotton and many half-finished products to exchange for our imports. were great britain, however, to lose her markets for manufactured goods, she would shrink into insignificance, if she did not literally starve. in 1913 the united kingdom spent $1,400,000,000 on imported foods, drink and tobacco, and for this, as for her importation of raw materials, she must pay. while our export of manufactures still forms but a trifling part (perhaps one thirtieth) of our total product, the british and the german export constitutes an immensely larger proportion. our export of finished wares, despite its rapid increase, was in 1914 only some seven dollars per capita, while that of the united kingdom was about forty-five dollars per capita.[1] it will therefore not be wondered at if our increasing export of manufactures both to europe and to the countries to which europe exports, causes us to be involved, as we have not been for over a century, in the ambitions, conflicts and life-interests of the great european nations. for at bottom a commercial war is an industrial war, a struggle for national prosperity. if, for example, germany fails to hold her foreign markets, she must shut down factories. her industrial problem is to buy raw materials from abroad cheap, ship to germany, manufacture into finished products, transport to a country {61} willing to buy, and from this enterprise secure profits enough to purchase food for her people. if she is beaten out, let us say, in the export cotton industry she must turn to something else. she may try to save the industry by increasing efficiency or reducing wages, but if she fails, she must close up some of her mills. if she cannot employ the growing masses who depend upon export industries, she must let her surplus people--and with them a part of her capital--emigrate. like other european countries she has learned this lesson by experience. thus it often happened when america increased her tariff rates that european factories, unable to compete, migrated, men and capital, to this country. it is true that the world market constantly expands, but the producing capacity of the manufacturing nations also increases, and competition becomes ever more severe. the more rapidly america invades the markets which europe has hitherto held, the more she squeezes them, the more bitter the feeling against her will become. that bitterness of feeling (in the conditions preceding the present war) was more likely to arise in germany than in england and more likely in england than in france. we have spoken of these as rival nations, but there are intensities of rivalry varying in proportion to the similarity of products and of methods of production. germany, like the united states, is a new-comer in international industry, pushing and aggressive. more scientific and better organised than we, she possesses far more meagre resources. we both have trusts or cartels, and both manufacture huge quantities of cheap, standardised products. our competition therefore is of the keenest, and is likely to grow more intense, if, as seems likely, germany recovers from the effects of this war. less keen is our competition with great britain. like an old firm, grown {62} rich and conservative, great britain is not pushing, not scientific, not well organised. we are gaining on her in those branches of manufacture which permit standardisation and production in huge quantities, and have no hope, and but little wish, of competing in articles of high finish and therefore high labour cost. with france we compete still less, since much of her export trade is in articles of taste and luxury, in which we are hopelessly inferior.[2] in this battle for the world market, the united states has the disadvantage of coming late and of being intellectually unprepared. on the other hand, not only have we superior natural resources, but also the advantage that to us success is not vital. whatever trade we gain is a mere improvement of a situation already good. we are playing "on velvet." finally, like germany, we have the advantage of large scale production by strong corporations working with what is practically a bounty upon exports. because of their control of a protected home market, our great corporations can make their sales at home cover all initial and constant costs, and as these costs need not be applied to exports, are able to sell goods cheaper in rio janeiro or lima than in chicago or new york. they are able to "dump" their surplus goods.[3] the opening of the panama canal cannot but increase the competition of the united states especially with the nations bordering on the pacific ocean. from 1897-1901 to 1907-11 the average annual exports from the united states to these pacific countries (mexico, central america and columbia, the remaining west coast of {63} south america, china, japan, the philippines and british australasia) increased from 104.2 millions to 200.2 millions, a growth of 92.1 per cent., while the export from germany increased 81.0 per cent. and from the united kingdom only 51.7 per cent. in the same period our average annual imports from these countries increased 112.9 per cent. (as compared with 113.9 per cent. for germany and 62.5 per cent. for the united kingdom).[4] the trade with these pacific countries lies largely with the united kingdom, the united states and germany (in the order named) and the united states seems to be slowly moving forward to first place.[5] what progress the united states has made, moreover, has been achieved under certain great disabilities which the panama canal removes. "by present all-sea routes new york is, in general, at a disadvantage compared with liverpool."[6] new york by the suez route is 3 days further away from australasia (for ten knot vessels) than is liverpool; by the panama route new york is from 9 to 12 days nearer. for points on the west coast of north and south america, new york is one and a half days nearer than is liverpool by the all-sea route and about eleven days nearer by the panama route. when all the conditions of distance, speed, cost of coal, tolls, etc., are considered, it is found that the panama canal gives in many parts of the world an advantage to new york over liverpool, antwerp and hamburg. the result is an impulse towards a keener american competition in the pacific trade. if our foreign commerce was gaining before the war, it has made even greater progress since the outbreak of {64} hostilities. while germany's foreign commerce has been temporarily destroyed and that of great britain has been hampered by the war, our total commerce has immensely increased. in the year 1915 we exported over a billion dollars in excess of our exports of 1913, our exports in the latter year exceeding those of the united kingdom or of any other country in any year of its history.[7] this development, it is true, was abnormal and consisted partly in increases in prices and temporary deflections in trade. nevertheless, while many american industries, especially those engaged in the manufacture of war munitions, will suffer severely at the end of the war, and while our export of such commodities will dwindle, the war cannot but result in a relative advantage to american manufacturers of export commodities. moreover, the war by destroying established connections between neutral countries and their natural purveyors of manufactured goods in europe has opened the way to a future extension of american export. like a protective tariff, it gives an initial advantage to americans, and helps them to overcome the early handicaps. it induces american manufacturers to think in terms of foreign markets instead of concentrating their attention upon a protected home market. in the beginning, it is true, the buying capacity of certain countries, such as those of south america, was diminished by the shattering of financial arrangements with europe. but such a condition is purely temporary. there will always be a demand for {65} the wheat, corn, meats, hides and wool of argentine, for the copper and nitrates of chile, for the coffee and rubber of brazil, for the wool of uruguay, for the sugar and cotton of peru, for the tin of bolivia, for the beef and tagua nuts of venezuela and colombia. so long as they sell raw materials, these countries will furnish a demand for finished products. american manufacturers are to-day determined to secure an increased share of this expanding market.[8] they are slowly learning that you cannot push your goods, in south america let us say, unless you learn to pack your goods, have studied local requirements, are willing to print catalogues in spanish and portuguese, and have your salesmen know these languages. in the past americans have been hampered by their unwillingness or inability to extend long credits, but this drawback is being removed by the improvement of banking facilities. the government, moreover, now seeks actively to promote american trade with foreign countries, and especially with latin america. a new merchant marine is expected to give additional facilities to american exporters and enable them to meet their british and german competitors on more nearly equal terms. moreover, the united states is learning that in the export trade co-operation is desirable, and the {66} federal trade commission seems about to grant permission to manufacturers to combine for the conduct of business in foreign countries.[9] all this does not mean that american manufacturers are completely to displace their european competitors in south america and other markets. competition after the war will be severe, and whatever the course of wages and employment in europe, a measure of success for industrial countries like great britain, germany and belgium is absolutely essential to the maintenance of their populations. desperate efforts will be made by these nations to re-establish their foreign business. a great part of south america is as near to london and rotterdam as to new york, and much of the trade and of its future increase will revert to europe. in the years to come, however, more than in the present or past, the united states will be a formidable competitor for the world-markets, and will incur enmity and jealousy in the attempt to maintain and improve its position. {67} a similar development is taking place in the field of investment. in former years, british, french, dutch, belgian and german financiers were requested, indeed begged, to invest their surplus capital in american enterprises. to these financiers we went cap in hand, and they did not lend their money cheaply. the complementary relation between lending europe and borrowing america was productive of the friendship of mutual benefit. to-day we are still a debtor nation, but only in the sense that the great financier is a debtor. we ourselves have a large capital, and in the main go to europe merely for the sale of safer and less remunerative bonds, while the common stock of new enterprises is likely to remain in america. or we graciously "let europe in on a good thing," conferring, not asking, a favour. in the meantime, we are paying off our indebtedness as is indicated by the balance of trade, which since 1876 has almost invariably been strongly in our favour.[10] the war has still further reduced our foreign obligations. during the two years ending june 30, 1916 our excess of exports over imports was over three and one-quarter billions of dollars. moreover, in 1915 we did not incur, as ordinarily, a large debt as a result of the expenditures of americans in europe. the result of this development has been twofold; a considerable transfer of european holdings of american securities to americans, and the direct loan of american capital to europe. while it is impossible to quote exact figures, the american debt to europe can hardly have been reduced during the two years ending august 1, 1916, by less than two to {68} two and a half billions, or perhaps a third, or even a half, of our former debt to europe.[11] in the meantime the united states though still a debtor nation has also become a creditor nation. just as germany, before the war, borrowed from france and loaned to bulgaria and turkey, so the united states, while still owing europe, invested in mexico, canada and south america. it is probable that by 1914 considerably over one and a quarter billion dollars of american capital was invested in canada, mexico, cuba and the republics of {69} central and south america, not including the capital represented by the panama canal.[12] even to-day (nov. 1, 1916) there is still a probable excess of our debts over our credits with foreign nations of at least two billions of dollars. in comparison with our total wealth, however (estimated by the census of 1910 at 207 billions and since then largely increased), this indebtedness seems comparatively small. the national income is rapidly expanding and as the chance to secure exceptionally large profits in railroad and industrial enterprises diminishes there is an increased temptation for surplus capital to flow abroad. whether or not we shall again have recourse to the fund of european capital in developing our immense resources, it is hardly to be doubted that we shall increasingly invest in foreign countries, and especially in mexico, and elsewhere in the americas.[13] such a development is entirely legitimate and within bounds desirable both for the united states and to the countries to which our capital (and trade) will go. the possible field of investment in latin america and the orient, to say nothing of other regions, is still immensely great, and as capital develops these areas their {70} international trade will also grow. there is no reason why the united states should not take its part both in the investment of capital and the development of trade with these non-industrial countries. as we so invest and trade, however, we must recognise the direction in which our policy is leading us and the dangers, both from within and without, that we are liable to incur. the more we invest the more we shall come into competition with the investing nations of europe. we are already urged to put capital into south america on the just plea that trade follows investment, and the same forces that are pushing our trade outward will seek opportunities for investment in the mines and railroads of the politically backward countries. like european nations, we too shall seek for valuable concessions, and may be tempted (and herein lies the danger) to use political pressure to secure investment opportunities. what happened in morocco, persia, egypt, where the financial interests of rival nations brought them to the verge of war, may occur in mexico, venezuela or colombia, and the united states may be one of the parties involved. we seem thus to be entering upon an economic competition not entirely unlike that which existed between germany and england. we too have gone over to a policy of extending our foreign markets and of protecting our foreign investments. more and more we shall be interested in politically and industrially backward countries, to which we shall sell and in which we shall invest. inevitably we shall face outwards. we shall not be permitted by our own financiers, manufacturers and merchants, to say nothing of those of europe, to hold completely aloof. we have seen, even in the present mexican crisis, how american investment tended to precipitate a conflict. we have learned the same lesson from england, {71} france and germany. as we expand both industrially and financially beyond our political borders we are placed in new, difficult and complicated international relations, and are forced to determine for ourselves the rã´le that america must play in this great development. we can no longer stand aside and do nothing, for that is the worst and most dangerous of policies. we must either plunge into national competitive imperialism, with all its profits and dangers, following our financiers wherever they lead, or must seek out some method by which the economic needs and desires of rival industrial nations may be compromised and appeased, so that foreign trade may go on and capital develop backward lands without the interested nations flying at each other's throat. isolation, aloofness, a hermit life among the nations is no longer safe or possible. whatever our decision the united states must face the new problem that presents itself, the problem of the economic expansion of the industrial nations throughout the world. [1] this comparison is not exact, since the british statistics include articles under manufactures which we do not include, and exclude articles which we include. i cite these figures merely to show that there is a vast difference in the relative importance to the united kingdom and the united states of their export of manufactures, but not to show exactly what that difference is. similarly the comparison above between the total product of american manufacturing and our export of manufactures is approximate. [2] see an analysis--let us say of argentine trade. [3] on the other hand the very extension of our home market tends to make us negligent of foreign exports of manufactures and to consider the profits from this business as a mere by-product. a large and successful foreign market can be maintained only by careful study and continuous work. [4] hutchinson (lincoln), "the panama canal and international trade competition," p. 105 _et seq._ new york, 1915. [5] despite the fact that as yet the _absolute_ increase is greater in the british than in the american trade with these countries. [6] hutchinson (lincoln), _op. cit._ [7] from 1914 to 1916 our exports of merchandise increased from 2365 to 4334 millions of dollars (an increase of 83 per cent.) and our balance of exports over imports rose from 471 to 2136 millions (an increase of 354 per cent.). monthly summary of foreign commerce of the united states, june, 1916. (corrected to aug. 9, 1916, subject to revision.) [8] "in spite of inexperience, crude methods, lack of banks and of ships we have made notable gains in south american trade. there seems to be no reason to question the probability of a continued rapid increase during the next few years.... the process of building and making more efficient our own manufacturing plants has been carried far, so that we are prepared, in the opinion of competent judges, to proceed more rapidly than ever with the production of goods for foreign markets."--william h. lough, "banking opportunities in south america," bureau of foreign and domestic commerce (dept. of commerce), special agents series no. 106, washington, 1915, p. 7. [9] in a recent address (see date) to the american iron and steel industry, mr. edwin w. hurley, vice-chairman of the federal trade commission, points out how during the last quarter of a century the germans have co-ordinated their foreign trade, with the result that of the steel business 90 per cent. has been brought under a single control. the effect has been a victory for the german over the british export business. mr. hurley states that while a constructive programme has been worked out by the interstate commerce commission for the railroads, and co-operation among the farmers has been stimulated by the department of agriculture, the manufacturing industries concerned in the export trade are hampered by provisions of the anti-trust law. "is it reasonable to suppose," he asks, "that congress meant to obstruct the development of our foreign commerce by forbidding the use in export trade of methods of organisation which do not operate to the prejudice of the american public, are lawful in the countries where the trade is to be carried on, and are necessary if americans are to meet competitors there on equal terms?"--new york _evening sun_, june 21, 1916. [10] in the last forty years the balance has been against us in only three years, 1888, 1889 and 1893. the real balance is not nearly so great as the apparent balance, but there can be little doubt that it represents a considerable repayment of the principal of our great debt to europe. [11] according to w. z. ripley the american debt to europe amounted in 1899 to $3,100,000,000 of which $2,500,000,000 was owed to england, $240,000,000 to holland, $200,000,000 to germany, $75,000,000 to switzerland, $50,000,000 to france, and $35,000,000 to the rest of europe. after 1899 there was a reduction in the amount of european holdings of american securities (mostly railroad bonds and stocks), but since 1907 there was again an increased purchase, so that by 1914 the american debt to europe was considerably greater than it had been in 1899. see new york _journal of commerce_, dec. 6, 1911. also, hobson, c. k., "the export of capital." new york, 1914, p. 153-5. according to a compilation made by president l. f. loree of the delaware and hudson railroad, the american railroad securities formerly held in foreign hands but which were absorbed by the american market during the eighteen months ending july 31, 1916, amounted to $1,288,773,801 par value and to $898,390,910 market value. the railroad securities remaining abroad (july 31, 1916), amounted to $1,415,628,563 par value with a market value of $1,110,099,090. in other words according to these statistics of returned securities (which mr. loree believes are largely underestimated) about 45 per cent. (market value) of the railroad securities held abroad on january 31, 1915, had been returned eighteen months later. (new york _times_, sept. 25, 1916.) the new york _times_ states that "it is high banking opinion that at the outbreak of the war, the total of industrial securities held abroad amounted to about 25 per cent. of the railroad securities, and that the liquidation of industrials since has been in about the same proportion to the total as the liquidation of rails." on this basis the foreign holdings of american railroad and industrial securities on july 31, 1916, would have amounted to only $1,375,000,000 (market value). [12] for data used as the basis of this estimate, see hobson, c. k., "export of capital" (p. 153 and following), together with sources there cited. [13] "the adoption of the federal reserve system has ... released and made available for other forms of financing great sums which were formerly tied up in scattered reserves. we have only to look at the monetary history of the german empire during the last forty years to see how powerful an influence on industry, trade, and investment is exerted by the centralisation and control of bank reserves. the london _statist_ has calculated the ultimate increased lending power of american banks, under the federal reserve system, at $3,000,000,000."--lough, _op. cit._, p. 8. {75} part ii the root of imperialism chapter vi the integration of the world for decades, the foreign and domestic policies of the united states were determined by our ambition to subdue and people a wilderness. our immediate profit, our ultimate destiny, our ideals of liberty, democracy and world influence, were all involved in this one effort. to us the problem was one of national growth. to-day we are beginning to realise that this western movement of ours affected all industrial nations, and was only a part of a vaster world movement--an economic revolution, which has been developing for more than a century. that revolution is the opening up of distant agricultural lands and the binding of agricultural and industrial nations into one great economic union. it is a world integration. to this world development the crude physical hunger of the western populations has contributed. the urbane chinese official, who voices the sentiments of mr. lowes dickinson, attributes europe's solicitous interference in china to the fact that the western world cannot live alone. "economically," he says, "your (western) society is so constituted that it is constantly on the verge of starvation. you cannot produce what you need to consume, nor consume what you need to produce. it is matter of life and death to you to find markets in which you may dispose of your manufactures, and from which you may derive your food and raw material. such a {76} market china is, or might be; and the opening of this market is in fact the motive, thinly disguised, of all your dealings with us in recent years. the justice and morality of such a policy i do not propose to discuss. it is, in fact, the product of sheer material necessity, and upon such a ground it is idle to dispute."[1] necessity is a large and a vague word; it may mean any degree of compulsion or freedom. yet the chinese official is right when he emphasises the immensity of the economic forces driving the western nations outward. not adventure, ambition or religious propagandism will account for the full momentum of this movement. back of the missionaries, traders, soldiers, financiers, diplomats, who are opening up "backward" countries stand hundreds of millions of people, whose primary daily needs make them unconscious imperialists. at the bottom this outward driving force is the breeding impulse, the growth of population. in 1800, one hundred and twenty-two millions of people lived in western europe, whereas in 1900 the population was two hundred and forty millions,[2] and the rate of increase is still rapid. the population has doubled; the area has remained the same. the new millions cannot be fed or clothed according to their present standard of living unless food and raw materials come from abroad. they depend for their existence on outside agricultural countries. this increase of european population, moreover, has been a net increase, after emigration has been deducted. {77} although during the last century tens of millions of immigrants have gone from western europe to the united states, canada, brazil and the argentine; the home population has increased by over one hundred and seventeen millions and is to-day increasing by twenty millions a decade.[3] for all of these twenty millions no sufficient outlet can be found either in old or in new lands. the problem, therefore, is not to find homes for them abroad but to secure their existence at home. and this existence can only be secured by raising the necessary food in distant agricultural countries and by turning over a large part of western europe to manufacturing and commercial enterprises. colonisation, imperialism, the opening up of new agricultural countries, is therefore the other side of industrialism. the present revolution in the world to-day is thus in a real sense a sequel to the industrial revolution, which gave birth to our modern industry. that imposing industry depends upon non-industrial populations, who produce food, cotton, wood and copper, and exchange them for manufactured goods. since the people who fashion and transport products must be fed by those who raise them, agricultural production must be stimulated at home and abroad. the nation must expand economically. this expansion, which is broader than what is usually called imperialism, is not a merely political process. it takes small account of national boundaries, but develops farming wherever possible. the movement is vast and intricate: commerce {78} between industry and agriculture is carried to the outermost parts of the earth; africa is divided up, colonies, dependencies and protectorates are acquired; agriculture is promoted in politically independent countries, and an internal colonisation, a colonisation within one's own country, occurs simultaneously. in australia, the canadian west, in argentine, in siberia settlers lay virgin fields under the plough, and the new lands are bound commercially to the great complex of western industrial nations. they are also bound psychologically. as the machine which conquered the nation now conquers the world, so the spirit of manchester and london and of pittsburgh and new york rules ancient peoples, breaking up their rigid civilisations, as it rules naked savages in the congo forests. it is a materialistic, rationalistic, machine-worshipping spirit. the unconscious christian missionaries to china, who teach the natives not to smoke opium and not to bind the feet of their women, are unwittingly introducing conceptions of life, as hostile to traditional christianity as to confucianism or buddhism. they are teaching the gospel of steam, the eternal verities of mechanics, and the true doctrine of pounds, shillings and pence. feudalism, conservatism, family piety, are dissolved; and, as the conquering mobile civilisations impinge upon quiescent peoples, new ambitions and desires are created among populations hitherto content to live as their forefathers lived. these desires are the inlet of the restless discontent which we call european civilisation. when the ancient peoples, civilised or not, desire guns, whiskey, cotton goods, watches and lamps, their dependence upon western civilisation is assured. bound to the industrial nations, they toil in mines or on tropical plantations that they may buy the goods they have learned to want, and that europe may live. {79} in this cosmopolitan division of labour, which destroys the old economic self-sufficiency of nations, england took the lead. a hundred years ago, when the british agriculturist sold his produce to the british manufacturer in return for finished wares, and foreign commerce was insignificant, the population was limited by the food it could produce. every increase in the number of englishmen meant recourse to less fertile fields, an increase in rents, a lowering of wages and a resultant pauperism. the hideous distress during the napoleonic wars and after was largely due to an excessive population striving to live upon narrow agricultural resources. the alternative presented was to stop bearing children or find food abroad; stagnation or industrialism. if england (with wales) could in 1821 barely support twelve millions, how could she maintain thirty-six millions in 1911? only by going over to free trade, by raising her food and raw materials in countries where land was cheap, and employing her people in converting these into finished products. to-day three live in england better than one lived before; on the other hand, a large part of the food supply is raised abroad. had great britain literally become "the workshop of the world," manufacturing for sixteen hundred million inhabitants, there would have been no limit to her possible increase in population. no such national monopoly, however, was possible, or from a world point of view desirable. belgium, france, germany and later other thickly populated countries were also faced with the choice between stagnation and industrialism, and as english machines, english industrial methods and english factory organisation could be imported, these nations, one after another, went over to manufacturing, ceased to export food and {80} began to import both food and raw materials, competing with great britain for industrial supremacy. these competing industrial nations had a great common interest, to increase the total food and raw materials to be bought and therefore the manufactured products to be sold. the greater the development of foreign agriculture the better for industry in all these nations. to secure this agricultural base abroad, the nation was not compelled to establish its own colonies, for belgium and holland could buy food and raw materials even if the congo and java were nonexistent. as a consumer it made little difference to england whether she got her wheat from russia or india, or her sugar from germany or mauritius, so long as the supply was plentiful, cheap and constant. actually a large part of the food supply came from politically independent countries, the united states alone increasing its food exports from fifty-one millions of dollars in 1860 to five hundred and forty-five millions in 1900, and its cotton in equal ratio. but as american economic development proves, it is difficult to maintain this common agricultural base. the agricultural nation, in the temperate zone, grows in population, converts itself into an industrial community, and not only consumes its own food and raw materials but draws upon the common agricultural fund of the older industrial nations. to-day the united states is rapidly lessening its food exports, is increasing its imports of sugar, coffee, tea, fish, and other foods, and is thus forcing industrial europe to find a new agricultural base. this conversion of agricultural into semi-industrial nations proceeds rapidly. switzerland, austria, italy, japan, even russia, increase their manufacturing, and intensify the demand for the world's supply of raw materials. it is a normal and in present circumstances an inevitable {81} process. when, however, the exportable supply of food and raw material of an agricultural country dwindles, a new equilibrium must be established. new states, territories, colonies, hitherto exporting but little agricultural produce, are opened and their production stimulated. from russia, the danube valley, canada, australia, brazil, argentine and many parts of africa, new supplies of raw material are secured. fresh sources are also discovered for the production of fodder, flax, cotton, wool and ores. it is an equilibrium, forever destroyed and forever re-established, between an increasing number of industrial nations with increasing populations and new agricultural bases, upon which the superstructure of the world's export industry is reared. it is not, however, by the sale of present manufactured goods alone that the industrial nations can secure their foreign food. one may own abroad as well as earn abroad. an englishman with a thousand acres in north dakota or alberta may export the wheat that he raises exactly as though the farm were in devon. if he owns shares in the pennsylvania railroad, he may with his dividends purchase wheat, which he may ship to his own country without exporting commodities in return. the true economic dominion of england extends wherever englishmen hold property. subject to the laws of the land where the property is held, this ownership gives the same claim to the product of industry as does an investment at home. as we read the imperialistic literature of to-day, we discover that the chief emphasis is laid on the great value of new countries as a field for this sort of profitable investment. investment, not commerce, is the decisive factor, and money is to be made out of opportunities to build railroads, open mines, construct harbours and irrigate arid districts. the diamond mines of the transvaal were more {82} attractive to the english than the chance to trade, and what was of immediate value in morocco were the iron mines and future railways and not the right to sell tallow candles to the berbers. in large part this foreign investment of capital has the effect of broadening the agricultural base. while to the individual investor, capital export means getting eight per cent. instead of four, and to the promoter, a chance to make a few hundred thousand dollars or pounds, to the industrial nation it means that a fund is created which will help pay for a steady flow of agricultural products and raw materials. to the whole complex of industrial nations and to the world at large it means even more. the export of capital increases the capacity of the agricultural nation to serve as a feeder to all industrial peoples. it provides cheap transportation and improved agricultural machinery. had great britain not invested in american railways during the fifties the united states would have exported less food to europe in the seventies. freight rates dropped and the industrial nations were flooded with cheap wheat. british capital in american railways aided british manufacturing more than if the same capital had been placed at home. to-day for the same reason the process continues elsewhere. in russia, south east europe, canada, australia, south america, asia and africa, capital, furnished by the industrial countries, is increasing the production and exportation of food and of raw materials, and is thus indirectly promoting the industry of western europe.[4] {83} such investment abroad is not new. in the middle ages the bankers of northern italy, and later of spain and portugal advanced small sums to impecunious foreign sovereigns. but the thousand marks borrowed by henry v from genoese merchants, or the loans made by holland in the 18th century, did not compare with the vast sums invested by england since the napoleonic wars, nor by other countries since 1850. for, as in manufacturing, so also in the export of capital, france, belgium, holland, germany and even the united states entered the field. the source from which capital could be obtained widened with the increase in the number of wealthy industrial nations, and the volume of investment expanded rapidly. the foreign investments of the united kingdom, according to an estimate made by dr. bowley, amounted in 1854 to two and three-quarter billions of dollars. for 1914, sixty years later, these holdings were estimated at seventeen and one-half billions. it is believed that the french have invested some eight billions of dollars and the germans four billions.[5] the entire foreign investment of capital by the industrial nations of europe cannot have amounted (in 1914) to less than thirty-two or thirty-five billions of dollars.[6] if this great investment were made solely in countries with a highly developed capitalism, with stable political conditions and strong economic ambitions, no imperialistic policy would be necessary. england need not "own" the united states in order to invest here safely or for purposes of trade. nor is she under an economic compulsion to rule canada or australasia. were these british colonies quite independent politically, canadians and australians would {84} still endeavour to sell wheat and mutton to europe and to attract and protect european capital. their own self-interest, not any outside compulsion, makes them serve european, in serving their own interests. in morocco, on the other hand, and in tunis, persia, jamaica, senegal and the congo, the situation is different. the natives of these lands lack most of the elements which make for the ordered economic development demanded by europe. under native rule there is governmental incompetence and venality, disorder, revolt, apathy and economic conservatism. foreign investment is impossible and trade precarious. it is here where the industrial system of western europe impinges upon the backward countries that economic expansion merges into modern imperialism. [1] "letters from a chinese official. being an eastern view of western civilisation." new york (mcclure, phillips & co.), 1903, p. 13. [2] see "handwã¶rterbuch der staatswissenschaften," ii, pp. 992, 993, third edition, jena, 1909-1911. western europe here includes all of europe except russia, hungary, bosnia and herzegovina, the balkan states and turkey. [3] the absolute increase in the population of western europe is itself increasing. in the decade 1800-1810, the increase was 6.3 millions; in the nine succeeding decades it was 7.8; 13.5; 11.3; 9.6; 9.7; 11.5; 14.1; 14.5 and 19.0 millions. in the fifty years ending 1850 the population increased 48.6 millions; in the fifty years ending 1900, 68.7 millions. [4] not all foreign investment of capital results or is intended to result in stimulating agriculture and other extractive industries. much of it is spent unproductively on guns, ships and royal and presidential luxuries, and much in stimulating manufacturing in agricultural nations, thus narrowing instead of widening the agricultural base of the capital-exporting countries. [5] see hobson, "export of capital." [6] moreover this investment, until the outbreak of the war, was rapidly increasing, amounting to no less than $1,500,000,000 a year. {85} chapter vii the root of imperialism "the free west indian negro," writes sir sidney olivier, "is not only averse as a matter of dignity to conducting himself as if he were a plantation slave, and bound to work every day, but also enjoys the fun of feeling himself a master. and so, on a big sugar estate, when expensive machinery is running, and the crop has to be worked without stoppage, or on a banana plantation, when the steamer has been telephoned at daybreak, and two or three thousand bunches have to be at the wharf by noon, the negro hands will very likely find it impossible to cut canes or fruit that morning. it isn't a strike for better conditions of labour; they may have no grievance; another day they will turn up all right: but a big concern cannot be run on that basis. that is the root of the demand for indentured labour in the west indies."[1] it is also the root of imperialism. for imperialism from an economic point of view is in the main a foreign political control to make the "niggers" work. the industrial nations, desiring food, raw materials, markets and a field for investment, being thwarted by conditions in certain backward agricultural countries, seek to remedy these conditions by means of political sovereignty. it is not necessary to control well-governed countries which are peopled by economically ambitious men who will work six {86} days a week, fifty-two weeks in a year. in politically independent countries, however, and especially in the tropics, production is rendered ineffective by the disturbed political conditions, the lack of capital and capitalistic intelligence, the absence of fixed industrial habits, as well as by a general inertia and distaste for continuous labour under the hot sun. as a result, industrial nations are deprived of the markets and food supplies, which they consider necessary to their development.[2] no necessity of feeding europeans appeals to the west indian negro when he emerges from his thatched hut after a comfortable night's sleep. though unskilled, he is a strong and capable man, willing, when incited by friendship or gratitude, to incur trouble and endure fatigue. but, as olivier points out, "the capitalist system of industry has never disciplined him into a wage-slave," and perhaps never will. the tropical negro "has no idea of {87} any obligation to be industrious for industry's sake, no conception of any essential dignity in labour itself, no delight in gratuitous toil. moreover, he has never been imbued with the vulgar and fallacious illusion which is so ingrained in competitive industrial societies, that service can be valued in money.... work and money are not yet rigidly commensurable in the consciousness of the african. half a dollar may be worth one day's work for him, a second half-dollar may be worth a second day's work, but a third half-dollar will not be worth a third day's work.... moreover he lives in climates where toil is exacting, and rest both easy and sweet. there are few days in the year in england when it is really pleasant to loaf, and the streets of civilised cities are not tempting to recumbent meditation."[3] it is not always necessary for a foreign power to intervene in order to disturb this "recumbent meditation." in certain tropical and sub-tropical countries there develops within the nation a group of exploiters, who control the government, such as it is, and force the natives to work. the atrocities of the putumayo district in brazil illustrate the capitalistic spirit in its very worst form, as did also the forced labour on the yucatan plantations during the diaz rã©gime in mexico. to meet the economic needs of the industrial world, it makes little difference whether peons are enslaved by mexican, american or english capitalists, so long as the output is the same. but native capitalists are often unable to secure the desired economic result because they are too ruthless and, through lack of adequate financial and military resources, cannot maintain order. despotism tempered by revolution, oppression interrupted by savage reprisals, is not {88} an approved economic stimulus. the difficulty in mexico to-day, as also in venezuela and in colombia, is the laming of industry by frequent revolutions. it is the same difficulty that was encountered in india, persia and morocco. the east indian is as unflagging as the french or italian peasant, but not until the british occupation could he secure the legal protection necessary to a higher economic development. peace, sanitation, industrial promotion and an economic or legal compulsion to work constitute the tools of imperialism, as they are applied to agricultural countries in the tropical and sub-tropical world. there is one outstanding difference between temperate and tropical countries, which gives to modern imperialism its essential character. given a low stage of civilisation, temperate lands are likely to be thinly populated, while tropical countries, however rudimentary their economic processes, may maintain large, low-grade populations. in the temperate climes, therefore, the intruder, who is more highly developed economically, soon outnumbers the natives, while in tropical countries, the white immigrant, even when he withstands the climate, is scarcely able to hold his own, and the very improvements which he introduces lead to an increase in the indigenous population. the white man either remains above and in a sense outside the population, or loses his identity by mixing his blood with that of the natives. the result is the maintenance of a people ethnically distinct from that of the nation exercising political control. to just what extent such control is necessary and effective constitutes a difficult question. it cannot be denied that the export from many colonies is far greater than would be the case if these had remained independent. the naturally rich country of haiti is far less valuable to the industrial nations than the poorer island of porto {89} rico.[4] in many parts of the world large agricultural resources are unavailable because owned by uncivilised nations or tribes maintaining their political independence. indeed, if an immediate increase in production and export were the only factor to be considered, a government of all tropical america by a capable industrial nation, like england or germany, would be of distinct advantage. other considerations, however, do enter. even a semi-efficient nation, like chili or brazil, gradually establishes order, secures foreign capital, intelligence and labour, and develops its resources. as opposed to europe, the united states stands in its monroe doctrine for the principle that latin-american countries, if left independent, will in time develop, and that a slow evolution may be more advantageous to the world than a more rapid exploitation under foreign dominion.[5] ultimately, however, the capacity of the nation to utilise its resources does constitute the test which decides whether it shall retain independence or become subject to foreign domination. it is this test which is being applied to-day to mexico and certain other latin-american countries.[6] as yet this imperialistic rã©gime is in its beginning. food and raw materials are still mainly derived from {90} independent nations and from temperate, settlement colonies, in which production is not affected by political control. the major part of the food-stuffs imported by europe come from russia, the united states, canada, australia, the argentine, the balkans; cotton comes chiefly from the united states; wool from australia; hides from the argentine; copper, coal, wood, oil from countries of temperate climate. more sugar is actually produced in temperate than in tropical countries, though the export from tropical countries largely preponderates. thus the external commerce of the specifically tropical countries subject to imperialistic rule is small compared to that of temperate countries exporting raw materials. india with its developed agricultural system exports only some $500,000,000 of food and raw materials[7] (in excess of its imports of like commodities) or about $1.55 per capita, while the per capita exportation of roumania is over ten times as great, of the argentine about twenty times, and of australia forty times.[8] if the present commerce with tropical countries were not to increase, the new tropical imperialism would have but a slender economic base, and it might well be questioned whether it was worth europe's while to govern hundreds of millions of yellow, brown and black men in all parts of the globe. but the english colonies in america, two hundred years ago, also exported little, and a similar immensity of growth may be expected from the commerce of tropical countries. "as civilisation advances and population becomes more dense," writes mr. edward e. slosson,[9] "the inhabitants of temperate zones {91} become necessarily more dependent on the tropics. where the sunshine falls straightest and the rain falls heaviest there the food of the future will be produced." cacao, coffee, copra, cotton, rubber, sugar cane, bananas and other fruits are all becoming increasingly important in our consumption, and these and other raw materials are the product of a scientific exploitation of tropical regions.[10] more and more the west-european nations, as also the united states and japan, are realising these immense potentialities. into many tropical countries, new crops are introduced, experiment stations established, railroads built, agricultural machines imported and efforts made not only to bring new lands into cultivation but also to increase the output of older lands. the experimental spread of cotton culture is a case in point. in 1902 the british cotton growing association was created to promote the growth of cotton in british dependencies. the fibre is now being raised in egypt, northern nigeria and central africa, while the possible output of west africa, it is claimed, could supply all the mills of lancashire. an ample supply of cotton for many decades to come seems reasonably assured. the gradual filling up of the temperate zones emphasises the immense future possibilities of the tropical regions. according to mr. earley vernon wilcox, the total land area of the world is about 52,500,000 square miles (of which about 29,000,000 are considered fertile) and of this total area about 15,000,000 square miles are to be found in tropical and sub-tropical regions. "in 1914, the united states imported tropical agricultural products to the value of $600,000,000," and the exports from ceylon, brazil, {92} the dutch east indies, cuba, hawaii and egypt were enormous. "the control and proper development of the tropics" writes mr. wilcox, "is a problem of tremendous consequences. year by year more tropical products become necessities in cold climates. this is apparent from the mere casual consideration of a list of the commonly imported tropical products, such as cane sugar, cocoanuts, tea, coffee, cocoa, bananas, pineapples, citrus fruits, olives, dates, figs, sisal, manila hemp, jute, kapok, raffia, rubber, balata, gutta-percha, chicle and other gums, cinchona, tans and dyes, rice, sago, cassava, cinnamon, pepper, cloves, nutmeg, vanilla and other spices, oils, such as palm, china wood, candlenut, caster, olive, cotton, lemon oil, etc."[11] in estimating the value of the economic gains to an imperialistic nation, a moralist might be inclined to introduce other factors. the problem whether a political subjection, which is of the essence of imperialism, is or is not justified raises an uncomfortable question in ethics. however carefully native rights are safe-guarded, these subject races are forced to obey a foreign will not primarily for their own good but for that of the sovereign power. several industrial nations, above all the united states and in second instance, england, have undoubtedly embarked upon imperialism with a truly missionary zeal for the welfare of the natives. on the other hand, the twentieth century outrages in the congo were almost as bad as the cruelties of the conquistadores in hispaniola and peru. even in well-governed countries, like egypt, the introduction of european legal systems has resulted in the expropriation of innumerable small property-holders, while the increase in population, due to better economic and {93} sanitary arrangements, has led to an intensification of misery. to what extent the average _fellah_ of egypt is better off than under the reign of mehemet ali or of ismail, how much the jamaican poor are more prosperous than the poor of haiti is at best an unpromising inquiry. on the whole, there has doubtless been improvement. in africa slave-catching has been abolished, and famine and pestilence circumscribed. but the gain such as it is, has been in the main incidental, the by-product of an exploitation primarily for the benefit of others.[12] yet however we discuss the moral question, the problem is determined by quite other considerations. so long as hundreds of millions in the industrial countries require and demand that these backward countries be utilised, humanitarian laws will not be allowed to interfere with the main economic purpose of the colonies. the imperialistic argument is always the same: the resources of the world must be unlocked. three hundred thousand indians must not be permitted to occupy a land capable of maintaining three hundred millions of civilised people.[13] {94} the earth and the fulness thereof belong to the inhabitants of the earth, and if the product is somewhat unevenly divided, that, the imperialists assert, is hardly to be avoided. back of the ethical argument lie necessity and power. let the backward countries be exploited with the utmost speed; in the centuries to come, we will go into these moral questions at our leisure. this submission of ethical ideals to economic needs is illustrated in the prevailing colonial labour policy, which reveals with clarity the quality and power of the economic impulse to imperialism. the great industrial nations, having reached the economic stage in which an ample labour supply can be secured without other compulsion than that of hunger, accept at home the ideal of a free labour contract, with a certain protection to the wage-earner. in their colonies, however, though they may wish to be fair to the natives, one form or another of forced labour is generally adopted. an african native, who wants little here below and can get that little easily, is compelled to neglect or surrender his diminutive banana patch or farm and come to the european's plantation or mine, or work for nothing or next to nothing on the public roads. either this compulsion is exerted by means of a heavy hut tax, the money to pay which can be obtained only by wage-labour, or by stringent vagrancy laws, or by a refusal to allow the natives to become independent proprietors, or by outright expropriation. in some colonies penal labour contracts are enforced, and the miserable native who breaks his agreement is imprisoned or flogged. credit bondage is also in favour, and no sooner does the native work off his original indebtedness than he finds that he is more in {95} debt than ever. finally if the natives cannot be compelled to give enough labour, coolies are imported, chiefly from china and india, and after their period of service are expatriated. even a more direct pressure is not always wanting. while the imperialistic nations theoretically oppose slavery, and have rather effectively checked the horrible slave trade of the arabs, they themselves have not always escaped the temptation to introduce slavery under new forms. at various times and in various colonies, the _corvã©e_ has been adopted both for public and private works, and in the belgian congo a thinly disguised slavery in its most atrocious form has been adopted. to justify this european slavery, which is infinitely more brutal than was the mild and customary native slavery, the same ethical and religious arguments are advanced as were utilised by the sixteenth century spaniards in establishing their _encomiendas_. the natives, especially in africa, are lumped together as worthless idlers, and their benevolent rulers are urged to teach these benighted creatures the christianity of hard and continuous labour.[14] but the real motive is to secure the greatest amount of profits for the investors and of tropical produce for the european {96} populations. whether even from this point of view a less exacting and ruthless labour policy might not be desirable need not here be discussed. what is immediately significant is the immense power of the forces driving european nations into colonial policies, intended to increase the export of tropical products. because of this demand for tropical produce, tropical markets, tropical fields for investment, the vast machinery of imperialism is set in motion. because of this demand, present and future, european armies march over deserts and jungles, and slay thousands of natives in spectacular _battues_. to satisfy the needs of european populations and adventurers, millions of brown men toil in the crowded, dirty cities of india, on sun-lit plantations in java and egypt, in the cotton fields of nigeria and togo. to grasp this imperialism, to realise the big, pulsing, dramatic movement of it, one must view the peons on hennequin plantations, the barefoot mexican labourers in silver mines, the rack-rented fellaheen in the nile valley, the patient chinese and japanese toilers on the hawaiian sugar plantations. one must gain a sense of the dull ambitions and compulsions working on these men, the desire for the cheap products of manchester and chemnitz, the craving for liquor, the fear of starvation and of the lash. and as these coloured peoples toil, not knowing for what they toil, other men in london and paris, in berlin, brussels and new york are speculating in the securities which represent their toil. they are buying "kaffirs" as they once bought "yankee rails." seated in their offices, these white-faced men are irrigating deserts, building railroads through jungles and wildernesses, and secure in the faith that all men, black, yellow and brown, can be made to want things and work for things, are revolutionising countries they have never seen. even these organisers, these {97} seemingly omnipotent shapers of the world, are themselves only half-conscious agents of a vast economic process not solely desired by a class or nation but dictated by a far wider necessity. it is a process varied in its many-sided appeal; a process which reveals itself in the transfusion of capitalistic ideals by means of little school-houses in the philippines, by means of the strict and rather harsh justice in british colonies, by means of the unconscious teachings of christian missionaries, by means of the swift decay of ancient, tenacious faiths. it is a process linking the ends of the world, uniting the statesmen and financiers of the imperialistic nation with wretches in the swarming cities of the east, with half-drunken men seeking for rubber in tangled forests, with negroes searching over great expanses of country for the ivory tusks of elephants, with the kaffirs in the diamond mines who enter naked and depart naked, and whose bodies are examined each day to discover the diamonds which might be buried in the flesh. at one end of the line are the urbane diplomats seated about a table at some algeciras, at the other, in the very depths of distant colonies, there is slavery, flagellation, political and intellectual corruption, missionary propaganda, and the day to day business and planning of white settlers, who are anxious to make their fortune quick and get back to "god's own country." it is a process so vast, so compelling, so interwoven with the deepest facts of our modern life that our ordinary moral judgments seem pale and unreal in contact with it. and so too with religion. christianity which changed in its passage from judea to rome and from rome to the northern barbarians takes on again a new aspect when imperialistic nations encounter the peoples they are to utilise. this imperialistic christianity defends forced labour and slavery as an advance over a mere doing nothing. the parable of the ten {98} talents is the one christian doctrine in which the imperialist fervently believes. this modern imperialism, which compels subject peoples to work at extractive industries at the behest of the swarming millions of the industrial nations, which excites, stimulates, urges, pushes, forces coloured peoples to raise bananas and cotton and buy shirts, gew-gaws, and whiskey, is at bottom a movement compelled by the economic expansion and necessity of the older countries. it is an outlet for the pressure, strain and expansiveness of the growing industrial nations, an outlet for industrialism itself. it ranges the industrial nations as a whole against the backward agricultural countries, and binds them together into a forced union, in which the industrial nations guide and rule and the backward peoples are ruled. but while the industrial nations have a common interest in imperialism, they have also separating and antagonistic interests. though the nations would prefer to have any one of their number, england, germany or france, rule all tropical countries rather than go without tropical colonies at all, each nation, for economic, as well as political and military reasons, desires that it, and not its neighbour and competitor, should be the supreme colonial power. it is because of this fact that modern imperialism takes on the form of a bitter nationalistic competition for colonies, and leads to diplomatic struggles and eventually to war. [1] "white capital and coloured labour," pp. 80, 81. london, 1910. [2] the case for tropical imperialism is argued by dr. j. c. willis (director of the royal botanic gardens at ceylon) as follows: "in the present condition of the world the temperate zones cannot get on without the products of the tropics. the latter provide many things, such as rubber, tea, coffee, cinchona, jute, cane-sugar, spices, etc., which are among the necessaries of modern civilised life. the need for these has led to the settlement of europeans at trading stations in the tropics, at calcutta, malacca, calabar and many other places. once settled there, the insecurity of the traders and the inefficiency of the natives have led to the conquest of adjacent territories, until now most of the valuable areas in the tropics are in european or american hands." the conquering nations "work on the principle of governing the country for the benefit of the governed; but they must also so arrange matters that the tropical countries shall take their share in the progress of the world at large, and produce and export certain commodities for the benefit of that world which cannot get along properly without them. if the countries of the tropics can be made to progress so far that they shall themselves, with their own population, produce these things, so much the better; _but the things must be produced_."--"agricultural progress in the tropics,"--_science_, london, vol. v, pp. 48, 49. (my italics.) [3] "white capital and black labour," pp. 82-83. [4] in 1911 the exports for haiti amounted to a little over $3 and in 1912 to a little under $7 per capita; the exports of porto rico (to the united states and foreign countries) amounted to almost $40 per capita. [5] historically, of course, this theory was not the real motive behind the doctrine. that motive was the unwillingness of the united states to have strong, military nations in its immediate vicinity. [6] a failure to meet the requirements of the industrial nations does not necessarily involve a complete extinction of political independence. any measure of control, any merely reserved right, such as the united states retains in cuba, may suffice for the purpose. [7] "food, drink, tobacco, raw materials and produce and articles mainly unmanufactured." [8] owing to differences in method of classification, these comparisons are only approximate. [9] the _independent_, oct. 11, 1915. [10] for a brilliant statement of the growing significance of tropical products, see benjamin kidd, "the control of the tropics," new york, 1898, especially part i. [11] "tropical agriculture," new york and london, 1916, p. 33. [12] the case is analogous to that of the operation of cotton mills in the south. despite low wages and brutal exploitation of children, the introduction of these mills has automatically raised the standard of living, but the goal desired was not this but the quickest possible making of profits. [13] "no false philanthropy or race-theory," writes prof. paul rohrbach, one of the more humane of the german imperialists, "can prove to reasonable people that the preservation of any tribe of nomadic south african kaffirs or their primitive cousins on the shores of lakes kiwu or victoria is more important for the future of mankind than the expansion of the great european nations, or the white races as a whole. should the german people renounce the chance of growing stronger and more serviceable, and of securing elbow room for their sons and daughters, because fifty or three hundred years ago some tribe of negroes exterminated its predecessors or expelled them or sold them into slavery, and has since lived its useless existence on a strip of land where ten thousand german families may have a flourishing existence, and thus strengthen the very sap and force of our people?"--rohrbach, "german world policies" ("der deutsche gedanke in der welt.") translated by edmund von mach. new york (macmillan), 1915 (pp. 141-2.) [14] prof. paul s. reinsch, from whose admirable books i have drawn extensively in this description of colonial labour, rescues from undeserved oblivion an article by the rev. c. usher wilson on "the native question and irrigation in south africa," published in the _fortnightly_ for august, 1903. "a careful study of educated natives," writes this pious gentleman, "has almost persuaded me that secular education is not a progressive factor in social evolution. the salvation of a primitive people depends upon the force of christianity alone, special attention being paid to its all-important rule 'six days shalt thou labour.' ... in the education of the world it has ever been true that slavery has been a necessary step in the social progress of primitive peoples."--reinsch, "colonial administration," new york, 1912, p. 383. {99} chapter viii imperialism and war if the entire imperialistic process could be directed by one omniscient individual, representing the interest of all industrial and agricultural countries, the progress of imperialism would be regular, rapid and easy. or if one nation, say england, could take over all colonies and run them in the common interest of the industrial nations alone, imperialism would be robbed of its greatest peril, that of embroiling the nations in war. unfortunately we have hit upon no such device for preserving the common interest of imperialist nations, while safe-guarding their separate interests. each nation desires the biggest share for itself. imperialism is directed by the conflicting ambitions, crude pretensions and confident vanities of selfish nations, and in the conflicts of interest that break out, the soup is spilled before it is served. from an economic point of view, this special interest of the nations in imperialism, like their common interest, is three-fold: markets for manufactured products, opportunities to invest capital and access to raw materials. if trade never followed the flag, if india imported as much from germany as from great britain, and madagascar as much from austria as from france, if there were an absolutely open door in each colony and a real as well as legal equality for all merchants, there would be a weaker competition for the dominion of backward countries. {100} germans, englishmen and frenchmen might then compete on equal terms in morocco, egypt and southwest africa as they compete to-day in chile or argentina. but no such equality exists in countries controlled by european powers, and many of these colonies are consciously utilised in a bitter economic competition between the nations. to what such competition may lead is suggested in a sensational article in the _saturday review_ of almost twenty years ago. says the anonymous author of this article: "in europe there are two great, irreconcilable, opposing forces, two great nations who would make the whole world their province, and who would levy from it the tribute of commerce. england, with her long history of successful aggression, with her marvellous conviction that in pursuing her own interests she is spreading light among nations dwelling in darkness, and germany, bone of the same bone, blood of the same blood, with a lesser will-force, but, perhaps, with a keener intelligence, compete in every corner of the globe. in the transvaal, at the cape, in central africa, in india, and the east, in the islands of the southern sea, and in the far northwest, wherever--and where has it not?--the flag has followed the bible and trade has followed the flag, the german bagman is struggling with the english pedlar. is there a mine to exploit, a railway to build, a native to convert from breadfruit to tinned meat, from temperance to trade-gin, the german and the englishman are struggling to be first. a million petty disputes build up the greatest cause of war the world has ever seen. if germany were extinguished to-morrow, the day after to-morrow there is not an englishman in the world who would not be richer. nations have fought for years over a city or a right of succession, must {101} they not fight for two hundred and fifty million pounds of yearly commerce?"[1] no doubt this assertion of a complete opposition between british and german commerce and investment contains an element of exaggeration. in 1913 england was the greatest consumer of german goods and germany an excellent customer of great britain and the british colonies. if germany were to be extinguished, englishmen would be poorer, not richer. yet the competition between german bagman and english pedlar is real, and this commercial competition is merely an expression of a far more significant industrial competition. as german organisation, science, and technical ability build up iron, steel, machinery, chemical and other industries, british industry, though still growing, finds itself circumscribed. if national colonies can be utilised for special national advantage, financial, industrial or commercial, the attempt will be made. if trade and investment can be made to follow the flag, the nation has an interest in securing colonies. there is always a certain presumption that colonials, partly from tradition, and partly from commercial patriotism, will deal with their home country. the merchant in british colonies is familiar with british firms and trademarks and rather resents the necessity of becoming acquainted with foreign wares and the standing of foreign merchants. prices being equal, we patronise the people we know and like. investment also leads to trade. the englishmen who control the vast resources of india, tend, without compulsion, to buy of british merchants. the possession of even a free-trade colony often insures the retention of its most profitable commerce. it is true that this presumption in favour of the home {102} nation may be overborne. lower prices, better service, a more active and intelligent business propaganda may divert trade to foreign merchants. before the war, german manufacturers found an increasing market in british colonies, overcoming colonial prejudice as they overcame the prejudice in great britain itself. geographical nearness is even more decisive. thus canada is economically far more closely bound to the united states than to england. in 1913-14 we sold canada $3.11 worth of goods for every dollar sold by the united kingdom.[2] to jamaica our exports exceeded those of the united kingdom, while our imports from the island were over three times as great as the british imports.[3] the united states profits far more immediately from the economic development of canada and jamaica than does the united kingdom.[4] in the main, however, even under free trade, subtle influences are constantly at work to bring the colony into closer commercial relations with the home country. thus in 1913-14, 64 per cent. of the imports of british india came from the united kingdom, and other british dependencies showed a similar preponderance of trade with great britain.[5] the volume of the entire traffic between the home country and its colonies is overwhelming. in 1914, the united kingdom imported from british {103} possessions no less than â£205,173,000, or over 29 per cent. of its total imports, and exported to these british possessions â£179,350,000 or almost 42 per cent. of its total exports (of british produce).[6] this trade, which is increasing faster than the total trade of the united kingdom, is peculiarly valuable. from her overseas dominions great britain secures a far larger proportion of food products and raw materials than from foreign countries, and to these overseas dominions she sends a large proportion of manufactured goods, containing a high percentage of labour. thus, says prof. reinsch,[7] "from the point of view of the development and prosperity of national industry it is important that the exports of the nation should be composed largely of manufactured goods, the value of which includes as high as possible an amount of labour cost. the export of raw material, of coal, of food materials, and of machinery used in factories, cannot be considered of the highest advantage to the industrial life of a manufacturing country, nor is it most profitable from a national point of view to furnish foreign countries with ships, which help to build up their merchant marines." but according to the figures of 1903 "only 10 per cent. of the exports of british goods to the colonies consist of those commodities which the national industry derives relatively the least profit from, while for foreign countries the figure is 27 per cent."[8] {104} the general colonial trend has been in the direction of deliberately securing by legislative means a preferential advantage for the home country. "france," writes dr. wilhelm solf, former german secretary of state for the colonies, "has assimilated algeria and a portion of her colonies from the point of view of customs. she regards them almost completely as within her tariff boundaries, which fact gives french commerce the advantage over that of other nations trading with these colonies. in regard to her other colonies france has introduced preferential tariffs favouring the motherland, and reciprocally the colonies, which amount to as much as 85 per cent. of the normal duties. in tunis, likewise, france has favoured her own trade in important lines, such as grain, by admitting them free of duty when carried in french bottoms. portugal has introduced discriminating customs rates up to 90 per cent. of the regular tariff in favour of her own colonial shipping. spain has acted similarly. england also enjoys tariff advantages as high as 33 per cent. of the normal rate in her self-governing colonies. she has in this manner secured for british industry a market which, without this preference, she would not have been able to maintain to the same degree. likewise, the united states has to a large extent assimilated its colonies in customs matters. belgium has, it is true, no preferential tariff, but by means of her extensive system of concessions she has practically precluded the competition of other states and secured a monopoly in the trade with her own colonies."[9] {105} no such colonial preference amounts to a complete exclusion of the trade of competitors. the germans, not the english, are the chief purchasers of india cotton, and from the german colonies, diamonds go chiefly to antwerp, west african copper to the united states and belgium, and east african skins and hemp to north america. in many colonies and dependencies a complete legal equality of trade is maintained. on the whole, however, whether as a result of tariffs or of quiet discrimination by local authorities, the foreign merchant finds obstacles placed in his way and the trade goes to the home country. thus in 1914, of algerian imports 84 per cent. came from france, while of her exports 79 per cent. went to france.[10] the trade of all the other french colonies and dependencies tends also to go to france. thus of the import of all french colonies and dependencies (exclusive of algeria and tunis) 45 per cent. in 1913 came from france and french colonies, while of the exports 42 per cent. went to france and french colonies.[11] similarly in 1909 of the entire import and export trade of german colonies (exclusive of kiau-chau), 65.3 per cent. were with germany.[12] to the citizens of the home country go also the investment opportunities, the chances to secure concessions for mines, railroads and tramways. the legal right to these lucrative monopolies inheres in the nation that develops the backward country. this preferred position, this assured possession of a sole and undivided privilege is of the essence of imperialism. all the economic arguments for peace based upon the theory that trade heals enmities, {106} shatter upon this fact. free traders never tire of insisting that trade is reciprocally advantageous, blessing him who sells and him who buys; that the more trade there is, the more there is to get. they argue that england, germany, america and japan might continue until the end of time amicably exporting pianos and gingham aprons to the backward peoples, and receive in return unimaginable quantities of sugar, rubber and tobacco. but modern imperialism, extending its dominion ever further, is dreaming not alone of this field for competitive selling, but of concessions, monopolies, exclusive privileges, immensely lucrative pre-emptions. there are whole worlds to exploit, and whoever rules garners. when france extends her sway over north africa and develops these lands, the valuable concessions go to french corporations. the actual capital used comes in last analysis from the great capital fund of western europe, from french, english, belgian, dutch and german capitalists, and whoever wishes to make four or five per cent. may lend his money to the banks that lend to the development companies that invest in the new country. but the big profit--the cream--does not go to these petty ultimate investors but to the political and high finance promoters, and these are french if the enterprise is french. moreover, trade accompanies and follows investment, and if france secures control, the imported locomotives, rails, cars and mining machinery come from france. in morocco, france keeps the inside track, as does england in egypt and india, and germany in togo and east africa. let who will pick up the scraps.[13] {107} this prevailing monopolistic character of colonial exploitation led prior to the war of 1914 to great dissatisfaction among those powers, which were least favoured colonially. in germany liberal imperialists like paul arndt and friedrich naumann bewailed the fact that germany was industrially handicapped because of the meagreness of her colonial possessions. "germans," complained prof. arndt, "receive no railway, harbour, shipping, telegraph or similar concessions in english, russian, french, american and portuguese colonies. everywhere citizens are preferred to foreigners, which is easily explicable and in fact natural...."[14] as colony after colony is formed, the field for the free competition of germany with the world is narrowed, so that at last only countries like abyssinia, siam, china and above all the southern half of america remain independent and open. the french success in gaining and closing colonies arouses german envy. why is france's colonial empire more than two and a half times as large as that of germany? asks dr. naumann. how is france ahead of us? "we have beaten her in the field of battle, but she has recovered diplomatically. she is weaker in a military sense but in a political sense stronger."[15] between envying france her colonial empire and determining at some favourable opportunity to redress the inequality is but a short step. to discontent with the present is added fear for the {108} future. those nations, which are least blessed with colonies and which lack at home a broad agricultural base for the support of their industries, look anxiously towards a possible development, which will rob them not only of their markets and investment opportunities but also of their necessary raw materials. to the country ruling the colony belongs in last instance the right to decide what shall be done with its food and raw materials. suppose that australia, by a special arrangement with the mother country, lays a heavy duty upon all wool exported to other countries than great britain, and thus makes german competition in the woollen industry impossible. suppose the cotton supply of the united states is rendered dearer by some scheme of valorisation, like that which brazil applied to coffee exports, or by action of financial groups in america, or, given a change in the federal constitution, by an export duty on raw cotton. how then will germany compete? what could germany do if foreign nations shut her off from access to ores, foods and textiles? how could she solve the problem of a dwindling supply of iron ore? as population outstrips home production of raw materials, the dependence of industrial nations upon the countries producing such materials increases, and the fear arises that such foreign resources will be monopolised, and the excluded industrial nations forced to stop their advance and to descend in the scale of power. as this fear grows, the backward countries cease to be regarded as a common agricultural base and become merely separate national preserves. each nation strives by means of an exclusive possession of colonies to become self-sufficing. the competition for colonies becomes a struggle for national existence. in such a struggle for national existence, all vested rights go by the board. a nation needing outlets will pay {109} small heed to maxims concerning peace, internationalism and the status quo; it will ask for the title deeds of the nations that own what it wants. so long as germany, for example, felt that colonies were absolutely essential to her future prosperity, it mattered little to her that england and france had been first in the field, that they had planted and sowed in foreign fields while she was still struggling to secure national unity. "where were you when the world was divided?" the germans asked themselves, and they came to the belief that their own economic needs justified their colonial ambitions, wherever those ambitions might lead them. rather than have the world shut to them they were willing to make sacrifices and incur dangers. war, they held, was better than stagnation, poverty and famine. but for a country like germany colonial ambitions conflicting with those of other european powers are especially dangerous, because a struggle for africa or asia means battles in champagne, westphalia or posen. "the future of germany's world policy," said an author who wrote under the pseudonym "ruedorffer," "will be decided on the continent. german public opinion has not yet fully comprehended the interdependence of germany's military peace in europe and her freedom of action in her foreign enterprises."[16] though bismarck understood this interrelation, he was primarily interested in the european and not in the colonial situation. "bismarck," wrote ruedorffer, "looked upon the consolidation of germany's newly acquired unity as the first and principal task after the fortunate war with france. to divert the attention of france from the rhine {110} border, he favoured, as much as he could, french expansion in africa and asia. when, toward the end of his career, he attempted to secure, for a future colonial activity of germany, a few african tracts which had not yet been claimed by any other power, he was extremely careful not to encroach upon england's interests. he avoided pushing germany's claims beyond southwest africa and annexing the _hinterland_ of the cape colony, a territory to-day known as rhodesia.... bismarck kept germany's world policies within the limits which, according to his opinion, were prescribed by her continental policies." as german colonial ambition grew, however, partly as a result of her fear of exclusion from colonial markets and sources of supply, she began to fear that she might raise up enemies in europe itself. "in every enterprise," wrote ruedorffer, "whether on african, turkish, persian, or chinese soil, germany's policy will necessarily have to take account of the presumable reaction on the european political constellation. if germany encounters russian interests in turkey, in persia, or in china, she will thereby bind russia still more closely to immutable france; if she infringes upon england's interests in mesopotamia, she will see england on the side of her opponents." "this reciprocal dependence of world policies and continental policies constitutes, if you please, a _circulus vitiosus_, the vicious circle of germany's foreign policy. german enterprises abroad react on the continental policy, and it is under pressure from the continental policy that germany's world policies find their limitations." as a result germany, with potential enemies on all sides, was constantly oppressed by the _cauchemar des coalitions_, the nightmare of jealous hostile alliances. it is this dependence of colonial upon continental politics that intensifies the dangers of imperialism, increases {111} its ruthlessness and recklessness, and causes it to become a deadly conflict, with diplomacy _ã  la maniã¨re forte_ in the foreground, and in the background, war. the danger of war as a result of imperialism is immensely increased by the disunion and disequilibrium of europe. the continental nations are always embattled and ready to strike. it is not an accidental or transient condition but is rooted deep in geographical, historical and economic causes. europe, since history began, has been overfilled with clashing peoples and races with variant beliefs, traditions and languages, and with opposed economic interests. to grow, to prevent others from growing, these crowded groups went to war. it was no fault or vice of the europeans, but merely the tragic fact that there was no firm basis for european union. after the downfall of the western roman empire, no power was strong enough to dominate europe. the dreams of universal dominion of a charlemagne and of a rudolf of hapsburg remained dreams; the great, loose federations like the holy roman empire were no match for the smaller but more compact nations, which grew up after the middle ages. these new nations, moreover, inevitably meant increased antagonism, a perpetual struggle for more territory, more trade, more gold; a despotic, militaristic, fighting society. the age of the rise of nations was also that of professional armies under the direction of a despot, and of wars for the spoliation of still unorganised peoples, like the germans and the italians. if european union was difficult to achieve in past centuries, it has become even more difficult to-day. the last century has been the century of nationalities, a period during which nations and nationalistic groups developed consciousness. group consciousness is, of course, no new thing, for all groups, possessing survival quality, have {112} conceit, self-esteem and veneration for the bond that unites them and for all qualities, characteristics, experiences and institutions which distinguish them. to-day this group consciousness has become national consciousness, and the impulse towards nationalistic expression spreads and makes itself felt not only in organised nations but also among submerged, conquered and dispersed peoples like the czechs, poles, finns and irish. the clash of europe's hundreds of millions for a satisfactory existence upon an insufficient area is intensified by the marshalling of these millions into nationalistic groups, speaking different languages and ruled by hostile traditions. the antagonism is the worse because in many parts of europe history and geography have conspired to jumble ethnic and linguistic groups without mixing them. in bohemia, east prussia, dalmatia, macedonia and lorraine, hostile groups intermingle without fusing. though the last century has brought about a certain approximation of state boundaries to the boundaries of nationalities, the process is far from complete. about many nations there is a fringe of people of like nationality subject to other states. roumania, servia, italy, each has its _irredenta_; austria-hungary, russia and turkey are loose bundles of nationalities, hating each other, while the balkan states cannot discover any nationalistic principle upon which to divide up macedonia. each nationality seeks independence and strength to maintain itself against the encroachment of rivals, and this desire for self-preservation through size, causes a nationality, which has attained to nationhood, to oppress smaller nationalistic groups within its borders. the condition is artificial and anomalous. absurd nationalistic claims are advanced in defence of aggression, and while learned pan-slavs convert balkan {113} dwellers into russians, the dutch, flemings and danes are proved by pan-germans to be only germans once removed. the progress of democracy has intensified this nationalistic strife and made it a matter of _amour propre_. so long as no citizen had rights, it mattered little whether the king were german or hungarian. with the participation of the people in government, however, the subject nationalities feel themselves disgraced. the pole longs for a free democratic poland; he is not content to become german, austrian or russian. rather than surrender his nationality he is willing to tear up the map of europe and thrust the world into war. in this condition we have the seeds of perpetual conflict in europe. partly for the sake of increasing the national strength and partly for the benefit of certain financial groups, the lesser nationalities are ruthlessly exploited by the dominating nationality within a given country. the oppression of roumanians and slavs by the magyar ruling classes of hungary causes a deep revulsion of feeling in roumania, servia and other countries across the border, just as the ambitions of pan-germans to make germany a nationalistic state arouse the indignation of the french and the fears of the dutch and danes. moreover the nationalistic groups often discover that they have antagonistic economic interests. the danger of this situation is immensely increased by the fact that all these hostile nations impinge territorially on one another, and modern warfare gives an enormous advantage to the nation gaining the initial success. austria, belgium, france may be overrun and permanently defeated by a campaign of six or seven weeks, and it is difficult thereafter to retrieve these early defeats. {114} european nations therefore live in the fear of immediate attack and conduct a hair-trigger diplomacy. this is the true interpretation of _realpolitik_, of a nationally selfish policy, devoid of sentiment and laying an excessive emphasis upon immediate and material ends. a nation in danger of annihilation cannot indulge in the luxury of sentiment, cannot consider long time views, cannot be over-generous or trust to the generosity of rivals. each nation is compelled to enter into offensive and defensive alliances, and these alliances, perpetually suspecting each other, are compelled to prepare for instant war. but preparation for war under such conditions makes war inevitable. if a nation believes that it is to be assailed, five, ten or fifteen years from now, it is tempted to precipitate the "inevitable" war at the moment when its chances are the best. the doctrine of "the war of prevention," however perilous, is, in the prevailing circumstances, natural. it is meeting a supposedly inevitable danger half way. still another element adds to the menace of imperialism. just as a successful imperialistic policy depends upon the ability of the european nation to defend itself at home, so also it depends upon access to the colonies, upon a control of the seas. had spain been a hundred times as powerful on land as the united states, she still could not have defended cuba. were germany to secure valuable colonies, she could not be sure of their retention against england (which lies on germany's lines of communication), so long as the british possessed an overwhelming naval supremacy. it was therefore natural, and indeed inevitable, that, sooner or later, german colonial ambitions should find expression in a naval expansion, which, whatever the intentions of its promoters, was potentially a menace to the british empire and even to the very {115} existence of england. the desire for imperialistic expansion thus led, in the absence of any formula of reconciliation upon a higher plane, to an irrepressible conflict between england and germany, in short, to a world war. herein lay and still lies the peril of imperialism, the danger that for fifty years to come europe, and perhaps america also, will be again and again embroiled in wars immeasurably more destructive than were the long colonial wars of the eighteenth century. the present world war does not automatically end the imperialistic struggle. there is china to consider, there is the independence of latin america, to say nothing of colonies securely held for the time being by one or another of the european powers. the allies, if successful in this war, will not necessarily remain allies. the ambitions of england, of russia, of japan, not to speak of france, germany, italy and perhaps the united states, may come into conflict. nor upon the signing of a treaty of peace will the forces making for imperialism become extinct. in the future, as in the past, a nationalistic competition for colonies will carry with it the seeds of war. [1] the _saturday review_, volume lxxxiv, sept. 11, 1897. [2] our exports to canada in that year amounted to $410,786,000; those of the united kingdom, $132,071,000. our imports from canada were $176,948,000; the imports of the united kingdom, $222,322,000 (canadian figures). statesman's year book, 1915, p. 285. [3] jamaican imports (1913-14). from the u. s., â£1,326,723; from the u. k., 1,088,309. exports: to the u. s., â£1,396,086; to the u. k., â£424,491 (jamaican figures). statesman's year book, 1915, p. 327. [4] naturally our proportion of the trade would be still greater if canada and jamaica were within the american customs union. [5] statesman's year book, 1915, p. 149. [6] in 1913 the trade of the united kingdom with british possessions was still greater, though it formed in that year a smaller percentage of the entire trade of the country. statesman's year book, 1915, p. 77. the trade of the united kingdom with foreign countries was considerably less (in 1913) than was that of germany. [7] "colonial administration," pp. 210-11. [8] _op. cit._ "it has further been shown that in the foreign trade of great britain the export of manufactured goods is declining while that of raw material and machinery is increasing." [9] "germany's colonial policy," in "modern germany in relation to the great war." new york, mitchell kennerley, 1916, p. 152. see also "british white book," a report on colonial preferences given in various countries. oct. 21, 1909, no. 296. for an able analysis of the results of the open and the closed door in colonies see jã¶hlinger (otto), "die koloniale handelspolitik der weltmachte," (_volkswirtschaftliche zeitfragen_) vol. xxxv, berlin, 1914. [10] statesman's year book, 1915, pp. 893-94. [11] statesman's year book, 1915, p. 882. [12] but the whole trade was small, amounting to less than 1 per cent. of the entire foreign trade (in 1909) of germany. [13] in his defence of german colonial policy, dr. solf makes much of the fact that of the total sum of 500,000,000 marks invested in german colonies, no less than 89,000,000 marks belongs to foreigners. but this means that germany which has little capital to export has invested over 82 per cent. and all the other countries of the world less than 18 per cent. moreover the character of the investment, not the absolute amount, is significant. competitive investment, as in a brewery or cotton factory, does not bring the same profit as does a concession for a railroad, tramway or bank. [14] paul arndt. "grundzã¼ge der auswã¤rtigen politik deutschlands," quoted by ludwig quessel, _sozialistische monatshefte_, vol. 19, ii, june 12, 1913. [15] fr. naumann. die hilfe, nov. 16, 1911. quoted by ludwig quessel. "auf dem weg zum weltreich." _sozialistische monatshefte_, vol. 19, 1913. [16] ruedorffer, j. j., "grundzã¼ge der weltpolitik in der gegenwart," stuttgart und berlin, 1914, quoted by paul rohrbach, "germany's isolation" ("der krieg und die deutsche politik"). chicago, 1915. {116} chapter ix industrial invasion the direct competition between great industrial nations for the products and profits of the backward countries would suffice to create an international antagonism even if no other economic forces contributed to this result. closely though not obviously bound to this struggle for colonies, however, is an equally intense struggle among the industrial nations to force their way economically into each other's home territory. germany, it is alleged, forces her way industrially into france, switzerland, italy, belgium and holland. she penetrates these countries economically, crushes their industries, forces upon them her own industrial products, extracts from them the profits which should go to their own manufacturers. industrially, commercially, financially she seeks to rule italy and belgium as great britain rules the argentine or canada. she holds these countries, so it is claimed, in industrial non-age. it is all a quiet economic infiltration, a matter of buying and selling and of lawful contracts, but it is none the less war. "war is war," admits prof. maurice milloud, a student of this phenomenon of german industrial expansion, "but make no mistake that it is war."[1] within the last few years there have appeared numerous books by french, swiss, belgian and italian[2] {117} publicists attacking the policy by which germany prior to the war secured a partial control of her neighbouring markets. with the merits of this controversy and with the morality or immorality of the procedure, we need not concern ourselves. to us the only point of interest is the nature of the economic forces leading to such a conflict and the effect of this conflict in creating national animosity and in inciting to war. all the industrial nations export to one another as well as to the agricultural countries. why, then, is germany's course so bitterly resented? at first glance one might suppose that the chief objection to this german enterprise lay in its ruthlessness and economic terrorism. a french manufacturer of formic acid is crushed outright by a sudden price reduction; a swiss or italian manufacturer is ruined by being spied upon by his own employã©s in the pay of a german competitor. but the main objection to the german competition seems to be its formidableness. germany exports not only wares but men, and in all the neighbouring countries are to be found german chemists, engineers, business men and clerks. it is claimed that these pioneers hold together, advance together, maintain the cult of _deutschtum_ in an alien country, and act as agents for the home industry. it is also claimed that germany "dumps" her goods on foreign markets, thus causing losses or even total destruction to rival industries. yet all these things have been done before, and even the nations which object are not always innocent of like practices. what is deeply resented, however, is that the german competition is a disciplined state-aided competition, that it is collective rather than individual. the belgian, italian or dutch {118} manufacturer feels that behind his german competitor stand the gigantic power and resources of the whole german nation. it is not individual germans who compete, but germany; a patient, resourceful, long-sighted germany, willing to make temporary sacrifices for permanent gains, a germany forced to expand industrially and bending its immense wealth and power to this one purpose. against such an organised body what can a single manufacturer avail? the means at germany's disposal in this invasion of near-lying markets are varied and great. industry is organised; the german has a genius for organisation. in all the near-lying countries, concerns with german connections open up a wide channel for the incoming wares. in antwerp, in rotterdam, in zurich, a large part of the big business is in german hands. german banks are established and these aid directly or indirectly in the importation of german commodities. moreover, the germans are better informed than any of their rivals concerning all the minute knowledge necessary to the conquest of a local market. their business plans are not only far flung but meticulous; they have a card-index method of study and their training is admirably adapted to just these methods of commercial penetration. no such penetration would be possible, however, but for the intelligence with which german industry is conducted at home. in germany the scientifically trained man is more highly regarded than in any other country. the chemist, the engineer, the specialist of every sort is called into consultation and the laboratory is united to the factory. the vast expense of maintaining a corps of inventors forever working at new problems is more than compensated for by the frequent technical improvements which result from their studies. the scientific men employed by {119} the german chemical factories have revolutionised methods and given germany almost a monopoly in this rapidly growing industry. in germany also, as in america, there is a willingness to discard old methods and machinery, whatever the initial expense. in a few years the losses due to the change are retrieved and the german business is creating values more efficiently than ever. such an industry must in its nature be immensely productive. the germans, like the americans, are successful in mass production, the fashioning of vast quantities of cheap, standardised articles. factories tend to grow larger. formerly competing concerns are united into associations or cartels, which buy or sell in common, save a vast amount of unnecessary friction within the trade and act as a clearing house for information and ideas. a high protective tariff enables these cartels to maintain a remunerative price in the home market while dumping their surplus products upon foreign markets. what this "dumping" may mean for manufacturers in the countries upon which the wares are dumped may be made clear by an example. "the german ironmasters," writes prof. milloud, "sell their girders and channel iron for 130 marks per ton in germany, for 120 to 125 in switzerland; in england, south america and the east for 103 to 110 marks; in italy they throw it away at 75 marks and _make a loss of from 10 to 20 marks per ton_, for the cost price may be reckoned at 85 to 95 marks per ton."[3] other iron products have been sold by germans in italy far cheaper than they could be sold or even produced in germany, with the result that the struggling italian iron industry is hardly able to exist. nor is this dumping a mere temporary expedient to relieve the german manufacturer of an unexpected surplus. it is {120} systematic, organised and intentional, designed to destroy competitors and establish a monopoly. it is a procedure with which we in america are unpleasantly familiar, since it has been long the practice of our trusts to destroy competition in a circumscribed local market by temporarily reducing prices and then to raise prices after the competitor is _hors de combat_. the most striking difference between the flooding of adjacent markets by german cartels and the destruction of competitors by american trusts is that in the former case the operation is international, and the manufacturers who suffer live in one country and those who profit in another. moreover, the german government is itself directly concerned in the process. not only is the government one of the associated concerns in certain cartels, but by its railroad policy it gives an immense impetus to dumping. railroad rates are cheaper if the commodity carried is to be exported. to take one out of a thousand instances "the freight of a double wagon of german coal from duisbourg to hamburg, a distance of 367 kilometers, costs 57 marks, whilst, in the reverse direction, from the sea-board to the industrial centres in the interior, the freight charge is 86 marks in the case of german coal, and as high as 93 in the case of foreign coal."[4] the government grants an export bounty upon coal (and other commodities) in the shape of reduced transportation rates. we need not study in detail the vastness and complexity of that integration of german industry, which permits it to act as a unit in its invasion of near-lying territories. we need not recount the almost vertiginous growth of the german banking system, with its tendency towards a narrow concentration, its bold conduct and control of german industry and its establishment of {121} branch organisations in the countries to be invaded. nor need we consider the practice of long credits by which german manufacturers secure a foothold in new markets or the system by which german capital, labour and intelligence migrate to the foreign country, and as branches of a german concern, continue the process of dumping from within. the significant fact is that the entire process is organised and thought out. it is a concrete national policy for securing german economic control in neighbouring industrial countries. nothing could better illustrate the collective nature of this economic invasion than the history of the german cartels. "it is evidently to the cartels," writes fritz-diepenhorst, "that germany owes in great measure the conquest of foreign markets."[5] the german cartel differs from the trust in that it does not represent the absorption of weaker rivals by one powerful concern but is a federation of business units which retain their legal independence but surrender a part of their industrial and commercial autonomy. in the beginning the german cartels represented an effort to regulate prices in the home market, but after the adoption of a protective tariff and during the period when germany launched out upon a policy of large-scale exportation, the cartels grew in numbers and power. their policy was to maintain prices at home and sell at a lower rate abroad. but this policy, owing to a near-sighted individualism, injured the german export industry itself. the coal cartel determined its policy irrespective of the interests of the coke cartel, which in turn fixed its prices irrespective of the interests of the iron industry. as a result vast {122} quantities of raw materials and semi-manufactured products were shipped abroad at prices which permitted the foreign manufacturer of finished wares to undersell the german manufacturer. it was a boomerang dumping, which worked to the advantage of the dumped and to the disadvantage of the dumper. within the last fifteen years, however, and especially since the report in 1903 of the german parliamentary commission on cartels, this early anarchy has been gradually abolished, and arrangements have been made by which a cartel grants lower prices not only for its own exports but also for such part of its home-sold product as is to be used in the manufacture of more highly finished wares, which are in turn to be exported. the coal used in iron manufactures that are to be shipped to foreign countries is sold cheaper than the coal used in iron manufactures which are not to be exported. a community of interest among the cartels is thus created. the result is an amazing industrial solidarity. "the individual exporter disappeared in the cartel, and the cartel itself is absorbed in this sort of cartel of cartels, which ends by becoming the german industry.... for an economic guerilla warfare there is substituted a mass action, a veritable strategy."[6] the excesses of dumping are cured and dumping becomes a national economic policy. but how can this organised conquest of adjacent industrial countries be averted without some alternative method for the economic expansion of a highly organised industry? the same forces that push germany and england into an imperialistic policy and into a conquest of the markets of agricultural countries also force them into a competition to secure the markets of industrial countries. the two processes are not quite alike, since the trade between, {123} let us say, brazil and germany is a complementary and mutually beneficial commerce, while the dumping of german rails and girders on italy is a competition or war between two industrial nations. the impulse and motive in both cases is, however, the same. it is the desire to increase buying power. germany can secure more of the wool of australia and of the wheat of the argentine if she can establish even a limited economic dominion over adjoining countries. it is the lack of a sufficient home market that forces germany to dump her goods on switzerland and belgium just as it forces england to sell largely to her colonies and to invest in backward countries. how far this policy of industrial invasion can safely go is one of the interesting international problems of the future. it is of course not the desire of any country to sell permanently below cost to the foreigner, since such a policy means, if not actual loss, at least a diminution of profits.[7] germany would prefer to get the same price for her girders in england and italy as she does at home. but she must take what she can get. her industry is based upon a productiveness in excess of the demands of the home market, and she is under the necessity of paying for large importations of food and raw material and of profitably employing increasing numbers of workmen. her industrial invasion of neighbouring countries is alternative and supplementary to an attempt to secure a {124} needed colonial market. it is, parenthetically, a necessity imposed upon an industrial nation menaced by a constantly growing population. be this policy of invasion ever so well organised, however, it cannot escape inherent limitations and obstacles. the german export policy maintained itself only by holding up prices at home, which meant an increased cost of living and a rise in money wages. the imposition of tariffs by neighbouring countries meant an increase in the difficulties to be overcome in exportation and a reduction in the net profits of the foreign trade. to a considerable extent this export of cheapened goods was at the mercy of the importing nations, which, at any moment, might levy prohibitory duties. at the best the whole development led to strong opposition and prejudice, to counter-attacks, to the violation of favouring commercial treaties and to the imposition of punitive duties (as in the canadian tariff) especially aimed at dumpings. in the opinion of many observers, the policy provided an insecure base for a top-heavy industry, with the result that in germany industrial crises were frequent and destructive and the economic development showed the weaknesses of a forced growth. it is too early to pass judgment upon the relative success or failure of this industrial invasion. prof. milloud believes that the policy by 1914 had demonstrated its failure, and that the fear of an industrial _dã©bacle_ forced germany to escape from an impossible economic position by throwing europe into war. how far this is true it is difficult to determine.[8] it is evident, however, that the {125} difficulty of this german penetration of adjacent countries must have intensified a desire for an easier market in the colonies. the italian trade for which germany fought so hard must have seemed unremunerative and unpromising as compared with the practically monopolised market which france possessed in north africa or with that which germany could obtain through the bagdad railway and the penetration of asia minor. the sharpness of the conflict for nearer lying markets illustrated anew the necessity of securing colonial outlets. if, however, the competition among industrial countries to secure each other's markets results in national antagonism, the competition of the same nations for the exclusive possession of colonies and dependencies leads, as we have seen, to an equally bitter struggle. the choice seems to lie between the devil and the deep sea. it is no wonder therefore that as the rapid expansion of industry brings the great nations into ever keener antagonism, voices are raised against the whole imperialistic policy. just as the german consumer objects to paying high prices for german commodities which the belgian or italian can buy cheap, so also opposition is encountered to a policy of extending colonial development at the expense and imminent risk of the nation and to the obvious benefit of certain preferred classes in the community. [1] "the ruling caste and frenzied finance in germany." boston, 1916, p. 104. [2] see in the first instance milloud, _op. cit._, and prof. henri hauser, "les mã©thodes allemandes d'expansion economique," paris, 1916. also g. preziosi, "la germania alia conquista dell' italia," florence, 1915. [3] _op. cit._, pp. 104-5. his italics. [4] milloud, _op. cit._, p. 110. [5] _revue ã©conomique internationale_, 1914, ii, p. 259, quoted from hauser (h.) "les mã©thodes allemandes d'expansion ã©conomique," p. 106. [6] hauser, h., _op. cit._, p. 128. [7] the goods exported to foreign countries may show a profit if they are sold at a price less than the average cost of production but greater than the marginal cost. if it costs $100 a unit to produce a million units of a given product for the home market and only $70 a unit to produce an additional 100,000 units then there is a profit in permanently selling this extra amount at any price above $70. to break down a foreign competition it may pay _temporarily_ to sell at 60 or even 30 dollars, in order to raise prices again after competition is destroyed. [8] prof. milloud's argument based upon the relative growth of british and german exports is far from conclusive. he shows that in the period from 1890-1903 to 1904-08 the german export trade increased only 75 per cent while the british export trade increased 79 per cent. if we consider the statistics for the subsequent period, 1909 to 1913 (which figures were quite accessible to prof. milloud), we find that the german export industry increased much more rapidly than did that of britain. {126} chapter x the revolt against imperialism what determines whether a backward country is to be exploited by its own people or by some beneficent imperialistic power is not any consideration of its own welfare, but the chance of profits held out to certain adventurous financiers in the capitals of europe. these modern pioneers are a ruthless, dangerous group, with the bold, speculative imagination that has marked adventurers since the world began. they have a domestic and a foreign morality, an ethics for home consumption and a fine contempt for "greasers" and "niggers." they know the difference between five per cent. and twenty per cent., and their business consists in investing their money at high rates of profit (because the enterprise is hazardous) and then in taking out the hazard by making their home government compel the fulfilment of their impossible contracts. the methods of these men are monotonously similar. they lend, they invest, they support revolutions, they invoke "the protection of the flag." they need not pay attention to the public opinion of the backward countries; they do not believe such countries have a public opinion. all that these speculators need is the support of their home government, and that they may secure through bribery, newspaper influence and patriotism. the first two cost money and are worth all they cost; the third can be had for {127} nothing. as for the excuse for intervention, it is that used by the wolf when he took a fancy to the lamb. money is loaned at usurious rates to some rogue who poses in history as the president of the lamb republic or to some spendthrift imbecile of a khedive. concessions are secured. by a concession in this instance is meant a solemn contract, by which, for and in consideration of nothing, duly paid in hand, the whole nation, its territory and population, are turned over in perpetuity. the negotiations are ratified by a battle cruiser; a few marines are landed, a few barelegged natives are buried in a tropical back-yard, a treaty of peace and amity is concluded between the imperial power and its latest morsel, and the real business of imperialism begins. it is good business and pays big dividends. but to whom do the dividends go? what profit has the french artisan or peasant in all these grand concessions from the illustrious sultan of morocco? how does the english workman prosper when english capital employs cheap indian labour to undersell british factories? obviously the immediate profits accrue to large capitalists rather than to the mass of the people. if a french peasant can invest his savings in morocco, he may earn a few extra dollars per year on his holdings of a thousand francs, but his whole interest payment forms a small proportion of his annual income. to the financier, on the other hand, who directs the investment of hundreds of millions, a concession in morocco is of value. the case of french foreign investments is pertinent. as a result of the activity of great bankers, who rule both finance and politics, some forty billion francs have been invested in foreign countries. the individual investor has little choice and no intelligent direction in these large affairs. it is even possible that the whole course of french {128} investments has been disadvantageous; that too much french capital has been sent abroad to cultivate foreign fields (or pay for war preparations) and too little has been absorbed at home. the profit to bankers does not prove that the loans are equally profitable to the nation. in any definite imperialistic policy, as that in morocco, this difference in interest between the directors and small owners of capital becomes even clearer. the promoters can afford even to risk war, while for the small investor, who, after all, can invest elsewhere, the net gain is less apparent, especially as the war, if it comes, must be fought by him and be paid for by him. from the beginning, therefore, a revolt or opposition has been manifested (in certain sections of the industrial nations) to the whole principle and policy of imperialism. this revolt relies for support upon those elements in the population who believe either that they are not benefited by imperialism or only slightly benefited. liberal and socialistic sentiment forms the core and centre of this opposition. for the most part the socialists are theoretically opposed to imperialism on the ground that it is immoral, brutal, anti-democratic and uneconomic. it does not, they believe, pay the people who in the end pay for it. this anti-imperialistic philosophy of the socialists is chiefly derived from the anti-colonial attitude of the liberals of the early nineteenth century. that attitude was founded on opposition to special trade privileges, which was the basis of the old colonial policy, and also on the belief that colonies did not benefit the mother country. in the middle of the eighteenth century turgot had declared that "colonies are like fruits which cling to the tree only till they ripen," and he predicted that "as soon as america can take care of herself, she will do what carthage did." when the american colonies later fulfilled this prediction {129} by securing their independence, and when it was perceived that this separation did not lessen england's commerce with america, the opponents of colonialism, who were also advocates of free trade, were reinforced in their convictions. the only true extension was trade, and to secure trade political domination was unnecessary. it was by no means contended even by the most doctrinaire free trader that an increase in the population and wealth of new countries, such as the united states and canada, was undesirable. all they opposed was political dominion by the home country and the adoption of a restrictive trade policy. similarly the orthodox socialists of to-day make a sharp distinction between colonisation and imperialism, between the acquisition, by conquest or otherwise, of lands suitable for settlement and the seizure of populous countries to which emigration is impossible. in this distinction it is not the intention but the fact that counts; whatever the motives of the explorers, the new country becomes a colony if it furnishes homes. such colonising is a direct national gain, benefiting all classes. the redemptioner, who was carried off to the british settlements in america, did in the end improve his economic condition, and his descendants, like those of the free immigrants, now form the population of the country. on the other hand tropical dominions, like porto rico or egypt, can provide profits for investors but no homes for settlers. this distinction negates by definition the claim that imperialism is an outlet for a redundant population. of the emigrants from the united kingdom during the last thirty years only a microscopic percentage went to britain's tropical colonies. in british india in 1911 only one in every two thousand was british born. similarly, most french, german, belgian and dutch colonies furnish no {130} outlet to the surplus populations of these nations. even in algeria the europeans constitute only one-seventh of the population, and in tunis only about one-tenth. the entire european population in all german, french and british possessions (exclusive of the five self-governing colonies), is less than the net immigration to the united states every two or three years.[1] the opponents of imperialism moreover claim that all the regions fit for colonisation are already pre-empted. there is room for many millions in the five self-governing colonies of great britain, as there is in siberia and south america, but where can place be found in regions newly acquired by imperialism? where can homes be had to-day for some twenty million germans (the excess of german population in a single generation), to say nothing of tens of millions of italians, british, austrians and poles? it is frequently claimed that the new medical science, which conquers tropical diseases, will make these regions habitable by the whites. but though the sanitary improvement in the canal zone permitted thousands of americans to help build the canal, it did not result in the actual physical work of construction being performed by white men. despite sanitary improvements, the jamaica negro could endure a hard day's work under the tropical sun far better than a man from illinois. the economic advantage of the lower-priced coloured labour is still more decisive. while in the highly organised industries of england, germany or the united states, high wages frequently mean small labour cost, in the lower-geared industries of the tropics the coloured man, black or yellow, easily holds his {131} own. since the european excess of births over deaths is about forty millions per decade, the impossibility of finding a place for this excess population in tropical and subtropical countries is manifest. if the countries still to be overrun are not adapted for colonisation, the benefits accruing from imperialism, according to these anti-imperialists, will go to merchants, manufacturers and investors and not to wage-earners. it is often claimed that this trade which arises from an imperialistic policy is not great enough to exercise a beneficent influence upon the fortunes of the masses. prof. hobson, writing in 1902, states that during the period since 1870, when great britain launched into its latest imperialistic policy, british foreign commerce did not grow as rapidly as population, and actually declined in proportion to wealth. the british colonies increased their trade with other nations more rapidly than with the home country. the newly acquired colonies, the last fruits of imperialism, were the least profitable. their commerce was small, fluctuating and of low quality. mr. hobson therefore comes to the conclusion "that our modern imperialistic policy has had no appreciable influence whatever upon the determination of our external trade."[2] when we consider individual countries which have been the cause of much rivalry and dissension, we discover that their commerce is often extremely small. france has almost monopolised the trade of martinique, but in 1913 her total trade with that country was less than a sixtieth of her trade with the united kingdom and less than a fiftieth {132} of her trade with germany. the specifically tropical countries, for which the nations are fighting, do not have a commerce worth a fraction of the cost of their acquisition.[3] nor are the investments in the imperialistic domain nearly so large as those in countries over which the european nations exercise no political control. france has invested largely in russia and the balkans; germany has put capital into the united states, south america and asia minor; england has gigantic sums in countries over which she exercises no dominion. the profits from imperialistic investments are merely a bonus. though they loom large in the popular imagination, they are only a small part of the national income, and even at the best these profits go to capitalists and not to the people. moreover, what advantage is it to the wage-earner to have his country's wealth exported beyond his reach? concerning this movement towards absentee ownership of capital, the widest divergence of opinion prevails. the optimists among the investing classes find it all good and sanctified by its results. the exportation of capital, they hold, not only fructifies the waste places of the world but does not decrease the capital in the exporting country, since it raises the rate of interest and thus stimulates saving. but such a rise in the interest rate means an increase in the cost of living and a reduction in the real wages of labour. in so far as it goes into competitive industrial enterprises abroad, it lessens the opportunity of labour at home. thus if british capital, exported to india, is used to erect cotton mills in calcutta, india will import fewer cotton goods from england, and british capital will be employing {133} indian labour and throwing british labour out of employment. this situation is analogous to that which was created when northern textile manufacturers, instead of increasing their new england plants, built mills in georgia, thus transferring the demand for employment from the north to the south. it is further contended by these opponents of imperialism that the export of capital is profoundly demoralising to the exporting nation, which ceases, in a real sense, to be industrial, and becomes financial. gradually the nation, with a large fixed income derived from foreign labour, ceases to care for its export industry, loses its intensity and keen application to business, becomes conservative in the technique of production, and, being no longer interested in the development of home industries (since its gains come from abroad), converts hundreds of thousands of industrial wage-earners into liveried house-servants, who minister to the cultivated wants of a sport-loving and decoratively idle upper class. the effect of this development upon england, the classic land of capital export, is portrayed in an acute study by dr. schulze-gaevernitz.[4] the author shows how the steadily mounting income derived by great britain from foreign investments has led to a relative restriction of the field of employment in home manufacturing industries. in 1851 23 per cent. of the population of england and wales were workers in the chief industries as compared with only 15 per cent. a half century later.[5] imports increase; exports do not increase proportionately. an ever larger proportion of the population becomes rentiã©rs, {134} "living on the sweat of coloured labour, whom it is their first interest to hold in political subjection." some of these rentiã©rs, large and small, are wholly unoccupied or only half occupied. they are sleeping partners, briefless barristers, professors of professions which do not exist. to these income-receivers or rentiã©rs, whom schulze-gaevernitz estimates at a million, must be added enormous numbers of servants and lackeys, who are paid, though indirectly, from the kimberley mines and investments in the argentine. upon the industry of the backward countries these idle and semi-idle people make increasing demands, and industry becomes a production of luxuries. in the meantime the nation falls behind in its competition with more purely industrial countries like germany and the united states. in the machine industry, in ship-building, in applied chemistry england does not hold her own.[6] her technique of production, her methods in commerce and banking become old-fashioned and ineffective; her invention (as measured by the issuance of patents) does not keep pace with that of her chief competitors. and all this conservatism does not inhere in the british character (for formerly the briton revolutionised the world) but is attributable to the fact that great britain is pre-eminently a _rentnerstaat_, a country of pensioners and creditors, increasingly independent and careless of its foreign export, and of the industries which formerly kept that export going.[7] {135} there is some exaggeration but also much truth in this description of a _rentnerstaat_. psychologically the account fits the englishman less exactly than the frenchman, who is industrially less venturesome. moreover from the individual's view-point it makes little difference whether his fixed income is derived from abroad or at home. economically, however, the influence of a large class of individuals living by foreign industry is difficult to exaggerate. their interests are abroad; at home they are concerned chiefly with the maintenance of low prices. the nation becomes in a sense parasitic, living without effort upon the "lesser breeds" in all parts of the world. whatever its evil results, however, there is little reason to believe that any nation will willingly surrender the income on its foreign investments or cease to export new capital if conditions are favourable. the interest-receiving nations are the world's aristocrats, happy in their favoured position, and if they can thus live partly on their past labour they see no reason for receiving less or working more. the social evils resulting at home from such a condition can be cured by changes in taxation and the distribution of wealth, by legislation which gives a greater part of the income from foreign investments to the nation as a whole, and thus forces the rentiã©rs back into industrial life. so long, however, as foreign investment is essential to the widening of the agricultural base of industrial nations, it will not be stopped by its beneficiaries.[8] those who advocate a complete cessation of the export {136} of capital,[9] therefore, might as well argue against its accumulation. you could not stop it if you wished, and would be none the wiser for wishing it. the export of capital is merely an export of goods, paid for in credit instead of in goods, and the only way to prevent credit from coming into the country is the suicidal method of expelling the creditor. it is unlikely, therefore, that this movement will cease until the demand for capital is fairly equalised throughout the world, until the backward nations of to-day are sated with capital or have themselves become industrial countries. the danger lies in exactly the opposite direction, not in an abstention by wealthy nations from investing abroad, but in so keen, unscrupulous and rough-handed a competition for the right to invest as to result in war. this danger of war is the final argument of anti-imperialists. they argue that the sacrifices which result in increased profits to investors and merchants are made by the masses who profit least from such investment. not only do the people pay for the armaments to secure political domination, but also for the wars, which in these days of clashing imperialistic ambitions are an ever-present possibility. so long as the imperialistic scramble continues war will be inevitable. for no new dominion can be secured without threatening the interests or pretensions of rival imperial nations. the vastly extended empires are cheek by jowl. an extension of one power anywhere menaces the colonies of another nation; rival colonial ambitions merge with strategical questions. just as the united states will not endure japan on the west coast of mexico, nor england germany on the west coast of morocco or on the persian gulf, so each nation fears the approach of other nations to its most distant {137} possessions. immediately even visions arise of coaling stations, from which great fleets may later issue, to be followed by transports of disciplined troops. in the seventeenth century england, france, spain and holland could hold colonies in north america and be reasonably out of each other's way. in the twentieth century, this is no longer possible. the increased cost of war adds to the opposition of these democratic groups. no longer is war a mere isolated venture of a single nation, but a conflict between alliances on a scale utterly unthought-of in former generations. no conceivable gain derived from any colonial venture of the last fifty years could compensate for the mere economic losses involved in the present war, to say nothing of the loss of life, the maiming and crippling of young men and the disruption of international bonds. and if war costs much so also does the preparation for war. until some mutual accommodation can be secured, even the most pacific nation must bear the burden of increasing armaments. there is a still deeper antagonism to these imperialistic ventures. from the beginning, the dominant classes in societies which are developing towards democracy have used foreign adventure to allay domestic discontent and to oppose democratic progress. when war is begun or even threatened it is too late to speak of uninteresting and seemingly petty internal reforms. between industrial and political democracy on the one hand and a policy of foreign adventures on the other, there is an inevitable opposition. it is not that the political and industrial interests of the dominant classes favour war, but rather a policy involving the constant fear of war. this fear itself is worth millions. it means a huge vested interest in the creation {138} of munitions and armaments. it means political quiescence and domination by a financial-military group. but for the fear of war and the imperialistic policies which kept this fear alive, the militaristic _junker_ class of germany could not have maintained its domination.[10] to disband the german army would cost these landed proprietors more than would a russian invasion. and a similar if lesser conflict in class interest is found in france, england, austria and to a certain extent in the united states. in all countries, the imperialistic policy, even when it redounds ultimately to the nation's advantage, is a class policy used to further class purposes. in europe, however, it is difficult for democratic leaders to make headway against imperialism. for the tragedy of the situation lies in the fact that where nations are constantly on the watch against each other, the imperialistic motive is interwoven with other motives of self-defence and nearer territorial aggression. if germany is intent upon war, and if her road leads over france, then france must arm. to be effective in defence, she must have {139} universal service, professional officers, a true military spirit, a certain degree of autocracy in military arrangements, as well as offensive and defensive alliances, not based on a true community of interest or similarity of ideals, but upon the need of beating back the foe. if england fears german aggression she cannot afford to maintain an isolation however magnificent, but is obliged to enter into alliances, _ententes_ and secret engagements. for if you play the game you must play it according to the rules. moreover, if you have the armament and alliances necessary for defence, you are tempted to use them for an aggressive and imperialistic policy. indeed, such an imperialistic policy may actually form the cement of your alliances. all these considerations lame and thwart the movement against imperialism. moreover, the problem of governing the backward countries remains. for their own sake you cannot leave them alone, and the abstention of one nation merely makes the imperialistic ventures of other nations easier. if governments refrain from organising backward countries, the private capitalistic exploitation of these regions will be more ruthless than ever. the anti-imperialists are thus faced with a difficult situation which they cannot meet with _a priori_ argument and pious formula. with them or without them, some form of co-operation must be effected between industrial and agricultural nations as well as some form of control over countries incapable of self-government. there is need for a definite, concrete democratic policy for the government of such backward countries. [1] in the philippines in 1914, out of a total population of almost nine millions (8,937,597), less than 20,000 were europeans and americans, including troops. the density of the native population is greater than that of indiana and over three times that of the united states as a whole. [2] "imperialism," p. 35. a survey of more recent figures somewhat modifies these conclusions of mr. hobson. the statistics of 1913 prove that british commerce with british colonies has not only greatly increased but has increased faster than british commerce with foreign countries. trade with canada, australia, india, egypt, new zealand and the straits has grown steadily and rapidly. [3] this argument, however, is not entirely conclusive, since it concerns itself with the _present_ trade exclusively. the profits in 1755 on the trade with canada would not have justified great britain in seeking to acquire it. [4] "britischer imperialisms und freihandel." [5] in the chief industries there were 4,074,000 out of a population of 17,928,000 in 1851 and 4,966,000 out of a population of 32,526,000 in 1901. [6] no such criticism can apply to the relative british decline of such crude industries as the production of coal and raw iron, since it is natural and desirable for more highly developed industrial nations to go over increasingly from the cruder to the more refined and differentiated forms of production. [7] "as we look back, we survey the long road which england has traversed in a century. towards the end of the eighteenth century the leading man was the landlord and behind him the _breitspurig_ comfortable farmer; towards the middle of the nineteenth century it was the manufacturer and behind him the industrial workers, ripening into trade unionists and members of co-operative societies; to-day it is the financier and behind him the broad masses of the _rentiã©rs_." _op. cit._, p. 322. [8] there may, however, be regulation, although this is, for any one nation, a difficult operation. [9] see burgess' "homeland." [10] in his celebrated book, "the nation in arms," the late field-marshall von der goltz shows how necessary is the sense of the imminence of war to the maintenance of the prestige of the officer class, which, as he states, is "chosen from the german aristocracy." he quotes approvingly the words of decken: "now, when in consequence of a long peace the memories of past services have become completely obliterated, and there is no immediate prospect of a war, the citizens take more and more note of the burden of the upkeep of an army, and attempt to convince themselves of the uselessness of this institution." to which von der goltz adds: "the present day (1883), especially in germany is favourable in this respect to the officer class. great and successful wars have enhanced its renown, and have moderated the envy of others. but should peace endure for several decades to come, it may again become necessary to remind the people that external favours may, without harm, be extended to the military profession, and especially to the officers."--popular edition, london, 1914, p. 25. {140} chapter xi the appeal of imperialism it is a significant fact that despite a democratic opposition to imperialism it is precisely the democratic nations, england and france, which are most imperialistic. the british public seems always willing to make sacrifices to extend the empire, and an almost equal enthusiasm is found among great sections of the french democracy. also in germany, when an election was fought in 1907 upon a colonial issue, thousands who usually voted the socialist ticket gave their adhesion to the imperialists. such a popular adhesion is essential to the success of an imperialistic policy. the masses need not be consulted upon the first steps but they are urgently called into conference when trouble begins and "pacification" or war is necessary. your financier, with all his money, is helpless against the rival ambitions of a great nation, and, he must have the support of his own country, its navy, army, credit, and millions of patriotic citizens. how is he to secure this support? to understand the implications of this question we must consider the changes in modern warfare and the rise of democracy in the western world. the mercenary soldiers once employed by absolutist princes would go anywhere at any time and no questions asked. war was a game played by small teams of professionals. to-day it is a national conflict in which entire populations, old and young, male and female, are pitted against each other. this fact gives {141} to the peoples a passive quasi-veto upon war, for success in a crucial conflict depends upon enthusiasm and supreme unity. to-day germany would crumple if her people were actively hostile or even merely listless towards the war. it would be difficult to raise loans, to sequester goods, to ensure the continuance of the industries upon which the nation and army live. victory depends upon the morale of the entire population. during the war itself, it is true, a nation tends to lose its power of self-criticism and to fight blindly. it defends proposals that in peace would be indefencible; it works itself up to a pitch of righteous self-justification. but war to-day is won before the first shot is fired; it is won by preparation. an army must be raised, a reserve of officers created, munitions stocked, strategic railways built, and plans elaborated for rapid military mobilisation and for a war organisation of industry. all this costs money--hundreds of millions. if then the nation is to be taxed for military budgets, and if the people as a whole secure an increasing veto over such expenditures, would it not seem likely that the nations would look askance at dangerous imperialistic ventures which contributed so obviously to the danger of war and to the size of military expenditures. would not the people say to the financiers, "keep your capital at home. make your profits at home"? to avert an attitude so fatal to any national policy of imperialism likely to lead to war, enthusiasm must be aroused and support secured. this support may be sought by a two-fold appeal; to direct economic interest, and to the sentiment of patriotism. the two appeals are not sharply separated, but merge. the economic argument for imperialism is that its advantages are in the end widely distributed. better access to raw material and a wider market for manufactures {142} means a flourishing national industry, steadier employment, better wages, and a prosperity of the whole population. a similar argument is made for investment in colonies. the whole nation is benefited if its capital brings the largest returns, and these are to be obtained only abroad and by an imperialist policy. this diversion of profits, works itself out in various ways. by swelling the income of the wealthy classes, foreign investment increases the expenditure at home for the labour of nationals, thus leading to steadier employment and higher wages. the servants of england are supported by india, egypt and the rand mines, as also by the profits on new york real estate and american rails.[1] the distribution of such income, moreover, is a matter over which the british nation has the final say. the entire national dividend, whencesoever derived, is a fund out of which all social improvements may be paid. social insurance, popular education, and other government projects for the national welfare are supported, and may be increasingly supported, by a taxation which in the form of income and inheritance taxes falls heavily on the rich. such a policy, by creating a certain community of interest between classes, gives to the entire population an economic interest in the wealth of the few. the profits from foreign, as from domestic investments, may be drawn upon at will for national purposes. the importance of this development in its effect upon nationalism and imperialism has been largely overlooked. {143} we have heard much of the german doctrine of the state as power, but have failed to realise how germany, like certain other european nations, has used its powers of taxation and governmental expenditure to create for the masses an ever larger stake in the national income. a policy, which increasingly taxes the rich for the benefit of the poor, establishes a certain unity in the commonwealth. even the socialist parties alter their allegiance. the early socialists were aggressively anti-patriotic, opposing to all conceptions of nationalism the solidarity of the working classes of the world. karl marx for example, declared that the workingman had no fatherland, "for in none is he a son." he was a nomad of society, doomed to a life hardly more secure, though far more burdensome, than that of the tramp or gipsy. long before the war, however, many socialists had accepted a more nationalistic view. not only did wage-earners realise that they already participated to some extent in the social surplus, but they also saw that their increasing political power would enable them to influence the future distribution of the national income, however that income were obtained.[2] once this interest in the national dividend was assured, it became desirable, even to socialists, to make that dividend as large as possible. the belief spread that all groups within a nation have common interests opposed to the interest of other nations. thus the austrian socialist dr. otto bauer in his "imperialisms und die nationalitaetsfrage" denies that the immediate interests of the wage-earners are the same in all countries and asserts that the workers may {144} find good reason to side with the employers of their own nation against wage-earners and employers in another country. "we do not say that there are no conflicts of interests between the nations, but we say, on the contrary, that as long as exploitation and oppression continue, there will be conflicts of interests between nations."[3] from which follows the conclusion that until capitalism is destroyed, and that may take many decades, it is essential for the workman to develop the welfare of the wage-earners of his own country, rather than of the world in general.[4] this argument is to immediate interest, which, as a rule, overrides considerations of ultimate interest. to the german workman, for example, it seems plain that english proletarians will not gain _his_ salvation; he must gain it himself. the german wage-earner must be better fed, clothed, housed, educated, organised, and all these needs translate themselves into more regular work, better paid. but if german industry is defeated by english industry, the german workman will suffer unemployment, reduction of wages, lockouts, unsuccessful strikes, and a decline in trade union membership. such a retrogression means a {145} delaying of the ultimate working class victory as well as a worse situation in the present. and, parenthetically, workingmen and socialists, being ordinary men with the ambitions and appetites of ordinary men, do not spend seven evenings in the week in contemplation of a co-operative commonwealth any more than the average church-goer devotes his entire mind to the day of judgment. the german socialist has his bowling club and his _stammtisch_; he must buy shoes for the children and a new pipe for himself, and his weekly wages count more than his share in a new society, which will not come until he is dead. besides his wages, he is interested in his government insurance premiums, in the education of his children, in the things that he and his family and the families of his class wish to enjoy. if imperialism appears to raise wages as well as profits, he is not likely to oppose it on sentimental grounds, especially as there are theorists who stand ready to prove that imperialism is merely the last phase of capitalism and will bring socialism all the sooner. and the argument for the beneficial reaction of imperialism upon wages seems at first glance convincing. the german workman sees that wages are high in england. he is told that the cause is the early british conquest of foreign markets.[5] his own rapid progress during recent {146} years he associates with a simultaneous increase in german industry and foreign trade. if therefore the foreign field is to be extended, why is the german eternally to be left out in the division? such a workman does not like the methods used, but so long as markets are to be seized, whether germany takes part or not, he is, with mental reservations, in favour of a "firm" policy.[6] he wants not war, but foreign markets. let germany become rich by means of imperialism and the wage-earner in due time will be able to get his share. if such an appeal can be made to the socialist, it can be made with even greater success to the middle classes, who have no anti-nationalistic prejudice and whose attitude is easily influenced by that of the great capitalists. the influence of the imperialistic propaganda was shown in a searching analysis of german public opinion made in 1912 or 1913 by a frenchman and reproduced in the french yellow book. the colonial expansion of france was regarded with intense irritation. "germans" it was held, "still require outlets for their commerce, and they still desire economic and colonial expansion. this they consider as their right as they are growing every day, and the future belongs to them." the treaty of 1911 with france (concerning morocco) is considered to be a defeat for germany, and france is represented as bellicose. on these two points, all groups are unanimous, "deputies of all parties in the reichstag, from conservatives to socialists, university men of berlin, halle, jena and marburg, students, teachers, employã©s, bank clerks, bankers, artisans, traders, manufacturers, doctors, lawyers, the editors of democratic and socialist newspapers, jewish publicists, {147} members of the trade unions, pastors and shop-keepers of brandenburg, _junkers_ from pomerania and shoe-makers of stettin, the owners of castles, government officials, curã©s and the large farmers of westphalia."[7] "the resentment felt in every part of the country is the same. all germans, even the socialists, resent our having taken their share in morocco." the german diplomatic defeat is a "national humiliation."[8] the words "national humiliation" used by this french observer illuminates both the force and limits of the economic motive in throwing nations into imperialism. the desire for greater profits and higher wages present themselves not nakedly, but garbed with idealistic motives. "a decent respect for the opinion of mankind," as well as a desire to gain one's own self-respect, compels men to represent their more crassly egoistic desires as part of an ethical plan. it is not hypocrisy, but a transformation of material into ideal values. thus nationalism enters into the problem, and the appeal to the supposed interests of the masses becomes an appeal to their "patriotism." the nation is outraged, humiliated, despised. its honour, which is in reality its prestige and inflated self-esteem, is affected. though not quite identical with the economic interests of the citizens, national honour has much to do with the conservation and furtherance of those interests. it is a mirror cracked and smudged with ancient dirt, which reflects imperfectly the economic motives of the classes dominant in the nation. the more primitive and instinctive a man, the more he is actuated by these idealistic elements. the crowds on {148} the london streets on mafeking day did not know what they wanted with the rand mines, but they were true-blue britishers, a trifle drunk but all the more patriotic. it is to this feeling of patriotism, sober or half-sober, to which the men who have something to gain from imperialism appeal. the home nation has its sacred duty to perform to the backward country, which does not pay its debts and is rent by revolutions, fomented perhaps abroad. the home nation must not relinquish its arduous privilege. it must not haul down the flag. it must not defer to other nations. beyond the seas there is to be created a new england, a new france, a new germany, to which all the national virtues are to be transplanted. the emigrants now lost to alien lands will carry their flag with them, and the nation will no longer strew its seed upon the sand. this nation (whichever one it happens to be) has a divine mission, which it can never perform unless it has a suitable army and navy, and unless this day week it sends a battleship to a certain port in china or africa. this quasi-idealistic element in imperialism strongly reinforces the economic argument. the german, englishman or frenchman dreams of extending _his_ culture, _his_ language, _his_ influence, _his_ sovereignty. he takes pride in the thought that _his_ people rule in distant lands, in deserts and jungles, in islands lying in tropical seas, and on frozen tundras, where civilised man cannot live. it is this dim mystic conception, this sense of an identification of a man's small personality with a vast imperium, that inspires the democracies, which year by year vote supplies for imperialistic ventures, far-sighted or absurd. though this idealism is partly the expression of an unrecognised economic need, yet for the most part, though perhaps decreasingly, the average citizen looks at imperialism as a sort of _aura_ to his beloved nation, and the conceptions {149} of national prestige and of imperialistic dominion fuse. moreover, even the calmer minds are reached by the fundamental argument of the necessity for extension. they recognise that despite the brutality and bloodiness of colonialism, it at least represents a certain phase or form of an inevitable development, the creation of an economic unity of the world. without colonial development, without an exploitation of unlocked resources, the industrial growth of the manufacturing countries cannot be maintained, and they will be thrown back upon their own meagre resources. so long as agriculture remains what it is to-day, the increasing millions of western europe, of japan, of the eastern united states, must rely more and more upon their commerce with the backward states, and must take a hand in stimulating their production. the present nationalistic imperialism may not be the best, it is perhaps the very worst form, that this world integration might assume, but in any case the problem remains to be solved either by this or some other means. as a consequence the opposition to our present nationalistic imperialism is tending to change from a merely negative attitude to a positive programme for an imperialism at once humane, democratic and international. it is an imperialism, the ideal of which is to safe-guard the interests of the natives, to prepare them for self-government and to carry on this process not by competition and war between the interested nations but by mutual agreements for a common benefit. the present cruelties and dangers are to be avoided. the nations are to unite in a joint, higher imperialism. it is this ideal which is to-day informing some of the leading minds of europe, an ideal which will convert the competitive imperialistic strivings of rival nations into a joint and beneficent rule of countries demonstrably {150} incapable of ruling themselves by a group of nations acting in the interest of the world. such a pooling of claims is admittedly difficult and is likely to be opposed by immense vested interests of classes and nations. it is this problem of a joint imperialism, the solution of which alone stands between europe and the continuance of bitter strife and war. [1] the profits from imperialism are only a part of the profits from foreign investment. in an economic sense, england, france, germany, holland and belgium own parts of the united states, and the profits of the pennsylvania railroad go largely to europe as do the profits of egyptian railways. there is this difference: the united states retains control of the physical property, and can, if it wishes, tax these incomes out of existence, while egypt can not. [2] "'if social democracy is not yet in power, it has already a position of influence which carries certain obligations. its word weighs very heavily in the scale.'"--edward bernstein, "die voraussetzungen des sozialismus," p. 145, quoted by jane t. stoddart. "the new socialism," new york and london, p. 156. [3] quoted by william english walling, "the socialists and the war," new york, 1915, p. 19. [4] "the improvement of the lot of the workers has as a necessary condition the prosperity of the industrial development; the ruin of commerce and industry would encompass their own ruin. in a speech delivered at stuttgart, mr. wolfgang heine, a socialist member of the reichstag, declared that 'the economic solidarity of the nation exists despite all antagonism of interest between the classes, and that if the german fatherland were conquered, the workers would suffer like the employers and even more than these.'" "the alliance between trade union socialism and military imperialism was manifested for the first time at the stuttgart (international socialist) congress in 1907. the majority of german delegates, composed above all of trade union representatives, were opposed to the marxist resolution condemning colonial wars."--"l'imperialisme des socialistes allemands," _la rã©vue_, vol. cxii. paris, 1915. [5] in their admirable "history of trade unionism" sidney and beatrice webb ascribe the rapid increase in the growth and power of british trade unions after 1850 in large part to the development of british commerce and industry. "this success we attribute mainly to the spread of education among the rank and file, and the more practical counsels which began, after 1842, to influence the trade union world. but we must not overlook the effect of economic changes. the period between 1825 and 1848 (in which "magnificent hopes ended in bitter disillusionment") was remarkable for the frequency and acuteness of its commercial depressions. from 1850 industrial expansion was for many years both greater and steadier than in any previous period." [6] this is the real but not the avowed policy of a large section of the workers, especially of trade unionists, in the social democratic party of germany. [7] french yellow book, no. 5. the document, according to the german commentators is falsely dated. [8] french yellow book, no. 1. annexe i. {151} chapter xii the american decision we have seen how in europe the outward expansion, which leads to international friction and war, has been due to deep-lying economic motives acting on ordinarily peace-loving populations. we have seen how national interest, blended with class interest, has distorted this expansion and has turned a wholesome process of world-development into a reckless scramble for territory and a perpetually latent warfare. lastly we have seen how in all countries broad sections of the population have been sickened by the stupid brutality and imminent peril of this unenlightened nationalic competition and have groped for some plan by which commerce might expand and industry grow without the nations going to war. such a plan must involve a basis of agreement, if not a community of interest, among nations requiring economic security and industrial growth. the choice does not lie between national expansion and contraction but between an expansion which ranges the nations in hostile camps and one which affords more equal opportunities of development to all competing powers. for each nation it is a choice between a headlong national aggrandisement, which takes no account of the needs and ambitions of other powers and the development of an economic world system, in which the industrial growth of one nation does not mean the stagnation or destruction of its neighbours. like the nations of europe, the united states is faced {152} with the necessity of making this decision. the problem presents itself less clearly to us, since in the past we have largely expanded within; we have been able to grow by a more intensive utilisation of what was already conceded to us instead of spreading out into regions where international competition was intense. those classes which in other countries are strongly driven by economic interest towards imperialism were in america otherwise occupied. but to-day we are beginning to overflow our boundaries, and we tend already to do instinctively what in the future we may do of set purpose. the men who wish to use army and navy to obtain american concessions in mexico, south america and china are not distantly related to the imperialists of germany, who believed that kiau-chau was a fair exchange for two dead missionaries, or to those of great britain and france who drove their nations into the boer war and the morocco imbroglio. our anti-imperialists also are animated by ideals similar to those of european anti-imperialists. the issue between these two groups and these two policies and ideals does not result in a single act of the national will. we do not go to the polls and vote once for all to be imperialistic or non-imperialistic, to grab what we can or seek a concert of the world. the issue resolves itself into many immediate and seemingly unrelated decisions. what we shall do in mexico to-day, what action we shall take in regard to a railroad concession in china, opposed by japan, what part we shall take in the coming peace negotiations are a few of the many decisions, which slowly crystallise into a national state of mind and finally into a national policy. the policy need not be absolutely rigid or consistent. while in the early days america decided upon a policy of isolation, we did occasionally interfere in europe, and despite our emphatic monroe {153} doctrine, we made at least one agreement--the clayton bulwer treaty--in flat contradiction to its principles. the decision, which we are now making between nationalistic imperialism and internationalism[1] is of vast moment. it is a decision which determines not only our foreign but our domestic policy. for europe it is equally important, since it influences the balance of power between those groups that are fighting for and those fighting against imperialism and militarism. by our comparative freedom of action, we can exert an immense influence either in accentuating the struggle between the industrial nations or in promoting a concert of action, based upon a discovered community of interest. how we shall in the end decide is not yet certain. though we are still upon the whole anti-imperialistic, voices already are raised in favour of a vigorous imperialistic policy. "the imperialism of the american," writes one defender of a policy of indefinite expansion, "is a duty and credit to humanity. he is the highest type of imperial master. he makes beautiful the land he touches; beautiful with moral and physical cleanliness.... there should be no doubt that even with all possible moral refinement, it is the absolute right of a nation to live to its full intensity, to expand, to found colonies, to get richer and richer by any proper means such as armed {154} conquest, commerce, diplomacy. such expansion as an aim is an inalienable right and in the case of the united states it is a particular duty, because we are idealists and are therefore bound by establishing protectorates over the weak to protect them from unmoral kultur."[2] it is not given to all imperialists to present their case with so naã¯ve a self-deception. not all would argue that it is our duty "to get richer and richer by ... armed conquest" to avert the "unmoral kultur" of some other nation which also desires to get richer and richer. yet in many other forms our imperialistic drift appears. voices call upon us to perform deeds of blood and valour, which bring national renown. ardent prophecies reveal that we shall become the first maritime power of the world and that we "are born to rule seas, as the romans were to conquer the world." but in the main american imperialistic sentiment is not vocal. it manifests itself in a vague determination to push american "interests" everywhere; to control mexico and the caribbean countries, to exert an increasing influence in south america, to be a decisive factor in china's exploitation. just how all these ambitions are to conflict with those of other imperialistic nations, our imperialists have not yet determined. let us be strong enough in our own might and in our alliances and we can take what we want and find excellent reasons for the taking. such a policy is not less dangerous because inchoate and undirected. it is all the more dangerous on that account. without thoroughly understanding the world into which they inject their undefined ambitions, our imperialists have not advanced far beyond a mental attitude. they are {155} anxious to conquer and rule, to exert economic, financial and military dominion, but their future domains are not yet surveyed. this new spirit has been strengthened by the passing of our isolation. since we cannot hold aloof, our imperialists believe that we must do as other nations do, seize our fortune at any risk. we must repudiate "our idealistic past," cease to be a dilettante in international relationships, take our share of the burden and get our share of the profits in the scrimmage which we call nationalistic imperialism. if we cannot live by ourselves, let us live as do other aggressive nations. in the future this new imperialism may drift in one of two directions. we may build up an american empire, a (probably plutocratic) republic with outlying dominions, or we may enter into a close association with the british empire, converting it gradually into an anglo-american dominion. the first method is the more obvious but also the more dangerous. to secure a semi-economic, semi-political control over all north america, south of the 49th parallel, to rule the antilles and islands in the pacific, to control in part the policy of china, might be possible without a british alliance. but any further imperialistic development would meet with opposition. almost all the valuable countries have been pre-empted. to absorb canada, to conquer australia or new zealand, would mean relentless war against us by england and perhaps other powers. such a conflict, though undesired, is not impossible. even if it is not true, as one latin-american writer confidently prophesies, that "the disintegration of the anglo-saxon empire will be the work of the united states,"[3] there may {156} come many industrial or commercial conflicts which in an imperialistic atmosphere may lead to war. a policy of encroachment cannot but be dangerous.[4] a more secure road to american imperialism lies in a closer union with the british empire. at present such a union would be opposed by an overwhelming majority of americans. in certain circles, however, there is a perceptible movement towards an agreement with england which might become an alliance and eventually a union. for such a union there are strong arguments. the kinship in blood, the similarity in language, traditions and points of view as well as a certain range of common interests tend to bring these two nations into closer relations. it would be a step towards a world-peace if the united states, the united kingdom, australia, new zealand, south africa, canada and newfoundland were to be guaranteed against war among themselves. the chance of peace is probably increased when the number of possible conflicts between nations is lessened. unfortunately many who desire an anglo-american alliance or union think of it only as a means of protecting rights, the defence of which would mean a circumscription of the rights of other nations and in the end a world war. writing over twenty years ago, captain mahan extolled the idea of such an alliance (although he held it to be premature) on the ground that with a strong navy the united states could help england to control the seas. he deprecated the proposal that the coalition should surrender the right to prey upon hostile commerce. it was only from the relative weakness of great britain, "or possibly {157} from a mistaken humanitarianism" that any concessions from the early rigours of naval warfare were wrung by neutrals. the alliance between great britain and the united states "looks ultimately and chiefly to the contingency of war," and such an alliance "would find the two (nations) united upon the ocean, consequently all-powerful there, and so possessors of that mastership of the general situation which the sea always has conferred upon its unquestioned rulers.... but why, then, if supreme, concede to an enemy immunity for his commerce."[5] such an alliance would mean nothing less than an imperialistic predominance in the world. the trans-oceanic colonies of all nations would be held subject to anglo-american consent. the power thus possessed might be used with wisdom and moderation or unwisely and immoderately. in either case the united states would enter upon the patrimony of the british empire. the interests controlling and exploiting the vast resources of the empire would come to be american as well as british. wall street would make money throughout the empire, and we might some day find a harvard graduate installed in the governor's chair of jamaica even if he did not actually become viceroy of india. the pressure towards such an imperialistic merger grows with the increasing sense in great britain of her precarious international position. the british empire is over-extended; it has too narrow a base for the length of its frontier. in arguing for an imperial federation, the _round table_ of london declared (in 1911) that "the safety of the imperial system cannot be maintained much longer by the arrangements which exist at present.... great britain alone cannot indefinitely guarantee the {158} empire from disruption by external attack. the farther one looks ahead the more obvious does this become. a nation of 45,000,000 souls, occupying a small territory and losing much of the natural increase in its population by emigration, cannot hope to compete in the long run even against single powers of the first magnitude--even russia, for instance, with its 150,000,000 inhabitants, with america with its 90,000,000, with germany with its 65,000,000 increasing by nearly a million a year, to say nothing of china with its 430,000,000 souls. far less can it hope to maintain the dominant position it has hitherto occupied in the world, with a dozen new powers entering upon the scene.... what will be the position of the empire then, if it has to depend upon the navy of england alone?"[6] even with the addition of the self-governing colonies, the population of the united kingdom is increased by less than a third,[7] and the sixty millions of the six british nations are little more capable of defending the british empire than are the forty-five millions of the united kingdom. the advantage of far more than doubling the population back of the british empire is therefore apparent. as compared with the united states, great britain is growing slowly. moreover she is in a permanently perilous situation, lying near the strongest military powers and unable to recover, once her navy is destroyed. great britain preserves her empire only by alliances which {159} prevent the forming of a hostile european coalition, and in the future an american alliance may seem indispensable to the maintenance of the empire and even to the safety of britain. at such time it may appear better to divide and rule than risk the chance of ruin by carrying the burden alone. this problem of defence is not one of valour but of economic resources and geographical position. the men of britain are as courageous to-day as were their forefathers, but just as the brave hollanders could not maintain supremacy on the sea because with their small numbers they were forced to make front against the french, so the english are now compelled to face an increasingly difficult international situation. in war, bulk, territory and weight of numbers count, and how these factors will affect the relation between great britain (even with her colonies) and other strong powers a half-century hence is a serious question. there is always the unpleasant possibility that a failure of the clever diplomacy by which great britain has hitherto divided her enemies will some day incite an attack from an overwhelming coalition of land-hungry powers. to american imperialists an invitation to share in the profits, prestige and cost of maintenance of the british empire might prove an overwhelming temptation. america would become an imperialistic people by adoption. without having laboured and fought we should overnight enter upon a joint control of the greatest imperium the world has seen. together with britain it would be ours to enjoy, and in the common possession of these vast domains the divisive forces between the british and american peoples would vanish. our american historians would forget that there had ever been a revolutionary war or would interpret that incident as a purely internal {160} conflict, which temporarily lost us a few excellent islands, since regained. but if the british empire, to say nothing of new rights, privileges and possessions would be ours to enjoy, it would also be ours to defend. an anglo-american empire would arouse the envy and the fear of other nations. we should have to defend not only our new joint dependencies but the most distant approaches to them. we could not rest quietly unarmed with these possessions in our house. an anglo-american imperialism, indeed any anglo-american alliance which does not include france, germany, russia and other powers, thus brings us no nearer to peace or to a solution of the international problem. it is but the prelude to a new balance of power, a new alignment of hostile national ambitions. if great britain and the united states grow and prevent other nations from growing, exploit and prevent other nations from exploiting, we shall be merely reproducing the present fatal scission of europe upon a large scale. as against this ideal of american imperialism, on its own account or in alliance with the greatest imperialistic power, stands the ideal of internationalism. it is an ideal which looks forward towards the creation of a concert of interest among the nations, the growth of international law and the more equal utilisation of the world by the nations. it is an ideal which can be realised only as nations perceive that their ultimate advantage lies in compromising their extreme demands and merging national interests in a larger international interest. to-day an overwhelming majority of americans desire a foreign policy looking towards internationalism. they prefer to strive for peace in america and europe rather than to attempt any imperialistic expansion likely to perpetuate the war-breeding competition between nations. {161} to realise this ideal, indeed to make any progress whatsoever towards its realisation, we must seek to alter the economic web in which the nations of the world now live. there is at present a conflict between two principles, economic nationalism and economic internationalism. each nation seeks to obtain for itself security, progress and a favoured position; each has its separate national ambitions. at the same time all the industrial nations have a common interest in maintaining themselves upon the resources of the agricultural countries, and in building up a vast system, in which the world's resources will be utilised most efficiently for the benefit of the world inhabitants. the problem, therefore, is to promote this economic internationalism and to limit as far as possible the disturbing influence of the divisive national interests. we cannot destroy and we cannot ignore nationalism. we cannot resolve humanity into a mass of denationalised atoms, citizens of the world with no economic or political allegiance to any state. all we can do is so to compromise and adjust strong and vital national claims, as to permit the growth of the international interest. the progress of economic internationalism, without which a permanent peace cannot be maintained, is to be furthered only as each nation attains to a political and economic security, both in the present and for the future. if a reasonable degree of industrial, commercial and colonial progress can be guaranteed, so that the great industrial nations do not live in constant peril, the vast forces which make for an international exploitation of the world's resources will be unchained. a common right to the use of the highway of the sea, a joint imperialism, an international development of commerce and of industry, a mutual insurance of the nations against war, and against national aggression likely to lead to war, will be factors in the establishment of an economic {162} internationalism, which is the next stage in the economic development of the world. the united states cannot by itself create a new economic world system; all that it can do is to contribute with other nations to the removal of obstacles that retard the coming development. the opportunity to advance this movement, however, is greater in the case of the united states than in that of the nations of europe. a nation tends to prefer its immediate national interest to its larger but more distant international interest directly in proportion to the economic or political danger in which it lives. because of our wealth, our sparse population and our relative immunity from attack, it devolves upon us to be the leader in the promotion of an economic internationalism. this potential leadership of ours, however, may be lost as a result of an unfavourable economic and social development in the future. what our attitude towards internationalism, nationalism, imperialism and war is to be ten, thirty or fifty years from now will depend upon our internal development. we cannot decide for a policy of internationalism if we grow to be an over-populated country of impoverished men, with great capitalists pushing us out towards foreign adventures, economic and military. an imperialistic war-like spirit will arise if the internal pressure upon the population becomes excessive. in measuring this pressure, we are dealing with relatives, not absolutes. during many centuries the chinese coolies have become so accommodated to a meagre life that they do not seek to conquer other nations but choose rather to starve quietly within their walls. there is a higher standard of living in germany to-day than in the more pacific germany of seventy years ago, but desires have increased more rapidly than wages. as a result the nation is forced outwards. {163} though in many respects conditions of life in america are improving, discontent and frustrated ambition increase. as our numbers grow, farms become relatively scarce, and a class of tenant farmers and an agricultural proletariat develop. the chances of success for both these classes are slighter than a generation ago. manufacturing is conducted on an ever larger scale and the opportunity to rise is becoming less. the openings in retail trade, though many, are small, and there are vast numbers of failures. wages are less in relation to the standards of living surrounding the workman, and fear of unemployment is chronic. the country is full of poor men with no firm purchase on life. income, it is true, is more evenly distributed than property, but even here a crass inequality reigns. upon the wage-earners falls the heavy incidence of industrial injuries, disease, and unemployment. it is of such conditions that imperialism and wars are made. to develop millions of landless men without wealth and with precarious jobs is to create a material superlatively inflammable. you can appeal to such men for a "strong" policy that will conquer foreign markets and therefore "jobs." there is a group much lower in economic status--the men submerged below the poverty line. these men, with no money in their pockets and no steady employment, but with voices, votes and newspaper organs, are susceptible to jingoism. they have a high narrow sensibility created by precariousness and hunger. here we are creating a culture for war bacteria. the concentration of wealth at the top of our society acts similarly. we are developing in america, the type of big business adventurer, who desires an aggressive foreign policy, not only for his direct business interests, but also to allay unrest at home by pointing a minatory finger at the foreigner beyond our borders. {164} already we have many of the elements that go to make up the war spirit. in the present conflict we have been pacific owing to the division of our sympathies, the deadening realisation of the immense forces engaged and losses incurred, and the realisation that our interests were not involved. to these factors there was added a sudden prosperity contingent upon our remaining at peace. but even as early as 1898, when the proletarisation of america was less developed, we had millions of inflamed patriots, who would willingly have fought all europe rather than "haul down our flag" in the philippines. what will happen twenty years from now, when our export trade is greater and more necessary and when (unless we change conditions) there will be more poverty and insecurity than to-day? if at such a time germany, japan or russia, or all three, determine upon an action, which will injure our pretensions and throw many of our citizens out of work, we shall surely feel resentment. we cannot safely predict that we will adopt a gentle attitude. like france in 1870, like russia in 1905, we may stumble into a war over our rights and pretensions, may be rushed into it not only because of a conflict of interests which we did not foresee but because of a vicious internal development which we did not avert. all our customary self-assurances that we shall never fight nations now friendly are mere deception. so we thought just before the war of 1812. we were never more pacific than in 1895 when we ventured on a desperate challenge to england, or in 1898 when we attacked spain. though we averted war with germany over the _lusitania_ matter, our public mind was so uninformed that we might easily have been pushed into the conflict by a more bellicose president. we should have a better chance of keeping the peace if we were not so blindly confident of our {165} peacefulness. it takes only one to make a quarrel, and the aggressor might not impossibly be ourselves. nor can peace be predicted on the ground that we have given no offence and do not intend to give offence. the other nation will be the judge of that. and if we become imperialistic we shall have given offence enough. neither will our religion, our almost universal christianity, strike the weapons from our hands. it is doubtful whether religion ever kept a nation out of war. the germans and the english are both christian peoples and therefore quite willing to fight god's battle, which is their battle. if a crisis arose in america out of our economic conflicts with europe and our own psychological instability, we should find the ministers of the gospel on the same side as the editors, politicians, and the people generally, as they have been at most times when peace has been threatened. a war rooted perhaps in the rival interests of american and foreign oil companies in venezuela would be hailed on both sides as a battle for civilisation and the lord. not even our diversity of racial stocks would prevent such a war, though it would no doubt make us hesitant. we should be loath to fight against germany, austria, italy or england, because of the presence in our midst of natives of these lands. once the fighting had begun, however, all opposition would be overcome, and the war would go on despite its spiritual costs. if we are to decide therefore not for imperialism and imperialistic wars but for a policy which will mean peace for ourselves and peace and international reorganisation for europe and the world, we must begin our labours at home. unless we are able to build a democratic civilisation upon the basis of a thoroughly scientific utilisation of our own resources, unless we so direct our american development that we shall not be forced to fight for a {166} larger share of the remaining exploitable regions, we shall make little progress towards a settlement of the grave problems which now divide the nations. to promote an economic internationalism we must make our own internal economic development sound; to help cure the world we must maintain our own health. internationalism begins at home. [1] it is difficult to find terms in which to express clearly the two policies between which we are choosing. in a sense the issue is between imperialism and internationalism, but since any international attempt to solve the problem of the backward countries must lead to some joint occupation, exploitation or dominion, which may be called imperialistic, the opposition of the two terms is not complete. nor do the terms nationalism and internationalism describe the two policies. the internationalism for which we are striving does not negate nationalism. it is not a cosmopolitanism, a world-union of undifferentiated and denationalized individuals, but a policy of compounding and accommodating permanent and distinct national interests. [2] _seven seas magazine_ (organ of the navy league of the united states), nov., 1915, pp. 27-28. [3] f. garcia calderon, "latin-america. its rise and progress." new york, 1915, p. 390. [4] a second prophecy of seã±or calderon is to the effect that "unless some extraordinary event occurs to disturb the evolution of the modern peoples, the great nations of industrial europe and japan, the champion of asiatic integrity, will oppose the formidable progress of the united states."--_op. cit._, 389. [5] mahan (a. t.), "possibilities of an anglo-american reunion." _north american review_, july, 1894. [6] _round table_, london, may, 1911, pp. 251-2 (?). [7] the combined white population of new zealand, australia, south africa, newfoundland and canada (in 1911) was only 14.2 millions, or almost exactly the increase in the (total) population of continental united states in the one decade ending 1910. the white population of the united states already constitutes 4/7 of the total white english-speaking population of the world. moreover, population is increasing far more rapidly in the united states than in the six british nations. {169} part iii towards economic internationalism chapter xiii natural resources and peace for the united states to attempt to secure an economic internationalism, which shall form the basis of an enduring peace, is to enter upon a task which bristles with difficulties. these difficulties fall into two classes, those which tend to deprive america of her freedom of action and disqualify her for leadership, and those which are found in deep antagonisms among the nations to be reconciled. america cannot succeed in her efforts to bring about an economic internationalism if she herself is economically or psychologically unstable or if her own foreign policy is grasping, aggressive and imperialistic. nor can she succeed unless her efforts are wisely directed towards the solution of the real problems which now divide the world. in all such discussions we are likely to take america's pacific intentions in the future for granted. such an assumption, however, is unwarranted. to-day the peace-maker is the organiser of the world and no nation can lead in the peace movement, nor even be assured of its own peace, unless it has reached a certain stage of economic stability and is organised on a reasonably satisfactory economic basis. our danger of war lies partly within. if we launch out upon an imperialistic policy, placing our vital national interests within the area of keen international rivalry, we shall be in peril of a war, evoked by ourselves. the time to prevent such a conflict is not immediately {170} before its threatened outbreak but during the period in which the forces making for war are slowly maturing. these forces, in our case at least, take their rise in home conditions. our chance of peace with england, germany, japan or russia twenty or thirty years from now depends upon what we do with our own territory and our own resources to-day. this may at first glance seem a paradox. why should we fight germany or japan because our agriculture is inefficient or our fiscal policy inadequate or because our wealthy are too wealthy and our poor too poor? yet the connection is close. bellicosity is not spontaneous, a thing evolved out of nothing. peoples do not fight when they have what they want, but only when they are frustrated and cramped and need air and elbow room. war is like emigration. the individual migrant leaves home for personal reasons, but the great movement of emigration is nothing but an escape from worse to better economic conditions. if the natural resources of a nation are too small or are badly utilised the resulting insecurity and poverty may lead to international conflicts. or if the national economy though otherwise efficient and self-contained is so ordered that huge masses of the population are impoverished and destitute, there will always be a centrifugal force inciting to foreign adventures and wars. where there is no place at home for "younger sons" they will seek a place outside. nowhere can one study this tremendous internal outward-driving pressure better than in japan. that nation, though extremely poor, spends huge sums upon armies, navies and fortifications, and engages in a dangerous and perhaps eventually fatal conflict with other powers. but it is not pride of race or dynastic ambition which compels japan to enter upon these imperialistic courses, but a {171} sheer lack of economic reserves. her area, not including korea, formosa, sakhalin, etc., is 149,000 square miles, or less than that of california, while her population (1914) is 56,000,000. moreover, japan is so extraordinarily mountainous that the greater part of her area is unfitted for agriculture. despite a very low standard of living, therefore, and a highly intensive culture, the land cannot feed the population, and foodstuffs must be imported. the population is growing with great rapidity, the excess of births over deaths amounting to over six hundred thousand a year. nor has japan a sufficient outlet through emigration. the immigration of japanese into australia, british columbia, the united states and south africa is practically prohibited. most parts of eastern asia are too crowded with men living still lower in the scale to permit any large infiltration of japanese. to japan, therefore, there are but two alternatives to an ultimate famine: the settlement of korea and manchuria, and industrialism. for industrialism, however, japan is rather ill-fitted by tradition and lack of raw materials. her best chance is to sell to china and to develop manchuria and korea, in both of which directions she runs counter to european ambitions. as a result, japan becomes imperialistic and militaristic. the american temptation to imperialism is far weaker than is that of japan. there is for us no overwhelming necessity to enter upon a scramble for new territories or to fight wars to secure such territories. our aggressiveness is latent, though with a capacity for growth. there are two ways to lessen this potential aggressiveness. the first is to weaken economic interests favouring imperialism and war and strengthen opposed interests; the second is to build up in the people a tough intellectual and emotional resistance to martial incitement. the remedy resolves itself into two {172} factors, economic completeness and internal stability and equality. economic completeness depends in the first place upon a certain relation between natural resources and population. if the fields and mines of a country are too unproductive or its population excessive, there will be an inevitable leaning upon the resources of foreign countries and an intense competition for new territory, trade or investment facilities. a nation, however, may possess most of the elements of economic completeness and yet suffer through a bad geographical position. its commerce, even its coast-wise commerce, may be at the mercy of a foreign country, or it may not control the mouths of its own rivers, or may be shut off completely from the sea. switzerland, hungary, bohemia cannot secure their economic independence of spain or france, but must depend upon the good will of other nations. because of such geographical conditions an otherwise pacific nation may fail completely to build up a resistance to war. an event in our own history will illustrate this point. from 1783 to 1803, our settlers in the ohio valley were entirely dependent for the sale of their products upon an outlet through the mississippi river. unless spain and later france would permit the rude arks, laden with tobacco, flour and bacon, to unload at new orleans, the west would be shut off from markets. railroads had not yet been invented and there were no good roads over the mountains. animosity towards the owner of new orleans was therefore inevitable,[1] since unless we could {173} control the mouth of the mississippi, we could not secure the allegiance of our own settlers west of the alleghenies. the interests of our citizens lay beyond our borders; the key to our door was in the hands of a foreign power. but for the lucky accident that peacefully gave us louisiana, we should sooner or later have been forced into war. the cession of this territory tended to establish for us an economic completeness. an economic completeness for the united states does not of course mean that we should become a hermit nation, absolutely shut up within our tariff walls. it would be manifestly undesirable to prohibit foreign commerce or the foreign investment of american capital and no such sacrifice, even if possible, would be necessary to prevent a too violent friction with europe. there is a more direct way in which to increase america's economic reliance upon herself and diminish her dependence upon the accidents and hostilities of the world competition. it can be done by a better utilisation of our own resources. as yet we have merely skimmed the cream of one of the richest parts of the earth, and have exploited, rather than developed, our great continental territory. we have been superficial not thorough, hasty not scientific, in our utilisation of our resources. we have still a margin in which further to develop agriculture and other great extractive industries in order to lay at home the basis for a population which is bound to increase during the coming decades. how great our friction with europe is to be will depend on whether our economic development in the main is to {174} consist of activities which impinge upon those of the great industrial countries or of activities which do not so impinge, whether for example, five per cent. or thirty per cent. of our people are to be engaged in industries which actively compete in foreign markets with the industries of europe. certain of our economic activities are for us pacific in tendency, inasmuch as they do not affect industrial europe or actually benefit her. of such a nature is agriculture. every added bushel of wheat or bale of cotton raised in the united states improves the chances of european industry, lessens our competition with europe and increases our market for european wares. the same is largely true of our production of copper, gold, silver, petroleum and other natural products. upon these extractive enterprises, including coal and iron ore, is based a vast manufacturing industry which supplies our home population, and an immense transportation and commercial system which has its roots in our home resources. our railroads do not appreciably compete with those of england and germany; on the contrary the industrial progress of those countries is hastened by the development of our transportation system, which cheapens their food and raw materials. on the other hand a development of the american carrying trade, a growth of ship-building, shipping and export trade, however necessary or desirable, trenches immediately upon british and german shipbuilding, carrying and export trade, and leads directly and inevitably to economic conflict.[2] {175} the dependence of our economic mutuality with europe upon our agriculture may be illustrated by an hypothesis. assume that our agricultural products were permanently cut in half while our population remained constant. we should have no food to export and would be obliged to import food. millions of men would be forced out of agriculture into manufacturing industries, and as the home demand for these industries would be lessened a foreign market would be essential. our railroad traffic would diminish, and railroad workers, thrown out of employment, would enter the export trade. we should be forced to secure foreign markets, and if political pressure were necessary, it would be forthcoming. similarly, our chances for investment in agriculture and in railroad and industrial companies being lessened, capital would be forced to find an outlet in other countries, especially in semi-developed lands to which european capital flows. the rate of interest would fall, big risks would be taken, and if american investments were endangered by unrest or disorder in the backward country, our government would intervene. we should have no choice and could afford no scruples. given such a fall in our agricultural product, the country would become imperialistic and bellicose, and there would be not the remotest possibility of our taking the lead in a policy to promote international peace. the hypothesis is far-fetched, but exactly the same result would follow if instead of our agricultural product dwindling, it remained constant while our population grew. if our population increased 100 per cent. and our agricultural product remained stationary or increased only twenty or forty per cent., it would be impossible to maintain our present relation to the world. we must uphold a certain, not quite constant relation between our agricultural (and other extractive) industries and our {176} population if we are to keep out of the thickest of the european complications. a secure basis for a policy of non-aggression lies therefore in the development of home agriculture.[3] it is not, however, to be expected that the proportion of farm workers will remain constant. in the united states this proportion has steadily fallen. of every thousand males in all occupations 483 were engaged in agricultural pursuits in 1880 as compared with only 358 in 1910.[4] but despite this relative decline agriculture did not become less productive. more horses and more agricultural machinery were used, and fewer persons were able to perform the same amount of work. what is more significant than the number of persons employed is the amount of land available for agriculture. until 1900 we were in the extensive period of american farming, during which an increase in the population was met by an increased farm acreage. from 1850 to 1900 our population increased from 23 to 76 millions, but our farm area increased almost as fast and the improved farm area even faster.[5] during the decade ending 1910, however, a strong pressure of population upon american agriculture became obvious. in these ten years the country's population increased 21 per cent. while the total farm area increased only 4.8 per cent.[6] while 16,000,000 {177} people were added to the population the increase in farm area was equal only to what would accommodate an additional three and a half million people. it is no longer easy to stretch the farm area and to a large extent our farms must grow by the increase of the improved at the expense of the unimproved acres.[7] actually the per capita agricultural production in 1909 (the year covered by the census of 1910) was less than that of a decade before. though the crops in the latter year were far higher in value, the increase in the quantity of product was only 10 per cent., as compared with an increase in population of 21 per cent.[8] had the american people consumed all the american product in both years, they would have been obliged to cut down their ration by about one-tenth;[9] instead there was a vast diminution of exports. the growing population began to consume the agricultural products formerly exported. the question is therefore pertinent whether it will be possible for us indefinitely to feed from our own fields our increasing millions or whether we shall be forced to depend increasingly for food on outside sources and to secure this food by a development of our export trade in manufactured products. to many this question will seem to answer itself. it is commonly assumed that there are almost no limits to {178} our possible agricultural production and therefore to our desirable increase of population. france is almost self-sufficing with a population of 189.5 to the square mile; when the united states (continental area) has an equally dense population we may maintain a population of five or six hundred millions. we need merely take up new lands and cultivate more intensively. the opportunities for the further development of american agriculture, however, while undoubtedly great, are not immeasurable. at present we have some 879,000,000 acres in farms, of which 478,000,000 (or 25.1 per cent. of our total land area) are improved.[10] but of the rest of our area much is not useful. some 465,000,000 acres in the western part of the country have an annual precipitation of fifteen inches or less, and of these acres, not over 30,000,000 could be profitably irrigated at present prices of farm products, labour, land and capital. this addition of 30,000,000 acres would increase our present improved area by less than seven per cent. besides the permanently arid acres, moreover, there is other unusable land in national forests, roads, cities and in swamps and over-flow lands difficult to reclaim. with these deductions made, we have only 1,252,000,000 acres as the maximum farm area of the future. this is 31.1 per cent. greater than the present farm area.[11] it is true that a larger part of the farm area can be cultivated. from 1900 to 1910 the area of improved lands increased 15.4 per cent. if this rate of increase could continue there would be about one billion acres improved by 1960, and this seems to be the absolutely {179} outside upper limit. but this does not mean that a billion acres could be improved and cultivated at the same cost per acre as at present. the improved lands would require a constantly increasing amount of capital and labour to secure returns equal to those which the farmer now obtains. similarly there are limits to the extent to which we can afford to divide up our land into smaller farms in order to secure a larger production per acre. intensive cultivation is an alluring phrase but in the production of many staple crops intensive cultivation is dear cultivation. the movement in progressive agricultural communities is towards a moderately large farm. it is the smaller farms (of from 20 to 99 acres) that the boys and girls leave most rapidly. "the farm management studies," writes mr. eugene merritt of the u. s. department of agriculture[12] "indicate that on these small-sized farms, man labour, horse labour, and agricultural machinery cannot be used efficiently. in other words, economic competition is eliminating the unprofitable sized farms."[13] {180} the pressure of agricultural population upon a given farm area results either in the growth of an inefficient small scale production or of a large rural proletariat. both are undesirable and neither will permit farming on as cheap a scale as at present. the actual trend to-day in districts where cereals are raised is towards larger farms (of 150 to 300 acres), and this tendency is likely to be increased by the introduction of cheap tractor engines, which now seems to impend. there is doubtless a considerable opportunity in the united states for an improvement in the average product per acre even though the increase in the area of cultivation constantly brings in land of decreasing fertility. if in the course of forty or fifty years we can increase the area under cultivation by fifty per cent. and the product per acre by 20 per cent. we shall have an increase in product of 80 per cent., which would provide for an increase in the population of 80,000,000 without any greater leaning upon foreign resources than to-day.[14] we are likely, however, to lean upon certain foreign resources, and more especially upon canada and the caribbean countries. whatever its political allegiance canada is and will probably remain economically a part of the united states. the iowa farmers, who sold out their home farms to buy cheaper land in canada, unconsciously illustrated the closeness of this economic bond. we may draw upon canadian wheat, fish, lumber and iron ore almost exactly as though the territory were our own. it is canada's interest to sell to us and buy from us, and even preferential duties cannot entirely overcome our immense geographical advantage over europe. similarly {181} we shall draw upon the caribbean countries, whether or not we have a political union, for vast quantities of tropical food stuffs. whatever our importation of food an increase in agricultural efficiency is also probable. we have already improved and cheapened our farm machinery and have disseminated agricultural education and information. but much progress remains to be made. we can use better seeds, raise better crops and cattle, and work more co-operatively instead of individualistically. our transportation system can be better co-ordinated with our agriculture, so that food, now wasted because it will not pay the freight, can be brought to market.[15] a better knowledge of the science of farming would greatly increase our agricultural production. if our country roads were improved, if we varied our crops more intelligently, if we refrained from impoverishing our soils, if we drained some tracts and irrigated others, we should speedily discover a vast increase in our agricultural productiveness, a larger return to the farmers, a greater home demand for manufactured products, and a better opportunity for capital at home. {182} if by putting more capital and intelligence upon our farms, we were to add several billions to the value of their output, we should broaden the base of our whole economic life, enlarge the volume of our non-competitive exports, and in the end approximate conditions that would make for a peaceful foreign policy and for the promotion of an economic internationalism. but though we widen our agricultural base, our population unless its rate of progress is checked, will eventually, and perhaps soon, overtake any extension.[16] though we increase agricultural knowledge and substitute mechanical for animal power and gasoline for hay, the law of diminishing returns will remain. ten men cannot secure as large a per capita product from a given area as five, or twenty as large as ten. but if our population were to maintain its present geometrical increase we should have 200,000,000 inhabitants in 1953 and, to assume the almost impossible, 400,000,000 in 1990. long before the latter figure could be reached there would be positive and preventive checks to further growth, but if these checks were late in being applied, there would come increased inequality, misery and economic uncertainty, and an enhanced liability to war. for us as for other nations a too rapid increase in population spells this constant danger of war. our farms cannot absorb more than a certain proportion of our population without causing lowered wages and increasing poverty, and we cannot expand our export trade without entering into the range of international conflict. while therefore an improved agriculture with high food prices will permit of an increase in our population, it is {183} advantageous that that increase does not proceed too rapidly. if we grow to two hundred millions in seventy-five or one hundred years instead of in thirty-seven, we shall still be strong enough to protect our present territories and shall have less occasion to fight for new. fortunately our rate of population increase, despite immigration, is steadily decreasing. in the decade ending 1860 our population increased 35.6 per cent., in the period 1860 to 1879 at an average decennial rate of 26.3 per cent., and in the three following decades 25.5 per cent., 20.7 per cent. and 21.1 per cent respectively. the fall in our natural increase was even greater. while the death rate has declined[17] the birth rate has fallen off even more rapidly. our birth statistics are inadequate, but we can gain some idea of this decline by comparing the number of children under 5 years of age living at each census year with the number of women between the ages of 16 to 44 inclusive. in 1800 there were 976 children per 1,000 women in these ages; in 1830, 877; in 1860, 714; in 1890, 554; in 1910, 508.[18] for a number of decades a continuation in this falling off in the birth rate is probable. it is rendered necessary by the fall in the death rate and possible by the fact that birth has ceased to be a mere physiological accident {184} and is coming under human control. "the most important factor in the change," says dr. john shaw billings, "is the deliberate and voluntary avoidance or prevention of child-bearing on the part of a steadily increasing number of married people who prefer to have but few children."[19] the spreading of the knowledge of birth control and the increasing financial burden of children in an urbanised society composed of economically ambitious people will probably prevent our population from ever again increasing as rapidly as it did half a century ago.[20] in the meanwhile our immigration (until the outbreak of the present war) continued to increase. in the ten years ending june 30, 1914, over ten million immigrant aliens arrived in the united states, of whom approximately seven millions remained. nor has the high point in immigration been surely attained. the european population increases so rapidly that the excess of births over deaths is between three and four times the entire emigration. immigration tends to flow from countries where the pressure of population is greater to countries like the united states, where the pressure is less. unless there is restriction we may witness within the next decades a new vast increase in immigration, which will result in a rapid growth of our population and a resulting pressure upon our agricultural (and other natural) resources, that will vastly increase the intensity and bitterness of our {185} competition for the world's markets and the world's investment opportunities. by thus increasing our agricultural product, and developing our home market and our less directly competitive industries and by slackening an increase in our population, which would otherwise force us into foreign adventures, we tend to approach a balanced economic system and a parallel growth of extractive and manufacturing industries. such a dependence in the main on home resources for the nation's primal needs is in the circumstances the best preventive of an imperialistic policy that might lead to war. but there is an even closer-lying incentive to imperialism and war. a nation may have a sufficiently wide base and an efficient industrial development but because of internal economic mal-adjustments may be driven into imperialistic courses. a policy not dictated by national needs may be forced upon the nation by the necessities and ambitions of its dominating class. [1] "there was," he (president jefferson) said, "one spot on the face of the earth so important to the united states that whoever held it was, for that very reason, naturally and forever our enemy; and that spot was new orleans. he could not, therefore, see it transferred to france but with deep regret. the day she took possession of the city the ancient friendship between her and the united states ended; alliance with great britain became necessary, and the sentence that was to keep france below low-water mark became fixed."--john bach mcmaster, "history of the people of the united states," vol. ii, p. 620. [2] agriculture is not essentially pacific; in various stages of historical development agricultural nations war upon each other in order to secure more land or to levy tribute of grain. the pacific tendency of our present agricultural development arises out of the needs of industrial europe. our agricultural progress, however, is peaceful only in so far as it increases the product of our fields; it would not be peaceful, and might be the exact reverse, if we sought to increase our acreage by, let us say, a conquest of canada. [3] by this is not meant that the nation should be preponderatingly agricultural, but only that where agriculture is sufficiently developed to maintain a large industrial population working for the home market the competition for foreign markets and foreign investment fields becomes less intense. [4] "agricultural pursuits" includes agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry. these figures from the united states census, 1910, vol. iv, p. 41, are only approximately exact, owing to almost insuperable difficulties in classifying occupations. see vol. iv, p. 19. [5] thirteenth census of the united states, vol. v, agriculture, p. 51. [6] the improved farm acreage increased 15.4 per cent., and the acreage devoted to the principal crops 9.9 per cent. [7] the new lands, moreover, are not so good as the old. from 1850 to 1885 the lands brought into cultivation (illinois, iowa, etc.) were better than the earlier area, but since 1885 the farmers have driven forward into more arid lands further removed from transportation. "across the great plains, the farmer has pushed closer and closer to the base of the rockies and, as he has done so, the difficulty of producing a bushel of corn or wheat has continually increased."--king. (willford isbell.) "the wealth and income of the people of the united states," new york (macmillan), 1915: pp. 23, 24. [8] for the comparability of the years 1909 and 1899, see census volume on agriculture, p. 537. [9] actually 9.9 per cent. [10] total land area equals 1,903,289,600 acres. [11] thompson, warren s. "population: a study in malthusianism." studies in history, economics and public law, columbia university vol. lxiii, no. 3. new york, 1915. [12] "the agricultural element in the population:" _american statistical association quarterly_, march, 1916, p. 52. [13] the dwarf farms found in many parts of europe are even less economical. the bavarian, french, or belgian peasant secures more per acre than the american farmer but much less per hour or year of work. "small scale farming, as we have defined it," says prof. thomas nixon carver, "invariably means small incomes for the farmers, though the land is usually well cultivated and yields large crops per acre." "the french or the belgian peasant (because of the smallness of his farm) frequently finds it more profitable to dispense altogether with horses, or even oxen, as draft animals, using rather a pair of milch cows, or only a single cow, for such work as he cannot do with his own muscles." "he would likewise find a reaping or a mowing machine a poor investment. the general result of such small scale staple farming is necessarily the use of laborious and inefficient methods."--"principles of rural economics," pp. 253-54. new york, 1911. [14] if, however, the average product per acre remains constant or decreases, the pressure of the population will make itself felt far sooner. [15] the loss in perishable farm products, to cite only one instance, is tremendous. a very large proportion of the perishable fruits and vegetables, and a smaller proportion of the dairy and poultry products, decay on the farmer's hands. according to a study made by mr. arthur b. adams, "at least 25 per cent. of the perishables which arrive at the wholesale markets is hauled to the dump-pile because it is unfit for human consumption.... in warm weather florida oranges lose 30 per cent. in transportation alone, and if we add the decay after the fruit reaches the consuming centre the total loss would be astounding. there is a loss of 17 per cent. in eggs from producer to consumer, due to breakage, decay, etc., but butter has an equally great loss.... it is not an over-estimate, therefore, to say that between 30 and 40 per cent. of the perishables which are raised on the farms are never consumed at all, but are a complete social loss."--"marketing perishable farm products." studies in history, economics and public law. columbia university. vol. lxxii, no. 3, p. 25. new york, 1916. [16] it is of course assumed that no means will soon be found by which cheap food can be produced synthetically; if that happens, all our conclusions go by the board. [17] in the decade 1850-59 the death rate in new york city was 35.6 per cent., in the period 1900-13 only 15.3 per cent.; in massachusetts, in the same periods, the death rate was 18.0 and 15.5 per cent. respectively. the diminution was due, partly to a change in the age-constitution of the population and partly to a progressive control of diseases.--walter f. willcox, "the nature and significance of the changes in the birth and death rates in recent years." _american statistical association quarterly_, march, 1916, p. 2. [18] prof. willcox, who presents the table from which these figures are drawn, illustrates the decline by showing that its continuation would wipe out all births in 160 years, so that by 2070 we should live in a baby-less world.--_op cit._, pp. 11, 12. [19] quoted by prof. willcox, _op. cit._, pp. 13, 14. [20] that there lies a danger in exactly the opposite direction cannot be denied. there are limits to the fall in the death rate, but practically no limits to the possible decline in child-bearing. the limitation of births is almost entirely determined by individual (or family) considerations, and may proceed to a point where population will decline rapidly and perhaps deteriorate in quality. a linking up of the individual interest in small families to the social interest in having the population maintained or slowly increased, as well as improved in quality, is essential. {186} chapter xiv an antidote to imperialism a nation, though economically complete, in the sense that it could, if it desired, maintain its population upon its own resources may yet be lured into an imperialistic and warlike policy. just as political disintegration leads to internal conflicts, disorders and finally foreign intervention, so an economic disequilibrium, by placing the interests of certain classes within the arena of international friction may evoke a struggle, which can have no other issue than war. this is exactly the effect, for example, of a gross inequality of wealth and income. such an inequality means that multi-millionaires, gaining far more than they can spend, are impelled to invest their surplus funds in outside ventures. the capital that can be profitably absorbed by industries manufacturing for home consumption depends upon the ability of the population to purchase food, clothes, houses, furniture, watches, and automobiles. if the population cannot or will not increase purchases at a rate commensurate with the increase of national savings, a vast capital must either be diverted to manufacturing for the export trade or must itself be exported. neither of these deflections is in itself bad; in moderation, both are good. there is, however, a certain degree of intensity of competition for foreign trade and investment which means industrial war and the danger of military war. the wider the interval between {187} national savings and national consumption, the more powerful and dangerous is this expulsive tendency of capital. such a tendency may arise in a country in which, despite an equality in wealth, the national savings are excessive, but the greatest danger is in countries in which the returns to capital, rent and business enterprise are large and the returns to labour small. the big profits come from the manufacture of articles of common use, and the home demand for such articles is limited by the consuming capacity of poor men. the surplus capital must therefore find a vent, and the larger this surplus capital, the more venturesome it grows and the more insistently it demands that the state back up its enterprises. we may trace this development in the recent history of great britain. though british wages rose during the half century ending in 1900, the consuming capacity of the masses was not sufficient to employ the rapidly expanding capital. british capital went everywhere; among other places to the transvaal. there was more money in "kaffirs" than in making socks for the british artisan, and if international friction resulted from this capital export, it was all the better, or at least none the worse, for the financiers. the men who controlled the rand mines knew when shares were to rise and when they were to fall, and profited by their knowledge. nor were war preparations disadvantageous. an extra dreadnought helped british capital more than would the expenditure of the cost of such a vessel in increasing the wages of school teachers. yet it was because school teachers and other wage-earners in britain, as in many other countries, were poorly paid, that the accumulating capital of the nations was forced increasingly into foreign lands and into imperialistic ventures. morocco, egypt, korea and manchuria offered larger rewards than did the highly {188} competitive businesses which depended on the custom of french, english and russian peasants or wage-earners. the inequality in the distribution of wealth proved to be a stimulus to imperialistic competition. those who are satisfied with things as they are never tire of speaking of this distribution of wealth as an immutable thing, protected by economic laws more potent than legislative enactments. they insist that law cannot control the expansion of capital or the distribution of wealth. but our whole system of distribution is based on law. if england had not preserved entail and primogeniture, if france had not decreed the equal inheritance by all children, if the united states had not adopted a liberal land policy, the distribution of wealth in each of these countries would have been far different. within wide limits the economic course of the nation can be controlled. such a peaceful programme for creating a better distribution of wealth, a wider consumption and therefore a larger employment of capital in industries for home consumption has the added advantage that it is a policy in complete harmony with the interests of great sections of the population. the average man desires peace feebly; he does not think of it day and night and is not willing to fight for it. but he is willing to fight for things which actually contribute more towards peace than do arbitration treaties. the demand of the workman for higher wages, shorter hours and better conditions is, whether the wage-earner knows it or not, a demand for international peace. progressive income and inheritance taxes, the regulation of railroads and industrial corporations, the conservation of natural resources are all opposed to an imperialistic policy leading to war. in short the entire {189} democratic struggle against the narrow concentration of wealth, by increasing the demand for capital within the country, tends to preserve us from a meddlesome, domineering, dangerous imperialism. to increase the consumption of the masses of our people is easier for us than for germany or england because of our wider economic base, our bulk, territory and immense potential wealth. to increase wages, we need not, like the crowded countries of western europe, acquire new resources beyond our borders. we already have a place in the sun, and out of our waste can extract more than can germany or france out of colonies for which they must fight. it is easier for us to increase industrial rewards because we now waste more in our unregulated scramble for wealth than germany gains in her scientific, economical use of her smaller resources. compared to industrial germany we are a spendthrift nation. had germany our resources and numbers, she would be peaceful and rich; were we obliged to live on her narrow territory, we should be bellicose and impoverished. not that germany has solved the whole problem; all she has learned is to be efficient. her early poverty taught her to make a little go a great way, to combine the peasant's industry and parsimony with the far-flung plans of the business organiser. so capably has she done this that living conditions have improved as her population has increased. where all nations have as yet failed, however, is in the distribution of the industrial product. in the end a gross inequality of wealth and income, as we find it in all developed countries, is another form of waste. it means fewer economic satisfactions, less true value. a few billion dollars added to the income of twenty thousand families is of less utility than when distributed among {190} twenty millions. inequality of wealth, moreover, involves low wages, over-work, child labour, insecurity, unemployment, preventable disease, premature death, in short, a bad economy. it also involves an inability on the part of the masses to consume the product of industries in which the wealthy invest. the economic inequality in the united states does not as yet present the same imminent dangers as in certain european countries. wealth, it is true, is most unevenly distributed,[1] but while incomes are also very unequal,[2] the rate of wages[3] and the returns to farmers and to small business men are far greater than in the industrial countries of europe. our statistics of consumption reveal an immense and constantly increasing demand for all kinds of articles and services. as compared with england or germany the distribution of income in the united states permits a high standard of living and creates a vast demand for the use of capital in industries for home consumption. there is, however, a danger that these conditions may grow worse. an unrestricted growth of the population {191} either through natural increase or immigration would tend to increase monopoly profits and reduce real wages, thus accentuating the inequality of distribution and forcing an enormous surplus capital to be devoted to foreign trade and foreign investments. on the other hand there is an opportunity to improve our conditions. there is still a wide margin for a real increase in wages, for shorter hours, better labour conditions, improved education, improved recreational facilities, and in general a deflection of a large part of the national dividend to the improvement of the conditions of life of the whole population. for a long time americans ignored the necessity of any such social policy. we were almost as wasteful of our human as of our physical resources. from birth to burial we regarded our men and women as human accidents, who died or lived, languished or grew great, as circumstances decreed. though in recent decades we have approached to a keener sense of collective national responsibility, we still suffer not only from a high infantile death-rate but also from a disastrous neglect of children who survive. our educational system is still rudimentary, conventional, and ill adapted to our economic needs. there is little industrial education, less vocational guidance, and almost no care at all for the adjustment of the educational system to the later needs of the children. millions of children, who in the next generation are to decide questions of war or peace, are growing up, anemic, underfed, intellectually sterile, and without morale, firmness or strength. our slums, our low wages, our evil conditions in mines and sweat-shops unite to give us the tramp, the corner loafer, the exploiter of vice, the criminal. such conditions are in every sense dangerous to our peace as also to our well-being. they mean a low economic efficiency, a restricted consumption, a barrier to the proper capitalisation of our country. {192} apart from this, the corruption arising out of such conditions menaces our national character. we hear praise to-day of the iron discipline of the german army, but we hear less of the discipline of the german school, factory system, social legislation, trade-union. if millions of americans are shiftless, shuffling, undisciplined and only vaguely and crudely patriotic, the cause is to be found in our neglect of the lessons of modern social life. to state these conditions of human waste and exploitation is to suggest the remedies. all such remedies cost money, hundreds of millions. there is no progress without higher taxes, better spent, and we shall not advance except by the path of a vast increase in collective expenditure for common purposes. in the end, of course, such improvements will pay for themselves. if we spent fifty millions a year upon agricultural education, we could easily reimburse ourselves out of our increased production. we spend over five hundred million dollars annually upon public elementary and secondary education, a sum much greater than that spent in any other country. if, however, we could efficiently organise our school system, we could more profitably spend three times as much. there are many other chances for the ultimately profitable investment of our capital upon agencies which make for a more intelligent, active, industrious and self-disciplined population. there is an added use to which such higher taxation may be put. by means of a larger collective expenditure, a more equal distribution of income and a wider consumption by the masses may be secured. what can be attained by industrial action, such as strikes, can be effected in even greater measure through fiscal action. taxes, to redress inequality, should be sharply graduated. by taxes on unearned increment and monopoly profits, by the {193} regulation of the wages, prices, dividends and profits of great corporations, we could increasingly divert large sums to wage-earners, consumers, stockholders and to the nation as a whole. by increasing the consumption both of individuals and of the national unit, such taxation would give an impetus to home industrial development. if this deflection of wealth from the rich caused a temporary lack of capital, the resulting rise in interest rates would stimulate saving and repair the evil. such a progress would mean not only an advance towards a fuller, freer and more active life for the population but also a diminution of the impulse to imperialistic adventure and war. an increased income for the men at the bottom creates a broader economic base, a less top-heavy structure, with smaller necessity for support from without. it increases our home market, widens the home investment field and reduces the intense sharpness of competition for the profits of the backward countries. it affords the opportunity to be disinterested in foreign policy and to work for the promotion of international peace. equally important is its effect upon the national psychology. it gives the people a stake at home. a device, familiar to certain statesmen, is to divert the people's minds from domestic affairs by arousing animosity against the foreigner. is it impossible to allay hatred of the foreigner by concentrating interest on home concerns? psychologically this process is nothing but immunisation. a disease may be resisted by the absence in the blood and tissues of substances needed by the bacteria for their growth and increase. as we may immunise the body, so we may immunise the mind of individual or nation. we protect our children from error, not by forbidding the publication of false doctrine but by creating in the child's mind a true knowledge and a faculty of {194} criticism. similarly to guard against the infection of the war spirit a public opinion can be created in which war bacteria will find no nutriment. to immunise society is not, however, a mere juggler's trick; we cannot ask washington to legislate us into immunity. what is needed is a potent social change, arousing enthusiasms and antagonisms, and involving a new attitude towards business and politics, freedom and discipline; a new efficiency; a new balance of power within society; a new attitude towards the state; a new value placed upon the life of each individual. such a change involves a patriotism so exigent that the nation will resent poverty in fall river or bethlehem as it resents murder in mexico. many americans would find such a revolution in our conditions and attitudes uninteresting or worse; some, with vast material interests at stake, would prefer a dozen wars. against this indifference and opposition, the change, if it comes, must make its way. such a progress would not, of course, create perpetual peace within the community. we read much to-day of satiated nations, unwilling to fight for more, but considered from within, there is no satiated society. everywhere groups fight for economic, political or social advancement. in a democratic community the mass of the people, and especially the manual workers, though in a more favourable economic situation, would still be unsatisfied. conflict would endure. it is well that it should be so, for a society in which all were contented in a buttressed, routine life would go to war through sheer boredom. the economic antidote to imperialism thus resolves itself into a very necessary intellectual and emotional antidote. the lure of war persists even to-day, when soldiers dig themselves into burrows and individual courage is lost in the vast magnitude of the contest. nor can you {195} counteract the temptation to fight (or have others fight) by preaching sermons against war, for the sermon and the bugle-call seem to appeal to different cells in the brain. all you can do is to polarise a man's thoughts and inspire him with other interests, ambitions and ideals. a full, varied, intense life is a better antidote than a mere vacuity of existence, without toil, pleasure, pain or excitement. in his search for an antidote to war, william james points out how utterly the ordinary pacifist ignores the stubborn instincts that impel men to battle. "we inherit," he says, "the war-like type.... our ancestors have bred pugnacity into our bone and marrow, and thousands of years won't breed it out of us. the popular imagination fairly fattens on the thoughts of war." the men at the bottom of society, james assures us, "are as tough as nails and physically and morally almost as insensitive," and if not to these then to all "who still keep a sense for life's more bitter flavours ... the whole atmosphere of present-day utopian literature tastes mawkish and dishwatery." for the discipline of war, william james wishes to substitute another and more strenuous discipline, "a conscription of the whole youthful population to form for a certain number of years a part of the army enlisted against _nature_." "the military ideals of hardihood and discipline would be wrought into the growing fibre of the people; no one would remain blind as the luxurious classes now are blind, to man's relations to the globe he lives on, and to the permanently sour and hard foundations of his higher life. to coal and iron mines, to freight trains, to fishing fleets in december, to dish-washing, clothes-washing and window-washing, to road-building and tunnel-making, to foundries and stokeholes, and to the frames of sky-scrapers, would our gilded youths be drafted off, according to their choice, to get the {196} childishness knocked out of them, and to come back into society with healthier sympathies and soberer ideals."[4] even in a society which would permit an industrial conscription both of rich and poor, a certain latent bellicosity, making for war, would undoubtedly persist. there seems to be an irreducible minimum of jingoism, just as whatever your precautions, you cannot quite do away with rats or noxious germs. no nation is free from this cheapest intoxicant. you may find it with the expensive american on his travels or on the cracker-barrels in the country store and you cannot help stumbling over it in the yellow journals and in many dull and respectable newspapers which do not know that they are yellow. even the self-depreciating type of american may turn out to be a jingo if you will trouble to take off his peel. such jingoism, however, though unpleasant may be quite innocuous. we all have a trace of it as we all are supposed to have a trace of tuberculosis. so long as our jingoes confine themselves to merely trumpeting national virtues, actual and imputed, we may rest content. such men will scarcely be capable of stirring a whole population to war, if men are living under decent conditions, struggling for still better conditions, and competing on a high plane. if we can secure prosperity, efficiency and equality and can make life fuller, more intense, varied and romantic, the ravages of jingoism will be circumscribed. it will be argued, however, that though we make our conditions what we will we shall still be anxious to fight at the first opportunity. "it is evident," says prof. sumner,[5] {197} "that men love war; when two hundred thousand men in the united states volunteer in a month for a war with spain which appeals to no sense of wrong against their country and to no other strong sentiment of human nature, when their lives are by no means monotonous or destitute of interest, and where life offers chances of wealth and prosperity, the pure love of adventure and war must be strong in our population." if two hundred thousand volunteer for a war when we are not obviously attacked, will not the whole country go to war for the sake of "honour"? it would be foolish to answer this question categorically; no one can predict what a nation will do when wounded in its self-esteem. the heir of thousands of centuries of fighting, man is to-day, as always, a fragile container of dynamite, not guaranteed against explosion, and there are experts in the touching off of dynamite. when bismarck falsified the ems despatch he knew exactly what its effect would be upon the french sense of honour. but "honour" is an ambiguous word, meaning everything, from a scrupulous regard to national obligations freely entered upon to a mere truculent bellicosity. the honour of nations, in the sense that nations usually fight for honour, is mere prestige, and prestige is not much more than an acknowledgment of formidableness. the danes and the dutch are honourable, but, in the sense in which the word is ordinarily used, neither denmark nor holland can afford honour. the claims of national honour, moreover, are strangely shadowy and transitory. what seems imperatively demanded by honour at the moment becomes insignificant later. for a number of years the united states paid tribute to the barbary pirates; our citizens were sold into slavery and his serene majesty, the dey of algiers, treated our representative in a manner which a great power to-day would hardly adopt in an ultimatum to {198} paraguay or san marino.[6] but it was not then convenient to fight and so we pocketed our honour until a more convenient occasion. the dey of algiers has long since gone to the scrap-pile of history, while the united states remains, a respected and honourable nation. nations which are sure of themselves, like men who respect themselves, are somewhat slower to resent affronts than nations which are insecure and fearsome. in 1914 austria was solicitous of her honour, which, she believed, was assailed by servia, and russia was solicitous of hers, for these two powers were engaged in a contest over the fears and prepossessions of the balkan states, and "honour" meant adherents. but when in the same year, a mexican government offered what was believed to be an affront to the united states, our people were in no mood to feel insulted. we did not need prestige. after all, questions of honour are usually questions of interest. in the _lusitania_ controversy, we did not receive the apologies which we believed were due to us. but as we had no interest in fighting germany, and as germany gained less from her submarine campaign than she would have lost in a war with us, the matter was amicably, though not logically, settled or at least postponed. had we, however, been in a different economic position, had a few million unemployed men been striking, rioting and threatening to revolt, or, on the other hand had we had plans for our aggrandisement at the expense of germany, acts of war would have followed within twenty-four hours of the massacre. we should have been far more "jealous in honour." but we were otherwise engaged. the headlines were full of the events {199} in europe and the horror of that tragedy in the atlantic, but the gaze of america was inward. we were interested day by day in the ambitions of peace. thus our hope of remaining at peace ourselves and of contributing to the peace and economic reorganisation of the world depends not only upon the conservation and development of our natural resources but also upon a distribution of wealth and income which will widen the consumption by the masses and will give to the whole population the opportunity of a full, varied and purposeful life. all these things, as well as the moral discipline which is so urgently needed, can be secured only as we learn to apply a national policy to our own nation. it is our own slackness, our own "state-blindness," our lack of a complete democracy, which increases our chances of imperialism and war. it is, on the other hand, our increasing willingness to take a national view of internal affairs, our increasing desire to base american prosperity upon american resources and to make life fuller and more valuable, that acts as a deterrent to war and fits us for the difficult task of contributing to a world peace. finally such a contribution to the peace of the world implies the condition that our own foreign policy shall not be in conflict with the international ideals which we are seeking to promote. if we ourselves are interested in the parcelling out of backward countries, we shall not be able to exert a restraining influence upon nations whose necessities are greater than ours. by this is not meant that we are to stay at home completely and enjoy no rights beyond our borders. such an effacement would mean a monastic seclusion for the united states. but while in the world beyond there is a fair field for peaceful competition, in which we also may take our part, our hope of promoting economic internationalism depends upon our not playing {200} a lone hand, upon our abstention from a selfish and short-sighted policy of national aggression and upon our free co-operation with other nations seeking the goal of international peace. [1] according to estimates based on studies of estates probated in massachusetts and wisconsin, it appears that 2 per cent. of the population owned almost 60 per cent. of the wealth while the poorest 65 per cent. of the population died in possession of only about 5 per cent. of the wealth. see king (w. i.), "the wealth and income of the people of the united states," new york, 1915; also cited sources. [2] twenty per cent. of the population receive 47.2 per cent. of national income and the remaining eighty per cent. of the population 52.8 per cent. of the national income.--king, _op. cit._, p. 235. [3] from 1880 to 1910 the total wages (and salaries) paid in the united states increased from 3.8 to 14.3 thousands of millions of dollars; the average wage increased from $323 to $507; the increase in the annual wages, taking into account differences in the cost of living, was 64 per cent. for basis of these calculations see king. [4] william james. the moral equivalent of war. in "memories and studies." new york. longmans, green & co. 1912. [5] sumner (william graham). "war and other essays," new haven (yale university press), 1913, p. 29. [6] "in 1800 captain bainbridge, arriving at algiers with the usual tribute, was ordered to carry dispatches to constantinople. 'you pay me tribute,' explained the dey, 'by which you become my slaves, and therefore i have a right to order you as i think proper.'"--fish. (carl russell.) "american diplomacy," new york (1915), p. 141. {201} chapter xv american interests abroad no nation in its foreign policy is completely disinterested, in the sense that it willingly abandons or sacrifices its larger interests. what generosity it displays is usually in smaller matters, like a rich man's gift to a beggar. england may sacrifice interests in jamaica to uphold the principle of human freedom, while at the same time fighting china to force the admission of opium. similarly the united states may generously return money to japan (as in the shimonoseki case) or to china, or relieve the sufferers of messina or of belgium. in really vital matters, however, nations are not self-sacrificing, but tenaciously pursue their own interests. there are two senses, however, in which a nation may be disinterested in its foreign policy. either it may possess no interest or its separate interest may be so small in relation to its larger interests elsewhere that it is willing to make a sacrifice. if, for example, the present war ended in a deadlock and the two groups of powers, unwilling to trust each other, were to confide constantinople and the straits to the keeping of the united states, it would be almost unthinkable that we should be false to the trust. we should have no interest in favouring one group of nations as against the other; we should have no political axe to grind and no economic or territorial gains to make. we should be fair and disinterested because we had no interest. {202} our recent attitude toward cuba, the philippines and mexico has been relatively disinterested in the second sense. we might have made money by exploiting these countries. we could have held cuba; we might have imported a million chinese into the philippine islands and grown rich on their toil, while in mexico, where we already had invested a large capital which was menaced and in part destroyed by the revolution, we could have taken what we wanted and held what we took. certain motives of decency prevented us from following this ruthless course; our self-satisfaction was worth more to us than a few hundred million dollars. the important fact, however, was that we were not pressed for this wealth. we were not compelled by poverty or pressure of population to grab what we could. we were able to seek a larger interest, to lay the basis of a slower but surer prosperity and to gain the good will, if not of cubans, filipinos and mexicans, at least of the nations generally. in the long run it was a policy that will pay, and our conditions are such that we can still afford to consider the long run. but although we have been occasionally disinterested or have shown at least a chemical trace of disinterestedness, our foreign policy has usually pursued concrete national aims. it has been a conservative, relatively uneventful policy, consisting for the most part in a quiet, unhurried advancement of our interests, with a not excessive consideration for the opinions of other nations. we have been cautious though persistent. we have avoided forcing quarrels upon powerful nations until we had grown irresistible. usually we obtained the large thing, but where we could obtain it only by fighting formidable opponents, we compromised. when as in 1861 we found ourselves in a dangerous position, we endured aggression by france and spain until we were again free {203} to compel redress. time worked for us, the passing years were our allies and we could afford to move slow. but we moved always in one direction--toward our perceived national interest. the issue, therefore, is not whether we shall sacrifice our national interests, but whether in our foreign policy we shall pursue ultimate, or at least relatively permanent, interests in a large way or seek immediate, smaller gains. it is a choice similar to that which a great store makes when it sells standard goods at a fixed price instead of seeking immediate advantage by petty cheatings and interminable and multitudinous hagglings. as nations advance towards power, stability and security, they are enabled to base their programmes increasingly on long time views and, ceasing to be interested in small advantages, to seek their larger interests in a policy of tolerance and seeming magnanimity. it was to england's real interest to be scrupulously fair in peace time toward weaker naval nations; it was equally to her larger interest to open her dependencies to the trade of the world and to accord political rights to her lately conquered dutch subjects in south africa. a tighter and harder policy would have been short-sighted. even had it gained immediate advantages, it might have left england in a day of adversity with the great powers ranged against her. the choice between immediate and ultimate interest in foreign policy presents itself daily. we could, for example, simply take the danish west indies, instead of paying for them, and doubtless might secure ourselves against a future retaliation by the great powers. such an adventure, however, to say nothing of its ethics, would be monstrously stupid. or, while the european nations are looking elsewhere, we might "go" into mexico and keep {204} what we wanted. we have a better excuse than in 1846 and an equally safe opportunity. we should be richer to-morrow if we took mexico, but would it pay in the end? would such a conquest accord with our larger policies and our true ambitions in the world? it is in this light that we should view the problem of our foreign policy as it shapes itself to-day. we must preserve certain national interests, material and spiritual. we must ward off certain dangers, securing ourselves as other nations secure themselves. but for better or worse, we have become a world power and a world influence, and what we do outside, as well as within, our borders, must affect the decisions and actions of other nations. if our ideal is not aggrandisement or empire but an equal fellowship with other great nations, if we desire to contribute to the progress of international development and not merely get all we can in the scramble, how shall we shape our foreign policy? on what broad general principle shall we decide the urgent questions which arise day by day in most unexpected conjunctions? the answer to these questions is not easy; there is not even an agreement as to what our interests are. what, after all, do the hundred million americans want beyond their borders? what are we willing to fight for rather than forego? what do we already have or claim, the retention of which would justify us in fighting? how we shall answer this depends upon our temperament and our special interests. certain americans would advise us to fight all europe, rather than recede from an action already determined upon or acknowledge that american policy is conditioned by the will of foreigners. one need not argue against such convictions. it is the current, instinctive philosophy of "my country right or wrong, wise or foolish; my country against the world." to fight {205} all europe, however, is not to fight at all, but merely to be assassinated. to act as though europe had no rights which america needs respect is to adopt a principle profoundly hostile to our own welfare. to a financier, whose interests in mexico, guatemala or indo-china are attacked, war seems preferable to a neglect of those interests. he would not put the matter so crudely; he would say that he preferred defeat or even disaster to a peace dictated by fear. what would lead him to this patriotic conclusion, however, would be the conviction that to do nothing would lose him his property, whereas even a disastrous war would cost him only his share in the national loss. and the war might be gained or even avoided, if only the united states were bold enough. he would, therefore, define our national interests as including all those things to which we in our good judgment believed that we had some claim. those with no special interest in foreign investments are less solicitous. a default on the bonds of mexican railways is less costly to the iowa farmer or boston stonemason than the contraction of debts for the purpose of pacifying mexico. to fight england or germany seems more costly to the average american than to forego extra opportunities for making money in china or the argentine. even the farmer or stonemason, however, feels that the united states has certain interests and rights abroad. our citizens should have the right to travel freely upon the high seas and in foreign countries and to enjoy privileges and immunities granted to citizens of other nations. we should have equal access with other nations to the sources of raw materials and to world markets, subject to the reserved right of each nation, including the united states, to levy customs duties for the protection of its own industries. finally we should enjoy the right of {206} investing our capital and conducting our businesses abroad under the equal protection of the laws of the particular country. all this is of course vague. it does not determine what protection we should assure ourselves in a country whose government is corrupt or unstable, nor does it consider the contingency of a weak nation, granting under duress more favourable conditions to some other foreign nation than to us. while however we cannot arrive at any final decision as to the details of our foreign policy, we can at least formulate in general terms certain principles which we may seek to apply. the most vital of these principles is equal opportunity for all nations, and no special advantage for ourselves or others. in accepting such a principle the united states would be merely applying to a territory, over which it held a dominant influence, a policy which, if universally applied by all the great powers, would immensely reduce the area of international friction. to apply such a principle in good faith is the first and most obvious contribution that we can make to economic internationalism. we cannot in reason demand the open door in asia or in europe's colonies if in our own colonies and in other lands where we are paramount, we adopt a contrary policy. we can afford to concede this principle of equal opportunity because of our resources at home and the large share of trade and investment opportunities which will come to us without special favours. what we might get above that is not worth the risk. a policy of taking all we can get, whether other nations suffer or not, is, apart from all other considerations, injudicious. such a policy of aggression might be cloaked for instance under the monroe doctrine, a vague tenet, capable {207} of contraction or infinite expansion. if we allow our speculators to determine its meaning, we shall in due course interpret the doctrine as the right of the united states to control south america politically and exploit it industrially. the downward path to such an interpretation is easy. to secure an inside track in latin america we need only look askance upon concessions to europeans and with benevolence upon concessions to americans. we can place obstacles in the way of foreign corporations recovering damages for injuries suffered, while we aid american companies to secure redress. we can make our ministers to latin america "business agents" of exporters and big banking concerns. such a policy would mean economic and eventually political control, the much feared _conquista pacifica_. if we embark upon such a policy we shall earn the hatred both of europe and of latin america. hitherto the monroe doctrine has been safe from serious attack by europe because england with her preponderant sea-power has been commercially the chief benefactor, and the other nations believed that, for the time being at least, south america was held open for joint exploitation. moreover, europe had nearer problems in the disposition of balkan territory and in the partition of africa and sections of asia. so long as european nations were not ready to divide up latin america, or so long as they believed that it would remain independent and thus open to the commerce of all, the temptation to fight for a slice of the great continent, though alluring, was not sufficiently powerful to overcome the sense of the peril of such an undertaking. for germany to seek to conquer a part of brazil would have been to add all the american nations to her already long list of enemies. but this tolerance of the monroe doctrine is conditioned upon our playing {208} the part of a guardian and not of a conqueror. we can neither monopolise latin america industrially nor rule it politically (which might involve the same result) without trenching upon the common patrimony of europe. to secure the inside track means therefore either to fight all europe, which is impossible, or to share the booty with one or two allied powers, like england and france, and thus to enter into all the complications and dangers of european politics. a pan-americanism of this sort would involve us in the next balkan imbroglio or the next quarrel over the persian gulf, and our peace would be at the mercy of any little monarch who struck the first blow at one of our allies. in latin america itself such a policy of aggression by the united states is already feared and resented.[1] the people to the south of us do not take our professions of disinterestedness with the simple faith of little children, but see in us a virile, formidable, unconsciously imperialistic nation, which has already benefited by its guardianship and hopes to benefit still more. they fear the colour prejudice in the united states and a certain unreasoning contempt for latin-american civilisation might lead us impatiently to set aside their rights if they conflicted with our own interests. the latin americans already speak of a "north american peril." they remember texas, {209} panama, porto rico. indeed, they recognise that the united states, in despite of itself, may be forced to expand southwards. "it is more than probable," writes the mexican sociologist, f. bulnes, "that by 1980 the united states will hold a population of 250,000,000 inhabitants. they will then scarcely be sufficient for the needs of this population, and will no longer be able to supply the world with the vast quantity of cereals which they supply to-day. they will therefore have to choose between a recourse to the methods of intensive culture and the conquest of the extra-tropical lands of latin america, which are fitted, by their conditions, to the easy and inexpensive production of cereals."[2] there is a nearer danger. "sometimes," writes garcia calderon, "this north american influence becomes a monopoly, and the united states takes possession of the markets of the south. they aim at making a trust of the south american republics, the supreme dream of their multi-millionaire _conquistadors_."[3] thus to shut off latin america, as spain once did, would, however, injure the southern republics and create an antagonism that would find its expression in armed resistance. nor would this resistance be entirely negligible. a century ago, latin america had a population of fifteen millions; to-day its population is eighty millions and is rapidly increasing. as an ally to european nations, opposed to aggression by the united states, a latin-american country or group of countries might well exert a decisive influence. ill defined and vague, capable of being indefinitely expanded by all sorts of sudden interpretations, the monroe {210} doctrine is to-day a peril to latin america and to ourselves. it is likely to become even more dangerous if turned over to an american plutocracy for its elucidation. if on the other hand, we restrict our policy to the protection of the interests of latin americans, europeans and ourselves, we shall not only be safe-guarding our own peace, but shall be removing a future coveted area from the field of international strife. to adopt such a policy, however, means that we must be better informed and more concrete. it is absurd to lump together all latin-american countries, as though all were equally advanced in civilisation. to compare the argentine with san domingo is to discover differences almost as great as between holland and abyssinia. mexico is far more significant to us politically, economically and in a military sense than brazil or chile. into the question of panama, haiti and the west indian islands generally, elements enter that are absent from our relations with venezuela or ecuador. our policy towards these countries need not be identical. we should have a mexican policy, a separate policy for the west indian islands, another policy for the caribbean states, and an individual policy for each south american state. our interests and obligations differ in these states. we cannot pretend to the same vital interest in the internal peace of argentina as in that of our next door neighbour. we cannot cover these diverse conditions with the blanket of one vague doctrine. in our relations to latin america, moreover, we should not grasp at political sovereignty, if the reasonable economic interests of the world can in any way be secured without political incorporation. we are gradually being forced into a policy of acquiring dominion over certain caribbean countries. we have a financial guardianship in haiti and san domingo; we have "taken" panama, {211} and it probably needs only a little disorder to give us a quasi-protectorate over other small countries in the same neighbourhood. the united states, however, is on the whole still averse from such interference, wherever avoidable. we have kept faith with cuba and there is strong opposition to acquiring mexico, despite the agitation of financiers and instinctive border-line patriots. the problem is not easy, for a measure of peace in these neighbouring states is not only essential to us but is demanded by europe (who will interfere if we do not) and peace may eventually require intervention. in countries like haiti, which show at present an invincible distaste for orderly government, abstention is almost impossible. the chief danger in our relations with certain latin-american countries lies in this political instability and unripeness that makes property and life unsafe and the administration of justice notoriously corrupt. the result is extortion, bribery and violence clothed in legal form. investors and creditors plead for intervention to enforce contracts, sometimes of doubtful validity, sometimes obviously dishonest. to meet the problems arising from such claims, we should have more information. our bureau of foreign commerce should ask for data concerning american investments abroad and especially in latin america. such information, supplied in the first instance by the corporations, should be verified by official investigations. there should be full publicity. our consular representatives should not seek to secure special privileges or business orders, and our governmental influence should guarantee equal economic opportunities to all nations. no claim by americans should be enforced until it has been reported upon favourably by a court of arbitration composed of representatives of nations with no interest in the controversy. {212} whether the united states should seek the aid of england or of some other european power in the maintenance of the monroe doctrine or should endeavour to internationalise the doctrine by gaining the adhesion of all nations, or should support the doctrine with the aid of the latin-american countries alone is a question the answer to which will depend upon the future attitude of european nations, and especially upon the relation of the united states to those nations. the difficulty of securing an international guarantee lies in the necessary vagueness of the doctrine. in the present state of mind concerning international guarantees, there is perhaps more immediate advantage in a special guardianship by the united states, the argentine, brazil and chile, especially as in the case of an assault upon the doctrine by one or more european powers, the assistance of other european nations could probably be obtained. the important consideration at present is that the strength of the doctrine will be in direct proportion to the disinterestedness of the united states. the more clearly the doctrine can be made to serve the common interests of the world instead of the special interests of a single country, the more likely is it to secure the support in any crisis of a group of nations possessing a preponderance of world power. our relations with canada present fewer temptations. our policy should look towards the creation of friendly relations and a nearer economic union, but neither immediately nor ultimately towards a forced annexation. a willing political incorporation of canada into the united states might be excellent, but an annexation against the opposition of the canadian people would be a crime and blunder. it would mean an american alsace-lorraine upon an immense scale. economically canada and the united states are rapidly becoming one. with exports to {213} canada already more than twice as great as those of all other nations (including great britain) we can at will draw upon her immense agricultural and mineral resources by the simple expedient of letting down our tariff wall. we can invest there as safely as britisher or canadian, and can benefit by canada (as canada benefits by us) as though she were a part of the united states. a growth of the eight million canadians to twenty or more millions will mean for us an enhanced prosperity. despite absurd prejudices on both sides of the border the economic union grows stronger.[4] if we do not strive for an inside track in latin america nor for the conquest of canada, should we be willing to fight for the "open door" in china, for equal privileges in all parts of that empire? the phrase the "open door" has a pleasing sound. there can be no doubt that the opening up of china's ports to commerce with all nations on equal terms would be of immediate advantage to us, and probably to china herself. our interest in the matter, however, is frankly selfish. though we have a kindly feeling for the chinese, so long as they stay in china, our "open door" policy is intended in the first instance to benefit our own merchants and investors. the alternative to the open door is to {214} permit other nations to divide up china, a proceeding in which we do not care to take part, and to exclude us from certain trade and investment opportunities. it is doubtful whether these chances which we should lose by an unaggressive policy, are sufficiently important to justify us in entering upon a conflict with japan or with japan and russia.[5] our losses would be less than is imagined, for whoever opens up china will be compelled to admit other industrial nations upon reasonable terms. japan cannot finance herself, to say nothing of financing china, and the nations, called upon to supply capital, would necessarily be consulted in essential political and economic arrangements. even if japan secured a relatively excessive share of the commerce, it would mean a diversion of other trade, which she formerly possessed, since her own factories would be busy. in the end, we could afford to permit other nations to take upon themselves the burden of policing china, in view of the fact that while our {215} own profits might be less our expenses also would be less. a deeper problem, however, is involved in this question of china. just as by the monroe doctrine we seek to prevent european powers from conquering, colonising and dividing up america, so in china, our interest, apart from a share of the trade and investment chances, lies in contributing to the world's peace by removing that vast territory from the field of international political competition. what we should mean by "the open door" in china is the integrity of that country and its immunity from conquest, partition and forced exploitation. the plea of an "open door," as a mere tariff policy, comes with ill grace from us, who have closed the door both in porto rico and at home, but china's integrity is an issue of a different character.[6] it is important to us not so much for immediate economic reasons as because it is likely to promote peace. it is a world, rather than a national, interest. because it is a world-interest, it should be secured by the efforts of many nations and not by the united states alone. {216} in principle, therefore, the six-power loan, which in a sense was a joint guarantee, was a step in the right direction. that its specific terms were unreasonable and that the loan was in a degree forced were perhaps sufficient reasons for our withdrawal from the arrangement. along somewhat similar lines, however, the early development of china should proceed, and it is to our interest to promote any plan that will prevent china from being the bone of contention among the belligerent nations of europe.[7] our relations to latin america, canada and china are perhaps the most immediate of our foreign concerns. these are the lands in which we have the greatest stake and the greatest temptation to pursue an imperialistic policy. the real power in this world, however, lies in europe. it is europe that decides the fate of asia, africa, australia, and may in the end decide that of south america. it is from europe that the fear of war arises, and it is in our dealings with europe, and in the dealings of european nations with one another, that the hope of peace and of progress in international development must centre. [1] for a view of latin america's fear of aggression by the united states, see such books as "el imperialismo norte-americano," by f. caraballo sotolongo, havana, 1914, and amã©rica latina ante el peliogro, by salvador k. merlos, san josã© (costa rica), 1914. both of these books are shrill and somewhat uncritical but they fairly represent a large body of latin-american thought. there is usually a division of opinion as to whether the united states is to attain its ends by military or by financial means. "it is not _manu militari_," writes a french author, "that brother jonathan intends to carve out his place in the sun, but by the force of dollars."--"l'imperialisme allemand," by maurice lair, paris, 1914. [2] f. bulnes, "l'avenir des nations hispano-americaines," quoted by f. garcia calderon, "latin america," p. 312. [3] f. garcia calderon, "latin america. its rise and progress," p. 299. [4] the problem of canada's relation to european controversies and wars may in the future present difficult problems for the united states. if in the present war germany had been able to land armies on canadian soil, or if in the future russia or japan were to do so, the position of the united states might be rendered dangerous by the permanent establishment of a strong military power, let us say in british columbia. yet we could not demand that canada be allowed to send troops against russia or japan and those nations be forbidden to attack in return. the problem of the immobilisation, and even of the neutrality, of canada in certain future wars, in which great britain is engaged but we ourselves are neutrals, may become an urgent question. [5] a guess at our possible losses through a non-aggressive policy in china is made by mr. thomas f. millard in his "our eastern question." "it is roughly estimated," he says, "that china's administrative, commercial, and economic development in the next twenty years will need $2,000,000,000 of foreign capital. under a genuine application of the hay doctrine, america would have approximately one-fourth of this financing.... the returns from this investment would be partly interest and partly trade. five per cent. interest on $500,000,000 is $25,000,000 income annually." in other words for the privilege of gaining twenty years from now $25,000,000 a year from an investment which if made at home or in the argentine or in russia would bring us in little less, mr. millard would have us put japan in her place and if necessary join with england and perhaps france to fight both japan and russia. even if we add the trade profits to this interest on investment, the total result is pitiably small. at our present rate of increase in wealth we may add about one hundred and fifty billions of dollars in the next twenty years. whether or not one-half billion is invested in china is, nationally speaking, superlatively unimportant. if we intervene in china let us not do it for a few million dollars annually. (see millard, _op. cit._, p. 383.) [6] the significant question has been raised whether manchuria should be included in the china, whose integrity is to be secured. while china is very densely populated, manchuria prior to 1904 had only 8,500,000 people on an area of 376,800 square miles, a density of population considerably less than that of minnesota. with immense natural resources, its development has, says dr. james francis abbott in "japanese expansion and american policies," p. 222, been prevented by "the existence of wandering brigands 'hunghuntzies,' who terrorised the country." dr. abbott distinguishes between the japanese occupation of shantung, which is filled with chinese, and of south manchuria which "was a sparsely settled province of which china was merely the nominal owner. the russians, and after them the japanese, occupied it as americans occupied california and annexed it for the same reason." korea and manchuria are absolutely necessary to japan. "japan's needs for expansion are real and obvious. manchuria and korea could hold the double of the japanese population" (p. 233). in other words dr. abbott advises a policy of maintaining the integrity of a china, excluding however both korea and manchuria. [7] if china does develop an industrial civilisation it may be quite capable before many generations of maintaining its own integrity and independence. the weaknesses under which china now suffers would tend to disappear once it became industrially organised. that this impending industrial progress of china would mean ultimate economic danger to western europe is probable, but this remote danger would not prevent those nations pursuing their immediate economic interests in developing china. {217} chapter xvi pacifism static and dynamic if at home we have a firm basis for national development, if we grow up as a great power beyond the range of fierce conflicts between the nations, the opportunity will be offered us to contribute in some degree to the ultimate establishment of peace, or at least to the limitation of war, in the world outside. our influence can be cast upon the side of peace and augment the forces making for peace. our hope lies in a national development, which will permit us while pursuing our larger national interests to work towards a great community of interest among other nations. in such an international peace the united states has a direct and an indirect interest. it has been recently asserted that we in america might regard the present war with equanimity since it brought us huge profits. undoubtedly there is money to be made out of the selling of provisions and munitions as well as from trade in countries from which competitors are temporarily excluded. on the other hand, the war means the impoverishment of european nations, who are our main purveyors and customers, and eventually the losses suffered by combatants must be shared to some extent by us who are non-combatants. the war brings about a dislocation of the world industry, a shrinking of capital, and in the end higher prices and a possible reduction in real wages. {218} in the years to come we shall be forced to pay our share of the cost. nor is this economic motive our sole reason for desiring international peace. we are linked to the nations of europe, and however we declaim against "hyphenates," cannot prevent our immigrants from sympathising with the land of their birth. the present straining of loyalties in this country is a sufficient reason for our desiring peace in europe. nor do we like bloodshed or the political reaction and the backwash of barbarism that wars entail. finally, however neutral we remain, there is always the possibility that we may be plunged into a great european conflict, in which in the beginning at least we shall have no direct interest. diplomatically also, war in europe is of no overwhelming advantage to us. in the early days of the republic, a constant balancing of hostile forces prevented england and france from taking advantage of our weakness. the quarrels of europe enabled us to preserve our independence by opposing a unitary strength to the enfeebling european dualism; otherwise we might not have dared to use so shrill a tone in admonishing the great powers. but even had the eagle not screeched, we might still have led a satisfactory national existence. whatever was true in the past, however, we need no longer be so completely defenceless that we must fear that peace in europe would mean a conquest of america. we should rather have europe fight itself than us, but--in dollars and cents as in other values--we should prefer to see the world at peace. we shall not secure peace, however, by merely wishing for it or by merely preaching it. in the midst of war there has always been the longing for peace, and throughout the centuries voices have been raised calling upon mankind to give up its war upon itself. the ideal of peace {219} pervades much of all folklore; it inspires the old testament prophets and is everywhere expressed in the new testament. the religious ideals of the chinese, hindus and persians are suffused with the hope of peace, and greek and roman philosophers and poets dreamed of a peaceful commonwealth of peoples and planned the federation of the world. the early church fathers, irenã¦us, clement of alexandria, tertullian, cyprian, augustine, preached the gospel of peace, and while the church doctrines later changed in this respect, there reappeared again and again during the mediã¦val period the conception of a world state, presided over by emperor or pope, and ending once for all the ceaseless strife among princes. after the reformation religious sects grew up, like the mennonites and the quakers, who preached not only peace but non-resistance. out of all this longing for peace, out of all these proposals, however, came nothing. similarly the pacifist writings of the abbã© de st. pierre, of rousseau, of leibnitz, of montesquieu, of voltaire, of kant, of jeremy bentham and of hundreds of others did not bring the world a single step nearer to an elimination of war.[1] throughout this long history, pacifism failed because it was in no sense based upon the actual conditions of the world. it was a religious, sentimental, hortatory pacifism. finding peace desirable, it pleaded with the men who ruled nations to compose their quarrels. it was an appeal not to the interest but to the sentiments of men. it discovered that war was evil and exhorted nations and rulers to refrain from evil. with the period of enlightenment that began shortly before the french revolution, the movement for peace was {220} accelerated. the ideas that were once current only among philosophers began to spread among considerable sections of the population. gradually also pacifism became rationalistic rather than religious or moral. war was attacked not because it was evil in the eyes of god but because, like high taxes, monopolies and tariffs, it was adverse to the economic interests of nations and peoples. the growth of the doctrine of _laissez-faire_ and of free trade gave a new impetus to the pacifist movement. the people of the world were looked upon as a myriad of human atoms, whose welfare did not depend upon the power of the particular state of which they chanced to form a part, but upon the free enterprise of each and the unobstructed exchange of products among all these individuals. it was held that the world would be better if there were no customs barriers, and free trade on equal terms for all the people of the world was predicted as a proximate consummation. there would then be no need for wars or fleets or armies, which cost money and prevented the progress of humanity. wars were economically inadvisable. they did not benefit the sovereign individual, and therefore could not benefit the nation, which was merely a huge assemblage of individuals. like the religious and emotional pacifism which preceded it, this rationalistic pacifism broke down through its sheer inapplicability to the facts of life. while the philosophers of the french revolution were still proclaiming the advent of peace, the greatest wars until then in all history were already preparing, and again when in 1851 at the first world's exposition in london men began to hope that the era of peace had at last come, a long period of war was again imminent. never was there more talk of peace or hope of peace than in the years preceding the great conflict of 1914. no wonder many advocates and {221} prophets of war believe that peace is forever impossible. "there," wrote the late prof. j. a. cramb, "in its specious and glittering beauty the ideal of pacificism remains; yet in the long march of humanity across thousands of years or thousands of centuries it remains still an ideal, lost in inaccessible distances, as when first it gleamed across the imagination."[2] "despite this hubbub of talk down all the centuries war has continued--absolutely as if not a word had been said on one side or the other. man's dreadful toll in blood has not yet all been paid. the human race bears still this burden. declaimed against in the name of religion, in the name of humanity, in the name of profit-and-loss, war still goes on."[3] but the fact that war still exists does not at all prove that it is inevitable, but merely that it has not yet been avoided. militarists argue that war is biologically necessary, an ingrained ineradicable instinct, a necessary evil or an inescapable good, a gift of a stern god. there is a curious sentimental fatalism about our war prophets, but in the end their arguments come down to two, that we have always had wars and that we still have them. it was said many years ago that "the poor ye have always with you" and to-day poverty on an immense scale still exists in every part of the planet. yet we do not despair of limiting or even of eradicating poverty. tuberculosis has existed for centuries and still exists, but to-day we understand the disease and it is doomed. if war is inevitable it is so for reasons which have not yet been established. until it is proved that war accompanies life and progress as the shadow accompanies the body, men will strive to eliminate war, however frequent and discouraging their failures. the cause of these failures of pacifism has been its {222} unreality, its too confident approach to a difficult problem. many pacifists have tended to exhort about war instead of studying it; they have looked upon it as a thing accursed and irrational, beyond the pale of serious consideration. they have likened the belief that war has accomplished good in the past to a faith in witchcraft and other superstitions. they have tilted at war, as the mediã¦val church tilted at usury, without stopping to consider what relation this war-process bore to the basic facts of social evolution. it was an error to consider war as a thing in itself instead of an effect of precedent causes. fortunately the newer pacifists, who have been rendered cautious by many bitter disappointments, are changing their approach and seeking to cure war not directly but by removing its causes. they are striving to outflank war. along this line alone can progress be made. you cannot end war without changing the international polity which leads to war. the bloody conflicts between nations, being a symptom of a world maladjustment and frequently an attempt to cure that maladjustment, can be averted only by policies which provide some other cure. to destroy war one must find some alternative regulator or governor of societies. in their failure to provide such a regulator, or even to recognise that such a regulator is necessary, lies the vital defect of many of the peace plans to-day. pacifism may be either static or dynamic; it may seek to keep things as they are, to crystallise international society in its present forms, or on the other hand may base itself on the assumption that these forms will change. it may address itself to the problem of stopping the world as one stops a clock, of forbidding unequal growth of nations, of discountenancing change, or it may seek to find an outlet and expression for the discontent and unrest which all growth {223} brings. pacifism that is static is doomed. our only hope lies in a dynamic, evolutionary pacifism, based on a principle of the ever-changing adjustment of nations to an ever-changing environment. at the bottom of static pacifism lies a conception somewhat as follows. the nations of the earth have an interest in maintaining peace, but are forced, tricked or lured into war by the tyranny or craft of princes and capitalists or by their own prejudices and sudden passions. some nations are peaceful and some, by reason of an evil education, hostile; wherefore the hostile nations must be restrained by the peaceful, as the anti-social classes are restrained by the community. honest differences of opinion among nations must be arbitrated; angry passions must be allowed to cool, and the nations must go about unarmed that there may be no indiscriminate shooting. given these precautions we shall have peace. but it is a peace without change, and such a peace, apart from its being impossible, is not even desirable. what the static pacifist does not perceive is that he is hopelessly conservative and stationary in a swiftly moving world. he would like to build a wall against time and change, to put down his stakes and bid evolution cease. it is this pathetic clinging to fixity, to a something immutable, that vitiates his proposals. nations that hate war prefer it nevertheless to the preservation of unendurable conditions, and the best conditions, if they remain unaltered, speedily become unendurable. we should not be satisfied to-day with the best constitution of the world agreed upon a hundred years ago, before there were railroads and telegraphs, and when democracy and nationalism were weaker than to-day. if to-morrow morning our wisest and most forward-looking men were to re-constitute society and petrify it in peace, our descendants would be far from content. {224} the best heritage that the world can have is not a perfect constitution but a feasible principle of change. a dynamic pacifism, on the other hand, must assume that the world is in change, and that no peace is possible or desirable which does not permit great international transformations. these transformations arise from various causes. thus a candid consideration of the facts of international life must convince us that in the present era nationality is a potent, vital and probably a growing force, and that many of the ambitions and desires of men are mobilised nationally. the nations, however, grow unequally and are subjected to unequal pressure by their various environments. as a consequence certain nations become increasingly dissatisfied with their place in the world, and naturally, and in the present circumstances wisely, prefer the risks and costs of war to their present position. such nations have an interest in war, if change cannot be otherwise effected. moreover, it is clear to the dynamic pacifist that certain classes by the fact of their position in society are more bellicose than others, that classes grow at unequal rates and exert a varying influence, and that certain classes may have a direct and obvious interest in throwing their nation into war. the neglect of any such dynamic conception of world society is revealed in all the proposals of the static pacifists. for example, the proposal to create a united states of europe is based on a palpably false analogy with the united states of america, and ignores grossly the living principle of nationality. the states of europe are either nations or are approaching nationhood. they lack the racial, linguistic and traditional bonds, which made the union of the american colonies not indeed easy but at least possible. these trans-atlantic nations suffer from being jostled one against the other and their keen sense of {225} national difference is accentuated by economic pressure and by a perpetual fear of foreign military aggression. to unite all these nations into one federal state, with a senate, a house of representatives and an impartial supreme court, is not only a static but a mechanical proposal. nations grow; they are not manufactured. equally static is the proposal for immediate and universal disarmament. nations will arm so long as they are afraid and so long as they want something vital that can be obtained only by warfare. moreover, there is no principle to determine the permitted armament of each nation or to designate the country which shall control the international police that is to enforce disarmament. an unequal disarmament would be unwise because it would take from the more pacific and civilised nations the weapons necessary to restrain unorganised and retrograde peoples. the fundamental defect of the proposal, however, is that it provides no way by which one nation, injured by another, can secure redress. if there is to be neither war nor an effective international regulation, what limits can a nation set to non-military aggression by its neighbour?[4] the belief that all wars may be averted by arbitration is equally a static conception. during the last few decades international arbitration has settled many controversies, which could not be adjusted by ordinary diplomatic means. increasingly cases have been submitted to arbitral decision. {226} the real questions over which nations clash, however, are not arbitrable. one cannot arbitrate whether russia or germany should control the balkans, whether the united states should admit japanese immigrants, or whether alsace should go to france or germany, or trieste to italy or austria. arbitration has the limitations of judicial processes. it is possible to arbitrate questions concerning the interpretation of treaties and formal agreements or the application of recognised principles of international law, but no nation will arbitrate its right to exist. moreover, the very fact that arbitration is a judicial process, based upon precedents and the assumption of the _status quo_ renders it unacceptable to the nations which are dissatisfied with present arrangements. the necessity which knows no law respects no arbitration, and no board of arbitration, however impartial, could decide that one nation should have more colonies because she needed them or because she was growing, while another nation must stand aside because feeble and unprogressive. it is probably not in the interest of the world that portugal and belgium should retain their colonies in africa, but on what precedent could these nations be forced to sell? questions of vital interest therefore are in truth non-justiciable. no powerful nation will accept a subordinate position in the world because some arbitral body decides it may not adopt a certain policy. arbitration is not a process of adjustment of growing nations to a changing environment. but if nations will not gladly accept arbitration where supposedly vital interests are concerned, can they not be coerced? out of the obvious need of such coercion arises a whole series of plans to force recalcitrant nations to accept mediation, to delay hostilities and even to abide by the arbitral award. a league to enforce peace is a proposed union of pacific nations to prevent immediate or even {227} ultimate recourse to war, to force combatants to arbitrate justiciable disputes and to place the sanction of force behind the decisions of the nations. this proposal contains within it an element valuable and indeed essential to international peace. it frankly assumes the right of a group of nations to compel a refractory nation by the use of force. it is far more realistic than the conception of a world peace based upon a sudden conversion of the nations to the iniquity of war, which is at bottom an anarchistic conception. for however we deplore a use of force we cannot rely exclusively upon anything less. force is not intrinsically immoral, and without force no morality can prevail. the compulsion which the parent exercises over a child, and organised communities over the individual citizen, must equally form the basis of an international system. one cannot base such a system upon mere moral suasion, which, though of value as a precedent and complement to force, is frequently thwarted by the public opinion of each nation, formed within its borders and protected from outside influence by pride and a blinding national interest. outside nations could not have persuaded germany that it was unethical to invade belgium. she would have appealed to her own moral sense and trusted to the future to make good her right to attack. had germany realised, however, that an invasion of belgium would be actively resisted by otherwise neutral nations, overwhelming in force, she might have been willing to debate the question. the immorality of force lies merely in improper use. all through history compulsion has been exerted for evil as well as for good purposes. the future of international concord lies, therefore, not in refraining from force or potential force, not in a purely _laissez-faire_ policy, but in applying force to uphold a growing body of international {228} ethics, increasingly recognised by the public opinion of the world. but a league of peace, unless it is _more_ than a league of peace, suffers from the same defect of not providing an alternative to war. if italy is not to attack austria, some way must be found to protect italian interests in the trentino and trieste, and if germany is not to attack england, some security must be given that german commerce will be safe and german colonial aspirations not entirely disregarded. if the nations believe, rightly or wrongly, that their vital interests are being disregarded in the peace which the league enforces, there will be defections and revolts. such a league would then become useless or worse, since it can only exert an influence so long as it possesses an immense preponderance of power. the same defect inheres in a league of satisfied powers. such powers, preferring the _status quo_ to any probable revision of the affairs of the world, are in the beginning united by a common conservative instinct. but no nation is completely satisfied; each wants a "rectification" here and a "compensation" there. the same disagreements over the spoils of the world that would be found outside such a league would also make their appearance within, and in the end one or more of the satiated nations would join the group of the unsatisfied, and the league would cease to be a guarantee of peace. it would die of the endless flux in human affairs. similarly static is the proposal that all nations wait, or be compelled to wait, a set term before beginning hostilities. in many cases such a compulsory postponement would be advantageous in that it would favour the mobilisation of the pacific elements in the community and thus tend to prevent wars being suddenly forced upon the nation against the national interest by a small, bellicose social class. the {229} underlying theory, however, is that nations always go to war because they are hot-headed, whereas in very many cases the decision to wage war at the proper time is perfectly deliberate and cold-blooded. moreover, a compulsory wait before declaring war would alter the balance of power between the groups of powers, and would adversely affect certain ready nations, which could therefore only be coerced into accepting the arrangement. unless some adequate provision were made (and it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to make it) to prevent a nation from preparing for war during the year's wait, the countries with the largest resources, such as great britain, the united states and russia, would secure an enormous advantage, while nations like germany and japan would lose. an event in the very recent past illustrates this point. on august 1, 1914 the german secretary of state intimated to the british ambassador that a failure on the part of russia to demobilise would cause germany to declare instant war. "russia had said that her mobilisation did not necessarily imply war, and that she could perfectly well remain mobilised for months without making war. this was not the case with germany. she had the speed and russia had the numbers, and the safety of the german empire forbade that germany should allow russia time to bring up masses of troops from all parts of her wide dominions."[5] in other words, for germany to give up her greater speed of mobilisation would be to destroy her advantage while assuring that of russia. actually, under present circumstances, such a proposal would tend to preserve the _status quo_ and to aid the satisfied nations. in practice it would take from the dissatisfied nations the power to alter arrangements, which they feel are unjust. {230} most of these plans, a federation of nations, a progressive disarmament, a wider application of the principle of arbitration, and a league to enforce peace, have elements of value, once they are divorced from purely static conceptions and are united with proposals to effect some form of progressive adjustment of nations to each other and to the world. in this effort at adjustment lies the real problem of securing international peace. so long as the nations have conflicting economic interests so wide and deep as to make their surrender perilous to the national future, so long will they find some way to escape from the restraints of peace. they will drive their armies through any compact or agreement, adverse to their economic interests, and in the process will smash whatever machinery has been created for establishing peace. a dynamic pacifism, therefore, must take into account this factor of the constantly changing, balancing, opposing economic needs of rival nations. it must devise not only some rudimentary form of international government but also arrangements by which the things for which the nations go to war may peacefully be distributed or utilized in a manner equitable to all. [1] for a brief digest of the history of pacifism, see dr. edward krehbiel, "nationalism, war and society," new york, 1916. see also books cited by him. [2] "england and germany," p. 56. [3] p. 58. [4] the proposal for disarmament also raises the question of the inner stability of each nation. in each country there must be some police force to keep down the anti-social classes and prevent revolution. such a force might be small in england or the united states; it would have to be large and powerful in russia and austria, if the subject nations were to be held down. but a large police force is an army under a different name. if each disarmed nation were permitted to decide its own police needs, the whole principle of disarmament would be whittled away. [5] british white paper, no. 138. {231} chapter xvii towards international government these are three ways in which the united states might conceivably attempt to promote the international adjustments without which peace cannot be secured. we might seek to "go it alone," righting one wrong after another, intervening whenever and wherever our national conscience directed. or we might enter into an alliance with one or a few selected democratic and enlightened nations to force international justice and comity upon other nations. finally we might refrain from ubiquitous interventions and peace-propagating alliances and devote ourselves, in conjunction with all other willing nations, to the formulation of principles of international policy, and unite with those nations in the legalisation and enforcement of such principles. in other words we might become the standard about which the peaceful parties and groups of all nations might rally. the first of these courses is quite impossible. it is grotesque to think of us, or of any country, as a knight-errant, rescuing nations forlorn from evil forsworn powers. there are two things, besides a saving sense of humour, which preclude us from essaying this rã´le; we have not the knowledge and we have not the power. for the making of peace more than good will is required. nothing is more harmful in international intercourse than a certain sentimentalism and contempt for realities on the part of many of our pacifists. the difficulty with most plans for intervention by one {232} moral and infallible power is that they attribute a pikestaff simplicity to international--as, in fact, to all questions. according to certain superlatively well-intentioned people, some nations are wicked and others virtuous; some nations love the clash of arms, some the ways of peace; some nations are greedy, brutal and dishonourable, others are generous, gentle and honourable. it is the absolute bad and the impossible good of the melodrama, in which the human sheep and goats are sundered by an obvious moral boundary line. in point of fact, no nation is good or bad in this simple sense, but all have a certain justice in their claims, however difficult it is to square these claims with the moral philosophy of the neutral country. the british had a certain justice in their conflict with the transvaal as had also the dutch burghers who resisted them. even in our brutal attack upon mexico in 1846 we had the justification arising from our greater ability to use the conquered territory. it is easy to find phrases to be used whenever we wish to interfere, but these phrases sometimes conceal an ambiguous meaning and sometimes have no meaning at all. are we, for instance, to become the defenders of small nationalities, ready to go to war whenever one is invaded? has a small nation a right to hold its present territory when that right conflicts with the economic advance, let us say, of a whole continent? should we respect canada's right to keep new york, had that city originally been settled by canadians? should we compel russia to treat her poles and jews fairly and concede to russia the right to compel us to treat our negroes fairly? some extension of the right of interference in what are now called the internal affairs of other nations must be admitted, but it is a precipitous road to travel. the united powers may compel roumania or greece to {233} behave, but the united states, acting alone, would find it irksome to have to constrain or discipline russia. by this it is not meant that we should never intervene. it would be futile to fix such a rule for conduct which, in the end, will be determined by circumstances. in any question of interference, however, the burden of proof should rest heavily upon the side which urges a nation to slay in order to secure what it believes to be the eternal principles of justice. the general development will be toward greater interference, but this intervention will be increasingly international, not national. in actual practice the problem when to interfere is immensely difficult. it is easy to say "let america assume her responsibility for policing the world," but the question arises, "what in particular should we do and what leave undone?" should we war against germany because of belgium, and against france and england because of greece? should we fight japan to aid china? are we to mete out justice even-handed to the poles, finns and jews of russia, the czechs and southern slavs of austria, the armenians and alsatians? should we have interposed to save persia from benevolent absorption by russia and england? clearly we could not do these things alone, and to attempt them would be to strike an impossibly virtuous attitude. even if we had the wisdom or the sure instinct to save us from error, we should not have a fraction of the power necessary to make our benevolent intervention effective. to right the wrongs of the world, to build up a firm international policy and thus to create and establish peace seems easier if it be attempted in alliance with two or three other virtuous powers. but if we unite with england, france and russia, to maintain virtue in the world, may we not, at least hypothetically, be playing a fool's {234} part in a knave's game of diplomacy? may we not be simply undermining germany and austria? to use our army and navy for such purposes would constitute us a part of one great european combination against the other, and our disinterested assistance might be exploited for purposes with which we had no sympathy. a proposal, at least potentially more popular, is the formation of an anglo-american union for the maintenance of peace. it is assumed that the two nations, and the five self-governing british colonies are kindred in blood, inspired by the same ideals and united by a common language. their white population exceeds one hundred and fifty millions. they are capable, energetic, individualistic peoples, favourably situated on an immense area, and holding dominion over hundreds of millions in various parts of the world. these britons, colonials and americans, by reason of geographical position, are naval rather than military, and if they could hold the sea, would be able to preserve peace in lands not accessible to military powers and to dictate peace even to the military nations. such an integration of the english-speaking peoples would thus constitute a step towards international peace. it is not here proposed to discuss the value of this proposal as a means of defending the united states. in general, its defensive value for us would probably be less in the coming decades than for britain and her colonies. the british empire has the greater number of enemies and is the more easily assailed. great britain cannot protect her colonies without maintaining her naval supremacy not alone in the north sea, but in the pacific as well. as for england, she occupies the same position towards us in any attack from the european continent that belgium occupies towards england. she is an outpost. our own continental territory could probably be protected in {235} most cases by a smaller military and naval effort than would be required of us as part-defenders of a british-american union. it is true that these conditions might change, with the result that we should need great britain's help most urgently. for the time being, however, we are discussing a british-american alliance or federation not as a possible protection to us but as an instrument for eliminating war. in all probability such an instrument would work badly, and to the non-anglo-saxon world would look much like a sword. for the fundamental defect of such a proposal lies in the fact that it is a plan for the coercion of other powers by a group of nations, not at all disinterested. if the british and americans possessed eighty per cent. of the military and naval power of the world, they might establish a peace like that which the roman empire was able to establish. it would be a peace dictated by the strong. in fact, however, there would be no such superiority of power. russia, germany, austria, japan united, would be quite capable of exerting a far superior force. even if the force opposed were only equal, the result would be a confrontation of peoples in all essential respects like the balance of power in europe, but on a vaster scale. we should not have advanced an inch towards the goal of a world peace or a world economy. for the united states to enter into such a federation would be to take our part in the world wars to come and the intrigues that precede and accompany such wars. we might be called upon to halt russia's progress towards suez, the persian gulf, or the indian border. we might be obliged to defend belgium, holland, denmark, norway and sweden. we could not permit any nation to reach a point where british commerce might be assailed. we should cease to be interested in {236} the freedom of the seas because sharing the dominion of the seas. we should have no leisure and no inclination to seek a more equal utilisation of the backward countries. we should need armies and navies to protect the approaches to england and to hold back the land nations. against us would work immense potential forces. strong, growing, ambitious populations, envying our arrogant sea-power and forced by their insecurity to remain militaristic and become navalistic would prepare unceasingly for the day when they could try conclusions with us. the anglo-saxon federation may be an exhilarating conception, but it is not peace. parenthetically an agreement or understanding with great britain, less ambitious and pretentious than the proposed federation, is in the interest of the two nations. in the more than one hundred years of acrid peace between the two countries, there has been revealed a certain community of interest, which might properly be utilised to prevent future conflicts. while we are not ready to involve ourselves in britain's european and imperialistic policies, and do not want a whole world in arms against us, we do wish to avoid misunderstandings with england. we should be better off were we to give great britain assurances that we would not contest her naval supremacy (however much we may strive to alter its nature), and if we were to obtain from england her unconditional support of the doctrine that the latin-american countries are not to be colonised or conquered. in our efforts to secure a basis of international peace, however, we must rely not upon england or any other single nation or group of nations but upon a league, into which all nations may enter upon identical terms. we must depend upon all-inclusive, not upon exclusive alliances. {237} at this point it may be well to recapitulate the difficulties and inevitable limitations of any such plan. in the first place nationality exists and cannot be exorcised. the several nations, though they have common interests, are also sundered in interest, and in present circumstances may gain more from a given war than they lose. no nation, because of a moral appeal, will surrender its vital interests, and each believes that its own ambitions are morally justified. to pursue these interests the nations arm, and this competitive armament breeds fear, which in turn provokes war. in various parts of the world broken nationalities seek to attain to national independence or autonomy and these nationalistic differences are exacerbated by economic quarrels. moreover, within the nations certain sections or groups find their true economic interest in policies leading to war, and these groups are able by means of ceaseless propaganda to drive their nation into war-provoking policies. finally we are faced with the grim fact that in europe at least no great nation can pursue a consistent policy of peace unless other nations move simultaneously in the same direction. furthermore the instinctive efforts of each nation to secure its own peace by force constitute a menace to other nations and a danger to the world's peace. the outlook for peace is thus not cheering; "the war against war," to use william james's expression, "is going to be no holiday excursion or camping party." fortunately, however, there are certain factors making for peace, and upon these factors we are able to build. all over the world there is a peace sentiment, a vast, undisciplined, inchoate desire to discover ways and means by which this scourge of war may be lifted. it is not inherently impossible to organise this sentiment, crystallise it, direct it and make it effective. the task is essentially {238} similar to that of organising democracy, for wars increasingly are becoming national wars, in which success depends not upon princes but upon the willingness and enthusiasm of the great slow peoples. the millions who bear the chief burdens of war and derive only its lesser gains are in all countries moving towards self-expression and domination. it is in the end upon these masses, with their inherent prejudices and passions, and not upon diplomats and rulers that any project for peace must be based. the appeal to these millions though it be couched in terms of morality and sentiment, must be an appeal to interest. what is necessary is to recognise the economic motives that drive such populations to war and to reverse those motives. it does not suffice to preach that wars are never in the interest of the people; the nations know otherwise. it is necessary rather to change conditions so that wars will in actual fact lose their economic value to nations. peace must be made not only to appear but actually to be in the interest of the peoples of the world. the popular horror of war, the growing sense of its immense costs, the slowly maturing sympathy between individual members of hostile nations form the substantial groundwork upon which an opposition to war _in general_ is based. added to these are the waning of the romanticism of war and the growth of a sense of its mechanical (rather than human) quality. the present war has immensely increased this opposition. it has disenchanted the world. in all countries millions of men now realise that wars must be fought not alone by adventurous youths, who do not put a high value upon life, but by husbands and fathers and middle-aged men, who are somewhat less susceptible to the glamorous appeal of battle. they are beginning to recognise that wars are not won by courage alone {239} but by numbers, by money, by intimidation, by intrigue, by mendacity and all manner of baseness. the lies spread broadcast throughout the world and the money spent by germans and allies to bribe bulgarian patriots are quite as great factors in deciding the issue of the war as the valour of the _poilus_ at verdun. in a moral sense war has committed suicide. this increasing comprehension of war's real nature and of war's new manifestations is leading the peoples to demand the right to decide for themselves when and how war is to be declared and to take part in negotiations which may lead up to war. the power to provoke wars is the last bulwark of autocracy; when the nation is in danger (and in present circumstances it is always in danger), democracy goes by the board. let the socialists and liberals in all countries declaim as they will against armies, navies, imperialism, colonialism, and international friction, let members of parliament ask awkward questions in the house, the answer is always the same, "it is a matter of national safety. to reply to the question of the honourable gentleman is not in the public interest." against this stone wall the efforts of organisations like the british "union of democratic control" break ineffectually. the socialists have also failed, at least externally. identifying the war-makers and imperialists with those classes to which they were already opposed in internal politics, the socialists sought to make good their democratic antagonism to war. they opposed armies and proposed disarmament; they threatened national strikes in case aggressive wars were declared; they fought with a sure democratic instinct against every manifestation of militarism. in the crisis, however, they failed. they failed because their conception of war was too narrow, {240} arbitrary and doctrinaire. they perceived the upper class interest in war but failed to recognise, or rather obstinately ignored, the national interest. when at last the nation was threatened, the socialists and peace-makers not only closed ranks with those who desired war, but even lent a willing ear to proposals of annexation (for purposes of national security) and agreed to other international arrangements likely to be the cause or at least the occasion of future wars. the general will for peace we have with us already; what is to-day most necessary is the knowledge and insight which will direct this will to the attempted solution of the causes of war. towards this knowledge the present war has contributed. never before have so many men recognised the strength of the economic impulses driving nations into the conflict. the war, it is true, has intensified national hatreds by its wholesale breach of plighted agreements; it has increased terror and distrust; it has sown broadcast the seeds of future wars by a series of secret, but known, agreements, creating a new europe even more unstable than was the europe of 1914. on the other hand, it has forced men to open their eyes to the real facts of war, and to recognise that wars will continue until the motives for war are reversed, until conditions are created in which nations may realise their more moderate hopes of development without recourse to fighting. it is upon this recognition, upon this guide to the blind passion for peace, that any league for peace must be based. such a league can probably not be immediately constructed and permanently maintained. it depends upon the slow growth of an international mind, upon a willingness, not indeed to sacrifice national interests but to recognise that national interests may be made to conform with the larger interests of humanity. it means the {241} fulfilment not the destruction of nationality. it requires for its realisation the breaking of two chains, an inner chain which binds the nation to the will of a selfish minority class, an outer chain which binds its national interest to war. how such a league will come about it is perhaps premature to discuss. in the immediate future we are likely to have not a true league of peace but rather a league of temporarily satisfied powers, seeking their group interest in the _status quo_ and pursuing their common aims at the expense of excluded nations in much the same spirit in which a single nation now pursues its separate interest. such a grouping of interested nations is likely to be only temporary, as dissensions will arise and new alignments be made comprising the nations formerly excluded. it is bound to break up when the _status quo_ becomes intolerable to several of its members. on the other hand the spirit of such an organisation might not impossibly change. the league of satisfied nations might discover that it was to its real interest, or might be compelled by outer pressure, to make concessions to the excluded nations, and finally to admit them on certain terms. such a development would be comparable to that by which autocracies have gradually become constitutional monarchies and republics. but, however the league is formed, two things are essential to its continued existence. one is the acceptance of principles of international regulation, tending to reduce the incentive and increase the repugnance to war, in other words a measure of international agreement, secured either by an international body having legislative power, or in the beginning by a series of diplomatic arrangements as at present. the second essential is a machinery for enforcing agreements. such machinery cannot be {242} dispensed with. peace cannot come by international machinery alone; neither can it come without machinery. peace between nations, like peace within a nation, does not depend upon force alone. unless the effective majority of the nations (or of the citizens) are reconciled to the system to be enforced, unless they desire peace, whether international or internal, the application of force will be impossible. on the other hand, peace is equally impossible without force. if no compulsion can be applied the smallest minority can throw the world into war. such a compulsion of one nation by others does not necessarily mean a bombardment of cities or the shedding of blood. the force to be applied may be economic instead of military. no nation to-day, above all, no great industrial nation, is socially and economically self-sufficient, but all depend upon constant intercourse with other nations. it is therefore true, as one writer says,[1] that "if all or most of these avenues of intercourse were stopped, it (the offending nation) would soon be reduced to worse straits than those which germany is now experiencing. if all diplomatic intercourse were withdrawn; if the international postal and telegraphic systems were closed to a public law-breaker; if all inter-state railway trains stopped at his frontiers; if no foreign ships entered his ports, and ships carrying his flags were excluded from every foreign port; if all coaling stations were closed to him; if no acts of sale or purchase were permitted to him in the outside world--if such a political and commercial boycott were seriously threatened, what country could long stand out against it? nay, the far less rigorous measure of a financial boycott, the closure of all foreign exchanges to members of the outlaw state, the prohibition of all {243} quotations on foreign stock exchanges, and of all dealings in stocks and shares, all discounting and acceptances of trade bills, all loans for public or private purposes, and all payments of moneys due--such a withdrawal of financial intercourse, if thoroughly applied and persisted in, would be likely, to bring to its senses the least scrupulous of states. assuming that the members of the league included all or most of the important commercial and financial nations, and that they could be relied upon to press energetically all or even a few of these forms of boycott, could any country long resist such pressure? would not the threat of it and the knowledge that it could be used form a potent restraint upon the law-breaker? even the single weapon of a complete postal and telegraphic boycott would have enormous efficiency were it rigorously applied. every section of the industrial and commercial community would bring organised pressure upon its government to withdraw from so intolerable a position and to return to its international allegiance." it cannot be assumed that the attempt to organise such a boycott would be invariably successful. not all nations would be equally injured, for while a boycott of italy or greece would be fatal, the united states or russia might survive such economic pressure. a boycott would not be easy to enforce. it would be necessary to secure a concert of opinion and action in states, which, however they may agree upon any particular question, have widely divergent interests in other matters. different boycotting nations would be variously affected. a boycott of germany, while it might injure the united states or japan would almost certainly ruin holland and belgium. even were these small countries to be partially reimbursed for their special losses, they might still hesitate. there would also remain the fear that some of the boycotting nations would {244} be detached through economic bribery, with the result that the boycott broken, the nations faithful to their agreements would suffer. finally, if holland joined in a boycott of germany, she might within a few days be compelled to resist a german invasion. an economic boycott might easily lead to war. this obvious connection between economic and military compulsion is often disregarded by men who dislike war but are willing to commit their nation to participation in economic compulsion. the two, however, are inseparable, though they may not be inseparable for each nation. the boycotting nations must be prepared to prevent reprisals, must be willing if necessary to fight. it is not, however, necessary for each nation upholding international law to contribute equally to this military compulsion. certain nations might use their armies and fleets while others, more remote from the struggle, might merely continue to boycott. it would not be possible, to enforce a decision against nations having a preponderance of military power, nor even against a group with a large, though not the preponderant share of military and economic resources. germany, austria and russia combined could not be compelled. the essence of the problem, however, is not the creation of a state of war between coalitions almost equal in size, but the gradual adoption of a policy of peace by securing a unity of interest among so large a group of nations that this group would hold a clearly preponderant power over any other group. just as peace within a state cannot be secured where the law-breakers are a majority, so international peace cannot be secured unless the preponderance of power is clearly on the side of peace. even with a majority of nations agreeing "in principle," the difficulties of actually creating a league of {245} peace and international polity would be great. to carry out such a plan, to work out modes of action which will conform to the world's evolving sense of the necessity for more stable international relations, requires an international machinery, concerning which nations and classes will disagree. some channel, however, is necessary for the flow of the peace forces resident in the world. a machinery must be created which will approximate in some degree to that by which a nation, composed of conflicting classes and economic groups, manages to secure a degree of common interest and action among such groups. there must be an international executive, an international legislative body and some approach to an international court. that there are immense difficulties in the creation of such a machinery is obvious and admitted. that the machinery cannot work perfectly, that it may repeatedly break down; that it can be perfected only through trial and error, are facts, which though in themselves discouraging, need not lead to the abandonment of the effort. there is nothing inherently impossible in the gradual creation and elaboration of such machinery. the development of the future lies in that direction.[2] let the machinery be ever so perfect, however, it is useless unless principles are formulated which meet the requirements of the nations which are to be bound over to keep the peace. a league to enforce peace is a futility unless it is also a league to determine international polity. peace cannot be negative, a mere abstention from war. it must be a dynamic process, an adjustment of the nations of the world to their international environment. [1] hobson (john a.), "towards international government," new york (the macmillan co.), 1915, pp. 90, 91. [2] it is not pertinent to this book to discuss in detail the plans which are being formed for the gradual evolution of such international machinery. for readers who desire to secure a _prã¨cis_ of such arrangements, the book of john a. hobson, "towards international government," is recommended. {246} chapter xviii the freedom of the seas we have seen that the problem of peace cannot be solved without at the same time avoiding the economic conflicts now sundering the nations. we have seen that these divisive interests which are real and vital, can be accommodated neither by the force of good will alone (although good will is essential), nor by an appeal to national unselfishness nor by proposals which merely mean the perpetuation of the _status quo_. we have also seen that in the last instance force, or at least the threat of force is necessary, that this force cannot be applied by the united states alone or by a group of two or three beneficent powers, but only by an all-inclusive league of nations, acting according to established rules and with a machinery previously elaborated. only so can a programme of peace be made effective. such a programme will consist of three elements. the first is the freedom of the seas; the second is a joint imperialism; the third is the promotion of an economic internationalism. the freedom of the seas is necessary because without it the other elements cannot be supplied. no division or joint use of colonies will promote peace unless each nation is assured of continuous access to such colonies. a promise of the products and the profits of the backward countries will not satisfy a nation if it believes that at the first outbreak of war it will be deprived not only of colonial but also of all commercial rights. {247} in recent decades the problem of the freedom of the seas has grown in significance as access to the oceans has become more important and the nations increasingly interdependent. to-day trans-oceanic colonies are worthless, commerce is insecure and a satisfactory economic life at home difficult without such access. in peace the vessels of all nations may travel anywhere, but in war a belligerent's merchant vessels may be seized and confiscated and her shores blockaded. she may even be deprived of the right to import goods through neighbouring neutral countries. in the advocacy of the freedom of the seas the united states has taken a leading part, while england has pursued a policy of obstruction. in this respect england has been a menace to the world's peace. she has stood fairly consistently against a modernisation of naval law; has insisted on the right of capture of merchant vessels and the right to blockade, and in the present war has reverted, under grave provocation it is true, to the most rigorous maritime repression. it is by means of our influence on england that we can take the first step towards creating a better international system. if we are to become friends with england, the price must be the freedom of the seas. it may seem incongruous to suggest as a condition of friendship that our friend weaken herself, but as will later be indicated such a surrender of rights by great britain might in the end redound to her security and greater strength. the reason is obvious. the insecurity of each nation is the weakness of all. so long as a nation is insecure it will arm. so long as one nation arms all must arm. moreover, england is peculiarly vulnerable. the british empire is threatened whenever any nation seeks an outlet to the sea. nations will build navies against great britain so long as {248} without navies their commerce and colonies are threatened. the case of the german-british conflict is in point. england lies on germany's naval base. it is an unfortunate thing for germany, and indeed for england, but it is a geographical fact and unalterable. for germany this situation is tolerable so long as peace endures, but when war breaks out, all her commerce is stopped. the future of germany depends upon her developing industrially to a point where she can no longer feed her population from her own farms. she needs, if not colonies, at least markets. she requires a foreign base for her industry and uninterrupted access to that foreign base both in war and peace. she can be throttled, strangled, starved under the present usages of sea war. the war may not be of her own making. in other words twenty or fifty years of commercial development may be swept away at a moment's notice in a war, declared, it may be, by england for purely commercial purposes. to these apprehensions of the germans, england may answer that in peace times german commerce is secure. but immunity in war as well as in peace is necessary. therefore, the germans do what other nations would do in like circumstances, take the matter into their own hands. they build a navy strong enough to make england hesitate to attack their merchant marine. it is an understandable attempt to protect what is an absolutely vital interest. but for germany to build a navy capable of measuring arms with the british navy is intolerable to great britain. it is useless for germany to protest that she will not use her fleet aggressively. so long as she can use it aggressively, she is a menace to england's life. england must prevent germany from building {249} a navy equal in power, for if she is defeated at sea, her fate is sealed. germany must be threatened on land by france and russia or she will be able to devote her energies exclusively to her navy and thus out-build england. given this situation, an anglo-german war is inevitable. nor is the situation in the north sea unique. once this conflict of interest begins, it spreads everywhere. germany may not have morocco or tripoli because with a foothold and a naval base on the mediterranean, she could exert pressure there in order to change conditions elsewhere. similarly the pacific commerce of russia is at the mercy of japan; her black sea traffic at the mercy of turkey, or whoever controls turkey, her baltic sea traffic at the mercy of germany, denmark and england. no wonder russia demands constantinople, which will at least open the inner doors of the black sea. but if she gets constantinople, she controls the whole danube traffic of austria, hungary and roumania, and she herself is menaced by british and french fleets at malta, gibraltar and aden. what is the probable, or at least possible, policy of russia in such circumstances? not immediately, not inopportunely, but in the right season? clearly it is to build a navy which will secure her control of the mediterranean and thus protect her outgoing trade from odessa and batum as well as her incoming trade. although not pre-eminently a naval power, russia must ultimately seek to accomplish what germany tried to do--make it dangerous for england to menace her mediterranean and red sea trade even in war times. but to secure naval supremacy in the mediterranean means to threaten egypt and india, thus breaking the neck of the {250} british empire. given the present unfreedom of the sea, therefore, great britain's vital interests oppose those of russia as they now oppose those of germany. this is the meaning of the historic british policy of the right of capture at sea, the right of blockade, the right to use naval power to work injury to the trade of hostile countries and to prevent colonial expansion. the policy is a menace to the british empire and to the independence of great britain herself. it stimulates other nations to outbuild great britain. and in the end that is at least a possible contingency. if a generation or two from now russia and germany should unite, russia attacking in the mediterranean and aiding germany in the north sea, the british empire would be put to a severe test. there might be no way of saving egypt and india or holland and denmark and these outposts gone, great britain might be menaced and attacked at leisure. if her navies were defeated she would starve. the rules of naval warfare, which britain has so long upheld, would be turned against her. it is thus to great britain's real interest to surrender this doctrine. in the present war it has been of value, but only because germany and austria were surrounded by powerful enemies, and all adjacent neutral powers with sea bases were small enough to be intimidated. the blockade of a nation is to-day of little value unless adjacent nations can also be blockaded. the railroad unites all land nations. if france had been neutral in this war, germany could not have been blockaded, for a british threat to blockade france would have thrown her into the arms of germany. even if italy had remained neutral, an effective blockade might have forced italy into the war on the side of the teutonic powers. england is using a weapon {251} which at the most means a serious loss to her enemies but which effectively turned against her would mean instant death. there are certain powerful groups in england who are obstinately opposed to any revision of the sea law in favour of neutral and belligerent nations. they feel to-day, as pitt felt in 1801, when the doctrine was advanced that a neutral flag might protect enemy's property. "shall we," asked pitt, "give up our maritime consequence and expose ourselves to scorn, to derision, and contempt? no man can deplore more than i do the loss of human blood--the calamities and distresses of war; but will you silently stand by and, acknowledging these monstrous and unheard-of principles of neutrality, insure your enemy against the effects of your hostility!... whatever shape it assumes, it (this doctrine) is a violation of the rights of england, and imperiously calls upon englishmen to resist it, even to the last shilling and the last drop of blood, rather than tamely submit to degrading consequences or weakly yield the rights of this country to shameful usurpation."[1] this doctrine, rather than accept which pitt was willing that england should fight to the death, was quietly accepted by great britain in the declaration of paris (1856) and, half a century later (1909), the declaration of london protected neutral rights even more strongly. but the spirit of pitt is by no means dead. the declaration of london failed of ratification in parliament partly because of mere factional opposition and partly because of ancient pride in england's naval supremacy. it was held that britain being the strongest naval power should uphold all naval rights {252} and all necessary naval aggressions both against belligerents and neutrals. the argument advanced in support of this position is that so long as the enemy disregards international law in land warfare britain has the right to disregard the laws of sea war. if germany violates belgium's neutrality, why should england surrender her power to put the maximum pressure upon her unscrupulous enemy? this argument, however, begs the whole question, whether it is to britain's real advantage that the naval law go back to what it was in the days of pitt and napoleon instead of being progressively liberalised. britain is not only the greatest naval but overwhelmingly the greatest maritime nation in the world. she has something to gain and everything to lose from a reaction towards the unregulated sea-warfare of 1801 (and 1916); she has much to gain and little to lose from the establishment of a true freedom of the sea. so long as england persists in a reactionary naval policy she will be menaced by every nation which feels itself menaced by her, and by every future development of naval warfare. the harshness of the british attitude in this matter of naval warfare leads to such brutal reprisals as that of the german submarine campaign against merchantmen. that campaign was not without its influence in laming the commercial activity of great britain; had the war broken out ten years later, with germany better equipped with submarines, the result might have been far more serious. a future submarine war carried on by france against england might be disastrous to the island kingdom. even the german campaign, hampered as it was by the fewness and remoteness of the german naval bases, might easily have had a crippling effect upon british industrial life but for the pressure brought to bear {253} upon germany by the united states. in the long run england cannot have it both ways. she must either defend her commerce from submarines alone or else accept a revision of the naval law. fortunately there are men in great britain who accept this broader view. "one of the promises of victory," writes the englishman, h. sidebotham, "is that great britain will be able to review her whole naval policy in the light of the experience gained in the war. sir edward grey has himself indicated that such a review may be appropriate in the negotiations for peace after victory has been won."[2] towards such a change in attitude the public opinion of the united states can largely contribute. while the majority of americans side strongly with britain and her allies, they make little distinction in their thought between a detested german militarism and a detested british navalism. our traditional attitude is one of hostility to the pretensions of the mistress of the sea. "how many more instances do we need," writes prof. j. w. burgess, "to demonstrate to us that the system of colonial empire with the dominance of the seas, and the unlimited territorial expansion which it claims, is not compatible with the freedom and prosperity of the world? can any american with half an eye fail to see that our greatest interest in the outcome of this war is that the seas shall become free and neutral, and that, shall they need policing, this shall become international; that the open door for trade and commerce shall take the place of colonial restrictions or preferences, or influences and shall, in times of peace, be the universal principle; that private property upon the high seas shall be inviolable; that trade between neutrals in time of war shall be entirely {254} unrestricted, and that contraband of war shall have an international definition?"[3] even if england did not recognise her true national interest in a revision of the sea-law, we could not co-operate with her in any broad attempt to establish the conditions of peace in europe without such a surrender on her part of rights which have become indefensible. it is not, of course, to be anticipated that a complete freedom of the sea will be immediately established, but unless the nations, not controlling the ocean, are given reasonable assurances of safety for their commerce and colonial development, each new war will merely lay the seeds of new wars. to establish the freedom of the sea, five things are desirable: (1) the abolition of the right of capture. (2) the abolition of the commercial blockade. this would permit the blockading of a naval port or base, the exclusion or destruction of naval vessels, the searching of merchant vessels for absolute and conditional contraband, and the blockade of a city or port where the naval blockade was merely the completion of a land blockade, but it would give to all ordinary merchant vessels, either enemy or neutral, the same access to enemy ports that they enjoy in peace, without any further delay than is necessary for the prevention of non-neutral acts by merchantmen. (3) the establishment of international prize courts and the submission of controversies to such courts. (4) the internationalization of such straits as the dardanelles, the suez canal, the panama canal, the kiel canal, the straits of gibraltar, as far as that can be achieved by international agreement. {255} (5) establishment of an international naval convention and of an international body to enforce its decisions, to which international body all powers, naval and non-naval, should be admitted. an anglo-american agreement to enforce such a convention could be made the corner-stone of an international organisation, open to all nations. a naval force of neutral powers would enforce the freedom of the sea in the interest of england's enemies and in her own interest. with such an agreement in force much of the present naval rivalry would lose its meaning. if german commerce were safe in time of war, if she could not be blockaded and her ships captured, she would have a weaker interest in building against england. she might still desire a fleet to bombard enemy coasts or to invade england, but even without such a navy she would have a large measure of security. she might well prefer to forego some of her naval ambitions in order to secure british friendship. in any case even a naval disaster would not be so utterly crushing to england nor so great a hardship to germany as under present conditions. naturally the value of such an arrangement would depend upon the belief of the nations in its faithful enforcement by all the signatory powers. international promises fall in value as wars come to be fought by powerful coalitions instead of by individual nations, each immensely weaker than the whole group of neutral powers. when all nations of the first rank become engaged actively or by sympathy, the truly neutral powers are too weak to exercise much influence. they cannot compel the belligerents even to live up to their acknowledged agreements. what in such cases is the value of a naval convention between england and germany, which neither of the {256} nations believes that the other will observe in the day of trial? the difficulty is a real one as the uncontrolled savagery and the unnumbered violations of international law during the present war amply prove. it is this doubt as to whether opposed groups will live up to their agreements, or whether neutral groups will enforce such agreements, that strikes at the root of international, as also of national cohesion. if we believe that our neighbors will not pay their personal property taxes, it is highly improbable that we will pay ours; a nation, which believes that its enemy will violate an agreement anticipates such action by violating the agreement first.[4] yet without such international agreements no international concert is possible. moreover the very condition, which made agreements so perishable during the present war (the number and strength of the belligerents and the weakness of the neutrals) is one which itself is likely to be remedied by agreements made in advance. if germany, england, france, italy and russia have even a qualified sense of security concerning their over-sea possessions and their commerce, they will be less likely to enter into these hostile, world-embracing coalitions, which rob such agreements of so much of their value. especially would this be true if certain terms of the agreement--such as the {257} neutralisation of strategic water-ways--could be effected in peace times. in any case this evolving and increasing half-trust in agreements is one of the fragile instruments with which we must work. if, therefore, an international arrangement were made, or a series of compacts were formed between individual nations, by which, for example, a group of powers promised to attack any nation violating these naval agreements (even if it pleaded counter violations by the enemy) a basis of faith in the new arrangements would be laid. there would remain, however, the question of colonies. so long as there is no principle by which the colonial opportunities of the world can be distributed, we shall have competitive nationalistic imperialism and the constant threat of war. [1] quoted by h. sidebotham. "the freedom of the seas." "towards a lasting settlement," by various authors; edited by charles roden buxton, london, 1915, p. 66. [2] h. sidebotham, _op. cit._, p. 63. [3] "the european war of 1914. its causes, purposes and probable results," chicago, 1915, p. 142. [4] some of the german defenders of the belgian invasion claim that the germans were convinced that had they not used belgium as a base for military operations, england or france would have done so at the first convenient moment, though possibly with belgium's consent (which, however, belgium had no legal right to give). whether or not this fear was justified, it is evident that violations and proposed violations of international law by one group of belligerents led to violations by the other, reprisals were answered by counter-reprisals, and grave breaches of international law by all belligerents were defended on the ground that the opponent would do, or had done, the same. {258} chapter xix the higher imperialism one of the greatest difficulties in the problem of working out an international colonial policy is our neglect of the immediate and overwhelming influence of colonies, as of other economic outlets, in the provocation of destructive wars. until the nations recognize that wars are in the main wars of interest, fought for concrete things, and unless such things can be utilised with some regard to the desires of all nations involved, war cannot be avoided. if these questions of interest were merely a matter of short division, of so much trade to be distributed, the problem, though difficult, would be easier of solution. but in many cases a single, indivisible prize must be awarded. there is only one antwerp, one trieste, one constantinople, and there are many claimants. is russia to control the yellow sea or is japan? is the persian gulf to be british, russian or german? is the present division of colonial possessions to be maintained or is there to be a new distribution, from which some nations will gain and others lose? what is to decide what colonies shall belong to what nation or what share each nation shall have in the profits of exploitations? these and a hundred other questions indicate the wide range of complicated economic interests which to-day divide nations and illustrate the difficulty of establishing a basis of agreement. clearly we cannot solve the problem by permanently {259} maintaining the _status quo_. for the _status quo_, being based upon the relative power of nations in the past, does not conform to the power of the same nations to-day or to-morrow. moreover, the maintenance of the _status quo_ means the perpetuation of absurd anachronisms. it is undesirable as well as impossible. nations are not static. you can no more assure exclusive economic advantages to a weak and unprogressive nation than you could have preserved the american continent to the aborigines. even if there were no single economic principle to apply, it would not follow that some approach to an economic equilibrium would be impossible. as law develops out of an endless chaos of human relations by means of decisions (based on temporary exigencies) until a rule of law is established, as the market-price grows out of the innumerable hagglings of the market, so even without the aid of a fundamental principle, some _modus vivendi_, some approach to an economic concert, could be attained. economically considered, war is an attempt to solve the problem of the utilisation of the world's resources. if the world's wealth and income can be so distributed among the world's inhabitants, grouped into nations, as to render those nations, not indeed satisfied, but sufficiently satisfied not to go to war, a basis for peace results, even though the arrangement is not ideal. if, however, the distribution is obviously at variance with the relative power and needs of the nations, then one nation or group seeks to overturn the arrangement by force. to secure such a distribution requires the establishment of certain canons of international policy and modes of international procedure. the decision must in some degree conform to the median expectations of the powers. back of any particular economic arrangement also, there {260} must be the force of tradition, a sense of security, a sense of justice. the redistribution must be such that the resulting motive to war will be weaker than the motive to peace. but before we can even approach such a plan to prevent war by reducing the economic incentive, we must frankly recognise that in certain circumstances a nation may have a direct economic interest in war. to deny such an interest is not only fallacious but even dangerous. for if we believe that nations have no economic motive to war, when in truth they have, we are likely to neglect to do things necessary to reverse such motives. our international task is to make arrangements which will cause nations to lose their interest in war. it is not that of trying to persuade nations that they have no such interest. there is much ambiguity and incoherence in most discussions concerning the economic advantages of war. on the whole, while the world does not usually gain by war, but loses through the destruction of capital and through industrial deterioration, an individual nation may clearly gain. england gained from the seven years' war, the united states from the war with mexico, germany from the war of 1870, japan from its war with china. by war nations may secure markets, access to raw materials, better opportunities for investment and a firm basis for industrial progress; they may cripple troublesome competitors; they may exact indemnities. much that is accounted gain on this score may in the end prove to be loss, but it is false to state that there can be no profit at all. the discussion whether or not a war is profitable often takes the superficial form of a comparison between the indemnity received and the money expended on the war. it is pointed out, for example, that in 1895 japan received a larger sum from china than {261} had been spent on the war, while on the other hand it is emphasised that thereafter the military expenditures of japan increased so rapidly that much more than this profit was spent. but the indemnity was the smallest part of japan's gain and the military expenditures were made necessary, not by the chinese war nor by the payment of the indemnity but by a concrete military policy, which was largely based on concrete economic needs. either an expansion into asia was necessary and in the end possible for japan or it was not; if it was, the expenditure of a few hundred million dollars on the wars against china, russia and germany were a paying investment, irrespective of indemnities; if it was not the wars would have been a bad investment even had they shown a clear balance on the books. the problem is not whether every war is advantageous to the victor but whether any war is of benefit. it is highly improbable that the war of 1914 will in the end pay most if any of the combatants, but if germany by a victory as easy as that of 1870 could have secured from france an indemnity of four or five billion dollars and the cession of northern africa, it would surely have paid. a war between germany and holland, if the other powers held off, would be equally profitable to the stronger power. if a coalition of nations could defeat and blockade great britain, they could easily recoup themselves for any expenditures involved. it is true that they could not physically remove british railways and mines, but they could confiscate the navy, the merchant marine, a part of the foreign and colonial investments and a certain part of the profits of business within the kingdom. to assert that a nation can never gain at war is merely to state that nations never have conflicting interests, whereas in truth some nations are cramped economically by other nations, {262} and a large part of the wealth and income of most nations can be diverted by means of physical compulsion. the problem of internationalism is therefore not solely to teach the nation its own interest but so to change the conditions that the nation's interest in war will disappear. the temptation to war can be overcome only by reversing the motives of the nation, either by making war no longer profitable, or by making the nation harmless. within the nation the same problem exists with regard to classes. either the bellicose class must be satisfied in some other way, must have its energies directed to some other task, or it must be made impotent. the first problem, that of destroying the economic root of war, can be solved only by securing a community of interest among great nations, an economic internationalism. not, of course, a complete community; there is perhaps no such thing in the world. the inter-class relations within a nation illustrate this point. these social classes, wage-earners and capitalists, industrialists and agriculturalists, are separated by many differences and have no complete community of interest, yet are sufficiently united to prevent a complete dissolution of the state. so, internationally, a community of interest may be partial and tentative if it suffices to give the countries enough, or the promise of enough, to discourage them from easily resorting to the costly and dangerous expedient of war. in securing this concert, we must work upon the general principle that wherever possible, a joint use of a given resource by various nations is better than an exclusive use by any one nation. the progress of society within the last few centuries has been toward an extension of this principle of joint use. more and more things are held by society for the benefit of the nation. {263} similarly an increasing number of the things for which nations compete might be held by the nations of the world for the joint use of humanity. while such a joint use is not always possible, especially when it runs counter to long usage, an immense opportunity for such joint use remains. this principle of joint use might advantageously be applied to the development of backward countries. nothing has been more difficult than the distribution among industrial nations of the advantages accruing from colonial exploitation. there are three methods by which nations, if they can agree at all, may seek to adjust their rival claims. the first is to do nothing nationally; to permit the backward countries to be exploited at will by individual competitors. the second is to divide the new territories among the rival powers. the third is to secure a joint development by all the great powers. the first method usually means both a ruthless exploitation of natives and a constant conflict among the interested nations. the nationals of one country conspire against those of another for a control of the native government. if, for example, we were to leave the philippines entirely alone, various enterprising capitalists would immediately organise and support corrupt native governments, lend money at usurious rates and secure exclusive concessions. to upset these arrangements, financiers of a rival nation would foment revolutions, and the country would be split up into political factions, supported by money from various european capitals. the political leaders though talking grandiloquently of independence and native sovereignty, would be, and perhaps would know that they were, merely pawns in a financial chess game. the second method, now more or less usual, of {264} establishing national spheres of influence, also leads to friction and the threat of force. the crucial difficulty of this plan lies in the fact that great nations which have come late into the colonial competition are left without a sufficient agricultural base for their industry and live in fear of having the colonies of rival powers shut against them. the whole plan is based upon the assumed right of each nation to monopolise the resources of colonies, in other words, to use exclusively what might be used jointly. as a result of this method the temptation to go to war over colonies is immensely great. if by a single war, germany could secure enough colonial territory from france to maintain her industry for three or four generations, it might well be worth her while to fight. it is the lives of one or of two million men to-day against tens of millions of lives a generation hence. a nation which would not fight for a somewhat larger share in the exploitation of a given colony would be tempted to fight for a sole and monopolistic possession. the third plan of distribution is what may be called the internationalisation of colonies. it is a step in the direction of an international imperialism, as opposed to the nationalistic imperialism of to-day. there have been numerous proposals to secure a machinery for such internationalism in colonies. especially during the last decade or two many men in europe and america have come to the conclusion that the danger of the present international scramble for colonies is so great that any change, even though not in itself unassailable, is better than the present anarchy. even among socialists the belief is now expressed that the colonial problem is to be solved, not by leaving it alone, but by a concerted action of the great powers, which will give each nation the assurance of a {265} certain stake in colonial development, and will lessen the temptation to wage imperialistic wars. of the various recent plans two concrete proposals are worth citing. thus mr. walter lippmann[1] suggests a permanent international conference of the great powers which would act as a senate to the native legislative body of the backward country, let us say morocco, and would in time supervise the budget, fix salaries and make appointments. it is hoped by mr. lippmann, though not confidently predicted, that such a body would guarantee the open door and give equal opportunities to the investors of all nations in the particular colony. a broader plan, proposed by mr. h. w. brailsford[2] involves the union into a permanent international syndicate of all companies and individuals seeking railroad, mining and other concessions in a backward country. fundamentally the plan of mr. brailsford is based on the open door for colonial trade and the equal (and automatic) participation of the great nations in colonial investment. "the remedy," he says, "is so simple that only a very clever man could sophisticate himself into missing it, and it is as old as cobden. it is not necessary to establish universal free trade to stop the rivalry to monopolise colonial markets; it would suffice to declare free trade in the colonies, or even in those which are not self-governing." "it ought not to be utterly beyond the statesmanship of europe to decree some limited form of colonial free trade by general agreement--to apply it, for example, to africa." "for the plague of concession-hunting the best expedient would probably be to impose on all the competing national groups in each area the duty of {266} amalgamating in a permanently international syndicate. if one such syndicate controlled all the railways and another all the mines of china and turkey, a vast cause of national rivalry would be removed. the interests of china and turkey might be secured by interposing a disinterested council or arbitrator between them and the syndicate to adjust their respective interests. short of creating a world state or a european federation, the chief constructive work for peace is to establish colonial free trade and internationalise the export of capital."[3] both the plans mentioned are limited in scope and difficult of application, but each contains the germ of a possible development. that of mr. brailsford seems on the whole the more promising. it is likely that a senate such as is proposed by mr. lippmann would go to pieces over the question whether a certain valuable and exclusive concession should go to a french or to a german syndicate or whether a punitive expedition should or should not be sent against the tribes in the interior. on the other hand the plan of mr. brailsford, which by no means excludes the other, has the advantage of making once and for all a fixed and certain distribution of all eventual profits and thus effecting a real community of interest among the promoters and investors of all nations. it is an economic rather than a political solution, and it is along the line of a present trend, the evolution of international investment and of economic internationalism generally. it would seem easier for the capitalists of six great nations to form a great international trust for specific purposes than for an international senate to make a multitude of decisions each affecting strong national interests. a difficulty, inhering in all plans, is that there is no rule of law or morals that will decide how much each {267} nation should secure from the profits of exploitation. to what extent shall american, dutch, belgian, austrian or japanese capitalists contribute to the international syndicate which is to exploit the backward countries? but this problem, though difficult, is less hopeless than that of equitably distributing colonies _en bloc_. for there is no principle on which to divide such colonies. neither national wealth nor population nor the strength of the national army and navy will serve as a criterion, though all perhaps would be factors in determining the shares of the different countries. a still greater difficulty however arises from the fact that the most valuable colonies are already distributed. even if germany were to receive a share in moroccan opportunities, might she not still seek by war to obtain the exclusive possession of the immense french colonial empire. perhaps no arrangement for a joint exploitation of new and presumably less valuable colonies would wholly satisfy the imperialists of great european powers, so long as the old colonies are so unevenly divided. to satisfy the nations without colonies, some arrangements must also be made for a redistribution of rights in colonies already belonging to the great powers. but against such redistribution immense forces are opposed. algeria is now safely french; india has been british for more than a century and a half. whatever rights are conceded in these countries to foreign investors, whatever division of profits is granted, will be effected only under the political control of the french and british governments. the best concessions have long since been given out, and the nation which has had political control has in the main favoured its own nationals. the essential problem here, however, is the open door. if the nations without colonies or sufficient agricultural resources at home can sell their products and buy their {268} raw materials on the same terms as do the nations owning colonies, a large part of the present bitterness and discontent would disappear. there are of course two difficulties in the way of the establishment of such an open door. the first is that commerce may be legally free and yet be hampered by a mass of local, illegal discriminations, and the second is that the trend at the present time is opposed to such equality in colonial commerce. the first difficulty is not unsolvable; the second constitutes an obstacle, which will only be removed when the forces making for an internationalisation of colonies become stronger than they are to-day. even a settlement of the colonial problem would not solve all the economic questions dividing the nations; equally perplexing difficulties are found nearer home. a generation or two from now germany might be completely ruined by a refusal on france's part to grant her access to the iron mines of lorraine. at any moment russia may prohibit the temporary emigration of agricultural laborers upon whom the prosperity of the east prussian agriculture largely depends. italy, switzerland, belgium, holland and other countries can be ruined by adverse tariff legislation. in very few countries is there such a balanced economic structure, such a complete control over the essentials of industry as to render an economic assault by other nations innocuous. it is not essential, however, in working out an economic concert that all the problems that separate the nations be completely and finally settled. given a satisfactory solution of the chief difficulties, some way will be sought to prevent secondary problems from leading nations to war. a single instance of a joint successful enterprise of the powers in a single economic field would act as a powerful inducement to attempt joint action in other {269} cases. it is not to be assumed that all the questions dividing europe are to be solved in a day or by a single decision. what is required is not one plan which will safeguard all the nations all the time but an inclination or desire to afford a measure of economic security to all and a gradual working out of a machinery, which will effect a settlement here and a settlement there and will in the end develop certain general lines of policy. it is not for a single economic setback that nations go to war, nor even because of a slower development than that of rivals; the chief animus is an ever present fear of industrial _dã©bacle_. economic insecurity, even more than present economic distress, forces nations to resort to arms. the way out is towards some form of internationalisation of the great external opportunities upon which the home industry of the nation depends. is such a development probable? will the nations in this generation or in five generations agree to make sacrifices to permit their rivals to live? it is a question not lightly to be answered. we cannot be dogmatic concerning the future development of industry and of international relations when we cannot see clearly a dozen years ahead. yet the very intensity, the almost pathological intensity, of the nationalistic economic struggle to-day is an indication that it may be approaching a change. in the midst of this struggle, there appears below the surface the signs of a growing economic internationalism. [1] "the stakes of diplomacy," new york, 1916, pp. 132-135. [2] the _new republic_, may 8, 1915. [3] the _new republic_, may 8th, 1915. {270} chapter xx the forces of internationalism an internationalism, which will bind the nations together into one economic unit, can be secured only as a result of a further political and economic development, limiting the power and autonomy of the several nations. without pressure, external or internal, no union or agreement among the nations can be expected. the thirteen american colonies would not have been willing to live together had they been able to live separately, and, similarly, to-day the great powers would make no concessions to internationalism were it safe and profitable to retain a complete liberty of action. but no such plenary independence is longer possible. forces are at work which circumscribe national autonomy and compel each nation to act with reference to the will of others. in the case of small nations this tendency is manifest. belgium before 1914 was a neutralised state, a ward of europe. it had surrendered its right to declare war or form alliances. switzerland, denmark, norway and sweden, while preserving their technical liberty, were by their weakness precluded from entering upon policies disapproved by stronger nations. even the six great powers were forced to pool issues. austria dared not carry out a programme which germany opposed, nor could russia or france act without the other's acquiescence. group policies were substituted for purely nationalistic aims. {271} economically a similar interdependence is being created. no nation is wholly self-sufficing. italy must import coal and iron, germany cotton, wool, leather and fodder. france requires germany's coal and germany the iron of france. a safe access to these markets and sources of raw material can only be assured by alliance with other powers. the economic dependence of one nation, moreover, influences the policies of its neighbours. the stress of a country suffering from industrial disequilibrium is transmitted to other nations. if, when germany has exhausted her iron ore, she is prevented from obtaining a supply, let us say from french lorraine, she will be faced with the alternative of dismantling her works in westphalia and silesia or of forcing france to sell ore to her. germany's stringency will thus vitally affect france's international policy. equally, if russia or austria cannot obtain what it needs from abroad, the nations which close the gates are endangered. caution alone must prevent a nation from allowing its neighbour to risk starvation. however ill-founded in precedent, the right to secure what it imperatively needs is a right that every people will fight for. from this political and economic interdependence among nations potentially hostile, there results a vague community of interest in peace. this common interest is strongly reinforced by the staggering costs of modern war. the present conflict is teaching us that europe cannot continue to live and fight, since more than what it fights for is lost in the fighting. on the other hand it cannot stop fighting until it evolves principles of settlement based on the economic security of the vanquished. what the industrial powers will gain from this conflict is but an insignificant part of its cost. compared with the billions {272} of dollars which france has spent upon this war, how insignificant are the few tens of millions that she may have gained from a monopolistic administration of her colonies! how little would the open door have cost the successful colonial nations as compared with the losses of this war! not that colonial administration was the only or the main cause of the conflict; other factors contributed, such as the megalomania of the pan-germans. it seems probable, however, that pan-german fanaticism was rendered infectious only by the fear that germany was to be economically encircled and undermined. this fear may well outlast the war. a german defeat, however crushing, will not solve the peace problem, for defeat without security means militarism and reaction in germany, which in turn means militarism and reaction in europe. the special advantages which the nations, possessing colonies, may in the future secure will be dearly bought at the expense of new wars, as costly and decivilising as that under which we now live. this is the chief sanction of internationalism, the price which is exacted from both beneficiaries and victims of a narrow nationalistic policy. whether a liberal internationalism would not pay better, even on the plane of dollars and cents, is a question that admits of but one rational answer. at this moment[1] there is small likelihood that that rational answer will be given. fighting inhibits thinking, and in the allied countries the belief is held that germany provoked the war through mere wantonness and not because of economic pressure, and that security can come only by ending prussian militarism. in germany there is an analogous conception of her opponents. the theory that the war was merely wanton has the {273} merit of simplicity, but like other simple interpretations, it does not cover the facts. there were in germany certain current ideas concerning racial dominion, the natural mission of the german and the absolute supremacy and moral self-sufficiency of the state, which intensified the war spirit. the pan-germans harangued in press and on platform to a people intoxicated by former military and economic triumphs and rendered susceptible by army discipline to martial intoxication. had it not been for a real sense of insecurity, however, peaceable germans would have been less receptive to such martial ideas. for a generation after 1870 germany, though armed, had been pacific because secure; her economic centre of gravity lay within. it was not until her national interests extended beyond her boundaries that this sense of insecurity arose. pan-germanism was the intellectual and emotional expression of an economic malaise. to boycott germany after the war will neither decrease her anxiety nor improve the prospects of peace in europe. such a "war after the war," as it is now proposed, is a flat denial of the economic interdependence of nations. its obvious result would be to intensify, rather than moderate, the industrial competition. driven from the markets of the allies, germany would be forced to dump her goods into all neutral countries (at the expense of the trade of the boycotting nations), as well as to form a counter economic alliance and if possible a military coalition. a permanent economic injury to the central powers would at the first convenient moment provoke military retaliation. and, parenthetically, a nation like germany, with its growing population and resources, cannot remain crushed. even if too weak to make headway against a powerful group of nations, it will always be strong enough to act as a make-weight between two opposed coalitions. {274} thus if england and russia, no longer united by a common peril, were to clash in the mediterranean or in persia, the presence of an economically threatened and therefore bellicose germany would tend to precipitate hostilities. if a boycotted germany by an economic or military alliance could detach one or more of her present enemies, the international situation created would be as dangerous as that of 1914.[2] the argument that economic insecurity does not tend toward war is thus seen to halt on all fours. there is, however, a stronger or at least a more obvious argument against the promotion of economic internationalism. it is the claim that wars are caused by nationalistic strife. if the incessant struggle between nationalities cannot be appeased but must lead again and again to world-wide wars, then it is futile to seek to avert war by the creation of an economic internationalism. no agreement among the great nations about trade or colonies will avail so long as poles, bulgars and southern slavs can throw the world into war to fulfil their nationalistic aspirations. until this nationalistic problem is solved no sure advance towards a permanent peace is possible. undoubtedly the struggle of subject nationalities to be {275} free, and of independent nations to annex their kin, has been a fruitful source of strife during the last century. the sense of nationality has been intensified by the nation's mobilisation of the economic interests of its citizens; it has become almost pathological as a result of petty nationalistic fragments competing for separate existence. bulgarians, greeks and serbians want the same tract in macedonia; roumanians, italians and serbs wish to redeem their subject brethren in the austro-hungarian empire; france seeks to rescue the francophile though german-speaking alsatians and lothringians, and germany would gladly welcome the dutch and flemings back to their putative german allegiance. there is no limit to these nationalistic claims; no room for arbitration; no fixed principle to determine to which nation each group shall be awarded. the result, quite apart from any action among the great powers, seems war--inevitable and endless.[3] {276} it is impossible to withhold one's admiration for the inspiring fight which oppressed peoples all over the world are making for their independence. we thrill over the old story of the grecian revolt against turkey, of the great risorgimento of italy, of the long slow struggle of germany to achieve statehood. the century since the vienna congress has marked an almost uninterrupted victory for the principle of nationality. yet though we sympathise with the aspirations of poles, finns, armenians and bohemians, an unlimited independence cannot always be desired. nationalities are not sundered geographically, but men of diverse stocks and traditions are interspersed, as though a malign power had wished to make concord forever impossible. ireland cannot secure autonomy, to say nothing of independence of great britain, without encountering ulster's demand to be independent of ireland. similarly a great roumania, a greater serbia, a poland, an independent bohemia can be secured only by denying the equal rights of lesser racial groups. to-day hungarians misrule the roumanians of transylvania; to-morrow a greater roumania may misrule the transylvania hungarians. the principle of the independence of nationalities collides with itself. it also collides with overwhelming economic facts. racially trieste is semi-italian, but if italy acquires the city (and includes it in her customs union), a vast austrian and german _hinterland_ is deprived of a necessary commercial outlet. italy can hold the east adriatic only by smothering serbia. moreover many of these foetal nationalities are too weak and geographically too insecure for independent political existence. what reality would attach to an independent bohemia held in a vice between two hostile german neighbours, and with a german population in its own territory? even in peace the {277} teutonic powers could gently strangle the new nation by means of discriminating tariffs. finally many of the claims for nationalistic expansion are inspired by a motive quite different from what appears on the surface. what the nation usually wants is not merely its own unredeemed brethren, but more territory and people. its unredeemed brethren are the easiest to take. but while roumania demands sovereignty over the roumanians of transylvania, she will not let the bulgarians of the dobrudja go. in the one case she upholds the sacred principle of nationality; in the other she discards that principle for the sake of a strategic frontier. serbians and greeks ask not only for the right to recover their ancient territory but also for the right to rule over bulgarians and turks. what they really desire is access to the sea, ample resources for an adequate population, and the national power, without which an independent existence is an illusion. it is too late to dream of a really independent existence for each pigmy nationality, strewn about in eastern europe. in the absence of a balkan confederation, servia, roumania, bulgaria, montenegro and greece may preserve their separate sovereignties, though only if they submit to the "advice" of greater nations, as portugal submits to britain. but for such nations to have conflicting nationalistic aspirations, to wage bloody wars for larger territory and more subjects, is a ridiculous and a tragic situation. servia, dreaming of the restoration of the empire of tsar stephen dushan, whose armies marched to the walls of constantinople, greece aspiring to the empire of the east, are a menace to the peace of the world. it is doubtful whether all of these ambitious nationalities can even preserve their separate national existence. if the welfare of europe conflicts with the {278} independence of a montenegro or a bohemia, some lesser form of self-government must be discovered. that lesser form of self-government might be sought in a local autonomy under a federal government. it is not improbable that the political development, of south-eastern europe for example, will tend towards group organisations based on the co-operation of diverse nationalities and stocks somewhat on the swiss model. if the political question could be divorced from the question of the economic exploitation of these small nations, and if each nationalistic group were permitted to retain its language, traditions and _kultur_, the result might be better than a mere _morcellement_ of south-eastern europe, with petty nationalities fighting the battles of their big backers. in such a larger switzerland, each group might be represented in proportion to its numbers, and the worst evils of the present racial contests be avoided. the important question in the present connection, however, is not what the particular solution is to be, but whether any solution is possible. it need not be a perfect but only a permanent settlement. such a settlement presupposes a concert among the great powers, an agreement concerning their own problems. given such an agreement, however, the powers could in time work out a balkan arrangement, which neither servia nor bulgaria, roumania nor greece would dare resist. in the end, if the arrangement were definite, practicable, in reasonable conformity with nationalistic lines, and with a strong and certain sanction, the small nations would become resigned. to-day they have boundless ambitions because the division among the great powers gives them a chance of realising ambitions, and what ambitions they have not to start with, austria or russia will lend to them on short notice. in this sense and to this extent, the {279} nationalistic problem in its worst form is an appendage to the vast struggle between the powers, and it may cease to be provocative of great wars once a basis of agreement is established among these larger nations. with the best will such a basis of international agreement among the great powers cannot be established in a few years. it requires a gradual development, a progressive give and take, a continuous widening of the principle of joint use. an international convention, altering the rules of maritime warfare, would be a long step in this direction; a congress of the nations for opening up the trade of colonies (like our international postal conventions) would be another step. the internationalisation of panama, kiel, gibraltar, constantinople, would immensely enhance security, and advance the progress of internationalisation. so also an economic convention between france and germany, or between germany and russia, in which reciprocal industrial advantages were accorded. such specific arrangements, which permit of international interpretation and enforcement, would help to bring about a larger economic internationalism. but for the real foundations of peace we must look far below the level of all these diplomatic and political arrangements, in the world industry itself. to-day we are still in the full momentum of an economic development that makes for war, but we are also at the beginning of an economic trend towards peace. in the present world-economy the nation is the unit and international friction the rule, but the movement, at what rate we do not know, tends towards a world business in which the unit will be international and there will be peace between partners. we are already in the first beginnings of the internationalism of capital. this development is in part the cause of a general {280} phenomenon, the growth of an internationalism of class. each social group seeks to establish relations with similar groups across the border, for the protection of interests that traverse national boundaries. thus we have a certain internationalism of the wage-earning class, of finance, of various scientific groups. the possibility of this internationalism grows with the integration of the world through commerce, industry, communication and the spread of knowledge. the most obviously international of social groups is the proletariat. though sundered on the question of immigration, though (in some countries) nationalistic and even militaristic in spirit, the wage-earners on the whole have less to gain from imperialism and national aggression than have wealthier classes, while they share disproportionately in the burdens that war entails. on the other hand workers have less influence in the making of diplomatic decisions than do their employers. in the end, moreover, their decision, like that of the capitalist class, is chiefly determined by economic forces largely beyond their control. it is the nascent internationalism of capital, not of capitalists or of wage-earners, that is the supreme element making for peace. we must beware, however, of welcoming all foreign investment as a portent of a growing internationalism of capital. much that is accounted economic internationalism is in truth merely an extended nationalism, an extra-nationalism. for investments to allay international discord they should create a community of interest between nations potentially hostile. if britain invested freely in germany and germany in britain there would be created a mutuality of interest which would render peace probable. each nation would have a stake in the prosperity of the other; each would have given hostages to peace. {281} but when the london financier puts his money in india, canada or the argentine, he is not co-operating but competing with potentially hostile nations. the process is an extension of the national economy to outlying districts, a transition to a larger national unit, like that created in the middle ages when the free cities ruled adjoining farm territory. such an economic extension exacerbates national antagonisms and leads to war. while foreign investment is preponderatingly of this sort, however, there also exist the beginnings of a movement more truly international. the securities of one nation are dealt with upon the stock exchanges of another, capital flows across national borders and great international business concerns are created. the movement in favourable circumstances is likely to accelerate, either by the mutual economic interpenetration of nations, as when the french build factories in germany or the germans in france, or by the amalgamation of the capitals of two countries and their use in joint enterprises. the formation of large international syndicates for the exploitation of backward countries, whatever its other consequences, tends towards the creation of a community of interest. if the powers unite, for example, and can agree upon a chinese loan, a step forward will have been taken towards an internationalism of capital. the process of trust formation tends in the same direction. as competing industries within a nation frequently end by combining, so in many great industries the competing national units may develop a gentleman's agreement to regulate output and finally may establish an international cartel. considerable progress has already been made in the division of the international field. a further development along these lines, though not easy, is by no means impossible or even improbable. {282} we may seek to understand this eventual international evolution of business by visualising a world organisation of the steel industry. either one corporation might be formed or a common control might be established among national steel companies through an interchange of stock. the result might be somewhat as follows: in the united states we should have an organisation comprising all american steel concerns, its directors representing constituent companies as well as the government, labour and consumers. in its domestic affairs, it would be under governmental jurisdiction. its capital might amount to a few billion dollars, of which a part would represent holdings of european companies in return for american stock, transferred to european companies. such a world corporation would be a financial aggregation immensely greater than any in the past. its principles of organisation, however, would not materially differ from those with which we are familiar. in each country a board of directors would hold control over constituent companies, and at london, paris or new york a high federal council would settle controversies and make arrangements for the business of the world. each company would have two elements of protection against unfair treatment; a community of interest secured through an interchange of stock and a representative on the federal council. a development, such as is here outlined, is in advance of the psychological preparation of the world. we have not yet succeeded in regulating corporations, and there would remain innumerable difficulties and inequalities as between nations, which could not easily be settled. the price which such concerns might be allowed to pay for ores or charge for finished products and the pressure which they might put upon workmen might cause financial {283} quarrels, leading to international controversies. if the governments held hands off, even greater evils might result. the various peoples would hesitate to turn over their basic industries to a private corporation beyond the regulation either of competitors or of their own government. but we are here concerned not with the end but with the direction of international capitalism, and this direction tends to be the same as that of national capitalism. division of the field, interchange of stock, community of interest, co-operation and combination in one form or another are as much a temptation in the relation of firms separated by a frontier as between those within one customs union. capital is fluid. it is quantitative. it is potentially international. a hundred dollars is indistinguishable from a certain number of pounds, marks or francs. the machinery for an international combination of capital is already present, the beginnings of international investment have already been made. further progress waits only upon the removal of barriers, in part traditional. the larger economic interests of the nations, and of most of the classes within the nations, lead towards the removal of these barriers and towards the gaining of that security without which international investment is dangerous and conventions and agreements almost worthless. given such an economic co-operation and such an economic interpenetration of rival european nations, and the political and diplomatic conflicts would grow less acrid and dangerous. as the process continued the interest of each nation in the welfare of its neighbours would become so great as to make international war as unthinkable as a war of pennsylvania against new york. a vital and powerful international spirit, which already exists but is held in check by the fear and insecurity of each {284} independent nation, would be given full sway. there would be a new europe and a new world, in which war would be but a vague and hateful memory. such developments, however, are slow and generations live their uncertain lives during a period of transition. while waiting for an economic internationalism to develop to maturity the nations remain on guard, armed, threatened and threatening. the change from our present anarchy to a future concord will not be swift. for the time even an increase of the economic unit to include several nations instead of one is not likely to put an end to all international economic strife. it is not improbable that the proximate economic development will be not internationalism but _supra-nationalism_. just as the customs union grew from a district to a nation, so it may grow to include a group of nations but not the whole world. the world may come to be divided into a group of five or six vast economic units, each of which would be composed of one or several or indeed many political units. the british empire, the russian empire, the united states, china and japan, south america, one or two economic coalitions of west and central europe (with their colonial possessions) would furnish a far more stable economic equilibrium for the world than is the present division of the powers. each of these groups would have both agricultural and manufacturing resources; none of them would be imperatively obliged to fight for new territories. while there would be friction, while one group would have a population in proportion to its resources in excess of a neighbouring group, the sheer brutal necessity of expansion which now forces nations to fight would be largely moderated. such a division of the world into seven or six or perhaps fewer economic aggregates though not easy is quite within {285} the bounds of possibility. three of these aggregates, britain, russia and the united states, are already political units; the chief difficulty would consist of western and central europe. no thoroughgoing political amalgamation of such countries as france, germany and italy is at all proximate, but some form of economic unity is not impossible. the bond which would join these countries might be less tight and therefore stronger than the _ausgleich_, which holds together the kingdoms of austria and hungary. in the beginning it might be merely a series of trade conventions terminable on notice; from this it might grow to more permanent trade agreements and finally to a customs union. while the opposition to such an economic union would be strong the forces driving in this direction would also be powerful. as the really great nations emerge, as russia, the united states and the british empire increase their population into the hundreds of millions and their wealth into the hundreds of billions, the individual nations of europe will become economically insignificant and economically unsafe. only by a pooling of their resources will they be able to escape from the crushing superiority of the nations with large bulk and from an insecurity which makes for war. even with such an economic rearrangement of the world the west european coalitions would be unsafe unless they lessened the rate of increase of their population. never before has this population grown so rapidly. in the decade ending 1810 western europe (including the nations lying to the west of russia), added 6.3 millions to its numbers; in the decade ending 1900 it added almost 19 millions. despite a decline in the birth-rate, the mortality has fallen so far that the population is reaching a point where it will be difficult to secure adequate food supplies from abroad. rather than starve or live under the {286} constraint of scarce food and high food prices, the west european powers will fight for new territory from which to feed their people. with the industrial development of asia, and especially of china, this danger will be enhanced. of the three great nuclei of population in the world, eastern asia, southern asia and western (and central) europe, only one has been able to draw upon the surplus food of the world. eight hundred million asiatics have been forced to live on their own meagre home resources. as china begins to export coal, iron, textiles and other manufactured products, however, she will be able, whether politically independent or not, to compete with europe for the purchase of this food supply. not only will china's population probably increase with the advent of industrialism but the standard of living of her population will rise, and her competition with europe for the sale of manufactured products and the purchase of food will become intense. the cheap, patient, disciplined labour of china's hundreds of millions will be fighting with the belgian, the german and the italian wage-earners to secure the food which it will be necessary to import. it is not a yellow, but a human peril; a mere addition to the hungry mouths that are to be fed. the supply of exportable food that can be raised in the world has of course not reached its maximum, but beyond a certain point every increase in agricultural production means a more than proportional increase in the cost of the product. to feed eight hundred millions costs much more than twice as much as to feed four hundred millions. even though china secure only a minor part of the exportable food, it will by just so much increase the strain upon the industrial populations of europe. it is a crisis for european industrialism, a slowly {287} preparing crisis with infinitely tragic possibilities. what it involves is not a mere re-distribution of wealth and income but an adjustment of population to the available home and foreign resources in food. collectivism will not permanently save the european wage-earner from hunger if he continues to multiply his numbers faster than the visible food supply increases. a decline in the rate of population growth is essential. fortunately this decline is already in progress. all the nations of western and central europe are moving towards a lower birth-rate and in france this diminution has reached a point where there is no longer a natural increase. in a few decades the birth rate will probably begin to fall everywhere faster than the death rate declines. an adjustment of the population to its probable resources will be in progress. in this progressive decline in the birth rate is to be found the greatest of all the factors making for internationalism and peace. it is a development which takes away the edge from the present frantic effort of industrial nations to secure a monopolistic control of foreign resources. it permits the gradual creation of an equilibrium between the nation's population and its physical resources at home and abroad. powerful forces in the world are at present slowly making for an economic internationalism to supplant the economic nationalism which to-day makes for war. the problem that faces the united states is what shall be its policy and action in view of the present nationalistic strife and of the slowly maturing economic internationalism. [1] november, 1916. [2] the proposal to boycott germany after the war is sometimes based upon weirdly moral rather than economic considerations. "is it possible," writes one c. r. enoch, "that trade relations with the nation that has outraged every tenet of international and moral decency, every consideration of humanity, and has committed unspeakable atrocities, as has germany in her conduct of the war, can be taken up again at the point where they were broken off? ... there is only one procedure compatible with honour and justice--namely, that no ordinary commercial dealings should be carried out with germany until the _generation of teutons that did these things has passed away_, unless absolute penitence and reparation--if reparation be possible--is done therefor." "can we set the world in order." london, 1916, p. 197. (my italics.) [3] the granting of permission to the people of the disputed district to decide their own allegiance is a good general principle, but, unfortunately, does not carry us far. the main difficulty lies in determining what shall be the unit of territory and population which is to decide. if ireland votes as a unit, all ireland will have home rule; if each county is to have the right of self direction, ulster will be detached from the rest of the island. if alsace-lorraine votes to become french, whole districts, which will have voted to remain german, will be dissatisfied. moreover, in the latter case, should all the residents of the two provinces be permitted to vote or only those people and their descendants who were living there in 1870? if the first plan is adopted a premium is placed upon the policy of legally dispossessing the inhabitants of a conquered land and filling their places with loyal _immigrã©s_; if the latter is chosen, the principle of the right of a population to determine its allegiance is abandoned. finally, if the decision of the population of the disputed district were adverse to the interests of europe as a whole, it would be irrational to validate such a result. the interests of europe are superior to those of any nation, however powerful, and vastly superior to those of a luxemburg, ulster or alsace-lorraine. {288} chapter xxi an immediate programme to the practical man who wants to know what to do and when and how to do it, general principles seem unreal and valueless. he is interested in the decisions of the next few months, not in a vague general direction of events for the coming century. and so in international politics he would like to decide what the nation shall do _now_ about the british blacklist, the german submarines, the mexican revolution, the california-japanese situation, and he is not keenly interested in the formulation of a policy which seems to hang high above the difficult concrete problems that must be solved immediately. he may languidly agree with proposals to create a community of interest among colonising nations and to establish the freedom of the sea, but he wishes to know whether in the meanwhile we are to back up carranza in mexico and what we are to do if the revolutionists "shoot up" an american town. while we work for these ideals, are we to allow germany to sink our liners and japan to swallow up china, or are we to fight? this attitude is not unreasonable. a general policy is of little value unless we can make successive decisions conform to it. but it is not easy or always possible to predict these decisions. we can tell approximately how many people in the united states will die next year, but not how many will die in any particular family. we can {289} advise a man who is walking from new york to san francisco to take a generally westward course, but for any given mile of the road the direction may be north or south or east. a trend of policy is made up of innumerable deflections, small or large; it is an irregular chain of successive actions, which do not all tend in one direction. even if we narrow our field of vision and seek to elaborate a more immediate policy, we do not escape from the vagueness which inheres in all such general conclusions. in the main our problem consists in using the influence of the united states to create such an economic harmony among the nations, and to give each nation such a measure of security as to permit them to agree upon an international policy, which will be in the interest of all. the chief elements of this programme are two in number: to create conditions within the united states which will permit us to exert a real influence; and to use this influence in the creation of an international organisation, which will give each nation a measure of economic and military security, and prevent any nation from wantonly breaking the peace. how far we can progress towards such an organisation will depend upon the course and uncertain issue of the present war. the war may end with the central allies crushed, with germany reduced in size and austria and turkey dismembered. it may end with a lesser defeat for the central powers and with lesser penalties. there may be an inconclusive peace, which may either be a mere truce or a new basis of agreement between nations disillusioned by the conflict. finally the war may end with the partial or even complete victory of the central powers, either through their overcoming the united opposition of their enemies or by detaching one or more from their alliances. {290} what the united states can effect at the conclusion of the war will inevitably depend upon which of these developments takes place. assuming that we ourselves are not drawn into the conflict, it is probable that our influence will be larger if neither of the great coalitions wins an overwhelming victory. if the western and eastern allies completely crush the resistance of the central powers, it is hardly likely that they will concede to us, who have not borne a share of the danger and toil, a large discretion in proposing the terms of peace. such an unconditional victory by either side would probably lead to an onerous and vindictive settlement, for each coalition is bound together by promises to its constituent nations, and these promises cannot be fulfilled without wholesale spoliation. moreover, each coalition will wish to weaken the future power of its opponents. a request by the united states that the victorious alliance deal generously with the defeated nations in order to create the conditions of a permanent peace would therefore probably meet with a more or less courteous denial. on the other hand, a drawn battle, or one in which the defeated party asking for peace still retained a considerable power of resistance, might lead to conditions in which the influence of the neutral nations, led by the united states, would be all-decisive. a situation might be created out of which no further fighting could bring a tolerable peace, and the nations might agree to some form of incipient international organisation, to which the united states could contribute. the problem of constantinople illustrates this possibility. that city, with the command of the straits, is likely to go to russia if the allies win, and to fall under a disguised german-austrian domination if the central powers are victorious. either situation would be vicious; {291} either would leave the commerce of the defeated nations at the mercy of the great power that held the bosphorus. if on the other hand, the two opposed alliances were almost equally formidable at the end of the war, or if england and france became unwilling to fight longer in order to give russia a strategic position at constantinople, a true solution of the problem might be obtained by neutralising the straits. a union of all the powers might guarantee the free passage of these waters at all times, and an american commissioner in command of a small american army might carry out the wishes of an international council. it would not be a pleasant or in any sense a profitable adventure for the united states, and we should accept the task most unwillingly. our sole motive would be the belief that our acceptance of this responsibility would remove one of the greatest causes of future war. such an assumption of obligations at constantinople would constitute for us a new and dangerous international policy. while constantinople is easily defended and while ample assistance would be forthcoming if defence were necessary, it can hardly be doubted that a rupture of such an international agreement guaranteeing the neutrality of the straits would bring on a war in which we should be obliged to take our part. yet the danger which we thus incur by entering upon an agreement looking to international peace is perhaps less than the danger of not entering since if constantinople causes another world war, as it may if not neutralised, it is by no means unlikely that sooner or later we may be forced into the struggle. it is better to risk our peace in seeking to avert a world disaster than to permit the great war to come. there are other international policies which in favouring circumstances might be urged by the united states at {292} the close of the war. we might append our signature to international conventions defining and guaranteeing a freedom of the seas, to agreements looking towards a co-operative exploitation of backward countries, to laws regulating the settlement of arbitrable international disputes, and to such special conventions as might be made for the re-neutralisation of belgium. upon the basis of such agreements, even though they were but tentative and partial, we might enter with the other nations upon some form of a league of peace and international polity, which would secure these new conventions from being rudely disturbed by the aggression of one or two powers. whether we help to carry out these policies at the close of this war, will depend upon the balance of power then existing in europe and upon the mood of the nations. if russia wants constantinople, if britain insists upon the right of capture at sea, if france, italy, servia, roumania and the british colonies demand territorial gains without compensation, and these powers are able to enforce their will, our delegates to the peace conference may make representations and suggestions, but will not be able to carry them through. nor if the central powers are victorious and unyielding, shall we be able to make our advice count. no one power or group of powers could carry out such a policy against the will of a majority or even of a strong minority of powers. unless the conditions at the end of the war are such as to convince the victors (if there are victors) that it is wiser to readjust the world than to get all they can, unless great nations like britain, france and germany can agree that a groundwork for future peace is more valuable than territorial gains and punitive damages, the opportunity for a peaceful reconstruction will pass. new coalitions will be formed; new wars will be fought. it is of course possible that such an international {293} reconstruction will be entered upon only with hesitation by several of the nations, including some of the victors. it is even conceivable that the movement might be furthered by certain of the belligerents on both sides, as for example germany, great britain, france and italy (aided by the united states and other neutrals) and be opposed to some extent by, let us say, russia and turkey. it is not assumed that this particular division among the nations will actually occur, but merely that upon the conclusion of the war the moral integrity of the alliances may be shattered and with the prospect of new cleavages and disagreements, an effort be made, aided by the neutrals, to create conditions doing away with the present balance of power. a war disintegrates the elements making for success in war; enemies become allies and allies enemies. at the final council board each nation tends to return to its allegiance to itself, and with the passing of the old alliances a new league based upon totally different principles becomes possible. it is, however, with a tempered optimism that we should approach the international conference that is to end this war. even if america is represented and wisely represented, even if the powers are willing to listen to proposals looking toward international reconstruction, the probability that there will be an inclination to make concessions is not overwhelming. hatred, distrust, the injection of petty interests, the tenacity of diplomatic conservatism will all work against a wise forbearance and a far-seeing policy, and the errors of the vienna conference of 1815 and of the berlin conference of 1878 may be duplicated or worse. there is at least an even chance that the international situation will be quite as unsatisfactory and perilous in 1920 as it was in 1900. progress towards international reconstruction is a possible but by no means {294} certain part of the agenda of the diplomatic conference, which will meet when enough millions of the youth of europe have been slaughtered and maimed. but those who desire peace and the international relations which will alone make peace possible have learned to be patient, and if the problem advances only slowly to a solution it will be sufficient satisfaction to know that it advances at all. after this war there will be many long years during which the nations may study at their leisure the clumsiness of the arrangements which make for international conflict. there will be years in which america, if she is worthy and strong, will be able to make her influence for peace felt. the problem, however, is not how rapidly we shall move but whether we shall move at all and in what direction. that direction seems to be clearly indicated by the recent trend of world events. with the passing of our isolation we are given the opportunity to use our immense influence directly, continuously and intelligently for the strengthening of the economic bonds which make for a world peace. time and the economic trend work on our side. we can hasten, though we cannot and need not create, the vast unifying movement which comes with the further integration of industry. what we can contribute to this consummation is an ability to see the world as it is and a willingness to work and if necessary to fight for the changes without which international peace is impossible. we must avoid a cautious yet dangerous clinging to a philosophy of national irresponsibility, as we must likewise avoid the excesses of a nationalistic imperialism. we must take our part manfully, side by side with the other nations, in the great reorganisation of the world, which even to-day is foreshadowed by an economic internationalism, now in its beginnings. {295} in the last century and a half the united states has made three great contributions to the political advancement of the world. the first was the adoption of the constitution, an experiment in federalism on a scale larger than ever before known in history. the second was the adoption of a policy, by which the vast territories of all the states were held in common, and these new territories admitted to statehood upon exactly the same terms as the original commonwealths, which formed the union. our third contribution was the monroe doctrine, which removed two continents from the field of foreign conquest and guaranteed to each american nation the freedom to determine its own form of government and its own sovereignty. to-day the nation is again in a position to contribute to the political progress of the world. it stands before a fourth decision. either it can cling hopelessly to the last vestiges of its policy of isolation or can launch out into imperialistic ventures, or finally it can promote, as can no other nation, a policy of internationalism, which will bind together the nations in a union of mutual interest, and will hasten the peaceful progress of the economic and political integration of the world. {297} index a abbott, j. f., "japanese expansion and american policies," quoted, 215 n. africa, slavery under imperialistic system in, 95. agricultural nations, how war was a necessity to early, 22-23; effect of conversion of, into industrial nations, 79-81. agricultural progress, as one of the causes of war, 17. agriculture, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, 174; how america's economic mutuality with europe may depend upon, 175; a secure base for a policy of non-aggression in development of, 176; amount of land available for, in america, 176-177; growth in products of, compared with growth in population, 177-178; opportunities for further development of american, 178-179; probable increase in efficiency in, 181-182. alaska, attitude of america in purchase of, 46. algeria, preferential treatment of, as to tariffs, by france, 104; volume of trade of, with france compared with that with other countries, 105. america, effect of great war upon, 1; choice of foreign policies open to, 2; influences which will determine national trend, 2-3; attitude of pacifist idealists, 3; attitude of self-seeking individualists, 4; origin and character of demand in, for preparedness, 5-6; the ideal of a united, 7-8; interest of financial groups in preparedness and "united america" ideal, 8-9; question as to what purpose armament in, is to be used, 10; the group for defence and the group for establishment of proper international relations, 10-11; factors which will determine foreign policy of, 11-12; goal of internationalism to be aspired for by, 12; causes of failure of, to realise ideal of internationalism, 13; imperialistic ideas in, 13-14; steadfastness necessary in whatever course decided on, 14-15; not exempt from economic forces which cause war, 30-31; attitude of, toward peace and war, 32-43; period of clipper ships in, 39; character of diplomacy of, 43-44; plunge taken by, in 1898; into imperialism, 45; strategic and industrial motives behind change in foreign policy of, 46-50; "congestion of capital" argument proved futile, 51-53; effect upon thought in, of imperialistic venture, 55; relations of, with europe, as affected by monroe doctrine, and international responsibilities thrust upon, 55-57; lessons derived by, from european war, 57-58; a positive policy to be substituted for a negative, 58-59; comparative intensity of competition with great britain, germany and france for foreign trade, 61-62; development in field of investment, 67-70; obvious entrance of, upon economic competition, 70-71; isolation evidently no longer possible to, 71; decision to be made by, as to nature of expansion policy to be adopted, 151-153; choice lies between nationalistic imperialism and internationalism, 153; arguments of imperialists as to course to be taken by, 153-154; dangers of imperialistic policy to, 154-156; secure road to imperialism for, in anglo-american union, 156-160; arguments for ideal of internationalism, 160-166; capability of, for leading in promotion of international peace, dependent on economic development, 169 ff.; tendency to imperialistic policy from unequal distribution of wealth, 186 ff.; danger of present favourable conditions as to incomes and wages not continuing, 190-191; foreign policy must accord with international ideals, 199-200; course to be followed by, in foreign policy, in choosing between immediate and ultimate interest, 203-212; question of future relations with canada, 212-213; policy toward china, 213-216; three ways open to, of promoting international adjustments aimed to secure peace, 231; absurdity of method of "going it alone," 231-234; the method of forming an alliance with one or more selected nations, 234-236; third and most promising method, to constitute our nation a rallying-point for the formulation and enforcement of principles of international policy, 236-241; leading part taken by, in advocacy of freedom of the seas, 247; hostility of, to british domination of the seas, 253; an immediate programme for, 288-295. americanism, as an ideal, 7-8. anglo-american union, arguments favouring, 156-160; drawbacks to plan of, 160; further discussion of possible value of, and disadvantages of, 234-236. anti-imperialists, arguments of, 126-138; considerations which work against, 138-139. arbitration, defects of, as a plan for preserving peace, 225-226. aristocracy, benefits of imperialism confined to the, 132-135; evil effects of imperialistic system upon, 135. arndt, paul, on handicapping of germany because of meagreness of colonial possessions, 107. b backward countries, root of imperialism in exploitation of, by imperialistic powers, 85-98; problem of governing, an argument for imperialism, 139; proposed joint development of, by all the great powers, 263-269. banks, german, in foreign countries, 118, 120-121. barker, ernest, article "crusades," quoted, 23. bauer, otto, quoted on diversified interests of wage-earners in different countries, 143-144. belgium, monopoly of trade with her colonies secured by, 104; industrial invasion of, by germany, 116 ff.; truths illustrated by german invasion of, 256; position of, before 1914, as a neutralised state, 270. birth rate, decline in, the greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, 287. bismarck, policy of, in encouraging france's colonial ambitions, 109-110. boycott, proposed for states violating principles of international league for peace, 242-244; discussion of, of germany after the war, 273-274. brailsford, h. w., quoted on solution of colonial problem, 265-266. brazil, tropical imperialism and the atrocities in, 87. bulnes, f., quoted on future relations of united states and latin america, 209. burgess, "homeland," cited, 136. burgess, j. w., "the european war of 1914," quoted, 253-254. business, international evolution of, 279-283. c canada, trade of, with united states compared with that with great britain, 102; present and future relations of united states with, 212-213. capital, internationalism of, 279-283. caraballo sotolongo, f., work by, cited, 208 n. cartels, description of german, 121-122. carver, t. n., quoted on small-scale farming, 179 n. children, dangers of neglect of, in united states, 191-192. china, views of official of, quoted, 75-76; question of america's policy regarding, 213-216; possibilities of the impending industrial progress of, 216 n. class, increasing internationalism of, 280. class policy, imperialism viewed as a, 138. coercion, preserving peace by, 226-228. colonies, how germs of war are carried in nationalistic competition for, 99 ff.; tendency of, to trade with home country, 101-103; preference given to, by tariff legislation, 104; the open and the closed door policy in treatment of, by home countries, 104; future advantages resulting from possession of, 107-108; problem of, in plans for a higher imperialism, 246, 258 ff.; internationalisation of, under proposed higher imperialism, 263-269. colonisation, failure of argument for imperialism based on, 129-131. coloured labour and the root of imperialism, 85-98. commerce, development of, and the economic motive for war, 23-24. conant, c. a., arguments of, for american imperialism, 48-49. constantinople, problem of, after the war, and part america might play, 290-291. coolidge, a. c., "united states as a world power," quoted, 45 n. cramb, j. a., war mystic, quoted, 20, 21; book, "england and germany," quoted, 221. crusades, economic motives behind, 23. d dardanelles, internationalisation of, 254, 279. democracy, the american tradition of, 12-13; failure to achieve ideal purpose of, 13. diepenhorst, fritz, quoted on german cartels, 121. diplomacy, character of american, 43-44. disarmament, defects in proposal for universal, 225. distribution of wealth, incentive to war found in unequal, 17. dodsworth, w., arguments of, in favour of imperialism, 50. "dumping" of surplus goods by germany, 62; as one of germany's methods of industrial invasion, 117, 119-120. e economic forces, determination of national policies by, 2-3; one of chief causes of wars, 14, 17-19, 21-28; hope of directing toward peace rather than war, 28-29. economic gains to imperialistic nation from tropical agriculture, 92. economic invasion, of other countries by germany, 116-125; relative success or failure of system of, 124-125. educational system in america, imperfections of, 191-192. emigration, as one of the causes of war, 17. england, relations between america and, 35-36, 40; economic competition between germany and, 99-101; strength of imperialism in, 140. _see_ great britain. enoch, c. r., on boycotting germany after the war, 274 n. europe, importance to, of american foreign policy, 2; attitude of pacifist idealists and of individualistic realists concerning america's relations with, 4-5; attitude of america toward, 35-42; economic competition of united states with, 55 ff.; significance to, of american competition for latin-american trade, 59-60; renewed competition of, for foreign trade after the war, 66; financial relations of america and, 67-70; foreign investment by, in new countries, 81-84; lack of firm basis for union of peoples of, 111-114; problems presented by canada's relation to controversies in, 213 n. extractive industries, pacific tendency of, 174. f farms, possibilities for future development of, in america, 178-179. _see_ agriculture. fear of war, value to certain interests of, 137-138. federation of nations, defect of plan for, to preserve peace, 224-225. finance, internationalism of, 279-283. financial relations of america and europe, 67-70. financiers, interest of, in preparedness and spirited foreign policy, 8-9. foreign investment and the internationalism of capital, 280-281. _see_ investment. foreign policy of america, effect of european war upon, 1 ff., 58-59; special factors which will figure in future, 11-12; change in, after the spanish war, 45; in part due to military considerations, 46; part played by economic motives in, 46-50; must accord with international ideals which we aim to promote, 199-200; the choice between immediate and ultimate interest, 203-204; concerning latin america, 207-212; concerning canada, 212-213; concerning china, 213-216. foreign trade, effect on america's, of opening of panama canal, 62-63; america's gain in, since outbreak of european war, 63-64; european competition for, after the war, 66; question of value of, resulting from imperialism, 131-136. france, relations between america and, 36; american competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than with germany, 62; preferential tariffs given to colonies of, 104; industrial invasion of, by germany, 116 ff.; appeal of imperialism in, 140. freedom of the seas, one of the elements in a programme of peace, 246; growth in significance of problem of, 247; opposite sides taken by america and england concerning, 247; benefits and drawbacks of england's policy, 249-254; five things desirable in order to establish, 254-255; international organisation to enforce convention regarding, with anglo-american agreement as a corner-stone, 255; value of proposed international arrangement, dependent upon belief of nations in its enforcement, 255-257. free trade, as an antidote to war, 29; error lurking in the doctrine, 29-30. g garcia calderon, f., quoted on course of united states in the future, 155-156; on north american influence in latin america, 209. geographical location, effect of, on a nation's policy, 172-173. germany, defence of war offered by romanticists in, 20-21; possibility of future competition with, by america, in battle for world market, 61-62; economic competition between england and, 99-101; volume of trade of colonies with, compared with that with other countries, 105; handicapping of, through lack of colonial possessions, 107; dangers of colonial ambition of, 109; bismarck's policy regarding colonies, 109-110; industrial invasion of competing countries by, 116; tactics of, in trade invasions, 117 ff.; limitations and obstacles to policy of invasion of, 124; appeal of imperialism in, 140; why imperialism appeals to wage-earners in, 145-146; frugality and efficiency characteristic of, 189; the proposal to boycott after the war, 273-274. gibraltar, straits of, internationalisation of, 254, 279. great britain, what loss of markets for manufactured goods would mean to, 60; american competition with, for foreign trade, less keen than that with germany, 61-62; comparative volume of trade between colonies and, 102-103; arguments for alliance between america and, 156-160; how surplus capital seeking a vent may lead to an imperialistic policy shown by, 187; policy of obstruction followed by, regarding freedom of the seas, 247; necessity to, of navy and command of seas, illustrated by case of germany, 248-249; discussion of advantages and disadvantages of attitude of, on naval supremacy, 249-254. h hauser, henri, work by, cited and quoted, 116, 121, 122. hawaii, acquisition of, by united states, 46; america's international liabilities increased by, 57. hobson, c. k., "the export of capital," cited, 68 n., 83. hobson, john a., "imperialism," quoted, 51, 131; "towards international government," quoted and cited, 242, 245. holland, industrial invasion of, by germany, 116 ff. honour, the demands of national, 197-199. hunting tribes, war inevitable among, 22. hurley, edwin w., address by, cited and quoted, 66 n. hutchinson, lincoln, "panama canal and international trade competition," cited, 63. i idealists, position of pacifists as, 3; mystic interpretation of war by, 20-21. immigration, effect of growth of america's population due to, on nation's economic development and foreign policy, 184. imperialism, american ideal of internationalism opposed to, 12-13; intricacy of problem of, 13; the present an age of, 13-14; america's plunge into, in 1898, 45; strategic and industrial arguments for american, 46-50; not warranted by real conditions in america, 51-53; significance of america's premature venture into, 54; root of, found in necessity of compelling subject peoples to labour for industrial nations, 85-98; arguments against, 126 ff.; results of, for investment purposes beneficial only to a few, 127; regarded by socialists as immoral, brutal, anti-democratic, and uneconomic, 128; revolt against, led by people of imperialistic powers not benefited by policy, 128 ff.; outlet for redundant population not secured by, 129-131; questionable value of foreign trade resulting from, 131-132; danger of war resulting from, 136-137; a class policy, 137-138; difficulty in europe of democratic leaders making headway against, 138-139; popular appeal of, 140; economic argument for, 141-147; patriotic appeal of, 147-150; decision to be made by america between internationalism and, 151-153; road open to america, through anglo-american union, 156-160; lack of economic reserves as an impelling force toward, 170-171; relation between geographical location and, 172-173; relation of inequalities of wealth and income to, 186 ff.; a more equal distribution of wealth an antidote to, 186-188; in what the economic antidote to, really consists, 194-195; measures necessary to achievement of higher form of, 258-269. income, equable distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, 191. india, british conquest of, due to desire for trade, 21; tendency of, to give bulk of trade to home country, 101, 102; small percentage of british born in, 129. industrial invasions of each other's territory by competing countries, 116-124; question of success or failure of policy of, 124-125. inequality of wealth and income, risk of imperialistic policy resulting from, 186-188. intensive cultivation, limitations of, 179. internationalisation of colonies, 263-269; of capital, 279-283. internationalism, ideal of, to be aspired for by america, 12; causes of failure of america to realise ideal of, 13; what is necessary if america decides on the course of, 14-15; decision to be made by america between nationalistic imperialism and, 151-153; meaning of ideal of, as opposed to ideal of imperialism, 160; steps necessary to achievement of, 161-166; to be secured only by further political and economic development, 270; forces making for, 270 ff.; actual profit of, 272; impossibility of independence for small subject nations, 277-279. intervention, objections to a policy of, for preserving peace, 231-234. investment, america's development in field of foreign, 67-70; value of new countries as a field for, 81-82; extent of foreign, by european countries, 83; internationalism of capital shown by foreign, 280-281. iron, "dumping" of, by germany in foreign countries, 119-120. italy, industrial invasion of, by germany, 116 ff.; "dumping" of german products in, 119. j jamaica, trade of, with united states compared with that with united kingdom, 102. james, william, "the moral equivalent of war," quoted, 195-196. japan, relations between america and, as influenced by philippine islands, 57; an example of a nation driven to imperialistic policy through lack of economic reserves, 170-171. jingoism, the irreducible minimum of, 196-197. jã¶hlinger, otto, on the open and the closed door in colonies, 104 n. k kidd, benjamin, "control of the tropics," cited, 91. kiel canal, internationalisation of, 254, 279. king, w. i., "wealth and income of people of united states," cited, 190 n. krehbiel, edward, digest of history of pacifism by, 219 n. l latin america, competition of america for trade of, 59-60; possibilities of, as a field for investment, 69-70; course to be followed by america toward, 207-208; fear of policy of aggression on part of united states by, 208-209; danger in our relations with, from its political instability and unripeness, 211. league for peace, foundations of a true, 240-241; question of how to form, premature, 241; things essential to continued existence of, 241-242; methods of enforcing system, 242-244; creation of international machinery for working out modes of action, 245. league to enforce peace, arguments for and against a, 226-228, 230. lippmann, walter, quoted on solution of colonial problem, 265. loree, l. f., compilation by, cited, 68 n. lough, w. h., quoted on trade of united states with south america, 65 n. m mcmaster, j. b., quotation from, 172 n. mahan, a. t., "interest of america in sea power," etc., cited, 46; on the possibilities of an anglo-american alliance, 156-157. marx, karl, on the workingman's lack of a fatherland, 143. merles, salvador r., work by, cited, 208 n. merritt, eugene, on disadvantages of small-sized farms, 179. mexico, significance of revolution in, to united states, 55; inferences to be drawn from action of united states concerning, 56-57; laming of industry by frequent revolutions in, 88. _see_ latin america. millard, t. f., "our eastern question," quoted, 214 n. milloud, maurice, "the ruling caste and frenzied finance in germany," quoted, 116, 119, 120, 124. mining, an economic activity that is pacific in tendency, 174. monroe doctrine, the, 39; effect of, on america's relations with europe, 55-57; stands for principle that latin-american countries will develop naturally, 89; possibility of cloaking a policy of aggression under, 206-207; tolerance of, by europe, conditioned upon america's acting as guardian and not conqueror, 207-208; peril in, both to united states and to latin america, 209-210; question of future treatment of, 212. munition makers, value to, of constant fear of war, 137-138. mystic interpretation of war, 20-21. n napoleonic wars, economic factors in, 26. national consciousness, development of, in europe, 111-112. nationalism and internationalism, discussion of use of terms, 153 n. nationalities, the struggle of subject, for independence, 274-276; impossibility of independence for all, 276-278. natural resources, lack of, a cause of militaristic and imperialistic policy, 170-171. naumann, friedrich, on handicapping of germany through meagreness of colonial possessions, 107. navies, arguments for reduction of, to secure freedom of the seas, 247-252. o olivier, sir sidney, "white capital and coloured labour," quoted, 85, 86-87. olney, richard, on sovereignty of united states in western hemisphere, 56. open door, america's policy of the, relative to china, 213; what america should mean by, 215; problem of, the essential one in solution of question of colonies, 267-268. orient, possibilities of, as a field for investment, 69-70. p pacifism, history of, 218-221; must be either static or dynamic, 222; our hope in dynamic type of, 223; character of dynamic as opposed to static, 223-226. _see also_ peace. pacifists in america, attitude of, toward national policies, 3; effect upon, of great war and the demand for preparedness, 6-7; mistaken ideas concerning war and its causes held by many, 16-17. panama canal, international liabilities of united states increased by, 57; competition of united states for foreign trade increased by, 62-63; internationalisation of, 254, 279. pastoral nations, war a necessity to, 22. peace, direct and indirect interest of america in, 217-218; the classic ideal of, 218-219; change in character of movement for, before french revolution, 219-220; proven inapplicability of rationalistic theories of, 220-221; cause of failures of pacifist efforts, 221-224; criticism of plans of static type for preserving, 224-230; the all-pervasive sentiment for, 237; decline in population rate a help toward, 287; proposed league for, _see_ league for peace. philippine islands, acquisition of, by america, 46; change in feeling of americans regarding ownership of, 53-54; increase of america's international responsibilities by, 57; small percentage of europeans and americans in, 130. popular appeal of imperialistic policy, 140; reason for, found in economic argument, 141-147; patriotic ideals and, 147-150. population, growth in, one incentive to war, 17; increase in, one of the chief forces driving western nations outward, 76-77; imperialism not an outlet for superfluity of, 129-131; overtaking of extension of agriculture by, 182; statistics of, 183; diminishing rate of increase in, 183; increase of america's, by immigration, 184; distribution of wealth among, in united states, 190 n.; increase in, means increased inequality in distribution of wealth, 190-191; decline in rate of, the greatest of factors making for internationalism and peace, 287. preparedness, origin and character of demand for, 5-6; effect of, on pacifist ideals, 6-7; interest of financial groups in policy of, 8-9. preziosi, g., work by, cited, 117. punic wars, economic motives behind, 21. r railroad policy of germany, impetus given to "dumping" by, 120. rationalistic pacifism, inapplicability of, to the facts of life, 220-221. reinsch, paul, "world politics," quoted, 54 n.; "colonial administration" by, cited and quoted, 95, 103. religion, a lesser cause of war than economic interests, 27-28; not a preventive of war, 165. ripley, w. z., cited concerning american debt to europe, 68 n. robinson, e. v. d., essay by, cited, 28 n. rohrbach, paul, "german world policies," quoted, 93 n. ruedorffer, j. j., quoted on future of germany's world policy, 109. russia, relations between america and, 36. s _saturday review_ article on competition between england and germany, 100. schulze-gaevernitz, dr., work by, cited and quoted, 133-134. scottish border wars, viewed as cattle-stealing raids, 24-25. shipping, an economic activity that is not pacific in tendency, 174. sidebotham, h., "the freedom of the seas," quoted, 251, 253. six-power loan, in principle a right step, 216. slavery, modern forms of, under system of tropical imperialism, 95. slosson, e. e., article by, quoted, 90-91. social democratic party in germany, attitude of, toward imperialism, 146. socialists, anti-imperialistic philosophy of, 128-129; allegiance of, to their own countries, 143-144; reason for failure of, to prevent war, 239-240; agreement of, with theory that colonial problem can be solved only by concerted action of great powers, 264-266. solf, wilhelm, quoted on germany's colonial policy, 104, 106 n. south american trade, competition of united states for, 63-65. _see_ latin america. suez canal, internationalisation of, 254. sumner, w. g., quoted on war, 196-197. supra-nationalism, the proximate economic development, 284. switzerland, industrial invasion of, by germany, 116 ff., 119. t taxation, an underlying cause of war, 17. thompson, warren s., "population: a study in malthusianism," cited, 178. trade development, as one of the causes of war, 17. trojan war, a free-booting expedition, 24. tropical imperialism, conditions causing, 85; arguments for and against, 85-98. tropical products, growing significance of, 90-92. trusts, tendency to internationalism in process of formation of, 281-282. tunis, trade of, favoured by france, 104. u united states. _see_ america. united states of europe, fallacy in proposal to create a, 224-225. v von der goltz, field-marshal, quoted on necessity of imminence of war to maintenance of prestige of officer class, 138 n. w wage-earners, imperialistic arguments that appeal to, 141-147; internationalism of, 280. wages, supposed beneficial reaction of imperialism upon, 144-146. war, popular theories regarding, 16; the real motives, incentives and origins of, 17; reason for both ancient and modern, traced to economic forces, 17-19, 260-262; interpretation of, by school of romanticists, 20-21; question of permanence of, as an institution, 28; attitude of americans toward, 32 ff.; cause of attitude of average american toward, 32-42; how system of imperialism tends to lead to, 99-115, 136-137; value of fear of, to certain political and industrial interests, 137-138; elements in america that foster spirit of, 164; antidotes to imperialistic policy and, 186-200. _see also_ peace. war after the war, the, 273. war of 1914, effect of, upon america, 1-15; lessons derived by america from, 57-58; the part that america might play at close of, 290-294. wealth, equal distribution of, an antidote to imperialism, 186-188. webb, sidney and beatrice, "history of trade unionism," quoted, 145 n. west indies, working of modern imperialistic methods in, 85-87. wilcox, e. v., "tropical agriculture," quoted, 91-92. willcox, w. f., birth and death rate statistics by, 183 n. willford, isbell, "wealth and income of people of united states," quoted, 177 n. willis, j. c., arguments by, for tropical imperialism, 86 n. wilson, c. usher, article on "the native question and irrigation in south africa," quoted, 95 n. printed in the united states of america. italy, france and britain at war by h. g. wells author of "mr. britling sees it through," "what is coming," etc. here mr. wells discusses with an incisiveness and penetrativeness all his own, conditions as he has seen them in three of the great countries engaged in the european war. the book is divided into four main sections: i. the passing of the effigy, in which are reviewed certain changing sentiments as regards war; ii. the war in italy, taking up the isonzo front, the mountain war and behind the front; iii. the western war, and iv. how people think about the war, in which are found such topics as do they really think at all, the yielding pacifist, the religious revival and the social changes in progress. the macmillan company publishers 64-66 fifth avenue new york _by the same author_ the new democracy an essay on certain political and economic tendencies in the united states by walter e. weyl, ph.d. a chief issue in the presidential campaign is "socialized democracy." dr. weyl's new work gives a clear summary of its causes and aims. _crown 8vo, blue cloth, gilt top, $2.00_ _standard library edition .50_ some press comments "a masterly, scathing, and absolutely fearless arraignment of things that ought not to be in a republic, and of tendencies that no democracy ought to tolerate."--_boston herald_. "a thoughtful volume ... a big synthesis of the whole social problem in this country. a keen survey."--_chicago evening post_. "a searching and suggestive study of american life.... a book to make people think.... notable for its scholarship and brilliant in execution, it is not merely for the theorist, but for the citizen."--_newark evening news_. "dr. weyl's book is a strong analysis of the whole subject. it will be read widely and will exercise a large influence."--_the evening mail_. "dr. weyl has read the modern writing on the wall and interprets it to us more clearly than has yet been done."--_new york globe_. "a masterly interpretation of the industrial, political, social, and moral revolution that is going on in this country."--_albany argus_. "a complete and circumstantial statement of the whole case ... our social and economic unrest is not to lead to a war of classes, but to a 'national readjustment.'"--_new york tribune_. "the best and most comprehensive survey of the general social and political status and prospects that has been published of late years."--_the pittsburg post_. the macmillan company publishers 64-66 fifth avenue new york _our national problems_ _decorated boards -------each fifty cents_ the pentecost of calamity by owen wister "one of the most striking and moving utterances.... let all americans read it."--_the congregationalist_. "it is written with sustained charm and freshness of insight."--_n. y. times_. their true faith and allegiance by gustavus ohlinger "hundreds of thousands of this book should be distributed as tracts for all honest, loyal, decent american citizens to read and digest."--_n. y. sun_. the forks of the road by washington gladden (this book won the first prize offered by the church peace union for the best essay on war and peace.) "small as the book is, it is full of 'meat for strong men,' and its closely reasoned argument is likely to set many people thinking along unaccustomed lines."--_n. y. times_. the heritage of tyre by william brown meloney "in terse, striking, forceful language the author of this most valuable little volume shows us the greatest weakness america has, and the most ominous danger such weakness involves."--_boston transcript_. straight america by frances a. kellor "practical, candid, and most earnest. it gets down to the first principles of american needs and discusses them with honesty, ability, and a straight-from-the-shoulder forcefulness that ought to prove inspiring and infectious."--_new york times_. americanization by royal dixon "no better beginning with the immigrant can be made than to teach him along the lines laid down in mr. dixon's sincere and ardent little manual of decency in democracy."--_new york sun_. what's the matter with mexico by caspar whitney "a vital question answered intelligently, fully and without hesitation.... should be read by every one whose sense of fair play has not been warped by a baneful sophistry."--_philadelphia public ledger_. the macmillan company publishers 64-66 fifth avenue new york brazil: today and tomorrow by lillian elwyn elliott, f. r. g. s. literary editor of the pan-american magazine, new york. this volume seeks to show how and to what extent brazil "has been opened up" and developed, and by whom, and to outline some of the work that remains to be done. miss elliott first of all discusses present social conditions in brazil, explaining who the brazilian is, what political and social events have moulded him and what he has done to develop his territory; a territory 300,000 square miles larger than that of the united states. later sections deal with finance, the monetary conditions of the country, the problem of exchange, and the source of income. still others take up various means of transit, the railroads, the coast-wise and the ocean service, rivers and roads. industries are treated in considerable detail--cattle, cotton raising, weaving, coffee growing and the rubber trade. an unusual feature comes under the heading of "the world's horticultural and medicinal debt to brazil" in which the reader is made to realize something of the immense forestal treasure house comprised in the huge, wild, half explored regions of north brazil. the macmillan company publishers 64-66 fifth avenue new york the world factbook 1990 electronic version the world factbook is produced annually by the central intelligence agency for the use of united states government officials, and the style, format, coverage, and content are designed to meet their specific requirements. comments and queries are welcome and may be addressed to: central intelligence agency attn: public affairs washington, dc 20505 (703) 351-2053 --------------------------------------------------- table of contents text (249 nations, dependent areas, and other entities) afghanistan albania algeria american samoa andorra angola anguilla antarctica antigua and barbuda arctic ocean argentina aruba ashmore and cartier islands atlantic ocean australia austria bahamas, the bahrain baker island bangladesh barbados bassas da india belgium belize benin bermuda bhutan bolivia botswana bouvet island brazil british indian ocean territory british virgin islands brunei bulgaria burkina burma burundi cambodia cameroon canada cape verde cayman islands central african republic chad chile china (also see separate taiwan entry) christmas island clipperton island cocos (keeling) islands colombia comoros congo cook islands coral sea islands costa rica cuba cyprus czechoslovakia denmark djibouti dominica dominican republic ecuador egypt el salvador equatorial guinea ethiopia europa island falkland islands (islas malvinas) faroe islands fiji finland france french guiana french polynesia french southern and antarctic lands gabon gambia, the gaza strip german democratic republic (east germany) germany, federal republic of (west germany) ghana gibraltar glorioso islands greece greenland grenada guadeloupe guam guatemala guernsey guinea guinea-bissau guyana haiti heard island and mcdonald islands honduras hong kong howland island hungary iceland india indian ocean indonesia iran iraq iraq-saudi arabia neutral zone ireland israel (also see separate gaza strip and west bank entries) italy ivory coast jamaica jan mayen japan jarvis island jersey johnston atoll jordan (also see separate west bank entry) juan de nova island kenya kingman reef kiribati korea, north korea, south kuwait laos lebanon lesotho liberia libya liechtenstein luxembourg macau madagascar malawi malaysia maldives mali malta man, isle of marshall islands martinique mauritania mauritius mayotte mexico micronesia, federated states of midway islands monaco mongolia montserrat morocco mozambique namibia nauru navassa island nepal netherlands netherlands antilles new caledonia new zealand nicaragua niger nigeria niue norfolk island northern mariana islands norway oman pacific islands, trust territory of the (palau) pacific ocean pakistan palmyra atoll panama papua new guinea paracel islands paraguay peru philippines pitcairn islands poland portugal puerto rico qatar reunion romania rwanda st. helena st. kitts and nevis st. lucia st. pierre and miquelon st. vincent and the grenadines san marino sao tome and principe saudi arabia senegal seychelles sierra leone singapore solomon islands somalia south africa south georgia and the south sandwich islands soviet union spain spratly islands sri lanka sudan suriname svalbard swaziland sweden switzerland syria taiwan entry follows zimbabwe tanzania thailand togo tokelau tonga trinidad and tobago tromelin island tunisia turkey turks and caicos islands tuvalu uganda united arab emirates united kingdom united states uruguay vanuatu vatican city venezuela vietnam virgin islands wake island wallis and futuna west bank western sahara western samoa world yemen arab republic {yemen (sanaa) or north yemen} yemen, people's democratic republic of {yemen (aden) or south yemen} yugoslavia zaire zambia zimbabwe taiwan appendix a: the united nations system appendix b: international organizations appendix c: country membership in international organizations appendix d: weights and measures appendix e: cross-reference list of geographic names note: all maps will be available only in the printed version for the foreseeable future --------------------------------------------------- notes, definitions, and abbreviations there have been some significant changes in this edition. in the government section the former branches entry has been replaced by three entries--executive branch, legislative branch, and judicial branch. the leaders entry now has subentries for chief of state, head of government, and their deputies. the elections entry has been completely redone with information for each branch of the national government, including the date for the last election, the date for the next election, results (percent of vote by candidate or party), and current distribution of seats by party. in the economy section there is a new entry on illicit drugs. abbreviations: (see appendix b for international organizations) avdp. avoirdupois c.i.f. cost, insurance, and freight cy calendar year dwt deadweight ton est. estimate ex-im export-import bank of the united states f.o.b. free on board frg federal republic of germany (west germany) fy fiscal year gdp gross domestic product gdr german democratic republic (east germany) gnp gross national product grt gross register ton km kilometer km2 square kilometer kw kilowatt kwh kilowatt-hour m meter na not available negl negligible nm nautical mile nz new zealand oda official development assistance oof other official flows pdry people's democratic republic of yemen {yemen (aden) or south yemen} uae united arab emirates uk united kingdom us united states ussr union of soviet socialist republics (soviet union) yar yemen arab republic {yemen (sanaa) or north yemen} administrative divisions: the numbers, designatory terms, and first-order administrative divisions are generally those approved by the united states board on geographic names (bgn) as of 5 april 1990. changes that have been reported but not yet acted upon by bgn are noted. area: total area is the sum of all land and water areas delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines. land area is the aggregate of all surfaces delimited by international boundaries and/or coastlines, excluding inland water bodies (lakes, reservoirs, rivers). comparative areas are based on total area equivalents. most entities are compared with the entire us or one of the 50 states. the smaller entities are compared with washington, dc (178 km2, 69 miles2) or the mall in washington, dc (0.59 km2, 0.23 miles2, 146 acres). birth rate: the average annual number of births during a year per 1,000 population at midyear. also known as crude birth rate. contributors: information was provided by the bureau of the census (department of commerce), central intelligence agency, defense intelligence agency, defense nuclear agency, department of state, foreign broadcast information service, navy operational intelligence center and maritime administration (merchant marine data), office of territorial and international affairs (department of the interior), united states board on geographic names, united states coast guard, and others. dates of information: in general, information available as of 1 january 1990 was used in the preparation of this edition. population figures are estimates for 1 july 1990, with population growth rates estimated for mid-1990 through mid-1991. major political events have been updated through 30 march 1990. military age figures are average annual estimates for 1990-94. death rate: the average annual number of deaths during a year per l,000 population at midyear. also known as crude death rate. diplomatic representation: the us government has diplomatic relations with 162 nations. there are only 144 us embassies, since some nations have us ambassadors accredited to them, but no physical us mission exists. the us has diplomatic relations with 149 of the 159 un members--the exceptions are albania, angola, byelorussia (constituent republic of the soviet union), cambodia, cuba, iran, vietnam, people's democratic republic of yemen {yemen (aden) or south yemen}, ukraine (constituent republic of the soviet union) and, obviously, the us itself. in addition, the us has diplomatic relations with 13 nations that are not in the un--andorra, federated states of micronesia, kiribati, liechtenstein, marshall islands, monaco, nauru, san marino, south korea, switzerland, tonga, tuvalu, and the vatican city. north korea is not in the un and the us does not have diplomatic relations with that nation. the us has not recognized the incorporation of estonia, latvia, and lithuania into the soviet union and continues to accredit the diplomatic representatives of their last free governments. disputes: this category includes a wide variety of situations that range from traditional bilateral boundary disputes to unilateral claims of one sort or another. every international land boundary dispute in the "guide to international boundaries," a map published by the department of state, is included. references to other situations may also be included that are borderor frontier-relevant, such as maritime disputes, geopolitical questions, or irredentist issues. however, inclusion does not necessarily constitute official acceptance or recognition by the us government. entities: some of the nations, dependent areas, areas of special sovereignty, and governments included in this publication are not independent, and others are not officially recognized by the us government. nation refers to a people politically organized into a sovereign state with a definite territory. dependent area refers to a broad category of political entities that are associated in some way with a nation. names used for page headings are usually the short-form names as approved by the us board on geographic names. the long-form name is included in the government section and an entry of "none" indicates a long-form name does not exist. in some instances, no short-form name exists--then the long-form name must serve for all usages. there are 249 entities in the factbook that may be categorized as follows: nations 157 un members (there are 159 members in the un, but only 157 are included in the world factbook because byelorussia and ukraine are constituent republics of the soviet union) 15 nations that are not members of the un--andorra, federated states of micronesia, kiribati, liechtenstein, marshall islands, monaco, namibia, nauru, north korea, san marino, south korea, switzerland, tonga, tuvalu, vatican city other 1 taiwan dependent areas 6 australia--ashmore and cartier islands, christmas island, cocos (keeling) islands, coral sea islands, heard island and mcdonald islands, norfolk island 2 denmark--faroe islands, greenland 16 france--bassas da india, clipperton island, europa island, french guiana, french polynesia, french southern and antarctic lands, glorioso islands, guadeloupe, juan de nova island, martinique, mayotte, new caledonia, reunion, st. pierre and miquelon, tromelin island, wallis and futuna 2 netherlands--aruba, netherlands antilles 3 new zealand--cook islands, niue, tokelau 3 norway--bouvet island, jan mayen, svalbard 1 portugal--macau 16 united kingdom--anguilla, bermuda, british indian ocean territory, british virgin islands, cayman islands, falkland islands, gibraltar, guernsey, hong kong, isle of man, jersey, montserrat, pitcairn islands, st. helena, south georgia and the south sandwich islands, turks and caicos islands 15 united states--american samoa, baker island, guam, howland island, jarvis island, johnston atoll, kingman reef, midway islands, navassa island, northern mariana islands, palmyra atoll, puerto rico, trust territory of the pacific islands (palau), virgin islands, wake island miscellaneous 7 antarctica, gaza strip, iraq-saudi arabia neutral zone, paracel islands, spratly islands, west bank, western sahara other entities 4 oceans--arctic ocean, atlantic ocean, indian ocean, pacific ocean 1 world === 249 total notes: the us government has not recognized the incorporation of estonia, latvia, and lithuania into the soviet union as constituent republics during world war ii. those baltic states are not members of the un and are not included in the list of nations. the us government does not recognize the four so-called "independent" homelands of bophuthatswana, ciskei, transkei, and venda in south africa. gross domestic product (gdp): the value of all goods and services produced domestically. gross national product (gnp): the value of all goods and services produced domestically, plus income earned abroad, minus income earned by foreigners from domestic production. gnp/gdp methodology: gnp/gdp dollar estimates for the oecd countries, the ussr, eastern europe, and a portion of the developing countries, are derived from purchasing power parity (ppp) calculations rather than from conversions at official currency exchange rates. the ppp methods involve the use of average price weights, which lie between the weights of the domestic and foreign price systems; using these weights, us $100 converted into german marks by a ppp method will buy an equal amount of goods and services in both the us and germany. one caution: the proportion of, say, military expenditures as a percent of gnp/gdp in local currency accounts may differ substantially from the proportion when gnp/gdp is expressed in ppp dollar terms, as, for example, when an observer estimates the dollar level of soviet or japanese military expenditures. similarly, dollar figures for exports and imports reflect the price patterns of international markets rather than ppp price patterns. growth rate (population): the annual percent change in the population, resulting from a surplus (or deficit) of births over deaths and the balance of migrants entering and leaving a country. the rate may be positive or negative. illicit drugs: there are five categories of illicit drugs--narcotics, stimulants, depressants (sedatives), hallucinogens, and cannabis. these categories include many drugs legally produced and prescribed by doctors as well as those illegally produced and sold outside medical channels. cannabis (cannabis sativa) is the common hemp plant, provides hallucinogens with some sedative properties, and includes marijuana (pot, acapulco gold, grass, reefer), tetrahydrocannabinol (thc, marinol), hashish (hash), and hashish oil (hash oil). coca (erythroxylon coca) is a bush and the leaves contain the stimulant cocaine. coca is not to be confused with cocoa which comes from cacao seeds and is used in making chocolate, cocoa, and cocoa butter. cocaine is a stimulant derived from the leaves of the coca bush. depressants (sedatives) are drugs that reduce tension and anxiety and include chloral hydrate, barbiturates (amytal, nembutal, seconal, phenobarbital), benzodiazepines (librium, valium), methaqualone (quaalude), glutethimide (doriden), and others (equanil, placidyl, valmid). drugs are any chemical substances that effect a physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral change in an individual. drug abuse is the use of any licit or illicit chemical substance that results in physical, mental, emotional, or behavioral impairment in an individual. hallucinogens are drugs that affect sensation, thinking, self-awareness, and emotion. hallucinogens include lsd (acid, microdot), mescaline and peyote (mexc, buttons, cactus), amphetamine variants (pma, stp, dob), phencyclidine (pcp, angel dust, hog), phencyclidine analogues (pce, pcpy, tcp), and others (psilocybin, psilocyn). hashish is the resinous exudate of the cannabis or hemp plant (cannabis sativa). heroin is a semisynthetic derivative of morphine. marijuana is the dried leaves of the cannabis or hemp plant (cannabis sativa). narcotics are drugs that relieve pain, often induce sleep, and refer to opium, opium derivatives, and synthetic substitutes. natural narcotics include opium (paregoric, parepectolin), morphine (ms-contin, roxanol), codeine (tylenol w/codeine, empirin w/codeine, robitussan a-c), and thebaine. semisynthetic narcotics include heroin (horse, smack), and hydromorphone (dilaudid). synthetic narcotics include meperidine or pethidine (demerol, mepergan), methadone (dolophine, methadose), and others (darvon, lomotil). opium is the milky exudate of the incised, unripe seedpod of the opium poppy. opium poppy (papaver somniferum) is the source for many natural and semisynthetic narcotics. poppy straw concentrate is the alkaloid derived from the mature dried opium poppy. qat (kat, khat) is a stimulant from the buds or leaves of catha edulis that is chewed or drunk as tea. stimulants are drugs that relieve mild depression, increase energy and activity, and include cocaine (coke, snow, crack), amphetamines (desoxyn, dexedrine), phenmetrazine (preludin), methylphenidate (ritalin), and others (cylert, sanorex, tenuate). infant mortality rate: the number of deaths to infants under one year of age in a given year per l,000 live births occurring in the same year. land use: human use of the land surface is categorized as arable land--land cultivated for crops that are replanted after each harvest (wheat, maize, rice); permanent crops--land cultivated for crops that are not replanted after each harvest (citrus, coffee, rubber); meadows and pastures--land permanently used for herbaceous forage crops; forest and woodland--land under dense or open stands of trees; and other--any land type not specifically mentioned above (urban areas, roads, desert). the percentage figure for irrigated refers to the portion of the entire amount of land area that is artificially supplied with water. leaders: the chief of state is the titular leader of the country who represents the state at official and ceremonial funcions but is not involved with the day-to-day activities of the government. the head of government is the administrative leader who manages the day-to-day activities of the government. in the uk, the monarch is the chief of state and the prime minister is the head of government. in the us, the president is both the chief of state and the head of government. life expectancy at birth: the average number of years to be lived by a group of people all born in the same year, if mortality at each age remains constant in the future. maritime claims: the proximity of neighboring states may prevent some national claims from being fully extended. merchant marine: all ships engaged in the carriage of goods. all commercial vessels (as opposed to all nonmilitary ships), which excludes tugs, fishing vessels, offshore oil rigs, etc. also, a grouping of merchant ships by nationality or register. captive register--a register of ships maintained by a territory, possession, or colony primarily or exclusively for the use of ships owned in the parent country. also referred to as an offshore register, the offshore equivalent of an internal register. ships on a captive register will fly the same flag as the parent country, or a local variant of it, but will be subject to the maritime laws and taxation rules of the offshore territory. although the nature of a captive register makes it especially desirable for ships owned in the parent country, just as in the internal register, the ships may also be owned abroad. the captive register then acts as a flag of convenience register, except that it is not the register of an independent state. flag of convenience register--a national register offering registration to a merchant ship not owned in the flag state. the major flags of convenience (foc) attract ships to their register by virtue of low fees, low or nonexistent taxation of profits, and liberal manning requirements. true foc registers are characterized by having relatively few of the ships registered actually owned in the flag state. thus, while virtually any flag can be used for ships under a given set of circumstances, an foc register is one where the majority of the merchant fleet is owned abroad. it is also referred to as an open register. flag state--the nation in which a ship is registered and which holds legal jurisdiction over operation of the ship, whether at home or abroad. differences in flag state maritime legislation determine how a ship is manned and taxed and whether a foreign-owned ship may be placed on the register. internal register--a register of ships maintained as a subset of a national register. ships on the internal register fly the national flag and have that nationality but are subject to a separate set of maritime rules from those on the main national register. these differences usually include lower taxation of profits, manning by foreign nationals, and, usually, ownership outside the flag state (when it functions as an foc register). the norwegian international ship register and danish international ship register are the most notable examples of an internal register. both have been instrumental in stemming flight from the national flag to flags of convenience and in attracting foreign-owned ships to the norwegian and danish flags. merchant ship--a vessel that carries goods against payment of freight. commonly used to denote any nonmilitary ship but accurately restricted to commercial vessels only. register--the record of a ship's ownership and nationality as listed with the maritime authorities of a country. also, the compendium of such individual ships' registrations. registration of a ship provides it with a nationality and makes it subject to the laws of the country in which registered (the flag state) regardless of the nationality of the ship's ultimate owner. money figures: all are expressed in contemporaneous us dollars unless otherwise indicated. net migration rate: the balance between the number of persons entering and leaving a country during the year per 1,000 persons (based on midyear population). an excess of persons entering the country is referred to as net immigration (3.56 migrants/1,000 population); an excess of persons leaving the country as net emigration (-9.26 migrants/1,000 population). population: figures are estimates from the bureau of the census based on statistics from population censuses, vital registration systems, or sample surveys pertaining to the recent past, and on assumptions about future trends. total fertility rate: the average number of children that would be born per woman if all women lived to the end of their childbearing years and bore children according to a given fertility rate at each age. years: all year references are for the calendar year (cy) unless indicated as fiscal year (fy). ------------------------------------------------------------------ the world factbook 1990 ------------------------------------------------------------------country: afghanistan geography total area: 647,500 km2; land area: 647,500 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than texas land boundaries: 5,826 km total; china 76 km, iran 936 km, pakistan 2,430 km, ussr 2,384 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: pashtun question with pakistan; baloch question with iran and pakistan; periodic disputes with iran over helmand water rights; insurgency with iranian and pakistani involvement; traditional tribal rivalries climate: arid to semiarid; cold winters and hot summers terrain: mostly rugged mountains; plains in north and southwest natural resources: natural gas, crude oil, coal, copper, talc, barites, sulphur, lead, zinc, iron ore, salt, precious and semiprecious stones land use: 12% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 46% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 39% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: damaging earthquakes occur in hindu kush mountains; soil degradation, desertification, overgrazing, deforestation, pollution note: landlocked people population: 15,862,293 (july 1990), growth rate 7.7% (1990) birth rate: 44 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 18 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 51 migrants/1,000 population (1990); note--there are flows across the border in both directions, but data are fragmentary and unreliable infant mortality rate: 154 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 47 years male, 46 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--afghan(s); adjective--afghan ethnic divisions: 50% pashtun, 25% tajik, 9% uzbek, 12-15% hazara; minor ethnic groups include chahar aimaks, turkmen, baloch, and others religion: 74% sunni muslim, 15% shia muslim, 11% other language: 50% pashtu, 35% afghan persian (dari), 11% turkic languages (primarily uzbek and turkmen), 4% thirty minor languages (primarily balochi and pashai); much bilingualism literacy: 12% labor force: 4,980,000; 67.8% agriculture and animal husbandry, 10.2% industry, 6.3% construction, 5.0% commerce, 10.7% services and other (1980 est.) organized labor: some small government-controlled unions government long-form name: republic of afghanistan type: authoritarian capital: kabul administrative divisions: 30 provinces (velayat, singular--velayat); badakhshan, badghis, baghlan, balkh, bamian, farah, faryab, ghazni, ghowr, helmand, herat, jowzjan, kabol, kandahar, kapisa, konar, kondoz, laghman, lowgar, nangarhar, nimruz, oruzgan, paktia, paktika, parvan, samangan, sar-e pol, takhar, vardak, zabol; note--there may be a new province of nurestan (nuristan) independence: 19 august 1919 (from uk) constitution: adopted 30 november 1987 legal system: has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the saur revolution, 27 april (1978) executive branch: president, four vice presidents, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral national assembly (meli shura) consists of an upper house or senate (sena) and a lower house or house of representatives (wolasi jirgah) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president (mohammad) najibullah (ahmadzai) (since 30 november 1987); chairman of the council of ministers executive committee soltan ali keshtmand (since 21 february 1989); prime minister fazil haq khaliqyar (since 21 may 1990) political parties and leaders: only party--the people's democratic party of afghanistan (pdpa) has two factions--the parchami faction has been in power since december 1979 and members of the deposed khalqi faction continue to hold some important posts mostly in the military and ministry of interior; nonparty figures hold some posts suffrage: universal, male ages 15-50 elections: senate--last held na april 1988 (next to be held april 1991); results--pdpa is the only party; seats--(192 total, 115 elected) pdpa 115; house of representatives--last held na april 1988 (next to be held april 1993); results--pdpa is the only party; seats--(234 total) pdpa 184, 50 seats reserved for opposition communists: the pdpa claims 200,000 members (1988) other political or pressure groups: the military and other branches of internal security have been rebuilt by the ussr; insurgency continues throughout the country; widespread anti-soviet and antiregime sentiment and opposition on religious and political grounds member of: adb, ccc, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, itu, nam, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto, wsg; suspended from oic in january 1980 diplomatic representation: minister-counselor, charge d'affaires miagol; chancery at 2341 wyoming avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 234-3770 or 3771; us--charge d'affaires (vacant); embassy at ansari wat, wazir akbar khan mina, kabul; telephone 62230 through 62235 or 62436; note--us embassy in kabul was closed in january 1989 flag: three equal horizontal bands of black (top), red, and green with the national coat of arms superimposed on the hoist side of the black and red bands; similar to the flag of malawi which is shorter and bears a radiant, rising, red sun centered in the black band economy overview: fundamentally, afghanistan is an extremely poor, landlocked country, highly dependent on farming (wheat especially) and livestock raising (sheep and goats). economic considerations, however, have played second fiddle to political and military upheavals, including the nine-year soviet military occupation (ended 15 february 1989) and the continuing bloody civil war. over the past decade, one-third of the population has fled the country, with pakistan sheltering some 3 million refugees and iran perhaps 2 million. another 1 million have probably moved into and around urban areas within afghanistan. large numbers of bridges, buildings, and factories have been destroyed or damaged by military action or sabotage. government claims to the contrary, gross domestic product almost certainly is lower than 10 years ago because of the loss of labor and capital and the disruption of trade and transport. official claims indicate that agriculture grew by 0.7% and industry by 3.5% in 1988. gdp: $3 billion, per capita $200; real growth rate 0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): over 50% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues na; expenditures $646.7 million, including capital expenditures of $370.2 million (fy87 est.) exports: $512 million (f.o.b., fy88); commodities--natural gas 55%, fruits and nuts 24%, handwoven carpets, wool, cotton, hides, and pelts; partners--mostly ussr and eastern europe imports: $996 million (c.i.f., fy88); commodities--food and petroleum products; partners--mostly ussr and eastern europe external debt: $1.8 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 6.2% (fy89 plan) electricity: 480,000 kw capacity; 1,470 million kwh produced, 100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: small-scale production of textiles, soap, furniture, shoes, fertilizer, and cement; handwoven carpets; natural gas, oil, coal, copper agriculture: largely subsistence farming and nomadic animal husbandry; cash products--wheat, fruits, nuts, karakul pelts, wool, mutton illicit drugs: an illicit producer of opium poppy and cannabis for the international drug trade; world's second largest opium producer (after burma) and a major source of hashish aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $265 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $419 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $57 million; communist countries (1970-88), $4.1 billion currency: afghani (plural--afghanis); 1 afghani (af) = 100 puls exchange rates: afghanis (af) per us$1--50.6 (fixed rate since 1982) fiscal year: 21 march-20 march communications railroads: 9.6 km (single track) 1.524-meter gauge from kushka (ussr) to towraghondi and 15.0 km from termez (ussr) to kheyrabad transshipment point on south bank of amu darya highways: 21,000 km total (1984); 2,800 km hard surface, 1,650 km bituminous-treated gravel and improved earth, 16,550 km unimproved earth and tracks inland waterways: total navigability 1,200 km; chiefly amu darya, which handles steamers up to about 500 metric tons pipelines: petroleum, oil, and lubricants pipelines--ussr to bagram and ussr to shindand; natural gas, 180 km ports: shir khan and kheyrabad (river ports) civil air: 2 tu-154, 2 boeing 727, assorted smaller transports airports: 38 total, 34 usable; 9 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 10 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 15 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: limited telephone, telegraph, and radiobroadcast services; television introduced in 1980; 31,200 telephones; stations--5 am, no fm, 1 tv; 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: armed forces (army; air and air defense forces); border guard forces; national police force (sarandoi); ministry of state security (wad); tribal militia military manpower: males 15-49, 3,880,124; 2,080,725 fit for military service; 168,021 reach military age (22) annually defense expenditures: 9.1% of gdp (1984) ---------------------------------------------------country: albania geography total area: 28,750 km2; land area: 27,400 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundaries: 768 km total; greece 282 km, yugoslavia 486 km coastline: 362 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specified; territorial sea: 15 nm disputes: kosovo question with yugoslavia; northern epirus question with greece climate: mild temperate; cool, cloudy, wet winters; hot, clear, dry summers; interior is cooler and wetter terrain: mostly mountains and hills; small plains along coast natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, timber, nickel land use: 21% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 15% meadows and pastures; 38% forest and woodland; 22% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to destructive earthquakes; tsunami occur along southwestern coast; deforestation seems to be slowing note: strategic location along strait of otranto (links adriatic sea to ionian sea and mediterranean sea) people population: 3,273,131 (july 1990), growth rate 1.9% (1990) birth rate: 25 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 52 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--albanian(s); adjective--albanian ethnic divisions: albanian 90%, greeks 8%, other 2% (vlachs, gypsies, serbs, and bulgarians) (1989 est.) religion: albania claims to be the world's first atheist state; all churches and mosques were closed in 1967 and religious observances prohibited; pre-1967 estimates of religious affiliation--70% muslim, 20% albanian orthodox, 10% roman catholic language: albanian (tosk is official dialect), greek literacy: 75% labor force: 1,500,000 (1987); about 60% agriculture, 40% industry and commerce (1986) organized labor: central council of albanian trade unions, 610,000 members government long-form name: people's socialist republic of albania type: communist state (stalinist) capital: tirane administrative divisions: 26 districts (rrethe, singular--rreth); berat, dibre, durres, elbasan, fier, gjirokaster, gramsh, kolonje, korce, kruje, kukes, lezhe, librazhd, lushnje, mat, mirdite, permet, pogradec, puke, sarande, shkoder, skrapar, tepelene, tirane, tropoje, vlore independence: 28 november 1912 (from turkey); people's socialist republic of albania declared 11 january 1946 constitution: 27 december 1976 legal system: judicial review of legislative acts only in the presidium of the people's assembly, which is not a true court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: liberation day, 29 november (1944) executive branch: president of the presidium of the people's assembly, three vice presidents, presidium of the people's assembly; chairman of the council of ministers, three deputy chairmen, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral people's assembly (kuvendi popullor) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president of the presidium of the people's assembly ramiz alia (since 22 november 1982); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers adil carcani (since 14 january 1982) political parties and leaders: only party--albanian workers party, ramiz alia, first secretary suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 19 february 1987 (next to be held february 1991); results--president ramiz alia was reelected without opposition; people's assembly--last held 1 february 1987 (next to be held february 1991); results--albanian workers party is the only party; seats--(250 total) albanian workers party 250 communists: 147,000 party members (november 1986) member of: ccc, cema (has not participated since rift with ussr in 1961), fao, iaea, ipu, itu, un, unesco, unido, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: none--the us does not recognize the albanian government and has no diplomatic or consular relations with albania; there is no third-power representation of albanian interests in the us or of us interests in albania flag: red with a black two-headed eagle in the center below a red five-pointed star outlined in yellow economy overview: as the poorest country in europe, albania's development lags behind even the least favored areas of the yugoslav economy. the stalinist-type economy operates on the principles of central planning and state ownership of the means of production. in recent years albania has implemented limited economic reforms to stimulate its lagging economy, although they do not go nearly so far as current reforms in the ussr and eastern europe. attempts at self-reliance and a policy of not borrowing from international lenders--sometimes overlooked in recent years--have greatly hindered the development of a broad economic infrastructure. albania, however, possesses considerable mineral resources and is largely self-sufficient in food. numerical estimates of albanian economic activity are subject to an especially wide margin of error because the government is isolated and closemouthed. gnp: $3.8 billion, per capita $1,200; real growth rate na% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $2.3 billion; expenditures $2.3 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1989) exports: $378 million (f.o.b., 1987 est.); commodities--asphalt, bitumen, petroleum products, metals and metallic ores, electricity, oil, vegetables, fruits, tobacco; partners--italy, yugoslavia, frg, greece, czechoslovakia, poland, romania, bulgaria, hungary imports: $255 million (f.o.b., 1987 est.); commodities--machinery, machine tools, iron and steel products, textiles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals; partners--italy, yugoslavia, frg, czechoslovakia, romania, poland, hungary, bulgaria, gdr external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na electricity: 1,630,000 kw capacity; 4,725 million kwh produced, 1,440 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, textiles and clothing, lumber, oil, cement, chemicals, basic metals, hydropower agriculture: arable land per capita among lowest in europe; one-half of work force engaged in farming; produces wide range of temperate-zone crops and livestock; claims self-sufficiency in grain output aid: none currency: lek (plural--leke); 1 lek (l) = 100 qintars exchange rates: leke (l) per us$1--8.00 (noncommercial fixed rate since 1986), 4.14 (commercial fixed rate since 1987) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 543 km total; 509 1.435-meter standard gauge, single track and 34 km narrow gauge, single track (1988); line connecting titograd (yugoslavia) and shkoder (albania) completed august 1986 highways: 16,700 km total; 6,700 km highway and roads, 10,000 km forest and agricultural inland waterways: 43 km plus albanian sections of lake scutari, lake ohrid, and lake prespa pipelines: crude oil, 145 km; refined products, 55 km; natural gas, 64 km (1988) ports: durres, sarande, vlore merchant marine: 11 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 52,886 grt/75,993 dwt; includes 11 cargo airports: 12 total, 10 usable; more than 5 with permanent-surface runways; more than 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--17 am, 5 fm, 9 tv; 52,000 tv sets; 210,000 radios defense forces branches: albanian people's army, frontier troops, interior troops, albanian coastal defense command, air and air defense force military manpower: males 15-49, 882,965; 729,635 fit for military service; 33,598 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 1.1 billion leks, 11.3% of total budget (fy88); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: algeria geography total area: 2,381,740 km2; land area: 2,381,740 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 3.5 times the size of texas land boundaries: 6,343 km total; libya 982 km, mali 1,376 km, mauritania 463 km, morocco 1,559 km, niger 956 km, tunisia 965 km, western sahara 42 km coastline: 998 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: libya claims about 19,400 km2 in southeastern algeria climate: arid to semiarid; mild, wet winters with hot, dry summers along coast; drier with cold winters and hot summers on high plateau; sirocco is a hot, dust/sand-laden wind especially common in summer terrain: mostly high plateau and desert; some mountains; narrow, discontinuous coastal plain natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, uranium, lead, zinc land use: 3% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 13% meadows and pastures; 2% forest and woodland; 82% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: mountainous areas subject to severe earthquakes; desertification note: second largest country in africa (after sudan) people population: 25,566,507 (july 1990), growth rate 2.8% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 87 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 61 years male, 64 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--algerian(s); adjective--algerian ethnic divisions: 99% arab-berber, less than 1% european religion: 99% sunni muslim (state religion); 1% christian and jewish language: arabic (official), french, berber dialects literacy: 52% labor force: 3,700,000; 40% industry and commerce, 24% agriculture, 17% government, 10% services (1984) organized labor: 16-19% of labor force claimed; general union of algerian workers (ugta) is the only labor organization and is subordinate to the national liberation front government long-form name: democratic and popular republic of algeria type: republic capital: algiers administrative divisions: 31 provinces (wilayat, singular--wilaya); adrar, alger, annaba, batna, bechar, bejaia, biskra, blida, bouira, constantine, djelfa, el asnam, guelma, jijel, laghouat, mascara, medea, mostaganem, m'sila, oran, ouargla, oum el bouaghi, saida, setif, sidi bel abbes, skikda, tamanrasset, tebessa, tiaret, tizi ouzou, tlemcen; note--there may now be 48 provinces with el asnam abolished, and the addition of 18 new provinces named ain delfa, ain temouchent, bordjbou, boumerdes, chlef, el bayadh, el oued, el tarf, illizi, jijel, khenchela, mila, naama, relizane, souk ahras, tindouf, tipaza, tissemsilt independence: 5 july 1962 (from france) constitution: 19 november 1976, effective 22 november 1976 legal system: socialist, based on french and islamic law; judicial review of legislative acts in ad hoc constitutional council composed of various public officials, including several supreme court justices; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the revolution, 1 november (1954) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national people's assembly (assemblee nationale populaire) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state--president chadli bendjedid (since 7 february 1979); head of government--prime minister mouloud hamrouche (since 9 september 1989) political parties and leaders: national liberation front (fln), col. chadli bendjedid, chairman; abdelhamid mehri, secretary general; the government established a multiparty system in september 1989 and as of 1 february 1990 19 legal parties existed suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 22 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--president bendjedid was reelected without opposition; people's national assembly--last held on 26 february 1987 (next to be held by february 1992); results--fln was the only party; seats--(281 total) fln 281; note--the government has promised to hold multiparty elections (municipal and wilaya) in june 1990, the first in algerian history communists: 400 (est.); communist party banned 1962 member of: afdb, aioec, arab league, assimer, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, ilzsg, interpol, iooc, itu, nam, oapec, oau, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador abderrahmane bensid; chancery at 2118 kalorama road nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 328-5300; us--ambassador christopher w. s. ross; embassy at 4 chemin cheich bachir brahimi, algiers (mailing address is b. p. box 549, alger-gare, 16000 algiers); telephone p213o (2) 601-425 or 255, 186; there is a us consulate in oran flag: two equal vertical bands of green (hoist side) and white with a red five-pointed star within a red crescent; the crescent, star, and color green are traditional symbols of islam (the state religion) economy overview: the exploitation of oil and natural gas products forms the backbone of the economy. algeria depends on hydrocarbons for nearly all of its export receipts, about 30% of government revenues, and nearly 25% of gdp. in 1973-74 the sharp increase in oil prices led to a booming economy that helped to finance an ambitious program of industrialization. plunging oil and gas prices, combined with the mismanagement of algeria's highly centralized economy, have brought the nation to its most serious social and economic crisis since independence. the government has promised far-reaching reforms, including giving public sector companies more autonomy, encouraging private-sector activity, boosting gas and nonhydrocarbon exports, and a major overhaul of the banking and financial systems. in 1988 the government started to implement a new economic policy to dismantle large state farms into privately operated units. gdp: $54.1 billion, per capita $2,235; real growth rate 1.8% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.9% (1988) unemployment rate: 19% (1988) budget: revenues $17.4 billion; expenditures $22.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $8.0 billion (1988) exports: $9.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--petroleum and natural gas 98%; partners--netherlands, czechoslovakia, romania, italy, france, us imports: $7.8 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--capital goods 35%, consumer goods 36%, food 20%; partners--france 25%, italy 8%, frg 8%, us 6-7% external debt: $26.2 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 5.4% (1986) electricity: 4,333,000 kw capacity; 14,370 million kwh produced, 580 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, light industries, natural gas, mining, electrical, petrochemical, food processing agriculture: accounts for 8% of gdp and employs 24% of labor force; net importer of food--grain, vegetable oil, and sugar; farm production includes wheat, barley, oats, grapes, olives, citrus, fruits, sheep, and cattle aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-85), $1.4 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $8.2 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $1.8 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $2.7 billion currency: algerian dinar (plural--dinars); 1 algerian dinar (da) = 100 centimes exchange rates: algerian dinars (da) per us$1--8.0086 (january 1990), 7.6086 (1989), 5.9148 (1988), 4.8497 (1987), 4.7023 (1986), 5.0278 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 4,146 km total; 2,632 km standard gauge (1.435 m), 1,258 km 1.055-meter gauge, 256 km 1.000-meter gauge; 300 km electrified; 215 km double track highways: 80,000 km total; 60,000 km concrete or bituminous, 20,000 km gravel, crushed stone, unimproved earth pipelines: crude oil, 6,612 km; refined products, 298 km; natural gas, 2,948 km ports: algiers, annaba, arzew, bejaia, jijel, mers el kebir, mostaganem, oran, skikda merchant marine: 75 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 900,957 grt/1,063,994 dwt; includes 5 passenger, 27 cargo, 2 vehicle carrier, 10 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 5 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 9 liquefied gas, 7 chemical tanker, 9 bulk, 1 specialized liquid cargo civil air: 42 major transport aircraft airports: 147 total, 136 usable; 53 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,660 m; 29 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 68 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent domestic and international service in the north, sparse in the south; 693,000 telephones; stations--26 am, no fm, 113 tv; 1,550,000 tv sets; 3,500,000 receiver sets; 6 submarine cables; coaxial cable or radio relay to italy, france, spain, morocco, and tunisia; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 intersputnik, 1 arabsat, and 15 domestic defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, national gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 5,886,334; 3,638,458 fit for military service; 293,476 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 1.8% of gdp, or $974 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: american samoa (territory of the us) geography total area: 199 km2; land area: 199 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 116 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical marine, moderated by southeast trade winds; annual rainfall averages 124 inches; rainy season from november to april, dry season from may to october; little seasonal temperature variation terrain: five volcanic islands with rugged peaks and limited coastal plains, two coral atolls natural resources: pumice and pumicite land use: 10% arable land; 5% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 75% forest and woodland; 10% other environment: typhoons common from december to march note: pago pago has one of the best natural deepwater harbors in the south pacific ocean, sheltered by shape from rough seas and protected by peripheral mountains from high winds; strategic location about 3,700 km south-southwest of honolulu in the south pacific ocean about halfway between hawaii and new zealand people population: 41,840 (july 1990), growth rate 2.9% (1990) birth rate: 41 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 4 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 immigrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 11 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--american samoan(s); adjective--american samoan ethnic divisions: 90% samoan (polynesian), 2% caucasian, 2% tongan, 6% other religion: about 50% christian congregationalist, 20% roman catholic, 30% mostly protestant denominations and other language: samoan (closely related to hawaiian and other polynesian languages) and english; most people are bilingual literacy: 99% labor force: 10,000; 48% government, 33% tuna canneries, 19% other (1986 est.) organized labor: na note: about 65,000 american samoans live in the states of california and washington and 20,000 in hawaii government long-form name: territory of american samoa type: unincorporated and unorganized territory of the us capital: pago pago administrative divisions: none (territory of the us) independence: none (territory of the us) constitution: ratified 1966, in effect 1967 national holiday: flag day, 17 april (1900) executive branch: us president, governor, lieutenant governor legislative branch: bicameral legislature (fono) consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state--president george bush (since 20 january 1989); vice president dan quayle (since 20 january 1989); head of government--governor peter tali coleman (since 20 january 1989); lieutenant governor galea'i poumele (since na 1989) suffrage: universal at age 18; indigenous inhabitants are us nationals, not us citizens elections: governor--last held 7 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--peter t. coleman was elected (percent of vote na); senate--last held 7 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--senators elected by county councils from 12 senate districts; seats--(18 total) number of seats by party na; house of representatives--last held 7 november 1988 (next to be held november 1990); results--representatives popularly elected from 17 house districts; seats--(21 total, 20 elected and 1 nonvoting delegate from swain's island); us house of representatives--last held 19 november 1988 (next to be held november 1990); results--eni r. f. h. faleomavaega elected as a nonvoting delegate communists: none diplomatic representation: none (territory of the us) flag: blue with a white triangle edged in red that is based on the fly side and extends to the hoist side; a brown and white american bald eagle flying toward the hoist side is carrying two traditional samoan symbols of authority, a staff and a war club note: administered by the us department of interior, office of territorial and international affairs; indigenous inhabitants are us nationals, not citizens of the us economy overview: economic development is strongly linked to the us, with which american samoa does 90% of its foreign trade. tuna fishing and tuna processing plants are the backbone of the private sector economy, with canned tuna the primary export. the tuna canneries are the second-largest employer, exceeded only by the government. other economic activities include meat canning, handicrafts, dairy farming, and a slowly developing tourist industry. tropical agricultural production provides little surplus for export. gnp: $190 million, per capita $5,210; real growth rate na% (1985) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.3% (1989) unemployment rate: 13.4% (1986) budget: revenues $90.3 million; expenditures $93.15 million, including capital expenditures of $4.9 million (1988) exports: $288 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--canned tuna 93%; partners--us 99.6% imports: $346 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--building materials 18%, food 17%, petroleum products 14%; partners--us 72%, japan 7%, nz 7%, australia 5%, other 9% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 35,000 kw capacity; 70 million kwh produced, 1,720 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tuna canneries (largely dependent on foreign supplies of raw tuna) agriculture: bananas, coconuts, vegetables, taro, breadfruit, yams, copra, pineapples, papayas aid: $20.1 million in operational funds and $5.8 million in construction funds for capital improvement projects from the us department of interior (1989) currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications railroads: small marine railroad in pago pago harbor highways: 350 km total; 150 km paved, 200 km unpaved ports: pago pago, ta'u airports: 3 total, 3 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440 to 3,659 m (international airport at tafuna, near pago pago); small airstrips on ta'u and ofu telecommunications: 6,500 telephones; stations--1 am, no fm, 1 tv; good telex, telegraph, and facsimile services; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: andorra geography total area: 450 km2; land area: 450 km2 comparative area: slightly more than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: 125 km total; france 60 km, spain 65 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: temperate; snowy, cold winters and cool, dry summers terrain: rugged mountains dissected by narrow valleys natural resources: hydropower, mineral water, timber, iron ore, lead land use: 2% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 56% meadows and pastures; 22% forest and woodland; 20% other environment: deforestation, overgrazing note: landlocked people population: 51,895 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 4 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 18 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--andorran(s); adjective--andorran ethnic divisions: catalan stock; 61% spanish, 30% andorran, 6% french, 3% other religion: virtually all roman catholic language: catalan (official); many also speak some french and castilian literacy: 100% labor force: na organized labor: none government long-form name: principality of andorra type: unique coprincipality under formal sovereignty of president of france and spanish bishop of seo de urgel, who are represented locally by officials called verguers capital: andorra la vella administrative divisions: 7 parishes (parroquies, singular--parroquia); andorra, canillo, encamp, la massana, les escaldes, ordino, sant julia de loria independence: 1278 constitution: none; some pareatges and decrees, mostly custom and usage legal system: based on french and spanish civil codes; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: mare de deu de meritxell, 8 september executive branch: two co-princes (president of france, bishop of seo de urgel in spain), two designated representatives (french veguer, episcopal veguer), two permanent delegates (french prefect for the department of pyrenees-orientales, spanish vicar general for the seo de urgel diocese), president of government, executive council legislative branch: unicameral general council of the valleys (consell general de las valls) judicial branch: civil cases--supreme court of andorra at perpignan (france) or the ecclesiastical court of the bishop of seo de urgel (spain); criminal cases--tribunal of the courts (tribunal des cortes) leaders: chiefs of state--french co-prince francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981), represented by veguer de franca louis deble; spanish episcopal co-prince mgr. joan marti y alanis (since 31 january 1971), represented by veguer episcopal francesc badia batalla; head of government--josep pintat solans (since na 1984) political parties and leaders: political parties not yet legally recognized; traditionally no political parties but partisans for particular independent candidates for the general council on the basis of competence, personality, and orientation toward spain or france; various small pressure groups developed in 1972; first formal political party, andorran democratic association, was formed in 1976 and reorganized in 1979 as andorran democratic party suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: general council of the valleys--last held 11 december 1989 (next to be held december 1993); results--percent of vote na; seats--(28 total) number of seats by party na communists: negligible member of: ccc, unesco diplomatic representation: andorra has no mission in the us; us--includes andorra within the barcelona (spain) consular district and the us consul general visits andorra periodically; consul general ruth a. davis; consulate general at via layetana 33, barcelona 3, spain (mailing address apo ny 09286); telephone p34o (3) 319-9550 flag: three equal vertical bands of blue (hoist side), yellow, and red with the national coat of arms centered in the yellow band; the coat of arms features a quartered shield; similar to the flag of chad which does not have a national coat of arms in the center; also similar to the flag of romania which has a national coat of arms featuring a mountain landscape below a red five-pointed star and the words republica socialista romania at the bottom economy overview: the mainstay of andorra's economy is tourism. an estimated 12 million tourists visit annually, attracted by andorra's duty-free status and by its summer and winter resorts. agricultural production is limited by a scarcity of arable land, and most food has to be imported. the principal livestock activity is sheep raising. manufacturing consists mainly of cigarettes, cigars, and furniture. the rapid pace of european economic integration is a potential threat to andorra's advantages from its duty-free status. gnp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na exports: $0.017 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--electricity; partners--france, spain imports: $531 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--na; partners--france, spain external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 35,000 kw capacity; 140 million kwh produced, 2,800 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism (particularly skiing), sheep, timber, tobacco, smuggling, banking agriculture: sheep raising; small quantities of tobacco, rye, wheat, barley, oats, and some vegetables aid: none currency: french franc (plural--francs) and spanish peseta (plural--pesetas); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes and 1 spanish peseta (pta) = 100 centimos exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985); spanish pesetas (ptas) per us$1--109.69 (january 1990), 118.38 (1989), 116.49 (1988), 123.48 (1987), 140.05 (1986), 170.04 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 96 km telecommunications: international digital microwave network; international landline circuits to france and spain; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 17,700 telephones defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france and spain ---------------------------------------------------country: angola geography total area: 1,246,700 km2; land area: 1,246,700 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of texas land boundaries: 5,198 km total; congo 201 km, namibia 1,376 km, zaire 2,511 km, zambia 1,110 km coastline: 1,600 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 20 nm disputes: civil war since independence on 11 november 1975 climate: semiarid in south and along coast to luanda; north has cool, dry season (may to october) and hot, rainy season (november to april) terrain: narrow coastal plain rises abruptly to vast interior plateau natural resources: petroleum, diamonds, iron ore, phosphates, copper, feldspar, gold, bauxite, uranium land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 23% meadows and pastures; 43% forest and woodland; 32% other environment: locally heavy rainfall causes periodic flooding on plateau; desertification note: cabinda is separated from rest of country by zaire people population: 8,534,483 (july 1990), growth rate 2.9% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 20 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 158 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 42 years male, 46 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--angolan(s); adjective--angolan ethnic divisions: 37% ovimbundu, 25% kimbundu, 13% bakongo, 2% mestico, 1% european religion: 47% indigenous beliefs, 38% roman catholic, 15% protestant (est.) language: portuguese (official); various bantu dialects literacy: 41% labor force: 2,783,000 economically active; 85% agriculture, 15% industry (1985 est.) organized labor: about 450,695 (1980) government long-form name: people's republic of angola type: marxist people's republic capital: luanda administrative divisions: 18 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia); bengo, benguela, bie, cabinda, cuando cubango, cuanza norte, cuanza sul, cunene, huambo, huila, luanda, lunda norte, lunda sul, malanje, moxico, namibe, uige, zaire independence: 11 november 1975 (from portugal) constitution: 11 november 1975; revised 7 january 1978 and 11 august 1980 legal system: based on portuguese civil law system and customary law, but being modified along socialist lines national holiday: independence day, 11 november (1975) executive branch: president, chairman of the council of ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national people's assembly judicial branch: supreme court (tribunal da relacao) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president jose eduardo dos santos (since 21 september 1979) political parties and leaders: only party--popular movement for the liberation of angola-labor party (mpla-labor party), jose eduardo dos santos; national union for the total independence of angola (unita), lost to the mpla with cuban military support in immediate postindependence struggle, now carrying out insurgency suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: none held to date member of: acp, afdb, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), icao, ifad, ilo, imo, intelsat, itu, nam, oau, sadcc, un, unesco, unicef, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: none flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and black with a centered yellow emblem consisting of a five-pointed star within half a cogwheel crossed by a machete (in the style of a hammer and sickle) economy overview: subsistence agriculture provides the main livelihood for 80-90% of the population, but accounts for only 10-20% of gdp. oil production is the most lucrative sector of the economy, contributing about 50% to gdp. in recent years, however, the impact of fighting an internal war has severely affected the economy and food has to be imported. gdp: $5.0 billion, per capita $600; real growth rate 9.2% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues na; expenditures $2.7 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1986 est.) exports: $2.9 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--oil, coffee, diamonds, sisal, fish and fish products, timber, cotton; partners--us, ussr, cuba, portugal, brazil imports: $2.5 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--capital equipment (machinery and electrical equipment), food, vehicles and spare parts, textiles and clothing, medicines; substantial military deliveries; partners--us, ussr, cuba, portugal, brazil external debt: $3.0 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 506,000 kw capacity; 770 million kwh produced, 90 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, mining (phosphate rock, diamonds), fish processing, brewing, tobacco, sugar, textiles, cement, food processing, building construction agriculture: cash crops--coffee, sisal, corn, cotton, sugar, manioc, tobacco; food crops--cassava, corn, vegetables, plantains, bananas, and other local foodstuffs; disruptions caused by civil war and marketing deficiencies require food imports aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $263 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $903 million; communist countries (1970-88), $1.3 billion currency: kwanza (plural--kwanza); 1 kwanza (kz) = 100 lwei exchange rates: kwanza (kz) per us$1--29.62 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,189 km total; 2,879 km 1.067-meter gauge, 310 km 0.600-meter gauge; limited trackage in use because of insurgent attacks; sections of the benguela railroad closed because of insurgency highways: 73,828 km total; 8,577 km bituminous-surface treatment, 29,350 km crushed stone, gravel, or improved earth, remainder unimproved earth inland waterways: 1,295 km navigable pipelines: crude oil, 179 km ports: luanda, lobito, namibe, cabinda merchant marine: 12 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 66,348 grt/102,825 dwt; includes 11 cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 27 major transport aircraft airports: 317 total, 184 usable; 28 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 12 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 60 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of wire, radio relay, and troposcatter routes; high frequency used extensively for military/cuban links; 40,300 telephones; stations--17 am, 13 fm, 2 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: army, navy, air force/air defense; paramilitary forces--people's defense organization and territorial troops, frontier guard, popular vigilance brigades military manpower: males 15-49, 2,049,295; 1,030,868 fit for military service; 90,877 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: anguilla (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 91 km2; land area: 91 km2 comparative area: about half the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 61 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical; moderated by northeast trade winds terrain: flat and low-lying island of coral and limestone natural resources: negligible; salt, fish, lobsters land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other; mostly rock with sparse scrub oak, few trees, some commercial salt ponds environment: frequent hurricanes, other tropical storms (july to october) note: located 270 km east of puerto rico people population: 6,883 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 24 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 10 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 18 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--anguillan(s); adjective--anguillan ethnic divisions: mainly of black african descent religion: anglican, methodist, and roman catholic language: english (official) literacy: 80% labor force: 2,780 (1984) organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: the valley administrative divisions: none (dependent territory of the uk) independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: 1 april 1982 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: anguilla day, 30 may executive branch: british monarch, governor, chief minister, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral house of assembly judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor geoffrey o. whittaker (since na 1987); head of government--chief minister emile gumbs (since na march 1984, served previously from february 1977 to may 1980) political parties and leaders: anguilla national alliance (ana), emile gumbs; anguilla united party (aup), ronald webster; anguilla democratic party (adp), victor banks suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of assembly--last held 27 february 1989 (next to be held february 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(11 total, 7 elected) ana 3, aup 2, adp 1, independent 1 communists: none member of: commonwealth diplomatic representation: none (dependent territory of the uk) flag: two horizontal bands of white (top, almost triple width) and light blue with three orange dolphins in an interlocking circular design centered in the white band economy overview: anguilla has few natural resources, and the economy depends heavily on lobster fishing, offshore banking, tourism, and remittances from emigrants. in recent years the economy has benefited from a boom in tourism. development is planned to improve the infrastructure, particularly transport and tourist facilities, and also light industry. improvement in the economy has reduced unemployment from 40% in 1984 to about 5% in 1988. gdp: $23 million, per capita $3,350 (1988 est.); real growth rate 8.2% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.5% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 5.0% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $9.0 million; expenditures $8.8 million, including capital expenditures of na (1988 est.) exports: $na; commodities--lobsters and salt; partners--na imports: $na; commodities--na; partners --na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 3,000 kw capacity; 9 million kwh produced, 1,300 kwh per capita (1988) industries: tourism, boat building, salt, fishing (including lobster) agriculture: pigeon peas, corn, sweet potatoes, sheep, goats, pigs, cattle, poultry aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $33 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: na communications highways: 60 km surfaced ports: road bay, blowing point civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 3 total, 3 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways of 1,100 m (wallblake airport) telecommunications: modern internal telephone system; 890 telephones; stations--3 am, 1 fm, no tv; radio relay link to island of st. martin defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: antarctica geography total area: about 14,000,000 km2; land area: about 14,000,000 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 1.5 times the size of the us; second-smallest continent (after australia) land boundaries: see entry on disputes coastline: 17,968 km maritime claims: see entry on disputes disputes: antarctic treaty suspends all claims; sections (some overlapping) claimed by argentina, australia, chile, france (adelie land), new zealand (ross dependency), norway (queen maud land), and uk; brazil claims a zone of interest; the us and ussr do not recognize the territorial claims of other nations and have made no claims themselves (but reserve the right to do so); no formal claims have been made in the sector between 90o west and 150o west climate: severe low temperatures vary with latitude, elevation, and distance from the ocean; east antarctica colder than antarctic peninsula in the west; warmest temperatures occur in january along the coast and average slightly below freezing terrain: about 98% thick continental ice sheet, with average elevations between 2,000 and 4,000 meters; mountain ranges up to 5,000 meters high; ice-free coastal areas include parts of southern victoria land, wilkes land, and the scientific research areas of graham land and ross island on mcmurdo sound; glaciers form ice shelves along about half of coastline natural resources: coal and iron ore; chromium, copper, gold, nickel, platinum, and hydrocarbons have been found in small quantities along the coast; offshore deposits of oil and gas land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other (98% ice, 2% barren rock) environment: mostly uninhabitable; katabatic (gravity) winds blow coastward from the high interior; frequent blizzards form near the foot of the plateau; cyclonic storms form over the ocean and move clockwise around the coast; during summer more solar radiation reaches the surface at the south pole than is received at the equator in an equivalent period; in october 1987 it was reported that the ozone shield, which protects the earth's surface from harmful ultraviolet radiation, has dwindled to its lowest level ever over antarctica; subject to active volcanism (deception island) note: the coldest continent people population: no indigenous inhabitants; staffing of research stations varies seasonally; summer (january) population--3,330; argentina 179, australia 216, brazil 36, chile 124, china 62, france 46, frg 9, gdr 15, india 59, italy 121, japan 52, nz 251, poland 19, south africa 102, south korea 17, uk 72, uruguay 47, us 1,250, ussr 653 (1986-87); winter (july) population--1,148 total; argentina 149, australia 82, brazil 11, chile 59, china 16, france 32, frg 9, gdr 9, india 17, japan 37, nz 11, poland 19, south africa 15, uk 61, uruguay 10, us 242, ussr 369 (1986-87); year-round stations--43 total; argentina 7, australia 3, brazil 1, chile 3, china 1, france 1, frg 1, gdr 1, india 1, japan 2, nz 1, poland 1, south africa 1, south korea 1, uk 6, uruguay 1, us 3, ussr 8 (1986-87); summer only stations--26 total; argentina 3, australia 3, chile 4, italy 1, japan 1, nz 2, south africa 2, us 4, ussr 6 (1986-87) government long-form name: none type: the antarctic treaty, signed on 1 december 1959 and entered into force on 23 june 1961, established, for at least 30 years, a legal framework for peaceful use, scientific research, and suspension of territorial claims. administration is carried out through consultative member meetings--the 14th and last meeting was held in rio de janeiro (brazil) in october 1987. consultative (voting) members include claimant nations (they claim portions of antarctica as national territory and some claims overlap) and nonclaimant nations (they have made no claims to antarctic territory, although the us and ussr have reserved the right to do so and do not recognize the claims of others); the year in parentheses indicates when an acceding nation was voted to full consultative (voting) status, while no date indicates an original 1959 treaty signatory. claimant nations are--argentina, australia, chile, france, new zealand, norway, and the uk. nonclaimant nations are--belgium, brazil (1983), china (1985), frg (1981), gdr (1987), india (1983), italy (1987), japan, poland (1977), south africa, uruguay (1985), us, and the ussr. acceding (nonvoting) members, with year of accession in parenthesis, are--austria (1987), bulgaria (1978), cuba (1984), czechoslovakia (1962), denmark (1965), finland (1984), greece (1987), hungary (1984), netherlands (1987), north korea (1987), papua new guinea (1981), peru (1981), romania (1971), south korea (1986), spain (1982), and sweden (1984). antarctic treaty summary: article 1--area to be used for peaceful purposes only and military activity, such as weapons testing, is prohibited, but military personnel and equipment may be used for scientific purposes; article 2--freedom of scientific investigation and cooperation shall continue; article 3--free exchange of information and personnel; article 4--does not recognize, dispute, or establish territorial claims and no new claims shall be asserted while the treaty is in force; article 5--prohibits nuclear explosions or disposal of radioactive wastes; article 6--includes under the treaty all land and ice shelves south of 60o 00' south, but that the water areas be covered by international law; article 7--treaty-state observers have free access, including aerial observation, to any area and may inspect all stations, installations, and equipment; advance notice of all activities and the introduction of military personnel must be given; article 8--allows for jurisdiction over observers and scientists by their own states; article 9--frequent consultative meetings take place among member nations and acceding nations given consultative status; article 10--treaty states will discourage activities by any country in antarctica that are contrary to the treaty; article 11--disputes to be settled peacefully by the parties concerned or, ultimately, by the icj; articles 12, 13, 14--deal with upholding, interpreting, and amending the treaty among involved nations. other agreements: convention on the conservation of antarctic marine living resources; convention for the conservation of antarctic seals; a mineral resources agreement is currently undergoing ratification by the antarctic treaty consultative parties economy overview: no economic activity at present except for fishing off the coast and small-scale tourism, both based abroad. exploitation of mineral resources will be held back by technical difficulties, high costs, and objections by environmentalists. communications airports: 39 total; 25 usable; none with permanent surface runways; 3 with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: none; article 7 of the antarctic treaty states that advance notice of all activities and the introduction of military personnel must be given ---------------------------------------------------country: antigua and barbuda geography total area: 440 km2; land area: 440 km2; includes redonda comparative area: slightly less than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 153 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical marine; little seasonal temperature variation terrain: mostly low-lying limestone and coral islands with some higher volcanic areas natural resources: negligible; pleasant climate fosters tourism land use: 18% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 16% forest and woodland; 59% other environment: subject to hurricanes and tropical storms (july to october); insufficient freshwater resources; deeply indented coastline provides many natural harbors note: 420 km east-southeast of puerto rico people population: 63,726 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 10 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 23 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--antiguan(s); adjective--antiguan ethnic divisions: almost entirely of black african origin; some of british, portuguese, lebanese, and syrian origin religion: anglican (predominant), other protestant sects, some roman catholic language: english (official), local dialects literacy: 90% (est.) labor force: 30,000; 82% commerce and services, 11% agriculture, 7% industry (1983) organized labor: antigua and barbuda public service association (abpsa), membership 500; antigua trades and labor union (atlu), 10,000 members; antigua workers union (awu), 10,000 members (1986 est.) government long-form name: none type: parliamentary democracy capital: saint john's administrative divisions: 6 parishes and 2 dependencies*; barbuda*, redonda*, saint george, saint john, saint mary, saint paul, saint peter, saint philip independence: 1 november 1981 (from uk) constitution: 1 november 1981 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 1 november (1981) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: eastern caribbean supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general sir wilfred ebenezer jacobs (since 1 november 1981, previously governor since 1976); head of government--prime minister vere cornwall bird, sr. (since na 1976); deputy prime minister lester bird (since na 1976) political parties and leaders: antigua labor party (alp), vere c. bird, sr., lester bird; united national democratic party (undp), dr. ivor heath suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of representatives--last held 9 march 1989 (next to be held 1994); results--percentage of vote by party na; seats--(17 total) alp 15, undp 1, independent 1 communists: negligible other political or pressure groups: antigua caribbean liberation movement (aclm), a small leftist nationalist group led by leonard (tim) hector; antigua trades and labor union (atlu), headed by noel thomas member of: acp, caricom, commonwealth, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ilo, imf, iso, oas, un, unesco, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador edmund hawkins lake; chancery at suite 2h, 3400 international drive nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 362-5211 or 5166, 5122, 5225; there is an antiguan consulate in miami; us--the us ambassador to barbados is accredited to antigua and barbuda, and in his absence, the embassy is headed by charge d'affaires roger r. gamble; embassy at queen elizabeth highway, saint john's (mailing address is fpo miami 34054); telephone (809) 462-3505 or 3506 flag: red with an inverted isosceles triangle based on the top edge of the flag; the triangle contains three horizontal bands of black (top), light blue, and white with a yellow rising sun in the black band economy overview: the economy is primarily service oriented, with tourism the most important determinant of economic performance. during the period 1983-87, real gdp expanded at an annual average rate of 8%. tourism's contribution to gdp, as measured by value added in hotels and restaurants, rose from about 14% in 1983 to 17% in 1987, and stimulated growth in other sectors--particularly in construction, communications, and public utilities. during the same period the combined share of agriculture and manufacturing declined from 12% to less than 10%. antigua and barbuda is one of the few areas in the caribbean experiencing a labor shortage in some sectors of the economy. gdp: $353.5 million, per capita $5,550; real growth rate 6.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7.1% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 5.0% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $77 million; expenditures $81 million, including capital expenditures of $13 million (1988 est.) exports: $30.4 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum products 46%, manufactures 29%, food and live animals 14%, machinery and transport equipment 11%; partners--trinidad and tobago 40%, barbados 8%, us 0.3% imports: $302.1 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--food and live animals, machinery and transport equipment, manufactures, chemicals, oil; partners--us 27%, uk 14%, caricom 7%, canada 4%, other 48% external debt: $245.4 million (1987) industrial production: growth rate 10% (1987) electricity: 49,000 kw capacity; 90 million kwh produced, 1,410 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, construction, light manufacturing (clothing, alcohol, household appliances) agriculture: accounts for 4% of gdp; expanding output of cotton, fruits, vegetables, and livestock sector; other crops--bananas, coconuts, cucumbers, mangoes; not self-sufficient in food aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $40 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 64 km 0.760-meter narrow gauge and 13 km 0.610-meter gauge used almost exclusively for handling sugarcane highways: 240 km ports: st. john's merchant marine: 80 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 307,315 grt/501,552 dwt; includes 50 cargo, 4 refrigerated cargo, 8 container, 8 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 5 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 1 short-sea passenger; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: 10 major transport aircraft airports: 3 total, 3 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways less than 2,440 m telecommunications: good automatic telephone system; 6,700 telephones; tropospheric scatter links with saba and guadeloupe; stations--4 am, 2 fm, 2 tv, 2 shortwave; 1 coaxial submarine cable; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: royal antigua and barbuda defense force, royal antigua and barbuda police force (includes the coast guard) military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: arctic ocean geography total area: 14,056,000 km2; includes baffin bay, barents sea, beaufort sea, chukchi sea, east siberian sea, greenland sea, hudson bay, hudson strait, kara sea, laptev sea, and other tributary water bodies comparative area: slightly more than 1.5 times the size of the us; smallest of the world's four oceans (after pacific ocean, atlantic ocean, and indian ocean) coastline: 45,389 km climate: persistent cold and relatively narrow annual temperature ranges; winters characterized by continuous darkness, cold and stable weather conditions, and clear skies; summers characterized by continuous daylight, damp and foggy weather, and weak cyclones with rain or snow terrain: central surface covered by a perennial drifting polar icepack which averages about 3 meters in thickness, although pressure ridges may be three times that size; clockwise drift pattern in the beaufort gyral stream, but nearly straight line movement from the new siberian islands (ussr) to denmark strait (between greenland and iceland); the ice pack is surrounded by open seas during the summer, but more than doubles in size during the winter and extends to the encircling land masses; the ocean floor is about 50% continental shelf (highest percentage of any ocean) with the remainder a central basin interrupted by three submarine ridges (alpha cordillera, nansen cordillera, and lomonsov ridge); maximum depth is 4,665 meters in the fram basin natural resources: sand and gravel aggregates, placer deposits, polymetallic nodules, oil and gas fields, fish, marine mammals (seals, whales) environment: endangered marine species include walruses and whales; ice islands occasionally break away from northern ellesmere island; icebergs calved from western greenland and extreme northeastern canada; maximum snow cover in march or april about 20 to 50 centimeters over the frozen ocean and lasts about 10 months; permafrost in islands; virtually icelocked from october to june; fragile ecosystem slow to change and slow to recover from disruptions or damage note: major chokepoint is the southern chukchi sea (northern access to the pacific ocean via the bering strait); ships subject to superstructure icing from october to may; strategic location between north america and the ussr; shortest marine link between the extremes of eastern and western ussr; floating research stations operated by the us and ussr economy overview: economic activity is limited to the exploitation of natural resources, including crude oil, natural gas, fishing, and sealing. communications ports: churchill (canada), murmansk (ussr), prudhoe bay (us) telecommunications: no submarine cables note: sparse network of air, ocean, river, and land routes; the northwest passage (north america) and northern sea route (asia) are important waterways ---------------------------------------------------country: argentina geography total area: 2,766,890 km2; land area: 2,736,690 km2 comparative area: slightly more than four times the size of texas land boundaries: 9,665 km total; bolivia 832 km, brazil 1,224 km, chile 5,150 km, paraguay 1,880 km, uruguay 579 km coastline: 4,989 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 200 nm (overflight and navigation permitted beyond 12 nm) disputes: short section of the boundary with uruguay is in dispute; short section of the boundary with chile is indefinite; claims british-administered falkland islands (islas malvinas); claims british-administered south georgia and the south sandwich islands; territorial claim in antarctica climate: mostly temperate; arid in southeast; subantarctic in southwest terrain: rich plains of the pampas in northern half, flat to rolling plateau of patagonia in south, rugged andes along western border natural resources: fertile plains of the pampas, lead, zinc, tin, copper, iron ore, manganese, crude oil, uranium land use: 9% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 52% meadows and pastures; 22% forest and woodland; 13% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: tucuman and mendoza areas in andes subject to earthquakes; pamperos are violent windstorms that can strike pampas and northeast; irrigated soil degradation; desertification; air and water pollution in buenos aires note: second-largest country in south america (after brazil); strategic location relative to sea lanes between south atlantic and south pacific oceans (strait of magellan, beagle channel, drake passage) people population: 32,290,966 (july 1990), growth rate 1.2% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 32 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--argentine(s); adjective--argentine ethnic divisions: 85% white, 15% mestizo, indian, or other nonwhite groups religion: 90% nominally roman catholic (less than 20% practicing), 2% protestant, 2% jewish, 6% other language: spanish (official), english, italian, german, french literacy: 94% labor force: 10,900,000; 12% agriculture, 31% industry, 57% services (1985 est.) organized labor: 3,000,000; 28% of labor force government long-form name: argentine republic type: republic capital: buenos aires (tentative plans to move to viedma by 1990 indefinitely postponed) administrative divisions: 22 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia), 1 national territory* (territorio nacional), and 1 district** (distrito); buenos aires, catamarca, chaco, chubut, cordoba, corrientes, distrito federal**, entre rios, formosa, jujuy, la pampa, la rioja, mendoza, misiones, neuquen, rio negro, salta, san juan, san luis, santa cruz, santa fe, santiago del estero, tierra del fuego and antartida e islas del atlantico sur*, tucuman independence: 9 july 1816 (from spain) constitution: 1 may 1853 legal system: mixture of us and west european legal systems; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 25 may (1810) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso nacional) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camera de diputados) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president carlos saul menem (since 8 july 1989); vice president eduardo duhalde (since 8 july 1989) political parties and leaders: justicialist party (jp), antonio cafiero, peronist umbrella political organization; radical civic union (ucr), raul alfonsin, moderately left of center; union of the democratic center (ucede), alvaro alsogaray, conservative party; intransigent party (pi), dr. oscar alende, leftist party; several provincial parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 14 may 1989 (next to be held may 1995); results--carlos saul menem was elected; chamber of deputies--last held 14 may 1989 (next to be held may 1991); results--jp 47%, ucr 30%, udc 7%, other 16%; seats--(254 total); jp 122, ucr 93, udc 11, other 28 communists: some 70,000 members in various party organizations, including a small nucleus of activists other political or pressure groups: peronist-dominated labor movement, general confederation of labor (peronist-leaning umbrella labor organization), argentine industrial union (manufacturers' association), argentine rural society (large landowners' association), business organizations, students, the roman catholic church, the armed forces member of: ccc, fao, g-77, gatt, group of eight, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, iso, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, laia, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador guido jose maria di tella; chancery at 1600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20009; telephone 202) 939-6400 through 6403; there are argentine consulates general in houston, miami, new orleans, new york, san francisco, and san juan (puerto rico), and consulates in baltimore, chicago, and los angeles; us--ambassador terence a. todman; embassy at 4300 colombia, 1425 buenos aires (mailing address is apo miami 34034); telephone p54o (1) 774-7611 or 8811, 9911 flag: three equal horizontal bands of light blue (top), white, and light blue; centered in the white band is a radiant yellow sun with a human face known as the sun of may economy overview: argentina is rich in natural resources, and has a highly literate population, an export-oriented agricultural sector, and a diversified industrial base. nevertheless, the economy has encountered major problems in recent years, leading to a recession in 1988-89. economic growth slowed to 2.0% in 1987 and to 1.8% in 1988; a sharp decline of 5.5% has been estimated for 1989. a widening public-sector deficit and a multidigit inflation rate has dominated the economy over the past three years, reaching about 5,000% in 1989. since 1978, argentina's external debt has nearly doubled to $60 billion, creating severe debt-servicing difficulties and hurting the country's creditworthiness with international lenders. gnp: $72.0 billion, per capita $2,217; real growth rate 5.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4,925% (1989) unemployment rate: 8.5% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $11.5 billion; expenditures $13.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.93 billion (1988) exports: $9.6 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--meat, wheat, corn, oilseed, hides, wool; partners--us 14%, ussr, italy, brazil, japan, netherlands imports: $4.3 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--machinery and equipment, chemicals, metals, fuels and lubricants, agricultural products; partners--us 25%, brazil, frg, bolivia, japan, italy, netherlands external debt: $60 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 8% (1989) electricity: 16,449,000 kw capacity; 46,590 million kwh produced, 1,460 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing (especially meat packing), motor vehicles, consumer durables, textiles, chemicals and petrochemicals, printing, metallurgy, steel agriculture: accounts for 15% of gnp (including fishing); produces abundant food for both domestic consumption and exports; among world's top five exporters of grain and beef; principal crops--wheat, corn, sorghum, soybeans, sugar beets; 1987 fish catch estimated at 500,000 tons aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.0 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.6 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $718 million currency: austral (plural--australes); 1 austral (a) = 100 centavos exchange rates: australes (a) per us$1--1,930 (december 1989), 8.7526 (1988), 2.1443 (1987), 0.9430 (1986), 0.6018 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 34,172 km total (includes 169 km electrified); includes a mixture of 1.435-meter standard gauge, 1.676-meter broad gauge, 1.000-meter gauge, and 0.750-meter gauge highways: 208,350 km total; 47,550 km paved, 39,500 km gravel, 101,000 km improved earth, 20,300 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 11,000 km navigable pipelines: 4,090 km crude oil; 2,900 km refined products; 9,918 km natural gas ports: bahia blanca, buenos aires, necochea, rio gallegos, rosario, santa fe merchant marine: 131 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,693,540 grt/2,707,079 dwt; includes 45 cargo, 6 refrigerated cargo, 6 container, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 railcar carrier, 48 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 4 liquefied gas, 18 bulk civil air: 54 major transport aircraft airports: 1,799 total, 1,617 usable; 132 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 30 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 335 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: extensive modern system; 2,650,000 telephones (12,000 public telephones); radio relay widely used; stations--171 am, no fm, 231 tv, 13 shortwave; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations; domestic satellite network has 40 stations defense forces branches: argentine army, navy of the argentine republic, argentine air force, national gendarmerie, argentine naval prefecture, national aeronautical police force military manpower: males 15-49, 7,860,054; 6,372,189 fit for military service; 277,144 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 1.4% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: aruba (part of the dutch realm) geography total area: 193 km2; land area: 193 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 68.5 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 12 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical marine; little seasonal temperature variation terrain: flat with a few hills; scant vegetation natural resources: negligible; white sandy beaches land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: lies outside the caribbean hurricane belt note: 28 km north of venezuela people population: 62,656 (july 1990), growth rate 0.2% (1990) birth rate: 16 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 8 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--aruban(s); adjective--aruban ethnic divisions: 80% mixed european/caribbean indian religion: 82% roman catholic, 8% protestant; also small hindu, muslim, confucian, and jewish minority language: dutch (official), papiamento (a spanish, portuguese, dutch, english dialect), english (widely spoken), spanish literacy: 95% labor force: na, but most employment is in the tourist industry (1986) organized labor: aruban workers' federation (fta) government long-form name: none type: part of the dutch realm--full autonomy in internal affairs obtained in 1986 upon separation from the netherlands antilles capital: oranjestad administrative divisions: none (self-governing part of the netherlands) independence: planned for 1996 constitution: 1 january 1986 legal system: based on dutch civil law system, with some english common law influence national holiday: flag day, 18 march executive branch: dutch monarch, governor, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral parliament (staten) judicial branch: joint high court of justice leaders: chief of state--queen beatrix wilhelmina armgard (since 30 april 1980), represented by governor general felipe b. tromp (since 1 january 1986); head of government--prime minister nelson oduber (since na february 1989) political parties and leaders: electoral movement party (mep), nelson oduber; aruban people's party (avp), henny eman; national democratic action (adn), pedro charro kelly; new patriotic party (ppn), eddy werlemen; aruban patriotic party (ppa), benny nisbet; aruban democratic party (pda), leo berlinski; democratic action '86 (ad'86), arturo oduber; governing coalition includes the mep, ppa, and adn suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held 6 january 1989 (next to be held by january 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(21 total) mep 10, avp 8, adn 1, ppn 1, ppa 1 diplomatic representation: none (self-governing part of the netherlands) flag: blue with two narrow horizontal yellow stripes across the lower portion and a red, four-pointed star outlined in white in the upper hoist-side corner economy overview: tourism is the mainstay of the economy. in 1985 the economy suffered a severe blow when exxon closed its refinery, a major source of employment and foreign exchange earnings. economic collapse was prevented by soft loans from the dutch government and by a booming tourist industry. hotel capacity expanded by 20% between 1985 and 1987 and is projected to more than double by 1990. unemployment has steadily declined from about 20% in 1986 to about 3% in 1988. gdp: $620 million, per capita $10,000; real growth rate 16.7% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 3% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $145 million; expenditures $185 million, including capital expenditures of $42 million (1988) exports: $47.5 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--mostly petroleum products; partners--us 64%, ec imports: $296.0 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--food, consumer goods, manufactures; partners--us 8%, ec external debt: $81 million (1987) industrial production: growth rate 20% (1984) electricity: 310,000 kw capacity; 945 million kwh produced, 15,120 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, transshipment facilities agriculture: poor quality soils and low rainfall limit agricultural activity to the cultivation of aloes aid: none currency: aruban florin (plural--florins); 1 aruban florin (af.) = 100 cents exchange rates: aruban florins (af.) per us$1--1.7900 (fixed rate since 1986) fiscal year: calendar year communications ports: oranjestad, sint nicolaas airfield: government-owned airport east of oranjestad telecommunications: generally adequate; extensive interisland radio relay links; 72,168 telephones; stations--4 am, 4 fm, 1 tv; 1 sea cable to st. maarten defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the netherlands until 1996 ---------------------------------------------------country: ashmore and cartier islands (territory of australia) geography total area: 5 km2; land area: 5 km2; includes ashmore reef (west, middle, and east islets) and cartier island comparative area: about 8.5 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 74.1 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploration; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical terrain: low with sand and coral natural resources: fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other--grass and sand environment: surrounded by shoals and reefs; ashmore reef national nature reserve established in august 1983 note: located in extreme eastern indian ocean between australia and indonesia 320 km off the northwest coast of australia people population: no permanent inhabitants; seasonal caretakers government long-form name: territory of ashmore and cartier islands type: territory of australia administered by the australian ministry for territories and local government administrative divisions: none (territory of australia) legal system: relevant laws of the northern territory of australia note: administered by the australian minister for arts, sports, the environment, tourism, and territories graham richardson diplomatic representation: none (territory of australia) economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of australia; periodic visits by the royal australian navy and royal australian air force ---------------------------------------------------country: atlantic ocean geography total area: 82,217,000 km2; includes baltic sea, black sea, caribbean sea, davis strait, denmark strait, drake passage, gulf of mexico, mediterranean sea, north sea, norwegian sea, weddell sea, and other tributary water bodies comparative area: slightly less than nine times the size of the us; second-largest of the world's four oceans (after the pacific ocean, but larger than indian ocean or arctic ocean) coastline: 111,866 km climate: tropical cyclones (hurricanes) develop off the coast of africa near cape verde and move westward into the caribbean sea; hurricanes can occur from may to december, but are most frequent from august to november terrain: surface usually covered with sea ice in labrador sea, denmark strait, and baltic sea from october to june; clockwise warm water gyre (broad, circular system of currents) in the north atlantic, counterclockwise warm water gyre in the south atlantic; the ocean floor is dominated by the mid-atlantic ridge, a rugged north-south centerline for the entire atlantic basin; maximum depth is 8,605 meters in the puerto rico trench natural resources: oil and gas fields, fish, marine mammals (seals and whales), sand and gravel aggregates, placer deposits, polymetallic nodules, precious stones environment: endangered marine species include the manatee, seals, sea lions, turtles, and whales; municipal sludge pollution off eastern us, southern brazil, and eastern argentina; oil pollution in caribbean sea, gulf of mexico, lake maracaibo, mediterranean sea, and north sea; industrial waste and municipal sewage pollution in baltic sea, north sea, and mediterranean sea; icebergs common in davis strait, denmark strait, and the northwestern atlantic from february to august and have been spotted as far south as bermuda and the madeira islands; icebergs from antarctica occur in the extreme southern atlantic note: ships subject to superstructure icing in extreme north atlantic from october to may and extreme south atlantic from may to october; persistent fog can be a hazard to shipping from may to september; major choke points include the dardanelles, strait of gibraltar, access to the panama and suez canals; strategic straits include the dover strait, straits of florida, mona passage, the sound (oresund), and windward passage; north atlantic shipping lanes subject to icebergs from february to august; the equator divides the atlantic ocean into the north atlantic ocean and south atlantic ocean economy overview: economic activity is limited to exploitation of natural resources, especially fish, dredging aragonite sands (the bahamas), and crude oil and natural gas production (caribbean sea and north sea). communications ports: alexandria (egypt), algiers (algeria), antwerp (belgium), barcelona (spain), buenos aires (argentina), casablanca (morocco), colon (panama), copenhagen (denmark), dakar (senegal), gdansk (poland), hamburg (frg), helsinki (finland), las palmas (canary islands, spain), le havre (france), leningrad (ussr), lisbon (portugal), london (uk), marseille (france), montevideo (uruguay), montreal (canada), naples (italy), new orleans (us), new york (us), oran (algeria), oslo (norway), piraeus (greece), rio de janeiro (brazil), rotterdam (netherlands), stockholm (sweden) telecommunications: numerous submarine cables with most between continental europe and the uk, north america and the uk, and in the mediterranean; numerous direct links across atlantic via intelsat satellite network note: kiel canal and st. lawrence seaway are two important waterways ---------------------------------------------------country: australia geography total area: 7,686,850 km2; land area: 7,617,930 km2; includes macquarie island comparative area: slightly smaller than the us land boundaries: none coastline: 25,760 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: territorial claim in antarctica (australian antarctic territory) climate: generally arid to semiarid; temperate in south and east; tropical in north terrain: mostly low plateau with deserts; fertile plain in southeast natural resources: bauxite, coal, iron ore, copper, tin, silver, uranium, nickel, tungsten, mineral sands, lead, zinc, diamonds, natural gas, crude oil land use: 6% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 58% meadows and pastures; 14% forest and woodland; 22% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: subject to severe droughts and floods; cyclones along coast; limited freshwater availability; irrigated soil degradation; regular, tropical, invigorating, sea breeze known as the doctor occurs along west coast in summer; desertification note: world's smallest continent but sixth-largest country people population: 16,923,478 (july 1990), growth rate 1.3% (1990) birth rate: 15 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 8 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--australian(s); adjective--australian ethnic divisions: 95% caucasian, 4% asian, 1% aboriginal and other religion: 26.1% anglican, 26.0% roman catholic, 24.3% other christian language: english, native languages literacy: 98.5% labor force: 7,700,000; 33.8% finance and services, 22.3% public and community services, 20.1% wholesale and retail trade, 16.2% manufacturing and industry, 6.1% agriculture (1987) organized labor: 42% of labor force (1988) government long-form name: commonwealth of australia type: federal parliamentary state capital: canberra administrative divisions: 6 states and 2 territories*; australian capital territory*, new south wales, northern territory*, queensland, south australia, tasmania, victoria, western australia dependent areas: ashmore and cartier islands, christmas island, cocos (keeling) islands, coral sea islands, heard island and mcdonald islands, norfolk island independence: 1 january 1901 (federation of uk colonies) constitution: 9 july 1900, effective 1 january 1901 legal system: based on english common law; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: australia day (last monday in january), 29 january 1990 executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral federal parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since february 1952), represented by governor general william george hayden (since na february 1989); head of government--prime minister robert james lee hawke (since 11 march 1983); deputy prime minister paul keating (since 3 april 1990) political parties and leaders: government--australian labor party, robert hawke; opposition--liberal party, andrew peacock; national party, charles blunt; australian democratic party, janine haines suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: senate--last held 11 july 1987 (next to be held by 12 may 1990); results--labor 43%, liberal-national 42%, australian democrats 8%, independents 2%; seats--(76 total) labor 32, liberal-national 34, australian democrats 7, independents 3; house of representatives--last held 24 march 1990 (next to be held by november 1993); results--labor 39.7%, liberal-national 43%, australian democrats and independents 11.1%; seats--(148 total) labor 78, liberal-national 69, independent 1 communists: 4,000 members (est.) other political or pressure groups: australian democratic labor party (anti-communist labor party splinter group); peace and nuclear disarmament action (nuclear disarmament party splinter group) member of: adb, aioec, anzus, ccc, cipec (associate), colombo plan, commonwealth, dac, esa, escap, fao, gatt, iaea, iatp, iba, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, irc, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, oecd, spf, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador michael j. cook; chancery at 1601 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 797-3000; there are australian consulates general in chicago, honolulu, houston, los angeles, new york, pago pago (american samoa), and san francisco; us--ambassador melvin f. sembler; moonah place, yarralumla, canberra, australian capital territory 2600 (mailing address is apo san francisco 6404); telephone p61o (62) 705000; there are us consulates general in melbourne, perth, and sydney, and a consulate in brisbane flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and a large seven-pointed star in the lower hoist-side quadrant; the remaining half is a representation of the southern cross constellation in white with one small five-pointed star and four, larger, seven-pointed stars economy overview: australia has a prosperous western-style capitalist economy, with a per capita gnp comparable to levels in industrialized west european countries. rich in natural resources, australia is a major exporter of agricultural products, minerals, metals, and fossil fuels. of the top 25 exports, 21 are primary products, so that, as happened during 1983-84, a downturn in world commodity prices can have a big impact on the economy. the government is pushing for increased exports of manufactured goods but competition in international markets will be severe. gnp: $240.8 billion, per capita $14,300; real growth rate 4.1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.0% (1989) unemployment rate: 6.0% (december 1989) budget: revenues $76.3 billion; expenditures $69.1 billion, including capital expenditures of na (fy90 est.) exports: $43.2 billion (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--wheat, barley, beef, lamb, dairy products, wool, coal, iron ore; partners--japan 26%, us 11%, nz 6%, south korea 4%, singapore 4%, ussr 3% imports: $48.6 billion (c.i.f., fy89); commodities--manufactured raw materials, capital equipment, consumer goods; partners--us 22%, japan 22%, uk 7%, frg 6%, nz 4% (1984) external debt: $111.6 billion (september 1989) industrial production: growth rate 5.6% (fy88) electricity: 38,000,000 kw capacity; 139,000 million kwh produced, 8,450 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, industrial and transportation equipment, food processing, chemicals, steel, motor vehicles agriculture: accounts for 5% of gnp and 37% of export revenues; world's largest exporter of beef and wool, second-largest for mutton, and among top wheat exporters; major crops--wheat, barley, sugarcane, fruit; livestock--cattle, sheep, poultry aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $8.8 billion currency: australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 40,478 km total; 7,970 km 1.600-meter gauge, 16,201 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 16,307 km 1.067-meter gauge; 183 km dual gauge; 1,130 km electrified; government owned (except for a few hundred kilometers of privately owned track) (1985) highways: 837,872 km total; 243,750 km paved, 228,396 km gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized soil surface, 365,726 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 8,368 km; mainly by small, shallow-draft craft pipelines: crude oil, 2,500 km; refined products, 500 km; natural gas, 5,600 km ports: adelaide, brisbane, cairns, darwin, devonport, fremantle, geelong, hobart, launceston, mackay, melbourne, sydney, townsville merchant marine: 77 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,300,049 grt/3,493,802 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 7 cargo, 5 container, 10 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 17 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 3 liquefied gas, 1 combination ore/oil, 1 livestock carrier, 29 bulk civil air: around 150 major transport aircraft airports: 564 total, 524 usable; 235 with permanent-surface runways, 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 20 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 311 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good international and domestic service; 8.7 million telephones; stations--258 am, 67 fm, 134 tv; submarine cables to new zealand, papua new guinea, and indonesia; domestic satellite service; satellite stations--4 indian ocean intelsat, 6 pacific ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: royal australian navy, australian army, royal australian air force military manpower: males 15-49, 4,588,750; 4,009,127 fit for military service; 136,042 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: austria geography total area: 83,850 km2; land area: 82,730 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than maine land boundaries: 2,640 km total; czechoslovakia 548 km, hungary 366 km, italy 430 km, liechtenstein 37 km, switzerland 164 km, frg 784 km, yugoslavia 311 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: south tyrol question with italy climate: temperate; continental, cloudy; cold winters with frequent rain in lowlands and snow in mountains; cool summers with occasional showers terrain: mostly mountains with alps in west and south; mostly flat, with gentle slopes along eastern and northern margins natural resources: iron ore, crude oil, timber, magnesite, aluminum, lead, coal, lignite, copper, hydropower land use: 17% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 24% meadows and pastures; 39% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: because of steep slopes, poor soils, and cold temperatures, population is concentrated on eastern lowlands note: landlocked; strategic location at the crossroads of central europe with many easily traversable alpine passes and valleys; major river is the danube people population: 7,644,275 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--austrian(s); adjective--austrian ethnic divisions: 99.4% german, 0.3% croatian, 0.2% slovene, 0.1% other religion: 85% roman catholic, 6% protestant, 9% other language: german literacy: 98% labor force: 3,037,000; 56.4% services, 35.4% industry and crafts, 8.1% agriculture and forestry; an estimated 200,000 austrians are employed in other european countries; foreign laborers in austria number 177,840, about 6% of labor force (1988) organized labor: 1,672,820 members of austrian trade union federation (1984) government long-form name: republic of austria type: federal republic capital: vienna administrative divisions: 9 states (bundeslander, singular--bundesland); burgenland, karnten, niederosterreich, oberosterreich, salzburg, steiermark, tirol, vorarlberg, wien independence: 12 november 1918 (from austro-hungarian empire) constitution: 1920, revised 1929 (reinstated 1945) legal system: civil law system with roman law origin; judicial review of legislative acts by a constitutional court; separate administrative and civil/penal supreme courts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 26 october (1955) executive branch: president, chancellor, vice chancellor, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral federal assembly (bundesversammlung) consists of an upper council or federal council (bundesrat) and a lower council or national council (nationalrat) judicial branch: supreme judicial court (oberster gerichtshof) for civil and criminal cases, administrative court (verwaltungsgerichtshof) for bureaucratic cases, constitutional court (verfassungsgerichtshof) for constitutional cases leaders: chief of state--president kurt waldheim (since 8 july 1986); head of government--chancellor franz vranitzky (since 16 june 1986); vice chancellor josef riegler (since 19 may 1989) political parties and leaders: socialist party of austria (spo), franz vranitzky, chairman; austrian people's party (ovp), josef riegler, chairman; freedom party of austria (fpo), jorg haider, chairman; communist party (kpo), franz muhri, chairman; green alternative list (gal), andreas wabl, chairman suffrage: universal at age 19; compulsory for presidential elections elections: president--last held 8 june 1986 (next to be held may 1992); results of second ballot--dr. kurt waldheim 53.89%, dr. kurt steyrer 46.11%; federal council--last held 23 november 1986 (next to be held november 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(63 total) ovp 32, spo 30, fpo 1; national council--last held 23 november 1986 (next to be held november 1990); results--sp0 43.1%, ovp 41.3%, fpo 9.7%, gal 4.8%, kpo 0.7%, other 0.32%; seats--(183 total) sp0 80, ovp 77, fp0 18, gal 8 communists: membership 15,000 est.; activists 7,000-8,000 other political or pressure groups: federal chamber of commerce and industry; austrian trade union federation (primarily socialist); three composite leagues of the austrian people's party (ovp) representing business, labor, and farmers; ovp-oriented league of austrian industrialists; roman catholic church, including its chief lay organization, catholic action member of: adb, council of europe, ccc, dac, ece, efta, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, idb--inter-american development bank, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, iea, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto, wsg; austria is neutral and is not a member of nato or the ec diplomatic representation: ambassador friedrich hoess; embassy at 2343 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-4474; there are austrian consulates general in chicago, los angeles, and new york; us--ambassador henry a. grunwald; embassy at boltzmanngasse 16, a-1091, vienna (mailing address is apo new york 09108); telephone p43o (222) 31-55-11; there is a us consulate general in salzburg flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and red economy overview: austria boasts a prosperous and stable capitalist economy with a sizable proportion of nationalized industry and extensive welfare benefits. thanks to an excellent raw material endowment, a technically skilled labor force, and strong links with west german industrial firms, austria has successfully occupied specialized niches in european industry and services (tourism, banking) and produces almost enough food to feed itself with only 8% of the labor force in agriculture. living standards are roughly comparable with the large industrial countries of western europe. problems for the l990s include an aging population and the struggle to keep welfare benefits within budget capabilities. gdp: $103.2 billion, per capita $13,600; real growth rate 4.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.7% (1989) unemployment: 4.8% (1989) budget: revenues $34.2 billion; expenditures $39.5 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1988) exports: $31.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--machinery and equipment, iron and steel, lumber, textiles, paper products, chemicals; partners--frg 35%, italy 10%, eastern europe 9%, switzerland 7%, us 4%, opec 3% imports: $37.9 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--petroleum, foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, vehicles, chemicals, textiles and clothing, pharmaceuticals; partners--frg 44%, italy 9%, eastern europe 6%, switzerland 5%, us 4%, ussr 2% external debt: $12.4 billion (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 5.8% (1989 est.) electricity: 17,562,000 kw capacity; 49,290 million kwh produced, 6,500 kwh per capita (1989) industries: foods, iron and steel, machines, textiles, chemicals, electrical, paper and pulp, tourism, mining agriculture: accounts for 4% of gdp (including forestry); principal crops and animals--grains, fruit, potatoes, sugar beets, sawn wood, cattle, pigs poultry; 80-90% self-sufficient in food aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $1.7 billion currency: austrian schilling (plural--schillings); 1 austrian schilling (s) = 100 groschen exchange rates: austrian schillings (s) per us$1--11.907 (january 1990), 13.231 (1989), 12.348 (1988), 12.643 (1987), 15.267 (1986), 20.690 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 6,028 km total; 5,388 km government owned and 640 km privately owned (1.435and 1.000-meter gauge); 5,403 km 1.435-meter standard gauge of which 3,051 km is electrified and 1,520 km is double tracked; 363 km 0.760-meter narrow gauge of which 91 km is electrified highways: 95,412 km total; 34,612 are the primary network (including 1,012 km of autobahn, 10,400 km of federal, and 23,200 km of provincial roads); of this number, 21,812 km are paved and 12,800 km are unpaved; in addition, there are 60,800 km of communal roads (mostly gravel, crushed stone, earth) inland waterways: 446 km ports: vienna, linz (river ports) merchant marine: 29 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 209,311 grt/366,401 dwt; includes 23 cargo, 1 container, 5 bulk pipelines: 554 km crude oil; 2,611 km natural gas; 171 km refined products civil air: 25 major transport aircraft airports: 55 total, 54 usable; 19 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: highly developed and efficient; 4,014,000 telephones; extensive tv and radiobroadcast systems; stations--6 am, 21 (544 repeaters) fm, 47 (867 repeaters) tv; satellite stations operating in intelsat 1 atlantic ocean earth station and 1 indian ocean earth station and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: army, flying division military manpower: males 15-49, 1,970,189; 1,656,228 fit for military service; 50,090 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 1.1% of gdp, or $1.1 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: the bahamas geography total area: 13,940 km2; land area: 10,070 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than connecticut land boundaries: none coastline: 3,542 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical marine; moderated by warm waters of gulf stream terrain: long, flat coral formations with some low rounded hills natural resources: salt, aragonite, timber land use: 1% arable land; negl% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 32% forest and woodland; 67% other environment: subject to hurricanes and other tropical storms that cause extensive flood damage note: strategic location adjacent to us and cuba; extensive island chain people population: 246,491 (july 1990), growth rate 1.2% (1990) birth rate: 17 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 21 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bahamian(s); adjective--bahamian ethnic divisions: 85% black, 15% white religion: baptist 29%, anglican 23%, roman catholic 22%, smaller groups of other protestants, greek orthodox, and jews language: english; some creole among haitian immigrants literacy: 95% (1986) labor force: 132,600; 30% government, 25% hotels and restaurants, 10% business services, 5% agriculture (1986) organized labor: 25% of labor force government long-form name: the commonwealth of the bahamas type: commonwealth capital: nassau administrative divisions: 21 districts; abaco, acklins island, andros island, berry islands, biminis, cat island, cay lobos, crooked island, eleuthera, exuma, grand bahama, harbour island, inagua, long cay, long island, mayaguana, new providence, ragged island, rum cay, san salvador, spanish wells independence: 10 july 1973 (from uk) constitution: 10 july 1973 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 10 july (1973) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by acting governor general sir henry taylor (since 26 june 1988); head of government--prime minister sir lynden oscar pindling (since 16 january 1967) political parties and leaders: progressive liberal party (plp), sir lynden o. pindling; free national movement (fnm), cecil wallace-whitfield suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of assembly--last held 19 june 1987 (next to be held by june 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(49 total) plp 31, fnm 16, independents 2 communists: none known other political or pressure groups: vanguard nationalist and socialist party (vnsp), a small leftist party headed by lionel carey; trade union congress (tuc), headed by arlington miller member of: acp, caricom, ccc, cdb, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, idb--inter-american development bank, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oas, paho, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador margaret e. mcdonald; chancery at suite 865, 600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 944-3390; there are bahamian consulates general in miami and new york; us--ambassador chic hecht; embassy at mosmar building, queen street, nassau (mailing address is p. o. box n-8197, nassau); telephone (809) 322-1181 or 328-2206 flag: three equal horizontal bands of aquamarine (top), gold, and aquamarine with a black equilateral triangle based on the hoist side economy overview: the bahamas is a stable, middle-income developing nation whose economy is based primarily on tourism and offshore banking. tourism alone provides about 50% of gdp and directly or indirectly employs about 50,000 people or 40% of the local work force. the economy has boomed in recent years, aided by a steady annual increase in the number of tourists. the per capita gdp of over $9,800 is one of the highest in the region. gdp: $2.4 billion, per capita $9,875; real growth rate 2.0% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.1% (1988) unemployment: 12% (1986) budget: revenues $555 million; expenditures $702 million, including capital expenditures of $138 million (1989 est.) exports: $733 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--pharmaceuticals, cement, rum, crawfish; partners--us 90%, uk 10% imports: $1.7 billion (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--foodstuffs, manufactured goods, mineral fuels; partners--iran 30%, nigeria 20%, us 10%, ec 10%, gabon 10% external debt: $1.5 billion (september 1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 368,000 kw capacity; 857 million kwh produced, 3,470 kwh per capita (1989) industries: banking, tourism, cement, oil refining and transshipment, salt production, rum, aragonite, pharmaceuticals, spiral weld, steel pipe agriculture: accounts for less than 5% of gdp; dominated by small-scale producers; principal products--citrus fruit, vegetables, poultry; large net importer of food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-80), $42 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $344 million currency: bahamian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 bahamian dollar (b$) = 100 cents exchange rates: bahamian dollar (b$) per us$1--1.00 (fixed rate) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 2,400 km total; 1,350 km paved, 1,050 km gravel ports: freeport, nassau merchant marine: 533 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 11,684,123 grt/19,574,532 dwt; includes 26 passenger, 15 short-sea passenger, 121 cargo, 40 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 42 refrigerated cargo, 16 container, 6 car carrier, 123 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 6 liquefied gas, 19 combination ore/oil, 29 chemical tanker, 1 specialized tanker, 86 bulk, 3 combination bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: 9 major transport aircraft airports: 59 total, 57 usable; 31 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 25 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: highly developed; 99,000 telephones in totally automatic system; tropospheric scatter and submarine cable links to florida; stations--3 am, 2 fm, 1 tv; 3 coaxial submarine cables;1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: royal bahamas defense force (a coast guard element only), royal bahamas police force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: bahrain geography total area: 620 km2; land area: 620 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 3.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 161 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: territorial dispute with qatar over the hawar islands climate: arid; mild, pleasant winters; very hot, humid summers terrain: mostly low desert plain rising gently to low central escarpment natural resources: oil, associated and nonassociated natural gas, fish land use: 2% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 90% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: subsurface water sources being rapidly depleted (requires development of desalination facilities); dust storms; desertification note: proximity to primary middle eastern crude oil sources and strategic location in persian gulf through which much of western world's crude oil must transit to reach open ocean people population: 520,186 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 3 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 19 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bahraini(s); adjective--bahraini ethnic divisions: 63% bahraini, 13% asian, 10% other arab, 8% iranian, 6% other religion: muslim (70% shia, 30% sunni) language: arabic (official); english also widely spoken; farsi, urdu literacy: 40% labor force: 140,000; 42% of labor force is bahraini; 85% industry and commerce, 5% agriculture, 5% services, 3% government (1982) organized labor: general committee for bahrain workers exists in only eight major designated companies government long-form name: state of bahrain type: traditional monarchy capital: manama administrative divisions: 11 municipalities (baladiyat, singular--baladiyah); al hadd, al manamah, al mintaqah al gharbiyah, al mintaqah al wusta, al mintaqah ash shamaliyah, al muharraq, ar rifa wa al mintaqah al janubiyah, jidd hafs, madinat isa, mintaqat juzur hawar, sitrah independence: 15 august 1971 (from uk) constitution: 26 may 1973, effective 6 december 1973 legal system: based on islamic law and english common law national holiday: national day, 16 december executive branch: amir, crown prince and heir apparent, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly was dissolved 26 august 1975 and legislative powers were assumed by the cabinet judicial branch: high civil appeals court leaders: chief of state--amir isa bin salman al khalifa (since 2 november 1961); heir apparent hamad bin isa al khalifa (son of amir; born 28 january 1950); head of government--prime minister khalifa bin salman al khalifa, (since 19 january 1970) political parties and pressure groups: political parties prohibited; several small, clandestine leftist and shia fundamentalist groups are active suffrage: none elections: none communists: negligible member of: arab league, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), gcc, ibrd, icao, idb--islamic development bank, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, itu, nam, oapec, oic, un, unesco, upu, who diplomatic representation: ambassador ghazi muhammad al-qusaybi; chancery at 3502 international drive nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 342-0741 or 342-0742; there is a bahraini consulate general in new york; us--ambassador dr. charles w. hostler; embassy at shaikh isa road, manama (mailing address is p. o. 26431, manama, or fpo new york 09526); telephone p973o 714151 through 714153 flag: red with a white serrated band (eight white points) on the hoist side economy overview: the oil price decline in recent years has had an adverse impact on the economy. petroleum production and processing account for about 85% of export receipts, 60% of government revenues, and 20% of gdp. in 1986 soft oil-market conditions led to a 5% drop in gdp, in sharp contrast wit the 5% average annual growth rate during the early 1980s. the slowdown in economic activity, however, has helped to check the inflation of the 1970s. the government's past economic diversification efforts have moderated the severity of the downturn but failed to offset oil and gas revenue losses. gdp: $3.5 billion, per capita $7,550 (1987); real growth rate 0% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 0.3% (1988) unemployment: 8-10% (1989) budget: revenues $1,136 million; expenditures $1,210 million, including capital expenditures of $294 million (1987) exports: $2.4 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum 80%, aluminum 7%, other 13%; partners--us, uae, japan, singapore, saudi arabia imports: $2.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--nonoil 59%, crude oil 41%; partners--uk, saudi arabia, us, japan external debt: $1.1 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 3.1% (1987) electricity: 1,652,000 kw capacity; 6,000 million kwh produced, 12,800 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum processing and refining, aluminum smelting, offshore banking, ship repairing agriculture: including fishing, accounts for less than 2% of gdp; not self-sufficient in food production; heavily subsidized sector produces fruit, vegetables, poultry, dairy products, shrimp, and fish; fish catch 9,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-79), $24 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $28 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $9.8 billion currency: bahraini dinar (plural--dinars); 1 bahraini dinar (bd) = 1,000 fils exchange rates: bahraini dinars (bd) per us$1--0.3760 (fixed rate) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 200 km bituminous surfaced, including 25 km bridge-causeway to saudi arabia opened in november 1986; na km natural surface tracks ports: mina salman, mina al manamah, sitrah merchant marine: 1 cargo and 1 bulk (1,000 grt or over) totaling 28,621 grt/44,137 dwt pipelines: crude oil, 56 km; refined products, 16 km; natural gas, 32 km civil air: 24 major transport aircraft airports: 3 total, 3 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent international telecommunications; adequate domestic services; 98,000 telephones; stations--2 am, 1 fm, 2 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 arabsat; tropospheric scatter and microwave to qatar, uae, saudi arabia; submarine cable to qatar and uae defense forces branches: army (defense force), navy, air force, police force military manpower: males 15-49, 183,580; 102,334 fit for military service defense expenditures: 5% of gdp, or $194 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: baker island (territory of the us) geography total area: 1.4 km2; land area: 1.4 km2 comparative area: about 2.3 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 4.8 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: equatorial; scant rainfall, constant wind, burning sun terrain: low, nearly level coral island surrounded by a narrow fringing reef natural resources: guano (deposits worked until 1891) land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: treeless, sparse and scattered vegetation consisting of grasses, prostrate vines, and low growing shrubs; lacks fresh water; primarily a nesting, roosting, and foraging habitat for seabirds, shorebirds, and marine wildlife note: remote location 2,575 km southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, just north of the equator, about halfway between hawaii and australia people population: uninhabited note: american civilians evacuated in 1942 after japanese air and naval attacks during world war ii; occupied by us military during world war ii, but abandoned after the war; public entry is by special-use permit only and generally restricted to scientists and educators; a cemetery and cemetery ruins located near the middle of the west coast government long-form name: none type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the fish and wildlife service of the us department of the interior as part of the national wildlife refuge system economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only, one boat landing area along the the middle of the west coast airports: 1 abandoned world war ii runway of 1,665 m note: there is a day beacon near the middle of the west coast defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us; visited annually by the us coast guard ---------------------------------------------------country: bangladesh geography total area: 144,000 km2; land area: 133,910 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than wisconsin land boundaries: 4,246 km total; burma 193 km, india 4,053 km coastline: 580 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 18 nm; continental shelf: up to outer limits of continental margin; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: a portion of the boundary with india is in dispute; water sharing problems with upstream riparian india over the ganges climate: tropical; cool, dry winter (october to march); hot, humid summer (march to june); cool, rainy monsoon (june to october) terrain: mostly flat alluvial plain; hilly in southeast natural resources: natural gas, uranium, arable land, timber land use: 67% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 16% forest and woodland; 11% other; includes 14% irrigated environment: vulnerable to droughts; much of country routinely flooded during summer monsoon season; overpopulation; deforestation note: almost completely surrounded by india people population: 118,433,062 (july 1990), growth rate 2.8% (1990) birth rate: 42 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 136 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 54 years male, 53 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bangladeshi(s); adjective--bangladesh ethnic divisions: 98% bengali; 250,000 biharis, and less than 1 million tribals religion: 83% muslim, about 16% hindu, less than 1% buddhist, christian, and other language: bangla (official), english widely used literacy: 29% (39% men, 18% women) labor force: 35,100,000; 74% agriculture, 15% services, 11% industry and commerce; extensive export of labor to saudi arabia, uae, oman, and kuwait (fy86) organized labor: 3% of labor force belongs to 2,614 registered unions (1986 est.) government long-form name: people's republic of bangladesh type: republic capital: dhaka administrative divisions: 64 districts (zillagulo, singular--zilla); bagerhat, bandarban, barisal, bhola, bogra, borguna, brahmanbaria, chandpur, chapai nawabganj, chattagram, chuadanga, comilla, cox's bazar, dhaka, dinajpur, faridpur, feni, gaibandha, gazipur, gopalganj, habiganj, jaipurhat, jamalpur, jessore, jhalakati, jhenaidah, khagrachari, khulna, kishorganj, kurigram, kushtia, laksmipur, lalmonirhat, madaripur, magura, manikganj, meherpur, moulavibazar, munshiganj, mymensingh, naogaon, narail, narayanganj, narsingdi, nator, netrakona, nilphamari, noakhali, pabna, panchagar, parbattya chattagram, patuakhali, pirojpur, rajbari, rajshahi, rangpur, satkhira, shariyatpur, sherpur, sirajganj, sunamganj, sylhet, tangail, thakurgaon independence: 16 december 1971 (from pakistan; formerly east pakistan) constitution: 4 november 1972, effective 16 december 1972, suspended following coup of 24 march 1982, restored 10 november 1986 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 26 march (1971) executive branch: president, vice president, prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral parliament (jatiya sangsad) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president hussain mohammad ershad (since 11 december 1983, elected 15 october 1986); vice president moudad ahmed (since 12 august 1989); head of government--prime minister qazi zafar ahmed (since 12 august 1989) political parties and leaders: jatiyo party, hussain mohammad ershad; bangladesh nationalist party, begum ziaur rahman; awami league, sheikh hasina wazed; united people's party, kazi zafar ahmed; democratic league, khondakar mushtaque ahmed; muslim league, khan a. sabur; jatiyo samajtantrik dal (national socialist party), m. a. jalil; bangladesh communist party (pro-soviet), saifuddin ahmed manik; jamaat-e-islami, ali khan suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 15 october 1986 (next to be held october 1991); results--president hussain mohammad ershad received 83.5% of vote; parliament--last held 3 march 1988 (next to be held march 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(330 total, 300 elected and 30 seats reserved for women) jatiyo party won 256 out of 300 seats communists: 5,000 members (1987 est.) member of: adb, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, itu, nam, oic, saarc, un, unctad, unesco, upu, who, wftu, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador a. h. s. ataul karim; chancery at 2201 wisconsin avenue nw, washington dc 20007; telephone (202) 342-8372 through 8376; there is a bangladesh consulate general in new york; us--ambassador-designate william b. milam; embassy at diplomatic enclave, madani avenue, baridhara model town, dhaka (mailing address is g. p. o. box 323, ramna, dhaka); telephone p88o (2) 608170 flag: green with a large red disk slightly to the hoist side of center; green is the traditional color of islam economy overview: the economy is based on the output of a narrow range of agricultural products, such as jute, which is the main cash crop and major source of export earnings. bangladesh is hampered by a relative lack of natural resources, a rapid population growth of 2.8% a year and a limited infrastructure, and it is highly vulnerable to natural disasters. despite these constraints, real gdp averaged about 3.8% annually during 1985-88. one of the poorest nations in the world, alleviation of poverty remains the cornerstone of the government's development strategy. the agricultural sector contributes over 50% to gdp and 75% to exports, and employs over 74% of the labor force. industry accounts for about 10% of gdp. gdp: $20.6 billion, per capita $180; real growth rate 2.1% (fy89 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8-10% (fy89 est.) unemployment rate: 30% (fy88 est.) budget: revenues $1.8 billion; expenditures $3.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.7 billion (fy89) exports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., fy89 est.); commodities--jute, tea, leather, shrimp, manufacturing; partners--us 25%, western europe 22%, middle east 9%, japan 8%, eastern europe 7% imports: $3.1 billion (c.i.f., fy89 est.); commodities--food, petroleum and other energy, nonfood consumer goods, semiprocessed goods, and capital equipment; partners--western europe 18%, japan 14%, middle east 9%, us 8% external debt: $10.4 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 5.4% (fy89 est.) electricity: 1,700,000 kw capacity; 4,900 million kwh produced, 40 kwh per capita (1989) industries: jute manufacturing, food processing, cotton textiles, petroleum, urea fertilizer agriculture: accounts for about 50% of gdp and 74% of both employment and exports; imports 10% of food grain requirements; world's largest exporter of jute; commercial products--jute, rice, wheat, tea, sugarcane, potatoes, beef, milk, poultry; shortages include wheat, vegetable oils and cotton; fish catch 778,000 metric tons in 1986 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $3.2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1980-87), $9.5 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $652 million; communist countries (1970-88), $1.5 billion currency: taka (plural--taka); 1 taka (tk) = 100 paise exchange rates: taka (tk) per us$1--32.270 (january 1990), 32.270 (1989), 31.733 (1988), 30.950 (1987), 30.407 (1986), 27.995 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 2,892 km total (1986); 1,914 km 1.000 meter gauge, 978 km 1.676 meter broad gauge highways: 7,240 km total (1985); 3,840 km paved, 3,400 km unpaved inland waterways: 5,150-8,046 km navigable waterways (includes 2,575-3,058 km main cargo routes) ports: chittagong, chalna merchant marine: 47 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 331,568 grt/493,935 dwt; includes 38 cargo, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 3 refrigerated cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off, 3 bulk pipelines: 650 km natural gas civil air: 15 major transport aircraft airports: 16 total, 13 usable; 13 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 4 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 7 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate international radio communications and landline service; fair domestic wire and microwave service; fair broadcast service; 182,000 telephones; stations--9 am, 6 fm, 11 tv; 2 indian ocean intelsat satellite earth stations defense forces branches: army, navy, air force; paramilitary forces--bangladesh rifles, bangladesh ansars, armed police reserve, coastal police military manpower: males 15-49, 28,110,802; 16,686,644 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.5% of gdp, or $309 million (fy90 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: barbados geography total area: 430 km2; land area: 430 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 97 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; rainy season (june to october) terrain: relatively flat; rises gently to central highland region natural resources: crude oil, fishing, natural gas land use: 77% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 9% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 14% other environment: subject to hurricanes (especially june to october) note: easternmost caribbean island people population: 262,688 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 16 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--barbadian(s); adjective--barbadian ethnic divisions: 80% african, 16% mixed, 4% european religion: 70% anglican, 9% methodist, 4% roman catholic, 17% other, including moravian language: english literacy: 99% labor force: 112,300; 37% services and government; 22% commerce, 22% manufacturing and construction; 9% transportation, storage, communications, and financial institutions; 8% agriculture; 2% utilities (1985 est.) organized labor: 32% of labor force government long-form name: none type: parliamentary democracy capital: bridgetown administrative divisions: 11 parishes; christ church, saint andrew, saint george, saint james, saint john, saint joseph, saint lucy, saint michael, saint peter, saint philip, saint thomas; note--there may a new city of bridgetown independence: 30 november 1966 (from uk) constitution: 30 november 1966 legal system: english common law; no judicial review of legislative acts national holiday: independence day, 30 november (1966) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of assembly judicial branch: supreme court of judicature leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general sir hugh springer (since 24 february 1984); head of government--prime minister lloyd erskine sandiford (since 2 june 1987) political parties and leaders: democratic labor party (dlp), erskine sandiford; barbados labor party (blp), henry forde; national democratic party (ndp), richie haynes suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of assembly--last held 28 may 1986 (next to be held by may 1991); results--dlp 59.4%, blp 40.6%; seats--(27 total) dlp 24, blp 3; note--a split in the dlp in february 1989 resulted in the formation of the ndp, changing the status of seats to dlp 20, ndp 4, blp 3 communists: negligible other political or pressure groups: industrial and general workers union, bobby clarke; people's progressive movement, eric sealy; workers' party of barbados, dr. george belle member of: acp, caricom, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, ibrd, icao, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador sir william douglas; chancery at 2144 wyoming avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-9200 through 9202; there is a barbadian consulate general in new york and a consulate in los angeles; us--ambassador-nominee g. philip hughes; embassy at canadian imperial bank of commerce building, broad street, bridgetown (mailing address is p. o. box 302, bridgetown or fpo miami 34054); telephone (809) 436-4950 through 4957 flag: three equal vertical bands of blue (hoist side), yellow, and blue with the head of a black trident centered on the gold band; the trident head represents independence and a break with the past (the colonial coat of arms contained a complete trident) economy overview: a per capita income of $5,250 gives barbados the highest standard of living of all the small island states of the eastern caribbean. historically, the economy was based on the cultivation of sugarcane and related activities. in recent years, however, the economy has diversified into manufacturing and tourism. the tourist industry is now a major employer of the labor force and a primary source of foreign exchange. a high unemployment rate of about 19% in 1988 remains one of the most serious economic problems facing the country. gdp: $1.3 billion, per capita $5,250 (1988 est.); real growth rate 3.7% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.7% (1988) unemployment: 18.6% (1988) budget: revenues $476 million; expenditures $543 million, including capital expenditures of $94 million (fy86) exports: $173 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar and molasses, electrical components, clothing, rum, machinery and transport equipment; partners: us 30%, caricom, uk, puerto rico, canada imports: $582 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, consumer durables, raw materials, crude oil; partners--us 34%, caricom, japan, uk, canada external debt: $635 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5.4% (1987 est.) electricity: 132,000 kw capacity; 460 million kwh produced, 1,780 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, sugar, light manufacturing, component assembly for export agriculture: accounts for 10% of gdp; major cash crop is sugarcane; other crops--vegetables and cotton; not self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-84), $14 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $144 million currency: barbadian dollars (plural--dollars); 1 barbadian dollar (bds$) = 100 cents exchange rates: barbadian dollars (bds$) per us$1--2.0113 (fixed rate) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 1,570 km total; 1,475 km paved, 95 km gravel and earth ports: bridgetown merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,200 grt/7,338 dwt civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 1 with permanent-surface runways 2,440-3,659 m telecommunications: islandwide automatic telephone system with 89,000 telephones; tropospheric scatter link to trinidad and st. lucia; stations--3 am, 2 fm, 2 (1 is pay) tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: royal barbados defense force, royal barbados police force, coast guard military manpower: males 15-49, 67,677; 47,566 fit for military service, no conscription defense expenditures: 0.6% of gdp (1986) ---------------------------------------------------country: bassas da india (french possession) geography total area: undetermined comparative area: undetermined land boundaries: none coastline: 35.2 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by madagascar climate: tropical terrain: a volcanic rock 2.4 m high natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other (rock) environment: surrounded by reefs; subject to periodic cyclones note: navigational hazard since it is usually under water during high tide; located in southern mozambique channel about halfway between africa and madagascar people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: french possession administered by commissioner of the republic daniel constantin, resident in reunion economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: belgium geography total area: 30,510 km2; land area: 30,230 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundaries: 1,385 km total; france 620 km, luxembourg 148 km, netherlands 450 km, frg 167 km coastline: 64 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; exclusive fishing zone: equidistant line with neighbors (extends about 68 km from coast); territorial sea: 12 nm climate: temperate; mild winters, cool summers; rainy, humid, cloudy terrain: flat coastal plains in northwest, central rolling hills, rugged mountains of ardennes forest in southeast natural resources: coal, natural gas land use: 24% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 20% meadows and pastures; 21% forest and woodland; 34% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: air and water pollution note: majority of west european capitals within 1,000 km of brussels; crossroads of western europe; brussels is the seat of the ec people population: 9,909,285 (july 1990), growth rate 0.1% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--belgian(s); adjective--belgian ethnic divisions: 55% fleming, 33% walloon, 12% mixed or other religion: 75% roman catholic; remainder protestant or other language: 56% flemish (dutch), 32% french, 1% german; 11% legally bilingual; divided along ethnic lines literacy: 98% labor force: 4,000,000; 58% services, 37% industry, 5% agriculture (1987) organized labor: 70% of labor force government long-form name: kingdom of belgium type: constitutional monarchy capital: brussels administrative divisions: 9 provinces (french--provinces, singular--province; flemish--provincien, singular--provincie); antwerpen, brabant, hainaut, liege, limburg, luxembourg, namur, oost-vlaanderen, west-vlaanderen independence: 4 october 1830 (from the netherlands) constitution: 7 february 1831, last revised 8-9 august 1980; the government is in the process of revising the constitution, with the aim of federalizing the belgian state legal system: civil law system influenced by english constitutional theory; judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: national day, 21 july (ascension of king leopold to the throne in 1831) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, five deputy prime ministers, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper chamber or senate (flemish--senaat, french--senat) and a lower chamber or chamber of representatives (flemish--kamer van volksvertegenwoordigers, french--chambre des representants) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (flemish--hof van cassatie, french--cour de cassation) leaders: chief of state--king baudouin i (since 17 july 1951); heir apparent prince albert of liege (brother of the king; born 6 june 1934); head of government--prime minister wilfried martens, (since april 1979, with a 10-month interruption in 1981) political parties and leaders: flemish social christian (cvp), herman van rompuy, president; walloon social christian (psc), gerard deprez, president; flemish socialist (sp), frank vandenbroucke, president; walloon socialist (ps), guy spitaels, president; flemish liberal (pvv), guy verhofstadt, president; walloon liberal (prl), antoine duquesne, president; francophone democratic front (fdf), georges clerfayt, president; volksunie (vu), jaak gabriels, president; communist party (pcb), louis van geyt, president; vlaams blok (vb), karel dillen; other minor parties suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: senate--last held 13 december 1987 (next to be held december 1991); results--cvp 19.2%, ps 15.7%, sp 14.7%, pvv 11.3%, prl 9.3%, vu 8.1%, psc 7.8%, ecolo-agalev 7.7%, vb 2.0%, vdf 1.3%, other 1.96%; seats--(106 total) cvp 22, ps 20, sp 17, prl 12, pvv 11, psc 9, vu 8, ecolo-agalev 5, vb 1, fdf 1; chamber of representatives--last held 13 december 1987 (next to be held december 1991); results--cvp 19.45%, ps 15.66%, sp 14.88%, pvv 11.55%, prl 9.41%, psc 8.01%, vu 8.05%, ecolo-agalev 7.05%, vb 1.90%, fdf 1.16%, other 2.88%; seats--(212 total) cvp 43, ps 40, sp 32, pvv 25, prl 23, psc 19, vu 16, ecolo-agalev 9, fdf 3, vb 2 communists: under 5,000 members (december 1985 est.) other political or pressure groups: christian and socialist trade unions; federation of belgian industries; numerous other associations representing bankers, manufacturers, middle-class artisans, and the legal and medical professions; various organizations represent the cultural interests of flanders and wallonia; various peace groups such as the flemish action committee against nuclear weapons and pax christi member of: adb, benelux, bleu, ccc, council of europe, dac, ec, ece, ecosoc, eib, ems, esa, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, itc, itu, nato, oas (observer), oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador herman dehennin; chancery at 3330 garfield street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 333-6900; there are belgian consulates general in atlanta, chicago, houston, los angeles, and new york; us--ambassador maynard w. glitman; embassy at 27 boulevard du regent, b-1000 brussels (mailing address is apo new york 09667); telephone p32o (2) 513-3830; there is a us consulate general in antwerp flag: three equal vertical bands of black (hoist side), yellow, and red; the design was based on the flag of france economy overview: this small private-enterprise economy has capitalized on its central geographic location, highly developed transport network, and diversified industrial and commercial base. industry is concentrated mainly in the populous flemish area in the north, although the government is encouraging reinvestment in the southern region of walloon. with few natural resources belgium must import essential raw materials, making its economy closely dependent on the state of world markets. in 1988 over 70% of trade was with other ec countries. during the period 1986-88 the economy profited from falling oil prices and a lower dollar, which helped to improve the terms of trade. real gdp grew by an average of 3.5% in 1986-89, up from 1.5% in 1985. however, a large budget deficit and 10% unemployment cast a shadow on the economy. gdp: $136.0 billion, per capita $13,700; real growth rate 4.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.6% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 9.7% est. (1989 est.) budget: revenues $45.0 billion; expenditures $55.3 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1989) exports: $100.3 billion (f.o.b., 1989) belgium-luxembourg economic union; commodities--iron and steel, transportation equipment, tractors, diamonds, petroleum products; partners--ec 74%, us 5%, communist countries 2% (1988) imports: $100.1 billion (c.i.f., 1989) belgium-luxembourg economic union; commodities--fuels, grains, chemicals, foodstuffs; partners--ec 72%, us 5%, oil-exporting less developed countries 4%, communist countries 3% (1988) external debt: $27.5 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 6.4% (1988) electricity: 17,325,000 kw capacity; 62,780 million kwh produced, 6,350 kwh per capita (1989) industries: engineering and metal products, processed food and beverages, chemicals, basic metals, textiles, glass, petroleum, coal agriculture: accounts for 2% of gdp; emphasis on livestock production--beef, veal, pork, milk; major crops are sugar beets, fresh vegetables, fruits, grain, and tobacco; net importer of farm products aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $4.3 billion currency: belgian franc (plural--francs); 1 belgian franc (bf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: belgian francs (bf) per us$1--35.468 (january 1990), 39.404 (1989), 36.768 (1988), 37.334 (1987), 44.672 (1986), 59.378 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: belgian national railways (sncb) operates 3,667 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, government owned; 2,563 km double track; 1,978 km electrified; 191 km 1.000-meter gauge, government owned and operated highways: 103,396 km total; 1,317 km limited access, divided autoroute; 11,717 km national highway; 1,362 km provincial road; about 38,000 km paved and 51,000 km unpaved rural roads inland waterways: 2,043 km (1,528 km in regular commercial use) ports: antwerp, brugge, gent, oostende, zeebrugge, 1 secondary, and 1 minor maritime; 11 inland merchant marine: 67 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,854,898 grt/3,071,637 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 10 cargo, 6 roll-on/roll-off, 6 container, 7 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 6 liquefied gas, 3 combination ore/oil, 9 chemical tanker, 13 bulk, 6 combination bulk pipelines: refined products 1,167 km; crude 161 km; natural gas 3,300 km civil air: 47 major transport aircraft airports: 42 total, 42 usable; 24 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 14 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent domestic and international telephone and telegraph facilities; 4,560,000 telephones; stations--8 am, 19 fm (41 relays), 25 tv (10 relays); 5 submarine cables; satellite earth stations operating in intelsat 3 atlantic ocean and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 2,512,681; 2,114,701 fit for military service; 66,758 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 2.7% of gdp, or $3.7 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: belize geography total area: 22,960 km2; land area: 22,800 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than massachusetts land boundaries: 516 km total; guatemala 266 km, mexico 250 km coastline: 386 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: claimed by guatemala, but boundary negotiations are under way climate: tropical; very hot and humid; rainy season (may to february) terrain: flat, swampy coastal plain; low mountains in south natural resources: arable land potential, timber, fish land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 2% meadows and pastures; 44% forest and woodland; 52% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: frequent devastating hurricanes (september to december) and coastal flooding (especially in south); deforestation note: national capital moved 80 km inland from belize city to belmopan because of hurricanes; only country in central america without a coastline on the north pacific ocean people population: 219,737 (july 1990), growth rate 3.7% (1990) birth rate: 38 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 35 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--belizean(s); adjective--belizean ethnic divisions: 39.7% creole, 33.1% mestizo, 9.5% maya, 7.6% garifuna, 2.1% east indian, 8.0% other religion: 60% roman catholic; 40% protestant (anglican, seventh-day adventist, methodist, baptist, jehovah's witnesses, mennonite) language: english (official), spanish, maya, garifuna (carib) literacy: 93% (est.) labor force: 51,500; 30.0% agriculture, 16.0% services, 15.4% government, 11.2% commerce, 10.3% manufacturing; shortage of skilled labor and all types of technical personnel (1985) organized labor: 30% of labor force; 11 unions currently active government long-form name: none type: parliamentary capital: belmopan administrative divisions: 6 districts; belize, cayo, corozal, orange walk, stann creek, toledo independence: 21 september 1981 (from uk; formerly british honduras) constitution: 21 september 1981 legal system: english law national holiday: independence day, 21 september executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national assembly consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general dame elmira minita gordon (since 21 september 1981); head of government--prime minister george cadle price (since 4 september 1989) political parties and leaders: people's united party (pup), george price, florencio marin, said musa; united democratic party (udp), manuel esquivel, curl thompson, dean barrow; belize popular party (bpp), louis sylvestre suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held 4 september 1989 (next to be held september 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(28 total) pup 15 seats, udp 13 seats; note--in january 1990 one member expelled from udp joined pup, making the seat count 16 pup, udp 12 communists: negligible other political or pressure groups: society for the promotion of education and research (spear) headed by former pup minister; united workers front member of: acp, caricom, cdb, commonwealth, fao, gatt, ibrd, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, g-77, iso, itu, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador edward a. laing; chancery at suite 2j, 3400 international drive nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 363-4505; us--ambassador robert g. rich, jr.; embassy at gabourel lane and hutson street, belize city (mailing address is p. o. box 286, belize city); telephone p501o 77161 through 77163 flag: blue with a narrow red stripe along the top and the bottom edges; centered is a large white disk bearing the coat of arms; the coat of arms features a shield flanked by two workers with a mahogany tree at the top and the related motto sub umbra floreo (i flourish in the shade) on a scroll at the bottom, all encircled by a green garland economy overview: the economy is based primarily on agriculture and merchandising. agriculture accounts for more than 30% of gdp and provides 75% of export earnings, while sugar, the chief crop, accounts for almost 40% of hard currency earnings. the us, belize's main trading partner, is assisting in efforts to reduce dependency on sugar with an agricultural diversification program. in 1987 the drop in income from sugar sales to the us because of quota reductions was almost totally offset by higher world prices for sugar. gdp: $225.6 million, per capita $1,285; real growth rate 6% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1988) unemployment rate: 14% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $94.6 million; expenditures $74.3 million, including capital expenditures of $33.9 million (1988 est.) exports: $120 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar, clothing, seafood, molasses, citrus, wood and wood products; partners--us 47%, uk, trinidad and tobago, canada (1987) imports: $176 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment, food, manufactured goods, fuels, chemicals, pharmaceuticals; partners--us 55%, uk, netherlands antilles, mexico (1987) external debt: $140 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 6% (1988) electricity: 34,000 kw capacity; 88 million kwh produced, 500 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar refining, clothing, timber and forest products, furniture, rum, soap, beverages, cigarettes, tourism agriculture: accounts for 30% of gdp (including fish and forestry); commercial crops include sugarcane, bananas, coca, citrus fruits; expanding output of lumber and cultured shrimp; net importer of basic foods illicit drugs: an illicit producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; eradication program cut marijuana production from 200 metric tons in 1987 to 66 metric tons in 1989; transshipment point for cocaine aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $94 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $194 million currency: belizean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 belizean dollar (bz$) = 100 cents exchange rates: belizean dollars (bz$) per us$1--2.00 (fixed rate) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 2,575 km total; 340 km paved, 1,190 km gravel, 735 km improved earth, and 310 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 825 km river network used by shallow-draft craft; seasonally navigable ports: belize city, belize city southwest civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 38 total, 30 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 8,650 telephones; above-average system based on radio relay; stations--6 am, 5 fm, 1 tv, 1 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: british forces belize, belize defense force, coast guard, police department military manpower: males 15-49, 50,988; 30,502 fit for military service; 2,500 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.0% of gdp, or $4.6 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: benin geography total area: 112,620 km2; land area: 110,620 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than pennsylvania land boundaries: 1,989 km total; burkina 306 km, niger 266 km, nigeria 773 km, togo 644 km coastline: 121 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid in south; semiarid in north terrain: mostly flat to undulating plain; some hills and low mountains natural resources: small offshore oil deposits, limestone, marble, timber land use: 12% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 35% forest and woodland; 45% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dry, dusty harmattan wind may affect north in winter; deforestation; desertification note: recent droughts have severely affected marginal agriculture in north; no natural harbors people population: 4,673,964 (july 1990), growth rate 3.3% (1990) birth rate: 50 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 16 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 121 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 52 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--beninese (sing., pl.); adjective--beninese ethnic divisions: 99% african (42 ethnic groups, most important being fon, adja, yoruba, bariba); 5,500 europeans religion: 70% indigenous beliefs, 15% muslim, 15% christian language: french (official); fon and yoruba most common vernaculars in south; at least six major tribal languages in north literacy: 25.9% labor force: 1,900,000 (1987); 60% agriculture, 38% transport, commerce, and public services, less than 2% industry; 49% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: about 75% of wage earners government long-form name: republic of benin type: dropped marxism-leninism december 1989; democratic reforms adopted february 1990; transition to multiparty system by 1991 planned capital: porto-novo (official), cotonou (de facto) administrative divisions: 6 provinces; atakora, atlantique, borgou, mono, oueme, zou independence: 1 august 1960 (from france; formerly dahomey) constitution: 23 may 1977 (nullified 1 march 1990); new constitution to be drafted by april 1990 legal system: based on french civil law and customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 30 november (1975) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national revolutionary assembly (assemblee nationale revolutionnaire) dissolved 1 march 1990 and replaced by a 24-member interim high council of the republic during the transition period judicial branch: central people's court (cour central populaire) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president mathieu kerekou (since 27 october 1972) political parties and leaders: only party--people's revolutionary party of benin (prpb), president mathieu kerekou, chairman of the central committee suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held july 1989 (next to be held july 1994); results--president mathieu kerekou was reelected by the national revolutionary assembly; national revolutionary assembly--dissolved 1 march 1990 and replaced by a 24-member interim high council of the republic with legislative elections for new institutions planned for february 1991 communists: dropped marxism-leninism december 1989 member of: acp, afdb, ceao, eama, eca, ecowas, entente, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, niger river commission, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador theophile nata; chancery at 2737 cathedral avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 232-6656; us--ambassador harriet isom; embassy at rue caporal anani bernard, cotonou (mailing address is b. p. 2012, cotonou); telephone p229o 30-06-50 flag: green with a red five-pointed star in the upper hoist-side corner economy overview: benin is one of the least developed countries in the world because of limited natural resources and a poorly developed infrastructure. agriculture accounts for almost 45% of gdp, employs about 60% of the labor force, and generates a major share of foreign exchange earnings. the industrial sector contributes only about 15% to gdp and employs 2% of the work force. persistently low prices in recent years have limited hard currency earnings from benin's major exports of agricultural products and crude oil. gdp: $1.7 billion, per capita $335; real growth rate 1.8% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.3% (1988) unemployment: na budget: revenues $168 million; expenditures $317 million, including capital expenditures of $97 million (1989) exports: $226 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--crude oil, cotton, palm products, cocoa; partners--frg 36%, france 16%, spain 14%, italy 8%, uk 7% imports: $413 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, beverages, tobacco, petroleum products, intermediate goods, capital goods, light consumer goods; partners--france 34%, netherlands 10%, japan 7%, italy 6%, us 5% external debt: $1.0 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 0.7% (1988) electricity: 28,000 kw capacity; 24 million kwh produced, 5 kwh per capita (1989) industries: palm oil and palm kernel oil processing, textiles, beverages, petroleum agriculture: small farms produce 90% of agricultural output; production is dominated by food crops--corn, sorghum, cassava, beans, and rice; cash crops include cotton, palm oil, and peanuts; poultry and livestock output has not kept up with consumption aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $41 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $19 million; communist countries (1970-88), $101 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 578 km, all 1.000-meter gauge, single track highways: 5,050 km total; 920 km paved, 2,600 laterite, 1,530 km improved earth inland waterways: navigable along small sections, important only locally ports: cotonou merchant marine: 1 cargo ship (1,000 grt or over) of 2,999 grt/4,407 dwt civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 6 total, 5 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of open wire, submarine cable, and radio relay; 16,200 telephones; stations--2 am, 2 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat satellite earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: eligible 15-49, 2,015,206; of the 950,921 males 15-49, 486,620 are fit for military service; of the 1,064,285 females 15-49, 537,049 are fit for military service; about 55,550 males and 53,663 females reach military age (18) annually; both sexes are liable for military service defense expenditures: 1.7% of gdp, or $28.9 million (1988 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: bermuda (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 50 km2; land area: 50 km2 comparative area: about 0.3 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 103 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: subtropical; mild, humid; gales, strong winds common in winter terrain: low hills separated by fertile depressions natural resources: limestone, pleasant climate fostering tourism land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 20% forest and woodland; 80% other environment: ample rainfall, but no rivers or freshwater lakes; consists of about 360 small coral islands note: 1,050 km east of north carolina; some reclaimed land leased by us government people population: 58,337 (july 1990), growth rate 1.5% (1990) birth rate: 15 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 12 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bermudian(s); adjective--bermudian ethnic divisions: 61% black, 39% white and other religion: 37% anglican, 14% roman catholic, 10% african methodist episcopal (zion), 6% methodist, 5% seventh-day adventist, 28% other language: english literacy: 98% labor force: 32,000; 25% clerical, 22% services, 21% laborers, 13% professional and technical, 10% administrative and managerial, 7% sales, 2% agriculture and fishing (1984) organized labor: 8,573 members (1985); largest union is bermuda industrial union government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: hamilton administrative divisions: 9 parishes and 2 municipalities*; devonshire, hamilton, hamilton*, paget, pembroke, saint george*, saint george's, sandys, smiths, southampton, warwick independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: 8 june 1968 legal system: english law national holiday: bermuda day, 22 may executive branch: british monarch, governor, deputy governor, premier, deputy premier, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor sir desmond langley (since na october 1988); head of government--premier john william david swan (since na january 1982) political parties and leaders: united bermuda party (ubp), john w. d. swan; progressive labor party (plp), frederick wade; national liberal party (nlp), gilbert darrell suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: house of assembly--last held 9 february 1989 (next to be held by february 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(40 total) ubp 23, plp 15, nlp 1, other 1 communists: negligible other political or pressure groups: bermuda industrial union (biu), headed by ottiwell simmons member of: interpol, who diplomatic representation: as a dependent territory of the uk, bermuda's interests in the us are represented by the uk; us--consul general james m. medas; consulate general at vallis building, par-la-ville road (off front street west), hamilton (mailing address is p. o. box 325, hamilton, or fpo new york 09560); telephone (809) 295-1342 flag: red with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the bermudian coat of arms (white and blue shield with a red lion holding a scrolled shield showing the sinking of the ship sea venture off bermuda in 1609) centered on the outer half of the flag economy overview: bermuda enjoys one of the highest per capita incomes in the world, having successfully exploited its location by providing luxury tourist facilities and financial services. the tourist industry attracts more than 90% of its business from north america. the industrial sector is small, and agriculture is severely limited by a lack of suitable land. about 80% of food needs are imported. gdp: $1.3 billion, per capita $23,000; real growth rate 2.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.8% (1988) unemployment: 2.0% (1988) budget: revenues $280 million; expenditures $279 million, including capital expenditures of $34 million (fy89 est.) exports: $23 million (f.o.b.,1985); commodities--semitropical produce, light manufactures; partners--us 25%, italy 25%, uk 14%, canada 5%, other 31% imports: $402 million (c.i.f., 1985); commodities--fuel, foodstuffs, machinery; partners--us 58%, netherlands antilles 9%, uk 8%, canada 6%, japan 5%, other 14% external debt: na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 134,000 kw capacity; 446 million kwh produced, 7,680 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, finance, structural concrete products, paints, pharmaceuticals, ship repairing agriculture: accounts for less than 1% of gdp; most basic foods must be imported; produces bananas, vegetables, citrus fruits, flowers, dairy products aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-81), $34 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $267 million currency: bermudian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 bermudian dollar (bd$) = 100 cents exchange rates: bermudian dollar (bd$) per us$1--1.0000 (fixed rate) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 210 km public roads, all paved (about 400 km of private roads) ports: freeport, hamilton, st. george merchant marine: 93 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 4,163,947 grt/7,744,319 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 10 cargo, 4 refrigerated cargo, 5 container, 10 roll-on/roll-off, 27 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 4 chemical tanker, 1 combination ore/oil, 10 liquefied gas, 20 bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: 16 major transport aircraft airports: 1 with permanent-surface runways 2,440-3,659 m telecommunications: modern with fully automatic telephone system; 46,290 telephones; stations--5 am, 3 fm, 2 tv; 3 submarine cables; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: bhutan geography total area: 47,000 km2; land area: 47,000 km2 comparative area: slightly more than half the size of indiana land boundaries: 1,075 km total; china 470 km, india 605 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: varies; tropical in southern plains; cool winters and hot summers in central valleys; severe winters and cool summers in himalayas terrain: mostly mountainous with some fertile valleys and savanna natural resources: timber, hydropower, gypsum, calcium carbide land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 70% forest and woodland; 23% other environment: violent storms coming down from the himalayas were the source of the country name which translates as land of the thunder dragon note: landlocked; strategic location between china and india; controls several key himalayan mountain passes people population: 1,565,969 (july 1990), growth rate 2.0% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 137 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 48 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bhutanese (sing., pl.); adjective--bhutanese ethnic divisions: 60% bhote, 25% ethnic nepalese, 15% indigenous or migrant tribes religion: 75% lamaistic buddhism, 25% indianand nepalese-influenced hinduism language: bhotes speak various tibetan dialects--most widely spoken dialect is dzongkha (official); nepalese speak various nepalese dialects literacy: 5% labor force: na; 95% agriculture, 1% industry and commerce; massive lack of skilled labor (1983) organized labor: not permitted government long-form name: kingdom of bhutan type: monarchy; special treaty relationship with india capital: thimphu administrative divisions: 3 regions and 1 division*; central bhutan, eastern bhutan, southern bhutan*, western bhutan; note--there may now be 18 districts (dzong, singular and plural) named bumthang, chhukha, chirang, daga, geylegphug, ha, lhuntshi, mongar, paro, pemagatsel, punakha, samchi, samdrup jongkhar, shemgang, tashigang, thimphu, tongsa, wangdiphodrang independence: 8 august 1949 (from india) constitution: no written constitution or bill of rights legal system: based on indian law and english common law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day (ugyen wangchuck became first hereditary king), 17 december (1907) executive branch: monarch, chairman of the royal advisory council, royal advisory council (lodoi tsokde), chairman of the council of ministers, council of ministers (lhengye shungtsog) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (tshogdu) judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state and head of government--king jigme singye wangchuck (since 24 july 1972) political parties: no legal parties suffrage: each family has one vote in village-level elections elections: no national elections communists: no overt communist presence other political or pressure groups: buddhist clergy, indian merchant community, ethnic nepalese organizations member of: adb, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, ibrd, ida, ifad, imf, nam, saarc, unesco, upu, un, who diplomatic representation: no formal diplomatic relations, although informal contact is maintained between the bhutanese and us embassies in new delhi (india); the bhutanese mission to the un in new york has consular jurisdiction in the us flag: divided diagonally from the lower hoist side corner; the upper triangle is orange and the lower triangle is red; centered along the dividing line is a large black and white dragon facing away from the hoist side economy overview: the economy is based on agriculture and forestry, which provide the main livelihood for 90% of the population and account for about 50% of gdp. one of the world's least developed countries, rugged mountains dominate and make the building of roads and other infrastructure difficult and expensive. bhutan's hydropower potential and its attraction for tourists are its most important natural resources. gdp: $273 million, per capita $199; real growth rate 6.3% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 10% (1989 est.) unemployment: na budget: revenues $99 million; expenditures $128 million, including capital expenditures of $65 million (fy89 est.) exports: $70.9 million (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--cardamon, gypsum, timber, handicrafts, cement, fruit; partners--india 93% imports: $138.3 million (c.i.f., fy89 est.); commodities--fuel and lubricants, grain, machinery and parts, vehicles, fabrics; partners--india 67% external debt: $70.1 million (fy89 est.) industrial production: growth rate 12.4% (1988 est.) electricity: 353,000 kw capacity; 2,000 million kwh produced, 1,300 kwh per capita (1989) industries: cement, chemical products, mining, distilling, food processing, handicrafts agriculture: accounts for 50% of gdp; based on subsistence farming and animal husbandry; self-sufficient in food except for foodgrains; other production--rice, corn, root crops, citrus fruit, dairy, and eggs aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $85.8 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $11 million currency: ngultrum (plural--ngultrum); 1 ngultrum (nu) = 100 chetrum; note--indian currency is also legal tender exchange rates: ngultrum (nu) per us$1--16.965 (january 1990), 16.226 (1989), 13.917 (1988), 12.962 (1987), 12.611 (1986), 12.369 (1985); note--the bhutanese ngultrum is at par with the indian rupee fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 1,304 km total; 418 km surfaced, 515 km improved, 371 km unimproved earth civil air: 1 jet, 2 prop airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: inadequate; 1,890 telephones (1985); 15,000 radio receivers (1987 est.); 85 tv sets (1985); stations--20 am, no fm, no tv defense forces branches: royal bhutan army military manpower: males 15-49, 389,142; 208,231 fit for military service; 17,203 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: bolivia geography total area: 1,098,580 km2; land area: 1,084,390 km2 comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of montana land boundaries: 6,743 km total; argentina 832 km, brazil 3,400 km, chile 861 km, paraguay 750 km, peru 900 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: has wanted a sovereign corridor to the south pacific ocean since the atacama area was lost to chile in 1884; dispute with chile over rio lauca water rights climate: varies with altitude; humid and tropical to cold and semiarid terrain: high plateau, hills, lowland plains natural resources: tin, natural gas, crude oil, zinc, tungsten, antimony, silver, iron ore, lead, gold, timber land use: 3% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 25% meadows and pastures; 52% forest and woodland; 20% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: cold, thin air of high plateau is obstacle to efficient fuel combustion; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: landlocked; shares control of lago titicaca, world's highest navigable lake, with peru people population: 6,706,854 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: 35 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 125 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 52 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bolivian(s); adjective bolivian ethnic divisions: 30% quechua, 25% aymara, 25-30% mixed, 5-15% european religion: 95% roman catholic; active protestant minority, especially evangelical methodist language: spanish, quechua, and aymara (all official) literacy: 63% labor force: 1,700,000; 50% agriculture, 26% services and utilities, 10% manufacturing, 4% mining, 10% other (1983) organized labor: 150,000-200,000, concentrated in mining, industry, construction, and transportation; mostly organized under bolivian workers' central (cob) labor federation government long-form name: republic of bolivia type: republic capital: la paz (seat of government); sucre (legal capital and seat of judiciary) administrative divisions: 9 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); chuquisaca, cochabamba, el beni, la paz, oruro, pando, potosi, santa cruz, tarija independence: 6 august 1825 (from spain) constitution: 2 february 1967 legal system: based on spanish law and code napoleon; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 6 august (1825) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso nacional) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camara de diputados) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president jaime paz zamora (since 6 august 1989); vice president luis ossio sanjines (since 6 august 1989) political parties and leaders: movement of the revolutionary left (mir), jaime paz zamora; nationalist democratic action (adn), hugo banzer suarez; nationalist revolutionary movement (mnr), gonzalo sanchez de lozada; united left (iu), coalition of leftist parties which includes free bolivia movement (mbl), led by antonio aranibar, patriotic national convergency axis (eje-p) led by walter delgadillo, and bolivian communist party (pcb) led by humberto ramirez; conscience of the fatherland (condepa), carlos palenque aviles; revolutionary vanguard-9th of april (vr-9), carlos serrate reich suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 (married) or 21 (single) elections: president--last held 7 may 1989 (next to be held may 1993); results--gonzalo sanchez de lozada (mnr) 23%, hugo banzer suarez (adn) 22%, jaime paz zamora (mir) 19%; no candidate received a majority of the popular vote; jaime paz zamora (mir) formed a coalition with hugo banzer (adn); with adn support paz zamora won the congressional runoff election on 4 august and was inaugurated on 6 august; senate--last held 7 may 1989 (next to be held may 1993); results--percent of vote na; seats (27 total) mnr 9, adn 8, mir 8, condepa 2; chamber of deputies--last held 7 may 1989 (next to be held may 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats (130 total) mnr 40, adn 38, mir 30, iu 10, condepa 9, vr-9 3 member of: fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, iatp, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, laia, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador jorge crespo; chancery at 3014 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-4410 through 4412; there are bolivian consulates general in houston, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador robert gelbard; embassy at banco popular del peru building, corner of calles mercado y colon, la paz (mailing address is p. o. box 425, la paz, or apo miami 34032); telephone p591o (2) 350251 or 350120 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), yellow, and green with the coat of arms centered on the yellow band; similar to the flag of ghana, which has a large black five-pointed star centered in the yellow band economy overview: the bolivian economy steadily deteriorated between 1980 and 1985 as la paz financed growing budget deficits by expanding the money supply and inflation spiraled--peaking at 11,700%. an austere orthodox economic program adopted by newly elected president paz estenssoro in 1985, however, succeeded in reducing inflation to between 10% and 20% annually during 1987 and 1989, eventually restarting economic growth. president paz zamora has pledged to retain the economic policies of the previous government in order to keep inflation down and continue the growth begun under his predecessor. nevertheless, bolivia continues to be one of the poorest countries in latin america, and it remains vulnerable to price fluctuations for its limited exports--mainly minerals and natural gas. moreover, for many farmers, who constitute half of the country's work force, the main cash crop is coca, which is sold for cocaine processing. gnp: $4.6 billion, per capita $660; real growth rate 2.8% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 20.7% (1988) budget: revenues $2,867 million; expenditures $2,867 million, including capital expenditures of $663 million (1987) exports: $634 million (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--metals 45%, natural gas 32%, coffee, soybeans, sugar, cotton, timber, and illicit drugs; partners--us 23%, argentina imports: $786 million (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--food, petroleum, consumer goods, capital goods; partners--us 15% external debt: $5.7 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 8.1% (1987) electricity: 817,000 kw capacity; 1,728 million kwh produced, 260 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, smelting, petroleum, food and beverage, tobacco, handicrafts, clothing; illicit drug industry reportedly produces the largest revenues agriculture: accounts for 20% of gdp (including forestry and fisheries); principal commodities--coffee, coca, cotton, corn, sugarcane, rice, potatoes, timber; self-sufficient in food illicit drugs: world's second-largest producer of coca (after peru) with an estimated 54,000 hectares under cultivation; government considers all but 12,000 hectares illicit and subject to eradication; intermediate coca products and cocaine exported to or through colombia and brazil to the us and other international drug markets aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $909 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.4 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $340 million currency: boliviano (plural--bolivianos); 1 boliviano ($b) = 100 centavos exchange rates: bolivianos ($b) per us$1--2.6917 (1989), 2.3502 (1988), 2.0549 (1987), 1.9220 (1986), 0.4400 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,675 km total; 3,643 km 1.000-meter gauge and 32 km 0.760-meter gauge, all government owned, single track highways: 38,836 km total; 1,300 km paved, 6,700 km gravel, 30,836 km improved and unimproved earth inland waterways: 10,000 km of commercially navigable waterways pipelines: crude oil 1,800 km; refined products 580 km; natural gas 1,495 km ports: none; maritime outlets are arica and antofagasta in chile and matarani in peru merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 14,051 grt/22,155 dwt; note--1 is owned by the bolivian navy civil air: 56 major transport aircraft airports: 636 total, 551 usable; 9 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 8 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 110 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: radio relay system being expanded; improved international services; 144,300 telephones; stations--129 am, no fm, 43 tv, 68 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: bolivian army, bolivian navy, bolivian air force (literally, the army of the nation, the navy of the nation, the air force of the nation) military manpower: males 15-49, 1,629,154; 1,060,187 fit for military service; 70,528 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 3% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: botswana geography total area: 600,370 km2; land area: 585,370 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than texas land boundaries: 4,013 km total; namibia 1,360 km, south africa 1,840 km, zimbabwe 813 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: short section of the boundary with namibia is indefinite; quadripoint with namibia, zambia, and zimbabwe is in disagreement climate: semiarid; warm winters and hot summers terrain: predominately flat to gently rolling tableland; kalahari desert in southwest natural resources: diamonds, copper, nickel, salt, soda ash, potash, coal, iron ore, silver, natural gas land use: 2% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 75% meadows and pastures; 2% forest and woodland; 21% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: rains in early 1988 broke six years of drought that had severely affected the important cattle industry; overgrazing; desertification note: landlocked; very long boundary with south africa people population: 1,224,527 (july 1990), growth rate 2.8% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 43 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 58 years male, 64 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun and adjective--motswana (singular), batswana (plural) ethnic divisions: 95% batswana; about 4% kalanga, basarwa, and kgalagadi; about 1% white religion: 50% indigenous beliefs, 50% christian language: english (official), setswana literacy: 60% labor force: 400,000; 163,000 formal sector employees, most others are engaged in cattle raising and subsistence agriculture (1988 est.); 19,000 are employed in various mines in south africa (1988) organized labor: 19 trade unions government long-form name: republic of botswana type: parliamentary republic capital: gaborone administrative divisions: 10 districts; central, chobe, ghanzi, kgalagadi, kgatleng, kweneng, ngamiland, north-east, south-east, southern; note--in addition, there may now be 4 town councils named francistown, gaborone, lobaste, selebi-pikwe independence: 30 september 1966 (from uk; formerly bechuanaland) constitution: march 1965, effective 30 september 1966 legal system: based on roman-dutch law and local customary law; judicial review limited to matters of interpretation; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: botswana day, 30 september (1966) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or house of chiefs and a lower house or national assembly judicial branch: high court, court of appeal leaders: chief of state and head of government--president quett k. j. masire (since 13 july 1980); vice president peter s. mmusi (since 3 january 1983) political parties and leaders: botswana democratic party (bdp), quett masire; botswana national front (bnf), kenneth koma; botswana people's party (bpp), knight maripe; botswana independence party (bip), motsamai mpho; botswana progressive union (bpu), daniel kwele suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 7 october 1989 (next to be held october 1994); results--president quett k. j. masire was reelected by the national assembly; national assembly--last held 7 october 1989 (next to be held october 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(34 total, 30 elected) bdp 31, bnf 3 communists: no known communist organization; koma of bnf has long history of communist contacts member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, interpol, itu, nam, oau, southern african customs union, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador botsweletse kingsley sebele; chancery at suite 404, 4301 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 244-4990 or 4991; us--ambassador-designate david passage; deputy chief of mission johnnie carson; embassy at botswana road, gaborone (mailing address is p. o. box 90, gaborone); telephone p267o 353982 through 353984 flag: light blue with a horizontal white-edged black stripe in the center economy overview: the economy has historically been based on cattle raising and crops. agriculture today provides a livelihood for over 80% of the population, but produces only about 50% of food needs and contributes a small 5% to gdp. the driving force behind the rapid economic growth of the 1970s and 1980s has been the mining industry. this sector, mostly on the strength of diamonds, has gone from generating 25% of gdp in 1980 to over 50% in 1988. no other sector has experienced such growth, especially not that of the agricultural sector, which is plagued by erratic rainfall and poor soils. the unemployment rate remains a problem at 25%. a scarce resource base limits diversification into labor-intensive industries. gdp: $1.87 billion, per capita $1,600; real growth rate 8.4% (fy88) inflation rate (consumer prices): 11.45% (1989) unemployment rate: 25% (1987) budget: revenues $1,235 million; expenditures $1,080 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy90 est.) exports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--diamonds 88%, copper and nickel 5%, meat 4%, cattle, animal products; partners--switzerland, us, uk, other ec-associated members of southern african customs union imports: $1.1 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, vehicles, textiles, petroleum products; partners--switzerland, us, uk, other ec-associated members of southern african customs union external debt: $700 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 16.8% (fy86) electricity: 217,000 kw capacity; 630 million kwh produced, 510 kwh per capita (1989) industries: livestock processing; mining of diamonds, copper, nickel, coal, salt, soda ash, potash; tourism agriculture: accounts for only 5% of gdp; subsistence farming predominates; cattle raising supports 50% of the population; must import large share of food needs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $242 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.6 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $43 million; communist countries (1970-88), $24 million currency: pula (plural--pula); 1 pula (p) = 100 thebe exchange rates: pula (p) per us$1--1.8734 (january 1990), 2.0125 (1989), 1.8159 (1988), 1.6779 (1987), 1.8678 (1986), 1.8882 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 712 km 1.0 67-meter gauge highways: 11,514 km total; 1,600 km paved; 1,700 km crushed stone or gravel, 5,177 km improved earth, 3,037 km unimproved earth civil air: 6 major transport aircraft airports: 99 total, 87 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 23 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: the small system is a combination of open-wire lines, radio relay links, and a few radiocommunication stations; 17,900 telephones; stations--2 am, 3 fm, no tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, air wing, botswana police military manpower: males 15-49, 249,480; 131,304 fit for military service; 14,363 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.2% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: bouvet island (territory of norway) geography total area: 58 km2; land area: 58 km2 comparative area: about 0.3 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 29.6 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 10 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 4 nm climate: antarctic terrain: volcanic; maximum elevation about 800 meters; coast is mostly inacessible natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: covered by glacial ice note: located in the south atlantic ocean 2,575 km south-southwest of the cape of good hope, south africa people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: territory of norway economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only telecommunications: automatic meteorological station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of norway ---------------------------------------------------country: brazil geography total area: 8,511,965 km2; land area: 8,456,510 km2; includes arquipelago de fernando de noronha, atol das rocas, ilha da trindade, ilhas martin vaz, and penedos de sao pedro e sao paulo comparative area: slightly smaller than the us land boundaries: 14,691 km total; argentina 1,224 km, bolivia 3,400 km, colombia 1,643 km, french guiana 673 km, guyana 1,119 km, paraguay 1,290 km, peru 1,560 km, suriname 597 km, uruguay 985 km, venezuela 2,200 km coastline: 7,491 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 200 nm disputes: short section of the boundary with paraguay (just west of guaira falls on the rio parana) is in dispute; two short sections of boundary with uruguay are in dispute (arroyo de la invernada area of the rio quarai and the islands at the confluence of the rio quarai and the uruguay); claims a zone of interest in antarctica climate: mostly tropical, but temperate in south terrain: mostly flat to rolling lowlands in north; some plains, hills, mountains, and narrow coastal belt natural resources: iron ore, manganese, bauxite, nickel, uranium, phosphates, tin, hydropower, gold, platinum, crude oil, timber land use: 7% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 19% meadows and pastures; 67% forest and woodland; 6% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recurrent droughts in northeast; floods and frost in south; deforestation in amazon basin; air and water pollution in rio de janeiro and sao paulo note: largest country in south america; shares common boundaries with every south american country except chile and ecuador people population: 152,505,077 (july 1990), growth rate 1.9% (1990) birth rate: 26 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 69 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 68 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--brazilian(s); adjective--brazilian ethnic divisions: portuguese, italian, german, japanese, black, amerindian; 55% white, 38% mixed, 6% black, 1% other religion: 90% roman catholic (nominal) language: portuguese (official), spanish, english, french literacy: 76% labor force: 57,000,000 (1989 est.); 42% services, 31% agriculture, 27% industry organized labor: 13,000,000 dues paying members (1989 est.) government long-form name: federative republic of brazil type: federal republic capital: brasilia administrative divisions: 24 states (estados, singular--estado), 2 territories* (territorios, singular--territorio), and 1 federal district** (distrito federal); acre, alagoas, amapa*, amazonas, bahia, ceara, distrito federal**, espirito santo, goias, maranhao, mato grosso, mato grosso do sul, minas gerais, para, paraiba, parana, pernambuco, piaui, rio de janeiro, rio grande do norte, rio grande do sul, rondonia, roraima*, santa catarina, sao paulo, sergipe, tocantins; note--the territories of amapa and roraima will become states on 15 march 1991 independence: 7 september 1822 (from portugal) constitution: 5 october 1988 legal system: based on latin codes; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 7 september (1822) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congresso nacional) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camara dos deputados) judicial branch: supreme federal tribunal leaders: chief of state and head of government--president fernando affonso collor de mello (since 15 march 1990); vice president itamar franco (since 15 march 1990) political parties and leaders: national reconstruction party (prn), daniel tourinho, president; brazilian democratic movement party (pmdb), ulysses guimaraes, president; liberal front party (pfl), hugo napoleao, president; workers' party (pt), luis ignacio (lula) da silva, president; brazilian labor party (ptb), luiz gonzaga de paiva muniz, president; democratic labor party (pdt), doutel de andrade, president; democratic social party (pds), jarbas passarinho, president; brazilian social democracy party (psdb), mario covas, president; brazilian communist party (pcb), salomao malina, secretary general; communist party of brazil (pcdob), joao amazonas, president suffrage: voluntary at age 16; compulsory between ages 18 and 70; voluntary at age 70 elections: president--last held 15 november 1989, with runoff on 17 december 1989 (next to be held november 1994); results--fernando collor de mello 53%, luis inacio da silva 47%; first free, direct presidential election since 1960; senate--last held 15 november 1986 (next to be held 3 october 1990); results--pmdb 60%, pfl 21%, pds 8%, pdt 3%, others 8%; seats--(66 total) pmdb 43, pfl 15, pds 6, pdt 2, others 6; note--as of 1990 senate has 75 seats; chamber of deputies--last held 15 november 1986 (next to be held 3 october 1990); results--pmdb 53%, pfl 23%, pds 7%, pdt 5%, other 12%; seats--(495 total) pmdb 258, pfl 114, pds 33, pdt 24, others 58; note--as of 1990 chamber of deputies has 570 seats communists: about 30,000 other political or pressure groups: left wing of the catholic church and labor unions allied to leftist worker's party are critical of government's social and economic policies member of: ccc, fao, g-77, gatt, group of eight, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, ipu, irc, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador marcilio marques moreira; chancery at 3006 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 745-2700; there are brazilian consulates general in atlanta, chicago, los angeles, miami, new orleans, and new york, and consulates in dallas, houston, and san francisco; us--ambassador richard melton; embassy at avenida das nocoes, lote 3, brasilia, distrito federal (mailing address is apo miami 34030); telephone p55o (6) 321-7272; there are us consulates general in rio de janeiro and sao paulo, and consulates in porto alegre and recife flag: green with a large yellow diamond in the center bearing a blue celestial globe with 23 white five-pointed stars (one for each state) arranged in the same pattern as the night sky over brazil; the globe has a white equatorial band with the motto ordem e progresso (order and progress) economy overview: the economy, a mixture of private enterprises of all sizes and extensive government intervention, experienced enormous difficulties in the late 1980s, notably declining real growth, runaway inflation, foreign debt obligations of more than $100 billion, and uncertain economic policy. government intervention includes trade and investment restrictions, wage/price controls, interest and exchange rate controls, and extensive tariff barriers. ownership of major industrial facilities is divided among private interests, the government, and multinational companies. ownership in agriculture likewise is varied, with the government intervening in the politically sensitive issues involving large landowners and the masses of poor peasants. in consultation with the imf, the brazilian government has initiated several programs over the last few years to ameliorate the stagnation and foreign debt problems. none of these has given more than temporary relief. the strategy of the new collor government is to increase the pace of privatization, encourage foreign trade and investment, and establish a more realistic exchange rate. one long-run strength is the existence of vast natural resources. gdp: $377 billion, per capita $2,500; real growth rate 3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1,765% (1989) unemployment rate: 2.5% (december 1989) budget: revenues $27.8 billion; expenditures $40.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $8.8 billion (1986) exports: $34.2 billion (1989 est.); commodities--coffee, metallurgical products, chemical products, foodstuffs, iron ore, automobiles and parts; partners--us 28%, ec 26%, latin america 11%, japan 6% (1987) imports: $18.0 billion (1989 est.); commodities--crude oil, capital goods, chemical products, foodstuffs, coal; partners--middle east and africa 24%, ec 22%, us 21%, latin america 12%, japan 6% (1987) external debt: $109 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 3.2% (1989 est.) electricity: 52,865,000 kw capacity; 202,280 million kwh produced, 1,340 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles and other consumer goods, shoes, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore, steel, motor vehicles and auto parts, metalworking, capital goods, tin agriculture: accounts for 12% of gdp; world's largest producer and exporter of coffee and orange juice concentrate and second-largest exporter of soybeans; other products--rice, corn, sugarcane, cocoa, beef; self-sufficient in food, except for wheat illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis and coca, mostly for domestic consumption; government has an active eradication program to control cannabis and coca cultivation aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $2.5 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $9.5 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $284 million; communist countries (1970-88), $1.3 billion currency: novo cruzado (plural--novos cruzados); 1 novo cruzado (ncr$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: novos cruzados (ncr$) per us$1--2.83392 (1989), 0.26238 (1988), 0.03923 (1987), 0.01366 (1986), 0.00620 (1985); note-25 tourist/parallel rate (december 1989) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 29,694 km total; 25,268 km 1.000-meter gauge, 4,339 km 1.600-meter gauge, 74 km mixed 1.600-1.000-meter gauge, 13 km 0.760-meter gauge; 2,308 km electrified highways: 1,448,000 km total; 48,000 km paved, 1,400,000 km gravel or earth inland waterways: 50,000 km navigable pipelines: crude oil, 2,000 km; refined products, 3,804 km; natural gas, 1,095 km ports: belem, fortaleza, ilheus, manaus, paranagua, porto alegre, recife, rio de janeiro, rio grande, salvador, santos merchant marine: 271 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 5,855,708 grt/9,909,097 dwt; includes 2 passenger-cargo, 68 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo, 12 container, 9 roll-on/roll-off, 56 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 15 chemical tanker, 10 liquefied gas, 14 combination ore/oil, 82 bulk, 2 combination bulk civil air: 176 major transport aircraft airports: 3,774 total, 3,106 usable; 386 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 21 with runways 2,240-3,659 m; 503 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good system; extensive radio relay facilities; 9.86 million telephones; stations--1,223 am, no fm, 112 tv, 151 shortwave; 3 coaxial submarine cables 3 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations with total of 3 antennas; 64 domestic satellite stations defense forces branches: brazilian army, navy of brazil, brazilian air force military manpower: males 15-49, 39,620,936; 26,752,307 fit for military service; 1,617,378 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 0.6% of gdp, or $2.3 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: british indian ocean territory (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 60 km2; land area: 60 km2 comparative area: about 0.3 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 698 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: diego garcia is claimed by mauritius climate: tropical marine; hot, humid, moderated by trade winds terrain: flat and low (up to 4 meters in elevation) natural resources: coconuts, fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: archipelago of 2,300 islands note: diego garcia, largest and southernmost island, occupies strategic location in central indian ocean people population: no permanent civilian population; formerly about 3,000 islanders ethnic divisions: civilian inhabitants, known as the ilois, evacuated to mauritius before construction of uk and us defense facilities government long-form name: british indian ocean territory (no short-form name); abbreviated biot type: dependent territory of the uk capital: none leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--commissioner r. edis (since na 1988), administrator robin crompton (since na 1988); note--both officials reside in the uk diplomatic representation: none (dependent territory of the uk) flag: the flag of the uk is used economy overview: all economic activity is concentrated on the largest island of diego garcia, where joint uk-us defense facilities are located. construction projects and various services needed to support the military installations are done by military and contract employees from the uk and us. there are no industrial or agricultural activities on the islands. electricity: provided by the us military communications highways: short stretch of paved road between port and airfield on diego garcia ports: diego garcia airports: 1 with permanent-surface runways over 3,659 m on diego garcia telecommunications: minimal facilities; stations (operated by the us navy)--1 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: british virgin islands (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 150 km2; land area: 150 km2 comparative area: about 0.8 times the size of washington, dc coastline: 80 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: subtropical; humid; temperatures moderated by trade winds terrain: coral islands relatively flat; volcanic islands steep, hilly natural resources: negligible land use: 20% arable land; 7% permanent crops; 33% meadows and pastures; 7% forest and woodland; 33% other environment: subject to hurricanes and tropical storms from july to october note: strong ties to nearby us virgin islands and puerto rico people population: 12,258 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 14 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--british virgin islander(s); adjective--british virgin islander ethnic divisions: over 90% black, remainder of white and asian origin religion: majority methodist; others include anglican, church of god, seventh-day adventist, baptist, and roman catholic language: english (official) literacy: 98% labor force: 4,911 (1980) organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: road town administrative divisions: none (dependent territory of the uk) independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: 1 june 1977 legal system: english law national holiday: territory day, 1 july executive branch: british monarch, governor, chief minister, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral legislative council judicial branch: eastern caribbean supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor john mark ambrose herdman (since na 1986); head of government--chief minister h. lavity stoutt (since na 1986) political parties and leaders: united party (up), conrad maduro; virgin islands party (vip), h. lavity stoutt; independent people's movement (ipm), cyril b. romney suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative council--last held 30 september 1986 (next to be held by september 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(9 total) up 2, vip 5, ipm 2 communists: probably none member of: commonwealth diplomatic representation: none (dependent territory of the uk) flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the virgin islander coat of arms centered in the outer half of the flag; the coat of arms depicts a woman flanked on either side by a vertical column of six oil lamps above a scroll bearing the latin word vigilate (be watchful) economy overview: the economy is highly dependent on the tourist industry, which generates about 21% of the national income. in 1985 the government offered offshore registration to companies wishing to incorporate in the islands, and, in consequence, incorporation fees generated about $2 million in 1987. livestock raising is the most significant agricultural activity. the islands' crops, limited by poor soils, are unable to meet food requirements. gdp: $106.7 million, per capita $8,900; real growth rate 2.5% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.7% (january 1987) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $26.2 million; expenditures $25.4 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1988 est.) exports: $2.3 million (f.o.b., 1985); commodities--rum, fresh fish, gravel, sand, fruits, animals; partners--virgin islands (us), puerto rico, us imports: $72.0 million (c.i.f., 1985); commodities--building materials, automobiles, foodstuffs, machinery; partners--virgin islands (us), puerto rico, us external debt: $4.5 million (1985) industrial production: growth rate 4.0% (1985) electricity: 13,500 kw capacity; 59 million kwh produced, 4,870 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, light industry, construction, rum, concrete block, offshore financial center agriculture: livestock (including poultry), fish, fruit, vegetables aid: na currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 106 km motorable roads (1983) ports: road town airports: 3 total, 3 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways less than 1,220 m telecommunications: 3,000 telephones; worldwide external telephone service; submarine cable communication links to bermuda; stations--1 am, no fm, 1 tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: brunei geography total area: 5,770 km2; land area: 5,270 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than delaware land boundary: 381 km with malaysia coastline: 161 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: may wish to purchase the malaysian salient that divides the country climate: tropical; hot, humid, rainy terrain: flat coastal plain rises to mountains in east; hilly lowland in west natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, timber land use: 1% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 79% forest and woodland; 18% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: typhoons, earthquakes, and severe flooding are rare note: close to vital sea lanes through south china sea linking indian and pacific oceans; two parts physically separated by malaysia; almost an enclave of malaysia people population: 372,108 (july 1990), growth rate 7.1% (1990) birth rate: 23 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 4 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 52 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bruneian(s); adjective--bruneian ethnic divisions: 64% malay, 20% chinese, 16% other religion: 60% muslim (official); 8% christian; 32% buddhist and indigenous beliefs language: malay (official), english, and chinese literacy: 45% labor force: 89,000 (includes members of the army); 33% of labor force is foreign (1988); 50.4% production of oil, natural gas, and construction; 47.6% trade, services, and other; 2.0% agriculture, forestry, and fishing (1984) organized labor: 2% of labor force government long-form name: negara brunei darussalam type: constitutional sultanate capital: bandar seri begawan administrative divisions: 4 districts (daerah-daerah, singular--daerah); belait, brunei and muara, temburong, tutong independence: 1 january 1984 (from uk) constitution: 29 september 1959 (some provisions suspended under a state of emergency since december 1962, others since independence on 1 january 1984) legal system: based on islamic law national holiday: national day, 23 february (1984) executive branch: sultan, prime minister, council of cabinet ministers legislative branch: unicameral legislative council (majlis masyuarat megeri) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--sultan and prime minister sir muda hassanal bolkiah muizzaddin waddaulah (since 5 october 1967) political parties and leaders: brunei national united party (inactive), anak hasanuddin, chairman; brunei national democratic party (the first legal political party and now banned) abdul latif bin abdul hamid, chairman suffrage: none elections: legislative council--last held in march 1962; in 1970 the council was changed to an appointive body by decree of the sultan and no elections are planned communists: probably none member of: asean, escap (associate member), imo, interpol, oic, un diplomatic representation: ambassador dato paduka haji mohamed suni bin haji idris; chancery at 2600 virginia avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 342-0159; us--ambassador christopher h. phillips; embassy at teck guan plaza (corner of jalan mcarthur), bandar seri begawan (mailing address is p. o. box 2991, bandar seri begawan); telephone p673o (2) 29670 flag: yellow with two diagonal bands of white (top, almost double width) and black starting from the upper hoist side; the national emblem in red is superimposed at the center; the emblem includes a swallow-tailed flag on top of a winged column within an upturned crescent above a scroll and flanked by two upraised hands economy overview: the economy is a mixture of foreign and domestic entrepreneurship, government regulation and welfare measures, and village tradition. it is almost totally supported by exports of crude oil and natural gas, with revenues from the petroleum sector accounting for more than 70% of gdp. per capita gdp of $9,600 is among the highest in the third world, and substantial income from overseas investment supplements domestic production. the government provides for all medical services and subsidizes food and housing. gdp: $3.3 billion, per capita $9,600; real growth rate 2.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.5% (1989 est.) unemployment: 2.5%, shortage of skilled labor (1989 est.) budget: revenues $1.2 billion (1987); expenditures $1.6 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1989 est.) exports: $2.07 billion (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--crude oil, liquefied natural gas, petroleum products; partners--japan 55% (1986) imports: $800 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods; food, beverages, tobacco; consumer goods; partners--singapore 31%, us 20%, japan 6% (1986) external debt: none industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 310,000 kw capacity; 890 million kwh produced, 2,580 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, liquefied natural gas, construction agriculture: imports about 80% of its food needs; principal crops and livestock include rice, cassava, bananas, buffaloes, and pigs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $20.6 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $143.7 million currency: bruneian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 bruneian dollar (b$) = 100 cents exchange rates: bruneian dollars (b$) per us$1--1.8895 (january 1990), 1.9503 (1989), 2.0124 (1988), 2.1060 (1987), 2.1774 (1986), 2.2002 (1985); note--the bruneian dollar is at par with the singapore dollar fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 13 km 0.610-meter narrow-gauge private line highways: 1,090 km total; 370 km paved (bituminous treated) and another 52 km under construction, 720 km gravel or unimproved inland waterways: 209 km; navigable by craft drawing less than 1.2 meters ports: kuala belait, muara merchant marine: 7 liquefied gas carriers (1,000 grt or over) totaling 348,476 grt/340,635 dwt pipelines: crude oil, 135 km; refined products, 418 km; natural gas, 920 km civil air: 4 major transport aircraft (3 boeing 757-200, 1 boeing 737-200) airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runway over 3,659 m; 1 with runway 1,406 m telecommunications: service throughout country is adequate for present needs; international service good to adjacent malaysia; radiobroadcast coverage good; 33,000 telephones (1987); stations--4 am/fm, 1 tv; 74,000 radio receivers (1987); satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 pacific ocean intelsat defense forces branches: royal brunei armed forces, including air wing, navy, and ground forces; british gurkha battalion; royal brunei police; gurkha reserve unit military manpower: males 15-49, 104,398; 60,242 fit for military service; 3,106 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: $197.6 million, 17% of central government budget (fy86) ---------------------------------------------------country: bulgaria geography total area: 110,910 km2; land area: 110,550 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than tennessee land boundaries: 1,881 km total; greece 494 km, romania 608 km, turkey 240 km, yugoslavia 539 km coastline: 354 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: macedonia question with greece and yugoslavia climate: temperate; cold, damp winters; hot, dry summers terrain: mostly mountains with lowlands in north and south natural resources: bauxite, copper, lead, zinc, coal, timber, arable land land use: 34% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 18% meadows and pastures; 35% forest and woodland; 10% other; includes 11% irrigated environment: subject to earthquakes, landslides; deforestation; air pollution note: strategic location near turkish straits; controls key land routes from europe to middle east and asia people population: 8,933,544 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 12 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 13 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--bulgarian(s); adjective--bulgarian ethnic divisions: 85.3% bulgarian, 8.5% turk, 2.6% gypsy, 2.5% macedonian, 0.3% armenian, 0.2% russian, 0.6% other religion: religious background of population is 85% bulgarian orthodox, 13% muslim, 0.8% jewish, 0.7% roman catholic, 0.5% protestant, gregorian-armenian, and other language: bulgarian; secondary languages closely correspond to ethnic breakdown literacy: 95% (est.) labor force: 4,300,000; 33% industry, 20% agriculture, 47% other (1987) organized labor: all workers are members of the central council of trade unions (cctu); pod krepa (support), an independent trade union, legally registered in january 1990 government long-form name: people's republic of bulgaria type: communist state, but democratic elections planned for 1990 capital: sofia administrative divisions: 8 provinces (oblasti, singular--oblast) and 1 city* (grad); burgas, grad sofiya*, khaskovo, lovech, mikhaylovgrad, plovdiv, razgrad, sofiya, varna independence: 22 september 1908 (from ottoman empire) constitution: 16 may 1971, effective 18 may 1971 legal system: based on civil law system, with soviet law influence; judicial review of legislative acts in the state council; has accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the socialist revolution in bulgaria, 9 september (1944) executive branch: president, chairman of the council of ministers, four deputy chairmen of the council of ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (narodno sobranyie) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president petur toshev mladenov (chairman of the state council since 11 november 1989; became president on 3 april 1990 when the state council was abolished); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers andrey lukanov (since 3 february 1990); deputy chairman of the council of ministers chudomir asenov aleksandrov (since 8 february 1990); deputy chairman of the council of ministers belcho antonov belchev (since 8 february 1990); deputy chairman of the council of ministers konstantin dimitrov kosev (since 8 february 1990); deputy chairman of the council of ministers nora krachunova ananieva (since 8 february 1990) political parties and leaders: bulgarian communist party (bkp), aleksandur lilov, chairman; bulgarian national agrarian union (bzns), angel angelov dimitrov, secretary of permanent board; bulgarian social democratic party, petur dentlieu; green party; christian democrats; radical democratic party; others forming suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: chairman of the state council--last held 17 june 1986 (next to be held 10 and 17 june 1990); results--todor zhivkov reelected but was replaced by petur toshev mladenov on 11 november 1989; national assembly--last held 8 june 1986 (next to be held 10 and 17 june 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(400 total) bkp 276, bzns 99, others 25 communists: 932,055 party members (april 1986) other political or pressure groups: union of democratic forces (umbrella organization for opposition groups); ecoglenost, podkrepa independent trade union, fatherland front, communist youth union, central council of trade unions, national committee for defense of peace, union of fighters against fascism and capitalism, committee of bulgarian women, all-national committee for bulgarian-soviet friendship; union of democratic forces, a coalition of about a dozen dissident groups; numerous regional and national interest groups with various agendas member of: ccc, cema, fao, iaea, ibec, icao, ilo, ilzsg, imo, ipu, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, un, unesco, upu, warsaw pact, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador velichko filipov velichkov; chancery at 1621 22nd street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 387-7969; us--ambassador sol polansky; embassy at 1 alexander stamboliski boulevard, sofia (mailing address is apo new york 09213); telephone p359o (2) 88-48-01 through 05 flag: three equal horizontal bands of white (top), green, and red with the national emblem on the hoist side of the white stripe; the emblem contains a rampant lion within a wreath of wheat ears below a red five-pointed star and above a ribbon bearing the dates 681 (first bulgarian state established) and 1944 (liberation from nazi control) economy overview: growth in the sluggish bulgarian economy fell to the 2% annual level in the 1980s, and by 1989 sofia's foreign debt had skyrocketed to $10 billion--giving a debt service ratio of more than 40% of hard currency earnings. the post-zhivkov regime faces major problems of renovating an aging industrial plant, keeping abreast of rapidly unfolding technological developments, investing in additional energy capacity (the portion of electric power from nuclear energy reached 37% in 1988), and motivating workers, in part by giving them a share in the earnings of their enterprises. a major decree of january 1989 summarized and extended the government's economic restructuring efforts, which include a partial decentralization of controls over production decisions and foreign trade. the new regime promises more extensive reforms and eventually a market economy. but the ruling group cannot (so far) bring itself to give up ultimate control over economic affairs exercised through the vertical party/ministerial command structure. reforms have not led to improved economic performance, in particular the provision of more and better consumer goods. a further blow to the economy was the exodus of 310,000 ethnic turks in mid-1989, which caused temporary shortages of skilled labor in glassware, aluminum, and other industrial plants and in tobacco fields. gnp: $51.2 billion, per capita $5,710; real growth rate 0.1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 12% (1989) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $26 billion; expenditures $28 billion, including capital expenditures of $na billion (1988) exports: $20.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and equipment 60.5%; agricultural products 14.7%; manufactured consumer goods 10.6%; fuels, minerals, raw materials, and metals 8.5%; other 5.7%; partners--socialist countries 82.5% (ussr 61%, gdr 5.5%, czechoslovakia 4.9%); developed countries 6.8% (frg 1.2%, greece 1.0%); less developed countries 10.7% (libya 3.5%, iraq 2.9%) imports: $21.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fuels, minerals, and raw materials 45.2%; machinery and equipment 39.8%; manufactured consumer goods 4.6%; agricultural products 3.8%; other 6.6%; partners--socialist countries 80.5% (ussr 57.5%, gdr 5.7%), developed countries 15.1% (frg 4.8%, austria 1.6%); less developed countries 4.4% (libya 1.0%, brazil 0.9%) external debt: $10 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 0.9% (1988) electricity: 11,500,000 kw capacity; 45,000 million kwh produced, 5,000 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, machine and metal building, electronics, chemicals agriculture: accounts for 15% of gnp; climate and soil conditions support livestock raising and the growing of various grain crops, oilseeds, vegetables, fruits and tobacco; more than one-third of the arable land devoted to grain; world's fourth-largest tobacco exporter; surplus food producer aid: donor--$1.6 billion in bilateral aid to non-communist less developed countries (1956-88) currency: lev (plural--leva); 1 lev (lv) = 100 stotinki exchange rates: leva (lv) per us$1--0.84 (1989), 0.82 (1988), 0.90 (1987), 0.95 (1986), 1.03 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 4,294 km total, all government owned (1986); 4,049 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 245 km narrow gauge; 908 km double track; 2,342 km electrified highways: 37,397 km total; 33,352 km hard surface (including 228 km superhighways); 4,045 km earth roads (1986) inland waterways: 470 km (1986) pipelines: crude, 193 km; refined product, 418 km; natural gas, 1,400 km (1986) ports: burgas, varna, varna west; river ports are ruse, vidin, and lom on the danube merchant marine: 108 ships (1,000 grt and over) totaling 1,240,204 grt/1,872,723 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 32 cargo, 2 container, 1 passenger-cargo training, 5 roll-on/roll-off, 16 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 railcar carriers, 48 bulk civil air: 65 major transport aircraft airports: 380 total, 380 usable; about 120 with permanent-surface runways; 20 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 20 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--15 am, 16 fm, 13 tv; 1 soviet tv relay; 2,100,000 tv sets; 2,100,000 radio receivers; at least 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: bulgarian people's army, bulgarian navy, air and air defense forces, frontier troops military manpower: males 15-49, 2,177,404; 1,823,111 fit for military service; 66,744 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 1.6051 billion leva (1989); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: burkina geography total area: 274,200 km2; land area: 273,800 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than colorado land boundaries: 3,192 km total; benin 306 km, ghana 548 km, ivory coast 584 km, mali 1,000 km, niger 628 km, togo 126 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: the disputed international boundary between burkina and mali was submitted to the international court of justice (icj) in october 1983 and the icj issued its final ruling in december 1986, which both sides agreed to accept; burkina and mali are proceeding with boundary demarcation, including the tripoint with niger climate: tropical; warm, dry winters; hot, wet summers terrain: mostly flat to dissected, undulating plains; hills in west and southeast natural resources: manganese, limestone, marble; small deposits of gold, antimony, copper, nickel, bauxite, lead, phosphates, zinc, silver land use: 10% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 37% meadows and pastures; 26% forest and woodland; 27% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recent droughts and desertification severely affecting marginal agricultural activities, population distribution, economy; overgrazing; deforestation note: landlocked people population: 9,077,828 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 50 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 121 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 51 years male, 52 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--burkinabe; adjective--burkinabe ethnic divisions: more than 50 tribes; principal tribe is mossi (about 2.5 million); other important groups are gurunsi, senufo, lobi, bobo, mande, and fulani religion: 65% indigenous beliefs, about 25% muslim, 10% christian (mainly roman catholic) language: french (official); tribal languages belong to sudanic family, spoken by 90% of the population literacy: 13.2% labor force: 3,300,000 residents; 30,000 are wage earners; 82% agriculture, 13% industry, 5% commerce, services, and government; 20% of male labor force migrates annually to neighboring countries for seasonal employment (1984); 44% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: four principal trade union groups represent less than 1% of population government long-form name: burkina faso type: military; established by coup on 4 august 1983 capital: ouagadougou administrative divisions: 30 provinces; bam, bazega, bougouriba, boulgou, boulkiemde, ganzourgou, gnagna, gourma, houet, kadiogo, kenedougou, komoe, kossi, kouritenga, mouhoun, namentenga, naouri, oubritenga, oudalan, passore, poni, sanguie, sanmatenga, seno, sissili, soum, sourou, tapoa, yatenga, zoundweogo independence: 5 august 1960 (from france; formerly upper volta) constitution: none; constitution of 27 november 1977 was abolished following coup of 25 november 1980 legal system: based on french civil law system and customary law national holiday: anniversary of the revolution, 4 august (1983) executive branch: chairman of the popular front, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) was dissolved on 25 november 1980 judicial branch: appeals court leaders: chief of state and head of government--chairman of the popular front captain blaise compaore (since 15 october 1987) political parties and leaders: all political parties banned following november 1980 coup suffrage: none elections: the national assembly was dissolved 25 november 1980 and no elections are scheduled communists: small communist party front group; some sympathizers other political or pressure groups: committees for the defense of the revolution, watchdog/political action groups throughout the country in both organizations and communities member of: acp, afdb, ccc, ceao, eama, eca, eib (associate), entente, fao, gatt, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, nam, niger river commission, oau, ocam, oic, un, unesco, upu, wcl, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador paul desire kabore; chancery at 2340 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-5577 or 6895; us--ambassador david h. shinn; embassy at avenue raoul follerau, ouagadougou (mailing address is b. p. 35, ouagadougou); telephone p226o 30-67-23 through 25 flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and green with a yellow five-pointed star in the center; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: one of the poorest countries in the world, burkina has a high population density, few natural resources, and relatively infertile soil. economic development is hindered by a poor communications network within a landlocked country. agriculture provides about 40% of gdp and is entirely of a subsistence nature. industry, dominated by unprofitable government-controlled corporations, accounted for 13% of gdp in 1985. gdp: $1.43 billion, per capita $170; real growth rate 7.7% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.3% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $422 million; expenditures $516 million, including capital expenditures of $25 million (1987) exports: $249 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--oilseeds, cotton, live animals, gold; partners--ec 42% (france 30%, other 12%), taiwan 17%, ivory coast 15% (1985) imports: $591 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--grain, dairy products, petroleum, machinery; partners--ec 37% (france 23%, other 14%), africa 31%, us 15% (1985) external debt: $969 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 7.1% (1985) electricity: 121,000 kw capacity; 320 million kwh produced, 37 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing plants; brewery, cement, and brick plants; a few other small consumer goods enterprises agriculture: cash crops--peanuts, shea nuts, sesame, cotton; food crops--sorghum, millet, corn, rice; livestock; not self-sufficient in food grains aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $271 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.5 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $94 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: cfa francs (cfaf) per us$1--284.55 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 620 km total; 520 km ouagadougou to ivory coast border and 100 km ouagadougou to kaya; all 1.00-meter gauge and single track highways: 16,500 km total; 1,300 km paved, 7,400 km improved, 7,800 km unimproved (1985) civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 50 total, 43 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 7 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: all services only fair; radio relay, wire, and radio communication stations in use; 13,900 telephones; stations--2 am, 2 fm, 2 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,775,143; 904,552 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 3.1% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: burma geography total area: 678,500 km2; land area: 657,740 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than texas land boundaries: 5,876 km total; bangladesh 193 km, china 2,185 km, india 1,463 km, laos 235 km, thailand 1,800 km coastline: 1,930 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical monsoon; cloudy, rainy, hot, humid summers (southwest monsoon, june to september); less cloudy, scant rainfall, mild temperatures, lower humidity during winter (northeast monsoon, december to april) terrain: central lowlands ringed by steep, rugged highlands natural resources: crude oil, timber, tin, antimony, zinc, copper, tungsten, lead, coal, some marble, limestone, precious stones, natural gas land use: 15% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 49% forest and woodland; 34% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: subject to destructive earthquakes and cyclones; flooding and landslides common during rainy season (june to september); deforestation note: strategic location near major indian ocean shipping lanes people population: 41,277,389 (july 1990), growth rate 2.0% (1990) birth rate: 33 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 97 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 53 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--burmese; adjective--burmese ethnic divisions: 68% burman, 9% shan, 7% karen, 4% rakhine, 3% chinese, 2% mon, 2% indian, 5% other religion: 85% buddhist, 15% animist beliefs, muslim, christian, or other language: burmese; minority ethnic groups have their own languages literacy: 78% labor force: 16,036,000; 65.2% agriculture, 14.3% industry, 10.1% trade, 6.3% government, 4.1% other (fy89 est.) organized labor: workers' asiayone (association), 1,800,000 members, and peasants' asiayone, 7,600,000 members government long-form name: union of burma; note--the local official name is pyidaungzu myanma naingngandaw which has been translated as union of myanma or union of myanmar type: military government capital: rangoon (sometimes translated as yangon) administrative divisions: 7 divisions* (yin-mya, singular--yin) and 7 states (pyine-mya, singular--pyine); chin state, irrawaddy*, kachin state, karan state, kayah state, magwe*, mandalay*, mon state, pegu*, rakhine state, rangoon*, sagaing*, shan state, tenasserim* independence: 4 january 1948 (from uk) constitution: 3 january 1974 (suspended since 18 september 1988) legal system: martial law in effect throughout most of the country; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 4 january (1948) executive branch: chairman of the state law and order restoration council, state law and order restoration council legislative branch: unicameral people's assembly (pyithu hluttaw) was dissolved after the coup of 18 september 1988 judicial branch: council of people's justices was abolished after the coup of 18 september 1988 leaders: chief of state and head of government--chairman of the state law and order restoration council and prime minister gen. saw maung (since 18 september 1988) political parties and leaders: national league for democracy, u tin oo and aung san suu kyi; league for democracy and peace, u nu; national unity party (promilitary); over 100 other parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: people's assembly--last held 6-20 october 1985, but dissolved after the coup of 18 september 1988; next scheduled 27 may 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(na total) number of seats by party na communists: several hundred, est., primarily as an insurgent group on the northeast frontier other political or pressure groups: kachin independence army; karen national union, several shan factions (all insurgent groups); burmese communist party (bcp) member of: adb, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, irc, itu, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador u myo aung; chancery at 2300 s street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-9044 through 9046; there is a burmese consulate general in new york; us--ambassador burton levin; embassy at 581 merchant street, rangoon (mailing address is g. p. o. box 521, rangoon or box b, apo san francisco 96346); telephone 82055 or 82181 flag: red with a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing, all in white, 14 five-pointed stars encircling a cogwheel containing a stalk of rice; the 14 stars represent the 14 administrative divisions economy overview: burma is one of the poorest countries in asia, with a per capita gdp of about $280. the government reports negligible growth for fy88. the nation has been unable to achieve any significant improvement in export earnings because of falling prices for many of its major commodity exports. for rice, traditionally the most important export, the drop in world prices has been accompanied by shrinking markets and a smaller volume of sales. in 1985 teak replaced rice as the largest export and continues to hold this position. the economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural sector, which generates about 40% of gdp and provides employment for more than 65% of the work force. gdp: $11.0 billion, per capita $280; real growth rate 0.2% (fy88 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 22.6% (fy89 est.) unemployment rate: 10.4% in urban areas (fy87) budget: revenues $4.9 billion; expenditures $5.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.7 billion (fy89 est.) exports: $311 million (f.o.b., fy88 est.) commodities--teak, rice, oilseed, metals, rubber, gems; partners--southeast asia, india, china, ec, africa imports: $536 million (c.i.f., fy88 est.) commodities--machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, food products; partners--japan, ec, cema, china, southeast asia external debt: $5.6 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 1.5% (fy88) electricity: 950,000 kw capacity; 2,900 million kwh produced, 70 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing; textiles and footwear; wood and wood products; petroleum refining; mining of copper, tin, tungsten, iron; construction materials; pharmaceuticals; fertilizer agriculture: accounts for about 40% of gdp (including fish and forestry); self-sufficient in food; principal crops--paddy rice, corn, oilseed, sugarcane, pulses; world's largest stand of hardwood trees; rice and teak account for 55% of export revenues; 1985 fish catch of 644 million metric tons illicit drugs: world's largest illicit producer of opium poppy and minor producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; opium production is on the increase as growers respond to the collapse of rangoon's antinarcotic programs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $158 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.8 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $424 million currency: kyat (plural--kyats); 1 kyat (k) = 100 pyas exchange rates: kyats (k) per us$1--6.5188 (january 1990), 6.7049 (1989), 6.3945 (1988), 6.6535 (1987), 7.3304 (1986), 8.4749 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 3,991 km total, all government owned; 3,878 km 1.000-meter gauge, 113 km narrow-gauge industrial lines; 362 km double track highways: 27,000 km total; 3,200 km bituminous, 17,700 km improved earth or gravel, 6,100 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 12,800 km; 3,200 km navigable by large commercial vessels pipelines: crude, 1,343 km; natural gas, 330 km ports: rangoon, moulmein, bassein merchant marine: 45 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 595,814 grt/955,924 dwt; includes 3 passenger-cargo, 15 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off, 1 vehicle carrier, 1 container, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 5 chemical, 16 bulk civil air: 17 major transport aircraft (including 3 helicopters) airports: 88 total, 81 usable; 29 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 37 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: meets minimum requirements for local and intercity service; international service is good; radiobroadcast coverage is limited to the most populous areas; 53,000 telephones (1986); stations--2 am, 1 fm, 1 tv (1985); 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: eligible 15-49, 20,294,848; of the 10,135,886 males 15-49, 5,438,196 are fit for military service; of the 10,158,962 females 15-49, 5,437,518 are fit for military service; 434,200 males and 423,435 females reach military age (18) annually; both sexes are liable for military service defense expenditures: $315.0 million, 21.0% of central government budget (fy88) ---------------------------------------------------country: burundi geography total area: 27,830 km2; land area: 25,650 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundaries: 974 km total; rwanda 290 km, tanzania 451 km, zaire 233 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: temperate; warm; occasional frost in uplands terrain: mostly rolling to hilly highland; some plains natural resources: nickel, uranium, rare earth oxide, peat, cobalt, copper, platinum (not yet exploited), vanadium land use: 43% arable land; 8% permanent crops; 35% meadows and pastures; 2% forest and woodland; 12% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: soil exhaustion; soil erosion; deforestation note: landlocked; straddles crest of the nile-congo watershed people population: 5,645,997 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 111 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 54 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--burundian(s); adjective--burundi ethnic divisions: africans--85% hutu (bantu), 14% tutsi (hamitic), 1% twa (pygmy); other africans include about 70,000 refugees, mostly rwandans and zairians; non-africans include about 3,000 europeans and 2,000 south asians religion: about 67% christian (62% roman catholic, 5% protestant), 32% indigenous beliefs, 1% muslim language: kirundi and french (official); swahili (along lake tanganyika and in the bujumbura area) literacy: 33.8% labor force: 1,900,000 (1983 est.); 93.0% agriculture, 4.0% government, 1.5% industry and commerce, 1.5% services; 52% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: sole group is the union of burundi workers (utb); by charter, membership is extended to all burundi workers (informally); figures denoting active membership unobtainable government long-form name: republic of burundi type: republic capital: bujumbura administrative divisions: 15 provinces; bubanza, bujumbura, bururi, cankuzo, cibitoke, gitega, karuzi, kayanza, kirundo, makamba, muramvya, muyinga, ngozi, rutana, ruyigi independence: 1 july 1962 (from un trusteeship under belgian administration) constitution: 20 november 1981; suspended following the coup of 3 september 1987 legal system: based on german and belgian civil codes and customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 1 july (1962) executive branch: president, military committee for national salvation, prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) was dissolved following the coup of 3 september 1987 judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state--president pierre buyoya (since 9 september 1987); head of government prime minister adrien sibomana (since 26 october 1988) political parties and leaders: only party--national party of unity and progress (uprona), a tutsi-led party, libere bararunyeretse, coordinator of the national permanent secretariat suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: national assembly--dissolved after the coup of 3 september 1987; no elections are planned communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, ccc, eama, eca, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, interpol, itu, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador julien kavakure; chancery at suite 212, 2233 wisconsin avenue nw, washington dc 20007; telephone (202) 342-2574; us--ambassador cynthia shepherd perry; embassy at avenue du zaire, bujumbura (mailing address is b. p. 1720, bujumbura); telephone 234-54 through 56 flag: divided by a white diagonal cross into red panels (top and bottom) and green panels (hoist side and outer side) with a white disk superimposed at the center bearing three red six-pointed stars outlined in green arranged in a triangular design (one star above, two stars below) economy overview: a landlocked, resource-poor country in an early stage of economic development, burundi is predominately agricultural with only a few basic industries. its economic health is dependent on the coffee crop, which accounts for an average 90% of foreign exchange earnings each year. the ability to pay for imports therefore continues to rest largely on the vagaries of the climate and the international coffee market. gdp: $1.3 billion, per capita $255; real growth rate 2.8% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.4% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $213 million; expenditures $292 million, including capital expenditures of $131 million (1988 est.) exports: $128 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee 88%, tea, hides and skins; partners--ec 83%, us 5%, asia 2% imports: $204 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--capital goods 31%, petroleum products 15%, foodstuffs, consumer goods; partners--ec 57%, asia 23%, us 3% external debt: $795 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: real growth rate 5.1% (1986) electricity: 51,000 kw capacity; 105 million kwh produced, 19 kwh per capita (1989) industries: light consumer goods such as blankets, shoes, soap; assembly of imports; public works construction; food processing agriculture: accounts for 60% of gdp; 90% of population dependent on subsistence farming; marginally self-sufficient in food production; cash crops--coffee, cotton, tea; food crops--corn, sorghum, sweet potatoes, bananas, manioc; livestock--meat, milk, hides, and skins aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $68 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $10 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $32 million; communist countries (1970-88), $175 million currency: burundi franc (plural--francs); 1 burundi franc (fbu) = 100 centimes exchange rates: burundi francs (fbu) per us$1--176.20 (january 1990), 158.67 (1989), 140.40 (1988), 123.56 (1987), 114.17 (1986), 120.69 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 5,900 km total; 400 km paved, 2,500 km gravel or laterite, 3,000 km improved or unimproved earth inland waterways: lake tanganyika ports: bujumbura (lake port) connects to transportation systems of tanzania and zaire civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 8 total, 7 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220 to 2,439 m telecommunications: sparse system of wire, radiocommunications, and low-capacity radio relay links; 8,000 telephones; stations--2 am, 2 fm, 1 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army (includes naval and air units); paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 1,230,559; 642,927 fit for military service; 61,418 reach military age (16) annually defense expenditures: 3.1% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: cambodia geography total area: 181,040 km2; land area: 176,520 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than oklahoma land boundaries: 2,572 km total; laos 541 km, thailand 803 km, vietnam 1,228 km coastline: 443 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: offshore islands and three sections of the boundary with vietnam are in dispute; maritime boundary with vietnam not defined; occupied by vietnam on 25 december 1978 climate: tropical; rainy, monsoon season (may to october); dry season (december to march); little seasonal temperature variation terrain: mostly low, flat plains; mountains in southwest and north natural resources: timber, gemstones, some iron ore, manganese, phosphates, hydropower potential land use: 16% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 76% forest and woodland; 4% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: a land of paddies and forests dominated by mekong river and tonle sap note: buffer between thailand and vietnam people population: 6,991,107 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 39 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 16 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 128 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 47 years male, 50 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cambodian(s); adjective--cambodian ethnic divisions: 90% khmer (cambodian), 5% chinese, 5% other minorities religion: 95% theravada buddhism, 5% other language: khmer (official), french literacy: 48% labor force: 2.5-3.0 million; 80% agriculture (1988 est.) organized labor: kampuchea federation of trade unions (fsc); under government control government long-form name: none type: disputed between the coalition government of democratic kampuchea (cgdk) led by prince norodom sihanouk and the people's republic of kampuchea (prk) led by heng samrin capital: phnom penh administrative divisions: 18 provinces (khet, singular and plural) and 1 autonomous municipality* (rottatheanei, singular and plural); batdambang, kampong cham, kampong chhnang, kampong spoe, kampong thum, kampot, kandal, kaoh kong, kracheh, mondol kiri, phnum penh*, pouthisat, preah vihear, prey veng, rotanokiri, siemreab-otdar meanchey, stoeng treng, svay rieng, takev; note--there may be a new province of banteay meanchey and siemreab-otdar meanchey may have been divided into two provinces named siemreab and otdar meanchey independence: 9 november 1953 (from france) constitution: 27 june 1981 national holidays: cgdk--independence day, 17 april (1975); prk--liberation day, 7 january (1979) executive branch: cgdk--president, prime minister; prk--chairman of the council of state, council of state, chairman of the council of ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: cgdk--none; prk--unicameral national assembly judicial branch: cgdk--none; prk--supreme people's court leaders: chief of state--cgdk--president prince norodom sihanouk (since na july 1982); prk--chairman of the council of state heng samrin (since 27 june 1981); head of government--cgdk--prime minister son sann (since na july 1982); prk--chairman of the council of ministers hun sen (since 14 january 1985) political parties and leaders: cgdk--three resistance groups including democratic kampuchea (dk, also known as the khmer rouge) under khieu samphan, khmer people's national liberation front (kpnlf) under son sann, and national united front for an independent, neutral, peaceful, and cooperative cambodia (funcinpec) under prince norodom sihanouk; prk--kampuchean people's revolutionary party (kprp) led by heng samrin suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: cgdk--none; prk--national assembly--last held 1 may 1981; in february 1986 the assembly voted to extend its term for five years (next to be held by march 1990); results--kprp is the only party; seats--(123 total) kprp 123 member of: adb, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, irc, itu, mekong committee (inactive), nam, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto for cgdk; none for prk diplomatic representation: none flag: cgdk--red with the yellow silhouette of a stylized three-towered temple representing angkor wat in the center; non-communists--three horizontal bands of blue, red (double width), and blue with a white stylized temple representing angkor wat centered on the red band; prk--red with the yellow silhouette of a stylized five-towered temple representing angkor wat in the center economy overview: cambodia is a desperately poor country whose economic development has been stymied by deadly political infighting. the economy is based on agriculture and related industries. over the past decade cambodia has been slowly recovering from its near destruction by war and political upheaval. it still remains, however, one of the world's poorest countries, with an estimated per capita gdp of about $130. the food situation is precarious; during the 1980s famine has been averted only through international relief. in 1986 the production level of rice, the staple food crop, was able to meet only 80% of domestic needs. the biggest success of the nation's recovery program has been in new rubber plantings and in fishing. industry, other than rice processing, is almost nonexistent. foreign trade is primarily with the ussr and vietnam. statistical data on the economy continues to be sparse and unreliable. gdp: $890 million, per capita $130; real growth rate 0% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na inflation rate (consumer prices): na% exports: $32 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--natural rubber, rice, pepper, wood; partners--vietnam, ussr, eastern europe, japan, india imports: $147 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--international food aid; fuels, consumer goods; partners--vietnam, ussr, eastern europe, japan, india external debt: $600 million (1989) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 126,000 kw capacity; 150 million kwh produced, 21 kwh per capita (1989) industries: rice milling, fishing, wood and wood products, rubber, cement, gem mining agriculture: mainly subsistence farming except for rubber plantations; main crops--rice, rubber, corn; food shortages--rice, meat, vegetables, dairy products, sugar, flour aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $719 million; western (non-us) countries (1970-85), $270 million; communist countries (1970-88), $950 million currency: riel (plural--riels); 1 riel (cr) = 100 sen exchange rates: riels (cr) per us$1--218 (november 1989) 100.00 (1987), 30.00 (1986), 7.00 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 612 km 1.000-meter gauge, government owned highways: 13,351 km total; 2,622 km bituminous; 7,105 km crushed stone, gravel, or improved earth; 3,624 km unimproved earth; some roads in disrepair inland waterways: 3,700 km navigable all year to craft drawing 0.6 meters; 282 km navigable to craft drawing 1.8 meters ports: kampong saom, phnom penh airports: 22 total, 9 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: service barely adequate for government requirements and virtually nonexistent for general public; international service limited to vietnam and other adjacent countries; stations--1 am, no fm, 1 tv defense forces branches: prk--people's republic of kampuchea armed forces; communist resistance forces--national army of democratic kampuchea (khmer rouge); non-communist resistance forces--sihanoukist national army (ans) and khmer people's national liberation front (kpnlf) military manpower: males 15-49, 1,857,129; 1,025,456 fit for military service; 61,649 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: cameroon geography total area: 475,440 km2; land area: 469,440 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than california land boundaries: 4,591 km total; central african republic 797 km, chad 1,094 km, congo 523 km, equatorial guinea 189 km, gabon 298 km, nigeria 1,690 km coastline: 402 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; territorial sea: 50 nm disputes: exact locations of the chad-niger-nigeria and cameroon-chad-nigeria tripoints in lake chad have not been determined, so the boundary has not been demarcated and border incidents have resulted; nigerian proposals to reopen maritime boundary negotiations and redemarcate the entire land boundary have been rejected by cameroon climate: varies with terrain from tropical along coast to semiarid and hot in north terrain: diverse with coastal plain in southwest, dissected plateau in center, mountains in west, plains in north natural resources: crude oil, bauxite, iron ore, timber, hydropower potential land use: 13% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 18% meadows and pastures; 54% forest and woodland; 13% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recent volcanic activity with release of poisonous gases; deforestation; overgrazing; desertification note: sometimes referred to as the hinge of africa people population: 11,092,470 (july 1990), growth rate 2.7% (1990) birth rate: 42 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 120 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 49 years male, 53 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cameroonian(s); adjective--cameroonian ethnic divisions: over 200 tribes of widely differing background; 31% cameroon highlanders, 19% equatorial bantu, 11% kirdi, 10% fulani, 8% northwestern bantu, 7% eastern nigritic, 13% other african, less than 1% non-african religion: 51% indigenous beliefs, 33% christian, 16% muslim language: english and french (official), 24 major african language groups literacy: 56.2% labor force: na; 74.4% agriculture, 11.4% industry and transport, 14.2% other services (1983); 50% of population of working age (15-64 years) (1985) organized labor: under 45% of wage labor force government long-form name: republic of cameroon type: unitary republic; one-party presidential regime capital: yaounde administrative divisions: 10 provinces; adamaoua, centre, est, extreme-nord, littoral, nord, nord-ouest, ouest, sud, sud-ouest independence: 1 january 1960 (from un trusteeship under french administration; formerly french cameroon) constitution: 20 may 1972 legal system: based on french civil law system, with common law influence; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 20 may (1972) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government president paul biya (since 6 november 1982) political parties and leaders: only party--cameroon people's democratic movement (rdpc), paul biya, president suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 24 april 1988 (next to be held april 1993); results--president paul biya reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held 24 april 1988 (next to be held april 1993); results--rdpc is the only party; seats--(180 total) rdpc 180 communists: no communist party or significant number of sympathizers other political or pressure groups: cameroon people's union (upc), remains an illegal group with its factional leaders in exile member of: acp, afdb, ccc, eama, eca, eib (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itu, lake chad basin commission, nam, niger river commission, oau, oic, udeac, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador paul pondi; chancery at 2349 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-8790 through 8794; us--ambassador frances cook; embassy at rue nachtigal, yaounde (mailing address is b. p. 817, yaounde); telephone p237o 234014; there is a us consulate general in douala flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), red, and yellow with a yellow five-pointed star centered in the red band; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: over the past decade the economy has registered a remarkable performance because of the development of an offshore oil industry. real gdp growth annually averaged 10% from 1978 to 1985. in 1986 cameroon had one of the highest levels of income per capita in tropical africa, with oil revenues picking up the slack as growth in other sectors softened. because of the sharp drop in oil prices, however, the economy is now experiencing serious budgetary difficulties and balance-of-payments disequalibrium. oil reserves currently being exploited will be depleted in the early 1990s, so ways must be found to boost agricultural and industrial exports in the medium term. the sixth cameroon development plan (1986-91) stresses balanced development and designates agriculture as the basis of the country's economic future. gdp: $12.9 billion, per capita $955; real growth rate 8.6% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.6% (fy88) unemployment rate: 7% (1985) budget: revenues $2.17 billion; expenditures $2.17 billion, including capital expenditures of $833 million (fy88) exports: $2.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum products 56%, coffee, cocoa, timber, manufactures; partners--ec (particularly the netherlands) about 50%, us 3% imports: $2.3 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machines and electrical equipment, transport equipment, chemical products, consumer goods; partners--france 42%, japan 7%, us 4% external debt: $4.9 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 6.4% (fy87) electricity: 752,000 kw capacity; 2,940 million kwh produced, 270 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crude oil products, small aluminum plant, food processing, light consumer goods industries, sawmills agriculture: the agriculture and forestry sectors provide employment for the majority of the population, contributing nearly 25% to gdp and providing a high degree of self-sufficiency in staple foods; commercial and food crops include coffee, cocoa, timber, cotton, rubber, bananas, oilseed, grains, livestock, root starches aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $400 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.9 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $29 million; communist countries (1970-88), $120 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 1,003 km total; 858 km 1.000-meter gauge, 145 km 0.600-meter gauge highways: about 65,000 km total; includes 2,682 km bituminous, 30,000 km unimproved earth, 32,318 km gravel, earth, and improved earth inland waterways: 2,090 km; of decreasing importance ports: douala merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 24,122 grt/33,509 dwt civil air: 5 major transport aircraft airports: 61 total, 54 usable; 10 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good system of open wire, cable, troposcatter, and radio relay; 26,000 telephones; stations--10 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: army, navy, air force; paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 2,553,867; 1,286,831 fit for military service; 121,773 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.7% of gdp, or $219 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: canada geography total area: 9,976,140 km2; land area: 9,220,970 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than us land boundaries: 8,893 km with us (includes 2,477 km with alaska) coastline: 243,791 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary disputes with france (st. pierre and miquelon) and us climate: varies from temperate in south to subarctic and arctic in north terrain: mostly plains with mountains in west and lowlands in southeast natural resources: nickel, zinc, copper, gold, lead, molybdenum, potash, silver, fish, timber, wildlife, coal, crude oil, natural gas land use: 5% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 35% forest and woodland; 57% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: 80% of population concentrated within 160 km of us border; continuous permafrost in north a serious obstacle to development note: second-largest country in world (after ussr); strategic location between ussr and us via north polar route people population: 26,538,229 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--canadian(s); adjective--canadian ethnic divisions: 40% british isles origin, 27% french origin, 20% other european, 1.5% indigenous indian and eskimo religion: 46% roman catholic, 16% united church, 10% anglican language: english and french (both official) literacy: 99% labor force: 13,380,000; services 75%, manufacturing 14%, agriculture 4%, construction 3%, other 4% (1988) organized labor: 30.6% of labor force; 39.6% of nonagricultural paid workers government long-form name: none type: confederation with parliamentary democracy capital: ottawa administrative divisions: 10 provinces and 2 territories*; alberta, british columbia, manitoba, new brunswick, newfoundland, northwest territories*, nova scotia, ontario, prince edward island, quebec, saskatchewan, yukon territory* independence: 1 july 1867 (from uk) constitution: amended british north america act 1867 patriated to canada 17 april 1982; charter of rights and unwritten customs legal system: based on english common law, except in quebec, where civil law system based on french law prevails; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: canada day, 1 july (1867) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of commons judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general raymond john hnatshyn (since 29 january 1990); head of government--prime minister (martin) brian mulroney (since 4 september 1984); deputy prime minister donald frank mazankowski (since na june 1986) political parties and leaders: progressive conservative, brian mulroney; liberal, john turner; new democratic, audrey mclaughlin suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of commons--last held 21 november 1988 (next to be held by november 1993); results--progressive conservative 43.0%, liberal 32%, new democratic party 20%, other 5%; seats--(295 total) progressive conservative 170, liberal 82, new democratic party 43 communists: 3,000 member of: adb, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, dac, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, nato, oas, oecd, paho, un, unctad, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador derek burney; chancery at 1746 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 785-1400; there are canadian consulates general in atlanta, boston, buffalo, chicago, cleveland, dallas, detroit, los angeles, minneapolis, new york, philadelphia, san francisco, and seattle; us--ambassador edward n. ney; embassy at 100 wellington street, k1p 5t1, ottawa (mailing address is p. o. box 5000, ogdensburg, ny 13669); telephone (613) 238-5335; there are us consulates general in calgary, halifax, montreal, quebec, toronto, and vancouver flag: three vertical bands of red (hoist side), white (double width, square), and red with a red maple leaf centered in the white band economy overview: as an affluent, high-tech industrial society, canada today closely resembles the us in per capita output, market-oriented economic system, and pattern of production. since world war ii the impressive growth of the manufacturing, mining, and service sectors has transformed the nation from a largely rural economy into one primarily industrial and urban. in the 1980s canada registered one of the highest rates of growth among the oecd nations, averaging about 4%. with its great natural resources, skilled labor force, and modern capital plant, canada has excellent economic prospects. in mid-1990, however, the long-simmering problems between englishand french-speaking areas became so acute that observers spoke openly of a possible split in the confederation; foreign investors were becoming edgy. gdp: $513.6 billion, per capita $19,600; real growth rate 2.9% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.0% (1989) unemployment rate: 7.5% (1989) budget: revenues $79.2 billion; expenditures $102.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.8 billion (fy88 est.) exports: $127.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--newsprint, wood pulp, timber, grain, crude petroleum, natural gas, ferrous and nonferrous ores, motor vehicles; partners--us, japan, uk, frg, other ec, ussr imports: $116.5 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--processed foods, beverages, crude petroleum, chemicals, industrial machinery, motor vehicles, durable consumer goods, electronic computers; partners--us, japan, uk, frg, other ec, taiwan, south korea, mexico external debt: $247 billion (1987) industrial production: growth rate 2.3% (1989) electricity: 103,746,000 kw capacity; 472,580 million kwh produced, 17,960 kwh per capita (1989) industries: processed and unprocessed minerals, food products, wood and paper products, transportation equipment, chemicals, fish products, petroleum and natural gas agriculture: accounts for 3% of gdp; one of the world's major producers and exporters of grain (wheat and barley); key source of us agricultural imports; large forest resources cover 35% of total land area; commercial fisheries provide annual catch of 1.5 million metric tons, of which 75% is exported illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the domestic drug market aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $2.2 billion currency: canadian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 canadian dollar (can$) = 100 cents exchange rates: canadian dollars (can$) per us$1--1.1714 (january 1990), 1.1840 (1989), 1.2307 (1988), 1.3260 (1987), 1.3895 (1986), 1.3655 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 80,095 km total; 79,917 km 1.435-meter standard gauge (includes 129 km electrified); 178 km 0.915-meter narrow gauge (mostly unused); two major transcontinental freight railway systems--canadian national (government owned) and canadian pacific railway; passenger service--via (government operated) highways: 884,272 km total; 712,936 km surfaced (250,023 km paved), 171,336 km earth inland waterways: 3,000 km, including st. lawrence seaway pipelines: oil, 23,564 km total crude and refined; natural gas, 74,980 km ports: halifax, montreal, quebec, saint john (new brunswick), st. john's (newfoundland), toronto, vancouver merchant marine: 78 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 555,749 grt/774,914 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 5 short-sea passenger, 2 passenger-cargo, 12 cargo, 2 railcar carrier, 1 refrigerated cargo, 8 roll-on/roll-off, 1 container, 29 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 6 chemical tanker, 1 specialized tanker, 10 bulk; note--does not include ships used exclusively in the great lakes ships civil air: 636 major transport aircraft; air canada is the major carrier airports: 1,359 total, 1,117 usable; 442 with permanent-surface runways; 4 with runways over 3,659 m; 30 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 322 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent service provided by modern media; 18.0 million telephones; stations--900 am, 29 fm, 53 (1,400 repeaters) tv; 5 coaxial submarine cables; over 300 satellite earth stations operating in intelsat (including 4 atlantic ocean and 1 pacific ocean) and domestic systems defense forces branches: mobile command, maritime command, air command, communications command, canadian forces europe, training commands military manpower: males 15-49, 7,174,119; 6,251,492 fit for military service; 187,894 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 2.0% of gdp, or $10 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: cape verde geography total area: 4,030 km2; land area: 4,030 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than rhode island land boundaries: none coastline: 965 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: temperate; warm, dry, summer precipitation very erratic terrain: steep, rugged, rocky, volcanic natural resources: salt, basalt rock, pozzolana, limestone, kaolin, fish land use: 9% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; negl% forest and woodland; 85% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to prolonged droughts; harmattan wind can obscure visibility; volcanically and seismically active; deforestation; overgrazing note: strategic location 500 km from african coast near major north-south sea routes; important communications station; important sea and air refueling site people population: 374,984 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 49 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 65 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 59 years male, 63 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cape verdean(s); adjective--cape verdean ethnic divisions: about 71% creole (mulatto), 28% african, 1% european religion: roman catholicism fused with indigenous beliefs language: portuguese and crioulo, a blend of portuguese and west african words literacy: 48% (1986) labor force: 102,000 (1985 est.); 57% agriculture (mostly subsistence), 29% services, 14% industry (1981); 51% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: trade unions of cape verde unity center (untc-cs) closely associated with ruling party government long-form name: republic of cape verde type: republic capital: praia administrative divisions: 12 districts (concelhos, singular--concelho); boa vista, brava, fogo, maio, paul, praia, ribeira grande, sal, santa catarina, sao nicolau, sao vicente, tarrafal; there may be 2 new districts named porto novo and santa cruz independence: 5 july 1975 (from portugal) constitution: 7 september 1980, amended 12 february 1981 and december 1988 national holiday: independence day, 5 july (1975) executive branch: president, prime minister, deputy minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national people's assembly (assembleia nacional popular) judicial branch: supreme tribunal of justice (supremo tribunal de justia) leaders: chief of state--president aristides maria pereira (since 5 july 1975); head of government--prime minister pedro verona rodrigues pires, (since 5 july 1975); deputy minister aguinaldo liboa ramos (since na february 1990) political parties and leaders: only party--african party for independence of cape verde (paicv), aristides maria pereira, secretary general suffrage: universal at age 15 elections: president--last held 13 january 1986 (next to be held january 1991); results--president aristides maria pereira (paicv) was reelected without opposition; national people's assembly--last held 7 december 1985 (next to be held december 1990); results--paicv is the only party; seats--(83 total) paicv 83 communists: a few communists and some sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, ipu, itu, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador jose luis fernandes lopes; chancery at 3415 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20007; telephone (202) 965-6820; there is a cape verdean consulate general in boston; us--ambassador terry mcnamara; embassy at rua hojl ya yenna 81, praia (mailing address is c. p. 201, praia); telephone p238o 614-363 or 253 flag: two equal horizontal bands of yellow (top) and green with a vertical red band on the hoist side; in the upper portion of the red band is a black five-pointed star framed by two corn stalks and a yellow clam shell; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia; similar to the flag of guinea-bissau which is longer and has an unadorned black star centered in the red band economy overview: cape verde's low per capita gdp reflects a poor natural resource base, a 17-year drought, and a high birth rate. the economy is service oriented, with commerce, transport, and public services accounting for 60% of gdp during the period 1984-86. although nearly 70% of the population lives in rural areas, agriculture's share of gdp is only 16%; the fishing and manufacturing sectors are 4% each. about 90% of food must be imported. the fishing potential of the islands is not fully exploited (the fish catch--mostly lobster and tuna--came to only 10,000 tons in 1985). cape verde annually runs a high trade deficit, financed by remittances from emigrants, cash grants, food aid, and foreign loans. gdp: $158 million, per capita $494; real growth rate 6.1% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.8% (1987) unemployment rate: 25% (1988) budget: revenues $80 million; expenditures $87 million, including capital expenditures of $45 million (1988 est.) exports: $8.9 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--fish, bananas, salt; partners--portugal, angola, algeria, belgium/luxembourg, italy imports: $124 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--petroleum, foodstuffs, consumer goods, industrial products; partners--portugal, netherlands, spain, france, us, frg external debt: $140 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 0% (1986 est.) electricity: 14,000 kw capacity; 18 million kwh produced, 50 kwh per capita (1989) industry: fish processing, salt mining, clothing factories, ship repair agriculture: accounts for 16% of gdp; largely subsistence farming; bananas are the only export crop; other crops--corn, beans, sweet potatoes, coffee; growth potential of agricultural sector limited by poor soils and limited rainfall; annual food imports required; fish catch provides for both domestic consumption and small exports aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy75-88), $83 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $540 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $12 million; communist countries (1970-88), $36 million currency: cape verdean escudo (plural--escudos); 1 cape verdean escudo (cvesc) = 100 centavos exchange rates: cape verdean escudos (cvesc) per us$1--72.31 (february 1990), 74.86 (december 1989), 72.01 (1988), 72.5 (1987), 76.56 (1986), 85.38 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications ports: mindelo and praia merchant marine: 5 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 9,308 grt/16,172 dwt civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 6 total, 6 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: interisland radio relay system, high-frequency radio to mainland portugal and guinea-bissau; 1,740 telephones; stations--5 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 2 coaxial submarine cables; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: people's revolutionary armed forces (farp); army, navy, and air force are separate components of farp military manpower: males 15-49, 68,776; 40,731 fit for military service defense expenditures: 11.8% of gdp (1981) ---------------------------------------------------country: cayman islands (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 260 km2; land area: 260 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 1.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 160 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical marine; warm, rainy summers (may to october) and cool, relatively dry winters (november to april) terrain: low-lying limestone base surrounded by coral reefs natural resources: fish, climate and beaches that foster tourism land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 8% meadows and pastures; 23% forest and woodland; 69% other environment: within the caribbean hurricane belt note: important location between cuba and central america people population: 26,356 (july 1990), growth rate 4.3% (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 33 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--caymanian(s); adjective--caymanian ethnic divisions: 40% mixed, 20% white, 20% black, 20% expatriates of various ethnic groups religion: united church (presbyterian and congregational), anglican, baptist, roman catholic, church of god, other protestant denominations language: english literacy: 98% labor force: 8,061; 18.7% service workers, 18.6% clerical, 12.5% construction, 6.7% finance and investment, 5.9% directors and business managers (1979) organized labor: global seaman's union; cayman all trade union government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: george town administrative divisions: 12 districts; bodden town, creek, east end, george town, jacksons, north side, prospect, south town, spot bay, stake bay, west bay, west end independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) legal system: british common law and local statutes constitution: 1959, revised 1972 national holiday: constitution day (first monday in july), 3 july 1989 executive branch: british monarch, governor, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly judicial branch: grand court, cayman islands court of appeal leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor alan james scott (since na 1987); head of government--governor and president of the executive council alan james scott (since na 1987) political parties and leaders: no formal political parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative assembly--last held na november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--percent of vote na; seats--(15 total, 12 elected) communists: none member of: commonwealth diplomatic representation: as a dependent territory of the uk, caymanian interests in the us are represented by the uk; us--none flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the caymanian coat of arms on a white disk centered on the outer half of the flag; the coat of arms includes a pineapple and turtle above a shield with three stars (representing the three islands) and a scroll at the bottom bearing the motto he hath founded it upon the seas economy overview: the economy depends heavily on tourism (70% of gdp and 75% of export earnings) and offshore financial services, with the tourist industry aimed at the luxury market and catering mainly to visitors from north america. about 90% of the islands' food and consumer goods needs must be imported. the caymanians enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the region. gdp: $238 million, per capita $10,000 (1989 est.); real growth rate 12% (1987 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.4% (1986) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $46.2 million; expenditures $47.0 million, including capital expenditures of $9.1 million (1986) exports: $2.2 million (f.o.b., 1986 est.); commodities--turtle products, manufactured consumer goods; partners--mostly us imports: $134 million (c.i.f., 1986 est.); commodities--foodstuffs, manufactured goods; partners--us, trinidad and tobago, uk, netherlands antilles, japan external debt: $15 million (1986) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 59,000 kw capacity; 213 million kwh produced, 8,960 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, banking, insurance and finance, real estate and construction agriculture: minor production of vegetables, fruit, livestock; turtle farming aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $26.7 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $32.2 million currency: caymanian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 caymanian dollar (ci$) = 100 cents exchange rates: caymanian dollars (ci$) per us$1--0.835 (fixed rate) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 160 km of main roads ports: george town, cayman brac merchant marine: 32 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 355,055 grt/576,622 dwt; includes 1 passenger-cargo, 8 cargo, 8 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 4 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 1 specialized tanker, 1 liquefied gas carrier, 8 bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry airports: 3 total; 3 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 35,000 telephones; telephone system uses 1 submarine coaxial cable and 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station to link islands and access international services; stations--2 am, 1 fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: central african republic geography total area: 622,980 km2; land area: 622,980 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than texas land boundaries: 5,203 km total; cameroon 797 km, chad 1,197 km, congo 467 km, sudan 1,165 km, zaire 1,577 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: tropical; hot, dry winters; mild to hot, wet summers terrain: vast, flat to rolling, monotonous plateau; scattered hills in northeast and southwest natural resources: diamonds, uranium, timber, gold, oil land use: 3% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 64% forest and woodland; 28% other environment: hot, dry, dusty harmattan winds affect northern areas; poaching has diminished reputation as one of last great wildlife refuges; desertification note: landlocked; almost the precise center of africa people population: 2,877,365 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 44 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 18 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 141 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 45 years male, 48 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--central african(s); adjective--central african ethnic divisions: about 80 ethnic groups, the majority of which have related ethnic and linguistic characteristics; 34% baya, 27% banda, 10% sara, 21% mandjia, 4% mboum, 4% m'baka; 6,500 europeans, of whom 3,600 are french religion: 24% indigenous beliefs, 25% protestant, 25% roman catholic, 15% muslim, 11% other; animistic beliefs and practices strongly influence the christian majority language: french (official); sangho (lingua franca and national language); arabic, hunsa, swahili literacy: 40.2% labor force: 775,413 (1986 est.); 85% agriculture, 9% commerce and services, 3% industry, 3% government; about 64,000 salaried workers; 55% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: 1% of labor force government long-form name: central african republic (no short-form name); abbreviated car type: republic, one-party presidential regime since 1986 capital: bangui administrative divisions: 14 prefectures (prefectures, singular--prefecture) and 2 economic prefectures* (prefectures economiques, singular--prefecture economique); bamingui-bangoran, basse-kotto, gribingui*, haute-kotto, haute-sangha, haut-mbomou, kemo-gribingui, lobaye, mbomou, nana-mambere, ombella-mpoko, ouaka, ouham, ouham-pende, sangha*, vakaga; note--there may be a new autonomous commune of bangui independence: 13 august 1960 (from france; formerly central african empire) constitution: 21 november 1986 legal system: based on french law national holiday: national day (proclamation of the republic), 1 december (1958) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral congress consists of an upper house or economic and regional council (conseil economique et regional) and a lower house or national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president andre-dieudonne kolingba (since 1 september 1981) political parties and leaders: only party--centrafrican democrtic rally party (rdc), andre-dieudonne kolingba suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 21 november 1986 (next to be held november 1993); results--president kolingba was reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held 31 july 1987 (next to be held july 1992); results--rdc is the only party; seats--(total) rdc 52 communists: small number of communist sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, ccc, conference of east and central african states, eama, eca, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, ocam, udeac, ueac, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador jean-pierre sohahong-kombet; chancery at 1618 22nd street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-7800 or 7801; us--ambassador daniel h. simpson; embassy at avenue du president david dacko, bangui (mailing address is b. p. 924, bangui); telephone 61-02-00 or 61-25-78, 61-43-33 flag: four equal horizontal bands of blue (top), white, green, and yellow with a vertical red band in center; there is a yellow five-pointed star on the hoist side of the blue band economy overview: the central african republic (car) is one of the poorest countries in africa, with a per capita income of roughly $450 in 1988. subsistence agriculture, including forestry, is the backbone of the economy, with over 70% of the population living in the countryside. in 1988 the agricultural sector generated about 40% of gdp, mining and manufacturing 14%, utilities and construction 4%, and services 41%. agricultural products accounted for about 60% of export earnings and the diamond industry for 30%. important constraints to economic development include the car's landlocked position, a poor transportation infrastructure, and a weak human resource base. multilateral and bilateral development assistance plays a major role in providing capital for new investment. gdp: $1.27 billion, per capita $453; real growth rate 2.0% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.2% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 30% in bangui (1988 est.) budget: revenues $132 million; current expenditures $305 million, including capital expenditures of $na million (1989 est.) exports: $138 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--diamonds, cotton, coffee, timber, tobacco; partners--france, belgium, italy, japan, us imports: $285 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--food, textiles, petroleum products, machinery, electrical equipment, motor vehicles, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, consumer goods, industrial products; partners--france, other ec, japan, algeria, yugoslavia external debt: $660 million (december 1989) industrial production: 1.9% (1987 est.) electricity: 35,000 kw capacity; 84 million kwh produced, 30 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sawmills, breweries, diamond mining, textiles, footwear, assembly of bicycles and motorcycles agriculture: accounts for 40% of gdp; self-sufficient in food production except for grain; commercial crops--cotton, coffee, tobacco, timber; food crops--manioc, yams, millet, corn, bananas aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $44 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.3 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $6 million; communist countries (1970-88), $38 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 22,000 km total; 458 km bituminous, 10,542 km improved earth, 11,000 unimproved earth inland waterways: 800 km; traditional trade carried on by means of shallow-draft dugouts; oubangui is the most important river civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 66 total, 49 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system; network relies primarily on radio relay links, with low-capacity, low-powered radiocommunication also used; 6,000 telephones; stations--1 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 642,207; 335,863 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.8% of gdp, or $23 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: chad geography total area: 1,284,000 km2; land area: 1,259,200 km2 comparative area: slightly more than three times the size of california land boundaries: 5,968 km total; cameroon 1,094 km, central african republic 1,197 km, libya 1,055 km, niger 1,175 km, nigeria 87 km, sudan 1,360 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: libya claims and occupies a small portion of the aozou strip in far north; exact locations of the chad-niger-nigeria and cameroon-chad-nigeria tripoints in lake chad have not been determined--since the boundary has not been demarcated, border incidents have resulted climate: tropical in south, desert in north terrain: broad, arid plains in center, desert in north, mountains in northwest, lowlands in south natural resources: small quantities of crude oil (unexploited but exploration beginning), uranium, natron, kaolin, fish (lake chad) land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 36% meadows and pastures; 11% forest and woodland; 51% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dry, dusty harmattan winds occur in north; drought and desertification adversely affecting south; subject to plagues of locusts note: landlocked; lake chad is the most significant water body in the sahel people population: 5,017,431 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: 42 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 22 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 136 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 38 years male, 40 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--chadian(s); adjective--chadian ethnic divisions: some 200 distinct ethnic groups, most of whom are muslims (arabs, toubou, fulbe, kotoko, hausa, kanembou, baguirmi, boulala, and maba) in the north and center and non-muslims (sara, ngambaye, mbaye, goulaye, moudang, moussei, massa) in the south; some 150,000 nonindigenous, of whom 1,000 are french religion: 44% muslim, 33% christian, 23% indigenous beliefs, animism language: french and arabic (official); sara and sango in south; more than 100 different languages and dialects are spoken literacy: 25.3% labor force: na; 85% agriculture (engaged in unpaid subsistence farming, herding, and fishing) organized labor: about 20% of wage labor force government long-form name: republic of chad type: republic capital: n'djamena administrative divisions: 14 prefectures (prefectures, singular--prefecture); batha, biltine, borkou-ennedi-tibesti, chari-baguirmi, guera, kanem, lac, logone occidental, logone oriental, mayo-kebbi, moyen-chari, ouaddai, salamat, tandjile independence: 11 august 1960 (from france) constitution: 22 december 1989 legal system: based on french civil law system and chadian customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day (founding of the third republic), 7 june (1982) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national consultative council (conseil national consultatif) judicial branch: court of appeal leaders: chief of state and head of government--president hissein habre (since 19 june 1982) political parties and leaders: national union for independence and revolution (unir) established june 1984 with habre as president; numerous dissident groups (most significant opponents have returned to the government since mid-1986) suffrage: universal at age na elections: president--last held 10 december 1989 (next to be held december 1996); results--president habre was reelected without opposition communists: no front organizations or underground party; probably a few communists and some sympathizers other political or pressure groups: na member of: acp, afdb, ceao, conference of east and central african states, eama, eca, ec (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, itu, lake chad basin commission, nam, oau, ocam, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador mahamat ali adoum; chancery at 2002 r steet nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 462-4009; us--ambassador-designate richard w. bogosian; charge d'affaires, julius walker; embassy at avenue felix eboue, n'djamena (mailing address is b. p. 413, n'djamena); telephone p235o (51) 32-69 or 35-13, 28-62, 23-29, 32-29, 30-94, 28-47 flag: three equal vertical bands of blue (hoist side), yellow, and red; similar to the flag of andorra which has a national coat of arms featuring a quartered shield centered in the yellow band; also similar to the flag of romania which has a national coat of arms featuring a mountain landscape centered in the yellow band; design was based on the flag of france economy overview: the climate, geographic location, and lack of infrastructure and natural resources potential make chad one of the most underdeveloped countries in the world. its economy is slowly recovering from the ravaging effects of prolonged civil war, conflict with libya, drought, and food shortages. in 1986 real gdp returned to its 1977 level, with cotton, the major cash crop, accounting for 43% of exports. over 80% of the work force is employed in subsistence farming and fishing. industry is based almost entirely on the processing of agricultural products, including cotton, sugarcane, and cattle. chad is still highly dependent on foreign aid, with its economy in trouble and many regions suffering from shortages. gdp: $902 million, per capita $190; real growth rate 7.0% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.0% (1987) unemployment rate: na budget: revenues $61 million; expenditures $85 million, including capital expenditures of na (1988 est.) exports: $432 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--cotton 43%, cattle 35%, textiles 5%, fish; partners--france, nigeria, cameroon imports: $214 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment 39%, industrial goods 20%, petroleum products 13%, foodstuffs 9%; partners--us, france external debt: $360 million (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 7.0% (1986) electricity: 38,000 kw capacity; 70 million kwh produced, 14 kwh per capita (1989) industries: cotton textile mills, slaughterhouses, brewery, natron (sodium carbonate) agriculture: accounts for 45% of gdp; largely subsistence farming; cotton most important cash crop; food crops include sorghum, millet, peanuts, rice, potatoes, manioc; livestock--cattle, sheep, goats, camels; self-sufficient in food in years of adequate rainfall aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $178 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.2 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $28 million; communist countries (1970-88), $71 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 31,322 km total; 32 km bituminous; 7,300 km gravel and laterite; remainder unimproved inland waterways: 2,000 km navigable civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 71 total, 55 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 24 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of radiocommunication stations for intercity links; 5,000 telephones; stations--3 am, 1 fm, limited tv service; many facilities are inoperative; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie, presidential guard military manpower: males 15-49, 1,163,312; 603,923 fit for military service; 50,255 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 3.5% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: chile geography total area: 756,950 km2; land area: 748,800 km2; includes isla de pascua (easter island) and isla sala y gomez comparative area: slightly smaller than twice the size of montana land boundaries: 6,171 km total; argentina 5,150 km, bolivia 861 km, peru 160 km coastline: 6,435 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 nm; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: short section of the southern boundary with argentina is indefinite; bolivia has wanted a sovereign corridor to the south pacific ocean since the atacama area was lost to chile in 1884; dispute with bolivia over rio lauca water rights; territorial claim in antarctica (chilean antarctic territory) partially overlaps argentine claim climate: temperate; desert in north; cool and damp in south terrain: low coastal mountains; fertile central valley; rugged andes in east natural resources: copper, timber, iron ore, nitrates, precious metals, molybdenum land use: 7% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 16% meadows and pastures; 21% forest and woodland; 56% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: subject to severe earthquakes, active volcanism, tsunami; atacama desert one of world's driest regions; desertification note: strategic location relative to sea lanes between atlantic and pacific oceans (strait of magellan, beagle channel, drake passage) people population: 13,082,842 (july 1990), growth rate 1.6% (1990) birth rate: 21 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 18 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--chilean(s); adjective--chilean ethnic divisions: 95% european and european-indian, 3% indian, 2% other religion: 89% roman catholic, 11% protestant, and small jewish population language: spanish literacy: 94% labor force: 3,840,000; 38.6% services (including 12% government), 31.3% industry and commerce; 15.9% agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 8.7% mining; 4.4% construction (1985) organized labor: 10% of labor force (1989) government long-form name: republic of chile type: republic capital: santiago administrative divisions: 13 regions (regiones, singular--region); aisen del general carlos ibanez del campo, antofagasta, araucania, atacama, biobio, coquimbo, libertador general bernardo o'higgins, los lagos, magallanes y antartica chilena, maule, region metropolitana, tarapaca, valparaiso independence: 18 september 1810 (from spain) constitution: 11 september 1980, effective 11 march 1981; amended 30 july 1989 legal system: based on code of 1857 derived from spanish law and subsequent codes influenced by french and austrian law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 18 september (1810) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso nacional) consisting of an upper house or senate and a lower house or chamber of deputies judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president patricio aylwin (since 11 march 1990) political parties and leaders: national renovation (rn), sergio jarpa, president; radical party (pr), enrique silva cimma; social democratic party (psd), eugenio velasco; christian democratic party (pdc), andres zaldivar; party for democracy, ricardo lagos; socialist party, clodomiro almeyda; other parties are movement of united popular action (mapu), victor barrueto; christian left (ic), luis maira; communist party of chile (pcch), volodia teitelboim; movement of the revolutionary left (mir) is splintered, no single leader; several leftist and far left parties formed a new coalition in november 1988 with luis maira as president; the 17-party concertation of parties for democracy backed patricio aylwin's presidential candidacy in december 1989 suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 14 december 1989 (next to be held december 1993 or january 1994); results--patricio aylwin 55.2%, hernan buchi 29.4%, other 15.4%; senate--last held 14 december 1989 (next to be held december 1993 or january 1994); seats--(47 total, 38 elected) 17-party concertation of parties for democracy 22; chamber of deputies--last held 14 december 1989 (next to be held december 1993 or january 1994); seats--(120 total) concertation of parties for democracy 69 communists: 120,000 when pcch was legal in 1973; 50,000 (est.) active militants other political or pressure groups: revitalized university student federations at all major universities dominated by opposition political groups; labor--united labor central (cut) includes trade unionists from the country's five-largest labor confederations; roman catholic church member of: ccc, cipec, ecosoc, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, laia, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador octavio errazuriz; chancery at 1732 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 785-1746; there are chilean consulates general in chicago, houston, los angeles, miami, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador charles a. gillespie, jr.; embassy at codina building, 1343 agustinas, santiago (mailing address is apo miami 34033); telephone p56o (2) 710133 or 710190, 710326, 710375 flag: two equal horizontal bands of white (top) and red; there is a blue square the same height as the white band at the hoist-side end of the white band; the square bears a white five-pointed star in the center; design was based on the us flag economy overview: in 1989 the economy grew at the rate of 9.9%, reflecting substantial growth in industry, agriculture, and construction. copper accounts for nearly 50% of export revenues; chile's economic well-being thus remains highly dependent on international copper prices. unemployment and inflation rates have declined from their peaks in 1982 to 5.3% and 21.4%, respectively, in 1989. the major long-term economic problem is how to sustain growth in the face of political uncertainties. gdp: $25.3 billion, per capita $1,970; real growth rate 9.9% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 21.4% (1989) unemployment rate: 5.3% (1989) budget: revenues $4.9 billion; expenditures $5.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.6 billion (1986) exports: $7.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--copper 48%, industrial products 33%, molybdenum, iron ore, wood pulp, fishmeal, fruits; partners--ec 34%, us 22%, japan 10%, brazil 7% imports: $4.7 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum, wheat, capital goods, spare parts, raw materials; partners--ec 23%, us 20%, japan 10%, brazil 9% external debt: $16.3 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 7.4% (1989) electricity: 4,044,000 kw capacity; 17,710 million kwh produced, 1,380 kwh per capita (1989) industries: copper, other minerals, foodstuffs, fish processing, iron and steel, wood and wood products agriculture: accounts for about 8% of gdp (including fishing and forestry); major exporter of fruit, fish, and timber products; major crops--wheat, corn, grapes, beans, sugar beets, potatoes, deciduous fruit; livestock products--beef, poultry, wool; self-sufficient in most foods; 1986 fish catch of 5.6 million metric tons net agricultural importer aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $521 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.3 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $386 million currency: chilean peso (plural--pesos); 1 chilean peso (ch$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: chilean pesos (ch$) per us$1--296.68 (january 1990), 267.16 (1989), 245.05 (1988), 219.54 (1987), 193.02 (1986), 161.08 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 8,613 km total; 4,257 km 1.676-meter gauge, 135 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 4,221 km 1.000-meter gauge; electrification, 1,578 km 1.676-meter gauge, 76 km 1.000-meter gauge highways: 79,025 km total; 9,913 km paved, 33,140 km gravel, 35,972 km improved and unimproved earth (1984) inland waterways: 725 km pipelines: crude oil, 755 km; refined products, 785 km; natural gas, 320 km ports: antofagasta, iquique, puerto montt, punta arenas, valparaiso, san antonio, talcahuano, arica merchant marine: 35 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 498,354 grt/804,809 dwt; includes 13 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo, 3 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 3 combination ore/oil, 10 bulk; note--in addition, 1 naval tanker and 1 military transport are sometimes used commercially civil air: 22 major transport aircraft airports: 392 total, 352 usable; 49 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 11 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 57 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern telephone system based on extensive radio relay facilities; 768,000 telephones; stations--159 am, no fm, 131 tv, 11 shortwave; satellite stations--2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 3 domestic defense forces branches: army of the nation, national navy, air force of the nation, carabineros of chile military manpower: males 15-49, 3,491,854; 2,610,048 fit for military service; 118,569 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 4.0% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: china (also see separate taiwan entry) geography total area: 9,596,960 km2; land area: 9,326,410 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than the us land boundaries: 23,213.34 km total; afghanistan 76 km, bhutan 470 km, burma 2,185 km, hong kong 30 km, india 3,380 km, north korea 1,416 km, laos 423 km, macau 0.34 km, mongolia 4,673 km, nepal 1,236 km, pakistan 523 km, ussr 7,520 km, vietnam 1,281 km coastline: 14,500 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: boundary with india; bilateral negotiations are under way to resolve four disputed sections of the boundary with the ussr (pamir, argun, amur, and khabarovsk areas); a short section of the boundary with north korea is indefinite; hong kong is scheduled to become a special administrative region in 1997; portuguese territory of macau is scheduled to become a special administrative region in 1999; sporadic border clashes with vietnam; involved in a complex dispute over the spratly islands with malaysia, philippines, taiwan, and vietnam; maritime boundary dispute with vietnam in the gulf of tonkin; paracel islands occupied by china, but claimed by vietnam and taiwan; claims japanese-administered senkaku-shoto (senkaku islands) climate: extremely diverse; tropical in south to subarctic in north terrain: mostly mountains, high plateaus, deserts in west; plains, deltas, and hills in east natural resources: coal, iron ore, crude oil, mercury, tin, tungsten, antimony, manganese, molybdenum, vanadium, magnetite, aluminum, lead, zinc, uranium, world's largest hydropower potential land use: 10% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 31% meadows and pastures; 14% forest and woodland; 45% other; includes 5% irrigated environment: frequent typhoons (about five times per year along southern and eastern coasts), damaging floods, tsunamis, earthquakes; deforestation; soil erosion; industrial pollution; water pollution; desertification note: world's third-largest country (after ussr and canada) people population: 1,118,162,727 (july 1990), growth rate 1.4% (1990) birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 34 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 69 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--chinese (sing., pl.); adjective--chinese ethnic divisions: 93.3% han chinese; 6.7% zhuang, uygur, hui, yi, tibetan, miao, manchu, mongol, buyi, korean, and other nationalities religion: officially atheist, but traditionally pragmatic and eclectic; most important elements of religion are confucianism, taoism, and buddhism; about 2-3% muslim, 1% christian language: standard chinese (putonghua) or mandarin (based on the beijing dialect); also yue (cantonese), wu (shanghainese), minbei (fuzhou), minnan (hokkien-taiwanese), xiang, gan, hakka dialects, and minority languages (see ethnic divisions) literacy: over 75% labor force: 513,000,000; 61.1% agriculture and forestry, 25.2% industry and commerce, 4.6% construction and mining, 4.5% social services, 4.6% other (1986 est.) organized labor: all-china federation of trade unions (acftu) follows the leadership of the chinese communist party; membership over 80 million or about 65% of the urban work force (1985) government long-form name: people's republic of china; abbreviated prc type: communist party-led state capital: beijing administrative divisions: 23 provinces (sheng, singular and plural), 5 autonomous regions* (zizhiqu, singular and plural), and 3 municipalities** (shi, singular and plural); anhui, beijing**, fujian, gansu, guangdong, guangxi*, guizhou, hainan, hebei, heilongjiang, henan, hubei, hunan, jiangsu, jiangxi, jilin, liaoning, nei mongol*, ningxia*, qinghai, shaanxi, shandong, shanghai**, shanxi, sichuan, tianjin**, xinjiang*, xizang*, yunnan, zhejiang; note--china considers taiwan its 23rd province independence: unification under the qin (ch'in) dynasty 221 bc, qing (ch'ing or manchu) dynasty replaced by the republic on 12 february 1912, people's republic established 1 october 1949 constitution: 4 december 1982 legal system: a complex amalgam of custom and statute, largely criminal law; rudimentary civil code in effect since 1 january 1987; new legal codes in effect since 1 january 1980; continuing efforts are being made to improve civil, administrative, criminal, and commercial law national holiday: national day, 1 october (1949) executive branch: president, vice president, premier, three vice premiers, state council, central military commission (de facto) legislative branch: unicameral national people's congress (quanguo renmin daibiao dahui) judicial branch: supreme people's court leaders: chief of state and head of government (de facto)--deng xiaoping (since mid-1977); chief of state--president yang shangkun (since 8 april 1988); vice president wang zhen (since 8 april 1988); head of government--premier li peng (acting premier since 24 november 1987, premier since 9 april 1988); vice premier yao yilin (since 2 july 1979); vice premier tian jiyun (since 20 june 1983); vice premier wu xueqian (since 12 april 1988) political parties and leaders: only party--chinese communist party (ccp), jiang zemin, general secretary of the central committee suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 8 april 1988 (next to be held march 1993); yang shangkun was elected by the seventh national people's congress; national people's congress--last held na march 1988 (next to be held march 1993); results--ccp is the only party; seats--(2,970 total) ccp 2,970 (indirectly elected) communists: about 45,000,000 party members (1986) other political or pressure groups: such meaningful opposition as exists consists of loose coalitions, usually within the party and government organization, that vary by issue member of: adb, ccc, escap, fao, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, itu, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador zhu qizhen; chancery at 2300 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 328-2500 through 2502; there are chinese consulates general in chicago, houston, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador james r. lilley; embassy at xiu shui bei jie 3, beijing (mailing address is fpo san francisco 96655); telephone p86o (1) 532-3831; there are us consulates general in chengdu, guangzhou, shanghai, and shenyang flag: red with a large yellow five-pointed star and four smaller yellow five-pointed stars (arranged in a vertical arc toward the middle of the flag) in the upper hoist-side corner economy overview: beginning in late 1978 the chinese leadership has been trying to move the economy from the sluggish soviet-style centrally planned economy to a more productive and flexible economy with market elements--but still within the framework of monolithic communist control. to this end the authorities have switched to a system of household responsibility in agriculture in place of the old collectivization, increased the authority of local officials and plant managers in industry, permitted a wide variety of small-scale enterprise in services and light manufacturing, and opened the foreign economic sector to increased trade and joint ventures. the most gratifying result has been a strong spurt in production, particularly in agriculture in the early 1980s. otherwise, the leadership has often experienced in its hybrid system the worst results of socialism (bureaucracy, lassitude, corruption) and of capitalism (windfall gains and stepped-up inflation). beijing thus has periodically backtracked, retightening central controls at intervals and thereby undermining the credibility of the reform process. open inflation and excess demand continue to plague the economy, and political repression, following the crackdown at tiananmen in mid-1989, has curtailed tourism, foreign aid, and new investment by foreign firms. popular resistance and changes in central policy have weakened china's population control program, which is essential to the nation's long-term economic viability. gnp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate 4% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 19.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 3.0% in urban areas (1989) budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na exports: $52.5 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--manufactured goods, agricultural products, oilseeds, grain (rice and corn), oil, minerals; partners--hong kong, us, japan, ussr, singapore, frg (1989) imports: $59.1 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--grain (mostly wheat), chemical fertilizer, steel, industrial raw materials, machinery, equipment; partners--hong kong, japan, us, frg, ussr (1989) external debt: $51 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 8.0% (1989) electricity: 110,000,000 kw capacity; 560,000 million kwh produced, 500 kwh per capita (1989) industries: iron, steel, coal, machine building, armaments, textiles, petroleum agriculture: accounts for 26% of gnp; among the world's largest producers of rice, potatoes, sorghum, peanuts, tea, millet, barley, and pork; commercial crops include cotton, other fibers, and oilseeds; produces variety of livestock products; basically self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 8 million metric tons in 1986 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $220.7 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $11.1 billion currency: yuan (plural--yuan); 1 yuan (y) = 10 jiao exchange rates: yuan (y) per us$1--4.7221 (january 1990), 3.7651 (1989), 3.7221 (1988), 3.7221 (1987), 3.4528 (1986), 2.9367 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: total about 54,000 km common carrier lines; 53,400 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 600 km 1.000-meter gauge; all single track except 11,200 km double track on standard-gauge lines; 6,500 km electrified; 10,000 km industrial lines (gauges range from 0.762 to 1.067 meters) highways: about 980,000 km all types roads; 162,000 km paved roads, 617,200 km gravel/improved earth roads, 200,800 km unimproved natural earth roads and tracks inland waterways: 138,600 km; about 109,800 km navigable pipelines: crude, 6,500 km; refined products, 1,100 km; natural gas, 6,200 km ports: dalian, guangzhou, huangpu, qingdao, qinhuangdao, shanghai, xingang, zhanjiang, ningbo merchant marine: 1,373 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 13,303,685 grt/ 20,092,833 dwt; includes 25 passenger, 41 short-sea passenger, 17 passenger-cargo, 7 cargo/training, 766 cargo, 10 refrigerated cargo, 65 container, 17 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 multifunction barge carriers, 173 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 9 chemical tanker, 237 bulk, 2 vehicle carrier, 1 liquefied gas; note--china beneficially owns an additional 175 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling approximately 5,380,415 dwt that operate under the registry of panama, uk, hong kong, liberia, and malta airports: 330 total, 330 usable; 260 with permanent-surface runways; fewer than 10 with runways over 3,500 m; 90 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 200 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: domestic and international services are increasingly available for private use; unevenly distributed internal system serves principal cities, industrial centers, and most townships; 11,000,000 telephones (december 1989); stations--274 am, unknown fm, 202 (2,050 relays) tv; more than 215 million radio receivers; 75 million tvs; satellite earth stations--4 pacific ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, and 55 domestic defense forces branches: chinese people's liberation army (cpla), cpla navy (including marines), cpla air force military manpower: males 15-49, 330,353,665; 184,515,412 fit for military service; 11,594,366 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: $5.28 billion (1988) ---------------------------------------------------country: christmas island (territory of australia) geography total area: 135 km2; land area: 135 km2 comparative area: about 0.8 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 138.9 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical; heat and humidity moderated by trade winds terrain: steep cliffs along coast rise abruptly to central plateau natural resources: phosphate land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: almost completely surrounded by a reef note: located along major sea lanes of indian ocean people population: 2,278 (july 1990), growth rate 0.0% (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--christmas islander(s), adjective--christmas island ethnic divisions: 61% chinese, 25% malay, 11% european, 3% other; no indigenous population religion: na language: english literacy: na% labor force: na; all workers are employees of the phosphate mining company of christmas island, ltd. organized labor: na government long-form name: territory of christmas island type: territory of australia capital: the settlement administrative divisions: none (territory of australia) independence: none (territory of australia) constitution: christmas island act of 1958 legal system: under the authority of the governor general of australia national holiday: na executive branch: british monarch, governor general of australia, administrator, advisory council (cabinet) legislative branch: none judicial branch: none leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--administrator a. d. taylor (since na) communists: none diplomatic representation: none (territory of australia) flag: the flag of australia is used economy overview: phosphate mining is the only significant economic activity, but in november 1987 the australian government announced that the mine would be closed because of labor unrest. plans are under way to build a casino and hotel to develop tourism. gdp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 0% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na exports: $na; commodities--phosphate; partners--australia, nz imports: $na; commodities--na; partners--na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 11,000 kw capacity; 38 million kwh produced, 16,680 kwh per capita (1989) industries: phosphate extraction (near depletion) agriculture: na aid: none currency: australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications ports: flying fish cove airports: 1 usable with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 4,000 radios (1982) defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of australia ---------------------------------------------------country: clipperton island (french possession) geography total area: undetermined comparative area: undetermined land boundaries: none coastline: 11.1 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical terrain: coral atoll natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other (coral) environment: reef about 8 km in circumference note: located 1,120 km southwest of mexico in the north pacific ocean people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: french possession administered by high commissioner of the republic jean montpezat, resident in french polynesia economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: cocos (keeling) islands (territory of australia) geography total area: 14 km2; land area: 14 km2; main islands are west island and home island comparative area: about 24 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 42.6 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: pleasant, modified by the southeast trade winds for about nine months of the year; moderate rainfall terrain: flat, low-lying coral atolls natural resources: fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: two coral atolls thickly covered with coconut palms and other vegetation note: located 1,070 km southwest of sumatra (indonesia) in the indian ocean about halfway between australia and sri lanka people population: 670 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cocos islander(s); adjective--cocos islander(s) ethnic divisions: mostly europeans on west island and cocos malays on home island religion: na language: english literacy: na% labor force: na organized labor: none government long-form name: territory of cocos (keeling) islands type: territory of australia capital: west island administrative divisions: none (territory of australia) independence: none (territory of australia) constitution: cocos (keeling) islands act of 1955 legal system: based upon the laws of australia and local laws national holiday: na executive branch: british monarch, governor general of australia, administrator, chairman of the islands council legislative branch: unicameral islands council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--administrator d. lawrie (since na 1989); chairman of the islands council parson bin yapat (since na) suffrage: na elections: na diplomatic representation: none (territory of australia) flag: the flag of australia is used economy overview: grown throughout the islands, coconuts are the sole cash crop. copra and fresh coconuts are the major export earners. small local gardens and fishing contribute to the food supply, but additional food and most other necessities must be imported from australia. gnp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment: na budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na exports: $na; commodities--copra; partners--australia imports: $na; commodities--foodstuffs; partners--australia external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: na kw capacity; na million kwh produced, na kwh per capita industries: copra products agriculture: gardens provide vegetables, bananas, pawpaws, coconuts aid: none currency: australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications ports: none; lagoon anchorage only airports: 1 airfield with permanent-surface runway, 2,440-3,659 m; airport on west island is a link in service between australia and south africa telecommunications: 250 radios (1985); linked by telephone, telex, and facsimile communications via satellite with australia; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of australia ---------------------------------------------------country: colombia geography total area: 1,138,910 km2; land area: 1,038,700 km2; includes isla de malpelo, roncador cay, serrana bank, and serranilla bank comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of montana land boundaries: 7,408 km total; brazil 1,643 km, ecuador 590 km, panama 225 km, peru 2,900, venezuela 2,050 km coastline: 3,208 km total (1,448 km north pacific ocean; 1,760 caribbean sea) maritime claims: continental shelf: not specified; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary dispute with venezuela in the gulf of venezuela; territorial dispute with nicaragua over archipelago de san andres y providencia and quita sueno bank climate: tropical along coast and eastern plains; cooler in highlands terrain: mixture of flat coastal lowlands, plains in east, central highlands, some high mountains natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, coal, iron ore, nickel, gold, copper, emeralds land use: 4% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 29% meadows and pastures; 49% forest and woodland; 16% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: highlands subject to volcanic eruptions; deforestation; soil damage from overuse of pesticides; periodic droughts note: only south american country with coastlines on both north pacific ocean and caribbean sea people population: 33,076,188 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: 27 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 38 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 73 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--colombian(s); adjective--colombian ethnic divisions: 58% mestizo, 20% white, 14% mulatto, 4% black, 3% mixed black-indian, 1% indian religion: 95% roman catholic language: spanish literacy: 88% (1987 est.), indians about 40% labor force: 11,000,000 (1986); 53% services, 26% agriculture, 21% industry (1981) organized labor: 1,400,000 members (1987), about 12% of labor force; the communist-backed unitary workers central or cut is the largest labor organization, with about 725,000 members (including all affiliate unions) government long-form name: republic of colombia type: republic; executive branch dominates government structure capital: bogota administrative divisions: 23 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento), 5 commissariats* (comisarias, singular--comisaria), and 4 intendancies** (intendencias, singular--intendencia); amazonas*, antioquia, arauca**, atlantico, bolivar, boyaca, caldas, caqueta, casanare**, cauca, cesar, choco, cordoba, cundinamarca, guainia*, guaviare*, huila, la guajira, magdalena, meta, narino, norte de santander, putumayo**, quindio, risaralda, san andres y providencia**, santander, sucre, tolima, valle del cauca, vaupes*, vichada*; note--there may be a new special district (distrito especial) named bogota independence: 20 july 1810 (from spain) constitution: 4 august 1886, with amendments codified in 1946 and 1968 legal system: based on spanish law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 20 july (1810) executive branch: president, presidential designate, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral congress (congreso) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of representatives (camara de representantes) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justica) leaders: chief of state and head of government--virgilio barco vargas (since 7 august 1986; term ends august 1990); presidential designate victor mosquera chaux (since 13 october 1986); president-elect cesar gaviria trujillo (since 27 may 1990, takes office 7 august 1990) political parties and leaders: liberal party--cesar gaviria trujillo, virgilio barco vargas, alfonso lopez michelson, julio cesar turbay; conservative party--misael pastrana borrero, alvaro gomez hurtado; patriotic union (up), is a legal political party formed by revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc) and colombian communist party (pcc), bernardo jaramillo ossa; 19th of april movement (m-19), rodrigo lloreda suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 27 may 1990 (next to be held may 1994); results--cesar gaviria trujillo (liberal) 47%, alvaro gomez hurtado (conservative) 24%, antonio novarro wolff (conservative) 13%, rodrigo lloreda (m-19) 12%; senate--last held 11 march 1990 (next to be held march 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(114 total) liberal 68, conservative 45, up 1; house of representatives last held 11 march 1990 (next to be held march 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(199 total) liberal 107, conservative 82, up 10 communists: 18,000 members (est.), including communist party youth organization (juco) other political or pressure groups: colombian communist party (pcc), gilberto vieira white; communist party/marxist-leninist (pcc/ml), chinese-line communist party; revolutionary armed forces of colombia (farc); national liberation army (eln); people's liberation army (epl) member of: fao, g-77, gatt, group of eight, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itu, laia, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador victor mosquera; chancery at 2118 leroy place nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 387-8338; there are colombian consulates general in chicago, houston, miami, new orleans, new york, san francisco, and san juan (puerto rico), and consulates in atlanta, boston, detroit, ft. lauderdale, los angeles, san diego, and tampa; us--ambassador thomas e. mcnamara; embassy at calle 38, no.8-61, bogota (mailing address is apo miami 34038); telephone p57o (1) 285-1300 or 1688; there is a us consulate in barranquilla flag: three horizontal bands of yellow (top, double-width), blue, and red; similar to the flag of ecuador which is longer and bears the ecuadorian coat of arms superimposed in the center economy overview: economic activity has slowed gradually since 1986, but growth rates remain high by latin american standards. conservative economic policies have encouraged investment and kept inflation and unemployment under 30% and 10%, respectively. the rapid development of oil, coal, and other nontraditional industries over the past four years has helped to offset the decline in coffee prices--colombia's major export. the collapse of the international coffee agreement in the summer of 1989, a troublesome rural insurgency, and drug-related violence dampen prospects for future growth. gdp: $35.4 billion, per capita $1,110; real growth rate 3.7% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 27% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 9.0% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $4.39 billion; current expenditures $3.93 billion, capital expenditures $l.03 billion (1989 est.) exports: $5.76 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--coffee 30%, petroleum 24%, coal, bananas, fresh cut flowers; partners--us 36%, ec 21%, japan 5%, netherlands 4%, sweden 3% imports: $5.02 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--industrial equipment, transportation equipment, foodstuffs, chemicals, paper products; partners--us 34%, ec 16%, brazil 4%, venezuela 3%, japan 3% external debt: $17.5 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 2.0% (1989 est.) electricity: 9,250,000 kw capacity; 35,364 million kwh produced, 1,110 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, food processing, oil, clothing and footwear, beverages, chemicals, metal products, cement; mining--gold, coal, emeralds, iron, nickel, silver, salt agriculture: accounts for 22% of gdp; crops make up two-thirds and livestock one-third of agricultural output; climate and soils permit a wide variety of crops, such as coffee, rice, tobacco, corn, sugarcane, cocoa beans, oilseeds, vegetables; forest products and shrimp farming are becoming more important illicit drugs: major illicit producer of cannabis and coca for the international drug trade; key supplier of marijuana and cocaine to the us and other international drug markets; drug production and trafficking accounts for an estimated 4% of gdp and 28% of foreign exchange earnings aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.6 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.9 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $399 million currency: colombian peso (plural--pesos); 1 colombian peso (col$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: colombian pesos (col$) per us$1--439.68 (january 1990), 382.57 (1989), 299.17 (1988), 242.61 (1987), 194.26 (1986), 142.31 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,563 km, all 0.914-meter gauge, single track highways: 75,450 km total; 9,350 km paved, 66,100 km earth and gravel surfaces inland waterways: 14,300 km, navigable by river boats pipelines: crude oil, 3,585 km; refined products, 1,350 km; natural gas, 830 km; natural gas liquids, 125 km ports: barranquilla, buenaventura, cartagena, covenas, san andres, santa marta, tumaco merchant marine: 34 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 334,854 grt/487,438 dwt; includes 23 cargo, 1 chemical tanker, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 9 bulk civil air: 106 major transport aircraft airports: 673 total, 622 usable; 66 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 10 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 124 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: nationwide radio relay system; 1,890,000 telephones; stations--413 am, no fm, 33 tv, 28 shortwave 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations with 2 antennas and 11 domestic satellite stations defense forces branches: armed forces include police (policia nacional) and military--army (ejercito nacional), air force (fuerza aerea de colombia), navy (armada nacional) military manpower: males 15-49, 8,768,072; 5,953,729 fit for military service; 354,742 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.9% of gdp, or $700 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: comoros geography total area: 2,170 km2; land area: 2,170 km2 comparative area: slightly more than 12 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 340 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims french-administered mayotte climate: tropical marine; rainy season (november to may) terrain: volcanic islands, interiors vary from steep mountains to low hills natural resources: negligible land use: 35% arable land; 8% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 16% forest and woodland; 34% other environment: soil degradation and erosion; deforestation; cyclones possible during rainy season note: important location at northern end of mozambique channel people population: 460,188 (july 1990), growth rate 3.5% (1990) birth rate: 48 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 12 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 89 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 54 years male, 58 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--comoran(s); adjective--comoran ethnic divisions: antalote, cafre, makoa, oimatsaha, sakalava religion: 86% sunni muslim, 14% roman catholic language: shaafi islam (a swahili dialect), malagasy, french literacy: 15% labor force: 140,000 (1982); 80% agriculture, 3% government; 51% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: na government long-form name: federal islamic republic of the comoros type: independent republic capital: moroni administrative divisions: 3 islands; anjouan, grande comore, moheli; note--there may also be 4 municipalities named domoni, fomboni, moroni, and mutsamudu independence: 6 july 1975 (from france) constitution: 1 october 1978, amended october 1982 and january 1985 legal system: french and muslim law in a new consolidated code national holiday: independence day, 6 july (1975) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral federal assembly (assemblee federale) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president said mohamed djohar (since 11 march 1990) political parties: comoran union for progress (udzima), said mohamed djohar, president; national union for democracy (undc), mohamed taki suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 11 march 1990 (next to be held march 1996); results--said mohamed djohar (udzima) 55%; mohamed taki abdulkarim (undc) 45%; federal assembly--last held 22 march 1987 (next to be held march 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(42 total) udzima 42 member of: acp, afdb, fao, g-77, ibrd, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador amini ali moumin; chancery (temporary) at the comoran permanent mission to the un, 336 east 45th street, 2nd floor, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 972-8010; us--ambassador howard k. walker, resides in antananarivo (madagascar); embassy at address na, moroni (mailing address b. p. 1318, moroni); telephone 73-12-03 flag: green with a white crescent placed diagonally (closed side of the crescent points to the upper hoist-side corner of the flag); there are four white five-pointed stars placed in a line between the points of the crescent; the crescent, stars, and color green are traditional symbols of islam; the four stars represent the four main islands of the archipelago--mwali, njazidja, nzwani, and mayotte (which is a territorial collectivity of france, but claimed by the comoros) economy overview: one of the world's poorest countries, comoros is made up of several islands that have poor transportation links, a young and rapidly increasing population, and few natural resources. the low educational level of the labor force contributes to a low level of economic activity, high unemployment, and a heavy dependence on foreign technical assistance. agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is the leading sector of the economy. it contributes about 40% to gdp, employs 80% of the labor force, and provides most of the exports. the country is not self-sufficient in food production, and rice, the main staple, accounts for 90% of imports. during the period 1982-86 the industrial sector grew at an annual average rate of 5.3%, but its contribution to gdp was less than 4% in 1986. despite major investment in the tourist industry, which accounts for about 25% of gdp, growth has stagnated since 1983. gdp: $207 million, per capita $475; real growth rate 0.1% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.3% (1986) unemployment rate: over 16% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $75.2 million; expenditures $77.9 million, including capital expenditures of $4.8 million (1988 est.) exports: $12 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--vanilla, cloves, perfume oil, copra; partners--us 53%, france 41%, africa 4%, frg 2% imports: $52 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--rice and other foodstuffs, cement, petroleum products, consumer goods; partners--europe 62% (france 22%, other 40%), africa 5%, pakistan, china external debt: $238 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.4% (1988 est.) electricity: 16,000 kw capacity; 24 million kwh produced, 55 kwh per capita (1989) industries: perfume distillation agriculture: accounts for 40% of gdp; most of population works in subsistence agriculture and fishing; plantations produce cash crops for export--vanilla, cloves, perfume essences, and copra; principal food crops--coconuts, bananas, cassava; world's leading producer of essence of ylang-ylang (for perfumes) and second-largest producer of vanilla; large net food importer aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy80-88), $9 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $371 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $22 million; communist countries (1970-88), $18 million currency: comoran franc (plural--francs); 1 comoran franc (cf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: comoran francs (cf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985); note--linked to the french franc at 50 to 1 french franc fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 750 km total; about 210 km bituminous, remainder crushed stone or gravel ports: mutsamudu, moroni civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 4 total, 4 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: sparse system of radio relay and high-frequency radio communication stations for interisland and external communications to madagascar and reunion; over 1,800 telephones; stations--2 am, 1 fm, 1 tv defense forces branches: army, presidential guard, gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 97,504; 58,274 fit for military service defense expenditures: 3% of gdp (1981) ---------------------------------------------------country: congo geography total area: 342,000 km2; land area: 341,500 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than montana land boundaries: 5,504 km total; angola 201 km, cameroon 523 km, central african republic 467 km, gabon 1,903 km, zaire 2,410 km coastline: 169 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm disputes: long section with zaire along the congo river is indefinite (no division of the river or its islands has been made) climate: tropical; rainy season (march to june); dry season (june to october); constantly high temperatures and humidity; particularly enervating climate astride the equator terrain: coastal plain, southern basin, central plateau, northern basin natural resources: petroleum, timber, potash, lead, zinc, uranium, copper, phosphates, natural gas land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 29% meadows and pastures; 62% forest and woodland; 7% other environment: deforestation; about 70% of the population lives in brazzaville, pointe noire, or along the railroad between them people population: 2,242,274 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 110 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 52 years male, 55 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--congolese (sing., pl.); adjective--congolese or congo ethnic divisions: about 15 ethnic groups divided into some 75 tribes, almost all bantu; most important ethnic groups are kongo (48%) in the south, sangha (20%) and m'bochi (12%) in the north, teke (17%) in the center; about 8,500 europeans, mostly french religion: 50% christian, 48% animist, 2% muslim language: french (official); many african languages with lingala and kikongo most widely used literacy: 62.9% labor force: 79,100 wage earners; 75% agriculture, 25% commerce, industry, and government; 51% of population of working age; 40% of population economically active (1985) organized labor: 20% of labor force (1979 est.) government long-form name: people's republic of the congo type: people's republic capital: brazzaville administrative divisions: 9 regions (regions, singular--region); bouenza, cuvette, kouilou, lekoumou, likouala, niari, plateaux, pool, sangha; note--there may be a new capital district of brazzaville independence: 15 august 1960 (from france; formerly congo/brazzaville) constitution: 8 july 1979 legal system: based on french civil law system and customary law national holiday: national day, 15 august (1960) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral people's national assembly (assemblee nationale populaire) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president denis sassou-nguesso (since 8 february 1979); prime minister alphonse poaty-souchlaty (since 6 august 1989) political parties and leaders: only party--congolese labor party (pct), president denis sassou-nguesso, leader suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 26-31 july 1989 (next to be held july 1993); results--president sassou-nguesso unanimously reelected leader of the pct by the party congress, which automatically makes him president; people's national assembly--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held 1993); results--pct is the only party; seats--(153 total) single list of candidates nominated by the pct communists: unknown number of communists and sympathizers other political or pressure groups: union of congolese socialist youth (ujsc), congolese trade union congress (csc), revolutionary union of congolese women (urfc), general union of congolese pupils and students (ugeec) member of: acp, afdb, ccc, conference of east and central african states, eama, eca, eib (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, udeac, ueac, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador benjamin bounkoulou; chancery at 4891 colorado avenue nw, washington dc 20011; telephone (202) 726-5500; us--ambassador-designate james daniel phillips; embassy at avenue amilcar cabral, brazzaville (mailing address is b. p. 1015, brazzaville, or box c, apo new york 09662-0006); telephone 83-20-70 or 83-26-24 flag: red with the national emblem in the upper hoist-side corner; the emblem includes a yellow five-pointed star above a crossed hoe and hammer (like the hammer and sickle design) in yellow, flanked by two curved green palm branches; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: oil has supplanted forestry as the mainstay of the economy, providing about two-thirds of government revenues and exports. in the early 1980s rapidly rising oil revenues enabled congo to finance large-scale development projects with growth averaging 5% annually, one of the highest rates in africa. the world decline in oil prices, however, has forced the government to launch an austerity program to cope with declining receipts and mounting foreign debts. gdp: $2.2 billion, per capita $1,000; real growth rate 3% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $382 million; expenditures $575 million, including capital expenditures of $118 million (1988) exports: $912 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--crude petroleum 72%, lumber, plywood, coffee, cocoa, sugar, diamonds; partners--us, france, other ec imports: $494.4 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--foodstuffs, consumer goods, intermediate manufactures, capital equipment; partners--france, italy, other ec, us, frg, spain, japan, brazil external debt: $4.5 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 5.9% (1987) electricity: 133,000 kw capacity; 300 million kwh produced, 130 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crude oil, cement, sawmills, brewery, sugar mill, palm oil, soap, cigarettes agriculture: accounts for 11% of gdp (including fishing and forestry); cassava accounts for 90% of food output; other crops--rice, corn, peanuts, vegetables; cash crops include coffee and cocoa; forest products important export earner; imports over 90% of food needs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $56 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.1 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $15 million; communist countries (1970-88), $338 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 797 km, 1.067-meter gauge, single track (includes 285 km that are privately owned) highways: 12,000 km total; 560 km bituminous surface treated; 850 km gravel, laterite; 5,350 km improved earth; 5,240 km unimproved roads inland waterways: the congo and ubangi (oubangui) rivers provide 1,120 km of commercially navigable water transport; the rest are used for local traffic only pipelines: crude oil 25 km ports: pointe-noire (ocean port), brazzaville (river port) civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 51 total, 46 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 17 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: services adequate for government use; primary network is composed of radio relay routes and coaxial cables; key centers are brazzaville, pointe-noire, and loubomo; 18,100 telephones; stations--3 am, 1 fm, 4 tv; 1 atlantic ocean satellite station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary national people's militia military manpower: males 15-49, 492,419; 250,478 fit for military service; 23,622 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 4.6% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: cook islands (free association with new zealand) geography total area: 240 km2; land area: 240 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 1.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 120 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or edge of continental margin; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; moderated by trade winds terrain: low coral atolls in north; volcanic, hilly islands in south natural resources: negligible land use: 4% arable land; 22% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 74% other environment: subject to typhoons from november to march note: located 4,500 km south of hawaii in the south pacific ocean people population: 18,187 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 10 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 24 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cook islander(s); adjective--cook islander ethnic divisions: 81.3% polynesian (full blood), 7.7% polynesian and european, 7.7% polynesian and other, 2.4% european, 0.9% other religion: christian, majority of populace members of cook islands christian church language: english literacy: na% labor force: 5,810; agriculture 29%, government 27%, services 25%, industry 15%, and other 4% (1981) organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: self-governing in free association with new zealand; cook islands fully responsible for internal affairs; new zealand retains responsibility for external affairs, in consultation with the cook islands capital: avarua administrative divisions: none independence: became self-governing in free association with new zealand on 4 august 1965 and has the right at any time to move to full independence by unilateral action constitution: 4 august 1965 national holiday: na executive branch: british monarch, representative of the uk, representative of new zealand, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament; note--the unicameral house of arikis (chiefs) advises on traditional matters, but has no legislative powers judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); representative of the uk sir tangaroa tangaroa (since na); representative of new zealand adrian sincock (since na); head of government--prime minister geoffrey henry (since na february 1989); deputy prime minister inatio akaruru (since na) political parties and leaders: cook islands party, geoffrey henry; democratic tumu party, vincent ingram; democratic party, dr. vincent pupuke robati; cook islands labor party, rena jonassen; cook islands people's party, sadaraka sadaraka suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: parliament--last held 19 january 1989 (next to be held by january 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(24 total) cook islands party 12, democratic tumu party 2, opposition coalition (including democratic party) 9, independent 1 member of: adb, escap (associate member), ida, ifc, imf, spec, spf diplomatic representation: none (self-governing in free association with new zealand) flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and a large circle of 15 white five-pointed stars (one for every island) centered in the outer half of the flag economy overview: agriculture provides the economic base. the major export earners are fruit, copra, and clothing. manufacturing activities are limited to a fruit-processing plant and several clothing factories. economic development is hindered by the isolation of the islands from foreign markets and a lack of natural resources and good transportation links. a large trade deficit is annually made up for by remittances from emigrants and from foreign aid. current economic development plans call for exploiting the tourism potential and expanding the fishing industry. gdp: $40.0 million, per capita $2,200 (1988 est.); real growth rate 5.3% (1986-88 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.0% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $33.8 million; expenditures $34.4 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1990 est.) exports: $4.0 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--copra, fresh and canned fruit, clothing; partners--nz 80%, japan imports: $38.7 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, textiles, fuels, timber; partners--nz 49%, japan, australia, us external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 4,800 kw capacity; 15 million kwh produced, 830 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fruit processing, tourism agriculture: export crops--copra, citrus fruits, pineapples, tomatoes, bananas; subsistence crops--yams, taro aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-89), $128 million currency: new zealand dollar (plural--dollars); 1 new zealand dollar (nz$) = 100 cents exchange rates: new zealand dollars (nz$) per us$1--1.6581 (january 1990), 1.6708 (1989), 1.5244 (1988), 1.6886 (1987), 1.9088 (1986), 2.0064 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 187 km total (1980); 35 km paved, 35 km gravel, 84 km improved earth, 33 km unimproved earth ports: avatiu civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 7 total, 5 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--2 am, no fm, no tv; 10,000 radio receivers; 2,052 telephones; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of new zealand ---------------------------------------------------country: coral sea islands (territory of australia) geography total area: undetermined; includes numerous small islands and reefs scattered over a sea area of about 1 million km2, with willis islets the most important comparative area: undetermined land boundaries: none coastline: 3,095 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical terrain: sand and coral reefs and islands (or cays) natural resources: negligible land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other, mostly grass or scrub cover; lihou reef reserve and coringa-herald reserve were declared national nature reserves on 3 august 1982 environment: subject to occasional tropical cyclones; no permanent fresh water; important nesting area for birds and turtles note: the islands are located just off the northeast coast of australia in the coral sea people population: 3 meteorologists government long-form name: coral sea islands territory type: territory of australia administered by the minister for arts, sport, the environment, tourism, and territories graham richardson flag: the flag of australia is used economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorages only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of australia; visited regularly by the royal australian navy; australia has control over the activities of visitors ---------------------------------------------------country: costa rica geography total area: 51,100 km2; land area: 50,660 km2; includes isla del coco comparative area: slightly smaller than west virginia land boundaries: 639 km total; nicaragua 309 km, panama 330 km coastline: 1,290 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; dry season (december to april); rainy season (may to november) terrain: coastal plains separated by rugged mountains natural resources: hydropower potential land use: 6% arable land; 7% permanent crops; 45% meadows and pastures; 34% forest and woodland; 8% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to occasional earthquakes, hurricanes along atlantic coast; frequent flooding of lowlands at onset of rainy season; active volcanoes; deforestation; soil erosion people population: 3,032,795 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 4 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 16 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--costa rican(s); adjective--costa rican ethnic divisions: 96% white (including mestizo), 2% black, 1% indian, 1% chinese religion: 95% roman catholic language: spanish (official), english spoken around puerto limon literacy: 93% labor force: 868,300; industry and commerce 35.1%, government and services 33%, agriculture 27%, other 4.9% (1985 est.) organized labor: 15.1% of labor force government long-form name: republic of costa rica type: democratic republic capital: san jose administrative divisions: 7 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia); alajuela, cartago, guanacaste, heredia, limon, puntarenas, san jose independence: 15 september 1821 (from spain) constitution: 9 november 1949 legal system: based on spanish civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 15 september (1821) executive branch: president, two vice presidents, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly (asamblea legislativa) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president rafael angel calderon fournier (since 8 may 1990); first vice president german serrano pinto (since 8 may 1990); second vice president arnoldo lopez echandi (since 8 may 1990) political parties and leaders: national liberation party (pln), carlos manuel castillo; social christian unity party (pusc), rafael angel calderon fournier; marxist popular vanguard party (pvp), humberto vargas carbonell; new republic movement (mnr), sergio erick ardon; progressive party (pp), javier solis; people's party of costa rica (ppc), lenin chacon vargas; radical democratic party (prd), juan jose echeverria brealey suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 4 february 1990 (next to be held february 1994); results--rafael calderon fournier 51%, carlos manuel castillo 47%; legislative assembly--last held 4 february 1990 (next to be held february 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(57 total) pusc 29, pln 25, pvp/ppc 1, regional parties 2 communists: 7,500 members and sympathizers other political or pressure groups: costa rican confederation of democratic workers (cctd; liberation party affiliate), confederated union of workers (cut; communist party affiliate), authentic confederation of democratic workers (catd; communist party affiliate), chamber of coffee growers, national association for economic development (anfe), free costa rica movement (mcrl; rightwing militants), national association of educators (ande) member of: cacm, fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oas, odeca, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador danilo jimenez; chancery at suite 211, 1825 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 234-2945 through 2947; there are costa rican consulates general at albuquerque, boston, houston, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, san antonio, san diego, san francisco, san juan (puerto rico), and tampa, and consulates in austin, buffalo, honolulu, and raleigh; us--ambassador (vacant); embassy at pavas road, san jose (mailing address is apo miami 34020); telephone p506o 33-11-55 flag: five horizontal bands of blue (top), white, red (double width), white, and blue with the coat of arms in a white disk on the hoist side of the red band economy overview: in 1988 the economy grew at a 3.8% rate, a drop from the 5.1% of the previous year. gains in agricultural production (on the strength of good coffee and banana crops) and in construction, were partially offset by declines in the rates of growth for the industry and commerce sectors. in 1988 consumer prices rose by nearly 21% followed by a 10% rise in 1989. unemployment is officially reported at about 6%, but much underemployment remains. external debt, on a per capita basis, is among the world's highest. gdp: $4.7 billion, per capita $1,630; real growth rate 3.8% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 10% (1989) unemployment rate: 5.5% (march 1989) budget: revenues $719 million; expenditures $808 million, including capital expenditures of $103 million (1988) exports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee, bananas, textiles, sugar; partners--us 75%, frg, guatemala, netherlands, uk, japan imports: $1.4 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum, machinery, consumer durables, chemicals, fertilizer, foodstuffs; partners--us 35%, japan, guatemala, frg external debt: $4.5 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 2.1% (1988) electricity: 909,000 kw capacity; 2,928 million kwh produced, 990 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, textiles and clothing, construction materials, fertilizer agriculture: accounts for 20-25% of gdp and 70% of exports; cash commodities--coffee, beef, bananas, sugar; other food crops include corn, rice, beans, potatotes; normally self-sufficient in food except for grain; depletion of forest resources resulting in lower timber output illicit drugs: illicit production of cannabis on small scattered plots; transshipment country for cocaine from south america aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.3 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $706 million; communist countries (1971-88), $27 million currency: costa rican colon (plural--colones); 1 costa rican colon (c) = 100 centimos exchange rates: costa rican colones (c) per us$1--84.689 (january 1990), 81.504 (1989), 75.805 (1988), 62.776 (1987), 55.986 (1986), 50.453 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 950 km total, all 1.067-meter gauge; 260 km electrified highways: 15,400 km total; 7,030 km paved, 7,010 km gravel, 1,360 km unimproved earth inland waterways: about 730 km, seasonally navigable pipelines: refined products, 176 km ports: puerto limon, caldera, golfito, moin, puntarenas merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 4,279 grt/6,602 dwt civil air: 9 major transport aircraft airports: 193 total, 177 usable; 25 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 11 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: very good domestic telephone service; 292,000 telephones; connection into central american microwave system; stations--71 am, no fm, 18 tv, 13 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: civil guard, rural assistance guard; note--constitution prohibits armed forces military manpower: males 15-49, 785,429; 530,986 fit for military service; 31,899 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 0.6% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: cuba geography total area: 110,860 km2; land area: 110,860 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than pennsylvania land boundary: 29.1 km with us naval base at guantanamo; note--guantanamo is leased and as such remains part of cuba coastline: 3,735 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: us naval base at guantanamo is leased to us and only mutual agreement or us abandonment of the area can terminate the lease climate: tropical; moderated by trade winds; dry season (november to april); rainy season (may to october) terrain: mostly flat to rolling plains with rugged hills and mountains in the southeast natural resources: cobalt, nickel, iron ore, copper, manganese, salt, timber, silica land use: 23% arable land; 6% permanent crops; 23% meadows and pastures; 17% forest and woodland; 31% other; includes 10% irrigated environment: averages one hurricane every other year note: largest country in caribbean; 145 km south of florida people population: 10,620,099 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 12 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cuban(s); adjective--cuban ethnic divisions: 51% mulatto, 37% white, 11% black, 1% chinese religion: at least 85% nominally roman catholic before castro assumed power language: spanish literacy: 98.5% labor force: 3,400,000 in state sector; 30% services and government, 22% industry, 20% agriculture, 11% commerce, 10% construction, 7% transportation and communications (1988); economically active population 4,500,000 (1987) organized labor: workers central union of cuba (ctc), only labor federation approved by government; 2,910,000 members; the ctc is an umbrella organization composed of 17 member unions government long-form name: republic of cuba type: communist state capital: havana administrative divisions: 14 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia) and 1 special municipality* (municipio especial); camaguey, ciego de avila, cienfuegos, ciudad de la habana, granma, guantanamo, holguin, isla de la juventud*, la habana, las tunas, matanzas, pinar del rio, sancti spiritus, santiago de cuba, villa clara independence: 20 may 1902 (from spain 10 december 1898; administered by the us from 1898 to 1902) constitution: 24 february 1976 legal system: based on spanish and american law, with large elements of communist legal theory; does not accept compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: revolution day, 1 january (1959) executive branch: president of the council of state, first vice president of the council of state, council of state, president of the council of ministers, first vice president of the council of ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly of the people's power (asamblea nacional del poder popular) judicial branch: people's supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president of the council of state and president of the council of ministers fidel castro ruz (became prime minister in january 1959 and president since 2 december 1976); first vice president of the council of state and first vice president of the council of ministers gen. raul castro ruz (since 2 december 1976) political parties and leaders: only party--cuban communist party (pcc), fidel castro ruz, first secretary suffrage: universal at age 16 elections: national assembly of the people's power--last held na december 1986 (next to be held december 1991); results--pcc is the only party; seats--(510 total) pcc 510 (indirectly elected) communists: about 600,000 full and candidate members member of: cema, ecla, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb (nonparticipant), iaea, ibec, icao, ifad, ico, iho, ilo, imo, irc, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oas (nonparticipant), paho, sela, un, unesco, unido, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: none; protecting power in the us is czechoslovakia--cuban interests section; counselor jose antonio arbesu fraga; 2630 and 2639 16th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 797-8518 or 8519, 8520, 8609, 8610; us--protecting power in cuba is switzerland--us interests section; principal officer john j. taylor; calzada entre l y m, vedado seccion, havana; telephone 320551 or 320543 flag: five equal horizontal bands of blue (top and bottom) alternating with white; a red equilateral triangle based on the hoist side bears a white five-pointed star in the center economy overview: the soviet-style economy, centrally planned and largely state owned, is highly dependent on the agricultural sector and foreign trade. sugar provides about 75% of export revenues and is mostly exported to the ussr and other cema countries. the economy has stagnated since 1985 under a program that has deemphasized material incentives in the workplace, abolished farmers' informal produce markets, and raised prices of government-supplied goods and services. castro has complained that the ongoing cema reform process has interfered with the regular flow of goods to cuba. recently the government has been trying to increase trade with latin america and china. cuba has had difficulty servicing its foreign debt since 1982. the government currently is encouraging foreign investment in tourist facilities. other investment priorities include sugar, basic foods, and nickel. the annual $4 billion soviet subsidy, a main prop to cuba's threadbare economy, may be cut in view of the ussr's mounting economic problems. gnp: $20.9 billion, per capita $2,000; real growth rate 1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment: 6% overall, 10% for women (1989) budget: revenues $11.7 billion; expenditures $13.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1989 est.) exports: $5.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar, nickel, shellfish, citrus, tobacco, coffee; partners--ussr 67%, gdr 6%, china 4% (1988) imports: $7.6 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--capital goods, industrial raw materials, food, petroleum; partners--ussr 71%, other communist countries 15% (1988) external debt: $6.8 billion (convertible currency, july 1989) industrial production: 3% (1988) electricity: 3,991,000 kw capacity; 14,972 million kwh produced, 1,425 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar milling, petroleum refining, food and tobacco processing, textiles, chemicals, paper and wood products, metals (particularly nickel), cement, fertilizers, consumer goods, agricultural machinery agriculture: accounts for 11% of gnp (including fishing and forestry); key commercial crops--sugarcane, tobacco, and citrus fruits; other products--coffee, rice, potatoes, meat, beans; world's largest sugar exporter; not self-sufficient in food aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $657.5 million; communist countries (1970-88), $13.5 billion currency: cuban peso (plural--pesos); 1 cuban peso (cu$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: cuban pesos (cu$) per us$1--1.0000 (linked to the us dollar) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 14,925 km total; cuban national railways operates 5,295 km of 1.435-meter gauge track; 199 km electrified; 9,630 km of sugar plantation lines of 0.914-1.435-meter gauge highways: about 21,000 km total; 9,000 km paved, 12,000 km gravel and earth surfaced inland waterways: 240 km ports: cienfuegos, havana, mariel, matanzas, santiago de cuba; 7 secondary, 35 minor merchant marine: 91 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 701,418 grt/1,014,014 dwt; includes 62 cargo, 7 refrigerated cargo, 3 cargo/training, 10 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 6 bulk; note--cuba beneficially owns an additional 34 ships (1,000 grt and over) totaling 475,864 dwt under the registry of panama, cyprus, and malta civil air: 59 major transport aircraft airports: 197 total, 168 usable; 72 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 14 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 17 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--150 am, 5 fm, 58 tv; 1,530,000 tv sets; 2,140,000 radio receivers; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: revolutionary armed forces (ground forces, revolutionary navy, air and air defense force), ministry of interior special troops, border guard troops, territorial militia troops, youth labor army military manpower: eligible 15-49, 6,027,131; of the 3,024,385 males 15-49, 1,897,175 are fit for military service; of the 3,002,746 females 15-49, 1,879,471 are fit for military service; 96,319 males and 92,765 females reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: about 6% of gnp, or $1.2-$1.4 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: cyprus geography total area: 9,250 km2; land area: 9,240 km2 comparative area: about 0.7 times the size of connecticut land boundaries: none coastline: 648 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: 1974 hostilities divided the island into two de facto autonomous areas--a greek area controlled by the cypriot government (60% of the island's land area) and a turkish-cypriot area (35% of the island) that are separated by a narrow un buffer zone; in addition, there are two uk sovereign base areas (about 5% of the island's land area) climate: temperate, mediterranean with hot, dry summers and cool, wet winters terrain: central plain with mountains to north and south natural resources: copper, pyrites, asbestos, gypsum, timber, salt, marble, clay earth pigment land use: 40% arable land; 7% permanent crops; 10% meadows and pastures; 18% forest and woodland; 25% other; includes 10% irrigated (most irrigated lands are in the turkish-cypriot area of the island) environment: moderate earthquake activity; water resource problems (no natural reservoir catchments, seasonal disparity in rainfall, and most potable resources concentrated in the turkish-cypriot area) people population: 707,776 (july 1990), growth rate 1.0% (1990) birth rate: 19 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--cypriot(s); adjective--cypriot ethnic divisions: 78% greek; 18% turkish; 4% other religion: 78% greek orthodox; 18% muslim; 4% maronite, armenian, apostolic, and other language: greek, turkish, english literacy: 99% (est.) labor force: greek area--251,406; 42% services, 33% industry, 22% agriculture; turkish area--na (1986) organized labor: 156,000 (1985 est.) government long-form name: republic of cyprus type: republic; a disaggregation of the two ethnic communities inhabiting the island began after the outbreak of communal strife in 1963; this separation was further solidified following the turkish invasion of the island in july 1974, which gave the turkish cypriots de facto control in the north; greek cypriots control the only internationally recognized government; on 15 november 1983 turkish cypriot president rauf denktash declared independence and the formation of a turkish republic of northern cyprus, which has been recognized only by turkey; both sides publicly call for the resolution of intercommunal differences and creation of a new federal system of government capital: nicosia administrative divisions: 6 districts; famagusta, kyrenia, larnaca, limassol, nicosia, paphos independence: 16 august 1960 (from uk) constitution: 16 august 1960; negotiations to create the basis for a new or revised constitution to govern the island and to better relations between greek and turkish cypriots have been held intermittently; in 1975 turkish cypriots created their own constitution and governing bodies within the turkish federated state of cyprus, which was renamed the turkish republic of northern cyprus in 1983; a new constitution for the turkish area passed by referendum in may 1985 legal system: based on common law, with civil law modifications national holiday: independence day, 1 october executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet); note--there is a president, prime minister, and council of ministers (cabinet) in the turkish area legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives (vouli antiprosopon); note--there is a unicameral assembly of the republic (cumhuriyet meclisi) in the turkish area judicial branch: supreme court; note--there is also a supreme court in the turkish area leaders: chief of state and head of government--president george vassiliou (since february 1988); note--rauf r. denktas was proclaimed president of the turkish area on 13 february 1975 political parties and leaders: greek cypriot--progressive party of the working people (akel; communist party), dimitrios christotias, democratic rally (desy), glafkos clerides; democratic party (deko), spyros kyprianou; united democratic union of the center (edek), vassos lyssarides; turkish area--national unity party (nup), dervis eroglu; communal liberation party (clp), ismail bozkurt; republican turkish party (rtp), ozker ozgur; new birth party (nbp), aytac besheshler; new cyprus savey (ncp), alpay durduran suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 14 february and 21 february 1988 (next to be held february 1993); results--george vassiliou 52%, glafkos clerides 48%; house of representatives--last held 8 december 1985 (next to be held december 1990); results--democratic rally 33.56%, democratic party 27.65%, akel 27.43%, edek 11.07%; seats--(56 total) democratic rally 19, democratic party 16, akel (communist) 15, edek 6; turkish area: president--last held 9 june 1985 (next to be held june 1990); results--rauf denktash 70%; turkish area: legislative assembly--last held 23 june 1985 (next to be held june 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(50 total) national unity party (conservative) 24, republican turkish party (communist) 12, communal liberation party (center-right) 10, new birth party 4 communists: about 12,000 other political or pressure groups: united democratic youth organization (edon; communist controlled); union of cyprus farmers (eka; communist controlled); cyprus farmers union (pek; pro-west); pan-cyprian labor federation (peo; communist controlled); confederation of cypriot workers (sek; pro-west); federation of turkish cypriot labor unions (turk-sen); confederation of revolutionary labor unions (dev-is) member of: ccc, commonwealth, council of europe, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto; turkish federated state of cyprus--oic (observer) diplomatic representation: ambassador michael e. sherifis; chancery at 2211 r street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 462-5772; there is a cypriot consulate general in new york; us--(vacant); embassy at the corner of therissos street and dositheos street, nicosia (mailing address is fpo new york 09530); telephone p357o (2) 465151 flag: white with a copper-colored silhouette of the island (the name cyprus is derived from the greek word for copper) above two green crossed olive branches in the center of the flag; the branches symbolize the hope for peace and reconciliation between the greek and turkish communities economy overview: these data are for the area controlled by the republic of cyprus (information on the northern turkish-cypriot area is sparse). the economy is small, diversified, and prosperous. industry contributes about 28% to gdp and employs 35% of the labor force, while the service sector contributes about 55% to gdp and employs 40% of the labor force. rapid growth in exports of agricultural and manufactured products and in tourism have played important roles in the average 6% rise in gdp in recent years. while this growth put considerable pressure on prices and the balance of payments, the inflation rate has remained low and the balance-of-payments deficit manageable. gdp: $4.2 billion, per capita $6,100; real growth rate 6.9% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.9% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 2.8% (1988) budget: revenues $1.2 billion; expenditures $1.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $178 million (1989 est.) exports: $767 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--citrus, potatoes, grapes, wine, cement, clothing and shoes; partners--middle east and north africa 37%, uk 27%, other ec 11%, us 2% imports: $1.9 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--consumer goods 23%, petroleum and lubricants 12%, food and feed grains, machinery; partners--ec 60%, middle east and north africa 7%, us 4% external debt: $2.8 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 6.5% (1988) electricity: 620,000 kw capacity; 1,770 million kwh produced, 2,530 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining (iron pyrites, gypsum, asbestos); manufactured products--beverages, footwear, clothing, and cement--are principally for local consumption agriculture: accounts for 8% of gdp and employs 22% of labor force; major crops--potatoes, vegetables, barley, grapes, olives, and citrus fruits; vegetables and fruit provide 25% of export revenues aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $272 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $223 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $62 million; communist countries (1970-88), $24 million currency: cypriot pound (plural--pounds) and in turkish area, turkish lira (plural--liras); 1 cypriot pound (lc) = 100 cents and 1 turkish lira (tl) = 100 kurus exchange rates: cypriot pounds (lc) per us$1--0.4854 (january 1990), 0.4933 (1989), 0.4663 (1988), 0.4807 (1987), 0.5167 (1986), 0.6095 (1985); in turkish area, turkish liras (tl) per us$1--2,314.7 (november 1989), 1,422.3 (1988), 857.2 (1987), 674.5 (1986), 522.0 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 10,780 km total; 5,170 km bituminous surface treated; 5,610 km gravel, crushed stone, and earth ports: famagusta, kyrenia, larnaca, limassol, paphos merchant marine: 1,100 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 18,093,340 grt/32,148,550 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 12 short-sea passenger, 2 passenger-cargo, 434 cargo, 61 refrigerated cargo, 18 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 40 container, 94 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 specialized cargo, 3 liquefied gas, 13 chemical tanker, 29 combination ore/oil, 341 bulk, 3 vehicle carrier, 48 combination bulk carrier; note--a flag of convenience registry; cuba owns at least 20 of these ships and yugoslavia owns 1 civil air: 8 major transport aircraft airports: 13 total, 13 usable; 10 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 7 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent in the area controlled by the cypriot government (greek area), moderately good in the turkish-cypriot administered area; 210,000 telephones; stations--13 am, 7 (7 repeaters) fm, 2 (40 repeaters) tv; tropospheric scatter circuits to greece and turkey; 3 submarine coaxial cables; satellite earth stations--intelsat, 1 atlantic ocean and 1 indian ocean, and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: cyprus national guard; turkish area--turkish cypriot security force military manpower: males 15-49, 180,946; 125,044 fit for military service; 5,083 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2% of gdp, or $84 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: czechoslovakia geography total area: 127,870 km2; land area: 125,460 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than new york state land boundaries: 3,446 km total; austria 548 km, gdr 459 km, hungary 676 km, poland 1,309 km, ussr 98 km, frg 356 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: nagymaros dam dispute with hungary climate: temperate; cool summers; cold, cloudy, humid winters terrain: mixture of hills and mountains separated by plains and basins natural resources: coal, timber, lignite, uranium, magnesite, iron ore, copper, zinc land use: 40% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 13% meadows and pastures; 37% forest and woodland; 9% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: infrequent earthquakes; acid rain; water pollution; air pollution note: landlocked; strategically located astride some of oldest and most significant land routes in europe; moravian gate is a traditional military corridor between the north european plain and the danube in central europe people population: 15,683,234 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 11 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--czechoslovak(s); adjective--czechoslovak ethnic divisions: 64.3% czech, 30.5% slovak, 3.8% hungarian, 0.4% german, 0.4% polish, 0.3% ukrainian, 0.1% russian, 0.2% other (jewish, gypsy) religion: 50% roman catholic, 20% protestant, 2% orthodox, 28% other language: czech and slovak (official), hungarian literacy: 99% labor force: 8,200,000 (1987); 36.9% industry, 12.3% agriculture, 50.8% construction, communications, and other (1982) organized labor: revolutionary trade union movement (roh), formerly regime-controlled; other industry-specific strike committees; new independent trade unions forming government long-form name: czechoslovak socialist republic; abbreviated cssr; note--on 23 march 1990 the name was changed to czechoslovak federative republic; because of slovak concerns about their status in the federation, the federal assembly approved the name czech and slovak federative republic on 20 april 1990 type: in transition from communist state to republic capital: prague administrative divisions: 2 socialist republics (socialisticke republiky, singular--socialisticka republika); ceska socialisticka republika, slovenska socialisticka republika independence: 18 october 1918 (from austro-hungarian empire) constitution: 11 july 1960; amended in 1968 and 1970; new constitution under review (1 january 1990) legal system: civil law system based on austro-hungarian codes, modified by communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national holiday of the republic (anniversary of the liberation), 9 may (1945) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral federal assembly (federalni shromazdeni) consists of an upper house or house of nations (snemovna narodu) and a lower house or house of the people (snemovna lidu) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president vaclav havel (since 28 december 1989); head of government--premier marian calfa (since 10 december 1989); first deputy premier valtr komarek (since 7 december 1989); jan carnogursky (since 7 december 1989) political parties and leaders: civic forum, since december 1989 leading political force, loose coalition of former oppositionists headed by president vaclav havel; communist party of czechoslovakia (ksc), ladislav adamec, chairman (since 20 december 1989); ksc toppled from power in november 1989 by massive antiregime demonstrations, minority role in coalition government since 10 december 1989 suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 22 may 1985 (next to be held 8 june 1990; will be a free election); results--gustav husak was reelected without opposition; federal assembly--last held 23 and 24 may 1986 (next to be held 8 june 1990; will be a free election); results--ksc was the only party; seats--(350 total) ksc 350 communists: 1.71 million party members (april 1988) and falling other political groups: czechoslovak socialist party, czechoslovak people's party, slovak freedom party, slovak revival party, christian democratic party; more than 40 political groups are expected to field candidates for the 8 june 1990 election member of: ccc, cema, fao, gatt, iaea, ibec, icao, ico, ilo, ilzsg, imo, ipu, iso, itc, itu, un, unesco, upu, warsaw pact, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador rita klimova; chancery at 3900 linnean avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 363-6315 or 6316; us--ambassador shirley temple black; embassy at trziste 15-12548, prague (mailing address is apo new york 09213); telephone p42o (2) 53 6641 through 6649 flag: two equal horizontal bands of white (top) and red with a blue isosceles triangle based on the hoist side economy overview: czechoslovakia is highly industrialized and has a well-educated and skilled labor force. its industry, transport, energy sources, banking, and most other means of production are state owned. the country is deficient, however, in energy and many raw materials. moreover, its aging capital plant lags well behind west european standards. industry contributes over 50% to gnp and construction 10%. about 95% of agricultural land is in collectives or state farms. the centrally planned economy has been tightly linked in trade (80%) to the ussr and eastern europe. growth has been sluggish, averaging less than 2% in the period 1982-89. gnp per capita ranks next to the gdr as the highest in the communist countries. as in the rest of eastern europe, the sweeping political changes of 1989 have been disrupting normal channels of supply and compounding the government's economic problems. czechoslovakia is beginning the difficult transition from a command to a market economy. gnp: $123.2 billion, per capita $7,878; real growth rate 1.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 0.9% (1987) budget: revenues $22.4 billion; expenditures $21.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.7 billion (1986 state budget) exports: $24.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and equipment 58.5%; industrial consumer goods 15.2%; fuels, minerals, and metals 10.6%; agricultural and forestry products 6.1%, other products 15.2%; partners--ussr, gdr, poland, hungary, frg, yugoslavia, austria, bulgaria, romania, us imports: $23.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and equipment 41.6%; fuels, minerals, and metals 32.2%; agricultural and forestry products 11.5%; industrial consumer goods 6.7%; other products 8.0%; partners--ussr, gdr, poland, hungary, frg, yugoslavia, austria, bulgaria, romania, us external debt: $7.4 billion, hard currency indebtedness (1989) industrial production: growth rate 2.1% (1988) electricity: 22,955,000 kw capacity; 85,000 million kwh produced, 5,410 kwh per capita (1989) industries: iron and steel, machinery and equipment, cement, sheet glass, motor vehicles, armaments, chemicals, ceramics, wood, paper products, footwear agriculture: accounts for 15% of gnp (includes forestry); largely self-sufficient in food production; diversified crop and livestock production, including grains, potatoes, sugar beets, hops, fruit, hogs, cattle, and poultry; exporter of forest products aid: donor--$4.2 billion in bilateral aid to non-communist less developed countries (1954-88) currency: koruna (plural--koruny); 1 koruna (kc) = 100 haleru exchange rates: koruny (kcs) per us$1--17.00 (march 1990), 10.00 (1989), 5.63 (1988), 5.43 (1987), 5.95 (1986), 6.79 (1985), 6.65 (1984) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 13,116 km total; 12,868 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 102 km 1.524-meter broad gauge, 146 km 0.750and 0.760-meter narrow gauge; 2,854 km double track; 3,530 km electrified; government owned (1986) highways: 73,805 km total; including 489 km superhighway (1986) inland waterways: 475 km (1986); the elbe (labe) is the principal river pipelines: crude oil, 1,448 km; refined products, 1,500 km; natural gas, 8,000 km ports: maritime outlets are in poland (gdynia, gdansk, szczecin), yugoslavia (rijeka, koper), frg (hamburg), gdr (rostock); principal river ports are prague on the vltava, decin on the elbe (labe), komarno on the danube, bratislava on the danube merchant marine: 21 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 208,471 grt/ 308,072 dwt; includes 15 cargo, 6 bulk civil air: 40 major transport aircraft airports: 158 total, 158 usable; 40 with permanent-surface runways; 19 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 37 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--58 am, 16 fm, 45 tv; 14 soviet tv relays; 4,360,000 tv sets; 4,208,538 radio receivers; at least 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: czechoslovak people's army, frontier guard, air and air defense forces military manpower: males 15-49, 4,019,311; 3,076,735 fit for military service; 137,733 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 28.4 billion koruny, 7% of total budget (1989); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: denmark geography total area: 43,070 km2; land area: 42,370 km2; includes the island of bornholm in the baltic sea and the rest of metropolitan denmark, but excludes the faroe islands and greenland comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of massachusetts land boundaries: 68 km with frg coastline: 3,379 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 4 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: rockall continental shelf dispute involving iceland, ireland, and the uk (ireland and the uk have signed a boundary agreement in the rockall area); denmark has challenged norway's maritime claims between greenland and jan mayen climate: temperate; humid and overcast; mild, windy winters and cool summers terrain: low and flat to gently rolling plains natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, fish, salt, limestone land use: 61% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 12% forest and woodland; 21% other; includes 9% irrigated environment: air and water pollution note: controls danish straits linking baltic and north seas people population: 5,131,217 (july 1990), growth rate negl% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--dane(s); adjective--danish ethnic divisions: scandinavian, eskimo, faroese, german religion: 97% evangelical lutheran, 2% other protestant and roman catholic, 1% other language: danish, faroese, greenlandic (an eskimo dialect); small german-speaking minority literacy: 99% labor force: 2,760,000; 51% services, 34% industry, 8% government, 7% agriculture, forestry, and fishing (1988) organized labor: 65% of labor force government long-form name: kingdom of denmark type: constitutional monarchy capital: copenhagen administrative divisions: metropolitan denmark--14 counties (amter, singular--amt) and 1 city* (stad); arhus, bornholm, frederiksborg, fyn, kobenhavn, nordjylland, ribe, ringkobing, roskilde, sonderjylland, staden kobenhavn*, storstrom, vejle, vestsjaelland, viborg; note--see separate entries for the faroe islands and greenland which are part of the danish realm and self-governing administrative divisions independence: became a constitutional monarchy in 1849 constitution: 5 june 1953 legal system: civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: birthday of the queen, 16 april (1940) executive branch: monarch, heir apparent, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament (folketing) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen margrethe ii (since january 1972); heir apparent crown prince frederik, elder son of the queen (born 26 may 1968); head of government--prime minister poul schluter (since 10 september 1982) political parties and leaders: social democratic, svend auken; liberal, uffe ellemann-jensen; conservative, poul schluter; radical liberal, niels helveg petersen; socialist people's, gert petersen; communist, ole sohn; left socialist, elizabeth brun olesen; center democratic, mimi stilling jakobsen; christian people's, flemming kofoed-svendsen; justice, poul gerhard kristiansen; progress party, aage brusgaard; socialist workers party, leader na; communist workers' party (kap); common course, preben moller hansen; green party, inger borlehmann suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: parliament--last held 10 may 1988 (next to be held by may 1992); results--social democrat 29.9%, conservative 19.3%, socialist people's 13.0%, liberal 11.8%, radical liberal 9.0%, center democratic 5.6%, christian people's 2.0%, common course 2.7%, other 6.7%; seats--(175 total; includes 2 from greenland and 2 from the faroe islands) social democratic 55, conservative 35, socialist people's 24, liberal 22, progress 16, radical liberal 10, center democratic 9, christian people's 4 member of: adb, ccc, council of europe, dac, ec, ems, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb, inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nato, nordic council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador peter pedersen dyvig; chancery at 3200 whitehaven street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 234-4300; there are danish consulates general at chicago, houston, los angeles, and new york; us--ambassador keith l. brown; embassy at dag hammarskjolds alle 24, 2100 copenhagen o (mailing address is apo new york 09170); telephone p45o (31) 42 31 44 flag: red with a white cross that extends to the edges of the flag; the vertical part of the cross is shifted to the hoist side and that design element of the dannebrog (danish flag) was subsequently adopted by the other nordic countries of finland, iceland, norway, and sweden economy overview: this modern economy features high-tech agriculture, up-to-date small-scale and corporate industry, extensive government welfare measures, comfortable living standards, and high dependence on foreign trade. growth in output, however, has been sluggish in 1987-89, and unemployment in early 1989 stood at 9.6% of the labor force. the government is trying to revitalize growth in preparation for the economic integration of europe in 1992. gdp: $73.7 billion, per capita $14,300; real growth rate 1.4% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.25% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 9.6% (1989) budget: revenues $34 billion; expenditures $34 billion, including capital expenditures of $19 billion (1988) exports: $27.7 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--meat and meat products, dairy products, transport equipment, fish, chemicals, industrial machinery; partners--us 6.0%, frg, norway, sweden, uk, other ec, japan imports: $26.4 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--petroleum, machinery and equipment, chemicals, grain and foodstuffs, textiles, paper; partners--us 7.0%, frg, netherlands, sweden, uk, other ec external debt: $41.1 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 0.9% (1988) electricity: 11,215,000 kw capacity; 30,910 million kwh produced, 6,030 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, machinery and equipment, textiles and clothing, chemical products, electronics, construction, furniture, and other wood products agriculture: accounts for 7% of gnp and employs 1.8% of labor force (includes fishing); farm products account for nearly 16% of export revenues; principal products--meat, dairy, grain, potatoes, rape, sugar beets, fish; self-sufficient in food production aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87) $4.8 billion currency: danish krone (plural--kroner); 1 danish krone (dkr) = 100 ore exchange rates: danish kroner (dkr) per us$1--6.560 (january 1990), 7.310 (1989), 6.732 (1988), 6.840 (1987), 8.091 (1986), 10.596 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 2,675 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; danish state railways (dsb) operate 2,025 km (1,999 km rail line and 121 km rail ferry services); 188 km electrified, 730 km double tracked; 650 km of standard-gauge lines are privately owned and operated highways: 66,482 km total; 64,551 km concrete, bitumen, or stone block; 1,931 km gravel, crushed stone, improved earth inland waterways: 417 km pipelines: crude oil, 110 km; refined products, 578 km; natural gas, 700 km ports: alborg, arhus, copenhagen, esbjerg, fredericia; numerous secondary and minor ports merchant marine: 252 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 4,498,611 grt/6,711,011 dwt; includes 12 short-sea passenger, 82 cargo, 15 refrigerated cargo, 28 container, 36 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 railcar carrier, 37 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 13 chemical tanker, 12 liquefied gas, 4 livestock carrier, 12 bulk; note--denmark has created a captive register called the danish international ship register (dis) as its own internal register; dis ships do not have to meet danish manning regulations, and they amount to a flag of convenience within the danish register; by the end of 1990, most danish flag ships will belong to the dis civil air: 58 major transport aircraft airports: 130 total, 114 usable; 27 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 9 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 6 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent telephone, telegraph, and broadcast services; 4,237,000 telephones; stations--2 am, 15 (39 repeaters) fm, 27 (25 repeaters) tv stations; 7 submarine coaxial cables; 1 satellite earth station operating in intelsat, 4 atlantic ocean, eutelsat, and domestic systems defense forces branches: royal danish army, royal danish navy, royal danish air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,368,013; 1,180,865 fit for military service; 37,228 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.1% of gdp, or $1.5 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: djibouti geography total area: 22,000 km2; land area: 21,980 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than massachusetts land boundaries: 517 km total; ethiopia 459 km, somalia 58 km coastline: 314 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: possible claim by somalia based on unification of ethnic somalis climate: desert; torrid, dry terrain: coastal plain and plateau separated by central mountains natural resources: geothermal areas land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 9% meadows and pastures; negl% forest and woodland; 91% other environment: vast wasteland note: strategic location near world's busiest shipping lanes and close to arabian oilfields; terminus of rail traffic into ethiopia people population: 337,386 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 119 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 46 years male, 49 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--djiboutian(s); adjective--djiboutian ethnic divisions: 60% somali (issa); 35% afar, 5% french, arab, ethiopian, and italian religion: 94% muslim, 6% christian language: french (official); arabic, somali, and afar widely used literacy: 20% labor force: na, but a small number of semiskilled laborers at the port and 3,000 railway workers; 52% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: 3,000 railway workers government long-form name: republic of djibouti type: republic capital: djibouti administrative divisions: 5 districts (cercles, singular--cercle); ali sahih, dikhil, djibouti, obock, tadjoura independence: 27 june 1977 (from france; formerly french territory of the afars and issas) constitution: partial constitution ratified january 1981 by the chamber of deputies legal system: based on french civil law system, traditional practices, and islamic law national holiday: independence day, 27 june (1977) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: chamber of deputies (chambre des deputes) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state--president hassan gouled aptidon (since 24 june 1977); head of government--prime minister barkat gourad hamadou (since 30 september 1978) political parties and leaders: only party--people's progress assembly (rpp), hassan gouled aptidon suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: president--last held 24 april 1987 (next to be held april 1993); results--president hassan gouled aptidon was reelected without opposition; chamber of deputies--last held 24 april 1987 (next to be held april 1992); results--rpp is the only party; seats--(65 total) rpp 65 communists: na member of: acp, afdb, arab league, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador roble olhaye; chancery (temporary) at the djiboutian permanent mission to the un; 866 united nations plaza, suite 4011, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 753-3163; us--ambassador robert s. barrett iv; embassy at villa plateau du serpent boulevard, marechal joffre, djibouti (mailing address is b. p. 185, djibouti); telephone p253o 35-38-49 or 35-39-95, 35-29-16, 35-29-17 flag: two equal horizontal bands of light blue (top) and light green with a white isosceles triangle based on the hoist side bearing a red five-pointed star in the center economy overview: the economy is based on service activities connected with the country's strategic location and status as a free trade zone. djibouti provides services as both a transit port for the region and an international transshipment and refueling center. it has few natural resources and little industry. the nation is, therefore, heavily dependent on foreign assistance to help support its balance of payments and to finance development projects. an unemployment rate of over 50% continues to be a major problem. gnp: $333 million, $1,070 per capita; real growth rate 0.7% (1986) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.0% (1987) unemployment rate: over 50% (1987) budget: revenues $117 million; expenditures $163 billion, including capital expenditures of $52 million (1987 est.) exports: $128 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--hides and skins, coffee (in transit); partners--middle east 50%, africa 43%, western europe 7% imports: $198 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--foods, beverages, transport equipment, chemicals, petroleum products; partners--ec 36%, africa 21%, bahrain 14%, asia 12%, us 2% external debt: $250 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 1.6% (1986) electricity: 110,000 kw capacity; 190 million kwh produced, 580 kwh per capita (1989) industries: limited to a few small-scale enterprises, such as dairy products and mineral-water bottling agriculture: accounts for 30% of gdp; scanty rainfall limits crop production to mostly fruit and vegetables; half of population pastoral nomads herding goats, sheep, and camels; imports bulk of food needs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy78-88), $36 million; western (non-us) countries, including oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $962 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $149 million; communist countries (1970-88), $35 million currency: djiboutian franc (plural--francs); 1 djiboutian franc (df) = 100 centimes exchange rates: djiboutian francs (df) per us$1--177.721 (fixed rate since 1973) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: the ethiopian-djibouti railroad extends for 97 km through djibouti highways: 2,900 km total; 280 km bituminous surface, 2,620 km improved or unimproved earth (1982) ports: djibouti civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 12 total, 9 usable; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of urban facilities in djibouti and radio relay stations at outlying places; 7,300 telephones; stations--2 am, 1 fm, 2 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station and 1 arabsat; 1 submarine cable to saudi arabia defense forces branches: army, navy, air force; paramilitary national security force military manpower: males 15-49, 88,132; 51,260 fit for military service defense expenditures: $29.9 million, 23% of central government budget (1986) ---------------------------------------------------country: dominica geography total area: 750 km2; land area: 750 km2 comparative area: slightly more than four times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 148 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; moderated by northeast trade winds; heavy rainfall terrain: rugged mountains of volcanic origin natural resources: timber land use: 9% arable land; 13% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 41% forest and woodland; 34% other environment: flash floods a constant hazard; occasional hurricanes note: located 550 km southeast of puerto rico in the caribbean sea people population: 84,854 (july 1990), growth rate 1.7% (1990) birth rate: 26 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 13 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--dominican(s); adjective--dominican ethnic divisions: mostly black; some carib indians religion: 80% roman catholic; anglican, methodist language: english (official); french patois widely spoken literacy: 80% (est.) labor force: 25,000; 40% agriculture, 32% industry and commerce, 28% services (1984) organized labor: 25% of labor force government long-form name: commonwealth of dominica type: parliamentary democracy capital: roseau administrative divisions: 10 parishes; saint andrew, saint david, saint george, saint john, saint joseph, saint luke, saint mark, saint patrick, saint paul, saint peter independence: 3 november 1978 (from uk) constitution: 3 november 1978 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 3 november (1978) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of assembly (includes 9 appointed senators and 21 elected representatives) judicial branch: eastern caribbean supreme court leaders: chief of state--president sir clarence augustus seignoret (since 19 december 1983); head of government--prime minister (mary) eugenia charles (since 21 july 1980) political parties and leaders: dominica freedom party (dfp), (mary) eugenia charles; labor party of dominica (lpd, a leftist-dominated coalition), michael douglas; united workers party (uwp), edison james suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 20 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); the president is elected by the house of assembly; house of assembly--last held 1 july 1985 (next to be held july 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(21 total) dfp 17, lpd 4 communists: negligible other political or pressure groups: dominica liberation movement (dlm), a small leftist group member of: acp, caricom, commonwealth, fao, gatt (de facto), g-77, ibrd, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, oas, oecs, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: there is no chancery in the us; us--no official presence since the ambassador resides in bridgetown (barbados), but travels frequently to dominica flag: green with a centered cross of three equal bands--the vertical part is yellow (hoist side), black, and white--the horizontal part is yellow (top), black, and white; superimposed in the center of the cross is a red disk bearing a sisserou parrot encircled by 10 green five-pointed stars edged in yellow; the 10 stars represent the 10 administrative divisions (parishes) economy overview: the economy is dependent on agriculture and thus is highly vulnerable to climatic conditions. agriculture accounts for about 30% of gdp and employs 40% of the labor force. principal products include bananas, coconuts, citrus, and root crops. in 1988 the economy achieved a 5.6% growth in real gdp on the strength of a boost in construction, higher agricultural production, and growth of the small manufacturing sector based on soap and garment industries. the tourist industry remains undeveloped because of a rugged coastline and the lack of an international-class airport. gdp: $137 million, per capita $1,408; real growth rate 5.6% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.9% (1987) unemployment rate: 10% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $60 million; expenditures $52 million, including capital expenditures of $18 million (fy88) exports: $46 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--bananas, coconuts, grapefruit, soap, galvanized sheets; partners--uk 72%, jamaica 10%, oecs 6%, us 3%, other 9% imports: $66.0 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--food, oils and fats, chemicals, fuels and lubricants, manufactured goods, machinery and equipment; partners--us 23%, uk 18%, caricom 15%, oecs 15%, japan 5%, canada 3%, other 21% external debt: $63.6 million (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 5.9% in manufacturing (1987) electricity: 7,000 kw capacity; 16 million kwh produced, 190 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing, tourism, soap and other coconut-based products, cigars, pumice mining agriculture: accounts for 30% of gdp; principal crops--bananas, citrus fruit, coconuts, root crops; bananas provide the bulk of export earnings; forestry and fisheries potential not exploited aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $109 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 750 km total; 370 km paved, 380 km gravel and earth ports: roseau, portsmouth civil air: na airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 4,600 telephones in fully automatic network; vhf and uhf link to st. lucia; new shf links to martinique and guadeloupe; stations--3 am, 2 fm, 1 cable tv defense forces branches: commonwealth of dominica police force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: dominican republic geography total area: 48,730 km2; land area: 48,380 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of new hampshire land boundary 275 km with haiti coastline: 1,288 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: outer edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 6 nm climate: tropical maritime; little seasonal temperature variation terrain: rugged highlands and mountains with fertile valleys interspersed natural resources: nickel, bauxite, gold, silver land use: 23% arable land; 7% permanent crops; 43% meadows and pastures; 13% forest and woodland; 14% other; includes 4% irrigated environment: subject to occasional hurricanes (july to october); deforestation note: shares island of hispaniola with haiti (western one-third is haiti, eastern two-thirds is the dominican republic) people population: 7,240,793 (july 1990), growth rate 2.0% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 62 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 69 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--dominican(s); adjective--dominican ethnic divisions: 73% mixed, 16% white, 11% black religion: 95% roman catholic language: spanish literacy: 74% labor force: 2,300,000-2,600,000; 49% agriculture, 33% services, 18% industry (1986) organized labor: 12% of labor force (1989 est.) government long-form name: dominican republic (no short-form name) type: republic capital: santo domingo administrative divisions: 29 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia) and 1 district* (distrito); azua, baoruco, barahona, dajabon, distrito nacional*, duarte, elias pina, el seibo, espaillat, hato mayor, independencia, la altagracia, la romana, la vega, maria trinidad sanchez, monsenor nouel, monte cristi, monte plata, pedernales, peravia, puerto plata, salcedo, samana, sanchez ramirez, san cristobal, san juan, san pedro de macoris, santiago, santiago rodriguez, valverde independence: 27 february 1844 (from haiti) constitution: 28 november 1966 legal system: based on french civil codes national holiday: independence day, 27 february (1844) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso nacional) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camara de diputados) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president joaquin balaguer ricardo (since 16 august 1986); vice president carlos a. morales troncoso (since 16 august 1986) political parties and leaders: major parties--social christian reformist party (prsc), joaquin balaguer ricardo; dominican revolutionary party (prd), which fractured in may 1989 with the understanding that leading rivals jacobo majluta and jose francisco pena gomez would run separately for president at the head of the independent revolutionary party (pri) and the social democratic institutional bloc (bis), respectively, and try to reconstitute the prd after the election; dominican liberation party (pld), juan bosch gavino; minor parties--national veterans and civilian party (pnvc), juan rene beauchanps javier; the structure (le), andres van der horst; democratic quisqueyan party (pqd), elias wessin chavez; constitutional action party (pac), luis arzeno rodriguez; national progressive force (fnp), marino vinicio castillo; popular christian party (ppc), rogelio delgado bogaert; dominican communist party (pcd), narciso isa conde; anti-imperialist patriotic union (upa), ivan rodriguez; in 1983 several leftist parties, including the pcd, joined to form the dominican leftist front (fid); however, they still retain individual party structures suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 or if married; members of the armed forces and police cannot vote elections: president--last held 16 may 1986 (next to be held may 1990); results--joaquin balaguer (prsc) 41.8%, jacobo majluta (prd) 39.7%, juan bosch gavino (pld) 18.5%; senate--last held 16 may 1986 (next to be held may 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(30 total) prsc 21, prd 7, pld 2; chamber of deputies--last held 16 may 1986 (next to be held may 1990); results--prsc 40.6%, prd 33.5%, pld 18.3%, le 5.3%, other 2.3%; seats--(120 total) prsc 56, prd 48, pld 16 communists: an estimated 8,000 to 10,000 members in several legal and illegal factions; effectiveness limited by ideological differences and organizational inadequacies member of: fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, iaea, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, irc, iso, itu, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador carlos a. morales troncoso (serves concurrently as vice president); chancery at 1715 22nd street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-6280; there are dominican consulates general in boston, chicago, los angeles, mayaguez (puerto rico), miami, new orleans, new york, philadelphia, san juan (puerto rico), and consulates in charlotte amalie (virgin islands), detroit, houston, jacksonville, minneapolis, mobile, ponce (puerto rico), and san francisco; us--ambassador paul d. taylor; embassy at the corner of calle cesar nicolas penson and calle leopoldo navarro, santo domingo (mailing address is apo miami 34041-0008); telephone p809o 541-2171 flag: a centered white cross that extends to the edges, divides the flag into four rectangles--the top ones are blue (hoist side) and red, the bottom ones are red (hoist side) and blue; a small coat of arms is at the center of the cross economy overview: the economy is largely dependent on the agricultural sector, which employs 50% of the labor force and provides about half of export revenues. the principal commercial crop is sugarcane, followed by coffee, cocoa, and tobacco. industry is based on the processing of agricultural products, durable consumer goods, minerals, and chemicals. rapid growth of free trade zones has established a significant expansion of manufacturing for export, especially wearing apparel. over the past decade tourism has also increased in importance and is a significant earner of foreign exchange and a source of new jobs. unemployment is officially reported at about 25%, but underemployment may be much higher. gdp: $5.1 billion, per capita $790; real growth rate 0.5% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 57.6% (1988) unemployment rate: 25% (1988) budget: revenues $413 million; expenditures $522 million, including capital expenditures of $218 million (1988) exports: $711 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar, coffee, cocoa, gold, ferronickel; partners--us, including puerto rico, 74% imports: $1.8 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, petroleum, cotton and fabrics, chemicals and pharmaceuticals; partners--us, including puerto rico, 37% (1985) external debt: $3.6 billion (1989) est. industrial production: growth rate 30% (1987 est.) electricity: 1,376,000 kw capacity; 4,000 million kwh produced, 560 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, sugar processing, ferronickel and gold mining, textiles, cement, tobacco agriculture: accounts for 18% of gdp and employs 49% of labor force; sugarcane most important commercial crop, followed by coffee, cotton, and cocoa; food crops--rice, beans, potatoes, corn, bananas; animal output--cattle, hogs, dairy products, meat, eggs; not self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.1 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $529 million currency: dominican peso (plural--pesos); 1 dominican peso (rd$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: dominican pesos per us$1--6.3400 (january 1990), 6.3400 (1989), 6.1125 (1988), 3.8448 (1987), 2.9043 (1986), 3.1126 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,655 km total in numerous segments; 4 different gauges from 0.558 m to 1.435 m highways: 12,000 km total; 5,800 km paved, 5,600 km gravel and improved earth, 600 km unimproved pipelines: crude oil, 96 km; refined products, 8 km ports: santo domingo, haina, san pedro de macoris, puerto plata merchant marine: 4 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 23,335 grt/40,297 dwt civil air: 14 major transport aircraft airports: 44 total, 30 usable; 14 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 9 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: relatively efficient domestic system based on islandwide radio relay network; 190,000 telephones; stations--120 am, no fm, 18 tv, 6 shortwave; 1 coaxial submarine cable; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,912,101; 1,210,172 fit for military service; 80,290 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.2% of gdp, or $61 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: ecuador geography total area: 283,560 km2; land area: 276,840 km2; includes galapagos islands comparative area: slightly smaller than nevada land boundaries: 2,010 km total; colombia 590 km, peru 1,420 km coastline: 2,237 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 m; territorial sea: 200 nm disputes: two sections of the boundary with peru are in dispute climate: tropical along coast becoming cooler inland terrain: coastal plain (costa), inter-andean central highlands (sierra), and flat to rolling eastern jungle (oriente) natural resources: petroleum, fish, timber land use: 6% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 17% meadows and pastures; 51% forest and woodland; 23% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: subject to frequent earthquakes, landslides, volcanic activity; deforestation; desertification; soil erosion; periodic droughts note: cotopaxi in andes is highest active volcano in world people population: 10,506,668 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 30 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 61 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 68 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--ecuadorian(s); adjective--ecuadorian ethnic divisions: 55% mestizo (mixed indian and spanish), 25% indian, 10% spanish, 10% black religion: 95% roman catholic language: spanish (official); indian languages, especially quechua literacy: 85% (1981) labor force: 2,800,000; 35% agriculture, 21% manufacturing, 16% commerce, 28% services and other activities (1982) organized labor: less than 15% of labor force government long-form name: republic of ecuador type: republic capital: quito administrative divisions: 21 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia); azuay, bolivar, canar, carchi, chimborazo, cotopaxi, el oro, esmeraldas, galapagos, guayas, imbabura, loja, los rios, manabi, morona-santiago, napo, pastaza, pichincha, sucumbios, tungurahua, zamora-chinchipe independence: 24 may 1822 (from spain; battle of pichincha) constitution: 10 august 1979 legal system: based on civil law system; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 10 august (1809, independence of quito) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral chamber of representatives (camara de representantes) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president rodrigo borja cevallos (since 10 august 1988); vice president luis parodi valverde (since 10 august 1988) political parties and leaders: right to center parties--social christian party (psc), camilio ponce, president; conservative party (pc), jose teran varea, director; radical liberal party (plr), blasco penaherrera, director; centrist parties--concentration of popular forces (cfp), averroes bucaram saxida, director; radical alfarist front (fra), cecilia calderon de castro, leader; people, change, and democracy (pcd), aquiles rigail santistevan, director; revolutionary nationalist party (pnr), carlos julio arosemena monroy, leader; center-left parties--democratic left (id), president rodrigo borja, leader; roldosist party of ecuador (pre), abdala bucaram, director; popular democracy (dp), vladimiro alvarez, leader; christian democratic (cd), julio cesar trujillo; democratic party (pd), francisco huerta montalvo, leader; far-left parties--broad leftist front (fadi), rene mauge mosquera, director; socialist party (pse), victor granda aguilar, secretary general; democratic popular movement (mpd), jaime hurtado gonzalez, leader; ecuadorian national liberation (ln), alfredo castillo; popular revolutionary action party (apre), lt. gen. frank vargas pazzos, leader suffrage: universal at age 18; compulsory for literate persons ages 18-65, optional for other eligible voters elections: president--first round held 31 january 1988 and second round on 8 may 1988 (next first round to be held january 1992 and second round may 1992); results--rodrigo borja cevallos (id) 54%, abdala bucaram ortiz (pre) 46%; chamber of representatives--last held 31 january 1988 (next to be held june 1990); results--id 42%, psc 11%, pre 11%, dp 9%, others 27%; seats--(71 total) id 30, pre 8, psc 8, dp 7, cfp 6, pse 4, fadi 2, mpd 2, fra 2, pce 1, plr 1; note--with the addition of the new province of sucumbios there will be 72 seats in the august 1990 election communists: communist party of ecuador (pce, pro-moscow), rene mauge mosquera, secretary general, 5,000 members; communist party of ecuador/marxist leninist (pcmle, maoist), 3,000 members; socialist party of ecuador (pse, pro-cuba), 5,000 members (est.); national liberation party (pln, communist), 5,000 members (est.) member of: andean pact, ecosoc, fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, itu, laia, nam, oas, opec, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador jaime moncayo; chancery at 2535 15th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 234-7200; there are ecuadorian consulates general in chicago, houston, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, and san francisco, and a consulate in san diego; us--ambassador-designate paul c. lambert; embassy at avenida patria 120, on the corner of avenida 12 de octubre, quito (mailing address is p. o. box 538, quito, or apo miami 34039); telephone p593o (2) 562-890; there is a us consulate general in guayaquil flag: three horizontal bands of yellow (top, double width), blue, and red with the coat of arms superimposed at the center of the flag; similar to the flag of colombia which is shorter and does not bear a coat of arms economy overview: ecuador continues to recover from a 1986 drop in international oil prices and a major earthquake in 1987 that interrupted oil exports for six months and forced ecuador to suspend foreign debt payments. in 1988-89 oil exports recovered--accounting for nearly half of ecuador's total export revenues--and quito resumed full interest payments on its official debt, and partial payments on its commercial debt. the borja administration has pursued austere economic policies that have helped reduce inflation and restore international reserves. ecuador was granted an imf standby agreement worth $135 million in 1989, and quito will seek to reschedule its foreign commercial debt in 1990. gdp: $9.8 billion, per capita $935; real growth rate 0.5% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 54% (1989) unemployment rate: 14.3% (1988) budget: revenues $2.2 billion; expenditures $2.7 billion, including capital expenditures of $601 million (1988 est.) exports: $2.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum 47%, coffee, bananas, cocoa products, shrimp, fish products; partners--us 58%, latin america, caribbean, ec countries imports: $1.6 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--transport equipment, vehicles, machinery, chemical, petroleum; partners--us 28%, latin america, caribbean, ec, japan external debt: $10.9 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 0.7% (1988) electricity: 1,953,000 kw capacity; 5,725 million kwh produced, 560 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, textiles, chemicals, fishing, timber, petroleum agriculture: accounts for 18% of gdp and 35% of labor force (including fishing and forestry); leading producer and exporter of bananas and balsawood; other exports--coffee, cocoa, fish, shrimp; crop production--rice, potatoes, manioc, plantains, sugarcane; livestock sector--cattle, sheep, hogs, beef, pork, dairy products; net importer of foodgrain, dairy products, and sugar illicit drugs: relatively small producer of coca following the successful eradication campaign of 1985-87; significant transit country, however, for derivatives of coca originating in colombia, bolivia, and peru aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $457 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.4 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $64 million currency: sucre (plural--sucres); 1 sucre (s/) = 100 centavos exchange rates: sucres (s/) per us$1--526.35 (1989), 301.61 (1988), 170.46 (1987), 122.78 (1986), 69.56 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 965 km total; all 1.067-meter-gauge single track highways: 28,000 km total; 3,600 km paved, 17,400 km gravel and improved earth, 7,000 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 1,500 km pipelines: crude oil, 800 km; refined products, 1,358 km ports: guayaquil, manta, puerto bolivar, esmeraldas merchant marine: 47 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 340,446 grt/492,670 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 7 cargo, 17 refrigerated cargo, 2 container, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 16 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 1 bulk civil air: 44 major transport aircraft airports: 179 total, 178 usable; 43 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 20 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: domestic facilities generally adequate; 318,000 telephones; stations--272 am, no fm, 33 tv, 39 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: ecuadorean army (ejercito ecuatoriano), ecuadorean air force (fuerza aerea ecuatoriana), ecuadorean navy (armada ecuatoriana) military manpower: males 15-49, 2,635,543; 1,786,068 fit for military service; 114,976 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 1% of gdp, or $100 million (1988 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: egypt geography total area: 1,001,450 km2; land area: 995,450 km2 comparative area: slightly more than three times the size of new mexico land boundaries: 2,689 km total; gaza strip 11, israel 255 km, libya 1,150 km, sudan 1,273 km coastline: 2,450 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: undefined; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: administrative boundary and international boundary with sudan climate: desert; hot, dry summers with moderate winters terrain: vast desert plateau interrupted by nile valley and delta natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, phosphates, manganese, limestone, gypsum, talc, asbestos, lead, zinc land use: 3% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; negl% forest and woodland; 95% other; includes 5% irrigated environment: nile is only perennial water source; increasing soil salinization below aswan high dam; hot, driving windstorm called khamsin occurs in spring; water pollution; desertification note: controls sinai peninsula, only land bridge between africa and remainder of eastern hemisphere; controls suez canal, shortest sea link between indian ocean and mediterranean; size and juxtaposition to israel establish its major role in middle eastern geopolitics people population: 54,705,746 (july 1990), growth rate 2.5% (1990) birth rate: 34 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 90 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 60 years male, 61 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--egyptian(s); adjective--egyptian ethnic divisions: 90% eastern hamitic stock; 10% greek, italian, syro-lebanese religion: (official estimate) 94% muslim (mostly sunni), 6% coptic christian and other language: arabic (official); english and french widely understood by educated classes literacy: 45% labor force: 15,000,000 (1989 est.); 36% government, public sector enterprises, and armed forces; 34% agriculture; 20% privately owned service and manufacturing enterprises (1984); shortage of skilled labor; 2,500,000 egyptians work abroad, mostly in iraq and the gulf arab states (1988 est.) organized labor: 2,500,000 (est.) government long-form name: arab republic of egypt type: republic capital: cairo administrative divisions: 26 governorates (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); ad daqahliyah, al bahr al ahmar, al buhayrah, al fayyum, al gharbiyah, al iskandariyah, al ismailiyah, al jizah, al minufiyah, al minya, al qahirah, al qalyubiyah, al wadi al jadid, ash sharqiyah, as suways, aswan, asyut, bani suwayf, bur said, dumyat, janub sina, kafr ash shaykh, matruh, qina, shamal sina, suhaj independence: 28 february 1922 (from uk); formerly united arab republic constitution: 11 september 1971 legal system: based on english common law, islamic law, and napoleonic codes; judicial review by supreme court and council of state (oversees validity of administrative decisions); accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: anniversary of the revolution, 23 july (1952) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral people's assembly (majlis al-shaab); note--there is an advisory council (majlis al-shura) that functions in a consultative role judicial branch: supreme constitutional court leaders: chief of state--president mohammed hosni mubarak (was made acting president on 6 october 1981 upon the assassination of president sadat and sworn in as president on 14 october 1981); head of government--prime minister atef mohammed najib sedky (since 12 november 1986) political parties and leaders: formation of political parties must be approved by government; national democratic party (ndp), president mohammed hosni mubarak, leader, is the dominant party; legal opposition parties are socialist liberal party (slp), kamal murad; socialist labor party, ibrahim shukri; national progressive unionist grouping, khalid muhyi-al-din; umma party, ahmad al-sabahi; and new wafd party (nwp), fuad siraj al-din suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 5 october 1987 (next to be held october 1993); results--president hosni mubarek was reelected; people's assembly--last held 6 april 1987 (next to be held april 1992); results--ndp 69.3%, socialist labor party coalition 17%, nwp 10.9%; seats--(458 total, 448 elected)--ndp 346, socialist labor party coalition 60, labor-liberal-muslim brotherhood alliance 60 (37 belong to the muslim brotherhood), nwp 36, independents 7; advisory council (majlis al-shura)--last held october 1986 (next to be held october 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(210 total, 140 elected) communists: about 500 party members other political or pressure groups: islamic groups are illegal, but the largest one, the muslim brotherhood, is tolerated by the government and recently gained a sizable presence in the new people's assembly; trade unions and professional associations are officially sanctioned member of: acc, afdb, arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, irc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oapec, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wpc, wsg, wto; egypt was suspended from arab league and oapec in april 1979 and readmitted in may 1989 diplomatic representation: ambassador el sayed abdel raouf el reedy; chancery at 2310 decatur place nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 232-5400; there are egyptian consulates general in chicago, houston, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador frank g. wisner; embassy at 5 sharia latin america, garden city, cairo (mailing address is fpo new york 09527); telephone p20o p2o 355-7371; there is a us consulate general in alexandria flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with the national emblem (a shield superimposed on a golden eagle facing the hoist side above a scroll bearing the name of the country in arabic) centered in the white band; similar to the flags of the yar which has one star, syria which has two stars, and iraq which has three stars--all green and five-pointed in a horizontal line centered in the white band economy overview: egypt has one of the largest public sectors of all the third world economies, most industrial plants being owned by the government. overregulation holds back technical modernization and foreign investment. even so, the economy grew rapidly during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but in 1986 the collapse of world oil prices and an increasingly heavy burden of debt servicing led egypt to begin negotiations with the imf for balance-of-payments support. as part of the 1987 agreement with the imf, the government agreed to institute a reform program to reduce inflation, promote economic growth, and improve its external position. the reforms have been slow in coming, however, and the economy has been largely stagnant for the past three years. with 1 million people being added every eight months to egypt's population, urban growth exerts enormous pressure on the 5% of the total land area available for agriculture. gdp: $38.3 billion, per capita $700; real growth rate 1.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 25% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 15% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $7 billion; expenditures $11.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $4 billion (fy89 est.) exports: $2.55 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--raw cotton, crude and refined petroleum, cotton yarn, textiles; partners--us, ec, japan, eastern europe imports: $10.1 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foods, machinery and equipment, fertilizers, wood products, durable consumer goods, capital goods; partners--us, ec, japan, eastern europe external debt: $45 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 2-4% (1989 est.) electricity: 11,273,000 kw capacity; 42,500 million kwh produced, 780 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, food processing, tourism, chemicals, petroleum, construction, cement, metals agriculture: accounts for 20% of gnp and employs more than one-third of labor force; dependent on irrigation water from the nile; world's fifth-largest cotton exporter; other crops produced include rice, corn, wheat, beans, fruit, vegetables; not self-sufficient in food; livestock--cattle, water buffalo, sheep, and goats; annual fish catch about 140,000 metric tons aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $14.7 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $7.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $2.9 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $2.4 billion currency: egyptian pound (plural--pounds); 1 egyptian pound (le) = 100 piasters exchange rates: egyptian pounds (le) per us$1--2.5790 (january 1990), 2.5171 (1989), 2.2128 (1988), 1.5015 (1987), 1.3503 (1986), 1.3010 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 5,110 km total; 4,763 km 1,435-meter standard gauge, 347 km 0.750-meter gauge; 951 km double track; 25 km electrified highways: 51,925 km total; 17,900 km paved, 2,500 km gravel, 13,500 km improved earth, 18,025 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 3,500 km (including the nile, lake nasser, alexandria-cairo waterway, and numerous smaller canals in the delta); suez canal, 193.5 km long (including approaches), used by oceangoing vessels drawing up to 16.1 meters of water pipelines: crude oil, 1,171 km; refined products, 596 km; natural gas, 460 km ports: alexandria, port said, suez, bur safajah, damietta merchant marine: 142 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,141,799 grt/1,754,181 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 7 short-sea passenger, 2 passenger-cargo, 88 cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, 13 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 14 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 15 bulk civil air: 43 major transport aircraft airports: 97 total, 87 usable; 67 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 46 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 21 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: system is large but still inadequate for needs; principal centers are alexandria, cairo, al mansurah, ismailia, and tanta; intercity connections by coaxial cable and microwave; extensive upgrading in progress; 600,000 telephones (est.); stations--25 am, 5 fm, 47 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 inmarsat; 4 submarine coaxial cables; tropospheric scatter to sudan; radio relay to libya (may not be operational); new radio relay to jordan defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, air defense command military manpower: males 15-49, 13,271,942; 8,642,075 fit for military service; 547,084 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 7.2% of gdp, or $2.8 billion (fy90 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: el salvador geography total area: 21,040 km2; land area: 20,720 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than massachusetts land boundaries: 545 km total; guatemala 203 km, honduras 342 km coastline: 307 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm (overflight and navigation permitted beyond 12 nm) disputes: several sections of the boundary with honduras are in dispute climate: tropical; rainy season (may to october); dry season (november to april) terrain: mostly mountains with narrow coastal belt and central plateau natural resources: hydropower and geothermal power, crude oil land use: 27% arable land; 8% permanent crops; 29% meadows and pastures; 6% forest and woodland; 30% other; includes 5% irrigated environment: the land of volcanoes; subject to frequent and sometimes very destructive earthquakes; deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution note: smallest central american country and only one without a coastline on caribbean sea people population: 5,309,865 (july 1990), growth rate 2.0% (1990) birth rate: 34 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 49 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 68 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--salvadoran(s); adjective--salvadoran ethnic divisions: 89% mestizo, 10% indian, 1% white religion: about 97% roman catholic, with activity by protestant groups throughout the country language: spanish, nahua (among some indians) literacy: 65% labor force: 1,700,000 (1982 est.); 40% agriculture, 16% commerce, 15% manufacturing, 13% government, 9% financial services, 6% transportation; shortage of skilled labor and a large pool of unskilled labor, but manpower training programs improving situation (1984 est.) organized labor: 15% total labor force; 10% agricultural labor force; 7% urban labor force (1987 est.) government long-form name: republic of el salvador type: republic capital: san salvador administrative divisions: 14 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); ahuachapan, cabanas, chalatenango, cuscatlan, la libertad, la paz, la union, morazan, san miguel, san salvador, santa ana, san vicente, sonsonate, usulutan independence: 15 september 1821 (from spain) constitution: 20 december 1983 legal system: based on civil and roman law, with traces of common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 15 september (1821) executive branch: president, vice president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly (asamblea legislativa) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president alfredo cristiani (since 1 june 1989); vice president jose francisco merino (since 1 june 1989) political parties and leaders: national republican alliance (arena), armando calderon sol; christian democratic party (pdc), jose antonio morales erlich; national conciliation party (pcn), ciro cruz zepeda; democratic action (ad), ricardo gonzalez camacho; salvadoran authentic institutional party (paisa), roberto escobar garcia; patria libre (pl), hugo barrera; authentic christian movement (mac), julio rey prendes; salvadoran popular party (pps), francisco quinonez; democratic convergence (cd), a coalition composed of the social democratic party (psd), mario rene roldan; the national revolutionary movement (mnr), guillermo ungo; and the popular social christian movement (mpsc), ruben zamora suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 19 march 1989 (next to be held march 1994); results--alfredo cristiani (arena) 53.8%, fidel chavez mena (pdc) 36.6%, other 9.6%; legislative assembly--last held 20 march 1988 (next to be held march 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(60 total) arena 32, mac 13, pdc 9, pcn 6 other political or pressure groups: leftist revolutionary movement--farabundo marti national liberation front (fmln), leadership body of the insurgency; popular liberation forces (fpl), armed forces of national resistance (farn), people's revolutionary army (erp), salvadoran communist party/armed forces of liberation (pces/fal), and central american workers' revolutionary party (prtc)/popular liberation revolutionary armed forces (farlp); militant front organizations--revolutionary coordinator of masses (crm; alliance of front groups), popular revolutionary bloc (bpr), unified popular action front (fapu), popular leagues of 28 february (lp-28), national democratic union (udn), and popular liberation movement (mlp); revolutionary democratic front (fdr), coalition of crm and democratic front (fd); fd consists of moderate leftist groups--independent movement of professionals and technicians of el salvador (miptes), national revolutionary movement (mnr), and popular social christian movement (mpsc); extreme rightist vigilante organizations--anti-communist army (esa); maximiliano hernandez brigade; organization for liberation from communism (olc); labor organizations--federation of construction and transport workers unions (fesinconstrans), independent; salvadoran communal union (ucs), peasant association; unitary federation of salvadoran unions (fuss), leftist; national federation of salvadoran workers (fenastras), leftist; democratic workers central (ctd), moderate; general confederation of workers (cgt), moderate; popular democratic unity (upd), moderate labor coalition which includes fesinconstrans, and other democratic labor organizations; national unity of salvadoran workers (unts), leftist; national union of workers and peasants (unoc), moderate labor coalition of democratic labor organizations; business organizations--national association of private enterprise (anep), conservative; productive alliance (ap), conservative; national federation of salvadoran small businessmen (fenapes), conservative member of: cacm, fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oas, odeca, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador miguel angel salaverria; chancery at 2308 california street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-3480 through 3482; there are salvadoran consulates general in houston, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, and san francisco, us--ambassador william g. walker; embassy at 25 avenida norte no. 1230, san salvador (mailing address is apo miami 34023); telephone p503o 26-7100 flag: three equal horizontal bands of blue (top), white, and blue with the national coat of arms centered in the white band; the coat of arms features a round emblem encircled by the words republica de el salvador en la america central; similar to the flag of nicaragua which has a different coat of arms centered in the white band--it features a triangle encircled by the words republica de nicaragua on top and america central on the bottom; also similar to the flag of honduras which has five blue stars arranged in an x pattern centered in the white band economy overview: the economy experienced a modest recovery during the period 1983-86, after a sharp decline in the early 1980s. real gdp grew by 1.5% a year on the strength of value added by the manufacturing and service sectors. in 1987 the economy expanded by 2.5% as agricultural output recovered from the 1986 drought. the agricultural sector accounts for 25% of gdp, employs about 40% of the labor force, and contributes about 66% to total exports. coffee is the major commercial crop, contributing 60% to export earnings. the manufacturing sector, based largely on food and beverage processing, accounts for 17% of gdp and 16% of employment. economic losses due to guerrilla sabotage total more than $2.0 billion since 1979. the costs of maintaining a large military seriously constrain the government's ability to provide essential social services. gdp: $5.5 billion, per capita $1,020 (1988); real growth rate 0.9% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 16.8% (september 1989) unemployment rate: 10% (1989) budget: revenues $688 million; expenditures $725 million, including capital expenditures of $112 million (1988) exports: $497 million (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--coffee 60%, sugar, cotton, shrimp; partners--us 49%, frg 24%, guatemala 7%, costa rica 4%, japan 4% imports: $1.1 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--petroleum products, consumer goods, foodstuffs, machinery, construction materials, fertilizer; partners--us 40%, guatemala 12%, venezuela 7%, mexico 7%, frg 5%, japan 4% external debt: $1.7 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 2.9% (1989) electricity: 669,000 kw capacity; 1,813 million kwh produced, 350 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, textiles, clothing, petroleum products, cement agriculture: accounts for 25% of gdp and 40% of labor force (including fishing and forestry); coffee most important commercial crop; other products--sugarcane, corn, rice, beans, oilseeds, beef, dairy products, shrimp; not self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $2.4 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $353 million currency: salvadoran colon (plural--colones); 1 salvadoran colon (c) = 100 centavos exchange rates: salvadoran colones (c) per us$1--5.0000 (fixed rate since 1986) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 602 km 0.914-meter gauge, single track highways: 10,000 km total; 1,500 km paved, 4,100 km gravel, 4,400 km improved and unimproved earth inland waterways: rio lempa partially navigable ports: acajutla, cutuco civil air: 7 major transport aircraft airports: 125 total, 84 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: nationwide trunk radio relay system; connection into central american microwave system; 116,000 telephones; stations--77 am, no fm, 5 tv, 2 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, national guard, national police, treasury police military manpower: males 15-49, 1,180,751; 754,350 fit for military service; 68,805 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 4% of gdp, or $220 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: equatorial guinea geography total area: 28,050 km2; land area: 28,050 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundaries: 539 km total; cameroon 189 km, gabon 350 km coastline: 296 km maritime claims: exclusive economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary dispute with gabon climate: tropical; always hot, humid terrain: coastal plains rise to interior hills; islands are volcanic natural resources: timber, crude oil, small unexploited deposits of gold, manganese, uranium land use: 8% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 51% forest and woodland; 33% other environment: subject to violent windstorms note: insular and continental regions rather widely separated people population: 368,935 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 16 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 118 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 52 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--equatorial guinean(s) or equatoguinean(s); adjective--equatorial guinean or equatoguinean ethnic divisions: indigenous population of bioko, primarily bubi, some fernandinos; rio muni, primarily fang; less than 1,000 europeans, mostly spanish religion: natives all nominally christian and predominantly roman catholic; some pagan practices retained language: spanish (official), pidgin english, fang, bubi, ibo literacy: 40% labor force: 172,000 (1986 est.); 66% agriculture, 23% services, 11% industry (1980); labor shortages on plantations; 58% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: no formal trade unions government long-form name: republic of equatorial guinea type: republic capital: malabo administrative divisions: 2 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia); bioko, rio muni; note--there may now be 6 provinces named bioko norte, bioko sur, centro sur, kie-ntem, litoral, wele nzas independence: 12 october 1968 (from spain; formerly spanish guinea) constitution: 15 august 1982 legal system: in transition; partly based on spanish civil law and tribal custom national holiday: independence day, 12 october (1968) executive branch: president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral chamber of people's representatives (camara de representantes del pueblo) judicial branch: supreme tribunal leaders: chief of state--president brig. gen. teodoro obiang nguema mbasogo (since 3 august 1979); head of government--prime minister cristino seriche bioko malabo (since 15 august 1982); deputy prime minister isidoro eyi monsuy andeme (since 15 august 1989) political parties and leaders: only party--democratic party for equatorial guinea (pdeg), obiang nguema mbasogo, party leader suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: president--last held 25 june 1989 (next to be held 25 june 1996); results--president brig. gen. obiang nguema mbasogo was reelected without opposition; chamber of deputies--last held 10 july 1988 (next to be held 10 july 1993); results--pdeg is the only party; seats--(41 total) pdeg 41 communists: no significant number but some sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, conference of east and central african states, eca, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, who diplomatic representation: ambassador damaso obiang ndong; chancery at 801 second avenue, suite 1403, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 599-1523; us--ambassador chester e. norris, jr.; embassy at calle de los ministros, malabo (mailing address is p. o. box 597, malabo); telephone 2406 or 2507 flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red with a blue isosceles triangle based on the hoist side and the coat of arms centered in the white band; the coat of arms has six yellow six-pointed stars (representing the mainland and five offshore islands) above a gray shield bearing a silk-cotton tree and below which is a scroll with the motto unidad, paz, justicia (unity, peace, justice) economy overview: the economy, destroyed during the regime of former president macias nguema, is now based on agriculture, forestry, and fishing, which account for about 60% of gnp and nearly all exports. subsistence agriculture predominates, with cocoa, coffee, and wood products providing income, foreign exchange, and government revenues. there is little industry. commerce accounts for about 10% of gnp, and the construction, public works, and service sectors for about 34%. undeveloped natural resources include titanium, iron ore, manganese, uranium, and alluvial gold. oil exploration is taking place under concessions offered to us, french, and spanish firms. gnp: $103 million, per capita $293; real growth rate na% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 6.0% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $23 million; expenditures $31 million, including capital expenditures of na (1988) exports: $30 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--coffee, timber, cocoa beans; partners--spain 44%, frg 19%, italy 12%, netherlands 11% (1987) imports: $50 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum, food, beverages, clothing, machinery; partners--spain 34%, italy 16%, france 14%, netherlands 8% (1987) external debt: $191 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 23,000 kw capacity; 60 million kwh produced, 170 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, sawmilling agriculture: cash crops--timber and coffee from rio muni, cocoa from bioko; food crops--rice, yams, cassava, bananas, oil palm nuts, manioc, livestock aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy81-88), $11 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $100 million; communist countries (1970-88), $55 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: rio muni--1,024 km; bioko--216 km ports: malabo, bata merchant marine: 2 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 6,413 grt/6,699 dwt; includes 1 cargo and 1 passenger-cargo civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 4 total, 3 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: poor system with adequate government services; international communications from bata and malabo to african and european countries; 2,000 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 1 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, and possibly air force military manpower: males 15-49, 77,363; 39,174 fit for military service defense expenditures: 11% of gnp (fy81 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: ethiopia geography total area: 1,221,900 km2; land area: 1,101,000 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of texas land boundaries: 5,141 km total; djibouti 459 km, kenya 861 km, somalia 1,600 km, sudan 2,221 km coastline: 1,094 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: southern half of the boundary with somalia is a provisional administrative line; possible claim by somalia based on unification of ethnic somalis; territorial dispute with somalia over the ogaden; separatist movement in eritrea; antigovernment insurgencies in tigray and other areas climate: tropical monsoon with wide topographic-induced variation; prone to extended droughts terrain: high plateau with central mountain range divided by great rift valley natural resources: small reserves of gold, platinum, copper, potash land use: 12% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 41% meadows and pastures; 24% forest and woodland; 22% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: geologically active great rift valley susceptible to earthquakes, volcanic eruptions; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; frequent droughts; famine note: strategic geopolitical position along world's busiest shipping lanes and close to arabian oilfields; major resettlement project ongoing in rural areas will significantly alter population distribution and settlement patterns over the next several decades people population: 51,666,622 (july 1990), growth rate 3.5% (1990) birth rate: 45 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 116 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 49 years male, 52 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--ethiopian(s); adjective--ethiopian ethnic divisions: 40% oromo, 32% amhara and tigrean, 9% sidamo, 6% shankella, 6% somali, 4% afar, 2% gurage, 1% other religion: 40-45% muslim, 35-40% ethiopian orthodox, 15-20% animist, 5% other language: amharic (official), tigrinya, orominga, arabic, english (major foreign language taught in schools) literacy: 55.2% labor force: 18,000,000; 80% agriculture and animal husbandry, 12% government and services, 8% industry and construction (1985) organized labor: all ethiopian trade union formed by the government in january 1977 to represent 273,000 registered trade union members government long-form name: people's democratic republic of ethiopia type: communist state capital: addis ababa administrative divisions: 14 administrative regions (plural--na, singular--kifle hager); arsi, bale, eritrea, gamo gofa, gojam, gonder, harerge, ilubabor, kefa, shewa, sidamo, tigray, welega, welo; note--the administrative structure may be changing to 25 administrative regions (astedader akababiwach, singular--astedader akababee) and 5 autonomous regions* (rasgez akababiwach, singular--rasgez akababee); addis ababa, arsi, aseb*, asosa, bale, borena, dire dawa*, east gojam, east harerge, eritrea*, gambela, gamo gofa, ilubabor, kefa, metekel, nazaret, north gonder, north shewa, north welo, ogaden*, omo, sidamo, south gonder, south shewa, south welo, tigray*, welega, west gojam, west harerge, west shewa independence: oldest independent country in africa and one of the oldest in the world--at least 2,000 years constitution: 12 september 1987 legal system: complex structure with civil, islamic, common, and customary law influences; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national revolution day, 12 september (1974) executive branch: president, vice president, council of state prime minister, five deputy prime ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (shengo) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president mengistu haile-mariam (chairman from 11 september 1977 until becoming president on 10 september 1987); vice president fisseha desta (since 10 september 1987); head of government--prime minister (acting) and deputy prime minister hailu yimenu (since 7 november 1989); deputy prime minister wolle chekol (since 21 november 1989); deputy prime minister alemu abebe (since 10 september 1987); deputy prime minister tesfaye dinka (since 10 september 1987); deputy prime minister ashagre yigletu (since 21 november 1989) political parties and leaders: only party--workers' party of ethiopia (wpe), mengistu haile-mariam, secretary general suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 10 september 1987 (next to be held september 1992); results--national assembly elected president mengistu haile-mariam; national assembly--last held 14 june 1987 (next to be held june 1992); results--wpe is the only party; seats--(835 total) wpe 835 other political or pressure groups: important dissident groups include eritrean people's liberation front (eplf) in eritrea; tigrean people's liberation front (tplf) and ethiopian peoples democratic movement in tigray, welo, and border regions; oromo liberation front in welega and harerge regions member of: acp, afdb, ccc, eca, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, ico, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: counselor, charge d'affaires ad interim girma amare; chancery at 2134 kalorama road nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 234-2281 or 2282; us--charge d'affaires robert g. houdek; embassy at entoto street, addis ababa (mailing address is p.o. box 1014, addis ababa); telephone 254-233-4141 flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), yellow, and red; ethiopia is the oldest independent country in africa and the colors of her flag were so often adopted by other african countries upon independence that they became known as the pan-african colors economy overview: ethiopia is one of the poorest and least developed countries in africa. its economy is based on subsistence agriculture, which accounts for about 45% of gdp, 90% of exports, and 80% of total employment; coffee generates over 60% of export earnings. the manufacturing sector is heavily dependent on inputs from the agricultural sector. the economy is centrally planned, and over 90% of large-scale industry is state run. favorable agricultural weather largely explains the 4.5% growth in output in fy89. gdp: $6.6 billion, per capita $130, real growth rate 4.5% (fy89 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.6% (fy89) unemployment rate: na; shortage of skilled manpower budget: revenues $1.4 billion; expenditures $1.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.7 billion (fy87) exports: $418 million (f.o.b., fy88); commodities--coffee 60%, hides; partners--us, frg, djibouti, japan, pdry, france, italy imports: $1.1 billion (c.i.f., fy88), commodities--food, fuels, capital goods; partners--ussr, italy, frg, japan, uk, us, france external debt: $2.6 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 0.2% (fy88 est.) electricity: 330,000 kw capacity; 700 million kwh produced, 14 kwh per capita (1989) industries: cement, textiles, food processing, oil refinery agriculture: accounts for 45% of gdp and is the most important sector of the economy even though frequent droughts, poor cultivation practices, and state economic policies keep farm output low; famines not uncommon; export crops of coffee and oilseeds grown partly on state farms; estimated 50% of agricultural production at subsistence level; principal crops and livestock--cereals, pulses, coffee, oilseeds, potatoes, sugarcane, vegetables, hides and skins, cattle, sheep, goats aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $471 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.6 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $8 million; communist countries (1970-88), $2.0 billion currency: birr (plural--birr); 1 birr (br) = 100 cents exchange rates: birr (br) per us$1--2.0700 (fixed rate) fiscal year: 8 july-7 july communications railroads: 988 km total; 681 km 1.000-meter gauge; 307 km 0.950-meter gauge (nonoperational) highways: 44,300 km total; 3,650 km bituminous, 9,650 km gravel, 3,000 km improved earth, 28,000 km unimproved earth ports: aseb, mitsiwa merchant marine: 14 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 71,837 grt/92,067 dwt; includes 10 cargo, 1 roll-on/roll off cargo, 1 livestock carrier, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 21 major transport aircraft airports: 152 total, 111 usable; 9 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 10 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 51 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: open-wire and radio relay system adequate for government use; open-wire to sudan and djibouti; radio relay to kenya and djibouti; stations--4 am, no fm, 1 tv; 45,000 tv sets; 3,300,000 radios; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, air defense military manpower: males 15-49, 11,438,616; 5,922,555 fit for military service; 589,231 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 8.5% of gdp (1988) ---------------------------------------------------country: europa island (french possession) geography total area: 28 km2; land area: 28 km2 comparative area: about 0.2 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 22.2 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by madagascar climate: tropical terrain: na natural resources: negligible land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other; heavily wooded environment: wildlife sanctuary note: located in the mozambique channel 340 km west of madagascar people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: french possession administered by commissioner of the republic daniel constantin, resident in reunion economy overview: no economic activity communications airports: 1 with runway 1,220 to 2,439 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only telecommunications: 1 meteorological station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: falkland islands (islas malvinas) (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 12,170 km2; land area: 12,170 km2; includes the two main islands of east and west falkland and about 200 small islands comparative area: slightly smaller than connecticut land boundaries: none coastline: 1,288 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 100 meter depth; exclusive fishing zone: 150 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: administered by the uk, claimed by argentina climate: cold marine; strong westerly winds, cloudy, humid; rain occurs on more than half of days in year; occasional snow all year, except in january and february, but does not accumulate terrain: rocky, hilly, mountainous with some boggy, undulating plains natural resources: fish and wildlife land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 99% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 1% other environment: poor soil fertility and a short growing season note: deeply indented coast provides good natural harbors people population: 1,958 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--falkland islander(s); adjective--falkland island ethnic divisions: almost totally british religion: primarily anglican, roman catholic, and united free church; evangelist church, jehovah's witnesses, lutheran, seventh-day adventist language: english literacy: na%, but compulsory education up to age 15 labor force: 1,100 (est.); about 95% in agriculture, mostly sheepherding organized labor: falkland islands general employees union, 400 members government long-form name: colony of the falkland islands type: dependent territory of the uk capital: stanley administrative divisions: none (dependent territory of the uk) independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: 3 october 1985 legal system: english common law national holiday: liberation day, 14 june (1982) executive branch: british monarch, governor, executive council legislative branch: unicameral legislative council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--governor william hugh fullerton (since na 1988) political parties: na suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative council--last held 3 october 1985 (next to be held october 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(10 total, 8 elected) number of seats by party na diplomatic representation: none (dependent territory of the uk) flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the falkland island coat of arms in a white disk centered on the outer half of the flag; the coat of arms contains a white ram (sheep raising is the major economic activity) above the sailing ship desire (whose crew discovered the islands) with a scroll at the bottom bearing the motto desire the right economy overview: the economy is based on sheep farming, which directly or indirectly employs most of the work force. a few dairy herds are kept to meet domestic consumption of milk and milk products, and crops grown are primarily those for providing winter fodder. major sources of income are from the export of high-grade wool to the uk and the sale of stamps and coins. rich stocks of fish in the surrounding waters are not presently exploited by the islanders, but development plans called for the islands to have six trawlers by 1989. in 1987 the government began to sell fishing licenses to foreign trawlers operating within the falklands exclusive fishing zone. these license fees amount to more than $25 million per year. to encourage tourism, the falkland islands development corporation has built three lodges for visitors who are attracted by the abundant wildlife and trout fishing. gnp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 0% budget: revenues $11 million; expenditures $11.8 million, including capital expenditures of $1.2 million (fy87) exports: at least $14.7 million; commodities--wool, hides and skins, and other; partners--uk, netherlands, japan (1987 est.) imports: at least $13.9 million; commodities--food, clothing, fuels, and machinery; partners--uk, netherlands antilles (curacao), japan (1987 est.) external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 9,200 kw capacity; 17 million kwh produced, 8,700 kwh per capita (1989) industries: wool processing agriculture: predominantly sheep farming; small dairy herds and fodder crops aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $102 million currency: falkland pound (plural--pounds); 1 falkland pound (lf) = 100 pence exchange rates: falkland pound (lf) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); note--the falkland pound is at par with the british pound fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 510 km total; 30 km paved, 80 km gravel, and 400 km unimproved earth ports: port stanley civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 5 total, 5 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220 to 2,439 m telecommunications: government-operated radiotelephone and private vhf/cb radio networks provide effective service to almost all points on both islands; 590 telephones; stations--2 am, 3 fm, no tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station with links through london to other countries defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: faroe islands (part of the danish realm) geography total area: 1,400 km2; land area: 1,400 km2 comparative area: slightly less than eight times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 764 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 4 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: mild winters, cool summers; usually overcast; foggy, windy terrain: rugged, rocky, some low peaks; cliffs along most of coast natural resources: fish land use: 2% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 98% other environment: precipitous terrain limits habitation to small coastal lowlands; archipelago of 18 inhabited islands and a few uninhabited islets note: strategically located along important sea lanes in northeastern atlantic about midway between iceland and shetland islands people population: 47,715 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 17 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--faroese (sing., pl.); adjective--faroese ethnic divisions: homogeneous scandinavian population religion: evangelical lutheran language: faroese (derived from old norse), danish literacy: 99% labor force: 17,585; largely engaged in fishing, manufacturing, transportation, and commerce organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: part of the danish realm; self-governing overseas administrative division of denmark capital: torshavn administrative divisions: none (self-governing overseas administrative division of denmark) independence: part of the danish realm; self-governing overseas administrative division of denmark constitution: danish legal system: danish national holiday: birthday of the queen, 16 april (1940) executive branch: danish monarch, high commissioner, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet (landsstyri) legislative branch: unicameral parliament (logting) judicial branch: none leaders: chief of state--queen margrethe ii (since 14 january 1972), represented by high commissioner bent klinte (since na); head of government--prime minister jogvan sundstein (since 17 january 1989) political parties and leaders: four-party ruling coalition--people's party, jogvan sundstein; republican party, signer hansen; progressive and fishing industry party combined with the christian people's party (cpp-pfip); home rule party, hilmar kass; opposition--social democratic party, atli p. dam; cooperation coalition party, pauli ellefsen; progress party suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: parliament--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(32 total) three-party coalition 21 (people's party 8, cooperation coalition party 7, republican party 6); social democrat 7, cpp-pfip 2, home rule 2 communists: insignificant number member of: nordic council diplomatic representation: none (self-governing overseas administrative division of denmark) flag: white with a red cross outlined in blue that extends to the edges of the flag; the vertical part of the cross is shifted to the hoist side in the style of the dannebrog (danish flag) economy overview: the faroese enjoy the high standard of living characteristic of the danish and other scandinavian economies. fishing is the dominant economic activity. it employs over 25% of the labor force, accounts for about 25% of gdp, and contributes over 80% to export revenues. a handicraft industry employs about 20% of the labor force. because of cool summers agricultural activities are limited to raising sheep and to potato and vegetable cultivation. there is a labor shortage, and immigrant workers accounted for 5% of the work force in 1989. denmark annually subsidizes the economy, perhaps on the order of 15% of gdp. gdp: $662 million, per capita $14,000; real growth rate 3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.0% (1988) unemployment rate: labor shortage budget: revenues $176 million; expenditures $176 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy86) exports: $267 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--fish and fish products 86%, animal feedstuffs, transport equipment; partners--denmark 18%, us 14%, frg, france, uk, canada imports: $363 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--machinery and transport equipment 38%, food and livestock 11%, fuels 10%, manufactures 10%, chemicals 5%; partners: denmark 46%, frg, norway, japan, uk external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 80,000 kw capacity; 280 million kwh produced, 5,910 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, shipbuilding, handicrafts agriculture: accounts for 27% of gdp and employs 27% of labor force; principal crops--potatoes and vegetables; livestock--sheep; annual fish catch about 360,000 metric tons aid: none currency: danish krone (plural--kroner); 1 danish krone (dkr) = 100 ore exchange rates: danish kroner (dkr) per us$1--6.560 (january 1990), 7.310 (1989), 6.732 (1988), 6.840 (1987), 8.091 (1986), 10.596 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 200 km ports: torshavn, tvoroyri; 8 minor merchant marine: 7 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 17,249 grt/11,887 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 2 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo; note--a subset of the danish register airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good international communications; fair domestic facilities; 27,900 telephones; stations--1 am, 3 (10 repeaters) fm, 3 (29 repeaters) tv; 3 coaxial submarine cables defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of denmark ---------------------------------------------------country: fiji geography total area: 18,270 km2; land area: 18,270 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than new jersey land boundaries: none coastline: 1,129 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines) continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical marine; only slight seasonal temperature variation terrain: mostly mountains of volcanic origin natural resources: timber, fish, gold, copper; offshore oil potential land use: 8% arable land; 5% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 65% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: subject to hurricanes from november to january; includes 332 islands of which approximately 110 are inhabited note: located 2,500 km north of new zealand in the south pacific ocean people population: 759,567 (july 1990), growth rate 1.5% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 22 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--fijian(s); adjective--fijian ethnic divisions: 49% indian, 46% fijian, 5% european, other pacific islanders, overseas chinese, and others religion: fijians are mainly christian, indians are hindu with a muslim minority language: english (official); fijian; hindustani literacy: 80% labor force: 176,000; 60% subsistence agriculture, 40% wage earners (1979) organized labor: about 45,000 employees belong to some 46 trade unions, which are organized along lines of work and ethnic origin (1983) government long-form name: republic of fiji type: military coup leader major general sitiveni rabuka formally declared fiji a republic on 6 october 1987 capital: suva administrative divisions: 4 divisions and 1 dependency*; central, eastern, northern, rotuma*, western independence: 10 october 1970 (from uk) constitution: 10 october 1970 (suspended 1 october 1987); note--a new constitution was proposed on 23 september 1988 and awaits final approval legal system: based on british system national holiday: independence day, 10 october (1970) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: the bicameral parliament, consisting of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives, was dissolved following the coup of 14 may 1987; the proposed constitution of na september 1988 provides for a bicameral parliament judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president ratu sir penaia kanatabatu ganilau (since 5 december 1987); head of government--prime minister ratu sir kamisese mara (since 5 december 1987); note--ratu sir kamisese mara served as prime minister from 10 october 1970 until the 5-11 april 1987 election; after a second coup led by major general sitiveni rabuka on 25 september 1987, ratu mara was reappointed as prime minister political parties and leaders: alliance, primarily fijian, ratu mara; national federation, primarily indian, siddiq koya; western united front, fijian, ratu osea gavidi; fiji labor party, adi kuini bavadra; coalition of the national federation party and the fiji labor party, adi kuini vuikaba bavadra suffrage: none elections: none communists: some member of: acp, adb, colombo plan, ec (associate), escap, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, spf, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: counselor (commercial), vice consul, charge d'affaires ad interim abdul h. yusuf; chancery at suite 240, 2233 wisconsin avenue nw, washington, dc 20007; telephone (202) 337-8320; there is a fijian consulate in new york; us--ambassador leonard rochwarger; embassy at 31 loftus street, suva (mailing address is p. o. box 218, suva); telephone p679o 314-466 or 314-069 flag: light blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the fijian shield centered on the outer half of the flag; the shield depicts a yellow lion above a white field quartered by the cross of st. george featuring stalks of sugarcane, a palm tree, bananas, and a white dove economy overview: fiji's economy is primarily agricultural, with a large subsistence sector. sugar exports are a major source of foreign exchange and sugar processing accounts for one-third of industrial output. industry, including sugar milling, contributes 10% to gdp. fiji traditionally earned considerable sums of hard currency from the 250,000 tourists who visited each year. in 1987, however, after two military coups, the economy went into decline. gdp dropped by 7.8% in 1987 and by another 2.5% in 1988; political uncertainly created a drop in tourism, and the worst drought of the century caused sugar production to fall sharply. in contrast, sugar and tourism turned in strong performances in 1989, and the economy rebounded vigorously. gdp: $1.32 billion, per capita $1,750; real growth rate 12.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 11.8% (1988) unemployment rate: 11% (1988) budget: revenues $260 million; expenditures $233 million, including capital expenditures of $47 million (1988) exports: $312 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar 49%, copra, processed fish, lumber; partners--uk 45%, australia 21%, us 4.7% imports: $454 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--food 15%, petroleum products, machinery, consumer goods; partners--us 4.8%, nz, australia, japan external debt: $398 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 15% (1988 est.) electricity: 215,000 kw capacity; 330 million kwh produced, 440 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar, copra, tourism, gold, silver, fishing, clothing, lumber, small cottage industries agriculture: principal cash crop is sugarcane; coconuts, cassava, rice, sweet potatoes, and bananas; small livestock sector includes cattle, pigs, horses, and goats aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1980-87), $677 million currency: fijian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 fijian dollar (f$) = 100 cents exchange rates: fijian dollars (f$) per us$1--1.4950 (january 1990), 1.4833 (1989), 1.4303 (1988), 1.2439 (1987), 1.1329 (1986), 1.1536 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 644 km 0.610-meter narrow gauge, belonging to the government-owned fiji sugar corporation highways: 3,300 km total (1984)--390 km paved; 1,200 km bituminous-surface treatment; 1,290 km gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized soil surface; 420 unimproved earth inland waterways: 203 km; 122 km navigable by motorized craft and 200-metric-ton barges ports: lambasa, lautoka, savusavu, suva merchant marine: 9 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 42,872 grt/49,795 dwt; includes 1 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 container, 2 liquefied gas, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker civil air: 1 dc-3 and 1 light aircraft airports: 26 total, 24 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern local, interisland, and international (wire/radio integrated) public and special-purpose telephone, telegraph, and teleprinter facilities; regional radio center; important compac cable link between us-canada and new zealand-australia; 53,228 telephones; stations--7 am, 1 fm, no tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: integrated ground and naval forces military manpower: males 15-49, 194,433; 107,317 fit for military service; 7,864 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.5% of gdp (1988) ---------------------------------------------------country: finland geography total area: 337,030 km2; land area: 305,470 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than montana land boundaries: 2,578 km total; norway 729 km, sweden 536 km, ussr 1,313 km coastline: 1,126 km excluding islands and coastal indentations maritime claims: contiguous zone: 6 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 12 nm; territorial sea: 4 nm climate: cold temperate; potentially subarctic, but comparatively mild because of moderating influence of the north atlantic current, baltic sea, and more than 60,000 lakes terrain: mostly low, flat to rolling plains interspersed with lakes and low hills natural resources: timber, copper, zinc, iron ore, silver land use: 8% arable land; 0% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 76% forest and woodland; 16% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: permanently wet ground covers about 30% of land; population concentrated on small southwestern coastal plain note: long boundary with ussr; helsinki is northernmost national capital on european continent people population: 4,977,325 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--finn(s); adjective--finnish ethnic divisions: finn, swede, lapp, gypsy, tatar religion: 97% evangelical lutheran, 1.2% eastern orthodox, 1.8% other language: 93.5% finnish, 6.3% swedish (both official); small lappand russian-speaking minorities literacy: almost 100% labor force: 2,556,000; 33.1% services, 22.9% mining and manufacturing, 13.8% commerce, 10.3% agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 7.2% construction, 7.1% transportation and communications (1989 est.) organized labor: 80% of labor force government long-form name: republic of finland type: republic capital: helsinki administrative divisions: 12 provinces (laanit, singular--laani); ahvenanmaa, hame, keski-suomi, kuopio, kymi, lappi, mikkeli, oulu, pohjois-karjala, turku ja pori, uusimaa, vaasa independence: 6 december 1917 (from soviet union) constitution: 17 july 1919 legal system: civil law system based on swedish law; supreme court may request legislation interpreting or modifying laws; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 6 december (1917) executive branch: president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of state (valtioneuvosto) legislative branch: unicameral parliament (eduskunta) judicial branch: supreme court (korkein oikeus) leaders: chief of state--president mauno koivisto (since 27 january 1982); head of government--prime minister harri holkeri (since 30 april 1987); deputy prime minister pertti paasio (since na january 1989) political parties and leaders: social democratic party, pertti paasio; center party, paavo vayrynen; people's democratic league (majority communist front), reijo kakela; national coalition (conservative) party, ilkka suominen; liberal people's party, kyosti lallukka; swedish people's party, christoffer taxell; rural party, leader na suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 31 january-1 february and 15 february 1988 (next to be held january 1994); results--mauno koivisto 48%, paavo vayrynen 20%, harri holkeri 18%; parliament--last held 15-16 march 1987 (next to be held march 1991); results--social democratic 24.3%, national coalition (conservative) 23.9%, center-liberal people's 18.6%, people's democratic league 9.4%, rural 6.3%, swedish people's 5.3%, democratic alternative 4.3%, green league 4.0%, finnish christian league 2.6%, finnish pensioners 1.2%, constitutional rightist 0.1%; seats--(200 total) social democratic 56, national coalition (conservative) 53, center-liberal people's 40, people's democratic league 16, swedish people's 13, rural 9, finnish christian league 5; democratic alternative 4, green league 4 communists: 28,000 registered members; an additional 45,000 persons belong to people's democratic league other political or pressure groups: finnish communist party (majority communist faction), jarmo wahlstrom; finnish communist party-unity (minority faction), esko-juhani tennila; democratic alternative (minority communist front), kristiina halkola; finnish christian league, esko almgren; constitutional rightist party; finnish pensioners party; green league, heidi hautala; communist workers party, timo lahdenmaki member of: adb, ccc, cema (special cooperation agreement), dac, ec (free trade agreement), efta, esa (associate), fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nordic council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador jukka valtasaari; chancery at 3216 new mexico avenue nw, washington dc 20016; telephone (202) 363-2430; there are finnish consulates general in los angeles and new york, and consulates in chicago and houston; us--ambassador john g. weinmann; embassy at itainen puistotie 14asf-00140, helsinki (mailing address is apo new york 09664); telephone p358o (0) 171931 flag: white with a blue cross that extends to the edges of the flag; the vertical part of the cross is shifted to the hoist side in the style of the dannebrog (danish flag) economy overview: finland has a highly industrialized, largely free market economy, with per capita output nearly three-fourths the us figure. its main economic force is the manufacturing sector--principally the wood, metals, and engineering industries. trade is important, with the export of goods representing about 25% of gnp. except for timber and several minerals, finland depends on imported raw materials, energy, and some components of manufactured goods. because of the climate, agricultural development is limited to maintaining self-sufficiency in basic commodities. economic prospects are generally bright, the main shadow being the increasing pressures on wages and prices. gdp: $74.4 billion, per capita $15,000; real growth rate 4.6% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 6.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 3.4% (1989) budget: revenues $28.3 billion; expenditures $28.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $na billion (1988 est.) exports: $22.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--timber, paper and pulp, ships, machinery, clothing and footwear; partners--ec 44.2% (uk 13.0%, frg 10.8%), ussr 14.9%, sweden 14.1%, us 5.8% imports: $22.0 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals, transport equipment, iron and steel, machinery, textile yarn and fabrics, fodder grains; partners--ec 43.5% (frg 16.9%, uk 6.8%), sweden 13.3%, ussr 12.1%, us 6.3% external debt: $5.3 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 4.3% (1989) electricity: 13,324,000 kw capacity; 49,330 million kwh produced, 9,940 kwh per capita (1989) industries: metal manufacturing and shipbuilding, forestry and wood processing (pulp, paper), copper refining, foodstuffs, textiles, clothing agriculture: accounts for 8% of gnp (including forestry); livestock production, especially dairy cattle, predominates; forestry is an important export earner and a secondary occupation for the rural population; main crops--cereals, sugar beets, potatoes; 85% self-sufficient, but short of food and fodder grains; annual fish catch about 160,000 metric tons aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $1.7 billion currency: markka (plural--markkaa); 1 markka (fmk) or finmark = 100 pennia exchange rates: markkaa (fmk) per us$1--4.0022 (january 1990), 4.2912 (1989), 4.1828 (1988), 4.3956 (1987), 5.0695 (1986), 6.1979 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 5,924 km total; finnish state railways (vr) operate a total of 5,863 km 1.524-meter gauge, of which 480 km are multiple track and 1,445 km are electrified highways: about 103,000 km total, including 35,000 km paved (bituminous, concrete, bituminous-treated surface) and 38,000 km unpaved (stabilized gravel, gravel, earth); additional 30,000 km of private (state-subsidized) roads inland waterways: 6,675 km total (including saimaa canal); 3,700 km suitable for steamers pipelines: natural gas, 580 km ports: helsinki, oulu, pori, rauma, turku; 6 secondary, numerous minor ports merchant marine: 82 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 737,811 grt/764,695 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 11 short-sea passenger, 18 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo, 24 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 12 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 5 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 7 bulk, 1 combination bulk civil air: 39 major transport airports: 160 total, 157 usable; 56 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 23 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good service from cable and radio relay network; 3,140,000 telephones; stations--4 am, 42 (101 relays) fm, 79 (195 relays) tv; 2 submarine cables; satellite service via swedish earth stations; satellite earth stations--2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 eutelsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,312,941; 1,091,416 fit for military service; 32,288 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 1.5% of gdp (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: france geography total area: 547,030 km2; land area: 545,630 km2; includes corsica and the rest of metropolitan france, but excludes the overseas administrative divisions comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of colorado land boundaries: 2,892.4 km total; andorra 60 km, belgium 620 km, frg 451 km, italy 488 km, luxembourg 73 km, monaco 4.4 km, spain 623 km, switzerland 573 km coastline: 3,427 km (includes corsica, 644 km) maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12-24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary dispute with canada (st. pierre and miquelon); madagascar claims bassas da india, europa island, glorioso islands, juan de nova island, and tromelin island; comoros claims mayotte; mauritius claims tromelin island; seychelles claims tromelin island; suriname claims part of french guiana; territorial claim in antarctica (adelie land) climate: generally cool winters and mild summers, but mild winters and hot summers along the mediterranean terrain: mostly flat plains or gently rolling hills in north and west; remainder is mountainous, especially pyrenees in south, alps in east natural resources: coal, iron ore, bauxite, fish, timber, zinc, potash land use: 32% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 23% meadows and pastures; 27% forest and woodland; 16% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: most of large urban areas and industrial centers in rhone, garonne, seine, or loire river basins; occasional warm tropical wind known as mistral note: largest west european nation people population: 56,358,331 (july 1990), growth rate 0.4% (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 82 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--frenchman(men), frenchwoman(women); adjective--french ethnic divisions: celtic and latin with teutonic, slavic, north african, indochinese, and basque minorities religion: 90% roman catholic, 2% protestant, 1% jewish, 1% muslim (north african workers), 6% unaffiliated language: french (100% of population); rapidly declining regional dialects (provencal, breton, alsatian, corsican, catalan, basque, flemish) literacy: 99% labor force: 24,170,000; 61.5% services, 31.3% industry, 7.3% agriculture (1987) organized labor: 20% of labor force (est.) government long-form name: french republic type: republic capital: paris administrative divisions: metropolitan france--22 regions (regions, singular--region); alsace, aquitaine, auvergne, basse-normandie, bourgogne, bretagne, centre, champagne-ardenne, corse, franche-comte, haute-normandie, ile-de-france, languedoc-roussillon, limousin, lorraine, midi-pyrenees, nord-pas-de-calais, pays de la loire, picardie, poitou-charentes, provence-alpes-cote d'azur, rhone-alpes; note--the 22 regions are subdivided into 96 departments; see separate entries for the overseas departments (french guiana, guadeloupe, martinique, reunion) and the territorial collectivities (mayotte, st. pierre and miquelon) dependent areas: bassas da india, clipperton island, europa island, french polynesia, french southern and antarctic lands, glorioso islands, juan de nova island, new caledonia, tromelin island, wallis and futuna independence: unified by clovis in 486, first republic proclaimed in 1792 constitution: 28 september 1958, amended concerning election of president in 1962 legal system: civil law system with indigenous concepts; review of administrative but not legislative acts national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral parliament (parlement) consists of an upper house or senate (senat) and a lower house or national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: court of cassation (cour de cassation) leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--prime minister michel rocard (since 10 march 1988) political parties and leaders: rally for the republic (rpr, formerly udr), jacques chirac; union for french democracy (udf, federation of pr, cds, and rad), valery giscard d'estaing; republicans (pr), francois leotard; center for social democrats (cds), pierre mehaignerie; radical (rad), yves gallard; socialist party (ps), pierre mauroy; left radical movement (mrg), yves collin; communist party (pcf), georges marchais; national front (fn), jean-marie le pen suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 8 may 1988 (next to be held may 1995); results--second ballot francois mitterrand 54%, jacques chirac 46%; senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(321 total; 296 metropolitan france, 13 for overseas departments and territories, and 12 for french nationals abroad) rpr 93, udf 143 (pr 53, cds 65, rad 25), ps 64, pcf 16, independents 2, unknown 3; national assembly--last held 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--second ballot ps-mrg 48.7%, rpr 23.1%, udf 21%, pcf 3.4%, other 3.8%; seats--(577 total) ps 275, rpr 132, udf 90, udc 40, pcf 25, independents 15 communists: 700,000 claimed but probably closer to 150,000; communist voters, 2.8 million in 1988 election other political or pressure groups: communist-controlled labor union (confederation generale du travail) nearly 2.4 million members (claimed); socialist-leaning labor union (confederation francaise democratique du travail or cfdt) about 800,000 members est.; independent labor union (force ouvriere) about 1,000,000 members est.; independent white-collar union (confederation generale des cadres) 340,000 members (claimed); national council of french employers (conseil national du patronat francais--cnpf or patronat) member of: adb, ccc, council of europe, dac, ec, eib, ems, esa, escap, fao, gatt, iaea, iatp, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, irc, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, nato (signatory), oas (observer), oecd, spc, un, unesco, upu, weu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador jacques andreani; chancery at 4101 reservoir road nw, washington dc 20007; telephone (202) 944-6000; there are french consulates general in boston, chicago, detroit, houston, los angeles, new orleans, miami, new york, san francisco, and san juan (puerto rico); us--ambassador walter j. p. curley; embassy at 2 avenue gabriel, 75382 paris cedex 08 (mailing address is apo new york 09777); telephone p33o (1) 42-96-12-02 or 42-61-80-75; there are us consulates general in bordeaux, lyon, marseille, and strasbourg flag: three equal vertical bands of blue (hoist side), white, and red; known as the french tricouleur (tricolor); the design and colors have been the basis for a number of other flags, including those of belgium, chad, ireland, ivory coast, and luxembourg; the official flag for all french dependent areas economy overview: one of the world's most developed economies, france has substantial agricultural resources and a highly diversified modern industrial sector. large tracts of fertile land, the application of modern technology, and subsidies have combined to make it the leading agricultural producer in western europe. france is largely self-sufficient in agricultural products and is a major exporter of wheat and dairy products. the industrial sector generates about one-third of gdp and employs about one-third of the work force. during the period 1982-86 economic growth was sluggish, averaging only 1.4% annually. this trend was reversed by late 1987, however, with a strong expansion of consumer demand, followed by a surge in investment. the economy has had difficulty generating enough jobs for new entrants into the labor force, resulting in a high unemployment rate, but the upward trend in growth recently pushed the jobless rate below 10%. the steadily advancing economic integration within the european community is a major force affecting the fortunes of the various economic sectors. gdp: $819.6 billion, per capita $14,600; real growth rate 3.4% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.5% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 9.7% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $197.0 billion; expenditures $213.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1989 est.) exports: $183.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs, agricultural products, iron and steel products, textiles and clothing; partners--frg 15.8%, italy 12.2%, uk 9.8%, belgium-luxembourg 8.9%, netherlands 8.7%, us 6.7%, spain 5.6%, japan 1.8%, ussr 1.3% (1989 est.) imports: $194.5 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--crude oil, machinery and equipment, agricultural products, chemicals, iron and steel products; partners--frg 19.4%, italy 11.5%, belgium-luxembourg 9.2%, us 7.7%, uk 7.2%, netherlands 5.2%, spain 4.4%, japan 4.1%, ussr 2.1% (1989 est.) external debt: $59.3 billion (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 4.4% (1989 est.) electricity: 109,972,000 kw capacity; 403,570 million kwh produced, 7,210 kwh per capita (1989) industries: steel, machinery, chemicals, automobiles, metallurgy, aircraft, electronics, mining, textiles, food processing, and tourism agriculture: accounts for 4% of gnp (including fishing and forestry); one of the world's top five wheat producers; other principal products--beef, dairy products, cereals, sugar beets, potatoes, wine grapes; self-sufficient for most temperate-zone foods; shortages include fats and oils and tropical produce, but overall net exporter of farm products; fish catch of 850,000 metric tons ranks among world's top 20 countries and is all used domestically aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $59.8 billion currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: french national railways (sncf) operates 34,568 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 11,674 km electrified, 15,132 km double or multiple track; 2,138 km of various gauges (1.000-meter to 1.440-meter), privately owned and operated highways: 1,551,400 km total; 33,400 km national highway; 347,000 km departmental highway; 421,000 km community roads; 750,000 km rural roads; 5,401 km of controlled-access divided autoroutes; about 803,000 km paved inland waterways: 14,932 km; 6,969 km heavily traveled pipelines: crude oil, 3,059 km; refined products, 4,487 km; natural gas, 24,746 km ports: maritime--bordeaux, boulogne, brest, cherbourg, dunkerque, fos-sur-mer, le havre, marseille, nantes, rouen, sete, toulon; inland--42 merchant marine: 153 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,671,645 grt/5,950,785 dwt; includes 10 short-sea passenger, 19 cargo, 19 container, 1 multifunction large-load carrier, 30 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 37 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 9 chemical tanker, 6 liquefied gas, 4 specialized tanker, 17 bulk, 1 combination bulk; note--france also maintains a captive register for french-owned ships in the kerguelen islands (french southern and antarctic lands) and french polynesia civil air: 355 major transport aircraft (1982) airports: 470 total, 460 usable; 204 with permanent-surface runways; 3 with runways over 3,659 m; 34 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 133 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: highly developed system provides satisfactory telephone, telegraph, radio and tv broadcast services; 39,110,000 telephones; stations--42 am, 138 (777 relays) fm, 215 tv (8,900 relays); 25 submarine coaxial cables; communication satellite earth stations operating in intelsat, 3 atlantic ocean and 2 indian ocean, eutelsat, marisat, and domestic systems defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, national gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 14,285,904; 12,042,731 fit for military service; 409,544 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 3.8% of gdp, or $31.1 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: french guiana (overseas department of france) geography total area: 91,000 km2; land area: 89,150 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than indiana land boundaries: 1,183 km total; brazil 673 km, suriname 510 km coastline: 378 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: suriname claims area between riviere litani and riviere marouini (both headwaters of the lawa) climate: tropical; hot, humid; little seasonal temperature variation terrain: low-lying coastal plains rising to hills and small mountains natural resources: bauxite, timber, gold (widely scattered), cinnabar, kaolin, fish land use: negl% arable land; negl% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 82% forest and woodland; 18% other environment: mostly an unsettled wilderness people population: 97,781 (july 1990), growth rate 3.4% (1990) birth rate: 29 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 10 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 19 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--french guianese (sing., pl.); adjective--french guiana ethnic divisions: 66% black or mulatto; 12% caucasian; 12% east indian, chinese, amerindian; 10% other religion: predominantly roman catholic language: french literacy: 73% labor force: 23,265; 60.6% services, government, and commerce, 21.2% industry, 18.2% agriculture (1980) organized labor: 7% of labor force government long-form name: department of guiana type: overseas department of france capital: cayenne administrative divisions: none (overseas department of france) independence: none (overseas department of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french legal system national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: french president, commissioner of the republic legislative branch: unicameral general council and a unicameral regional council judicial branch: highest local court is the court of appeals based in martinique with jurisdiction over martinique, guadeloupe, and french guiana leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--commissioner of the republic jean-pierre lacroix (since na august 1988) political parties and leaders: guianese socialist party (psg), gerard holder; rally for the republic (rpr), paulin brune; guyanese democratic action (adg), andre lecante; union for french democracy (udf), claude ho a chuck; national front, guy malon; popular and national party of guiana (pnpg), claude robo; national anti-colonist guianese party (panga), michel kapel suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: regional council--last held 16 march 1986 (next to be held march 1991); results--psg 43%, rpr 27.7%, adg 12.2%, udf 8.9%, fn 3.7%, pnpg 1.4%, others 3.1%; seats--(31 total) psg 15, rpr 9, adg 4, udf 3; french senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) psg 1; french national assembly--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(2 total) psg 1, rpr 1 communists: communist party membership negligible member of: wftu diplomatic representation: as an overseas department of france the interests of french guiana are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: the economy is tied closely to that of france through subsidies and imports. besides the french space center at kourou, fishing and forestry are the most important economic activities, with exports of fish and fish products (mostly shrimp) accounting for about two-thirds of total revenue in 1985. the large reserves of tropical hardwoods, not fully exploited, support an expanding sawmill industry that provides sawn logs for export. cultivation of crops--rice, cassava, bananas, and sugarcane--are limited to the coastal area, where the population is largely concentrated. french guiana is heavily dependent on imports of food and energy. unemployment is a serious problem, particularly among younger workers, with an unemployment rate of 15%. gdp: $210 million, per capita $3,230; real growth rate na% (1982) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.1% (1987) unemployment rate: 15% (1987) budget: revenues $735 million; expenditures $735 million, including capital expenditures of na (1987) exports: $37.0 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--shrimp, timber, rum, rosewood essence; partners--us 41%, japan 18%, france 9% (1984) imports: $297.7 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--food (grains, processed meat), other consumer goods, producer goods, petroleum; partners--france 55%, trinidad and tobago 13%, us 3% (1984) external debt: $1.2 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 92,000 kw capacity; 185 million kwh produced, 1,950 kwh per capita (1989) industries: construction, shrimp processing, forestry products, rum, gold mining agriculture: some vegetables for local consumption; rice, corn, manioc, cocoa, bananas, sugar aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.1 billion currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 680 km total; 510 km paved, 170 km improved and unimproved earth inland waterways: 460 km, navigable by small oceangoing vessels and river and coastal steamers; 3,300 km possibly navigable by native craft ports: cayenne civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 11 total, 11 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair open wire and radio relay system; 18,100 telephones; stations--5 am, 7 fm, 9 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces 1military manpower: males 15-49 27,866; 18,430 fit for military service note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: french polynesia (overseas territory of france) geography total area: 3,941 km2; land area: 3,660 km2 comparative area: slightly less than one-third the size of connecticut land boundaries: none coastline: 2,525 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical, but moderate terrain: mixture of rugged high islands and low islands with reefs natural resources: timber, fish, cobalt land use: 1% arable land; 19% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 31% forest and woodland; 44% other environment: occasional cyclonic storm in january; includes five archipelagoes note: makatea is one of three great phosphate rock islands in the pacific (others are banaba or ocean island in kiribati and nauru) people population: 190,181 (july 1990), growth rate 2.5% (1990) birth rate: 31 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 23 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 71 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--french polynesian(s); adjective--french polynesian ethnic divisions: 78% polynesian, 12% chinese, 6% local french, 4% metropolitan french religion: mainly christian; 55% protestant, 32% roman catholic language: french (official), tahitian literacy: na% labor force: 57,863 employed (1983) organized labor: na government long-form name: territory of french polynesia type: overseas territory of france capital: papeete administrative divisions: none (overseas territory of france) independence: none (overseas territory of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: based on french system national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: french president, high commissioner of the republic, president of the council of ministers, vice president of the council of ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral territorial assembly judicial branch: court of appeal leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); high commissioner of the republic jean montpezat (since na november 1987); head of government--president of the council of ministers alexandre leontieff (since 9 december 1987); vice president of the council of ministers georges kelly (since 9 december 1987) political parties and leaders: tahoeraa huiraatira (gaullist), gaston flosse; pupu here ai'a, jean juventin; front de liberation, oscar temaru; ai'a api, emile vernaudon; ia mana te nunaa, jacques drollet; pupu taina, michel law; toatiraa polynesia, arthur chung; te e'a api, francis sanford suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: territorial assembly--last held 16 march 1986 (next to be held march 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(41 total) tahoeraa huiraatira 24, amuitahiraa mo porinesia 6, pupu here ai'a 4, ia mana 3, front de liberation 2, other 2; french senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) democrats for progress 1; french national assembly last held 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(2 total) rally for the republic 1, ai'a api 1 diplomatic representation: as an overseas territory of france, french polynesian interests are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: since 1962, when france stationed military personnel in the region, french polynesia has changed from a subsistence economy to one in which a high proportion of the work force is either employed by the military or supports the tourist industry. tourism accounts for about 20% of gdp and is a primary source of hard currency earnings. gdp: $2.24 billion, per capita $6,400; real growth rate na% (1986) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.2% (1987) unemployment rate: 8% (1986 est.) budget: revenues $431; expenditures $418, including capital expenditures of $na (1986) exports: $75 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--coconut products 79%, mother-of-pearl 14%, vanilla, shark meat; partners--france 44%, us 21% imports: $767 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--fuels, foodstuffs, equipment; partners--france 50%, us 16%, new zealand 6% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 72,000 kw capacity; 265 million kwh produced, 1,350 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, pearls, agricultural processing, handicrafts agriculture: coconut and vanilla plantations; vegetables and fruit; poultry, beef, dairy products aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.6 billion currency: comptoirs francais du pacifique franc (plural--francs); 1 cfp franc (cfpf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: comptoirs francais du pacifique francs (cfpf) per us$1--104.71 (january 1990), 115.99 (1989), 108.30 (1988), 109.27 (1987), 125.92 (1986), 163.35 (1985); note--linked at the rate of 18.18 to the french franc fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 600 km (1982) ports: papeete, bora-bora merchant marine: 2 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,732 grt/4,191 dwt; includes 1 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo; note--a subset of the french register civil air: about 6 major transport aircraft airports: 43 total, 41 usable; 23 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 12 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 33,200 telephones; 84,000 radio receivers; 26,400 tv sets; stations--5 am, 2 fm, 6 tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: french southern and antarctic lands (overseas territory of france) geography total area: 7,781 km2; land area: 7,781 km2; includes ile amsterdam, ile saint-paul, iles kerguelen, and iles crozet; excludes claim not recognized by the us of about 500,000 km2 in antarctica known as terre adelie comparative area: slightly less than 1.5 times the size of delaware land boundaries: none coastline: 1,232 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploration; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claim in antarctica (terre adelie) not recognized by the us climate: antarctic terrain: volcanic natural resources: fish, crayfish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: ile amsterdam and ile saint-paul are extinct volcanoes note: located in the southern indian ocean about equidistant between africa, antarctica, and australia people population: 210 (july 1990), growth rate 0.00% (1990); mostly researchers government long-form name: territory of the french southern and antarctic lands type: overseas territory of france governed by high administrator claude corbier (since na 1988) flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: economic activity is limited to servicing meteorological and geophysical research stations and french and other fishing fleets. the fishing catches landed on iles kerguelen by foreign ships are exported to france and reunion. communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only merchant marine: 10 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 217,203 grt/348,632 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 3 refrigerated cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 2 bulk; note--a subset of the french register telecommunications: na defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: gabon geography total area: 267,670 km2; land area: 257,670 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than colorado land boundaries: 2,551 km total; cameroon 298 km, congo 1,903 km, equatorial guinea 350 km coastline: 885 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary with equatorial guinea climate: tropical; always hot, humid terrain: narrow coastal plain; hilly interior; savanna in east and south natural resources: crude oil, manganese, uranium, gold, timber, iron ore land use: 1% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 18% meadows and pastures; 78% forest and woodland; 2% other environment: deforestation people population: 1,068,240 (july 1990), growth rate 0.8% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 106 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--gabonese (sing., pl.); adjective--gabonese ethnic divisions: about 40 bantu tribes, including four major tribal groupings (fang, eshira, bapounou, bateke); about 100,000 expatriate africans and europeans, including 27,000 french religion: 55-75% christian, less than 1% muslim, remainder animist language: french (official), fang, myene, bateke, bapounou/eschira, bandjabi literacy: 61.6% labor force: 120,000 salaried; 65.0% agriculture, 30.0% industry and commerce, 2.5% services, 2.5% government; 58% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: there are 38,000 members of the national trade union, the gabonese trade union confederation (cosyga) government long-form name: gabonese republic type: republic; one-party presidential regime since 1964 capital: libreville administrative divisions: 9 provinces; estuaire, haut-ogooue, moyen-ogooue, ngounie, nyanga, ogooue-ivindo, ogooue-lolo, ogooue-maritime, woleu-ntem independence: 17 august 1960 (from france) constitution: 21 february 1961, revised 15 april 1975 legal system: based on french civil law system and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in constitutional chamber of the supreme court; compulsory icj jurisdiction not accepted national holiday: renovation day (gabonese democratic party established), 12 march (1968) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemble nationale) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state--president el hadj omar bongo (since 2 december 1967); head of government--prime minister leon mebiame (since 16 april 1975) political parties and leaders: only party--gabonese social democratic rally (rsdg), el hadj omar bongo, president; formerly gabonese democratic party (pdg), which was dissolved in february 1990 suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held on 9 november 1986 (next to be held november 1993); results--president omar bongo was reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held on 17 february 1985 (next to be held by february 1992); results--pdg was the only party; seats--(120 total, 111 elected) pdg 111 communists: no organized party; probably some communist sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, ccc, conference of east and central african states, eama, eib (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, icco, ico, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oau, oic, opec, udeac, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador jean robert odzaga; chancery at 2034 20th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 797-1000; us--ambassador keith l. wauchope; embassy at boulevard de la mer, libreville (mailing address is b. p. 4000, libreville); telephone 762003 or 762004, 761337, 721348, 740248 flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), yellow, and blue economy overview: the economy, dependent on timber and manganese until the early 1970s, is now dominated by the oil sector. during the period 1981-85 oil accounted for about 46% of gdp, 83% of export earnings, and 65% of government revenues on average. the high oil prices of the early 1980s contributed to a substantial increase in per capita income, stimulated domestic demand, reinforced migration from rural to urban areas, and raised the level of real wages to among the highest in sub-saharan africa. the three-year slide of gabon's economy, which began with falling oil prices in 1985, stabilized in 1989 because of a near doubling of oil prices over their 1988 lows. the agricultural and industrial sectors are relatively underdeveloped, accounting for only 8% and 10%, respectively, of gdp in 1986. gdp: $3.2 billion, per capita $3,200; real growth rate 0% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3% (1989) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $927 million; expenditures $1.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $33 million (1988) exports: $1.14 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--crude oil 70%, manganese 11%, wood 12%, uranium 6%; partners--france 53%, us 22%, frg, japan imports: $0.76 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--foodstuffs, chemical products, petroleum products, construction materials, manufactures, machinery; partners--france 48%, us 2.6%, frg, japan, uk external debt: $2.0 billion (october 1989) industrial production: growth rate 1.7% (1986) electricity: 310,000 kw capacity; 980 million kwh produced, 920 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sawmills, petroleum, food and beverages; mining of increasing importance (especially manganese and uranium) agriculture: accounts for 8% of gdp (including fishing and forestry); cash crops--cocoa, coffee, palm oil; livestock not developed; importer of food; small fishing operations provide a catch of about 20,000 metric tons; okoume (a tropical softwood) is the most important timber product aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $64 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.7 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $27 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 649 km 1.437-meter standard-gauge single track (transgabonese railroad) highways: 7,500 km total; 560 km paved, 960 km laterite, 5,980 km earth inland waterways: 1,600 km perennially navigable pipelines: crude oil, 270 km; refined products, 14 km ports: owendo, port-gentil, libreville merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 18,563 grt/25,330 dwt civil air: 11 major transport aircraft airports: 79 total, 68 usable; 10 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 21 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate system of open-wire, radio relay, tropospheric scatter links and radiocommunication stations; 13,800 telephones; stations--6 am, 6 fm, 8 tv; satellite earth stations--2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 12 domestic satellite defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 266,110; 133,158 fit for military service; 9,282 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 3.2% of gdp, or $102 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: the gambia geography total area: 11,300 km2; land area: 10,000 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of delaware land boundary: 740 km with senegal coastline: 80 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 18 nm; continental shelf: not specific; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: short section of boundary with senegal is indefinite climate: tropical; hot, rainy season (june to november); cooler, dry season (november to may) terrain: flood plain of the gambia river flanked by some low hills natural resources: fish land use: 16% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 9% meadows and pastures; 20% forest and woodland; 55% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: deforestation note: almost an enclave of senegal; smallest country on the continent of africa people population: 848,147 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 48 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 18 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 140 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 46 years male, 50 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--gambian(s); adjective--gambian ethnic divisions: 99% african (42% mandinka, 18% fula, 16% wolof, 10% jola, 9% serahuli, 4% other); 1% non-gambian religion: 90% muslim, 9% christian, 1% indigenous beliefs language: english (official); mandinka, wolof, fula, other indigenous vernaculars literacy: 25.1% labor force: 400,000 (1986 est.); 75.0% agriculture, 18.9% industry, commerce, and services, 6.1% government; 55% population of working age (1983) organized labor: 25-30% of wage labor force government long-form name: republic of the gambia type: republic capital: banjul administrative divisions: 5 divisions and 1 city*; banjul*, lower river, maccarthy island, north bank, upper river, western independence: 18 february 1965 (from uk); the gambia and senegal signed an agreement on 12 december 1981 (effective 1 february 1982) that called for the creation of a loose confederation to be known as senegambia, but the agreement was dissolved on 30 september 1989 constitution: 24 april 1970 legal system: based on a composite of english common law, koranic law, and customary law; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 18 february (1965) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president alhaji sir dawda kairaba jawara (since 24 april 1970); vice president bakary bunja darbo (since 12 may 1982) political parties and leaders: people's progressive party (ppp), dawda k. jawara, secretary general; national convention party (ncp), sheriff dibba; gambian people's party (gpp), assan musa camara; united party (up); people's democratic organization of independence and socialism (pdois) suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held on 11 march 1987 (next to be held march 1992); results--sir dawda jawara (ppp) 61.1%, sherif mustapha dibba (ncp) 25.2%, assan musa camara (gpp) 13.7%; house of representatives--last held on 11 march 1987 (next to be held by march 1992); results--ppp 56.6%, ncp 27.6%, gpp 14.7%, pdois 1%; seats--(43 total, 36 elected) ppp 31, ncp 5 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, apc, commonwealth, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, imf, imo, irc, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador ousman a. sallah; chancery at suite 720, 1030 15th street nw, washington dc 20005; telephone (202) 842-1356 or 842-1359; us--ambassador (vacant); embassy at pipeline road (kairaba avenue), fajara, banjul (mailing address is p. m. b. no. 19, banjul); telephone serrekunda p220o 92856 or 92858, 91970, 91971 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), blue with white edges, and green economy overview: the gambia has no important mineral or other natural resources and has a limited agricultural base. it is one of the world's poorest countries with a per capita income of about $250. about 75% of the population is engaged in crop production and livestock raising, which contributes about 30% to gdp. small-scale manufacturing activity--processing peanuts, fish, and hides--accounts for less than 10% of gdp. tourism is a growing industry. the gambia imports about 33% of its food, all fuel, and most manufactured goods. exports are concentrated on peanut products (over 75% of total value). gdp: $195 million, per capita $250; real growth rate 4.6% (fy89 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.0% (fy89 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $75 million; expenditures $67 million, including capital expenditures of $21 million (fy89) exports: $133 million (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--peanuts and peanut products, fish, cotton lint, palm kernels; partners--ghana 49%, europe 27%, japan 12%, us 1% (1986) imports: $105 million (c.i.f., fy89); commodities--foodstuffs, manufactures, raw materials, fuel, machinery and transport equipment; partners--europe 55% (ec 39%, other 16%), asia 20%, us 11%, senegal 4% (1986) external debt: $330 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 7.3% (fy88) electricity: 29,000 kw capacity; 64 million kwh produced, 80 kwh per capita (1989) industries: peanut processing, tourism, beverages, agricultural machinery assembly, woodworking, metalworking, clothing agriculture: accounts for 30% of gdp and employs about 75% of the population; imports one-third of food requirements; major export crop is peanuts; the principal crops--millet, sorghum, rice, corn, cassava, palm kernels; livestock--cattle, sheep, and goats; forestry and fishing resources not fully exploited aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $84 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $422 million; communist countries (1970-88), $39 million currency: dalasi (plural--dalasi); 1 dalasi (d) = 100 bututs exchange rates: dalasi (d) per us$1--8.3232 (december 1989), 7.5846 (1989), 6.7086 (1988), 7.0744 (1987), 6.9380 (1986), 3.8939 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 3,083 km total; 431 km paved, 501 km gravel/laterite, and 2,151 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 400 km ports: banjul civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 2,440-3,659 m telecommunications: adequate network of radio relay and wire; 3,500 telephones; stations--3 am, 2 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 182,308; 92,001 fit for military service defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: gaza strip note: the war between israel and the arab states in june 1967 ended with israel in control of the west bank and the gaza strip, the sinai, and the golan heights. as stated in the 1978 camp david accords and reaffirmed by president reagan's 1 september 1982 peace initiative, the final status of the west bank and the gaza strip, their relationship with their neighbors, and a peace treaty between israel and jordan are to be negotiated among the concerned parties. camp david further specifies that these negotiations will resolve the respective boundaries. pending the completion of this process, it is us policy that the final status of the west bank and the gaza strip has yet to be determined. in the view of the us, the term west bank describes all of the area west of the jordan under jordanian administration before the 1967 arab-israeli war. with respect to negotiations envisaged in the framework agreement, however, it is us policy that a distinction must be made between jerusalem and the rest of the west bank because of the city's special status and circumstances. therefore, a negotiated solution for the final status of jerusalem could be different in character from that of the rest of the west bank. geography total area: 380km2; land area: 380 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: 62 km total; egypt 11 km, israel 51 km coastline: 40 km maritime claims: israeli occupied with status to be determined disputes: israeli occupied with status to be determined climate: temperate, mild winters, dry and warm to hot summers terrain: flat to rolling, sand and dune covered coastal plain natural resources: negligible land use: 13% arable land, 32% permanent crops, 0% meadows and pastures, 0% forest and woodland, 55% other environment: desertification note: there are 18 jewish settlements in the gaza strip people population: 615,575 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990); in addition, there are 2,500 jewish settlers in the gaza strip birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 55 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 63 years male, 66 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: na ethnic divisions: 99.8% palestinian arab and other, 0.2% jewish religion: 99% muslim (predominantly sunni), 0.7% christian, 0.3% jewish language: arabic, israeli settlers speak hebrew, english widely understood literacy: na% labor force: (excluding israeli jewish settlers) 32.0% small industry, commerce and business, 24.4% construction, 25.5% service and other, and 18.1% agriculture (1984) organized labor: na government long-form name: none note: the gaza strip is currently governed by israeli military authorities and israeli civil administration. it is us policy that the final status of the gaza strip will be determined by negotiations among the concerned parties. these negotiations will determine how this area is to be governed. economy overview: nearly half of the labor force of the gaza strip is employed across the border by israeli industrial, construction, and agricultural enterprises, with worker transfer funds accounting for 40% of gnp in 1989. the once dominant agricultural sector now contributes only 13% to gnp, about the same as that of the construction sector, and industry accounts for 7%. gaza depends upon israel for 90% of its imports and as a market for 80% of its exports. unrest in the territory in 1988-89 (intifadah) has raised unemployment and substantially lowered the incomes of the population. gnp: $380 million, per capita $650; real growth rate na% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $36.6 million; expenditures $32.0 million, including capital expenditures of na (1986) exports: $88 million; commodities--citrus; partners--israel, egypt (1989 est.) imports: $260 million; commodities--food, consumer goods, construction materials; partners--israel, egypt (1989 est.) external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: power supplied by israel industries: generally small family businesses that produce cement, textiles, soap, olive-wood carvings, and mother-of-pearl souvenirs; the israelis have established some small-scale modern industries in an industrial center agriculture: olives, citrus and other fruits, vegetables, beef, dairy products aid: none currency: new israeli shekel (plural--shekels); 1 new israeli shekel (nis) = 100 new agorot exchange rates: new israeli shekels (nis) per us$1--1.9450 (january 1990), 1.9164 (1989), 1.5989 (1988), 1.5946 (1987), 1.4878 (1986), 1.1788 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-march 31 communications railroads: one line, abandoned and in disrepair, but trackage remains highways: small, poorly developed indigenous road network ports: facilities for small boats to service gaza airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway less than 1,220 m telecommunications: stations--no am, no fm, no tv defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: german democratic republic (east germany) geography total area: 108,330 km2; land area: 105,980 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than tennessee land boundaries: 2,296 km total; czechoslovakia 459 km, poland 456 km, frg 1,381 km coastline: 901 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: it is us policy that the final borders of germany have not been established; the us is seeking to settle the property claims of us nationals against the gdr climate: temperate; cloudy, cold winters with frequent rain and snow; cool, wet summers terrain: mostly flat plain with hills and mountains in south natural resources: lignite, potash, uranium, copper, natural gas, salt, nickel land use: 45% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 12% meadows and pastures; 28% forest and woodland; 12% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: significant deforestation in mountains caused by air pollution and acid rain note: strategic location on north european plain and near the entrance to the baltic sea; west berlin is an enclave (about 116 km by air or 176 km by road from frg) people population: 16,307,170 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 12 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--german(s); adjective--german ethnic divisions: 99.7% german, 0.3% slavic and other religion: 47% protestant, 7% roman catholic, 46% unaffiliated or other; less than 5% of protestants and about 25% of roman catholics active participants language: german literacy: 99% labor force: 8,960,000; 37.5% industry, 21.1% services, 10.8% agriculture and forestry, 10.3% commerce, 7.4% transport and communications, 6.6% construction, 3.1% handicrafts, 3.2% other (1987) organized labor: 87.7% of labor force government long-form name: german democratic republic; abbreviated gdr type: communist state capital: east berlin (not officially recognized by france, uk, and us, which together with the ussr have special rights and responsibilities in berlin) administrative divisions: 14 districts (bezirke, singular--bezirk); cottbus, dresden, erfurt, frankfurt, gera, halle, karl-marx-stadt, leipzig, magdeburg, neubrandenburg, potsdam, rostock, schwerin, suhl independence: self-government proclaimed 7 october 1949, with permission of the soviet authorities constitution: 9 april 1968, amended 7 october 1974 legal system: civil law system modified by communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: foundation of the german democratic republic, 7 october (1949) executive branch: council of state abolished on 5 april 1990, post of president to be created; chairman of the council of ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral people's chamber (volkskammer) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--acting president of the people's chamber sabine bergmann-pohl (since 5 april 1990); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers lothar de maiziere (since 12 april 1990); deputy chairman peter-michael diestel (since 16 april 1990) political parties and leaders: alliance for germany--christian democratic union (cdu), lothar de maiziere, chairman; german social union (dsu), hans-wilhelm ebeling, chairman; and democratic awakening (da), rainer eppelmann, chairman; social democratic party of germany (spd), markus meckel, acting chairman; party for democratic socialism (pds, former communist), gregor gysi, chairman; league of free democrats (bfd)--liberals, rainer ortleb, chairman; free democratic party (fdp), bruno menzel, chairman; and german forum party (dfp), juergen schmieder, chairman; alliance '90--new forum, baerbel bohley, jens reich, sebastian pflugbeil, spokespersons; democracy now, konrad weiss, spokesperson; and united left, herbert misslitz, spokesperson; greens party (gp), vera wollenberger, spokesperson; democratic peasants' party (dbd), guenther maleuda, chairman suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: people's chamber--last held on 18 march 1990 (next to be held march na); results--alliance for germany--cdu 40.9%, dsu 6.3%, da 0.9%; spd 21.8; bfd 5.3%; spd 21.8%; pds 16.3%; alliance '90 2.9%; dbd 2.2%; gp 2.0%; ndpd 0.4%; others 1.0%; seats--(400 total, including 66 from east berlin) alliance for germany--cdu 164, dsu 25, da 4; spd 87; bfd 21; pds 65; alliance '90 12, dbd 9; gp 8; ndpd 2; others 3 communists: 500,000 to 700,000 party members (1990) member of: cema, iaea, ibec, ices, ilo, imo, ipu, itu, un, unesco, upu, warsaw pact, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador dr. gerhard herder; chancery at 1717 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 232-3134; us--ambassador richard c. barkley; embassy at 1080 berlin, neustaedtische kirchstrasse 4-5, east berlin (mailing address is box e, apo new york 09742); telephone p37o (2) 220-2741 flag: three equal horizontal bands of black (top), red, and yellow with the coat of arms centered; the coat of arms contains, in yellow, a hammer and compass encircled by a wreath of grain with a black, red, and gold ribbon at the bottom; similar to the flag of the frg which does not have a coat of arms economy overview: the gdr is moving rapidly away from its centrally planned economy. as the 1990s begin, economic integration with west germany appears inevitable, beginning with the establishment of a common currency. the opening of the border with the frg in late 1989 and the continuing emigration of hundreds of thousands of skilled workers had brought growth to a standstill by yearend 1989. features of the old economic regime that will quickly change: (a) the collectivization of 95% of east german farms; (b) state ownership of nearly all transportation facilities, industrial plants, foreign trade organizations, and financial institutions; (c) the 65% share in trade of the ussr and other cema countries; and (d) the detailed control over economic details exercised by party and state. once integrated into the thriving west german economy, the area will have to stem the outflow of workers and renovate the obsolescent industrial base. after an initial readjustment period, living standards and quality of output will steadily rise toward west german levels. gnp: $159.5 billion, per capita $9,679; real growth rate 1.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $123.5 billion; expenditures $123.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $33 billion (1986) exports: $30.7 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and transport equipment 47%, fuels and metals 16%, consumer goods 16%, chemical products and building materials 13%, semimanufactured goods and processed foodstuffs 8%; partners--ussr, czechoslovakia, poland, frg, hungary, bulgaria, switzerland, romania imports: $31.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fuels and metals 40%, machinery and transport equipment 29%, chemical products and building materials 9%; partners--cema countries 65%, non-communist 33%, other 2% external debt: $20.6 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 2.7% (1989 est.) electricity: (including east berlin) 24,585,000 kw capacity; 122,500 million kwh produced, 7,390 kwh per capita (1989) industries: metal fabrication, chemicals, brown coal, shipbuilding, machine building, food and beverages, textiles, petroleum agriculture: accounts for about 10% of gnp (including fishing and forestry); principal crops--wheat, rye, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, fruit; livestock products include pork, beef, chicken, milk, hides and skins; net importer of food; fish catch of 193,600 metric tons in 1987 aid: donor--$4.0 billion extended bilaterally to non-communist less developed countries (1956-88) currency: gdr mark (plural--marks); 1 gdr mark (m) = 100 pfennige exchange rates: gdr marks (m) per us$1--3.01 (1988), 3.00 (1987), 3.30 (1986), 3.70 (1985), 3.64 (1984) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 14,005 km total; 13,730 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 275 km 1.000-meter or other narrow gauge, 3,830 (est.) km 1.435-meter double-track standard gauge; 2,754 km overhead electrified (1986) highways: 124,615 km total; 47,214 km concrete, asphalt, stone block, of which 1,913 km are autobahn and limited access roads, 11,261 are trunk roads, and 34,040 are regional roads; 77,401 municipal roads (1985) inland waterways: 2,319 km (1986) pipelines: crude oil, 1,301 km; refined products, 500 km; natural gas, 2,150 km (1988) ports: rostock, wismar, stralsund, sassnitz; river ports are east berlin, riesa, magdeburg, and eisenhuttenstadt on the elbe or oder rivers and connecting canals merchant marine: 145 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,349,537 grt/1,733,089 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 89 cargo, 10 refrigerated cargo, 6 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 16 container, 1 multifunction large-load carrier, 2 railcar carrier, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas tanker, 16 bulk civil air: 45 major transport aircraft airports: 190 total, 190 usable; 70 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runway over 3,659 m; 45 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 40 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--23 am, 17 fm, 21 tv; 15 soviet tv relays; 6,181,860 tv sets; 6,700,000 radio receivers; at least 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: national people's army, border troops, air and air defense command, people's navy military manpower: eligible 15-49, 7,944,305; of the 4,045,396 males 15-49, 3,243,970 are fit for military service; 91,579 reach military age (18) annually; of the 3,898,909 females 15-49, 3,117,847 are fit for military service; 85,892 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 16.2 billion marks, 5.4% of total budget (1989); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: germany, federal republic of (west germany) geography total area: 248,580 km2; land area: 244,280 km2; includes west berlin comparative area: slightly smaller than oregon land boundaries: 4,256 km total; austria 784 km, belgium 167 km, czechoslovakia 356 km, denmark 68 km, france 451 km, gdr 1,381 km; luxembourg 138 km, netherlands 577 km, switzerland 334 km coastline: 1,488 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm (extends, at one point, to 16 nm in the helgolander bucht) disputes: it is us policy that the final borders of germany have not been established climate: temperate and marine; cool, cloudy, wet winters and summers; occasional warm, tropical foehn wind; high relative humidity terrain: lowlands in north, uplands in center, bavarian alps in south natural resources: iron ore, coal, potash, timber land use: 30% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 19% meadows and pastures; 30% forest and woodland; 20% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: air and water pollution note: west berlin is an exclave (about 116 km by air or 176 km by road from frg) people population: 62,168,200 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) birth rate: 11 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--german(s); adjective--german ethnic divisions: primarily german; danish minority religion: 45% roman catholic, 44% protestant, 11% other language: german literacy: 99% labor force: 27,790,000; 41.6% industry, 35.4% services and other, 18.2% trade and transport, 4.8% agriculture (1987) organized labor: 9,300,000 total; 7,760,000 in german trade union federation (dgb); union membership constitutes about 40% of union-eligible labor force, 34% of total labor force, and 35% of wage and salary earners (1986) government long-form name: federal republic of germany; abbreviated frg type: federal republic capital: bonn administrative divisions: 10 states (lander, singular--land); baden-wurttemberg, bayern, bremen, hamburg, hessen, niedersachsen, nordrhein-westfalen, rheinland-pfalz, saarland, schleswig-holstein constitution: 23 may 1949, provisional constitution known as basic law legal system: civil law system with indigenous concepts; judicial review of legislative acts in the federal constitutional court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: na executive branch: president, chancellor, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament (parlament) consists of an upper chamber or federal assembly (bundesrat) and a lower chamber or national assembly (bundestag) judicial branch: federal constitutional court (bundesverfassungsgericht) leaders: chief of state--president dr. richard von weizsacker (since 1 july 1984); head of government--chancellor dr. helmut kohl (since 4 october 1982) political parties and leaders: christian democratic union (cdu), helmut kohl; christian social union (csu), theo waigel; free democratic party (fdp), otto lambsdorff; social democratic party (spd), hans-jochen vogel; national democratic party (npd), martin mussgnug; republikaner, franz schoerhuber; communist party (dkp), herbert mies; green party--realos faction, joschka fischer; green party--fundis faction, jutta ditfurth suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held 25 january 1987 (next to be held by 18 january 1991); results--spd 37.0%, cdu 34.5%, csu 9.8%, fdp 9.1%, green party 8.2%, others 1.4%; seats--(497 total, 22 are elected by the west berlin house of representatives and have limited voting rights) spd 186, cdu 174, csu 49, fdp 46, green party 42 communists: about 40,000 members and supporters other political or pressure groups: expellee, refugee, and veterans groups member of: adb, ccc, council of europe, dac, ec, eib, ems, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, iea, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itc, itu, nato, oas (observer), oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador jeurgen ruhfus; chancery at 4645 reservoir road nw, washington dc 20007; telephone (202) 298-4000; there are frg consulates general in atlanta, boston, chicago, detroit, houston, los angeles, san francisco, seattle, and new york, and consulates in miami and new orleans; us--ambassador vernon walters; embassy at deichmanns avenue, 5300 bonn 2 (mailing address is apo new york 09080); telephone 49 (228) 3391; there are us consulates general in frankfurt, hamburg, munich, and stuttgart flag: three equal horizontal bands of black (top), red, and yellow; similar to the flag of the gdr which has a coat of arms in the center economy overview: west germany, a major economic power and a leading exporter, has a highly urbanized and skilled population that enjoys excellent living standards and comprehensive social welfare benefits. the frg is poor in natural resources, coal being the most important mineral. the frg's comparative advantage lies in the technologically advanced production stages. thus manufacturing and services dominate economic activity, and raw materials and semimanufactures constitute a large proportion of imports. in 1988 manufacturing accounted for 35% of gdp, with other sectors contributing lesser amounts. the major economic problem in 1989 is persistent unemployment of over 8%. the frg is well poised to take advantage of the increasing economic integration of the european community. the dramatic opening of the boundary with east germany in late 1989 poses new economic challenges that could tax even this powerful economy. gdp: $945.7 billion, per capita $15,300; real growth rate 4.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.0% (1989) unemployment rate: 8.4% (1989) budget: revenues $539 billion; expenditures $563 billion, including capital expenditures of $11.5 billion (1988) exports: $323.4 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--manufactures 86.6% (including machines and machine tools, chemicals, motor vehicles, iron and steel products), agricultural products 4.9%, raw materials 2.3%, fuels 1.3%; partners--ec 52.7% (france 12%, netherlands 9%, italy 9%, uk 9%, belgium-luxembourg 7%), other west europe 18%, us 10%, eastern europe 4%, opec 3% (1987) imports: $250.6 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--manufactures 68.5%, agricultural products 12.0%, fuels 9.7%, raw materials 7.1%; partners--ec 52.7% (france 12%, netherlands 11%, italy 10%, uk 7%, belgium-luxembourg 7%), other west europe 15%, us 6%, japan 6%, eastern europe 5%, opec 3% (1987) external debt: $500 million (june 1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.3% (1988) electricity: (including west berlin) 110,075,000 kw capacity; 452,390 million kwh produced, 7,420 kwh per capita (1989) industries: among world's largest producers of iron, steel, coal, cement, chemicals, machinery, ships, vehicles, and machine tools; electronics, food and beverages agriculture: accounts for about 2% of gdp (including fishing and forestry); diversified crop and livestock farming; principal crops and livestock include potatoes, wheat, barley, sugar beets, fruit, cabbage, cattle, pigs, poultry; net importer of food; fish catch of 202,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $60.0 billion currency: deutsche mark (plural--marks); 1 deutsche mark (dm) = 100 pfennige exchange rates: deutsche marks (dm) per us$1--1.6918 (january 1990), 1.8800 (1989), 1.7562 (1988), 1.7974 (1987), 2.1715 (1986), 2.9440 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 31,443 km total; 27,421 km government owned, 1.435-meter standard gauge (12,491 km double track, 11,501 km electrified); 4,022 km nongovernment owned, including 3,598 km 1.435-meter standard gauge (214 km electrified) and 424 km 1.000-meter gauge (186 km electrified) highways: 466,305 km total; 169,568 km primary, includes 6,435 km autobahn, 32,460 km national highways (bundesstrassen), 65,425 km state highways (landesstrassen), 65,248 km county roads (kreisstrassen); 296,737 km of secondary communal roads (gemeindestrassen) inland waterways: 5,222 km, of which almost 70% are usable by craft of 1,000-metric ton capacity or larger; major rivers include the rhine and elbe; kiel canal is an important connection between the baltic sea and the north sea pipelines: crude oil, 2,343 km; refined products, 3,446 km; natural gas, 95,414 km ports: maritime--bremerhaven, brunsbuttel, cuxhaven, emden, bremen, hamburg, kiel, lubeck, wilhelmshaven; inland--27 major merchant marine: 422 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,436,568 grt/4,297,520 dwt; includes 2 passenger, 7 short-sea passenger, 218 cargo, 4 refrigerated cargo, 95 container, 20 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 railcar carrier, 7 barge carrier, 2 multifunction large-load carrier, 12 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 21 chemical tanker, 15 liquefied gas, 5 combination ore/oil, 13 combination bulk civil air: 194 major transport aircraft airports: 466 total, 457 usable; 240 with permanent-surface runways; 3 with runways over 3,659 m; 41 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 55 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: highly developed, modern telecommunication service to all parts of the country; fully adequate in all respects; 40,300,000 telephones; stations--87 am, 205 (376 relays) fm, 300 (6,400 relays) tv; 6 submarine coaxial cables; satellite earth stations operating in intelsat (12 atlantic ocean, 2 indian ocean), eutelsat, and domestic systems defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 16,006,352; 13,883,536 fit for military service; 326,666 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.9% of gdp (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: ghana geography total area: 238,540 km2; land area: 230,020 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than oregon land boundaries: 2,093 km total; burkina 548 km, ivory coast 668 km, togo 877 km coastline: 539 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 nm; exclusive economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; warm and comparatively dry along southeast coast; hot and humid in southwest; hot and dry in north terrain: mostly low plains with dissected plateau in south-central area natural resources: gold, timber, industrial diamonds, bauxite, manganese, fish, rubber land use: 5% arable land; 7% permanent crops; 15% meadows and pastures; 37% forest and woodland; 36% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recent drought in north severely affecting marginal agricultural activities; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; dry, northeasterly harmattan wind (january to march) note: lake volta is world's largest artificial lake people population: 15,165,243 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 89 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 52 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--ghanaian(s); adjective--ghanaian ethnic divisions: 99.8% black african (major tribes--44% akan, 16% moshi-dagomba, 13% ewe, 8% ga), 0.2% european and other religion: 38% indigenous beliefs, 30% muslim, 24% christian, 8% other language: english (official); african languages include akan, moshi-dagomba, ewe, and ga literacy: 53.2% labor force: 3,700,000; 54.7% agriculture and fishing, 18.7% industry, 15.2% sales and clerical, 7.7% services, transportation, and communications, 3.7% professional; 48% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: 467,000 (about 13% of labor force) government long-form name: republic of ghana type: military capital: accra administrative divisions: 10 regions; ashanti, brong-ahafo, central, eastern, greater accra, northern, upper east, upper west, volta, western independence: 6 march 1957 (from uk, formerly gold coast) constitution: 24 september 1979; suspended 31 december 1981 legal system: based on english common law and customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 6 march (1957) executive branch: chairman of the provisional national defense council (pndc), pndc, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly dissolved after 31 december 1981 coup, and legislative powers were assumed by the provisional national defense council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--chairman of the provisional national defense council flt. lt. (ret.) jerry john rawlings (since 31 december 1981) political parties and leaders: none; political parties outlawed after 31 december 1981 coup suffrage: none elections: none communists: a small number of communists and sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itu, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, wcl, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador eric k. otoo; chancery at 2460 16th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 462-0761; there is a ghanaian consulate general in new york; us--ambassador raymond c. ewing; embassy at ring road east, east of danquah circle, accra (mailing address is p. o. box 194, accra); telephone 775347 through 775349 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), yellow, and green with a large black five-pointed star centered in the gold band; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia; similar to the flag of bolivia which has a coat of arms centered in the yellow band economy overview: supported by substantial international assistance, ghana has been implementing a steady economic rebuilding program since 1983. good harvests in 1988 featured the 6% growth in gnp. moves toward privatization and relaxation of government controls continued in 1988-89, although at a slower-than-expected pace. in 1988 service on the $2.8 billion debt was equivalent to 75% of export earnings. as ghana obtains concessional loans and pays off high-interest debt, however, debt service is expected to fall below 30% of export earnings in the early 1990s. the economic rebuilding program has both helped and harmed the manufacturing sector, for example, by improving the supply of raw materials and by increasing competition from imports. the long-term outlook is favorable provided that the political structure can endure the slow pace at which living standards are improving and can manage the problems stemming from excessive population growth. gnp: $5.2 billion, per capita $400; real growth rate 6% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 32.7% (1988) unemployment rate: 26% (april 1987) budget: revenues $769 million; expenditures $749 million, including capital expenditures of $179 million (1988 est.) exports: $977 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--cocoa 60%, timber, gold, tuna, bauxite, and aluminum; partners--us 23%, uk, other ec imports: $988 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--petroleum 16%, consumer goods, foods, intermediate goods, capital equipment; partners--us 10%, uk, frg, france, japan, south korea, gdr external debt: $3.0 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 0.5% in manufacturing (1987) electricity: 1,172,000 kw capacity; 4,110 million kwh produced, 280 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, lumbering, light manufacturing, fishing, aluminum, food processing agriculture: accounts for more than 50% of gdp (including fishing and forestry); the major cash crop is cocoa; other principal crops--rice, coffee, cassava, peanuts, corn, shea nuts, timber; normally self-sufficient in food illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the international drug trade aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $424 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.9 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $78 million; communist countries (1970-88), $84 million currency: cedi (plural--cedis); 1 cedi (c) = 100 pesewas exchange rates: cedis (c) per us$1--301.68 (december 1989), 270.00 (1989), 202.35 (1988), 153.73 (1987), 89.20 (1986), 54.37 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 953 km, all 1.067-meter gauge; 32 km double track; railroads undergoing major renovation highways: 28,300 km total; 6,000 km concrete or bituminous surface, 22,300 km gravel, laterite, and improved earth surfaces inland waterways: volta, ankobra, and tano rivers provide 155 km of perennial navigation for launches and lighters; lake volta provides 1,125 km of arterial and feeder waterways pipelines: none ports: tema, takoradi merchant marine: 4 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 52,016 grt/66,627 dwt civil air: 6 major transport aircraft airports: 10 total, 9 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 7 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: poor to fair system of open-wire and cable, radio relay links; 38,000 telephones; stations--6 am, no fm, 9 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary palace guard, paramilitary people's militia military manpower: males 15-49, 3,437,300; 1,927,817 fit for military service; 167,778 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 0.9% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: gibraltar (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 6.5 km2; land area: 6.5 km2 comparative area: about 11 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: 1.2 km with spain coastline: 12 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 3 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: source of occasional friction between spain and the uk climate: mediterranean with mild winters and warm summers terrain: a narrow coastal lowland borders the rock natural resources: negligible land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: natural freshwater sources are meager so large water catchments (concrete or natural rock) collect rain water note: strategic location on strait of gibraltar that links the north atlantic ocean and mediterranean sea people population: 29,572 (july 1990), growth rate 0.1% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--gibraltarian; adjective--gibraltar ethnic divisions: mostly italian, english, maltese, portuguese, and spanish descent religion: 75% roman catholic, 8% church of england, 2.25% jewish language: english and spanish are primary languages; italian, portuguese, and russian also spoken; english used in the schools and for official purposes literacy: 99% (est.) labor force: about 14,800 (including non-gibraltar laborers); uk military establishments and civil government employ nearly 50% of the labor force organized labor: over 6,000 government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: gibraltar administrative divisions: none (colony of the uk) independence: none (colony of the uk) constitution: 30 may 1969 legal system: english law national holiday: commonwealth day (second monday of march), 12 march 1990 executive branch: british monarch, governor, chief minister, gibraltar council, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral house of assembly judicial branch: supreme court, court of appeal leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor and commander in chief air chief marshal sir peter terry (since na 1985); head of government--chief minister joe bossano (since na march 1988) political parties and leaders: socialist labor party (sl), joe bossano; gibraltar labor party/association for the advancement of civil rights (gcl/aacr), adolfo canepa; independent democratic party, joe pitaluga suffrage: universal at age 18, plus other uk subjects resident six months or more elections: house of assembly: last held on 24 march 1988 (next to be held march 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(18 total, 15 elected) sl 8, gcl/aacr 7 communists: negligible other political or pressure groups: housewives association, chamber of commerce, gibraltar representatives organization diplomatic representation: none (colony of the uk) flag: two horizontal bands of white (top, double-width) and red with a three-towered red castle in the center of the white band; hanging from the castle gate is a gold key centered in the red band economy overview: the economy depends heavily on british defense expenditures, revenue from tourists, fees for services to shipping, and revenues from banking and finance activities. because more than 70% of the economy is in the public sector, changes in government spending have a major impact on the level of employment. construction workers are particularly affected when government expenditures are cut. gnp: $129 million, per capita $4,450; real growth rate na% (fy85) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.4% (1986) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $105 million; expenditures $104 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy87) exports: $62.2 million (1985); commodities--(principally reexports) petroleum 75%, beverages and tobacco 12%, manufactured goods 8%; partners--uk, morocco, portugal, netherlands, spain, us, frg imports: $147 million (1985); commodities--manufactured goods, fuels, and foodstuffs; partners--uk, morocco, portugal, netherlands, spain, us, frg external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 46,000 kw capacity; 200 million kwh produced, 6,770 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, banking and finance, construction, commerce; support to large uk naval and air bases; transit trade and supply depot in the port; light manufacturing of tobacco, roasted coffee, ice, mineral waters, candy, beer, and canned fish agriculture: na aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $0.8 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $162.5 million currency: gibraltar pound (plural--pounds); 1 gibraltar pound (lg) = 100 pence exchange rates: gibraltar pounds (lg) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); note--the gibraltar pound is at par with the british pound fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 1.000-meter-gauge system in dockyard area only highways: 50 km, mostly good bitumen and concrete ports: gibraltar merchant marine: 45 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,126,060 grt/4,189,948 dwt; includes 10 cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, 1 container, 16 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker 1 combination oil/ore, 1 liquefied gas, 13 bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate international radiocommunication facilities; automatic telephone system with 10,500 telephones; stations--1 am, 6 fm, 4 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: glorioso islands (french possession) geography total area: 5 km2; land area: 5 km2; includes ile glorieuse, ile du lys, verte rocks, wreck rock, and south rock comparative area: about 8.5 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 35.2 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by madagascar climate: tropical terrain: undetermined natural resources: guano, coconuts land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other--lush vegetation and coconut palms environment: subject to periodic cyclones note: located in the indian ocean just north of the mozambique channel between africa and madagascar people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: french possession administered by commissioner of the republic daniel constantin, resident in reunion economy overview: no economic activity communications airports: 1 with runway 1,220-2,439 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: greece geography total area: 131,940 km2; land area: 130,800 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than alabama land boundaries: 1,228 km total; albania 282 km, bulgaria 494 km, turkey 206 km, yugoslavia 246 km coastline: 13,676 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 6 nm disputes: complex maritime and air (but not territorial) disputes with turkey in aegean sea; cyprus question; macedonia question with bulgaria and yugoslavia; northern epirus question with albania climate: temperate; mild, wet winters; hot, dry summers terrain: mostly mountains with ranges extending into sea as peninsulas or chains of islands natural resources: bauxite, lignite, magnesite, crude oil, marble land use: 23% arable land; 8% permanent crops; 40% meadows and pastures; 20% forest and woodland; 9% other; includes 7% irrigated environment: subject to severe earthquakes; air pollution; archipelago of 2,000 islands note: strategic location dominating the aegean sea and southern approach to turkish straits people population: 10,028,171 (july 1990), growth rate 0.2% (1990) birth rate: 11 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--greek(s); adjective--greek ethnic divisions: greek 98%, others 2%; note--the greek government states there are no ethnic divisions in greece religion: 98% greek orthodox, 1.3% muslim, 0.7% other language: greek (official); english and french widely understood literacy: 95% labor force: 3,860,000; 43% services, 27% agriculture, 20% manufacturing and mining, 7% construction (1985) organized labor: 10-15% of total labor force, 20-25% of urban labor force government long-form name: hellenic republic type: presidential parliamentary government; monarchy rejected by referendum 8 december 1974 capital: athens administrative divisions: 51 departments (nomoi, singular--nomos); aitolia kai akarnania, akhaia, argolis, arkadhia, arta, attiki, dhodhekanisos, drama, evritania, evros, evvoia, florina, fokis, fthiotis, grevena, ilia, imathia, ioannina, iraklion, kardhitsa, kastoria, kavala, kefallinia, kerkira, khalkidhiki, khania, khios, kikladhes, kilkis, korinthia, kozani, lakonia, larisa, lasithi, lesvos, levkas, magnisia, messinia, pella, pieria, preveza, rethimni, rodhopi, samos, serrai, thesprotia, thessaloniki, trikala, voiotia, xanthi, zakinthos independence: 1827 (from the ottoman empire) constitution: 11 june 1975 legal system: na national holiday: independence day (proclamation of the war of independence), 25 march (1821) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament (vouli) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president christos sartzetakis (since 30 march 1985); head of government--prime minister constantin mitsotakis (since 11 april 1990) political parties and leaders: new democracy (nd; conservative), constantine mitsotakis; panhellenic socialist movement (pasok), andreas papandreou; democratic renewal (dr), constantine stefanopoulos; communist party (kke), grigorios farakos; greek left party (ear), leonidas kyrkos; kke and ear have joined in the left alliance, harilaos florakis, president suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 30 march 1985 (next to be held 29 april 1990); results--christos sartzetakis was elected by parliament; parliament:--last held on 8 april 1990 (next to be held april 1994); results--new democracy 46.89%, panhellenic socialist movement 38.62%, left alliance 10.27%, pasok-left alliance cooperation 1.02%, ecologist-alternative 0.77%, democratic renewal 0.67%, muslim 0.5%; seats--(300 total) new democracy 150, panhellenic socialist movement 123, left alliance 19, pasok-left alliance cooperation 4, muslim independent 2, democratic renewal 1, ecologist-alternative 1 communists: an estimated 60,000 members and sympathizers member of: ccc, ec, eib (associate), fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nato, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador christos zacharakis; chancery at 2221 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 667-3168; there are greek consulates general in atlanta, boston, chicago, los angeles, new york, and san francisco, and a consulate in new orleans; us--ambassador michael g. sotirhos; embassy at 91 vasilissis sophias boulevard, 10160 athens (mailing address is apo new york 09253); telephone p30o (1) 721-2951 or 721-8401; there is a us consulate general in thessaloniki flag: nine equal horizontal stripes of blue (top and bottom) alternating with white; there is a blue square in the upper hoist-side corner bearing a white cross; the cross symbolizes christianity, the established religion of the country economy overview: greece has a mixed capitalistic economy with the basic entrepreneurial system overlaid in 1981-89 by a socialist-left-government that enlarged the public sector and became the nation's largest employer. like many other western economies, greece suffered severely from the global oil price hikes of the 1970s, annual gdp growth plunging from 8% to 2% in the 1980s, and inflation, unemployment, and budget deficits rising sharply. the fall of the socialist government in 1989 and the inability of the conservative opposition to muster a clear majority have led to business uncertainty and the continued prospects for lackluster economic performance. once the political situation is sorted out, greece will have to face the challenges posed by the steadily increasing integration of the european community, including the progressive lowering of tariff barriers. tourism continues as a major industry, providing a vital offset to the sizable commodity trade deficit. gdp: $56.3 billion, per capita $5,605; real growth rate 2.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 14.8% (december 1989) unemployment rate: 7.7% (1988) budget: revenues $15.5 billion; expenditures $23.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $2.5 billion (1988) exports: $5.9 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--manufactured goods, food and live animals, fuels and lubricants, raw materials; partners--frg 24%, italy 14%, nonoil developing countries 11.8%, france 9.5%, us 7.1%, uk 6.8% imports: $13.5 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery and transport equipment, light manufactures, fuels and lubricants, foodstuffs, chemicals; partners--frg 22%, nonoil developing countries 14%, oil exporting countries 13%, italy 12%, france 8%, us 3.2% external debt: $20.0 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 1.6% (1989 est.) electricity: 10,500,000 kw capacity; 36,420 million kwh produced, 3,630 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food and tobacco processing, textiles, chemicals, metal products, tourism, mining, petroleum agriculture: including fishing and forestry, accounts for 14% of gnp and 27% of the labor force; principal products--wheat, corn, barley, sugar beets, olives, tomatoes, wine, tobacco, potatoes, beef, mutton, pork, dairy products; self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 135,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-81), $525 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.3 billion currency: drachma (plural--drachmas); 1 drachma (dr) = 100 lepta exchange rates: drachma (dr) per us$1--158.03 (january 1990), 162.42 (1989), 141.86 (1988), 135.43 (1987), 139.98 (1986), 138.12 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 2,479 km total; 1,565 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, of which 36 km electrified and 100 km double track, 892 km 1.000-meter gauge; 22 km 0.750-meter narrow gauge; all government owned highways: 38,938 km total; 16,090 km paved, 13,676 km crushed stone and gravel, 5,632 km improved earth, 3,540 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 80 km; system consists of three coastal canals and three unconnected rivers pipelines: crude oil, 26 km; refined products, 547 km ports: piraeus, thessaloniki merchant marine: 954 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 20,544,516 grt/36,858,545 dwt; includes 15 passenger, 58 short-sea passenger, 2 passenger-cargo, 164 cargo, 18 container, 20 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 27 refrigerated cargo, 182 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 10 chemical tanker, 10 liquefied gas, 20 combination ore/oil, 6 specialized tanker, 407 bulk, 15 specialized bulk; note--ethnic greeks also own large numbers of ships under the registry of liberia, panama, cyprus, and lebanon civil air: 39 major transport aircraft airports: 79 total, 77 usable; 60 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 20 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate, modern networks reach all areas; 4,079,000 telephones; stations--30 am, 17 (20 repeaters) fm, 39 (560 repeaters) tv; 8 submarine cables; satellite earth stations operating in intelsat (1 atlantic ocean and 1 indian ocean), eutelsat, and marisat systems defense forces branches: hellenic army, hellenic navy, hellenic air force military manpower: males 15-49, 2,418,754; 1,861,141 fit for military service; about 73,809 reach military age (21) annually defense expenditures: 6.0% of gdp, or $3.4 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: greenland (part of the danish realm) geography total area: 2,175,600 km2; land area: 341,700 km2 (ice free) comparative area: slightly more than three times the size of texas land boundaries: none coastline: 44,087 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 4 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: denmark has challenged norway's maritime claims between greenland and jan mayen climate: arctic to subarctic; cool summers, cold winters terrain: flat to gradually sloping icecap covers all but a narrow, mountainous, barren, rocky coast natural resources: zinc, lead, iron ore, coal, molybdenum, cryolite, uranium, fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; negl% forest and woodland; 99% other environment: sparse population confined to small settlements along coast; continuous permafrost over northern two-thirds of the island note: dominates north atlantic ocean between north america and europe people population: 56,078 (july 1990), growth rate 1.2% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 28 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 68 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--greenlander(s); adjective--greenlandic ethnic divisions: 86% greenlander (eskimos and greenland-born caucasians), 14% danish religion: evangelical lutheran language: eskimo dialects, danish literacy: 99% labor force: 22,800; largely engaged in fishing, hunting, sheep breeding organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: part of the danish realm; self-governing overseas administrative division capital: nuuk (godthab) administrative divisions: 3 municipalities (kommuner, singular--kommun); nordgronland, ostgronland, vestgronland independence: part of the danish realm; self-governing overseas administrative division constitution: danish legal system: danish national holiday: birthday of the queen, 16 april (1940) executive branch: danish monarch, high commissioner, home rule chairman, prime minister, cabinet (landsstyre) legislative branch: unicameral parliament (landsting) judicial branch: high court (landsret) leaders: chief of state--queen margrethe ii (since 14 january 1972), represented by high commissioner bent klinte (since na); head of government--home rule chairman jonathan motzfeldt (since na may 1979) political parties: siumut (moderate socialist, advocates more distinct greenlandic identity and greater autonomy from denmark); atassut party (more conservative, favors continuing close relations with denmark); inuit ataqatigiit (marxist-leninist party that favors complete independence from denmark rather than home rule); polar party (conservative-greenland nationalist) suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held on 27 may 1987 (next to be held by 27 may 1991); results--siumut 39.8%, atassut party 40.1%, inuit ataqatigiit 15.3%, polar party 4.5%; seats--(27 total) siumut 11, atassut party 11, inuit ataqatigiit 4, polar party 1; danish parliament--last held on 10 may 1988 (next to be held by 10 may 1992); greenland elects two representatives to the danish parliament; results--(percent of vote by party na; seats--(2 total) number of seats by party na diplomatic representation: none (self-governing overseas administrative division of denmark) flag: the flag of denmark is used economy overview: over the past 25 years, the economy has changed from one based on subsistence whaling, hunting, and fishing to one dependent on foreign trade. fishing is still the most important industry, accounting for over two-thirds of exports and about 25% of the population's income. exploitation of mineral resources is limited to lead and zinc. maintenance of a social welfare system similar to denmark's has given the public sector a dominant role in the economy. greenland is heavily dependent on an annual subsidy of about $400 million from the danish government. gnp: $500 million, per capita $9,000; real growth rate 5% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.9% (1987) unemployment rate: 10% budget: revenues $380 million; expenditures $380 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1985) exports: $386.2 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fish and fish products, metallic ores and concentrates; partners--denmark 76%, frg 7%, sweden 5% imports: $445.6 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum and petroleum products, machinery and transport equipment, food products; partners--denmark 66%, norway 5%, sweden 4%, frg 4%, japan 4% us 3% external debt: $445 million (1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 84,000 kw capacity; 176 million kwh produced, 3,180 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fish processing, lead and zinc mining, handicrafts agriculture: sector dominated by fishing and sheep raising; crops limited to forage and small garden vegetables; 1987 fish catch of 101,000 metric tons aid: none currency: danish krone (plural--kroner); 1 danish krone (dkr) = 100 ore exchange rates: danish kroner (dkr) per us$1--6.560 (january 1990), 7.310 (1989), 6.732 (1988), 6.840 (1987), 8.091 (1986), 10.596 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 80 km ports: kangerluarsoruseq (faeringehavn), paamiut (frederikshaab), nuuk (godthaab), sisimiut (holsteinsborg), julianehaab, maarmorilik, north star bay, and at least 10 minor ports merchant marine: 1 refrigerated cargo (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,021 grt/1,778 dwt; note--operates under the registry of denmark civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 11 total, 8 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate domestic and international service provided by cables and radio relay; 17,900 telephones; stations--5 am, 7 (35 relays) fm, 4 (9 relays) tv; 2 coaxial submarine cables; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is responsibility of denmark ---------------------------------------------------country: grenada geography total area: 340 km2; land area: 340 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 121 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; tempered by northeast trade winds terrain: volcanic in origin with central mountains natural resources: timber, tropical fruit, deepwater harbors land use: 15% arable land; 26% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 9% forest and woodland; 47% other environment: lies on edge of hurricane belt; hurricane season lasts from june to november note: islands of the grenadines group are divided politically with st. vincent and the grenadines people population: 84,135 (july 1990), growth rate 0.4% (1990) birth rate: 36 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 33 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 30 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--grenadian(s); adjective--grenadian ethnic divisions: mainly of black african descent religion: largely roman catholic; anglican; other protestant sects language: english (official); some french patois literacy: 85% labor force: 36,000; 31% services, 24% agriculture, 8% construction, 5% manufacturing, 32% other (1985) organized labor: 20% of labor force government long-form name: none type: parliamentary democracy capital: saint george's administrative divisions: 6 parishes and 1 dependency*; carriacou and little martinique*, saint andrew, saint david, saint george, saint john, saint mark, saint patrick independence: 7 february 1974 (from uk) constitution: 19 december 1973 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 7 february (1974) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, ministers of government (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general sir paul scoon (since 30 september 1978); head of government--prime minister nicholas brathwaite (since 13 march 1990) political parties and leaders: national democratic congress (ndc), nicholas brathwaite; grenada united labor party (gulp), sir eric gairy; the national party (tnp), ben jones; new national party (nnp), keith mitchell; maurice bishop patriotic movement (mbpm), terrence merryshow; new jewel movement (njm), bernard coard suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of representatives--last held on 13 march 1990 (next to be held by march 1996); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(15 total) ndc 8, gulp 3, tnp 2, nnp 2 communists: about 450 members of the new jewel movement (pro-soviet) and the maurice bishop patriotic movement (pro-cuban) member of: acp, caricom, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, itu, nam, oas, oecs, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who diplomatic representation: ambassador albert o. xavier; chancery at 1701 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 265-2561; there is a grenadian consulate general in new york; us--charge d'affaires james f. cooper; embassy at ross point inn, saint george's (mailing address is p. o. box 54, saint george's); telephone p440o 1731 or 1734 flag: a rectangle divided diagonally into yellow triangles (top and bottom) and green triangles (hoist side and outer side) with a red border around the flag; there are seven yellow five-pointed stars with three centered in the top red border, three centered in the bottom red border, and one on a red disk superimposed at the center of the flag; there is also a symbolic nutmeg pod on the hoist-side triangle (grenada is the world's second-largest producer of nutmeg, after indonesia); the seven stars represent the seven administrative divisions economy overview: the economy is essentially agricultural and centers on the traditional production of spices and tropical plants. agriculture accounts for about 20% of gdp and 90% of exports and employs 24% of the labor force. tourism is the leading foreign exchange earner, followed by agricultural exports. manufacturing remains relatively undeveloped, but with a more favorable private investment climate since 1983, it is expected to grow. despite an impressive average annual growth rate for the economy of 5.5% during the period 1984-88, unemployment remains high at about 26%. gdp: $129.7 million, per capita $1,535; real growth rate 5% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.0% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 26% (1988) budget: revenues $74.2 million; expenditures $82.3 million, including capital expenditures of $27.8 million (1989 est.) exports: $31.8 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--nutmeg 35%, cocoa beans 15%, bananas 13%, mace 7%, textiles; partners--us 4%, uk, frg, netherlands, trinidad and tobago imports: $92.6 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--machinery 24%, food 22%, manufactured goods 19%, petroleum 8%; partners--us 32%, uk, trinidad and tobago, japan, canada external debt: $108 million (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5.8% (1989 est.) electricity: 11,400 kw capacity; 24 million kwh produced, 280 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food and beverage, textile, light assembly operations, tourism, construction agriculture: accounts for 20% of gdp and 90% of exports; bananas, cocoa, nutmeg, and mace account for two-thirds of total crop production; world's second-largest producer and fourth-largest exporter of nutmeg and mace; small-size farms predominate, growing a variety of citrus fruits, avocados, root crops, sugarcane, corn, and vegetables aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy84-88), $60 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $61 million; communist countries (1970-88), $32 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 1,000 km total; 600 km paved, 300 km otherwise improved; 100 km unimproved ports: saint george's civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 3 total, 3 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: automatic, islandwide telephone system with 5,650 telephones; new shf links to trinidad and tobago and st. vincent; vhf and uhf links to trinidad and carriacou; stations--1 am, no fm, 1 tv defense forces branches: royal grenada police force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: guadeloupe (overseas department of france) geography total area: 1,780 km2; land area: 1,760 km2 comparative area: 10 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 306 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: subtropical tempered by trade winds; relatively high humidity terrain: basse-terre is volcanic in origin with interior mountains; grand-terre is low limestone formation natural resources: cultivable land, beaches, and climate that foster tourism land use: 18% arable land; 5% permanent crops; 13% meadows and pastures; 40% forest and woodland; 24% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to hurricanes (june to october); la soufriere is an active volcano note: located 500 km southeast of puerto rico in the caribbean sea people population: 342,175 (july 1990), growth rate 0.8% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 17 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--guadeloupian(s); adjective--guadeloupe ethnic divisions: 90% black or mulatto; 5% white; less than 5% east indian, lebanese, chinese religion: 95% roman catholic, 5% hindu and pagan african language: french, creole patois literacy: over 70% labor force: 120,000; 53.0% services, government, and commerce, 25.8% industry, 21.2% agriculture organized labor: 11% of labor force government long-form name: department of guadeloupe type: overseas department of france capital: basse-terre administrative divisions: none (overseas department of france) independence: none (overseas department of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french legal system national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: government commissioner legislative branch: unicameral general council and unicameral regional council judicial branch: court of appeal (cour d'appel) with jurisdiction over guadeloupe, french guiana, and martinique leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--commissioner of the republic jean-paul proust (since november 1989) political parties and leaders: rally for the republic (rpr), marlene captant; communist party of guadeloupe (pcg), christian medard celeste; socialist party (psg), dominique larifla; independent republicans; union for french democracy (udf); union for a new majority (unm) suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: general council --last held na 1986 (next to be held by na 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(42 total) number of seats by party na; regional council--last held on 16 march 1986 (next to be held by 16 march 1992); results--rpr 33.1%, ps 28.7%, pcg 23.8%, udf 10.7%, others 3.8%; seats--(41 total) rpr 15, ps 12, pcg 10, udf 4; french senate--last held on 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1994); guadeloupe elects two representatives; results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(2 total) pcg 1, ps 1; french national assembly--last held on 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1994); guadeloupe elects four representatives; results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(4 total) ps 2 seats, rpr 1 seat, pcg 1 seat communists: 3,000 est. other political or pressure groups: popular union for the liberation of guadeloupe (uplg); popular movement for independent guadeloupe (mpgi); general union of guadeloupe workers (ugtg); general federation of guadeloupe workers (cgt-g); christian movement for the liberation of guadeloupe (klpg) member of: wftu diplomatic representation: as an overseas department of france, the interests of guadeloupe are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: the economy depends on agriculture, tourism, light industry, and services. it is also dependent upon france for large subsidies and income and social transfers. tourism is a key industry, with most tourists from the us. in addition, an increasingly large number of cruise ships visit the islands. the traditionally important sugarcane crop is slowly being replaced by other crops, such as bananas (which now supply about 50% of export earnings), eggplant, and flowers. other vegetables and root crops are cultivated for local consumption, although guadeloupe is still dependent on imported food, which comes mainly from france. light industry consists mostly of sugar and rum production. most manufactured goods and fuel are imported. unemployment is especially high among the young. gdp: $1.1 billion, per capita $3,300; real growth rate na% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.0% (1987) unemployment rate: 25% (1983) budget: revenues $251 million; expenditures $251 million, including capital expenditures of na (1985) exports: $109 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--bananas, sugar, rum; partners--france 72%, martinique 16% (1984) imports: $792 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--vehicles, foodstuffs, clothing and other consumer goods, construction materials, petroleum products; partners--france 59% (1984) external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 103,000 kw capacity; 315 million kwh produced, 920 kwh per capita (1989) industries: construction, cement, rum, sugar, tourism agriculture: cash crops--bananas and sugarcane; other products include tropical fruits and vegetables; livestock--cattle, pigs, and goats; not self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $4 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $7.7 billion currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: privately owned, narrow-gauge plantation lines highways: 1,940 km total; 1,600 km paved, 340 km gravel and earth ports: pointe-a-pitre, basse-terre civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 9 total, 9 usable, 8 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: domestic facilities inadequate; 57,300 telephones; interisland radio relay to antigua and barbuda, dominica, and martinique; stations--2 am, 8 fm (30 private stations licensed to broadcast fm), 9 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat ground station defense forces note: defense is responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: guam (territory of the us) geography total area: 541 km2; land area: 541 km2 comparative area: slightly more than three times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 125.5 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical marine; generally warm and humid, moderated by northeast trade winds; dry season from january to june, rainy season from july to december; little seasonal temperature variation terrain: volcanic origin, surrounded by coral reefs; relatively flat coraline limestone plateau (source of most fresh water) with steep coastal cliffs and narrow coastal plains in north, low-rising hills in center, mountains in south natural resources: fishing (largely undeveloped), tourism (especially from japan) land use: 11% arable land; 11% permanent crops; 15% meadows and pastures; 18% forest and woodland; 45% other environment: frequent squalls during rainy season; subject to relatively rare, but potentially very destructive typhoons (especially in august) note: largest and southernmost island in the mariana islands archipelago; strategic location in western north pacific ocean 5,955 km west-southwest of honolulu about three-quarters of the way between hawaii and the philippines people population: 141,039 (july 1990), growth rate 2.8% (1990) birth rate: 26 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 4 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 12 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--guamanian(s); adjective--guamanian ethnic divisions: 47% chamorro, 25% filipino, 10% caucasian, 18% chinese, japanese, korean, and other religion: 98% roman catholic, 2% other language: english and chamorro, most residents bilingual; japanese also widely spoken literacy: 90% labor force: 54,000; 42% government, 58% private (1988) organized labor: 13% of labor force government long-form name: territory of guam type: organized, unincorporated territory of the us capital: agana administrative divisions: none (territory of the us) independence: none (territory of the us) constitution: organic act of 1 august 1950 legal system: na national holiday: guam discovery day (first monday in march), 6 march 1989 executive branch: us president, governor, lieutenant governor, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral legislature judicial branch: superior court of guam (federal district court) leaders: chief of state--president george bush (since 20 january 1989); head of government--governor joseph a. ada (since na november 1986) political parties and leaders: democratic party (controls the legislature); republican party (party of the governor) suffrage: universal at age 18; us citizens, but do not vote in us presidential elections elections: governor--last held on na november 1986 (next to be held november 1990); legislature--last held on 8 november 1988 (next to be held november 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(21 total) democratic 13, republican 8; us house of representatives--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held november 1990); guam elects one nonvoting delegate; results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) republican 1 communists: none note: relations between guam and the us are under the jurisdiction of the office of territorial and international affairs, us department of the interior diplomatic representation: none (territory of the us) flag: dark blue with a narrow red border on all four sides; centered is a red-bordered, pointed, vertical ellipse containing a beach scene, outrigger canoe with sail, and a palm tree with the word guam superimposed in bold red letters economy overview: the economy is based on us military spending and on revenues from tourism. over the past 20 years the tourist industry has grown rapidly, creating a construction boom for new hotels and the expansion of older ones. visitors numbered about 800,000 in 1989. the small manufacturing sector includes textile and clothing, beverage, food, and watch production. about 58% of the labor force works for the private sector and the rest for government. most food and industrial goods are imported, with about 75% from the us. in 1989 the unemployment rate was about 3%, down from 10% in 1983. gnp: $1.0 billion, per capita $7,675; real growth rate 20% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.9% (1988) unemployment rate: 3% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $208.0 million; expenditures $175 million, including capital expenditures of $17 million (1987 est.) exports: $39 million (f.o.b., 1983); commodities--mostly transshipments of refined petroleum products, copra, fish; partners--us 25%, others 75% imports: $611 million (c.i.f., 1983); commodities--mostly crude petroleum and petroleum products, food, manufactured goods; partners--us 77%, others 23% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 500,000 kw capacity; 2,300 million kwh produced, 16,660 kwh per capita (1989) industries: us military, tourism, petroleum refining, construction, concrete products, printing and publishing, food processing, textiles agriculture: relatively undeveloped with most food imported; fruits, vegetables, eggs, pork, poultry, beef, copra aid: na currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: 674 km all-weather roads ports: apra harbor airports: 5 total, 4 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 26,317 telephones (1989); stations--3 am, 3 fm, 3 tv; 2 pacific ocean intelsat ground stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: guatemala geography total area: 108,890 km2; land area: 108,430 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than tennessee land boundaries: 1,687 km total; belize 266 km, el salvador 203 km, honduras 256 km, mexico 962 km coastline: 400 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims belize, but boundary negotiations are under way climate: tropical; hot, humid in lowlands; cooler in highlands terrain: mostly mountains with narrow coastal plains and rolling limestone plateau (peten) natural resources: crude oil, nickel, rare woods, fish, chicle land use: 12% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 12% meadows and pastures; 40% forest and woodland; 32% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: numerous volcanoes in mountains, with frequent violent earthquakes; caribbean coast subject to hurricanes and other tropical storms; deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution note: no natural harbors on west coast people population: 9,097,636 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 61 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 60 years male, 65 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--guatemalan(s); adjective--guatemalan ethnic divisions: 56% ladino (mestizo--mixed indian and european ancestry), 44% indian religion: predominantly roman catholic; also protestant, traditional mayan language: spanish, but over 40% of the population speaks an indian language as a primary tongue (18 indian dialects, including quiche, cakchiquel, kekchi) literacy: 50% labor force: 2,500,000; 57.0% agriculture, 14.0% manufacturing, 13.0% services, 7.0% commerce, 4.0% construction, 3.0% transport, 0.8% utilities, 0.4% mining (1985) organized labor: 8% of labor force (1988 est.) government long-form name: republic of guatemala type: republic capital: guatemala administrative divisions: 22 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); alta verapaz, baja verapaz, chimaltenango, chiquimula, el progreso, escuintla, guatemala, huehuetenango, izabal, jalapa, jutiapa, peten, quezaltenango, quiche, retalhuleu, sacatepequez, san marcos, santa rosa, solola, suchitepequez, totonicapan, zacapa independence: 15 september 1821 (from spain) constitution: 31 may 1985, effective 14 january 1986 legal system: civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 15 september (1821) executive branch: president, vice president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national congress (congreso nacional) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justicia) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president mario vinicio cerezo arevalo (since 14 january 1986); vice president roberto carpio nicolle (since 14 january 1986) political parties and leaders: christian democratic party (dcg), marco vinicio cerezo arevalo; national centrist union (ucn), jorge carpio nicolle; national liberation movement (mln), mario sandoval alarcon; social action movement (mas), jorge serrano elias; revolutionary party (pr) in coalition with national renewal party (pnr), alejandro maldonado aguirre; social democratic party (psd), mario solarzano martinez; national authentic center (can), mario david garcia; united anti-communist party (pua), leonel sisniega; emerging movement for harmony (mec), louis gordillo; democratic party of national cooperation (pdcn), adan fletes; democratic institutional party (pid), oscar rivas; nationalist united front (fun), gabriel giron suffrage: universal at age 18, compulsory for literates, voluntary for illiterates elections: president--last held on 3 december 1985 (next to be held 3 november 1990); results--mario vinicio cerezo arevalo (dcg) 38.7%, jorge carpio nicolle (ucn) 20.2%, jorge serrano elias (pdcn/pr) 14.8%; national congress--last held on 3 november 1985 (next to be held 3 november 1990); results--dcg 38.7%, ucn 20.2%, pdcn/pr 13.8%, mln/pid 12.6%, can 6.3%, psd 3.4%, pnr 3.2%, pua/fun/mec 1.9%; seats--(100 total) dcg 51, ucn 22, mln 12, pdcn/pr 11, psd 2, pnr 1, can 1 communists: guatemalan labor party (pgt); main radical left guerrilla groups--guerrilla army of the poor (egp), revolutionary organization of the people in arms (orpa), rebel armed forces (far), and pgt dissidents other political or pressure groups: federated chambers of commerce and industry (cacif), mutual support group (gam), unity for popular and labor action (uasp), agrarian owners group (unagro), committee for campesino unity (cuc) member of: cacm, ccc, fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oas, odeca, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador rodolfo rohrmoser v; chancery at 2220 r street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 745-4952 through 4954; there are guatemalan consulates general in chicago, houston, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador thomas f. stroock; embassy at 7-01 avenida de la reforma, zone 10, guatemala city (mailing address is apo miami 34024); telephone p502o (2) 31-15-41 flag: three equal vertical bands of light blue (hoist side), white, and light blue with the coat of arms centered in the white band; the coat of arms includes a green and red quetzal (the national bird) and a scroll bearing the inscription libertad 15 de septiembre de 1821 (the original date of independence from spain) all superimposed on a pair of crossed rifles and a pair of crossed swords and framed by a wreath economy overview: the economy is based on agriculture, which accounts for 25% of gdp, employs about 60% of the labor force, and supplies two-thirds of exports. industry accounts for about 20% of gdp and 15% of the labor force. the economy has reentered a slow-growth phase, but is hampered by political uncertainty. in 1988 the economy grew by 3.7%, the third consecutive year of mild growth. government economic reforms introduced since 1986 have stabilized exchange rates and have helped to stem inflationary pressures. the inflation rate has dropped from 36.9% in 1986 to 15% in 1989. gdp: $10.8 billion, per capita $1,185; real growth rate 1.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15% (1989) unemployment rate: 13%, with 30-40% underemployment (1988 est.) budget: revenues $771 million; expenditures $957 million, including capital expenditures of $188 million (1988) exports: $1.02 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee 38%, bananas 7%, sugar 7%, cardamom 4%; partners--us 29%, el salvador, frg, costa rica, italy imports: $1.5 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--fuel and petroleum products, machinery, grain, fertilizers, motor vehicles; partners--us 38%, mexico, frg, japan, el salvador external debt: $3.0 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 3.5% (1988 est.) electricity: 807,000 kw capacity; 2,540 million kwh produced, 280 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar, textiles and clothing, furniture, chemicals, petroleum, metals, rubber, tourism agriculture: accounts for 25% of gdp; most important sector of economy and contributes two-thirds to export earnings; principal crops--sugarcane, corn, bananas, coffee, beans, cardamom; livestock--cattle, sheep, pigs, chickens; food importer illicit drugs: illicit producer of opium poppy and cannabis for the international drug trade; the government has engaged in aerial eradication of opium poppy; transit country for cocaine shipments aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $869 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $7.7 billion currency: quetzal (plural--quetzales); 1 quetzal (q) = 100 centavos exchange rates: free market quetzales (q) per us$1--3.3913 (january 1990), 2.8261 (1989), 2.6196 (1988), 2.500 (1987), 1.875 (1986), 1.000 (1985); note--black-market rate 2.800 (may 1989) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 870 km 0.914-meter gauge, single track; 780 km government owned, 90 km privately owned highways: 26,429 km total; 2,868 km paved, 11,421 km gravel, and 12,140 unimproved inland waterways: 260 km navigable year round; additional 730 km navigable during high-water season pipelines: crude oil, 275 km ports: puerto barrios, puerto quetzal, santo tomas de castilla merchant marine: 1 cargo ship (1,000 grt or over) totaling 4,129 grt/6,450 dwt civil air: 10 major transport aircraft airports: 451 total, 391 usable; 11 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 19 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fairly modern network centered in guatemala pcityo; 97,670 telephones; stations--91 am, no fm, 25 tv, 15 shortwave; connection into central american microwave system; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 2,028,875; 1,327,374 fit for military service; 107,251 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1% of gdp, or $115 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: guernsey (british crown dependency) geography total area: 194 km2; land area: 194 km2; includes alderney, guernsey, herm, sark, and some other smaller islands comparative area: slightly larger than washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 50 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: temperate with mild winters and cool summers; about 50% of days are overcast terrain: mostly level with low hills in southwest natural resources: cropland land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other; about 50% cultivated environment: large, deepwater harbor at st. peter port note: 52 km west of france people population: 57,227 (july 1990), growth rate 0.7% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--channel islander(s); adjective--channel islander ethnic divisions: uk and norman-french descent religion: anglican, roman catholic, presbyterian, baptist, congregational, methodist language: english, french; norman-french dialect spoken in country districts literacy: na%, but universal education labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: bailiwick of guernsey type: british crown dependency capital: st. peter port administrative divisions: none (british crown dependency) independence: none (british crown dependency) constitution: unwritten; partly statutes, partly common law and practice legal system: english law and local statute; justice is administered by the royal court national holiday: liberation day, 9 may (1945) executive branch: british monarch, lieutenant governor, bailiff, deputy bailiff legislative branch: states of deliberation judicial branch: royal court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--lieutenant governor lt. gen. sir alexander boswell (since 1985); bailiff sir charles frossard (since 1982) political parties and leaders: none; all independents suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: states of deliberation--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote na; seats--(60 total, 33 elected), all independents communists: none diplomatic representation: none (british crown dependency) flag: white with the red cross of st. george (patron saint of england) extending to the edges of the flag economy overview: tourism is a major source of revenue. other economic activity includes financial services, breeding the world-famous guernsey cattle, and growing tomatoes and flowers for export. gdp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate 9% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $145.0 million; expenditures $117.2 million, including capital expenditures of na (1985) exports: $na; commodities--tomatoes, flowers and ferns, sweet peppers, eggplant, other vegetables; partners--uk (regarded as internal trade) imports: $na; commodities--coal, gasoline and oil; partners--uk (regarded as internal trade) external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 173,000 kw capacity; 525 million kwh produced, 9,340 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, banking agriculture: tomatoes, flowers (mostly grown in greenhouses), sweet peppers, eggplant, other vegetables and fruit; guernsey cattle aid: none currency: guernsey pound (plural--pounds); 1 guernsey (lg) pound = 100 pence exchange rates: guernsey pounds (lg) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); note--the guernsey pound is at par with the british pound fiscal year: calendar year communications ports: st. peter port, st. sampson airport: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m (la villiaze) telecommunications: stations--1 am, no fm, 1 tv; 41,900 telephones; 1 submarine cable defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: guinea geography total area: 245,860 km2; land area: 245,860 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than oregon land boundaries: 3,399 km total; guinea-bissau 386 km, ivory coast 610 km, liberia 563 km, mali 858 km, senegal 330 km, sierra leone 652 km coastline: 320 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: generally hot and humid; monsoonal-type rainy season (june to november) with southwesterly winds; dry season (december to may) with northeasterly harmattan winds terrain: generally flat coastal plain, hilly to mountainous interior natural resources: bauxite, iron ore, diamonds, gold, uranium, hydropower, fish land use: 6% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 12% meadows and pastures; 42% forest and woodland; 40% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dry, dusty harmattan haze may reduce visibility during dry season; deforestation people population: 7,269,240 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 22 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 147 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 40 years male, 44 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--guinean(s); adjective--guinean ethnic divisions: fulani, malinke, sousou, 15 smaller tribes religion: 85% muslim, 5% indigenous beliefs, 1.5% christian language: french (official); each tribe has its own language literacy: 20% in french; 48% in local languages labor force: 2,400,000 (1983); 82.0% agriculture, 11.0% industry and commerce, 5.4% services; 88,112 civil servants (1987); 52% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: virtually 100% of wage earners loosely affiliated with the national confederation of guinean workers government long-form name: republic of guinea type: republic capital: conakry administrative divisions: 29 administrative regions (regions administratives, singular--region administrative); beyla, boffa, boke, conakry, dabola, dalaba, dinguiraye, dubreka, faranah, forecariah, fria, gaoual, gueckedou, kankan, kerouane, kindia, kissidougou, koundara, kouroussa, labe, macenta, mali, mamou, nzerekore, pita, siguiri, telimele, tougue, yomou independence: 2 october 1958 (from france; formerly french guinea) constitution: 14 may 1982, suspended after coup of 3 april 1984 legal system: based on french civil law system, customary law, and decree; legal codes currently being revised; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the second republic, 3 april (1984) executive branch: president, military committee for national recovery (comite militaire de redressement national or cmrn), council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: people's national assembly (assemblee nationale populaire) was dissolved after the 3 april 1984 coup judicial branch: court of appeal (cour d'appel) leaders: chief of state and head of government--gen. lansana conte (since 5 april 1984) political parties and leaders: none; following the 3 april 1984 coup all political activity was banned suffrage: none elections: none communists: no communist party, although there are some sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, mano river union, niger river commission, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador kekoura camara; chancery at 2112 leroy place nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-9420; us--ambassador samuel e. lupo; embassy at 2nd boulevard and 9th avenue, conakry (mailing address is b. p. 603, conakry); telephone 44-15-20 through 24 flag: three equal vertical bands of red (hoist side), yellow, and green; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia; similar to the flag of rwanda which has a large black letter r centered in the yellow band economy overview: although possessing many natural resources and considerable potential for agricultural development, guinea is one of the poorest countries in the world. the agricultural sector contributes about 40% to gdp and employs more than 80% of the work force, while industry accounts for about 25% of gdp. guinea possesses over 25% of the world's bauxite reserves; exports of bauxite and alumina accounted for more than 80% of total exports in 1986. gdp: $2.5 billion, per capita $350; real growth rate 5.0% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 27.0% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $357 million; expenditures $480 million, including capital expenditures of $229 million (1988 est.) exports: $553 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--alumina, bauxite, diamonds, coffee, pineapples, bananas, palm kernels; partners--us 33%, ec 33%, ussr and eastern europe 20%, canada imports: $509 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum products, metals, machinery, transport equipment, foodstuffs, textiles and other grain; partners--us 16%, france, brazil external debt: $1.6 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 113,000 kw capacity; 300 million kwh produced, 40 kwh per capita (1989) industries: bauxite mining, alumina, diamond mining, light manufacturing and agricultural processing industries agriculture: accounts for 40% of gdp (includes fishing and forestry); mostly subsistence farming; principal products--rice, coffee, pineapples, palm kernels, cassava, bananas, sweet potatoes, timber; livestock--cattle, sheep and goats; not self-sufficient in food grains aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $203 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $882 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $120 million; communist countries (1970-88), $446 million currency: guinean franc (plural--francs); 1 guinean franc (fg) = 100 centimes exchange rates: guinean francs (fg) per us$1--505.00 (october 1988), 440.00 (january 1988), 440.00 (1987), 235.63 (1986), 22.47 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,045 km; 806 km 1.000-meter gauge, 239 km 1.435-meter standard gauge highways: 30,100 km total; 1,145 km paved, 12,955 km gravel or laterite (of which barely 4,500 km are currently all-weather roads), 16,000 km unimproved earth (1987) inland waterways: 1,295 km navigable by shallow-draft native craft ports: conakry, kamsar civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 16 total, 16 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 9 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of open-wire lines, small radiocommunication stations, and new radio relay system; 10,000 telephones; stations--3 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 12,000 tv sets; 125,000 radio receivers; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army (ground forces), navy (acts primarily as a coast guard), air force, paramilitary national gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 1,657,787; 834,777 fit for military service defense expenditures: 3.1% of gdp (1984) ---------------------------------------------------country: guinea-bissau geography total area: 36,120 km2; land area: 28,000 km2 comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of connecticut land boundaries: 724 km total; guinea 386, senegal 338 km coastline: 350 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: the international court of justice (icj) has rendered its decision on the guinea-bissau/senegal maritime boundary (in favor of senegal)--that decision has been rejected by guinea-bissau climate: tropical; generally hot and humid; monsoon-type rainy season (june to november) with southwesterly winds; dry season (december to may) with northeasterly harmattan winds terrain: mostly low coastal plain rising to savanna in east natural resources: unexploited deposits of petroleum, bauxite, phosphates; fish, timber land use: 11% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 43% meadows and pastures; 38% forest and woodland; 7% other environment: hot, dry, dusty harmattan haze may reduce visibility during dry season people population: 998,963 (july 1990), growth rate 2.5% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 19 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 127 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 44 years male, 48 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--guinea-bissauan(s); adjective--guinea-bissauan ethnic divisions: about 99% african (30% balanta, 20% fula, 14% manjaca, 13% mandinga, 7% papel); less than 1% european and mulatto religion: 65% indigenous beliefs, 30% muslim, 5% christian language: portuguese (official); criolo and numerous african languages literacy: 34% (1986) labor force: 403,000 (est.); 90% agriculture, 5% industry, services, and commerce, 5% government; 53% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: only one trade union--the national union of workers of guinea-bissau (untg) government long-form name: republic of guinea-bissau type: republic; highly centralized one-party regime since september 1974 capital: bissau administrative divisions: 9 regions (regioes, singular--regiao); bafata, biombo, bissau, bolama, cacheu, gabu, oio, quinara, tombali independence: 24 september 1973 (from portugal; formerly portuguese guinea) constitution: 16 may 1984 legal system: na national holiday: independence day, 24 september (1973) executive branch: president of the council of state, vice presidents of the council of state, council of state, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national people's assembly (assembleia nacional popular) judicial branch: none; there is a ministry of justice in the council of ministers leaders: chief of state and head of government--president of the council of state brig. gen. joao bernardo vieira (assumed power 14 november 1980 and elected president of council of state on 16 may 1984); first vice president col. iafai camara (since 7 november 1985); second vice president vasco cabral (since 21 june 1989) political parties and leaders: only party--african party for the independence of guinea-bissau and cape verde (paigc), president joao bernardo vieira, leader; the party decided to retain the binational title despite its formal break with cape verde suffrage: universal at age 15 elections: president of council of state--last held 19 june 1989 (next to be held 19 june 1994); results--brig. gen. joao bernardo vieira was reelected without opposition by the national people's assembly; national people's assembly--last held 15 june 1989 (next to be held 15 june 1994); results--paigc is the only party; seats--(150 total) paigc 150, appointed by regional councils; regional councils--last held 1 june 1989 (next to be held 1 june 1994); results--paigc is the only party; seats--(473 total) paigc 473, by public plebiscite communists: a few communists, some sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, irc, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador alfredo lopes cabral; chancery (temporary) at the guinea-bissauan permanent mission to the un, suite 604, 211 east 43rd street, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 661-3977; us--ambassador william l. jacobsen; embassy at 17 avenida domingos ramos, bissau (mailing address is c. p. 297, bissau); telephone p245o 212816, 21817, 213674 flag: two equal horizontal bands of yellow (top) and green with a vertical red band on the hoist side; there is a black five-pointed star centered in the red band; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia; similar to the flag of cape verde which has the black star raised above the center of the red band and is framed by two corn stalks and a yellow clam shell economy overview: guinea-bissau ranks among the poorest countries in the world, with a per capita gdp below $200. agriculture and fishing are the main economic activities, with cashew nuts, peanuts, and palm kernels the primary exports. exploitation of known mineral deposits is unlikely at present because of a weak infrastructure and the high cost of development. the government's four-year plan (1988-91) has targeted agricultural development as the top priority. gdp: $152 million, per capita $160 (1988); real growth rate 5.6% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $20 million; expenditures $25 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1987) exports: $15 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--cashews, fish, peanuts, palm kernels; partners--portugal, spain, switzerland, cape verde, china imports: $49 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--capital equipment, consumer goods, semiprocessed goods, foods, petroleum; partners--portugal, ussr, ec countries, other europe, senegal, us external debt: $465 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 1.7% (1986 est.) electricity: 22,000 kw capacity; 28 million kwh produced, 30 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing, beer, soft drinks agriculture: accounts for over 50% of gdp, nearly 100% of exports, and 80% of employment; rice is the staple food; other crops include corn, beans, cassava, cashew nuts, peanuts, palm kernels, and cotton; not self-sufficient in food; fishing and forestry potential not fully exploited aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $46 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $519 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $41 million; communist countries (1970-88), $68 million currency: guinea-bissauan peso (plural--pesos); 1 guinea-bissauan peso (pg) = 100 centavos exchange rates: guinea-bissauan pesos (pg) per us$1--650 pesos (december 1989), na (1988), 851.65 (1987), 238.98 (1986), 173.61 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 3,218 km; 2,698 km bituminous, remainder earth inland waterways: scattered stretches are important to coastal commerce ports: bissau civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 37 total, 18 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: poor system of radio relay, open-wire lines, and radiocommunications; 3,000 telephones; stations--1 am, 2 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: people's revolutionary armed force (farp); army, navy, and air force are separate components military manpower: males 15-49, 215,552; 122,824 fit for military service defense expenditures: 3.2% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: guyana geography total area: 214,970 km2; land area: 196,850 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than idaho land boundaries: 2,462 km total; brazil 1,119 km, suriname 600 km, venezuela 743 km coastline: 459 km maritime claims: continental shelf: outer edge of continental margin or 200 nm; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: essequibo area claimed by venezuela; suriname claims area between new (upper courantyne) and courantyne/kutari rivers (all headwaters of the courantyne) climate: tropical; hot, humid, moderated by northeast trade winds; two rainy seasons (may to mid-august, mid-november to mid-january) terrain: mostly rolling highlands; low coastal plain; savanna in south natural resources: bauxite, gold, diamonds, hardwood timber, shrimp, fish land use: 3% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 83% forest and woodland; 8% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: flash floods a constant threat during rainy seasons; water pollution people population: 764,649 (july 1990), growth rate 0.1% (1990) birth rate: 24 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 19 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 40 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--guyanese (sing., pl.); adjective--guyanese ethnic divisions: 51% east indian, 43% black and mixed, 4% amerindian, 2% european and chinese religion: 57% christian, 33% hindu, 9% muslim, 1% other language: english, amerindian dialects literacy: 85% labor force: 268,000; 44.5% industry and commerce, 33.8% agriculture, 21.7% services; public-sector employment amounts to 60-80% of the total labor force (1985) organized labor: 34% of labor force government long-form name: co-operative republic of guyana type: republic capital: georgetown administrative divisions: 10 regions; barima-waini, cuyuni-mazaruni, demerara-mahaica, east berbice-corentyne, essequibo islands-west demerara, mahaica-berbice, pomeroon-supenaam, potaro-siparuni, upper demerara-berbice, upper takutu-upper essequibo independence: 26 may 1966 (from uk; formerly british guiana) constitution: 6 october 1980 legal system: based on english common law with certain admixtures of roman-dutch law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: republic day, 23 february (1970) executive branch: executive president, first vice president, prime minister, first deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly judicial branch: supreme court of judicature leaders: chief of state--president hugh desmond hoyte (since 6 august 1985); first vice president hamilton green (since 6 august 1985); head of government--prime minister hamilton green (since 6 august 1985) political parties and leaders: people's national congress (pnc), hugh desmond hoyte; people's progressive party (ppp), cheddi jagan; working people's alliance (wpa), eusi kwayana, rupert roopnarine, moses bhagwan; democratic labor movement (dlm), paul tennassee; people's democratic movement (pdm), llewellyn john; national democratic front (ndf), joseph bacchus; united force (uf), marcellus feilden singh; vanguard for liberation and democracy (vld, also known as liberator party), gunraj kumar, j. k. makepeace richmond suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: executive president--last held on 9 december 1985 (next to be held late 1990); hugh desmond hoyte was elected president (the leader of the party with the most votes in the national assembly elections--pnc 78%); national assembly--last held on 9 december 1985 (next to be held by 9 december 1990); results--pnc 78%, ppp 16%, uf 4%, wpa 2%; seats--(65 total, 53 elected) pnc 42, ppp 8, uf 2, wpa 1 communists: 100 (est.) hardcore within ppp; top echelons of ppp and pyo (progressive youth organization, militant wing of the ppp) include many communists; small but unknown number of orthodox marxist-leninists within pnc, some of whom formerly belonged to the ppp other political or pressure groups: trades union congress (tuc); guyana council of indian organizations (gcio); civil liberties action committee (clac); the latter two organizations are small and active but not well organized member of: acp, caricom, ccc, cdb, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, iba, ibrd, icao, icj, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, irc, iso, itu, nam, oas (observer), paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador dr. cedric hilburn grant; chancery at 2490 tracy place nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-6900; there is a guyanese consulate general in new york; us--ambassador theresa a. tull; embassy at 31 main street, georgetown; telephone p592o (02) 54900 through 54909 flag: green with a red isosceles triangle (based on the hoist side) superimposed on a long yellow arrowhead; there is a narrow black border between the red and yellow, and a narrow white border between the yellow and the green economy overview: after growing on average at less than 1% a year in 1984-87, gdp dropped by 3% in 1988, the result of bad weather, labor trouble in the canefields, and flooding and equipment problems in the bauxite industry. consumer prices rose about 35%, and the current account deficit widened substantially as sugar and bauxite exports fell. moreover, electric power is in short supply and constitutes a major barrier to future gains in national output. the government, in association with international financial agencies, seeks to reduce its payment arrears and to raise new funds. the government's stabilization program--aimed at establishing realistic exchange rates, reasonable price stability, and a resumption of growth--requires considerable public administrative abilities and continued patience by consumers during a long incubation period. gdp: $323 million, per capita $420; real growth rate 3.0% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 35% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $173 million; expenditures $414 million, including capital expenditures of $75 million (1988 est.) exports: $215 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.) commodities--bauxite, sugar, rice, shrimp, gold, molasses, timber, rum; partners--uk 37%, us 12%, canada 10.6%, caricom 4.8% (1986) imports: $216 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--manufactures machinery, food, petroleum; partners--caricom 41%, us 18%, uk 9%, canada 3% (1984) external debt: $1.8 billion, including arrears (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 5.0% (1988 est.) electricity: 221,000 kw capacity; 583 million kwh produced, 760 kwh per capita (1989) industries: bauxite mining, sugar, rice milling, timber, fishing (shrimp), textiles, gold mining agriculture: most important sector, accounting for 25% of gdp and over 50% of exports; sugar and rice are key crops; development potential exists for fishing and forestry; not self-sufficient in food, especially wheat, vegetable oils, and animal products aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $109 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $234 million; communist countries (1970-88), $242 million currency: guyanese dollar (plural--dollars); 1 guyanese dollar (g$) = 100 cents exchange rates: guyanese dollars (g$) per us$1--33.0000 (january 1990), 27.159 (1989), 10.000 (1988), 9.756 (1987), 4.272 (1986), 4.252 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 187 km total, all single track 0.914-meter gauge highways: 7,665 km total; 550 km paved, 5,000 km gravel, 1,525 km earth, 590 km unimproved inland waterways: 6,000 km total of navigable waterways; berbice, demerara, and essequibo rivers are navigable by oceangoing vessels for 150 km, 100 km, and 80 km, respectively ports: georgetown civil air: 5 major transport aircraft airports: 66 total, 63 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 12 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system with radio relay network; over 27,000 telephones; tropospheric scatter link to trinidad; stations--4 am, 3 fm, no tv, 1 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: guyana defense force (including maritime corps and air corps), guyana police force, guyana people's militia, guyana national service military manpower: males 15-49, 201,104; 152,958 fit for military service defense expenditures: 4.3% of gdp, or $13.8 million (1988 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: haiti geography total area: 27,750 km2; land area: 27,560 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundary: 275 km with the dominican republic coastline: 1,771 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims us-administered navassa island climate: tropical; semiarid where mountains in east cut off trade winds terrain: mostly rough and mountainous natural resources: bauxite land use: 20% arable land; 13% permanent crops; 18% meadows and pastures; 4% forest and woodland; 45% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: lies in the middle of the hurricane belt and subject to severe storms from june to october; occasional flooding and earthquakes; deforestation note: shares island of hispaniola with dominican republic people population: 6,142,141 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 45 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 16 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 107 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 52 years male, 55 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--haitian(s); adjective--haitian ethnic divisions: 95% black, 5% mulatto and european religion: 75-80% roman catholic (of which an overwhelming majority also practice voodoo), 10% protestant language: french (official) spoken by only 10% of population; all speak creole literacy: 23% labor force: 2,300,000; 66% agriculture, 25% services, 9% industry; shortage of skilled labor, unskilled labor abundant (1982) organized labor: na government long-form name: republic of haiti type: republic capital: port-au-prince administrative divisions: 9 departments, (departements, singular--departement); artibonite, centre, grand'anse, nord, nord-est, nord-ouest, ouest, sud, sud-est independence: 1 january 1804 (from france) constitution: 27 august 1983, suspended february 1986; draft constitution approved march 1987, suspended june 1988, most articles reinstated march 1989 legal system: based on roman civil law system; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 1 january (1804) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) consisted of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives, but was dissolved on 20 june 1988 after the coup of 19 june 1988 (there was a subsequent coup on 18 september 1988); after naming a civilian as provisional president on 13 march 1990, it was announced that a council of state was being formed judicial branch: court of appeal (cour de cassation) leaders: chief of state and head of government--provisional president ertha pascal-trouillot (since 13 march 1990) political parties and leaders: haitian christian democratic party (pdch), sylvio claude; haitian social christian party (psch), gregoire eugene; movement for the installation of democracy in haiti (midh), marc bazin; national alliance front (fnc), gerard gourgue; national agricultural and industrial party (pain), louis dejoie; congress of democratic movements (conacom), victor bono; national progressive revolutionary party (panpra), serge gilles; national patriotic movement of november 28 (mnp-28), dejean belizaire; movement for the organization of the country (mop), gesner comeau; mobilization for national development (mdn), hubert de ronceray suffrage: none elections: president--last held 17 january 1988 (next to be held by mid-june 1990); on 13 march 1990 ertha pascal-trouillot became provisional president after the resignation of president lieut. gen prosper avril; legislature--last held 17 january 1988, but dissolved on 20 june 1988; the government has promised an election by mid-june 1990 communists: united party of haitian communists (puch), rene theodore (roughly 2,000 members) other political or pressure groups: democratic unity confederation (kid), roman catholic church, confederation of haitian workers (cth), federation of workers trade unions (fos), autonomous haitian workers (cath), national popular assembly (apn) member of: ccc, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, iaea, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, itu, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador (vacant), charge d'affaires fritz vougy; chancery at 2311 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-4090 through 4092; there are haitian consulates general in boston, chicago, miami, new york, and san juan (puerto rico); us--ambassador alvin adams; embassy at harry truman boulevard, port-au-prince (mailing address is p. o. box 1761, port-au-prince), telephone p509o (1) 20354 or 20368, 20200, 20612 flag: two equal horizontal bands of blue (top) and red with a centered white rectangle bearing the coat of arms which contains a palm tree flanked by flags and two cannons above a scroll bearing the motto l'union fait la force (union makes strength) economy overview: about 85% of the population live in absolute poverty. agriculture is mainly small-scale subsistence farming and employs 65% of the work force. the majority of the population does not have ready access to safe drinking water, adequate medical care, or sufficient food. few social assistance programs exist, and the lack of employment opportunities remains the most critical problem facing the economy. gdp: $2.4 billion, per capita $380; real growth rate 0.3% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.8% (1988) unemployment rate: 50% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $252 million; expenditures $357 million, including capital expenditures of $na million (1988) exports: $200 million (f.o.b., fy88); commodities--light manufactures 65%, coffee 17%, other agriculture 8%, other products 10%; partners--us 77%, france 5%, italy 4%, frg 3%, other industrial 9%, less developed countries 2% (fy86) imports: $344 million (c.i.f., fy88); commodities--machines and manufactures 36%, food and beverages 21%, petroleum products 11%, fats and oils 12%, chemicals 12%; partners--us 65%, netherlands antilles 6%, japan 5%, france 4%, canada 2%, asia 2% (fy86) external debt: $820 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 2% (fy87) electricity: 230,000 kw capacity; 482 million kwh produced, 75 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar refining, textiles, flour milling, cement manufacturing, bauxite mining, tourism, light assembly industries based on imported parts agriculture: accounts for 32% of gdp and employs 65% of work force; mostly small-scale subsistence farms; commercial crops--coffee and sugarcane; staple crops--rice, corn, sorghum, mangoes; shortage of wheat flour aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $638 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $627 million currency: gourde (plural--gourdes); 1 gourde (g) = 100 centimes exchange rates: gourdes (g) per us$1-5.0 (fixed rate) fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications railroads: 40 km 0.760-meter narrow gauge, single-track, privately owned industrial line highways: 4,000 km total; 950 km paved, 900 km otherwise improved, 2,150 km unimproved inland waterways: negligible; less than 100 km navigable ports: port-au-prince, cap-haitien civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 15 total, 10 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: domestic facilities barely adequate, international facilities slightly better; 36,000 telephones; stations--33 am, no fm, 4 tv, 2 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air corps military manpower: males 15-49, 1,264,238; 679,209 fit for military service; 59,655 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: heard island and mcdonald islands (territory of australia) geography total area: 412 km2; land area: 412 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 101.9 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploration; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: antarctic terrain: heard island--bleak and mountainous, with an extinct volcano; mcdonald islands--small and rocky land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: primarily used as research stations note: located 4,100 km southwest of australia in the southern indian ocean people population: uninhabited government long-form name: territory of heard island and mcdonald islands type: territory of australia administered by the antarctic division of the department of science in canberra (australia) economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of australia ---------------------------------------------------country: honduras geography total area: 112,090 km2; land area: 111,890 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than tennessee land boundaries: 1,520 km total; guatemala 256 km, el salvador 342 km, nicaragua 922 km coastline: 820 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: several sections of the boundary with el salvador are in dispute climate: subtropical in lowlands, temperate in mountains terrain: mostly mountains in interior, narrow coastal plains natural resources: timber, gold, silver, copper, lead, zinc, iron ore, antimony, coal, fish land use: 14% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 30% meadows and pastures; 34% forest and woodland; 20% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to frequent, but generally mild, earthquakes; damaging hurricanes along caribbean coast; deforestation; soil erosion people population: 5,259,699 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 62 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--honduran(s); adjective--honduran ethnic divisions: 90% mestizo (mixed indian and european), 7% indian, 2% black, 1% white religion: about 97% roman catholic; small protestant minority language: spanish, indian dialects literacy: 56% labor force: 1,300,000; 62% agriculture, 20% services, 9% manufacturing, 3% construction, 6% other (1985) organized labor: 40% of urban labor force, 20% of rural work force (1985) government long-form name: republic of honduras type: republic capital: tegucigalpa administrative divisions: 18 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); atlantida, choluteca, colon, comayagua, copan, cortes, el paraiso, francisco morazan, gracias a dios, intibuca, islas de la bahia, la paz, lempira, ocotepeque, olancho, santa barbara, valle, yoro independence: 15 september 1821 (from spain) constitution: 11 january 1982, effective 20 january 1982 legal system: rooted in roman and spanish civil law; some influence of english common law; accepts icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 15 september (1821) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national congress (congreso nacional) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justica) leaders: chief of state and head of government--rafael leonardo callejas romero (since 26 january 1990) political parties and leaders: liberal party (plh)--faction leaders, carlos flores facusse (leader of florista liberal movement), carlos montoya (azconista subfaction), ramon villeda bermudez and jorge arturo reina (m-lider faction); national party (pnh), ricardo maduro, party president; pnh faction leaders--oswaldo ramos soto and rafael leonardo callejas (monarca faction); national innovation and unity party-social democrats (pinu-sd), enrique aguilar cerrato paz; christian democratic party (pdch), jorge illescas; democratic action (ad), walter lopez reyes suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held on 26 november 1989 (next to be held november 1993); results--leonardo rafael callejas (pnh) 51%, jose azcona hoyo (plh) 43.3%, others 5.7%; national congress--last held on 24 november 1985 (next to be held november 1993); results--plh 51%, pnh 45%, pdch 1.9%, pinu 1.5%, others 0.65; seats--(134 total) plh 62, pnh 71, pinu 1 communists: up to 1,500; honduran leftist groups--communist party of honduras (pch), party for the transformation of honduras (pth), morazanist front for the liberation of honduras (fmlh), people's revolutionary union/popular liberation movement (urp/mpl), popular revolutionary forces-lorenzo zelaya (fpr/lz), socialist party of honduras central american workers revolutionary party (paso/prtc) other political or pressure groups: national association of honduran campesinos (anach), honduran council of private enterprise (cohep), confederation of honduran workers (cth), national union of campesinos (unc), general workers confederation (cgt), united federation of honduran workers (futh), committee for the defense of human rights in honduras (codeh), coordinating committee of popular organizations (ccop) member of: cacm, fao, g-77, iadb, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador jorge ramon hernandez alcerro; chancery at suite 100, 4301 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 966-7700 through 7702; there are honduran consulates general in chicago, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, and san francisco, and consulates in baton rouge, boston, detroit, houston, and jacksonville; us--ambassador crescencio arcos; embassy at avenida la paz, tegucigalpa (mailing address is apo miami 34022); telephone p504o 32-3120 flag: three equal horizontal bands of blue (top), white, and blue with five blue five-pointed stars arranged in an x pattern centered in the white band; the stars represent the members of the former federal republic of central america--costa rica, el salvador, guatemala, honduras, and nicaragua; similar to the flag of el salvador which features a round emblem encircled by the words republica de el salvador en la america central centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of nicaragua which features a triangle encircled by the words republica de nicaragua on top and america central on the bottom, centered in the white band economy overview: honduras is one of the poorest countries in the western hemisphere. agriculture is the most important sector of the economy, accounting for nearly 30% of gdp, employing 62% of the labor force, and producing two-thirds of exports. productivity remains low, however, leaving considerable room for improvement. although industry is still in its early stages, it employs nearly 15% of the labor force, accounts for 23% of gdp, and generates 20% of exports. the service sectors, including public administration, account for 48% of gdp and employ nearly 20% of the labor force. basic problems facing the economy include a high population growth rate, a high unemployment rate, a lack of basic services, a large and inefficient public sector, and an export sector dependent mostly on coffee and bananas, which are subject to sharp price fluctuations. gdp: $4.4 billion, per capita $890; real growth rate 4.0% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 11% (1989) unemployment rate: 12% unemployed, 30-40% underemployed (1988) budget: revenues $1,053 million; expenditures $949 million, including capital expenditures of $159 million (1989) exports: $1.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--bananas, coffee, shrimp, lobster, minerals, lumber; partners--us 52%, frg 11%, japan, italy, belgium imports: $1.4 billion (c.i.f. 1988); commodities--machinery and transport equipment, chemical products, manufactured goods, fuel and oil, foodstuffs; partners--us 39%, japan 9%, cacm, venezuela, mexico external debt: $3.2 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 5% (1988) electricity: 655,000 kw capacity; 1,980 million kwh produced, 390 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing (sugar and coffee), textiles, clothing, wood products agriculture: most important sector, accounting for nearly 30% of gdp, over 60% of the labor force, and two-thirds of exports; principal products include bananas, coffee, timber, beef, citrus fruit, shrimp; importer of wheat illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis, cultivated on small plots and used principally for local consumption; transshipment point for cocaine aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.3 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $776 million currency: lempira (plural--lempiras); 1 lempira (l) = 100 centavos exchange rates: lempiras (l) per us$1--2.00 (fixed rate); 3.50 parallel exchange and black-market rate (october 1989) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 785 km total; 508 km 1.067-meter gauge, 277 km 0.914-meter gauge highways: 8,950 km total; 1,700 km paved, 5,000 km otherwise improved, 2,250 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 465 km navigable by small craft ports: puerto castilla, puerto cortes, san lorenzo merchant marine: 149 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 438,495 grt/660,990 dwt; includes 2 passenger-cargo, 87 cargo, 12 refrigerated cargo, 9 container, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 17 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 1 specialized tanker, 1 vehicle carrier, 17 bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: 9 major transport aircraft airports: 180 total, 140 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 4 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 12 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: improved, but still inadequate; connection into central american microwave system; 35,100 telephones; stations--176 am, no fm, 28 tv, 7 shortwave; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: armed forces, naval forces, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,222,858; 727,851 fit for military service; 61,493 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.9% of gdp, or $82.5 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: hong kong (colony of the uk) geography total area: 1,040 km2; land area: 990 km2 comparative area: slightly less than six times the size of washington, dc land boundary: 30 km with china coastline: 733 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 3 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: scheduled to become a special administrative region of china in 1997 climate: tropical monsoon; cool and humid in winter, hot and rainy from spring through summer, warm and sunny in fall terrain: hilly to mountainous with steep slopes; lowlands in north natural resources: outstanding deepwater harbor, feldspar land use: 7% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 12% forest and woodland; 79% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: more than 200 islands; occasional typhoons people population: 5,759,990 (july 1990), growth rate 1.0% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 76 years male, 82 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: adjective--hong kong ethnic divisions: 98% chinese, 2% other religion: 90% eclectic mixture of local religions, 10% christian language: chinese (cantonese), english literacy: 75% labor force: 2,640,000; 35.8% manufacturing; 22.7% wholesale and retail trade, restaurants and hotel, 17.1% services, 7.5% construction, 8.4% transport and communications, 6.1% financing, insurance, and real estate (1986) organized labor: 15% of labor force (1986) government long-form name: none; abbreviated hk type: colony of the uk; scheduled to revert to china in 1997 capital: victoria administrative divisions: none (colony of the uk) independence: none (colony of the uk); the uk signed an agreement with china on 19 december 1984 to return hong kong to china on 1 july 1997; in the joint declaration, china promises to respect hong kong's existing social and economic systems and lifestyle for 50 years after transition constitution: unwritten; partly statutes, partly common law and practice legal system: based on english common law national holiday: liberation day, 29 august (1945) executive branch: british monarch, governor, chief secretary of the executive council legislative branch: legislative council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--governor sir david clive wilson (since 9 april 1987); chief secretary sir david robert ford (since na february 1987) political parties: none suffrage: limited to about 71,000 professionals of electoral college and functional constituencies elections: legislative council--indirect elections last held 26 september 1985 (next to be held in september 1991) seats--(58 total; 26 elected, 32 appointed) communists: 5,000 (est.) cadres affiliated with communist party of china other political or pressure groups: federation of trade unions (communist controlled), hong kong and kowloon trade union council (nationalist chinese dominated), hong kong general chamber of commerce, chinese general chamber of commerce (communist controlled), federation of hong kong industries, chinese manufacturers' association of hong kong, hong kong professional teachers' union, and several small pro-democracy groups. member of: adb, escap (associate member), gatt, imo, interpol, multifiber arrangement, wmo diplomatic representation: as a british colony, the interests of hong kong in the us are represented by the uk; us--consul general donald m. anderson; consulate general at 26 garden road, hong kong (mailing address is box 30, hong kong, or fpo san francisco 96659-0002); telephone p852o (5) 239011 flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant with the hong kong coat of arms on a white disk centered on the outer half of the flag; the coat of arms contains a shield (bearing two junks below a crown) held by a lion (representing the uk) and a dragon (representing china) with another lion above the shield and a banner bearing the words hong kong below the shield economy overview: hong kong has a free-market economy and is autonomous in financial affairs. natural resources are limited and food and raw materials must be imported. manufacturing is the backbone of the economy, accounting for more than 20% of gdp, employing 36% of the labor force, and exporting about 90% of output. real gdp growth averaged a remakable 8% in 1987-88, then slowed to a respectable 3% in 1989. unemployment, which has been declining since the mid-1980s, is now less than 2%. a shortage of labor continues to put upward pressure on prices and the cost of living. short-term prospects remain solid so long as major trading partners continue to be prosperous. the crackdown in china in 1989 casts a long shadow over the longer term economic outlook. gdp: $57 billion, per capita $10,000; real growth rate 3% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 1.6% (1988) budget: $6.9 billion (fy89) exports: $63.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988), including reexports of $22.9 billion; commodities--clothing, textile yarn and fabric, footwear, electrical appliances, watches and clocks, toys; partners--us 31%, china 14%, frg 8%, uk 6%, japan 5% imports: $63.9 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, transport equipment, raw materials, semimanufactures, petroleum; partners--china 31%, japan 20%, taiwan 9%, us 8% external debt: $9.6 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 7.0% (1988) electricity: 7,800,000 kw capacity; 23,000 million kwh produced, 4,030 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, clothing, tourism, electronics, plastics, toys, watches, clocks agriculture: minor role in the economy; rice, vegetables, dairy products; less than 20% self-sufficient; shortages of rice, wheat, water aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $141.2 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $899.8 million currency: hong kong dollar (plural--dollars); 1 hong kong dollar (hk$) = 100 cents exchange rates: hong kong dollars (hk$) per us$--7.800 (march 1989), 7.810 (1988), 7.760 (1987), 7.795 (1986), 7.811 (1985); note--linked to the us dollar at the rate of about 7.8 hk$ per 1 us$ since 1985 fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 35 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, government owned highways: 1,100 km total; 794 km paved, 306 km gravel, crushed stone, or earth ports: hong kong merchant marine: 134 ships (1,000 grt or over), totaling 4,391,102 grt/7,430,337 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 1 short-sea passenger, 11 cargo, 10 refrigerated cargo, 13 container, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 10 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 9 combination ore/oil, 7 liquefied gas, 69 bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry; ships registered in hong kong fly the uk flag and an estimated 500 hong kong-owned ships are registered elsewhere civil air: 16 major transport aircraft airports: 2 total; 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern facilities provide excellent domestic and international services; 2,300,000 telephones; microwave transmission links and extensive optical fiber transmission network; stations--6 am, 6 fm, 4 tv; 1 british broadcasting corporation (bbc) relay station and 1 british forces broadcasting service relay station; 2,500,000 radio receivers; 1,312,000 tv sets (1,224,000 color tv sets); satellite earth stations--1 pacific ocean intelsat and 2 indian ocean intelsat; coaxial cable to guangzhou, china; links to 5 international submarine cables providing access to asean member nations, japan, taiwan, australia, middle east, and western europe defense forces branches: headquarters of british forces, gurkha brigade, royal navy, royal air force, royal hong kong auxiliary air force, royal hong kong police force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,703,890; 1,320,914 fit for military service; 46,440 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 0.5% of gdp, or $300 million (1989 est.); this represents one-fourth of the total cost of defending the colony, the remainder being paid by the uk note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: howland island (territory of the us) geography total area: 1.6 km2; land area: 1.6 km2 comparative area: about 2.7 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 6.4 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: equatorial; scant rainfall, constant wind, burning sun terrain: low-lying, nearly level, sandy, coral island surrounded by a narrow fringing reef; depressed central area natural resources: guano (deposits worked until late 1800s) land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 5% forest and woodland; 95% other environment: almost totally covered with grasses, prostrate vines, and low-growing shrubs; small area of trees in the center; lacks fresh water; primarily a nesting, roosting, and foraging habitat for seabirds, shorebirds, and marine wildlife; feral cats note: remote location 2,575 km southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, just north of the equator, about halfway between hawaii and australia people population: uninhabited note: american civilians evacuated in 1942 after japanese air and naval attacks during world war ii; occupied by us military during world war ii, but abandoned after the war; public entry is by special-use permit only and generally restricted to scientists and educators government long-form name: none type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the fish and wildlife service of the us department of the interior as part of the national wildlife refuge system economy overview: no economic activity communications airports: airstrip constructed in 1937 for scheduled refueling stop on the round-the-world flight of amelia earhart and fred noonan--they left lae, new guinea, for howland island, but were never seen again; the airstrip is no longer serviceable ports: none; offshore anchorage only, one boat landing area along the middle of the west coast note: earhart light is a day beacon near the middle of the west coast that was partially destroyed during world war ii, but has since been rebuilt in memory of famed aviatrix amelia earhart defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us; visited annually by the us coast guard ---------------------------------------------------country: hungary geography total area: 93,030 km2; land area: 92,340 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than indiana land boundaries: 2,251 km total; austria 366 km, czechoslovakia 676 km, romania 443 km, ussr 135 km, yugoslavia 631 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: transylvania question with romania; nagymaros dam dispute with czechoslovakia climate: temperate; cold, cloudy, humid winters; warm summers terrain: mostly flat to rolling plains natural resources: bauxite, coal, natural gas, fertile soils land use: 54% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 14% meadows and pastures; 18% forest and woodland; 11% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: levees are common along many streams, but flooding occurs almost every year note: landlocked; strategic location astride main land routes between western europe and balkan peninsula as well as between ussr and mediterranean basin people population: 10,568,686 (july 1990), growth rate 0.1% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 15 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--hungarian(s); adjective--hungarian ethnic divisions: 96.6% hungarian, 1.6% german, 1.1% slovak, 0.3% southern slav, 0.2% romanian religion: 67.5% roman catholic, 20.0% calvinist, 5.0% lutheran, 7.5% atheist and other language: 98.2% hungarian, 1.8% other literacy: 99% labor force: 4,860,000; 43.2% services, trade, government, and other, 30.9% industry, 18.8% agriculture, 7.1% construction (1988) organized labor: 96.5% of labor force; central council of hungarian trade unions (szot) includes 19 affiliated unions, all controlled by the government; independent unions legal; may be as many as 12 small independent unions in operation government long-form name: republic of hungary type: republic capital: budapest administrative divisions: 19 counties (megyek, singular--megye) and 1 capital city* (fovaros); bacs-kiskun, baranya, bekes, borsod-abauj-zemplen, budapest*, csongrad, fejer, gyor-sopron, hajdu-bihar, heves, komarom, nograd, pest, somogy, szabolcs-szatmar, szolnok, tolna, vas, veszprem, zala independence: 1001, unification by king stephen i constitution: 18 august 1949, effective 20 august 1949, revised 19 april 1972 and 18 october 1989 legal system: based on communist legal theory, with both civil law system (civil code of 1960) and common law elements; supreme court renders decisions of principle that sometimes have the effect of declaring legislative acts unconstitutional; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the liberation, 4 april (1945) executive branch: president, premier, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (orszaggyules) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president-designate arpad goncz (since 2 may 1990); head of government--prime minister jozsef antall (since 23 may 1990) political parties and leaders: democratic forum, jozsef antall, chairman; free democrats, janos kis, chairman; independent smallholders, istvan prepeliczay, president; hungarian socialist party (msp), rezso nyers, chairman; young democrats; christian democrats, sandor keresztes, president; note--the hungarian socialist (communist) workers' party (mszmp) renounced communism and became the hungarian socialist party (msp) in october 1989 suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held on 25 march 1990 (first round, with the second round held 8 april 1990); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(394 total) democratic forum 165, free democrats 92, independent smallholders 43, hungarian socialist party (msp) 33, young democrats 21, christian democrats 21, independent candidates or jointly sponsored candidates 19; an additional 8 seats will be given to representatives of minority nationalities communists: fewer than 100,000 (december 1989) member of: ccc, cema, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, ibec, icac, icao, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, ipu, iso, itc, itu, un, unesco, upu, warsaw pact, wftu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador dr. peter varkonyi; chancery at 3910 shoemaker street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 362-6730; there is a hungarian consulate general in new york; us--ambassador-designate charles thomas; embassy at v. szabadsag ter 12, budapest (mailing address is apo new york 09213); telephone p36o (1) 126-450 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and green economy overview: hungary's postwar communist government spurred the movement from a predominantly agricultural to an industrialized economy. the share of the labor force in agriculture dropped from over 50% in 1950 to under 20% in 1989. agriculture nevertheless remains an important sector, providing sizable export earnings and meeting domestic food needs. industry accounts for about 40% of gnp and 30% of employment. nearly three-fourths of foreign trade is with the ussr and eastern europe. low rates of growth reflect the inability of the soviet-style economy to modernize capital plant and motivate workers. gnp grew about 1% in 1988 and declined by 1% in 1989. since 1985 external debt has more than doubled, to nearly $20 billion. in recent years hungary has moved further than any other east european country in experimenting with decentralized and market-oriented enterprises. these experiments have failed to jump-start the economy because of: limitations on funds for privatization; continued subsidization of insolvent state enterprises; and the leadership's reluctance to implement sweeping market reforms that would cause additional social dislocations in the short term. gnp: $64.6 billion, per capita $6,108; real growth rate 1.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 18% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 0.4% (1989) budget: revenues $14.0 billion; expenditures $14.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $944 million (1988) exports: $19.1 billion (f.o.b. 1988); commodities--capital goods 36%, foods 24%, consumer goods 18%, fuels and minerals 11%, other 11%; partners ussr 48%, eastern europe 25%, developed countries 16%, less developed countries 8% (1987) imports: $18.3 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery and transport 28%, fuels 20%, chemical products 14%, manufactured consumer goods 16%, agriculture 6%, other 16%; partners--ussr 43%, eastern europe 28%, less developed countries 23%, us 3% (1987) external debt: $19.6 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 0.6% (1988) electricity: 7,250,000 kw capacity; 30,300 million kwh produced, 2,870 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, metallurgy, engineering industries, processed foods, textiles, chemicals (especially pharmaceuticals) agriculture: including forestry, accounts for about 15% of gnp and 19% of employment; highly diversified crop-livestock farming; principal crops--wheat, corn, sunflowers, potatoes, sugar beets; livestock--hogs, cattle, poultry, dairy products; self-sufficient in food output aid: donor--$1.8 billion in bilateral aid to non-communist less developed countries (1962-88) currency: forint (plural--forints); 1 forint (ft) = 100 filler exchange rates: forints (ft) per us$1--62.5 (january 1990), 59.2 (1989), 50.413 (1988), 46.971 (1987), 45.832 (1986), 50.119 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 7,770 km total; 7,513 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 222 km narrow gauge (mostly 0.760-meter), 35 km 1.524-meter broad gauge; 1,138 km double track, 2,088 km electrified; all government owned (1987) highways: 130,000 km total; 29,701 km national highway system--26,727 km asphalt and bitumen, 146 km concrete, 55 km stone and road brick, 2,345 km macadam, 428 km unpaved; 58,495 km country roads (66% unpaved), and 41,804 km (est.) other roads (70% unpaved) (1987) inland waterways: 1,622 km (1986) pipelines: crude oil, 1,204 km; refined products, 600 km; natural gas, 3,800 km (1986) ports: budapest and dunaujvaros are river ports on the danube; maritime outlets are rostock (gdr), gdansk (poland), gdynia (poland), szczecin (poland), galati (romania), and braila (romania) merchant marine: 16 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 77,141 grt/103,189 dwt civil air: 22 major transport aircraft airports: 90 total, 90 usable; 20 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 10 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 15 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--13 am, 11 fm, 21 tv; 8 soviet tv relays; 3,500,000 tv sets; 5,500,000 receiver sets; at least 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: hungarian people's army, frontier guard, air and air defense command military manpower: males 15-49, 2,645,016; 2,112,651 fit for military service; 86,481 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 43.7 billion forints, na% of total budget (1989); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: iceland geography total area: 103,000 km2; land area: 100,250 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than kentucky land boundaries: none coastline: 4,988 km maritime claims: continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: rockall continental shelf dispute involving denmark, ireland, and the uk (ireland and the uk have signed a boundary agreement in the rockall area) climate: temperate; moderated by north atlantic current; mild, windy winters; damp, cool summers terrain: mostly plateau interspersed with mountain peaks, icefields; coast deeply indented by bays and fiords natural resources: fish, hydroelectric and geothermal power, diatomite land use: negl% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 23% meadows and pastures; 1% forest and woodland; 76% other environment: subject to earthquakes and volcanic activity note: strategic location between greenland and europe; westernmost european country people population: 257,023 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--icelander(s); adjective--icelandic ethnic divisions: homogeneous mixture of descendants of norwegians and celts religion: 95% evangelical lutheran, 3% other protestant and roman catholic, 2% no affiliation language: icelandic literacy: 100% labor force: 134,429; 55.4% commerce, finance, and services, 14.3% other manufacturing, 5.8% agriculture, 7.9% fish processing, 5.0% fishing (1986) organized labor: 60% of labor force government long-form name: republic of iceland type: republic capital: reykjavik administrative divisions: 23 counties (syslar, singular--sysla) and 14 independent towns* (kaupstadar, singular--kaupstadur); akranes*, akureyri*, arnessysla, austur-bardhastrandarsysla, austur-hunavatnssysla, austur-skaftafellssysla, borgarfjardharsysla, dalasysla, eyjafjardharsysla, gullbringusysla, hafnarfjordhur*, husavik*, isafjordhur*, keflavik*, kjosarsysla, kopavogur*, myrasysla, neskaupstadhur*, nordhur-isafjardharsysla, nordhur-mulasysla, nordhur-thingeyjarsysla, olafsfjordhur*, rangarvallasysla, reykjavik*, saudharkrokur*, seydhisfjordhur*, siglufjordhur*, skagafjardharsysla, snaefellsnes-og hanppadalssysla, strandasysla, sudhur-mulasysla, sudhur-thingeyjarsysla, vestmannaeyjar*, vestur-bardhastrandarsysla, vestur-hunavatnssysla, vestur-isafjardharsysla, vestur-skaftafellssysla independence: 17 june 1944 (from denmark) constitution: 16 june 1944, effective 17 june 1944 legal system: civil law system based on danish law; does not accept compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the establishment of the republic, 17 june (1944) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament (althing) with an upper house (efri deild) and a lower house (nedri deild) judicial branch: supreme court (haestirettur) leaders: chief of state--president vigdis finnbogadottir (since 1 august 1980); head of government--prime minister steingrimur hermannsson (since 28 september 1988) political parties and leaders: independence (conservative), thorsteinn palsson; progressive, steingrimur hermannsson; social democratic, jon baldvin hannibalsson; people's alliance (left socialist), olafur ragnar grimsson; citizens party (conservative nationalist), julius solnes; women's list suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: president--last held on 29 june 1980 (next scheduled for june 1992); results--there were no elections in 1984 and 1988 as president vigdis finnbogadottir was unopposed; parliament--last held on 25 april 1987 (next to be held by 25 april 1991); results--independence 27.2%, progressive 18.9%, social democratic 15.2%, people's alliance 13.4%, citizens party 10.9%, womens list 10.1%, other 4.3%; seats--(63 total) independence 18, progressive 13, social democratic 10, people's alliance 8, citizens party 7, womens list 6, regional equality platform 1 communists: less than 100 (est.), some of whom participate in the people's alliance member of: ccc, council of europe, ec (free trade agreement pending resolution of fishing limits issue), efta, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ices, ida, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, nato, nordic council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador ingvi s. ingvarsson; chancery at 2022 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-6653 through 6655; there is an icelandic consulate general in new york; us--ambassador charles e. cobb; embassy at laufasvegur 21, reykjavik (mailing address is fpo new york 09571-0001); telephone p354o (1) 29100 flag: blue with a red cross outlined in white that extends to the edges of the flag; the vertical part of the cross is shifted to the hoist side in the style of the dannebrog (danish flag) economy overview: iceland's prosperous scandinavian-type economy is basically capitalistic, but with extensive welfare measures, low unemployment, and comparatively even distribution of income. the economy is heavily dependent on the fishing industry, which provides nearly 75% of export earnings. in the absence of other natural resources, iceland's economy is vulnerable to changing world fish prices. national output declined for the second consecutive year in 1989, and two of the largest fish farms filed for bankruptcy. other economic activities include livestock raising and aluminum smelting. a fall in the fish catch is expected for 1990, resulting in a continuation of the recession. gdp: $4.0 billion, per capita $16,200; real growth rate 1.8% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 17.4% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 1.3% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $1.5 billion; expenditures $1.7 billion, including capital expenditures of $na million (1988) exports: $1.4 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fish and fish products, animal products, aluminum, diatomite; partners--ec 58.9% (uk 23.3%, frg 10.3%), us 13.6%, ussr 3.6% imports: $1.6 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment, petroleum, foodstuffs, textiles; partners--ec 58% (frg 16%, denmark 10.4%, uk 9.2%), us 8.5%, ussr 3.9% external debt: $1.8 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 4.7% (1987 est.) electricity: 1,063,000 kw capacity; 5,165 million kwh produced, 20,780 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fish processing, aluminum smelting, ferro-silicon production, hydropower agriculture: accounts for about 25% of gdp (including fishing); fishing is most important economic activity, contributing nearly 75% to export earnings; principal crops--potatoes and turnips; livestock--cattle, sheep; self-sufficient in crops; fish catch of about 1.6 million metric tons in 1987 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-81), $19.1 million currency: krona (plural--kronur); 1 icelandic krona (ikr) = 100 aurar exchange rates: icelandic kronur (ikr) per us$1--60.751 (january 1990), 57.042 (1989), 43.014 (1988), 38.677 (1987), 41.104 (1986), 41.508 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 12,343 km total; 166 km bitumen and concrete; 1,284 km bituminous treated and gravel; 10,893 km earth ports: reykjavik, akureyri, hafnarfjordhur, keflavik, seydhisfjordhur, siglufjordur, vestmannaeyjar; numerous minor ports merchant marine: 18 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 62,867 grt/87,610 dwt; includes 9 cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, 1 container, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 2 bulk civil air: 20 major transport aircraft airports: 99 total, 92 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 14 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate domestic service, wire and radio communication system; 135,000 telephones; stations--10 am, 17 (43 relays) fm, 14 (132 relays) tv; 2 submarine cables; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: police, coast guard military manpower: males 15-49, 68,688; 61,553 fit for military service; no conscription or compulsory military service defense expenditures: none ---------------------------------------------------country: india geography total area: 3,287,590 km2; land area: 2,973,190 km2 comparative area: slightly more than one-third the size of the us land boundaries: 14,103 km total; bangladesh 4,053 km, bhutan 605 km, burma 1,463 km, china 3,380, nepal 1,690 km, pakistan 2,912 km coastline: 7,000 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: boundaries with bangladesh, china, and pakistan; water sharing problems with downstream riparians, bangladesh over the ganges and pakistan over the indus climate: varies from tropical monsoon in south to temperate in north terrain: upland plain (deccan plateau) in south, flat to rolling plain along the ganges, deserts in west, himalayas in north natural resources: coal (fourth-largest reserves in the world), iron ore, manganese, mica, bauxite, titanium ore, chromite, natural gas, diamonds, crude oil, limestone land use: 55% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 23% forest and woodland; 17% other; includes 13% irrigated environment: droughts, flash floods, severe thunderstorms common; deforestation; soil erosion; overgrazing; air and water pollution; desertification note: dominates south asian subcontinent; near important indian ocean trade routes people population: 849,746,001 (july 1990), growth rate 2.0% (1990) birth rate: 30 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 89 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 57 years male, 59 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--indian(s); adjective--indian ethnic divisions: 72% indo-aryan, 25% dravidian, 3% mongoloid and other religion: 82.6% hindu, 11.4% muslim, 2.4% christian, 2.0% sikh, 0.7% buddhist, 0.5% jains, 0.4% other language: hindi, english, and 14 other official languages--bengali, telgu, marathi, tamil, urdu, gujarati, malayalam, kannada, oriya, punjabi, assamese, kashmiri, sindhi, and sanskrit; 24 languages spoken by a million or more persons each; numerous other languages and dialects, for the most part mutually unintelligible; hindi is the national language and primary tongue of 30% of the people; english enjoys associate status but is the most important language for national, political, and commercial communication; hindustani, a popular variant of hindi/urdu, is spoken widely throughout northern india literacy: 36% labor force: 284,400,000; 67% agriculture (fy85) organized labor: less than 5% of the labor force government long-form name: republic of india type: federal republic capital: new delhi administrative divisions: 24 states and 7 union territories*; andaman and nicobar islands*, andhra pradesh, arunachal pradesh, assam, bihar, chandigarh*, dadra and nagar haveli*, delhi*, goa and daman and diu*, gujarat, haryana, himachal pradesh, jammu and kashmir, karnataka, kerala, lakshadweep*, madhya pradesh, maharashtra, manipur, meghalaya, mizoram, nagaland, orissa, pondicherry*, punjab, rajasthan, sikkim, tamil nadu, tripura, uttar pradesh, west bengal; note--goa may have become a state with daman and diu remaining a union territory independence: 15 august 1947 (from uk) constitution: 26 january 1950 legal system: based on english common law; limited judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: anniversary of the proclamation of the republic, 26 january (1950) executive branch: president, vice president, prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: bicameral parliament (sansad) consists of an upper house or government assembly (rajya sabha) and a lower house or people's assembly (lok sabha) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president ramaswamy iyer venkataraman (since 25 july 1987); vice president dr. shankar dayal sharma (since 3 september 1987); head of government--prime minister vishwanath pratap singh (since 2 december 1989) political parties and leaders: janata dal party, prime minister v. p. singh; congress (i) party, rajiv gandhi; bharatiya janata party, l. k. advani; communist party of india (cpi), c. rajeswara rao; communist party of india/marxist (cpi/m), e. m. s. namboodiripad; communist party of india/marxist-leninist (cpi/ml), satyanarayan singh; all-india anna dravida munnetra kazagham (aiadmk), a regional party in tamil nadu, jayalalitha; dravida munnetra kazagham, m. karunanidhi; akali dal factions representing sikh religious community in the punjab; telugu desam, a regional party in andhra pradesh, n. t. rama rao; national conference (nc), a regional party in jammu and kashmir, farooq abdullah; asom gana parishad, a regional party in assam, prafulla mahanta suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: people's assembly--last held 22, 24, 26 november 1989 (next to be held by november 1994, subject to postponement); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(544 total), 525 elected--congress (i) party 193, janata dal party 141, bharatiya janata party 86, communist party of india (marxist) 32, independents 18, communist party of india 12, aiadmk 11, akali dal 6, shiv sena 4, rsp 4, forward bloc 3, bsp 3, telugu desam 2, congress (s) party 1, others 9 communists: 466,000 members claimed by cpi, 361,000 members claimed by cpi/m; communist extremist groups, about 15,000 members other political or pressure groups: various separatist groups seeking greater communal autonomy; numerous senas or militant/chauvinistic organizations, including shiv sena (in bombay), anand marg, and rashtriya swayamsevak sangh member of: adb, aioec, anrpc, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, saarc, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador-designate abid hussein; chancery at 2107 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-7000; there are indian consulates general in chicago, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador william clark; embassy at shanti path, chanakyapuri 110021, new delhi; telephone p91o (11) 600651; there are us consulates general in bombay, calcutta, and madras flag: three equal horizontal bands of orange (top), white, and green with a blue chakra (24-spoked wheel) centered in the white band; similar to the flag of niger which has a small orange disk centered in the white band economy overview: india's malthusian economy is a mixture of traditional village farming and handicrafts, modern agriculture, old and new branches of industry, and a multitude of support services. it presents both the entrepreneurial skills and drives of the capitalist system and widespread government intervention of the socialist mold. growth of 4% to 5% annually in the 1980s has softened the impact of population growth on unemployment, social tranquility, and the environment. agricultural output has continued to expand, reflecting the greater use of modern farming techniques and improved seed that have helped to make india self-sufficient in food grains and a net agricultural exporter. however, tens of millions of villagers, particularly in the south, have not benefited from the green revolution and live in abject poverty. industry has benefited from a liberalization of controls. the growth rate of the service sector has also been strong. gnp: $333 billion, per capita $400; real growth rate 5.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.5% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 20% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $48 billion; expenditures $53 billion, including capital expenditures of $13.6 billion (1989) exports: $17.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--tea, coffee, iron ore, fish products, manufactures; partners--ec 25%, ussr and eastern europe 17%, us 19%, japan 10% imports: $24.7 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--petroleum, edible oils, textiles, clothing, capital goods; partners--ec 33%, middle east 19%, japan 10%, us 9%, ussr and eastern europe 8% external debt: $48.7 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 8.8% (1989) electricity: 59,000,000 kw capacity; 215,000 million kwh produced, 260 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, food processing, steel, machinery, transportation equipment, cement, jute manufactures, mining, petroleum, power, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, electronics agriculture: accounts for about 33% of gnp and employs 67% of labor force; self-sufficient in food grains; principal crops--rice, wheat, oilseeds, cotton, jute, tea, sugarcane, potatoes; livestock--cattle, buffaloes, sheep, goats and poultry; fish catch of about 3 million metric tons ranks india in the world's top 10 fishing nations illicit drugs: licit producer of opium poppy for the pharmaceutical trade, but some opium is diverted to international drug markets; major transit country for illicit narcotics produced in neighboring countries aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $4.2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1980-87), $18.6 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $315 million; ussr (1970-88), $10.0 billion; eastern europe (1970-88), $105 million currency: indian rupee (plural--rupees); 1 indian rupee (re) = 100 paise exchange rates: indian rupees (rs) per us$1--16.965 (january 1990), 16.226 (1989), 13.917 (1988), 12.962 (1987), 12.611 (1986), 12.369 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 61,850 km total (1986); 33,553 km 1.676-meter broad gauge, 24,051 km 1.000-meter gauge, 4,246 km narrow gauge (0.762 meter and 0.610 meter); 12,617 km is double track; 6,500 km is electrified highways: 1,633,300 km total (1986); 515,300 km secondary and 1,118,000 km gravel, crushed stone, or earth inland waterways: 16,180 km; 3,631 km navigable by large vessels pipelines: crude oil, 3,497 km; refined products, 1,703 km; natural gas, 902 km (1989) ports: bombay, calcutta, cochin, kandla, madras, new mangalore, port blair (andaman islands) merchant marine: 296 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 5,855,842 grt/9,790,260 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 8 passenger-cargo, 95 cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 8 container, 53 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 10 chemical tanker, 9 combination ore/oil,109 bulk, 2 combination bulk civil air: 93 major transport aircraft airports: 345 total, 292 usable; 202 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 57 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 91 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: poor domestic telephone service, international radio communications adequate; 3,200,000 telephones; stations--170 am, no fm, 14 tv (government controlled); domestic satellite system for communications and tv; 3 indian ocean intelsat earth stations; submarine cables to sri lanka, malaysia, and pakistan defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, border security forces, coast guard, paramilitary forces military manpower: males 15-49, 227,436,282; 134,169,114 fit for military service; about 9,403,063 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 2.6% of gnp, or $8.7 billion (fy90 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: indian ocean geography total area: 73,600,000 km2; arabian sea, bass strait, bay of bengal, java sea, persian gulf, red sea, strait of malacca, timor sea, and other tributary water bodies comparative area: slightly less than eight times the size of the us; third-largest ocean (after the pacific ocean and atlantic ocean, but larger than the arctic ocean) coastline: 66,526 km climate: northeast monsoon (december to april), southwest monsoon (june to october); tropical cyclones occur during may/june and october/november in the north indian ocean and january/february in the south indian ocean terrain: surface dominated by counterclockwise gyre (broad, circular system of currents) in the south indian ocean; unique reversal of surface currents in the north indian ocean--low pressure over southwest asia from hot, rising, summer air results in the southwest monsoon and southwest-to-northeast winds and currents, while high pressure over northern asia from cold, falling, winter air results in the northeast monsoon and northeast-to-southwest winds and currents; ocean floor is dominated by the mid-indian ocean ridge and subdivided by the southeast indian ocean ridge, southwest indian ocean ridge, and ninety east ridge; maximum depth is 7,258 meters in the java trench natural resources: oil and gas fields, fish, shrimp, sand and gravel aggregates, placer deposits, polymetallic nodules environment: endangered marine species include the dugong, seals, turtles, and whales; oil pollution in the arabian sea, persian gulf, and red sea note: major choke points include bab el mandeb, strait of hormuz, strait of malacca, southern access to the suez canal, and the lombok strait; ships subject to superstructure icing in extreme south near antarctica from may to october economy overview: the indian ocean provides a major transportation highway for the movement of petroleum products from the middle east to europe and north and south american countries. fish from the ocean are of growing economic importance to many of the bordering countries as a source of both food and exports. fishing fleets from the ussr, japan, korea, and taiwan also exploit the indian ocean for mostly shrimp and tuna. large reserves of hydrocarbons are being tapped in the offshore areas of saudi arabia, iran, india, and western australia. an estimated 40% of the world's offshore oil production comes from the indian ocean. beach sands rich in heavy minerals and offshore placer deposits are actively exploited by bordering countries, particularly india, south africa, indonesia, sri lanka, and thailand. industries: based on exploitation of natural resources, particularly marine life, minerals, oil and gas production, fishing, sand and gravel aggregates, placer deposits communications ports: bombay (india), calcutta (india), madras (india), colombo (sri lanka), durban (south africa), fremantle (australia), jakarta (indonesia), melbourne (australia), richard's bay (south africa) telecommunications: no submarine cables ---------------------------------------------------country: indonesia geography total area: 1,919,440 km2; land area: 1,826,440 km2 comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of texas land boundaries: 2,602 km total; malaysia 1,782 km, papua new guinea 820 km coastline: 54,716 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); continental shelf: to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: east timor question with portugal climate: tropical; hot, humid; more moderate in highlands terrain: mostly coastal lowlands; larger islands have interior mountains natural resources: crude oil, tin, natural gas, nickel, timber, bauxite, copper, fertile soils, coal, gold, silver land use: 8% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 67% forest and woodland; 15% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: archipelago of 13,500 islands (6,000 inhabited); occasional floods, severe droughts, and tsunamis; deforestation note: straddles equator; strategic location astride or along major sea lanes from indian ocean to pacific ocean people population: 190,136,221 (july 1990), growth rate 1.8% (1990) birth rate: 27 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 75 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 58 years male, 63 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--indonesian(s); adjective--indonesian ethnic divisions: majority of malay stock comprising 45.0% javanese, 14.0% sundanese, 7.5% madurese, 7.5% coastal malays, 26.0% other religion: 88% muslim, 6% protestant, 3% roman catholic, 2% hindu, 1% other language: bahasa indonesia (modified form of malay; official); english and dutch leading foreign languages; local dialects, the most widely spoken of which is javanese literacy: 62% labor force: 67,000,000; 55% agriculture, 10% manufacturing, 4% construction, 3% transport and communications (1985 est.) organized labor: 3,000,000 members (claimed); about 5% of labor force government long-form name: republic of indonesia type: republic capital: jakarta administrative divisions: 24 provinces (propinsi-propinsi, singular--propinsi), 2 special regions* (daerah-daerah istimewa, singular--daerah istimewa), and 1 special capital city district** (daerah khusus ibukota); aceh*, bali, bengkulu, irian jaya, jakarta raya**, jambi, jawa barat, jawa tengah, jawa timur, kalimantan barat, kalimantan selatan, kalimantan tengah, kalimantan timur, lampung, maluku, nusa tenggara barat, nusa tenggara timur, riau, sulawesi selatan, sulawesi tengah, sulawesi tenggara, sulawesi utara, sumatera barat, sumatera selatan, sumatera utara, timor timur, yogyakarta* independence: 17 august 1945 (from netherlands; formerly netherlands or dutch east indies) constitution: august 1945, abrogated by federal constitution of 1949 and provisional constitution of 1950, restored 5 july 1959 legal system: based on roman-dutch law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts and by new criminal procedures code; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 17 august (1945) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives (dewan perwakilan rakyat or dpr); note--the people's consultative assembly (majelis permusyawaratan rakyat or mpr) includes the dpr plus 500 indirectly elected members who meet every five years to elect the president and vice president and, theoretically, to determine national policy judicial branch: supreme court (mahkamah agung) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president gen. (ret.) soeharto (since 27 march 1968); vice president lt. gen. (ret.) sudharmono (since 11 march 1983) political parties and leaders: golkar (quasi-official party based on functional groups), lt. gen. (ret.) wahono, general chairman; indonesia democracy party (pdi--federation of former nationalist and christian parties), soeryadi, chairman; development unity party (ppp, federation of former islamic parties), ismail hasan metareum, chairman suffrage: universal at age 17 and married persons regardless of age elections: house of representatives--last held on 23 april 1987 (next to be held 23 april 1992); results--golkar 73%, udp 16%, pdi 11%; seats--(500 total--400 elected, 100 appointed) golkar 299, udp 61, pdi 40 communists: communist party (pki) was officially banned in march 1966; current strength about 1,000-3,000, with less than 10% engaged in organized activity; pre-october 1965 hardcore membership about 1.5 million member of: adb, anrpc, asean, association of tin producing countries, ccc, cipec, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, iso, itc, itu, nam, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador abdul rachman ramly; chancery at 2020 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 775-5200; there are indonesian consulates general in houston, new york, and los angeles, and consulates in chicago and san francisco; us--ambassador john c. monjo; embassy at medan merdeka selatan 5, jakarta (mailing address is apo san francisco 96356); telephone p62o (21) 360-360; there are us consulates in medan and surabaya flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and white; similar to the flag of monaco which is shorter; also similar to the flag of poland which is white (top) and red economy overview: indonesia is a mixed economy with many socialist institutions and central planning but with a recent emphasis on deregulation and private enterprise. indonesia has extensive natural wealth but, with a large and rapidly increasing population, it remains a poor country. gnp growth in 1985-89 averaged about 4%, somewhat short of the 5% rate needed to absorb the 2.3 million workers annually entering the labor force. agriculture, including forestry and fishing, is the most important sector, accounting for 21% of gdp and over 50% of the labor force. the staple crop is rice. once the world's largest rice importer, indonesia is now nearly self-sufficient. plantation crops--rubber and palm oil--are being encouraged for both export and job generation. the diverse natural resources include crude oil, natural gas, timber, metals, and coal. of these, the oil sector dominates the external economy, generating more than 20% of the government's revenues and 40% of export earnings in 1989. japan is indonesia's most important customer and supplier of aid. gnp: $80 billion, per capita $430; real growth rate 5.7% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 3.1% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $20.9 billion; expenditures $20.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $7.5 billion (fy89) exports: $21.0 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--petroleum and liquefied natural gas 40%, timber 15%, textiles 7%, rubber 5%, coffee 3%; partners--japan 42%, us 16%, singapore 9%, ec 11% (1988) imports: $13.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--machinery 39%, chemical products 19%, manufactured goods 16%; partners--japan 26%, ec 19%, us 13%, singapore 7% (1988) external debt: $55.0 billion, medium and long-term (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.8% (1988 est.) electricity: 11,600,000 kw capacity; 38,000 million kwh produced, 200 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, textiles, mining, cement, chemical fertilizer production, timber, food, rubber agriculture: subsistence food production; small-holder and plantation production for export; rice, cassava, peanuts, rubber, cocoa, coffee, copra, other tropical products illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the international drug trade, but not a major player; government actively eradicating plantings and prosecuting traffickers aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $4.2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $19.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $213 million; communist countries (1970-88), $175 million currency: indonesian rupiah (plural--rupiahs); 1 indonesian rupiah (rp) = 100 sen (sen no longer used) exchange rates: indonesian rupiahs (rp) per us$1--1,804.9 (january 1990), 1,770.1 (1989), 1,685.7 (1988), 1,643.8 (1987), 1,282.6 (1986), 1,110.6 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 6,964 km total; 6,389 km 1.067-meter gauge, 497 km 0.750-meter gauge, 78 km 0.600-meter gauge; 211 km double track; 101 km electrified; all government owned highways: 119,500 km total; 11,812 km state, 34,180 km provincial, and 73,508 km district roads inland waterways: 21,579 km total; sumatra 5,471 km, java and madura 820 km, kalimantan 10,460 km, celebes 241 km, irian jaya 4,587 km pipelines: crude oil, 2,505 km; refined products, 456 km; natural gas, 1,703 km (1989) ports: cilacap, cirebon, jakarta, kupang, palembang, ujungpandang, semarang, surabaya merchant marine: 313 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,480,912 grt/2,245,233 dwt; includes 5 short-sea passenger, 13 passenger-cargo, 173 cargo, 6 container, 3 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 vehicle carrier, 77 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 6 specialized tanker, 1 livestock carrier, 24 bulk civil air: about 216 commercial transport aircraft airports: 468 total, 435 usable; 106 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 12 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 62 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: interisland microwave system and hf police net; domestic service fair, international service good; radiobroadcast coverage good; 763,000 telephones (1986); stations--618 am, 38 fm, 9 tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat earth station and 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station; and 1 domestic satellite communications system defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, national police military manpower: males 15-49, 49,283,496; 29,137,291 fit for military service; 2,098,169 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.1% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: iran geography total area: 1,648,000 km2; land area: 1,636,000 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than alaska land boundaries: 5,492 km total; afghanistan 936 km, iraq 1,458 km, pakistan 909 km, turkey 499 km, ussr 1,690 km coastline: 3,180 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; exclusive fishing zone: 50 nm in the sea of oman, median-line boundaries in the persian gulf; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: iran began formal un peace negotiations with iraq in august 1988 to end the war that began on 22 september 1980--troop withdrawal, freedom of navigation, sovereignty over the shatt al arab waterway and prisoner-of-war exchange are the major issues for negotiation; kurdish question among iran, iraq, syria, turkey, and the ussr; occupies three islands in the persian gulf claimed by uae (jazireh-ye abu musa or abu musa, jazireh-ye tonb-e bozorg or greater tunb, and jazireh-ye tonb-e kuchek or lesser tunb); periodic disputes with afghanistan over helmand water rights; boluch question with afghanistan and pakistan climate: mostly arid or semiarid, subtropical along caspian coast terrain: rugged, mountainous rim; high, central basin with deserts, mountains; small, discontinuous plains along both coasts natural resources: petroleum, natural gas, coal, chromium, copper, iron ore, lead, manganese, zinc, sulfur land use: 8% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 27% meadows and pastures; 11% forest and woodland; 54% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: deforestation; overgrazing; desertification people population: 55,647,001 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 45 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 91 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 63 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--iranian(s); adjective--iranian ethnic divisions: 51% persian, 25% azerbaijani, 9% kurd, 8% gilaki and mazandarani, 2% lur, 1% baloch, 1% arab, 3% other religion: 95% shia muslim, 4% sunni muslim, 2% zoroastrian, jewish, christian, and bahai language: 58% persian and persian dialects, 26% turkic and turkic dialects, 9% kurdish, 2% luri, 1% baloch, 1% arabic, 1% turkish, 2% other literacy: 48% (est.) labor force: 15,400,000; 33% agriculture, 21% manufacturing; shortage of skilled labor (1988 est.) organized labor: none government long-form name: islamic republic of iran type: theocratic republic capital: tehran administrative divisions: 24 provinces (ostanha, singular--ostan); azarbayjan-e bakhtari, azarbayjan-e khavari, bakhtaran, bushehr, chahar mahall va bakhtiari, esfahan, fars, gilan, hamadan, hormozgan, ilam, kerman, khorasan, khuzestan, kohkiluyeh va buyer ahmadi, kordestan, lorestan, markazi, mazandaran, semnan, sistan va baluchestan, tehran, yazd, zanjan independence: 1 april 1979, islamic republic of iran proclaimed constitution: 2-3 december 1979; revised 1989 to expand powers of the presidency legal system: the new constitution codifies islamic principles of government national holiday: islamic republic day, 1 april (1979) executive branch: cleric (faqih), president, council of cabinet ministers legislative branch: unicameral islamic consultative assembly (majlis-e-shura-e-islami) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: cleric and functional chief of state--leader of the islamic revolution ayatollah ali hoseini-khamenei (since 3 june 1989); head of government--president ali akbar rafsanjani (since 3 august 1989); political parties and leaders: there are at least seven licensed parties; the two most important are--militant clerics association, mehdi mahdavi-karubi and mohammad asqar musavi-khoinima; fedaiyin islam organization, sadeq khalkhali suffrage: universal at age 15 elections: president--last held na july 1989 (next to be held april 1993); results--ali akbar rafsanjani was elected with only token opposition; islamic consultative assembly--last held 8 april and 13 may 1988 (next to be held april 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(270 seats total) number of seats by party na communists: 1,000 to 2,000 est. hardcore; 15,000 to 20,000 est. sympathizers; crackdown in 1983 crippled the party; trials of captured leaders began in late 1983 and remain incomplete other political or pressure groups: groups that generally support the islamic republic include hizballah, hojjatiyeh society, mojahedin of the islamic revolution, muslim students following the line of the imam, and tehran militant clergy association; mojahedin khalq organization (mko), people's fedayeen, and kurdish democratic party are armed political groups that have been almost completely repressed by the government member of: ccc, escap, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, ida, idb, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, ipu, oic, opec, un, unesco, unicef, unido, who diplomatic representation: none; protecting power in the us is algeria--iranian interests section, 2209 wisconsin avenue nw, washington dc 20007; telephone (202) 965-4990; us--protecting power in iran is switzerland flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red; the national emblem (a stylized representation of the word allah) in red is centered in the white band; allah akbar (god is great) in white arabic script is repeated 11 times along the bottom edge of the green band and 11 times along the top edge of the red band economy overview: since the 1979 revolution, the banks, petroleum industry, transportation, utilities, and mining have been nationalized, but the new five-year plan--the first since the revolution--passed in january 1990, calls for the transfer of many government-controlled enterprises to the private sector. war-related disruptions, massive corruption, mismanagement, demographic pressures, and ideological rigidities have kept economic growth at depressed levels. oil accounts for 90% of export revenues. a combination of war damage and low oil prices brought a 2% drop in gnp in 1988. gnp probably rose slightly in 1989, considerably short of the 3.4% population growth rate in 1989. heating oil and gasoline are rationed. agriculture has suffered from the war, land reform, and shortages of equipment and materials. the five-year plan seeks to reinvigorate the economy by increasing the role of the private sector, boosting nonoil income, and securing foreign loans. the plan is overly ambitious but probably will generate some short-term relief. gnp: $97.6 billion, per capita $1,800; real growth rate 0-1% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 50-80% (1989) unemployment rate: 30% (1989) budget: revenues $na; expenditures $55.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $11.5 billion (fy88 est.) exports: $12.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum 90%, carpets, fruits, nuts, hides; partners--japan, turkey, italy, netherlands, spain, france, frg imports: $12.0 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery, military supplies, metal works, foodstuffs, pharmaceuticals, technical services, refined oil products; partners--frg, japan, turkey, uk, italy external debt: $4-5 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 14,579,000 kw capacity; 40,000 million kwh produced, 740 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, petrochemicals, textiles, cement and other building materials, food processing (particularly sugar refining and vegetable oil production), metal fabricating (steel and copper) agriculture: principal products--rice, other grains, sugar beets, fruits, nuts, cotton, dairy products, wool, caviar; not self-sufficient in food illicit drugs: illicit producer of opium poppy for the domestic and international drug trade aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-80), $1.0 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.5 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $976 million; note--aid fell sharply following the 1979 revolution currency: iranian rial (plural--rials); 1 iranian rial (ir) = 100 dinars; note--domestic figures are generally referred to in terms of the toman (plural--tomans), which equals 10 rials exchange rates: iranian rials (ir) per us$1--70.019 (january 1990), 72.015 (1989), 68.683 (1988), 71.460 (1987), 78.760 (1986), 91.052 (1985) fiscal year: 21 march-20 march communications railroads: 4,601 km total; 4,509 km 1.432-meter gauge, 92 km 1.676-meter gauge; 730 km under construction from bafq to bandar abbas highways: 140,072 km total; 46,866 km gravel and crushed stone; 49,440 km improved earth; 42,566 km bituminous and bituminous-treated surfaces; 1,200 km (est.) of rural road network inland waterways: 904 km; the shatt al arab is usually navigable by maritime traffic for about 130 km, but closed since september 1980 because of iran-iraq war pipelines: crude oil, 5,900 km; refined products, 3,900 km; natural gas, 3,300 km ports: abadan (largely destroyed in fighting during 1980-88 war), bandar beheshti, bandar-e abbas, bandar-e bushehr, bandar-e khomeyni, bandar-e shahid rajai, khorramshahr (largely destroyed in fighting during 1980-88 war) merchant marine: 133 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 4,631,836 grt/8,662,454 dwt; includes 36 cargo, 6 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 33 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 4 chemical tanker, 3 refrigerated cargo, 49 bulk, 2 combination bulk civil air: 42 major transport aircraft airports: 201 total, 175 usable; 82 with permanent-surface runways; 17 with runways over 3,659 m; 17 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 68 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: radio relay extends throughout country; system centered in tehran; 2,143,000 telephones; stations--62 am, 30 fm, 250 tv; satellite earth stations--2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat; hf and microwave to turkey, pakistan, syria, kuwait, and ussr defense forces branches: islamic republic of iran ground forces, navy, air force, and revolutionary guard corps (includes basij militia and own ground, air, and naval forces), gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 12,302,967; 7,332,614 fit for military service; 569,647 reach military age (21) annually defense expenditures: 8% of gnp, or $7.8 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: iraq geography total area: 434,920 km2; land area: 433,970 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of idaho land boundaries: 3,454 km total; iran 1,458 km, iraq saudi arabia neutral zone 191 km, jordan 134 km, kuwait 240 km, saudi arabia 495 km, syria 605 km, turkey 331 km coastline: 58 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: iraq began formal un peace negotiations with iran in august 1988 to end the war that began on 22 september 1980--sovereignty over the shatt al arab waterway, troop withdrawal, freedom of navigation, and prisoner of war exchange are the major issues for negotiation; kurdish question among iran, iraq, syria, turkey, and the ussr; shares neutral zone with saudi arabia--in july 1975, iraq and saudi arabia signed an agreement to divide the zone between them, but the agreement must be ratified before it becomes effective; disputes kuwaiti ownership of warbah and bubiyan islands; periodic disputes with upstream riparian syria over euphrates water rights; potential dispute over water development plans by turkey for the tigris and euphrates rivers climate: desert; mild to cool winters with dry, hot, cloudless summers terrain: mostly broad plains; reedy marshes in southeast; mountains along borders with iran and turkey natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, phosphates, sulfur land use: 12% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 9% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 75% other; includes 4% irrigated environment: development of tigris-euphrates river systems contingent upon agreements with upstream riparians (syria, turkey); air and water pollution; soil degradation (salinization) and erosion; desertification people population: 18,781,770 (july 1990), growth rate 3.9% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 67 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 68 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--iraqi(s); adjective--iraqi ethnic divisions: 75-80% arab, 15-20% kurdish, 5% turkoman, assyrian or other religion: 97% muslim (60-65% shia, 32-37% sunni), 3% christian or other language: arabic (official), kurdish (official in kurdish regions), assyrian, armenian literacy: 55-65% (1989 est.) labor force: 3,400,000 (1984); 39% services, 33% agriculture, 28% industry, severe labor shortage (1987); expatriate labor force about 1,000,000 (1989) organized labor: less than 10% of the labor force government long-form name: republic of iraq type: republic capital: baghdad administrative divisions: 18 provinces (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); al anbar, al basrah, al muthanna, al qadisiyah, an najaf, as sulaymaniyah, at tamim, babil, baghdad, dahuk, dhi qar, diyala, arbil, karbala, maysan, ninawa, salah ad din, wasit independence: 3 october 1932 (from league of nations mandate under british administration) constitution: 22 september 1968, effective 16 july 1970 (interim constitution); new constitution now in final stages of drafting legal system: based on islamic law in special religious courts, civil law system elsewhere; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the revolution, 17 july (1968) executive branch: president, vice president, chairman of the revolutionary command council, vice chairman of the revolutionary command council, prime minister, first deputy prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (majlis al umma) judicial branch: court of cassation leaders: chief of state and head of government--president saddam husayn (since 16 july 1979); vice president taha muhyi al-din maruf (since 21 april 1974) political parties: national progressive front is a coalition of the arab bath socialist party, kurdistan democratic party, and kurdistan revolutionary party suffrage: universal adult at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held on 1 april 1989 (next to be held na); results--shia arabs 30%, kurds 15%, sunni arabs 53%, christians 2% est.; seats--(250 total) number of seats by party na communists: about 1,500 hardcore members other political or pressure groups: political parties and activity severely restricted; possibly some opposition to regime from disaffected members of the regime, army officers, and religious and ethnic dissidents member of: acc, arab league, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oapec, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador dr. mohamed sadiq al-mashat; chancery at 1801 p street nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 483-7500; us--ambassador april c. glaspie; embassy in masbah quarter (opposite the foreign ministry club), baghdad (mailing address is p. o. box 2447 alwiyah, baghdad); telephone p964o (1) 719-6138 or 719-6139, 718-1840, 719-3791 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with three green five-pointed stars in a horizontal line centered in the white band; similar to the flags of the yar which has one star and syria which has two stars (in a horizontal line centered in the white band)--all green and five-pointed; also similar to the flag of egypt which has a symbolic eagle centered in the white band economy overview: the bathist regime engages in extensive central planning and management of industrial production and foreign trade while leaving some small-scale industry and services and most agriculture to private enterprise. the economy is dominated by the oil sector, which provides about 95% of foreign exchange earnings. since the early 1980s financial problems, caused by war expenditures and damage to oil export facilities by iran, have led the government to implement austerity measures and to reschedule foreign debt payments. oil exports have gradually increased with the construction of new pipelines. agricultural development remains hampered by labor shortages, salinization, and dislocations caused by previous land reform and collectivization programs. the industrial sector, although accorded high priority by the government, is under financial constraints. new investment funds are generally allocated only to projects that result in import substitution or foreign exchange earnings. gnp: $35 billion, per capita $1,940; real growth rate 5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 30-40% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: less than 5% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $na billion; expenditures $35 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1989) exports: $12.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--crude oil and refined products, machinery, chemicals, dates; partners--us, brazil, ussr, italy, turkey, france, japan, yugoslavia (1988) imports: $10.2 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--manufactures, food; partners--turkey, us, frg, uk, france, japan, romania, yugoslavia, brazil (1988) external debt: $40 billion (1988 est.), excluding debt to persian gulf arab states industrial production: na% electricity: 9,902,000 kw capacity; 20,000 million kwh produced, 1,110 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, chemicals, textiles, construction materials, food processing agriculture: accounts for less than 10% of gnp but 33% of labor force; principal products--wheat, barley, rice, vegetables, dates, other fruit, cotton, wool; livestock--cattle, sheep; not self-sufficient in food output aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-80), $3 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $607 million; opec bilateral aid (1980-89), $37.2 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $3.9 billion currency: iraqi dinar (plural--dinars); 1 iraqi dinar (id) = 1,000 fils exchange rates: iraqi dinars (id) per us$1--0.3109 (fixed rate since 1982) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 2,962 km total; 2,457 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 505 km 1.000-meter gauge highways: 25,479 km total; 8,290 km paved, 5,534 km improved earth, 11,655 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 1,015 km; shatt al arab usually navigable by maritime traffic for about 130 km, but closed since september 1980 because of iran-iraq war; tigris and euphrates navigable by shallow-draft steamers (of little importance); shatt al basrah canal navigable in sections by shallow-draft vessels ports: umm qasr, khawr az zubayr merchant marine: 44 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 947,721 grt/1,703,988 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 1 passenger-cargo, 18 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo, 3 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 19 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker pipelines: crude oil, 4,350 km; 725 km refined products; 1,360 km natural gas civil air: 64 major transport aircraft (including 30 il-76s used by the iraq air force) airports: 111 total, 101 usable; 72 with permanent-surface runways; 8 with runways over 3,659 m; 53 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 14 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good network consists of coaxial cables, radio relay links, and radiocommunication stations; 632,000 telephones; stations--9 am, 1 fm, 81 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 gorizont atlantic ocean in the intersputnik system; coaxial cable and radio relay to kuwait, jordan, syria, and turkey defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, border guard force, mobile police force, republican guard military manpower: males 15-49, 4,097,190; 2,284,417 fit for military service; 219,701 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: iraq saudi arabia neutral zone geography total area: 3,520 km2; land area: 3,520 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than rhode island land boundaries: 389 km total; 191 km iraq, 198 km saudi arabia coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: harsh, dry desert terrain: sandy desert natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other (sandy desert) environment: harsh, inhospitable note: landlocked; located west of quadripoint with iraq, kuwait, and saudi arabia people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: joint administration by iraq and saudi arabia; in july 1975, iraq and saudi arabia signed an agreement to divide the zone between them, but the agreement must be ratified, however, before it becomes effective. economy overview: no economic activity communications highways: none; some secondary roads defense forces note: defense is the joint responsibility of iraq and saudi arabia ---------------------------------------------------country: ireland geography total area: 70,280 km2; land area: 68,890 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than west virginia land boundary: 360 km with uk coastline: 1,448 km maritime claims: continental shelf: no precise definition; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary with the uk; northern ireland question with the uk; rockall continental shelf dispute involving denmark, iceland, and the uk (ireland and the uk have signed a boundary agreement in the rockall area) climate: temperate maritime; modified by north atlantic current; mild winters, cool summers; consistently humid; overcast about half the time terrain: mostly level to rolling interior plain surrounded by rugged hills and low mountains; sea cliffs on west coast natural resources: zinc, lead, natural gas, crude oil, barite, copper, gypsum, limestone, dolomite, peat, silver land use: 14% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 71% meadows and pastures; 5% forest and woodland; 10% other environment: deforestation people population: 3,500,212 (july 1990), growth rate -0.4% (1990) birth rate: 15 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 10 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--irishman(men), irish (collective pl.); adjective--irish ethnic divisions: celtic, with english minority religion: 94% roman catholic, 4% anglican, 2% other language: irish (gaelic) and english; english is the language generally used, with gaelic spoken in a few areas, mostly along the western seaboard literacy: 99% labor force: 1,310,000; 57.3% services, 19.1% manufacturing and construction, 14.8% agriculture, forestry, and fishing (1988) organized labor: 36% of labor force government long-form name: republic of ireland type: republic capital: dublin administrative divisions: 26 counties; carlow, cavan, clare, cork, donegal, dublin, galway, kerry, kildare, kilkenny, laois, leitrim, limerick, longford, louth, mayo, meath, monaghan, offaly, roscommon, sligo, tipperary, waterford, westmeath, wexford, wicklow independence: 6 december 1921 (from uk) constitution: 29 december 1937; adopted 1937 legal system: based on english common law, substantially modified by indigenous concepts; judicial review of legislative acts in supreme court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: st. patrick's day, 17 march executive branch: president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament (oireachtas) consists of an upper house or senate (seanad eireann) and a lower house or house of representatives (dail eireann) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president dr. patrick j. hillery (since 3 december 1976); head of government--prime minister charles j. haughey (since 12 july 1989, the fourth time elected as prime minister) political parties and leaders: fianna fail, charles haughey; labor party, richard spring; fine gael, alan dukes; communist party of ireland, michael o'riordan; workers' party, proinsias derossa; sinn fein, gerry adams; progressive democrats, desmond o'malley; note--prime minister haughey heads a coalition consisting of the fianna fail and the progressive democrats suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 21 october 1983 (next to be held october 1990); results--dr. patrick hillery reelected; senate--last held on 17 february 1987 (next to be held february 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(60 total, 49 elected) fianna fail 30, fine gael 16, labor 3, independents 11; house of representatives--last held on 12 july 1989 (next to be held na june 1994); results--fianna fail 44.0%, fine gael 29.4%, labor party 9.3%, progressive democrats 5.4%, workers' party 4.9%, sinn fein 1.1%, independents 5.9%; seats--(166 total) fianna fail 77, fine gael 55, labor party 15, workers' party 7, progressive democrats 6, independents 6 communists: under 500 member of: ccc, council of europe, ec, ems, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ices, ida, iea, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador padraic n. mackernan; chancery at 2234 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 462-3939; there are irish consulates general in boston, chicago, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador richard a. moore; embassy at 42 elgin road, ballsbridge, dublin; telephone p353o (1) 688777 flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and orange; similar to the flag of the ivory coast which is shorter and has the colors reversed--orange (hoist side), white, and green; also similar to the flag of italy which is shorter and has colors of green (hoist side), white, and red economy overview: the economy is small, open, and trade dependent. agriculture, once the most important sector, is now dwarfed by industry, which accounts for 35% of gnp and about 80% of exports and employs 20% of the labor force. the government has successfully reduced the rate of inflation from double-digit figures in the late 1970s to about 4% in 1989. in 1987, after years of deficits, the balance of payments was brought into the black. unemployment, however, is a serious problem. a 1989 unemployment rate of 17.7% placed ireland along with spain as the countries with the worst jobless records in western europe. gdp: $31.4 billion, per capita $8,900; real growth rate 4.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.2% (1989) unemployment rate: 17.7% (1989) budget: revenues $10.9 billion; expenditures $11.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.5 billion (1989) exports: $20.3 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--live animals, animal products, chemicals, data processing equipment, industrial machinery; partners--ec 74% (uk 35%, frg 11%, france 9%), us 8% imports: $17.3 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--food, animal feed, chemicals, petroleum and petroleum products, machinery, textiles, clothing; partners--ec 66% (uk 42%, frg 9%, france 4%), us 16% external debt: $16.1 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 9.5% (1989 est.) electricity: 4,957,000 kw capacity; 14,480 million kwh produced, 4,080 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food products, brewing, textiles, clothing, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, machinery, transportation equipment, glass and crystal agriculture: accounts for 11% of gnp and 14.8% of the labor force; principal crops--turnips, barley, potatoes, sugar beets, wheat; livestock--meat and dairy products; 85% self-sufficient in food; food shortages include bread grain, fruits, vegetables aid: na currency: irish pound (plural--pounds); 1 irish pound (lir) = 100 pence exchange rates: irish pounds (lir) per us$1--0.6399 (january 1990), 0.7047 (1989), 0.6553 (1988), 0.6720 (1987), 0.7454 (1986), 0.9384 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: irish national railways (cie) operates 1,947 km 1.602-meter gauge, government owned; 485 km double track; 38 km electrified highways: 92,294 km total; 87,422 km surfaced, 4,872 km gravel or crushed stone inland waterways: limited for commercial traffic pipelines: natural gas, 225 km ports: cork, dublin, shannon estuary, waterford merchant marine: 67 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 113,569 grt/139,681 dwt; includes 3 short-sea passenger, 29 cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, 2 container, 23 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 specialized tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 5 bulk civil air: 23 major transport aircraft airports: 40 total, 37 usable; 18 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: small, modern system using cable and radio relay circuits; 900,000 telephones; stations--45 am, 16 (29 relays) fm, 18 (68 relays) tv; 5 coaxial submarine cables; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: army, naval service, army air corps military manpower: males 15-49, 870,161; 705,765 fit for military service; 33,259 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 1.6% of gdp, or $500 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: israel (also see separate gaza strip and west bank entries) note: the arab territories occupied by israel since the 1967 war are not included in the data below. as stated in the 1978 camp david accords and reaffirmed by president reagan's 1 september 1982 peace initiative, the final status of the west bank and gaza strip, their relationship with their neighbors, and a peace treaty between israel and jordan are to be negotiated among the concerned parties. the camp david accords further specify that these negotiations will resolve the location of the respective boundaries. pending the completion of this process, it is us policy that the final status of the west bank and gaza strip has yet to be determined (see west bank and gaza strip entries). on 25 april 1982 israel relinquished control of the sinai to egypt. statistics for the israeli-occupied golan heights are included in the syria entry. geography total area: 20,770 km2; land area: 20,330 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than new jersey land boundaries: 1,006 km total; egypt 255 km, jordan 238 km, lebanon 79 km, syria 76 km, west bank 307, gaza strip 51 km coastline: 273 km maritime claims: continental shelf: to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 6 nm disputes: separated from lebanon, syria, and the west bank by the 1949 armistice line; differences with jordan over the location of the 1949 armistice line which separates the two countries; west bank and gaza strip are israeli occupied with status to be determined; golan heights is israeli occupied; israeli troops in southern lebanon since june 1982; water-sharing issues with jordan climate: temperate; hot and dry in desert areas terrain: negev desert in the south; low coastal plain; central mountains; jordan rift valley natural resources: copper, phosphates, bromide, potash, clay, sand, sulfur, asphalt, manganese, small amounts of natural gas and crude oil land use: 17% arable land; 5% permanent crops; 40% meadows and pastures; 6% forest and woodland; 32% other; includes 11% irrigated environment: sandstorms may occur during spring and summer; limited arable land and natural water resources pose serious constraints; deforestation; note: there are 173 jewish settlements in the west bank, 35 in the israeli-occupied golan heights, 18 in the gaza strip, and 14 israeli-built jewish neighborhoods in east jerusalem people population: 4,409,218 (july 1990), growth rate 1.5% (1989); includes 70,000 jewish settlers in the west bank, 10,500 in the israeli-occupied golan heights, 2,500 in the gaza strip, and 110,000 in east jerusalem (1989 est.) birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (july 1990) life expectancy at birth: 76 years male, 79 years female (july 1990) total fertility rate: 2.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--israeli(s); adjective--israeli ethnic divisions: 83% jewish, 17% non-jewish (mostly arab) religion: 83% judaism, 13.1% islam (mostly sunni muslim), 2.3% christian, 1.6% druze language: hebrew (official); arabic used officially for arab minority; english most commonly used foreign language literacy: 88% jews, 70% arabs labor force: 1,400,000 (1984 est.); 29.5% public services; 22.8% industry, mining, and manufacturing; 12.8% commerce; 9.5% finance and business; 6.8% transport, storage, and communications; 6.5% construction and public works; 5.5% agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 5.8% personal and other services; 1.0% electricity and water (1983) organized labor: 90% of labor force government long-form name: state of israel type: republic capital: israel proclaimed jerusalem its capital in 1950, but the us, like nearly all other countries, maintains its embassy in tel aviv administrative divisions: 6 districts (mehozot, singular--mehoz); central, haifa, jerusalem, northern, southern, tel aviv independence: 14 may 1948 (from league of nations mandate under british administration) constitution: no formal constitution; some of the functions of a constitution are filled by the declaration of establishment (1948), the basic laws of the parliament (knesset), and the israeli citizenship law legal system: mixture of english common law, british mandate regulations, and, in personal matters, jewish, christian, and muslim legal systems; in december 1985 israel informed the un secretariat that it would no longer accept compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 10 may 1989; israel declared independence on 14 may 1948, but the jewish calendar is lunar and the holiday may occur in april or may executive branch: president, prime minister, vice prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral knesset judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president gen. chaim herzog (since 5 may 1983); head of government--prime minister yitzhak shamir (since 20 october 1986); vice prime minister shimon peres (prime minister from 13 september 1984 to 20 october 1986, when he rotated to vice prime minister) political parties and leaders: israel currently has a national unity government comprising five parties that hold 95 of the knesset's 120 seats; members of the unity government--likud bloc, prime minister yitzhak shamir; labor party, vice prime minister and finance minister shimon peres; sephardic torah guardians (shas), minister of immigrant absorption yitzhak peretz; national religious party, minister of religious affairs zevulun hammer; agudat yisrael, deputy minister of labor and social welfare moshe zeev feldman; opposition parties--tehiya party, yuval ne'eman; tzomet party, rafael eytan; moledet party, rehavam ze'evi; degel hatorah, avraham ravitz; citizens' rights movement, shulamit aloni; united workers' party (mapam), yair tzaban; center movement-shinui, amnon rubenstein; new communist party of israel (rakah), meir wilner; progressive list for peace, muhammad mi'ari; arab democratic party, abd al wahab darawshah suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 23 february 1988 (next to be held february 1994); results--gen. chaim herzog reelected by knesset; parliament--last held 1 november 1988 (next to be held by november 1992); seats--(120 total) likud bloc 40, labor party 39, shas 6, national religious party 5, agudat yisrael 5, citizens' rights movement 5, rakah 4, tehiya party 3, mapam 3, tzomet party 2, moledet party 2, degel hatorah 2, center movement-shinui 2, progressive list for peace 1, arab democratic party 1 communists: hadash (predominantly arab but with jews in its leadership) has some 1,500 members other political or pressure groups: gush emunim, jewish nationalists advocating jewish settlement on the west bank and gaza strip; peace now, critical of government's west bank/gaza strip and lebanon policies member of: ccc, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, iooc, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oas (observer), un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador moshe arad; chancery at 3514 international drive nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 364-5500; there are israeli consulates general in atlanta, boston, chicago, houston, los angeles, miami, new york, philadelphia, and san francisco; us--ambassador william a. brown; embassy at 71 hayarkon street, tel aviv (mailing address is apo new york 09672); telephone p972o (3) 654338; there is a us consulate general in jerusalem flag: white with a blue hexagram (six-pointed linear star) known as the magen david (shield of david) centered between two equal horizontal blue bands near the top and bottom edges of the flag economy overview: israel has a market economy with substantial government participation. it depends on imports for crude oil, food, grains, raw materials, and military equipment. despite limited natural resources, israel has developed its agriculture and industry sectors on an intensive scale over the past 20 years. industry accounts for about 23% of the labor force, agriculture for 6%, and services for most of the balance. diamonds, high-technology machinery, and agricultural products (fruits and vegetables) are the biggest export earners. the balance of payments has traditionally been negative, but is offset by large transfer payments and foreign loans. nearly two-thirds of israel's $16 billion external debt is owed to the us, which is its major source for economic and military aid. to earn needed foreign exchange, israel must continue to exploit high-technology niches in the international market, such as medical scanning equipment. in 1987 the economy showed a 5.2% growth in real gnp, the best gain in nearly a decade; in 1988-89 the gain was only 1% annually, largely because of the economic impact of the palestinian uprising (intifadah). inflation dropped from an annual rate of over 400% in 1984 to about 16% in 1987-88 without any major increase in unemployment. gnp: $38 billion, per capita $8,700; real growth rate 1% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 20% (1989) unemployment rate: 9% (december 1989) budget: revenues $24.2 billion; expenditures $26.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $7 billion (fy89 est.) exports: $10.4 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--polished diamonds, citrus and other fruits, textiles and clothing, processed foods, fertilizer and chemical products, military hardware, electronics; partners--us, uk, frg, france, belgium, luxembourg, italy imports: $12.4 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--military equipment, rough diamonds, oil, chemicals, machinery, iron and steel, cereals, textiles, vehicles, ships, aircraft; partners--us, frg, uk, switzerland, italy, belgium, luxembourg external debt: $16.4 billion (march 1989) industrial production: growth rate 1.5% (1989) electricity: 4,392,000 kw capacity; 17,500 million kwh produced, 4,000 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, diamond cutting and polishing, textiles, clothing, chemicals, metal products, military equipment, transport equipment, electrical equipment, miscellaneous machinery, potash mining, high-technology electronics, tourism agriculture: accounts for 5% of gnp; largely self-sufficient in food production, except for bread grains; principal products--citrus and other fruits, vegetables, cotton; livestock products--beef, dairy, and poultry aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $15.8 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.2 billion currency: new israeli shekel (plural--shekels); 1 new israeli shekel (nis) = 100 new agorot exchange rates: new israeli shekels (nis) per us$1--1.9450 (january 1990), 1.9164 (1989), 1.5989 (1988), 1.5946 (1987), 1.4878 (1986), 1.1788 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 594 km 1.435-meter gauge, single track; diesel operated highways: 4,500 km; majority is bituminous surfaced pipelines: crude oil, 708 km; refined products, 290 km; natural gas, 89 km ports: ashdod, haifa, elat merchant marine: 31 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 483,424 grt/560,085 dwt; includes 9 cargo, 20 container, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo civil air: 27 major transport aircraft airports: 55 total, 52 usable; 26 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 11 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: most highly developed in the middle east though not the largest; good system of coaxial cable and radio relay; 1,800,000 telephones; stations--11 am, 24 fm, 54 tv; 2 submarine cables; satellite earth stations--2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: israel defense forces; historically there have been no separate israeli military services; ground, air, and naval components are branches of israel defense forces military manpower: eligible 15-49, 2,159,462; of the 1,089,346 males 15-49, 898,272 are fit for military service; of the 1,070,116 females 15-49, 878,954 are fit for military service; 43,644 males and 41,516 females reach military age (18) annually; both sexes are liable for military service defense expenditures: 8.5% of gnp, or $3.2 billion (1989 est.); note--does not include an estimated $1.8 billion in us military aid ---------------------------------------------------country: italy geography total area: 301,230 km2; land area: 294,020 km2; includes sardinia and sicily comparative area: slightly larger than arizona land boundaries: 1,902.2 km total; austria 430 km, france 488 km, san marino 39 km, switzerland 740 km, vatican city 3.2 km, yugoslavia 202 km coastline: 4,996 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 m or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: south tyrol question with austria climate: predominantly mediterranean; alpine in far north; hot, dry in south terrain: mostly rugged and mountainous; some plains, coastal lowlands natural resources: mercury, potash, marble, sulfur, dwindling natural gas and crude oil reserves, fish, coal land use: 32% arable land; 10% permanent crops; 17% meadows and pastures; 22% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes 10% irrigated environment: regional risks include landslides, mudflows, snowslides, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, flooding, pollution; land sinkage in venice note: strategic location dominating central mediterranean as well as southern sea and air approaches to western europe people population: 57,664,405 (july 1990), growth rate 0.2% (1990) birth rate: 10 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--italian(s); adjective--italian ethnic divisions: primarily italian but population includes small clusters of german-, french-, and slovene-italians in the north and albanian-italians in the south; sicilians; sardinians religion: almost 100% nominally roman catholic language: italian; parts of trentino-alto adige region are predominantly german speaking; significant french-speaking minority in valle d'aosta region; slovene-speaking minority in the trieste-gorizia area literacy: 93% labor force: 23,670,000; 56.7% services, 37.9% industry, 5.4% agriculture (1987) organized labor: 40-45% of labor force (est.) government long-form name: italian republic type: republic capital: rome administrative divisions: 20 regions (regioni, singular--regione); abruzzi, basilicata, calabria, campania, emilia-romagna, friuli-venezia giulia, lazio, liguria, lombardia, marche, molise, piemonte, puglia, sardegna, sicilia, toscana, trentino-alto adige, umbria, valle d'aosta, veneto independence: 17 march 1861, kingdom of italy proclaimed constitution: 1 january 1948 legal system: based on civil law system, with ecclesiastical law influence; judicial review under certain conditions in constitutional court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the republic, 2 june (1946) executive branch: president, prime minister, legislative branch: bicameral parliament (parlamento) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senato) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camera dei deputati) judicial branch: constitutional court (corte costituzionale) leaders: chief of state--president francesco cossiga (since 3 july 1985); head of government--prime minister giulio andreotti (since 22 july 1989, heads the government for the sixth time); deputy prime minister claudio martelli (since 23 july 1989) political parties and leaders: christian democratic party (dc), arnaldo forlani (general secretary), ciriaco de mita (president); communist party (pci), achille occhetto (secretary general); socialist party (psi), bettino craxi (party secretary); social democratic party (psdi), antonio cariglia (party secretary); liberal party (pli), renato altissimo (secretary general); italian social movement (msi), giuseppe (pino) rauti (national secretary); republican party (pri), giorgio la malfa (political secretary); italy's 49th postwar government was formed on 23 july 1989, with prime minister andreotti, a christian democrat, presiding over a five-party coalition consisting of the christian democrats, socialists, social democrats, republicans, and liberals suffrage: universal at age 18 (except in senatorial elections, where minimum age is 25) elections: senate--last held 14-15 june 1987 (next to be held by june 1992); results--dc 33.9%, pci 28.3%, psi 10.7%, others 27.1%; seats--(320 total, 315 elected) dc 125, pci 100, psi 36, others 54; chamber of deputies--last held 14-15 june 1987 (next to be held by june 1992); results--dc 34.3%, pci 26.6%, psi 14.3%, msi 5.9%, pri 3.7%, psdi 3.0%, radicals 2.6%, greens 2.5%, pli 2.1%, proletarian democrats 1.7%, others 3.3%; seats--(630 total) dc 234, pci 177, psi 94, msi 35, pri 21, psdi 17, radicals 13, greens 13, pli 11, proletarian democrats 8, others 7 communists: 1,673,751 members (1983) other political or pressure groups: vatican city; three major trade union confederations (cgil--communist dominated, cisl--christian democratic, and uil--social democratic, socialist, and republican); italian manufacturers association (confindustria); organized farm groups (confcoltivatori, confagricoltura) member of: adb, assimer, ccc, council of europe, dac, ec, ecowas, eib, ems, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, iea, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, irc, itc, itu, nato, oas (observer), oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador rinaldo petrignani; chancery at 1601 fuller street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 328-5500; there are italian consulates general in boston, chicago, houston, new orleans, los angeles, philadelphia, san francisco, and consulates in detroit and newark (new jersey); us--ambassador peter f. secchia; embassy at via veneto 119/a, 00187-rome (mailing address is apo new york 09794); telephone p39o (6) 46741; there are us consulates general in florence, genoa, milan, naples, and palermo (sicily) flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and red; similar to the flag of ireland which is longer and is green (hoist side), white, and orange; also similar to the flag of the ivory coast which has the colors reversed--orange (hoist side), white, and green economy overview: since world war ii the economy has changed from one based on agriculture into a ranking industrial economy, with approximately the same total and per capita output as france and the uk. the country is still divided into a developed industrial north, dominated by large private companies and state enterprises and an undeveloped agricultural south. services account for 58% of gdp, industry 37%, and agriculture 5%. most raw materials needed by industry and over 75% of energy requirements must be imported. the economic recovery that began in mid-1983 has continued through 1989, with the economy growing at an annual average rate of 3%. for the 1990s, italy faces the problems of refurbishing a tottering communications system, curbing the increasing pollution in major industrial centers, and adjusting to the new competitive forces accompanying the ongoing economic integration of the european community. gdp: $803.3 billion, per capita $14,000; real growth rate 3.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 6.6% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 11.9% (1989) budget: revenues $355 billion; expenditures $448 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1989) exports: $141.6 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--textiles, wearing apparel, metals, transportation equipment, chemicals; partners--ec 57%, us 9%, opec 4% imports: $143.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--petroleum, industrial machinery, chemicals, metals, food, agricultural products; partners--ec 57%, opec 6%, us 6% external debt: na industrial production: growth rate 2.9% (1989) electricity: 56,022,000 kw capacity; 201,400 million kwh produced, 3,500 kwh per capita (1989) industries: machinery and transportation equipment, iron and steel, chemicals, food processing, textiles, motor vehicles agriculture: accounts for about 5% of gnp and 5% of the work force; self-sufficient in foods other than meat and dairy products; principal crops--fruits, vegetables, grapes, potatoes, sugar beets, soybeans, grain, olives; fish catch of 554,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $18.7 billion currency: italian lira (plural--lire); 1 italian lira (lit) = 100 centesimi exchange rates: italian lire (lit) per us$1--1,262.5 (january 1990), 1,372.1 (1989), 1,301.6 (1988), 1,296.1 (1987), 1,490.8 (1986), 1,909.4 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 20,011 km total; 16,066 km 1.435-meter government-owned standard gauge (8,999 km electrified); 3,945 km privately owned--2,100 km 1.435-meter standard gauge (1,155 km electrified) and 1,845 km 0.950-meter narrow gauge (380 km electrified) highways: 294,410 km total; autostrada 5,900 km, state highways 45,170 km, provincial highways 101,680 km, communal highways 141,660 km; 260,500 km concrete, bituminous, or stone block, 26,900 km gravel and crushed stone, 7,010 km earth inland waterways: 2,400 km for various types of commercial traffic, although of limited overall value pipelines: crude oil, 1,703 km; refined products, 2,148 km; natural gas, 19,400 km ports: cagliari (sardinia), genoa, la spezia, livorno, naples, palermo (sicily), taranto, trieste, venice merchant marine: 547 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 6,871,505 grt/10,805,368 dwt; includes 6 passenger, 41 short-sea passenger, 100 cargo, 5 refrigerated cargo, 22 container, 72 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 4 vehicle carrier, 1 multifunction large-load carrier, 2 livestock carrier, 147 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 37 chemical tanker, 29 liquefied gas, 8 specialized tanker, 16 combination ore/oil, 55 bulk, 2 combination bulk civil air: 132 major transport aircraft airports: 143 total, 138 usable; 88 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 35 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 42 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: well engineered, constructed, and operated; 28,000,000 telephones; stations--144 am, 54 (over 1,800 repeaters) fm, 135 (over 1,300 repeaters) tv; 22 submarine cables; communication satellite earth stations operating in intelsat 3 atlantic ocean and 2 indian ocean, inmarsat, and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 14,721,704; 12,855,022 fit for military service; 430,782 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.4% of gdp, or $19 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: ivory coast (also known as cote d'ivoire) geography total area: 322,460 km2; land area: 318,000 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than new mexico land boundaries: 3,110 km total; burkina 584 km, ghana 668 km, guinea 610 km, liberia 716 km, mali 532 km coastline: 515 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical along coast, semiarid in far north; three seasons--warm and dry (november to march), hot and dry (march to may), hot and wet (june to october) terrain: mostly flat to undulating plains; mountains in northwest natural resources: crude oil, diamonds, manganese, iron ore, cobalt, bauxite, copper land use: 9% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 9% meadows and pastures; 26% forest and woodland; 52% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: coast has heavy surf and no natural harbors; severe deforestation people population: 12,478,024 (july 1990), growth rate 4.0% (1990) birth rate: 48 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 100 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 52 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--ivorian(s); adjective--ivorian ethnic divisions: over 60 ethnic groups; most important are the baoule 23%, bete 18%, senoufou 15%, malinke 11%, and agni; about 2 million foreign africans, mostly burkinabe; about 130,000 to 330,000 non-africans (30,000 french and 100,000 to 300,000 lebanese) religion: 63% indigenous, 25% muslim, 12% christian language: french (official), over 60 native dialects; dioula most widely spoken literacy: 42.7% labor force: 5,718,000; over 85% of population engaged in agriculture, for estry, livestock raising; about 11% of labor force are wage earners, nearly half in agriculture and the remainder in government, industry, commerce, and professions; 54% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: 20% of wage labor force government long-form name: republic of the ivory coast; note--the local official name is republique de cote d'ivoire type: republic; one-party presidential regime established 1960 capital: abidjan (capital city changed to yamoussoukro in march 1983 but not recognized by us) administrative divisions: 49 departments (departements, singular--(departement); abengourou, abidjan, aboisso, adzope, agboville, bangolo, beoumi, biankouma, bondoukou, bongouanou, bouafle, bouake, bouna, boundiali, dabakala, daloa, danane, daoukro, dimbokro, divo, duekoue, ferkessedougou, gagnoa, grand-lahou, guiglo, issia, katiola, korhogo, lakota, man, mankono, mbahiakro, odienne, oume, sakassou, san-pedro, sassandra, seguela, sinfra, soubre, tabou, tanda, tengrela, tiassale, touba, toumodi, vavoua, yamoussoukro, zuenoula independence: 7 august 1960 (from france) constitution: 3 november 1960 legal system: based on french civil law system and customary law; judicial review in the constitutional chamber of the supreme court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 7 december executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president dr. felix houphouet-boigny (since 27 november 1960) political parties and leaders: only party--democratic party of the ivory coast (pdci), dr. felix houphouet-boigny suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 27 october 1985 (next to be held october 1990); results--president felix houphouet-boigny was reelected without opposition to his fifth consecutive five-year term; national assembly--last held 10 november 1985 (next to be held 10 november 1990); results--pdci is the only party; seats--(175 total) pdci 175 communists: no communist party; possibly some sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, ccc, ceao, eama, eca, ecowas, eib (associate), entente, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, niger river commission, nam, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador charles gomis; chancery at 2424 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 797-0300; us--ambassador kenneth brown; embassy at 5 rue jesse owens, abidjan (mailing address is b. p. 1712, abidjan 01); telephone p225o 32-09-79 flag: three equal vertical bands of orange (hoist side), white, and green; similar to the flag of ireland which is longer and has the colors reversed--green (hoist side), white, and orange; also similar to the flag of italy which is green (hoist side), white, and red; design was based on the flag of france economy overview: the ivory coast is among the world's largest producers and exporters of coffee, cocoa beans, and palm-kernel oil. consequently, the economy is highly sensitive to fluctuations in international prices for coffee and cocoa and to weather conditions. despite attempts by the government to diversify, the economy is still largely dependent on agriculture and related industries. the agricultural sector accounts for over one-third of gdp and about 80% of export earnings and employs about 85% of the labor force. a collapse of world cocoa and coffee prices in 1986 threw the economy into a recession, from which the country had not recovered by 1989. gdp: $10.0 billion, per capita $900; real growth rate 6.4% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7.5% (1988) unemployment rate: 14% (1985) budget: revenues $1.6 billion (1986); expenditures $2.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $504 million (1988 est.) exports: $2.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--cocoa 30%, coffee 20%, tropical woods 11%, cotton, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, cotton; partners--france, frg, netherlands, us, belgium, spain (1985) imports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--manufactured goods and semifinished products 50%, consumer goods 40%, raw materials and fuels 10%; partners--france, other ec, nigeria, us, japan (1985) external debt: $14.7 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 0% (1987) electricity: 1,081,000 kw capacity; 2,440 million kwh produced, 210 kwh per capita (1989) industries: foodstuffs, wood processing, oil refinery, automobile assembly, textiles, fertilizer, beverage agriculture: most important sector, contributing one-third to gdp and 80% to exports; cash crops include coffee, cocoa beans, timber, bananas, palm kernels, rubber; food crops--corn, rice, manioc, sweet potatoes; not selfsufficient in bread grain and dairy products illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis on a small scale for the international drug trade aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $344 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $4.6 billion currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 660 km (burkina border to abidjan, 1.00-meter gauge, single track, except 25 km abidjan-anyama section is double track) highways: 46,600 km total; 3,600 km bituminous and bituminous-treated surface; 32,000 km gravel, crushed stone, laterite, and improved earth; 11,000 km unimproved inland waterways: 980 km navigable rivers, canals, and numerous coastal lagoons ports: abidjan, san-pedro merchant marine: 7 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 71,945 grt/ 90,684 dwt; includes 5 cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker civil air: 12 major transport aircraft, including multinationally owned air afrique fleet airports: 49 total, 42 usable; 7 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 16 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: system above african average; consists of open-wire lines and radio relay links; 87,700 telephones; stations--3 am, 17 fm, 11 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations; 2 coaxial submarine cables defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 2,874,925; 1,487,909 fit for military service; 141,193 males reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.9% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: jamaica geography total area: 10,990 km2; land area: 10,830 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than connecticut land boundaries: none coastline: 1,022 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid; temperate interior terrain: mostly mountains with narrow, discontinuous coastal plain natural resources: bauxite, gypsum, limestone land use: 19% arable land; 6% permanent crops; 18% meadows and pastures; 28% forest and woodland; 29% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: subject to hurricanes (especially july to november); deforestation; water pollution note: strategic location between cayman trench and jamaica channel, the main sea lanes for panama canal people population: 2,441,396 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 21 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 10 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 16 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--jamaican(s); adjective--jamaican ethnic divisions: 76.3% african, 15.1% afro-european, 3.4% east indian and afro-east indian, 3.2% white, 1.2% chinese and afro-chinese, 0.8% other religion: predominantly protestant (including anglican and baptist), some roman catholic, some spiritualist cults language: english, creole literacy: 74% labor force: 728,700; 32% agriculture, 28% industry and commerce, 27% services, 13% government; shortage of technical and managerial personnel (1984) organized labor: 25% of labor force (1989) government long-form name: none type: parliamentary democracy capital: kingston administrative divisions: 14 parishes; clarendon, hanover, kingston, manchester, portland, saint andrew, saint ann, saint catherine, saint elizabeth, saint james, saint mary, saint thomas, trelawny, westmoreland independence: 6 august 1962 (from uk) constitution: 6 august 1962 legal system: based on english common law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day (first monday in august), 6 august 1990 executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general sir florizel a. glasspole (since 2 march 1973); head of government--prime minister michael manley (since 9 february 1989) political parties and leaders: people's national party (pnp), michael manley; jamaica labor party (jlp), edward seaga; workers' party of jamaica (wpj), trevor munroe suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of representatives--last held 9 february 1989 (next to be held by february 1994); results--pnp 57%, jlp 43%; seats--(60 total) pnp 45, jlp 15 communists: workers' party of jamaica (marxist-leninist) other political or pressure groups: rastafarians (black religious/racial cultists, pan-africanists) member of: acp, caricom, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, iaea, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador keith johnson; chancery at suite 355, 1850 k street nw, washington dc 20006; telephone (202) 452-0660; there are jamaican consulates general in miami and new york; us--ambassador glen holden; embassy at 3rd floor, jamaica mutual life center, 2 oxford road, kingston; telephone p809o 929-4850 flag: diagonal yellow cross divides the flag into four triangles--green (top and bottom) and black (hoist side and fly side) economy overview: the economy is based on sugar, bauxite, and tourism. in 1985 it suffered a setback with the closure of some facilities in the bauxite and alumina industry, a major source of hard currency earnings. since 1986 an economic recovery has been under way. in 1987 conditions began to improve for the bauxite and alumina industry because of increases in world metal prices. the recovery has also been supported by growth in the manufacturing and tourism sectors. in september 1988, hurricane gilbert inflicted severe damage on crops and the electric power system, a sharp but temporary setback to the economy. by october 1989 the economic recovery from the hurricane was largely complete and real growth was up about 3% for 1989. gdp: $3.8 billion, per capita $1,529; real growth rate 3.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15% (1989) unemployment rate: 18.7% (1988) budget: revenues $1.1 billion; expenditures $1.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (fy88 est.) exports: $948 million (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--bauxite, alumina, sugar, bananas; partners--us 40%, uk, canada, trinidad and tobago, norway imports: $1.6 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--petroleum, machinery, food, consumer goods, construction goods; partners--us 46%, uk, venezuela, canada, japan, trinidad and tobago external debt: $4.4 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 3% (1989 est.) electricity: 1,437,000 kw capacity; 2,390 million kwh produced, 960 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, bauxite mining, textiles, food processing, light manufactures agriculture: accounts for about 9% of gdp, one-third of work force, and 17% of exports; commercial crops--sugarcane, bananas, coffee, citrus, potatoes, and vegetables; livestock and livestock products include poultry, goats, milk; not self-sufficient in grain, meat, and dairy products illicit drugs: illicit cultivation of cannabis has decreased, with production shifting from large to small plots and nurseries to evade aerial detection and eradication aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.1 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.2 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $27 million; communist countries (1974-88), $349 million currency: jamaican dollar (plural--dollars); 1 jamaican dollar (j$) = 100 cents exchange rates: jamaican dollars (j$) per us$1--6.5013 (january 1990), 5.7446 (1989), 5.4886 (1988), 5.4867 (1987), 5.4778 (1986), 5.5586 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 370 km, all 1.435-meter standard gauge, single track highways: 18,200 km total; 12,600 km paved, 3,200 km gravel, 2,400 km improved earth pipelines: refined products, 10 km ports: kingston, montego bay merchant marine: 5 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 13,048 grt/21,412 dwt; includes 1 cargo, 1 container, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 bulk civil air: 6 major transport aircraft airports: 41 total, 25 usable; 14 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fully automatic domestic telephone network; 127,000 telephones; stations--10 am, 17 fm, 8 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations; 3 coaxial submarine cables defense forces branches: jamaica defense force (includes coast guard and air wing) military manpower: males 15-49, 620,400; 440,967 fit for military service; no conscription; 27,014 reach minimum volunteer age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.1% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: jan mayen (territory of norway) geography total area: 373 km2; land area: 373 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 124.1 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 10 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 4 nm disputes: denmark has challenged norway's maritime claims beween greenland and jan mayen climate: arctic maritime with frequent storms and persistent fog terrain: volcanic island, partly covered by glaciers; beerenberg is the highest peak, with an elevation of 2,277 meters natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: barren volcanic island with some moss and grass; volcanic activity resumed in 1970 note: located 590 km north-northwest of iceland between the greenland sea and the norwegian sea north of the arctic circle people population: no permanent inhabitants government long-form name: none type: territory of norway note: administered by a governor (sysselmann) resident in longyearbyen (svalbard) economy overview: jan mayen is a volcanic island with no exploitable natural resources. economic activity is limited to providing services for employees of norway's radio and meteorological stations located on the island. electricity: 15,000 kw capacity; 40 million kwh produced, na kwh per capita (1989) communications airports: 1 with runway 1,220 to 2,439 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only telecommunications: radio and meteorological station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of norway ---------------------------------------------------country: japan geography total area: 377,835 km2; land area: 374,744 km2; includes bonin islands (ogasawara-gunto), daito-shoto, minami-jima, okinotori-shima, ryukyu islands (nansei-shoto), and volcano islands (kazan-retto) comparative area: slightly smaller than california land boundaries: none coastline: 29,751 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm (3 nm in international straits--la perouse or soya, tsugaru, osumi, and eastern and western channels of the korea or tsushima strait) disputes: habomai islands, etorofu, kunashiri, and shikotan islands occupied by soviet union since 1945, claimed by japan; kuril islands administered by soviet union; liancourt rocks disputed with south korea; senkaku-shoto (senkaku islands) claimed by china and taiwan climate: varies from tropical in south to cool temperate in north terrain: mostly rugged and mountainous natural resources: negligible mineral resources, fish land use: 13% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 67% forest and woodland; 18% other; includes 9% irrigated environment: many dormant and some active volcanoes; about 1,500 seismic occurrences (mostly tremors) every year; subject to tsunamis note: strategic location in northeast asia people population: 123,642,461 (july 1990), growth rate 0.4% (1990) birth rate: 11 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 5 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 76 years male, 82 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--japanese (sing., pl.); adjective--japanese ethnic divisions: 99.4% japanese, 0.6% other (mostly korean) religion: most japanese observe both shinto and buddhist rites; about 16% belong to other faiths, including 0.8% christian language: japanese literacy: 99% labor force: 63,330,000; 54% trade and services; 33% manufacturing, mining, and construction; 7% agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 3% government (1988) organized labor: about 29% of employed workers; 76.4% public service, 57.9% transportation and telecommunications, 48.7% mining, 33.7% manufacturing, 18.2% services, 9.3% wholesale, retail, and restaurant government long-form name: none type: constitutional monarchy capital: tokyo administrative divisions: 47 prefectures (fuken, singular and plural); aichi, akita, aomori, chiba, ehime, fukui, fukuoka, fukushima, gifu, gumma, hiroshima, hokkaido, hyogo, ibaraki, ishikawa, iwate, kagawa, kagoshima, kanagawa, kochi, kumamoto, kyoto, mie, miyagi, miyazaki, nagano, nagasaki, nara, niigata, oita, okayama, okinawa, osaka, saga, saitama, shiga, shimane, shizuoka, tochigi, tokushima, tokyo, tottori, toyama, wakayama, yamagata, yamaguchi, yamanashi independence: 660 bc, traditional founding by emperor jimmu; 3 may 1947, constitutional monarchy established constitution: 3 may 1947 legal system: civil law system with english-american influence; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: birthday of the emperor, 23 december (1933) executive branch: emperor, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral diet (kokkai) consists of an upper house or house of councillors (sangi-in) and a lower house or house of representatives (shugi-in) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--emperor akihito (since 7 january 1989); head of government--prime minister toshiki kaifu (since 9 august 1989) political parties and leaders: liberal democratic party (ldp), toshiki kaifu, president; japan socialist party (jsp), t. doi, chairman; democratic socialist party (dsp), keigo ouchi, chairman; japan communist party (jcp), k. miyamoto, presidium chairman; komeito (clean government party, cgp), koshiro ishida, chairman suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: house of councillors--last held on 23 july 1989 (next to be held 23 july 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(252 total, 100 elected) ldp 109, jsp 67, cgp 21, jcp 14, others 33; house of representatives--last held on 18 february 1990 (next to be held by february 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(512 total) ldp 275, jsp 136, cgp 45, jcp 16, jdsp 14, other parties 5, independents 21; note--nine independents are expected to join the ldp, five the jsp communists: about 470,000 registered communist party members member of: adb, aspac, ccc, colombo plan, dac, escap, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador nobuo matsunaga; chancery at 2520 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-6700; there are japanese consulates general in agana (guam), anchorage, atlanta, boston, chicago, honolulu, houston, kansas city (missouri), los angeles, new orleans, new york, san francisco, seattle, and portland (oregon), and a consulate in saipan (northern mariana islands); us--ambassador michael h. armacost; embassy at 10-1, akasaka 1-chome, minato-ku (107), tokyo (mailing address is apo san francisco 96503); telephone p81o (3) 224-5000; there are us consulates general in naha, osaka-kobe, and sapporo and a consulate in fukuoka flag: white with a large red disk (representing the sun without rays) in the center economy overview: although japan has few natural resources, since 1971 it has become the world's third-largest industrial economy, ranking behind only the us and the ussr. government-industry cooperation, a strong work ethic, and a comparatively small defense allocation have helped japan advance rapidly, notably in high-technology fields. industry, the most important sector of the economy, is heavily dependent on imported raw materials and fuels. self-sufficent in rice, japan must import 50% of its requirements for other grain and fodder crops. japan maintains one of the world's largest fishing fleets and accounts for nearly 15% of the total global catch. overall economic growth has been spectacular: a 10% average in the 1960s, a 5% average in the 1970s and 1980s. in 1989 strong investment and consumption spending helped maintain growth at nearly 5%. inflation remains low at 2.1% despite high oil prices and a somewhat weaker yen. japan continues to run a huge trade surplus, $60 billion in 1989, which supports extensive investment in foreign properties. gnp: $1,914.1 billion, per capita $15,600; real growth rate 4.8% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.1% (1989) unemployment rate: 2.3% (1989) budget: revenues $392 billion; expenditures $464 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (fy89) exports: $270 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--manufactures 97% (including machinery 38%, motor vehicles 17%, consumer electronics 10%); partners--us 34%, southeast asia 22%, western europe 21%, communist countries 5%, middle east 5% imports: $210 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--manufactures 42%, fossil fuels 30%, foodstuffs 15%, nonfuel raw materials 13%; partners--southeast asia 23%, us 23%, middle east 15%, western europe 16%, communist countries 7% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate 9.0% (1989) electricity: 191,000,000 kw capacity; 700,000 million kwh produced, 5,680 kwh per capita (1989) industries: metallurgy, engineering, electrical and electronic, textiles, chemicals, automobiles, fishing agriculture: accounts for 3% of gnp; highly subsidized and protected sector, with crop yields among highest in world; principal crops--rice, sugar beets, vegetables, fruit; animal products include pork, poultry, dairy and eggs; about 50% self-sufficient in food production; shortages of wheat, corn, soybeans; world's largest fish catch of 11.8 million metric tons in 1987 aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $57.5 billion currency: yen (plural--yen); 1 yen (y) = 100 sen exchange rates: yen (y) per us$1--145.09 (january 1990), 137.96 (1989), 128.15 (1988), 144.64 (1987), 168.52 (1986), 238.54 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 27,327 km total; 2,012 km 1.435-meter standard gauge and 25,315 km predominantly 1.067-meter narrow gauge; 5,724 km doubletrack and multitrack sections, 9,038 km 1.067-meter narrow-gauge electrified, 2,012 km 1.435-meter standard-gauge electrified (1987) highways: 1,098,900 km total; 718,700 km paved, 380,200 km gravel, crushed stone, or unpaved; 3,900 km national expressways, 46,544 km national highways, 43,907 km principal local roads, 86,930 km prefectural roads, and 917,619 other (1987) inland waterways: about 1,770 km; seagoing craft ply all coastal inland seas pipelines: crude oil, 84 km; refined products, 322 km; natural gas, 1,800 km ports: chiba, muroran, kitakyushu, kobe, tomakomai, nagoya, osaka, tokyo, yokkaichi, yokohama, kawasaki, niigata, fushiki-toyama, shimizu, himeji, wakayama-shimozu, shimonoseki, tokuyama-shimomatsu merchant marine: 1,088 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 23,597,688 grt/36,655,266 dwt; includes 7 passenger, 57 short-sea passenger, 4 passenger cargo, 108 cargo, 44 container, 27 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 135 refrigerated cargo, 117 vehicle carrier, 237 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 21 chemical tanker, 42 liquefied gas, 12 combination ore/oil, 3 specialized tanker, 272 bulk, 1 combination bulk, 1 multifunction large-load carrier civil air: 341 major transport aircraft airports: 165 total, 156 usable; 128 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 27 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 55 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent domestic and international service; 64,000,000 telephones; stations--318 am, 58 fm, 12,350 tv (196 major--1 kw or greater); satellite earth stations--4 pacific ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat; submarine cables to us (via guam), philippines, china, and ussr defense forces branches: japan ground self-defense force (army), japan maritime self-defense force (navy), japan air self-defense force (air force), maritime safety agency (coast guard) military manpower: males 15-49, 32,181,866; 27,695,890 fit for military service; 1,004,052 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.0% of gnp at market prices (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: jarvis island (territory of the us) geography total area: 4.5 km2; land area: 4.5 km2 comparative area: about 7.5 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 8 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; scant rainfall, constant wind, burning sun terrain: sandy, coral island surrounded by a narrow fringing reef natural resources: guano (deposits worked until late 1800s) land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: sparse bunch grass, prostrate vines, and low-growing shrubs; lacks fresh water; primarily a nesting, roosting, and foraging habitat for seabirds, shorebirds, and marine wildlife; feral cats note: 2,090 km south of honolulu in the south pacific ocean, just south of the equator, about halfway between hawaii and the cook islands people population: uninhabited note: millersville settlement on western side of island occasionally used as a weather station from 1935 until world war ii, when it was abandoned; reoccupied in 1957 during the international geophysical year by scientists who left in 1958; public entry is by special-use permit only and generally restricted to scientists and educators government long-form name: none (territory of the us) type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the fish and wildlife service of the us department of the interior as part of the national wildlife refuge system economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only--one boat landing area in the middle of the west coast and another near the southwest corner of the island note: there is a day beacon near the middle of the west coast defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us; visited annually by the us coast guard ---------------------------------------------------country: jersey (british crown dependency) geography total area: 117 km2; land area: 117 km2 comparative area: about 0.7 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 70 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: temperate; mild winters and cool summers terrain: gently rolling plain with low, rugged hills along north coast natural resources: agricultural land land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other; about 58% of land under cultivation environment: about 30% of population concentrated in saint helier note: largest and southernmost of channel islands; 27 km from france people population: 83,609 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--channel islander(s); adjective--channel islander ethnic divisions: uk and norman-french descent religion: anglican, roman catholic, baptist, congregational new church, methodist, presbyterian language: english and french (official), with the norman-french dialect spoken in country districts literacy: na%, but probably high labor force: na organized labor: none government long-form name: bailiwick of jersey type: british crown dependency capital: saint helier administrative divisions: none (british crown dependency) independence: none (british crown dependency) constitution: unwritten; partly statutes, partly common law and practice legal system: english law and local statute national holiday: liberation day, 9 may (1945) executive branch: british monarch, lieutenant governor, bailiff legislative branch: unicameral assembly of the states judicial branch: royal court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--lieutenant governor adm. sir william pillar (since na 1985); bailiff peter crill (since na) political parties and leaders: none; all independents suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: assembly of the states--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote na; seats--(56 total, 52 elected) 52 independents communists: probably none diplomatic representation: none (british crown dependency) flag: white with the diagonal red cross of st. patrick (patron saint of ireland) extending to the corners of the flag economy overview: the economy is based largely on financial services, agriculture, and tourism. potatoes, cauliflower, tomatoes, and especially flowers are important export crops, shipped mostly to the uk. the jersey breed of dairy cattle is known worldwide and represents an important export earner. milk products go to the uk and other ec countries. in 1986 the finance sector overtook tourism as the main contributor to gdp, accounting for 40% of the island's output. in recent years the government has encouraged light industry to locate in jersey, with the result that an electronics industry has developed alongside the traditional manufacturing of knitwear. all raw material and energy requirements are imported, as well as a large share of jersey's food needs. gdp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate 8% (1987 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $308.0 million; expenditures $284.4 million, including capital expenditures of na (1985) exports: $na; commodities--light industrial and electrical goods, foodstuffs, textiles; partners--uk imports: $na; commodities--machinery and transport equipment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs, mineral fuels, chemicals; partners--uk external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 50,000 kw standby capacity (1989); power supplied by france industries: tourism, banking and finance, dairy agriculture: potatoes, cauliflowers, tomatoes; dairy and cattle farming aid: none currency: jersey pound (plural--pounds); 1 jersey pound (lj) = 100 pence exchange rates: jersey pounds (lj) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); the jersey pound is at par with the british pound fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications ports: saint helier, gorey, st. aubin airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m (st. peter) telecommunications: 63,700 telephones; stations--1 am, no fm, 1 tv; 3 submarine cables defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: johnston atoll (territory of the us) geography total area: 2.8 km2; land area: 2.8 km2 comparative area: about 4.7 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 10 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical, but generally dry; consistent northeast trade winds with little seasonal temperature variation terrain: mostly flat with a maximum elevation of 4 meters natural resources: guano (deposits worked until about 1890) land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: some low-growing vegetation note: strategic location 1,328 km west-southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, about one-third of the way between hawaii and the marshall islands; johnston island and sand island are natural islands; north island (akau) and east island (hikina) are manmade islands formed from coral dredging; closed to the public; former nuclear weapons test site people population: 1,203 (december 1989); all us government personnel and contractors government long-form name: none (territory of the us) type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the us defense nuclear agency (dna) and managed cooperatively by dna and the fish and wildlife service of the us department of the interior as part of the national wildlife refuge system diplomatic representation: none (territory of the us) flag: the flag of the us is used economy overview: economic activity is limited to providing services to us military personnel and contractors located on the island. all food and manufactured goods must be imported. communications ports: johnston island airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 2,743 m telecommunications: excellent system including 60-channel submarine cable, autodin/srt terminal, digital telephone switch, military affiliated radio system (mars station), and a (receive only) commercial satellite television system note: us coast guard operates a loran transmitting station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: jordan (see separate west bank entry) note: the war between israel and the arab states in june 1967 ended with israel in control of the west bank. as stated in the 1978 camp david accords and reaffirmed by president reagan's 1 september 1982 peace initiative, the final status of the west bank and gaza strip, their relationship with their neighbors, and a peace treaty between israel and jordan are to be negotiated among the concerned parties. the camp david accords further specify that these negotiations will resolve the location of the respective boundaries. pending the completion of this process, it is us policy that the final status of the west bank and gaza strip has yet to be determined. geography total area: 91,880 km2; land area: 91,540 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than indiana land boundaries: 1,586 km total; iraq 134 km, israel 238 km, saudi arabia 742 km, syria 375 km, west bank 97 km coastline: 26 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: differences with israel over the location of the 1949 armistice line which separates the two countries climate: mostly arid desert; rainy season in west (november to april) terrain: mostly desert plateau in east, highland area in west; great rift valley separates east and west banks of the jordan river natural resources: phosphates, potash, shale oil land use: 4% arable land; 0.5% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 0.5% forest and woodland; 94% other; includes 0.5% irrigated environment: lack of natural water resources; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification people population: 3,064,508 (july 1990), growth rate 3.6% (1990) birth rate: 42 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 55 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 71 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--jordanian(s); adjective--jordanian ethnic divisions: 98% arab, 1% circassian, 1% armenian religion: 92% sunni muslim, 8% christian language: arabic (official); english widely understood among upper and middle classes literacy: 71% (est.) labor force: 572,000 (1988); 20% agriculture, 20% manufacturing and mining (1987 est.) organized labor: about 10% of labor force note: 1.5-1.7 million palestinians live on the east bank (55-60% of the population), most are jordanian citizens government long-form name: hashemite kingdom of jordan type: constitutional monarchy capital: amman administrative divisions: 8 governorates (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); al balqa, al karak, al mafraq, amman, at tafilah, az zarqa, irbid, maan independence: 25 may 1946 (from league of nations mandate under british administration; formerly trans-jordan) constitution: 8 january 1952 legal system: based on islamic law and french codes; judicial review of legislative acts in a specially provided high tribunal; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 25 may (1946) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national assembly (majlis al umma) consists of an upper house or house of notables (majlis al-ayaan) and a lower house or house of representatives (majlis al-nuwwab); note--the house of representatives was dissolved by king hussein on 30 july 1988 as part of jordanian disengagement from the west bank and in november 1989 the first parliamentary elections in 22 years were held, with no seats going to palestinians on the west bank judicial branch: court of cassation leaders: chief of state--king hussein ibn talal i (since 11 august 1952); head of government--prime minister mudar badran (since 4 december 1989) political parties and leaders: none; after 1989 parliamentary elections, king hussein promised to allow the formation of political parties suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: house of representatives--last held 8 november 1989 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote na; seats--(80 total) percent of vote na communists: party actively repressed, membership less than 500 (est.) member of: acc, arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador hussein a. hammami; chancery at 3504 international drive nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 966-2664; us--ambassador roscoe s. suddarth; embassy on jebel amman, amman (mailing address is p. o. box 354, amman, or apo new york 09892); telephone p962o (6) 644371 through 644376 flag: three equal horizontal bands of black (top), white, and green with a red isosceles triangle based on the hoist side bearing a small white seven-pointed star; the seven points on the star represent the seven fundamental laws of the koran economy overview: jordan was a secondary beneficiary of the oil boom of the late 1970s and early 1980s, when its gnp growth averaged 10-12%. recent years, however, have witnessed a sharp reduction in cash aid from arab oil-producing countries and in worker remittances, with growth averaging 1-2%. imports--mainly oil, capital goods, consumer durables, and foodstuffs--have been outstripping exports by roughly $2 billion annually, the difference being made up by aid, remittances, and borrowing. in 1989 the government pursued policies to encourage private investment, curb imports of luxury goods, promote exports, reduce the budget deficit, and, in general, reinvigorate economic growth. success will depend largely on exogenous forces, such as the absence of drought and a pickup in outside support. down the road, the completion of the proposed unity dam on the yarmuk is vital to meet rapidly growing requirements for water. gnp: $5.2 billion, per capita $1,760; real growth rate 0% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 35% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 9-10% (december 1989 est.) budget: revenues $0.92 billion; expenditures $1.6 billion, including capital expenditures of $540 million (1989 est.) exports: $0.910 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--fruits and vegetables, phosphates, fertilizers; partners--iraq, saudi arabia, india, kuwait, japan, china, yugoslavia, indonesia imports: $1.7 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--crude oil, textiles, capital goods, motor vehicles, foodstuffs; partners--ec, us, saudi arabia, japan, turkey, romania, china, taiwan external debt: $8.3 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 7.8% (1988 est.) electricity: 981,000 kw capacity; 3,500 million kwh produced, 1,180 kwh per capita (1989) industries: phosphate mining, petroleum refining, cement, potash, light manufacturing agriculture: accounts for only 5% of gdp; principal products are wheat, barley, citrus fruit, tomatoes, melons, olives; livestock--sheep, goats, poultry; large net importer of food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.7 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.2 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $9.5 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $44 million currency: jordanian dinar (plural--dinars); 1 jordanian dinar (jd) = 1,000 fils exchange rates: jordanian dinars (jd) per us$1--0.6557 (january 1990), 0.5704 (1989), 0.3715 (1988), 0.3387 (1987), 0.3499 (1986), 0.3940 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 619 km 1.050-meter gauge, single track highways: 7,500 km; 5,500 km asphalt, 2,000 km gravel and crushed stone pipelines: crude oil, 209 km ports: al aqabah merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 32,635 grt/44,618 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 2 bulk cargo civil air: 19 major transport aircraft airports: 19 total, 16 usable; 14 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 13 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate system of radio relay, cable, and radio; 81,500 telephones; stations--4 am, 3 fm, 24 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 arabsat, 1 domestic tv receive-only; coaxial cable and radio relay to iraq, saudi arabia, and syria; radio relay to lebanon is inactive; a microwave network linking syria, egypt, libya, tunisia, algeria, morocco and jordan defense forces branches: jordan arab army, royal jordanian air force, royal jordanian coast guard military manpower: males 15-49, 726,736; 519,972 fit for military service; 38,730 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 11% of gnp, or $570 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: juan de nova island (french possession) geography total area: 4.4 km2; land area: 4.4 km2 comparative area: about 7.5 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 24.1 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by madagascar climate: tropical terrain: undetermined natural resources: guano deposits and other fertilizers land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 90% forest and woodland; 10% other environment: subject to periodic cyclones; wildlife sanctuary note: located in the central mozambique channel about halfway between africa and madagascar people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: french possession administered by commissioner of the republic daniel constantin, resident in reunion economy overview: no economic activity communications railroads: short line going to a jetty airports: 1 with nonpermanent-surface runway less than 1,220 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only note: one weather station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: kenya geography total area: 582,650 km2; land area: 569,250 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of nevada land boundaries: 3,477 km total; ethiopia 861 km, somalia 682 km, sudan 232 km, tanzania 769 km, uganda 933 km coastline: 536 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: international boundary and administrative boundary with sudan; possible claim by somalia based on unification of ethnic somalis climate: varies from tropical along coast to arid in interior terrain: low plains rise to central highlands bisected by great rift valley; fertile plateau in west natural resources: gold, limestone, diotomite, salt barytes, magnesite, feldspar, sapphires, fluorspar, garnets, wildlife land use: 3% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 4% forest and woodland; 85% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: unique physiography supports abundant and varied wildlife of scientific and economic value; deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; glaciers on mt. kenya note: kenyan highlands one of the most successful agricultural production regions in africa people population: 24,639,261 (july 1990), growth rate 3.8% (1990) birth rate: 45 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 60 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--kenyan(s); adjective--kenyan ethnic divisions: 21% kikuyu, 14% luhya, 13% luo, 11% kalenjin, 11% kamba, 6% kisii, 6% meru, 1% asian, european, and arab religion: 38% protestant, 28% roman catholic, 26% indigenous beliefs, 6% muslim language: english and swahili (official); numerous indigenous languages literacy: 59.2% labor force: 9,003,000; 78% agriculture, 22% nonagriculture (1987 est.) organized labor: 390,000 (est.) government long-form name: republic of kenya type: republic capital: nairobi administrative divisions: 7 provinces and 1 area*; central, coast, eastern, nairobi area*, north-eastern, nyanza, rift valley, western independence: 12 december 1963 (from uk; formerly british east africa) constitution: 12 december 1963, amended as a republic 1964; reissued with amendments 1979, 1983, 1986, and 1988 legal system: based on english common law, tribal law, and islamic law; judicial review in high court; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations; constitutional amendment in 1982 made kenya a de jure one-party state national holiday: independence day, 12 december (1963) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly judicial branch: court of appeal, high court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president daniel teroitich arap moi (since 14 october 1978); vice president george saitoti (since 10 may 1989) political parties and leaders: only party--kenya african national union (kanu), daniel t. arap moi, president suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 21 march 1988 (next to be held february 1993); results--president daniel t. arap moi was reelected; national assembly--last held on 21 march 1988 (next to be held march 1993); results--kanu is the only party; seats--(202 total, 188 elected) kanu 200 communists: may be a few communists and sympathizers other political or pressure groups: labor unions; exile opposition--mwakenya and other groups member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oau, un, undp, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador denis daudi afande; chancery at 2249 r street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 387-6101; there are kenyan consulates general in los angeles and new york; us--ambassador smith hempstone; embassy at the corner of moi avenue and haile selassie avenue, nairobi (mailing address is p. o. box 30137, nairobi or apo new york 09675); telephone p254o (2) 334141; there is a us consulate in mombasa flag: three equal horizontal bands of black (top), red, and green; the red band is edged in white; a large warrior's shield covering crossed spears is superimposed at the center economy overview: a serious underlying economic problem is kenya's 3.8% annual population growth rate--one of the highest in the world. in the meantime, gdp growth in the near term has kept slightly ahead of population--annually averaging 5.2% in the 1986-88 period. undependable weather conditions and a shortage of arable land hamper long-term growth in agriculture, the leading economic sector. gdp: $8.5 billion, per capita $360; real growth rate 4.9% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.3% (1988) unemployment rate: na%, but there is a high level of unemployment and underemployment budget: revenues $2.3 billion; expenditures $2.6 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.71 billion (fy87) exports: $1.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee 20%, tea 18%, manufactures 15%, petroleum products 10% (1987); partners--western europe 45%, africa 22%, far east 10%, us 4%, middle east 3% (1987) imports: $1.8 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment 36%, raw materials 33%, fuels and lubricants 20%, food and consumer goods 11% (1987); partners--western europe 49%, far east 20%, middle east 19%, us 7% (1987) external debt: $6.2 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.8% (1987 est.) electricity: 587,000 kw capacity; 2,250 million kwh produced, 90 kwh per capita (1989) industries: small-scale consumer goods (plastic, furniture, batteries, textiles, soap, cigarettes, flour), agricultural processing, oil refining, cement, tourism agriculture: most important sector, accounting for 30% of gdp, about 80% of the work force, and over 50% of exports; cash crops--coffee, tea, sisal, pineapple; food products--corn, wheat, sugarcane, fruit, vegetables, dairy products; food output not keeping pace with population growth illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis used mostly for domestic consumption; widespread cultivation of cannabis and qat on small plots; transit country for heroin and methaqualone en route from southwest asia to west africa, western europe, and the us aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $771 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $6.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $74 million; communist countries (1970-88), $83 million currency: kenyan shilling (plural--shillings); 1 kenyan shilling (ksh) = 100 cents exchange rates: kenyan shillings (ksh) per us$1--21.749 (december 1989), 20.572 (1989), 17.747 (1988), 16.454 (1987), 16.226 (1986), 16.432 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 2,040 km 1.000-meter gauge highways: 64,590 km total; 7,000 km paved, 4,150 km gravel, remainder improved earth inland waterways: part of lake victoria system is within boundaries of kenya; principal inland port is at kisumu pipelines: refined products, 483 km ports: mombasa, lamu civil air: 14 major transport aircraft airports: 247 total, 211 usable; 18 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 45 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: in top group of african systems; consists of radio relay links, open-wire lines, and radiocommunication stations; 260,000 telephones; stations--11 am, 4 fm, 4 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intlesat defense forces branches: kenya army, kenya navy, air force; paramilitary general service unit military manpower: males 15-49, 5,240,551; 3,235,557 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 1.0% of gdp, or $100 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: kingman reef (territory of the us) geography total area: 1 km2; land area: 1 km2 comparative area: about 1.7 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 3 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical, but moderated by prevailing winds terrain: low and nearly level with a maximum elevation of about 1 meter natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: barren coral atoll with deep interior lagoon; wet or awash most of the time note: located 1,600 km south-southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, about halfway between hawaii and american samoa; maximum elevation of about 1 meter makes this a navigational hazard; closed to the public people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the us navy economy overview: no economic activity communications airports: lagoon was used as a halfway station between hawaii and american samoa by pan american airways for flying boats in 1937 and 1938 ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: kiribati geography total area: 717 km2; land area: 717 km2; includes three island groups--gilbert islands, line islands, phoenix islands comparative area: slightly more than four times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 1,143 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; marine, hot and humid, moderated by trade winds terrain: mostly low-lying coral atolls surrounded by extensive reefs natural resources: phosphate (production discontinued in 1979) land use: negl% arable land; 51% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 46% other environment: typhoons can occur any time, but usually november to march; 20 of the 33 islands are inhabited note: banaba or ocean island is one of the three great phosphate rock islands in the pacific (the others are makatea in french polynesia and nauru) people population: 70,012 (july 1990), growth rate 1.7% (1990) birth rate: 34 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 65 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 52 years male, 57 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--kiribatian(s); adjective--kiribati ethnic divisions: micronesian religion: 48% roman catholic, 45% protestant (congregational), some seventh-day adventist and baha'i language: english (official), gilbertese literacy: 90% labor force: 7,870 economically active (1985 est.) organized labor: kiribati trades union congress--2,500 members government long-form name: republic of kiribati type: republic capital: tarawa administrative divisions: 3 units; gilbert islands, line islands, phoenix islands; note--a new administrative structure of 6 districts (banaba, central gilberts, line islands, northern gilberts, southern gilberts, tarawa) may have been changed to 20 island councils (one for each of the inhabited islands) named abaiang, abemama, aranuka, arorae, banaba, beru, butaritari, kiritimati, kuria, maiana, makin, marakei, nikunau, nonouti, onotoa, tabiteuea, tabuaeran, tamana, tarawa, teraina independence: 12 july 1979 (from uk; formerly gilbert islands) constitution: 12 july 1979 national holiday: independence day, 12 july (1979) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of assembly (maneaba ni maungatabu) judicial branch: court of appeal, high court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president ieremia t. tabai (since 12 july 1979); vice president teatao teannaki (since 20 july 1979) political parties and leaders: gilbertese national party; christian democratic party, teburoro tito, secretary; essentially not organized on basis of political parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 12 may 1987 (next to be held may 1991); results--ieremia t. tabai 50.1%, tebruroro tito 42.7%, tetao tannaki 7.2%; national assembly--last held on 19 march l987 (next to be held march 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(40 total; 39 elected) percent of seats by party na member of: acp, adb, commonwealth, escap (associate member), gatt (de facto), icao, imf, spf, who diplomatic representation: ambassador (vacant) lives in tarawa (kiribati); us--none flag: the upper half is red with a yellow frigate bird flying over a yellow rising sun and the lower half is blue with three horizontal wavy white stripes to represent the ocean economy overview: the country has few national resources. phosphate deposits were exhausted at the time of independence in 1979. copra and fish now represent the bulk of production and exports. the economy has fluctuated widely in recent years. real gdp declined about 8% in 1987, as the fish catch fell sharply to only one-fourth the level of 1986 and copra production was hampered by repeated rains. output rebounded strongly in 1988, with real gdp growing by 17%. the upturn in economic growth came from an increase in copra production and a good fish catch. following the strong surge in output in 1988, gdp remained about the same in 1989. gdp: $34 million, per capita $500; real growth rate 0% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.1% (1988) unemployment rate: 2% (1985); considerable underemployment budget: revenues $22.0 million; expenditures $12.7 million, including capital expenditures of $9.7 million (1988) exports: $5.1 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fish 55%, copra 42%; partners--ec 20%, marshall islands 12%, us 8%, american samoa 4% (1985) imports: $21.5 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, fuel, transportation equipment; partners--australia 39%, japan 21%, nz 6%, uk 6%, us 3% (1985) external debt: $2.0 million (december 1987 est.) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 5,000 kw capacity; 13 million kwh produced, 190 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, handicrafts agriculture: accounts for 30% of gdp (including fishing); copra and fish contribute 95% to exports; subsistence farming predominates; food crops--taro, breadfruit, sweet potatoes, vegetables; not self-sufficient in food aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $245 million currency: australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: na communications highways: 640 km of motorable roads inland waterways: small network of canals, totaling 5 km, in line islands ports: banaba and betio (tarawa) civil air: 2 trislanders; no major transport aircraft airports: 22 total; 21 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 1,400 telephones; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: korea, north geography total area: 120,540 km2; land area: 120,410 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than mississippi land boundaries: 1,671 km total; china 1,416 km, south korea 238 km, ussr 17 km coastline: 2,495 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm; military boundary line: 50 nm (all foreign vessels and aircraft without permission are banned) disputes: short section of boundary with china is indefinite; demarcation line with south korea climate: temperate with rainfall concentrated in summer terrain: mostly hills and mountains separated by deep, narrow valleys; coastal plains wide in west, discontinuous in east natural resources: coal, lead, tungsten, zinc, graphite, magnesite, iron ore, copper, gold, pyrites, salt, fluorspar, hydropower land use: 18% arable land; 1% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 74% forest and woodland; 7% other; includes 9% irrigated environment: mountainous interior is isolated, nearly inaccessible, and sparsely populated; late spring droughts often followed by severe flooding note: strategic location bordering china, south korea, and ussr people population: 21,292,649 (july 1990), growth rate 1.7% (1990) birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 27 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--korean(s); adjective--korean ethnic divisions: racially homogeneous religion: buddhism and confucianism; religious activities now almost nonexistent language: korean literacy: 95% (est.) labor force: 9,615,000; 36% agricultural, 64% nonagricultural; shortage of skilled and unskilled labor (mid-1987 est.) organized labor: 1,600,000 members; single-trade union system coordinated by the general federation of trade unions of korea under the central committee government long-form name: democratic people's republic of korea; abbreviated dprk type: communist state; one-man rule capital: p'yongyang administrative divisions: 9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 3 special cities* (jikhalsi, singular and plural); chagang-do, hamgyong-namdo, hamgyong-bukto, hwanghae-namdo, hwanghae-bukto, kaesong-si*, kangwon-do, namp'o-si*, p'yongan-bukto, p'yongan-namdo, p'yongyang-si*, yanggang-do independence: 9 september 1948 constitution: adopted 1948, revised 27 december 1972 legal system: based on german civil law system with japanese influences and communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 9 september (1948) executive branch: president, two vice presidents, premier, nine vice premiers, state administration council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral supreme people's assembly (choe ko in min hoe ui) judicial branch: central court leaders: chief of state--president kim il-song (since 28 december 1972); designated successor kim chong-il (son of president, born 16 february 1942); head of government--premier yon hyong-muk (since na december 1988) political parties and leaders: only party--korean workers' party (kwp); kim il-song, general secretary, and his son, kim chong-il, secretary, central committee suffrage: universal at age 17 elections: president--last held 29 december 1986 (next to be held december 1990); results--president kim il song was reelected without opposition; supreme people's assembly--last held on 2 november 1986 (next to be held november 1990, but the constitutional provision for elections every four years is not always followed); results--kwp is the only party; seats--(655 total) kwp 655; the kwp approves a single list of candidates who are elected without opposition communists: kwp claims membership of about 2 million, or about one-tenth of population member of: escap, fao, g-77, iaea, icao, imo, ipu, itu, nam, unctad, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wto, unido, wmo; official observer status at un diplomatic representation: none flag: three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple width), and blue; the red band is edged in white; on the hoist side of the red band is a white disk with a red five-pointed star economy overview: more than 90% of this command economy is socialized; agricultural land is collectivized; and state-owned industry produces 95% of manufactured goods. state control of economic affairs is unusually tight even for a communist country because of the small size and homogeneity of the society and the strict one-man rule of kim. economic growth during the period 1984-89 has averaged approximately 3%. abundant natural resources and hydropower form the basis of industrial development. output of the extractive industries includes coal, iron ore, magnesite, graphite, copper, zinc, lead, and precious metals. manufacturing emphasis is centered on heavy industry, with light industry lagging far behind. the use of high-yielding seed varieties, expansion of irrigation, and the heavy use of fertilizers have enabled north korea to become largely self-sufficient in food production. north korea, however, is far behind south korea in economic development and living standards. gnp: $28 billion, per capita $1,240; real growth rate 3% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: officially none budget: revenues $15.6 billion; expenditures $15.6 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1989) exports: $2.4 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--minerals, metallurgical products, agricultural products, manufactures; partners--ussr, china, japan, frg, hong kong, singapore imports: $3.1 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum, machinery and equipment, coking coal, grain; partners--ussr, japan, china, frg, hong kong, singapore external debt: $2.5 billion hard currency (1989) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 6,440,000 kw capacity; 40,250 million kwh produced, 1,740 kwh per capita (1989) industries: machine building, military products, electric power, chemicals, mining, metallurgy, textiles, food processing agriculture: accounts for about 25% of gnp and 36% of work force; principal crops--rice, corn, potatoes, soybeans, pulses; livestock and livestock products--cattle, hogs, pork, eggs; not self-sufficient in grain; fish catch estimated at 1.7 million metric tons in 1987 aid: communist countries (1970-88), $1.3 billion currency: north korean won (plural--won); 1 north korean won (wn) = 100 chon exchange rates: north korean won (wn) per us$1--2.3 (december 1989), 2.13 (december 1988), 0.94 (march 1987), na (1986), na (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 4,535 km total operating in 1980; 3,870 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 665 km 0.762-meter narrow gauge, 159 km double track; 3,175 km electrified; government owned highways: about 20,280 km (1980); 98.5% gravel, crushed stone, or earth surface; 1.5% concrete or bituminous inland waterways: 2,253 km; mostly navigable by small craft only pipelines: crude oil, 37 km ports: ch'ongjin, haeju, hungnam, namp'o, wonsan, songnim, najin merchant marine: 65 ships (1,000 grt and over) totaling 437,103 grt/663,835 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 1 short-sea passenger, 1 passenger-cargo, 56 cargo, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 3 bulk, 1 combination bulk airports: 50 total, 50 usable; about 30 with permanent-surface runways; fewer than 5 with runways over 3,659 m; 20 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 30 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--18 am, no fm, 11 tv; 200,000 tv sets; 3,500,000 radio receivers; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: ministry of people's armed forces (consists of the army, navy, and air force) military manpower: males 15-49, 6,054,774; 3,699,088 fit for military service; 223,087 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 22% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: korea, south geography total area: 98,480 km2; land area: 98,190 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than indiana land boundary: 238 km with north korea coastline: 2,413 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm (3 nm in the korea strait) disputes: demarcation line with north korea; liancourt rocks claimed by japan climate: temperate, with rainfall heavier in summer than winter terrain: mostly hills and mountains; wide coastal plains in west and south natural resources: coal, tungsten, graphite, molybdenum, lead, hydropower land use: 21% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 67% forest and woodland; 10% other; includes 12% irrigated environment: occasional typhoons bring high winds and floods; earthquakes in southwest; air pollution in large cities notes: strategic location along the korea strait, sea of japan, and yellow sea people population: 43,045,098 (july 1990), growth rate 0.8% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 23 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 73 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--korean(s); adjective--korean ethnic divisions: homogeneous; small chinese minority (about 20,000) religion: strong confucian tradition; vigorous christian minority (28% of the total population); buddhism; pervasive folk religion (shamanism); chondokyo (religion of the heavenly way), eclectic religion with nationalist overtones founded in 19th century, claims about 1.5 million adherents language: korean; english widely taught in high school literacy: over 90% labor force: 16,900,000; 52% services and other; 27% mining and manufacturing; 21% agriculture, fishing, forestry (1987) organized labor: about 10% of nonagricultural labor force in government-sanctioned unions government long-form name: republic of korea; abbreviated rok type: republic capital: seoul administrative divisions: 9 provinces (do, singular and plural) and 6 special cities* (jikhalsi, singular and plural); cheju-do, cholla-bukto, cholla-namdo, ch'ungch'ong-bukto, ch'ungch'ong-namdo, inch'on-jikhalsi*, kangwon-do, kwangju-jikhalsi, kyonggi-do, kyongsang-bukto, kyongsang-namdo, pusan-jikhalsi*, soul-t'ukpyolsi*, taegu-jikhalsi*, taejon-jikhalsi independence: 15 august 1948 constitution: 25 february 1988 legal system: combines elements of continental european civil law systems, anglo-american law, and chinese classical thought; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 15 august (1948) executive branch: president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, state council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president roh tae woo (since 25 february 1988); head of government--prime minister kang young hoon (since 5 december 1988); deputy prime minister cho soon (since 5 december 1988) political parties and leaders: major party is government's democratic justice party (djp), roh tae woo, president, and park tae chun, chairman; opposition parties are peace and democracy party (ppd), kim dae jung; korea reunification democratic party (rpd), kim young sam; new democratic republican party (ndrp), kim jong pil; several smaller parties suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: president--last held on 16 december 1987 (next to be held december 1992); results--roh tae woo (djp) 35.9%, kim young sam (rdp) 27.5%, kim dae jung (ppd) 26.5%, other 10.1%; national assembly--last held on 26 april 1988 (next to be held april 1992); results--djp 34%, rpd 24%, ppd 19%, ndrp 15%, others 8%; seats--(299 total) djp 125, ppd 71, rpd 59, ndrp 35, others 9 communists: communist party activity banned by government other political or pressure groups: korean national council of churches; large, potentially volatile student population concentrated in seoul; federation of korean trade unions; korean veterans' association; federation of korean industries; korean traders association member of: adb, afdb, aspac, ccc, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, unctad, undp, unesco, unicef, unido, un special fund, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto; official observer status at un diplomatic representation: ambassador tong-jin park; chancery at 2320 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-5600; there are korean consulates general in agana (guam), anchorage, atlanta, chicago, honolulu, houston, los angeles, new york, san francisco, and seattle; us--ambassador donald gregg; embassy at 82 sejong-ro, chongro-ku, seoul (mailing address is apo san francisco 96301); telephone p82o (2) 732-2601 through 2618; there is a us consulate in pusan flag: white with a red (top) and blue yin-yang symbol in the center; there is a different black trigram from the ancient i ching (book of changes) in each corner of the white field economy overview: the driving force behind the economy's dynamic growth has been the planned development of an export-oriented economy in a vigorously entrepreneurial society. gnp increased almost 13% in both 1986 and 1987 and 12% in 1988 before slowing to 6.5% in 1989. such a rapid rate of growth was achieved with an inflation rate of only 3% in the period 1986-87, rising to 7% in 1988 and 5% in 1989. unemployment is also low, and some labor bottlenecks have appeared in several processing industries. while the south korean economy is expected to grow at more than 5% annually during the 1990s, labor unrest--which led to substantial wage hikes in 1987-89--threatens to undermine noninflationary growth. gnp: $200 billion, per capita $4,600; real growth rate 6.5% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5% (1989) unemployment rate: 3% (1989) budget: revenues $33.6 billion; expenditures $33.6 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1990) exports: $62.3 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--textiles, clothing, electronic and electrical equipment, footwear, machinery, steel, automobiles, ships, fish; partners--us 33%, japan 21% imports: $61.3 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--machinery, electronics and electronic equipment, oil, steel, transport equipment, textiles, organic chemicals, grains; partners--japan 28%, us 25% (1990) external debt: $30.5 billion (september 1989) industrial production: growth rate 3.5% (1989) electricity: 20,500,000 kw capacity; 80,000 million kwh produced, 1,850 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, clothing, footwear, food processing, chemicals, steel, electronics, automobile production, ship building agriculture: accounts for 11% of gnp and employs 21% of work force (including fishing and forestry); principal crops--rice, root crops, barley, vegetables, fruit; livestock and livestock products--cattle, hogs, chickens, milk, eggs; self-sufficient in food, except for wheat; fish catch of 2.9 million metric tons, seventh-largest in world aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-85), $3.9 billion currency: south korean won (plural--won); 1 south korean won (w) = 100 chon (theoretical) exchange rates: south korean won (w) per us$1--683.43 (january 1990), 671.46 (1989), 731.47 (1988), 822.57 (1987), 881.45 (1986), 870.02 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,106 km operating in 1983; 3,059 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 47 km 0.610-meter narrow gauge, 712 km double track, 418 km electrified; government owned highways: 62,936 km total (1982); 13,476 km national highway, 49,460 km provincial and local roads inland waterways: 1,609 km; use restricted to small native craft pipelines: 294 km refined products ports: pusan, inchon, kunsan, mokpo, ulsan merchant marine: 423 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 7,006,481 grt/11,658,104 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 130 cargo, 41 container, 11 refrigerated cargo, 11 vehicle carrier, 49 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 8 chemical tanker, 10 liquefied gas, 10 combination ore/oil, 143 bulk, 7 combination bulk, 1 multifunction large-load carrier civil air: 93 major transport aircraft airports: 112 total, 105 usable; 61 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 17 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate domestic and international services; 4,800,000 telephones; stations--79 am, 46 fm, 256 tv (57 of 1 kw or greater); satellite earth stations--2 pacific ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, marine corps military manpower: males 15-49, 12,792,426; 8,260,886 fit for military service; 445,320 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 5% of gnp, or $10 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: kuwait geography total area: 17,820 km2; land area: 17,820 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than new jersey land boundaries: 462 km total; iraq 240 km, saudi arabia 222 km coastline: 499 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: ownership of warbah and bubiyan islands disputed by iraq; ownership of qaruh and umm al maradim islands disputed by saudi arabia climate: dry desert; intensely hot summers; short, cool winters terrain: flat to slightly undulating desert plain natural resources: petroleum, fish, shrimp, natural gas land use: negl% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 8% meadows and pastures; negl% forest and woodland; 92% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: some of world's largest and most sophisticated desalination facilities provide most of water; air and water pollution; desertification note: strategic location at head of persian gulf people population: 2,123,711 (july 1990), growth rate 3.8% (1990) birth rate: 29 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 2 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 11 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 15 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--kuwaiti(s); adjective--kuwaiti ethnic divisions: 27.9% kuwaiti, 39% other arab, 9% south asian, 4% iranian, 20.1% other religion: 85% muslim (30% shia, 45% sunni, 10% other), 15% christian, hindu, parsi, and other language: arabic (official); english widely spoken literacy: 71% (est.) labor force: 566,000 (1986); 45.0% services, 20.0% construction, 12.0% trade, 8.6% manufacturing, 2.6% finance and real estate, 1.9% agriculture, 1.7% power and water, 1.4% mining and quarrying; 70% of labor force is non-kuwaiti organized labor: labor unions exist in oil industry and among government personnel government long-form name: state of kuwait type: nominal constitutional monarchy capital: kuwait administrative divisions: 4 governorates (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); al ahmadi, al jahrah, al kuwayt, hawalli; note--there may be a new governorate of farwaniyyah independence: 19 june 1961 (from uk) constitution: 16 november 1962 (some provisions suspended since 29 august 1962) legal system: civil law system with islamic law significant in personal matters; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 25 february executive branch: amir, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: national assembly (majlis al umma) dissolved 3 july 1986 judicial branch: high court of appeal leaders: chief of state--amir sheikh jabir al-ahmad al-jabir al sabah (since 31 december 1977); head of government--prime minister and crown prince sad abdallah al-salim al sabah (since 8 february 1978) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: adult males who resided in kuwait before 1920 and their male descendants at age 21; note--out of all citizens, only 8.3% are eligible to vote and only 3.5% actually vote elections: national assembly--dissolved 3 july 1986 and no elections are planned communists: insignificant other political or pressure groups: large (350,000) palestinian community; several small, clandestine leftist and shia fundamentalist groups are active member of: arab league, fao, g-77, gatt, gcc, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oapec, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador shaikh saud nasir al-sabah; chancery at 2940 tilden street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 966-0702; us--ambassador w. nathaniel howell; embassy at bneid al-gar (opposite the hilton hotel), kuwait city (mailing address is p. o. box 77 safat, 13001 safat, kuwait city); telephone p965o 242-4151 through 4159 flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and red with a black trapezoid based on the hoist side economy overview: the oil sector dominates the economy. of the countries in the middle east, kuwait has oil reserves second only to those of saudi arabia. earnings from hydrocarbons generate over 90% of both export and government revenues and contribute about 40% to gdp. most of the nonoil sector is dependent upon oil-derived government revenues to provide infrastructure development and to promote limited industrial diversification. the economy is heavily dependent upon foreign labor--kuwaitis account for less than 20% of the labor force. the early years of the iran-iraq war pushed kuwait's gdp well below its 1980 peak; however, during the period 1986-88, gdp increased each year, rising to 5% in 1988. gdp: $20.5 billion, per capita $10,500; real growth rate 5.0% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1988) unemployment rate: 0% budget: revenues $7.1 billion; expenditures $10.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.1 billion (fy88) exports: $7.1 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--oil 90%; partners--japan, italy, frg, us imports: $5.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--food, construction material, vehicles and parts, clothing; partners--japan, us, frg, uk external debt: $7.2 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 3% (1988) electricity: 8,287,000 kw capacity; 21,500 million kwh produced, 10,710 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, petrochemicals, desalination, food processing, salt, construction agriculture: virtually none; dependent on imports for food; about 75% of potable water must be distilled or imported aid: donor--pledged $18.3 billion in bilateral aid to less developed countries (1979-89) currency: kuwaiti dinar (plural--dinars); 1 kuwaiti dinar (kd) = 1,000 fils exchange rates: kuwaiti dinars (kd) per us$1--0.2915 (january 1990), 0.2937 (1989), 0.2790 (1988), 0.2786 (1987), 0.2919 (1986), 0.3007 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 3,000 km total; 2,500 km bituminous; 500 km earth, sand, light gravel pipelines: crude oil, 877 km; refined products, 40 km; natural gas, 165 km ports: ash shuwaykh, ash shuaybah, mina al ahmadi merchant marine: 51 ships (1,000 grt or over), totaling 1,862,010 grt/2,935,007 dwt; includes 18 cargo, 5 container, 5 livestock carrier, 18 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 5 liquefied gas civil air: 19 major transport aircraft airports: 8 total, 4 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 4 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent international, adequate domestic facilities; 258,000 telephones; stations--3 am, 2 fm, 3 tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat, and 2 atlantic ocean intelsat; 1 inmarsat, 1 arabsat; coaxial cable and radio relay to iraq and saudi arabia defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, national police force, national guard military manpower: males 15-49, about 688,516; about 411,742 fit for military service; 18,836 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 5.8% of gdp, or $1.2 billion (fy89) ---------------------------------------------------country: laos geography total area: 236,800 km2; land area: 230,800 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than utah land boundaries: 5,083 km total; burma 235 km, cambodia 541 km, china 423 km, thailand 1,754 km, vietnam 2,130 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: boundary dispute with thailand climate: tropical monsoon; rainy season (may to november); dry season (december to april) terrain: mostly rugged mountains; some plains and plateaus natural resources: timber, hydropower, gypsum, tin, gold, gemstones land use: 4% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 58% forest and woodland; 35% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: deforestation; soil erosion; subject to floods note: landlocked people population: 4,023,726 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 126 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 51 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--lao (sing., lao or laotian); adjective--lao or laotian ethnic divisions: 50% lao, 15% phoutheung (kha), 20% tribal thai, 15% meo, hmong, yao, and other religion: 85% buddhist, 15% animist and other language: lao (official), french, and english literacy: 85% labor force: 1-1.5 million; 85-90% in agriculture (est.) organized labor: lao federation of trade unions is subordinate to the communist party government long-form name: lao people's democratic republic type: communist state capital: vientiane administrative divisions: 16 provinces (khoueng, singular and plural) and 1 municipality* (kampheng nakhon, singular and plural); attapu, bokeo, bolikhamsai, champasak, houaphan, khammouan, louang namtha, louangphrabang, oudomxai, phongsali, saravan, savannakhet, sekong, vientiane, vientiane*, xaignabouri, xiangkhoang independence: 19 july 1949 (from france) constitution: draft constitution under discussion since 1976 legal system: based on civil law system; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day (proclamation of the lao people's democratic republic), 2 december (1975) executive branch: president, chairman and five vice chairmen of the council of ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: supreme people's assembly judicial branch: central supreme court leaders: chief of state--acting president phoumi vongvichit (since 29 october 1986); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers general kaysone phomvihan (since 2 december 1975) political parties and leaders: lao people's revolutionary party (lprp), kaysone phomvihan, party chairman; includes lao patriotic front and alliance committee of patriotic neutralist forces; other parties moribund suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: supreme people's assembly--last held on 26 march 1989 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(79 total) number of seats by party na other political or pressure groups: non-communist political groups moribund; most leaders have fled the country member of: adb, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ilo, imf, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, mekong committee, nam, un, unctad, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: first secretary, charge d'affaires ad interim done somvorachit; chancery at 2222 s street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-6416 or 6417; us--charge d'affaires charles b. salmon; embassy at rue bartholonie, vientiane (mailing address is b. p. 114, vientiane, or box v, apo san francisco 96346); telephone 2220, 2357, 2384 flag: three horizontal bands of red (top), blue (double width), and red with a large white disk centered in the blue band economy overview: one of the world's poorest nations, laos has had a communist centrally planned economy with government ownership and control of productive enterprises of any size. recently, however, the government has been decentralizing control and encouraging private enterprise. laos is a landlocked country with a primitive infrastructure, that is, it has no railroads, a rudimentary road system, limited external and internal telecommunications, and electricity available in only a limited area. subsistence agriculture is the main occupation, accounting for over 60% of gdp and providing about 85-90% of total employment. the predominant crop is rice. for the foreseeable future the economy will continue to depend for its survival on foreign aid--from cema, imf, and other international sources. gdp: $585 million, per capita $150; real growth rate 3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 35% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 15% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $71 million; expenditures $198 million, including capital expenditures of $132 million (1988 est.) exports: $57.5 million (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities-electricity, wood products, coffee, tin; partners--thailand, malaysia, vietnam, ussr, us imports: $219 million (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--food, fuel oil, consumer goods, manufactures; partners--thailand, ussr, japan, france, vietnam external debt: $964 million (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 8% (1989 est.) electricity: 176,000 kw capacity; 900 million kwh produced, 225 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tin mining, timber, electric power, agricultural processing agriculture: accounts for 60% of gdp and employs most of the work force; subsistence farming predominates; normally self-sufficient; principal crops--rice (80% of cultivated land), potatoes, vegetables, coffee, sugarcane, cotton illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis and opium poppy for the international drug trade; production of cannabis increased in 1989; marijuana and heroin are shipped to western countries, including the us aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-79), $276 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $468 million; communist countries (1970-88), $895 million currency: new kip (plural--kips); 1 new kip (nk) = 100 at exchange rates: new kips (nk) per us$1--700 (december 1989), 725 (1989), 350 (1988), 200 (1987), 108 (1986), 95 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: about 27,527 km total; 1,856 km bituminous or bituminous treated; 7,451 km gravel, crushed stone, or improved earth; 18,220 km unimproved earth and often impassable during rainy season mid-may to mid-september inland waterways: about 4,587 km, primarily mekong and tributaries; 2,897 additional kilometers are sectionally navigable by craft drawing less than 0.5 m pipelines: 136 km, refined products ports: none airports: 64 total, 50 usable; 9 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 12 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: service to general public considered poor; radio network provides generally erratic service to government users; 7,390 telephones (1986); stations--10 am, no fm, 1 tv; 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: lao people's army (lpa, which consists of an army with naval, aviation, and militia elements), air force, national police department military manpower: males 15-49, 967,047; 517,666 fit for military service; 44,176 reach military age (18) annually; conscription age na defense expenditures: 3.8% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: lebanon geography total area: 10,400 km2; land area: 10,230 km2 comparative area: about 0.8 times the size of connecticut land boundaries: 454 km total; israel 79 km, syria 375 km coastline: 225 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: separated from israel by the 1949 armistice line; israeli troops in southern lebanon since june 1982; syrian troops in northern lebanon since october 1976 climate: mediterranean; mild to cool, wet winters with hot, dry summers terrain: narrow coastal plain; al biqa (bekaa valley) separates lebanon and anti-lebanon mountains natural resources: limestone, iron ore, salt; water-surplus state in a water-deficit region land use: 21% arable land; 9% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 8% forest and woodland; 61% other; includes 7% irrigated environment: rugged terrain historically helped isolate, protect, and develop numerous factional groups based on religion, clan, ethnicity; deforestation; soil erosion; air and water pollution; desertification note: nahr al litani only major river in near east not crossing an international boundary people population: 3,339,331 (july 1990), growth rate 1.3% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 49 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--lebanese (sing., pl.); adjective--lebanese ethnic divisions: 93% arab, 6% armenian, 1% other religion: 75% islam, 25% christian, negl% judaism; 17 legally recognized sects--4 orthodox christian (armenian orthodox, greek orthodox, nestorean, syriac orthodox), 7 uniate christian (armenian catholic, caldean, greek catholic, maronite, protestant, roman catholic, syrian catholic), 5 islam (alawite or nusayri, druze, ismailite, shia, sunni), and 1 jewish language: arabic and french (both official); armenian, english literacy: 75% labor force: 650,000; 79% industry, commerce, and services, 11% agriculture, 10% goverment (1985) organized labor: 250,000 members (est.) government note: between early 1975 and late 1976 lebanon was torn by civil war between its christians--then aided by syrian troops--and its muslims and their palestinian allies. the cease-fire established in october 1976 between the domestic political groups generally held for about six years, despite occasional fighting. syrian troops constituted as the arab deterrent force by the arab league have remained in lebanon. syria's move toward supporting the lebanese muslims and the palestinians and israel's growing support for lebanese christians brought the two sides into rough equilibrium, but no progress was made toward national reconciliation or political reforms--the original cause of the war. continuing israeli concern about the palestinian presence in lebanon led to the israeli invasion of lebanon in june 1982. israeli forces occupied all of the southern portion of the country and mounted a summer-long siege of beirut, which resulted in the evacuation of the plo from beirut in september under the supervision of a multinational force (mnf) made up of us, french, and italian troops. within days of the departure of the mnf, lebanon's newly elected president, bashir gemayel, was assassinated. in the wake of his death, christian militiamen massacred hundreds of palestinian refugees in two beirut camps. this prompted the return of the mnf to ease the security burden on lebanon's weak army and security forces. in late march 1984 the last mnf units withdrew. lebanese parliamentarians met in taif, saudi arabia in late 1989 and concluded a national reconciliation pact that codified a new power-sharing formula, specifiying a christian president but giving muslims more authority. rene muawad was subsequently elected president on 4 november 1989, ending a 13-month period during which lebanon had no president and rival muslim and christian governments. muawad was assassinated 17 days later, on 22 november; on 24 november elias harawi was elected to succeed muawad. progress toward lasting political compromise in lebanon has been stalled by opposition from christian strongman gen. michel awn. awn--appointed acting prime minister by outgoing president amin gemayel in september 1988--called the national reconciliation accord illegitimate and has refused to recognize the new lebanese government. lebanon continues to be partially occupied by syrian troops. syria augmented its troop presence during the weeks following muawad's assassination. troops are deployed in west beirut and its southern suburbs, in al biqa, and in northern lebanon. iran also maintains a small contingent of revolutionary guards in al biqa, from which it supports lebanese islamic fundamentalist groups. israel withdrew the bulk of its forces from the south in 1985, although it still retains troops in a 10-km-deep security zone north of its border with lebanon. israel arms and trains the army of south lebanon (asl), which also occupies the security zone and is israel's first line of defense against attacks on its northern border. the following description is based on the present constitutional and customary practices of the lebanese system. long-form name: republic of lebanon; note--may be changed to lebanese republic type: republic capital: beirut administrative divisions: 5 governorates (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); al biqa, al janub, ash shamal, bayrut, jabal lubnan independence: 22 november 1943 (from league of nations mandate under french administration) constitution: 26 may 1926 (amended) legal system: mixture of ottoman law, canon law, napoleonic code, and civil law; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 22 november (1943) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet; note--by custom, the president is a maronite christian, the prime minister is a sunni muslim, and the president of the legislature is a shia muslim legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (arabic--majlis alnuwab, french--assemblee nationale) judicial branch: four courts of cassation (three courts for civil and commercial cases and one court for criminal cases) leaders: chief of state--elias harawi (since 24 november 1989); head of government--prime minister salim al-huss (since 24 november 1989) political parties and leaders: political party activity is organized along largely sectarian lines; numerous political groupings exist, consisting of individual political figures and followers motivated by religious, clan, and economic considerations; most parties have well-armed militias, which are still involved in occasional clashes suffrage: compulsory for all males at age 21; authorized for women at age 21 with elementary education elections: national assembly--elections should be held every four years but security conditions have prevented elections since may 1972 communists: the lebanese communist party was legalized in 1970; members and sympathizers estimated at 2,000-3,000 member of: arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador (vacant); charge d'affaires suleiman rassi; note--the former lebanese ambassador, dr. abdallah bouhabib, is loyal to gen. awn and has refused to abandon his residence or relinquish his post; chancery at 2560 28th street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-6300; there are lebanese consulates general in detroit, new york, and los angeles; us--ambassador john t. mccarthy; embassy at avenue de paris, beirut (mailing address is p. o. box 70-840, beirut); telephone p961o 417774 or 415802, 415803, 402200, 403300 flag: three horizontal bands of red (top), white (double width), and red with a green and brown cedar tree centered in the white band economy overview: severe factional infighting in 1989 has been destroying physical property, interrupting the established pattern of economic affairs, and practically ending chances of restoring lebanon's position as a middle eastern entrepot and banking hub. the ordinary lebanese citizen struggles to keep afloat in an environment of physical danger, high unemployment, and growing shortages. the central government's ability to collect taxes has suffered greatly from militia control and taxation of local areas. as the civil strife persists, the us dollar has become more and more the medium of exchange. transportation, communications, and other parts of the infrastructure continue to deteriorate. family remittances, foreign political money going to the factions, international emergency aid, and a small volume of manufactured exports help prop up the battered economy. prospects for 1990 are grim, with expected further declines in economic activity and living standards. gdp: $2.3 billion, per capita $700; real growth rate na% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 60% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 33% (1987 est.) budget: revenues $50 million; expenditures $650 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1988 est.) exports: $1.0 billion (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--agricultural products, chemicals, textiles, precious and semiprecious metals and jewelry, metals and metal products; partners--saudi arabia 16%, switzerland 8%, jordan 6%, kuwait 6%, us 5% imports: $1.5 billion (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--na; partners--italy 14%, france 12%, us 6%, turkey 5%, saudi arabia 3% external debt: $935 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 1,381,000 kw capacity; 3,870 million kwh produced, 1,170 kwh per capita (1989) industries: banking, food processing, textiles, cement, oil refining, chemicals, jewelry, some metal fabricating agriculture: accounts for about one-third of gdp; principal products--citrus fruits, vegetables, potatoes, olives, tobacco, hemp (hashish), sheep, and goats; not self-sufficient in grain illicit drugs: illicit producer of opium poppy and cannabis for the international drug trade; opium poppy production in al biqa is increasing; most hashish production is shipped to western europe aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $356 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $509 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $962 million; communist countries (1970-86), $9 million currency: lebanese pound (plural--pounds); 1 lebanese pound (ll) = 100 piasters exchange rates: lebanese pounds (ll) per us$1--474.21 (december 1989), 496.69 (1989), 409.23 (1988), 224.60 (1987), 38.37 (1986), 16.42 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 378 km total; 296 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 82 km 1.050-meter gauge; all single track; system almost entirely inoperable highways: 7,370 km total; 6,270 km paved, 450 km gravel and crushed stone, 650 km improved earth pipelines: crude oil, 72 km (none in operation) ports: beirut, tripoli, ras silata, juniyah, sidon, az zahrani, tyre, shikka (none are under the direct control of the lebanese government); northern ports are occupied by syrian forces and southern ports are occupied or partially quarantined by israeli forces; illegal ports scattered along the central coast are owned and operated by various christian, druze, and shia militias merchant marine: 67 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 325,361 grt/494,319 dwt; includes 43 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo, 2 vehicle carrier, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 container, 7 livestock carrier, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 1 specialized tanker, 6 bulk, 1 combination bulk civil air: 15 major transport aircraft airports: 9 total, 8 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m; none under the direct control of the lebanese government telecommunications: rebuilding program disrupted; had fair system of radio relay, cable; 325,000 telephones; stations--5 am, 3 fm, 15 tv; 1 inactive indian ocean intelsat satellite earth station; 3 submarine coaxial cables; radio relay to jordan and syria, inoperable defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 702,961; 434,591 fit for military service; about 44,625 reach military age (18) yearly defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: lesotho geography total area: 30,350 km2; land area: 30,350 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundary: 909 km with south africa coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: temperate; cool to cold, dry winters; hot, wet summers terrain: mostly highland with some plateaus, hills, and mountains natural resources: some diamonds and other minerals, water, agricultural and grazing land land use: 10% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 66% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 24% other environment: population pressure forcing settlement in marginal areas results in overgrazing, severe soil erosion, soil exhaustion; desertification note: surrounded by south africa; highlands water project will control, store, and redirect water to south africa people population: 1,754,664 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 80 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 59 years male, 62 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mosotho (sing.), basotho (pl.); adjective--basotho ethnic divisions: 99.7% sotho; 1,600 europeans, 800 asians religion: 80% christian, rest indigenous beliefs language: sesotho (southern sotho) and english (official); also zulu and xhosa literacy: 59% (1989) labor force: 689,000 economically active; 86.2% of resident population engaged in subsistence agriculture; roughly 60% of active male labor force works in south africa organized labor: there are two trade union federations; the government favors formation of a single, umbrella trade union confederation government long-form name: kingdom of lesotho type: constitutional monarchy capital: maseru administrative divisions: 10 districts; berea, butha-buthe, leribe, mafeteng, maseru, mohales hoek, mokhotlong, qachas nek, quthing, thaba-tseka independence: 4 october 1966 (from uk; formerly basutoland) constitution: 4 october 1966, suspended january 1970 legal system: based on english common law and roman-dutch law; judicial review of legislative acts in high court and court of appeal; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 4 october (1966) executive branch: monarch, chairman of the military council, military council, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: a bicameral parliament consisting of an upper house or senate and a lower house or national assembly was dissolved in january 1970; following the military coup of 20 january 1986, legislative powers were vested in the monarch judicial branch: high court, court of appeal leaders: chief of state--king moshoeshoe ii (paramount chief from 1960 until independence on 4 october 1966, when he became king); heir apparent letsie david seeiso (son of the king); head of government--chairman of the military council maj. gen. justin metsing lekhanya (since 24 january 1986) political parties and leaders: basotho national party (bnp), position vacant; basutoland congress party (bcp), ntsu mokhehle; basotho democratic alliance (bda), a. s. nqojane; national independent party (nip), a. c. manyeli; marematlou freedom party (mfp), s. h. mapheleba; united democratic party, c. d. mofeli suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: national assembly --dissolved following the military coup in january 1986; no date set for national elections communists: small lesotho communist party member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, interpol, itu, nam, oau, southern african customs union, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador w. t. van tonder; chancery at 2511 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 797-5 534; us--ambassador (vacant): deputy chief of mission howard f. jeter; embassy at address na, maseru (mailing address is p. o. box 333, maseru 100); telephone p266o 312666 flag: divided diagonally from the lower hoist side corner; the upper half is white bearing the brown silhouette of a large shield with crossed spear and club; the lower half is a diagonal blue band with a green triangle in the corner economy overview: small, landlocked, and mountainous, lesotho has no important natural resources other than water. its economy is based on agriculture, light manufacturing, and remittances from laborers employed in south africa. subsistence farming is the principal occupation for about 86% of the domestic labor force and accounts for about 20% of gdp. manufacturing depends largely on farm products to support the milling, canning, leather, and jute industries; other industries include textile, clothing, and light engineering. industry's share of total gdp rose from 6% in 1982 to 10.5% in 1987. during the period 1985-87 real gdp growth averaged 2.9% per year, only slightly above the population growth rate. in fy89 per capita gdp was only $245 and nearly 25% of the labor force was unemployed. gdp: $412 million, per capita $245; real growth rate 8.2% (fy89 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15.0% (fy89 est.) unemployment rate: 23% (1988) budget: revenues $159 million; expenditures $224 million, including capital expenditures of $68 million (fy89 est.) exports: $55 million (f.o.b., fy89 est.); commodities--wool, mohair, wheat, cattle, peas, beans, corn, hides, skins, baskets; partners--south africa 87%, ec 10%, (1985) imports: $526 million (f.o.b., fy89 est.); commodities--mainly corn, building materials, clothing, vehicles, machinery, medicines, petroleum, oil, and lubricants; partners--south africa 95%, ec 2% (1985) external debt: $235 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 10.3% (1988 est.) electricity: power supplied by south africa industries: tourism agriculture: exceedingly primitive, mostly subsistence farming and livestock; principal crops are corn, wheat, pulses, sorghum, barley aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $252 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $714 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $4 million; communist countries (1970-88), $14 million currency: loti (plural--maloti); 1 loti (l) = 100 lisente exchange rates: maloti (m) per us$1--2.5555 (january 1990), 2.6166 (1989), 2.2611 (1988), 2.0350 (1987), 2.2685 (1986), 2.1911 (1985); note--the basotho loti is at par with the south african rand fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 1.6 km; owned, operated, and included in the statistics of south africa highways: 5,167 km total; 508 km paved; 1,585 km crushed stone, gravel, or stabilized soil; 946 km improved earth, 2,128 km unimproved earth civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 28 total, 28 usable; 2 with permanent surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modest system consisting of a few land lines, a small radio relay system, and minor radiocommunication stations; 5,920 telephones; stations--2 am, 2 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, air wing, police department military manpower: males 15-49, 381,015; 205,499 fit for military service defense expenditures: 8.6% of gdp, or $35 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: liberia geography total area: 111,370 km2; land area: 96,320 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than tennessee land boundaries: 1,585 km total; guinea 563 km, ivory coast 716 km, sierra leone 306 km coastline: 579 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 200 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid; dry winters with hot days and cool to cold nights; wet, cloudy summers with frequent heavy showers terrain: mostly flat to rolling coastal plains rising to rolling plateau and low mountains in northeast natural resources: iron ore, timber, diamonds, gold land use: 1% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 2% meadows and pastures; 39% forest and woodland; 55% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: west africa's largest tropical rain forest, subject to deforestation people population: 2,639,809 (july 1990), growth rate 3.4% (1990) birth rate: 45 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 126 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 54 years male, 58 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--liberian(s); adjective--liberian ethnic divisions: 95% indigenous african tribes, including kpelle, bassa, gio, kru, grebo, mano, krahn, gola, gbandi, loma, kissi, vai, and bella; 5% descendants of repatriated slaves known as americo-liberians religion: 70% traditional, 20% muslim, 10% christian language: english (official); more than 20 local languages of the niger-congo language group; english used by about 20% literacy: 35% labor force: 510,000, including 220,000 in the monetary economy; 70.5% agriculture, 10.8% services, 4.5% industry and commerce, 14.2% other; non-african foreigners hold about 95% of the top-level management and engineering jobs; 52% of population of working age organized labor: 2% of labor force government long-form name: republic of liberia type: republic capital: monrovia administrative divisions: 13 counties; bomi, bong, grand bassa, grand cape mount, grand jide, grand kru, lofa, margibi, maryland, montserrado, nimba, rivercess, sino independence: 26 july 1847 constitution: 6 january 1986 legal system: dual system of statutory law based on anglo-american common law for the modern sector and customary law based on unwritten tribal practices for indigenous sector national holiday: independence day, 26 july (1847) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national assembly consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: people's supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president gen. dr. samuel kanyon doe (since 12 april 1980); vice president harry f. moniba (since 6 january 1986) political parties and leaders: national democratic party of liberia (ndpl), augustus caine, chairman; liberian action party (lap), emmanuel koromah, chairman; unity party (up), carlos smith, chairman; united people's party (upp), gabriel baccus matthews, chairman suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 15 october 1985 (next to be held october 1991); results--samuel kanyon doe (ndpl) 50.9%, jackson doe (lap) 26.4%, others 22.7%; senate--last held on 15 october 1985 (next to be held 15 october 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(26 total) ndpl 21, lap 3, up 1, lup 1; house of representatives--last held on 15 october 1985 (next to be held october 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(64 total) ndpl 51, lap 8, up 3, lup 2 member of: acp, afdb, ccc, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, mano river union, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador eugenia a. wordsworth-stevenson; chancery at 5201 16th street nw, washington dc 20011; telephone (202) 723-0437 through 0440; there is a liberian consulate general in new york; us--ambassador james k. bishop; embassy at 111 united nations drive, monrovia (mailing address is p. o. box 98, monrovia, or apo new york 09155); telephone p231o 222991 through 222994 flag: 11 equal horizontal stripes of red (top and bottom) alternating with white; there is a white five-pointed star on a blue square in the upper hoist-side corner; the design was based on the us flag economy overview: in 1988 and 1989 the liberian economy posted its best two years in a decade, thanks to a resurgence of the rubber industry and rapid growth in exports of forest products. richly endowed with water, mineral resources, forests, and a climate favorable to agriculture, liberia is a producer and exporter of basic products. local manufacturing, mainly foreign owned, is small in scope. liberia imports primarily machinery and parts, transportation equipment, petroleum products, and foodstuffs. persistent budget deficits, the flight of capital, and deterioration of transport and other infrastructure continue to hold back economic progress. gdp: $988 million, per capita $395; real growth rate 1.5% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 12% (1989) unemployment rate: 43% urban (1988) budget: revenues $242.1 million; expenditures $435.4 million, including capital expenditures of $29.5 million (1989) exports: $550 million (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--iron ore 61%, rubber 20%, timber 11%, coffee; partners--us, ec, netherlands imports: $335 million (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--rice, mineral fuels, chemicals, machinery, transportation equipment, other foodstuffs; partners--us, ec, japan, china, netherlands, ecowas external debt: $1.7 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 1.5% in manufacturing (1987) electricity: 400,000 kw capacity; 730 million kwh produced, 290 kwh per capita (1989) industries: rubber processing, food processing, construction materials, furniture, palm oil processing, mining (iron ore, diamonds) agriculture: accounts for about 40% of gdp (including fishing and forestry); principal products--rubber, timber, coffee, cocoa, rice, cassava, palm oil, sugarcane, bananas, sheep, and goats; not self-sufficient in food, imports 25% of rice consumption aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $634 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $793 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $25 million; communist countries (1970-88), $77 million currency: liberian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 liberian dollar (l$) = 100 cents exchange rates: liberian dollars (l$) per us$1--1.00 (fixed rate since 1940); unofficial parallel exchange rate of l$2.5 = us$1, january 1989 fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 480 km total; 328 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 152 km 1.067-meter narrow gauge; all lines single track; rail systems owned and operated by foreign steel and financial interests in conjunction with liberian government highways: 10,087 km total; 603 km bituminous treated, 2,848 km all weather, 4,313 km dry weather; there are also 2,323 km of private, laterite-surfaced roads open to public use, owned by rubber and timber companies ports: monrovia, buchanan, greenville, harper (or cape palmas) merchant marine: 1,379 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 48,655,666 dwt/ 90,005,898 dwt; includes 11 passenger, 148 cargo, 26 refrigerated cargo, 18 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 42 vehicle carrier, 42 container, 4 barge carrier, 436 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 100 chemical, 63 combination ore/oil, 41 liquefied gas, 6 specialized tanker, 413 bulk, 2 multifunction large-load carrier, 26 combination bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry; all ships are foreign owned; the top four owning flags are us 17%, hong kong 13%, japan 10%, and greece 10%; china owns at least 20 ships and vietnam owns 1 civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 76 total, 60 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: telephone and telegraph service via radio relay network; main center is monrovia; 8,500 telephones; stations--3 am, 4 fm, 5 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: armed forces of liberia, liberia national coast guard military manpower: males 15-49, 627,519; 335,063 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 2.4% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: libya geography total area: 1,759,540 km2; land area: 1,759,540 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than alaska land boundaries: 4,383 km total; algeria 982 km, chad 1,055 km, egypt 1,150 km, niger 354 km, sudan 383 km, tunisia 459 km coastline: 1,770 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm; gulf of sidra closing line: 32o 30' n disputes: claims and occupies a small portion of the aozou strip in northern chad; maritime boundary dispute with tunisia; libya claims about 19,400 km2 in northern niger; libya claims about 19,400 km2 in southeastern algeria climate: mediterranean along coast; dry, extreme desert interior terrain: mostly barren, flat to undulating plains, plateaus, depressions natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, gypsum land use: 1% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 8% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 91% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dry, dust-laden ghibli is a southern wind lasting one to four days in spring and fall; desertification; sparse natural surface-water resources note: the great manmade river project, the largest water development scheme in the world, is being built to bring water from large aquifers under the sahara to coastal cities people population: 4,221,141 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 64 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--libyan(s); adjective--libyan ethnic divisions: 97% berber and arab; some greeks, maltese, italians, egyptians, pakistanis, turks, indians, and tunisians religion: 97% sunni muslim language: arabic; italian and english widely understood in major cities literacy: 50-60% labor force: 1,000,000, includes about 280,000 resident foreigners; 31% industry, 27% services, 24% government, 18% agriculture organized labor: national trade unions' federation, 275,000 members; general union for oil and petrochemicals; pan-africa federation of petroleum energy and allied workers government long-form name: socialist people's libyan arab jamahiriya type: jamahiriya (a state of the masses); in theory, governed by the populace through local councils; in fact, a military dictatorship capital: tripoli administrative divisions: 46 municipalities (baladiyat, singular--baladiyah); ajdabiya, al abyar, al aziziyah, al bayda, al jufrah, al jumayl, al khums, al kufrah, al marj, al qarabulli, al qubbah, al ujaylat, ash shati, awbari, az zahra, az zawiyah, banghazi, bani walid, bin jawwad, darnah, ghadamis, gharyan, ghat, jadu, jalu, janzur, masallatah, misratah, mizdah, murzuq, nalut, qaminis, qasr bin ghashir, sabha, sabratah, shahhat, surman, surt, tajura, tarabulus, tarhunah, tubruq, tukrah, yafran, zlitan, zuwarah; note--the number of municipalities may have been reduced to 13 named al jabal al-akhdar, al jabal al-gharbi, al jabal al-khums, al batnam, al kufrah, al marqab, al marzuq, az zawiyah, banghazi, khalij surt, sabha, tripoli, wadi al-hayat independence: 24 december 1951 (from italy) constitution: 11 december 1969, amended 2 march 1977 legal system: based on italian civil law system and islamic law; separate religious courts; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: revolution day, 1 september (1969) executive branch: revolutionary leader, chairman of the general people's committee, general people's committee (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral general people's congress judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--revolutionary leader col. muammar abu minyar al-qadhafi (since 1 september 1969); head of government--chairman of the general people's committee (premier) umar mustafa al-muntasir (since 1 march 1987) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: national elections are indirect through a hierarchy of revolutionary committees flag: plain green; green is the traditional color of islam (the state religion) economy overview: the socialist-oriented economy depends primarily upon revenues from the oil sector, which contributes virtually all export earnings and over 50% to gnp. since 1980, however, the sharp drop in oil prices and resulting decline in export revenues has adversely affected economic development. in 1986 per capita gnp was the highest in africa at $5,410, but it had been $2,000 higher in 1982. severe cutbacks in imports over the past five years have led to shortages of basic goods and foodstuffs, although the reopening of the libyan-tunisian border in april 1988 and the libyan-egyptian border in december 1989 have somewhat eased shortages. austerity budgets and a lack of trained technicians have undermined the government's ability to implement a number of planned infrastructure development projects. the nonoil industrial and construction sectors, which account for about 15% of gnp, have expanded from processing mostly agricultural products to include petrochemicals, iron, steel, and aluminum. although agriculture accounts for less than 5% of gnp, it employs 20% of the labor force. climatic conditions and poor soils severely limit farm output, requiring libya to import about 75% of its food requirements. gnp: $20 billion, per capita $5,410; real growth rate 0% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 20% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 2% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $6.4 billion; expenditures $11.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.6 billion (1986 est.) exports: $6.1 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum, peanuts, hides; partners--italy, ussr, frg, spain, france, belgium/luxembourg, turkey imports: $5.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--machinery, transport equipment, food, manufactured goods; partners--italy, ussr, frg, uk, japan external debt: $2.1 billion, excluding military debt (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 4,580,000 kw capacity; 13,360 million kwh produced, 3,270 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, food processing, textiles, handicrafts, cement agriculture: 5% of gnp; cash crops--wheat, barley, olives, dates, citrus fruits, peanuts; 75% of food is imported aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $242 million currency: libyan dinar (plural--dinars); 1 libyan dinar (ld) = 1,000 dirhams exchange rates: libyan dinars (ld) per us$1--0.2896 (january 1990), 0.2922 (1989), 0.2853 (1988), 0.2706 (1987), 0.3139 (1986), 0.2961 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 32,500 km total; 24,000 km bituminous and bituminous treated, 8,500 km gravel, crushed stone and earth pipelines: crude oil 4,383 km; natural gas 1,947 km; refined products 443 km (includes 256 km liquid petroleum gas) ports: tobruk, tripoli, banghazi, misratah, marsa el brega merchant marine: 30 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 816,546 grt/1,454,874 dwt; includes 3 short-sea passenger, 11 cargo, 4 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 11 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker civil air: 59 major transport aircraft airports: 130 total, 122 usable; 53 with permanent-surface runways; 7 with runways over 3,659 m; 30 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 44 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern telecommunications system using radio relay, coaxial cable, tropospheric scatter, and domestic satellite stations; 370,000 telephones; stations--18 am, 3 fm, 13 tv; satellite earth stations-1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, and 14 domestic; submarine cables to france and italy; radio relay to tunisia; tropospheric scatter to greece; planned arabsat and intersputnik satellite stations defense forces branches: armed forces of the libyan arab jamahariya includes people's defense (army), arab air force and air defense command, arab navy military manpower: males 15-49, 991,368; 584,512 fit for military service; 50,379 reach military age (17) annually; conscription now being implemented defense expenditures: 11.1% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: liechtenstein geography total area: 160 km2; land area: 160 km2 comparative area: about 0.9 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: 78 km total; austria 37 km, switzerland 41 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: continental; cold, cloudy winters with frequent snow or rain; cool to moderately warm, cloudy, humid summers terrain: mostly mountainous (alps) with rhine valley in western third natural resources: hydroelectric potential land use: 25% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 38% meadows and pastures; 19% forest and woodland; 18% other environment: variety of microclimatic variations based on elevation note: landlocked people population: 28,292 (july 1990), growth rate 0.7% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 5 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--liechtensteiner(s); adjective--liechtenstein ethnic divisions: 95% alemannic, 5% italian and other religion: 82.7% roman catholic, 7.1% protestant, 10.2% other language: german (official), alemannic dialect literacy: 100% labor force: 12,258; 5,078 foreign workers (mostly from switzerland and austria); 54.4% industry, trade, and building; 41.6% services; 4.0% agriculture, fishing, forestry, and horticulture organized labor: na government long-form name: principality of liechtenstein type: hereditary constitutional monarchy capital: vaduz administrative divisions: 11 communes (gemeinden, singular--gemeinde); balzers, eschen, gamprin, mauren, planken, ruggell, schaan, schellenberg, triesen, triesenberg, vaduz independence: 23 january 1719, imperial principality of liechtenstein established constitution: 5 october 1921 legal system: local civil and penal codes; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: st. joseph's day, 19 march executive branch: reigning prince, hereditary prince, prime minister, deputy prime minister legislative branch: unicameral diet (landtag) judicial branch: supreme court (oberster gerichtshof) for criminal cases and superior court (obergericht) for civil cases leaders: chief of state--prince hans adam von und zu liechtenstein (since 13 november 1989; assumed executive powers 26 august 1984); head of government--prime minister hans brunhart (since 26 april 1978); deputy prime minister dr. herbert wille (since 2 february 1986) political parties and leaders: fatherland union (vu), dr. otto hasler; progressive citizens' party (fbp), dr. herbert batliner; christian social party, fritz kaiser suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: diet--last held on 5 march 1989 (next to be held by march 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(25 total) vu 13, fbp 12 communists: none member of: council of europe, efta, iaea, intelsat, interpol, itu, unctad, unido, unicef, upu, wipo; considering un membership; has consultative status in the ec diplomatic representation: in routine diplomatic matters, liechtenstein is represented in the us by the swiss embassy; us--the us has no diplomatic or consular mission in liechtenstein, but the us consul general at zurich (switzerland) has consular accreditation at vaduz flag: two equal horizontal bands of blue (top) and red with a gold crown on the hoist side of the blue band economy overview: the prosperous economy is based primarily on small-scale light industry and some farming. industry accounts for 54% of total employment, the service sector 42% (mostly based on tourism), and agriculture and forestry 4%. the sale of postage stamps to collectors is estimated at $10 million annually and accounts for 10% of revenues. low business taxes (the maximum tax rate is 20%) and easy incorporation rules have induced about 25,000 holding or so-called letter box companies to establish nominal offices in liechtenstein. such companies, incorporated solely for tax purposes, provide an additional 30% of state revenues. the economy is tied closely to that of switzerland in a customs union, and incomes and living standards parallel those of the more prosperous swiss groups. gnp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1987 est.) unemployment rate: 0.1% (december 1986) budget: revenues $171 million; expenditures $189 million, including capital expenditures of na (1986) exports: $807 million; commodities--small specialty machinery, dental products, stamps, hardware, pottery; partners--ec 40%, efta 26% (switzerland 19%) (1986) imports: $na; commodities--machinery, metal goods, textiles, foodstuffs, motor vehicles; partners--na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 23,000 kw capacity; 150 million kwh produced, 5,340 kwh per capita (1989) industries: electronics, metal manufacturing, textiles, ceramics, pharmaceuticals, food products, precision instruments, tourism agriculture: livestock, vegetables, corn, wheat, potatoes, grapes aid: none currency: swiss franc, franken, or franco (plural--francs, franken, or franchi); 1 swiss franc, franken, or franco (swf) = 100 centimes, rappen, or centesimi exchange rates: swiss francs, franken, or franchi (swf) per us$1--1.5150 (january 1990), 1.6359 (1989), 1.4633 (1988), 1.4912 (1987), 1.7989 (1986), 2.4571 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 18.5 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, electrified; owned, operated, and included in statistics of austrian federal railways highways: 130.66 km main roads, 192.27 km byroads civil air: no transport aircraft airports: none telecommunications: automatic telephone system; 25,400 telephones; stations--no am, no fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is responsibility of switzerland ---------------------------------------------------country: luxembourg geography total area: 2,586 km2; land area: 2,586 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than rhode island land boundaries: 359 km total; belgium 148 km, france 73 km, frg 138 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: modified continental with mild winters, cool summers terrain: mostly gently rolling uplands with broad, shallow valleys; uplands to slightly mountainous in the north; steep slope down to moselle floodplain in the southeast natural resources: iron ore (no longer exploited) land use: 24% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 20% meadows and pastures; 21% forest and woodland; 34% other environment: deforestation note: landlocked people population: 383,813 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1989) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 9 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--luxembourger(s); adjective--luxembourg ethnic divisions: celtic base, with french and german blend; also guest and worker residents from portugal, italy, and european countries religion: 97% roman catholic, 3% protestant and jewish language: luxembourgish, german, french; many also speak english literacy: 100% labor force: 161,000; one-third of labor force is foreign workers, mostly from portugal, italy, france, belgium, and frg; 48.9% services, 24.7% industry, 13.2% government, 8.8% construction, 4.4% agriculture (1984) organized labor: 100,000 (est.) members of four confederated trade unions government long-form name: grand duchy of luxembourg type: constitutional monarchy capital: luxembourg administrative divisions: 3 districts; diekirch, grevenmacher, luxembourg independence: 1839 constitution: 17 october 1868, occasional revisions legal system: based on civil law system; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day (public celebration of the grand duke's birthday), 23 june (1921) executive branch: grand duke, prime minister, vice prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral chamber of deputies (chambre des deputes); note--the council of state (conseil d'etat) is an advisory body whose views are considered by the chamber of deputies judicial branch: superior court of justice (cour superieure de de justice) leaders: chief of state--grand duke jean (since 12 november 1964); heir apparent prince henri (son of grand duke jean, born 16 april 1955); head of government--prime minister jacques santer (since 21 july 1984); deputy prime minister jacques f. poos (since 21 july 1984) political parties and leaders: christian social party (csv), jacques santer; socialist workers party (lsap), jacques poos; liberal (dp), colette flesch; communist (kpl), rene urbany; green alternative (gap), jean huss suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: chamber of deputies--last held on 18 june 1989 (next to be held by june 1994); results--csv 31.7%, lsap 27.2%, dp 16.2%, greens 8.4%, pac 7.3%, kpl 5.1%, others 4%; seats--(60 total) csv 22, lsap 18, dp 11, greens 4, pac 4, kpl 1, others 4 communists: 500 party members (1982) other political or pressure groups: group of steel industries representing iron and steel industry, centrale paysanne representing agricultural producers; christian and socialist labor unions; federation of industrialists; artisans and shopkeepers federation member of: benelux, bleu, ccc, council of europe, ec, eib, ems, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, iea, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, itu, nato, oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador andre philippe; chancery at 2200 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-4171; there are luxembourg consulates general in new york and san francisco; us--ambassador jean b. s. gerard; embassy at 22 boulevard emmanuel-servais, 2535 luxembourg city (mailing address is apo new york 09132); telephone p352o 460123 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and light blue; similar to the flag of the netherlands which uses a darker blue and is shorter; design was based on the flag of france economy overview: the stable economy features moderate growth, low inflation, and negligible unemployment. agriculture is based on small but highly productive family-owned farms. the industrial sector, until recently dominated by steel, has become increasingly more diversified, particularly toward high-technology firms. during the past decade growth in the financial sector has more than compensated for the decline in steel. services, especially banking, account for a growing proportion of the economy. luxembourg participates in an economic union with belgium on trade and most financial matters and is also closely connected economically with the netherlands. gdp: $6.3 billion, per capita $17,200; real growth rate 4% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.0% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 1.6% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $2.5 billion; expenditures $2.3 billion, including capital expenditures of na (1988) exports: $4.7 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--finished steel products, chemicals, rubber products, glass, aluminum, other industrial products; partners--ec 75%, us 6% imports: $5.9 billion (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--minerals, metals, foodstuffs, quality consumer goods; partners--frg 40%, belgium 35%, france 15%, us 3% external debt: $131.6 million (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5% (1989 est.) electricity: 1,500,000 kw capacity; 1,163 million kwh produced, 3,170 kwh per capita (1989) industries: banking, iron and steel, food processing, chemicals, metal products, engineering, tires, glass, aluminum agriculture: accounts for less than 3% of gdp (including forestry); principal products--barley, oats, potatoes, wheat, fruits, wine grapes; cattle raising widespread aid: none currency: luxembourg franc (plural--francs); 1 luxembourg franc (luxf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: luxembourg francs (luxf) per us$1--35.468 (january 1990), 39.404 (1989), 36.768 (1988), 37.334 (1987), 44.672 (1986), 59.378 (1985); note--the luxembourg franc is at par with the belgian franc, which circulates freely in luxembourg fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: luxembourg national railways (cfl) operates 270 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 162 km double track; 162 km electrified highways: 5,108 km total; 4,995 km paved, 57 km gravel, 56 km earth; about 80 km limited access divided highway inland waterways: 37 km; moselle river pipelines: refined products, 48 km ports: mertert (river port) merchant marine: 4 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 6,138 grt/9,373 dwt; includes 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker civil air: 13 major transport aircraft airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways less than 1,220 m; 1 with runways over 3,659 m telecommunications: adequate and efficient system, mainly buried cables; 230,000 telephones; stations--2 am, 4 fm, 6 tv; 2 communication satellite earth stations operating in eutelsat and domestic systems defense forces branches: army military manpower: males 15-49, 99,734; 83,237 fit for military service; 2,368 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 1.2% of gdp, or $76 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: macau (overseas territory of portugal) geography total area: 16 km2; land area: 16 km2 comparative area: about 0.1 times the size of washington, dc land boundary: 0.34 km with china coastline: 40 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 12 nm; territorial sea: 6 nm disputes: scheduled to become a special administrative region of china in 1999 climate: subtropical; marine with cool winters, warm summers terrain: generally flat natural resources: negligible land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: essentially urban; one causeway and one bridge connect the two islands to the peninsula on mainland note: 27 km west southwest of hong kong on the southeast coast of china people population: 441,691 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 16 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--macanese (sing. and pl.); adjective--macau ethnic divisions: 95% chinese, 3% portuguese, 2% other religion: mainly buddhist; 17,000 roman catholics, of whom about half are chinese language: portuguese (official); cantonese is the language of commerce literacy: almost 100% among portuguese and macanese; no data on chinese population labor force: 180,000 (1986) organized labor: none government long-form name: none type: overseas territory of portugal; scheduled to revert to china in 1999 capital: macau administrative divisions: 2 districts (concelhos, singular--concelho); ilhas, macau independence: none (territory of portugal); portugal signed an agreement with china on 13 april 1987 to return macau to china on 20 december 1999; in the joint declaration, china promises to respect macau's existing social and economic systems and lifestyle for 50 years after transition constitution: 17 february 1976, organic law of macau legal system: portuguese civil law system national holiday: day of portugal, 10 june executive branch: president of portugal, governor, consultative council, (cabinet) legislative branch: legislative assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president (of portugal) mario alberto soares (since 9 march 1986); head of government--governor carlos melancia (since 3 july 1987) political parties and leaders: association to defend the interests of macau; macau democratic center; group to study the development of macau; macau independent group suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative assembly--last held on 9 november 1988 (next to be held november 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(17 total; 6 elected by universal suffrage, 6 by indirect suffrage) number of seats by party na other political or pressure groups: wealthy macanese and chinese representing local interests, wealthy pro-communist merchants representing china's interests; in january 1967 the macau government acceded to chinese demands that gave china veto power over administration member of: multifiber agreement diplomatic representation: as chinese territory under portuguese administration, macanese interests in the us are represented by portugal; us--the us has no offices in macau and us interests are monitored by the us consulate general in hong kong flag: the flag of portugal is used economy overview: the economy is based largely on tourism (including gambling), and textile and fireworks manufacturing. efforts to diversify have spawned other small industries--toys, artificial flowers, and electronics. the tourist sector has accounted for roughly 25% of gdp, and the clothing industry has provided about two-thirds of export earnings. macau depends on china for most of its food, fresh water, and energy imports. japan and hong kong are the main suppliers of raw materials and capital goods. gdp: $2.7 billion, per capita $6,300; real growth rate 5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 2% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $305 million; expenditures $298 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1989) exports: $1.7 billion (1989 est.); commodities--textiles, clothing, toys; partners--us 33%, hong kong 15%, frg 12%, france 10% (1987) imports: $1.6 billion (1989 est.); commodities--raw materials, foodstuffs, capital goods; partners--hong kong 39%, china 21%, japan 10% (1987) external debt: $91 million (1985) industrial production: na electricity: 179,000 kw capacity; 485 million kwh produced, 1,110 kwh per capita (1989) industries: clothing, textiles, toys, plastic products, furniture, tourism agriculture: rice, vegetables; food shortages--rice, vegetables, meat; depends mostly on imports for food requirements aid: none currency: pataca (plural--patacas); 1 pataca (p) = 100 avos exchange rates: patacas (p) per us$1--8.03 (1989), 8.044 (1988), 7.993 (1987), 8.029 (1986), 8.045 (1985); note--linked to the hong kong dollar at the rate of 1.03 patacas per hong kong dollar fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 42 km paved ports: macau civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: none; 1 seaplane station telecommunications: fairly modern communication facilities maintained for domestic and international services; 52,000 telephones; stations--4 am, 3 fm, no tv; 75,000 radio receivers (est.); international high-frequency radio communication facility; access to international communications carriers provided via hong kong and china; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces military manpower: males 15-49, 166,956; 93,221 fit for military service note: defense is responsibility of portugal ---------------------------------------------------country: madagascar geography total area: 587,040 km2; land area: 581,540 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of arizona land boundaries: none coastline: 4,828 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 150 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims bassas da india, europa island, glorioso islands, juan de nova island, and tromelin island (all administered by france) climate: tropical along coast, temperate inland, arid in south terrain: narrow coastal plain, high plateau and mountains in center natural resources: graphite, chromite, coal, bauxite, salt, quartz, tar sands, semiprecious stones, mica, fish land use: 4% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 58% meadows and pastures; 26% forest and woodland; 11% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: subject to periodic cyclones; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: world's fourth-largest island; strategic location along mozambique channel people population: 11,800,524 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 97 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 54 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--malagasy (sing. and pl.); adjective--malagasy ethnic divisions: basic split between highlanders of predominantly malayo-indonesian origin (merina 1,643,000 and related betsileo 760,000) on the one hand and coastal tribes, collectively termed the cotiers, with mixed african, malayo-indonesian, and arab ancestry (betsimisaraka 941,000, tsimihety 442,000, antaisaka 415,000, sakalava 375,000), on the other; there are also 11,000 european french, 5,000 indians of french nationality, and 5,000 creoles religion: 52% indigenous beliefs; about 41% christian, 7% muslim language: french and malagasy (official) literacy: 67.5% labor force: 4,900,000; 90% nonsalaried family workers engaged in subsistence agriculture; 175,000 wage earners--26% agriculture, 17% domestic service, 15% industry, 14% commerce, 11% construction, 9% services, 6% transportation, 2% other; 51% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: 4% of labor force government long-form name: democratic republic of madagascar type: republic capital: antananarivo administrative divisions: 6 provinces (plural--na, singular--faritanin); antananarivo, antsiranana, fianarantsoa, mahajanga, toamasina, toliara independence: 26 june 1960 (from france; formerly malagasy republic) constitution: 21 december 1975 legal system: based on french civil law system and traditional malagasy law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 26 june (1960) executive branch: president, supreme council of the revolution, prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral popular national assembly (assemblee nationale populaire) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme), high constitutional court (haute cour constitutionnelle) leaders: chief of state--president adm. didier ratsiraka (since 15 june 1975); head of government--prime minister lt. col. victor ramahatra (since 12 february 1988) political parties and leaders: seven parties are now allowed limited political activity under the national front and are represented on the supreme revolutionary council: advance guard of the malagasy revolution (arema), didier ratsiraka; congress party for malagasy independence (akfm); congress party for malagasy independence-revival (akfm-r), pastor richard andriamanjato; movement for national unity (vonjy), dr. marojama razanabahiny; malagasy christian democratic union (udecma), norbert andriamorasata; militants for the establishment of a proletarian regime (mfm), manandafy rakotonirina; national movement for the independence of madagascar (monima), monja jaona; socialist organization monima (vsm, an offshoot of monima), tsihozony maharanga suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 12 march 1989 (next to be held march 1996); results--didier ratsiraka (arema) 62%, manandafy rakotonirina (mfm/mft) 20%, dr. jerome marojama razanabahiny (vonjy) 15%, monja jaona (monima) 3%; people's national assembly--last held on 28 may 1989 (next to be held may 1994); results--arema 88.2%, mfm 5.1%, akfm 3.7%, vonjy 2.2%, others 0.8%; seats--(137 total) arema 120, mfm 7, akfm 5, vonjy 4, monima 1, independent 1 communists: communist party of virtually no importance; small and vocal group of communists has gained strong position in leadership of akfm, the rank and file of which is non-communist member of: acp, afdb, ccc, eama, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itu, nam, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador pierrot jocelyn rajaonarivelo; chancery at 2374 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-5525 or 5526; there is a malagasy consulate general in new york; us--ambassador howard k. walker; embassy at 14 and 16 rue rainitovo, antsahavola, antananarivo (mailing address is b. p. 620, antananarivo); telephone 212-57, 209-56, 200-89, 207-18 flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and green with a vertical white band of the same width on hoist side economy overview: madagascar is one of the poorest countries in the world. during the period 1980-85 it had a population growth of 3% a year and a 0.4% gdp growth rate. agriculture, including fishing and forestry, is the mainstay of the economy, accounting for over 40% of gdp, employing about 85% of the labor force, and contributing more than 70% to export earnings. industry is confined to the processing of agricultural products and textile manufacturing; in 1988 it contributed only 16% to gdp and employed 3% of the labor force. industrial development has been hampered by government policies that have restricted imports of equipment and spare parts and put strict controls on foreign-owned enterprises. in 1986 the government introduced a five-year development plan that stresses self-sufficiency in food (mainly rice) by 1990, increased production for exports, and reduced energy imports. gdp: $1.7 billion, per capita $155; real growth rate 2.2% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 17.0% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $337 million; expenditures $245 million, including capital expenditures of $163 million (1988) exports: $284 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee 45%, vanilla 15%, cloves 11%, sugar, petroleum products; partners--france, japan, italy, frg, us imports: $319 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--intermediate manufactures 30%, capital goods 28%, petroleum 15%, consumer goods 14%, food 13%; partners--france, frg, uk, other ec, us external debt: $3.6 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 3.9 % (1988) electricity: 119,000 kw capacity; 430 million kwh produced, 40 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing (meat canneries, soap factories, brewery, tanneries, sugar refining), light consumer goods industries (textiles, glassware), cement, automobile assembly plant, paper, petroleum agriculture: accounts for 40% of gdp; cash crops--coffee, vanilla, sugarcane, cloves, cocoa; food crops--rice, cassava, beans, bananas, peanuts; cattle raising widespread; not self-sufficient in rice and wheat flour illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis (cultivated and wild varieties) used mostly for domestic consumption aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $118 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.6 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $491 million currency: malagasy franc (plural--francs); 1 malagasy franc (fmg) = 100 centimes exchange rates: malagasy francs (fmg) per us$1--1,531.0 (january 1990), 1603.4 (1989), 1,407.1 (1988), 1,069.2 (1987), 676.3 (1986), 662.5 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,020 km 1.000-meter gauge highways: 40,000 km total; 4,694 km paved, 811 km crushed stone, gravel, or stabilized soil, 34,495 km improved and unimproved earth (est.) inland waterways: of local importance only; isolated streams and small portions of canal des pangalanes ports: toamasina, antsiranana, mahajanga, toliara merchant marine: 13 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 58,126 grt/79,420 dwt; includes 8 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas civil air: 5 major transport aircraft airports: 147 total, 115 usable; 30 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 43 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: above average system includes open-wire lines, coaxial cables, radio relay, and troposcatter links; submarine cable to bahrain; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 atlantic ocean intelsat; over 38,200 telephones; stations--14 am, 1 fm, 7 (30 repeaters) tv defense forces branches: popular army, aeronaval forces (includes navy and air force), paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 2,550,775; 1,519,084 fit for military service; 116,438 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.2% of gdp, or $37 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: malawi geography total area: 118,480 km2; land area: 94,080 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than pennsylvania land boundaries: 2,881 km total; mozambique 1,569 km, tanzania 475 km, zambia 837 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: dispute with tanzania over the boundary in lake nyasa (lake malawi) climate: tropical; rainy season (november to may); dry season (may to november) terrain: narrow elongated plateau with rolling plains, rounded hills, some mountains natural resources: limestone; unexploited deposits of uranium, coal, and bauxite land use: 25% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 20% meadows and pastures; 50% forest and woodland; 5% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: deforestation note: landlocked people population: 9,157,528 (july 1990), growth rate 1.8% (1990) birth rate: 52 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 18 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 16 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 130 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 50 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--malawian(s); adjective--malawian ethnic divisions: chewa, nyanja, tumbuko, yao, lomwe, sena, tonga, ngoni, ngonde, asian, european religion: 55% protestant, 20% roman catholic, 20% muslim; traditional indigenous beliefs are also practiced language: english and chichewa (official); other languages important regionally literacy: 41.2% labor force: 428,000 wage earners; 43% agriculture, 16% manufacturing, 15% personal services, 9% commerce, 7% construction, 4% miscellaneous services, 6% other permanently employed (1986) organized labor: small minority of wage earners are unionized note: there are 800,000 mozambican refugees in malawi (1989 est.) government long-form name: republic of malawi type: one-party state capital: lilongwe administrative divisions: 24 districts; blantyre, chikwawa, chiradzulu, chitipa, dedza, dowa, karonga, kasungu, kasupe, lilongwe, mangochi, mchinji, mulanje, mwanza, mzimba, ncheu, nkhata bay, nkhota kota, nsanje, ntchisi, rumphi, salima, thyolo, zomba independence: 6 july 1964 (from uk; formerly nyasaland) constitution: 6 july 1964; republished as amended january 1974 legal system: based on english common law and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court of appeal; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 6 july (1964) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly judicial branch: high court, supreme court of appeal leaders: chief of state and head of government--president dr. hastings kamuzu banda (since 6 july 1966; sworn in as president for life 6 july 1971) political parties and leaders: only party--malawi congress party (mcp), maxwell pashane, administrative secretary; john tembo, treasurer general; top party position of secretary general vacant since 1983 suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--president banda sworn in as president for life on 6 july 1971; national assembly--last held 27-28 may 1987 (next to be held by may 1992); results--mcp is the only party; seats--(133 total, 112 elected) mcp 133 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, ec (associated member), fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itu, nam, oau, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador robert b. mbaya; chancery at 2408 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 797-1007; us--ambassador george a. trail, iii; embassy in new capital city development area, address na (mailing address is p. o. box 30016, lilongwe); telephone 730-166 flag: three equal horizontal bands of black (top), red, and green with a radiant, rising, red sun centered in the black band; similar to the flag of afghanistan which is longer and has the national coat of arms superimposed on the hoist side of the black and red bands economy overview: a landlocked country, malawi ranks among the world's least developed with a per capita gdp of $180. the economy is predominately agricultural and operates under a relatively free enterprise environment, with about 90% of the population living in rural areas. agriculture accounts for 40% of gdp and 90% of export revenues. after two years of weak performance, economic growth improved significantly in 1988 as a result of good weather and a broadly based economic adjustment effort by the government. the closure of traditional trade routes through mozambique continues to be a constraint on the economy. gdp: $1.4 billion, per capita $180; growth rate 3.6% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 31.5% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $246 million; expenditures $390 million, including capital expenditures of $97 million (fy88 est.) exports: $292 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--tobacco, tea, sugar, coffee, peanuts; partners--us, uk, zambia, south africa, frg imports: $402 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--food, petroleum, semimanufactures, consumer goods, transportation equipment; partners--south africa, japan, us, uk, zimbabwe external debt: $1.4 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 6.4% (1988) electricity: 181,000 kw capacity; 535 million kwh produced, 60 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agricultural processing (tea, tobacco, sugar), sawmilling, cement, consumer goods agriculture: accounts for 40% of gdp; cash crops--tobacco, sugarcane, cotton, tea, and corn; subsistence crops--potatoes, cassava, sorghum, pulses; livestock--cattle and goats aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $182 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.8 billion currency: malawian kwacha (plural--kwacha); 1 malawian kwacha (mk) = 100 tambala exchange rates: malawian kwacha (mk) per us$1--2.6793 (january 1990), 2.7595 (1989), 2.5613 (1988), 2.2087 (1987), 1.8611 (1986), 1.7191 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 789 km 1.067-meter gauge highways: 13,135 km total; 2,364 km paved; 251 km crushed stone, gravel, or stabilized soil; 10,520 km earth and improved earth inland waterways: lake nyasa (lake malawi); shire river, 144 km ports: chipoka, monkey bay, nkhata bay, and nkotakota--all on lake nyasa (lake malawi) civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 48 total, 47 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 9 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of open-wire lines, radio relay links, and radio communication stations; 36,800 telephones; stations--8 am, 4 fm, no tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 atlantic ocean intelsat note: a majority of exports would normally go through mozambique on the beira or nacala railroads, but now most go through south africa because of insurgent activity and damage to rail lines defense forces branches: army, army air wing, army naval detachment, paramilitary police mobile force unit, paramilitary young pioneers military manpower: males 15-49, 1,904,445; 967,032 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.6% of gdp, or $22 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: malaysia geography total area: 329,750 km2; land area: 328,550 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than new mexico land boundaries: 2,669 km total; brunei 381 km, indonesia 1,782, thailand 506 km coastline: 4,675 km total (2,068 km peninsular malaysia, 2,607 km east malaysia) maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation, specified boundary in the south china sea; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: involved in a complex dispute over the spratly islands with china, philippines, taiwan, and vietnam; state of sabah claimed by the philippines; brunei may wish to purchase the malaysian salient that divides brunei into two parts climate: tropical; annual southwest (april to october) and northeast (october to february) monsoons terrain: coastal plains rising to hills and mountains natural resources: tin, crude oil, timber, copper, iron ore, natural gas, bauxite land use: 3% arable land; 10% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 63% forest and woodland; 24% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to flooding; air and water pollution note: strategic location along strait of malacca and southern south china sea people population: 17,510,546 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 29 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 30 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 71 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--malaysian(s); adjective--malaysian ethnic divisions: 59% malay and other indigenous, 32% chinese, 9% indian religion: peninsular malaysia--malays nearly all muslim, chinese predominantly buddhists, indians predominantly hindu; sabah--38% muslim, 17% christian, 45% other; sarawak--35% tribal religion, 24% buddhist and confucianist, 20% muslim, 16% christian, 5% other language: peninsular malaysia--malay (official); english, chinese dialects, tamil; sabah--english, malay, numerous tribal dialects, mandarin and hakka dialects predominate among chinese; sarawak--english, malay, mandarin, numerous tribal languages literacy: 65.0% overall, age 20 and up; peninsular malaysia--80%; sabah--60%; sarawak--60% labor force: 6,800,000; 30.8% agriculture, 17% manufacturing, 13.6% government, 5.8% construction, 4.3% finance, 3.4% business services, transport and communications, 0.6% mining, 24.5% other (1989 est.) organized labor: 660,000, 10% of total labor force (1988) government long-form name: none type: federation of malaysia formed 9 july 1963; constitutional monarchy nominally headed by the paramount ruler (king) and a bicameral parliament composed of a 58-member senate and a 177-member house of representatives; peninsular malaysian states--hereditary rulers in all but penang and melaka, where governors are appointed by malaysian government; powers of state governments are limited by federal constitution; sabah--self-governing state, holds 20 seats in house of representatives, with foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and other powers delegated to federal government; sarawak--self-governing state within malaysia, holds 24 seats in house of representatives, with foreign affairs, defense, internal security, and other powers delegated to federal government capital: kuala lumpur administrative divisions: 13 states (negeri-negeri, singular--negeri) and 2 federal territories* (wilayah-wilayah persekutuan, singular--wilayah persekutuan); johor, kedah, kelantan, labuan*, melaka, negeri sembilan, pahang, perak, perlis, pulau pinang, sabah, sarawak, selangor, terengganu, wilayah persekutuan* independence: 31 august 1957 (from uk) constitution: 31 august 1957, amended 16 september 1963 when federation of malaya became federation of malaysia legal system: based on english common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court at request of supreme head of the federation; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 31 august (1957) executive branch: paramount ruler, deputy paramount ruler, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament (parlimen) consists of an upper house or senate (dewan negara) and a lower house or house of representatives (dewan rakyat) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--paramount ruler azlan muhibbuddin shah ibni sultan yusof izzudin (since 26 april 1989); deputy paramount ruler ja'afar ibni abdul rahman (since 26 april 1989); head of government--prime minister dr. mahathir bin mohamad (since 16 july 1981); deputy prime minister abdul ghafar baba (since 7 may 1986) political parties and leaders: peninsular malaysia--national front, a confederation of 14 political parties dominated by united malays national organization baru (umno baru), mahathir bin mohamad; malaysian chinese association (mca), ling liong sik; gerakan rakyat malaysia, datuk lim keng yaik; malaysian indian congress (mic), datuk samy vellu; sabah--berjaya party, datuk haji mohamed noor mansoor; bersatu sabah (pbs), joseph pairin kitingan; united sabah national organizaton (usno), tun datuk mustapha; sarawak--coalition sarawak national front composed of the party pesaka bumiputra bersatu (pbb), datuk patinggi tan sri haji abdul taib mahmud; sarawak united people's party (supp), datuk amar stephen yong kuat tze; sarawak national party (snap), datuk james wong; parti bansa dayak sarawak (pbds), datuk leo moggie; major opposition parties are democratic action party (dap), lim kit siang and pan-malaysian islamic party (pas), fadzil noor suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: house of representatives--last held 2-3 august 1986 (next to be held by august 1991); results--national front 57.4%, dap 20.8%, pas 15.6%, independents 3.3%, others 2.9%; note--within the national front, umno got 35% and mca 14% of the vote; seats--(177 total) national front 148, dap 24, pas 1, independents 4; note--within the national front, umno got 83 seats and mca 17 seats communists: peninsular malaysia--about 1,000 armed insurgents on thailand side of international boundary and about 200 full time inside malaysia surrendered on 2 december 1989; only about 100 communist insurgents remain in north kalimantan and sabah member of: adb, anrpc, asean, association of tin producing countries, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itc, itu, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador albert s. talalla; chancery at 2401 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 328-2700; there are malaysian consulates general in los angeles and new york; us--ambassador paul m. cleveland; embassy at 376 jalan tun razak, 50400 kuala lumpur (mailing address is p. o. box no. 10035, 50700 kuala lumpur); telephone p6o (03) 248-9011 flag: fourteen equal horizontal stripes of red (top) alternating with white (bottom); there is a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing a yellow crescent and a yellow fourteen-pointed star; the crescent and the star are traditional symbols of islam; the design was based on the flag of the us economy overview: in 1988-89 booming exports helped malaysia continue to recover from the severe 1985-86 recession. real output grew by 8.7% in 1988 and about 7.7% in 1989, helped by vigorous growth in manufacturing output and further increases in foreign direct investment, particularly from japanese and taiwanese firms facing higher costs at home. malaysia has become the world's third-largest producer of semiconductor devices (after the us and japan) and the world's largest exporter of semiconductor devices. inflation remained low as unemployment stood at about 8% of the labor force and as the government followed prudent fiscal/monetary policies. the country is not self-sufficient in food, and a majority of the rural population subsists at the poverty level. malaysia's high export dependence (merchandise exports are 63% of gdp) leaves it vulnerable to a recession in the oecd countries or a fall in world commodity prices. gdp: $37.9 billion, per capita $2,270; real growth rate 7.7% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.6% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 7.9% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $8.8 billion; expenditures $11.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $2.5 billion (1989 est.) exports: $24 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--natural rubber, palm oil, tin, timber, petroleum, electronics, light manufactures; partners--singapore, japan, ussr, ec, australia, us imports: $20 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--food, crude oil, consumer goods, intermediate goods, capital equipment, chemicals; partners--japan, singapore, frg, uk, thailand, china, australia, us external debt: $16.3 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 13.6% (1988) electricity: 5,600,000 kw capacity; 16,500 million kwh produced, 990 kwh per capita (1989) industries: peninsular malaysia--rubber and oil palm processing and manufacturing, light manufacturing industry, electronics, tin mining and smelting, logging and processing timber; sabah--logging, petroleum production; sarawak--agriculture processing, petroleum production and refining, logging agriculture: peninsular malaysia--natural rubber, palm oil, rice; sabah--mainly subsistence; main crops--rubber, timber, coconut, rice; sarawak--main crops--rubber, timber, pepper; there is a deficit of rice in all areas; fish catch of 608,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-84), $170 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $42 million currency: ringgit (plural--ringgits); 1 ringgit (m$) = 100 sen exchange rates: ringgits (m$) per us$1--2.7038 (january 1990), 2.7087 (1989), 2.6188 (1988), 2.5196 (1987), 2.5814 (1986), 2.4830 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: peninsular malaysia--1,665 km 1.04-meter gauge; 13 km double track, government owned; sabah--136 km 1.000-meter gauge highways: peninsular malaysia--23,600 km (19,352 km hard surfaced, mostly bituminous-surface treatment, and 4,248 km unpaved); sabah--3,782 km; sarawak--1,644 km inland waterways: peninsular malaysia--3,209 km; sabah--1,569 km; sarawak--2,518 km ports: tanjong, kidurong, kota kinabalu, kuching, pasir gudang, penang, port kelang, sandakan, tawau merchant marine: 159 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,525,635 grt/2,216,215 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 71 cargo, 21 container, 2 vehicle carrier, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 livestock carrier, 28 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 6 liquefied gas, 1 specialized tanker, 1 passenger-cargo, 22 bulk, 1 passenger civil air: 53 major transport aircraft pipelines: crude oil, 1,307 km; natural gas, 379 km airports: 126 total, 121 usable; 32 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 8 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 19 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good intercity service provided to peninsular malaysia mainly by microwave relay, adequate intercity radio relay network between sabah and sarawak via brunei; international service good; good coverage by radio and television broadcasts; 994,860 telephones (1984); stations--28 am, 3 fm, 33 tv; submarine cables extend to india and sarawak; seacom submarine cable links to hong kong and singapore; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 pacific ocean intelsat, and 2 domestic defense forces branches: royal malaysian army, royal malaysian navy, royal malaysian air force, royal malaysian police force military manpower: males 15-49, 4,499,495; 2,744,743 fit for military service; 178,923 reach military age (21) annually defense expenditures: 3.8% of gdp, or $1.4 billion (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: maldives geography total area: 300 km2; land area: 300 km2 comparative area: slightly more than 1.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 644 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: about 100 nm (defined by geographic coordinates); extended economic zone: 37-310 nm (segment of zone coincides with maritime boundary with india); territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid; dry, northeast monsoon (november to march); rainy, southwest monsoon (june to august) terrain: flat with elevations only as high as 2.5 meters natural resources: fish land use: 10% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 84% other environment: 1,200 coral islands grouped into 19 atolls note: archipelago of strategic location astride and along major sea lanes in indian ocean people population: 217,945 (july 1990), growth rate 3.7% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 76 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 60 years male, 65 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--maldivian(s); adjective--maldivian ethnic divisions: admixtures of sinhalese, dravidian, arab, and black religion: sunni muslim language: divehi (dialect of sinhala; script derived from arabic); english spoken by most government officials literacy: 36% labor force: 66,000 (est.); 80% engaged in fishing industry organized labor: none government long-form name: republic of maldives type: republic capital: male administrative divisions: 19 district (atolls); aliff, baa, daalu, faafu, gaafu aliff, gaafu daalu, haa aliff, haa daalu, kaafu, laamu, laviyani, meemu, naviyani, noonu, raa, seenu, shaviyani, thaa, waavu independence: 26 july 1965 (from uk) constitution: 4 june 1964 legal system: based on islamic law with admixtures of english common law primarily in commercial matters; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 26 july (1965) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral citizens' council (majlis) judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president maumoon abdul gayoom (since since 11 november 1978) political parties and leaders: no organized political parties; country governed by the didi clan for the past eight centuries suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 23 september 1988 (next to be held september 1994); results--president maumoon abdul gayoom reelected; citizens' council--last held on 7 december 1984 (next to be held 7 december 1989); results--percent of vote na; seats--(48 total, 40 elected) communists: negligible member of: adb, colombo plan, commonwealth (special member), escap, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, imf, imo, itu, nam, oic, saarc, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: maldives does not maintain an embassy in the us, but does have a un mission in new york; us--the us ambassador to sri lanka is accredited to maldives and makes periodic visits there; us consular agency, mahduedurage, violet magu, henveru, male; telephone 2581 flag: red with a large green rectangle in the center bearing a vertical white crescent; the closed side of the crescent is on the hoist side of the flag economy overview: the economy is based on fishing, tourism, and shipping. agriculture is limited to the production of a few subsistence crops that provide only 10% of food requirements. fishing is the largest industry, employing 80% of the work force and accounting for over 60% of exports; it is also an important source of government revenue. during the 1980s tourism has become one of the most important and highest growth sectors of the economy. in 1988 industry accounted for about 14% of gdp. real gdp is officially estimated to have increased by about 10% annually during the period 1974-86, and gdp estimates for 1988 show a further growth of 9% on the strength of a record fish catch and an improved tourist season. gdp: $136 million, per capita $670; real growth rate 9.2% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 14% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $51 million; expenditures $50 million, including capital expenditures of $25 million (1988 est.) exports: $47.0 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--fish 57%, clothing 39%; partners--thailand, western europe, sri lanka imports: $90.0 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities-intermediate and capital goods 47%, consumer goods 42%, petroleum products 11%; partners--japan, western europe, thailand external debt: $70 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.9% (1988 est.) electricity: 5,000 kw capacity; 10 million kwh produced, 50 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing and fish processing, tourism, shipping, boat building, some coconut processing, garments, woven mats, coir (rope), handicrafts agriculture: accounts for almost 30% of gdp (including fishing); fishing more important than farming; limited production of coconuts, corn, sweet potatoes; most staple foods must be imported aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $28 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $84 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $14 million currency: rufiyaa (plural--rufiyaa); 1 rufiyaa (rf) = 100 laaris exchange rates: rufiyaa (rf) per us$1--9.3043 (january 1990), 9.0408 (1989), 8.7846 (1988), 9.2230 (1987), 7.1507 (1986), 7.0981 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: male has 9.6 km of coral highways within the city ports: male, gan merchant marine: 16 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 70,066 grt/112,480 dwt; includes 12 cargo, 1 container, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 bulk civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 2 with permanent-surface runways 2,440-3,659 m telecommunications: minimal domestic and international facilities; 2,325 telephones; stations--2 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: no military force military manpower: males 15-49, 49,261; 27,519 fit for military service defense expenditures: $1.8 million (1984 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: mali geography total area: 1,240,000 km2; land area: 1,220,000 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of texas land boundaries: 7,243 km total; algeria 1,376 km, burkina 1,000 km, guinea 858 km, ivory coast 532 km, mauritania 2,237 km, niger 821 km, senegal 419 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: the disputed international boundary between burkina and mali was submitted to the international court of justice (icj) in october 1983 and the icj issued its final ruling in december 1986, which both sides agreed to accept; burkina and mali are proceeding with boundary demarcation, including the tripoint with niger climate: subtropical to arid; hot and dry february to june; rainy, humid, and mild june to november; cool and dry november to february terrain: mostly flat to rolling northern plains covered by sand; savanna in south, rugged hills in northeast natural resources: gold, phosphates, kaolin, salt, limestone, uranium; bauxite, iron ore, manganese, tin, and copper deposits are known but not exploited land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 25% meadows and pastures; 7% forest and woodland; 66% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dust-laden harmattan haze common during dry seasons; desertification note: landlocked people population: 8,142,373 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 51 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 21 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 116 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 45 years male, 47 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--malian(s); adjective--malian ethnic divisions: 50% mande (bambara, malinke, sarakole), 17% peul, 12% voltaic, 6% songhai, 5% tuareg and moor, 10% other religion: 90% muslim, 9% indigenous beliefs, 1% christian language: french (official); bambara spoken by about 80% of the population; numerous african languages literacy: 18% labor force: 2,666,000 (1986 est.); 80% agriculture, 19% services, 1% industry and commerce (1981); 50% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: national union of malian workers (untm) is umbrella organization for over 13 national unions government long-form name: republic of mali type: republic; single-party constitutional government capital: bamako administrative divisions: 7 regions (regions, singular--region); gao, kayes, koulikoro, mopti, segou, sikasso, tombouctou; note--there may be a new capital district of bamako independence: 22 september 1960 (from france; formerly french sudan) constitution: 2 june 1974, effective 19 june 1979; amended september 1981 and march 1985 legal system: based on french civil law system and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in constitutional section of court of state; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the proclamation of the republic, 22 september (1960) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemble nationale) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president gen. moussa traore (since 6 december 1968) political parties and leaders: only party--democratic union of malian people (udpm) suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held on 9 june 1985 (next to be held june 1991); results--general moussa traore was reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held on 26 june 1988 (next to be held june 1991); results--udpm is the only party; seats--(82 total) udpm 82 communists: a few communists and some sympathizers (no legal communist party) member of: acp, afdb, ceao, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, nam, niger river commission, oau, oic, omvs (organization for the development of the senegal river valley), un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto, diplomatic representation: ambassador alhousseyni toure; chancery at 2130 r street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-2249 or 939-8950; us--ambassador robert m. pringle; embassy at rue testard and rue mohamed v., bamako (mailing address is b. p. 34, bamako); telephone 225834 flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), yellow, and red; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: mali is among the poorest countries in the world, with about 80% of its land area desert or semidesert. economic activity is largely confined to the riverine area irrigated by the niger. about 10% of the population lives as nomads and some 80% of the labor force is engaged in agriculture and fishing. industrial activity is concentrated on processing farm commodities. gdp: $1.94 billion, per capita $220; real growth rate 0.9% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% (1987) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $338 million; expenditures $559 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1987) exports: $260 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--livestock, peanuts, dried fish, cotton, skins; partners--mostly franc zone and western europe imports: $493 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--textiles, vehicles, petroleum products, machinery, sugar, cereals; partners--mostly franc zone and western europe external debt: $2.1 billion (december 1988 est.) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 92,000 kw capacity; 165 million kwh produced, 20 kwh per capita (1989) industries: small local consumer goods and processing, construction, phosphate, gold, fishing agriculture: accounts for 50% of gdp; most production based on small subsistence farms; cotton and livestock products account for over 70% of exports; other crops--millet, rice, corn, vegetables, peanuts; livestock--cattle, sheep, and goats aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $313 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.4 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $92 million; communist countries (1970-88), $190 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 642 km 1.000-meter gauge; linked to senegal's rail system through kayes highways: about 15,700 km total; 1,670 km bituminous, 3,670 km gravel and improved earth, 10,360 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 1,815 km navigable civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 37 total, 29 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 7 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 9 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: domestic system poor but improving; provides only minimal service with radio relay, wire, and radio communications stations; expansion of radio relay in progress; 11,000 telephones; stations--2 am, 2 fm, 2 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, air force; paramilitary, gendarmerie, republican guard, national guard military manpower: males 15-49, 1,585,878; 913,000 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 2.5% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: malta geography total area: 320 km2; land area: 320 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 140 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 25 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: mediterranean with mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers terrain: mostly low, rocky, flat to dissected plains; many coastal cliffs natural resources: limestone, salt land use: 38% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 59% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: numerous bays provide good harbors; fresh water very scarce--increasing reliance on desalination note: strategic location in central mediterranean, 93 km south of sicily, 290 km north of libya people population: 353,465 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 15 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 8 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--maltese (sing. and pl.); adjective--maltese ethnic divisions: mixture of arab, sicilian, norman, spanish, italian, english religion: 98% roman catholic language: maltese and english (official) literacy: 83% labor force: 125,674; 30% services, 24% manufacturing, 21% government (except job corps), 8% construction, 5% utilities and drydocks, 4% agriculture (1987) organized labor: about 40% of labor force government long-form name: republic of malta type: parliamentary democracy capital: valletta administrative divisions: none (administration directly from valletta) independence: 21 september 1964 (from uk) constitution: 26 april 1974, effective 2 june 1974 legal system: based on english common law and roman civil law; has accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: freedom day, 31 march executive branch: president, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives judicial branch: constitutional court and court of appeal leaders: chief of state--president vincent (censu) tabone (since 4 april 1989); head of government--prime minister dr. edward (eddie) fenech adami (since 12 may 1987); deputy prime minister dr. guido de marco (since 14 may 1987) political parties and leaders: nationalist party, edward fenech adami; malta labor party, karmenu mifsud bonnici suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of representatives--last held on 9 may 1987 (next to be held by may 1992); results--np 51.1%, mlp 48.9%; seats--(usually 65 total, but additional seats are given to the party with the largest popular vote to ensure a legislative majority; current total 69) mlp 34, np 31 before popular vote adjustment; mlp 34, np 35 after adjustment communists: fewer than 100 (est.) member of: ccc, commonwealth, council of europe, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam,un, undp, unesco, unicef, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador salvatore j. stellini; chancery at 2017 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 462-3611 or 3612; there is a maltese consulate general in new york; us--ambassador sally j. novetzke; embassy at 2nd floor, development house, st. anne street, floriana, valletta (mailing address is p. o. box 535, valletta); telephone p356o 623653 or 620424, 623216 flag: two equal vertical bands of white (hoist side) and red; in the upper hoist-side corner is a representation of the george cross, edged in red economy overview: significant resources are limestone, a favorable geographic location, and a productive labor force. malta produces only about 20% of its food needs, has limited freshwater supplies, and has no domestic energy sources. consequently, the economy is highly dependent on foreign trade and services. manufacturing and tourism are the largest contributors to the economy. manufacturing accounts for about 30% of gdp, with the textile and clothing industry a major contributor. in 1988 inflation was held to a low 0.9%. per capita gdp at $5,100 places malta in the middle-income range of the world's nations. gdp: $1.9 billion, per capita $5,100; real growth rate 7.1% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 0.9% (1988) unemployment rate: 4.4% (1987) budget: revenues $844 million; expenditures $938 million, including capital expenditures of $226 million (1989 est.) exports: $710 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--clothing, textiles, footwear, ships; partners--frg 31%, uk 14%, italy 14% imports: $1,360 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--food, petroleum, nonfood raw materials; partners--frg 19%, uk 17%, italy 17%, us 11% external debt: $90 million, medium and long-term (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 6.2% (1987) electricity: 328,000 kw capacity; 1,110 million kwh produced, 2,990 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, ship repair yard, clothing, construction, food manufacturing, textiles, footwear, clothing, beverages, tobacco agriculture: overall, 20% self-sufficient; main products--potatoes, cauliflower, grapes, wheat, barley, tomatoes, citrus, cut flowers, green peppers, hogs, poultry, eggs; generally adequate supplies of vegetables, poultry, milk, pork products; seasonal or periodic shortages in grain, animal fodder, fruits, other basic foodstuffs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-81), $172 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $332 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $76 million; communist countries (1970-88), $48 million currency: maltese lira (plural--liri); 1 maltese lira (lm) = 100 cents exchange rates: maltese liri (lm) per us$1--0.3332 (january 1990), 0.3483 (1989), 0.3306 (1988), 0.3451 (1987), 0.3924 (1986), 0.4676 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 1,291 km total; 1,179 km paved (asphalt), 77 km crushed stone or gravel, 35 km improved and unimproved earth ports: valletta, marsaxlokk merchant marine: 314 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,677,797 grt/6,357,733 dwt; includes 3 passenger, 4 short-sea passenger, 127 cargo, 2 container, 1 passenger-cargo, 13 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 vehicle carrier, 6 refrigerated cargo, 7 chemical tanker, 4 combination ore/oil, 1 specialized tanker, 61 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 72 bulk, 11 combination bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry; china owns 1 ship, cuba owns 8, and vietnam owns 1 civil air: 8 major transport aircraft airports: 1 with permanent-surface runways 2,440-3,659 m telecommunications: modern automatic system centered in valletta; 153,000 telephones; stations--9 am, 3 fm, 2 tv; 1 submarine cable; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: armed forces, police, paramilitary dejima force military manpower: males 15-49, 92,610; 74,256 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.3% of gdp, or $25 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: man, isle of (british crown dependency) geography total area: 588 km2; land area: 588 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 3.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 113 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: cool summers and mild winters; humid; overcast about half the time terrain: hills in north and south bisected by central valley natural resources: lead, iron ore land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other; extensive arable land and forests environment: strong westerly winds prevail note: located in irish sea equidistant from england, scotland, and ireland people population: 64,859 (july 1990), growth rate 0.2% (1990) birth rate: 11 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--manxman, manxwoman, adjective--manx ethnic divisions: native manx of norse-celtic descent; british religion: anglican, roman catholic, methodist, baptist, presbyterian, society of friends language: english, manx gaelic literacy: na%, but compulsory education between ages of 5 and 15 labor force: 25,864 (1981) organized labor: 22 labor unions patterned along british lines government long-form name: none type: british crown dependency capital: douglas administrative divisions: none (british crown dependency) independence: none (british crown dependency) constitution: 1961, isle of man constitution act legal system: english law and local statute national holiday: tynwald day, 5 july executive branch: british monarch, lieutenant governor, prime minister, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral parliament (tynwald) consists of an upper house or legislative council and a lower house or house of keys judicial branch: high court of justice leaders: chief of state--lord of mann queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by lieutenant governor maj. gen. laurence new (since 1985); head of government--president of the legislative council j. c. nivison (since 1985) political parties and leaders: there is no party system and members sit as independents suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: house of keys--last held in 1986 (next to be held 1991); results--percent of vote na; seats--(24 total) independents 24 communists: probably none diplomatic representation: none (british crown dependency) flag: red with the three legs of man emblem (trinacria), in the center; the three legs are joined at the thigh and bent at the knee; in order to have the toes pointing clockwise on both sides of the flag, a two-sided emblem is used economy overview: offshore banking, manufacturing, and tourism are key sectors of the economy. the government's policy of offering incentives to high-technology companies and financial institutions to locate on the island has paid off in expanding employment opportunities in high-income industries. as a result, agriculture and fishing, once the mainstays of the economy, have declined in their shares of gnp. banking now contributes over 20% to gnp and manufacturing about 15%. trade is mostly with the uk. gnp: $490 million, per capita $7,573; real growth rate na% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 1.5% (1988) budget: revenues $130.4 million; expenditures $114.4 million, including capital expenditures of $18.1 million (fy85 est.) exports: $na; commodities--tweeds, herring, processed shellfish meat; partners--uk imports: $na; commodities--timber, fertilizers, fish; partners--uk external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 61,000 kw capacity; 190 million kwh produced, 2,930 kwh per capita (1989) industries: an important offshore financial center; financial services, light manufacturing, tourism agriculture: cereals and vegetables; cattle, sheep, pigs, poultry aid: na currency: manx pound (plural--pounds); 1 manx pound (lm) = 100 pence exchange rates: manx pounds (lm) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); the manx pound is at par with the british pound fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 36 km electric track, 24 km steam track highways: 640 km motorable roads ports: douglas, ramsey, peel merchant marine: 77 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,656,216 grt/2,984,047 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 8 cargo, 5 container, 6 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 32 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 5 chemical tanker, 2 combination ore/oil, 6 liquefied gas, 12 bulk; note--a captive register of the united kingdom, although not all ships on the register are british-owned airports: 2 total; 1 usable with permanent-surface runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 24,435 telephones; stations--1 am, 4 fm, 4 tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: marshall islands geography total area: 181.3 km2; land area: 181.3 km2; includes the atolls of bikini, eniwetak, and kwajalein comparative area: slightly larger than washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 370.4 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims us-administered wake island climate: wet season may to november; hot and humid; islands border typhoon belt terrain: low coral limestone and sand islands natural resources: phosphate deposits, marine products, deep seabed minerals land use: 0% arable land; 60% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 40% other environment: occasionally subject to typhoons; two archipelagic island chains of 30 atolls and 1,152 islands note: located 3,825 km southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, about two-thirds of the way between hawaii and papua new guinea; bikini and eniwetak are former us nuclear test sites; kwajalein, the famous world war ii battleground, is now used as a us missile test range people population: 43,417 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 39 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 43 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--marshallese; adjective--marshallese ethnic divisions: almost entirely micronesian religion: predominantly christian, mostly protestant language: english universally spoken and is the official language; two major marshallese dialects from malayo-polynesian family; japanese literacy: 90% labor force: 4,800 (1986) organized labor: none government long-form name: republic of the marshall islands type: constitutional government in free association with the us; the compact of free association entered into force 21 october 1986 capital: majuro administrative divisions: none independence: 21 october 1986 (from the us-administered un trusteeship; formerly the marshall islands district of the trust territory of the pacific islands) constitution: 1 may 1979 legal system: based on adapted trust territory laws, acts of the legislature, municipal, common, and customary laws national holiday: proclamation of the republic of the marshall islands, 1 may (1979) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament (nitijela) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president amata kabua (since 1979) political parties and leaders: no formal parties; president kabua is chief political (and traditional) leader suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held na november 1987 (next to be held november 1991); results--president amata kabua was reelected; parliament--last held na november 1987 (next to be held november 1991); results--percent of vote na; seats--(33 total) communists: none member of: spf, escap (associate) diplomatic representation: representative wilfred i. kendall; representative office at suite 1004, 1901 pennsylvania avenue nw, washington dc 20006; telephone (202) 223-4952; us--representative samuel b. thomsen; us office at na address (mailing address is p. o. box 680, majuro, republic of the marshall islands 96960); telephone 692-9-3348 flag: blue with two stripes radiating from the lower hoist-side corner--orange (top) and white; there is a white star with four large rays and 20 small rays on the hoist side above the two stripes economy overview: agriculture and tourism are the mainstays of the economy. agricultural production is concentrated on small farms, and the most important commercial crops are coconuts, tomatoes, melons, and breadfruit. a few cattle ranches supply the domestic meat market. small-scale industry is limited to handicrafts, fish processing, and copra. the tourist industry is the primary source of foreign exchange and employs about 10% of the labor force. the islands have few natural resources, and imports far exceed exports. in 1987 the us government provided grants of $40 million out of the marshallese budget of $55 million. gdp: $63 million, per capita $1,500; real growth rate na% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.6% (1981) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $55 million; expenditures na, including capital expenditures of na (1987 est.) exports: $2.5 million (f.o.b., 1985); commodities--copra, copra oil, agricultural products, handicrafts; partners--na imports: $29.2 million (c.i.f., 1985); commodities--foodstuffs, beverages, building materials; partners--na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 12,000 kw capacity; 10 million kwh produced, 240 kwh per capita (1989) industries: copra, fish, tourism; craft items from shell, wood, and pearl; offshore banking (embryonic) agriculture: coconuts, cacao, taro, breadfruit, fruits, copra; pigs, chickens aid: under the terms of the compact of free association, the us is to provide approximately $40 million in aid annually currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: macadam and concrete roads on major islands (majuro, kwajalein), otherwise stone-, coral-, or laterite-surfaced roads and tracks ports: majuro merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 475,968 grt/949,888 dwt; includes 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 bulk carrier; note--a flag of convenience registry airports: 5 total, 5 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: telephone network--570 lines (majuro) and 186 (ebeye); telex services; islands interconnected by shortwave radio (used mostly for government purposes); stations--1 am, 2 fm, 1 tv, 1 shortwave; 2 pacific ocean intelsat earth stations; us government satellite communications system on kwajalein defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: martinique (overseas department of france) geography total area: 1,100 km2; land area: 1,060 km2 comparative area: slightly more than six times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 290 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; moderated by trade winds; rainy season (june to october) terrain: mountainous with indented coastline; dormant volcano natural resources: coastal scenery and beaches, cultivable land land use: 10% arable land; 8% permanent crops; 30% meadows and pastures; 26% forest and woodland; 26% other; includes 5% irrigated environment: subject to hurricanes, flooding, and volcanic activity that result in an average of one major natural disaster every five years note: located 625 km southeast of puerto rico in the caribbean sea people population: 340,381 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 19 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 11 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--martiniquais (sing. and pl.); adjective--martiniquais ethnic divisions: 90% african and african-caucasian-indian mixture, 5% caucasian, less than 5% east indian, lebanese, chinese religion: 95% roman catholic, 5% hindu and pagan african language: french, creole patois literacy: over 70% labor force: 100,000; 31.7% service industry, 29.4% construction and public works, 13.1% agriculture, 7.3% industry, 2.2% fisheries, 16.3% other organized labor: 11% of labor force government long-form name: department of martinique type: overseas department of france capital: fort-de-france administrative divisions: none (overseas department of france) independence: none (overseas department of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french legal system national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: government commissioner legislative branch: unicameral general council and unicameral regional council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--government commissioner jean claude roure (since 5 may 1989); president of the general council emile maurice (since na 1988) political parties: rally for the republic (rpr), stephen bago; union of the left composed of the progressive party of martinique (ppm), aime cesaire; socialist federation of martinique, michael yoyo; and the communist party of martinique (pcm), armand nicolas; union for french democracy (udf), jean maran suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: general council--last held on na october 1988 (next to be held by march 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(44 total) number of seats by party na; regional assembly--last held on 16 march 1986 (next to be held by march 1992); results--udf/rpr coalition 49.8%, ppm/fsm/pcm coalition 41.3%, others 8.9%; seats--(41 total) ppm/fsm/pcm coalition 21, udf/rpr coalition 20; french senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(2 total) udf 1, ppm 1; french national assembly--last held on 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(4 total) ppm 1, fsm 1, rpr 1, udf 1 communists: 1,000 (est.) other political or pressure groups: proletarian action group (gap); alhed marie-jeanne socialist revolution group (grs), martinique independence movement (mim), caribbean revolutionary alliance (arc), central union for martinique workers (cstm), marc pulvar; frantz fanon circle; league of workers and peasants member of: wftu diplomatic representation: as an overseas department of france, martiniquais interests are represented in the us by france; us--consul general ray robinson; consulate general at 14 rue blenac, fort-de-france (mailing address is b. p. 561, fort-de-france); telephone p596o 63-13-03 flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: the economy is based on sugarcane, bananas, tourism, and light industry. agriculture accounts for about 7% of gdp and the small industrial sector for 10%. sugar production has declined, with most of the sugarcane now used for the production of rum. banana exports are increasing, however, going mostly to france. the bulk of meat, vegetable, and grain requirements must be imported, contributing to a chronic trade deficit that requires large annual transfers of aid from france. tourism has become more important than agricultural exports as a source of foreign exchange. the majority of the work force is employed in the service sector and in administration. in 1984 the annual per capita income was relatively high at $3,650. during 1985 the unemployment rate was between 25% and 30% and was particularly severe among younger workers. gdp: $1.3 billion, per capita $3,650; real growth rate na% (1984) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.4% (1986) unemployment rate: 25-30% (1985) budget: revenues $223 million; expenditures $223 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1987 est.) exports: $209 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--refined petroleum products, bananas, rum, pineapples; partners--france 65%, guadeloupe 26% (1986) imports: $879 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--petroleum products, foodstuffs, construction materials, vehicles, clothing and other consumer goods; partners--france 64% (1986) external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 108,000 kw capacity; 330 million kwh produced, 990 kwh per capita (1989) industries: construction, rum, cement, oil refining, sugar, tourism agriculture: accounts for about 7% of gdp; principal crops--pineapples, avocados, bananas, flowers, vegetables, and sugarcane for rum; dependent on imported food, particularly meat and vegetables aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $9.8 billion currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 1,680 km total; 1,300 km paved, 380 km gravel and earth ports: fort-de-france civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 2 total; 2 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways less than 2,439 m telecommunications: domestic facilities are adequate; 68,900 telephones; interisland radio relay links to guadeloupe, dominica, and st. lucia; stations--1 am, 6 fm, 10 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: mauritania geography total area: 1,030,700 km2; land area: 1,030,400 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than three times the size of new mexico land boundaries: 5,074 km total; algeria 463 km, mali 2,237 km, senegal 813 km, western sahara 1,561 km coastline: 754 km maritime claims: continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: armed conflict in western sahara; boundary with senegal climate: desert; constantly hot, dry, dusty terrain: mostly barren, flat plains of the sahara; some central hills natural resources: iron ore, gypsum, fish, copper, phosphate land use: 1% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 38% meadows and pastures; 5% forest and woodland; 56% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dry, dust/sand-laden sirocco wind blows primarily in march and april; desertification; only perennial river is the senegal people population: 1,934,549 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 49 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 18 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 96 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 44 years male, 49 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mauritanian(s); adjective--mauritanian ethnic divisions: 40% mixed maur/black, 30% maur, 30% black religion: nearly 100% muslim language: hasaniya arabic (national); french (official); toucouleur, fula, sarakole, wolof literacy: 17% labor force: 465,000 (1981 est.); 45,000 wage earners (1980); 47% agriculture, 29% services, 14% industry and commerce, 10% government; 53% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: 30,000 members claimed by single union, mauritanian workers' union government long-form name: islamic republic of mauritania type: republic; military first seized power in bloodless coup 10 july 1978; a palace coup that took place on 24 december 1984 brought president taya to power capital: nouakchott administrative divisions: 12 regions (regions, singular--region); adrar, brakna, dakhlet nouadhibou, el acaba, gorgol, guidimaka, hodh ech chargui, hodh el gharbi, inchiri, tagant, tiris zemmour, trarza; note--there may be a new capital district of nouakchott independence: 28 november 1960 (from france) constitution: 20 may 1961, abrogated after coup of 10 july 1978; provisional constitution published 17 december 1980 but abandoned in 1981; new constitutional charter published 27 february 1985 legal system: based on islamic law national holiday: independence day, 28 november (1960) executive branch: president, military committee for national salvation (cmsn), council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale), dissolved after 10 july 1978 coup; legislative power resides with the cmsn judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president col. maaouiya ould sidahmed taya (since 12 december 1984) political parties and leaders: suspended suffrage: none elections: none; last presidential election august 1976; national assembly dissolved 10 july 1978; no national elections are scheduled communists: no communist party, but there is a scattering of maoist sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, aioec, arab league, ccc, ceao, cipec (associate), eama, eib (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oau, oic, omvs (organization for the development of the senegal river valley), un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador abdellah ould daddah; chancery at 2129 leroy place nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 232-5700; us--ambassador william h. twaddell; embassy at address na, nouakchott (mailing address is b. p. 222, nouakchott); telephone p2222o 52660 or 52663 flag: green with a yellow five-pointed star above a yellow, horizontal crescent; the closed side of the crescent is down; the crescent, star, and color green are traditional symbols of islam economy overview: a majority of the population still depends on agriculture and livestock for a livelihood, even though most of the nomads and many subsistence farmers were forced into the cities by recurrent drought in 1983. mauritania has extensive deposits of iron ore that account for almost 50% of total exports. the decline in world demand for this ore, however, has led to cutbacks in production in recent years. the nation's coastal waters are among the richest fishing areas in the world, but overexploitation by foreigners threatens this key source of revenue. the country's first deepwater port opened near nouakchott in 1986. gdp: $1.0 billion, per capita $520; real growth rate 3.6% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.4% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 50% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $358 million; expenditures $334 million, including capital expenditures of $79 million (1988 est.) exports: $424 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--iron ore, processed fish, small amounts of gum arabic and gypsum, unrecorded but numerically significant cattle exports to senegal; partners--ec 57%, japan 39%, ivory coast 2% imports: $365 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, consumer goods, petroleum products, capital goods; partners--ec 79%, africa 5%, us 4%, japan 2% external debt: $2.3 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 4.4% (1988 est.) electricity: 189,000 kw capacity; 136 million kwh produced, 70 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, fish processing, mining of iron ore and gypsum agriculture: accounts for 29% of gdp (including fishing); largely subsistence farming and nomadic cattle and sheep herding except in senegal river valley; crops--dates, millet, sorghum, root crops; fish products number-one export; large food deficit in years of drought aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $160 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.1 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $490 million; communist countries (1970-88), $277 million currency: ouguiya (plural--ouguiya); 1 ouguiya (um) = 5 khoums exchange rates: ouguiya (um) per us$1--83.838 (january 1990), 83.051 (1989), 75.261 (1988), 73.878 (1987), 74.375 (1986), 77.085 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 670 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, single track, owned and operated by government mining company highways: 7,525 km total; 1,685 km paved; 1,040 km gravel, crushed stone, or otherwise improved; 4,800 km unimproved roads, trails, tracks inland waterways: mostly ferry traffic on the senegal river ports: nouadhibou, nouakchott merchant marine: 1 cargo ship (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,272 grt/ 1,840 dwt civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 30 total, 29 usable; 9 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 4 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 17 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: poor system of cable and open-wire lines, minor radio relay links, and radio communications stations; 5,200 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 1 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 2 arabsat, with a third planned defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie, paramilitary national guard, paramilitary national police, paramilitary presidential guard, paramilitary nomad security guards military manpower: males 15-49, 410,153; 200,212 fit for military service; conscription law not implemented defense expenditures: 4.2% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: mauritius geography total area: 1,860 km2; land area: 1,850 km2; includes agalega islands, cargados carajos shoals (st. brandon) and rodrigues comparative area: slightly less than 10.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 177 km maritime claims: continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims chagos archipelago, which includes the island of diego garcia in uk-administered british indian ocean territory; claims french-administered tromelin island climate: tropical modified by southeast trade winds; warm, dry winter (may to november); hot, wet, humid summer (november to may) terrain: small coastal plain rising to discontinuous mountains encircling central plateau natural resources: arable land, fish land use: 54% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 31% forest and woodland; 7% other; includes 9% irrigated environment: subject to cyclones (november to april); almost completely surrounded by reefs note: located 900 km east of madagascar in the indian ocean people population: 1,070,005 (july 1990), growth rate 1.8% (1990) birth rate: 21 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 20 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 73 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mauritian(s); adjective--mauritian ethnic divisions: 68% indo-mauritian, 27% creole, 3% sino-mauritian, 2% franco-mauritian religion: 51% hindu, 30% christian (mostly roman catholic with a few anglicans), 17% muslim, 2% other language: english (official), creole, french, hindi, urdu, hakka, bojpoori literacy: 82.8% labor force: 335,000; 29% government services, 27% agriculture and fishing, 22% manufacturing, 22% other; 43% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: 35% of labor force in more than 270 unions government long-form name: none type: parliamentary democracy capital: port louis administrative divisions: 5 urban councils and 3 district councils*; beau bassin-rose hill, curepipe, moka-flacq*, north*, port louis, quatre bornes, south*, vacoas-phoenix; note--there may now be 4 urban councils and 9 district councils* named beau bassin-rose hill, black river*, curepipe, flacq*, grand port*, moka*, pamplemousses*, plaine wilhems*, port louis*, quartre bornes, riviere du rempart*, savanne*, and vacoas-phoenix independence: 12 march 1968 (from uk) constitution: 12 march 1968 legal system: based on french civil law system with elements of english common law in certain areas national holiday: independence day, 12 march (1968) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general sir veerasamy ringadoo (since 17 january 1986); head of government--prime minister anerood jugnauth (since 12 june 1982); deputy prime minister sir satcam boolell (since 15 august 1988) political parties and leaders: the government is currently controlled by a coalition composed of the militant socialist movement (msm), a. jugnauth, and the mauritian labor party (mlp), s. boolell; the main opposition union consists of the mauritian militant movement (mmm), prem nababsing; socialist workers front, sylvio michel; democratic labor movement, anil baichoo; mauritian social democratic party (pmsd), g. duval suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative assembly--last held on 30 august 1987 (next to be held 30 august 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(70 total, 62 elected) msm 24, mmm 21, mlp 10, pmsd 5, others 10 communists: may be 2,000 sympathizers; several communist organizations; mauritius lenin youth organization, mauritius women's committee, mauritius communist party, mauritius people's progressive party, mauritius young communist league, mauritius liberation front, chinese middle school friendly association, mauritius/ussr friendship society other political or pressure groups: various labor unions member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador chitmansing jesseramsing; chancery at suite 134, 4301 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 244-1491 or 1492; us--ambassador penne korth; embassy at 4th floor, rogers building, john kennedy street, port louis; telephone 082347 flag: four equal horizontal bands of red (top), blue, yellow, and green economy overview: the economy is based on sugar, manufacturing (mainly textiles), and tourism. despite significant expansion in other sectors over the past decade, sugarcane remains dominant and is grown on about 90% of the cultivated land area, accounting for 40% of export earnings. the government's development strategy is centered on industrialization (with a view to exports), agricultural diversification, and tourism. economic performance in 1988 was impressive, with 6.3% real growth rate and low unemployment. gdp: $1.9 billion, per capita $1,910; real growth rate 6.3% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.2% (1988) unemployment rate: 3.6% (1988) budget: revenues $351 million; expenditures $414 million, including capital expenditures of $76 million (fy87 est.) exports: $1.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--textiles 44%, sugar 40%, light manufactures 10%; partners--ec and us have preferential treatment, ec 77%, us 15% imports: $1.3 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--manufactured goods 50%, capital equipment 17%, foodstuffs 13%, petroleum products 8%, chemicals 7%; partners--ec, us, south africa, japan external debt: $670 million (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 12.9% (fy87) electricity: 233,000 kw capacity; 420 million kwh produced, 375 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing (largely sugar milling), textiles, wearing apparel, chemical and chemical products, metal products, transport equipment, nonelectrical machinery, tourism agriculture: accounts for 14% of gdp; about 90% of cultivated land in sugarcane; other products--tea, corn, potatoes, bananas, pulses, cattle, goats, fish; net food importer, especially rice and fish illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the international drug trade aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $72 million; western (non-us) countries (1970-87), $538 million; communist countries (1970-88), $54 million currency: mauritian rupee (plural--rupees); 1 mauritian rupee (maur) = 100 cents exchange rates: mauritian rupees (maurs) per us$1--15.033 (january 1990), 15.250 (1989), 13.438 (1988), 12.878 (1987), 13.466 (1986), 15.442 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 1,800 km total; 1,640 km paved, 160 km earth ports: port louis merchant marine: 9 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 143,029 grt/ 248,754 dwt; includes 1 passenger-cargo, 3 cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 3 bulk civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 5 total, 4 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m telecommunications: small system with good service; new microwave link to reunion; high-frequency radio links to several countries; 48,000 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 4 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: paramilitary special mobile force, special support units, regular police force military manpower: males 15-49, 297,975; 153,130 fit for military service defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: mayotte (territorial collectivity of france) geography total area: 375 km2; land area: 375 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 185.2 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by comoros climate: tropical; marine; hot, humid, rainy season during northeastern monsoon (november to may); dry season is cooler (may to november) terrain: generally undulating with ancient volcanic peaks, deep ravines natural resources: negligible land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other environment: subject to cyclones during rainy season note: part of comoro archipelago; located in the mozambique channel about halfway between africa and madagascar people population: 72,186 (july 1990), growth rate 3.9% (1990) birth rate: 51 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 12 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 89 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 54 years male, 58 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mahorais (sing., pl.); adjective--mahoran religion: 99% muslim; remainder christian, mostly roman catholic language: mahorian (a swahili dialect), french literacy: na%, but probably high labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: territorial collectivity of mayotte type: territorial collectivity of france capital: dzaoudzi administrative divisions: none (territorial collectivity of france) independence: none (territorial collectivity of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french law national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: government commissioner legislative branch: unicameral general council (conseil general) judicial branch: supreme court (tribunal superieur d'appel) leaders: chief of state president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government government commissioner akli khider (since 1983); president of the general council youssouf bamana (since 1976) political parties and leaders: mahoran popular movement (mpm), zna m'oere; party for the mahoran democratic rally (prdm), daroueche maoulida; mahoran rally for the republic (rmpr), abdoul anizizi; union of the center (udc) suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: general council--last held na june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(17 total) mpm 9, rpr 6, others 2; french senate--last held on 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) mpm 1; french national assembly--last held 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) udc 1 communists: probably none diplomatic representation: as a territorial collectivity of france, mahoran interests are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: economic activity is based primarily on the agricultural sector, including fishing and livestock raising. mayotte is not self-sufficient and must import a large portion of its food requirements, mainly from france. the economy and future development of the island is heavily dependent on french financial assistance. gdp: na inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues na; expenditures $37.3 million, including capital expenditures of na (1985) exports: $4.0 million (f.o.b., 1984); commodities--ylang-ylang, vanilla; partners--france 79%, comoros 10%, reunion 9% imports: $21.8 million (f.o.b., 1984); commodities--building materials, transportation equipment, rice, clothing, flour; partners--france 57%, kenya 16%, south africa 11%, pakistan 8% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: na kw capacity; na million kwh produced, na kwh per capita industries: newly created lobster and shrimp industry agriculture: most important sector; provides all export earnings; crops--vanilla, ylang-ylang, coffee, copra; imports major share of food needs aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $287.8 million currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 42 km total; 18 km bituminous civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m ports: dzaoudzi telecommunications: small system administered by french department of posts and telecommunications; includes radio relay and high-frequency radio communications for links with comoros and international communications; 450 telephones; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: mexico geography total area: 1,972,550 km2; land area: 1,923,040 km2 comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of texas land boundaries: 4,538 km total; belize 250 km, guatemala 962 km, us 3,326 km coastline: 9,330 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: natural prolongation of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: varies from tropical to desert terrain: high, rugged mountains, low coastal plains, high plateaus, and desert natural resources: crude oil, silver, copper, gold, lead, zinc, natural gas, timber land use: 12% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 39% meadows and pastures; 24% forest and woodland; 24% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: subject to tsunamis along the pacific coast and destructive earthquakes in the center and south; natural water resources scarce and polluted in north, inaccessible and poor quality in center and extreme southeast; deforestation; erosion widespread; desertification; serious air pollution in mexico city and urban centers along us-mexico border note: strategic location on southern border of us people population: 87,870,154 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 29 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 33 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mexican(s); adjective--mexican ethnic divisions: 60% mestizo (indian-spanish), 30% amerindian or predominantly amerindian, 9% white or predominantly white, 1% other religion: 97% nominally roman catholic, 3% protestant language: spanish literacy: 88% labor force: 26,100,000 (1988); 31.4% services; 26% agriculture, forestry, hunting, and fishing, 13.9% commerce, 12.8% manufacturing, 9.5% construction, 4.8% transportation, 1.3% mining and quarrying, 0.3% electricity, (1986) organized labor: 35% of labor force government long-form name: united mexican states type: federal republic operating under a centralized government capital: mexico administrative divisions: 31 states (estados, singular--estado) and 1 federal district* (distrito federal); aguascalientes, baja california norte, baja california sur, campeche, chiapas, chihuahua, coahuila, colima, distrito federal*, durango, guanajuato, guerrero, hidalgo, jalisco, mexico, michoacan, morelos, nayarit, nuevo leon, oaxaca, puebla, queretaro, quintana roo, san luis potosi, sinaloa, sonora, tabasco, tamaulipas, tlaxcala, veracruz, yucatan, zacatecas independence: 16 september 1810 (from spain) constitution: 5 february 1917 legal system: mixture of us constitutional theory and civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 16 september (1810) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso de la union) consists of an upper chamber or senate (camara de senadores) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camara de diputados) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (suprema corte de justicia) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president carlos salinas de gortari (since 1 december 1988) political parties and leaders: (recognized parties) institutional revolutionary party (pri), luis donaldo colosio murrieta; national action party (pan), luis alvarez; popular socialist party (pps), indalecio sayago herrera; democratic revolutionary party (prd), cuauhtemoc cardenas; cardenist front for the national reconstruction party (pfcrn), rafael aguilar talamantes; authentic party of the mexican revolution (parm), carlos enrique cantu rosas suffrage: universal and compulsory (but not enforced) at age 18 elections: president--last held on 6 july 1988 (next to be held september 1994); results--carlos salinas de gortari (pri) 50.74%, cuauhtemoc cardemas solorzano (fdn) 31.06%, manuel clouthier (pan) 16.81%; others 1.39%; note--several of the smaller parties ran a common candidate under a coalition called the national democratic front (fdn) senate--last held on 6 july 1988 (next to be held september 1991); results--pri 94%, fdn (now prd) 6%; seats--(64 total) number of seats by party na; chamber of deputies--last held on 6 july 1988 (next to be held september 1991); results--pri 53%, pan 20%, pfcrn 10%, pps 6%, parm 7%, pms (now part of prd) 4%; seats--(500 total) number of seats by party na other political or pressure groups: roman catholic church, confederation of mexican workers (ctm), confederation of industrial chambers (concamin), confederation of national chambers of commerce (concanaco), national peasant confederation (cnc), national confederation of popular organizations (cnop), revolutionary workers party (prt), mexican democratic party (pdm), revolutionary confederation of workers and peasants (croc), regional confederation of mexican workers (crom), confederation of employers of the mexican republic (coparmex), national chamber of transformation industries (canacintra), business coordination council (cce) member of: fao, g-77, gatt, group of eight, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, laia, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador gustavo petricioli iturbide; chancery at 1911 pennsylvania avenue nw, washington dc 20006; telephone (202) 728-1600; there are mexican consulates general in chicago, dallas, denver, el paso, houston, los angeles, new orleans, new york, san francisco, san antonio, san diego, and consulates in albuquerque, atlanta, austin, boston, brownsville (texas), calexico (california), corpus christi, del rio (texas), detroit, douglas (arizona), eagle pass (texas), fresno (california), kansas city (missouri), laredo, mcallen (texas), miami, nogales (arizona), oxnard (california), philadelphia, phoenix, presidio (texas), sacramento, st. louis, st. paul (minneapolis), salt lake city, san bernardino, san jose, san juan (puerto rico), and seattle; us--ambassador john d. negroponte, jr.; embassy at paseo de la reforma 305, mexico 5, d.f. (mailing address is p. o. box 3087, laredo, tx 78044); telephone p52o (5) 211-0042; there are us consulates general in ciudad juarez, guadalajara, monterrey, and tijuana, and consulates in hermosillo, matamoros, mazatlan, merida, and nuevo laredo flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and red; the coat of arms (an eagle perched on a cactus with a snake is its beak) is centered in the white band economy overview: mexico's economy is a mixture of state-owned industrial plants (notably oil), private manufacturing and services, and both large-scale and traditional agriculture. in the 1980s mexico experienced severe economic difficulties: the nation accumulated large external debts as world petroleum prices fell; rapid population growth outstripped the domestic food supply; and inflation, unemployment, and pressures to emigrate became more acute. growth in national output dropped from 8% in 1980 to 1.1% in 1988 and 2.5% in 1989. the us is mexico's major trading partner, accounting for two-thirds of its exports and imports. after petroleum, border assembly plants and tourism are the largest earners of foreign exchange. the government, in consultation with international economic agencies, is implementing programs to stabilize the economy and foster growth. gdp: $187.0 billion, per capita $2,165; real growth rate 2.5% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 20% (1989) unemployment rate: 20% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $36.1 billion; expenditures $56.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $7.7 biilion (1988) exports: $23.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--crude oil, oil products, coffee, shrimp, engines, cotton; partners--us 66%, ec 16%, japan 11% imports: $23.3 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--grain, metal manufactures, agricultural machinery, electrical equipment; partners--us 62%, ec 18%, japan 10% external debt: $95.1 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 1.3% (1988) electricity: 26,900,000 kw capacity; 103,670 million kwh produced, 1,200 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food and beverages, tobacco, chemicals, iron and steel, petroleum, mining, textiles, clothing, transportation equipment, tourism agriculture: accounts for 9% of gdp and over 25% of work force; large number of small farms at subsistence level; major food crops--corn, wheat, rice, beans; cash crops--cotton, coffee, fruit, tomatoes; fish catch of 1.4 million metric tons among top 20 nations (1987) illicit drugs: illicit cultivation of opium poppy and cannabis continues in spite of government eradication efforts; major link in chain of countries used to smuggle cocaine from south american dealers to us markets aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $3.0 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $6.8 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $110 million currency: mexican peso (plural--pesos); 1 mexican peso (mex$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: market rate of mexican pesos (mex$) per us$1--2,660.3 (january 1990), 2,461.3 (1989), 2,273.1 (1988), 1,378.2 (1987), 611.8 (1986), 256.9 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 20,680 km total; 19,950 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 730 km 0.914-meter narrow gauge highways: 210,000 km total; 65,000 km paved, 30,000 km semipaved or cobblestone, 60,000 km rural roads (improved earth) or roads under construction, 55,000 km unimproved earth roads inland waterways: 2,900 km navigable rivers and coastal canals pipelines: crude oil, 4,381 km; refined products, 8,345 km; natural gas, 13,254 km ports: acapulco, coatzacoalcos, ensenada, guaymas, manzanillo, mazatlan, progreso, puerto vallarta, salina cruz, tampico, veracruz merchant marine: 68 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,041,229 grt/1,552,478 dwt; includes 5 short-sea passenger, 10 cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 31 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 3 chemical tanker, 7 liquefied gas, 4 bulk, 4 combination bulk civil air: 174 major transport aircraft airports: 1,785 total, 1,484 usable; 190 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 31 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 259 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: highly developed system with extensive radio relay links; connection into central american microwave system; 6.41 million telephones; stations--679 am, no fm, 238 tv, 22 shortwave; 120 domestic satellite terminals; satellite earth stations--4 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 pacific ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, air force, navy, marine corps military manpower: males 15-49, 21,575,525; 15,803,322 fit for military service; 1,118,046 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 0.5% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: micronesia, federated states of geography total area: 702 km2; land area: 702 km2; includes pohnpei, truk, yap, and kosrae comparative area: slightly less than four times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 6,112 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; heavy year-round rainfall, especially in the eastern islands; located on southern edge of the typhoon belt with occasional severe damage terrain: islands vary geologically from high mountainous islands to low, coral atolls; volcanic outcroppings on pohnpei, kosrae, and truk natural resources: forests, marine products, deep-seabed minerals land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other environment: subject to typhoons from june to december; four major island groups totaling 607 islands note: located 5,150 km west-southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, about three-quarters of the way between hawaii and indonesia people population: 104,937 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 34 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 26 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 73 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--micronesian(s); adjective--micronesian; kosrae(s), pohnpeian(s), trukese, yapese ethnic divisions: nine ethnic micronesian and polynesian groups religion: predominantly christian, divided between roman catholic and protestant; other churches include assembly of god, jehovah's witnesses, seventh-day adventist, latter day saints, and the baha'i faith language: english is the official and common language; most indigenous languages fall within the austronesian language family, the exceptions are the polynesian languages; major indigenous languages are trukese, pohnpeian, yapese, and kosrean literacy: na%, but education compulsory through eight grades labor force: na; two-thirds are government employees; 45,000 people are between the ages of 15 and 65 organized labor: na government long-form name: federated states of micronesia (no short-form name) type: constitutional government in free association with the us; the compact of free association entered into force 3 november 1986 capital: kolonia (on the island of pohnpei); note--a new capital is being built about 10 km southwest in the palikir valley administrative divisions: 4 states; kosrae, pohnpei, truk, yap independence: 3 november 1986 (from the us-administered un trusteeship; formerly the kosrae, pohnpei, truk, and yap districts of the trust territory of the pacific islands) constitution: 10 may 1979 legal system: based on adapted trust territory laws, acts of the legislature, municipal, common, and customary laws national holiday: proclamation of the federated states of micronesia, 10 may (1979) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president john r. haglelgam (since 11 may 1987); vice president hiroshi h. ismael (since 11 may 1987) political parties and leaders: no formal parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 11 may 1987 (next to be held may 1991); results--john r. haglelgam was elected; house of representatives--last held on na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote na; seats--(na total) communists: none member of: spf, escap (associate) diplomatic representation: deputy representative jesse b. marehalan; representative office at 706 g street se, washington dc 20003; telephone (202) 544-2640; us--representative michael g. wygant; us office at address na, kolonia (mailing address is p. o. box 1286, pohnpei, federated states of micronesia 96941); telephone 691-320-2187 flag: light blue with four white five-pointed stars centered; the stars are arranged in a diamond pattern economy overview: financial assistance from the us is the primary source of revenue, with the us pledged to spend $1 billion in the islands in the 1990s. micronesia also earns about $4 million a year in fees from foreign commercial fishing concerns. economic activity consists primarily of subsistence farming and fishing. the islands have few mineral deposits worth exploiting, except for high-grade phosphate. the potential for a tourist industry exists, but the remoteness of the location and a lack of adequate facilities hinder development; note--gnp numbers reflect us spending. gnp: $150 million, per capita $1,500; real growth rate na% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 80% budget: revenues $110.8 million; expenditures na, including capital expenditures of na (1987 est.) exports: $1.6 million (f.o.b., 1983); commodities--copra; partners--na imports: $48.9 million (c.i.f., 1983); commodities--na; partners--na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 15,000 kw capacity; 35 million kwh produced, 340 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, craft items from shell, wood, and pearl agriculture: mainly a subsistence economy; copra, black pepper; tropical fruits and vegetables, coconuts, cassava, sweet potatoes, pigs, chickens aid: under terms of the compact of free association, the us will provide $1.3 billion in grant aid during the period 1986-2001 currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: 39 km of paved macadam and concrete roads on major islands, otherwise 187 km stone-, coral-, or laterite-surfaced roads ports: colonia (yap), truk (kosrae), okat (kosrae) airports: 11 total, 10 usable; 7 with permanent-surface runways; 6 with runways 1,220-2,439 telecommunications: 16,000 radio receivers, 1,125 tv sets (est. 1987); telephone network--960 telephone lines at both kolonia and truk; islands interconnected by shortwave radio (used mostly for government purposes); stations--5 am, 1 fm, 6 tv, 1 shortwave; 4 pacific ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: midway islands (territory of the us) geography total area: 5.2 km2; land area: 5.2 km2; includes eastern island and sand island comparative area: about nine times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 15 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical, but moderated by prevailing easterly winds terrain: low, nearly level natural resources: fish and wildlife land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: coral atoll note: located 2,350 km west-northwest of honolulu at the western end of hawaiian islands group, about one-third of the way between honolulu and tokyo; closed to the public people population: 453 us military personnel (1989) government long-form name: none type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the us navy, under command of the barbers point naval air station in hawaii and managed cooperatively by the us navy and the fish and wildlife service of the us department of the interior as part of the national wildlife refuge system diplomatic representation: none (territory of the us) flag: the us flag is used economy overview: the economy is based on providing support services for us naval operations located on the islands. all food and manufactured goods must be imported. communications highways: 32 km total pipelines: 7.8 km ports: sand island airports: 3 total; 2 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: monaco geography total area: 1.9 km2; land area: 1.9 km2 comparative area: about three times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundary: 4.4 km with france coastline: 4.1 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm climate: mediterranean with mild, wet winters and hot, dry summers terrain: hilly, rugged, rocky natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: almost entirely urban note: second-smallest independent state in world (after vatican city) people population: 29,453 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 7 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 9 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--monacan(s) or monegasque(s); adjective--monacan or monegasque ethnic divisions: 47% french, 16% monegasque, 16% italian, 21% other religion: 95% roman catholic language: french (official), english, italian, monegasque literacy: 99% labor force: na organized labor: 4,000 members in 35 unions government long-form name: principality of monaco type: constitutional monarchy capital: monaco administrative divisions: 4 quarters (quartiers, singular--quartier); fontvieille, la condamine, monaco-ville, monte-carlo independence: 1419, rule by the house of grimaldi constitution: 17 december 1962 legal system: based on french law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 19 november executive branch: prince, minister of state, council of government (cabinet) legislative branch: national council (conseil national) judicial branch: supreme tribunal (tribunal supreme) leaders: chief of state--prince rainier iii (since november 1949); heir apparent prince albert alexandre louis pierre (born 14 march 1958); head of government minister of state jean ausseil (since 10 september 1985) political parties and leaders: national and democratic union (und), democratic union movement (mud), monaco action, monegasque socialist party (psm) suffrage: universal adult at age 25 elections: national council--last held on 24 january 1988 (next to be held 24 january 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(18 total) und 18 member of: iaea, icao, iho, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, un (permanent observer), unesco, upu, who, wipo diplomatic representation: monaco maintains honorary consulates general in boston, chicago, los angeles, new orleans, new york, and san francisco, and honorary consulates in dallas, honolulu, palm beach, philadelphia, and washington; us--no mission in monaco, but the us consul general in marseille, france, is accredited to monaco; consul general r. susan wood; consulate general at 12 boulevard paul peytral, 13286 marseille cedex (mailing address apo ny 09777); telephone p33o (91) 549-200 flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and white; similar to the flag of indonesia which is longer and the flag of poland which is white (top) and red economy overview: no data are published on the economy. monaco, situated on the french mediterranean coast, is a popular resort, attracting tourists to its casino and pleasant climate. the principality has successfully sought to diversify into services and small, high-value-added, non-polluting industries. the state has no income tax and low business taxes and thrives as a tax haven both for individuals who have established residence and for foreign companies that have set up businesses and offices. about 50% of monaco's annual revenue comes from value-added taxes on hotels, banks, and the industrial sector; about 25% of revenue comes from tourism. living standards are high, that is, roughly comparable to those in prosperous french metropolitan suburbs. gnp: na inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: full employment (1989) budget: revenues $386 million; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na (1988 est.) exports: $na; full customs integration with france, which collects and rebates monacan trade duties; also participates in ec market system through customs union with france imports: $na; full customs integration with france, which collects and rebates monacan trade duties; also participates in ec market system through customs union with france external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 10,000 kw standby capacity (1988); power supplied by france industries: pharmaceuticals, food processing, precision instruments, glassmaking, printing, tourism agriculture: na aid: na currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1.6 km 1.435-meter gauge highways: none; city streets ports: monaco merchant marine: 1 tanker (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,268 grt/4,959 dwt civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 1 usable airfield with permanent-surface runways telecommunications: served by the french communications system; automatic telephone system; 38,200 telephones; stations--3 am, 4 fm, 5 tv; no communication satellite stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: mongolia geography total area: 1,565,000 km2; land area: 1,565,000 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than alaska land boundaries: 8,114 km total; china 4,673 km, ussr 3,441 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: desert; continental (large daily and seasonal temperature ranges) terrain: vast semidesert and desert plains; mountains in west and southwest; gobi desert in southeast natural resources: coal, copper, molybdenum, tungsten, phosphates, tin, nickel, zinc, wolfram, fluorspar, gold land use: 1% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 79% meadows and pastures; 10% forest and woodland; 10% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: harsh and rugged note: landlocked; strategic location between china and soviet union people population: 2,187,275 (july 1990), growth rate 2.7% (1990) birth rate: 35 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 50 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mongolian(s); adjective--mongolian ethnic divisions: 90% mongol, 4% kazakh, 2% chinese, 2% russian, 2% other religion: predominantly tibetan buddhist, about 4% muslim, limited religious activity because of communist regime language: khalkha mongol used by over 90% of population; minor languages include turkic, russian, and chinese literacy: 80% (est.); 100% claimed (1985) labor force: na, but primarily agricultural; over half the adult population is in the labor force, including a large percentage of women; shortage of skilled labor organized labor: 425,000 members of the central council of mongolian trade unions (ccmtu) controlled by the government (1984) government long-form name: mongolian people's republic; abbreviated mpr type: communist state capital: ulaanbaatar administrative divisions: 18 provinces (aymguud, singular--aymag) and 3 municipalities* (hotuud, singular--hot); arhangay, bayanhongor, bayan-olgiy, bulgan, darhan*, dornod, dornogovi, dundgovi, dzavhan, erdenet*, govi-altay, hentiy, hovd, hovsgol, omnogovi, ovorhangay, selenge, suhbaatar, tov, ulaanbaatar*, uvs independence: 13 march 1921 (from china; formerly outer mongolia) constitution: 6 july 1960 legal system: blend of russian, chinese, and turkish systems of law; no constitutional provision for judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: people's revolution day, 11 july (1921) executive branch: chairman and deputy chairman of the presidium of the people's great hural, presidium of the people's great hural, chairman of the council of ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral people's great hural judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--chairman of the presidium of the people's great hural punsalmaagiyn ochirbat (since 21 march 1990); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers sharabyn gungaadorj (since 21 march 1990); political parties and leaders: only party--mongolian people's revolutionary party (mprp), gombojabin ochirbat, general secretary suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 21 march 1990 (next to be held july 1991); results--punsalmaagiyn ochirbat elected by the people's great hural; people's great hural--last held on 22 june 1986 (next to be held june 1990); results--mprp was the only party; seats--(370 total) mprp 370 communists: mprp membership 88,150 (1986 est.) member of: cema, escap, fao, iaea, ibec, ilo, ipu, itu, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador gendengiin nyamdoo; us--ambassador richard l. williams flag: three equal, vertical bands of red (hoist side), blue, and red; centered on the hoist-side red band in yellow is a five-pointed star above the national emblem (soyombo--a columnar arrangement of abstract and geometric representations for fire, sun, moon, earth, water, and the yin-yang symbol) economy overview: economic activity traditionally has been based on agriculture and the breeding of livestock--mongolia has the highest number of livestock per person in the world. in recent years extensive mineral resources have been developed with soviet support. the mining and processing of coal, copper, molybdenum, tin, tungsten, and gold account for a large part of industrial production. gdp: $1.7 billion, per capita $880 (1985 est.); average real growth rate 3.6% (1976-85 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $2.2 billion; expenditures $2.19 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.9 billion (1987 est.) exports: $388 million (f.o.b., 1985); commodities--livestock, animal products, wool, hides, fluorspar, nonferrous metals, minerals; partners--nearly all trade with communist countries (about 80% with ussr) imports: $1.0 billion (c.i.f., 1985); commodities--machinery and equipment, fuels, food products, industrial consumer goods, chemicals, building materials, sugar, tea; partners--nearly all trade with communist countries (about 80% with ussr) external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate 10.9% (1985) electricity: 657,000 kw capacity; 29,500 million kwh produced, 1,340 kwh per capita (1989) industries: processing of animal products, building materials, food and beverage, mining (particularly coal) agriculture: accounts for 90% of exports and provides livelihood for about 50% of the population; livestock raising predominates (sheep, goats, horses); crops--wheat, barley, potatoes, forage aid: about $500-$700 million annually from ussr currency: tughrik (plural--tughriks); 1 tughrik (tug) = 100 mongos exchange rates: tughriks (tug) per us$1--3.355 (1986-1988), 3.600 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,750 km 1.524-meter broad gauge (1986) highways: 46,700 km total; 1,000 km hard surface; 45,700 km other surfaces (1986) inland waterways: 397 km of principal routes (1986) civil air: 22 major transport aircraft airports: 80 total, 30 usable; 10 with permanent-surface runways; fewer than 5 with runways over 3,659 m; fewer than 20 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 10 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--13 am, 1 fm, 1 tv (with 18 provincial relays); relay of soviet tv; 60,000 tv sets; 186,000 radio receivers; at least 1 satellite earth station defense forces branches: mongolian people's army, air force (negligible) military manpower: males 15-49, 518,482; 338,652 fit for military service; 24,783 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: montserrat (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 100 km2; land area: 100 km2 comparative area: about 0.6 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 40 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical; little daily or seasonal temperature variation terrain: volcanic islands, mostly mountainous, with small coastal lowland natural resources: negligible land use: 20% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 10% meadows and pastures; 40% forest and woodland; 30% other environment: subject to severe hurricanes from june to november note: located 400 km southeast of puerto rico in the caribbean sea people population: 12,467 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 16 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--montserratian(s); adjective--montserratian ethnic divisions: mostly black with a few europeans religion: anglican, methodist, roman catholic, pentecostal, seventh-day adventist, other christian denominations language: english literacy: 77% labor force: 5,100; 40.5% community, social, and personal services, 13.5% construction, 12.3% trade, restaurants, and hotels, 10.5% manufacturing, 8.8% agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 14.4% other (1983 est.) organized labor: 30% of labor force, three trade unions with 1,500 members (1984 est.) government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: plymouth administrative divisions: 3 parishes; saint anthony, saint georges, saint peter independence: none (colony of the uk) constitution: 1 january 1960 legal system: english common law and statute law national holiday: celebration of the birthday of the queen (second saturday of june) executive branch: monarch, governor, executive council (cabinet), chief minister legislative branch: unicameral legislative council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor christopher j. turner (since 1987); head of government--chief minister john a. osborne (since 1978) political parties and leaders: people's liberation movement (plm), john osborne; progressive democratic party (pdp), howell bramble; united national front (unf), dr. george irish; national development party (ndp), bertrand osborne suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative council--last held on 25 august 1987 (next to be held na 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(11 total, 7 elected) plm 4, ndp 2, pdp 1 communists: probably none diplomatic representation: none (colony of the uk) flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the montserratian coat of arms centered in the outer half of the flag; the coat of arms features a woman standing beside a yellow harp with her arm around a black cross economy overview: the economy is small and open with economic activity centered on tourism and construction. tourism is the most important sector and accounted for 20% of gdp in 1986. agriculture accounted for about 4% of gdp and industry 9%. the economy is heavily dependent on imports, making it vulnerable to fluctuations in world prices. exports consist mainly of electronic parts sold to the us. gdp: $45.4 million, per capita $3,780; real growth rate 12% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.7% (1987) unemployment rate: 3.0% (1987) budget: revenues $10.0 million; expenditures $9.4 million, including capital expenditures of $3.2 million (1987) exports: $3.0 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--plastic bags, electronic parts, apparel, hot peppers, live plants, cattle; partners--na imports: $25.3 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment, foodstuffs, manufactured goods, fuels, lubricants, and related materials; partners--na external debt: $3.7 million (1985) industrial production: growth rate 8.1% (1986) electricity: 5,000 kw capacity; 12 million kwh produced, 930 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism; light manufacturing--rum, textiles, electronic appliances agriculture: accounts for 4% of gdp; small-scale farming; food crops--tomatoes, onions, peppers; not self-sufficient in food, especially livestock products aid: na currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 280 km total; about 200 km paved, 80 km gravel and earth ports: plymouth airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,036 m telecommunications: 3,000 telephones; stations--8 am, 4 fm, 1 tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: morocco geography total area: 446,550 km2; land area: 446,300 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than california land boundaries: 2,002 km total; algeria 1,559 km, western sahara 443 km coastline: 1,835 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims and administers western sahara, but sovereignty is unresolved; armed conflict in western sahara; spain controls two coastal presidios or places of sovereignty (ceuta, melilla) climate: mediterranean, becoming more extreme in the interior terrain: mostly mountains with rich coastal plains natural resources: phosphates, iron ore, manganese, lead, zinc, fish, salt land use: 18% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 28% meadows and pastures; 12% forest and woodland; 41% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: northern mountains geologically unstable and subject to earthquakes; desertification note: strategic location along strait of gibraltar people population: 25,648,241 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 31 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 78 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 63 years male, 66 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--moroccan(s); adjective--moroccan ethnic divisions: 99.1% arab-berber, 0.7% non-moroccan, 0.2% jewish religion: 98.7% muslim, 1.1% christian, 0.2% jewish language: arabic (official); several berber dialects; french is language of business, government, diplomacy, and postprimary education literacy: 28% labor force: 7,400,000; 50% agriculture, 26% services, 15% industry, 9% other (1985) organized labor: about 5% of the labor force, mainly in the union of moroccan workers (umt) and the democratic confederation of labor (cdt) government long-form name: kingdom of morocco type: constitutional monarchy capital: rabat administrative divisions: 36 provinces (provinces, singular--province) and 2 municipalities* (wilayas, singular--wilaya); agadir, al hoceima, azilal, beni mellal, ben slimane, boulemane, casablanca*, chaouen, el jadida, el kelaa des srarhna, er rachidia, essaouira, fes, figuig, guelmim, ifrane, kenitra, khemisset, khenifra, khouribga, laayoune, marrakech, meknes, nador, ouarzazate, oujda, rabat-sale*, safi, settat, sidi kacem, tanger, tan-tan, taounate, taroudannt, tata, taza, tetouan, tiznit independence: 2 march 1956 (from france) constitution: 10 march 1972 legal system: based on islamic law and french and spanish civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in constitutional chamber of supreme court national holiday: national day (anniversary of king hassan ii's accession to the throne), 3 march (1961) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral chamber of representatives (majlis al nuwab) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--king hassan ii (since 3 march 1961); head of government--prime minister dr. azzedine laraki (since 30 september 1986) political parties and leaders: morocco has 15 political parties; the major ones are istiqlal party, m'hamed boucetta; socialist union of popular forces (usfp), abderrahim bouabid; popular movement (mp), secretariat general; national assembly of independents (rni), ahmed osman; national democratic party (pnd), mohamed arsalane el-jadidi; party for progress and socialism (pps), ali yata; constitutional union (uc), maati bouabid suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: chamber of representatives--last held on 14 september 1984 (were scheduled for september 1990, but postponed until na 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(306 total, 206 elected) cu 83, rni 61, mp 47, istiqlal 41, usfp 36, pnd 24, others 14 communists: about 2,000 member of: afdb, arab league, ccc, ec (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, itu, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador ali bengelloun; chancery at 1601 21st street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 462-7979; there is a moroccan consulate general in new york; us--ambassador michael ussery; embassy at 2 avenue de marrakech, rabat (mailing address is p. o. box 120, rabat, or apo new york 09284); telephone p212o (7) 622-65; there are us consulates general in casablanca and tangier flag: red with a green pentacle (five-pointed, linear star) known as solomon's seal in the center of the flag; green is the traditional color of islam economy overview: after registering a robust 10% growth in 1988, the economy slowed in 1989 because of higher prices for food and oil imports, lower worker remittances, and a trade dispute with india over phosphoric acid prices that cost rabat $500 million. to meet the foreign payments shortfall, rabat has been drawing down foreign exchange reserves. servicing the $22 billion foreign debt, high unemployment, and morocco's vulnerability to external forces remain severe problems for the 1990s. gdp: $21.9 billion, per capita $880 (1988); real growth rate 4.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 6% (1989) unemployment rate: 15% (1988) budget: revenues $5.1 billion; expenditures $6.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.4 billion (1988) exports: $3.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--food and beverages 30%, semiprocessed goods 23%, consumer goods 21%, phosphates 17%; partners--ec 58%, india 7%, japan 5%, ussr 3%, us 2% imports: $5.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--capital goods 24%, semiprocessed goods 22%, raw materials 16%, fuel and lubricants 16%, food and beverages 13%, consumer goods 10%; partners--ec 53%, us 11%, canada 4%, iraq 3%, ussr 3%, japan 2% external debt: $22.2 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 4% (1989 est.) electricity: 2,140,000 kw capacity; 7,760 million kwh produced, 300 kwh per capita (1989) industries: phosphate rock mining and processing, food processing, leather goods, textiles, construction, tourism agriculture: 50% of employment and 30% of export value; not self-sufficient in food; cereal farming and livestock raising predominate; barley, wheat, citrus fruit, wine, vegetables, olives; fishing catch of 491,000 metric tons in 1987 illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis; trafficking on the increase for both domestic and international drug markets; shipments of cannabis mostly directed to western europe; occasional transit point for cocaine from south america destined for western europe. aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $6.3 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $4.8 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $2.3 billion currency: moroccan dirham (plural--dirhams); 1 moroccan dirham (dh) = 100 centimes exchange rates: moroccan dirhams (dh) per us$1--8.093 (january 1990), 8.488 (1989), 8.209 (1988), 8.359 (1987), 9.104 (1986), 10.062 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,893 km 1.435-meter standard gauge (246 km double track, 974 km electrified) highways: 59,198 km total; 27,740 km bituminous treated, 31,458 km gravel, crushed stone, improved earth, and unimproved earth pipelines: 362 km crude oil; 491 km (abandoned) refined products; 241 km natural gas ports: agadir, casablanca, el jorf lasfar, kenitra, mohammedia, nador, safi, tangier; also spanish-controlled ceuta and melilla merchant marine: 54 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 334,931 grt/513,762 dwt; includes 11 cargo, 2 container, 14 refrigerated cargo, 5 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 12 chemical tanker, 4 bulk, 3 short-sea passenger civil air: 23 major transport aircraft airports: 75 total, 68 usable; 26 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 14 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 27 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good system composed of wire lines, cables, and radio relay links; principal centers are casablanca and rabat, secondary centers are fes, marrakech, oujda, tangier, and tetouan; 280,000 telephones; stations--14 am, 6 fm, 47 tv; 5 submarine cables; satellite earth stations--2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 arabsat; radio relay to gibraltar, spain, and western sahara; coaxial cable to algeria; microwave network linking syria, jordan, egypt, libya, tunisia, algeria and morocco defense forces branches: royal moroccan army, royal moroccan navy, royal moroccan air force, royal gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 6,203,759; 3,946,408 fit for military service; 293,893 reach military age (18) annually; limited conscription defense expenditures: 7.1% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: mozambique geography total area: 801,590 km2; land area: 784,090 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of california land boundaries: 4,571 km total; malawi 1,569 km, south africa 491 km, swaziland 105 km, tanzania 756 km, zambia 419 km, zimbabwe 1,231 km coastline: 2,470 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical to subtropical terrain: mostly coastal lowlands, uplands in center, high plateaus in northwest, mountains in west natural resources: coal, titanium land use: 4% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 56% meadows and pastures; 20% forest and woodland; 20% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: severe drought and floods occur in south; desertification people population: 14,565,656 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 18 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 138 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 45 years male, 49 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--mozambican(s); adjective--mozambican ethnic divisions: majority from indigenous tribal groups; about 10,000 europeans, 35,000 euro-africans, 15,000 indians religion: 60% indigenous beliefs, 30% christian, 10% muslim language: portuguese (official); many indigenous dialects literacy: 38% labor force: na, but 90% engaged in agriculture organized labor: 225,000 workers belong to a single union, the mozambique workers' organization (otm) note: there are 800,000 mozambican refugees in malawi (1989 est.) government long-form name: people's republic of mozambique type: people's republic capital: maputo administrative divisions: 10 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia); cabo delgado, gaza, inhambane, manica, maputo, nampula, niassa, sofala, tete, zambezia independence: 25 june 1975 (from portugal) constitution: 25 june 1975 legal system: based on portuguese civil law system and customary law national holiday: independence day, 25 june (1975) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral people's assembly (assembleia popular) judicial branch: people's courts at all levels leaders: chief of state--president joaquim alberto chissano (since 6 november 1986); head of government--prime minister mario da graca machungo (since 17 july 1986) political parties and leaders: front for the liberation of mozambique (frelimo) is the only legal party and is a marxist organization with close ties to the ussr suffrage: universal adult at age 18 elections: national elections are indirect and based on mass meetings throughout the country communists: about 60,000 frelimo members member of: acp, afdb, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, itu, nam, oau, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador valeriano ferrao; chancery at suite 570, 1990 m street nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 293-7146; us--ambassador melissa f. wells; embassy at 3rd floor, 35 rua da mesquita, maputo (mailing address is p. o. box 783, maputo); telephone 743167 or 744163 flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), black, and yellow with a red isosceles triangle based on the hoist side; the black band is edged in white; centered in the triangle is a yellow five-pointed star bearing a crossed rifle and hoe in black superimposed on an open white book economy overview: one of africa's poorest countries, with a per capita gdp of little more than $100, mozambique has failed to exploit the economic potential of its sizable agricultural, hydropower, and transportation resources. indeed, national output, consumption, and investment declined throughout the first half of the 1980s because of internal disorders, lack of government administrative control, and a growing foreign debt. a sharp increase in foreign aid, attracted by an economic reform policy, has resulted in successive years of economic growth since 1985. agricultural output, nevertheless, is only at about 75% of its 1981 level, and grain has to be imported. industry operates at only 20-40% of capacity. the economy depends heavily on foreign assistance to keep afloat. gdp: $1.6 billion, per capita less than $110; real growth rate 5.0% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 81.1% (1988) unemployment rate: 40.0 (1988) budget: revenues $186 million; expenditures $239 million, including capital expenditures of $208 million (1988 est.) exports: $100 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--shrimp 48%, cashews 21%, sugar 10%, copra 3%, citrus 3%; partners--us, western europe, gdr, japan imports: $764 million (c.i.f., 1988), including aid; commodities--food, clothing, farm equipment, petroleum; partners--us, western europe, ussr external debt: $4.4 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 7% (1989 est.) electricity: 2,265,000 kw capacity; 1,740 million kwh produced, 120 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food, beverages, chemicals (fertilizer, soap, paints), petroleum products, textiles, nonmetallic mineral products (cement, glass, asbestos), tobacco agriculture: accounts for 50% of gdp, over 80% of labor force, and about 90% of exports; cash crops--cotton, cashew nuts, sugarcane, tea, shrimp; other crops--cassava, corn, rice, tropical fruits; not self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $282 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.1 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $37 million; communist countries (1970-88), $887 million currency: metical (plural--meticais); 1 metical (mt) = 100 centavos exchange rates: meticais (mt) per us$1--800 (september 1989), 528.60 (1988), 289.44 (1987), 40.43 (1986), 43.18 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,288 km total; 3,140 km 1.067-meter gauge; 148 km 0.762-meter narrow gauge; malawi-nacala, malawi-beira, and zimbabwe-maputo lines are subject to closure because of insurgency highways: 26,498 km total; 4,593 km paved; 829 km gravel, crushed stone, stabilized soil; 21,076 km unimproved earth inland waterways: about 3,750 km of navigable routes pipelines: 306 km crude oil (not operating); 289 km refined products ports: maputo, beira, nacala merchant marine: 5 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 7,806 grt/12,873 dwt civil air: 5 major transport aircraft airports: 203 total, 153 usable; 27 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 29 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of troposcatter, open-wire lines, and radio relay; 57,400 telephones; stations--15 am, 3 fm, 1 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 3 domestic defense forces branches: mozambique armed forces (including army, border guard, naval command, air defense forces) military manpower: males 15-49, 3,295,067; 1,892,699 fit for military service defense expenditures: 8.4% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: namibia geography total area: 824,290 km2; land area: 823,290 km2 comparative area: slightly more than half the size of alaska land boundaries: 3,935 km total; angola 1,376 km, botswana 1,360 km, south africa 966 km, zambia 233 km coastline: 1,489 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 12 nm; territorial sea: 6 nm disputes: short section of boundary with botswana is indefinite; quadripoint with botswana, zambia, and zimbabwe is in disagreement; possible future claim to south africa's walvis bay climate: desert; hot, dry; rainfall sparse and erratic terrain: mostly high plateau; namib desert along coast; kalahari desert in east natural resources: diamonds, copper, uranium, gold, lead, tin, zinc, salt, vanadium, natural gas, fish; suspected deposits of coal and iron ore land use: 1% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 64% meadows and pastures; 22% forest and woodland; 13% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: inhospitable with very limited natural water resources; desertification note: walvis bay area is an exclave of south africa in namibia people population: 1,452,951 (july 1990), growth rate 5.6% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 20 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 71 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 57 years male, 63 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--namibian(s); adjective--namibian ethnic divisions: 86% black, 6.5% white, 7.5% mixed; about 50% of the population belong to the ovambo tribe and 9% from the kavangos tribe religion: predominantly christian language: afrikaans principal language of about 60% of white population, german of 33%, and english of 7% (all official); several indigenous languages literacy: 100% whites, 16% nonwhites labor force: 500,000; 60% agriculture, 19% industry and commerce, 8% services, 7% government, 6% mining (1981 est.) organized labor: 15 trade unions--largest is the mineworkers' union which has a sizable black membership government long-form name: republic of namibia type: republic as of 21 march 1990 capital: windhoek administrative divisions: 26 districts; bethanien, boesmanland, caprivi oos, damaraland, gobabis, grootfontein, hereroland oos, hereroland wes, kaokoland, karasburg, karibib, kavango, keetmanshoop, luderitz, maltahohe, mariental, namaland, okahandja, omaruru, otjiwarongo, outjo, owambo, rehoboth, swakopmund, tsumeb, windhoek independence: 21 march 1990 constitution: ratified 9 february 1990 legal system: based on roman-dutch law and customary law national holiday: settlers' day, 10 december executive branch: president, cabinet, constitutional council legislative branch: bicameral national assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government president sam nujoma (since 21 march 1990) political parties and leaders: south-west africa people's organization (swapo), sam nujoma; democratic turnhalle alliance (dta), dirk mudge; united democratic front (udf), justus garoeb; action christian national (acn), kosie pretorius; national patriotic front (npf), moses katjiuongua; federal convention of namibia (fcn), hans diergaardt; namibia national front (nnf), vekuii rukoro suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held on 7-11 november 1989 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(72 total) swapo 41, dta 21, udf 4, acn 3, nnf 1, fcn 1, npf 1 communists: no communist party other political or pressure groups: na member of: fao, iaea, ilo, unesco, who diplomatic representation: na flag: a large blue triangle with a yellow sunburst fills the upper left section, and an equal green triangle (solid) fills the lower right section; the triangles are separated by a red stripe which is contrasted by two narrow white edge borders economy overview: the economy is heavily dependent on the mining industry to extract and process minerals for export. mining accounts for almost 35% of gdp, agriculture and fisheries 10-15%, and manufacturing about 5%. namibia is the fourth-largest exporter of nonfuel minerals in africa and the world's fifth-largest producer of uranium. alluvial diamond deposits are among the richest in the world, making namibia a primary source for gem-quality diamonds. namibia also produces large quantities of lead, zinc, tin, silver, and tungsten, and it has substantial resources of coal. gnp: $1.54 billion, per capita $1,245; real growth rate 2.9% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15.1% (1989) unemployment rate: over 30% (1988) budget: revenues $781 million; expenditures $932 million, including capital expenditures of $na (fy88) exports: $935 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--diamonds, uranium, zinc, copper, meat, processed fish, karakul skins; partners--south africa imports: $856 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, manufactured consumer goods, machinery and equipment; partners--south africa, frg, uk, us external debt: about $27 million at independence; under a 1971 international court of justice (icj) ruling, namibia may not be liable for debt incurred during its colonial period industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 486,000 kw capacity; 1,280 million kwh produced, 930 kwh per capita (1989) industries: meatpacking, fish processing, dairy products, mining (copper, lead, zinc, diamond, uranium) agriculture: accounts for 10% of gdp (including fishing); mostly subsistence farming; livestock raising major source of cash income; crops--millet, sorghum, peanuts; fish catch potential of over 1 million metric tons not being fulfilled, 1987 catch reaching only 520,000 metric tons; not self-sufficient in food aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $47.2 million currency: south african rand (plural--rand); 1 south african rand (r) = 100 cents exchange rates: south african rand (r) per us$1--2.5555 (january 1990), 2.6166 (1989), 2.2611 (1988), 2.0350 (1987), 2.2685 (1986), 2.1911 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 2,341 km 1.067-meter gauge, single track highways: 54,500 km; 4,079 km paved, 2,540 km gravel, 47,881 km earth roads and tracks ports: luderitz; primary maritime outlet is walvis bay (south africa) civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 143 total, 123 usable; 21 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 63 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good urban, fair rural services; radio relay connects major towns, wires extend to other population centers; 62,800 telephones; stations--2 am, 40 fm, 3 tv defense forces branches: na military manpower: males 15-49, 298,249; 176,660 fit for military service defense expenditures: 4.9% of gnp (1986) note: the south-west africa territorial force, established in 1980, was demobilized in june 1989; a new national defense force will probably be formed by the new government ---------------------------------------------------country: nauru geography total area: 21 km2; land area: 21 km2 comparative area: about 0.1 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 30 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; monsoonal; rainy season (november to february) terrain: sandy beach rises to fertile ring around raised coral reefs with phosphate plateau in center natural resources: phosphates land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: only 53 km south of equator note: one of three great phosphate rock islands in the pacific (others are banaba or ocean island in kiribati and makatea in french polynesia) people population: 9,202 (july 1990), growth rate 1.5% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 41 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 69 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--nauruan(s); adjective--nauruan ethnic divisions: 58% nauruan, 26% other pacific islander, 8% chinese, 8% european religion: christian (two-thirds protestant, one-third roman catholic) language: nauruan, a distinct pacific island language (official); english widely understood, spoken, and used for most government and commercial purposes literacy: 99% labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: republic of nauru type: republic capital: no capital city as such; government offices in yaren district administrative divisions: 14 districts; aiwo, anabar, anetan, anibare, baiti, boe, buada, denigomodu, ewa, ijuw, meneng, nibok, uaboe, yaren independence: 31 january 1968 (from un trusteeship under australia, new zealand, and uk); formerly pleasant island constitution: 29 january 1968 legal system: own acts of parliament and british common law national holiday: independence day, 31 january (1968) executive branch: president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president bernard dowiyogo (since 12 december 1989) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 20 elections: president--last held 9 december 1989 (next to be held december 1992); results--bernard dowiyogo elected by parliament; parliament--last held on 9 december 1989 (next to be held december 1992); results--percent of vote na; seats--(18 total) independents 18 member of: commonwealth (special member), escap, icao, interpol, itu, spc, spf, upu diplomatic representation: ambassador t. w. star resides in melbourne (australia); there is a nauruan consulate in agana (guam); us--the us ambassador to australia is accredited to nauru flag: blue with a narrow, horizontal, yellow stripe across the center and a large white 12-pointed star below the stripe on the hoist side; the star indicates the country's location in relation to the equator (the yellow stripe) and the 12 points symbolize the 12 original tribes of nauru economy overview: revenues come from the export of phosphates, the reserves of which are expected to be exhausted by the year 2000. phosphates have given nauruans one of the highest per capita incomes in the third world--$10,000 annually. few other resources exist so most necessities must be imported, including fresh water from australia. the rehabilitation of mined land and the replacement of income from phosphates constitute serious long-term problems. substantial investment in trust funds, out of phosphate income, will help cushion the transition. gnp: over $90 million, per capita $10,000; real growth rate na% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 0% budget: revenues $69.7 million; expenditures $51.5 million, including capital expenditures of $na (fy86 est.) exports: $93 million (f.o.b., 1984); commodities--phosphates; partners--australia, nz imports: $73 million (c.i.f., 1984); commodities--food, fuel, manufactures, building materials, machinery; partners--australia, uk, nz, japan external debt: $33.3 million industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 13,250 kw capacity; 48 million kwh produced, 5,300 kwh per capita (1989) industries: phosphate mining, financial services, coconuts agriculture: negligible; almost completely dependent on imports for food and water aid: none currency: australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 3.9 km; used to haul phosphates from the center of the island to processing facilities on the southwest coast highways: about 27 km total; 21 km paved, 6 km improved earth ports: nauru merchant marine: 4 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 39,597 grt/50,729 dwt; includes 1 passenger-cargo, 1 cargo, 2 bulk civil air: 3 major transport aircraft, one on order airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate intraisland and international radio communications provided via australian facilities; 1,600 telephones; 4,000 radio receivers; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: no regular armed forces military manpower: males 15-49, 298,249; 176,660 fit for military service; 100 reach age 18 annually defense expenditures: no formal defense structure ---------------------------------------------------country: navassa island (territory of the us) geography total area: 5.2 km2; land area: 5.2 km2 comparative area: about nine times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 8 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by haiti climate: marine, tropical terrain: raised coral and limestone plateau, flat to undulating; ringed by vertical white cliffs (9 to 15 meters high) natural resources: guano land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 10% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 90% other environment: mostly exposed rock, but enough grassland to support goat herds; dense stands of fig-like trees, scattered cactus note: strategic location between cuba, haiti, and jamaica in the caribbean sea; 160 km south of the us naval base at guantanamo, cuba people population: uninhabited; transient haitian fishermen and others camp on the island government long-form name: none (territory of the us) type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the us coast guard economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: nepal geography total area: 140,800 km2; land area: 136,800 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than arkansas land boundaries: 2,926 km total; china 1,236 km, india 1,690 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: varies from cool summers and severe winters in north to subtropical summers and mild winter in south terrain: tarai or flat river plain of the ganges in south, central hill region, rugged himalayas in north natural resources: quartz, water, timber, hydroelectric potential, scenic beauty; small deposits of lignite, copper, cobalt, iron ore land use: 17% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 13% meadows and pastures; 33% forest and woodland; 37% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: contains eight of world's 10 highest peaks; deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution note: landlocked; strategic location between china and india people population: 19,145,800 (july 1990), growth rate 2.4% (1990) birth rate: 39 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 99 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 50 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--nepalese (sing. and pl.); adjective--nepalese ethnic divisions: newars, indians, tibetans, gurungs, magars, tamangs, bhotias, rais, limbus, sherpas, as well as many smaller groups religion: only official hindu state in world, although no sharp distinction between many hindu (about 88% of population) and buddhist groups; small groups of muslims and christians language: nepali (official); 20 languages divided into numerous dialects literacy: 20% labor force: 4,100,000; 93% agriculture, 5% services, 2% industry; severe lack of skilled labor organized labor: teachers' union, not officially recognized government long-form name: kingdom of nepal type: constitutional monarchy, but king birendra exercises control over multitiered system of government capital: kathmandu administrative divisions: 14 zones (anchal, singular and plural); bagmati, bheri, dhawalagiri, gandaki, janakpur, karnali, kosi, lumbini, mahakali, mechi, narayani, rapti, sagarmatha, seti independence: 1768, unified by prithyi narayan shah constitution: 16 december 1962 legal system: based on hindu legal concepts and english common law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: birthday of his majesty the king, 28 december (1945) executive branch: monarch, chairman of the council of state, council of state, prime minister legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (rashtriya panchayat) judicial branch: supreme court (sarbochha adalat) leaders: chief of state--king birendra bir bikram shah dev (since 31 january 1972, crowned king 24 february 1985); heir apparent crown prince dipendra bir bikram shah dev, son of the king (born 21 june 1971); head of government--prime minister marich man singh shrestha (since 15 july 1986) political parties and leaders: all political parties outlawed but operate more or less openly; nepali congress party (ncp), ganesh man singh, k. p. bhattarai, g. p. koirala suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: national assembly--last held on 12 may 1986 (next to be held may 1991); results--all independents since political parties are officially banned; seats--(140 total, 112 elected) independents 112 communists: communist party of nepal (cpn); factions include v. b. manandhar, man mohan adhikari/sahana pradhan, bharat raj joshi, rai majhi, tulsi lal, krishna raj burma other political or pressure groups: numerous small, left-leaning student groups in the capital; indian merchants in tarai and capital; several small, radical nepalese antimonarchist groups operating from north india member of: adb, ccc, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, nam, saarc, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador mohan man sainju; chancery at 2131 leroy place nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 667-4550; there is a nepalese consulate general in new york; us--ambassador julia chang bloch; embassy at pani pokhari, kathmandu; telephone p977o 411179 or 412718, 411601 flag: red with a blue border around the unique shape of two overlapping right triangles; the smaller, upper triangle bears a white stylized moon and the larger, lower triangle bears a white 12-pointed sun economy overview: nepal is among the poorest and least developed countries in the world with a per capita income of only $158. real growth averaged 4% in the 1980s until fy89, when it plunged to 1.5% because of the ongoing trade/transit dispute with india. agriculture is the mainstay of the economy, providing a livelihood for over 90% of the population and accounting for 60% of gdp and about 75% of exports. industrial activity is limited, and what there is involves the processing of agricultural produce (jute, sugarcane, tobacco, and grain). apart from agricultural land and forests, the only other exploitable natural resources are mica, hydropower, and tourism. despite considerable investment in the agricultural sector, production in the 1980s has not kept pace with the population growth of 2.7%, which has led to a reduction in exportable surpluses and balance-of-payments difficulties. economic prospects for the 1990s remain grim. gdp: $2.9 billion, per capita $158; real growth rate 1.5% (fy89) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.1% (fy89 est.) unemployment rate: 5%; underemployment estimated at 25-40% (1987) budget: revenues $296 million; expenditures $635 million, including capital expenditures of $394 million (fy89 est.) exports: $374 million (f.o.b., fy89 est.), but does not include unrecorded border trade with india; commodities--clothing, carpets, leather goods, grain; partners--india 38%, us 23%, uk 6%, other europe 9% (fy88) imports: $724 million (c.i.f., fy89 est.); commodities--petroleum products 20%, fertilizer 11%, machinery 10%; partners--india 36%, japan 13%, europe 4%, us 1% (fy88) external debt: $1.3 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.5% (fy89 est.) electricity: 205,000 kw capacity; 535 million kwh produced, 30 kwh per capita (1989) industries: small rice, jute, sugar, and oilseed mills; cigarette, textiles, cement, brick; tourism agriculture: accounts for 60% of gdp and 90% of work force; farm products--rice, corn, wheat, sugarcane, root crops, milk, buffalo meat; not self-sufficient in food, particularly in drought years illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the domestic and international drug markets aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $285 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1980-87), $1.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $30 million; communist countries (1970-88), $273 million currency: nepalese rupee (plural--rupees); 1 nepalese rupee (nr) = 100 paisa exchange rates: nepalese rupees (nrs) per us$1--28.559 (january 1990), 27.189 (1989), 23.289 (1988), 21.819 (1987), 21.230 (1986), 18.246 (1985) fiscal year: 16 july-15 july communications railroads: 52 km (1985), all 0.762-meter narrow gauge; all in tarai close to indian border; 10 km from raxaul to birganj is government owned highways: 5,958 km total (1986); 2,645 km paved, 815 km gravel or crushed stone, 2,257 km improved and unimproved earth; also 241 km of seasonally motorable tracks civil air: 5 major and 11 minor transport aircraft airports: 38 total, 38 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 9 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: poor telephone and telegraph service; fair radio communication and broadcast service; international radio communication service is poor; 30,000 telephones (1987); stations--4 am, no fm, 1 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: royal nepalese army, royal nepalese army air service, nepalese police force military manpower: males 15-49, 4,531,660; 2,347,412 fit for military service; 225,349 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 2% of gdp, or $58 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: netherlands geography total area: 37,290 km2; land area: 33,940 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of new jersey land boundaries: 1,027 km total; belgium 450 km, frg 577 km coastline: 451 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: temperate; marine; cool summers and mild winters terrain: mostly coastal lowland and reclaimed land (polders); some hills in southeast natural resources: natural gas, crude oil, fertile soil land use: 25% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 34% meadows and pastures; 9% forest and woodland; 31% other; includes 15% irrigated environment: 27% of the land area is below sea level and protected from the north sea by dikes note: located at mouths of three major european rivers (rhine, maas or meuse, schelde) people population: 14,936,032 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--dutchman(men), dutchwoman(women); adjective--dutch ethnic divisions: 96% dutch, 4% moroccans, turks, and others (1988) religion: 36% roman catholic, 27% protestant, 4% other, 33% unaffiliated (1986) language: dutch literacy: 99% labor force: 5,300,000; 50.1% services, 28.2% manufacturing and construction, 15.9% government, 5.8% agriculture (1986) organized labor: 29% of labor force government long-form name: kingdom of the netherlands type: constitutional monarchy capital: amsterdam, but government resides at the hague administrative divisions: 12 provinces (provincien, singular--provincie); drenthe, flevoland, friesland, gelderland, groningen, limburg, noord-brabant, noord-holland, overijssel, utrecht, zeeland, zuid-holland dependent areas: aruba, netherlands antilles independence: 1579 (from spain) constitution: 17 february 1983 legal system: civil law system incorporating french penal theory; judicial review in the supreme court of legislation of lower order rather than acts of parliament; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: queen's day, 30 april (1938) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, vice prime minister, cabinet, cabinet of ministers legislative branch: bicameral states general (staten generaal) consists of an upper chamber or first chamber (eerste kamer) and a lower chamber or second chamber (tweede kamer) judicial branch: supreme court (de hoge raad) leaders: chief of state--queen beatrix wilhelmina armgard (since 30 april 1980); heir apparent willem-alexander, prince of orange, son of queen beatrix (born 27 april 1967); head of government--prime minister ruud (rudolph) f. m. lubbers (since 4 november 1982); deputy prime minister wim kok (since 2 november 1989) political parties and leaders: christian democratic appeal (cda), willem van velzen; labor (pvda), wim kok; liberal (vvd), joris voorhoeve; democrats '66 (d'66), hans van mierio; communist (cpn), henk hoekstra; a host of minor parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: first chamber--last held on 9 june l987 (next to be held 9 june 1991); results--elected by the country's 12 provincial councils; seats--(75 total) percent of seats by party na; second chamber--last held on 6 september 1989 (next to be held by september 1993); results--cda 35.3%, pvda 31.9%, vvd 14.6%, d'66 7.9%, others 10.3%; seats--(150 total) cda 54, pvda 49, vvd 22, d'66 12, others 13 communists: about 6,000 other political or pressure groups: large multinational firms; federation of netherlands trade union movement (comprising socialist and catholic trade unions) and a protestant trade union; federation of catholic and protestant employers associations; the nondenominational federation of netherlands enterprises; and ikv--interchurch peace council member of: adb, benelux, ccc, council of europe, dac, ec, ece, eib, ems, esa, escap, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, inro, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council (with respect to interests of the netherlands antilles and suriname), nato, oas (observer), oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, diplomatic representation: ambassador richard h. fein; chancery at 4200 linnean avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 244-5300; there are dutch consulates general in chicago, houston, los angeles, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador c. howard wilkins; embassy at lange voorhout 102, 2514 ej the hague (mailing address apo new york 09159); telephone p31o (70) 62-49-11; there is a us consulate general in amsterdam flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and blue; similar to the flag of luxembourg which uses a lighter blue and is longer economy overview: this highly developed and affluent economy is based on private enterprise. the government makes its presence felt, however, through many regulations, permit requirements, and welfare programs affecting most aspects of economic activity. the trade and financial services sector contributes over 50% of gdp. industrial activity, including construction, provides about 25% of gdp, and is led by the food-processing, oil-refining, and metal-working industries. the highly mechanized agricultural sector employs only 6% of the labor force, but provides large surpluses for export and the domestic food-processing industry. an unemployment rate of over 8.6% and a sizable budget deficit are currently the most serious economic problems. gdp: $205.9 billion, per capita $13,900; real growth rate 4.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 8.6% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $71 billion; expenditures $82 billion, including capital expenditures of $na billion (1989) exports: $110.3 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--agricultural products, processed foods and tobacco, natural gas, chemicals, metal products, textiles, clothing; partners--ec 74.9% (frg 28.3%, belgium-luxembourg 14.2%, france 10.7%, uk 10.2%), us 4.7% (1988) imports: $100.9 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--raw materials and semifinished products, consumer goods, transportation equipment, crude oil, food products; partners--ec 63.8% (frg 26.5%, belgium-luxembourg 23.1%, uk 8.1%), us 7.9% (1988) external debt: none industrial production: growth rate 4.8% (1989 est.) electricity: 22,216,000 kw capacity; 63,570 million kwh produced, 4,300 kwh per capita (1989) industries: agroindustries, metal and engineering products, electrical machinery and equipment, chemicals, petroleum, fishing, construction, microelectronics agriculture: accounts for 4% of gdp; animal production predominates; crops--grains, potatoes, sugar beets, fruits, vegetables; shortages of grain, fats, and oils aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $15.8 billion currency: netherlands guilder, gulden, or florin (plural--guilders, gulden, or florins); 1 netherlands guilder, gulden, or florin (f.) = 100 cents exchange rates: netherlands guilders, gulden, or florins (f.) per us$1--2.2906 (january 1990), 2.1207 (1989), 1.9766 (1988), 2.0257 (1987), 2.4500 (1986), 3.3214 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,037 km track (includes 1,871 km electrified and 1,800 km double track; 2,871 km 1.435-meter standard gauge operated by netherlands railways (ns); 166 km privately owned highways: 108,360 km total; 92,525 km paved (including 2,185 km of limited access, divided highways); 15,835 km gravel, crushed stone inland waterways: 6,340 km, of which 35% is usable by craft of 1,000 metric ton capacity or larger pipelines: 418 km crude oil; 965 km refined products; 10,230 km natural gas ports: maritime--amsterdam, delfzijl, den helder, dordrecht, eemshaven, ijmuiden, rotterdam, scheveningen, terneuzen, vlissingen; inland--29 ports merchant marine: 345 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,661,822 grt/3,732,282 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 187 cargo, 42 refrigerated cargo, 23 container, 9 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 livestock carrier, 12 multifunction large-load carrier, 15 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 27 chemical tanker, 11 liquefied gas, 2 specialized tanker, 1 combinatio n ore/oil, 9 bulk, 2 combination bulk; note--many dutch-owned ships are also registered in the captive netherlands antilles register civil air: 98 major transport aircraft airports: 28 total, 28 usable; 19 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 12 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: highly developed, well maintained, and integrated; extensive system of multiconductor cables, supplemented by radio relay links; 9,418,000 telephones; stations--6 am, 20 (32 repeaters) fm, 21 (8 repeaters) tv; 5 submarine cables; communication satellite earth stations operating in intelsat (1 indian ocean and 2 atlantic ocean) and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: royal netherlands army, royal netherlands navy/marine corps, royal netherlands air force military manpower: males 15-49, 4,134,006; 3,660,048 fit for military service; 111,948 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.9% of gdp, or $6.0 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: netherlands antilles (part of the dutch realm) geography total area: 960 km2; land area: 960 km2; includes bonaire, curacao, saba, sint eustatius, and sint maarten (dutch part of the island of saint martin) comparative area: slightly less than 5.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 364 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 12 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; modified by northeast trade winds terrain: generally hilly, volcanic interiors natural resources: phosphates (curacao only), salt (bonaire only) land use: 8% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 92% other environment: curacao and bonaire are south of caribbean hurricane belt, so rarely threatened; sint maarten, saba, and sint eustatius are subject to hurricanes from july to october note: consists of two island groups--curacao and bonaire are located off the coast of venezuela, and sint maarten, saba, and sint eustatius lie 800 km to the north people population: 183,503 (july 1990), growth rate 0.2% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 11 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--netherlands antillean(s); adjective--netherlands antillean ethnic divisions: 85% mixed african; remainder carib indian, european, latin, and oriental religion: predominantly roman catholic; protestant, jewish, seventh-day adventist language: dutch (official); papiamento, a spanish-portuguese-dutch-english dialect predominates; english widely spoken; spanish literacy: 95% labor force: 89,000; 65% government, 28% industry and commerce (1983) organized labor: 60-70% of labor force government long-form name: none type: part of the dutch realm--full autonomy in internal affairs granted in 1954 capital: willemstad administrative divisions: none (part of the dutch realm) independence: none (part of the dutch realm) constitution: 29 december 1954, statute of the realm of the netherlands, as amended legal system: based on dutch civil law system, with some english common law influence national holiday: queen's day, 30 april (1938) executive branch: dutch monarch, governor, prime minister, vice prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: parliament (staten) judicial branch: joint high court of justice leaders: chief of state--queen beatrix wilhelmina armgard (since 30 april 1980), represented by governor general jaime saleh (since october 1989); head of government--prime minister maria liberia-peters (since 17 may 1988, previously served from september 1984 to november 1985) political parties and leaders: political parties are indigenous to each island: curacao--national people's party (nvp), maria liberia-peters; new antilles movement (man), domenico felip martina; democratic party of curacao (dp), augustus diaz; workers' liberation front (fol), wilson (papa) godett; socialist independent (si), george hueck and nelson monte; bonaire--new force, rudy ellis; democratic party of bonaire (pdb), john evert (jopie) abraham; sint maarten--democratic party of sint maarten, claude wathey; patriotic movement of sint maarten, romeo paplophlet; sint eustatius--democratic party of sint eustatius, albert k. van putten; windward islands people's movement (wipm), eric henriquez; saba--windward islands people's movement (wipm saba), will johnston; saba democratic labor movement, vernon hassell; saba unity party, carmen simmonds suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held on 22 november 1985 (next to be held november 1989); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(22 total) pnp 6, man 4, dp-curacao 3, dp-st. maarten 3, dp-bonaire 2, dp-st. eustatius 1, fol 1, upb 1, wipm 1; note--the government of prime minister maria liberia-peters is a coalition of several parties communists: small leftist groups member of: ec (associate), interpol; associated with un through the netherlands; upu, wmo diplomatic representation: as an autonomous part of the netherlands, netherlands antillean interests in the us are represented by the netherlands; us--consul general sharon p. wilkinson; consulate general at st. anna boulevard 19, willemstad, curacao (mailing address p. o. box 158, willemstad, curacao); telephone p599o (9) 613066 flag: white with a horizontal blue stripe in the center superimposed on a vertical red band also centered; five white five-pointed stars are arranged in an oval pattern in the center of the blue band; the five stars represent the five main islands of bonaire, curacao, saba, sint eustatius, and sint maarten economy overview: tourism, petroleum refining, and offshore finance are the mainstays of the economy. the islands enjoy a comparatively high per capita income and a well-developed infrastructure compared with other countries in the region. unlike many latin american countries, the netherlands antilles has avoided large international debt. almost all consumer and capital goods are imported, with the us being the major supplier. the economy has suffered somewhat in recent years because of the depressed state of the world oil market and declining tax revenues. in 1983 the drop in oil prices led to the devaluation of the venezuelan bolivar, which ended a substantial flow of venezuelan tourists to the islands. as a result of a decline in tax revenues, the government has been seeking financial support from the netherlands. gdp: $1.0 billion, per capita $5,500; real growth rate 3% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.0% (1988) unemployment rate: 26.0% (1988) budget: revenues $180 million; expenditures $289 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1987 est.) exports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum products 98%; partners--us 55%, uk 7%, jamaica 5% imports: $1.5 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--crude petroleum 64%, food, manufactures; partners--venezuela 52%, nigeria 15%, us 12% external debt: $701.2 million (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 125,000 kw capacity; 365 million kwh produced, 1,990 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism (curacao and sint maarten), petroleum refining (curacao), petroleum transshipment facilities (curacao and bonaire), light manufacturing (curacao) agriculture: hampered by poor soils and scarcity of water; chief products--aloes, sorghum, peanuts, fresh vegetables, tropical fruit; not self-sufficient in food aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-79), $353 million currency: netherlands antillean guilder, gulden, or florin (plural--guilders, gulden, or florins); 1 netherlands antillean guilder, gulden, or florin (naf.) = 100 cents exchange rates: netherlands antillean guilders, gulden, or florins (naf.) per us$1--1.80 (fixed rate since 1971) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 950 km total; 300 km paved, 650 km gravel and earth ports: willemstad, philipsburg, kralendijk merchant marine: 52 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 418,206 grt/414,325 dwt; includes 4 passenger, 19 cargo, 5 refrigerated cargo, 7 container, 4 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 6 multifunction large-load carrier, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 2 bulk; note--all but a few are foreign owned civil air: 5 major transport aircraft airports: 7 total, 7 usable; 7 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: generally adequate facilities; extensive interisland radio relay links; stations--9 am, 4 fm, 1 tv; 2 submarine cables; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces military manpower: males 15-49 49,299; 27,888 fit for military service; 1,678 reach military age (20) annually note: defense is responsibility of the netherlands ---------------------------------------------------country: new caledonia (overseas territory of france) geography total area: 19,060 km2; land area: 18,760 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than new jersey land boundaries: none coastline: 2,254 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; modified by southeast trade winds; hot, humid terrain: coastal plains with interior mountains natural resources: nickel, chrome, iron, cobalt, manganese, silver, gold, lead, copper land use: negl% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 14% meadows and pastures; 51% forest and woodland; 35% other environment: typhoons most frequent from november to march note: located 1,750 km east of australia in the south pacific ocean people population: 153,215 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 24 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 39 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 71 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--new caledonian(s); adjective--new caledonian ethnic divisions: melanesian 42.5%, european 37.1%, wallisian 8.4%, polynesian 3.8%, indonesian 3.6%, vietnamese 1.6%, other 3.0% religion: over 60% roman catholic, 30% protestant, 10% other language: french; melanesian-polynesian dialects labor force: 50,469; foreign workers for plantations and mines from wallis and futuna, vanuatu, and french polynesia (1980 est.) organized labor: na government long-form name: territory of new caledonia and dependencies type: overseas territory of france capital: noumea administrative divisions: none (overseas territory of france) independence: none (overseas territory of france); note--a referendum on independence will be held in 1998, with a review of the issue in 1992 constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: the 1988 matignon accords grant substantial autonomy to the islands; formerly under french law national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: high commissioner, consultative committee (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral territorial assembly judicial branch: court of appeal leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government high commissioner and president of the council of government bernard grasset (since 15 july 1988) political parties: white-dominated rassemblement pour la caledonie dans la republique (rpcr), conservative; melanesian proindependence kanak socialist national liberation front (flnks); melanesian moderate kanak socialist liberation (lks); national front (fn), extreme right; caledonian separatist front, extreme left suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: territorial congress--last held na june 1989 (next to be held na 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(54 total) rpcr 27, flnks 19, fn 3, others 5; french senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) rpcr 1; french national assembly--last held 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(2 total) rpcr 2 communists: number unknown; palita extreme left party; some politically active communists deported during 1950s; small number of north vietnamese member of: eib (associate), wftu, wmo diplomatic representation: as an overseas territory of france, new caledonian interests are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: new caledonia has more than 40% of the world's known nickel resources. in recent years the economy has suffered because of depressed international demand for nickel, the principal source of export earnings. only a negligible amount of the land is suitable for cultivation, and food accounts for about 25% of imports. gnp: $860 million, per capita $5,810; real growth rate 2.4% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1986) unemployment rate: 6.2% (1983) budget: revenues $110.5 million; expenditures $110.5 million, including capital expenditures of na (1981) exports: $75 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--nickel metal 87%, nickel ore; partners--france 56.3%, japan imports: $180 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--foods, fuels, minerals, machines, electrical equipment; partners--france 50.3%, australia external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 400,000 kw capacity; 2,200 million kwh produced, 14,440 kwh per capita (1989) industries: nickel mining agriculture: large areas devoted to cattle grazing; coffee, corn, wheat, vegetables; 60% self-sufficient in beef aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.6 billion currency: comptoirs francais du pacifique franc (plural--francs); 1 cfp franc (cfpf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: comptoirs francais du pacifique francs (cfpf) per us$1--104.71 (january 1990), 115.99 (1989), 108.30 (1988), 109.27 (1987), 125.92 (1986), 163.35 (1985); note--linked at the rate of 18.18 to the french franc fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 5,448 km total; 558 km paved, 2,251 km improved earth, 2,639 km unimproved earth ports: noumea, nepoui, poro, thio civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 29 total, 27 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 32,578 telephones (1987); stations--5 am, 3 fm, 7 tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: new zealand geography total area: 268,680 km2; land area: 268,670 km2; includes antipodes islands, auckland islands, bounty islands, campbell island, chatham islands, and kermadec islands comparative area: about the size of colorado land boundaries: none coastline: 15,134 km maritime claims: continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: territorial claim in antarctica (ross dependency) climate: temperate with sharp regional contrasts terrain: predominately mountainous with some large coastal plains natural resources: natural gas, iron ore, sand, coal, timber, hydropower, gold, limestone land use: 2% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 53% meadows and pastures; 38% forest and woodland; 7% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: earthquakes are common, though usually not severe people population: 3,295,866 (july 1990), growth rate 0.4% (1990) birth rate: 16 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--new zealander(s); adjective--new zealand ethnic divisions: 88% european, 8.9% maori, 2.9% pacific islander, 0.2% other religion: 81% christian, 18% none or unspecified, 1% hindu, confucian, and other language: english (official), maori literacy: 99% labor force: 1,591,900; 67.4% services, 19.8% manufacturing, 9.3% primary production (1987) organized labor: 681,000 members; 43% of labor force (1986) government long-form name: none; abbreviated nz type: parliamentary democracy capital: wellington administrative divisions: 93 counties, 9 districts*, and 3 town districts**; akaroa, amuri, ashburton, bay of islands, bruce, buller, chatham islands, cheviot, clifton, clutha, cook, dannevirke, egmont, eketahuna, ellesmere, eltham, eyre, featherston, franklin, golden bay, great barrier island, grey, hauraki plains, hawera*, hawke's bay, heathcote, hikurangi**, hobson, hokianga, horowhenua, hurunui, hutt, inangahua, inglewood, kaikoura, kairanga, kiwitea, lake, mackenzie, malvern, manaia**, manawatu, mangonui, maniototo, marlborough, masterton, matamata, mount herbert, ohinemuri, opotiki, oroua, otamatea, otorohanga*, oxford, pahiatua, paparua, patea, piako, pohangina, raglan, rangiora*, rangitikei, rodney, rotorua*, runanga, saint kilda, silverpeaks, southland, stewart island, stratford, strathallan, taranaki, taumarunui, taupo, tauranga, thames-coromandel*, tuapeka, vincent, waiapu, waiheke, waihemo, waikato, waikohu, waimairi, waimarino, waimate, waimate west, waimea, waipa, waipawa*, waipukurau*, wairarapa south, wairewa, wairoa, waitaki, waitomo*, waitotara, wallace, wanganui, waverley**, westland, whakatane*, whangarei, whangaroa, woodville dependent areas: cook islands, niue, tokelau independence: 26 september 1907 (from uk) constitution: no formal, written constitution; consists of various documents, including certain acts of the uk and new zealand parliaments; constitution act 1986 was to have come into force 1 january 1987, but has not been enacted legal system: based on english law, with special land legislation and land courts for maoris; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: waitangi day (treaty of waitangi established british sovereignty), 6 february (1840) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives (commonly called parliament) judicial branch: high court, court of appeal leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii ( since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general the most rev. sir paul reeves (since 20 november 1985); head of government--prime minister geoffrey palmer (since 8 august 1989); deputy prime minister helen clark (since 8 august 1989) political parties and leaders: new zealand labor party (nzlp; government), geoffrey palmer; national party (np; opposition), jim bolger; democratic party, neil morrison; socialist unity party (sup; pro-soviet), ken douglas suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of representatives--last held on 15 august 1987 (next to be held by august 1990); results--lp 47%, np 45%, dp 6%; seats--(97 total) lp 58, np 39 communists: sup about 140, other groups, about 200 member of: adb, anzus, aspac, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, dac, escap, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itu, oecd, spf, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador harold huyton francis; chancery at 37 observatory circle nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 328-4800; there are new zealand consulates general in los angeles and new york; us--ambassador della newman; embassy at 29 fitzherbert terrace, thorndon, wellington (mailing address is private bag, wellington, or fpo san francisco 96690-0001); telephone p64o (4) 722-068; there is a us consulate general in auckland flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant with four red five-pointed stars edged in white centered in the outer half of the flag; the stars represent the southern cross constellation economy overview: since 1984 the government has been reorienting an agrarian economy dependent on a guaranteed british market to an open free market economy that can compete on the global scene. the government has hoped that dynamic growth would boost real incomes, reduce inflationary pressures, and permit the expansion of welfare benefits. the results have been mixed: inflation is down from double-digit levels but growth has been sluggish and unemployment, always a highly sensitive issue, has been at a record high 7.4%. in 1988 gdp fell by 1% and in 1989 grew by a moderate 2.4%. gdp: $39.1 billion, per capita $11,600; real growth rate 2.4% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5% (1989) unemployment rate: 7.4% (1989) budget: revenues $18.6 billion; expenditures $19.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (fy90 est.) exports: $8.9 billion (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--wool, lamb, mutton, beef, fruit, fish, cheese, manufactures, chemicals, foresty products; partners--ec 18.3%, japan 17.9%, australia 17.5%, us 13.5%, china 3.6%, south korea 3.1% imports: $7.5 billion (c.i.f., fy89); commodities--petroleum, consumer goods, motor vehicles, industrial equipment; partners--australia 19.7%, japan 16.9%, ec 16.9%, us 15.3%, taiwan 3.0% external debt: $17.0 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 1.6% (fy88) electricity: 7,800,000 kw capacity; 27,600 million kwh produced, 8,190 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, wood and paper products, textiles, machinery, transportation equipment, banking and insurance, tourism, mining agriculture: accounts for about 9% of gnp and 10% of the work force; livestock predominates--wool, meat, dairy products all export earners; crops--wheat, barley, potatoes, pulses, fruits, and vegetables; surplus producer of farm products; fish catch reached a record 431,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $448 million currency: new zealand dollar (plural--dollars); 1 new zealand dollar (nz$) = 100 cents exchange rates: new zealand dollars (nz$) per us$1--1.6581 (january 1990), 1.6708 (1989), 1.5244 (1988), 1.6886 (1987), 1.9088 (1986), 2.0064 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 4,716 km total; all 1.067-meter gauge; 274 km double track; 113 km electrified; over 99% government owned highways: 92,648 km total; 49,547 km paved, 43,101 km gravel or crushed stone inland waterways: 1,609 km; of little importance to transportation pipelines: 1,000 km natural gas; 160 km refined products; 150 km condensate ports: auckland, christchurch, dunedin, wellington, tauranga merchant marine: 18 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 190,553 grt/257,782 dwt; includes 1 cargo, 2 container, 4 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 railcar carrier, 4 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 5 bulk civil air: about 40 major transport aircraft airports: 157 total, 157 usable; 33 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 47 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent international and domestic systems; 2,110,000 telephones; stations 64 am, 2 fm, 14 tv; submarine cables extend to australia and fiji; 2 pacific ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: royal new zealand navy, new zealand army, royal new zealand air force military manpower: males 15-49, 872,336; 740,207 fit for military service; 29,532 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.1% of gdp, or $820 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: nicaragua geography total area: 129,494 km2; land area: 120,254 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than new york state land boundaries: 1,231 km total; costa rica 309 km, honduras 922 km coastline: 910 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 25 nm security zone (status of claim uncertain); continental shelf: not specified; territorial sea: 200 nm disputes: territorial disputes with colombia over the archipelago de san andres y providencia and quita sueno bank climate: tropical in lowlands, cooler in highlands terrain: extensive atlantic coastal plains rising to central interior mountains; narrow pacific coastal plain interrupted by volcanoes natural resources: gold, silver, copper, tungsten, lead, zinc, timber, fish land use: 9% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 43% meadows and pastures; 35% forest and woodland; 12% other; including 1% irrigated environment: subject to destructive earthquakes, volcanoes, landslides, and occasional severe hurricanes; deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution people population: 3,722,683 (july 1990), growth rate 2.8% (1990) birth rate: 40 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 68 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 61 years male, 62 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--nicaraguan(s); adjective--nicaraguan ethnic divisions: 69% mestizo, 17% white, 9% black, 5% indian religion: 95% roman catholic, 5% protestant language: spanish (official); englishand indian-speaking minorities on atlantic coast literacy: 88% (1981) labor force: 1,086,000; 43% service, 44% agriculture, 13% industry (1986) organized labor: 35% of labor force government long-form name: republic of nicaragua type: republic capital: managua administrative divisions: 9 administrative regions encompassing 17 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); north, atlantic coast, south, atlantic coast, boaco, carazo, chinandega, chontales, esteli, granada, jinotega, leon, madriz, managua, masaya, matagalpa, nueva segovia, rio san juan, rivas independence: 15 september 1821 (from spain) constitution: january 1987 legal system: civil law system; supreme court may review administrative acts national holiday: independence day, 15 september (1821) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: national assembly (asamblea nacional) judicial branch: supreme court (corte suprema) and municipal courts leaders: chief of state and head of government--president-elect violeta barios de chamorro (since 25 february 1990; takes office 25 april 1990); vice president-elect virgilio godoy (since 25 february 1990; takes office 25 april 1990) political parties and leaders: ruling coalition: national opposition union (uno)--14 party alliance: national conservative party (pnc), silviano matamoros; conservative popular alliance party (papc), miriam arguello; national conservative action party (panc), hernaldo zuniga; national democratic confidence party (pdcn), augustin jarquin; independent liberal party (pli), virgilio godoy; neo-liberal party (pali), andres zuniga; liberal constitutionalist party (plc), jose ernesto somarriba; national action party (pan), eduardo rivas; nicaraguan socialist party (psn), gustavo tablada; communist party of nicaragua (pcden), eli altimirano; popular social christian party (ppsc), luis humberto; nicaraguan democratic movement (mdn), roberto urroz; social democratic party (psd), guillermo potoy; central american integrationist party (piac), alejandro perez; opposition parties: sandinista national liberation front (fsln), daniel ortega; central american unionist party (puca), blanca rojas; democratic conservative party of nicaragua (pcdn), jose brenes; liberal party of national unity (pluin), eduardo coronado; movement of revolutionary unity (mur), francisco samper; social christian party (psc), erick ramirez; revolutionary workers' party (prt), bonifacio miranda; social conservative party (psoc), fernando aguerro; popular action movement--marxist-leninist (map-ml), isidro tellez; popular social christian party (ppsc), mauricio diaz suffrage: universal at age 16 elections: president--last held on 25 february 1990 (next to be held february 1996); results--violeta barrios de chamorro (uno) 54.7%, daniel ortega saavedra (fsln) 40.8%, others 4.5%; national constituent assembly--last held on 25 february 1990 (next to be held february 1996); results--uno 53.9%, fsln 40.8%, psc 1.6%, mur 1.0%; seats--(92 total) uno 51, fsln 39, psc 1, mur 1 communists: fsln--35,000; other communists--15,000-20,000 other political or pressure groups: permanent congress of workers (cpt), confederation of labor unification (cus), autonomous nicaraguan workers' central (ctn-a), independent general confederation of workers (ctg-i), communist labor action and unity central (caus), nicaraguan workers' central (cst); superior council of private enterprise (cosep) is an umbrella group of 11 different business groups, including the chamber of commerce, the chamber of industry, and the nicaraguan development institute (inde) member of: cacm, cema (observer), fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, iso, itu, nam, oas, odeca, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: charge d'affaires leonor arguello de huper; chancery at 1627 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 387-4371 or 4372; us--charge d'affaires john p. leonard; embassy at kilometer 4.5 carretera sur, managua (mailing address is apo miami 34021); telephone p505o (2) 66010 or 66013, 66015 through 66018, 66026, 66027, 66032 through 66034; note--nicaragua expelled the us ambassador on 11 july 1988, and the us expelled the nicaraguan ambassador on 12 july 1988 flag: three equal horizontal bands of blue (top), white, and blue with the national coat of arms centered in the white band; the coat of arms features a triangle encircled by the words republica de nicaragua on the top and america central on the bottom; similar to the flag of el salvador which features a round emblem encircled by the words republica de el salvador en la america central centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of honduras, which has five blue stars arranged in an x pattern centered in the white band economy overview: government control of the economy historically has been extensive, although the new government has pledged to reduce it. the financial system is directly controlled by the state, which also regulates wholesale purchasing, production, sales, foreign trade, and distribution of most goods. over 50% of the agricultural and industrial firms are state owned. sandinista economic policies and the war have produced a severe economic crisis. the foundation of the economy continues to be the export of agricultural commodities, largely coffee and cotton. farm production fell by roughly 7% in 1989, the fifth successive year of decline. the agricultural sector employs 44% of the work force and accounts for 23% of gdp and 86% of export earnings. industry, which employs 13% of the work force and contributes 26% to gdp, showed a sharp drop of 23% in 1988 and remains below pre-1979 levels. external debt is one of the highest in the world on a per capita basis. in 1989 the annual inflation rate was 1,700%, down from a record 16,000% in 1988. shortages of basic consumer goods are widespread. gdp: $1.7 billion, per capita $470; real growth rate 5.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1,700% (1989) unemployment rate: 25% (1989) budget: revenues $0.9 billion; expenditures $1.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.15 billion (1987) exports: $250 million (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--coffee, cotton, sugar, bananas, seafood, meat, chemicals; partners--cema 15%, oecd 75%, others 10% imports: $550 million (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--petroleum, food, chemicals, machinery, clothing; partners--cema 55%, ec 20%, latin america 10%, others 10% external debt: $8 billion (year end 1988) industrial production: growth rate 23% (1988 est.) electricity: 415,000 kw capacity; 1,340 million kwh produced, 380 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, chemicals, metal products, textiles, clothing, petroleum refining and distribution, beverages, footwear agriculture: accounts for 23% of gdp and 44% of work force; cash crops--coffee, bananas, sugarcane, cotton; food crops--rice, corn, cassava, citrus fruit, beans; variety of animal products--beef, veal, pork, poultry, dairy; while normally self-sufficient in food, war-induced shortages now exist aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-82), $290 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $981 million; communist countries (1970-88), $3.3 billion currency: cordoba (plural--cordobas); 1 cordoba (c$) = 100 centavos exchange rates: cordobas (c$) per us$1--65,000 (february 1990) is the free market rate; official rate is 46,000 (february 1990), 270 (1988), 0.103 (1987), 0.097 (1986), 0.039 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 373 km 1.067-meter gauge, government owned; majority of system not operating; 3 km 1.435-meter gauge line at puerto cabezas (does not connect with mainline) highways: 25,930 km total; 4,000 km paved (includes all 2,170 km gravel or crushed stone, 5,425 km earth or graded earth, 14,335 km unimproved, 368.5 km of the pan-american highway) inland waterways: 2,220 km, including 2 large lakes pipelines: crude oil, 56 km ports: corinto, el bluff, puerto cabezas, puerto sandino, rama merchant marine: 2 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,161 grt/2,500 dwt civil air: 12 major transport aircraft airports: 261 total, 169 usable; 9 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 12 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: low-capacity radio relay and wire system being expanded; connection into central american microwave system; 60,000 telephones; stations--45 am, no fm, 7 tv, 3 shortwave; satellite earth stations--1 intersputnik and 1 atlantic ocean intelsat defense forces branches: sandinista popular army, sandinista navy, sandinista air force/air defense, sandinista people's militia military manpower: males 15-49, 747,144; 459,333 fit for military service; 44,213 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: niger geography total area: 1,267,000 km2; land area: 1,266,700 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of texas land boundaries: 5,697 km total; algeria 956 km, benin 266 km, burkina 628 km, chad 1,175 km, libya 354 km, mali 821 km, nigeria 1,497 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: libya claims about 19,400 km2 in northern niger; exact locations of the chad-niger-nigeria and cameroon-chad-nigeria tripoints in lake chad have not been determined, so the boundary has not been demarcated and border incidents have resulted; burkina and mali are proceeding with boundary demarcation, including the tripoint with niger climate: desert; mostly hot, dry, dusty; tropical in extreme south terrain: predominately desert plains and sand dunes; flat to rolling plains in south; hills in north natural resources: uranium, coal, iron ore, tin, phosphates land use: 3% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 2% forest and woodland; 88% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recurrent drought and desertification severely affecting marginal agricultural activities; overgrazing; soil erosion note: landlocked people population: 7,969,309 (july 1990), growth rate 3.6% (1990) birth rate: 52 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 131 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 53 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--nigerien(s) adjective--nigerien ethnic divisions: 56% hausa; 22% djerma; 8.5% fula; 8% tuareg; 4.3% beri beri (kanouri); 1.2% arab, toubou, and gourmantche; about 4,000 french expatriates religion: 80% muslim, remainder indigenous beliefs and christians language: french (official); hausa, djerma literacy: 13.9% labor force: 2,500,000 wage earners (1982); 90% agriculture, 6% industry and commerce, 4% government; 51% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: negligible government long-form name: republic of niger type: republic; presidential system in which military officers hold key offices capital: niamey administrative divisions: 7 departments (departements, singular--departement); agadez, diffa, dosso, maradi, niamey, tahoua, zinder independence: 3 august 1960 (from france) constitution: adopted na december 1989 after 15 years of military rule legal system: based on french civil law system and customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holidays: republic day, 18 december (1958) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: national development council judicial branch: state court (cour d'etat), court of appeal (cour d'apel) leaders: chief of state--president brig. gen. ali saibou (since 14 november 1987); head of government--prime minister aliou mahamida (since 2 march 1990) political parties and leaders: only party--national movement for the development society (mnsd), leader na suffrage: universal adult at age 18 elections: president--last held december 1989 (next to be held na 1996); results--president ali saibou was reelected without opposition; national development council--last held december 1989 (next to be held na 1994); results--mnsd is the only party; seats--(150 total) mnsd 150 (indirectly elected) communists: no communist party; some sympathizers in outlawed sawaba party member of: acp, afdb, apc, ccc, ceao, eama, eca, ecowas, entente, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, lake chad basin commission, niger river commission, nam, oau, ocam, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador moumouni adamou djermakoye; chancery at 2204 r street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-4224 through 4227; us--ambassador carl c. cundiff; embassy at avenue des ambassadeurs, niamey (mailing address is b. p. 11201, niamey); telephone p227o 72-26-61 through 64 and 72-26-70 flag: three equal horizontal bands of orange (top), white, and green with a small orange disk (representing the sun) centered in the white band; similar to the flag of india which has a blue, spoked wheel centered in the white band economy overview: about 90% of the population is engaged in farming and stock rearing, activities which generate almost half of the national income. the economy also depends heavily on exploitation of large uranium deposits. uranium production grew rapidly in the mid-1970s, but tapered off in the early 1980s, when world prices declined. france is a major customer, while frg, japan, and spain also make regular purchases. the depressed demand for uranium has contributed to an overall sluggishness in the economy, a severe trade imbalance, and a mounting external debt. gdp: $2.4 billion, per capita $330; real growth rate 7.1% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.4% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $254 million; expenditures $510 million, including capital expenditures of $239 million (1988 est.) exports: $371 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--uranium 76%, livestock, cowpeas, onions, hides, skins; partners--na imports: $441 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum products, primary materials, machinery, vehicles and parts, electronic equipment, pharmaceuticals, chemical products, cereals, foodstuffs external debt: $1.8 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.7% (1989 est.) electricity: 102,000 kw capacity; 225 million kwh produced, 30 kwh per capita (1989) industries: cement, brick, rice mills, small cotton gins, oilseed presses, slaughterhouses, and a few other small light industries; uranium production began in 1971 agriculture: accounts for roughly 40% of gdp and 90% of labor force; cash crops--cowpeas, cotton, peanuts; food crops--millet, sorghum, cassava, rice; livestock--cattle, sheep, goats; self-sufficient in food except in drought years aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $349 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $504 million; communist countries (1970-88), $61 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: 39,970 km total; 3,170 km bituminous, 10,330 km gravel and laterite, 3,470 km earthen, 23,000 km tracks inland waterways: niger river is navigable 300 km from niamey to gaya on the benin frontier from mid-december through march civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 31 total, 29 usable; 7 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 11 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: small system of wire, radiocommunications, and radio relay links concentrated in southwestern area; 11,900 telephones; stations--15 am, 5 fm, 16 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, and 4 domestic defense forces branches: army, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie, paramilitary republican guard, paramilitary presidential guard, paramilitary national police military manpower: males 15-49, 1,656,466; 894,095 fit for military service; 87,478 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: $20.6 million (1988) ---------------------------------------------------country: nigeria geography total area: 923,770 km2; land area: 910,770 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of california land boundaries: 4,047 km total; benin 773 km, cameroon 1,690 km, chad 87 km, niger 1,497 km coastline: 853 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 30 nm disputes: exact locations of the chad-niger-nigeria and cameroon-chad-nigeria tripoints in lake chad have not been determined, so the boundary has not been demarcated and border incidents have resulted; nigerian proposals to reopen maritime boundary negotiations and redemarcate the entire land boundary have been rejected by cameroon climate: varies--equatorial in south, tropical in center, arid in north terrain: southern lowlands merge into central hills and plateaus; mountains in southeast, plains in north natural resources: crude oil, tin, columbite, iron ore, coal, limestone, lead, zinc, natural gas land use: 31% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 23% meadows and pastures; 15% forest and woodland; 28% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recent droughts in north severely affecting marginal agricultural activities; desertification; soil degradation, rapid deforestation people population: 118,819,377 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 119 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 49 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--nigerian(s); adjective--nigerian ethnic divisions: more than 250 tribal groups; hausa and fulani of the north, yoruba of the southwest, and ibos of the southeast make up 65% of the population; about 27,000 non-africans religion: 50% muslim, 40% christian, 10% indigenous beliefs language: english (official); hausa, yoruba, ibo, fulani, and several other languages also widely used literacy: 42.4% labor force: 42,844,000; 54% agriculture, 19% industry, commerce, and services, 15% government; 49% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: 3,520,000 wage earners belong to 42 recognized trade unions, which come under a single national labor federation--the nigerian labor congress (nlc) government long-form name: federal republic of nigeria type: military government since 31 december 1983 capital: lagos administrative divisions: 21 states and 1 territory*; abuja capital territory*, akwa ibom, anambra, bauchi, bendel, benue, borno, cross river, gongola, imo, kaduna, kano, katsina, kwara, lagos, niger, ogun, ondo, oyo, plateau, rivers, sokoto independence: 1 october 1960 (from uk) constitution: 1 october 1979, amended 9 february 1984, revised 1989 legal system: based on english common law, islamic, and tribal law national holiday: independence day, 1 october (1960) executive branch: president of the armed forces ruling council, armed forces ruling council, national council of state, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: national assembly was dissolved after the military coup of 31 december 1983 judicial branch: supreme court, federal court of appeal leaders: chief of state and head of government--president and commander in chief of armed forces gen. ibrahim babangida (since 27 august 1985) political parties and leaders: two political parties established by the government in 1989--social democratic party (sdp) and national republican convention (nrc) suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--scheduled for 1 october 1992 communists: the pro-communist underground consists of a small fraction of the nigerian left; leftist leaders are prominent in the country's central labor organization but have little influence on government member of: acp, afdb, apc, ccc, commonwealth, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imo, imf, intelsat, interpol, irc, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, lake chad basin commission, niger river commission, nam, oau, opec, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador hamzat ahmadu; chancery at 2201 m street nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 822-1500; there are nigerian consulates general in atlanta, new york and san francisco; us--ambassador lannon walker; embassy at 2 eleke crescent, victoria island, lagos (mailing address is p. o. box 554, lagos); telephone p234o (1) 610097; there is a us consulate general in kaduna flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and green economy overview: in 1989, despite rising oil prices, the economic performance failed to meet government expectations because of higher inflationary pressures fueled by a relatively poor agricultural performance. agricultural production was up only 4% following a 10% decline in 1988, and manufacturing remained below the 1985 level with only a 6% increase. the government is continuing an economic adjustment program to reduce nigeria's dependence on oil and to help create a basis for sustainable noninflationary growth. gnp: $30.0 billion, per capita $270; real growth rate 4% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 47.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 7.5% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $6.5 billion; expenditures $7.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.9 billion (1988 est.) exports: $8.4 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--oil 95%, cocoa, palm kernels, rubber; partners--ec 51%, us 32% imports: $5.7 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--consumer goods, capital equipment, chemicals, raw materials; partners--ec, us external debt: $32 billion, medium and long-term (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5% (1987 est.) electricity: 4,737,000 kw capacity; 11,270 million kwh produced, 100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining--crude oil, natural gas, coal, tin, columbite; primary processing industries--palm oil, peanut, cotton, rubber, petroleum, wood, hides and skins; manufacturing industries--textiles, cement, building materials, food products, footwear, chemical, printing, ceramics, steel agriculture: accounts for 28% of gnp and half of labor force; inefficient small-scale farming dominates; once a large net exporter of food and now an importer; cash crops--cocoa, peanuts, palm oil, rubber; food crops--corn, rice, sorghum, millet, cassava, yams; livestock--cattle, sheep, goats, pigs; fishing and forestry resources extensively exploited illicit drugs: illicit heroin and some cocaine trafficking; marijuana cultivation for domestic consumption and export; major transit country for heroin en route from southwest asia via africa to western europe and the us; growing transit route for cocaine from south america via west africa to western europe and the us aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $662 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.9 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $2.2 billion currency: naira (plural--naira); 1 naira (n) = 100 kobo exchange rates: naira (n) per us$1--7.6221 (december 1989), 7.3647 (1989), 4.5370 (1988), 4.0160 (1987), 1.7545 (1986), 0.8938 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,505 km 1.067-meter gauge highways: 107,990 km total 30,019 km paved (mostly bituminous-surface treatment); 25,411 km laterite, gravel, crushed stone, improved earth; 52,560 km unimproved inland waterways: 8,575 km consisting of niger and benue rivers and smaller rivers and creeks pipelines: 2,042 km crude oil; 500 km natural gas; 3,000 km refined products ports: lagos, port harcourt, calabar, warri, onne, sapele merchant marine: 28 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 428,116 grt/680,343 dwt; includes 19 cargo, 1 refrigerated, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 5 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 1 bulk civil air: 76 major transport aircraft airports: 84 total, 72 usable; 32 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 13 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: above-average system limited by poor maintenance; major expansion in progress; radio relay and cable routes; 155,000 telephones; stations--37 am, 19 fm, 38 tv; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, domestic, with 19 stations; 1 coaxial submarine cable defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary police force military manpower: males 15-49, 27,282,248; 15,587,485 fit for military service; 1,263,883 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1% of gnp, or $300 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: niue (free association with new zealand) geography total area: 260 km2; land area: 260 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 1.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 64 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; modified by southeast trade winds terrain: steep limestone cliffs along coast, central plateau natural resources: fish, arable land land use: 61% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 19% forest and woodland; 12% other environment: subject to typhoons note: one of world's largest coral islands; located about 460 km east of tonga people population: 2,019 (july 1990), growth rate na (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--niuean(s); adjective--niuean ethnic divisions: polynesian, with some 200 europeans, samoans, and tongans religion: 75% ekalesia nieue (niuean church)--a protestant church closely related to the london missionary society, 10% mormon, 5% roman catholic, jehovah's witnesses, seventh-day adventist language: polynesian tongue closely related to tongan and samoan; english literacy: na%, but education compulsory between 5 and 14 years of age labor force: 1,000 (1981 est.); most work on family plantations; paid work exists only in government service, small industry, and the niue development board organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: self-governing territory in free association with new zealand capital: alofi administrative divisions: none independence: none (self-governing territory in free association with new zealand) constitution: no formal, written constitution legal system: english common law national holiday: waitangi day (treaty of waitangi established british sovereignty), 6 february (1840) executive branch: british monarch, premier, cabinet legislative branch: legislative assembly judicial branch: appeal court of new zealand, high court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by new zealand representative john springford (since 1974); head of government--premier sir robert r. rex (since na october 1974) suffrage: universal adult at age 18 political parties and leaders: niue people's action party, leader na elections: legislative assembly--last held on 28 march 1987 (next to be held na 1990); results--percent of vote na; seats--(20 total, 6 elected) independents 5, niue people's action party 1 member of: escap (associate member), spf diplomatic representation: none (self-governing territory in free association with new zealand) flag: yellow with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant; the flag of the uk bears five yellow five-pointed stars--a large one on a blue disk in the center and a smaller one on each arm of the bold red cross economy overview: the economy is heavily dependent on aid from new zealand. government expenditures regularly exceed revenues, with the shortfall made up by grants from new zealand--the grants are used to pay wages to the 80% or more of the work force employed in public service. the agricultural sector consists mainly of subsistence gardening, although some cash crops are grown for export. industry consists primarily of small factories to process passion fruit, lime oil, honey, and coconut cream. the sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors is an important source of revenue. the island in recent years has suffered a serious loss of population because of migration of niueans to new zealand. gnp: $2.1 million, per capita $1,000; real growth rate na% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 9.6% (1984) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $5.5 million; expenditures $6.3 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy85 est.) exports: $175,274 (f.o.b., 1985); commodities--canned coconut cream, copra, honey, passion fruit products, pawpaw, root crops, limes, footballs, stamps, handicrafts; partners--nz 89%, fiji, cook islands, australia imports: $3.8 million (c.i.f., 1985); commodities--food, live animals, manufactured goods, machinery, fuels, lubricants, chemicals, drugs; partners--nz 59%, fiji 20%, japan 13%, western samoa, australia, us external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 1,500 kw capacity; 3 million kwh produced, 1,420 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourist, handicrafts agriculture: copra, coconuts, passion fruit, honey, limes; subsistence crops--taro, yams, cassava (tapioca), sweet potatoes; pigs, poultry, beef cattle aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $58 million currency: new zealand dollar (plural--dollars); 1 new zealand dollar (nz$) = 100 cents exchange rates: new zealand dollars (nz$) per us$1--1.6581 (january 1990), 1.6708 (1989), 1.5244 (1988), 1.6886 (1987), 1.9088 (1986), 2.0064 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 123 km all-weather roads, 106 km access and plantation roads ports: none; offshore anchorage only airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway of 1,650 m telecommunications: single-line telephone system connects all villages on island; 383 telephones; 1,000 radio receivers (1987 est.); stations--1 am, 1 fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of new zealand ---------------------------------------------------country: norfolk island (territory of australia) geography total area: 34.6 km2; land area: 34.6 km2 comparative area: about 0.2 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 32 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: subtropical, mild, little seasonal temperature variation terrain: volcanic formation with mostly rolling plains natural resources: fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 25% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 75% other environment: subject to typhoons (especially may to july) note: located 1,575 km east of australia in the south pacific ocean people population: 2,533 (july 1990), growth rate 1.7% (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--norfolk islander(s); adjective--norfolk islander(s) ethnic divisions: descendants of the bounty mutiny; more recently, australian and new zealand settlers religion: anglican, roman catholic, uniting church in australia, and seventh-day adventist language: english (official) and norfolk--a mixture of 18th century english and ancient tahitian literacy: na%, but probably high labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: territory of norfolk island type: territory of australia capital: kingston (administrative center), burnt pine (commercial center) administrative divisions: none (territory of australia) independence: none (territory of australia) constitution: norfolk island act of 1957 legal system: wide legislative and executive responsibility under the norfolk island act of 1979; supreme court national holiday: pitcairners arrival day anniversary, 8 june (1856) executive branch: british monarch, governor general of australia, administrator, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by administrator h. b. macdonald (since na 1989), who is appointed by the governor general of australia; head of government--assembly president and chief minister john terence brown (since na) political parties and leaders: na suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative assembly--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(9 total) percent of seats by party na diplomatic representation: none (territory of australia) flag: three vertical bands of green (hoist side), white, and green with a large green norfolk island pine tree centered in the slightly wider white band economy overview: the primary economic activity is tourism, which has brought a level of prosperity unusual among inhabitants of the pacific islands. the number of visitors has increased steadily over the years and reached almost 30,000 in 1986. revenues from tourism have given the island a favorable balance of trade and helped the agricultural sector to become self-sufficient in the production of beef, poultry, and eggs. gnp: na inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $3.4 million; expenditures $3.4 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy88) exports: $1.8 million (f.o.b., fy85); commodities--postage stamps, seeds of the norfolk island pine and kentia palm, small quantities of avocados; partners--australia, pacific islands, nz, asia, europe imports: $16.3 million (c.i.f., fy85); commodities--na; partners--australia, pacific islands, nz, asia, europe external debt: na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 7,000 kw capacity; 8 million kwh produced, 3,210 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism agriculture: norfolk island pine seed, kentia palm seed, cereals, vegetables, fruit, cattle, poultry aid: none currency: australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 80 km of roads, including 53 km of sealed roads; remainder are earth formed or coral surfaced ports: none; loading jetties at kingston and cascade airports: 1 with permanent-surface runways 1,220-2,439 m (australian owned) telecommunications: 1,500 radio receivers (1982); radio link service with sydney; 987 telephones (1983); stations--1 am, no fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of australia ---------------------------------------------------country: northern mariana islands (commonwealth associated with the us) geography total area: 477 km2; land area: 477 km2; includes saipan, rota, and tinian comparative area: slightly more than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 1,482 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical marine; moderated by northeast trade winds, little seasonal temperature variation; dry season december to july, rainy season july to october terrain: southern islands are limestone with level terraces and fringing coral reefs; northern islands are volcanic; highest elevation is 471 meters (mt. tagpochu on saipan) natural resources: arable land, fish land use: 1% arable land; na% permanent crops; 19% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other environment: mt. pagan is an active volcano (last erupted in october 1988); subject to typhoons during the rainy season note: strategic location 5,635 km west-southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, about three-quarters of the way between hawaii and the philippines people population: 22,719 (july 1990), growth rate 3.4% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 17 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: undetermined ethnic divisions: chamorro majority; carolinians and other micronesians; spanish, german, japanese admixtures religion: christian with a roman catholic majority, although traditional beliefs and taboos may still be found language: english, but chamorro and carolinian are also spoken in the home and taught in school literacy: na% labor force: 17,533, including 10,000 foreign workers (1988 est.) organized labor: na government long-form name: commonwealth of the northern mariana islands type: commonwealth associated with the us and administered by the office of territorial and international affairs, us department of the interior capital: saipan administrative divisions: none independence: none (commonwealth associated with the us) constitution: covenant agreement effective 3 november 1986 legal system: na national holiday: commonwealth day, 8 january (1978) executive branch: governor, lieutenant governor legislative branch: bicameral legislature consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president george bush (since 20 january 1989); vice president dan quayle (since 20 january 1989); head of government--governor pedro p. tenorio (since 1978); lieutenant governor pedro a. tenorio (since na) political parties and leaders: democratic party, antonio s. guerrero; republican party, alonso igisomar suffrage: universal at age 18; indigenous inhabitants are us citizens but do not vote in us presidential elections elections: governor--last held on na (next to be held na); results--pedro p. tenorio (democratic party) was elected; senate--last held on na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(9 total) number of seats by party na; house of representatives--last held on na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(14 total) number of seats by party na; us house of representatives--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) party of nonvoting delegate na diplomatic representation: none flag: blue with a white five-pointed star superimposed on the gray silhouette of a latte stone (a traditional foundation stone used in building) in the center economy overview: the economy benefits substantially from financial assistance from the us. an agreement for the years 1986 to 1992 entitles the islands to $228 million for capital development, government operations, and special programs. another major source of income is the tourist industry, which employs about 10% of the work force. the agricultural sector is made up of cattle ranches and small farms producing coconuts, breadfruit, tomatoes, and melons. industry is small scale in nature--mostly handicrafts and fish processing. gnp: $165 million, per capita $9,170; real growth rate na% (1982) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $70.6 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1987) exports: $na; commodities--vegetables, beef, pork; partners--na imports: $na; commodities--na; partners--na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 25,000 kw capacity; 35 million kwh produced, 1,640 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, construction, light industry, handicrafts agriculture: coffee, coconuts, fruits, tobacco, cattle aid: none currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: 300 km total (53 km primary, 55 km secondary, 192 km local) ports: saipan, rota, tinian airports: 6 total, 4 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--2 am, no fm, 1 tv; 2 pacific ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: norway geography total area: 324,220 km2; land area: 307,860 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than new mexico land boundaries: 2,582 km total; finland 729 km, sweden 1,657, ussr 196 km coastline: 21,925 km (3,419 km mainland; 2,413 km large islands; 16,093 km long fjords, numerous small islands, and minor indentations) maritime claims: contiguous zone: 10 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 4 nm disputes: maritime boundary dispute with ussr; territorial claim in antarctica (queen maud land); denmark has challenged norway's maritime claims beween greenland and jan mayen climate: temperate along coast, modified by north atlantic current; colder interior; rainy year-round on west coast terrain: glaciated; mostly high plateaus and rugged mountains broken by fertile valleys; small, scattered plains; coastline deeply indented by fjords; arctic tundra in north natural resources: crude oil, copper, natural gas, pyrites, nickel, iron ore, zinc, lead, fish, timber, hydropower land use: 3% arable land; 0% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 27% forest and woodland; 70% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: air and water pollution; acid rain note: strategic location adjacent to sea lanes and air routes in north atlantic; one of most rugged and longest coastlines in world; norway and turkey only nato members having a land boundary with the ussr people population: 4,252,806 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--norwegian(s); adjective--norwegian ethnic divisions: germanic (nordic, alpine, baltic) and racial-cultural minority of 20,000 lapps religion: 94% evangelical lutheran (state church), 4% other protestant and roman catholic, 2% other language: norwegian (official); small lappand finnish-speaking minorities literacy: 100% labor force: 2,164,000; 33.6% services, 17.4% commerce, 16.6% mining and manufacturing, 8.4% transportation, 7.8% construction, 6.8% banking and financial services, 6.5% agriculture, forestry, and fishing (1986) organized labor: 66% of labor force (1985) government long-form name: kingdom of norway type: constitutional monarchy capital: oslo administrative divisions: 19 provinces (fylker, singular--fylke); akershus, aust-agder, buskerud, finnmark, hedmark, hordaland, more og romsdal, nordland, nord-trondelag, oppland, oslo, ostfold, rogaland, sogn og fjordane, sor-trondelag, telemark, troms, vest-agder, vestfold independence: 26 october 1905 (from sweden) constitution: 17 may 1814, modified in 1884 dependent areas: bouvet island, jan mayen, svalbard legal system: mixture of customary law, civil law system, and common law traditions; supreme court renders advisory opinions to legislature when asked; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: constitution day, 17 may (1814) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, state council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral parliament (storting or stortinget) with an upper chamber (lagting) and a lower chamber (odelsting) judicial branch: supreme court (hoiesterett) leaders: chief of state--king olav v (since 21 september 1957); heir apparent crown prince harald (born 21 february 1937); head of government--prime minister jan p. syse (since 16 october 1989) political parties and leaders: labor, gro harlem brundtland; conservative, jan p. syse; center, johan j. jakobsen; christian people's, kjell magne bondevik; socialist left, eric solheim; norwegian communist, hans i. kleven; progress, carl i. hagen; liberal, arne fjortoft; finnmark list, leader na suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held on 11 september 1989 (next to be held 6 september 1993); results--labor 34.3%, conservative 22.2%, progress 13.0%, socialist left 10.1%, christian people's 8.5%, center 6.6%, finnmark list 0.3%, others 5%; seats--(165 total) labor 63, conservative 37, progress 22, socialist left 17, christian people's 14, center 11, finnmark list 1 communists: 15,500 est.; 5,500 norwegian communist party (nkp); 10,000 workers communist party marxist-leninist (akp-ml, pro-chinese) member of: adb, ccc, council of europe, dac, efta, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, iea (associate member), ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, nato, nordic council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador kjeld vibe; chancery at 2720 34th street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 333-6000; there are norwegian consulates general in houston, los angeles, minneapolis, new york, and san francisco, and consulates in miami and new orleans; us--ambassador loret miller ruppe; embassy at drammensveien 18, oslo 2 (mailing address is apo new york 09085); telephone p47o (2) 44-85-50 flag: red with a blue cross outlined in white that extends to the edges of the flag; the vertical part of the cross is shifted to the hoist side in the style of the dannebrog (danish flag) economy overview: norway is a prosperous capitalist nation with the resources to finance extensive welfare measures. since 1975 exploitation of large crude oil and natural gas reserves has helped achieve an average annual growth of roughly 4%, the third-highest among oecd countries. growth slackened in 1987-88 because of the sharp drop in world oil prices and a slowdown in consumer spending, but picked up again in 1989. future economic issues involve the aging of the population, the increased economic integration of europe, and the balance between private and public influence in economic decisions. gdp: $75.8 billion, per capita $17,900; real growth rate 5.7% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.5% (1989) unemployment rate: 3.9% (1989 est., excluding people in job-training programs) budget: revenues $40.6 billion; expenditures $41.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1989) exports: $22.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--petroleum and petroleum products 25%, natural gas 11%, fish 7%, aluminum 6%, ships 3.5%, pulp and paper; partners--uk 26%, efta 16.3%, less developed countries 14%, sweden 12%, frg 12%, us 6%, denmark 5% (1988) imports: $18.7 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--machinery, fuels and lubricants, transportation equipment, chemicals, foodstuffs, clothing, ships; partners--sweden 18%, less developed countries 18%, frg 14%, denmark 8%, uk 7%, us 7%, japan 5% (1988) external debt: $18.3 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 15.8% (1989) electricity: 26,735,000 kw capacity; 121,685 million kwh produced, 28,950 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum and gas, food processing, shipbuilding, pulp and paper products, metals, chemicals, timber, mining, textiles, fishing agriculture: accounts for 3.1% of gnp and 6.5% of labor force; among world's top 10 fishing nations; livestock output exceeds value of crops; over half of food needs imported; fish catch of 1.9 million metric tons in 1987 aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $3.7 billion currency: norwegian krone (plural--kroner); 1 norwegian krone (nkr) = 100 ore exchange rates: norwegian kroner (nkr) per us$1--6.5405 (january 1990), 6.9045 (1989), 6.5170 (1988), 6.7375 (1987), 7.3947 (1986), 8.5972 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 4,223 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; norwegian state railways (nsb) operates 4,219 km (2,450 km electrified and 96 km double track); 4 km other highways: 79,540 km total; 18,600 km concrete, bituminous, stone block; 19,980 km bituminous treated; 40,960 km gravel, crushed stone, and earth inland waterways: 1,577 km along west coast; 1.5-2.4 m draft vessels maximum pipelines: refined products, 53 km ports: oslo, bergen, fredrikstad, kristiansand, stavanger, trondheim merchant marine: 660 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 16,702,254 grt/28,722,304 dwt; includes 11 passenger, 19 short-sea passenger, 104 cargo, 3 passenger-cargo, 19 refrigerated cargo, 6 container, 40 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 6 vehicle carrier, 1 railcar carrier, 128 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 86 chemical tanker, 62 liquefied gas, 26 combination ore/oil, 142 bulk, 7 combination bulk; note--the government has created a captive register, the norwegian international ship register (nis), as a subset of the norwegian register; ships on the nis enjoy many benefits of flags of convenience and do not have to be crewed by norwegians; the majority of ships under the norwegian flag are now registered with the nis civil air: 76 major transport aircraft airports: 104 total, 104 usable; 64 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 12 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 16 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: high-quality domestic and international telephone, telegraph, and telex services; 3,102,000 telephones; stations--8 am, 46 (1,400 relays) fm, 55 (2,100 relays) tv; 4 coaxial submarine cables; communications satellite earth stations operating in the eutelsat, intelsat (1 atlantic ocean), marisat, and domestic systems defense forces branches: royal norwegian army, royal norwegian navy, royal norwegian air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,115,620; 937,555 fit for military service; 32,748 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 3.3% of gdp, or $2.5 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: oman geography total area: 212,460 km2; land area: 212,460 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than kansas land boundaries: 1,374 km total; saudi arabia 676 km, uae 410 km, pdry 288 km coastline: 2,092 km maritime claims: continental shelf: to be defined; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: administrative line with pdry; no defined boundary with most of uae, administrative line in far north climate: dry desert; hot, humid along coast; hot, dry interior; strong southwest summer monsoon (may to september) in far south terrain: vast central desert plain, rugged mountains in north and south natural resources: crude oil, copper, asbestos, some marble, limestone, chromium, gypsum, natural gas land use: negl% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 95% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: summer winds often raise large sandstorms and duststorms in interior; sparse natural freshwater resources note: strategic location with small foothold on musandam peninsula controlling strait of hormuz (17% of world's oil production transits this point going from persian gulf to arabian sea) people population: 1,457,064 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 12 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 105 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 56 years male, 58 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--omani(s); adjective--omani ethnic divisions: almost entirely arab, with small balochi, zanzibari, and indian groups religion: 75% ibadhi muslim; remainder sunni muslim, shia muslim, some hindu language: arabic (official); english, balochi, urdu, indian dialects literacy: 20% labor force: 430,000; 60% agriculture (est.); 58% are non-omani organized labor: trade unions are illegal government long-form name: sultanate of oman type: absolute monarchy; independent, with residual uk influence capital: muscat administrative divisions: none independence: 1650, expulsion of the portuguese constitution: none legal system: based on english common law and islamic law; ultimate appeal to the sultan; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction executive branch: sultan, cabinet, state consultative assembly legislative branch: none judicial branch: none; traditional islamic judges and a nascent civil court system national holiday: national day, 18 november leaders: chief of state and head of government--sultan and prime minister qaboos bin said al said (since 23 july 1970) political parties: none suffrage: none elections: none other political or pressure groups: outlawed popular front for the liberation of oman (pflo), based in south yemen; small, clandestine shia fundamentalist groups are active member of: arab league, fao, g-77, gcc, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador awadh bader al-shanfari; chancery at 2342 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 387-1980 through 1982; us--ambassador richard boehm; embassy at address na, muscat (mailing address is p. o. box 966, muscat); telephone 738-231 or 738-006 flag: three horizontal bands of white (top, double width), red, and green (double width) with a broad, vertical, red band on the hoist side; the national emblem (a khanjar dagger in its sheath superimposed on two crossed swords in scabbards) in white is centered at the top of the vertical band economy overview: economic performance is closely tied to the fortunes of the oil industry. petroleum accounts for nearly all export earnings, about 70% of government revenues, and more than 50% of gdp. oman has proved oil reserves of 4 billion barrels, equivalent to about 20 years' supply at the current rate of extraction. although agriculture employs a majority of the population, urban centers depend on imported food. gdp: $7.8 billion, per capita $6,006; real growth rate 3.0% (1987 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.0% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $3.1 billion; expenditures $4.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.0 billion (1989 est.) exports: $3.6 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum, reexports, processed copper, dates, nuts, fish; partners--japan, south korea, thailand imports: $1.9 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities --machinery, transportation equipment, manufactured goods, food, livestock, lubricants; partners--japan, uae, uk, frg, us external debt: $3.1 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5.0% (1986) electricity: 1,130,000 kw capacity; 3,600 million kwh produced, 2,760 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crude oil production and refining, natural gas production, construction, cement, copper agriculture: accounts for 3.4% of gdp and 60% of the labor force (including fishing); less than 2% of land cultivated; largely subsistence farming (dates, limes, bananas, alfalfa, vegetables, camels, cattle); not self-sufficient in food; annual fish catch averages 100,000 metric tons aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $122 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $92 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $797 million currency: omani rial (plural--rials); 1 omani rial (ro) = 1,000 baiza exchange rates: omani rials (ro) per us$1--0.3845 (fixed rate since 1986) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 22,800 km total; 3,800 km bituminous surface, 19,000 km motorable track pipelines: crude oil 1,300 km; natural gas 1,030 km ports: mina qabus, mina raysut civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 128 total, 119 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 63 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of open-wire, radio relay, and radio communications stations; 50,000 telephones; stations--3 am, 3 fm, 11 tv; satellite earth stations--2 indian ocean intelsat, 1 arabsat and 8 domestic defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, royal oman police military manpower: males 15-49, 350,173; 198,149 fit for military service defense expenditures: 16.5% of gdp, or $1.3 billion (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: pacific islands, trust territory of the (palau) geography total area: 458 km2; land area: 458 km2 comparative area: slightly more than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 1,519 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: wet season may to november; hot and humid terrain: islands vary geologically from the high mountainous main island of babelthuap to low, coral islands usually fringed by large barrier reefs natural resources: forests, minerals (especially gold), marine products; deep-seabed minerals land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other environment: subject to typhoons from june to december; archipelago of six island groups totaling over 200 islands in the caroline chain note: important location 850 km southeast of the philippines; includes world war ii battleground of peleliu and world-famous rock islands people population: 14,310 (july 1990), growth rate 0.7% (1990) birth rate: 25 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 12 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 26 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--palauan(s); adjective--palauan ethnic divisions: palauans are a composite of polynesian, malayan, and melanesian races religion: predominantly christian, mainly roman catholic language: palauan is the official language, though english is commonplace; inhabitants of the isolated southwestern islands speak a dialect of trukese literacy: na%, but education compulsory through eight grades labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: trust territory of the pacific islands (no short-form name); may change to republic of palau after independence; note--belau, the native form of palau, is sometimes used type: un trusteeship administered by the us; constitutional government signed a compact of free association with the us on 10 january 1986, after approval in a series of un-observed plebiscites; until the un trusteeship is terminated with entry into force of the compact, palau remains under us administration as the palau district of the trust territory of the pacific islands capital: koror; a new capital is being built about 20 km northeast in eastern babelthuap administrative divisions: none independence: still part of the us-administered un trusteeship (the last polity remaining under the trusteeship; the republic of the marshall islands, federated states of micronesia, and commonwealth of the northern marianas have left); administered by the office of territorial and international affairs, us department of interior constitution: 11 january 1981 legal system: based on trust territory laws, acts of the legislature, municipal, common, and customary laws national holiday: constitution day, 9 july (1979) executive branch: us president, us vice president, national president, national vice president legislative branch: bicameral parliament (olbiil era kelulau or oek) consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of delegates judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president george walker bush (since 20 january 1989), represented by high commissioner janet mccoy (since na); head of government--president ngiratkel etpison (since 2 november 1988) political parties: no formal parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 2 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); ngiratkel etpison 26.3%, roman tmetuchl 25.9%, thomas remengesau 19.5%, others 28.3%; senate--last held 2 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--percent of vote na; seats--(18 total); house of delegates--last held 2 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--percent of vote na; seats--(16 total) diplomatic representation: none; us--us liaison officer steven r. pruett; us liaison office at top side, neeriyas, koror (mailing address: p. o. box 6028, koror, republic of palau 96940); telephone 160-680-920 or 990 flag: light blue with a large yellow disk (representing the moon) shifted slightly to the hoist side economy overview: the economy consists primarily of subsistence agriculture and fishing. tourism provides some foreign exchange, although the remote location of palau and a shortage of suitable facilities has hindered development. the government is the major employer of the work force, relying heavily on financial assistance from the us. gdp: $31.6 million, per capita $2,260; real growth rate na% (1986) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 20% (1986) budget: revenues $6.0 million; expenditures na, including capital expenditures of na (1986) exports: $0.5 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--na; partners--us, japan imports: $27.2 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--na; partners--us external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 16,000 kw capacity; 22 million kwh produced, 1,550 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, craft items (shell, wood, pearl), some commercial fishing and agriculture agriculture: subsistence-level production of coconut, copra, cassava, sweet potatoes aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $62.6 million currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: 25.7 km paved macadam and concrete roads, otherwise stone-, coral-, or laterite-surfaced roads (1986) ports: koror airports: 2 with permanent-surface runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--1 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us and that will not change when the un trusteeship terminates ---------------------------------------------------country: pacific ocean geography total area: 165,384,000 km2; includes arafura sea, banda sea, bellingshausen sea, bering sea, bering strait, coral sea, east china sea, gulf of alaska, makassar strait, philippine sea, ross sea, sea of japan, sea of okhotsk, south china sea, tasman sea, and other tributary water bodies comparative area: slightly less than 18 times the size of the us; the largest ocean (followed by the atlantic ocean, indian ocean, and arctic ocean); covers about one-third of the global surface; larger than the total land area of the world coastline: 135,663 km climate: the western pacific is monsoonal--a rainy season occurs during the summer months, when moisture-laden winds blow from the ocean over the land, and a dry season during the winter months, when dry winds blow from the asian land mass back to the ocean terrain: surface in the northern pacific dominated by a clockwise, warm water gyre (broad, circular system of currents) and in the southern pacific by a counterclockwise, cool water gyre; sea ice occurs in the bering sea and sea of okhotsk during winter and reaches maximum northern extent from antarctica in october; the ocean floor in the eastern pacific is dominated by the east pacific rise, while the western pacific is dissected by deep trenches; the world's greatest depth is 10,924 meters in the marianas trench natural resources: oil and gas fields, polymetallic nodules, sand and gravel aggregates, placer deposits, fish environment: endangered marine species include the dugong, sea lion, sea otter, seals, turtles, and whales; oil pollution in philippine sea and south china sea; dotted with low coral islands and rugged volcanic islands in the southwestern pacific ocean; subject to tropical cyclones (typhoons) in southeast and east asia from may to december (most frequent from july to october); tropical cyclones (hurricanes) may form south of mexico and strike central america and mexico from june to october (most common in august and september); southern shipping lanes subject to icebergs from antarctica; occasional el nino phenomenon occurs off the coast of peru when the trade winds slacken and the warm equatorial countercurrent moves south, which kills the plankton that is the primary food source for anchovies; consequently, the anchovies move to better feeding grounds, causing resident marine birds to starve by the thousands because of their lost food source note: the major choke points are the bering strait, panama canal, luzon strait, and the singapore strait; the equator divides the pacific ocean into the north pacific ocean and the south pacific ocean; ships subject to superstructure icing in extreme north from october to may and in extreme south from may to october; persistent fog in the northern pacific from june to december is a hazard to shipping; surrounded by a zone of violent volcanic and earthquake activity sometimes referred to as the pacific ring of fire economy overview: the pacific ocean is a major contributor to the world economy and particularly to those nations its waters directly touch. it provides cheap sea transportation between east and west, extensive fishing grounds, offshore oil and gas fields, minerals, and sand and gravel for the construction industry. in 1985 over half (54%) of the world's total fish catch came from the pacific ocean, which is the only ocean where the fish catch has increased every year since 1978. exploitation of offshore oil and gas reserves is playing an ever increasing role in the energy supplies of australia, new zealand, china, us, and peru. the high cost of recovering offshore oil and gas, combined with the lower world prices for oil since 1985, has slowed but not stopped new drillings. industries: fishing, oil and gas production communications ports: bangkok (thailand), hong kong, los angeles (us), manila (philippines), pusan (south korea), san francisco (us), seattle (us), shanghai (china), singapore, sydney (australia), vladivostok (ussr), wellington (nz), yokohama (japan) telecommunications: several submarine cables with network focused on guam and hawaii ---------------------------------------------------country: pakistan geography total area: 803,940 km2; land area: 778,720 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of california land boundaries: 6,774 km total; afghanistan 2,430 km, china 523 km, india 2,912 km, iran 909 km coastline: 1,046 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: boundary with india; pashtun question with afghanistan; baloch question with afghanistan and iran; water sharing problems with upstream riparian india over the indus climate: mostly hot, dry desert; temperate in northwest; arctic in north terrain: flat indus plain in east; mountains in north and northwest; balochistan plateau in west natural resources: land, extensive natural gas reserves, limited crude oil, poor quality coal, iron ore, copper, salt, limestone land use: 26% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 4% forest and woodland; 64% other; includes 19% irrigated environment: frequent earthquakes, occasionally severe especially in north and west; flooding along the indus after heavy rains (july and august); deforestation; soil erosion; desertification; water logging note: controls khyber pass and malakand pass, traditional invasion routes between central asia and the indian subcontinent people population: 114,649,406 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 43 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 110 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 56 years male, 57 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--pakistani(s); adjective--pakistani ethnic divisions: punjabi, sindhi, pashtun (pathan), baloch, muhajir (immigrants from india and their descendents) religion: 97% muslim (77% sunni, 20% shia), 3% christian, hindu, and other language: urdu and english (official); total spoken languages--64% punjabi, 12% sindhi, 8% pashtu, 7% urdu, 9% balochi and other; english is lingua franca of pakistani elite and most government ministries, but official policies are promoting its gradual replacement by urdu literacy: 26% labor force: 28,900,000; 54% agriculture, 13% mining and manufacturing, 33% services; extensive export of labor (1987 est.) organized labor: about 10% of industrial work force government long-form name: islamic republic of pakistan type: parliamentary with strong executive, federal republic capital: islamabad administrative divisions: 4 provinces, 1 tribal area*, and 1 territory**; balochistan, federally administered tribal areas*, islamabad capital territory**, north-west frontier, punjab, sindh; note--the pakistani-administered portion of the disputed jammu and kashmir region includes azad kashmir and the northern areas independence: 15 august 1947 (from uk; formerly west pakistan) constitution: 10 april 1973, suspended 5 july 1977, restored 30 december 1985 legal system: based on english common law with provisions to accommodate pakistan's stature as an islamic state; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: pakistan day (proclamation of the republic), 23 march (1956) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral federal legislature (mijlis-e-shoora) consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or national assembly judicial branch: supreme court, federal islamic (shariat) court leaders: chief of state--president ghulam ishaq khan (since 13 december 1988); head of government--prime minister benazir bhutto (since 2 december 1988) political parties and leaders: pakistan people's party (ppp), prime minister benazir bhutto; pakistan muslim league (pml), former prime minister mohammed khan junejo; pml is the main party in the anti-ppp islamic democratic alliance (ida); muhajir quami movement, altaf hussain; jamiat-ul-ulema-i-islam (jui), fazlur rahman; jamaat-i-islami (ji), qazi hussain ahmed; awami national party (anp), khan abdul wali khan suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held on 12 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--ghulam ishaq khan was elected by the federal legislature; senate--last held march 1988 (next to be held march 1990); results--elected by provincial assemblies; seats--(87 total) pml 84, ppp 2, independent 1; national assembly--last held on 16 november 1988 (next to be held november 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(237 total) ppp 109, iji 65, mqm 14, jui 8, pai 3, anp 3, bna 3, others 3, independents 29 communists: the communist party is no longer outlawed and operates openly other political or pressure groups: military remains dominant political force; ulema (clergy), industrialists, and small merchants also influential member of: adb, ccc, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oic, saarc, un, unesco, upu, who, wftu, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador zulfikar ali khan; chancery at 2315 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-6200; there is a pakistani consulate general in new york; us--ambassador robert b. oakley; embassy at diplomatic enclave, ramna 5, islamabad (mailing address is p. o. box 1048, islamabad); telephone p92o (51) 8261-61 through 79; there are us consulates general in karachi and lahore, and a consulate in peshawar flag: green with a vertical white band on the hoist side; a large white crescent and star are centered in the green field; the crescent, star, and color green are traditional symbols of islam economy overview: pakistan is a poor third world country faced with the usual problems of rapidly increasing population, sizable government deficits, and heavy dependence on foreign aid. in addition, the economy must support a large military establishment and provide for the needs of 4 million afghan refugees. a real economic growth rate averaging 5-6% in recent years has enabled the country to cope with these problems. almost all agriculture and small-scale industry is in private hands, and the government seeks to privatize a portion of the large-scale industrial enterprises now publicly owned. in december 1988, pakistan signed a three-year economic reform agreement with the imf, which provides for a reduction in the government deficit and a liberalization of trade in return for further imf financial support. the so-called islamization of the economy has affected mainly the financial sector; for example, a prohibition on certain types of interest payments. pakistan almost certainly will make little headway against its population problem; at the current rate of growth, population would double in 32 years. gnp: $43.2 billion, per capita $409; real growth rate 5.1% (fy89) inflation rate (consumer prices): 11% (fy89) unemployment rate: 4% (fy89 est.) budget: revenues $7.5 billion; expenditures $10.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $2.3 billion (fy89 est.) exports: $4.5 billion (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--rice, cotton, textiles, clothing; partners--ec 31%, us 11%, japan 11% (fy88) imports: $7.2 billion (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--petroleum, petroleum products, machinery, transportation, equipment, vegetable oils, animal fats, chemicals; partners--ec 26%, japan 15%, us 11% (fy88) external debt: $17.4 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 3% (fy89) electricity: 7,575,000 kw capacity; 29,300 million kwh produced, 270 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, food processing, beverages, petroleum products, construction materials, clothing, paper products, international finance, shrimp agriculture: 24% of gnp, over 50% of labor force; world's largest contiguous irrigation system; major crops--cotton, wheat, rice, sugarcane, fruits, and vegetables; livestock products--milk, beef, mutton, eggs; self-sufficient in food grain illicit drugs: illicit producer of opium poppy and cannabis for the international drug trade; government eradication efforts on poppy cultivation of limited success; 1988 output of opium and hashish each estimated at about 200 metric tons aid: (including bangladesh before 1972) us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $4.2 billion authorized (excluding what is now bangladesh); western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1980-87), $7.5 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $2.3 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $2.9 billion currency: pakistani rupee (plural--rupees); 1 pakistani rupee (pre) = 100 paisa exchange rates: pakistani rupees (prs) per us$1--21.420 (january 1990), 20.541 (1989), 18.003 (1988), 17.399 (1987), 16.648 (1986), 15.928 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 8,773 km total; 7,718 km broad gauge, 445 km meter gauge, and 610 km narrow gauge; 1,037 km broad-gauge double track; 286 km electrified; all government owned (1985) highways: 101,315 km total (1987); 40,155 km paved, 23,000 km gravel, 29,000 km improved earth, and 9,160 km unimproved earth or sand tracks (1985) pipelines: 250 km crude oil; 4,044 km natural gas; 885 km refined products (1987) ports: gwadar, karachi, port muhammad bin qasim merchant marine: 29 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 338,173 grt/508,107 dwt; includes 4 passenger-cargo, 24 cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 30 major transport aircraft airports: 115 total, 102 usable; 70 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 30 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 42 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good international radiocommunication service over microwave and intelsat satellite; domestic radio communications poor; broadcast service good; 564,500 telephones (1987); stations--16 am, 8 fm, 16; satellite eath station--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 2 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, air force, navy, civil armed forces, national guard military manpower: males 15-49, 26,215,898; 16,080,545 fit for military service; 1,282,294 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 5.6% of gnp, or $2.4 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: palmyra atoll (territory of the us) geography total area: 11.9 km2; land area: 11.9 km2 comparative area: about 20 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 14.5 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: equatorial, hot, and very rainy terrain: low, with maximum elevations of about 2 meters natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 100% forest and woodland; 0% other environment: about 50 islets covered with dense vegetation, coconut trees, and balsa-like trees up to 30 meters tall note: located 1,600 km south-southwest of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, almost halfway between hawaii and american samoa people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: unincorporated territory of the us; privately owned, but administered by the office of territorial and international affairs, us department of the interior economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage in west lagoon airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 1,220-2,439 m defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: panama geography total area: 78,200 km2; land area: 75,990 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than south carolina land boundaries: 555 km total; colombia 225 km, costa rica 330 km coastline: 2,490 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid, cloudy; prolonged rainy season (may to january), short dry season (january to may) terrain: interior mostly steep, rugged mountains and dissected, upland plains; coastal areas largely plains and rolling hills natural resources: copper, mahogany forests, shrimp land use: 6% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 15% meadows and pastures; 54% forest and woodland; 23% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: dense tropical forest in east and northwest note: strategic location on eastern end of isthmus forming land bridge connecting north and south america; controls panama canal that links north atlantic ocean via caribbean sea with north pacific ocean people population: 2,425,400 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: 26 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 22 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--panamanian(s); adjective--panamanian ethnic divisions: 70% mestizo (mixed indian and european ancestry), 14% west indian, 10% white, 6% indian religion: over 93% roman catholic, 6% protestant language: spanish (official); 14% speak english as native tongue; many panamanians bilingual literacy: 90% labor force: 770,472 (1987); 27.9% government and community services; 26.2% agriculture, hunting, and fishing; 16% commerce, restaurants, and hotels; 10.5% manufacturing and mining; 5.3% construction; 5.3% transportation and communications; 4.2% finance, insurance, and real estate; 2.4% canal zone; shortage of skilled labor, but an oversupply of unskilled labor organized labor: 17% of labor force (1986) government long-form name: republic of panama type: centralized republic capital: panama administrative divisions: 9 provinces (provincias, singular--provincia) and 1 territory* (comarca); bocas del toro, chiriqui, cocle, colon, darien, herrera, los santos, panama, san blas*, veraguas independence: 3 november 1903 (from colombia; became independent from spain 28 november 1821) constitution: 11 october 1972; major reforms adopted april 1983 legal system: based on civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court of justice; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 3 november (1903) executive branch: president, two vice presidents, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly (asamblea legislativa) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justica) currently being reorganized leaders: chief of state and head of government--president guillermo endara (since 20 december 1989, elected 7 may 1989); first vice president ricardo arias calderon (since 20 december 1989, elected 7 may 1989); second vice president guillermo ford (since 20 december 1989, elected 7 may 1989) political parties and leaders: government alliance--authentic liberal party (pla); faction of authentic panamenista party (ppa), guillermo endara; christian democrat party (pdc), ricardo arias calderon; nationalist republican liberal movement (molirena), alfredo ramirez; former noriegist parties--democratic revolutionary party (prd, ex-official government party), carlos duque; labor party (pala), ramon sieiro murgas; people's party (pdp, soviet-oriented communist party), ruben dario sousa batista; democratic workers party; national action party (pan); other opposition parties--popular nationalist party (pnp), olimpo a. saez maruci; factions of the former liberal and republican parties; popular action party (pap), carlos ivan zuniga; socialist workers party (pst, leftist), jose cambra; revolutionary workers party (prt, leftist), graciela dixon suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held on 7 may 1989, annulled but later upheld (next to be held may 1994); results--anti-noriega coalition believed to have won about 75% of the total votes cast; legislative assembly--last held on 7 may 1989, annulled but later upheld; in process of reorganization (next to be held may 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(67 total) the electoral tribunal has confirmed 58 of the 67 seats--pdc 27, molirena 15, pla 6, noriegist prd 7, ppa 3; legitimate holders of the other 9 seats cannot be determined and a special election will be held communists: people's party (pdp), pro-noriega regime mainline communist party, did not obtain the necessary 3% of the total vote in the 1984 election to retain its legal status; about 3,000 members other political or pressure groups: national council of organized workers (conato); national council of private enterprise (conep); panamanian association of business executives (apede) member of: fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, idb--inter-american development bank, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upeb, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador eduardo vallarino; chancery at 2862 mcgill terrace nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-1407; the status of the consulates general and consulates has not yet been determined; us--ambassador deane r. hinton; embassy at avenida balboa and calle 38, apartado 6959, panama city 5 (mailing address is box e, apo miami 34002); telephone p507o 27-1777 flag: divided into four, equal rectangles; the top quadrants are white with a blue five-pointed star in the center (hoist side) and plain red, the bottom quadrants are plain blue (hoist side) and white with a red five-pointed star in the center economy overview: the gdp contracted an estimated 7.5% in 1989, following a drop of 20% in 1988. political instability, lack of credit, and the erosion of business confidence prompted declines of 20-70% in the financial, agricultural, commercial, manufacturing, and construction sectors between 1987 and 1989. transits through the panama canal were off slightly, as were toll revenues. unemployment remained about 23% during 1989. imports of foodstuffs and crude oil increased during 1989, but capital goods imports continued their slide. exports were widely promoted by noriega trade delegations, but sales abroad remained stagnant. gdp: $3.9 billion, per capita $1,648; real growth rate 7.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 0.1% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 23% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $598 million; expenditures $750 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1989 est.) exports: $220 million (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--bananas 40%, shrimp 27%, coffee 4%, sugar, petroleum products; partners--us 90%, central america and caribbean, ec (1989 est.) imports: $830 million (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--foodstuffs 16%, capital goods 9%, crude oil 16%, consumer goods, chemicals; partners--us 35%, central america and caribbean, ec, mexico, venezuela (1989 est.) external debt: $5.2 billion (november 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.1% (1989 est.) electricity: 1,113,000 kw capacity; 3,270 million kwh produced, 1,380 kwh per capita (1989) industries: manufacturing and construction activities, petroleum refining, brewing, cement and other construction material, sugar mills, paper products agriculture: accounts for 10% of gdp (1989 est.), 26% of labor force (1987); crops--bananas, rice, corn, coffee, sugarcane; livestock; fishing; importer of food grain, vegetables, milk products aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $515 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $568 million; communist countries (1970-88), $4 million currency: balboa (plural--balboas); 1 balboa (b) = 100 centesimos exchange rates: balboas (b) per us$1--1.000 (fixed rate) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 238 km total; 78 km 1.524-meter gauge, 160 km 0.914-meter gauge highways: 8,530 km total; 2,745 km paved, 3,270 km gravel or crushed stone, 2,515 km improved and unimproved earth inland waterways: 800 km navigable by shallow draft vessels; 82 km panama canal pipelines: crude oil, 130 km ports: cristobal, balboa, puerto de la bahia de las minas merchant marine: 3,187 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 46,502,092 grt/72,961,250 dwt; includes 34 passenger, 22 short-sea passenger, 3 passenger-cargo, 1,087 cargo, 179 refrigerated cargo, 186 container, 71 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 136 vehicle carrier, 7 livestock carrier, 9 multifunction large-load carrier, 315 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 184 chemical tanker, 30 combination ore/oil, 91 liquefied gas, 8 specialized tanker, 767 bulk, 58 combination bulk; note--all but 5 are foreign owned and operated; the top 4 foreign owners are japan 41%, greece 9%, hong kong 9%, and the us 7% (china owns at least 144 ships, yugoslavia 12, cuba 6, and vietnam 9) civil air: 16 major transport aircraft airports: 123 total, 112 usable; 42 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 15 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: domestic and international facilities well developed; connection into central american microwave system; 2 atlantic ocean satellite antennas; 220,000 telephones; stations--91 am, no fm, 23 tv; 1 coaxial submarine cable defense forces branches: the panamanian defense forces (pdf) ceased to exist as a military institution shortly after the united states invaded panama on 20 december 1989; president endara is attempting to restructure the forces, with more civilian control, under the new name of panamanian public forces (ppf) military manpower: males 15-49, 628,327; 433,352 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 2.0% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: papua new guinea geography total area: 461,690 km2; land area: 451,710 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than california land boundary: 820 km with indonesia coastline: 5,152 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical; northwest monsoon (december to march), southeast monsoon (may to october); slight seasonal temperature variation terrain: mostly mountains with coastal lowlands and rolling foothills natural resources: gold, copper, silver, natural gas, timber, oil potential land use: negl% arable land; 1% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 71% forest and woodland; 28% other environment: one of world's largest swamps along southwest coast; some active volcanos; frequent earthquakes note: shares island of new guinea with indonesia people population: 3,822,875 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 34 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 68 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 54 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--papua new guinean(s); adjective--papua new guinean ethnic divisions: predominantly melanesian and papuan; some negrito, micronesian, and polynesian religion: over half of population nominally christian (490,000 roman catholic, 320,000 lutheran, other protestant sects); remainder indigenous beliefs language: 715 indigenous languages; english spoken by 1-2%, pidgin english widespread, motu spoken in papua region literacy: 32% labor force: 1,660,000; 732,806 in salaried employment; 54% agriculture, 25% government, 9% industry and commerce, 8% services (1980) organized labor: more than 50 trade unions, some with fewer than 20 members government long-form name: independent state of papua new guinea type: parliamentary democracy capital: port moresby administrative divisions: 20 provinces; central, chimbu, eastern highlands, east new britain, east sepik, enga, gulf, madang, manus, milne bay, morobe, national capital, new ireland, northern, north solomons, sandaun, southern highlands, western, western highlands, west new britain independence: 16 september 1975 (from un trusteeship under australian administration) constitution: 16 september 1975 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 16 september (1975) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, national executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national parliament (sometimes referred to as the house of assembly) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general vincent eri (since 18 january 1990); head of government--prime minister rabbie namaliu (since 4 july 1988); deputy prime minister akoko doi (since 7 july 1988) political parties: pangu party, people's progress party, united party, papua besena, national party, melanesian alliance suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national parliament--last held 13 june-4 july 1987 (next to be held 4 july 1992); results--pp 14.7%, pdm 10.8%, ppp 6.1%, ma 5.6%, np 5.1%, pap 3.2%, independents 42.9%, others 11.6%; seats--(109 total) pp 26, pdm 17, np 12, ma 7, pap 6, ppp 5, independents 22, others 14 communists: no significant strength member of: acp, adb, anrpc, cipec (associate), commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, spc, spf, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador margaret taylor; chancery at suite 350, 1330 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 659-0856; us--ambassador-designate william ferrand; embassy at armit street, port moresby (mailing address is p. o. box 1492, port moresby); telephone p675o 211-455 or 594, 654 flag: divided diagonally from upper hoist-side corner; the upper triangle is red with a soaring yellow bird of paradise centered; the lower triangle is black with five white five-pointed stars of the southern cross constellation centered economy overview: papua new guinea is richly endowed with natural resources, but exploitation has been hampered by the rugged terrain and the high cost of developing an infrastructure. agriculture provides a subsistence livelihood for more than half of the population. mining of numerous deposits, including copper and gold, accounts for about 60% of export earnings. budgetary support from australia and development aid under world bank auspices help sustain the economy. gdp: $3.26 billion, per capita $890; real growth rate 1.2% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 5% (1988) budget: revenues $962 million; expenditures $998 million, including capital expenditures of $169 million (1988) exports: $1.4 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--gold, copper ore, coffee, copra, palm oil, timber, lobster; partners--frg, japan, australia, uk, spain, us imports: $1.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and transport equipment, fuels, food, chemicals, consumer goods; partners--australia, singapore, japan, us, new zealand, uk external debt: $2.5 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 397,000 kw capacity; 1,510 million kwh produced, 400 kwh per capita (1989) industries: copra crushing, oil palm processing, plywood processing, wood chip production, gold, silver, copper, construction, tourism agriculture: one-third of gdp; livelihood for 85% of population; fertile soils and favorable climate permits cultivating a wide variety of crops; cash crops--coffee, cocoa, coconuts, palm kernels; other products--tea, rubber, sweet potatoes, fruit, vegetables, poultry, pork; net importer of food for urban centers aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $38.8 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $5.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $17 million currency: kina (plural--kina); 1 kina (k) = 100 toea exchange rates: kina (k) per us$1--1.1592 (december 1989), 1.1685 (1989), 1.1538 (1988), 1.1012 (1987), 1.0296 (1986), 1.0000 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 19,200 km total; 640 km paved, 10,960 km gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized-soil surface, 7,600 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 10,940 km ports: anewa bay, lae, madang, port moresby, rabaul merchant marine: 11 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 18,675 grt/27,954 dwt; includes 6 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 combination ore/oil, 2 bulk civil air: about 15 major transport aircraft airports: 575 total, 455 usable; 19 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 38 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: services are adequate and being improved; facilities provide radiobroadcast, radiotelephone and telegraph, coastal radio, aeronautical radio, and international radiocommunication services; submarine cables extend to australia and guam; 51,700 telephones (1985); stations--31 am, 2 fm, 2 tv (1987); 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: papua new guinea defense force military manpower: males 15-49, 952,454; 529,570 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.3% of gdp, or $42 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: paracel islands geography total area: undetermined comparative area: undetermined land boundaries: none coastline: 518 km maritime claims: undetermined disputes: occupied by china, but claimed by taiwan and vietnam climate: tropical terrain: undetermined natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: subject to typhoons note: located 400 km east of vietnam in the south china sea about one-third of the way between vietnam and the philippines people population: no permanent inhabitants government long-form name: none economy overview: no economic activity communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: occupied by china ---------------------------------------------------country: paraguay geography total area: 406,750 km2; land area: 397,300 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than california land boundaries: 3,920 km total; argentina 1,880 km, bolivia 750 km, brazil 1,290 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: short section of the boundary with brazil (just west of guaira falls on the rio parana) is in dispute climate: varies from temperate in east to semiarid in far west terrain: grassy plains and wooded hills east of rio paraguay; gran chaco region west of rio paraguay mostly low, marshy plain near the river, and dry forest and thorny scrub elsewhere natural resources: iron ore, manganese, limestone, hydropower, timber land use: 20% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 39% meadows and pastures; 35% forest and woodland; 5% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: local flooding in southeast (early september to june); poorly drained plains may become boggy (early october to june) note: landlocked; buffer between argentina and brazil people population: 4,660,270 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 36 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 48 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--paraguayan(s); adjective--paraguayan ethnic divisions: 95% mestizo (spanish and indian), 5% white and indian religion: 90% roman catholic; mennonite and other protestant denominations language: spanish (official) and guarani literacy: 81% labor force: 1,300,000; 44% agriculture, 34% industry and commerce, 18% services, 4% government (1986) organized labor: about 2% of labor force government long-form name: republic of paraguay type: republic capital: asuncion administrative divisions: 19 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); alto paraguay, alto parana, amambay, boqueron, caaguazu, caazapa, canendiyu, central, chaco, concepcion, cordillera, guaira, itapua, misiones, neembucu, nueva asuncion, paraguari, presidente hayes, san pedro independence: 14 may 1811 (from spain) constitution 25 august 1967 legal system: based on argentine codes, roman law, and french codes; judicial review of legislative acts in supreme court of justice; does not accept compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence days, 14-15 may (1811) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet), council of state legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso nacional) consists of an upper chamber or senate and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justicia) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president gen. andres rodriguez pedotti (since 15 may 1989) political parties and leaders: colorado party, juan ramon chaves; authentic radical liberal party (plra), domingo laino; christian democratic party (pdc), jorge dario cristaldo; febrerista revolutionary party (prf), euclides acevedo; liberal party (pl), reinaldo odone; popular colorado movement (mopoco), miguel angel gonzalez casabianca; radical liberal party (plr), emilio forestieri; popular democratic movement (mdp) suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 and up to age 60 elections: president--last held 1 may 1989 (next to be held february 1993); results--gen. rodriguez 75.8%, domingo laino 19.4%; senate--last held 1 may 1989 (next to be held by may 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(36 total) colorado party 24, plra 10, plr 1, prf 1; chamber of deputies--last held on 1 may 1989 (next to be held by may 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(72 total) colorado party 48, plra 19, prf 2, pdc 1, pl 1, plr 1 communists: oscar creydt faction and miguel angel soler faction (both illegal); 3,000 to 4,000 (est.) party members and sympathizers in paraguay, very few are hard core; party beginning to return from exile is small and deeply divided other political or pressure groups: febrerista; authentic radical liberal; christian democratic parties; confederation of workers (cut); roman catholic church member of: ccc, fao, g-77, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, laia, oas, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador marcos martinez mendieta; chancery at 2400 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-6960 through 6962; there are paraguayan consulates general in new orleans and new york, and a consulate in houston; us--ambassador timothy l. towell; embassy at 1776 avenida mariscal lopez, asuncion (mailing address is c. p. 402, asuncion, or apo miami 34036-0001); telephone p595o (21) 201-041 or 049 flag: three equal, horizontal bands of red (top), white, and blue with an emblem centered in the white band; unusual flag in that the emblem is different on each side; the obverse (hoist side at the left) bears the national coat of arms (a yellow five-pointed star within a green wreath capped by the words republica del paraguay, all within two circles); the reverse (hoist side at the right) bears the seal of the treasury (a yellow lion below a red cap of liberty and the words paz y justica (peace and justice) capped by the words republica del paraguay, all within two circles) economy overview: the economy is predominantly agricultural. agriculture, including forestry, accounts for about 25% of gnp, employs about 45% of the labor force, and provides the bulk of exports. paraguay has no known significant mineral or petroleum resources, but does have a large hydropower potential. since 1981 economic performance has declined compared with the boom period of 1976-81, when real gdp grew at an average annual rate of nearly 11%. during 1982-86 real gdp fell three out of five years, inflation jumped to an annual rate of 32%, and foreign debt rose. factors responsible for the erratic behavior of the economy were the completion of the itaipu hydroelectric dam, bad weather for crops, and weak international commodity prices for agricultural exports. in 1987 the economy experienced a modest recovery because of improved weather conditions and stronger international prices for key agricultural exports. the recovery continued through 1988, with a bumper soybean crop and record cotton production. the government, however, must follow through on promises of reforms needed to deal with large fiscal deficits, growing debt arrearages, and falling reserves. gdp: $8.9 billion, per capita $1,970; real growth rate 5.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 30% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 12% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $609 million; expenditures $909 million, including capital expenditures of $401 million (1988) exports: $1,020 million (registered f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--cotton, soybean, timber, vegetable oils, coffee, tung oil, meat products; partners--ec 37%, brazil 25%, argentina 10%, chile 6%, us 6% imports: $1,010 million (registered c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--capital goods 35%, consumer goods 20%, fuels and lubricants 19%, raw materials 16%, foodstuffs, beverages, and tobacco 10%; partners--brazil 30%, ec 20%, us 18%, argentina 8%, japan 7% external debt: $2.9 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 2% (1987) electricity: 5,169,000 kw capacity; 15,140 million kwh produced, 3,350 kwh per capita (1989) industries: meat packing, oilseed crushing, milling, brewing, textiles, other light consumer goods, cement, construction agriculture: accounts for 25% of gdp and 50% of labor force; cash crops--cotton, sugarcane; other crops--corn, wheat, tobacco, soybeans, cassava, fruits, and vegetables; animal products--beef, pork, eggs, milk; surplus producer of timber; self-sufficient in most foods illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the international drug trade with an estimated 300 hectares cultivated in 1988; important transshipment point for bolivian cocaine headed for the us and europe aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $168 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $994 million currency: guarani (plural--guaranies); 1 guarani (g) = 100 centimos exchange rates: guaranies (g) per us$1--1,200.20 (november 1989; floated in february 1989), 550.00 (fixed rate 1986-february 1989), 339.17 (1986), 306.67 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 970 km total; 440 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 60 km 1.000-meter gauge, 470 km various narrow gauge (privately owned) highways: 21,960 km total; 1,788 km paved, 474 km gravel, and 19,698 km earth inland waterways: 3,100 km ports: asuncion merchant marine: 15 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 20,735 grt/26,043 dwt; includes 13 cargo, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker; note--1 naval cargo ship is sometimes used commercially civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 873 total, 753 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 52 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: principal center in asuncion; fair intercity microwave net; 78,300 telephones; stations--40 am, no fm, 5 tv, 7 shortwave; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: paraguayan army, paraguayan navy, paraguayan air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,096,227; 798,750 fit for military service; 49,791 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: peru geography total area: 1,285,220 km2; land area: 1,280,000 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than alaska land boundaries: 6,940 km total; bolivia 900 km, brazil 1,560 km, chile 160 km, colombia 2,900 km, ecuador 1,420 km coastline: 2,414 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm disputes: two sections of the boundary with ecuador are in dispute climate: varies from tropical in east to dry desert in west terrain: western coastal plain (costa), high and rugged andes in center (sierra), eastern lowland jungle of amazon basin (selva) natural resources: copper, silver, gold, petroleum, timber, fish, iron ore, coal, phosphate, potash land use: 3% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 21% meadows and pastures; 55% forest and woodland; 21% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to earthquakes, tsunamis, landslides, mild volcanic activity; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification; air pollution in lima note: shares control of lago titicaca, world's highest navigable lake, with bolivia people population: 21,905,605 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 67 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 66 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--peruvian(s); adjective--peruvian ethnic divisions: 45% indian; 37% mestizo (mixed indian and european ancestry); 15% white; 3% black, japanese, chinese, and other religion: predominantly roman catholic language: spanish and quechua (official), aymara literacy: 80% (est.) labor force: 6,800,000 (1986); 44% government and other services, 37% agriculture, 19% industry (1988 est.) organized labor: about 40% of salaried workers (1983 est.) government long-form name: republic of peru type: republic capital: lima administrative divisions: 24 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento) and 1 constitutional province* (provincia constitucional); amazonas, ancash, apurimac, arequipa, ayacucho, cajamarca, callao*, cusco, huancavelica, huanuco, ica, junin, la libertad, lambayeque, lima, loreto, madre de dios, moquegua, pasco, piura, puno, san martin, tacna, tumbes, ucayali independence: 28 july 1821 (from spain) constitution: 28 july 1980 (often referred to as the 1979 constitution because constituent assembly met in 1979, but constitution actually took effect the following year); reestablished civilian government with a popularly elected president and bicameral legislature legal system: based on civil law system; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 28 july (1821) executive branch: president, two vice presidents, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral congress (congreso) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camara de diputados) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justicia) leaders: chief of state--president-elect alberto fujimori (since 10 june 1990; vice president-elect maximo san roman (since 10 june 1990); vice president-elect carlos garcia; president alan garcia perez (since 28 july 1985); first vice president luis alberto sanchez sanchez (since 28 july 1985); second vice president luis juan alva castro (since 28 july 1985); head of government--prime minister guillermo larco cox (since 3 october 1989) political parties and leaders: american popular revolutionary alliance (apra), alan garcia perez; united left (iu), run by committee; democratic front (fredemo), headed by mario vargas llosa of the liberty movement (ml), coalition also includes the popular christian party (ppc), luis bedoya reyes and the popular action party (ap), fernando belaunde terry; socialist left (iso), alfonso barrantes lingan suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held on 10 june 1990 (next to be held april 1995); results--alberto fujimori xx%, mario vargas llosa xx%, others xx%; senate--last held on 8 april 1990 (next to be held april 1995); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(60 total) apra 32, iu 15, ap 5, others 8; chamber of deputies--last held 8 april 1990 (next to be held april 1995); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(180 total) apra 107, iu 48, ap 10, others 15 communists: peruvian communist party-unity (pcp-u), pro-soviet, 2,000; other minor communist parties other political or pressure groups: na member of: andean pact, aioec, assimer, ccc, cipec, fao, g-77, gatt, group of eight, iadb, iaea, iatp, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, interpol, imf, imo, intelsat, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, laia, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador cesar g. atala; chancery at 1700 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 833-9860 through 9869); peruvian consulates general are located in chicago, houston, los angeles, miami, new york, paterson (new jersey), san francisco, and san juan (puerto rico); us--ambassador anthony quainton; embassy at the corner of avenida inca garcilaso de la vega and avenida espana, lima (mailing address is p. o. box 1995, lima 1010, or apo miami 34031); telephone p51o (14) 338-000 flag: three equal, vertical bands of red (hoist side), white, and red with the coat of arms centered in the white band; the coat of arms features a shield bearing a llama, cinchona tree (the source of quinine), and a yellow cornucopia spilling out gold coins, all framed by a green wreath economy overview: the economy is verging on hyperinflation and economic activity is contracting rapidly. deficit spending is at the root of domestic economic problems, but poor relations with international lenders--the result of curtailing debt payments since 1985--are preventing an inflow of funds to generate a recovery. reduced standards of living have increased labor tensions, and strikes, particularly in the key mining sector, have cut production and exports. foreign exchange shortages have forced reductions in vital consumer imports such as food and industrial inputs. peru is the world's leading producer of coca, from which the drug cocaine is produced. gdp: $18.9 billion, per capita $880; real growth rate 12.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2,775% (1989) unemployment rate: 15.0%; underemployment estimated at 60% (1989) budget: revenues $3.2 billion; expenditures $3.7 billion, including capital expenditures of $796 million (1986) exports: $3.55 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--fishmeal, cotton, sugar, coffee, copper, iron ore, refined silver, lead, zinc, crude petroleum and byproducts; partners--ec 22%, us 20%, japan 11%, latin america 8%, ussr 4% imports: $2.50 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--foodstuffs, machinery, transport equipment, iron and steel semimanufactures, chemicals, pharmaceuticals; partners--us 23%, latin america 16%, ec 12%, japan 7%, switzerland 3% external debt: $17.7 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 25.0% (1988 est.) electricity: 4,867,000 kw capacity; 15,540 million kwh produced, 725 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining of metals, petroleum, fishing, textiles, clothing, food processing, cement, auto assembly, steel, shipbuilding, metal fabrication agriculture: accounts for 12% of gdp, 37% of labor force; commercial crops--coffee, cotton, sugarcane; other crops--rice, wheat, potatoes, plantains, coca; animal products--poultry, red meats, dairy, wool; not self-sufficient in grain or vegetable oil; fish catch of 4.6 million metric tons (1987), world's fifth-largest illicit drugs: world's largest coca producer and source of supply for coca paste and cocaine base; about 85% of cultivation is for illicit production; most of coca base is shipped to colombian drug dealers for processing into cocaine for the international drug market aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.6 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $3.7 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $577 million currency: inti (plural--intis); 1 inti (i/) = 1,000 soles exchange rates: intis (i/) per us$1--5,261.40 (december 1989), 128.83 (1988), 16.84 (1987), 13.95 (1986), 10.97 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,876 km total; 1,576 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 300 km 0.914-meter gauge highways: 56,645 km total; 6,030 km paved, 11,865 km gravel, 14,610 km improved earth, 24,140 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 8,600 km of navigable tributaries of amazon system and 208 km lago titicaca pipelines: crude oil, 800 km; natural gas and natural gas liquids, 64 km ports: callao, ilo, iquitos, matarani, talara merchant marine: 32 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 341,213 grt/535,215 dwt; includes 18 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 chemical tanker, 8 bulk; note--in addition, 7 naval tankers and 1 naval cargo are sometimes used commercially civil air: 27 major transport aircraft airports: 242 total, 226 usable; 35 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 24 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 39 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fairly adequate for most requirements; nationwide radio relay system; 544,000 telephones; stations--273 am, no fm, 140 tv, 144 shortwave; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations, 12 domestic antennas defense forces branches: peruvian army (ejercito peruano), peruvian navy (marina de guerra del peru), peruvian air force (fuerza aerea del peru) military manpower: males 15-49, 5,543,166; 3,751,077 fit for military service; 236,814 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 4.9% of gnp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: philippines geography total area: 300,000 km2; land area: 298,170 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than arizona land boundaries: none coastline: 36,289 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); continental shelf: to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: irregular polygon extending up to 100 nm from coastline as defined by 1898 treaty; since late 1970s has also claimed polygonal-shaped area in south china sea up to 285 nm in breadth disputes: involved in a complex dispute over the spratly islands with china, malaysia, taiwan, and vietnam; claims malaysian state of sabah climate: tropical marine; northeast monsoon (november to april); southwest monsoon (may to october) terrain: mostly mountains with narrow to extensive coastal lowlands natural resources: timber, crude oil, nickel, cobalt, silver, gold, salt, copper land use: 26% arable land; 11% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 40% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes 5% irrigated environment: astride typhoon belt, usually affected by 15 and struck by five to six cyclonic storms per year; subject to landslides, active volcanoes, destructive earthquakes, tsunami; deforestation; soil erosion; water pollution people population: 66,117,284 (july 1990), growth rate 2.5% (1990) birth rate: 32 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 48 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 63 years male, 69 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--filipino(s); adjective--philippine ethnic divisions: 91.5% christian malay, 4% muslim malay, 1.5% chinese, 3% other religion: 83% roman catholic, 9% protestant, 5% muslim, 3% buddhist and other language: pilipino (based on tagalog) and english; both official literacy: 88% (est.) labor force: 22,889,000; 47% agriculture, 20% industry and commerce, 13.5% services, 10% government, 9.5% other (1987) organized labor: 2,064 registered unions; total membership 4.8 million (includes 2.7 million members of the national congress of farmers organizations) government long-form name: republic of the philippines type: republic capital: manila administrative divisions: 73 provinces and 61 chartered cities*; abra, agusan del norte, agusan del sur, aklan, albay, angeles*, antique, aurora, bacolod*, bago*, baguio*, bais*, basilan, basilan city*, bataan, batanes, batangas, batangas city*, benguet, bohol, bukidnon, bulacan, butuan*, cabanatuan*, cadiz*, cagayan, cagayan de oro*, calbayog*, caloocan*, camarines norte, camarines sur, camiguin, canlaon*, capiz, catanduanes, cavite, cavite city*, cebu, cebu city*, cotabato*, dagupan*, danao*, dapitan*, davao city* davao, davao del sur, davao oriental, dipolog*, dumaguete*, eastern samar, general santos*, gingoog*, ifugao, iligan*, ilocos norte, ilocos sur, iloilo, iloilo city*, iriga*, isabela, kalinga-apayao, la carlota*, laguna, lanao del norte, lanao del sur, laoag*, lapu-lapu*, la union, legaspi*, leyte, lipa*, lucena*, maguindanao, mandaue*, manila*, marawi*, marinduque, masbate, mindoro occidental, mindoro oriental, misamis occidental, misamis oriental, mountain, naga*, negros occidental, negros oriental, north cotabato, northern samar, nueva ecija, nueva vizcaya, olongapo*, ormoc*, oroquieta*, ozamis*, pagadian*, palawan, palayan*, pampanga, pangasinan, pasay*, puerto princesa*, quezon, quezon city*, quirino, rizal, romblon, roxas*, samar, san carlos* (in negros occidental), san carlos* (in pangasinan), san jose*, san pablo*, silay*, siquijor, sorsogon, south cotabato, southern leyte, sultan kudarat, sulu, surigao*, surigao del norte, surigao del sur, tacloban*, tagaytay*, tagbilaran*, tangub*, tarlac, tawitawi, toledo*, trece martires*, zambales, zamboanga*, zamboanga del norte, zamboanga del sur independence: 4 july 1946 (from us) constitution: 2 february 1987, effective 11 february 1987 legal system: based on spanish and anglo-american law; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day (from spain), 12 june (1898) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral congress consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president corazon c. aquino (since 25 february 1986); vice president salvador h. laurel (since 25 february 1986) political parties and leaders: pdp-laban, aquilino pimentel; struggle of philippine democrats (ldp), neptali gonzales; nationalista party, salvador laurel, juan ponce enrile; liberal party, jovito salonga suffrage: universal at age 15 elections: president--last held 7 february 1986 (next election to be held may 1992); results--corazon c. aquino elected after the fall of the marcos regime; senate--last held 11 may 1987 (next to be held may 1993); results--pro-aquino ldp 63%, liberals ldp and pdp-laban (pimentel wing) 25%, opposition nationalista party 4%, independents 8%; seats--(24 total) pro-aquino ldp 15, liberals ldp-laban (pimentel wing) 6, opposition 1, independents 2; house of representatives--last held on 11 may 1987 (next to be held may 1992); results--pro-aquino ldp 73%, liberals ldp and pdp-laban (pimentel wing) 10%, opposition nationalista party 17%; seats--(250 total, 180 elected) number of seats by party na communists: the communist party of the philippines (cpp) controls about 18,000-23,000 full-time insurgents and is not recognized as a legal party; a second communist party, the pro-soviet philippine communist party (pkp), has quasi-legal status member of: adb, asean, aspac, ccc, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, iso, itu, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador emmanuel pelaez; chancery at 1617 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 483-1414; there are philippine consulates general in agana (guam), chicago, honolulu, houston, los angeles, new york, san francisco, and seattle; us--ambassador nicholas platt; embassy at 1201 roxas boulevard, manila (mailing address is apo san francisco 96528); telephone p63o (2) 521-7116; there is a us consulate in cebu flag: two equal horizontal bands of blue (top) and red with a white equilateral triangle based on the hoist side; in the center of the triangle is a yellow sun with eight primary rays (each containing three individual rays) and in each corner of the triangle is a small yellow five-pointed star economy overview: the economy continues to recover from the political turmoil following the ouster of former president marcos and several coup attempts. after two consecutive years of economic contraction (1984 and 1985), the economy has since 1986 had positive growth. the agricultural sector, together with forestry and fishing, plays an important role in the economy, employing about 50% of the work force and providing almost 30% of gdp. the philippines is the world's largest exporter of coconuts and coconut products. manufacturing contributed about 25% of gdp. major industries include food processing, chemicals, and textiles. gnp: $40.5 billion, per capita $625; real growth rate 5.2% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 10.6% (1989) unemployment rate: 8.7% (1989) budget: $7.2 billion; expenditures $8.12 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.97 billion (1989 est.) exports: revenues $8.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--electrical equipment 19%, textiles 16%, minerals and ores 11%, farm products 10%, coconut 10%, chemicals 5%, fish 5%, forest products 4%; partners--us 36%, ec 19%, japan 18%, escap 9%, asean 7% imports: $10.5 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--raw materials 53%, capital goods 17%, petroleum products 17%; partners--us 25%, japan 17%, escap 13%, ec 11%, asean 10%, middle east 10% external debt: $27.8 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 7.3% (1989) electricity: 6,700,000 kw capacity; 25,000 million kwh produced, 385 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, wood products, food processing, electronics assembly, petroleum refining, fishing agriculture: accounts for about one-third of gnp and 50% of labor force; major crops--rice, coconut, corn, sugarcane, bananas, pineapple, mango; animal products--pork, eggs, beef; net exporter of farm products; fish catch of 2 million metric tons annually illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for the international drug trade; growers are producing more and better quality cannabis despite government eradication efforts aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $3.2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $6.4 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $5 million; communist countries (1975-88), $123 million currency: philippine peso (plural--pesos); 1 philippine peso (p) = 100 centavos exchange rates: philippine pesos (p) per us$1--22.464 (january 1990), 21.737 (1989), 21.095 (1988), 20.568 (1987), 20.386 (1986), 18.607 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 378 km operable on luzon, 34% government owned (1982) highways: 156,000 km total (1984); 29,000 km paved; 77,000 km gravel, crushed-stone, or stabilized-soil surface; 50,000 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 3,219 km; limited to shallow-draft (less than 1.5 m) vessels pipelines: refined products, 357 km ports: cagayan de oro, cebu, davao, guimaras, iloilo, legaspi, manila, subic bay merchant marine: 595 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 9,134,924 grt/15,171,692 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 10 short-sea passenger, 16 passenger-cargo, 166 cargo, 17 refrigerated cargo, 30 vehicle carrier, 8 livestock carrier, 7 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 6 container, 36 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 6 liquefied gas, 3 combination ore/oil, 282 bulk, 5 combination bulk; note--many philippine flag ships are foreign owned and are on the register for the purpose of long-term bare-boat charter back to their original owners who are principally in japan and frg civil air: 53 major transport aircraft airports: 301 total, 237 usable; 70 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 9 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 49 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good international radio and submarine cable services; domestic and interisland service adequate; 872,900 telephones; stations--267 am (including 6 us), 55 fm, 33 tv (including 4 us); submarine cables extended to hong kong, guam, singapore, taiwan, and japan; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat, 2 pacific ocean intelsat, and 11 domestic defense forces branches: army, navy, marine corps, air force, constabulary--integrated national police military manpower: males 15-49, 16,160,543; 11,417,451 fit for military service; 684,976 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.1% of gnp, or $850 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: pitcairn islands (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 47 km2; land area: 47 km2 comparative area: about 0.3 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 51 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical, hot, humid, modified by southeast trade winds; rainy season (november to march) terrain: rugged volcanic formation; rocky coastline with cliffs natural resources: miro trees (used for handicrafts), fish land use: na% arable land; na% permanent crops; na% meadows and pastures; na% forest and woodland; na% other environment: subject to typhoons (especially november to march) note: located in the south pacific ocean about halfway between peru and new zealand people population: 56 (july 1990), growth rate 0.0% (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--pitcairn islander(s); adjective--pitcairn islander ethnic divisions: descendants of bounty mutineers religion: 100% seventh-day adventist language: english (official); also a tahitian/english dialect literacy: na%, but probably high labor force: na; no business community in the usual sense; some public works; subsistence farming and fishing organized labor: na government long-form name: pitcairn, henderson, ducie, and oeno islands type: dependent territory of the uk capital: adamstown administrative divisions: none (dependent territory of the uk) independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: local government ordinance of 1964 legal system: local island by-laws national holiday: celebration of the birthday of the queen (second saturday in june), 10 june 1989 executive branch: british monarch, governor, island magistrate legislative branch: unicameral island council judicial branch: island court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by the governor and uk high commissioner to new zealand robin a. c. byatt (since na 1988); head of government--island magistrate and chairman of the island council brian young (since na 1985) political parties and leaders: na suffrage: universal at age 18 with three years residency elections: island council--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(11 total, 5 elected) number of seats by party na communists: none other political or pressure groups: na diplomatic representation: none (dependent territory of the uk) flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the pitcairn islander coat of arms centered on the outer half of the flag; the coat of arms is yellow, green, and light blue with a shield featuring a yellow anchor economy overview: the inhabitants exist on fishing and subsistence farming. the fertile soil of the valleys produces a wide variety of fruits and vegetables, including citrus, sugarcane, watermelons, bananas, yams, and beans. bartering is an important part of the economy. the major sources of revenue are the sale of postage stamps to collectors and the sale of handicrafts to passing ships. gnp: na inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $430,440; expenditures $429,983, including capital expenditures of $na (fy87 est.) exports: $na; commodities--fruits, vegetables, curios; partners--na imports: $na; commodities--fuel oil, machinery, building materials, flour, sugar, other foodstuffs; partners--na external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 110 kw capacity; 0.30 million kwh produced, 4,410 kwh per capita (1989) industries: postage stamp sales, handicrafts agriculture: based on subsistence fishing and farming; wide variety of fruits and vegetables grown; must import grain products aid: none currency: new zealand dollar (plural--dollars); 1 new zealand dollar (nz$) = 100 cents exchange rates: new zealand dollars (nz$) per us$1--1.6581 (january 1990), 1.6708 (1989), 1.5244 (1988), 1.6866 (1987), 1.9088 (1986), 2.0064 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: none highways: 6.4 km dirt roads ports: bounty bay airports: none telecommunications: 24 telephones; party line telephone service on the island; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; diesel generator provides electricity defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: poland geography total area: 312,680 km2; land area: 304,510 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than new mexico land boundaries: 2,980 km total; czechoslovakia 1,309 km, gdr 456 km, ussr 1,215 km coastline: 491 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm climate: temperate with cold, cloudy, moderately severe winters with frequent precipitation; mild summers with frequent showers and thundershowers terrain: mostly flat plain, mountains along southern border natural resources: coal, sulfur, copper, natural gas, silver, lead, salt land use: 46% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 13% meadows and pastures; 28% forest and woodland; 12% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: plain crossed by a few north-flowing, meandering streams; severe air and water pollution in south note: historically, an area of conflict because of flat terrain and the lack of natural barriers on the north european plain people population: 37,776,725 (july 1990), growth rate negl (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 13 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--pole(s); adjective--polish ethnic divisions: 98.7% polish, 0.6% ukrainian, 0.5% byelorussian, less than 0.05% jewish religion: 95% roman catholic (about 75% practicing), 5% russian orthodox, protestant, and other language: polish literacy: 98% labor force: 17,128,000 (1988); 36.5% industry and construction; 28.5% agriculture; 14.7% trade, transport, and communications; 20.3% government and other organized labor: trade union pluralism government long-form name: republic of poland type: democratic state capital: warsaw administrative divisions: 49 provinces (wojewodztwa, singular--wojewodztwo); biala podlaska, bialystok, bielsko-biala, bydgoszcz, chelm, ciechanow, czestochowa, elblag, gdansk, gorzow wielkopolski, jelenia gora, kalisz, katowice, kielce, konin, koszalin, krakow, krosno, legnica, leszno, lodz, lomza, lublin, nowy sacz, olsztyn, opole, ostroleka, pila, piotrkow, plock, poznan, przemysl, radom, rzeszow, siedlce, sieradz, skierniewice, slupsk, suwalki, szczecin, tarnobrzeg, tarnow, torun, walbrzych, warszawa, wloclawek, wroclaw, zamosc, zielona gora independence: 11 november 1918, independent republic proclaimed constitution: the communist-imposed constitution of 22 july 1952 will be replaced by a democratic constitution before may 1991 legal system: mixture of continental (napoleonic) civil law and communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national liberation day, 22 july (1952) will probably be replaced by constitution day, 3 may (1794) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral parliament (parlament) consists of an upper house or senate (senat) and a lower house or national assembly (sejm) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president gen. wojciech jaruzelski (since 19 july 1989, chairman of council of state since 6 november 1985); head of government--premier tadeusz mazowiecki (since 24 august 1989) political parties and leaders: center-right agrarian parties--polish peasant party (psl, known unofficially as psl-wilanowska), gen. franciszek kaminski, chairman; polish peasant party-solidarity, josef slisz, chairman; polish peasant party-rebirth (formerly the united peasant party), kazimirrz olrsiak, chairman; other center-right parties--national party, bronislaw ekert, chairman; christian national union, urrslaw chnzanowski, chairman; christian democratic labor party, wladyslaw sila nowicki, chairman; democratic party, jerzy jozwiak, chairman; center-left parties--polish socialist party, jan jozef lipski, chairman; left-wing parties--polish socialist party-democratic revolution; other--social democracy of the republic of poland (formerly the communist party or polish united workers' party/pzpr), aleksander kwasnuewski, chairman; union of the social democracy of the republic of poland (breakaway faction of the pzpr), tadrusz fiszbach, chairman suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: senate--last held 4 and 18 june 1989 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(100 total) solidarity 99, independent 1; national assembly--last held 4 and 18 june 1989 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(460 total) communists 173, solidarity 161, polish peasant party 76, democratic party 27, christian national union 23; note--rules governing the election limited solidarity's share of the vote to 35% of the seats; future elections are to be freely contested communists: 70,000 members in the communist successor party (1990) other political or pressure groups: powerful roman catholic church; confederation for an independent poland (kpn), a nationalist group; solidarity (trade union); all poland trade union alliance (opzz), populist program; clubs of catholic intellectuals (kiks); freedom and peace (wip), a pacifist group; independent student union (nzs) member of: ccc, cema, council of europe, fao, gatt, iaea, ibec, icao, ices, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imo, ipu, iso, itc, itu, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, warsaw pact, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador jan kinast; chancery at 2640 16th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 234-3800 through 3802; there are polish consulates general in chicago and new york; us--ambassador-designate thomas simons, jr.; embassy at aleje ujazdowskie 29/31, warsaw (mailing address is apo new york 09213); telephone p48o 283041 through 283049; there is a us consulate general in krakow and a consulate in poznan flag: two equal horizontal bands of white (top) and red--a crowned eagle is to be added; similar to the flags of indonesia and monaco which are red (top) and white economy overview: the economy, except for the agricultural sector, had followed the soviet model of state ownership and control of the country's productive assets. about 75% of agricultural production had come from the private sector and the rest from state farms. the economy has presented a picture of moderate but slowing growth against a background of underlying weaknesses in technology and worker motivation. gnp increased between 3% and 6% annually during the period 1983-1986, but grew only 2.5% and 2.1% in 1987 and 1988, respectively. output dropped by 1.5% in 1989. the inflation rate, after falling sharply from the 1982 peak of 100% to 22% in 1986, rose to a galloping rate of 640% in 1989. shortages of consumer goods and some food items worsened in 1988-89. agricultural products and coal have remained the biggest hard currency earners, but manufactures are increasing in importance. poland, with its hard currency debt of approximately $40 billion, is severely limited in its ability to import much-needed hard currency goods. the sweeping political changes of 1989 disrupted normal economic channels and exacerbated shortages. in january 1990, the new solidarity-led government adopted a cold turkey program for transforming poland to a market economy. the government moved to eliminate subsidies, end artificially low prices, make the zloty convertible, and, in general, halt the hyperinflation. these financial measures are accompanied by plans to privatize the economy in stages. substantial outside aid will be needed if poland is to make a successful transition in the 1990s. gnp: $172.4 billion, per capita $4,565; real growth rate 1.6% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 640% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: na%; 215,000 (official number, mid-march 1990) budget: revenues $23 billion; expenditures $24 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.5 billion (1988) exports: $24.7 billion (f.o.b., 1987 est.); commodities--machinery and equipment 63%; fuels, minerals, and metals 14%; manufactured consumer goods 14%; agricultural and forestry products 5% (1987 est.); partners--ussr 25%, frg 12%, czechoslovakia 6% (1988) imports: $22.8 billion (f.o.b., 1987 est.); commodities--machinery and equipment 36%; fuels, minerals, and metals 35%; manufactured consumer goods 9%; agricultural and forestry products 12%; partners--ussr 23%, frg 13%, czechoslovakia 6% (1988) external debt: $40 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 2.0% (1988) electricity: 31,390,000 kw capacity; 125,000 million kwh produced, 3,260 kwh per capita (1989) industries: machine building, iron and steel, extractive industries, chemicals, shipbuilding, food processing, glass, beverages, textiles agriculture: accounts for 15% of gnp and 28% of labor force; 75% of output from private farms, 25% from state farms; productivity remains low by european standards; leading european producer of rye, rapeseed, and potatoes; wide variety of other crops and livestock; major exporter of pork products; normally self-sufficient in food aid: donor--bilateral aid to non-communist less developed countries, $2.1 billion (1954-88) currency: zloty (plural--zlotych); 1 zloty (zl) = 100 groszy exchange rates: zlotych (zl) per us$1--9,500.00 (january 1990), 1,439.18 (1989), 430.55 (1988), 265.08 (1987), 175.29 (1986), 147.14 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 27,245 km total; 24,333 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 397 km 1.524-meter broad gauge, 2,515 km narrow gauge; 8,986 km double track; 10,000 km electrified; government owned (1986) highways: 299,887 km total; 130,000 km improved hard surface (concrete, asphalt, stone block); 24,000 km unimproved hard surface (crushed stone, gravel); 100,000 km earth; 45,887 km other urban roads (1985) inland waterways: 3,997 km navigable rivers and canals (1988) pipelines: 4,500 km for natural gas; 1,986 km for crude oil; 360 km for refined products (1987) ports: gdansk, gdynia, szczecin, swinoujscie; principal inland ports are gliwice on kanal gliwice, wroclaw on the oder, and warsaw on the vistula merchant marine: 234 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,957,534 grt/4,164,665 dwt; includes 5 short-sea passenger, 93 cargo, 3 refrigerated cargo, 12 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 9 container, 3 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 4 chemical tanker, 105 bulk civil air: 42 major transport aircraft airports: 160 total, 160 usable; 85 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runway over 3,659 m; 35 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 65 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--30 am, 28 fm, 41 tv; 4 soviet tv relays; 9,691,075 tv sets; 9,290,000 radio receivers; at least 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: ground forces, national air defense forces, air force command, navy military manpower: males 15-49, 9,501,088; 7,503,477 fit for military service; 292,769 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 954 billion zlotych, na% of total budget (1989); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: portugal geography total area: 92,080 km2; land area: 91,640 km2; includes azores and madeira islands comparative area: slightly smaller than indiana land boundary: 1,214 km with spain coastline: 1,793 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: macau is scheduled to become a special administrative region of china in 1999; east timor question with indonesia climate: maritime temperate; cool and rainy in north, warmer and drier in south terrain: mountainous north of the tagus, rolling plains in south natural resources: fish, forests (cork), tungsten, iron ore, uranium ore, marble land use: 32% arable land; 6% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 40% forest and woodland; 16% other; includes 7% irrigated environment: azores subject to severe earthquakes note: azores and madeira islands occupy strategic locations along western sea approaches to strait of gibraltar people population: 10,354,497 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 14 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--portuguese (sing. and pl.); adjective--portuguese ethnic divisions: homogeneous mediterranean stock in mainland, azores, madeira islands; citizens of black african descent who immigrated to mainland during decolonization number less than 100,000 religion: 97% roman catholic, 1% protestant denominations, 2% other language: portuguese literacy: 83% labor force: 4,605,700; 45% services, 35% industry, 20% agriculture (1988) organized labor: about 55% of the labor force; the communist-dominated general confederation of portuguese workers--intersindical (cgtp-in) represents more than half of the unionized labor force; its main competition, the general workers union (ugt), is organized by the socialists and social democrats and represents less than half of unionized labor government long-form name: portuguese republic type: republic capital: lisbon administrative divisions: 18 districts (distritos, singular--distrito) and 2 autonomous regions* (regioes autonomas, singular--regiao autonoma); acores*, aveiro, beja, braga, braganca, castelo branco, coimbra, evora, faro, guarda, leiria, lisboa, madeira*, portalegre, porto, santarem, setubal, viana do castelo, vila real, viseu dependent area: macau (scheduled to become a special administrative region of china in 1999) independence: 1140; independent republic proclaimed 5 october 1910 constitution: 25 april 1976, revised 30 october 1982; new discussions on constitutional revision began october 1987 legal system: civil law system; the constitutional tribunal reviews the constitutionality of legislation; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: day of portugal, 10 june executive branch: president, council of state, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral assembly of the republic (assembleia da republica) judicial branch: supreme tribunal of justice (supremo tribunal de justica) leaders: chief of state--president dr. mario alberto nobre lopes soares (since 9 march 1986); head of government--prime minister anibal cavaco silva (since 6 november 1985); deputy prime minister (vacant) political parties and leaders: social democratic party (psd), anibal cavaco silva; portuguese socialist party (ps), jorge sampaio; party of democratic renewal (prd), herminio martinho; portuguese communist party (pcp), alvaro cunhal; social democratic center (cds), diogo freitas do amaral suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 16 february 1986 (next to be held january 1991); results--dr. mario lopes soares 51.3%, prof. diogo freitas do amal 48.7%; assembly of the republic--last held 19 july 1987 (next to be held july 1991); results--social democrats 59.2%, socialists 24.0%, communists (in a front coalition) 12.4%, democratic renewal 2.8%, center democrats 1.6%; seats--(250 total) social democrats 148, socialists 60, communists (in a front coalition) 31 seats, democratic renewal 7, center democrats 4 communists: portuguese communist party claims membership of 200,753 (december 1983) member of: ccc, council of europe, ec, efta, fao, gatt, iaea, iatp, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, irc, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nato, oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador joao eduardo m. pereira bastos; chancery at 2125 kalorama road nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 328-8610; there are portuguese consulates general in boston, new york, and san francisco, and consulates in los angeles, newark (new jersey), new bedford (massachusetts), and providence (rhode island); us--ambassador edward m. rowell; embassy at avenida das forcas armadas, 1600 lisbon (mailing address is apo new york 09678-0002); telephone p351o (1) 726-6600 or 6659, 8670, 8880; there are us consulates in oporto and ponta delgada (azores) flag: two vertical bands of green (hoist side, two-fifths) and red (three-fifths) with the portuguese coat of arms centered on the dividing line economy overview: during the past four years, the economy has made a sustained recovery from the severe recession of 1983-85. the economy grew by 4.7% in 1987, 4.1% in 1988, and 3.5% in 1989, largely because of strong domestic consumption and investment spending. unemployment has declined for the third consecutive year, but inflation continues to be about three times the european community average. the government is pushing economic restructuring and privatization measures in anticipation of the 1992 european community timetable to form a single large market in europe. gdp: $72.1 billion, per capita $6,900; real growth rate 3.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 11.8% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 5.9% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $19.0 billion; expenditures $22.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $3.1 billion (1989 est.) exports: $11.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--cotton textiles, cork and cork products, canned fish, wine, timber and timber products, resin, machinery, appliances; partners--ec 72%, other developed countries 13%, us 6% imports: $17.7 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum, cotton, foodgrains, industrial machinery, iron and steel, chemicals; partners--ec 67%, other developed countries 13%, less developed countries 15%, us 4% external debt: $17.2 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 5.5% (1988) electricity: 6,729,000 kw capacity; 16,000 million kwh produced, 1,530 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles and footwear; wood pulp, paper, and cork; metalworking; oil refining; chemicals; fish canning; wine; tourism agriculture: accounts for 9% of gdp and 20% of labor force; small inefficient farms; imports more than half of food needs; major crops--grain, potatoes, olives, grapes; livestock sector--sheep, cattle, goats, poultry, meat, dairy products aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.8 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $998 million currency: portuguese escudo (plural--escudos); 1 portuguese escudo (esc) = 100 centavos exchange rates: portuguese escudos (esc) per us$1--149.15 (january 1990), 157.46 (1989), 143.95 (1988), 140.88 (1987), 149.59 (1986), 170.39 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,613 km total; state-owned portuguese railroad co. (cp) operates 2,858 km 1.665-meter gauge (434 km electrified and 426 km double track), 755 km 1.000-meter gauge; 12 km (1.435-meter gauge) electrified, double track, privately owned highways: 73,661 km total; 61,599 km paved (bituminous, gravel, and crushed stone), including 140 km of limited-access divided highway; 7,962 km improved earth; 4,100 km unimproved earth (motorable tracks) inland waterways: 820 km navigable; relatively unimportant to national economy, used by shallow-draft craft limited to 300-metric-ton cargo capacity pipelines: crude oil, 11 km; refined products, 58 km ports: leixoes, lisbon, porto, ponta delgada (azores), velas (azores), setubal, sines merchant marine: 50 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 576,654 grt/1,005,740 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 21 cargo, 2 refrigerated cargo, 1 container, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 10 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 10 bulk, 1 combination bulk; note--portugal has created a captive register on madeira (mar) for portuguese-owned ships that will have the taxation and crewing benefits of a flag of convenience; although only one ship is currently known to fly the portuguese flag on the mar register, it is likely that a majority of portuguese flag ships will transfer to this subregister in a few years airports: 69 total, 64 usable; 37 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 11 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 8 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: facilities are generally adequate; 2,250,000 telephones; stations--44 am, 66 (22 relays) fm, 25 (23 relays) tv; 7 submarine cables; communication satellite ground stations operating in the intelsat (2 atlantic ocean and 1 indian ocean), eutelsat, and domestic systems (mainland and azores) defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 2,583,782; 2,102,835 fit for military service; 88,384 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: $1.3 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: puerto rico (commonwealth associated with the us) geography total area: 9,104 km2; land area: 8,959 km2 comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of rhode island land boundaries: none coastline: 501 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical marine, mild, little seasonal temperature variation terrain: mostly mountains with coastal plain belt in north; mountains precipitous to sea on west coast natural resources: some copper and nickel; potential for onshore and offshore crude oil land use: 8% arable land; 9% permanent crops; 51% meadows and pastures; 25% forest and woodland; 7% other environment: many small rivers and high central mountains ensure land is well watered; south coast relatively dry; fertile coastal plain belt in north note: important location between the dominican republic and the virgin islands group along the mona passage--a key shipping lane to the panama canal; san juan is one of the biggest and best natural harbors in the caribbean people population: 3,291,207 (july 1990), growth rate 0.1% (1990) birth rate: 19 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 11 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 17 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--puerto rican(s); adjective--puerto rican ethnic divisions: almost entirely hispanic religion: mostly christian, 85% roman catholic, 15% protestant denominations and other language: spanish (official); english is widely understood literacy: 89% labor force: 1,062,000; 23% government, 20% trade, 18% manufacturing, 4% agriculture, 35% other (1988) organized labor: 115,000 members in 4 unions; the largest is the general confederation of puerto rican workers with 35,000 members (1983) government long-form name: commonwealth of puerto rico type: commonwealth associated with the us capital: san juan administrative divisions: none (commonwealth associated with the us) independence: none (commonwealth associated with the us) constitution: ratified 3 march 1952; approved by us congress 3 july 1952; effective 25 july 1952 national holiday: constitution day, 25 july (1952) legal system: based on english common law executive branch: us president, us vice president, governor legislative branch: bicameral legislative assembly consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president george bush (since 20 january 1989); vice president dan quayle (since 20 january 1989); head of government governor rafael hernandez colon (since 2 january 1989) political parties and leaders: popular democratic party (ppd), rafael hernandez colon; new progressive party (pnp), baltasar corrado del rio; puerto rican socialist party (psp), juan mari bras and carlos gallisa; puerto rican independence party (pip), ruben berrios martinez; puerto rican communist party (pcp), leader(s) unknown suffrage: universal at age 18; indigenous inhabitants are us citizens, but do not vote in us presidential elections elections: governor--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--rafael hernandez colon (ppd) 48.7%, baltasar corrada del rio (pnp) 45.8%, ruben barrios martinez (pip) 5.5%; senate--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(27 total) ppd 18, pnp 8, pip 1; house of representatives--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held november 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(53 total) ppd 36, pnp 15, pip 2 other political or pressure groups: all have engaged in terrorist activities--armed forces for national liberation (faln), volunteers of the puerto rican revolution, boricua popular army (also known as the macheteros), armed forces of popular resistance diplomatic representation: none (commonwealth associated with the us) flag: five equal horizontal bands of red (top and bottom) alternating with white; a blue isosceles triangle based on the hoist side bears a large white five-pointed star in the center; design based on the us flag economy overview: puerto rico has one of the most dynamic economies in the caribbean region. industry has surpassed agriculture as the primary sector of economic activity and income. encouraged by duty-free access to the us and by tax incentives, us firms have invested heavily in puerto rico since the 1970s. important new industries include pharmaceuticals, electronics, textiles, petrochemicals, and processed foods. sugar production has lost out to dairy production and other livestock products as the main source of income in the agricultural sector. tourism has traditionally been an important source of income for the island. gnp: $18.4 billion, per capita $5,574; real growth rate 4.9% (fy88) inflation rate (consumer prices): 33% (december 1987-88) unemployment rate: 12.8% (december 1988) budget: revenues $4.9 million; expenditures $4.9 million, including capital expenditures of $na (fy88) exports: $13.2 billion (f.o.b., fy88); commodities--sugar, coffee, petroleum products, chemical, metal products, textiles, electronic equipment; partners--us 87% imports: $11.8 billion (c.i.f., fy88); commodities--chemicals, clothing, food, fish products, crude oil; partners--us 60% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate 5.8% (fy87) electricity: 4,149,000 kw capacity; 14,050 million kwh produced, 4,260 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, food processing, petroleum refining agriculture: accounts for 4% of labor force; crops--sugarcane, coffee, pineapples, tobacco, bananas; livestock--cattle, chickens; imports a large share of food needs aid: none currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 100 km rural narrow-gauge system for hauling sugarcane; no passenger railroads highways: 13,762 km paved ports: san juan, ponce, mayaguez, arecibo airports: 33 total; 23 usable; 19 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 2,000,000 radio receivers; 810,000 tv receivers; 769,140 telephones; stations--69 am, 42 fm, 24 tv (1984) defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us; paramilitary national guard; police force of 10,050 men and women (1984) ---------------------------------------------------country: qatar geography total area: 11,000 km2; land area: 11,000 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than connecticut land boundaries: 60 km total; saudi arabia 40 km, uae 20 km coastline: 563 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; exclusive fishing zone: as delimited with neighboring states, or to limit of shelf, or to median line; extended economic zone: to median line; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: boundary with uae is in dispute; territorial dispute with bahrain over the hawar islands climate: desert; hot, dry; humid and sultry in summer terrain: mostly flat and barren desert covered with loose sand and gravel natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, fish land use: negl% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 95% other environment: haze, duststorms, sandstorms common; limited freshwater resources mean increasing dependence on large-scale desalination facilities note: strategic location in central persian gulf near major crude oil sources people population: 490,897 (july 1990), growth rate 5.7% (1990) birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 3 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 38 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 25 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 73 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--qatari(s); adjective--qatari ethnic divisions: 40% arab, 18% pakistani, 18% indian, 10% iranian, 14% other religion: 95% muslim language: arabic (official); english is commonly used as second language literacy: 40% labor force: 104,000; 85% non-qatari in private sector (1983) organized labor: trade unions are illegal government long-form name: state of qatar type: traditional monarchy capital: doha administrative divisions: none independence: 3 september 1971 (from uk) constitution: provisional constitution enacted 2 april 1970 legal system: discretionary system of law controlled by the amir, although civil codes are being implemented; islamic law is significant in personal matters national holiday: independence day, 3 september (1971) executive branch: amir, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral advisory council (majlis al-shura) judicial branch: court of appeal leaders: chief of state and head of government--amir and prime minister khalifa bin hamad al thani (since 22 february 1972); heir apparent hamad bin khalifa al thani (appointed 31 may 1977; son of amir) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: none elections: advisory council--constitution calls for elections for part of this consultative body, but no elections have been held; seats--(30 total) member of: arab league, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), gcc, ibrd, icao, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oapec, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador hamad abd al-aziz al-kawari, chancery at suite 1180, 600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 338-0111; us--ambassador mark g. hambley; embassy at fariq bin omran (opposite the television station), doha (mailing address is p. o. box 2399, doha); telephone p974o 864701 through 864703 flag: maroon with a broad white serrated band (nine white points) on the hoist side economy overview: oil is the backbone of the economy and accounts for 90% of export earnings and more than 80% of government revenues. proved oil reserves of 3.3 billion barrels should ensure continued output at current levels for about 25 years. oil has given qatar a per capita gdp of about $17,000, among the highest in the world. gdp: $5.4 billion, per capita $17,070; real growth rate 9.0% (1987) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.6% (1987) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $1.7 billion; expenditures $3.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (fy88 est.) exports: $2.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum products 90%, steel, fertilizers; partners--france, frg, italy, japan, spain imports: $1.0 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.), excluding military equipment; commodities--foodstuffs, beverages, animal and vegetable oils, chemicals, machinery and equipment; partners--ec, japan, arab countries, us, australia external debt: $1.1 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 0.6% (1987) electricity: 1,514,000 kw capacity; 4,000 million kwh produced, 8,540 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crude oil production and refining, fertilizers, petrochemicals, steel, cement agriculture: farming and grazing on small scale, less than 2% of gdp; commercial fishing increasing in importance; most food imported aid: donor--pledged $2.7 billion in oda to less developed countries (197988) currency: qatari riyal (plural--riyals); 1 qatari riyal (qr) = 100 dirhams exchange rates: qatari riyals (qr) per us$1--3.6400 riyals (fixed rate) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 1,500 km total; 1,000 km bituminous, 500 km gravel or natural surface (est.) pipelines: crude oil, 235 km; natural gas, 400 km ports: doha, musayid, halul island merchant marine: 12 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 273,318 grt/420,227 dwt; includes 7 cargo, 3 container, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 4 total, 4 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; none with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern system centered in doha; 110,000 telephones; tropospheric scatter to bahrain; radio relay to saudi arabia; submarine cable to bahrain and uae; stations--2 am, 1 fm, 3 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 arabsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, police department military manpower: males 15-49, 255,474; 120,614 fit for military service; 3,982 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: reunion (overseas department of france) geography total area: 2,510 km2; land area: 2,500 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than rhode island land boundaries: none coastline: 201 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical, but moderates with elevation; cool and dry from may to november, hot and rainy from november to april terrain: mostly rugged and mountainous; fertile lowlands along coast natural resources: fish, arable land land use: 20% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 35% forest and woodland; 39% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: periodic devastating cyclones note: located 750 km east of madagascar in the indian ocean people population: 595,583 (july 1990), growth rate 1.9% (1990) birth rate: 24 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--reunionese (sing. and pl.); adjective--reunionese ethnic divisions: most of the population is of intermixed french, african, malagasy, chinese, pakistani, and indian ancestry religion: 94% roman catholic language: french (official); creole widely used literacy: na%, but over 80% among younger generation labor force: na; 30% agriculture, 21% industry, 49% services (1981); 63% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: general confederation of workers of reunion (cgtr) government long-form name: department of reunion type: overseas department of france capital: saint-denis administrative divisions: none (overseas department of france) independence: none (overseas department of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french law national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: french president, commissioner of the republic legislative branch: unicameral general council, unicameral regional council judicial branch: court of appeals (cour d'appel) leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--commissioner of the republic daniel constantin (since september 1989) political parties and leaders: rally for the republic (rpr), francois mas; union for french democracy (udf), gilbert gerard; communist party of reunion (pcr); france-reunion future (fra), andre thien ah koon; socialist party (ps), jean-claude fruteau; social democrats (cds), other small parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: regional council--last held 16 march 1986 (next to be held march 1991); results--rpr/udf 36.8%, pcr 28.2%, fra and other right wing 17.3%, ps 14.1%, other 3.6%; seats--(45 total) rpr/udf 18, pcr 13, fra and other right wing 8, ps 6; french senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(3 total) rpr-udf 1, ps 1, independent 1; french national assembly--last held 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(5 total) pcr 2, rpr 1, udf-cds 1, fra 1 communists: communist party small but has support among sugarcane cutters, the minuscule popular movement for the liberation of reunion (mplr), and in the district of le port member of: wftu diplomatic representation: as an overseas department of france, reunionese interests are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: the economy has traditionally been based on agriculture. sugarcane has been the primary crop for more than a century, and in some years it accounts for 85% of exports. the government is pushing the development of a tourist industry to relieve a high unemployment rate that was over 30% in 1986. the economic well-being of reunion depends heavily on continued financial assistance from france. gdp: $2.4 billion, per capita $4,290 (1985); real growth rate 9% (1987 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.8% (1987) unemployment rate: 32.0%; high seasonal unemployment (1986) budget: revenues $358 million; expenditures $914 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1986) exports: $136 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--sugar 75%, rum and molasses 4%, perfume essences 4%, vanilla and tea 1%; partners--france, mauritius, bahrain, s. africa, italy imports: $1.1 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--manufactured goods, food, beverages, tobacco, machinery and transportation equipment, raw materials, and petroleum products; partners--france, mauritius, bahrain, south africa, italy external debt: na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 245,000 kw capacity; 546 million kwh produced, 965 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar, rum, cigarettes, several small shops producing handicraft items agriculture: accounts for 30% of labor force; dominant sector of economy; cash crops--sugarcane, vanilla, tobacco; food crops--tropical fruits, vegetables, corn; imports large share of food needs aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $13.5 billion currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 2,800 km total; 2,200 km paved, 600 km gravel, crushed stone, or stabilized earth ports: pointe des galets civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate system for needs; modern open-wire line and radio relay network; principal center saint-denis; radiocommunication to comoros, france, madagascar; new radio relay route to mauritius; 85,900 telephones; stations--3 am, 13 fm, 1 (18 relays) tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces military manpower: males 15-49, 158,812; 82,400 fit for military service; 6,075 reach military age (18) annually note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: romania geography total area: 237,500 km2; land area: 230,340 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than oregon land boundaries: 2,904 km total; bulgaria 608 km, hungary 443 km, ussr 1,307 km, yugoslavia 546 km coastline: 225 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: transylvania question with hungary; bessarabia question with ussr climate: temperate; cold, cloudy winters with frequent snow and fog; sunny summers with frequent showers and thunderstorms terrain: central transylvanian basin is separated from the plain of moldavia on the east by the carpathian mountains and separated from the walachian plain on the south by the transylvanian alps natural resources: crude oil (reserves being exhausted), timber, natural gas, coal, iron ore, salt land use: 43% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 19% meadows and pastures; 28% forest and woodland; 7% other; includes 11% irrigated environment: frequent earthquakes most severe in south and southwest; geologic structure and climate promote landslides, air pollution in south note: controls most easily traversable land route between the balkans and western ussr people population: 23,273,285 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) birth rate: 16 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 19 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--romanian(s); adjective--romanian ethnic divisions: 89.1% romanian; 7.8% hungarian; 1.5% german; 1.6% ukrainian, serb, croat, russian, turk, and gypsy religion: 80% romanian orthodox; 6% roman catholic; 4% calvinist, lutheran, jewish, baptist language: romanian, hungarian, german literacy: 98% labor force: 10,690,000; 34% industry, 28% agriculture, 38% other (1987) organized labor: until december 1989, a single trade union system organized by the general confederation of romanian trade unions (ugsr) under control of the communist party; since ceausescu's overthrow, newly-created trade and professional trade unions are joining two rival umbrella organizations--organization of free trade unions and fratia (brotherhood) government long-form name: none type: former communist state; current multiparty provisional government has scheduled a general democratic election for 20 may 1990 capital: bucharest administrative divisions: 40 counties (judete, singular--judet) and 1 municipality* (municipiu); alba, arad, arges, bacau, bihor, bistrita-nasaud, botosani, braila, brasov, bucuresti*, buzau, calarasi, caras-severin, cluj, constanta, covasna, dimbovita, dolj, galati, gorj, giurgiu, harghita, hunedoara, ialomita, iasi, maramures, mehedinti, mures, neamt, olt, prahova, salaj, satu mare, sibiu, suceava, teleorman, timis, tulcea, vaslui, vilcea, vrancea independence: 1881 (from turkey); republic proclaimed 30 december 1947 constitution: 21 august 1965; new constitution being drafted legal system: former mixture of civil law system and communist legal theory that increasingly reflected romanian traditions is being revised; communist regime had not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction; provisional council of national unity will probably accept icj jurisdiction national holiday: liberation day, 23 august (1944); new national day to commemorate popular anti-ceausescu uprising under discussion executive branch: president, vice president, prime minister, and council of ministers (cabinet) appointed by provisional government legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate (senat) and a lower house or house of deputies (adunarea deputatilor) judicial branch: supreme court of justice leaders: chief of state--president of provisional council of national unity ion iliescu (since 23 december 1989); head of government--prime minister of council of ministers petre roman (since 23 december 1989) political parties and leaders: social democratic party, sergiu cunescu; national liberal party, radu cimpeanu; national christian peasants party, corneliu coposu; free democratic social justice party, gheorghe susana; several others being formed; communist party has ceased to exist; formation of left-wing parties is uncertain suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: senate--elections for the new upper house to be held 20 may 1990; house of deputies--elections for the new lower house to be held 20 may 1990 communists: 3,400,000 (november 1984); communist party has ceased to exist member of: ccc, cema, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibec, ibrd, icao, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, ipu, itc, itu, un, unesco, upu, warsaw pact, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador virgil constantinescu; chancery at 1607 23rd street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 232-4747; us--ambassador alan green, jr., recalled to washington may 1990; embassy at strada tudor arghezi 7-9, bucharest (mailing address is apo new york 09213); telephone p40o (0) 10-40-40 flag: three equal vertical bands of blue (hoist side), yellow, and red; the national coat of arms that used to be centered in the yellow band, has been removed; now similar to the flags of andorra and chad economy overview: industry, which accounts for one-third of the labor force and generates over half the gnp, suffers from an aging capital plant and persistent shortages of energy. in recent years the agricultural sector has had to contend with drought, mismanagement, and shortages of inputs. favorable weather in 1989 helped produce a good harvest, although far below government claims. the new government is slowly loosening the tight central controls of ceausescu's command economy. it has instituted moderate land reforms, with close to one-third of cropland now in private hands, and it has allowed changes in prices for private agricultural output. also, the new regime is permitting the establishment of private enterprises of 20 or fewer employees in services, handicrafts, and small-scale industry. furthermore, the government has halted the old policy of diverting food from domestic consumption to hard currency export markets. so far, the government does not seem willing to adopt a thorough-going market system. gnp: $79.8 billion, per capita $3,445; real growth rate 1.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 0% (1987) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $26 billion; expenditures $21.6 billion, including capital expenditures of $13.6 billion (1987) exports: $11.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and equipment 34.7%, fuels, minerals and metals 24.7%, manufactured consumer goods 16.9%, agricultural materials and forestry products 11.9%, other 11.6% (1986); partners--ussr 27%, eastern europe 23%, ec 15%, us 5%, china 4% (1987) imports: $8.75 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fuels, minerals, and metals 51.0%, machinery and equipment 26.7%, agricultural and forestry products 11.0%, manufactured consumer goods 4.2% (1986); partners--communist countries 60%, non-communist countries 40% (1987) external debt: none (mid-1989) industrial production: growth rate 3.6% (1988) electricity: 22,640,000 kw capacity; 80,000 million kwh produced, 3,440 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, timber, construction materials, metallurgy, chemicals, machine building, food processing, petroleum agriculture: accounts for 15% of gnp and 28% of labor force; major wheat and corn producer; other products--sugar beets, sunflower seed, potatoes, milk, eggs, meat, grapes aid: donor--$4.3 billion in bilateral aid to non-communist less developed countries (1956-88) currency: leu (plural--lei); 1 leu (l) = 100 bani exchange rates: lei (l) per us$1--20.96 (february 1990), 14.922 (1989), 14.277 (1988), 14.557 (1987), 16.153 (1986), 17.141 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 11,221 km total; 10,755 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 421 km narrow gauge, 45 km broad gauge; 3,328 km electrified, 3,060 km double track; government owned (1986) highways: 72,799 km total; 15,762 km concrete, asphalt, stone block; 20,208 km asphalt treated; 27,729 km gravel, crushed stone, and other paved surfaces; 9,100 km unpaved roads (1985) inland waterways: 1,724 km (1984) pipelines: 2,800 km crude oil; 1,429 km refined products; 6,400 km natural gas ports: constanta, galati, braila, mangalia; inland ports are giurgiu, drobeta-turnu severin, orsova merchant marine: 282 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,313,320 grt/5,134,335 dwt; includes 1 passenger-cargo, 184 cargo, 1 container, 1 rail-car carrier, 14 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 livestock carrier, 10 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 69 bulk civil air: 70 major transport aircraft airports: 165 total, 165 usable; 25 with permanent-surface runways; 15 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 15 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--39 am, 30 fm, 38 tv; 3,910,000 tv sets; 3,225,000 radio receivers; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 atlantic ocean intelsat defense forces branches: romanian army, security troops, air and air defense forces, romanian navy military manpower: males 15-49, 5,736,783; 4,860,427 fit for military service; 193,537 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 11.8 billion lei, 2.8% of total budget (1989); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: rwanda geography total area: 26,340 km2; land area: 24,950 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than maryland land boundaries: 893 km total; burundi 290 km, tanzania 217 km, uganda 169 km, zaire 217 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: temperate; two rainy seasons (february to april, november to january); mild in mountains with frost and snow possible terrain: mostly grassy uplands and hills; mountains in west natural resources: gold, cassiterite (tin ore), wolframite (tungsten ore), natural gas, hydropower land use: 29% arable land; 11% permanent crops; 18% meadows and pastures; 10% forest and woodland; 32% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: deforestation; overgrazing; soil exhaustion; soil erosion; periodic droughts note: landlocked people population: 7,609,119 (july 1990), growth rate 3.8% (1990) birth rate: 53 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 113 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 54 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 8.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun and adjective--rwandan(s) ethnic divisions: hutu 90%, tutsi 9%, twa (pygmoid) 1% religion: roman catholic 65%, protestant 9%, muslim 1%, indigenous beliefs and other 25% language: kinyarwanda, french (official); kiswahili used in commercial centers literacy: 46.6% labor force: 3,600,000; 93% agriculture, 5% government and services, 2% industry and commerce; 49% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: na government long-form name: republic of rwanda type: republic; presidential system in which military leaders hold key offices capital: kigali administrative divisions: 10 prefectures (prefectures, singular--prefecture in french; plural--na, singular--prefegitura in kinyarwanda); butare, byumba, cyangugu, gikongoro, gisenyi, gitarama, kibungo, kibuye, rigali, ruhengeri constitution: 17 december 1978 independence: 1 july 1962 (from un trusteeship under belgian administration) legal system: based on german and belgian civil law systems and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 1 july (1962) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national development council (conseil pour le developpement national) judicial branch: constitutional court (consists of the court of cassation and the council of state in joint session) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president maj. gen. juvenal habyarimana (since 5 july 1973) political parties and leaders: only party--national revolutionary movement for development (mrnd), maj. gen. juvenal habyarimana (officially a development movement, not a party) suffrage: universal adult, exact age na elections: president--last held 19 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--president maj. gen. juvenal habyarimana reelected; national development council--last held 19 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--mrnd is the only party; seats--(70 total); mrnd 70 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, eama, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador aloys uwimana; chancery at 1714 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 232-2882; us--ambassador leonard h. o. spearman, sr.; embassy at boulevard de la revolution, kigali (mailing address is b. p. 28, kigali); telephone p205o 75601 through 75603 or 72126 through 72128 flag: three equal vertical bands of red (hoist side), yellow, and green with a large black letter r centered in the yellow band; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia; similar to the flag of guinea, which has a plain yellow band economy overview: about 40% of gdp comes from the agricultural sector; coffee and tea make up 80-90% of total exports. the amount of fertile land is limited, however, and deforestation and soil erosion have created problems. the industrial sector in rwanda is small, contributing less than 20% to gdp. manufacturing focuses mainly on the processing of agricultural products. the rwandan economy remains dependent on coffee exports and foreign aid, with no relief in sight. weak international prices since 1986 have caused the economy to contract and per capita gdp to decline. gdp: $2.3 billion, per capita $325; real growth rate 2.5% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $413 million; expenditures $522 million, including capital expenditures of $230 million (1988 est.) exports: $118 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee 85%, tea, tin, cassiterite, wolframite, pyrethrum; partners--frg, belgium, italy, uganda, uk, france, us imports: $278 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--textiles, foodstuffs, machines and equipment, capital goods, steel, petroleum products, cement and construction material; partners--us, belgium, frg, kenya, japan external debt: $645 million (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 1.2% (1988) electricity: 26,000 kw capacity; 112 million kwh produced, 15 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining of cassiterite (tin ore) and wolframite (tungsten ore), tin, cement, agricultural processing, small-scale beverage production, soap, furniture, shoes, plastic goods, textiles, cigarettes agriculture: cash crops--coffee, tea, pyrethrum (insecticide made from chrysanthemums); main food crops--bananas, beans, sorghum, potatoes; stock raising; self-sufficiency declining; country imports foodstuffs as farm production fails to keep up with a 3.8% annual growth in population aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $118 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.7 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $45 million; communist countries (1970-88), $58 million currency: rwandan franc (plural--francs); 1 rwandan franc (rf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: rwandan francs (rf) per us$1--78.99 (december 1989), 79.98 (1989), 76.45 (1988), 79.67 (1987), 87.64 (1986), 101.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 4,885 km total; 460 km paved, 1,725 km gravel and/or improved earth, 2,700 km unimproved inland waterways: lac kivu navigable by shallow-draft barges and native craft civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 8 total, 8 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system with low-capacity radio relay system centered on kigali; 6,600 telephones; stations--2 am, 5 fm, no tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 symphonie defense forces branches: army, paramilitary, gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 1,586,989; 810,560 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 2.1% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: st. helena (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 410 km2; land area: 410 km2; includes ascension, gough island, inaccessible island, nightingale island, and tristan da cunha comparative area: slightly more than 2.3 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 60 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; marine; mild, tempered by trade winds terrain: rugged, volcanic; small scattered plateaus and plains natural resources: fish; ascension is a breeding ground for sea turtles and sooty terns; no minerals land use: 7% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 83% other environment: very few perennial streams note: napoleon bonaparte's place of exile and burial; the remains were taken to paris in 1840 people population: 6,657 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 46 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--st. helenian(s); adjective--st. helenian ethnic divisions: na religion: anglican majority; also baptist, seventh-day adventist, and roman catholic language: english literacy: na%, but probably high labor force: na organized labor: st. helena general workers' union, 472 members; 17% crafts, 10% professional and technical, 10% service, 9% management and clerical, 9% farming and fishing, 6% transport, 5% sales, 1% security, and 33% other government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: jamestown administrative divisions: 2 dependencies and 1 administrative area*; ascension*, saint helena, tristan da cunha independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: 1 january 1967 legal system: na national holiday: celebration of the birthday of the queen (second saturday in june), 10 june 1989 executive branch: british monarch, governor, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral legislative council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--governor and commander in chief robert f. stimson (since 1987) political parties and leaders: st. helena labor party, g. a. o. thornton; st. helena progressive party, leader unknown; note--both political parties inactive since 1976 suffrage: na elections: legislative council--last held october 1984 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(15 total, 12 elected) number of seats by party na communists: probably none diplomatic representation: none (dependent territory of the uk) flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the st. helenian shield centered on the outer half of the flag; the shield features a rocky coastline and three-masted sailing ship economy overview: the economy depends primarily on financial assistance from the uk. the local population earns some income from fishing, the rearing of livestock, and sales of handicrafts. because there are few jobs, a large proportion of the work force have left to seek employment overseas. gdp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.1% (1986) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $3.2 million; expenditures $2.9 million, including capital expenditures of na (1984) exports: $23.9 thousand (f.o.b., 1984); commodities--fish (frozen skipjack, tuna, salt-dried skipjack), handicrafts; partners--south africa, uk imports: $2.4 million (c.i.f., 1984); commodities--food, beverages, tobacco, fuel oils, animal feed, building materials, motor vehicles and parts, machinery and parts; partners--uk, south africa external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 9,800 kw capacity; 10 million kwh produced, 1,390 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crafts (furniture, lacework, fancy woodwork), fish agriculture: maize, potatoes, vegetables; timber production being developed; crawfishing on tristan da cunha aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $168 million currency: st. helenian pound (plural--pounds); 1 st. helenian pound (ls) = 100 pence exchange rates: st. helenian pounds (ls) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); note--the st. helenian pound is at par with the british pound fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 87 km bitumen-sealed roads, 20 km earth roads on st. helena; 80 km bitumen-sealed on ascension; 2.7 km bitumen-sealed on tristan da cunha ports: jamestown (st. helena), georgetown (ascension) merchant marine: 1 passenger-cargo ship totaling 3,150 grt/2,264 dwt airports: 1 with permanent-surface runway 2,440-3,659 m on ascension telecommunications: 1,500 radio receivers; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 550 telephones in automatic network; hf radio links to ascension, then into worldwide submarine cable and satellite networks; major coaxial cable relay point between south africa, portugal, and uk at ascension; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: st. kitts and nevis geography total area: 360 km2; land area: 360 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 135 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: subtropical tempered by constant sea breezes; little seasonal temperature variation; rainy season (may to november) terrain: volcanic with mountainous interiors natural resources: negligible land use: 22% arable land; 17% permanent crops; 3% meadows and pastures; 17% forest and woodland; 41% other environment: subject to hurricanes (july to october) note: located 320 km southeast of puerto rico people population: 40,157 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 24 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 11 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 40 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 71 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.7 children born/woman (1990) ethnic divisions: mainly of black african descent nationality: noun--kittsian(s), nevisian(s); adjective--kittsian, nevisian religion: anglican, other protestant sects, roman catholic language: english literacy: 80% labor force: 20,000 (1981) organized labor: 6,700 government long-form name: federation of saint kitts and nevis type: constitutional monarchy capital: basseterre administrative divisions: 14 parishs; christ church nichola town, saint anne sandy point, saint george basseterre, saint george gingerland, saint james windward, saint john capisterre, saint john figtree, saint mary cayon, saint paul capisterre, saint paul charlestown, saint peter basseterre, saint thomas lowland, saint thomas middle island, trinity palmetto point independence: 19 september 1983 (from uk) constitution: 19 september 1983 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 19 september (1983) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of assembly (sometimes referred to as the national assembly) judicial branch: eastern caribbean supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general sir clement athelston arrindell (since 19 september 1983, previously governor general of the associated state since november 1981); head of government--prime minister dr. kennedy alphonse simmonds (since 19 september 1983, previously premier of the associated state since february 1980); deputy prime minister michael oliver powell (since na) political parties and leaders: people's action movement (pam), kennedy simmonds; st. kitts and nevis labor party (sknlp), lee moore; nevis reformation party (nrp), simeon daniel; concerned citizens movement (ccm), vance amory suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: house of assembly--last held 21 march 1989 (next to be held by 21 march 1994); seats--(14 total, 11 elected) pam 6, sknlp 2, nrp 2, ccm 1 communists: none known member of: acp, caricom, commonwealth, fao, ibrd, imf, iso, oas, oecs, un diplomatic representation: minister-counselor (deputy chief of mission), charge d'affaires ad interim erstein m. edwards; chancery at suite 540, 2501 m street nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 833-3550; us--none flag: divided diagonally from the lower hoist side by a broad black band bearing two white five-pointed stars; the black band is edged in yellow; the upper triangle is green, the lower triangle is red economy overview: the economy has historically depended on the growing and processing of sugarcane and on remittances from overseas workers. in recent years, tourism and export-oriented manufacturing have assumed larger roles. gdp: $119 million, per capita $3,240; real growth rate 6% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 0.9% (1987) unemployment rate: 20-25% (1987) budget: revenues $38.5 million; expenditures $45.0 million, including capital expenditures of $15.8 million (1988) exports: $30.3 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar, manufactures, postage stamps; partners--us 44%, uk 30%, trinidad and tobago 12% (1987) imports: $94.7 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, intermediate manufactures, machinery, fuels; partners--us 35%, uk 18%, trinidad and tobago 10%, canada 6%, japan 4% (1987) external debt: $27.6 million (1988) industrial production: growth rate 5.8% (1986) electricity: 15,800 kw capacity; 45 million kwh produced, 1,120 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar processing, tourism, cotton, salt, copra, clothing, footwear, beverages agriculture: accounts for 10% of gdp; cash crop--sugarcane; subsistence crops--rice, yams, bananas; fishing potential not fully exploited; most food imported aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $13.6 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $46 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 58 km 0.760-meter narrow gauge on st. kitts for sugarcane highways: 300 km total; 125 km paved, 125 km otherwise improved, 50 km unimproved earth ports: basseterre (st. kitts), charlestown (nevis) civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good interisland vhf/uhf/shf radio connections and international link via antigua and barbuda and st. martin; 2,400 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 4 tv defense forces branches: royal st. kitts and nevis police force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: st. lucia geography total area: 620 km2; land area: 610 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 3.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 158 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical, moderated by northeast trade winds; dry season from january to april, rainy season from may to august terrain: volcanic and mountainous with some broad, fertile valleys natural resources: forests, sandy beaches, minerals (pumice), mineral springs, geothermal potential land use: 8% arable land; 20% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 13% forest and woodland; 54% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: subject to hurricanes and volcanic activity; deforestation; soil erosion note: located 700 km southeast of puerto rico people population: 153,196 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 33 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 18 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--st. lucian(s); adjective--st. lucian ethnic divisions: 90.3% african descent, 5.5% mixed, 3.2% east indian, 0.8% caucasian religion: 90% roman catholic, 7% protestant, 3% anglican language: english (official), french patois literacy: 78% labor force: 43,800; 43.4% agriculture, 38.9% services, 17.7% industry and commerce (1983 est.) organized labor: 20% of labor force government long-form name: none type: parliamentary democracy capital: castries administrative divisions: 11 parishes; anse-la-raye, castries, choiseul, dauphin, dennery, gros-islet, laborie, micoud, praslin, soufriere, vieux-fort independence: 22 february 1979 (from uk) constitution: 22 february 1979 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 22 february (1979) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of assembly judicial branch: eastern caribbean supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general stanislaus anthony james (since 10 october 1988); head of government--prime minister john george melvin compton (since 3 may 1982) political parties and leaders: united workers' party (uwp), john compton; st. lucia labor party (slp), julian hunte; progressive labor party (plp), george odlum suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of assembly--last held 6 april 1987 (next to be held april 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(17 total) uwp 10, slp 7 communists: negligible member of: acp, caricom, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, nam, oas, oecs, paho, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador dr. joseph edsel edmunds; chancery at suite 309, 2100 m street nw, washington dc 30037; telephone (202) 463-7378 or 7379; there is a st. lucian consulate general in new york; us--none flag: blue with a gold isosceles triangle below a black arrowhead; the upper edges of the arrowhead have a white border economy overview: since 1983 the economy has shown an impressive average annual growth rate of almost 5% because of strong agricultural and tourist industry sectors. there is also an expanding industrial base supported by foreign investment in manufacturing and other activities, such as in data processing. the economy, however, remains vulnerable because the important agricultural sector is dominated by banana production. st. lucia is subject to periodic droughts and/or tropical storms, and its protected market agreement with the uk for bananas may end in 1992. gdp: $172 million, per capita $1,258; real growth rate 6.8% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7.0% (1987) unemployment rate: 18.6% (1986) budget: revenues $71.7 million; expenditures $79.3 million, including capital expenditures of $19.6 million (1987) exports: $76.8 million (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--bananas 67%, cocoa, vegetables, fruits, coconut oil, clothing; partners--uk 55%, caricom 21%, us 18%, other 6% imports: $178.1 million (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--manufactured goods 22%, machinery and transportation equipment 21%, food and live animals 20%, mineral fuels, foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, fertilizers, petroleum products; partners--us 33%, uk 16%, caricom 14.8%, japan 6.5%, other 29.7% external debt: $39.5 million (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 2.4% (1987) electricity: 20,000 kw capacity; 80 million kwh produced, 530 kwh per capita (1989) industries: clothing, assembly of electronic components, beverages, corrugated boxes, tourism, lime processing, coconut processing agriculture: accounts for 15% of gdp and 43% of labor force; crops--bananas, coconuts, vegetables, citrus fruit, root crops, cocoa; imports food for the tourist industry aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $4 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $93 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: 760 km total; 500 km paved; 260 km otherwise improved ports: castries civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 telecommunications: fully automatic telephone system; 9,500 telephones; direct radio relay link with martinique and st. vincent and the grenadines; interisland troposcatter link to barbados; stations--4 am, 1 fm, 1 tv (cable) defense forces branches: royal st. lucia police force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: st. pierre and miquelon (territorial collectivity of france) geography total area: 242 km2; land area: 242 km2; includes eight small islands in the st. pierre and the miquelon groups comparative area: slightly less than 1.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 120 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: focus of maritime boundary dispute between canada and france climate: cold and wet, with much mist and fog; spring and autumn are windy terrain: mostly barren rock natural resources: fish, deepwater ports land use: 13% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 4% forest and woodland; 83% other environment: vegetation scanty note: located 25 km south of newfoundland, canada, in the north atlantic ocean people population: 6,330 (july 1990), growth rate 0.4% (1990) birth rate: 17 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--frenchman(men), frenchwoman(women); adjective--french ethnic divisions: originally basques and bretons (french fishermen) religion: 98% roman catholic language: french literacy: na%, but compulsory education between 6 and 16 years of age labor force: 2,510 (1982) organized labor: workers' force trade union government long-form name: territorial collectivity of saint pierre and miquelon type: territorial collectivity of france capital: st. pierre administrative divisions: none (territorial collectivity of france) independence: none (territorial collectivity of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french law national holiday: national day, 14 july executive branch: commissioner of the republic legislative branch: unicameral general council judicial branch: superior tribunal of appeals (tribunal superieur d'appel) leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--commissioner of the republic jean-pierre marquie (since february 1989); president of the general council marc plantegenest (since na) political parties and leaders: socialist party (ps); union for french democracy (udf/cds), gerard grignon suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: general council--last held september-october 1988 (next to be held september 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(19 total) socialist and other left-wing parties 13, udf and right-wing parties 6; french president--last held 8 may 1988 (next to be held may 1995); results--(second ballot) jacques chirac 56%, francois mitterrand 44%; french senate--last held 24 september 1989 (next to be held september 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) ps 1; french national assembly--last held 5 and 12 june 1988 (next to be held june 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) udf/cds 1 diplomatic representation: as a territorial collectivity of france, local interests are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: the inhabitants have traditionally earned their livelihood by fishing and by servicing fishing fleets operating off the coast of newfoundland. the economy has been declining, however, because the number of ships stopping at st. pierre has steadily dropped over the years. in march 1989, an agreement between france and canada set fish quotas for st. pierre's trawlers fishing in canadian and canadian-claimed waters for three years. the agreement settles a longstanding dispute that had virtually brought fish exports to a halt. the islands are heavily subsidized by france. imports come primarily from canada. gdp: $na, per capita $2,495 (1984); real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 13.3% (1987) budget: revenues $na million; expenditures $13.9 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1988) exports: $23.3 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--fish and fish products, fox and mink pelts; partners--us 58%, france 17%, uk 11%, canada, portugal imports: $50.3 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--meat, clothing, fuel, electrical equipment, machinery, building materials; partners--canada, france, us, netherlands, uk external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 10,000 kw capacity; 25 million kwh produced, 3,970 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing and supply base for fishing fleets; tourism agriculture: vegetables, cattle, sheep and pigs for local consumption; fish catch, 14,750 metric tons (1986) aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $477 million currency: french franc (plural--francs); 1 french franc (f) = 100 centimes exchange rates: french francs (f) per us$1--5.7598 (january 1990), 6.3801 (1989), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 120 km total; 60 km paved (1985) ports: st. pierre civil air: air saint-pierre airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways, none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runway 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 3,601 telephones; stations--1 am, 3 fm, no tv; radiotelecommunication with most countries in the world; 1 satellite earth station in french domestic system defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: st. vincent and the grenadines geography total area: 340 km2; land area: 340 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 84 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; little seasonal temperature variation; rainy season (may to november) terrain: volcanic, mountainous; soufriere volcano on the island of st. vincent natural resources: negligible land use: 38% arable land; 12% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 41% forest and woodland; 3% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: subject to hurricanes; soufriere volcano is a constant threat note: some islands of the grenadines group are administered by grenada people population: 112,646 (july 1990), growth rate 1.4% (1990) birth rate: 27 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 32 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--st. vincentian(s) or vincentian(s); adjectives--st. vincentian or vincentian ethnic divisions: mainly of black african descent; remainder mixed, with some white, east indian, carib indian religion: anglican, methodist, roman catholic, seventh-day adventist language: english, some french patois literacy: 82% labor force: 67,000 (1984 est.) organized labor: 10% of labor force government long-form name: none type: constitutional monarchy capital: kingstown administrative divisions: 6 parishes; charlotte, grenadines, saint andrew, saint david, saint george, saint patrick independence: 27 october 1979 (from uk) constitution: 27 october 1979 legal system: based on english common law national holiday: independence day, 27 october (1979) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of assembly (includes 15 elected representatives and six appointed senators) judicial branch: eastern caribbean supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general david jack (since 29 septermber 1989); head of government--prime minister james f. mitchell (since 30 july 1984) political parties and leaders: new democratic party (ndp), james (son) mitchell; st. vincent labor party (svlp), vincent beach; united people's movement (upm), adrian saunders; movement for national unity (mnu), ralph gonsalves; national reform party (nrp), joel miguel suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of assembly--last held 16 may 1989 (next to be held july 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(15 total) ndp 15 member of: acp, caricom, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, imf, imo, oas, oecs, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who diplomatic representation: none flag: three vertical bands of blue (hoist side), gold (double width), and green; the gold band bears three green diamonds arranged in a v pattern economy overview: agriculture, dominated by banana production, is the most important sector of the economy, providing employment for over 60% of the labor force and contributing about 20% to gdp. the services sector is next in importance, based mostly on a growing tourist industry. the economy continues to have a high unemployment rate of 30% because of an overdependence on the weather-plagued banana crop as a major export earner. government progress toward diversifying into new industries has been relatively unsuccessful. gdp: $136 million, per capita $1,305; real growth rate 8.4% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.0% (1988) unemployment rate: 30% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $42.7 million; expenditures $67.5 million, including capital expenditures of $25.8 (fy88) exports: $63.8 million (f.o.b., 1986); commodities--bananas, eddoes and dasheen (taro), arrowroot starch, copra; partners--caricom 60%, uk 27%, us 10% imports: $87.3 million (c.i.f., 1986); commodities--foodstuffs, machinery and equipment, chemicals and fertilizers, minerals and fuels; partners--us 37%, caricom 18%, uk 13% external debt: $35 million (july 1987) industrial production: growth rate 1.2% (1986) electricity: 16,600 kw capacity; 64 million kwh produced, 610 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing (sugar, flour), cement, furniture, rum, starch, sheet metal, beverage agriculture: accounts for 20% of gdp and 60% of labor force; provides bulk of exports; products--bananas, arrowroot (world's largest producer), coconuts, sweet potatoes, spices; small numbers of cattle, sheep, hogs, goats; small fish catch used locally aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $11 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $71 million currency: east caribbean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 ec dollar (ec$) = 100 cents exchange rates: east caribbean dollars (ec$) per us$1--2.70 (fixed rate since 1976) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: about 1,000 km total; 300 km paved; 400 km improved; 300 km unimproved ports: kingstown merchant marine: 175 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,305,945 grt/2,029,935 dwt; includes 2 passenger, 1 passenger cargo, 103 cargo, 10 container, 8 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 4 refrigerated cargo, 9 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 4 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 28 bulk, 4 combination bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 6 total, 6 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: islandwide fully automatic telephone system; 6,500 telephones; vhf/uhf interisland links to barbados and the grenadines; new shf links to grenada and st. lucia; stations--2 am, no fm, 1 tv (cable) defense forces branches: royal st. vincent and the grenadines police force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: san marino geography total area: 60 km2; land area: 60 km2 comparative area: about 0.3 times the size of washington, dc land boundary: 39 km with italy coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: mediterranean; mild to cool winters; warm, sunny summers terrain: rugged mountains natural resources: building stones land use: 17% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 83% other environment: dominated by the appenines note: landlocked; world's smallest republic; enclave of italy people population: 23,123 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 8 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 9 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 74 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--sanmarinese (sing. and pl.); adjective--sanmarinese ethnic divisions: sanmarinese, italian religion: roman catholic language: italian literacy: 97% labor force: about 4,300 organized labor: democratic federation of sanmarinese workers (affiliated with icftu) has about 1,800 members; communist-dominated general federation of labor, 1,400 members government long-form name: republic of san marino type: republic capital: san marino administrative divisions: 9 municipalities (castelli, singular--castello); acquaviva, borgo maggiore, chiesanuova, domagnano, faetano, fiorentino, monte giardino, san marino, serravalle independence: 301 (by tradition) constitution: 8 october 1600; electoral law of 1926 serves some of the functions of a constitution legal system: based on civil law system with italian law influences; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the foundation of the republic, 3 september executive branch: two captains regent, congress of state (cabinet); real executive power is wielded by the secretary of state for foreign affairs and the secretary of state for internal affairs legislative branch: unicameral grand and general council (consiglio grande e generale) judicial branch: council of twelve (consiglio dei xii) leaders: co-chiefs of state and co-heads of government--captain regent salvatori reves (since april 1989) and captain regent luciano cardelli (since april 1989); captains regent are elected for six-month terms political parties and leaders: christian democratic party (dcs), gabriele gatti; communist party (pcs), gilberto ghiotti; socialist unity party (psu), emilio della balda and patrizia busignani; san marino socialist party (pss), antonio volpinari; san marino social democratic party (psds), augusto casali; san marino republican party (prs), cristoforo buscarini suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: grand and general council--last held 29 may 1988 (next to be held by may 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(60 total) dcs 27, pcs 18, psu 8, pss 7 communists: about 300 members; the pcs, in conjunction with the pss, psu, and psds, has led the government since 1978 other political parties or pressure groups: political parties influenced by policies of their counterparts in italy member of: icj, itu, irc, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wto; observer status in nam diplomatic representation: san marino maintains honorary consulates general in washington and new york, and an honorary consulate in detroit; us--no mission in san marino, but the consul general in florence (italy) is accredited to san marino; consulate general at 38 lungarno amerigo vespucci, florence, italy (mailing address is apo ny 09019); telephone p39o (55) 298-276 flag: two equal horizontal bands of white (top) and light blue with the national coat of arms superimposed in the center; the coat of arms has a shield (featuring three towers on three peaks) flanked by a wreath, below a crown and above a scroll bearing the word libertas (liberty) economy overview: the economy relies heavily on the tourist industry as a source of revenue. more than 2 million tourists visit each year, contributing about 60% to gdp. the sale of postage stamps to foreign collectors is another important income producer. the manufacturing sector employs nearly 40% of the labor force and agriculture less than 4%. the per capita level of output and standard of living are comparable to northern italy. gdp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): 6.4% (1986) unemployment rate: 6.5% (1985) budget: revenues $99.2 million; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na (1983) exports: trade data are included with the statistics for italy; commodity trade consists primarily of exchanging building stone, lime, wood, chestnuts, wheat, wine, baked goods, hides, and ceramics for a wide variety of consumer manufactures imports: see exports external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: supplied by italy industries: wine, olive oil, cement, leather, textile, tourist agriculture: employs less than 4% of labor force; products--wheat, grapes, corn, olives, meat, cheese, hides; small numbers of cattle, pigs, horses; depends on italy for food imports aid: na currency: italian lira (plural--lire); 1 italian lira (lit) = 100 centesimi; also mints its own coins exchange rates: italian lire (lit) per us$1--1,262.5 (january 1990), 1,372.1 (1989), 1,301.6 (1988), 1,296.1 (1987), 1,490.8 (1986), 1,909.4 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 104 km telecommunications: automatic telephone system; 11,700 telephones; stations--no am, 20 fm, no tv; radio relay and cable links into italian networks; no communication satellite facilities defense forces branches: public security or police force of less than 50 people military manpower: all fit men ages 16-60 constitute a militia that can serve as an army defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: sao tome and principe geography total area: 960 km2; land area: 960 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 5.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 209 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid; one rainy season (october to may) terrain: volcanic, mountainous natural resources: fish land use: 1% arable land; 20% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 75% forest and woodland; 3% other environment: deforestation; soil erosion note: located south of nigeria and west of gabon near the equator in the north atlantic ocean people population: 124,765 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 38 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 61 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--sao tomean(s); adjective--sao tomean ethnic divisions: mestico, angolares (descendents of angolan slaves), forros (descendents of freed slaves), servicais (contract laborers from angola, mozambique, and cape verde), tongas (children of servicais born on the islands), and europeans (primarily portuguese) religion: roman catholic, evangelical protestant, seventh-day adventist language: portuguese (official) literacy: 50% (est.) labor force: 21,096 (1981); most of population engaged in subsistence agriculture and fishing; labor shortages on plantations and of skilled workers; 56% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: na government long-form name: democratic republic of sao tome and principe type: republic capital: sao tome administrative divisions: 2 districts (concelhos, singular--concelho); principe, sao tome independence: 12 july 1975 (from portugal) constitution: 5 november 1975, approved 15 december 1982 legal system: based on portuguese law system and customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 12 july (1975) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national people's assembly, sometimes referred to as the national popular assembly (assembleia popular nacional) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president dr. manuel pinto da costa (since 12 july 1975); head of government--prime minister celestino rocha da costa (since 8 january 1988) political parties and leaders: only party--movement for the liberation of sao tome and principe (mlstp), dr. manuel pinto da costa suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 30 september 1985 (next to be held september 1990); results--president dr. manuel pinto da costa was reelected without opposition by the national people's assembly; national people's assembly--last held 30 september 1985 (next to be held september 1990); results--mlstp is the only party; seats--(40 total) mlstp 40 (indirectly elected) member of: acp, afdb, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, itu, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador joaquim rafael branco; chancery (temporary) at 801 second avenue, suite 1504, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 697-4211; us--the us ambassador in gabon is accredited to sao tome and principe on a nonresident basis and makes periodic visits to the islands flag: three horizontal bands of green (top), yellow (double width), and green with two black five-pointed stars placed side by side in the center of the yellow band and a red isosceles triangle based on the hoist side; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: the economy has remained dependent on cocoa since the gained independence nearly 15 years ago. since then, however, cocoa production has gradually deteriorated because of drought and mismanagement, so that by 1987 output had fallen to less than 50% of its former levels. as a result, a shortage of cocoa for export has created a serious balance-of-payments problem. production of less important crops, such as coffee, copra, and palm kernels, has also declined. the value of imports generally exceeds that of exports by a ratio of 4 to 1. the emphasis on cocoa production at the expense of other food crops has meant that sao tome has to import 90% of food needs. it also has to import all fuels and most manufactured goods. over the years, sao tome has been unable to service its external debt, which amounts to roughly 80% of export earnings. considerable potential exists for development of a tourist industry, and the government has taken steps to expand facilities in recent years. the government also implemented a five-year plan covering 1986-90 to restructure the economy and reschedule external debt service payments in cooperation with the international development association and western lenders. gdp: $37.9 million, per capita $340; real growth rate 1.8% (1986) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.2% (1986) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $19.2 million; expenditures $25.1 million, including capital expenditures of $19.9 million (1987) exports: $9.1 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--cocoa 90%, copra, coffee, palm oil; partners--frg, gdr, netherlands, china imports: $17.3 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--machinery and electrical equipment 59%, food products 32%, fuels 9%; partners--portugal, gdr, angola, china external debt: $95 million (1988) industrial production: growth rate 7.1% (1986) electricity: 6,000 kw capacity; 12 million kwh produced, 100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: light construction, shirts, soap, beer, fisheries, shrimp processing agriculture: dominant sector of economy, primary source of exports; cash crops--cocoa (90%), coconuts, palm kernels, coffee; food products--bananas, papaya, beans, poultry, fish; not self-sufficient in food grain and meat aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $7 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), 41.9 million currency: dobra (plural--dobras); 1 dobra (db) = 100 centimos exchange rates: dobras (db) per us$1--122.48 (december 1988), 72.827 (1987), 36.993 (1986), 41.195 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 300 km (two-thirds are paved); roads on principe are mostly unpaved and in need of repair ports: sao tome, santo antonio civil air: 8 major transport aircraft airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: minimal system; 2,200 telephones; stations--1 am, 2 fm, no tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy military manpower: males 15-49, 27,805; 14,662 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.6% of gdp (1980) ---------------------------------------------------country: saudi arabia geography total area: 2,149,690 km2; land area: 2,149,690 km2 comparative area: slightly less than one-fourth the size of us land boundaries: 4,410 km total; iraq 488 km, iraq-saudi arabia neutral zone 198 km, jordan 742 km, kuwait 222 km, oman 676 km, qatar 40 km, uae 586 km, pdry 830 km, yar 628 km coastline: 2,510 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 18 nm; continental shelf: not specific; exclusive fishing zone: not specific; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: no defined boundaries with pdry, uae, and yar; shares neutral zone with iraq--in july 1975, iraq and saudi arabia signed an agreement to divide the zone between them, but the agreement must be ratified, however, before it becomes effective; kuwaiti ownership of qaruh and umm al maradim islands is disputed by saudi arabia climate: harsh, dry desert with great extremes of temperature terrain: mostly uninhabited, sandy desert natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, gold, copper land use: 1% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 39% meadows and pastures; 1% forest and woodland; 59% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: no perennial rivers or permanent water bodies; developing extensive coastal seawater desalination facilities; desertification note: extensive coastlines on persian gulf and red sea provide great leverage on shipping (especially crude oil) through persian gulf and suez canal people population: 17,115,728 (july 1990), growth rate 4.4% (1990); note--the population figure is based on growth since the last official saudi census of 1974 reported a total of 7 million persons and includes foreign workers, while estimates from other sources may be 15-30% lower birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 13 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 71 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--saudi(s); adjective--saudi or saudi arabian ethnic divisions: 90% arab, 10% afro-asian religion: 100% muslim language: arabic literacy: 52% labor force: 4,200,000; about 60% are foreign workers; 34% government, 28% industry and oil, 22% services, and 16% agriculture organized labor: trade unions are illegal government long-form name: kingdom of saudi arabia type: monarchy capital: riyadh administrative divisions: 14 emirates (imarat, singular--imarah); al bahah, al hudud ash shamaliyah, al jawf, al madinah, al qasim, al qurayyat, ar riyad, ash sharqiyah, asir, hail, jizan, makkah, najran, tabuk independence: 23 september 1932 (unification) constitution: none; governed according to sharia (islamic law) legal system: based on islamic law, several secular codes have been introduced; commercial disputes handled by special committees; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: unification of the kingdom, 23 september (1932) executive branch: monarch and prime minister, crown prince and deputy prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: none judicial branch: supreme council of justice leaders: chief of state and head of government--king and prime minister fahd bin abd al-aziz al saud (since 13 june 1982); crown prince and deputy prime minister abdallah bin abd al-aziz al saud (half-brother to the king, appointed heir to the throne 13 june 1982) suffrage: none elections: none communists: negligible member of: arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, gcc, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oapec, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador bandar bin sultan; chancery at 601 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 342-3800; there are saudi arabian consulates general in houston, los angeles, and new york; us--ambassador charles w. freeman; embassy at collector road m, diplomatic quarter, riyadh (mailing address is p. o. box 9041, riyadh 11143, or apo new york 09038); telephone p966o (1) 488-3800; there are us consulates general in dhahran and jiddah (jeddah) flag: green with large white arabic script (that may be translated as there is no god but god; muhammad is the messenger of god) above a white horizontal saber (the tip points to the hoist side); green is the traditional color of islam economy overview: by far the most important economic activity is the production of petroleum and petroleum products. the petroleum sector accounts for about 85% of budget revenues, 80% of gdp, and almost all export earnings. saudi arabia has the largest reserves of petroleum in the world, is the largest exporter of petroleum, and plays a leading role in opec. oil wealth has provided a per capita gdp that is comparable to most industrialized countries. saudi arabia is one of the few countries where consumer prices have been dropping or showing little change in recent years. gdp: $73 billion, per capita $4,720; real growth rate 3.2% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.5% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 0% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $31.5 billion; expenditures $38.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1990) exports: $24.5 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--petroleum and petroleum products 89%; partners--japan 26%, us 26%, france 6%, bahrain 6% imports: $21.8 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--manufactured goods, transportation equipment, construction materials, processed food products; partners--us 20%, japan 18%, uk 16%, italy 11% external debt: $18.9 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 6.1% (1980-86) electricity: 25,066,000 kw capacity; 50,000 million kwh produced, 3,100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crude oil production, petroleum refining, basic petrochemicals, cement, small steel-rolling mill, construction, fertilizer, plastic agriculture: accounts for about 10% of gdp, 16% of labor force; fastest growing economic sector; subsidized by government; products--wheat, barley, tomatoes, melons, dates, citrus fruit, mutton, chickens, eggs, milk; approaching self-sufficiency in food aid: donor--pledged $64.7 billion in bilateral aid (1979-89) currency: saudi riyal (plural--riyals); 1 saudi riyal (sr) = 100 halalas exchange rates: saudi riyals (sr) per us$1--3.7450 (fixed rate since late 1986), 3.7033 (1986), 3.6221 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 886 km 1.435-meter standard gauge highways: 74,000 km total; 35,000 km bituminous, 39,000 km gravel and improved earth pipelines: 6,400 km crude oil; 150 km refined products; 2,200 km natural gas, includes 1,600 km of natural gas liquids ports: jiddah, ad dammam, ras tanura, jizan, al jubayl, yanbu al bahr, yanbu al sinaiyah merchant marine: 94 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,988,322 grt/3,474,788 dwt; includes 1 passenger, 6 short-sea passenger, 1 passenger-cargo, 15 cargo, 12 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 container, 6 refrigerated cargo, 4 livestock carrier, 32 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 8 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 1 combination ore/oil, 1 specialized tanker, 3 bulk civil air: 182 major transport aircraft available airports: 204 total, 179 usable; 66 with permanent-surface runways; 13 with runways over 3,659 m; 33 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 98 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good system with extensive microwave and coaxial cable systems; 1,624,000 telephones; stations--21 am, 16 fm, 97 tv; radio relay to bahrain, jordan, kuwait, qatar, uae, yar, and sudan; coaxial cable to kuwait; submarine cable to djibouti and egypt; satellite earth stations--3 atlantic ocean intelsat, 2 indian ocean intelsat, 1 arabsat, 1 inmarsat, 1 arabsat defense forces branches: saudi arabian land forces, royal saudi naval forces, royal saudi air force, royal saudi air defense force, saudi arabian national guard, coast guard and frontier forces, special security force, public security force, special emergency force military manpower: males 15-49, 6,437,039; 3,606,344 fit for military service; 159,186 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 16.9% of gdp, or $12.3 billion (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: senegal geography total area: 196,190 km2; land area: 192,000 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than south dakota land boundaries: 2,640 km total; the gambia 740 km, guinea 330 km, guinea-bissau 338 km, mali 419 km, mauritania 813 km coastline: 531 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: short section of the boundary with the gambia is indefinite; the international court of justice (icj) rendered its decision on the guinea-bissau/senegal maritime boundary in favor of senegal--that decision has been rejected by guinea-bissau; boundary with mauritania climate: tropical; hot, humid; rainy season (december to april) has strong southeast winds; dry season (may to november) dominated by hot, dry harmattan wind terrain: generally low, rolling, plains rising to foothills in southeast natural resources: fish, phosphates, iron ore land use: 27% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 30% meadows and pastures; 31% forest and woodland; 12% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: lowlands seasonally flooded; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: the gambia is almost an enclave people population: 7,713,851 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 44 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 87 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 53 years male, 56 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--senegalese (sing. and pl.); adjective--senegalese ethnic divisions: 36% wolof, 17% fulani, 17% serer, 9% toucouleur, 9% diola, 9% mandingo, 1% european and lebanese, 2% other religion: 92% muslim, 6% indigenous beliefs, 2% christian (mostly roman catholic) language: french (official); wolof, pulaar, diola, mandingo literacy: 28.1% labor force: 2,509,000; 77% subsistence agricultural workers; 175,000 wage earners--40% private sector, 60% government and parapublic; 52% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: majority of wage-labor force represented by unions; however, dues-paying membership very limited; major confederation is national confederation of senegalese labor (cnts), an affiliate of governing party government long-form name: republic of senegal type: republic under multiparty democratic rule capital: dakar administrative divisions: 10 regions (regions, singular--region); dakar, diourbel, fatick, kaolack, kolda, louga, saint-louis, tambacounda, thies, ziguinchor independence: 4 april 1960 (from france); the gambia and senegal signed an agreement on 12 december 1981 (effective 1 february 1982) that called for the creation of a loose confederation to be known as senegambia, but the agreement was dissolved on 30 september 1989 constitution: 3 march 1963, last revised in 1984 legal system: based on french civil law system; judicial review of legislative acts in supreme court, which also audits the government's accounting office; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 4 april (1960) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president abdou diouf (since 1 january 1981) political parties and leaders: socialist party (ps), abdou diouf; senegalese democratic party (pds), abdoulaye wade; 13 other small uninfluential parties suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 28 february 1988 (next to be held february 1993); results--abdou diouf (ps) 73%, abdoulaye wade (pds) 26%, others 1%; national assembly--last held 28 february 1988 (next to be held february 1993); results--ps 71%, pds 25%, others 4%; seats--(120 total) ps 103, pds 17 communists: small number of communists and sympathizers other political or pressure groups: students, teachers, labor, muslim brotherhoods member of: acp, afdb, apc, ccc, ceao, eama, eca, ecowas, eib (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, ocam, oic, omvs (organization for the development of the senegal river valley), un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador ibra deguene ka; chancery at 2112 wyoming avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 234-0540 or 0541; us--ambassador george e. moose; embassy on avenue jean xxiii at the corner of avenue kleber, dakar (mailing address is b. p. 49, dakar); telephone p221o 21-42-96 flag: three equal vertical bands of green (hoist side), yellow, and red with a small green five-pointed star centered in the yellow band; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: the agricultural sector accounts for about 20% of gdp and provides employment for about 75% of the labor force. about 40% of the total cultivated land is used to grow peanuts, an important export crop. the principal economic resource is fishing, which brought in about $200 million or about 25% of total foreign exchange earnings in 1987. mining is dominated by the extraction of phosphate, but production has faltered because of reduced worldwide demand for fertilizers in recent years. over the past 10 years tourism has become increasingly more important to the economy. gdp: $5.0 billion, per capita $680; real growth rate 5.1% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 1.8% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 3.5% (1987) budget: revenues $921 million; expenditures $1,024 million; including capital expenditures of $14 million (fy89 est.) exports: $761 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--manufactures 30%, fish products 27%, peanuts 11%, petroleum products 11%, phosphates 10%; partners--us, france, other ec, ivory coast, india imports: $1.1 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--semimanufactures 30%, food 27%, durable consumer goods 17%, petroleum 12%, capital goods 14%; partners--us, france, other ec, nigeria, algeria, china, japan external debt: $3.8 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 4.9% (1986) electricity: 210,000 kw capacity; 760 million kwh produced, 100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, agricultural processing, phosphate mining, petroleum refining, building materials agriculture: including fishing, accounts for 20% of gdp and 75% of labor force; major products--peanuts (cash crop), millet, corn, sorghum, rice, cotton, tomatoes, green vegetables; estimated two-thirds self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 299,000 metric tons in 1987 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $492 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $4.4 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $589 million; communist countries (1970-88), $295 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 1,034 km 1.000-meter gauge; all single track except 70 km double track dakar to thies highways: 14,000 km total; 3,770 km paved, 10,230 km laterite or improved earth inland waterways: 900 km total; 785 km on the senegal, 115 km on the saloum ports: dakar, kaolack merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 grt and over) totaling 9,263 grt/15,167 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 1 bulk civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 25 total, 20 usable; 10 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 15 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: above-average urban system, using radio relay and cable; 40,200 telephones; stations--8 am, no fm, 1 tv; 3 submarine cables; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 1,682,786; 878,812 fit for military service; 88,940 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2% of gdp, or $100 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: seychelles geography total area: 455 km2; land area: 455 km2 comparative area: slightly more than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 491 km maritime claims: continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims tromelin island climate: tropical marine; humid; cooler season during southeast monsoon (late may to september); warmer season during northwest monsoon (march to may) terrain: mahe group is granitic, narrow coastal strip, rocky, hilly; others are coral, flat, elevated reefs natural resources: fish, copra, cinnamon trees land use: 4% arable land; 18% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 18% forest and woodland; 60% other environment: lies outside the cyclone belt, so severe storms are rare; short droughts possible; no fresh water, catchements collect rain; 40 granitic and about 50 coralline islands note: located north-northeast of madagascar in the indian ocean people population: 68,336 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 24 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 15 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 75 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--seychellois (sing. and pl.); adjective--seychelles ethnic divisions: seychellois (mixture of asians, africans, europeans) religion: 90% roman catholic, 8% anglican, 2% other language: english and french (official); creole literacy: 60% labor force: 27,700; 31% industry and commerce, 21% services, 20% government, 12% agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 16% other (1985); 57% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: three major trade unions government long-form name: republic of seychelles type: republic; member of the commonwealth capital: victoria administrative divisions: none; note--there may be 21 administrative districts named anse boileau, anse etoile, anse louis, anse royale, baie lazare, baie st. anne, beau vallon, bel air, bel ombre, cascade, glacis, grand anse (on mahe island), grand anse (on praslin island), la digue, mont fleuri, plaisance, pointe larue, port-glaud, riviere anglaise, st. louis, takamaka independence: 29 june 1976 (from uk) constitution: 5 june 1979 legal system: based on english common law, french civil law, and customary law national holiday: liberation day (anniversary of coup), 5 june (1977) executive branch: president, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: court of appeal, supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president france albert rene (since 5 june 1977) political parties and leaders: only party--seychelles people's progressive front (sppf), france albert rene suffrage: universal at age 17 elections: president--last held 9-11 june 1989 (next to be held june 1994); results--president france albert rene reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held 5 december 1987 (next to be held december 1992); results--sppf is the only party; seats--(25 total, 23 elected) sppf 23 communists: negligible, although some cabinet ministers espouse pro-soviet line other political or pressure groups: trade unions, roman catholic church member of: acp, afdb, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, nam, oau, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: second secretary, charge d'affaires ad interim marc r. marengo; chancery (temporary) at 820 second avenue, suite 201, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 687-9766; us--ambassador james moran; embassy at 4th floor, victoria house, victoria (mailing address is box 148, victoria, or apo new york 09030); telephone 23921 or 23922 flag: three horizontal bands of red (top), white (wavy), and green; the white band is the thinnest, the red band is the thickest economy overview: in this small, open tropical island economy, the tourist industry employs about 30% of the labor force and provides the main source of hard currency earnings. in recent years the government has encouraged foreign investment in order to upgrade hotels and other services. at the same time, the government has moved to reduce the high dependence on tourism by promoting the development of farming, fishing, and small-scale manufacturing. gdp: $255 million, per capita $3,720; real growth rate 6.2%; (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.3% (1988) unemployment rate: 15% (1986) budget: revenues $106 million; expenditures $130 million, including capital expenditures of $21 million (1987) exports: $17 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--fish, copra, cinnamon bark, petroleum products (reexports); partners--france 63%, pakistan 12%, reunion 10%, uk 7% (1987) imports: $116 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--manufactured goods, food, tobacco, beverages, machinery and transportation equipment, petroleum products; partners--uk 20%, france 14%, south africa 13%, pdry 13%, singapore 8%, japan 6% (1987) external debt: $178 million (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 7% (1987) electricity: 25,000 kw capacity; 67 million kwh produced, 960 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, processing of coconut and vanilla, fishing, coir rope factory, boat building, printing, furniture, beverage agriculture: accounts for 7% of gdp, mostly subsistence farming; cash crops--coconuts, cinnamon, vanilla; other products--sweet potatoes, cassava, bananas; broiler chickens; large share of food needs imported; expansion of tuna fishing under way aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy78-88), $23 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1978-87), $297 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $5 million; communist countries (1970-88), $56 million currency: seychelles rupee (plural--rupees); 1 seychelles rupee (sre) = 100 cents exchange rates: seychelles rupees (sr) per us$1--5.4884 (january 1990), 5.6457 (1989), 5.3836 (1988), 5.6000 (1987), 6.1768 (1986), 7.1343 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 260 km total; 160 km bituminous, 100 km crushed stone or earth ports: victoria merchant marine: 1 refrigerated cargo (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,827 grt/2,170 dwt civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 14 total, 14 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: direct radio communications with adjacent islands and african coastal countries; 13,000 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 1 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station; usaf tracking station defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, militia military manpower: males 15-49, 17,073; 8,776 fit for military service defense expenditures: 6% of gdp, or $12 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: sierra leone geography total area: 71,740 km2; land area: 71,620 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than south carolina land boundaries: 958 km total; guinea 652 km, liberia 306 km coastline: 402 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid; summer rainy season (may to december); winter dry season (december to april) terrain: coastal belt of mangrove swamps, wooded hill country, upland plateau, mountains in east natural resources: diamonds, titanium ore, bauxite, iron ore, gold, chromite land use: 25% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 31% meadows and pastures; 29% forest and woodland; 13% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: extensive mangrove swamps hinder access to sea; deforestation; soil degradation people population: 4,165,953 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 21 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 154 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 42 years male, 47 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--sierra leonean(s); adjective--sierra leonean ethnic divisions: 99% native african (30% temne, 30% mende); 1% creole, european, lebanese, and asian; 13 tribes religion: 30% muslim, 30% indigenous beliefs, 10% christian, 30% other or none language: english (official); regular use limited to literate minority; principal vernaculars are mende in south and temne in north; krio is the language of the resettled ex-slave population of the freetown area and is lingua franca literacy: 31% (1986) labor force: 1,369,000 (est.); 65% agriculture, 19% industry, 16% services (1981); only about 65,000 earn wages (1985); 55% of population of working age organized labor: 35% of wage earners government long-form name: republic of sierra leone type: republic under presidential regime capital: freetown administrative divisions: 4 provinces; eastern, northern, southern, western independence: 27 april 1961 (from uk) constitution: 14 june 1978 legal system: based on english law and customary laws indigenous to local tribes; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: republic day, 27 april (1961) executive branch: president, two vice presidents, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president gen. joseph saidu momoh (since 28 november 1985); first vice president abu bakar kamara (since 4 april 1987); second vice president salia jusu-sheriff (since 4 april 1987) political parties and leaders: only party--all people's congress (apc), gen. joseph saidu momoh suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: president--last held 1 october 1985 (next to be held october 1992); results--gen. joseph saidu momoh was elected without opposition; house of representatives--last held 30 may 1986 (next to be held may 1991); results--apc is the only party; seats--(127 total, 105 elected) apc 105 communists: no party, although there are a few communists and a slightly larger number of sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, commonwealth, eca, ecowas, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, iba, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, mano river union, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador george carew; chancery at 1701 19th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 939-9261; us--ambassador johnny young; embassy at the corner of walpole and siaka stevens street, freetown; telephone 26481 flag: three equal horizontal bands of light green (top), white, and light blue economy overview: the economic and social infrastructure is not well developed. subsistence agriculture dominates the economy, generating about one-third of gdp and employing about two-thirds of the working population. manufacturing accounts for less than 10% of gdp, consisting mainly of the processing of raw materials and of light manufacturing for the domestic market. diamond mining provides an important source of hard currency. the economy suffers from high unemployment, rising inflation, large trade deficits, and a growing dependency on foreign assistance. gdp: $965 million, per capita $250; real growth rate 1.8% (fy87) inflation rate (consumer prices): 42% (september 1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $86 million; expenditures $128 million, including capital expenditures of $na (fy90 est.) exports: $106 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--rutile 50%, bauxite 17%, cocoa 11%, diamonds 3%, coffee 3%; partners--us, uk, belgium, frg, other western europe imports: $167 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--capital goods 40%, food 32%, petroleum 12%, consumer goods 7%, light industrial goods; partners--us, ec, japan, china, nigeria external debt: $805 million (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 19% (fy88 est.) electricity: 83,000 kw capacity; 180 million kwh produced, 45 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining (diamonds, bauxite, rutile), small-scale manufacturing (beverages, textiles, cigarettes, footwear), petroleum refinery agriculture: accounts for over 30% of gdp and two-thirds of the labor force; largely subsistence farming; cash crops--coffee, cocoa, palm kernels; harvests of food staple rice meets 80% of domestic needs; annual fish catch averages 53,000 metric tons aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $149 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $698 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $18 million; communist countries (1970-88), $101 million currency: leone (plural--leones); 1 leone (le) = 100 cents exchange rates: leones per us$1--87.7193 (january 1990), 58.1395 (1989), 31.2500 (1988), 30.7692 (1987), 8.3963 (1986), 4.7304 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 84 km 1.067-meter narrow-gauge mineral line is used on a limited basis because the mine at marampa is closed highways: 7,400 km total; 1,150 km bituminous, 490 km laterite (some gravel), remainder improved earth inland waterways: 800 km; 600 km navigable year round ports: freetown, pepel civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 12 total, 8 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: marginal telephone and telegraph service; national microwave radio relay system unserviceable at present; 23,650 telephones; stations--1 am, 1 fm, 1 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: army, navy military manpower: males 15-49, 918,078; 433,350 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 1% of gdp (1986) ---------------------------------------------------country: singapore geography total area: 632.6 km2; land area: 622.6 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 3.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 193 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: not specific; territorial sea: 3 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid, rainy; no pronounced rainy or dry seasons; thunderstorms occur on 40% of all days (67% of days in april) terrain: lowland; gently undulating central plateau contains water catchment area and nature preserve natural resources: fish, deepwater ports land use: 4% arable land; 7% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 5% forest and woodland; 84% other environment: mostly urban and industrialized note: focal point for southeast asian sea routes people population: 2,720,915 (july 1990), growth rate 1.3% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 8 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--singaporean(s), adjective--singapore ethnic divisions: 76.4% chinese, 14.9% malay, 6.4% indian, 2.3% other religion: majority of chinese are buddhists or atheists; malays nearly all muslim (minorities include christians, hindus, sikhs, taoists, confucianists) language: chinese, malay, tamil, and english (official); malay (national) literacy: 86.8% (1987) labor force: 1,280,000; 34.4% industry, 1.2% agriculture, 61.7% services (1988) organized labor: 211,200; 16.5% of labor force (1988) government long-form name: republic of singapore type: republic within commonwealth capital: singapore administrative divisions: none independence: 9 august 1965 (from malaysia) constitution: 3 june 1959, amended 1965; based on preindependence state of singapore constitution legal system: based on english common law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 9 august (1965) executive branch: president, prime minister, two deputy prime ministers, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president wee kim wee (since 3 september 1985); head of government--prime minister lee kuan yew (since 5 june 1959); first deputy prime minister goh chok tong (since 2 january 1985); second deputy prime minister ong teng cheong (since 2 january 1985) political parties and leaders: government--people's action party (pap), lee kuan yew; opposition--workers' party (wp), j. b. jeyaretnam; singapore democratic party (sdp), chiam see tong; national solidarity party (nsp), soon kia seng; united people's front (upf), harbans singh; barisan sosialis (bs); communist party illegal suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 20 elections: president--last held 31 august 1989 (next to be held na august 1993); results--president wee kim wee was reelected by parliament without opposition; parliament--last held 3 september 1988 (next to be held na september 1993); results--pap 61.8%, wp 18.4%, sdp 11.5%, nsp 3.7%, upf 1.3%, others 3.3%; seats--(81 total) pap 80, sdp 1; note--bs has 1 nonvoting seat communists: 200-500; barisan sosialis infiltrated by communists member of: adb, anrpc, asean, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, escap, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, iso, itu, nam, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador tommy koh tong bee; chancery at 1824 r street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 667-7555; us--ambassador robert d. orr; embassy at 30 hill street, singapore 0617 (mailing address is fpo san francisco 96699); telephone p65o 338-0251 flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and white; near the hoist side of the red band, there is a vertical, white crescent (closed portion is toward the hoist side) partially enclosing five white five-pointed stars arranged in a circle economy overview: singapore has an open entrepreneurial economy with strong service and manufacturing sectors and excellent international trading links derived from its entrepot history. during the 1970s and early 1980s, the economy expanded rapidly, achieving an average annual growth rate of 9%. per capita gdp is among the highest in asia. in 1985 the economy registered its first drop in 20 years and achieved less than a 2% increase in 1986. recovery was strong. estimates for 1989 suggest a 9.2% growth rate based on rising demand for singapore's products in oecd countries, a strong japanese yen, and improved competitiveness of domestic manufactures. gdp: $27.5 billion, per capita $10,300; real growth rate 9.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.5% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 2% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $6.6 billion; expenditures $5.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $2.2 billion (fy88) exports: $46 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--includes transshipments to malaysia--petroleum products, rubber, electronics, manufactured goods; partners--us 24%, malaysia 14%, japan 9%, thailand 6%, hong kong 5%, australia 3%, frg 3% imports: $53 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--includes transshipments from malaysia--capital equipment, petroleum, chemicals, manufactured goods, foodstuffs; partners--japan 22%, us 16%, malaysia 15%, ec 12%, kuwait 1% external debt: $5.2 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 9% (1989 est.) electricity: 4,000,000 kw capacity; 12,000 million kwh produced, 4,490 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum refining, electronics, oil drilling equipment, rubber processing and rubber products, processed food and beverages, ship repair, entrepot trade, financial services, biotechnology agriculture: occupies a position of minor importance in the economy; self-sufficient in poultry and eggs; must import much of other food; major crops--rubber, copra, fruit, vegetables aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-83), $590 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $882 million currency: singapore dollar (plural--dollars); 1 singapore dollar (s$) = 100 cents exchange rates: singapore dollars per us$1--1.8895 (january 1990), 1.9503 (1989), 2.0124 (1988), 2.1060 (1987), 2.1774 (1986), 2.2002 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 38 km of 1.000-meter gauge highways: 2,597 km total (1984) ports: singapore merchant marine: 407 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 7,286,824 grt/11,921,610 dwt; includes 126 cargo, 52 container, 5 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 11 refrigerated cargo, 13 vehicle carrier, 1 livestock carrier, 103 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 5 chemical tanker, 4 combination ore/oil, 1 specialized tanker, 15 liquefied gas, 68 bulk, 3 combination bulk; note--many singapore flag ships are foreign owned civil air: 38 major transport aircraft (est.) airports: 6 total, 6 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good domestic facilities; good international service; good radio and television broadcast coverage; 1,110,000 telephones; stations--13 am, 4 fm, 2 tv; submarine cables extend to malaysia (sabah and peninsular malaysia), indonesia, and the philippines; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 pacific ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, army reserve military manpower: males 15-49, 834,720; 621,497 fit for military service defense expenditures: 5% of gdp, or $1.4 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: solomon islands geography total area: 28,450 km2; land area: 27,540 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than maryland land boundaries: none coastline: 5,313 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical monsoon; few extremes of temperature and weather terrain: mostly rugged mountains with some low coral atolls natural resources: fish, forests, gold, bauxite, phosphates land use: 1% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 93% forest and woodland; 4% other environment: subject to typhoons, which are rarely destructive; geologically active region with frequent earth tremors note: located just east of papua new guinea in the south pacific ocean people population: 335,082 (july 1990), growth rate 3.5% (1990) birth rate: 41 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 40 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--solomon islander(s); adjective--solomon islander ethnic divisions: 93.0% melanesian, 4.0% polynesian, 1.5% micronesian, 0.8% european, 0.3% chinese, 0.4% other religion: almost all at least nominally christian; anglican, seventh-day adventist, and roman catholic churches dominant language: 120 indigenous languages; melanesian pidgin in much of the country is lingua franca; english spoken by 1-2% of population literacy: 60% labor force: 23,448 economically active; 32.4% agriculture, forestry, and fishing; 25% services, 7.0% construction, manufacturing, and mining; 4.7% commerce, transport, and finance (1984) organized labor: na, but most of the cash-economy workers have trade union representation government long-form name: none type: independent parliamentary state within commonwealth capital: honiara administrative divisions: 7 provinces and 1 town*; central, guadalcanal, honiara*, isabel, makira, malaita, temotu, western independence: 7 july 1978 (from uk; formerly british solomon islands) constitution: 7 july 1978 legal system: common law national holiday: independence day, 7 july (1978) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national parliament judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general george lepping (since 27 june 1989, previously acted as governor general since 7 july 1988); head of government--prime minister solomon mamaloni (since 28 march 1989); deputy prime minister danny philip (since 31 march 1989) political parties and leaders: people's alliance party (pap), solomon mamaloni; united party (up), sir peter kenilorea; solomon islands liberal party (silp), bartholemew ulufa'alu; nationalist front for progress (nfp), andrew nori; labor party (lp), joses tuhanuku suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: national parliament--last held 22 february 1989 (next to be held february 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(38 total) pap 13, up 6, nfp 4, silp 4, lp 2, independents 9 member of: acp, adb, commonwealth, escap, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, spf, un, upu, who diplomatic representation: ambassador (vacant) resides in honiara (solomon islands); us--the ambassador in papua new guinea is accredited to the solomon islands; embassy at mud alley, honiara (mailing address is american embassy, p. o. box 561, honiara); telephone (677) 23488 flag: divided diagonally by a thin yellow stripe from the lower hoist-side corner; the upper triangle (hoist side) is blue with five white five-pointed stars arranged in an x pattern; the lower triangle is green economy overview: about 90% of the population depend on subsistence agriculture, fishing, and forestry for at least part of their livelihood. agriculture, fishing, and forestry contribute about 75% to gdp, with the fishing and forestry sectors being important export earners. the service sector contributes about 25% to gdp. manufacturing activity is negligible. most manufactured goods and petroleum products must be imported. the islands are rich in undeveloped mineral resources such as lead, zinc, nickel, and gold. the economy suffered from a severe cyclone in mid-1986 which caused widespread damage to the infrastructure. gdp: $156 million, per capita $500; real growth rate 4.3% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 11.2% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $139.0 million; expenditures $154.4 million, including capital expenditures of $113.4 million (1987) exports: $80.1 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--fish 46%, timber 31%, copra 5%, palm oil 5%; partners--japan 51%, uk 12%, thailand 9%, netherlands 8%, australia 2%, us 2% (1985) imports: $101.7 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--plant and machinery 30%, fuel 19%, food 16%; partners--japan 36%, us 23%, singapore 9%, uk 9%, nz 9%, australia 4%, hong kong 4%, china 3% (1985) external debt: $128 million (1988 est.) industrial production: growth rate 0% (1987) electricity: 15,000 kw capacity; 30 million kwh produced, 90 kwh per capita (1989) industries: copra, fish (tuna) agriculture: including fishing and forestry, accounts for about 75% of gdp; mostly subsistence farming; cash crops--cocoa, beans, coconuts, palm kernels, timber; other products--rice, potatoes, vegetables, fruit, cattle, pigs; not self-sufficient in food grains; 90% of the total fish catch of 44,500 metric tons was exported (1988) aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1985), $16.1 million currency: solomon islands dollar (plural--dollars); 1 solomon islands dollar (si$) = 100 cents exchange rates: solomon islands dollars (si$) per us$1--2.4067 (january 1990), 2.3090 (1989), 2.0825 (1988), 2.0033 (1987), 1.7415 (1986), 1.4808 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: about 2,100 km total (1982); 30 km sealed, 290 km gravel, 980 km earth, 800 private logging and plantation roads of varied construction ports: honiara, ringi cove civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 29 total, 27 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 3,000 telephones; stations--4 am, no fm, no tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: somalia geography total area: 637,660 km2; land area: 627,340 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than texas land boundaries: 2,340 km total; djibouti 58 km, ethiopia 1,600 km, kenya 682 km coastline: 3,025 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 200 nm disputes: southern half of boundary with ethiopia is a provisional administrative line; territorial dispute with ethiopia over the ogaden; possible claims to djibouti, ethiopia, and kenya based on unification of ethnic somalis climate: desert; northeast monsoon (december to february), cooler southwest monsoon (may to october); irregular rainfall; hot, humid periods (tangambili) between monsoons terrain: mostly flat to undulating plateau rising to hills in north natural resources: uranium, and largely unexploited reserves of iron ore, tin, gypsum, bauxite, copper, salt land use: 2% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 46% meadows and pastures; 14% forest and woodland; 38% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: recurring droughts; frequent dust storms over eastern plains in summer; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: strategic location on horn of africa along southern approaches to bab el mandeb and route through red sea and suez canal people population: 8,424,269 (july 1990), growth rate 0.8% (1990) birth rate: 47 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 24 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 125 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 53 years male, 54 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--somali(s); adjective--somali ethnic divisions: 85% somali, rest mainly bantu; 30,000 arabs, 3,000 europeans, 800 asians religion: almost entirely sunni muslim language: somali (official); arabic, italian, english literacy: 11.6% (government est.) labor force: 2,200,000; very few are skilled laborers; 70% pastoral nomad, 30% agriculture, government, trading, fishing, handicrafts, and other; 53% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: general federation of somali trade unions is controlled by the government government long-form name: somali democratic republic type: republic capital: mogadishu administrative divisions: 16 regions (plural--na, singular--gobolka); bakool, banaadir, bari, bay, galguduud, gedo, hiiraan, jubbada dhexe, jubbada hoose, mudug, nugaal, sanaag, shabeellaha dhexe, shabeellaha hoose, togdheer, woqooyi galbeed independence: 1 july 1960 (from a merger of british somaliland, which became independent from the uk on 26 june 1960, and italian somaliland, which became independent from the italian-administered un trusteeship on 1 july 1960, to form the somali republic) constitution: 25 august 1979, presidential approval 23 september 1979 national holiday: anniversary of the revolution, 21 october (1969) executive branch: president, two vice presidents, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral people's assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president and commander in chief of the army maj. gen. mohamed siad barre (since 21 october 1969); head of government--prime minister lt. gen. mohamed ali samantar (since 1 february 1987) political parties and leaders: only party--somali revolutionary socialist party (srsp), maj. gen. mohamed siad barre, general secretary suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 23 december 1986 (next to be held december 1993); results--president siad was reelected without opposition; people's assembly--last held 31 december 1984 (next scheduled for december 1989 was postponed); results--srsp is the only party; seats--(177 total, 171 elected) srsp 171 communists: probably some communist sympathizers in the government hierarchy member of: acp, afdb, arab league, eama, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador abdikarim ali omar; chancery at suite 710, 600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 342-1575; there is a somali consulate general in new york; us--ambassador t. frank crigler; embassy at corso primo luglio, mogadishu (mailing address is p. o. box 574, mogadishu); telephone p252o (01) 20811 flag: light blue with a large white five-pointed star in the center; design based on the flag of the un (italian somaliland was a un trust territory) economy overview: one of the world's least developed countries, somalia has few resources. in 1988 per capita gdp was $210. agriculture is the most important sector of the economy, with the livestock sector accounting for about 40% of gdp and about 65% of export earnings. nomads and seminomads who are dependent upon livestock for their livelihoods make up about 50% of the population. crop production generates only 10% of gdp and employs about 20% of the work force. the main export crop is bananas; sugar, sorghum, and corn are grown for the domestic market. the small industrial sector is based on the processing of agricultural products and accounts for less than 10% of gdp. at the end of 1988 serious economic problems facing the nation were the external debt of $2.8 billion and double-digit inflation. gdp: $1.7 billion, per capita $210; real growth rate 1.4% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 81.7% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $273 million; expenditures $405 million, including capital expenditures of $219 million (1987) exports: $58.0 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--livestock, hides, skins, bananas, fish; partners--us 0.5%, saudi arabia, italy, frg (1986) imports: $354.0 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--textiles, petroleum products, foodstuffs, construction materials; partners--us 13%, italy, frg, kenya, uk, saudi arabia (1986) external debt: $2.8 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 71,000 kw capacity; 65 million kwh produced, 8 kwh per capita (1989) industries: a few small industries, including sugar refining, textiles, petroleum refining agriculture: dominant sector, led by livestock raising (cattle, sheep, goats); crops--bananas, sorghum, corn, mangoes, sugarcane; not self-sufficient in food; fishing potential largely unexploited aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $618 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.8 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $1.1 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $336 million currency: somali shilling (plural--shillings); 1 somali shilling (so.sh.) = 100 centesimi exchange rates: somali shillings (so. sh.) per us$1--643.92 (december 1989), 170.45 (1988), 105.18 (1987), 72.00 (1986), 39.49 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 15,215 km total; including 2,335 km bituminous surface, 2,880 km gravel, and 10,000 km improved earth or stabilized soil (1983) pipelines: 15 km crude oil ports: mogadishu, berbera, chisimayu merchant marine: 3 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 6,563 grt/9,512 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 1 refrigerated cargo civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 60 total, 45 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 20 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: minimal telephone and telegraph service; radio relay and troposcatter system centered on mogadishu connects a few towns; 6,000 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 1 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station; scheduled to receive an arabsat station defense forces branches: somali national army (including navy, air force, and air defense force), national police force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,878,939; 1,052,644 fit for military service defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: south africa geography total area: 1,221,040 km2; land area: 1,221,040 km2; includes walvis bay, marion island, and prince edward island comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of texas land boundaries: 4,973 km total; botswana 1,840 km, lesotho 909 km, mozambique 491 km, namibia 1,078 km, swaziland 430 km, zimbabwe 225 km coastline: 2,881 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: south africa administered namibia until independence was achieved on 21 march 1990; possible future claim to walvis bay by namibia climate: mostly semiarid; subtropical along coast; sunny days, cool nights terrain: vast interior plateau rimmed by rugged hills and narrow coastal plain natural resources: gold, chromium, antimony, coal, iron ore, manganese, nickel, phosphates, tin, uranium, gem diamonds, platinum, copper, vanadium, salt, natural gas land use: 10% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 65% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 21% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: lack of important arterial rivers or lakes requires extensive water conservation and control measures note: walvis bay is an exclave of south africa in namibia; completely surrounds lesotho; almost completely surrounds swaziland people population: 39,549,941 (july 1990), growth rate 2.67%; includes the 10 so-called homelands, which are not recognized by the us four independent homelands--bophuthatswana 2,352,296, growth rate 2.80%; ciskei 1,025,873, growth rate 2.93%; transkei 4,367,648, growth rate 4.19%; venda 665,197, growth rate 3.86% six other homelands--gazankulu 742,361, growth rate 3.99%; kangwane 556,009, growth rate 3.64%; kwandebele 348,655, growth rate 3.35%; kwazulu 5,349,247, growth rate 3.62%; lebowa 2,704,641, growth rate 3.92%; qwagwa 268,138, growth rate 3.59% birth rate: 35 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 52 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 61 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--south african(s); adjective--south african ethnic divisions: 73.8% black, 14.3% white, 9.1% colored, 2.8% indian religion: most whites and coloreds and roughly 60% of blacks are christian; roughly 60% of indians are hindu, 20% muslim language: afrikaans, english (official); many vernacular languages, including zulu, xhosa, north and south sotho, tswana literacy: almost all white population literate; government estimates 50% of blacks literate labor force: 11,000,000 economically active; 34% services, 30% agriculture, 29% industry and commerce, 7% mining (1985) organized labor: about 17% of total labor force is unionized; african unions represent 15% of black labor force government long-form name: republic of south africa; abbreviated rsa type: republic capital: administrative, pretoria; legislative, cape town; judicial, bloemfontein administrative divisions: 4 provinces; cape, natal, orange free state, transvaal; there are 10 homelands not recognized by the us--4 independent (bophuthatswana, ciskei, transkei, venda) and 6 other (gazankulu, kangwane, kwandebele, kwazulu, lebowa, qwaqwa) independence: 31 may 1910 (from uk) constitution: 3 september 1984 legal system: based on roman-dutch law and english common law; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: republic day, 31 may (1910) executive branch: state president, cabinet, executive council (cabinet) ministers' councils (from the three houses of parliament) legislative branch: tricameral parliament consists of the house of assembly (whites), house of representatives (coloreds), and house of delegates (indians) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--state president frederik w. de klerk (since 13 september 1989) political parties and leaders: white political parties and leaders--national party (np), frederik w. de klerk (majority party); conservative party (cp), dr. andries p. treurnicht (official opposition party); herstigte national party (hnp), jaap marais; democratic party (dp), zach de beer, wynand malan, and denis worrall; colored political parties and leaders--labor party (lp), allan hendrickse (majority party); democratic reform party (drp), carter ebrahim; united democratic party (udp), jac rabie; freedom party; indian political parties and leaders--solidarity, j. n. reddy (majority party); national people's party (npp), amichand rajbansi; merit people's party suffrage: universal at age 18, but voting rights are racially based elections: house of assembly (whites)--last held 6 september 1989 (next to be held by september 1994); results--np 58%, cp 23%, dp 19%; seats--(178 total, 166 elected) np 103, cp 41, dp 34; house of representatives (coloreds)--last held 6 september 1989 (next to be held by september 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(85 total, 80 elected) lp 69, drp 5, udp 3, freedom party 1, independents 2; house of delegates (indians)--last held 6 september 1989 (next to be held by september 1994); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(45 total, 40 elected) solidarity 16, npp 9, merit people's party 3, united party 2, democratic party 2, people's party 1, national federal party 1, independents 6 communists: small communist party illegal since 1950; party in exile maintains headquarters in london, daniel tloome (chairman) and joe slovo (general secretary) other political groups: insurgent groups in exile--african national congress (anc), oliver tambo; pan-africanist congress (pac), zephania mothopeng; internal antiapartheid groups--pan-africanist movement (pam), clarence makwetu; united democratic front (udf), albertina sisulu and archibald gumede member of: ccc, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifc, iho, ilzsg, imf, intelsat, iso, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, southern african customs union, un, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg (membership rights in iaea, icao, itu, who, wipo, and wmo suspended or restricted) diplomatic representation: ambassador piet g. j. koornhof; chancery at 3051 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 232-4400; there are south african consulates general in beverly hills (california), chicago, houston, and new york; us--ambassador william l. swing; embassy at thibault house, 225 pretorius street, pretoria; telephone p27o (12) 28-4266; there are us consulates general in cape town, durban, and johannesburg flag: actually four flags in one--three miniature flags reproduced in the center of the white band of the former flag of the netherlands which has three equal horizontal bands of orange (top), white, and blue; the miniature flags are a vertically hanging flag of the old orange free state with a horizontal flag of the uk adjoining on the hoist side and a horizontal flag of the old transvaal republic adjoining on the other side economy overview: many of the white one-seventh of the south african population enjoy incomes, material comforts, and health and educational standards equal to those of western europe. in contrast, most of the remaining population suffers from the poverty patterns of the third world, including unemployment, lack of job skills, and barriers to movement into higher-paying fields. inputs and outputs thus do not move smoothly into the most productive employments, and the effectiveness of the market is further lowered by international constraints on dealings with south africa. the main strength of the economy lies in its rich mineral resources, which provide two-thirds of exports. average growth of 2% in output in recent years falls far short of the level needed to cut into the high unemployment level. gdp: $83.5 billion, per capita $2,380; real growth rate 3.2% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 14.67% (1989) unemployment rate: 22% (1988); blacks 25-30%, up to 50% in homelands (1988 est.) budget: revenues $24.3 billion; expenditures $27.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $na billion (fy91) exports: $21.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--gold 40%, minerals and metals 23%, food 6%, chemicals 3%; partners--frg, japan, uk, us, other ec, hong kong imports: $18.5 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--machinery 27%, chemicals 11%, vehicles and aircraft 11%, textiles, scientific instruments, base metals; partners--us, frg, japan, uk, france, italy, switzerland external debt: $21.2 billion (1988 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5.6% (1988) electricity: 34,941,000 kw capacity; 158,000 million kwh produced, 4,100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining (world's largest producer of diamonds, gold, chrome), automobile assembly, metalworking, machinery, textile, iron and steel, chemical, fertilizer, foodstuffs agriculture: accounts for 6% of gdp and 30% of labor force; diversified agriculture, with emphasis on livestock; products--cattle, poultry, sheep, wool, milk, beef, corn, wheat; sugarcane, fruits, vegetables; self-sufficient in food aid: na currency: rand (plural--rand); 1 rand (r) = 100 cents exchange rates: rand (r) per us$1--2.5555 (january 1990), 2.6166 (1989), 2.2611 (1988), 2.0350 (1987), 2.2685 (1986), 2.1911 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 20,638 km route distance total; 35,079 km of 1.067-meter gauge trackage (counts double and multiple tracking as single track); 314 km of 610 mm gauge highways: 188,309 km total; 54,013 km paved, 134,296 km crushed stone, gravel, or improved earth pipelines: 931 km crude oil; 1,748 km refined products; 322 km natural gas ports: durban, cape town, port elizabeth, richard's bay, saldanha, mosselbaai, walvis bay merchant marine: 9 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 275,684 grt/273,973 dwt; includes 7 container, 1 vehicle carrier, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 81 major transport aircraft airports: 931 total, 793 usable; 124 with permanent-surface runways; 4 with runways over 3,659 m; 10 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 213 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: the system is the best developed, most modern, and has the highest capacity in africa; it consists of carrier-equipped open-wire lines, coaxial cables, radio relay links, fiber optic cable, and radiocommunication stations; key centers are bloemfontein, cape town, durban, johannesburg, port elizabeth, and pretoria; 4,500,000 telephones; stations--14 am, 286 fm, 67 tv; 1 submarine cable; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 2 atlantic ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, medical services military manpower: males 15-49, 9,544,357; 5,828,167 fit for military service; 419,815 reach military age (18) annually; obligation for service in citizen force or commandos begins at 18; volunteers for service in permanent force must be 17; national service obligation is two years; figures include the so-called homelands not recognized by the us defense expenditures: 5% of gdp, or $4 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: south georgia and the south sandwich islands (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 4,066 km2; land area: 4,066 km2; includes shag and clerke rocks comparative area: slightly larger than rhode island land boundaries: none coastline: undetermined maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: administered by the uk, claimed by argentina climate: variable, with mostly westerly winds throughout the year, interspersed with periods of calm; nearly all precipitation falls as snow terrain: most of the islands, rising steeply from the sea, are rugged and mountainous; south georgia is largely barren and has steep, glacier-covered mountains; the south sandwich islands are of volcanic origin with some active volcanoes natural resources: fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other; largely covered by permanent ice and snow with some sparse vegetation consisting of grass, moss, and lichen environment: reindeer, introduced early in this century, live on south georgia; weather conditions generally make it difficult to approach the south sandwich islands; the south sandwich islands are subject to active volcanism note: the north coast of south georgia has several large bays, which provide good anchorage people population: no permanent population; there is a small military garrison on south georgia and the british antarctic survey has a biological station on bird island; the south sandwich islands are uninhabited government long-form name: south georgia and the south sandwich islands (no short-form name) type: dependent territory of the uk capital: grytviken harbour on south georgia is the chief town administrative divisions: none (dependent territory of the uk) independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: 3 october 1985 legal system: english common law national holiday: liberation day, 14 june (1982) executive branch: british monarch, commissioner legislative branch: none judicial branch: none leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by commissioner william hugh fullerton (since 1988; resident at stanley, falkland islands) economy overview: some fishing takes place in adjacent waters. there is a potential source of income from harvesting fin fish and krill. the islands receive income from postage stamps produced in the uk. budget: revenues $291,777; expenditures $451,011, including capital expenditures of $na (fy88 est.) electricity: 900 kw capacity; 2 million kwh produced, na kwh per capita (1989) communications highways: na ports: grytviken harbour on south georgia airports: none telecommunications: coastal radio station at grytviken; no broadcast stations defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: soviet union geography total area: 22,402,200 km2; land area: 22,272,000 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 2.5 times the size of us land boundaries: 19,933 km total; afghanistan 2,384 km, czechoslovakia 98 km, china 7,520 km, finland 1,313 km, hungary 135 km, iran 1,690 km, north korea 17 km, mongolia 3,441 km, norway 196 km, poland 1,215 km, romania 1,307 km, turkey 617 km coastline: 42,777 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: bilateral negotiations are under way to resolve four disputed sections of the boundary with china (pamir, argun, amur, and khabarovsk areas); us government has not recognized the incorporation of estonia, latvia, and lithuania into the soviet union; habomai islands, etorofu, kunashiri, and shikotan islands occupied by soviet union since 1945, claimed by japan; kuril islands administered by soviet union; maritime dispute with norway over portion of barents sea; has made no territorial claim in antarctica (but has reserved the right to do so) and does not recognize the claims of any other nation; bessarabia question with romania; kurdish question among iran, iraq, syria, turkey, and the ussr climate: mostly temperate to arctic continental; winters vary from cool along black sea to frigid in siberia; summers vary from hot in southern deserts to cool along arctic coast terrain: broad plain with low hills west of urals; vast coniferous forest and tundra in siberia, deserts in central asia, mountains in south natural resources: self-sufficient in oil, natural gas, coal, and strategic minerals (except bauxite, alumina, tantalum, tin, tungsten, fluorspar, and molybdenum), timber, gold, manganese, lead, zinc, nickel, mercury, potash, phosphates land use: 10% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 17% meadows and pastures; 41% forest and woodland; 32% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: despite size and diversity, small percentage of land is arable and much is too far north; some of most fertile land is water deficient or has insufficient growing season; many better climates have poor soils; hot, dry, desiccating sukhovey wind affects south; desertification; continuous permafrost over much of siberia is a major impediment to development note: largest country in world, but unfavorably located in relation to major sea lanes of world people population: 290,938,469 (july 1990), growth rate 0.7% (1990) birth rate: 18 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 24 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--soviet(s); adjective--soviet ethnic divisions: russian 50.78%, ukrainian 15.45%, uzbek 5.84%, byelorussian 3.51%, kazakh 2.85%, azerbaijan 2.38%, armenian 1.62%, tajik 1.48%, georgian 1.39%, moldavian 1.17%, lithuanian 1.07%, turkmen 0.95%, kirghiz 0.89%, latvian 0.51%, estonian 0.36%, others 9.75% religion: 20% russian orthodox; 10% muslim; 7% protestant, georgian orthodox, armenian orthodox, and roman catholic; less than 1% jewish; 60% atheist (est.) language: russian (official); more than 200 languages and dialects (at least 18 with more than 1 million speakers); 75% slavic group, 8% other indo-european, 12% altaic, 3% uralian, 2% caucasian literacy: 99% labor force: 152,300,000 civilians; 80% industry and other nonagricultural fields, 20% agriculture; shortage of skilled labor (1989) organized labor: 98% of workers are union members; all trade unions are organized within the all-union central council of trade unions (aucctu) and conduct their work under guidance of the communist party government long-form name: union of soviet socialist republics; abbreviated ussr type: communist state capital: moscow administrative divisions: 1 soviet federative socialist republic* (sovetskaya federativnaya sotsialistcheskaya respublika) and 14 soviet socialist republics (sovetskiye sotsialisticheskiye respubliki, singular--sovetskaya sotsialisticheskaya respublika); armenian soviet socialist republic, azerbaijan soviet socialist republic, byelorussian soviet socialist republic, estonian soviet socialist republic, georgian soviet socialist republic, kazakh soviet socialist republic, kirghiz soviet socialist republic, latvian soviet socialist republic, lithuanian soviet socialist republic, moldavian soviet socialist republic, russian soviet federative socialist republic*, tajik soviet socialist republic, turkmen soviet socialist republic, ukrainian soviet socialist republic, uzbek soviet socialist republic; note--the russian soviet federative socialist republic is often abbreviated rsfsr and soviet socialist republic is often abbreviated ssr independence: 1721 (russian empire proclaimed) constitution: 7 october 1977 legal system: civil law system as modified by communist legal theory; no judicial review of legislative acts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: great october socialist revolution, 7-8 november (1917) executive branch: president legislative branch: the congress of people's deputies is the supreme organ of ussr state power and selects the bicameral ussr supreme soviet (verkhovnyy sovyet) which consists of two coequal houses--council of the union (sovet soyuza) and council of nationalities (sovet natsionalnostey) judicial branch: supreme court of the ussr leaders: chief of state--president mikhail sergeyevich gorbachev (since 14 march 1990; general secretary of the central committee of the communist party since 11 march 1985); head of government--chairman of the ussr council of ministers nikolay ivanovich ryzhkov (since 28 september 1985) political parties and leaders: only party--communist party of the soviet union (cpsu), president mikhail sergeyevich gorbachev, general secretary of the central committee of the cpsu; note--the cpsu is the only party, but others are forming suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 14 march 1990 (next to be held na 1995); results--mikhail sergeyevich gorbachev was elected by the congress of people's deputies; congress of people's deputies--last held 12 march 1990 (next to be held na); results--cpsu is the only party; seats--(2,250 total) cpsu 1,931, non-cpsu 319; ussr supreme soviet--last held na june 1989 (next to be held na); results--cpsu is the only party; seats--(542 total) cpsu 475, non-cpsu 67; council of the union--last held spring 1989 (next to be held na); results--cpsu is the only party; seats--(271 total) cpsu 239, non-cpsu 32; council of nationalities--last held spring 1989 (next to be held na); results--cpsu is the only party; seats--(271 total) cpsu 236, non-cpsu 35 communists: about 19 million party members other political or pressure groups: komsomol, trade unions, and other organizations that facilitate communist control; regional popular fronts, informal organizations, and nascent parties with varying attitudes toward the communist party establishment member of: cema, escap, iaea, ibec, icac, icao, icco, ices, ilo, ilzsg, imo, inro, interpol, ipu, iso, itc, itu, international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, un, unctad, unesco, upu, warsaw pact, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador-designate aleksandr bessmertnykh; chancery at 1125 16th street nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 628-7551 or 8548; there is a soviet consulate general in san francisco; us--ambassador jack f. matlock, jr.; embassy at ulitsa chaykovskogo 19/21/23, moscow (mailing address is apo new york 09862); telephone p7o (096) 252-24-51 through 59; there is a us consulate general in leningrad flag: red with the yellow silhouette of a crossed hammer and sickle below a yellow-edged five-pointed red star in the upper hoist-side corner economy overview: the first five years of perestroyka (economic restructuring) have undermined the institutions and processes of the soviet command economy without replacing them with efficiently functioning markets. the initial reforms featured greater authority for enterprise managers over prices, wages, product mix, investment, sources of supply, and customers. but in the absence of effective market discipline, the result was the disappearance of low-price goods, excessive wage increases, an even larger volume of unfinished construction projects, and, in general, continued economic stagnation. the gorbachev regime has made at least four serious errors in economic policy in these five years: the unpopular and short-lived anti-alcohol campaign; the initial cutback in imports of consumer goods; the failure to act decisively for the privatization of agriculture; and the buildup of a massive overhang of unspent rubles in the hands of households and enterprises. in october 1989, a top economic adviser, leonid abalkin presented an ambitious but reasonable timetable for the conversion to a partially privatized market system in the 1990s. in december 1989, however, premier ryzhkov's conservative approach prevailed, namely, the contention that a period of retrenchment was necessary to provide a stable financial and legislative base for launching further reforms. accordingly, the new strategy was to put the reform process on hold in 1990-92 by recentralizing economic authority and to placate the rank-and-file through sharp increases in consumer goods output. in still another policy twist, the leadership in early 1990 was considering a marked speedup in the marketization process. because the economy is caught in between two systems, there was in 1989 an even greater mismatch between what was produced and what would serve the best interests of enterprises and households. meanwhile, the seething nationality problems have been dislocating regional patterns of economic specialization and pose a further major threat to growth prospects over the next few years. gnp: $2,659.5 billion, per capita $9,211; real growth rate 1.4% (1989 est. based on soviet statistics; cutbacks in soviet reporting on products included in sample make the estimate subject to greater uncertainty than in earlier years) inflation rate (consumer prices): 6% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: officially, no unemployment budget: revenues $622 billion; expenditures $781 billion, including capital expenditures of $119 billion (1989 est.) exports: $110.7 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum and petroleum products, natural gas, metals, wood, agricultural products, and a wide variety of manufactured goods (primarily capital goods and arms); partners--eastern europe 49%, ec 14%, cuba 5%, us, afghanistan (1988) imports: $107.3 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--grain and other agricultural products, machinery and equipment, steel products (including large-diameter pipe), consumer manufactures; partners--eastern europe 54%, ec 11%, cuba, china, us (1988) external debt: $27.3 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 0.2% (1989 est.) electricity: 355,000,000 kw capacity; 1,790,000 million kwh produced, 6,150 kwh per capita (1989) industries: diversified, highly developed capital goods and defense industries; consumer goods industries comparatively less developed agriculture: accounts for roughly 20% of gnp and labor force; production based on large collective and state farms; inefficiently managed; wide range of temperate crops and livestock produced; world's second-largest grain producer after the us; shortages of grain, oilseeds, and meat; world's leading producer of sawnwood and roundwood; annual fish catch among the world's largest--11.2 million metric tons (1987) illicit drugs: illegal producer of cannabis and opium poppy, mostly for domestic consumption; government has begun eradication program to control cultivation; used as a transshipment country aid: donor--extended to non-communist less developed countries (1954-88), $47.4 billion; extended to other communist countries (1954-88), $147.6 billion currency: ruble (plural--rubles); 1 ruble (r) = 100 kopeks exchange rates: rubles (r) per us$1--0.600 (february 1990), 0.629 (1989), 0.629 (1988), 0.633 (1987), 0.704 (1986), 0.838 (1985); note--the exchange rate is administratively set and should not be used indiscriminately to convert domestic rubles to dollars; on 1 november 1989 the ussr began using a rate of 6.26 rubles to the dollar for western tourists buying rubles and for soviets traveling abroad, but retained the official exchange rate for most trade transactions fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 146,100 km total; 51,700 km electrified; does not include industrial lines (1987) highways: 1,609,900 km total; 1,196,000 km hard-surfaced (asphalt, concrete, stone block, asphalt treated, gravel, crushed stone); 413,900 km earth (1987) inland waterways: 122,500 km navigable, exclusive of caspian sea (1987) pipelines: 81,500 km crude oil and refined products; 195,000 km natural gas (1987) ports: leningrad, riga, tallinn, kaliningrad, liepaja, ventspils, murmansk, arkhangel'sk, odessa, novorossiysk, il'ichevsk, nikolayev, sevastopol', vladivostok, nakhodka; inland ports are astrakhan', baku, gor'kiy, kazan', khabarovsk, krasnoyarsk, kuybyshev, moscow, rostov, volgograd, kiev merchant marine: 1,646 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 16,436,063 grt/22,732,215 dwt; includes 53 passenger, 937 cargo, 52 container, 11 barge carrier, 5 roll-on/float off cargo, 5 railcar carrier, 108 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 251 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 11 liquefied gas, 21 combination ore/oil, 4 specialized liquid carrier, 17 chemical tanker, 171 bulk; note--639 merchant ships are based in black sea, 383 in baltic sea, 408 in soviet far east, and 216 in barents sea and white sea; the soviet ministry of merchant marine is beginning to use foreign registries for its merchant ships to increase the economic competitiveness of the fleet in the international market--the first reregistered ships have gone to the cypriot flag civil air: 4,500 major transport aircraft airports: 6,950 total, 4,530 usable; 1,050 with permanent-surface runways; 30 with runways over 3,659 m; 490 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 660 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: extensive network of am-fm stations broadcasting both moscow and regional programs; main tv centers in moscow and leningrad plus 11 more in the soviet republics; hundreds of tv stations; 85,000,000 tv sets; 162,000,000 radio receivers; many satellite earth stations and extensive satellite networks (including 2 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat earth stations) defense forces branches: ground forces, navy, air defense forces, air forces, strategic rocket forces military manpower: males 15-49, 69,634,893; 55,588,743 fit for military service; 2,300,127 million reach military age (18) annually (down somewhat from 2,500,000 a decade ago) defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: spain geography total area: 504,750 km2; land area: 499,400 km2; includes balaeric islands, canary islands, ceuta, mellila, islas chafarinas, penon de alhucemas, and penon de velez de la gomera comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of oregon land boundaries: 1,903.2 km total; andorra 65 km, france 623 km, gibraltar 1.2 km, portugal 1,214 km coastline: 4,964 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: gibraltar question with uk; controls two presidios or places of sovereignty (ceuta and melilla) on the north coast of morocco climate: temperate; clear, hot summers in interior, more moderate and cloudy along coast; cloudy, cold winters in interior, partly cloudy and cool along coast terrain: large, flat to dissected plateau surrounded by rugged hills; pyrenees in north natural resources: coal, lignite, iron ore, uranium, mercury, pyrites, fluorspar, gypsum, zinc, lead, tungsten, copper, kaolin, potash, hydropower land use: 31% arable land; 10% permanent crops; 21% meadows and pastures; 31% forest and woodland; 7% other; includes 6% irrigated environment: deforestation; air pollution note: strategic location along approaches to strait of gibraltar people population: 39,268,715 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 11 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 82 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--spaniard(s); adjective--spanish ethnic divisions: composite of mediterranean and nordic types religion: 99% roman catholic, 1% other sects language: castilian spanish; second languages include 17% catalan, 7% galician, and 2% basque literacy: 97% labor force: 14,621,000; 53% services, 24% industry, 14% agriculture, 9% construction (1988) organized labor: less 10% of labor force (1988) government long-form name: kingdom of spain type: parliamentary monarchy capital: madrid administrative divisions: 17 autonomous communities (comunidades autonomas, singular--comunidad autonoma); andalucia, aragon, asturias, canarias, cantabria, castilla-la mancha, castilla y leon, cataluna, extremadura, galicia, islas baleares, la rioja, madrid, murcia, navarra, pais vasco, valenciana independence: 1492 (expulsion of the moors and unification) constitution: 6 december 1978, effective 29 december 1978 legal system: civil law system, with regional applications; does not accept compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 12 october executive branch: monarch, president of the government (prime minister), deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet), council of state legislative branch: bicameral the general courts or national assembly (las cortes generales) consists of an upper house or senate (senado) and a lower house or congress of deputies (congreso de los diputados) judicial branch: supreme court (tribunal supremo) leaders: chief of state--king juan carlos i (since 22 november 1975); head of government--prime minister felipe gonzalez marquez (since 2 december 1982); deputy prime minister alfonso guerra gonzalez (since 2 december 1982) political parties and leaders: principal national parties, from right to left--popular party (pp), jose maria aznar; popular democratic party (pdp), luis de grandes; social democratic center (cds), adolfo suarez gonzalez; spanish socialist workers party (psoe), felipe gonzalez marquez; spanish communist party (pce), julio anguita; chief regional parties--convergence and unity (ciu), jordi pujol saley, in catalonia; basque nationalist party (pnv), xabier arzallus; basque solidarity (ea), carlos garaicoetxea urizza; basque popular unity (hb), jon idigoras; basque left (ee), juan maria bandries molet; andalusian party (pa); independent canary group (aic); aragon regional party (par); valencian union (uv) suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: the courts general--last held 29 october 1989 (next to be held october 1993); results--psoe 39.6%, pp 25.8%, cds 9%, communist-led coalition (iu) 9%, ciu 5%, basque nationalist party 1.2%, hb 1%, andalusian party 1%, others 8.4%; seats--(350 total, 18 vacant pending new elections caused by voting irregularities) psoe 176, pp 106, ciu 18, iu 17, cds 14, pnv 5, hb 4, others 10 communists: pce membership declined from a possible high of 160,000 in 1977 to roughly 60,000 in 1987; the party gained almost 1 million voters and 10 deputies in the 1989 election; voters came mostly from the disgruntled socialist left; remaining strength is in labor, where it dominates the workers commissions trade union (one of the country's two major labor centrals), which claims a membership of about 1 million; experienced a modest recovery in 1986 national election, nearly doubling the share of the vote it received in 1982 other political or pressure groups: on the extreme left, the basque fatherland and liberty (eta) and the first of october antifascist resistance group (grapo) use terrorism to oppose the government; free labor unions (authorized in april 1977) include the communist-dominated workers commissions (ccoo); the socialist general union of workers (ugt), and the smaller independent workers syndical union (uso); the catholic church; business and landowning interests; opus dei; university students member of: andean pact (observer), assimer, ccc, council of europe, ec, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, itc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nato, oas (observer), oecd, un, unesco, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador julian santamaria; chancery at 2700 15th street nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 265-0190 or 0191; there are spanish consulates general in boston, chicago, houston, los angeles, miami, new orleans, new york, san francisco, and san juan (puerto rico); us--ambassador joseph zappala; embassy at serrano 75, madrid 6 (mailing address is apo new york 09285); telephone p34o (1) 276-3400 or 3600; there is a us consulate general in barcelona and a consulate in bilbao flag: three horizontal bands of red (top), yellow (double width), and red with the national coat of arms on the hoist side of the yellow band; the coat of arms includes the royal seal framed by the pillars of hercules which are the two promontories (gibraltar and ceuta) on either side of the eastern end of the strait of gibraltar economy overview: this western capitalistic economy has done well since spain joined the european economic community in 1986. with increases in real gnp of 5.5% in 1987 and about 5% in 1988 and 1989, spain has been the fastest growing member of the ec. increased investment--both domestic and foreign--has been the most important factor pushing the economic expansion. inflation moderated to 4.8% in 1988, but an overheated economy caused inflation to reach an estimated 7% in 1989. another economic problem facing spain is an unemployment rate of 16.5%, the highest in europe. gnp: $398.7 billion, per capita $10,100; real growth rate 4.8% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7.0% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 16.5% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $57.8 billion; expenditures $66.7 billion, including capital expenditures of $10.4 billion (1987) exports: $40.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, live animals, wood, footwear, machinery, chemicals; partners--ec 66%, us 8%, other developed countries 9% imports: $60.4 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum, footwear, machinery, chemicals, grain, soybeans, coffee, tobacco, iron and steel, timber, cotton, transport equipment; partners--ec 57%, us 9%, other developed countries 13%, middle east 3% external debt: $32.7 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.0% (1988) electricity: 46,589,000 kw capacity; 157,040 million kwh produced, 3,980 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles and apparel (including footwear), food and beverages, metals and metal manufactures, chemicals, shipbuilding, automobiles, machine tools agriculture: accounts for 5% of gnp and 14% of labor force; major products--grain, vegetables, olives, wine grapes, sugar beets, citrus fruit, beef, pork, poultry, dairy; largely self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 1.4 million metric tons among top 20 nations aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $1.9 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-79), $545.0 million currency: peseta (plural--pesetas); 1 peseta (pta) = 100 centimos exchange rates: pesetas (ptas) per us$1--109.69 (january 1990), 118.38 (1989), 116.49 (1988), 123.48 (1987), 140.05 (1986), 170.04 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 15,430 km total; spanish national railways (renfe) operates 12,691 km 1.668-meter gauge, 6,184 km electrified, and 2,295 km double track; feve (government-owned narrow-gauge railways) operates 1,821 km of predominantly 1.000-meter gauge and 441 km electrified; privately owned railways operate 918 km of predominantly 1.000-meter gauge, 512 km electrified, and 56 km double track highways: 150,839 km total; 82,513 km national (includes 2,433 km limited-access divided highway, 63,042 km bituminous treated, 17,038 km intermediate bituminous, concrete, or stone block) and 68,326 km provincial or local roads (bituminous treated, intermediate bituminous, or stone block) inland waterways: 1,045 km, but of minor economic importance pipelines: 265 km crude oil; 1,794 km refined products; 1,666 km natural gas ports: algeciras, alicante, almeria, barcelona, bilbao, cadiz, cartagena, castellon de la plana, ceuta, el ferrol del caudillo, puerto de gijon, huelva, la coruna, las palmas (canary islands), mahon, malaga, melilla, rota, santa cruz de tenerife, sagunto, tarragona, valencia, vigo, and 175 minor ports merchant marine: 324 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,492,563 grt/6,128,190 dwt; includes 2 passenger, 9 short-sea passenger, 121 cargo, 19 refrigerated cargo, 17 container, 23 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 51 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 16 chemical tanker, 10 liquefied gas, 1 specialized tanker, 1 combination ore/oil, 49 bulk, 5 vehicle carrier civil air: 142 major transport aircraft airports: 110 total, 103 usable; 62 with permanent-surface runways; 4 with runways over 3,659 m; 20 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 29 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: generally adequate, modern facilities; 15,310,000 telephones; stations--196 am, 404 (134 relays) fm, 143 (1,297 relays) tv; 17 coaxial submarine cables; communications satellite earth stations operating in intelsat (5 atlantic ocean, 1 indian ocean), marisat, and entelsat systems defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 10,032,649; 8,141,384 fit for military service; 338,582 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.1% of gdp, or $8.4 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: spratly islands geography total area: less than 5 km2; land area: less than 5 km2; includes 100 or so islets, coral reefs, and sea mounts scattered over the south china sea comparative area: undetermined land boundaries: none coastline: 926 km maritime claims: undetermined disputes: china, malaysia, the philippines, taiwan, and vietnam claim all or part of the spratly islands climate: tropical terrain: flat natural resources: fish, guano; oil and natural gas potential land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: subject to typhoons; includes numerous small islands, atolls, shoals, and coral reefs note: strategically located near several primary shipping lanes in the central south china sea; serious navigational hazard people population: no permanent inhabitants; garrisons government long-form name: none economy overview: economic activity is limited to commercial fishing and phosphate mining. geological surveys carried out several years ago suggest that substantial reserves of oil and natural gas may lie beneath the islands; commercial exploitation has yet to be developed. industries: some guano mining communications airports: 3 total, 2 usable; none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only defense forces note: approximately 50 small islands or reefs are occupied by china, malaysia, the philippines, taiwan, and vietnam ---------------------------------------------------country: sri lanka geography total area: 65,610 km2; land area: 64,740 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than west virginia land boundaries: none coastline: 1,340 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; monsoonal; northeast monsoon (december to march); southwest monsoon (june to october) terrain: mostly low, flat to rolling plain; mountains in south-central interior natural resources: limestone, graphite, mineral sands, gems, phosphates, clay land use: 16% arable land; 17% permanent crops; 7% meadows and pastures; 37% forest and woodland; 23% other; includes 8% irrigated environment: occasional cyclones, tornados; deforestation; soil erosion note: only 29 km from india across the palk strait; near major indian ocean sea lanes people population: 17,196,436 (july 1990), growth rate 1.5% (1990) birth rate: 21 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 31 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--sri lankan(s); adjective--sri lankan ethnic divisions: 74% sinhalese; 18% tamil; 7% moor; 1% burgher, malay, and veddha religion: 69% buddhist, 15% hindu, 8% christian, 8% muslim language: sinhala (official); sinhala and tamil listed as national languages; sinhala spoken by about 74% of population, tamil spoken by about 18%; english commonly used in government and spoken by about 10% of the population literacy: 87% labor force: 6,600,000; 45.9% agriculture, 13.3% mining and manufacturing, 12.4% trade and transport, 28.4% services and other (1985 est.) organized labor: about 33% of labor force, over 50% of which are employed on tea, rubber, and coconut estates government long-form name: democratic socialist republic of sri lanka type: republic capital: colombo administrative divisions: 24 districts; amparai, anuradhapura, badulla, batticaloa, colombo, galle, gampaha, hambantota, jaffna, kalutara, kandy, kegalla, kurunegala, mannar, matale, matara, moneragala, mullativu, nuwara eliya, polonnaruwa, puttalam, ratnapura, trincomalee, vavuniya; note--the administrative structure may now include 8 provinces (central, north central, north eastern, north western, sabaragamuwa, southern, uva, and western) and 25 districts (with kilinochchi added to the existing districts) independence: 4 february 1948 (from uk; formerly ceylon) constitution: 31 august 1978 legal system: a highly complex mixture of english common law, roman-dutch, muslim, and customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence and national day, 4 february (1948) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president ranasinghe premadasa (since 2 january 1989); head of government--prime minister dingiri banda wijetunge (since 6 march 1989) political parties and leaders: united national party (unp), ranasinghe premadasa; sri lanka freedom party (slfp), sirimavo bandaranaike; sri lanka muslim congress (slmc), mhm. ashraff; all ceylon tamil congress (actc), kumar ponnambalam; mahajana eksath peramuna (mep, or people's united front), dinesh gundawardene; sri lanka mahajana party (slmp, or sri lanka people's party), chandrika baudaranaike kumaranatunga; lanka sama samaja party (lssp, lanka socialist party/trotskyite), colin r. de silva; nava sama samaja party (nssp, or new socialist party), vasudeva nanayakkara; tamil united liberation front (tulf), leader na; communist party/moscow (cp/m), k. p. silva; communist party/beijing (cp/b), n. shanmugathasan suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 19 december 1988 (next to be held december 1994); results--ranasinghe premadasa (unp) 50%, sirimavo bandaranaike (slfp) 45%, others 5%; parliament--last held 15 february 1989 (next to be held by february 1995); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(225 total) unp 125, slfp 67, others 33 other political or pressure groups: liberation tigers of tamil eelam (ltte) and other smaller tamil separatist groups; janatha vimukthi peramuna (jvp or people's liberation front); buddhist clergy; sinhalese buddhist lay groups; labor unions member of: adb, anrpc, ccc, colombo plan, commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, nam, saarc, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador w. susanta de alwis; chancery at 2148 wyoming avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-4025 through 4028; there is a sri lankan consulate in new york; us--ambassador marion v. creekmore; embassy at 210 galle road, colombo 3 (mailing address is p. o. box 106, colombo); telephone p94o (1) 548007 flag: yellow with two panels; the smaller hoist-side panel has two equal vertical bands of green (hoist side) and orange; the other panel is a large dark red rectangle with a yellow lion holding a sword and there is a yellow bo leaf in each corner; the yellow field appears as a border that goes around the entire flag and extends between the two panels economy overview: agriculture, forestry, and fishing dominate the economy, employing about half of the labor force and accounting for about 25% of gdp. the plantation crops of tea, rubber, and coconuts provide about 50% of export earnings and almost 20% of budgetary revenues. the economy has been plagued by high rates of unemployment since the late 1970s. gdp: $6.1 billion, per capita $370; real growth rate 2.7% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15% (1988) unemployment rate: 20% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $1.5 billion; expenditures $2.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.7 billion (1989) exports: $1.5 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--tea, textiles and garments, petroleum products, coconut, rubber, agricultural products, gems and jewelry, marine products; partners--us 26%, egypt, iraq, uk, frg, singapore, japan imports: $2.3 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum, machinery and equipment, textiles and textile materials, wheat, transportation equipment, electrical machinery, sugar, rice; partners--japan, saudi arabia, us 5.6%, india, singapore, frg, uk, iran external debt: $5.6 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 5% (1988) electricity: 1,300,000 kw capacity; 4,200 million kwh produced, 250 kwh per capita (1989) industries: processing of rubber, tea, coconuts, and other agricultural commodities; cement, petroleum refining, textiles, tobacco, clothing agriculture: accounts for 25% of gdp and nearly half of labor force; most important staple crop is paddy rice; other field crops--sugarcane, grains, pulses, oilseeds, roots, spices; cash crops--tea, rubber, coconuts; animal products--milk, eggs, hides, meat; not self-sufficient in rice production aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $932 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1980-87), $4.3 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $169 million; communist countries (1970-88), $369 million currency: sri lankan rupee (plural--rupees); 1 sri lankan rupee (slre) = 100 cents exchange rates: sri lankan rupees (slrs) per us$1--40.000 (january 1990), 36.047 (1989), 31.807 (1988), 29.445 (1987), 28.017 (1986), 27.163 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,868 km total (1985); all 1.868-meter broad gauge; 102 km double track; no electrification; government owned highways: 66,176 km total (1985); 24,300 km paved (mostly bituminous treated), 28,916 km crushed stone or gravel, 12,960 km improved earth or unimproved earth; several thousand km of mostly unmotorable tracks inland waterways: 430 km; navigable by shallow-draft craft pipelines: crude and refined products, 62 km (1987) ports: colombo, trincomalee merchant marine: 40 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 258,923 grt/334,702 dwt; includes 22 cargo, 8 refrigerated cargo, 4 container, 1 livestock carrier, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 3 bulk civil air: 8 major transport (including 1 leased) airports: 14 total, 13 usable; 12 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 7 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: good international service; 109,900 telephones (1982); stations--12 am, 5 fm, 1 tv; submarine cables extend to indonesia, djibouti, india; 2 indian ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: army, air force, navy, police force, special police task force, national auxiliary force military manpower: males 15-49, 4,568,648; 3,574,637 fit for military service; 177,610 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 5% of gdp, or $300 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: sudan geography total area: 2,505,810 km2; land area: 2,376,000 km2 comparative area: slightly more than one quarter the size of us land boundaries: 7,697 km total; central african republic 1,165 km, chad 1,360 km, egypt 1,273 km, ethiopia 2,221 km, kenya 232 km, libya 383 km, uganda 435 km, zaire 628 km coastline: 853 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 18 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: international boundary and administrative boundary with kenya; international boundary and administrative boundary with egypt climate: tropical in south; arid desert in north; rainy season (april to october) terrain: generally flat, featureless plain; mountains in east and west natural resources: modest reserves of crude oil, iron ore, copper, chromium ore, zinc, tungsten, mica, silver, crude oil land use: 5% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 24% meadows and pastures; 20% forest and woodland; 51% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: dominated by the nile and its tributaries; dust storms; desertification note: largest country in africa people population: 24,971,806 (july 1990), growth rate 2.9% (1990) birth rate: 44 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 107 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 51 years male, 55 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--sudanese (sing. and pl.); adjective--sudanese ethnic divisions: 52% black, 39% arab, 6% beja, 2% foreigners, 1% other religion: 70% sunni muslim (in north), 20% indigenous beliefs, 5% christian (mostly in south and khartoum) language: arabic (official), nubian, ta bedawie, diverse dialects of nilotic, nilo-hamitic, and sudanic languages, english; program of arabization in process literacy: 31% (1986) labor force: 6,500,000; 80% agriculture, 10% industry and commerce, 6% government; labor shortages for almost all categories of skilled employment (1983 est.); 52% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: trade unions suspended following 30 june 1989 coup; now in process of being legalized anew government long-form name: republic of the sudan type: military; civilian government suspended and martial law imposed after 30 june 1989 coup capital: khartoum administrative divisions: 9 regions (aqalim, singular--iqlim); aali an nil, al awsat, al istiwai, al khartum, ash shamali, ash sharqi, bahr al ghazal, darfur, kurdufan independence: 1 january 1956 (from egypt and uk; formerly anglo-egyptian sudan) constitution: 12 april 1973, suspended following coup of 6 april 1985; interim constitution of 10 october 1985 suspended following coup of 30 june 1989 legal system: based on english common law and islamic law; in september 1983 then president nimeiri declared the penal code would conform to islamic law; some separate religious courts; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 1 january (1956) executive branch: executive and legislative authority vested in a 15-member revolutionary command council (rcc); chairman of the rcc acts as prime minister; in july 1989 rcc appointed a predominately civilian 22-member cabinet to function as advisers legislative branch: none judicial branch: supreme court, special revolutionary courts leaders: chief of state and head of government--revolutionary command council chairman and prime minister brig. gen. umar hasan ahmad al-bashir (since 30 june 1989); deputy chairman of the command council and deputy prime minister brig. gen. al-zubayr muhammad salih (since 9 july 1989) political parties and leaders: none; banned following 30 june 1989 coup suffrage: none elections: none member of: acp, afdb, apc, arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador abdallah ahmad abdallah; chancery at 2210 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 338-8565 through 8570; there is a sudanese consulate general in new york; us--ambassador james cheek; embassy at shar'ia ali abdul latif, khartoum (mailing address is p. o. box 699, khartoum, or apo new york 09668); telephone 74700 or 75680, 74611 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with a green isosceles triangle based on the hoist side economy overview: sudan, one of the world's poorest countries, is buffeted by civil war, chronic political instability, adverse weather, and counterproductive economic policies. the economy is dominated by governmental entities that account for more than 70% of new investment. the private sector's main areas of activity are agriculture and trading, with most private industrial investment predating 1980. the economy's base is agriculture, which employs 80% of the work force. industry mainly processes agricultural items. a high foreign debt and arrearages of about $13 billion continue to cause difficulties. since 1979 the international monetary fund has provided assistance and has forced sudan to make economic reforms aimed at improving the performance of the economy. gdp: $8.5 billion, per capita $340 (fy87); real growth rate 7.0% (fy89 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 70% (fy89) unemployment rate: na budget: revenues $514 million; expenditures $1.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $183 million (fy89 est.) exports: $550 million (f.o.b., fy89 est.); commodities--cotton 43%, sesame, gum arabic, peanuts; partners--western europe 46%, saudi arabia 14%, eastern europe 9%, japan 9%, us 3% (fy88) imports: $1.2 billion (c.i.f., fy89 est.); commodities--petroleum products, manufactured goods, machinery and equipment, medicines and chemicals; partners--western europe 32%, africa and asia 15%, us 13%, eastern europe 3% (fy88) external debt: $11.6 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 1.7% (fy89 est.) electricity: 606,000 kw capacity; 900 million kwh produced, 37 kwh per capita (1989) industries: cotton ginning, textiles, cement, edible oils, sugar, soap distilling, shoes, petroleum refining agriculture: accounts for 35% of gnp and 80% of labor force; untapped potential for higher farm production; two-thirds of land area suitable for raising crops and livestock; major products--cotton, oilseeds, sorghum, millet, wheat, gum arabic, sheep; marginally self-sufficient in most foods aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $1.4 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $4.4 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $3.1 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $588 million currency: sudanese pound (plural--pounds); 1 sudanese pound (lsd) = 100 piasters exchange rates: official rate--sudanese pounds (lsd) per us$1--4.5004 (fixed rate since 1987), 2.8121 (1987), 2.5000 (1986), 2.2883 (1985); note--commercial exchange rate is set daily, 12.2 (march 1990) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 5,500 km total; 4,784 km 1.067-meter gauge, 716 km 1.6096-meter-gauge plantation line highways: 20,000 km total; 1,600 km bituminous treated, 3,700 km gravel, 2,301 km improved earth, 12,399 km unimproved earth and track inland waterways: 5,310 km navigable pipelines: refined products, 815 km ports: port sudan, suakin merchant marine: 10 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 91,107 grt/122,222 dwt; includes 8 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo civil air: 14 major transport aircraft airports: 78 total, 68 usable; 8 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 4 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 31 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: large, well-equipped system by african standards, but barely adequate and poorly maintained; consists of radio relay, cables, radio communications, and troposcatter; domestic satellite system with 14 stations; 73,400 telephones; stations--4 am, 1 fm, 2 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 arabsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, air defense force military manpower: males 15-49, 5,621,469; 3,437,004 fit for military service; 273,011 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 7.2% of gdp, or $610 million (1989 est) ---------------------------------------------------country: suriname geography total area: 163,270 km2; land area: 161,470 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than georgia land boundaries: 1,707 km total; brazil 597 km, french guiana 510 km, guyana 600 km coastline: 386 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims area in french guiana between litani rivier and riviere marouini (both headwaters of the lawa); claims area in guyana between new (upper courantyne) and courantyne/kutari rivers (all headwaters of the courantyne) climate: tropical; moderated by trade winds terrain: mostly rolling hills; narrow coastal plain with swamps natural resources: timber, hydropower potential, fish, shrimp, bauxite, iron ore, and modest amounts of nickel, copper, platinum, gold land use: negl% arable land; negl% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 97% forest and woodland; 3% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: mostly tropical rain forest people population: 396,813 (july 1990), growth rate 1.4% (1990) birth rate: 27 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 7 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 40 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 66 years male, 71 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--surinamer(s); adjective--surinamese ethnic divisions: 37.0% hindustani (east indian), 31.0% creole (black and mixed), 15.3% javanese, 10.3% bush black, 2.6% amerindian, 1.7% chinese, 1.0% europeans, 1.1% other religion: 27.4% hindu, 19.6% muslim, 22.8% roman catholic, 25.2% protestant (predominantly moravian), about 5% indigenous beliefs language: dutch (official); english widely spoken; sranan tongo (surinamese, sometimes called taki-taki) is native language of creoles and much of the younger population and is lingua franca among others; also hindi suriname hindustani (a variant of bhoqpuri), and javanese literacy: 65% labor force: 104,000 (1984) organized labor: 49,000 members of labor force government long-form name: republic of suriname type: republic capital: paramaribo administrative divisions: 10 districts (distrikten, singular--distrikt); brokopondo, commewijne, coronie, marowijne, nickerie, para, paramaribo, saramacca, sipaliwini, wanica independence: 25 november 1975 (from netherlands; formerly netherlands guiana or dutch guiana) constitution: ratified 30 september 1987 legal system: na national holiday: independence day, 25 november (1975) executive branch: president, vice president and prime minister, cabinet of ministers, council of state; note--commander in chief of the national army maintains significant power legislative branch: unicameral national assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president ramsewak shankar (since 25 january 1988); vice president and prime minister henck alfonsus eugene arron (since 25 january 1988) political parties and leaders: 25 february movement established by lt. col. desire bouterse in november 1983, but much of its activity taken over by new democratic party (ndp) in may 1987; leftists (all small groups)--revolutionary people's party (rvp), michael naarendorp; progressive workers and farmers (palu), iwan krolis; traditional parties--progressive reform party (vhp), jaggernath lachmon; national party of suriname (nps), henck arron; indonesian peasants party (ktpi), willy soemita; the vhp, nps, and ktpi formed a coalition known as the front in july 1987 that overwhelmingly defeated the ndp in the november 1987 elections suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held 25 november 1987 (next to be held november 1992); results--the front 80%, others 20%; seats--(51 total) the front 40, ndp 3, palu 4, pendawa llwa 4 member of: acp, ecla, fao, gatt, g-77, iba, ibrd, icao, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, interpol, itu, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador willem a. udenhout; chancery at suite 108, 4301 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 244-7488 or 7490 through 7492; there is a surinamese consulate general in miami; us--ambassador richard howland; embassy at dr. sophie redmonstraat 129, paramaribo (mailing address is p. o. box 1821, paramaribo); telephone p597o 72900 or 76459 flag: five horizontal bands of green (top, double width), white, red (quadruple width), white, and green (double width); there is a large yellow five-pointed star centered in the red band economy overview: the economy is dominated by the bauxite industry, which accounts for about 80% of export earnings and 40% of tax revenues. the economy has been in trouble since the dutch ended development aid in 1982. a drop in world bauxite prices that started in the late 1970s and continued until late 1986, was followed by the outbreak of a guerrilla insurgency in the interior. the guerrillas targeted the economic infrastructure, crippling the important bauxite sector and shutting down other export industries. these problems have created both high inflation and high unemployment. a small gain in economic growth of 3.6% was registered in 1988 due to reduced guerrilla activity and improved international markets for bauxite. gdp: $1.27 billion, per capita $3,215; real growth rate 3.6% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 50% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: 27% (1988) budget: revenues $466 million; expenditures $716 million, including capital expenditures of $123 million (1989 est.) exports: $425 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--alumina, bauxite, aluminum, rice, wood and wood products, shrimp and fish, bananas; partners--netherlands 28%, us 22%, norway 18%, japan 11%, brazil 10%, uk 4% imports: $365 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--capital equipment, petroleum, foodstuffs, cotton, consumer goods; partners--us 34%, netherlands 20%, trinidad and tobago 8%, brazil 5%, uk 3% external debt: $65 million (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 3.1% (1986) electricity: 458,000 kw capacity; 2,018 million kwh produced, 5,030 kwh per capita (1989) industries: bauxite mining, alumina and aluminum production, lumbering, food processing, fishing agriculture: accounts for 11% of both gdp and labor force; paddy rice planted on 85% of arable land and represents 60% of total farm output; other products--bananas, palm kernels, coconuts, plantains, peanuts, beef, chicken; shrimp and forestry products of increasing importance; self-sufficient in most foods aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-83), $2.5 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.4 billion currency: surinamese guilder, gulden, or florin (plural--guilders, gulden, or florins); 1 surinamese guilder, gulden, or florin (sf.) = 100 cents exchange rates: surinamese guilders, gulden, or florins (sf.) per us$1--1.7850 (fixed rate) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 166 km total; 86 km 1.000-meter gauge, government owned, and 80 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; all single track highways: 8,300 km total; 500 km paved; 5,400 km bauxite gravel, crushed stone, or improved earth; 2,400 km sand or clay inland waterways: 1,200 km; most important means of transport; oceangoing vessels with drafts ranging from 4.2 m to 7 m can navigate many of the principal waterways ports: paramaribo, moengo merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 6,472 grt/8,914 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 1 container civil air: 2 major transport aircraft airports: 47 total, 43 usable; 6 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: international facilities good; domestic radio relay system; 27,500 telephones; stations--5 am, 14 fm, 6 tv, 1 shortwave; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: national army (including support battalion, infantry battalion, mechanized cavalry unit, military police brigade, navy which is company-size, small air force element) military manpower: males 15-49, 105,328; 62,896 fit for military service defense expenditures: 7.2% of gdp, or $91 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: svalbard (territory of norway) geography total area: 62,049 km2; land area: 62,049 km2; includes spitsbergen and bjornoya (bear island) comparative area: slightly smaller than west virginia land boundaries: none coastline: 3,587 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 10 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm unilaterally claimed by norway, not recognized by ussr; territorial sea: 4 nm disputes: focus of maritime boundary dispute between norway and ussr climate: arctic, tempered by warm north atlantic current; cool summers, cold winters; north atlantic current flows along west and north coasts of spitsbergen, keeping water open and navigable most of the year terrain: wild, rugged mountains; much of high land ice covered; west coast clear of ice about half the year; fjords along west and north coasts natural resources: coal, copper, iron ore, phosphate, zinc, wildlife, fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other; there are no trees and the only bushes are crowberry and cloudberry environment: great calving glaciers descend to the sea note: located 445 km north of norway where the arctic ocean, barents sea, greenland sea, and norwegian sea meet people population: 3,942 (july 1990), growth rate na% (1990); about one-third of the population resides in the norwegian areas (longyearbyen and svea on vestspitsbergen) and two-thirds in the soviet areas (barentsburg and pyramiden on vestspitsbergen); about 9 persons live at the polish research station birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) ethnic divisions: 64% russian, 35% norwegian, 1% other (1981) language: russian, norwegian literacy: na% labor force: na organized labor: none government long-form name: none type: territory of norway administered by the ministry of industry, oslo, through a governor (sysselmann) residing in longyearbyen, spitsbergen; by treaty (9 february 1920) sovereignty was given to norway capital: longyearbyen leaders: chief of state--king olav v (since 21 september 1957); head of government governor leif eldring (since na) flag: the flag of norway is used economy overview: coal mining is the major economic activity on svalbard. by treaty (9 february 1920), the nationals of the treaty powers have equal rights to exploit mineral deposits, subject to norwegian regulation. although us, uk, dutch, and swedish coal companies have mined in the past, the only companies still mining are norwegian and soviet. each company mines about half a million tons of coal annually. the settlements on svalbard are essentially company towns. the norwegian state-owned coal company employs nearly 60% of the norwegian population on the island, runs many of the local services, and provides most of the local infrastructure. there is also some trapping of seal, polar bear, fox, and walrus. electricity: 21,000 kw capacity; 45 million kwh produced, 11,420 kwh per capita (1989) currency: norwegian krone (plural--kroner); 1 norwegian krone (nkr) = 100 ore exchange rates: norwegian kroner (nkr) per us$1--6.5405 (january 1990), 6.9045 (1989), 6.5170 (1988), 6.7375 (1987), 7.3947 (1986), 8.5972 (1985) communications ports: limited facilities--ny-alesund, advent bay airports: 4 total, 4 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 5 meteorological/radio stations; stations--1 am, 1 (2 relays) fm, 1 tv defense forces note: demilitarized by treaty (9 february 1920) ---------------------------------------------------country: swaziland geography total area: 17,360 km2; land area: 17,200 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than new jersey land boundaries: 535 km total; mozambique 105 km, south africa 430 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: varies from tropical to near temperate terrain: mostly mountains and hills; some moderately sloping plains natural resources: asbestos, coal, clay, tin, hydroelelectric power, forests, and small gold and diamond deposits land use: 8% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 67% meadows and pastures; 6% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: overgrazing; soil degradation; soil erosion note: landlocked; almost completely surrounded by south africa people population: 778,525 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 15 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 126 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 55 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--swazi(s); adjective--swazi ethnic divisions: 97% african, 3% european religion: 60% christian, 40% indigenous beliefs language: english and siswati (official); government business conducted in english literacy: 67.9% labor force: 195,000; over 60,000 engaged in subsistence agriculture; about 92,000 wage earners (many only intermittently), with 36% agriculture and forestry, 20% community and social services, 14% manufacturing, 9% construction, 21% other; 24,000-29,000 employed in south africa (1987) organized labor: about 10% of wage earners government long-form name: kingdom of swaziland type: monarchy; independent member of commonwealth capital: mbabane (administrative); lobamba (legislative) administrative divisions: 4 districts; hhohho, lubombo, manzini, shiselweni independence: 6 september 1968 (from uk) constitution: none; constitution of 6 september 1968 was suspended on 12 april 1973; a new constitution was promulgated 13 october 1978, but has not been formally presented to the people legal system: based on south african roman-dutch law in statutory courts, swazi traditional law and custom in traditional courts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: somhlolo (independence) day, 6 september (1968) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament (libandla) is advisory and consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of assembly judicial branch: high court, court of appeal leaders: chief of state--king mswati iii (since 25 april 1986); head of government--prime minister obed mfanyana (since 12 july 1989) political parties: none; banned by the constitution promulgated on 13 october 1978 suffrage: none elections: no direct elections communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, interpol, iso, itu, nam, oau, southern african customs union, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who diplomatic representation: ambassador absalom vusani mamba; chancery at 4301 connecticut avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 362-6683; us--ambassador (vacant), deputy chief of mission armajane karaer; embassy at central bank building, warner street, mbabane (mailing address is p. o. box 199, mbabane); telephone 22281 through 22285 flag: three horizontal bands of blue (top), red (triple width), and blue; the red band is edged in yellow; centered in the red band is a large black and white shield covering two spears and a staff decorated with feather tassels, all placed horizontally economy overview: the economy is based on subsistence agriculture, which occupies much of the labor force and contributes about 25% to gdp. manufacturing, which includes a number of agroprocessing factories, accounts for another 25% of gdp. mining has declined in importance in recent years; high-grade iron ore deposits were depleted in 1978, and health concerns cut world demand for asbestos. exports of sugar and forestry products are the main earners of hard currency. surrounded by south africa, except for a short border with mozambique, swaziland is heavily dependent on south africa, from which it receives 90% of its imports and to which it sends about one-third of its exports. gnp: $539 million, per capita $750; real growth rate 5.7% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 17% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $255 million; expenditures $253 million, including capital expenditures of $na million (fy91 est.) exports: $394 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--sugar, asbestos, wood pulp, citrus, canned fruit, soft drink concentrates; partners--south africa, uk, us imports: $386 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--motor vehicles, machinery, transport equipment, chemicals, petroleum products, foodstuffs; partners--south africa, us, uk external debt: $275 million (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 24% (1986) electricity: 50,000 kw capacity; 130 million kwh produced, 170 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining (coal and asbestos), wood pulp, sugar agriculture: accounts for 25% of gdp and over 60% of labor force; mostly subsistence agriculture; cash crops--sugarcane, citrus fruit, cotton, pineapples; other crops and livestock--corn, sorghum, peanuts, cattle, goats, sheep; not self-sufficient in grain aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $132 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $468 million currency: lilangeni (plural--emalangeni); 1 lilangeni (e) = 100 cents exchange rates: emalangeni (e) per us$1--2.5555 (january 1990), 2.6166 (1989), 2.2611 (1988), 2.0350 (1987), 2.2685 (1986), 2.1911 (1985); note--the swazi emalangeni is at par with the south african rand fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: 297 km plus 71 km disused, 1.067-meter gauge, single track highways: 2,853 km total; 510 km paved, 1,230 km crushed stone, gravel, or stabilized soil, and 1,113 km improved earth civil air: 1 major transport aircraft airports: 23 total, 22 usable; 1 with permanent-surfaced runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: system consists of carrier-equipped open-wire lines and low-capacity radio relay links; 15,400 telephones; stations--6 am, 6 fm, 10 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: umbutfo swaziland defense force, royal swaziland police force military manpower: males 15-49, 166,537; 96,239 fit for military service defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: sweden geography total area: 449,960 km2; land area: 411,620 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than california land boundaries: 2,193 km total; finland 536 km, norway 1,657 km coastline: 3,218 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: temperate in south with cold, cloudy winters and cool, partly cloudy summers; subarctic in north terrain: mostly flat or gently rolling lowlands; mountains in west natural resources: zinc, iron ore, lead, copper, silver, timber, uranium, hydropower potential land use: 7% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 2% meadows and pastures; 64% forest and woodland; 27% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: water pollution; acid rain note: strategic location along danish straits linking baltic and north seas people population: 8,526,452 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) birth rate: 13 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 6 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 81 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--swede(s); adjective--swedish ethnic divisions: homogeneous white population; small lappish minority; about 12% foreign born or first-generation immigrants (finns, yugoslavs, danes, norwegians, greeks, turks) religion: 93.5% evangelical lutheran, 1.0% roman catholic, 5.5% other language: swedish, small lappand finnish-speaking minorities; immigrants speak native languages literacy: 99% labor force: 4,531,000 (1988); 32.8% private services, 30.0% government services, 22.0% mining and manufacturing, 5.9% construction, 5.0% agriculture, forestry, and fishing, 0.9% electricity, gas, and waterworks (1986) organized labor: 90% of labor force (1985 est.) government long-form name: kingdom of sweden type: constitutional monarchy capital: stockholm administrative divisions: 24 provinces (lan, singular and plural); alvsborgs lan, blekinge lan, gavleborgs lan, goteborgs och bohus lan, gotlands lan, hallands lan, jamtlands lan, jonkopings lan, kalmar lan, kopparbergs lan, kristianstads lan, kronobergs lan, malmohus lan, norrbottens lan, orebro lan, ostergotlands lan, skaraborgs lan, sodermanlands lan, stockholms lan, uppsala lan, varmlands lan, vasterbottens lan, vasternorrlands lan, vastmanlands lan independence: 6 june 1809, constitutional monarchy established constitution: 1 january 1975 legal system: civil law system influenced by customary law; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: day of the swedish flag, 6 june executive branch: monarch, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament (riksdag) judicial branch: supreme court (hogsta domstolen) leaders: chief of state--king carl xvi gustaf (since 19 september 1973); heir apparent princess victoria ingrid alice desiree, daughter of the king (born 14 july 1977); head of government--prime minister ingvar carlsson (since 12 march 1986); deputy prime minister kjell-olof feldt (since na march 1986) political parties and leaders: moderate (conservative), carl bildt; center, olof johansson; liberal people's party, bengt westerberg; social democratic, ingvar carlsson; left party-communist (vpk), lars werner; swedish communist party (skp), rune pettersson; communist workers' party, rolf hagel; green party, no formal leader suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held 18 september 1988 (next to be held september 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(349 total) social democratic 156, moderate (conservative) 66, liberals 44, center 42, communists 21, greens 20 communists: vpk and skp; vpk, the major communist party, is reported to have roughly 17,800 members; in the 1988 election, the vpk attracted 5.8% of the vote member of: adb, ccc, council of europe, dac, efta, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, interpol, intelsat, ipu, iso, itu, iwc--international, whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, nordic council, oecd, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador anders thunborg; chancery at suite 1200, 600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 944-5600; there are swedish consulates general in chicago, los angeles, minneapolis, and new york; us--ambassador charles e. redman; embassy at strandvagen 101, s-115 27 stockholm; telephone p46o (8) 7835300 flag: blue with a yellow cross that extends to the edges of the flag; the vertical part of the cross is shifted to the hoist side in the style of the dannebrog (danish flag) economy overview: aided by a long period of peace and neutrality during world war i through world war ii, sweden has achieved an enviable standard of living under a mixed system of high-tech capitalism and extensive welfare benefits. it has essentially full employment, a modern distribution system, excellent internal and external communications, and a skilled and intelligent labor force. timber, hydropower, and iron ore constitute the resource base of an economy that is heavily oriented toward foreign trade. privately owned firms account for about 90% of industrial output, of which the engineering sector accounts for 50% of output and exports. as the 1990s open, however, sweden faces serious economic problems: long waits for adequate housing, the decay of the work ethic, and a loss of competitive edge in international markets. gdp: $132.7 billion, per capita $15,700; real growth rate 2.1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.7% (september 1989) unemployment rate: 1.5% (1989) budget: revenues $58.0 billion; expenditures $57.9 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (fy89) exports: $52.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--machinery, motor vehicles, paper products, pulp and wood, iron and steel products, chemicals, petroleum and petroleum products; partners--ec 52.1%, (frg 12.1%, uk 11.2%, denmark 6.8%), us 9.8%, norway 9.3% imports: $48.5 billion (c.i.f., 1989 est.); commodities--machinery, petroleum and petroleum products, chemicals, motor vehicles, foodstuffs, iron and steel, clothing; partners--ec 55.8% (frg 21.2%, uk 8.6%, denmark 6.6%), us 7.5%, norway 6.0% external debt: $17.9 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.3% (1989) electricity: 39,716,000 kw capacity; 200,315 million kwh produced, 23,840 kwh per capita (1989) industries: iron and steel, precision equipment (bearings, radio and telephone parts, armaments), wood pulp and paper products, processed foods, motor vehicles agriculture: animal husbandry predominates, with milk and dairy products accounting for 37% of farm income; main crops--grains, sugar beets, potatoes; 100% self-sufficient in grains and potatoes, 85% self-sufficient in sugar beets aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $7.9 billion currency: swedish krona (plural--kronor); 1 swedish krona (skr) = 100 ore exchange rates: swedish kronor (skr) per us$1--6.1798 (january 1990), 6.4469 (1989), 6.1272 (1988), 6.3404 (1987), 7.1236 (1986), 8.6039 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 12,000 km total; swedish state railways (sj)--10,819 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 6,955 km electrified and 1,152 km double track; 182 km 0.891-meter gauge; 117 km rail ferry service; privately owned railways--511 km 1.435-meter standard gauge (332 km electrified); 371 km 0.891-meter gauge (all electrified) highways: 97,400 km (51,899 km paved, 20,659 km gravel, 24,842 km unimproved earth) inland waterways: 2,052 km navigable for small steamers and barges pipelines: 84 km natural gas ports: gavle, goteborg, halmstad, helsingborg, kalmar, malmo, stockholm; numerous secondary and minor ports merchant marine: 173 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,856,217 grt/2,215,659 dwt; includes 9 short-sea passenger, 29 cargo, 3 container, 42 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 11 vehicle carrier, 2 railcar carrier, 27 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 25 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 5 combination ore/oil, 6 specialized tanker, 12 bulk, 1 combination bulk civil air: 65 major transports airports: 259 total, 256 usable; 138 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 11 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 91 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent domestic and international facilities; 8,200,000 telephones; stations--4 am, 56 (320 relays) fm, 110 (925 relays) tv; 5 submarine coaxial cables; communication satellite earth stations operating in the intelsat (1 atlantic ocean) and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: royal swedish army, royal swedish air force, royal swedish navy military manpower: males 15-49, 2,133,101; 1,865,526 fit for military service; 56,632 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: $4.5 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: switzerland geography total area: 41,290 km2; land area: 39,770 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of new jersey land boundaries: 1,852 km total; austria 164 km, france 573 km, italy 740 km, liechtenstein 41 km, frg 334 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: temperate, but varies with altitude; cold, cloudy, rainy/snowy winters; cool to warm, cloudy, humid summers with occasional showers terrain: mostly mountains (alps in south, jura in northwest) with a central plateau of rolling hills, plains, and large lakes natural resources: hydropower potential, timber, salt land use: 10% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 40% meadows and pastures; 26% forest and woodland; 23% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: dominated by alps note: landlocked; crossroads of northern and southern europe people population: 6,742,461 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 12 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 3 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 5 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 75 years male, 83 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--swiss (sing. & pl.); adjective--swiss ethnic divisions: total population--65% german, 18% french, 10% italian, 1% romansch, 6% other; swiss nationals--74% german, 20% french, 4% italian, 1% romansch, 1% other religion: 49% roman catholic, 48% protestant, 0.3% jewish language: total population--65% german, 18% french, 12% italian, 1% romansch, 4% other; swiss nationals--74% german, 20% french, 4% italian, 1% romansch, 1% other literacy: 99% labor force: 3,220,000; 841,000 foreign workers, mostly italian; 42% services, 39% industry and crafts, 11% government, 7% agriculture and forestry, 1% other (1988) organized labor: 20% of labor force government long-form name: swiss confederation type: federal republic capital: bern administrative divisions: 26 cantons (cantons, singular--canton in french; cantoni, singular--cantone in italian; kantone, singular--kanton in german); aargau, ausser-rhoden, basel-landschaft, basel-stadt, bern, fribourg, geneve, glarus, graubunden, inner-rhoden, jura, luzern, neuchatel, nidwalden, obwalden, sankt gallen, schaffhausen, schwyz, solothurn, thurgau, ticino, uri, valais, vaud, zug, zurich independence: 1 august 1291 constitution: 29 may 1874 legal system: civil law system influenced by customary law; judicial review of legislative acts, except with respect to federal decrees of general obligatory character; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: anniversary of the founding of the swiss confederation, 1 august (1291) executive branch: president, vice president, federal council (german--bundesrat, french--conseil federal) legislative branch: bicameral federal assembly (german--bundesversammlung, french--assemblee federale) consists of an upper council or council of states (german--standerat, french--conseil des etats) and and a lower council or national council (german--nationalrat, french--conseil national) judicial branch: federal supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president arnold koller (1990 calendar year; presidency rotates annually); vice president flavio cotti (term runs concurrently with that of president) political parties and leaders: social democratic party (sps), helmut hubacher, chairman; radical democratic party (fdp), bruno hunziker, president; christian democratic people's party (cvp), eva segmuller-weber, president; swiss people's party (svp), hans uhlmann, president; workers' party (pda), armand magnin, secretary general; national action party (na), hans zwicky, chairman; independents' party (ldu), dr. franz jaeger, president; republican movement (rep), dr. james schworzenboch, franz baumgartner, leaders; liberal party (lps), gilbert coutau, president; evangelical people's party (evp), max dunki, president; progressive organizations of switzerland (poch), georg degen, secretary; federation of ecology parties (gp), laurent rebeaud, president; autonomous socialist party (psa), werner carobbio, secretary suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: council of state--last held throughout 1987 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(46 total) cvp 19, fdp 14, sps 5, svp 4, others 4; national council--last held 18 october 1987 (next to be held october 1991); results--fdp 22.9%, cvp 20.0%, sps 18.4%, svp 11.0%, gp 4.8%, others 22.9%; seats--(200 total) fdp 51, cvp 42, sps 41, svp 25, gp 9, others 32 communists: 4,500 members (est.) member of: adb, ccc, council of europe, dac, efta, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, icac, icao, ico, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ilo, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, iwc--international wheat council, oecd, unesco, upu, wcl, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto; permanent observer status at the un diplomatic representation: ambassador edouard brunner; chancery at 2900 cathedral avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 745-7900; there are swiss consulates general in atlanta, chicago, houston, los angeles, new york, and san francisco; us--ambassador joseph b. guildenhorn; embassy at jubilaeumstrasse 93, 3005 bern; telephone p41o (31) 437011; there is a branch office of the embassy in geneva and a consulate general in zurich flag: red square with a bold, equilateral white cross in the center that does not extend to the edges of the flag economy overview: switzerland's economic success is matched in few, if any, other nations. per capita output, general living standards, education and science, health care, and diet are unsurpassed in europe. inflation remains low because of sound government policy and harmonious labor-management relations. unemployment is negligible, a marked contrast to the larger economies of western europe. this economic stability helps promote the important banking and tourist sectors. since world war ii, switzerland's economy has adjusted smoothly to the great changes in output and trade patterns in europe and presumably can adjust to the challenges of the 1990s, in particular, the further economic integration of western europe and the amazingly rapid changes in east european political/economic prospects. gdp: $119.5 billion, per capita $17,800; real growth rate 3.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.8% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 0.5% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $17.0 billion; expenditures $16.8 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1988) exports: $51.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--machinery and equipment, precision instruments, metal products, foodstuffs, textiles and clothing; partners--europe 64% (ec 56%, other 8%), us 9%, japan 4% imports: $57.2 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--agricultural products, machinery and transportation equipment, chemicals, textiles, construction materials; partners--europe 79% (ec 72%, other 7%), us 5% external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate 7.0% (1988) electricity: 17,710,000 kw capacity; 59,070 million kwh produced, 8,930 kwh per capita (1989) industries: machinery, chemicals, watches, textiles, precision instruments agriculture: dairy farming predominates; less than 50% self-sufficient; food shortages--fish, refined sugar, fats and oils (other than butter), grains, eggs, fruits, vegetables, meat aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $2.5 billion currency: swiss franc, franken, or franco (plural--francs, franken, or franchi); 1 swiss franc, franken, or franco (swf) = 100 centimes, rappen, or centesimi exchange rates: swiss francs, franken, or franchi (swf) per us$1--1.5150 (january 1990), 1.6359 (1989), 1.4633 (1988), 1.4912 (1987), 1.7989 (1986), 2.4571 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 5,174 km total; 2,971 km are government owned and 2,203 km are nongovernment owned; the government network consists of 2,897 km 1.435-meter standard gauge and 74 km 1.000-meter narrow gauge track; 1,432 km double track, 99% electrified; the nongovernment network consists of 710 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 1,418 km 1.000-meter gauge, and 75 km 0.790-meter gauge track, 100% electrified highways: 62,145 km total (all paved), of which 18,620 km are canton and 1,057 km are national highways (740 km autobahn); 42,468 km are communal roads pipelines: 314 km crude oil; 1,506 km natural gas inland waterways: 65 km; rhine (basel to rheinfelden, schaffhausen to bodensee); 12 navigable lakes ports: basel (river port) merchant marine: 20 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 215,851 grt/365,131 dwt; includes 4 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 chemical tanker, 3 specialized liquid cargo, 8 bulk civil air: 89 major transport aircraft airports: 72 total, 70 usable; 42 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 17 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent domestic, international, and broadcast services; 5,808,000 telephones; stations--6 am, 36 (400 relays) fm, 145 (1,250 relays) tv; communications satellite earth stations operating in the intelsat (4 atlantic ocean and 1 indian ocean) and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: army, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,800,211; 1,550,662 fit for military service; 44,154 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: $1.2 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: syria geography total area: 185,180 km2; land area: 184,050 km2 (including 1,295 km2 of israeli-occupied territory) comparative area: slightly larger than north dakota land boundaries: 2,253 km total; iraq 605 km, israel 76 km, jordan 375 km, lebanon 375 km, turkey 822 km coastline: 193 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 6 nm beyond territorial sea limit; territorial sea: 35 nm disputes: separated from israel by the 1949 armistice line; golan heights is israeli occupied; hatay question with turkey; periodic disputes with iraq over euphrates water rights; ongoing dispute over water development plans by turkey for the tigris and euphrates rivers; kurdish question among iran, iraq, syria, turkey, and the ussr climate: mostly desert; hot, dry, sunny summers (june to august) and mild, rainy winters (december to february) along coast terrain: primarily semiarid and desert plateau; narrow coastal plain; mountains in west natural resources: crude oil, phosphates, chrome and manganese ores, asphalt, iron ore, rock salt, marble, gypsum land use: 28% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 46% meadows and pastures; 3% forest and woodland; 20% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: there are 35 jewish settlements in the israeli-occupied golan heights people population: 12,483,440 (july 1990), growth rate 3.8% (1990); in addition, there are 13,500 druze and 10,500 jewish settlers in the israeli-occupied golan heights birth rate: 44 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 38 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--syrian(s); adjective--syrian ethnic divisions: 90.3% arab; 9.7% kurds, armenians, and other religion: 74% sunni muslim; 16% alawite, druze, and other muslim sects; 10% christian (various sects); tiny jewish communities in damascus, al qamishli, and aleppo language: arabic (official), kurdish, armenian, aramaic, circassian; french widely understood literacy: 49% labor force: 2,400,000; 36% miscellaneous and government services, 32% agriculture, 32% industry and construction); majority unskilled; shortage of skilled labor (1984) organized labor: 5% of labor force government long-form name: syrian arab republic type: republic; under leftwing military regime since march 1963 capital: damascus administrative divisions: 14 provinces (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); al hasakah, al ladhiqiyah, al qunaytirah, ar raqqah, as suwayda, dara, dayr az zawr, dimashq, halab, hamah, hims, idlib, madinat dimashq, tartus independence: 17 april 1946 (from league of nations mandate under french administration); formerly united arab republic constitution: 13 march 1973 legal system: based on islamic law and civil law system; special religious courts; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 17 april (1946) executive branch: president, three vice presidents, prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral people's council (majlis ash shaab) judicial branch: supreme constitutional court, high judicial council, court of cassation, state security courts leaders: chief of state--president lt. gen. hafiz al-assad (since 22 february 1971); vice presidents abd al-halim khaddam, dr. rifat al-assad, and muhammad zuhayr mashariqa (since 11 march 1984); head of government--prime minister mahmud zubi (since 1 november 1987); deputy prime minister lt. gen. mustafa talas (since 11 march 1984) political parties and leaders: ruling party is the arab socialist resurrectionist (bath) party; the progressive national front is dominated by bathists but includes independents and members of the syrian arab socialist party (asp), arab socialist union (asu), socialist unionist movement, and syrian communist party (scp) suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 10-11 february 1985 (next to be held february 1992); results--president hafiz al-assad was reelected without opposition; people's council--last held 10-11 february 1986 (next to be held 22 may 1990); results--bath 66%, asu 5%, scp 5%, socialist unionist movement 4%, asp 2%, independents 18%; seats--(195 total) bath 129, communist 9, asu 9, socialiist unionist movement 8, asp 5, independents 35; the people's council will have 250 seats total in the 22 may 1990 election communists: mostly sympathizers, numbering about 5,000 other political or pressure groups: non-bath parties have little effective political influence; communist party ineffective; greatest threat to assad regime lies in factionalism in the military; conservative religious leaders; muslim brotherhood member of: arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oapec, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador walid mu'allim; chancery at 2215 wyoming avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 232-6313; us--ambassador edward p. djerejian; embassy at abu rumaneh, al mansur street no.2, damascus (mailing address is p. o. box 29, damascus); telephone p963o (11) 333052 or 332557, 330416, 332814, 332315 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with two small green five-pointed stars in a horizontal line centered in the white band; similar to the flags of the yar which has one star and iraq which has three stars (in a horizontal line centered in the white band)--all green and five-pointed; also similar to the flag of egypt which has a symbolic eagle centered in the white band economy overview: syria's rigidly structured bathist economy is turning out roughly the same amount of goods in 1989 as in 1983, when the population was 20% smaller. economic difficulties are attributable, in part, to severe drought in several recent years, costly but unsuccessful attempts to match israel's military strength, a falloff in arab aid, and insufficient foreign exchange earnings to buy needed inputs for industry and agriculture. socialist policy, embodied in a thicket of bureaucratic regulations, in many instances has driven away or pushed underground the mercantile and entrepreneurial spirit for which syrian businessmen have long been famous. two bright spots: a sizable number of villagers have benefited from land redistribution, electrification, and other rural development programs; and a recent find of light crude oil has enabled syria to cut back its substantial imports of light crude. a long-term concern is the additional drain of upstream euphrates water by turkey when its vast dam and irrigation projects are completed toward the end of the 1990s. gdp: $18.5 billion, per capita $1,540; real growth rate 2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 70% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $3.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $1.92 billion (1989) exports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum, textiles, fruits and vegetables, phosphates; partners--italy, romania, ussr, us, iran, france imports: $1.9 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--petroleum, machinery, base metals, foodstuffs and beverages; partners--iran, frg, ussr, france, gdr, libya, us external debt: $5.3 billion in hard currency (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 2,867,000 kw capacity; 6,000 million kwh produced, 500 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, food processing, beverages, tobacco, phosphate rock mining, petroleum agriculture: accounts for 27% of gdp and one-third of labor force; all major crops (wheat, barley, cotton, lentils, chickpeas) grown on rainfed land causing wide swings in yields; animal products--beef, lamb, eggs, poultry, milk; not self-sufficient in grain or livestock products aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-81), $538 million; western (non-us) oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $12.3 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $3.3 billion currency: syrian pound (plural--pounds); 1 syrian pound (ls) = 100 piasters exchange rates: syrian pounds (ls) per us$1--11.2250 (fixed rate since 1987), 3.9250 (fixed rate 1976-87) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 2,241 km total; 1,930 km standard gauge, 311 km 1.050-meter narrow gauge; note--the tartus-latakia line is nearly complete highways: 27,000 km total; 21,000 km paved, 3,000 km gravel or crushed stone, 3,000 km improved earth inland waterways: 672 km; of little economic importance pipelines: 1,304 km crude oil; 515 km refined products ports: tartus, latakia, baniyas merchant marine: 19 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 53,938 grt/72,220 dwt; includes 16 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 bulk civil air: 35 major transport aircraft airports: 97 total, 94 usable; 24 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 21 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 5 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system currently undergoing significant improvement; 512,600 telephones; stations--9 am, 1 fm, 40 tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat earth station, with 1 intersputnik station under construction; 1 submarine cable; coaxial cable and radio relay to iraq, jordan, turkey, and lebanon (inactive) defense forces branches: syrian arab army, syrian arab air force, syrian arab navy military manpower: males 15-49, 2,712,360; 1,520,798 fit for military service; 144,791 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: tanzania geography total area: 945,090 km2; land area: 886,040 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than twice the size of california land boundaries: 3,402 km total; burundi 451 km, kenya 769 km, malawi 475 km, mozambique 756 km, rwanda 217 km, uganda 396 km, zambia 338 km coastline: 1,424 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: boundary dispute with malawi in lake nyasa; tanzania-zaire-zambia tripoint in lake tanganyika may no longer be indefinite since it is reported that the indefinite section of the zaire-zambia boundary has been settled climate: varies from tropical along coast to temperate in highlands terrain: plains along coast; central plateau; highlands in north, south natural resources: hydropower potential, tin, phosphates, iron ore, coal, diamonds, gemstones, gold, natural gas, nickel land use: 5% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 40% meadows and pastures; 47% forest and woodland; 7% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: lack of water and tsetse fly limit agriculture; recent droughts affected marginal agriculture; kilimanjaro is highest point in africa people population: 25,970,843 (july 1990), growth rate 3.4% (1990) birth rate: 50 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 16 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 107 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 49 years male, 54 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--tanzanian(s); adjective--tanzanian ethnic divisions: mainland--99% native african consisting of well over 100 tribes; 1% asian, european, and arab religion: mainland--33% christian, 33% muslim, 33% indigenous beliefs; zanzibar--almost all muslim language: swahili and english (official); english primary language of commerce, administration, and higher education; swahili widely understood and generally used for communication between ethnic groups; first language of most people is one of the local languages; primary education is generally in swahili literacy: 79% labor force: 732,200 wage earners; 90% agriculture, 10% industry and commerce (1986 est.) organized labor: 15% of labor force government long-form name: united republic of tanzania type: republic capital: dar es salaam; some government offices have been transferred to dodoma, which is planned as the new national capital in the 1990s administrative divisions: 25 regions; arusha, dar es salaam, dodoma, iringa, kigoma, kilimanjaro, lindi, mara, mbeya, morogoro, mtwara, mwanza, pemba north, pemba south, pwani, rukwa, ruvuma, shinyanga, singida, tabora, tanga, zanzibar central/south, zanzibar north, zanzibar urban/west, ziwa magharibi independence: tanganyika became independent 9 december 1961 (from un trusteeship under british administration); zanzibar became independent 19 december 1963 (from uk); tanganyika united with zanzibar 26 april 1964 to form the united republic of tanganyika and zanzibar; renamed united republic of tanzania 29 october 1964 constitution: 15 march 1984 (zanzibar has its own constitution but remains subject to provisions of the union constitution) legal system: based on english common law; judicial review of legislative acts limited to matters of interpretation; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: union day, 26 april (1964) executive branch: president, first vice president and prime minister of the union, second vice president and president of zanzibar, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (bunge) judicial branch: court of appeal, high court leaders: chief of state--president ali hassan mwinyi (since 5 november 1985); head of government--first vice president and prime minister joseph sinde warioba (since 6 november 1985) political parties and leaders: only party--chama cha mapinduzi (ccm or revolutionary party), julius nyerere, party chairman suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 27 october 1985 (next to be held october 1990); results--ali hassan mwinyi was elected without opposition; national assembly--last held 27 october 1985 (next to be held october 1990); results--ccm is the only party; seats--(244 total, 168 elected) ccm 168 communists: no communist party; a few communist sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador-designate charles musama nyirabu; chancery at 2139 r street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 939-6125; us--ambassador edmond de jarnette; embassy at 36 laibon road (off bagamoyo road), dar es salaam (mailing address is p. o. box 9123, dar es salaam); telephone p255o (51) 37501 through 37504 flag: divided diagonally by a yellow-edged black band from the lower hoist-side corner; the upper triangle (hoist side) is green and the lower triangle is blue economy overview: tanzania is one of the poorest countries in the world. the economy is heavily dependent on agriculture, which accounts for about 40% of gdp, provides 85% of exports, and employs 90% of the work force. industry accounts for about 10% of gdp and is mainly limited to processing agricultural products and light consumer goods. the economic recovery program announced in mid-1986 has generated notable increases in agricultural production and financial support for the program by bilateral donors. the world bank and the international monetary fund have increased the availability of imports and provided funds to rehabilitate tanzania's deteriorated economic infrastructure. gdp: $5.92 billion, per capita $235; real growth rate 4.5% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 29% (1989) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $568 million; expenditures $835 million, including capital expenditures of $230 million (fy89) exports: $394 million (f.o.b., fy89); commodities--coffee, cotton, sisal, cashew nuts, meat, tobacco, tea, diamonds, coconut products, pyrethrum, cloves (zanzibar); partners--frg, uk, us, netherlands, japan imports: $1.3 billion (c.i.f., fy89); commodities--manufactured goods, machinery and transportation equipment, cotton piece goods, crude oil, foodstuffs; partners--frg, uk, us, iran, japan, italy external debt: $4.5 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 6% (1988 est.) electricity: 401,000 kw capacity; 895 million kwh produced, 35 kwh per capita (1989) industries: primarily agricultural processing (sugar, beer, cigarettes, sisal twine), diamond mine, oil refinery, shoes, cement, textiles, wood products, fertilizer agriculture: accounts for over 40% of gdp; topography and climatic conditions limit cultivated crops to only 5% of land area; cash crops--coffee, sisal, tea, cotton, pyrethrum (insecticide made from chrysanthemums), cashews, tobacco, cloves (zanzibar); food crops--corn, wheat, cassava, bananas, fruits, and vegetables; small numbers of cattle, sheep, and goats; not self-sufficient in food grain production aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $387 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $8.5 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $44 million; communist countries (1970-88), $607 million currency: tanzanian shilling (plural--shillings); 1 tanzanian shilling (tsh) = 100 cents exchange rates: tanzanian shillings (tsh) per us$1--192.901 (january 1990), 143.377 (1989), 99.292 (1988), 64.260 (1987), 32.698 (1986), 17.472 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 3,555 km total; 960 km 1.067-meter gauge; 2,595 km 1.000-meter gauge, 6.4 km double track, 962 km tazara railroad 1.067-meter gauge; 115 km 1.000-meter gauge planned by end of decade highways: total 81,900 km, 3,600 km paved; 5,600 km gravel or crushed stone; remainder improved and unimproved earth pipelines: 982 km crude oil inland waterways: lake tanganyika, lake victoria, lake nyasa ports: dar es salaam, mtwara, tanga, and zanzibar are ocean ports; mwanza on lake victoria and kigoma on lake tanganyika are inland ports merchant marine: 7 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 29,174 grt/39,186 dwt; includes 2 passenger-cargo, 3 cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 6 major transport aircraft airports: 103 total, 92 usable; 13 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 44 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system of open wire, radio relay, and troposcatter; 103,800 telephones; stations--12 am, 4 fm, 2 tv; 1 indian ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: tanzanian people's defense force includes army, navy, and air force; paramilitary police field force unit; militia military manpower: males 15-49, 5,351,192; 3,087,501 fit for military service defense expenditures: 3.3% of gdp (1985) ---------------------------------------------------country: thailand geography total area: 514,000 km2; land area: 511,770 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of wyoming land boundaries: 4,863 km total; burma 1,800 km, cambodia 803 km, laos 1,754 km, malaysia 506 km coastline: 3,219 km maritime claims: continental shelf: not specific; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: boundary dispute with laos climate: tropical; rainy, warm, cloudy southwest monsoon (mid-may to september); dry, cool northeast monsoon (november to mid-march); southern isthmus always hot and humid terrain: central plain; eastern plateau (khorat); mountains elsewhere natural resources: tin, rubber, natural gas, tungsten, tantalum, timber, lead, fish, gypsum, lignite, fluorite land use: 34% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 30% forest and woodland; 31% other; includes 7% irrigated environment: air and water pollution; land subsidence in bangkok area note: controls only land route from asia to malaysia and singapore people population: 55,115,683 (july 1990), growth rate 1.3% (1990) birth rate: 20 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 34 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--thai (sing. and pl.); adjective--thai ethnic divisions: 75% thai, 14% chinese, 11% other religion: 95.5% buddhist, 4% muslim, 0.5% other language: thai; english is the secondary language of the elite; ethnic and regional dialects literacy: 82% labor force: 26,000,000; 73% agriculture, 11% industry and commerce, 10% services, 6% government (1984) organized labor: 300,000 union members (1986) government long-form name: kingdom of thailand type: constitutional monarchy capital: bangkok administrative divisions: 73 provinces (changwat, singular and plural); ang thong, buriram, chachoengsao, chai nat, chaiyaphum, chanthaburi, chiang mai, chiang rai, chon buri, chumphon, kalasin, kamphaeng phet, kanchanaburi, khon kaen, krabi, krung thep mahanakhon, lampang, lamphun, loei, lop buri, mae hong son, maha sarakham, nakhon nayok, nakhon pathom, nakhon phanom, nakhon ratchasima, nakhon sawan, nakhon si thammarat, nan, narathiwat, nong khai, nonthaburi, pathum thani, pattani, phangnga, phatthalung, phayao, phetchabun, phetchaburi, phichit, phitsanulok, phra nakhon si ayutthaya, phrae, phuket, prachin buri, prachuap khiri khan, ranong, ratchaburi, rayong, roi et, sakon nakhon, samut prakan, samut sakhon, samut songkhram, sara buri, satun, sing buri, sisaket, songkhla, sukhothai, suphan buri, surat thani, surin, tak, trang, trat, ubon ratchathani, udon thani, uthai thani, uttaradit, yala, yasothon independence: 1238 (traditional founding date); never colonized constitution: 22 december 1978 legal system: based on civil law system, with influences of common law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: birthday of his majesty the king, 5 december (1927) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, council of ministers (cabinet), privy council legislative branch: bicameral national assembly (ratha satha) consists of an upper house or senate (woothi satha) and a lower house or house of representatives (satha poothan) judicial branch: supreme court (sarn dika) leaders: chief of state--king bhumibol adulyadej (since 9 june 1946); heir apparent crown prince vajiralongkorn (born 28 july 1952); head of government prime minister maj. gen. chatchai chunhawan (since 9 august 1988); deputy prime minister chuan likphai political parties and leaders: democrat party (dp), social action party (sap), thai nation party (tnp), people's party (ratsadon), people's party (prachachon), thai citizens party (tcp), united democracy party, solidarity party, thai people's party, mass party, force of truth party (phalang dharma) suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: house of representatives--last held 24 july 1988 (next to be held within 90 days of july 1992); results--tnp 27%, sap 15%, dp 13%, tcp 9%, others 36%; seats--(357 total) tnp 96, solidarity 62, sap 54, dp 48, tcp 31, people's party (ratsadon) 21, people's party (prachachon) 17, force of truth party (phalang dharma) 14, united democracy party 5, mass party 5, others 4 communists: illegal communist party has 500 to 1,000 members (est.); armed communist insurgents throughout thailand total 300 to 500 (est.) member of: adb, anrpc, asean, aspac, association of tin producing countries, ccc, colombo plan, gatt, escap, fao, g-77, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, inro, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itc, itu, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador vitthya vejjajiva; embassy at 2300 kalorama road nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 483-7200; there are thai consulates general in chicago, los angeles, and new york; us--ambassador daniel o'donahue; embassy at 95 wireless road, bangkok (mailing address is apo san francisco 96346); telephone p66o (2) 252-5040; there is a us consulate general in chiang mai and consulates in songkhla and udorn flag: five horizontal bands of red (top), white, blue (double width), white, and red economy overview: thailand, one of the more advanced developing countries in asia, enjoyed its second straight exceptionally prosperous year in 1989. real output again rose about 11%. the increasingly sophisticated manufacturing sector benefited from export-oriented investment, and agriculture grew by 4.0% because of improved weather. the trade deficit of $5.2 billion was more than offset by earnings from tourism ($3.9 billion), remittances, and net capital inflows. the government has followed a fairly sound fiscal and monetary policy, aided by increased tax receipts from the fast-moving economy. in 1989 the government approved new projects--roads, ports, electric power, communications--needed to refurbish the now overtaxed infrastructure. although growth in 1990-91 must necessarily fall below the 1988-89 pace, thailand's immediate economic outlook is good, assuming the continuation of prudent government policies in the context of a private-sector-oriented development strategy. gnp: $64.5 billion, per capita $1,160; real growth rate 10.8% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.4% (1989) unemployment rate: 6% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $12.1 billion; expenditures $9.7 billion, including capital expenditures of na (fy89) exports: $19.9 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--textiles 12%, fishery products 12%, rice 8%, tapioca 8%, jewelry 6%, manufactured gas, corn, tin; partners--us 18%, japan 14%, singapore 9%, netherlands, malaysia, hong kong, china (1988) imports: $25.1 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--machinery and parts 23%, petroleum products 13%, chemicals 11%, iron and steel, electrical appliances; partners--japan 26%, us 14%, singapore 7%, frg, malaysia, uk (1987) external debt: $18.5 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 12.5% (1989) electricity: 7,100,000 kw capacity; 28,000 million kwh produced, 500 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism is the largest source of foreign exchange; textiles and garments, agricultural processing, beverages, tobacco, cement, other light manufacturing, such as jewelry; electric appliances and components, integrated circuits, furniture, plastics; world's second-largest tungsten producer and third-largest tin producer agriculture: accounts for 16% of gnp and 73% of labor force; leading producer and exporter of rice and cassava (tapioca); other crops--rubber, corn, sugarcane, coconuts, soybeans; except for wheat, self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 2.2 million tons (1987) illicit drugs: a minor producer, major illicit trafficker of heroin, particularly from burma and laos, and cannabis for the international drug market; eradication efforts have reduced the area of cannabis cultivation and shifted some production to neighboring countries; opium poppy cultivation has been affected by eradication efforts, but unusually good weather boosted output in 1989 aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $828 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $7.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $19 million currency: baht (plural--baht); 1 baht (b) = 100 satang exchange rates: baht (b) per us$1--25.726 (january 1990), 25.699 (1989), 25.294 (1988), 25.723 (1987), 26.299 (1986), 27.159 (1985) fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications railroads: 3,940 km 1.000-meter gauge, 99 km double track highways: 44,534 km total; 28,016 km paved, 5,132 km earth surface, 11,386 km under development inland waterways: 3,999 km principal waterways; 3,701 km with navigable depths of 0.9 m or more throughout the year; numerous minor waterways navigable by shallow-draft native craft pipelines: natural gas, 350 km; refined products, 67 km ports: bangkok, pattani, phuket, sattahip, si racha merchant marine: 122 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 483,688 grt/730,750 dwt; includes 2 short-sea passenger, 70 cargo, 8 container, 27 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 8 liquefied gas, 1 chemical tanker, 3 bulk, 1 refrigerated cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off, 1 combination bulk civil air: 41 (plus 2 leased) major transport aircraft airports: 127 total, 103 usable; 56 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 13 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 26 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: service to general public adequate; bulk of service to government activities provided by multichannel cable and radio relay network; 739,500 telephones (1987); stations--over 200 am, 100 fm, and 11 tv in government-controlled networks; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 pacific ocean intelsat; domestic satellite system being developed defense forces branches: royal thai army, royal thai navy (includes royal thai marine corps), royal thai air force; paramilitary forces include border patrol police, thahan phran (irregular soldiers), village defense forces military manpower: males 15-49, 15,617,486; 9,543,119 fit for military service; 610,410 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 2.9% of gnp, or $1.9 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: togo geography total area: 56,790 km2; land area: 54,390 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than west virginia land boundaries: 1,647 km total; benin 644 km, burkina 126 km, ghana 877 km coastline: 56 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 30 nm climate: tropical; hot, humid in south; semiarid in north terrain: gently rolling savanna in north; central hills; southern plateau; low coastal plain with extensive lagoons and marshes natural resources: phosphates, limestone, marble land use: 25% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 28% forest and woodland; 42% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: hot, dry harmattan wind can reduce visibility in north during winter; recent droughts affecting agriculture; deforestation people population: 3,674,355 (july 1990), growth rate 3.7% (1990) birth rate: 50 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 112 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 53 years male, 57 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--togolese (sing. and pl.); adjective--togolese ethnic divisions: 37 tribes; largest and most important are ewe, mina, and kabye; under 1% european and syrian-lebanese religion: about 70% indigenous beliefs, 20% christian, 10% muslim language: french, both official and language of commerce; major african languages are ewe and mina in the south and dagomba and kabye in the north literacy: 40.7% labor force: na; 78% agriculture, 22% industry; about 88,600 wage earners, evenly divided between public and private sectors; 50% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: one national union, the national federation of togolese workers government long-form name: republic of togo type: republic; one-party presidential regime capital: lome administrative divisions: 21 circumscriptions (circonscriptions, singular--circonscription); amlame (amou), aneho (lacs), atakpame (ogou), badou (wawa), bafilo (assoli), bassar (bassari), dapaong (tone), kante (keran), klouto (kloto), kpagouda (binah), lama-kara (kozah), lome (golfe), mango (oti), niamtougou (doufelgou), notse (haho), sotouboua, tabligbo (yoto), tchamba, tchaoudjo, tsevie (zio), vogan (vo); note--the 21 units may now be called prefectures (prefectures, singular--prefecture) and reported name changes for individual units are included in parenthesis independence: 27 april 1960 (from un trusteeship under french administration, formerly french togo) constitution: 30 december 1979, effective 13 january 1980 legal system: french-based court system national holiday: liberation day (anniversary of coup), 13 january (1967) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: court of appeal (cour d'appel), supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president gen. gnassingbe eyadema (since 14 april 1967) political parties and leaders: only party--rally of the togolese people (rpt), president eyadema suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: president--last held 21 december 1986 (next to be held december 1993); results--gen. eyadema was reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held 4 march 1990 (next to be held march 1995); results--rpt is the only party; seats--(77 total) rpt 77 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, ceao (observer), eama, eca, ecowas, entente, fao, g-77, gatt, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador ellom-kodjo schuppius; chancery at 2208 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 234-4212 or 4213; us--ambassador rush w. taylor, jr.; embassy at rue pelletier caventou and rue vauban, lome (mailing address is b. p. 852, lome); telephone p228o 21-29-91 through 94 and 21-36-09 flag: five equal horizontal bands of green (top and bottom) alternating with yellow; there is a white five-pointed star on a red square in the upper hoist-side corner; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: togo is one of the least developed countries in the world with a per capita gdp of about $400. the economy is heavily dependent on subsistence agriculture, which accounts for about 35% of gdp and provides employment for 80% of the labor force. primary agricultural exports are cocoa, coffee, and cotton, which together account for about 30% of total export earnings. togo is self-sufficient in basic foodstuffs when harvests are normal. in the industrial sector phosphate mining is by far the most important activity, with phosphate exports accounting for about 40% of total foreign exchange earnings. gdp: $1.35 billion, per capita $405; real growth rate 4.1% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.5% (1987 est.) unemployment rate: 2.0% (1987) budget: revenues $354 million; expenditures $399 million, including capital expenditures of $102 million (1988 est.) exports: $344 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--phosphates, cocoa, coffee, cotton, manufactures, palm kernels; partners--ec 70%, africa 9%, us 2%, other 19% (1985) imports: $369 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--food, fuels, durable consumer goods, other intermediate goods, capital goods; partners--ec 69%, africa 10%, japan 7%, us 4%, other 10% (1985) external debt: $1.3 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 4.9% (1987 est.) electricity: 117,000 kw capacity; 155 million kwh produced, 45 kwh per capita (1989) industries: phosphate mining, agricultural processing, cement, handicrafts, textiles, beverages agriculture: cash crops--coffee, cocoa, cotton; food crops--yams, cassava, corn, beans, rice, millet, sorghum, fish aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $121 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.6 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $35 million; communist countries (1970-88), $46 million currency: communaute financiere africaine franc (plural--francs); 1 cfa franc (cfaf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: communaute financiere africaine francs (cfaf) per us$1--287.99 (january 1990), 319.01 (1989), 297.85 (1988), 300.54 (1987), 346.30 (1986), 449.26 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 515 km 1.000-meter gauge, single track highways: 6,462 km total; 1,762 km paved; 4,700 km unimproved roads inland waterways: none ports: lome, kpeme (phosphate port) merchant marine: 7 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 41,809 grt/72,289 dwt; includes 4 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 multifunction large-load carrier civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 9 total, 9 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system based on network of open-wire lines supplemented by radio relay routes; 12,000 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 3 (2 relays) tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 symphonie defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, paramilitary gendarmerie military manpower: males 15-49, 767,949; 403,546 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 3.3% of gdp (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: tokelau (territory of new zealand) geography total area: 10 km2; land area: 10 km2 comparative area: about 17 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 101 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; moderated by trade winds (april to november) terrain: coral atolls enclosing large lagoons natural resources: negligible land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: lies in pacific typhoon belt note: located 3,750 km southwest of honolulu in the south pacific ocean, about halfway between hawaii and new zealand people population: 1,700 (july 1990), growth rate 0.0% (1990) birth rate: na births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: na deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: na migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: na deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: na years male, na years female (1990) total fertility rate: na children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--tokelauan(s); adjective--tokelauan ethnic divisions: all polynesian, with cultural ties to western samoa religion: 70% congregational christian church, 30% roman catholic; on atafu, all congregational christian church of samoa; on nukunonu, all roman catholic; on fakaofo, both denominations, with the congregational christian church predominant language: tokelauan (a polynesian language) and english literacy: na%, but probably high labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: territory of new zealand capital: none, each atoll has its own administrative center administrative divisions: none (territory of new zealand) independence: none (territory of new zealand) constitution: administered under the tokelau islands act of 1948, as amended in 1970 legal system: british and local statutes national holiday: waitangi day (treaty of waitangi established british sovereignty over new zealand), 6 february (1840) executive branch: administrator (appointed by the minister of foreign affairs in new zealand), official secretary legislative branch: council of elders (taupulega) on each atoll judicial branch: high court in niue, supreme court in new zealand leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); head of government--administrator neil walter; official secretary m. norrish, office of tokelau affairs suffrage: na elections: na communists: probably none diplomatic representation: none (territory of new zealand) flag: the flag of new zealand is used economy overview: tokelau's small size, isolation, and lack of resources greatly restrain economic development and confine agriculture to the subsistence level. the people must rely on aid from new zealand to maintain public services, annual aid being substantially greater than gdp. the principal sources of revenue come from sales of copra, postage stamps, souvenir coins, and handicrafts. money is also remitted to families from relatives in new zealand. gdp: $1.4 million, per capita $800; real growth rate na% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $430,830; expenditures $2.8 million, including capital expenditures of $37,300 (fy87) exports: $98,000 (f.o.b., 1983); commodities--stamps, copra, handicrafts; partners--nz imports: $323,400 (c.i.f., 1983); commodities--foodstuffs, building materials, fuel; partners--nz external debt: none industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 200 kw capacity; 0.30 million kwh produced, 175 kwh per capita (1989) industries: small-scale enterprises for copra production, wood work, plaited craft goods; stamps, coins; fishing agriculture: coconuts, copra; basic subsistence crops--breadfruit, papaya, bananas; pigs, poultry, goats aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $21 million currency: new zealand dollar (plural--dollars); 1 new zealand dollar (nz$) = 100 cents exchange rates: new zealand dollars (nz$) per us$1--1.6581 (january 1990), 1.6708 (1989), 1.5244 (1988), 1.6886 (1987), 1.9088 (1986), 2.0064 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications ports: none; offshore anchorage only airports: none; lagoon landings by amphibious aircraft from western samoa telecommunications: telephone service between islands and to western samoa defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of new zealand ---------------------------------------------------country: tonga geography total area: 748 km2; land area: 718 km2 comparative area: slightly more than four times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 419 km maritime claims: continental shelf: no specific limits; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; modified by trade winds; warm season (december to may), cool season (may to december) terrain: most islands have limestone base formed from uplifted coral formation; others have limestone overlying volcanic base natural resources: fish, fertile soil land use: 25% arable land; 55% permanent crops; 6% meadows and pastures; 12% forest and woodland; 2% other environment: archipelago of 170 islands (36 inhabited); subject to cyclones (october to april); deforestation note: located about 2,250 km north-northwest of new zealand, about two-thirds of the way between hawaii and new zealand people population: 101,313 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 27 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 11 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 24 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--tongan(s); adjective--tongan ethnic divisions: polynesian; about 300 europeans religion: christian; free wesleyan church claims over 30,000 adherents language: tongan, english literacy: 90-95%; compulsory education for children ages 6 to 14 labor force: na; 70% agriculture; 600 engaged in mining organized labor: none government long-form name: kingdom of tonga type: hereditary constitutional monarchy capital: nukualofa administrative divisions: three island groups; haapai, tongatapu, vavau independence: 4 june 1970 (from uk; formerly friendly islands) constitution: 4 november 1875, revised 1 january 1967 legal system: based on english law national holiday: emancipation day, 4 june (1970) executive branch: monarch, prime minister, deputy prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet), privy council legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--king taufa'ahau tupou iv (since 16 december 1965); head of government--prime minister prince fatafehi tu'ipelehake (since 16 december 1965) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: all literate, tax-paying males and all literate females over 21 elections: legislative assembly--last held 14-15 february 1990 (next to be held na february 1993); results--percent of vote na; seats--(29 total, 9 elected) 6 proreform, 3 traditionalist communists: none known member of: acp, adb, commonwealth, fao, escap, gatt (de facto), ifad, itu, spf, unesco, upu, who diplomatic representation: ambassador siosaia a'ulupekotofa tuita resides in london; us--the us has no offices in tonga; the ambassador to fiji is accredited to tonga and makes periodic visits flag: red with a bold red cross on a white rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner economy overview: the economy's base is agriculture, which employs about 70% of the labor force and contributes 50% to gdp. coconuts, bananas, and vanilla beans are the main crops and make up two-thirds of exports. the country must import a high proportion of its food, mainly from new zealand. the manufacturing sector accounts for only 10% of gdp. tourism is the primary source of hard currency earnings, but the island remains dependent on sizable external aid and remittances to sustain its trade deficit. gdp: $86 million, per capita $850; real growth rate 3.6% (fy89 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.2% (fy87) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $54.8 million; expenditures $56.2 million, including capital expenditures of $16.9 million (fy88 est.) exports: $9.1 million (f.o.b., fy88 est.); commodities--coconut oil, desiccated coconut, copra, bananas, taro, vanilla beans, fruits, vegetables, fish; partners--nz 54%, australia 30%, us 8%, fiji 5% (fy87) imports: $60.1 million (c.i.f., fy88 est.); commodities--food products, beverages and tobacco, fuels, machinery and transport equipment, chemicals, building materials; partners--nz 39%, australia 25%, japan 9%, us 6%, ec 5% (fy87) external debt: $31.8 million (1987) industrial production: growth rate 15% (fy86) electricity: 5,000 kw capacity; 8 million kwh produced, 80 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, fishing agriculture: dominated by coconut, copra, and banana production; vanilla beans, cocoa, coffee, ginger, black pepper aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $15 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $220 million currency: pa'anga (plural--pa'anga); 1 pa'anga (t$) = 100 seniti exchange rates: pa'anga (t$) per us$1--1.23 (fy89 est.), 1.37 (fy88), 1.51 (fy87), 1.43 (fy86), 1.30 (fy85) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications highways: 198 km sealed road (tongatapu); 74 km (vavau); 94 km unsealed roads usable only in dry weather ports: nukualofa, neiafu, pangai merchant marine: 6 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 37,249 grt/50,116 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 container, 1 liquefied gas civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 6 total, 6 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 3,529 telephones; 66,000 radio receivers; no tv sets; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: land force, maritime force military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: trinidad and tobago geography total area: 5,130 km2; land area: 5,130 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than delaware land boundaries: none coastline: 362 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary with venezuela in the gulf of paria climate: tropical; rainy season (june to december) terrain: mostly plains with some hills and low mountains natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, asphalt land use: 14% arable land; 17% permanent crops; 2% meadows and pastures; 44% forest and woodland; 23% other; includes 4% irrigated environment: outside usual path of hurricanes and other tropical storms note: located 11 km from venezuela people population: 1,344,639 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 74 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--trinidadian(s), tobagonian(s); adjective--trinidadian, tobagonian ethnic divisions: 43% black, 40% east indian, 14% mixed, 1% white, 1% chinese, 1% other religion: 36.2% roman catholic, 23.0% hindu, 13.1% protestant, 6.0% muslim, 21.7% unknown language: english (official), hindi, french, spanish literacy: 98% labor force: 463,900; 18.1% construction and utilities; 14.8% manufacturing, mining, and quarrying; 10.9% agriculture; 56.2% other (1985 est.) organized labor: 22% of labor force (1988) government long-form name: republic of trinidad and tobago type: parliamentary democracy capital: port-of-spain administrative divisions: 8 counties, 3 municipalities*, and 1 ward**; arima*, caroni, mayaro, nariva, port-of-spain*, saint andrew, saint david, saint george, saint patrick, san fernando*, tobago**, victoria independence: 31 august 1962 (from uk) constitution: 31 august 1976 legal system: based on english common law; judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 31 august (1962) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: court of appeal, supreme court leaders: chief of state--president noor mohammed hassanali (since 18 march 1987); head of government--prime minister arthur napoleon raymond robinson (since 18 december 1986) political parties and leaders: national alliance for reconstruction (nar), a. n. r. robinson; people's national movement (pnm), patrick manning; united national congress, basdeo panday; movement for social transformation (motion), david abdullah suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of representatives--last held 15 december 1986 (next to be held by december 1991); results--nar 66%, pnm 32%, others 2%; seats--(36 total) nar 33, pnm 3 communists: communist party of trinidad and tobago; trinidad and tobago peace council, james millette other political pressure groups: national joint action committee (njac), radical antigovernment black-identity organization; trinidad and tobago peace council, leftist organization affiliated with the world peace council; trinidad and tobago chamber of industry and commerce; trinidad and tobago labor congress, moderate labor federation; council of progressive trade unions, radical labor federation member of: acp, caricom, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iadb, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador angus albert khan; chancery at 1708 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20036; telephone (202) 467-6490; trinidad and tobago has a consulate general in new york; us--ambassador charles a. gargano; embassy at 15 queen's park west, port-of-spain (mailing address is p. o. box 752, port-of-spain); telephone p809o 622-6372 or 6376, 6176 flag: red with a white-edged black diagonal band from the upper hoist side economy overview: trinidad and tobago's petroleum-based economy has been in decline since 1982. during the first half of the 1980s, the petroleum sector accounted for nearly 80% of export earnings, 40% of government revenues, and almost 25% of gdp. in recent years, however, the economy has suffered because of the sharp fall in the price of oil. the government, in response to the revenue loss, pursued a series of austerity measures that pushed the unemployment rate to 22% in 1988. agriculture employs only about 11% of the labor force and produces less than 3% of gdp. since this sector is small, it has been unable to absorb the large numbers of the unemployed. the government currently seeks to diversify its export base. gdp: $3.75 billion, per capita $3,070; real growth rate 2.0% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 15.0% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 22% (1988) budget: revenues $1.4 billion; expenditures $2.1 billion, including capital expenditures of $430 million (1988 est.) exports: $1.4 billion (f.o.b., 1987); commodities--includes reexports--petroleum and petroleum products 70%, fertilizer, chemicals 15%, steel products, sugar, cocoa, coffee, citrus (1987); partners--us 61%, ec 15%, caricom 9%, latin america 7%, canada 3% (1986) imports: $1.2 billion (c.i.f., 1987); commodities--raw materials 41%, capital goods 30%, consumer goods 29% (1986); partners--us 42%, ec 21%, japan 10%, canada 6%, latin america 6%, caricom 4% (1986) external debt: $2.02 billion (december 1987) industrial production: growth rate 5.2%, excluding oil refining (1986) electricity: 1,176,000 kw capacity; 3,350 million kwh produced, 2,700 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, chemicals, tourism, food processing, cement, beverage, cotton textiles agriculture: accounts for about 3% of gdp and 4% of labor force; highly subsidized sector; major crops--cocoa and sugarcane; sugarcane acreage is being shifted into rice, citrus, coffee, vegetables; must import large share of food needs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-85), $370 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $437 million currency: trinidad and tobago dollar (plural--dollars); 1 trinidad and tobago dollar (tt$) = 100 cents exchange rates: trinidad and tobago dollars (tt$) per us$1--4.2500 (january 1990), 4.2500 (1989), 3.8438 (1988), 3.6000 (1987), 3.6000 (1986), 2.4500 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: minimal agricultural system near san fernando highways: 8,000 km total; 4,000 km paved, 1,000 km improved earth, 3,000 km unimproved earth pipelines: 1,032 km crude oil; 19 km refined products; 904 km natural gas ports: port-of-spain, point lisas, pointe-a-pierre civil air: 14 major transport aircraft airports: 6 total, 5 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: excellent international service via tropospheric scatter links to barbados and guyana; good local service; 109,000 telephones; stations--2 am, 4 fm, 5 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: trinidad and tobago defense force, trinidad and tobago police service military manpower: males 15-49, 343,292; 248,674 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.6% of gdp, or $59 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: tromelin island (french possession) geography total area: 1 km2; land area: 1 km2 comparative area: about 1.7 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 3.7 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by madagascar, mauritius, and seychelles climate: tropical terrain: sandy natural resources: fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other--scattered bushes environment: wildlife sanctuary note: located 350 km east of madagascar and 600 km north of reunion in the indian ocean; climatologically important location for forecasting cyclones people population: uninhabited government long-form name: none type: french possession administered by commissioner of the republic daniel constantin, resident in reunion economy overview: no economic activity communications airports: 1 with runway less than 1,220 m ports: none; offshore anchorage only telecommunications: important meteorological station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: tunisia geography total area: 163,610 km2; land area: 155,360 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than georgia land boundaries: 1,424 km total; algeria 965 km, libya 459 km coastline: 1,148 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary dispute with libya climate: temperate in north with mild, rainy winters and hot, dry summers; desert in south terrain: mountains in north; hot, dry central plain; semiarid south merges into the sahara natural resources: crude oil, phosphates, iron ore, lead, zinc, salt land use: 20% arable land; 10% permanent crops; 19% meadows and pastures; 4% forest and woodland; 47% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: strategic location in central mediterranean; only 144 km from italy across the strait of sicily; borders libya on east people population: 8,095,492 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 40 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 68 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--tunisian(s); adjective--tunisian ethnic divisions: 98% arab, 1% european, less than 1% jewish religion: 98% muslim, 1% christian, less than 1% jewish language: arabic (official); arabic and french (commerce) literacy: 62% (est.) labor force: 2,250,000; 32% agriculture; shortage of skilled labor organized labor: about 360,000 members claimed, roughly 20% of labor force; general union of tunisian workers (ugtt), quasi-independent of constitutional democratic party government long-form name: republic of tunisia; note--may be changed to tunisian republic type: republic capital: tunis administrative divisions: 23 governorates (wilayat, singular--wilayah); al kaf, al mahdiyah, al munastir, al qasrayn, al qayrawan, aryanah, bajah, banzart, bin arus, jundubah, madanin, nabul, qabis, qafsah, qibili, safaqis, sidi bu zayd, silyanah, susah, tatawin, tawzar, tunis, zaghwan independence: 20 march 1956 (from france) constitution: 1 june 1959 legal system: based on french civil law system and islamic law; some judicial review of legislative acts in the supreme court in joint session national holiday: national day, 20 march (1956) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (assemblee nationale) judicial branch: court of cassation (cour de cassation) leaders: chief of state--president gen. zine el abidine ben ali (since 7 november 1987); head of government--prime minister hamed karoui (since 26 september 1989) political parties and leaders: constitutional democratic rally party (rcd), president ben ali (official ruling party); movement of democratic socialists (mds), ahmed mestiri; five other political parties are legal, including the communist party suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: president--last held 2 april 1989 (next to be held april 1994); results--gen. zine el abidine ben aliwas reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held 2 april 1989 (next to be held april 1994); results--rcd 80.7%, independents/islamists 13.7%, mds 3.2%, others 2.4% seats--(141 total) rcd 141 communists: a small number of nominal communists, mostly students member of: afdb, arab league, aioec, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, nam, oapec, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador abdelaziz hamzaoui; chancery at 1515 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20005; telephone (202) 862-1850; us--ambassador robert h. pelletreau, jr.; embassy at 144 avenue de la liberte, 1002 tunis-belvedere; telephone p216o (1) 782-566 flag: red with a white disk in the center bearing a red crescent nearly encircling a red five-pointed star; the crescent and star are traditional symbols of islam economy overview: the economy depends primarily on petroleum, phosphates, and tourism for continued growth. two successive drought-induced crop failures have strained the government's budget and increased unemployment. the current account fell from a $23 million surplus in 1988 to a $390 million deficit in 1989. despite its foreign payments problems, tunis appears committed to its imf-supported structural adjustment program. nonetheless, the government may have to slow its implementation to head off labor unrest. the increasing foreign debt--$7.6 billion at yearend 1989--is also a key problem. tunis probably will seek debt relief in 1990. gdp: $8.7 billion, per capita $1,105; real growth rate 3.1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 10% (1989) unemployment rate: 25% (1989) budget: revenues $2.9 billion; expenditures $3.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $0.8 billion (1989 est.) exports: $3.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--hydrocarbons, agricultural products, phosphates and chemicals; partners--ec 73%, middle east 9%, us 1%, turkey, ussr imports: $4.4 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--industrial goods and equipment 57%, hydrocarbons 13%, food 12%, consumer goods; partners--ec 68%, us 7%, canada, japan, ussr, china, saudi arabia, algeria external debt: $7.6 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate 3.5% (1988) electricity: 1,493,000 kw capacity; 4,210 million kwh produced, 530 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, mining (particularly phosphate and iron ore), textiles, footwear, food, beverages agriculture: accounts for 16% of gdp and one-third of labor force; output subject to severe fluctuations because of frequent droughts; export crops--olives, dates, oranges, almonds; other products--grain, sugar beets, wine grapes, poultry, beef, dairy; not self-sufficient in food; fish catch of 99,200 metric tons (1986) aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $694 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $4.6 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $684 million; communist countries (1970-88), $410 million currency: tunisian dinar (plural--dinars); 1 tunisian dinar (td) = 1,000 millimes exchange rates: tunisian dinars (td) per us$1--0.9055 (january 1990), 0.9493 (1989), 0.8578 (1988), 0.8287 (1987), 0.7940 (1986), 0.8345 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 2,154 km total; 465 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 1,689 km 1.000-meter gauge highways: 17,700 km total; 9,100 km bituminous; 8,600 km improved and unimproved earth pipelines: 797 km crude oil; 86 km refined products; 742 km natural gas ports: bizerte, gabes, sfax, sousse, tunis, la goulette, zarzis merchant marine: 21 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 160,172 grt/218,970 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 4 cargo, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 2 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 6 chemical tanker, 1 liquefied gas, 5 bulk civil air: 13 major transport aircraft airports: 30 total, 28 usable; 13 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 7 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 7 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: the system is above the african average; facilities consist of open-wire lines, multiconductor cable, and radio relay; key centers are safaqis, susah, bizerte, and tunis; 233,000 telephones; stations--18 am, 4 fm, 14 tv; 4 submarine cables; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 arabsat with back-up control station; coaxial cable to algeria; radio relay to algeria, libya, and italy defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 1,997,197; 1,149,141 fit for military service; 88,368 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 2.7% of gdp, or $235 million (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: turkey geography total area: 780,580 km2; land area: 770,760 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than texas land boundaries: 2,715 km total; bulgaria 240 km, greece 206 km, iran 499 km, iraq 331 km, syria 822 km, ussr 617 km coastline: 7,200 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: in black sea only--to the maritime boundary agreed upon with the ussr; territorial sea: 6 nm (12 nm in black sea and mediterranean sea) disputes: complex maritime and air (but not territorial) disputes with greece in aegean sea; cyprus question; hatay question with syria; ongoing dispute with downstream riparians (syria and iraq) over water development plans for the tigris and euphrates rivers; kurdish question among iran, iraq, syria, turkey, and the ussr climate: temperate; hot, dry summers with mild, wet winters; harsher in interior terrain: mostly mountains; narrow coastal plain; high central plateau (anatolia) natural resources: antimony, coal, chromium, mercury, copper, borate, sulphur, iron ore land use: 30% arable land; 4% permanent crops; 12% meadows and pastures; 26% forest and woodland; 28% other; includes 3% irrigated environment: subject to severe earthquakes, especially along major river valleys in west; air pollution; desertification note: strategic location controlling the turkish straits (bosporus, sea of marmara, dardanelles) that link black and aegean seas; turkey and norway only nato members having a land boundary with the ussr people population: 56,704,327 (july 1990), growth rate 2.2% (1990) birth rate: 29 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 74 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 67 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--turk(s); adjective--turkish ethnic divisions: 85% turkish, 12% kurd, 3% other religion: 98% muslim (mostly sunni), 2% other (mostly christian and jewish) language: turkish (official), kurdish, arabic literacy: 70% labor force: 18,800,000; 56% agriculture, 30% services, 14% industry; about 1,000,000 turks work abroad (1987) organized labor: 10-15% of labor force government long-form name: republic of turkey type: republican parliamentary democracy capital: ankara administrative divisions: 67 provinces (iller, singular--il); adana, adiyaman, afyon, agri, amasya, ankara, antalya, artvin, aydin, balikesir, bilecik, bingol, bitlis, bolu, burdur, bursa, canakkale, cankiri, corum, denizli, diyarbakir, edirne, elazig, erzincan, erzurum, eskisehir, gaziantep, giresun, gumushane, hakkari, hatay, icel, isparta, istanbul, izmir, kahraman maras, kars, kastamonu, kayseri, kirklareli, kirsehir, kocaeli, konya, kutahya, malatya, manisa, mardin, mugla, mus, nevsehir, nigde, ordu, rize, sakarya, samsun, siirt, sinop, sivas, tekirdag, tokat, trabzon, tunceli, urfa, usak, van, yozgat, zonguldak; note--there may be four new provinces named aksaray, bayburt, karaman, and kirikkale independence: 29 october 1923 (successor state to the ottoman empire) constitution: 7 november 1982 legal system: derived from various continental legal systems; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: anniversary of the declaration of the republic, 29 october (1923) executive branch: president, presidential council, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral grand national assembly (buyuk millet meclisi) judicial branch: court of cassation leaders: chief of state--president turgut ozal (since 9 november 1989); head of government--prime minister yildirim akbulut (since 9 november 1989); deputy prime minister ali bozer (since 31 march 1989) political parties and leaders: motherland party (anap), yildirim akbulut; social democratic populist party (shp), erdal inonu; correct way party (cwp), suleyman demirel; democratic left party (dlp), bulent ecevit; prosperity party (rp), necmettin erbakan; national work party (mcp), alpaslan turkes; reform democratic party (idp), aykut edibali suffrage: universal at age 21 elections: grand national assembly--last held 29 november 1987 (next to be held november 1992); results--anap 36%, shp 25%, cwp 19%, others 20%; seats--(450 total) anap 283, shp 81, cwp 56, independents 26, vacant 4 communists: strength and support negligible member of: assimer, ccc, council of europe, ec (associate member), ecosoc, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, itc, itu, nato, oecd, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador nuzhet kandemir; chancery at 1606 23rd street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 387-3200; there are turkish consulates general in chicago, houston, los angeles, and new york; us--ambassador morton abramowitz; embassy at 110 ataturk boulevard, ankara (mailing address is apo new york 09254--0001); telephone p90o (4) 126 54 70; there are us consulates general in istanbul and izmir, and a consulate in adana flag: red with a vertical white crescent (the closed portion is toward the hoist side) and white five-pointed star centered on the hoist side economy overview: the economic reforms that turkey launched in 1980 continue to bring an impressive stream of benefits. the economy has grown steadily since the early 1980s, with real growth in per capita gdp increasing more than 6% annually. agriculture remains the most important economic sector, employing about 60% of the labor force, accounting for almost 20% of gdp, and contributing about 25% to exports. impressive growth in recent years has not solved all of the economic problems facing turkey. inflation and interest rates remain high, and a large budget deficit will continue to provide difficulties for a country undergoing a substantial transformation from a centrally controlled to a free market economy. the government has launched a multimillion-dollar development program in the southeastern region, which includes the building of a dozen dams on the tigris and euphrates rivers to generate electric power and irrigate large tracts of farmland. the planned tapping of huge quantities of euphrates water has raised serious concern in the downstream riparian nations of syria and iraq. gdp: $75 billion, per capita $1,350; real growth rate 1.8% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 68.8% (1989) unemployment rate: 15.8% (1988) budget: revenues $12.1 billion; expenditures $14.5 billion, including capital expenditures of $2.08 billion (fy88 est.) exports: $11.7 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--industrial products 70%, crops and livestock products 25%; partners--frg 18.4%, iraq 8.5%, italy 8.2%, us 6.5%, uk 4.9%, iran 4.7% imports: $14.3 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--crude oil, machinery, transport equipment, metals, pharmaceuticals, dyes, plastics, rubber, mineral fuels, fertilizers, chemicals; partners--frg 14.3%, us 10.6%, iraq 10.0%, italy 7.0%, france 5.8%, uk 5.2% external debt: $36.3 billion (november 1989) industrial production: growth rate 7.4% (1988) electricity: 14,064,000 kw capacity; 40,000 million kwh produced, 720 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, food processing, mining (coal, chromite, copper, boron minerals), steel, petroleum, construction, lumber, paper agriculture: accounts for 20% of gdp and employs majority of population; products--tobacco, cotton, grain, olives, sugar beets, pulses, citrus fruit, variety of animal products; self-sufficient in food most years illicit drugs: one of the world's major suppliers of licit opiate products; government maintains strict controls over areas of opium poppy cultivation and output of poppy straw concentrate aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $2.2 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $7.9 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $665 million; communist countries (1970-88), $4.5 billion currency: turkish lira (plural--liras); 1 turkish lira (tl) = 100 kurus exchange rates: turkish liras (tl) per us$1--2,314.7 (november 1989), 1,422.3 (1988), 857.2 (1987), 674.5 (1986), 522.0 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 8,401 km 1.435-meter standard gauge; 479 km electrified highways: 49,615 km total; 26,915 km bituminous; 16,500 km gravel or crushed stone; 4,000 km improved earth; 2,200 km unimproved earth (1985) inland waterways: about 1,200 km pipelines: 1,738 km crude oil; 2,321 km refined products; 708 km natural gas ports: iskenderun, istanbul, mersin, izmir merchant marine: 327 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 2,972,465 grt/5,087,620 dwt; includes 6 short-sea passenger, 1 passenger, 1 passenger-cargo, 193 cargo, 1 container, 4 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 refrigerated cargo, 1 livestock carrier, 35 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 15 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 4 combination ore/oil, 1 specialized tanker, 55 bulk, 4 combination bulk, 1 specialized liquid cargo civil air: 30 major transport aircraft (1985) airports: 119 total, 112 usable; 69 with permanent-surface runways; 3 with runways over 3,659 m; 30 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 28 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair domestic and international systems; trunk radio relay network; 3,100,000 telephones; stations--15 am; 45 (60 repeaters) fm; 61 (476 repeaters) tv; communications satellite earth stations operating in the intelsat (1 atlantic ocean) and eutelsat systems; 1 submarine telephone cable defense forces branches: land forces, navy, air force, gendarmerie, coast guard military manpower: males 15-49, 14,413,944; 8,813,430 fit for military service; 597,547 reach military age (20) annually defense expenditures: 3.9% of gdp, or $2.9 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: turks and caicos islands (dependent territory of the uk) geography total area: 430 km2; land area: 430 km2 comparative area: slightly less than 2.5 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 389 km maritime claims: exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; marine; moderated by trade winds; sunny and relatively dry terrain: low, flat limestone; extensive marshes and mangrove swamps natural resources: spiny lobster, conch land use: 2% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 98% other environment: 30 islands (eight inhabited); subject to frequent hurricanes note: located 190 km north of the dominican republic in the north atlantic ocean people population: 9,761 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 25 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 14 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 78 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: no noun or adjectival forms ethnic divisions: majority of african descent religion: anglican, roman catholic, baptist, methodist, church of god, seventh-day adventist language: english (official) literacy: 99% (est.) labor force: na; majority engaged in fishing and tourist industries; some subsistence agriculture organized labor: st. george's industrial trade union government long-form name: none type: dependent territory of the uk capital: grand turk (cockburn town) administrative divisions: none (dependent territory of the uk) independence: none (dependent territory of the uk) constitution: introduced 30 august 1976, suspended in 1986, and a constitutional commission is currently reviewing its contents legal system: based on laws of england and wales with a small number adopted from jamaica and the bahamas national holiday: constitution day, 30 august (1976) executive branch: british monarch, governor, executive council legislative branch: unicameral legislative council judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1953), represented by governor michael j. bradley (since 1987); head of government--chief minister oswald o. skippings (since 3 march 1988) political parties and leaders: people's democratic movement (pdm), oswald skippings; progressive national party (pnp), dan malcolm and norman saunders; national democratic alliance (nda), ariel missick suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: legislative council--last held on 3 march 1988 (next to be held na); results--pdm 60%, pnp 30%, others 10%; seats--(20 total, 13 elected) pdm 11, pnp 2 communists: none diplomatic representation: as a dependent territory of the uk, the interests of the turks and caicos islands are represented in the us by the uk; us--none flag: blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant and the colonial shield centered on the outer half of the flag; the shield is yellow and contains a conch shell, lobster, and cactus economy overview: the economy is based on fishing, tourism, and offshore banking. subsistence farming--corn and beans--exists only on the caicos islands, so that most foods, as well as nonfood products, must be imported. gdp: $44.9 million, per capita $5,000; real growth rate na% (1986) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 12% (1989) budget: revenues $12.4 million; expenditures $15.8 million, including capital expenditures of $2.6 million (fy87) exports: $2.9 million (f.o.b., fy84); commodities--lobster, dried and fresh conch, conch shells; partners--us, uk imports: $26.3 million (c.i.f., fy84); commodities--foodstuffs, drink, tobacco, clothing; partners--us, uk external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 9,050 kw capacity; 11 million kwh produced, 1,160 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, tourism, offshore financial services agriculture: subsistence farming prevails, based on corn and beans; fishing more important than farming; not self-sufficient in food aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $92.8 million currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 121 km, including 24 km tarmac ports: grand turk, salt cay, providenciales, cockburn harbour civil air: air turks and caicos (passenger service) and turks air ltd. (cargo service) airports: 7 total, 7 usable; 4 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair cable and radio services; 1,446 telephones; stations--3 am, no fm, several tv; 2 submarine cables; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the uk ---------------------------------------------------country: tuvalu geography total area: 26 km2; land area: 26 km2 comparative area: about 0.1 times the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 24 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; moderated by easterly trade winds (march to november); westerly gales and heavy rain (november to march) terrain: very low-lying and narrow coral atolls natural resources: fish land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: severe tropical storms are rare note: located 3,000 km east of papua new guinea in the south pacific ocean people population: 9,136 (july 1990), growth rate 2.0% (1990) birth rate: 30 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 33 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 60 years male, 63 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.1 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--tuvaluans(s); adjective--tuvaluan ethnic divisions: 96% polynesian religion: christian, predominantly protestant language: tuvaluan, english literacy: less than 50% labor force: na organized labor: none government long-form name: none type: democracy capital: funafuti administrative divisions: none independence: 1 october 1978 (from uk; formerly ellice islands) constitution: 1 october 1978 national holiday: independence day, 1 october (1978) executive branch: british monarch, governor general, prime minister, deputy prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament judicial branch: high court leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952), represented by governor general tupua leupena (since 1 march 1986); head of government--prime minister bikenibeu paeniu (since 16 october 1989); deputy prime minister dr. alesana seluka (since october 1989) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held 28 september 1989 (next to be held by september 1993); results--percent of vote na; seats--(12 total) member of: acp, escap (associate member), gatt (de facto), spf, spc, upu diplomatic representation: ambassador (vacant); us--none flag: light blue with the flag of the uk in the upper hoist-side quadrant; the outer half of the flag represents a map of the country with nine yellow five-pointed stars symbolizing the nine islands economy overview: tuvalu consists of a scattered group of nine coral atolls with poor-quality soil. the country has a small economy, no known mineral resources, and few exports. subsistence farming and fishing are the primary economic activities. the islands are too small and too remote for development of a tourist industry. government revenues largely come from the sale of stamps and coins and worker remittances. substantial income is received annually from an international trust fund established in 1987 by australia, new zealand, and the uk and supported also by japan and south korea. gnp: $4.6 million, per capita $530; real growth rate na% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 3.9% (1984) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $2.59 million; expenditures $3.6 million, including capital expenditures of na (1983 est.) exports: $1.0 million (f.o.b., 1983 est.); commodities--copra; partners--fiji, australia, nz imports: $2.8 million (c.i.f., 1983 est.); commodities--food, animals, mineral fuels, machinery, manufactured goods; partners--fiji, australia, nz external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na electricity: 2,600 kw capacity; 3 million kwh produced, 350 kwh per capita (1989) industries: fishing, tourism, copra agriculture: coconuts, copra aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-87), $1 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $84 million currency: tuvaluan dollar and australian dollar (plural--dollars); 1 tuvaluan dollar ($t) or 1 australian dollar ($a) = 100 cents exchange rates: tuvaluan dollars ($t) or australian dollars ($a) per us$1--1.2784 (january 1990), 1.2618 (1989), 1.2752 (1988), 1.4267 (1987), 1.4905 (1986), 1.4269 (1985) fiscal year: na communications highways: 8 km gravel ports: funafuti, nukufetau merchant marine: 1 passenger-cargo (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,043 grt/450 dwt civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 1 with runway 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 300 radiotelephones; 4,000 radio receivers; 108 telephones defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: uganda geography total area: 236,040 km2; land area: 199,710 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than oregon land boundaries: 2,698 km total; kenya 933 km, rwanda 169 km, sudan 435 km, tanzania 396 km, zaire 765 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: tropical; generally rainy with two dry seasons (december to february, june to august); semiarid in northeast terrain: mostly plateau with rim of mountains natural resources: copper, cobalt, limestone, salt land use: 23% arable land; 9% permanent crops; 25% meadows and pastures; 30% forest and woodland; 13% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: straddles equator; deforestation; overgrazing; soil erosion note: landlocked people population: 17,960,262 (july 1990), growth rate 3.5% (1990) birth rate: 52 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 107 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 50 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--ugandan(s); adjective--ugandan ethnic divisions: 99% african, 1% european, asian, arab religion: 33% roman catholic, 33% protestant, 16% muslim, rest indigenous beliefs language: english (official); luganda and swahili widely used; other bantu and nilotic languages literacy: 57.3% labor force: 4,500,000 (est.); 94% subsistence activities, 6% wage earners (est.); 50% of population of working age (1983) organized labor: 125,000 union members government long-form name: republic of uganda type: republic capital: kampala administrative divisions: 10 provinces; busoga, central, eastern, karamoja, nile, north buganda, northern, south buganda, southern, western independence: 9 october 1962 (from uk) constitution: 8 september 1967, suspended following coup of 27 july 1985; in process of constitutional revision legal system: government plans to restore system based on english common law and customary law and reinstitute a normal judicial system; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 9 october (1962) executive branch: president, prime minister, three deputy prime ministers, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national resistance council judicial branch: court of appeal, high court leaders: chief of state--president lt. gen. yoweri kaguta museveni (since 29 january 1986); head of government--prime minister samson babi mululu kisekka (since 30 january 1986); first deputy prime minister eriya kategaya (since na) political parties and leaders: only party--national resistance movement (nrm); note--the uganda patriotic movement (upm), ugandan people's congress (upc), democratic party (dp), and conservative party (cp) are all proscribed from conducting public political activities suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national resistance council--last held 11-28 february 1989 (next to be held after january 1995); results--nrm is the only party; seats--(278 total, 210 indirectly elected) nrm 210 other political parties or pressure groups: uganda people's democratic movement (updm), uganda people's front (upf), uganda freedom movement (ufm), holy spirit movement (hsm) communists: possibly a few sympathizers member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ico, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, interpol, iso, itu, nam, oau, oic, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador stephen kapimpina katenta-apuli; 5909 16th street nw, washington dc 20011; telephone (202) 726-7100 through 7102; us--ambassador john a. burroughs, jr.; embassy at british high commission building, obote avenue, kampala (mailing address is p. o. box 7007, kampala); telephone p256o (41) 259791 flag: six equal horizonal bands of black (top), yellow, red, black, yellow, and red; a white disk is superimposed at the center and depicts a red-crested crane (the national symbol) facing the staff side economy overview: uganda has substantial natural resources, including fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable mineral deposits of copper and cobalt. for most of the past 15 years the economy has been devastated by political instability, mismanagement, and civil war, keeping uganda poor with a per capita income of about $300. (gdp remains below the levels of the early 1970s, as does industrial production.) agriculture is the most important sector of the economy, employing over 80% of the work force. coffee is the major export crop and accounted for 97% of export revenues in 1988. since 1986 the government has acted to rehabilitate and stabilize the economy by undertaking currency reform, raising producer prices on export crops, increasing petroleum prices, and improving civil service wages. the policy changes are especially aimed at dampening inflation, which was running at over 300% in 1987, and boosting production and export earnings. gdp: $4.9 billion, per capita $300 (1988); real growth rate 6.1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 72% (fy89) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $365 million; expenditures $545 million, including capital expenditures of $165 million (fy89 est.) exports: $272 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coffee 97%, cotton, tea; partners--us 25%, uk 18%, france 11%, spain 10% imports: $626 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum products, machinery, cotton piece goods, metals, transportation equipment, food; partners--kenya 25%, uk 14%, italy 13% external debt: $1.4 billion (1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 25.1% (1988) electricity: 173,000 kw capacity; 312 million kwh produced, 18 kwh per capita (1989) industries: sugar, brewing, tobacco, cotton textiles, cement agriculture: accounts for 57% of gdp and 83% of labor force; cash crops--coffee, tea, cotton, tobacco; food crops--cassava, potatoes, corn, millet, pulses; livestock products--beef, goat meat, milk, poultry; self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (1970-88), $123 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $60 million; communist countries (1970-88), $140 million currency: ugandan shilling (plural--shillings); 1 ugandan shilling (ush) = 100 cents exchange rates: ugandan shillings (ush) per us$1--370 (december 1989), 223.09 (1989), 106.14 (1988), 42.84 (1987), 14.00 (1986), 6.72 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 1,300 km, 1.000-meter-gauge single track highways: 26,200 km total; 1,970 km paved; 5,849 km crushed stone, gravel, and laterite; remainder earth roads and tracks inland waterways: lake victoria, lake albert, lake kyoga, lake george, lake edward; victoria nile, albert nile; principal inland water ports are at jinja and port bell, both on lake victoria merchant marine: 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo (1,000 grt or over) totaling 1,697 grt civil air: 4 major transport aircraft airports: 39 total, 30 usable; 5 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 10 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: fair system with radio relay and radio communications stations; 61,600 telephones; stations--10 am, no fm, 9 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: national resistance army (nra) military manpower: males 15-49, about 3,836,921; about 2,084,813 fit for military service defense expenditures: 1.4% of gdp (1985) ---------------------------------------------------country: united arab emirates geography total area: 83,600 km2; land area: 83,600 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than maine land boundaries: 1,016 km total; oman 410 km, saudi arabia 586 km, qatar 20 km coastline: 1,448 km maritime claims: continental shelf: defined by bilateral boundaries or equidistant line extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 3 nm disputes: boundary with qatar is in dispute; no defined boundary with saudi arabia; no defined boundary with most of oman, but administrative line in far north; claims three islands in the persian gulf occupied by iran (jazireh-ye abu musa or abu musa, jazireh-ye tonb-e bozorg or greater tunb, and jazireh-ye tonb-e kuchek or lesser tunb) climate: desert; cooler in eastern mountains terrain: flat, barren coastal plain merging into rolling sand dunes of vast desert wasteland; mountains in east natural resources: crude oil and natural gas land use: negl% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 2% meadows and pastures; negl% forest and woodland; 98% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: frequent dust and sand storms; lack of natural freshwater resources being overcome by desalination plants; desertification note: strategic location along southern approaches to strait of hormuz, a vital transit point for world crude oil people population: 2,253,624 (july 1990), growth rate 6.0% (1990) birth rate: 31 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 3 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 33 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 24 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 73 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--emirian(s), adjective--emirian ethnic divisions: 19% emirian, 23% other arab, 50% south asian (fluctuating), 8% other expatriates (includes westerners and east asians); less than 20% of the population are uae citizens (1982) religion: 96% muslim (16% shia); 4% christian, hindu, and other language: arabic (official); farsi and english widely spoken in major cities; hindi, urdu literacy: 68% labor force: 580,000 (1986 est.); 85% industry and commerce, 5% agriculture, 5% services, 5% government; 80% of labor force is foreign organized labor: trade unions are illegal government long-form name: united arab emirates (no short-form name); abbreviated uae type: federation with specified powers delegated to the uae central government and other powers reserved to member shaykhdoms capital: abu dhabi administrative divisions: 7 emirates (imarat, singular--imarah); abu zaby, ajman, al fujayrah, ash shariqah, dubayy, ras al khaymah, umm al qaywayn independence: 2 december 1971 (from uk; formerly trucial states) constitution: 2 december 1971 (provisional) legal system: secular codes are being introduced by the uae government and in several member shaykhdoms; islamic law remains influential national holiday: national day, 2 december (1971) executive branch: president, vice president, supreme council of rulers, prime minister, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral federal national council judicial branch: union supreme court leaders: chief of state--president shaykh zayid bin sultan al nuhayyan of abu dhabi (since 2 december 1971); vice president shaykh rashid bin said al maktum of dubayy (since 2 december 1971; head of government--prime minister shaykh rashid bin said al maktum of dubayy (prime minister since 30 april 1979); deputy prime minister maktum bin rashid al maktum (since 2 december 1971) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: none elections: none communists: na other political or pressure groups: a few small clandestine groups are active member of: arab league, ccc, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), gcc, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oapec, oic, opec, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador abdullah bin zayed al-nahayyan; chancery at suite 740, 600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 338-6500; us--ambassador edward s. walker, jr.; embassy at al-sudan street, abu dhabi (mailing address is p. o. box 4009, abu dhabi); telephone p971o (2) 336691; there is a us consulate general in dubai flag: three equal horizontal bands of green (top), white, and black with a thicker vertical red band on the hoist side economy overview: the uae has an open economy with one of the world's higher levels of income per capita. this wealth is based on oil and gas, and the fortunes of the economy fluctuate with the prices of those commodities. since 1973, when petroleum prices shot up, the uae has undergone a profound transformation from an impoverished region of small desert principalities to a modern state with a high standard of living. at present levels of production, crude oil reserves should last for over 100 years. gnp: $23.3 billion, per capita $11,680; real growth rate 2.1% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5-6% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: negl (1988) budget: revenues $3.5 billion; expenditures $4.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1989 est.) exports: $10.6 billion (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--crude oil 75%, natural gas, reexports, dried fish, dates; partners--us, ec, japan imports: $8.5 billion (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--food, consumer and capital goods; partners--ec, japan, us external debt: $11.0 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 9.3% (1986) electricity: 5,590,000 kw capacity; 15,000 million kwh produced, 7,090 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, fishing, petrochemicals, construction materials, some boat building, handicrafts, pearling agriculture: accounts for 1% of gnp and 5% of labor force; cash crop--dates; food products--vegetables, watermelons, poultry, eggs, dairy, fish; only 25% self-sufficient in food aid: donor--pledged $9.1 billion in bilateral aid to less developed countries (1979-89) currency: emirian dirham (plural--dirhams); 1 emirian dirham (dh) = 100 fils exchange rates: emirian dirhams (dh) per us$1--3.6710 (fixed rate) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 2,000 km total; 1,800 km bituminous, 200 km gravel and graded earth pipelines: 830 km crude oil; 870 km natural gas, including natural gas liquids ports: al fujayrah, khawr fakkan, mina jabal ali, mina khalid, mina rashid, mina saqr, mina zayid merchant marine: 47 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 728,332 grt/1,181,566 dwt; includes 14 cargo, 7 container, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 20 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 4 bulk civil air: 8 major transport aircraft airports: 40 total, 34 usable; 19 with permanent-surface runways; 8 with runways over 3,659 m; 5 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 4 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: adequate system of radio relay and coaxial cable; key centers are abu dhabi and dubayy; 386,600 telephones; stations--8 am, 3 fm, 12 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 2 indian ocean intelsat and 1 arabsat; submarine cables to qatar, bahrain, india, and pakistan; tropospheric scatter to bahrain; radio relay to saudi arabia defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, central military command, federal police force military manpower: males 15-49, 904,690; 498,082 fit for military service defense expenditures: $1.59 billion (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: united kingdom geography total area: 244,820 km2; land area: 241,590 km2; includes rockall and shetland islands comparative area: slightly smaller than oregon land boundary: ireland 360 km coastline: 12,429 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation or in accordance with agreed upon boundaries; exclusive fishing zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary with ireland; northern ireland question with ireland; gibraltar question with spain; argentina claims falkland islands (islas malvinas); argentina claims south georgia and the south sandwich islands; mauritius claims island of diego garcia in british indian ocean territory; hong kong is scheduled to become a special administrative region of china in 1997; rockall continental shelf dispute involving denmark, iceland, and ireland (ireland and the uk have signed a boundary agreement in the rockall area); territorial claim in antarctica (british antarctic territory) climate: temperate; moderated by prevailing southwest winds over the north atlantic current; more than half of the days are overcast terrain: mostly rugged hills and low mountains; level to rolling plains in east and southeast natural resources: coal, crude oil, natural gas, tin, limestone, iron ore, salt, clay, chalk, gypsum, lead, silica land use: 29% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 48% meadows and pastures; 9% forest and woodland; 14% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: pollution control measures improving air, water quality; because of heavily indented coastline, no location is more than 125 km from tidal waters note: lies near vital north atlantic sea lanes; only 35 km from france people population: 57,365,665 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 14 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 11 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 7 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 79 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--briton(s), british (collective pl.); adjective--british ethnic divisions: 81.5% english, 9.6% scottish, 2.4% irish, 1.9% welsh, 1.8% ulster, 2.8% west indian, indian, pakistani, and other religion: 27.0 million anglican, 5.3 million roman catholic, 2.0 million presbyterian, 760,000 methodist, 410,000 jewish language: english, welsh (about 26% of population of wales), scottish form of gaelic (about 60,000 in scotland) literacy: 99% labor force: 28,120,000; 53.3% services, 23.6% manufacturing and construction, 10.8% self-employed, 6.8% government, 1.0% agriculture (1988) organized labor: 37% of labor force (1987) government long-form name: united kingdom of great britain and northern ireland; abbreviated uk type: constitutional monarchy capital: london administrative divisions: 47 counties, 7 metropolitan counties, 26 districts, 9 regions, and 3 islands areas england--39 counties, 7 metropolitan counties*; avon, bedford, berkshire, buckingham, cambridge, cheshire, cleveland, cornwall, cumbria, derby, devon, dorset, durham, east sussex, essex, gloucester, greater london*, greater manchester*, hampshire, hereford and worcester, hertford, humberside, isle of wight, kent, lancashire, leicester, lincoln, merseyside*, norfolk, northampton, northumberland, north yorkshire, nottingham, oxford, shropshire, somerset, south yorkshire*, stafford, suffolk, surrey, tyne and wear*, warwick, west midlands*, west sussex, west yorkshire*, wiltshire northern ireland--26 districts; antrim, ards, armagh, ballymena, ballymoney, banbridge, belfast, carrickfergus, castlereagh, coleraine, cookstown, craigavon, down, dungannon, fermanagh, larne, limavady, lisburn, londonderry, magherafelt, moyle, newry and mourne, newtownabbey, north down, omagh, strabane scotland--9 regions, 3 islands areas*; borders, central, dumfries and galloway, fife, grampian, highland, lothian, orkney*, shetland*, strathclyde, tayside, western isles* wales--8 counties; clwyd, dyfed, gwent, gwynedd, mid glamorgan, powys, south glamorgan, west glamorgan independence: 1 january 1801, united kingdom established constitution: unwritten; partly statutes, partly common law and practice dependent areas: anguilla, bermuda, british indian ocean territory, british virgin islands, cayman islands, falkland islands, gibraltar, guernsey, hong kong (scheduled to become a special administrative region of china in 1997), jersey, isle of man, montserrat, pitcairn islands, st. helena, south georgia and the south sandwich islands, turks and caicos islands legal system: common law tradition with early roman and modern continental influences; no judicial review of acts of parliament; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: celebration of the birthday of the queen (second saturday in june), 10 june 1989 executive branch: monarch, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral parliament consists of an upper house or house of lords and a lower house or house of commons judicial branch: house of lords leaders: chief of state--queen elizabeth ii (since 6 february 1952); heir apparent prince charles (son of the queen, born 14 november 1948); head of government--prime minister margaret thatcher (since 4 may 1979); deputy prime minister geoffrey howe (since 24 july 1989) political parties and leaders: conservative, margaret thatcher; labour, neil kinnock; social democratic, david owen (disbanded 3 june 1990); social and liberal democratic party, jeremy (paddy) ashdown; communist, nina temple; scottish national, gordon wilson; plaid cymru, dafydd thomas; ulster unionist, james molyneaux; democratic unionist, ian paisley; social democratic and labour, john hume; provisional sinn fein, gerry adams; alliance/northern ireland suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: house of commons--last held 11 june 1987 (next to be held by june 1992); results--conservative 43%, labour 32%, social and liberal democratic party 23%, others 2%; seats--(650 total) conservative 376, labour 228, social and liberal democratic party 18, ulster (official) unionist (northern ireland) 9, social democratic party 4, scottish national party 4, plaid cymru (welsh nationalist) 3, ulster democratic unionist (northern ireland) 3, social democratic and labour (northern ireland) 3, ulster popular unionist (northern ireland) 1, sinn fein (northern ireland) 1 communists: 15,961 other political or pressure groups: trades union congress, confederation of british industry, national farmers' union, campaign for nuclear disarmament member of: adb, ccc, colombo plan, council of europe, dac, ec, escap, esa, fao, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, iooc, ipu, irc, iso, itc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, nato, oecd, un, upu, weu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador sir antony acland; chancery at 3100 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 462-1340; there are british consulates general in atlanta, boston, chicago, cleveland, houston, los angeles, new york, and san francisco, and consulates in dallas, miami, and seattle; us--ambassador henry e. catto; embassy at 24/31 grosvenor square, london, w.1a1ae, (mailing address is box 40, fpo new york 09509); telephone p44o (01) 499-9000; there are us consulates general in belfast and edinburgh flag: blue with the red cross of st. george (patron saint of england) edged in white superimposed on the diagonal red cross of st. patrick (patron saint of ireland) which is superimposed on the diagonal white cross of st. andrew (patron saint of scotland); known as the union flag or union jack; the design and colors (especially the blue ensign) have been the basis for a number of other flags including dependencies, commonwealth countries, and others economy overview: the uk is one of the world's great trading powers and financial centers, and its economy ranks among the four largest in europe. the economy is essentially capitalistic with a generous admixture of social welfare programs and government ownership. over the last decade the thatcher government has halted the expansion of welfare measures and has promoted extensive reprivatization of the government economic sector. agriculture is intensive, highly mechanized, and efficient by european standards, producing about 60% of food needs with only 1% of the labor force. industry is a mixture of public and private enterprises, employing about 24% of the work force and generating 22% of gdp. the uk is an energy-rich nation with large coal, natural gas, and oil reserves; primary energy production accounts for 12% of gdp, one of the highest shares of any industrial nation. following the recession of 1979-81, the economy has enjoyed the longest period of continuous economic growth it has had during the last 30 years. during the period 1982-89 real gdp grew by about 25%, while the inflation rate of 14% was nearly halved. between 1986 and 1989 unemployment fell from 11% to about 6%. as a major trading nation, the uk will continue to be greatly affected by: world boom or recession; swings in the international oil market; productivity trends in domestic industry; and the terms on which the economic integration of europe proceeds. gdp: $818.0 billion, per capita $14,300; real growth rate 2.3% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7.8% (1989) unemployment rate: 6.4% (1989) budget: revenues $348.7 billion; expenditures $327.8 billion, including capital expenditures of $42.0 billion (fy89) exports: $151.0 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--manufactured goods, machinery, fuels, chemicals, semifinished goods, transport equipment; partners--ec 50.4% (frg 11.7%, france 10.2%, netherlands 6.8%), us 13.0%, communist countries 2.3% imports: $189.2 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--manufactured goods, machinery, semifinished goods, foodstuffs, consumer goods; partners--ec 52.5% (frg 16.6%, france 8.8%, netherlands 7.8%), us 10.2%, communist countries 2.1% external debt: $15.7 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 0.9% (1989) electricity: 98,000,000 kw capacity; 361,990 million kwh produced, 6,350 kwh per capita (1989) industries: machinery and transportation equipment, metals, food processing, paper and paper products, textiles, chemicals, clothing, other consumer goods, motor vehicles, aircraft, shipbuilding, petroleum, coal agriculture: accounts for only 1.5% of gnp and 1% of labor force; highly mechanized and efficient farms; wide variety of crops and livestock products produced; about 60% self-sufficient in food and feed needs; fish catch of 665,000 metric tons (1987) aid: donor--oda and oof commitments (1970-87), $18.9 billion currency: british pound or pound sterling (plural--pounds); 1 british pound (l) = 100 pence exchange rates: british pounds (l) per us$1--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989) 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications railroads: great britain--16,629 km total; british railways (br) operates 16,629 km 1.435-meter standard gauge (4,205 km electrified and 12,591 km double or multiple track); several additional small standard-gauge and narrow-gauge lines are privately owned and operated; northern ireland railways (nir) operates 332 km 1.600-meter gauge, 190 km double track highways: uk, 362,982 km total; great britain, 339,483 km paved (including 2,573 km limited-access divided highway); northern ireland, 23,499 km (22,907 paved, 592 km gravel) inland waterways: 2,291 total; british waterways board, 606 km; port authorities, 706 km; other, 979 km pipelines: 933 km crude oil, almost all insignificant; 2,993 km refined products; 12,800 km natural gas ports: london, liverpool, felixstowe, tees and hartlepool, dover, sullom voe, southampton merchant marine: 285 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 6,174,142grt/9,024,090 dwt; includes 7 passenger, 22 short-sea passenger, 44 cargo, 44 container, 21 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 9 refrigerated cargo, 1 vehicle carrier, 1 railcar carrier, 78 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 4 chemical tanker, 5 liquefied gas, 2 combination ore/oil, 1 specialized tanker, 45 bulk, 1 combination bulk civil air: 618 major transport aircraft airports: 522 total, 379 usable; 245 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 37 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 132 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern, efficient domestic and international system; 30,200,000 telephones; excellent countrywide broadcast systems; stations--223 am, 165 (396 relays) fm, 205 (3,210 relays) tv; 38 coaxial submarine cables; communication satellite earth stations operating in intelsat (7 atlantic ocean and 3 indian ocean), marisat, and eutelsat systems defense forces branches: royal navy (includes royal marines), army, royal air force military manpower: males 15-49, 14,462,993; 12,180,580 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 4.3% of gdp, or $35 billion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: united states geography total area: 9,372,610 km2; land area: 9,166,600 km2; includes only the 50 states and district of colombia comparative area: about four-tenths the size of ussr; about one-third the size of africa; about one-half the size of south america (or slightly larger than brazil); slightly smaller than china; about two and one-half times the size of western europe land boundaries: 12,248.1 km total; canada 8,893 km (including 2,477 km with alaska), mexico 3,326 km, cuba (us naval base at guantanamo) 29.1 km coastline: 19,924 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: not specified; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: maritime boundary disputes with canada; us naval base at guantanamo is leased from cuba and only mutual agreement or us abandonment of the area can terminate the lease; haiti claims navassa island; has made no territorial claim in antarctica (but has reserved the right to do so) and does not recognize the claims of any other nation climate: mostly temperate, but varies from tropical (hawaii) to arctic (alaska); arid to semiarid in west with occasional warm, dry chinook wind terrain: vast central plain, mountains in west, hills and low mountains in east; rugged mountains and broad river valleys in alaska; rugged, volcanic topography in hawaii natural resources: coal, copper, lead, molybdenum, phosphates, uranium, bauxite, gold, iron, mercury, nickel, potash, silver, tungsten, zinc, crude oil, natural gas, timber land use: 20% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 26% meadows and pastures; 29% forest and woodland; 25% other; includes 2% irrigated environment: pollution control measures improving air and water quality; acid rain; agricultural fertilizer and pesticide pollution; management of sparse natural water resources in west; desertification; tsunamis, volcanoes, and earthquake activity around pacific basin; continuous permafrost in northern alaska is a major impediment to development note: world's fourth-largest country (after ussr, canada, and china) people population: 250,410,000 (july 1990), growth rate 0.9% (1990) birth rate: 15 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 10 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 73 years male, 80 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--american(s); adjective--american ethnic divisions: 85% white, 12% black, 3% other (1985) religion: protestant 61% (baptist 21%, methodist 12%, lutheran 8%, presbyterian 4%, episcopalian 3%, other protestant 13%), roman catholic 25%, jewish 2%, other 5%; none 7% language: predominantly english; sizable spanish-speaking minority literacy: 99% labor force: 125,557,000 (includes armed forces and unemployed); civilian labor force 123,869,000 (1989) organized labor: 16,960,000 members; 16.4% of labor force (1989) government long-form name: united states of america; abbreviated us or usa type: federal republic; strong democratic tradition capital: washington, dc administrative divisions: 50 states and 1 district*; alabama, alaska, arizona, arkansas, california, colorado, connecticut, delaware, district of columbia*, florida, georgia, hawaii, idaho, illinois, indiana, iowa, kansas, kentucky, louisiana, maine, maryland, massachusetts, michigan, minnesota, mississippi, missouri, montana, nebraska, nevada, new hampshire, new jersey, new mexico, new york, north carolina, north dakota, ohio, oklahoma, oregon, pennyslvania, rhode island, south carolina, south dakota, tennessee, texas, utah, vermont, virginia, washington, west virginia, wisconsin, wyoming independence: 4 july 1776 (from england) constitution: 17 september 1787, effective 4 june 1789 dependent areas: american samoa, baker island, guam, howland island; jarvis island, johnston atoll, kingman reef, midway islands, navassa island, palmyra atoll, puerto rico, virgin islands, wake island. since 18 july 1947, the us has administered the trust territory of the pacific islands, but recently entered into a new political relationship with three of the four political units. the northern mariana islands is a commonwealth associated with the us (effective 3 november 1986). palau concluded a compact of free association with the us that was approved by the us congress but to date the compact process has not been completed in palau, which continues to be administered by the us as the trust territory of the pacific islands. the federated states of micronesia signed a compact of free association with the us (effective 3 november 1986). the republic of the marshall islands signed a compact of free association with the us (effective 21 october 1986). legal system: based on english common law; judicial review of legislative acts; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: independence day, 4 july (1776) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: bicameral congress consists of an upper house or senate and a lower house or house of representatives judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president george bush (since 20 january 1989); vice president dan quayle (since 20 january 1989) political parties and leaders: republican party, lee atwater, national committee chairman and jeanie austin, co-chairman; democratic party, ronald h. brown, national committee chairman; several other groups or parties of minor political significance suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held 3 november 1992); results--george bush (republican party) 53.37%, michael dukakis (democratic party) 45.67%, others 0.96%; senate--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held 6 november 1990); results--democratic party 52.1%, republican party 46.2%, others 1.7%; seats--(100 total) democratic party 55, republican party 45; house of representatives--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held 6 november 1990); results--democratic party 53.2%, republican party 45.3%, others 1.5%; seats--(435 total) democratic party 259, republican party 174, vacant 2 communists: communist party (claimed 15,000-20,000 members), gus hall, general secretary; socialist workers party (claimed 1,800 members), jack barnes, national secretary member of: adb, anzus, ccc, colombo plan, dac, fao, escap, gatt, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icac, icao, icem, ices, ico, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, iea, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itc, itu, iwc--international whaling commission, iwc--international wheat council, nato, oas, oecd, paho, spc, un, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg, wto diplomatic representation: us representative to the un, ambassador thomas r. pickering; mission at 799 united nations plaza, new york, ny 10017; telephone (212) 415-4444 flag: thirteen equal horizontal stripes of red (top and bottom) alternating with white; there is a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing 50 small white five-pointed stars arranged in nine offset horizontal rows of six stars (top and bottom) alternating with rows of five stars; the 50 stars represent the 50 states, the 13 stripes represent the 13 original colonies; known as old glory; the design and colors have been the basis for a number of other flags including chile, liberia, malaysia, and puerto rico economy overview: the us has the most powerful and diversified economy in the world, with a per capita gnp of over $21,000, the largest among the major industrial nations. in 1989 the economy entered its eighth successive year of growth, the longest in peacetime history. the expansion has featured continued moderation in wage and consumer price increases, an unemployment rate of 5.2%, (the lowest in 10 years), and an inflation rate of 4.8%. on the negative side, the us enters the 1990s with massive budget and trade deficits, huge and rapidly rising medical costs, and inadequate investment in industrial capacity and economic infrastructure. gnp: $5,233.3 billion, per capita $21,082; real growth rate 2.9% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 4.8% (1989) unemployment rate: 5.2% (1989) budget: revenues $976 billion; expenditures $1,137 billion, including capital expenditures of na (fy89 est.) exports: $322.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--capital goods, automobiles, industrial supplies and raw materials, consumer goods, agricultural products; partners--canada 22.9%, japan 11.8% (1988) imports: $440.9 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--crude and partly refined petroleum, machinery, automobiles, consumer goods, industrial raw materials, food and beverages; partners--japan 19.6% , canada 19.1% (1988) external debt: $532 billion (december 1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.3% (1989) electricity: 776,550,000 kw capacity; 2,958,300 million kwh produced, 11,920 kwh per capita (1989) industries: leading industrial power in the world, highly diversified; petroleum, steel, motor vehicles, aerospace, telecommunications, chemicals, electronics, food processing, consumer goods, fishing, lumber, mining agriculture: accounts for 2% of gnp and 2.8% of labor force; favorable climate and soils support a wide variety of crops and livestock production; world's second-largest producer and number-one exporter of grain; surplus food producer; fish catch of 5.7 million metric tons (1987) illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis for domestic consumption with 1987 production estimated at 3,500 metric tons or about 25% of the available marijuana; ongoing eradication program aimed at small plots and greenhouses has not reduced production aid: donor--commitments, including ex-im (fy80-88), $90.5 billion currency: united states dollar (plural--dollars); 1 united states dollar (us$) = 100 cents exchange rates: british pounds (l) per us$--0.6055 (january 1990), 0.6099 (1989), 0.5614 (1988), 0.6102 (1987), 0.6817 (1986), 0.7714 (1985); canadian dollars (can$) per us$--1.1885 (february 1990), 1.2307 (1988), 1.3260 (1987), 1.3895 (1986); french francs (f) per us$--5.695 (february 1990), 5.9569 (1988), 6.0107 (1987), 6.9261 (1986), 8.9852 (1985); italian lire (lit) per us$--1,244.8 (february 1990), 1,301.6 (1988), 1,296.1 (1987), 1,490.8 (1986), 1,909.4 (1985); japanese yen (y) per us$--145.55 (february 1990), 128.15 (1988), 144.64 (1987), 168.52 (1986), 238.54 (1985); frg deutsche marks (dm) per us$--1.6775 (february 1990), 1.7562 (1988), 1.7974 (1987), 2.1715 (1986), 2.9440 (1985) fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications railroads: 270,312 km highways: 6,365,590 km, including 88,641 km expressways inland waterways: 41,009 km of navigable inland channels, exclusive of the great lakes (est.) pipelines: 275,800 km petroleum, 305,300 km natural gas (1985) ports: anchorage, baltimore, beaumont, boston, charleston, cleveland, duluth, freeport, galveston, hampton roads, honolulu, houston, jacksonville, long beach, los angeles, milwaukee, mobile, new orleans, new york, philadelphia, portland (oregon), richmond (california), san francisco, savannah, seattle, tampa, wilmington merchant marine: 373 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling na grt/na dwt); includes 2 passenger-cargo, 37 cargo, 22 bulk, 165 tanker, 13 tanker tug-barge, 10 liquefied gas, 124 intermodal; in addition there are 248 government-owned vessels civil air: 3,297 commercial multiengine transport aircraft, including 2,989 jet, 231 turboprop, 77 piston (1985) airports: 15,422 in operation (1981) telecommunications: 182,558,000 telephones; stations--4,892 am, 5,200 fm (including 3,915 commercial and 1,285 public broadcasting), 7,296 tv (including 796 commercial, 300 public broadcasting, and 6,200 commercial cable); 495,000,000 radio receivers (1982); 150,000,000 tv sets (1982); satellite earth stations--45 atlantic ocean intelsat and 16 pacific ocean intelsat defense forces branches: department of the army, department of the navy (including marine corps), department of the air force military manpower: 2,247,000 total; 781,000 army; 599,000 air force; 793,000 navy (includes 200,000 marine corps) (1988) defense expenditures: 5.8% of gnp, or $302.8 billion (1989) ---------------------------------------------------country: uruguay geography total area: 176,220 km2; land area: 173,620 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than washington state land boundaries: 1,564 km total; argentina 579 km, brazil 985 km coastline: 660 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 200 nm (overflight and navigation permitted beyond 12 nm) disputes: short section of boundary with argentina is in dispute; two short sections of the boundary with brazil are in dispute (arroyo de la invernada area of the rio quarai and the islands at the confluence of the rio quarai and the uruguay) climate: warm temperate; freezing temperatures almost unknown terrain: mostly rolling plains and low hills; fertile coastal lowland natural resources: soil, hydropower potential, minor minerals land use: 8% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 78% meadows and pastures; 4% forest and woodland; 10% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to seasonally high winds, droughts, floods people population: 3,036,660 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 17 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 10 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 22 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--uruguayan(s); adjective--uruguayan ethnic divisions: 88% white, 8% mestizo, 4% black religion: 66% roman catholic (less than half adult population attends church regularly), 2% protestant, 2% jewish, 30% nonprofessing or other language: spanish literacy: 94% labor force: 1,300,000; 25% government, 19% manufacturing, 11% agriculture, 12% commerce, 12% utilities, construction, transport, and communications, 21% other services (1988 est.) organized labor: interunion workers' assembly/national workers' confederation (pit/cnt) labor federation government long-form name: oriental republic of uruguay type: republic capital: montevideo administrative divisions: 19 departments (departamentos, singular--departamento); artigas, canelones, cerro largo, colonia, durazno, flores, florida, lavalleja, maldonado, montevideo, paysandu, rio negro, rivera, rocha, salto, san jose, soriano, tacuarembo, treinta y tres independence: 25 august 1828 (from brazil) constitution: 27 november 1966, effective february 1967, suspended 27 june 1973, new constitution rejected by referendum 30 november 1980 legal system: based on spanish civil law system; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 25 august (1828) executive branch: president, vice president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral congress (congreso) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camera del diputados) judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--president luis alberto lacalle (since 1 march 1990); vice president gonzalo aguirre (since 1 march 1990) political parties and leaders: national (blanco) party, roberto rubio; colorado party; broad front coalition, liber seregni includes communist party led by jaime perez and national liberation movement (mln) or tupamaros led by eleuterio fernandez huidobro; new space coalition consists of the party of the government of the people (pgp) led by hugo batalla, christian democratic party (pdc), and civic union led by humberto ciganda suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 26 november 1989 (next to be held november 1994); results--luis lacalle (blanco) 37%, jorge batlle (colorado) 29%, liber seregni (broad front) 20%; senate--last held 26 november 1989 (next to be held november 1994); results--blanco 40%, colorado 30%, broad front 23% new space 7%; seats--(30 total) blanco 12, colorado 9, broad front 7, new space 2; chamber of deputies--last held na november 1989 (next to be held november 1994); results--blanco 39%, colorado 30%, broad front 22%, new space 8%, others 1%; seats--(99 total) number of seats by party na communists: 50,000 member of: ccc, fao, g-77, gatt, group of eight, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, irc, itu, laia, oas, paho, sela, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wsg diplomatic representation: ambassador juan podesta pinon; chancery at 1918 f street nw, washington dc 20006; telephone (202) 331-1313 through 1316; there are uruguayan consulates general in los angeles, miami, and new york, and a consulate in new orleans; us--ambassador malcolm r. wilkey; embassy at lauro muller 1776, montevideo (mailing address is apo miami 34035); telephone p598o (2) 40-90-51 flag: nine equal horizontal stripes of white (top and bottom) alternating with blue; there is a white square in the upper hoist-side corner with a yellow sun bearing a human face known as the sun of may and 16 rays alternately triangular and wavy economy overview: the economy is slowly recovering from the deep recession of 1981-84. in 1986 real gdp grew by 6.6% and in 1987 by 4.9%. the recovery was led by growth in the agriculture and fishing sectors, agriculture alone contributing 20% to gdp, employing about 11% of the labor force, and generating a large proportion of export earnings. raising livestock, particularly cattle and sheep, is the major agricultural activity. in 1988, despite healthy exports and an improved current account, domestic growth slowed because of government concentration on the external sector, adverse weather conditions, and prolonged strikes. high inflation rates of about 80%, a large domestic debt, and frequent strikes remain major economic problems for the government. gdp: $8.8 billion, per capita $2,950; real growth rate 1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 80% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 9.0% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $1.2 billion; expenditures $1.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $165 million (1988) exports: $1.5 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--hides and leather goods 17%, beef 10%, wool 9%, fish 7%, rice 4%; partners--brazil 17%, us 15%, frg 10%, argentina 10% (1987) imports: $1.1 billion (f.o.b., 1989 est.); commodities--fuels and lubricants 15%, metals, machinery, transportation equipment, industrial chemicals; partners--brazil 24%, argentina 14%, us 8%, frg 8% (1987) external debt: $6 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 2.9% (1988 est.) electricity: 1,950,000 kw capacity; 4,330 million kwh produced, 1,450 kwh per capita (1989) industries: meat processing, wool and hides, sugar, textiles, footwear, leather apparel, tires, cement, fishing, petroleum refining, wine agriculture: large areas devoted to extensive livestock grazing; wheat, rice, corn, sorghum; self-sufficient in most basic foodstuffs aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $105 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $263 million; communist countries (1970-88), $69 million currency: new uruguayan peso (plural--pesos); 1 new uruguayan peso (n$ur) = 100 centesimos exchange rates: new uruguayan pesos (n$ur) per us$1--832.62 (january 1990), 605.62 (1989), 359.44 (1988), 226.67 (1987), 151.99 (1986), 101.43 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,000 km, all 1.435-meter standard gauge and government owned highways: 49,900 km total; 6,700 km paved, 3,000 km gravel, 40,200 km earth inland waterways: 1,600 km; used by coastal and shallow-draft river craft ports: montevideo, punta del este merchant marine: 4 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 65,212 grt/116,613 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 container civil air: 14 major transport aircraft airports: 92 total, 87 usable; 16 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 2 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 17 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: most modern facilities concentrated in montevideo; new nationwide radio relay network; 337,000 telephones; stations--99 am, no fm, 26 tv, 9 shortwave; 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 711,700; 580,898 fit for military service; no conscription defense expenditures: 2.5% of gdp (1986) ---------------------------------------------------country: vanuatu geography total area: 14,760 km2; land area: 14,760 km2; includes more than 80 islands comparative area: slightly larger than connecticut land boundary: none coastline: 2,528 km maritime claims: (measured from claimed archipelagic baselines); contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; moderated by southeast trade winds terrain: mostly mountains of volcanic origin; narrow coastal plains natural resources: manganese, hardwood forests, fish land use: 1% arable land; 5% permanent crops; 2% meadows and pastures; 1% forest and woodland; 91% other environment: subject to tropical cyclones or typhoons (january to april); volcanism causes minor earthquakes note: located 5,750 km southwest of honolulu in the south pacific ocean about three-quarters of the way between hawaii and australia people population: 165,006 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 36 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 67 years male, 72 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.5 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--vanuatuan(s); adjective--vanuatuan ethnic divisions: 94% indigenous melanesian, 4% french, remainder vietnamese, chinese, and various pacific islanders religion: most at least nominally christian language: english and french (official); pidgin (known as bislama or bichelama) literacy: 10-20% (est.) labor force: na organized labor: 7 registered trade unions--largest include oil and gas workers' union, vanuatu airline workers' union government long-form name: republic of vanuatu type: republic capital: port-vila administrative divisions: 11 island councils; ambrym, aoba/maewo, banks/torres, efate, epi, malakula, paama, pentecote, santo/malo, shepherd, tafea independence: 30 july 1980 (from france and uk; formerly new hebrides) constitution: 30 july 1980 legal system: unified system being created from former dual french and british systems national holiday: independence day, 30 july (1980) executive branch: president, prime minister, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral parliament; note--the national council of chiefs advises on matters of custom and land judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president frederick timakata (since 30 january 1989); head of government--prime minister father walter hadye lini (since 30 july 1980); deputy prime minister (vacant) political parties and leaders: national party (vanua'aku pati), walter lini; union of moderate parties, maxine carlot; melanesian progressive party, barak sope suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: parliament--last held 30 november 1987 (next to be held na); byelections were held na december 1988 to fill vacancies resulting from the expulsion of opposition members for boycotting sessions; results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(46 total) national party 26, union of moderate parties 19, independent 1 member of: acp, adb, commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, ifc, imf, itu, nam, spf, un, who, wmo diplomatic representation: vanuatu does not have a mission in washington; us--the ambassador in papua new guinea is accredited to vanuatu flag: two equal horizontal bands of red (top) and green (bottom) with a black isosceles triangle (based on the hoist side) all separated by a black-edged yellow stripe in the shape of a horizontal y (the two points of the y face the hoist side and enclose the triangle); centered in the triangle is a boar's tusk encircling two crossed namele leaves, all in yellow economy overview: the economy is based primarily on subsistence farming that provides a living for about 80% of the population. fishing and tourism are the other mainstays of the economy. mineral deposits are negligible; the country has no known petroleum deposits. a small light-industry sector caters to the local market. tax revenues come mainly from import duties. gdp: $120 million, per capita $820; real growth rate 0.7% (1987 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.0% (1988 est.) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $80.1 million; expenditures $86.6 million, including capital expenditures of $27.1 million (1988 est.) exports: $16 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--copra 37%, cocoa 11%, meat 9%, fish 8%, timber 4%; partners--netherlands 34%, france 27%, japan 17%, belgium 4%, new caledonia 3%, singapore 2% (1987) imports: $58 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--machines and vehicles 25%, food and beverages 23%, basic manufactures 18%, raw materials and fuels 11%, chemicals 6%; partners--australia 36%, japan 13%, nz 10%, france 8%, fiji 5% (1987) external debt: $57 million (1988) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 10,000 kw capacity; 20 million kwh produced, 125 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food and fish freezing, forestry processing, meat canning agriculture: export crops--copra, cocoa, coffee, and fish; subsistence crops--copra, taro, yams, coconuts, fruits, and vegetables aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $541 million currency: vatu (plural--vatu); 1 vatu (vt) = 100 centimes exchange rates: vatu (vt) per us$1--107.17 (january 1990), 116.04 (1989), 104.43 (1988), 109.85 (1987), 106.08 (1986), 106.03 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: none highways: 1,027 km total; at least 240 km sealed or all-weather roads ports: port-vila, luganville, palikoulo, santu merchant marine: 65 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 885,668 grt/1,473,443 dwt; includes 26 cargo, 4 refrigerated cargo, 5 container, 2 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 vehicle carrier, 3 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 21 bulk, 1 combination bulk; note--a flag of convenience registry civil air: no major transport aircraft airports: 33 total, 28 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 2 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--2 am, no fm, no tv; 3,000 telephones; 1 pacific ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: a paramilitary force is responsible for internal and external security; no military forces military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: vatican city geography total area: 0.438 km2; land area: 0.438 km2 comparative area: about 0.7 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundary: 3.2 km with italy coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked climate: temperate; mild, rainy winters (september to mid-may) with hot, dry summers (may to september) terrain: low hill natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: urban note: landlocked; enclave of rome, italy; world's smallest state; outside the vatican city, 13 buildings in rome and castel gandolfo (the pope's summer residence) enjoy extraterritorial rights people population: 774 (july 1990), growth rate 0.5% (1990) nationality: no noun or adjectival forms ethnic divisions: primarily italians but also many other nationalities religion: roman catholic language: italian, latin, and various other languages literacy: 100% labor force: about 1,500; vatican city employees divided into three categories--executives, office workers, and salaried employees organized labor: association of vatican lay workers, 1,800 members (1987) government long-form name: state of the vatican city; note--the vatican city is the physical seat of the holy see which is the central government of the roman catholic church type: monarchical-sacerdotal state capital: vatican city independence: 11 february 1929 (from italy) constitution: apostolic constitution of 1967 (effective 1 march 1968) national holiday: installation day of the pope (john paul ii), 22 october (1978); note--pope john paul ii was elected on 16 october 1978 executive branch: pope legislative branch: unicameral pontifical commission judicial branch: none; normally handled by italy leaders: chief of state and head of government--pope john paul ii (karol wojtyla; since 16 october 1978) political parties and leaders: none suffrage: limited to cardinals less than 80 years old elections: pope--last held 16 october 1978 (next to be held after the death of the current pope); results--karol wojtyla was elected for life by the college of cardinals communists: na other political or pressure groups: none (exclusive of influence exercised by church officers) member: iaea, intelsat, itu, iwc--international wheat council, upu, wipo, wto; permanent observer status at fao, oas, un, and unesco diplomatic representation: apostolic pro-nuncio archbishop pio laghi; 3339 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 333-7121; us--ambassador thomas p. melady; embassy at villino pacelli, via aurelia 294, 00165 rome (mailing address is apo new york 09794); telephone p396o 639-0558 flag: two vertical bands of yellow (hoist side) and white with the crossed keys of st. peter and the papal tiara centered in the white band economy overview: the economy is supported financially by contributions (known as peter's pence) from roman catholics throughout the world, the sale of postage stamps, tourist mementos, fees for admission to museums, and the sale of publications. budget: revenues $57 million; expenditures $113.7 million, including capital expenditures of $na (1986) electricity: 5,000 kw standby capacity (1989); power supplied by italy industries: printing and production of a small amount of mosaics and staff uniforms; worldwide banking and financial activities currency: vatican lira (plural--lire); 1 vatican lira (vlit) = 100 centesimi exchange rates: vatican lire (vlit) per us$1--1,262.5 (january 1990), 1,372.1 (1989), 1,301.6 (1988), 1,296.1 (1987), 1,490.8 (1986), 1,909.4 (1985); note--the vatican lira is at par with the italian lira which circulates freely fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 850 m, 750 mm gauge (links with italian network near the rome station of st. peter's) highways: none; all city streets telecommunications: stations--3 am, 4 fm, no tv; 2,000-line automatic telephone exchange; no communications satellite systems defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of italy; swiss papal guards are posted at entrances to the vatican city ---------------------------------------------------country: venezuela geography total area: 912,050 km2; land area: 882,050 km2 comparative area: slightly more than twice the size of california land boundaries: 4,993 km total; brazil 2,200 km, colombia 2,050 km, guyana 743 km coastline: 2,800 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 15 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claims essequibo area of guyana; maritime boundary disputes with colombia in the gulf of venezuela and with trinidad and tobago in the gulf of paria climate: tropical; hot, humid; more moderate in highlands terrain: andes mountains and maracaibo lowlands in northwest; central plains (llanos); guyana highlands in southeast natural resources: crude oil, natural gas, iron ore, gold, bauxite, other minerals, hydropower, diamonds land use: 3% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 20% meadows and pastures; 39% forest and woodland; 37% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: subject to floods, rockslides, mudslides; periodic droughts; increasing industrial pollution in caracas and maracaibo note: on major sea and air routes linking north and south america people population: 19,698,104 (july 1990), growth rate 2.5% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 4 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrant/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 27 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 71 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.4 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--venezuelan(s); adjective--venezuelan ethnic divisions: 67% mestizo, 21% white, 10% black, 2% indian religion: 96% nominally roman catholic, 2% protestant language: spanish (official); indian dialects spoken by about 200,000 amerindians in the remote interior literacy: 85.6% labor force: 5,800,000; 56% services, 28% industry, 16% agriculture (1985) organized labor: 32% of labor force government long-form name: republic of venezuela type: republic capital: caracas administrative divisions: 20 states (estados, singular--estado), 2 territories* (territorios, singular--territorio), 1 federal district** (distrito federal), and 1 federal dependence*** (dependencia federal); amazonas*, anzoategui, apure, aragua, barinas, bolivar, carabobo, cojedes, delta amacuro*, dependencias federales***, distrito federal**, falcon, guarico, lara, merida, miranda, monagas, nueva esparta, portuguesa, sucre, tachira, trujillo, yaracuy, zulia; note--the federal dependence consists of 11 federally controlled island groups with a total of 72 individual islands independence: 5 july 1811 (from spain) constitution: 23 january 1961 legal system: based on napoleonic code; judicial review of legislative acts in cassation court only; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 5 july (1811) executive branch: president, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: bicameral national congress (congreso nacional) consists of an upper chamber or senate (senado) and a lower chamber or chamber of deputies (camara de diputados) judicial branch: supreme court of justice (corte suprema de justica) leaders: chief of state and head of government--president carlos andres perez (since 2 february 1989) political parties and leaders: social christian party (copei), eduardo fernandez, secretary general; democratic action (ad), gonzalo barrios, president, and humberto celli, secretary general; movement toward socialism (mas), teodoro petkoff, president, and freddy munoz, secretary general suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18, though poorly enforced elections: president--last held 4 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--carlos andres perez (ad) 53%, eduardo fernandez (copei) 40%, others 7%; senate--last held 4 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(49 total) ad 23, copei 22, others 4; chamber of deputies--last held 4 december 1988 (next to be held december 1993); results--ad 43.7%, copei 31.4%, mas 10.3%, others 14.6%; seats--(201 total) ad 97, copei 67, mas 18, others 19 communists: 10,000 members (est.) other political or pressure groups: fedecamaras, a conservative business group; venezuelan confederation of workers, the democratic action-dominated labor organization member of: andean pact, aioec, fao, g-77, group of eight, iadb, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, irc, itu, iwc--international wheat council, laia, nam, oas, opec, paho, sela, wftu, un, unesco, upu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador simon alberto consalvi bottaro; chancery at 2445 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 797-3800; there are venezuelan consulates general in baltimore, boston, chicago, houston, miami, new orleans, new york, philadelphia, san francisco, and san juan (puerto rico); us--ambassador-designate eric javits; embassy at avenida francisco de miranda and avenida principal de la floresta, caracas (mailing address is p. o. box 62291, caracas 1060-a, or apo miami 34037); telephone p58o (2) 284-6111 or 7111; there is a us consulate in maracaibo flag: three equal horizontal bands of yellow (top), blue, and red with the coat of arms on the hoist side of the yellow band and an arc of seven white five-pointed stars centered in the blue band economy overview: petroleum is the cornerstone of the economy and accounted for 17% of gdp, 52% of central government revenues, and 81% of export earnings in 1988. president perez introduced an economic readjustment program when he assumed office in february 1989. lower tariffs and price supports, a free market exchange rate, and market-linked interest rates have thrown the economy into confusion, causing about an 8% decline in gdp. gdp: $52.0 billion, per capita $2,700; real growth rate 8.1% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 80.7% (1989) unemployment rate: 7.0% (1988) budget: revenues $8.4 billion; expenditures $8.6 billion, including capital expenditures of $5.9 billion (1989) exports: $10.4 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--petroleum 81%, bauxite and aluminum, iron ore, agricultural products, basic manufactures; partners--us 50.3%, frg 5.3%, japan 4.1% (1988) imports: $10.9 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--foodstuffs, chemicals, manufactures, machinery and transport equipment; partners--us 44%, frg 8.5%, japan 6%, italy 5%, brazil 4.4% (1987) external debt: $33.6 billion (1988) industrial production: growth rate 3.7%, excluding oil (1988) electricity: 19,110,000 kw capacity; 54,516 million kwh produced, 2,830 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum, iron-ore mining, construction materials, food processing, textiles, steel, aluminum, motor vehicle assembly agriculture: accounts for 6% of gdp and 15% of labor force; products--corn, sorghum, sugarcane, rice, bananas, vegetables, coffee, beef, pork, milk, eggs, fish; not self-sufficient in food other than meat illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis and coca for the international drug trade on a small scale; however, large quantities of cocaine and marijuana do transit the country aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-86), $488 million; communist countries (1970-88), $10 million currency: bolivar (plural--bolivares); 1 bolivar (bs) = 100 centimos exchange rates: bolivares (bs) per us$1--43.42 (january 1990), 34.6815 (1989), 14.5000 (fixed rate 1987-88), 8.0833 (1986), 7.5000 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 542 km total; 363 km 1.435-meter standard gauge all single track, government owned; 179 km 1.435-meter gauge, privately owned highways: 77,785 km total; 22,780 km paved, 24,720 km gravel, 14,450 km earth roads, and 15,835 km unimproved earth inland waterways: 7,100 km; rio orinoco and lago de maracaibo accept oceangoing vessels pipelines: 6,370 km crude oil; 480 km refined products; 4,010 km natural gas ports: amuay bay, bajo grande, el tablazo, la guaira, puerto cabello, puerto ordaz merchant marine: 70 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 997,458 grt/1,615,155 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 1 passenger cargo, 28 cargo, 2 container, 3 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 17 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 2 chemical tanker, 2 liquefied gas, 11 bulk, 1 vehicle carrier, 1 combination bulk, 1 combination ore/oil civil air: 58 major transport aircraft airports: 306 total, 278 usable; 134 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 12 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 92 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: modern and expanding; 1,440,000 telephones; stations--181 am, no fm, 59 tv, 26 shortwave; 3 submarine coaxial cables; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 3 domestic defense forces branches: ground forces (army), naval forces (navy, marines, coast guard), air forces, armed forces of cooperation (national guard) military manpower: males 15-49, 5,073,913; 3,680,176 fit for military service; 211,269 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: 1.1% of gdp, or $570 million (1990 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: vietnam geography total area: 329,560 km2; land area: 325,360 comparative area: slightly larger than new mexico land boundaries: 3,818 km total; cambodia 982 km, china 1,281 km, laos 1,555 km coastline: 3,444 km (excluding islands) maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: offshore islands and three sections of the boundary with cambodia are in dispute; maritime boundary with cambodia not defined; occupied cambodia on 25 december 1978; sporadic border clashes with china; involved in a complex dispute over the spratly islands with china, malaysia, philippines, and taiwan; maritime boundary dispute with china in the gulf of tonkin; paracel islands occupied by china but claimed by vietnam and taiwan climate: tropical in south; monsoonal in north with hot, rainy season (mid-may to mid-september) and warm, dry season (mid-october to mid-march) terrain: low, flat delta in south and north; central highlands; hilly, mountainous in far north and northwest natural resources: phosphates, coal, manganese, bauxite, chromate, offshore oil deposits, forests land use: 22% arable land; 2% permanent crops; 1% meadows and pastures; 40% forest and woodland; 35% other; includes 5% irrigated environment: occasional typhoons (may to january) with extensive flooding people population: 66,170,889 (july 1990), growth rate 2.1% (1990) birth rate: 30 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 8 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 1 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 50 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 62 years male, 66 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--vietnamese (sing. and pl.); adjective--vietnamese ethnic divisions: 85-90% predominantly vietnamese; 3% chinese; ethnic minorities include muong, thai, meo, khmer, man, cham; other mountain tribes religion: buddhist, confucian, taoist, roman catholic, indigenous beliefs, islamic, protestant language: vietnamese (official), french, chinese, english, khmer, tribal languages (mon-khmer and malayo-polynesian) literacy: 78% labor force: 35,000,000 (1989 est.) organized labor: reportedly over 90% of wage and salary earners are members of the vietnam federation of trade unions (vftu) government long-form name: socialist republic of vietnam; abbreviated srv type: communist state capital: hanoi administrative divisions: 37 provinces (tinh, singular and plural), 3 municipalities* (thanh pho, singular and plural); an giang, bac thai, ben tre, binh tri thien, cao bang, cuu long, dac lac, dong nai, dong thap, gia lai-cong tum, ha bac, hai hung, hai phong*, ha nam ninh, ha noi*, ha son binh, ha tuyen, hau giang, hoang lien son, ho chi minh*, kien giang, lai chau, lam dong, lang son, long an, minh hai, nghe tinh, nghia binh, phu khanh, quang nam-da nang, quang ninh, song be, son la, tay ninh, thai binh, thanh hoa, thuan hai, tien giang, vinh pu, vung tau-con dao; note--diacritical marks are not included; the number of provinces may have been changed with the elimination of binh tri thien, nghia binh, and phu khanh and the addition of binh dinh, khanh hoa, phu yen, quang binh, quang ngai, quang tri, and thua thien independence: 2 september 1945 (from france) constitution: 18 december 1980 legal system: based on communist legal theory and french civil law system national holiday: independence day, 2 september (1945) executive branch: chairman of the council of state, council of state, chairman of the council of ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral national assembly (quoc hoi) judicial branch: supreme people's court leaders: chief of state--chairman of the council of state vo chi cong (since 18 june 1987); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers (premier) do muoi (since 22 june 1988) political parties and leaders: only party-vietnam communist party (vcp), nguyen van linh suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: national assembly--last held 19 april 1987 (next to be held april 1992); results--vcp is the only party; seats--(496 total) vcp or vcp-approved 496 communists: nearly 2 million member of: adb, cema, colombo plan, escap, fao, g-77, iaea, ibec, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, intelsat, irc, itu, mekong committee, nam, un, undp, unesco, unicef, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: none flag: red with a large yellow five-pointed star in the center economy overview: this is a centrally planned, developing economy with extensive government ownership and control of productive facilities. the economy is primarily agricultural, employing about 65% of the labor force and accounting for almost half of gnp. rice is the staple crop; substantial amounts of maize, sorghum, cassava, and sweet potatoes are also grown. the government permits sale of surplus grain on the open market. most of the mineral resources are located in the north, including coal, which is an important export item. following the end of the war in 1975, heavy handed government measures undermined efforts at an efficient merger of the agricultural resources of the south and the industrial resources of the north. the economy remains heavily dependent on foreign aid and has received assistance from communist countries, sweden, and un agencies. inflation, although down from recent triple-digit levels, is still a major weakness, and per capita output is among the world's lowest. since early 1989 the government has sponsored a broad reform program that seeks to turn more economic activity over to the private sector. gnp: $14.2 billion, per capita $215; real growth rate 8% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 40% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 25% (1989 est.) budget: revenues $3.2 billion; expenditures $4.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $528 million (1987 est.) exports: $1.1 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--agricultural and handicraft products, coal, minerals, ores; partners--ussr, eastern europe, japan, singapore imports: $2.5 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--petroleum, steel products, railroad equipment, chemicals, medicines, raw cotton, fertilizer, grain; partners--ussr, eastern europe, japan, singapore external debt: $16 billion (1989) industrial production: growth rate 10% (1989) electricity: 2,465,000 kw capacity; 6,730 million kwh produced, 100 kwh per capita (1989) industries: food processing, textiles, machine building, mining, cement, chemical fertilizer, glass, tires, oil, fishing agriculture: accounts for half of gnp; paddy rice, corn, potatoes make up 50% of farm output; commercial crops (rubber, soybeans, coffee, tea, bananas) and animal products other 50%; not self-sufficient in food staple rice; fish catch of 900,000 metric tons (1988 est.) aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-74), $3.1 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.7 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $61 million; communist countries (1970-88), $10.9 million currency: new dong (plural--new dong); 1 new dong (d) = 100 xu exchange rates: new dong (d) per us$1--4,000 (march 1990), 900 (1988), 225 (1987), 18 (1986), 12 (1985); note--1985-89 figures are end of year fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 3,059 km total; 2,454 1.000-meter gauge, 151 km 1.435-meter standard gauge, 230 km dual gauge (three rails), and 224 km not restored to service highways: about 85,000 km total; 9,400 km bituminous, 48,700 km gravel or improved earth, 26,900 km unimproved earth pipelines: 150 km, refined products inland waterways: about 17,702 km navigable; more than 5,149 km navigable at all times by vessels up to 1.8 meter draft ports: da nang, haiphong, ho chi minh city merchant marine: 71 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 290,123 grt/432,152 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 55 cargo, 4 refrigerated cargo, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 1 vehicle carrier, 8 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 1 bulk; note--vietnam owns 10 cargo ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 111,028 dwt under the registry of panama and malta civil air: controlled by military airports: 100 total, 100 usable; 50 with permanent-surface runways; 10 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 20 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 35,000 telephones in ho chi minh city (1984); stations--16 am, 1 fm, 2 tv; 2,300,000 tv sets; 6,000,000 radio receivers; at least 2 satellite earth stations, including 1 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, navy, air force military manpower: males 15-49, 15,707,629; 10,030,563 fit for military service; 787,444 reach military age (17) annually defense expenditures: 19.4% of gnp (1986 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: virgin islands (territory of the us) geography total area: 352 km2; land area: 349 km2 comparative area: slightly less than twice the size of washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 188 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: subtropical, tempered by easterly tradewinds, relatively low humidity, little seasonal temperature variation; rainy season may to november terrain: mostly hilly to rugged and mountainous with little level land natural resources: sun, sand, sea, surf land use: 15% arable land; 6% permanent crops; 26% meadows and pastures; 6% forest and woodland; 47% other environment: rarely affected by hurricanes; subject to frequent severe droughts, floods, earthquakes; lack of natural freshwater resources note: important location 1,770 km southeast of miami and 65 km east of puerto rico, along the anegada passage--a key shipping lane for the panama canal; st. thomas has one of the best natural, deepwater harbors in the caribbean people population: 99,200 (july 1990), growth rate 0.3% (1990) birth rate: 22 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 20 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 19 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 2.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--virgin islander(s); adjective--virgin islander ethnic divisions: 74% west indian (45% born in the virgin islands and 29% born elsewhere in the west indies), 13% us mainland, 5% puerto rican, 8% other; 80% black, 15% white, 5% other; 14% of hispanic origin religion: 42% baptist, 34% roman catholic, 17% episcopalian, 7% other language: english (official), but spanish and creole are widely spoken literacy: 90% labor force: 45,000 (1987) organized labor: 90% of the government labor force government long-form name: virgin islands of the united states type: organized, unincorporated territory of the us administered by the office of territorial and international affairs, us department of the interior capital: charlotte amalie administrative divisions: none (territory of the us) independence: none (territory of the us) constitution: revised organic act of 22 july 1954 serves as the constitution legal system: based on us national holiday: transfer day (from denmark to us), 31 march (1917) executive branch: us president, governor, lieutenant governor legislative branch: unicameral senate judicial branch: us district court handles civil matters over $50,000, felonies (persons 15 years of age and over), and federal cases; territorial court handles civil matters up to $50,000 small claims, juvenile, domestic, misdemeanors, and traffic cases leaders: chief of state and head of government--president george bush (since 20 january 1989), represented by governor alexander farrelly (since 5 january 1987); lieutenant governor derek hodge (since 5 january 1987) political parties and leaders: democratic party, marilyn stapleton; independent citizens' movement (icm), virdin brown; republican party, charlotte-poole davis suffrage: universal at age 18; indigenous inhabitants are us citizens, but do not vote in us presidential elections elections: governor--last held na 1986 (next to be held na 1990); results--alexander farrelly (democratic party) defeated adelbert bryan (icm); senate--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(15 total) number of seats by party na; us house of representatives--last held 8 november 1988 (next to be held 6 november 1990); results--the virgin islands elects one nonvoting representative diplomatic representation: none (territory of the us) flag: white with a modified us coat of arms in the center between the large blue initials v and i; the coat of arms shows an eagle holding an olive branch in one talon and three arrows in the other with a superimposed shield of vertical red and white stripes below a blue panel economy overview: tourism is the primary economic activity, accounting for more than 70% of gdp and 70% of employment. the manufacturing sector consists of textile, electronics, pharmaceutical, and watch assembly plants. the agricultural sector is small with most food imported. international business and financial services are a small but growing component of the economy. the world's largest petroleum refinery is at st. croix. gdp: $1.03 billion, per capita $9,030; real growth rate na% (1985) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: 3.5% (1987) budget: revenues $315 million; expenditures $322 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy88) exports: $3.4 billion (f.o.b., 1985); commodities--refined petroleum products; partners--us, puerto rico imports: $3.7 billion (c.i.f., 1985); commodities--crude oil, foodstuffs, consumer goods, building materials; partners--us, puerto rico external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate 12% electricity: 341,000 kw capacity; 507 million kwh produced, 4,650 kwh per capita (1989) industries: tourism, government service, petroleum refining, watch assembly, rum distilling, construction, pharmaceuticals, textiles, electronics agriculture: truck gardens, food crops (small scale), fruit, sorghum, senepol cattle aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $33.5 million currency: us currency is used exchange rates: us currency is used fiscal year: 1 october-30 september communications highways: 856 km total ports: st. croix--christiansted, frederiksted; st. thomas--long bay, crown bay, red hook; st. john--cruz bay airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways 1,220-2,439 m; international airports on st. thomas and st. croix telecommunications: 44,280 telephones; stations--4 am, 6 fm, 3 tv; modern system using fiber optic cable, submarine cable, microwave radio, and satellite facilities; 90,000 radio receivers; 56,000 television sets defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: wake island (territory of the us) geography total area: 6.5 km2; land area: 6.5 km2 comparative area: about 11 times the size of the mall in washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 19.3 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 12 nm; continental shelf: 200 m; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: claimed by the republic of the marshall islands climate: tropical terrain: atoll of three coral islands built up on an underwater volcano; central lagoon is former crater, islands are part of the rim; average elevation less than four meters natural resources: none land use: 0% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 100% other environment: subject to occasional typhoons note: strategic location 3,700 km west of honolulu in the north pacific ocean, about two-thirds of the way between hawaii and the northern mariana islands; emergency landing location for transpacific flights people population: 195 (january 1990); no indigenous inhabitants; temporary population consists of 11 us air force personnel, 27 us civilians, and 151 thai contractors note: population peaked about 1970 with over 1,600 persons during the vietnam conflict government long-form name: none type: unincorporated territory of the us administered by the us air force (under an agreement with the us department of interior) since 24 june 1972 flag: the us flag is used economy overview: economic activity is limited to providing services to us military personnel and contractors located on the island. all food and manufactured goods must be imported. communications ports: none; because of the reefs, there are only two offshore anchorages for large ships airports: 1 with permanent-surface runways 2,987 m telecommunications: underwater cables to guam and through midway to honolulu; afrts radio and television service provided by satellite; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv note: formerly an important commercial aviation base, now used only by us military and some commercial cargo planes defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of the us ---------------------------------------------------country: wallis and futuna (overseas territory of france) geography total area: 274 km2; land area: 274 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than washington, dc land boundaries: none coastline: 129 km maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; hot, rainy season (november to april); cool, dry season (may to october) terrain: volcanic origin; low hills natural resources: negligible land use: 5% arable land; 20% permanent crops; 0% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 75% other environment: both island groups have fringing reefs note: located 4,600 km southwest of honolulu in the south pacific ocean about two-thirds of the way from hawaii to new zealand people population: 14,910 (july 1990), growth rate 3.0% (1990) birth rate: 28 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 8 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 32 deaths/1,000 population (1990) life expectancy at birth: 69 years male, 70 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--wallisian(s), futunan(s), or wallis and futuna islanders; adjective--wallisian, futunan, or wallis and futuna islander ethnic divisions: almost entirely polynesian religion: largely roman catholic language: french, wallisian (indigenous polynesian language) literacy: na% labor force: na organized labor: na government long-form name: territory of the wallis and futuna islands type: overseas territory of france capital: mata-utu administrative divisions: none (overseas territory of france) independence: none (overseas territory of france) constitution: 28 september 1958 (french constitution) legal system: french national holiday: taking of the bastille, 14 july (1789) executive branch: french president, high administrator; note--there are three traditional kings with limited powers legislative branch: unicameral territorial assembly (assemblee territoriale) judicial branch: none; justice generally administered under french law by the chief administrator, but the three traditional kings administer customary law and there is a magistrate in mata-utu leaders: chief of state--president francois mitterrand (since 21 may 1981); head of government--chief administrator roger dumec (since 15 july 1988) political parties and leaders: rally for the republic (rpr); union populaire locale (upl); union pour la democratie francaise (udf) suffrage: universal adult at age na elections: territorial assembly--last held 15 march 1987 (next to be held march 1992); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(20 total) rpr 7, udf coalition 7, upl 6; french senate--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) party of the representative is na; french national assembly--last held na (next to be held na); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(1 total) rpr 1 diplomatic representation: as an overseas territory of france, local interests are represented in the us by france flag: the flag of france is used economy overview: the economy is limited to subsistence agriculture. the majority of the labor force earns its livelihood from agriculture, raising livestock, and fishing, with the rest employed by the government sector. exports are negligible. the territory has to import food, fuel, and construction materials, and is dependent on budgetary support from france to meet recurring expenses. the economy also benefits from cash remittances from expatriate workers. gdp: $6.7 million, per capita $484; real growth rate na% (est. 1985) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na exports: $na; commodities--copra; partners--na imports: $3.4 million (c.i.f., 1977); commodities--largely foodstuffs and some equipment associated with development programs; partners--france, australia, new zealand external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 1,200 kw capacity; 1 million kwh produced, 70 kwh per capita (1989) industries: copra, handicrafts, fishing, lumber agriculture: dominated by coconut production, with subsistence crops of yams, taro, bananas aid: western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $118 million currency: comptoirs francais du pacifique franc (plural--francs); 1 cfp franc (cfpf) = 100 centimes exchange rates: comptoirs francais du pacifique francs (cfpf) per us$1--104.71 (january 1990), 115.99 (1989), 108.30 (1988), 109.27 (1987), 125.92 (1986), 163.35 (1985); note--linked at the rate of 18.18 to the french franc fiscal year: na communications highways: 100 km on ile uvea (wallis island), 16 km sealed; 20 km earth surface on ile futuna (futuna island) inland waterways: none ports: mata-utu, leava airports: 2 total; 2 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 225 telephones; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv defense forces note: defense is the responsibility of france ---------------------------------------------------country: west bank note: the war between israel and the arab states in june 1967 ended with israel in control of the west bank and the gaza strip, the sinai, and the golan heights. as stated in the 1978 camp david accords and reaffirmed by president reagan's 1 september 1982 peace initiative, the final status of the west bank and the gaza strip, their relationship with their neighbors, and a peace treaty between israel and jordan are to be negotiated among the concerned parties. camp david further specifies that these negotiations will resolve the respective boundaries. pending the completion of this process, it is us policy that the final status of the west bank and the gaza strip has yet to be determined. in the view of the us, the term west bank describes all of the area west of the jordan river under jordanian administration before the 1967 arab-israeli war. however, with respect to negotiations envisaged in the framework agreement, it is us policy that a distinction must be made between jerusalem and the rest of the west bank because of the city's special status and circumstances. therefore, a negotiated solution for the final status of jerusalem could be different in character from that of the rest of the west bank. geography total area: 5,860 km2; land area: 5,640 km2; includes west bank, east jerusalem, latrun salient, jerusalem no man's land, and the northwest quarter of the dead sea, but excludes mt. scopus comparative area: slightly larger than delaware land boundaries: 404 km total; israel 307 km, jordan 97 km; coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: israeli occupied with status to be determined climate: temperate, temperature and precipitation vary with altitude, warm to hot summers, cool to mild winters terrain: mostly rugged dissected upland, some vegetation in west, but barren in east natural resources: negligible land use: 27% arable land, 0% permanent crops, 32% meadows and pastures, 1% forest and woodland, 40% other environment: highlands are main recharge area for israel's coastal aquifers note: landlocked; there are 173 jewish settlements in the west bank and 14 israeli-built jewish neighborhoods in east jerusalem people population: 1,058,122 (july 1990), growth rate 2.6% (1990); in addition, there are 70,000 jewish settlers in the west bank and 110,000 in east jerusalem (1989 est.) birth rate: 37 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 6 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 48 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 65 years male, 68 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: na ethnic divisions: 88% palestinian arab and other, 12% jewish religion: 80% muslim (predominantly sunni), 12% jewish, 8% christian and other language: arabic, israeli settlers speak hebrew, english widely understood literacy: na% labor force: na; excluding israeli jewish settlers--29.8% small industry, commerce, and business, 24.2% construction, 22.4% agriculture, 23.6% service and other (1984) organized labor: na government long-form name: none note: the west bank is currently governed by israeli military authorities and israeli civil administration. it is us policy that the final status of the west bank will be determined by negotiations among the concerned parties. these negotiations will determine how the area is to be governed. economy overview: economic progress in the west bank has been hampered by israeli military occupation and the effects of the palestinian uprising. industries using advanced technology or requiring sizable financial resources have been discouraged by a lack of financial resources and israeli policy. capital investment has largely gone into residential housing, not into productive assets that could compete with israeli industry. a major share of gnp is derived from remittances of workers employed in israel and neighboring gulf states. israeli reprisals against palestinian unrest in the west bank since 1987 have pushed unemployment up and lowered living standards. gnp: $1.0 billion, per capita $1,000; real growth rate 15% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $47.4 million; expenditures $45.7 million, including capital expenditures of na (fy86) exports: $150 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--na; partners--jordan, israel imports: $410 million (c.i.f., 1988 est.); commodities--na; partners--jordan, israel external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: power supplied by israel industries: generally small family businesses that produce cement, textiles, soap, olive-wood carvings, and mother-of-pearl souvenirs; the israelis have established some small-scale modern industries in the settlements and industrial centers agriculture: olives, citrus and other fruits, vegetables, beef, and dairy products aid: none currency: new israeli shekel (plural--shekels) and jordanian dinar (plural--dinars); 1 new israeli shekel (nis) = 100 new agorot and 1 jordanian dinar (jd) = 1,000 fils exchange rates: new israeli shekels (nis) per us$1--1.9450 (january 1990), 1.9164 (1989), 1.5992 (1988), 1.5946 (1987), 1.4878 (1986), 1.1788 (1985); jordanian dinars (jd) per us$1--0.6557 (january 1990), 0.5704 (1989), 0.3715 (1988), 0.3387 (1987), 0.3499 (1986), 0.3940 (1985) fiscal year: 1 april-31 march communications highways: small indigenous road network, israelis developing east-west axial highways airports: 2 total, 2 usable; 2 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 2,439 m; 1 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: open-wire telephone system currently being upgraded; stations--no am, no fm, no tv defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: western sahara geography total area: 266,000 km2; land area: 266,000 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than colorado land boundaries: 2,046 km total; algeria 42 km, mauritania 1,561 km, morocco 443 km coastline: 1,110 km maritime claims: contingent upon resolution of sovereignty issue disputes: claimed and administered by morocco, but sovereignty is unresolved and guerrilla fighting continues in the area climate: hot, dry desert; rain is rare; cold offshore currents produce fog and heavy dew terrain: mostly low, flat desert with large areas of rocky or sandy surfaces rising to small mountains in south and northeast natural resources: phosphates, iron ore land use: negl% arable land; 0% permanent crops; 19% meadows and pastures; 0% forest and woodland; 81% other environment: hot, dry, dust/sand-laden sirocco wind can occur during winter and spring; widespread harmattan haze exists 60% of time, often severely restricting visibility; sparse water and arable land people population: 191,707 (july 1990), growth rate 2.7% (1990) birth rate: 48 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 23 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 177 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 39 years male, 41 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.3 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--saharan(s), moroccan(s); adjective--saharan, moroccan ethnic divisions: arab and berber religion: muslim language: hassaniya arabic, moroccan arabic literacy: 20% among moroccans, 5% among saharans (est.) labor force: 12,000; 50% animal husbandry and subsistence farming organized labor: na government long-form name: none type: legal status of territory and question of sovereignty unresolved; territory contested by morocco and polisario front (popular front for the liberation of the saguia el hamra and rio de oro); territory partitioned between morocco and mauritania in april 1976, with morocco acquiring northern two-thirds; mauritania, under pressure from polisario guerrillas, abandoned all claims to its portion in august 1979; morocco moved to occupy that sector shortly thereafter and has since asserted administrative control; the polisario's government in exile was seated as an oau member in 1984; guerrilla activities continue to the present capital: none administrative divisions: none (under de facto control of morocco) leaders: none diplomatic representation: none economy overview: western sahara, a territory poor in natural resources and having little rainfall, has a per capita gdp of just a few hundred dollars. fishing and phosphate mining are the principal industries and sources of income. most of the food for the urban population must be imported. all trade and other economic activities are controlled by the moroccan government. gdp: $na, per capita $na; real growth rate na% inflation rate (consumer prices): na% unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $na; expenditures $na, including capital expenditures of $na exports: $8 million (f.o.b., 1982 est.); commodities--phosphates 62%; partners--morocco claims and administers western sahara, so trade partners are included in overall moroccan accounts imports: $30 million (c.i.f., 1982 est.); commodities--fuel for fishing fleet, foodstuffs; partners--morocco claims and administers western sahara, so trade partners are included in overall moroccan accounts external debt: $na industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 60,000 kw capacity; 79 million kwh produced, 425 kwh per capita (1989) industries: phosphate, fishing, handicrafts agriculture: practically none; some barley is grown in nondrought years; fruit and vegetables are grown in the few oases; food imports are essential; camels, sheep, and goats are kept by the nomadic natives; cash economy exists largely for the garrison forces aid: na currency: moroccan dirham (plural--dirhams); 1 moroccan dirham (dh) = 100 centimes exchange rates: moroccan dirhams (dh) per us$1--8.093 (january 1990), 8.488 (1989), 8.209 (1988), 8.359 (1987), 9.104 (1986), 10.062 (1985) fiscal year: na communications highways: 6,100 km total; 1,350 km surfaced, 4,750 km improved and unimproved earth roads and tracks ports: el aaiun, ad dakhla airports: 16 total, 14 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 6 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: sparse and limited system; tied into morocco's system by radio relay, tropospheric scatter, and 2 atlantic ocean intelsat earth stations linked to rabat, morocco; 2,000 telephones; stations--2 am, no fm, 2 tv defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: western samoa geography total area: 2,860 km2; land area: 2,850 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than rhode island land boundaries: none coastline: 403 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm climate: tropical; rainy season (october to march), dry season (may to october) terrain: narrow coastal plain with volcanic, rocky, rugged mountains in interior natural resources: hardwood forests, fish land use: 19% arable land; 24% permanent crops; negl% meadows and pastures; 47% forest and woodland; 10% other environment: subject to occasional typhoons; active volcanism note: located 4,300 km southwest of honolulu in the south pacific ocean about halfway between hawaii and new zealand people population: 186,031 (july 1990), growth rate 2.3% (1990) birth rate: 34 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 7 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 5 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 48 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 64 years male, 69 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 4.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--western samoan(s); adjective--western samoan ethnic divisions: samoan; about 7% euronesians (persons of european and polynesian blood), 0.4% europeans religion: 99.7% christian (about half of population associated with the london missionary society; includes congregational, roman catholic, methodist, latter day saints, seventh-day adventist) language: samoan (polynesian), english literacy: 90% labor force: 37,000; 22,000 employed in agriculture (1983 est.) organized labor: public service association (psa) government long-form name: independent state of western samoa type: constitutional monarchy under native chief capital: apia administrative divisions: 11 districts; aana, aiga-i-le-tai, atua, faasaleleaga, gagaemauga, gagaifomauga, palauli, satupaitea, tuamasaga, vaa-o-fonoti, vaisigano independence: 1 january 1962 (from un trusteeship administered by new zealand) constitution: 1 january 1962 legal system: based on english common law and local customs; judicial review of legislative acts with respect to fundamental rights of the citizen; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: national day, 1 june executive branch: monarch, executive council, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral legislative assembly (fono) judicial branch: supreme court, court of appeal leaders: chief of state--susuga malietoa tanumafili ii (co-chief of state from 1 january 1962 until becoming sole chief of state on 5 april 1963); head of government--prime minister tofilau eti alesana (since 7 april 1988) political parties and leaders: human rights protection party (hrpp), tofilau eti, chairman; samoan national development party (sndp), tupua tamasese efi, chairman suffrage: there are two electoral rolls--the matai (head of family) roll and the individuals roll; about 12,000 persons are on the matai roll, hold matai titles, and elect 45 members of the legislative assembly; about 1,600 persons are on the individuals roll, lack traditional matai ties, and elect two members of the legislative assembly by universal adult suffrage at the age of na elections: legislative assembly--last held 26 february 1988 (next to be held by february 1991); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(47 total) hrpp 25, sndp 22 member of: acp, adb, commonwealth, escap, fao, g-77, ibrd, ida, ifad, ifc, imf, spc, spf, un, unesco, who diplomatic representation: ambassador fili (felix) tuaopepe wendt; chancery (temporary) at the western samoan mission to the un, 820 2nd avenue, new york, ny 10017 (212) 599-6196; us--the ambassador to new zealand is accredited to western samoa flag: red with a blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side quadrant bearing five white five-pointed stars representing the southern cross constellation economy overview: agriculture employs two-thirds of the labor force, contributes 50% to gdp, and is the source of 90% of exports. the bulk of export earnings comes from the sale of coconut oil and copra. the economy depends on emigrant remittances and foreign aid to support a level of imports about five times export earnings. tourism has become the most important growth industry, and construction of the first international hotel is under way. gdp: $112 million, per capita $615; real growth rate 0.2% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 8.5% (1988) unemployment rate: na%; shortage of skilled labor budget: revenues $54 million; expenditures $54 million, including capital expenditures of $28 million (1988) exports: $9.9 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--coconut oil and cream 42%, taro 19%, cocoa 14%, copra, timber; partners--nz 30%, ec 24%, australia 21%, american samoa 7%, us 9% (1987) imports: $51.8 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--intermediate goods 58%, food 17%, capital goods 12%; partners--new zealand 31%, australia 20%, japan 15%, fiji 15%, us 5%, ec 4% (1987) external debt: $75 million (december 1988 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.0% (1987) electricity: 23,000 kw capacity; 35 million kwh produced, 190 kwh per capita (1989) industries: timber, tourism, food processing, fishing agriculture: coconuts, fruit (including bananas, taro, yams) aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $16 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $261 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $4 million currency: tala (plural--tala); 1 tala (ws$) = 100 sene exchange rates: tala (ws$) per us$1--2.2857 (january 1990), 2.2686 (1989), 2.0790 (1988), 2.1204 (1987), 2.2351 (1986), 2.2437 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 2,042 km total; 375 km sealed; remainder mostly gravel, crushed stone, or earth ports: apia merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 24,930 grt/34,135 dwt; includes 2 container, 1 roll-on/roll-off cargo civil air: 3 major transport aircraft airports: 4 total, 4 usable; 1 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 1 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; none with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: 7,500 telephones; 70,000 radio receivers; stations--1 am, no fm, no tv; 1 pacific ocean intelsat station defense forces branches: na military manpower: na defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: world geography total area: 510,072,000 km2; 361,132,000 km2 (70.8%) is water and 148,940,000 km2 (29.2%) is land comparative area: land area about 16 times the size of the us land boundaries: 442,000 km coastline: 359,000 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: generally 24 nm, but varies from 4 nm to 24 nm; continental shelf: generally 200 nm, but some are 200 meters in depth; exclusive fishing zone: most are 200 nm, but varies from 12 nm to 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm, only madagascar claims 150 nm; territorial sea: generally 12 nm, but varies from 3 nm to 200 nm disputes: 13 international land boundary disputes--argentina-uruguay, bangladesh-india, brazil-paraguay, brazil-uruguay, cambodia-vietnam, china-india, china-ussr, ecuador-peru, el salvador-honduras, french guiana-suriname, guyana-suriname, guyana-venezuela, qatar-uae climate: two large areas of polar climates separated by two rather narrow temperate zones from a wide equatorial band of tropical to subtropical climates terrain: highest elevation is mt. everest at 8,848 meters and lowest elevation is the dead sea at 392 meters below sea level; greatest ocean depth is the marianas trench at 10,924 meters natural resources: the oceans represent the last major frontier for the discovery and development of natural resources land use: 10% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 24% meadows and pastures; 31% forest and woodland; 34% other; includes 1.6% irrigated environment: large areas subject to severe weather (tropical cyclones), natural disasters (earthquakes, landslides, tsunamis, volcanic eruptions), industrial disasters, pollution (air, water, acid rain, toxic substances), loss of vegetation (overgrazing, deforestation, desertification), loss of wildlife resources, soil degradation, soil depletion, erosion people population: 5,316,644,000 (july 1990), growth rate 1.7% (1990) birth rate: 27 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 70 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 60 years male, 64 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 3.4 children born/woman (1990) literacy: 77% men; 66% women (1980) labor force: 1,939,000,000 (1984) organized labor: na government administrative divisions: 248 nations, dependent areas, and other entities legal system: varies among each of the entities; 162 are parties to the united nations international court of justice (icj) or world court diplomatic representation: there are 159 members of the un economy overview: in 1989 the world economy grew at an estimated 3.0%, somewhat lower than the estimated 3.4% for 1988. the technologically advanced areas--north america, japan, and western europe--together account for 65% of the gross world product (gwp) of $20.3 trillion; these developed areas grew in the aggregate at 3.5%. in contrast, the communist (second world) countries typically grew at between 0% and 2%, accounting for 23% of gwp. experience in the developing countries continued mixed, with the newly industrializing countries generally maintaining their rapid growth, and many others struggling with debt, inflation, and inadequate investment. the year 1989 ended with remarkable political upheavals in the communist countries, which presumably will dislocate economic production still further. the addition of nearly 100 million people a year to an already overcrowded globe will exacerbate the problems of pollution, desertification, underemployment, and poverty throughout the 1990s. gwp (gross world product): $20.3 trillion, per capita $3,870; real growth rate 3.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5%, developed countries; 100%, developing countries with wide variations (1989 est.) unemployment rate: na% exports: $2,694 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--na; partners--in value, about 70% of exports from industrial countries imports: $2,750 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--na; partners--in value, about 75% of imports by the industrial countries external debt: $1,008 billion for less developed countries (1988 est.) industrial production: growth rate 5% (1989 est.) electricity: 2,838,680,000 kw capacity; 11,222,029 million kwh produced, 2,140 kwh per capita (1989) industries: chemicals, energy, machinery, electronics, metals, mining, textiles, food processing agriculture: cereals (wheat, maize, rice), sugar, livestock products, tropical crops, fruit, vegetables, fish aid: na communications ports: mina al ahmadi (kuwait), chiba, houston, kawasaki, kobe, marseille, new orleans, new york, rotterdam, yokohama defense forces branches: ground, maritime, and air forces at all levels of technology military manpower: 29.15 million persons in the defense forces of the world (1987) defense expenditures: 5.4% of gwp, or $1.1 trillion (1989 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: yemen arab republic yemen (sanaa) or north yemen geography total area: 195,000 km2; land area: 195,000 km2 comparative area: slightly smaller than south dakota land boundaries: 1,209 km total; saudi arabia 628 km, pdry 581 km coastline: 523 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 18 nm; continental shelf: 200 meters; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: sections of the boundary with pdry are indefinite or undefined; undefined section of boundary with saudi arabia climate: desert; hot and humid along coast; temperate in central mountains; harsh desert in east terrain: narrow coastal plain (tihama); western mountains; flat dissected plain in center sloping into desert interior of arabian peninsula natural resources: crude oil, rock salt, marble; small deposits of coal, nickel, and copper; fertile soil land use: 14% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 36% meadows and pastures; 8% forest and woodland; 42% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to sand and dust storms in summer; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: controls northern approaches to bab el mandeb linking red sea and gulf of aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes people population: 7,160,981 (july 1990), growth rate 3.1% (1990) birth rate: 52 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 17 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 4 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 129 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 48 years male, 49 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.6 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--yemeni(s); adjective--yemeni ethnic divisions: 90% arab, 10% afro-arab (mixed) religion: 100% muslim (sunni and shia) language: arabic literacy: 15% (est.) labor force: na; 70% agriculture and herding, 30% expatriate laborers (est.) government long-form name: yemen arab republic; abbreviated yar type: republic; military regime assumed power in june 1974 capital: sanaa administrative divisions: 11 governorates (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); al bayda, al hudaydah, al jawf, al mahwit, dhamar, hajjah, ibb, marib, sadah, sana, taizz independence: november 1918 (from ottoman empire) constitution: 28 december 1970, suspended 19 june 1974 legal system: based on turkish law, islamic law, and local customary law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: proclamation of the republic, 26 september (1962) executive branch: president, vice president, prime minister, four deputy prime ministers, council of ministers (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral consultative assembly (majlis ash-shura) judicial branch: state security court leaders: chief of state--president col. ali abdallah salih (since 18 july 1978); vice president (vacant); head of government--prime minister abd al-aziz abd al-ghani (since 12 november 1983, previously prime minister from 1975-1980 and co-vice president from october 1980 to november 1983) political parties and leaders: no legal political parties; in 1983 president salih started the general people's congress, which is designed to function as the country's sole political party suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: consultative assembly--last held 5 july 1988 (next to be held na); results--percent of vote na; seats--(159 total, 128 elected) communists: small number other political or pressure groups: conservative tribal groups, muslim brotherhood, leftist factions--pro-iraqi bathists, nasirists, national democratic front (ndf) supported by the pdry member of: acc, arab league, fao, g-77, ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, itu, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wipo, wmo diplomatic representation: ambassador mohsin a. al-aini; chancery at suite 840, 600 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20037; telephone (202) 965-4760 or 4761; there is a yemeni consulate general in detroit and a consulate in san francisco; us--ambassador charles f. dunbar; embassy at address na, sanaa (mailing address is p. o. box 1088, sanaa); telephone p967o (2) 271950 through 271958 flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with a large green five-pointed star centered in the white band; similar to the flags of iraq, which has three stars, and syria, which has two stars--all green and five-pointed in a horizontal line centered in the white band; also similar to the flag of egypt, which has a symbolic eagle centered in the white band economy overview: the low level of domestic industry and agriculture make north yemen dependent on imports for virtually all of its essential needs. large trade deficits are made up for by remittances from yemenis working abroad and foreign aid. once self-sufficient in food production, the yar is now a major importer. land once used for export crops--cotton, fruit, and vegetables--has been turned over to growing qat, a mildly narcotic shrub chewed by yemenis that has no significant export market. oil export revenues started flowing in late 1987 and boosted 1988 earnings by about $800 million. gdp: $5.5 billion, per capita $820; real growth rate 19.7% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 16.9% (1988) unemployment rate: 13% (1986) budget: revenues $1.32 billion; expenditures $2.18 billion, including capital expenditures of $588 million (1988 est.) exports: $853 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--crude oil, cotton, coffee, hides, vegetables; partners--us 41%, pdry 14%, japan 12% imports: $1.3 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--textiles and other manufactured consumer goods, petroleum products, sugar, grain, flour, other foodstuffs, and cement; partners--italy 10%, saudi arabia 9%, us 9.3%, japan 9%, uk 8% (1985) external debt: $3.5 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 2% in manufacturing (1988) electricity: 415,000 kw capacity; 500 million kwh produced, 70 kwh per capita (1989) industries: crude oil production, small-scale production of cotton textiles and leather goods; food processing; handicrafts; fishing; small aluminum products factory; cement agriculture: accounts for 50% of gdp and 70% of labor force; farm products--grain, fruits, vegetables, qat (mildly narcotic shrub), coffee, cotton, dairy, poultry, meat, goat meat; not self-sufficient in grain aid: us commitments, including ex-im (1970-88), $354 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $1.4 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $2.9 billion; communist countries (1970-88), $248 million currency: yemeni riyal (plural--riyals); 1 yemeni riyal (yr) = 100 fils exchange rates: yemeni riyals (yr) per us$1--9.7600 (january 1990), 9.7600 (1989), 9.7717 (1988), 10.3417 (1987), 9.6392 (1986), 7.3633 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 4,500 km; 2,000 km bituminous, 500 km crushed stone and gravel, 2,000 km earth, sand, and light gravel (est.) pipelines: crude oil, 424 km ports: al hudaydah, al mukha, salif, ras al katib merchant marine: 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker (1,000 grt or over) totaling 192,679 grt/40,640 dwt civil air: 7 major transport aircraft airports: 19 total, 14 usable; 3 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 9 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 3 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: system poor but improving; new radio relay and cable networks; 50,000 telephones; stations--3 am, no fm, 17 tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 1 arabsat; tropospheric scatter to pdry; radio relay to pdry, saudi arabia, and djibouti defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, police military manpower: males 15-49, 1,289,217; 734,403 fit for military service; 79,609 reach military age (18) annually defense expenditures: $358 million (1987) ---------------------------------------------------country: yemen, people's democratic republic of yemen (aden) or south yemen geography total area: 332,970 km2; land area: 332,970 km2; includes perim, socotra comparative area: slightly larger than new mexico land boundaries: 1,699 km total; oman 288 km, saudi arabia 830 km, yar 581 km coastline: 1,383 km maritime claims: contiguous zone: 24 nm; continental shelf: edge of continental margin or 200 nm; extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: sections of boundary with yar indefinite or undefined; administrative line with oman; no defined boundary with saudi arabia climate: desert; extraordinarily hot and dry terrain: mostly upland desert plains; narrow, flat, sandy coastal plain backed by flat-topped hills and rugged mountains natural resources: fish, oil, minerals (gold, copper, lead) land use: 1% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 27% meadows and pastures; 7% forest and woodland; 65% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: scarcity of natural freshwater resources; overgrazing; soil erosion; desertification note: controls southern approaches to bab el mandeb linking red sea to gulf of aden, one of world's most active shipping lanes people population: 2,585,484 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 48 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 14 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 2 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 110 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 50 years male, 54 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--yemeni(s); adjective--yemeni ethnic divisions: almost all arabs; a few indians, somalis, and europeans religion: sunni muslim, some christian and hindu language: arabic literacy: 25% labor force: 477,000; 45.2% agriculture, 21.2% services, 13.4% construction, 10.6% industry, 9.6% commerce and other (1983) organized labor: 348,200; the general confederation of workers of the people's democratic republic of yemen has 35,000 members government long-form name: people's democratic republic of yemen; abbreviated pdry type: republic capital: aden administrative divisions: 6 governorates (muhafazat, singular--muhafazah); abyan, adan, al mahrah, hadramawt, lahij, shabwah independence: 30 november 1967 (from uk) constitution: 31 october 1978 legal system: based on islamic law (for personal matters) and english common law (for commercial matters) national holiday: national day, 14 october executive branch: president, prime minister, two deputy prime ministers, council of ministers legislative branch: unicameral supreme people's council judicial branch: federal high court leaders: chief of state--president haydar abu bakr al-attas (since 8 february 1986); head of government--chairman of the council of ministers (prime minister) dr. yasin said numan (since 8 february 1986); deputy prime minister salih abu bakr bin husaynun (since 8 february 1986); deputy prime minister salih munassir al-siyayli (since 8 february 1986) political parties and leaders: only party--yemeni socialist party (ysp) is a coalition of national front, bath, and communist parties suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: supreme people's council--last held 28-30 october 1986 (next to be held na); results--ysp is the only party; seats--(111 total) ysp or ysp approved 111 communists: na other political or pressure groups: na member of: arab league, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), ibrd, icao, ida, idb--islamic development bank, ifad, ilo, imf, imo, itu, nam, oic, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: none; the uk acts as the protecting power for the us in the pdry flag: three equal horizontal bands of red (top), white, and black with a light blue, isosceles triangle based on the hoist side bearing a red five-pointed star economy overview: the pdry is one of the poorest arab countries, with a per capita gnp of about $500. a shortage of natural resources, a widely dispersed population, and an arid climate make economic development difficult. the economy has grown at an average annual rate of only 2-3% since the mid-1970s. the economy is organized along socialist lines, dominated by the public sector. economic growth has been constrained by a lack of incentives, partly stemming from centralized control over production decisions, investment allocation, and import choices. gnp: $1.2 billion, per capita $495; real growth rate 5.2% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2.8% (1987) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $429 million; expenditures $976 million, including capital expenditures of $402 million (1988 est.) exports: $82.2 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--cotton, hides, skins, dried and salted fish; partners--japan, yar, singapore imports: $598.0 million (f.o.b., 1988 est.); commodities--grain, consumer goods, crude oil, machinery, chemicals; partners--ussr, australia, uk external debt: $2.25 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 245,000 kw capacity; 600 million kwh produced, 240 kwh per capita (1989) industries: petroleum refinery (operates on imported crude oil); fish agriculture: accounts for 13% of gnp and 45% of labor force; products--grain, qat (mildly narcotic shrub), coffee, fish, livestock; fish and honey major exports; most food imported aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-80), $4.5 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $241 million; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $279 million; communist countries (1970-88), $2.2 billion currency: yemeni dinar (plural--dinars); 1 yemeni dinar (yd) = 1,000 fils exchange rates: yemeni dinars (yd) per us$1--0.3454 (fixed rate) fiscal year: calendar year communications highways: 11,000 km; 2,000 km bituminous, 9,000 km natural surface (est.) pipelines: refined products, 32 km ports: aden, al khalf, nishtun merchant marine: 3 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 4,309 grt/6,568 dwt; includes 2 cargo, 1 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker civil air: 8 major transport aircraft airports: 42 total, 29 usable; 7 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3,659 m; 11 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 10 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: small system of open-wire, radio relay, multiconductor cable, and radio communications stations; 15,000 telephones (est.); stations--1 am, no fm, 5 tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat, 1 intersputnik, 1 arabsat; radio relay and tropospheric scatter to yar defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, people's militia, people's police military manpower: males 15-49, 544,190; 307,005 fit for military service defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: yugoslavia geography total area: 255,800 km2; land area: 255,400 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than wyoming land boundaries: 2,961 km total; albania 486 km, austria 311 km, bulgaria 539 km, greece 246 km, hungary 631 km, italy 202 km, romania 546 km coastline: 3,935 km (including 2,414 km offshore islands) maritime claims: continental shelf: 200 meters or to depth of exploitation; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: kosovo question with albania; macedonia question with bulgaria and greece climate: temperate; hot, relatively dry summers with mild, rainy winters along coast; warm summer with cold winters inland terrain: mostly mountains with large areas of karst topography; plain in north natural resources: coal, copper, bauxite, timber, iron ore, antimony, chromium, lead, zinc, asbestos, mercury, crude oil, natural gas, nickel, uranium land use: 28% arable land; 3% permanent crops; 25% meadows and pastures; 36% forest and woodland; 8% other; includes 1% irrigated environment: subject to frequent and destructive earthquakes note: controls the most important land routes from central and western europe to aegean sea and turkish straits people population: 23,841,608 (july 1990), growth rate 0.6% (1990) birth rate: 15 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 22 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 70 years male, 76 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.9 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--yugoslav(s); adjective--yugoslav ethnic divisions: 36.3% serb, 19.7% croat, 8.9% muslim, 7.8% slovene, 7.7% albanian, 5.9% macedonian, 5.4% yugoslav, 2.5% montenegrin, 1.9% hungarian, 3.9% other (1981 census) religion: 50% eastern orthodox, 30% roman catholic, 9% muslim, 1% protestant, 10% other language: serbo-croatian, slovene, macedonian (all official); albanian, hungarian literacy: 90.5% labor force: 9,600,000; 22% agriculture, 27% mining and manufacturing; about 5% of labor force are guest workers in western europe (1986) organized labor: 6,200,000 members in the confederation of trade unions of yugoslavia (ssj) government long-form name: socialist federal republic of yugoslavia; abbreviated sfry type: communist state, federal republic in form capital: belgrade administrative divisions: 6 socialist republics (socijalisticke republike, singular--socijalisticka republika); bosna i hercegovina, crna gora, hrvatska, makedonija, slovenija, srbija; note--there are two autonomous provinces (autonomne pokajine, singular--autonomna pokajina) named kosovo and vojvodina within srbija independence: 1 december 1918; independent monarchy established from the kingdoms of serbia and montenegro, parts of the turkish empire, and the austro-hungarian empire; sfry proclaimed 29 november 1945 constitution: 21 february 1974 legal system: mixture of civil law system and communist legal theory; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: proclamation of the socialist federal republic of yugoslavia, 29 november (1945) executive branch: president of the collective state presidency, vice president of the collective state presidency, collective state presidency, president of the federal executive council, two vice presidents of the federal executive council, federal executive council legislative branch: bicameral federal assembly (savezna skupstina) consists of an upper chamber or chamber of republics and provinces and a lower chamber or federal chamber judicial branch: federal court (savezna sud), constitutional court leaders: chief of state president of the collective state presidency borisav jovic (from srbija; one-year term expires 15 may 1991); vice president of the collective state presidency--stipe suvar (from hrvatska; one-year term expires 15 may 1991); note--the offices of president and vice president rotate annually among members of the collective state presidency with the current vice president assuming the presidency and a new vice president selected from area which has gone the longest without filling the position (the current sequence is srbija, hrvatska, crna gora, vojvodina, kosovo, makedonija, bosna i hercegovina, and slovenija); head of government president of the federal executive council ante markovic (since 16 march 1989); vice president of the federal executive council aleksandar mitrovic (since 16 march 1989); vice president of the federal executive council zivko pregl (since 16 march 1989) political parties and leaders: there are about 90 political parties operating country-wide including the league of communists of yugoslavia (lcy) suffrage: at age 16 if employed, universal at age 18 elections: direct national elections probably will be held in late 1990 communists: 2,079,013 party members (1988) other political or pressure groups: socialist alliance of working people of yugoslavia (sawpy), the major mass front organization; confederation of trade unions of yugoslavia (ctuy), league of socialist youth of yugoslavia, federation of veterans' associations of yugoslavia (subnor) member of: assimer, ccc, cema (observer but participates in certain commissions), fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, iba, ibrd, icac, icao, ida, idb--inter-american development bank, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, ilzsg, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itc, itu, nam, oecd (participant in some activities), un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador dzevad mujezinovic; chancery at 2410 california street nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 462-6566; there are yugoslav consulates general in chicago, cleveland, new york, pittsburgh, and san francisco; us--ambassador warren zimmerman; embassy at kneza milosa 50, belgrade; telephone p38o (11) 645-655; there is a us consulate general in zagreb flag: three equal horizontal bands of blue (top), white, and red with a large red five-pointed star edged in yellow superimposed in the center over all three bands economy overview: tito's reform programs 20 years ago changed the stalinist command economy to a decentralized semimarket system but a system that the rigid, ethnically divided political structure ultimately could not accommodate. a prominent feature of the reforms was the establishment of workers' self-management councils in all large plants, which were to select managers, stimulate production, and divide the proceeds. the general result of these reforms has been rampant wage-price inflation, substantial rundown of capital plant, consumer shortages, and a still larger income gap between the poorer southern regions and the relatively affluent northern provinces of hrvatska and slovenija. in 1988-89 the beleaguered central government has been reforming the reforms, trying to create an open market economy with still considerable state ownership of major industrial plants. these reforms have been moving forward with the advice and support of the international monetary fund through a series of tough negotiations. self-management supposedly is to be replaced by the discipline of the market and by fiscal austerity, ultimately leading to a stable dinar. however, strikes in major plants, hyperinflation, and interregional political jousting have held back progress. according to us economic advisers, only a highly unlikely combination of genuine privatization, massive western economic investment and aid, and political moderation can salvage this economy. gnp: $129.5 billion, per capita $5,464; real growth rate 1.0% (1989 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 2,700% (1989 est.) unemployment rate: 15% (1989) budget: revenues $6.4 billion; expenditures $6.4 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (1990) exports: $13.1 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--raw materials and semimanufactures 50%, consumer goods 31%, capital goods and equipment 19%; partners--ec 30%, cema 45%, less developed countries 14%, us 5%, other 6% imports: $13.8 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--raw materials and semimanufactures 79%, capital goods and equipment 15%, consumer goods 6%; partners--ec 30%, cema 45%, less developed countries 14%, us 5%, other 6% external debt: $17.0 billion, medium and long term (1989) industrial production: growth rate 1% (1989 est.) electricity: 21,000,000 kw capacity; 87,100 million kwh produced, 3,650 kwh per capita (1989) industries: metallurgy, machinery and equipment, petroleum, chemicals, textiles, wood processing, food processing, pulp and paper, motor vehicles, building materials agriculture: diversified, with many small private holdings and large combines; main crops--corn, wheat, tobacco, sugar beets, sunflowers; occasionally a net exporter of corn, tobacco, foodstuffs, live animals aid: donor--about $3.5 billion in bilateral aid to non-communist less developed countries (1966-88) currency: yugoslav dinar (plural--dinars); 1 yugoslav dinar (yd) = 100 paras; note--on 1 january 1990, yugoslavia began issuing a new currency with 1 new dinar equal to 10,000 yd exchange rates: yugoslav dinars (yd) per us$1--118,568 (january 1990), 28,764 (1989), 2,523 (1988), 737 (1987), 379 (1986), 270 (1985); note--as of february 1990 the new dinar is linked to the frg deutsche mark at the rate of 7 new dinars per 1 deustche mark fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 9,270 km total; (all 1.435-meter standard gauge) including 926 km double track, 3,771 km electrified (1987) highways: 120,747 km total; 71,315 km asphalt, concrete, stone block; 34,299 km macadam, asphalt treated, gravel, crushed stone; 15,133 km earth (1987) inland waterways: 2,600 km (1982) pipelines: 1,373 km crude oil; 2,900 km natural gas; 150 km refined products ports: rijeka, split, koper, bar, ploce; inland port is belgrade merchant marine: 270 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 3,608,705 grt/5,809,219 dwt; includes 3 passenger, 4 short-sea passenger, 131 cargo, 3 refrigerated cargo, 16 container, 14 roll-on/roll-off cargo, 3 multifunction large-load carrier, 9 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 3 chemical tanker, 3 combination ore/oil, 73 bulk, 8 combination bulk; note--yugoslavia owns 19 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 229,614 grt/353,224 dwt under the registry of liberia, panama, and cyprus civil air: na major transport aircraft airports: 184 total, 184 usable; 54 with permanent-surface runways; none with runways over 3.659 m; 22 with runways 2,440 to 3,659 m; 20 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: stations--199 am, 87 fm, 50 tv; 4,107,846 tv sets; 4,700,000 radio receivers; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat defense forces branches: yugoslav people's army--ground forces, naval forces, air and air defense forces, frontier guard, territorial defense force, civil defense military manpower: males 15-49, 6,135,628; 4,970,420 fit for military service; 188,028 reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 14.8 trillion dinars, 4.6% of national income (1989 est.); note--conversion of the military budget into us dollars using the official administratively set exchange rate would produce misleading results ---------------------------------------------------country: zaire geography total area: 2,345,410 km2; land area: 2,267,600 km2 comparative area: slightly more than one-quarter the size of us land boundaries: 10,271 km total; angola 2,511 km, burundi 233 km, central african republic 1,577 km, congo 2,410 km, rwanda 217 km, sudan 628 km, uganda 765 km, zambia 1,930 km coastline: 37 km maritime claims: territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: tanzania-zaire-zambia tripoint in lake tanganyika may no longer be indefinite since it is reported that the indefinite section of the zaire-zambia boundary has been settled; long section with congo along the congo river is indefinite (no division of the river or its islands has been made) climate: tropical; hot and humid in equatorial river basin; cooler and drier in southern highlands; cooler and wetter in eastern highlands; north of equator--wet season april to october, dry season december to february; south of equator--wet season november to march, dry season april to october terrain: vast central basin is a low-lying plateau; mountains in east natural resources: cobalt, copper, cadmium, crude oil, industrial and gem diamonds, gold, silver, zinc, manganese, tin, germanium, uranium, radium, bauxite, iron ore, coal, hydropower potential land use: 3% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 4% meadows and pastures; 78% forest and woodland; 15% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: dense tropical rainforest in central river basin and eastern highlands; periodic droughts in south note: straddles equator; very narrow strip of land is only outlet to south atlantic ocean people population: 36,589,468 (july 1990), growth rate 3.3% (1990) birth rate: 46 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 13 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 103 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 51 years male, 55 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 6.2 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--zairian(s); adjective--zairian ethnic divisions: over 200 african ethnic groups, the majority are bantu; four largest tribes--mongo, luba, kongo (all bantu), and the mangbetu-azande (hamitic) make up about 45% of the population religion: 50% roman catholic, 20% protestant, 10% kimbanguist, 10% muslim, 10% other syncretic sects and traditional beliefs language: french (official), lingala, swahili, kingwana, kikongo, tshiluba literacy: 55% males, 37% females labor force: 15,000,000; 75% agriculture, 13% industry, 12% services; 13% wage earners (1981); 51% of population of working age (1985) organized labor: national union of workers of zaire (untza) is the only trade union government long-form name: republic of zaire type: republic with a strong presidential system capital: kinshasa administrative divisions: 8 regions (regions, singular--region) and 1 town* (ville); bandundu, bas-zaire, equateur, haut-zaire, kasai-occidental, kasai-oriental, kinshasa*, kivu, shaba; note--there may now be 10 regions with the elimination of kivu and addition of maniema, nord-kivu, and sud-kivu independence: 30 june 1960 (from belgium; formerly belgian congo, then congo/leopoldville, then congo/kinshasa) constitution: 24 june 1967, amended august 1974, revised 15 february 1978 legal system: based on belgian civil law system and tribal law; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: anniversary of the regime (second republic), 24 november (1965) executive branch: president, prime minister, executive council (cabinet) legislative branch: unicameral national legislative council (conseil legislatif national) judicial branch: supreme court (cour supreme) leaders: chief of state--president marshal mobutu sese seko kuku ngbendu wa za banga (since 24 november 1965); head of government--prime minister lunda bululu (since 25 april 1988) political parties and leaders: only party--popular movement of the revolution (mpr) suffrage: universal and compulsory at age 18 elections: president--last held 29 july 1984 (next to be held july 1991); results--president mobutu was reelected without opposition; national legislative council--last held 6 september 1987 (next to be held september 1992); results--mpr is the only party; seats--(210 total) mpr 210 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, apc, ccc, cipec, eama, eib (associate), fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ico, ida, ifad, ifc, iho, ilo, imf, imo, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itc, itu, nam, oau, ocam, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador (vacant), charge d'affaires mukendi tambo a kabila; chancery at 1800 new hampshire avenue nw, washington dc 20009; telephone (202) 234-7690 or 7691; us--ambassador william c. harrop; embassy at 310 avenue des aviateurs, kinshasa (mailing address is apo new york 09662); telephone 243o (12) 25881 through 25886; there is a us consulate general in lubumbashi flag: light green with a yellow disk in the center bearing a black arm holding a red flaming torch; the flames of the torch are blowing away from the hoist side; uses the popular pan-african colors of ethiopia economy overview: in 1988, in spite of large mineral resources and one of the most developed and diversified economies in sub-saharan africa, zaire had a gdp per capita of $195, one of the lowest on the continent. agriculture, a key sector of the economy, employs 75% of the population but generates under 30% of gdp. the main impetus for economic development has been the extractive industries. mining and mineral processing account for about one-third of gdp and two-thirds of total export earnings. during the period 1983-88 the economy experienced slow growth, high inflation, a rising foreign debt, and a drop in foreign exchange earnings. recent increases in foreign prices for copper--a key export earner--and other minerals offer some hope of reversing the economic decline. zaire is the world's largest producer of diamonds. gdp: $6.5 billion, per capita $195; real growth rate 2.8% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 82% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $856 million; expenditures $2.3 billion, including capital expenditures of $655 million (1988) exports: $2.2 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--copper 37%, coffee 24%, diamonds 12%, cobalt, crude oil; partners--us, belgium, france, frg, italy, uk, japan imports: $1.9 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--consumer goods, foodstuffs, mining and other machinery, transport equipment, fuels; partners--us, belgium, france, frg, italy, japan, uk external debt: $8.6 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate na% electricity: 2,574,000 kw capacity; 5,550 million kwh produced, 160 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, mineral processing, consumer products (including textiles, footwear, and cigarettes), processed foods and beverages, cement, diamonds agriculture: cash crops--coffee, palm oil, rubber, quinine; food crops--cassava, bananas, root crops, corn illicit drugs: illicit producer of cannabis, mostly for domestic consumption aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy70-88), $998 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $6.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $35 million; communist countries (1970-88), $263 million currency: zaire (plural--zaire); 1 zaire (z) = 100 makuta exchange rates: zaire (z) per us$1--465.000 (january 1989), 381.445 (1989), 187.070 (1988), 112.403 (1987), 59.625 (1986), 49.873 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 5,254 km total; 3,968 km 1.067-meter gauge (851 km electrified); 125 km 1.000-meter gauge; 136 km 0.615-meter gauge; 1,025 km 0.600-meter gauge highways: 146,500 km total; 2,550 km bituminous, 46,450 km gravel and improved earth; remainder unimproved earth inland waterways: 15,000 km including the congo, its tributaries, and unconnected lakes pipelines: refined products 390 km ports: matadi, boma, banana merchant marine: 4 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 41,802 grt/60,496 dwt; includes 1 passenger cargo, 3 cargo civil air: 38 major transport aircraft airports: 312 total, 258 usable; 25 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 6 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 71 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: barely adequate wire and radio relay service; 31,200 telephones; stations--10 am, 4 fm, 18 tv; satellite earth stations--1 atlantic ocean intelsat, 14 domestic defense forces branches: army, navy, air force, national gendarmerie, logistics corps, special presidential division military manpower: males 15-49, 7,970,619; 4,057,561 fit for military service defense expenditures: $67 million (1988) ---------------------------------------------------country: zambia geography total area: 752,610 km2; land area: 740,720 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than texas land boundaries: 5,664 km total; angola 1,110 km, malawi 837 km, mozambique 419 km, namibia 233 km, tanzania 338 km, zaire 1,930 km, zimbabwe 797 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: quadripoint with botswana, namibia, and zimbabwe is in disagreement; tanzania-zaire-zambia tripoint in lake tanganyika may no longer be indefinite since it is reported that the indefinite section of the zaire-zambia boundary has been settled climate: tropical; modified by altitude; rainy season (october to april) terrain: mostly high plateau with some hills and mountains natural resources: copper, cobalt, zinc, lead, coal, emeralds, gold, silver, uranium, hydropower potential land use: 7% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 47% meadows and pastures; 27% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: deforestation; soil erosion; desertification note: landlocked people population: 8,112,782 (july 1990), growth rate 3.2% (1990) birth rate: 49 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 12 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 6 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 80 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 55 years male, 58 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 7.0 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--zambian(s); adjective--zambian ethnic divisions: 98.7% african, 1.1% european, 0.2% other religion: 50-75% christian, 1% muslim and hindu, remainder indigenous beliefs language: english (official); about 70 indigenous languages literacy: 75.7% labor force: 2,455,000; 85% agriculture; 6% mining, manufacturing, and construction; 9% transport and services organized labor: about 238,000 wage earners are unionized government long-form name: republic of zambia type: one-party state capital: lusaka administrative divisions: 9 provinces; central, copperbelt, eastern, luapula, lusaka, northern, north-western, southern, western independence: 24 october 1964 (from uk; formerly northern rhodesia) constitution: 25 august 1973 legal system: based on english common law and customary law; judicial review of legislative acts in an ad hoc constitutional council; has not accepted compulsory icj jurisdiction national holiday: independence day, 24 october (1964) executive branch: president, prime minister, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral national assembly judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state--president dr. kenneth david kaunda (since 24 october 1964); head of government--prime minister gen. malimba masheke (since 15 march 1989) political parties and leaders: only party--united national independence party (unip), kenneth kaunda suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 26 october 1988 (next to be held october 1993); results--president kenneth kaunda was reelected without opposition; national assembly--last held 26 october 1988 (next to be held october 1993); results--unip is the only party; seats--(136 total, 125 elected) unip 125 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt (de facto), iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, iea, ifad, ifc, ilo, ilzsg, imf, intelsat, interpol, ipu, itu, nam, oau, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, who, wipo, wmo, wto diplomatic representation: ambassador paul j. f. lusaka; chancery at 2419 massachusetts avenue nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 265-9717 through 9721; us--ambassador jeffrey davidow; embassy at corner of independence avenue and united nations avenue, lusaka (mailing address is p. o. box 31617, lusaka); telephone 2601o 214911 flag: green with a panel of three vertical bands of red (hoist side), black, and orange below a soaring orange eagle, on the outer edge of the flag economy overview: despite temporary growth in 1988, the economy has been in decline for more than a decade with falling imports and growing foreign debt. economic difficulties stem from a sustained drop in copper production and ineffective economic policies. in 1988 real gdp stood only slightly higher than that of 10 years before, while an annual population growth of more than 3% has brought a decline in per capita gdp of 25% during the same period. a high inflation rate has also added to zambia's economic woes in recent years. gdp: $4.0 billion, per capita $530; real growth rate 6.7% (1988) inflation rate (consumer prices): 55.7% (1988) unemployment rate: na% budget: revenues $570 million; expenditures $939 million, including capital expenditures of $36 million (1988 est.) exports: $1,184 million (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--copper, zinc, cobalt, lead, tobacco; partners--ec, japan, south africa, us imports: $687 million (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery, transportation equipment, foodstuffs, fuels, manufactures; partners--ec, japan, south africa, us external debt: $6.9 billion (december 1989) industrial production: growth rate na% (1986) electricity: 1,900,000 kw capacity; 8,245 million kwh produced, 1,050 kwh per capita (1989) industries: copper mining and processing, transport, construction, foodstuffs, beverages, chemicals, textiles, and fertilizer agriculture: accounts for 15% of gdp and 85% of labor force; crops--corn (food staple), sorghum, rice, peanuts, sunflower, tobacco, cotton, sugarcane, cassava; cattle, goats, beef, eggs produced; marginally self-sufficient in corn aid: us commitments, including ex-im (1970-88), $466 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $4.2 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $60 million; communist countries (1970-88), $533 million currency: zambian kwacha (plural--kwacha); 1 zambian kwacha (zk) = 100 ngwee exchange rates: zambian kwacha (zk) per us$1--21.7865 (january 1990), 12.9032 (1989), 8.2237 (1988), 8.8889 (1987), 7.3046 (1986), 2.7137 (1985) fiscal year: calendar year communications railroads: 1,266 km, all 1.067-meter gauge; 13 km double track highways: 36,370 km total; 6,500 km paved, 7,000 km crushed stone, gravel, or stabilized soil; 22,870 km improved and unimproved earth inland waterways: 2,250 km, including zambezi and luapula rivers, lake tanganyika pipelines: 1,724 km crude oil ports: mpulungu (lake port) civil air: 6 major transport aircraft airports: 121 total, 106 usable; 13 with permanent-surface runways; 1 with runways over 3,659 m; 4 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 22 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: facilities are among the best in sub-saharan africa; high-capacity radio relay connects most larger towns and cities; 71,700 telephones; stations--11 am, 3 fm, 9 tv; satellite earth stations--1 indian ocean intelsat and 1 atlantic ocean intelsat defense forces branches: army, air force, police, paramilitary military manpower: males 15-49, 1,683,758; 883,283 fit for military service defense expenditures: na ---------------------------------------------------country: zimbabwe geography total area: 390,580 km2; land area: 386,670 km2 comparative area: slightly larger than montana land boundaries: 3,066 km total; botswana 813 km, mozambique 1,231 km, south africa 225 km, zambia 797 km coastline: none--landlocked maritime claims: none--landlocked disputes: quadripoint with botswana, namibia, and zambia is in disagreement climate: tropical; moderated by altitude; rainy season (november to march) terrain: mostly high plateau with higher central plateau (high veld); mountains in east natural resources: coal, chromium ore, asbestos, gold, nickel, copper, iron ore, vanadium, lithium, tin land use: 7% arable land; negl% permanent crops; 12% meadows and pastures; 62% forest and woodland; 19% other; includes negl% irrigated environment: recurring droughts; floods and severe storms are rare; deforestation; soil erosion; air and water pollution; desertification note: landlocked people population: 10,392,161 (july 1990), growth rate 3.3% (1990) birth rate: 42 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 9 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: 0 migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 65 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 59 years male, 63 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 5.8 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--zimbabwean(s); adjective--zimbabwean ethnic divisions: 98% african (71% shona, 16% ndebele, 11% other); 1% white, 1% mixed and asian religion: 50% syncretic (part christian, part indigenous beliefs), 25% christian, 24% indigenous beliefs, a few muslim language: english (official); shona and ndebele literacy: 74% labor force: 3,100,000; 74% agriculture, 16% transport and services, 10% mining, manufacturing, construction (1987) organized labor: 17% of wage and salary earners have union membership government long-form name: republic of zimbabwe type: parliamentary democracy capital: harare administrative divisions: 8 provinces; manicaland, mashonaland central, mashonaland east, mashonaland west, matabeleland north, matabeleland south, midlands, victoria (commonly called masvingo) independence: 18 april 1980 (from uk; formerly southern rhodesia) constitution: 21 december 1979 legal system: mixture of roman-dutch and english common law national holiday: independence day, 18 april (1980) executive branch: president, vice president, cabinet legislative branch: unicameral parliament judicial branch: supreme court leaders: chief of state and head of government--executive president robert gabriel mugabe (since 31 december 1987); vice president simon vengai muzenda (since 31 december 1987) political parties and leaders: zimbabwe african national union-patriotic front (zanu-pf), robert mugabe; zimbabwe african national union-sithole (zanu-s), ndabaningi sithole; zimbabwe unity movement (zum), edgar tekere suffrage: universal at age 18 elections: president--last held 28-30 march 1990 (next to be held march 1995); results--president robert mugabe 78.3%; edgar tekere 21.7%; parliament--last held 28-30 march 1990 (next to be held march 1993); results--percent of vote by party na; seats--(150 total, 120 elected) zanu 116, zum 2, zanu-s 1, to be determined 1 communists: no communist party member of: acp, afdb, ccc, commonwealth, fao, g-77, gatt, iaea, ibrd, icao, ida, ifad, ifc, ilo, imf, interpol, nam, oau, sadcc, un, unesco, upu, wftu, who, wmo diplomatic representation: counselor (political affairs), head of chancery, ambassador stanislaus garikai chigwedere; chancery at 2852 mcgill terrace nw, washington dc 20008; telephone (202) 332-7100; us--ambassador-designate steven rhodes; embassy at 172 rhodes avenue, harare (mailing address is p. o. box 3340, harare); telephone 263o (14) 794-521 flag: seven equal horizontal bands of green, yellow, red, black, red, yellow, and green with a white equilateral triangle edged in black based on the hoist side; a yellow zimbabwe bird is superimposed on a red five-pointed star in the center of the triangle economy overview: agriculture employs a majority of the labor force and supplies almost 40% of exports. the agro-based manufacturing sector produces a variety of goods and contributes about 25% to gdp. mining accounts for only 5% of both gdp and employment, but supplies of minerals and metals account for about 40% of exports. wide year-to-year fluctuations in agricultural production over the past six years resulted in not only an uneven growth rate, but one that did not equal the 3% annual increase in population. gdp: $4.6 billion, per capita $470; real growth rate 5.3% (1988 est.) inflation rate (consumer prices): 7.4% (1988) unemployment rate: at least 20% (1988 est.) budget: revenues $2.4 billion; expenditures $3.0 billion, including capital expenditures of $290 million (fy90) exports: $1.6 billion (f.o.b., 1988); commodities--agricultural 34% (tobacco 21%, other 13%), manufactures 19%, gold 11%, ferrochrome 11%, cotton 6%; partners--europe 55% (ec 41%, netherlands 6%, other 8%), africa 22% (south africa 12%, other 10%), us 6% imports: $1.1 billion (c.i.f., 1988); commodities--machinery and transportation equipment 37%, other manufactures 22%, chemicals 16%, fuels 15%; partners--ec 31%, africa 29% (south africa 21%, other 8%), us 8%, japan 4% external debt: $2.96 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.7% (1988 est.) electricity: 2,036,000 kw capacity; 5,460 million kwh produced, 540 kwh per capita (1989) industries: mining, steel, clothing and footwear, chemicals, foodstuffs, fertilizer, beverage, transportation equipment, wood products agriculture: accounts for about 15% of gdp and employs over 70% of population; 40% of land area divided into 6,000 large commercial farms and 42% in communal lands; crops--corn (food staple), cotton, tobacco, wheat, coffee, sugarcane, peanuts; livestock--cattle, sheep, goats, pigs; self-sufficient in food aid: us commitments, including ex-im (fy80-88), $359 million; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $2.0 billion; opec bilateral aid (1979-89), $36 million; communist countries (1970-88), $134 million currency: zimbabwean dollar (plural--dollars); 1 zimbabwean dollar (z$) = 100 cents exchange rates: zimbabwean dollars (z$) per us$1--2.2873 (january 1990), 2.1133 (1989), 1.8018 (1988), 1.6611 (1987), 1.6650 (1986), 1.6119 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: 2,745 km 1.067-meter gauge; 42 km double track; 355 km electrified highways: 85,237 km total; 15,800 km paved, 39,090 km crushed stone, gravel, stabilized soil: 23,097 km improved earth; 7,250 km unimproved earth inland waterways: lake kariba is a potential line of communication pipelines: 8 km, refined products civil air: 12 major transport aircraft airports: 506 total, 420 usable; 23 with permanent-surface runways; 2 with runways over 3,659 m; 3 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 37 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: system was once one of the best in africa, but now suffers from poor maintenance; consists of radio relay links, open-wire lines, and radio communications stations; 247,000 telephones; stations--8 am, 18 fm, 8 tv; 1 atlantic ocean intelsat earth station defense forces branches: zimbabwe national army, air force of zimbabwe, police support unit, people's militia military manpower: males 15-49, 2,173,448; 1,342,920 fit for military service defense expenditures: $446.7 million (fy89 est.) ---------------------------------------------------country: taiwan geography total area: 35,980 km2; land area: 32,260 km2; includes the pescadores, matsu, and quemoy comparative area: slightly less than three times the size of connecticut land boundaries: none coastline: 1,448 km maritime claims: extended economic zone: 200 nm; territorial sea: 12 nm disputes: involved in complex dispute over the spratly islands with china, malaysia, philippines, and vietnam; paracel islands occupied by china, but claimed by vietnam and taiwan; japanese-administered senkaku-shoto (senkaku islands) claimed by china and taiwan climate: tropical; marine; rainy season during southwest monsoon (june to august); cloudiness is persistent and extensive all year terrain: eastern two-thirds mostly rugged mountains; flat to gently rolling plains in west natural resources: small deposits of coal, natural gas, limestone, marble, and asbestos land use: 24% arable land; 1% permanent crops; 5% meadows and pastures; 55% forest and woodland; 15% other; 14% irrigated environment: subject to earthquakes and typhoons people population: 20,546,664 (july 1990), growth rate 1.1% (1990) birth rate: 16 births/1,000 population (1990) death rate: 5 deaths/1,000 population (1990) net migration rate: negl migrants/1,000 population (1990) infant mortality rate: 17 deaths/1,000 live births (1990) life expectancy at birth: 72 years male, 77 years female (1990) total fertility rate: 1.7 children born/woman (1990) nationality: noun--chinese (sing., pl.); adjective--chinese ethnic divisions: 84% taiwanese, 14% mainland chinese, 2% aborigine religion: 93% mixture of buddhist, confucian, and taoist; 4.5% christian; 2.5% other language: mandarin chinese (official); taiwanese and hakka dialects also used literacy: 94% labor force: 7,880,000; 41% industry and commerce, 32% services, 20% agriculture, 7% civil administration (1986) organized labor: 1,300,000 or about 18.4% (government controlled) (1983) administration long-form name: none type: one-party presidential regime; opposition political parties legalized in march, 1989 capital: taipei administrative divisions: 16 counties (hsien, singular and plural), 5 municipalities* (shih, singular and plural), 2 special municipalities** (chuan-shih, singular and plural); chang-hua, chia-i, chia-i*, chi-lung*, hsin-chu, hsin-chu*, hua-lien, i-lan, kao-hsiung, kao-hsiung**, miao-li, nan-t'ou, p'eng-hu, p'ing-tung, t'ai-chung, t'ai-chung*, t'ai-nan, t'ai-nan*, t'ai-pei, t'ai-pei**, t'ai-tung, t'ao-yuan, yun-lin; note--the wade-giles system is used for romanization constitution: 25 december 1947 legal system: based on civil law system; accepts compulsory icj jurisdiction, with reservations national holiday: national day (anniversary of the revolution), 10 october (1911) executive branch: president, vice president, premier of the executive yuan, vice premier of the executive yuan, executive yuan legislative branch: unicameral legislative yuan judicial branch: judicial yuan leaders: chief of state--president li teng-hui (since 13 january 1988); vice president li yuan-tzu (will take office 20 may 1990); head of government--premier (president of the executive yuan) hao po-ts'un (since 2 may 1990); vice premier (vice president of the executive yuan) shih ch'i-yang (since na july 1988) political parties and leaders: kuomintang (nationalist party), li teng-hui, chairman; democratic socialist party and young china party controlled by kuomintang; democratic progressive party (dpp); labor party; 27 other minor parties suffrage: universal at age 20 elections: president--last held 21 march 1990 (next to be held march 1996); results--president li teng-hui was elected by the national assembly; vice president--last held 21 march 1990 (next to be held march 1996); results--li yuan-tzu was elected by the national assembly; legislative yuan--last held 2 december 1989 (next to be held december 1992); results--kmt 65%, dpp 33%, independents 2%; seats--(304 total, 102 elected) kmt 78, dpp 21, independents 3 member of: expelled from un general assembly and security council on 25 october 1971 and withdrew on same date from other charter-designated subsidiary organs; expelled from imf/world bank group april/may 1980; member of adb and pecc, seeking to join gatt and/or mfa; attempting to retain membership in icac, iso, intelsat, interpol, iwc--international wheat council; suspended from iaea in 1972, but still allows iaea controls over extensive atomic development diplomatic representation: none; unofficial commercial and cultural relations with the people of the us are maintained through a private instrumentality, the coordination council for north american affairs (ccnaa) with headquarters in taipei and field offices in washington and 10 other us cities with all addresses and telephone numbers na; us--unofficial commercial and cultural relations with the people of taiwan are maintained through a private institution, the american institute in taiwan (ait), which has offices in taipei at 7 lane 134, hsin yi road, section 3 with telephone 002 886o (2) 709-2000 and in kao-hsiung at 88 wu fu 3rd road with telephone na flag: red with a dark blue rectangle in the upper hoist-side corner bearing a white sun with 12 triangular rays economy overview: taiwan has a dynamic capitalist economy with considerable government guidance of investment and foreign trade and partial government ownership of some large banks and industrial firms. real growth in gnp has averaged about 9% a year during the past three decades. export growth has been even faster and has provided the impetus for industrialization. agriculture contributes about 6% to gnp, down from 35% in 1952. taiwan currently ranks as number 13 among major trading countries. traditional labor-intensive industries are steadily being replaced with more capitaland technology-intensive industries. gnp: $121.4 billion, per capita $6,000; real growth rate 7.2% (1989) inflation rate (consumer prices): 5.0% (1989) unemployment rate: 1.7% (1989) budget: revenues $25.9 billion; expenditures $33.2 billion, including capital expenditures of $na (fy89) exports: $66.2 billion (f.o.b., 1989); commodities--textiles 9.7%, electrical machinery 19.0%, general machinery and equipment 14%, telecommunications equipment 9%, basic metals and metal products 7.4%, foodstuffs 0.9%, plywood and wood products 1.3%; partners--us 36.2%, japan 13.7% imports: $52.2 billion (c.i.f., 1989); commodities--machinery and equipment 15.9%, crude oil 5%, chemical and chemical products 11.1%, basic metals 7.4%, foodstuffs 2.0%; partners--japan 31%, us 23%, saudi arabia 8.6% external debt: $1.0 billion (december 1989 est.) industrial production: growth rate 4.1% (1988) electricity: 17,000,000 kw capacity; 68,000 million kwh produced, 3,360 kwh per capita (1989) industries: textiles, clothing, chemicals, electronics, food processing, plywood, sugar milling, cement, shipbuilding, petroleum agriculture: accounts for 6% of gnp and 20% of labor force (includes part-time farmers); heavily subsidized sector; major crops--rice, sugarcane, sweet potatoes, fruits, vegetables; livestock--hogs, poultry, beef, milk, cattle; not self-sufficient in wheat, soybeans, corn; fish catch expanding, 1.1 million metric tons in (1987) aid: us, including ex-im (fy46-82), $4.6 billion; western (non-us) countries, oda and oof bilateral commitments (1970-87), $439 million currency: new taiwan dollar (plural--dollars); 1 new taiwan dollar (nt$) = 100 cents exchange rates: new taiwan dollars per us$1--26.3 (march 1990), 26.156 (december 1989), 28.589 (1988), 31.845 (1987), 37.838 (1986), 39.849 (1985) fiscal year: 1 july-30 june communications railroads: about 1,075 km common carrier lines and over 3,800 km industrial lines; common carrier lines consist of the 1.067-meter gauge 708 km west line and the 367 km east line; a 98.25 km south link line connection is under construction; common carrier lines owned by the government and operated by the railway administration under ministry of communications; industrial lines owned and operated by government enterprises highways: 18,800 km total; 15,800 km bituminous or concrete, 2,500 km crushed stone or gravel, 500 km graded earth pipelines: 615 km refined products, 97 km natural gas ports: kao-hsiung, chi-lung, hua-lien, su-ao, t'ai-tung merchant marine: 218 ships (1,000 grt or over) totaling 5,061,960 grt/7,634,074 dwt; includes 1 short-sea passenger, 61 cargo, 13 refrigerated cargo, 71 container, 14 petroleum, oils, and lubricants (pol) tanker, 3 combination ore/oil, 1 specialized tanker, 54 bulk airports: 38 total, 37 usable; 32 with permanent-surface runways; 3 with runways over 3,659 m; 16 with runways 2,440-3,659 m; 8 with runways 1,220-2,439 m telecommunications: best developed system in asia outside of japan; 6,000,000 telephones; extensive microwave transmission links on east and west coasts; stations--91 am, 23 fm, 15 tv (13 relays); 8,000,000 radio receivers; 6,000,000 tv sets (5,300,000 color, 700,000 monochrome); satellite earth stations--1 pacific ocean intelsat and 1 indian ocean intelsat; submarine cable links to japan (okinawa), the philippines, guam, singapore, hong kong, indonesia, australia, middle east, and western europe defense forces branches: army, navy (including marines), air force, garrison command military manpower: males 15-49, 5,809,354; 4,534,950 fit for military service; about 185,235 currently reach military age (19) annually defense expenditures: 6.8% of gnp, or $8.2 billion (fy90 est.) ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ appendix a: the united nations system the un is composed of six principal organs and numerous subordinate agencies and bodies as follows: 1) secretariat: undro united nations disaster relief coordinator's office 2) general assembly: instraw international research and training institute for the advancement of women unchs united nations center for human settlements (habitat) unctad united nations conference on trade and development undp united nations development program unep united nations environment program unfpa united nations population fund unhcr united nations office of high commissioner for refugees unicef united nations children's fund unidir united nations institute for disarmament research unitar united nations institute for training and research unrisd united nations research institute for social development unrwa united nations relief and works agency for palestine refugees in the near east unsp united nations special fund unu united nations university up university for peace wfc world food council wfp world food program 3) security council: unavem united nations angola verification mission undof united nations disengagement observer force unficyp united nations force in cyprus ungomap united nations good offices mission in afghanistan and pakistan unifil united nations interim force in lebanon uniimog united nations iran-iraq military observer group unmogip united nations military observer group in india and pakistan untag united nations transition assistance group untso united nations truce supervision organization 4) economic and social council (ecosoc): specialized agencies fao food and agriculture organization of the united nations ibrd international bank for reconstruction and development icao international civil aviation organization ida international development association ifad international fund for agricultural development ifc international finance corporation ilo international labor organization imf international monetary fund imo international maritime organization itu international telecommunication union miga multilateral investment guarantee agency unesco united nations educational, scientific, and cultural organization unido united nations industrial development organization upu universal postal union who world health organization wipo world intellectual property organization wmo world meteorological organization related organizations gatt general agreement on tariffs and trade iaea international atomic energy agency regional commissions eca economic commission for africa ece economic commission for europe eclac economic commission for latin america and the caribbean escap economic and social commission for asia and the pacific escwa economic and social commission for western asia functional commissions commission on human rights commission on narcotic drugs commission for social development commission on the status of women population commission statistical commission 5) trusteeship council 6) international court of justice (icj) --------------------------------------------------- appendix b: international organizations acc arab cooperation council acp african, caribbean, and pacific countries (assoc. with ec) adb asian development bank afdb african development bank afesd arab fund for economic and social development aioec association of iron ore exporting countries al arab league or league of arab states amf arab monetary fund amu arab maghreb union -- andean pact anrpc association of natural rubber producing countries anzus anzus council ap andean pact apc african peanut (groundnut) association asean association of southeast asian nations aspac asian and pacific council assimer international mercury producers association -- association of tin producing countries badea arab bank for economic development in africa bcie central american bank for economic integration benelux belgium, netherlands, luxembourg economic union bis bank for international settlements bleu belgium-luxembourg economic union boad west african development bank c commonwealth cacm central american common market caeu council of arab economic unity caricom caribbean community and common market ccc customs cooperation council cdb caribbean development bank ce council of europe ceao west african economic community ceeac economic community of central african states cema council for mutual economic assistance (sometimes cmea or comecon) cento central treaty organization cepgl economic community of the great lakes countries cern european organization for nuclear research cilss permanent interstate committee on drought control in the sahel cipec intergovernmental council of copper exporting countries cmea see cema comecon see cema -- conference of east and central african states cp colombo plan dac development assistance committee (oecd) eadb east african development bank eama african states associated with the ec ec european communities eca economic commission for africa (un) ece economic commission for europe (un) ecla economic commission for latin america (un) eclac economic commission for latin america and the caribbean (un) ecosoc economic and social council (un) ecowas economic community of west african states ecwa economic commission for western asia (un) efta european free trade association eib european investment bank ems european monetary system entente council of the entente esa european space agency escap economic and social commission for asia and the pacific (un) escwa economic and social commission for western asia (un) fao food and agriculture organization (un) fz franc zone g-8 group of eight g-10 group of ten g-77 group of 77 ga general assembly (un) gatt general agreement on tariffs and trade (un) gcc gulf cooperation council iadb inter-american development bank iaea international atomic energy agency (un) iatp international association of tungsten producers iba international bauxite association ibec international bank for economic cooperation ibrd international bank for reconstruction and development or world bank (un) icac international cotton advisory committee icao international civil aviation organization (un) icc international chamber of commerce icco international cocoa organization icem intergovernmental committee for european migration ices international cooperation in ocean exploration icftu international confederation of free trade unions icj international court of justice (un) icm intergovernmental committee for migration ico international coffee organization icrc international committee of the red cross ida international development association (ibrd affiliate, un) idb inter-american development bank idb islamic development bank iea international energy agency (associated with oecd) ifad international fund for agricultural development (un) ifc international finance corporation (ibrd affiliate, un) iho international hydrographic organization iib international investment bank ilo international labor organization (un) ilzsg international lead and zinc study group imf international monetary fund (un) imo international maritime organization (un) inmarsat international maritime satellite organization inro international natural rubber organization intelsat international telecommunications satellite organization interpol international criminal police organization ioc international olympic committee iooc international olive oil council ipu inter-parliamentary union irc international rice council iso international sugar organization itc international tin council itu international telecommunication union (un) iwc international whaling commission iwc international wheat council laes latin american economic system laia latin american integration association -- lake chad basin commission lorcs league of red cross and red crescent societies -- mano river commission -- mekong committee miga multilateral investment guarantee agency nam nonaligned movement nato north atlantic treaty organization nc nordic council ncc nordic council of ministers nea nuclear energy agency (oecd) nib nordic investment bank -- niger river commission -- nordic council oapec organization of arab petroleum exporting countries oas organization of american states oau organization of african unity ocam afro-malagasy and mauritian common organization odeca organization of central american states oecd organization for economic cooperation and development oecs organization of eastern caribbean states oic organization of the islamic conference omvs organization for the development of the senegal river valley opanal agency for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in latin america and the caribbean opec organization of petroleum exporting countries paho pan american health organization pca permanent court of arbitration saarc south asian association for regional cooperation sadcc southern african development coordination conference sc security council (un) sela latin american economic system spc south pacific commission spec south pacific bureau for economic cooperation spf south pacific forum tc trusteeship council (un) tdb trade and development board (un) udeac central african customs and economic union ueac union of central african states un united nations unctad un conference on trade and development undp un development program unesco un educational, scientific, and cultural organization unhcr un high commissioner for refugees unicef un children's fund unido un industrial development organization upeb union of banana exporting countries upu universal postal union (un) wcl world confederation of labor weu western european union wfc world food council (un) wftu world federation of trade unions who world health organization (un) wipo world intellectual property organization (un) wmo world meteorological organization (un) wp warsaw pact wpc world peace council wsg international wool study group wto world tourism organization --------------------------------------------------- appendix c: country membership in international organizations this information is currently available only as a table in the printed version of the world factbook 1990. for the 1991 edition a new textual format will be adopted that will greatly expand the breadth and depth of coverage to include many more organizations with complete name, acronym or abbreviation, date established, aim, and list of members. --------------------------------------------------- appendix d: weights and measures mathematical notation mathematical power name 10 +18 or 1,000,000,000,000,000,000 one quintillion 10 +15 or 1,000,000,000,000,000 one quadrillion 10 +12 or 1,000,000,000,000 one trillion 10 +9 or 1,000,000,000 one billion 10 +6 or 1,000,000 one million 10 +3 or 1,000 one thousand 10 +2 or 100 one hundred 10 +1 or 10 ten 10 +0 or 1 one 10 -1 or 0.1 one tenth 10 -2 or 0.01 one hundredth 10 -3 or 0.001 one thousandth 10 -6 or 0.000 001 one millionth 10 -9 or 0.000 000 001 one billionth 10 -12 or 0.000 000 000 001 one trillionth 10 -15 or 0.000 000 000 000 001 one quadrillionth 10 -18 or 0.000 000 000 000 000 001 one quintillionth conversions from a multiple or submultiple to the basic units of meters, liters, or grams can be done using the table. for example, to convert from kilometers to meters, multiply by 1,000 (9.26 kilometers equals 9,260 meters) or to convert from meters to kilometers, multiply by 0.001 (9,260 meters equals 9.26 kilometers) length, weight, prefix symbol capacity area volume ----- ----- ------- ----- ------exa e 10 +18 10 +36 10 +54 peta p 10 +15 10 +30 10 +45 tera t 10 +12 10 +24 10 +36 giga g 10 +9 10 +18 10 +27 mega m 10 +6 10 +12 10 +18 hectokilo hk 10 +5 10 +10 10 +15 myria ma 10 +4 10 +8 10 +12 kilo k 10 +3 10 +6 10 +9 hecto h 10 +2 10 +4 10 +6 deka da 10 +1 10 +2 10 +3 basic unit 1 meter, 1 meter2 1 meter3 1 gram, 1 liter deci d 10 -1 10 -2 10 -3 centi c 10 -2 10 -4 10 -6 milli m 10 -3 10 -6 10 -9 decimilli dm 10 -4 10 -8 10 -12 centimilli cm 10 -5 10 -10 10 -15 micro u 10 -6 10 -12 10 -18 nano n 10 -9 10 -18 10 -27 pico p 10 -12 10 -24 10 -36 femto f 10 -15 10 -30 10 -45 atto a 10 -18 10 -36 10 -54 ======================================================================== equivalents the exponents 2 and 3 are used for square and cubic, respectively. name metric equivalents -----------------------------------------------------------------------------acre 0.404 685 64 hectares 43,560 feet2 acre 4,046,856 4 meters2 4,840 yards2 acre 0.004 046 856 4 0.001 562 5 miles2, kilometers2 statute are 100 meters2 119.599 yards2 barrel (petroleum, us) 158.987 29 liters 42 gallons (proof spirits, us) 151.416 47 liters 40 gallons (beer, us) 117.347 77 liters 31 gallons bushel 35.239 07 liters 4 pecks cable 219.456 meters 120 fathoms chain (surveyor's) 20.116 8 meters 66 feet cord (wood) 3.624 556 meters3 128 feet3 cup 0.236 588 2 liters 8 ounces, liquid (us) degrees, celsius (water boils at 100 multiply by 1.8 and add degrees c, freezes at 32 to obtain degrees f 0 degrees c) degrees, fahrenheit subtract 32 and divide (water boils at 212 by 1.8 to obtain degrees f, freezes at degrees c 32 degrees f) dram, avoirdupois 1.771 845 2 grams 0.062 5 ounces, avoirdupois dram, troy 3.887 934 6 grams 0.125 ounces, troy dram, liquid (us) 3.696 69 milliliters 0.125 ounces, liquid fathom 1.828 8 meters 6 feet foot 30.48 centimeters 12 inches foot 0.304 8 meters 0.333 333 3 yards foot 0.000 304 8 kilometers 0.000 189 39 miles, statute foot2 929.030 4 centimeters2 144 inches2 foot 2 0.092 903 04 meters2 0.111 111 1 yards2 foot3 28.316 846 592 liters 7.480 519 gallons foot3 0.028 316 847 meters3 1,728 inches3 furlong 201.168 meters 220 yards gallon, liquid (us) 3.785 411 784 liters 4 quarts, liquid gill (us) 118.294 118 milliliters 4 ounces, liquid grain 64.798 91 milligrams 0.002 285 71 ounces, advp. gram 1,000 milligrams 0.035 273 96 ounces, advp. hand (height of horse) 10.16 centimeters 4 inches hectare 10,000 meters2 2.471 053 8 acres hundredweight, long 50.802 345 kilograms 112 pounds, avoirdupois hundredweight, short 45.359 237 kilograms 100 pounds, avoirdupois inch 2.54 centimeters 0.083 333 33 feet inch2 6.451 6 centimeters2 0.006 944 44 feet2 inch3 16.387 064 centimeters3 0.000 578 7 feet3 inch3 16.387 064 milliliters 0.029 761 6 pints, dry inch3 16.387 064 milliliters 0.034 632 0 pints, liquid kilogram 0.001 tons, metric 2.204 623 pounds, avoirdupois kilometer 1,000 meters 0.621 371 19 miles, statute kilometer2 100 hectares 247.105 38 acres kilometer2 1,000,000 meters2 0.386 102 16 miles2, statute knot (1 nautical mi/hr) 1.852 kilometers/hour 1.151 statute miles/hour league, nautical 5.559 552 kilometers 3 miles, nautical league, statute 4.828.032 kilometers 3 miles, statute link (surveyor's) 20.116 8 centimeters 7.92 inches liter 0.001 meters3 61.023 74 inches3 liter 0.1 dekaliter 0.908 083 quarts, dry liter 1,000 milliliters 1.056 688 quarts, liquid meter 100 centimeters 1.093 613 yards meter2 10,000 centimeters2 1.195 990 yards2 meter3 1,000 liters 1.307 951 yards3 micron 0.000 001 meter 0.000 039 4 inches mil 0.025 4 millimeters 0.001 inch mile, nautical 1.852 kilometers 1.150 779 4 miles, statute mile2, nautical 3.429 904 kilometers2 1.325 miles2, statute mile, statute 1.609 344 kilometers 5,280 feet or 8 furlongs mile2, statute 258.998 811 hectares 640 acres or 1 section mile2, statute 2.589 988 11 kilometers2 0.755 miles2, nautical minim (us) 0.061 611 52 milliliters 0.002 083 33 ounces, liquid ounce, avoirdupois 28.349 523 125 grams 437.5 grains ounce, liquid (us) 29.573 53 milliliters 0.062 5 pints, liquid ounce, troy 31.103 476 8 grams 480 grains pace 76.2 centimeters 30 inches peck 8.809 767 5 liters 8 quarts, dry pennyweight 1.555 173 84 grams 24 grains pint, dry (us) 0.550 610 47 liters 0.5 quarts, dry pint, liquid (us) 0.473 176 473 liters 0.5 quarts, liquid point (typographical) 0.351 459 8 millimeters 0.013 837 inches pound, avoirdupois 453.592 37 grams 16 ounces, avourdupois pound, troy 373.241 721 6 grams 12 ounces, troy quart, dry (us) 1.101 221 liters 2 pints, dry quart, liquid (us) 0.946 352 946 liters 2 pints, liquid quintal 100 kilograms 220.462 26 pounds, avdp. rod 5.029 2 meters 5.5 yards scruple 1.295 978 2 grams 20 grains section (us) 2.589 988 1 kilometers2 1 mile2, statute or 640 acres span 22.86 centimeters 9 inches stere 1 meter3 1.307 95 yards3 tablespoon 14.786 76 milliliters 3 teaspoons teaspoon 4.928 922 milliliters 0.333 333 tablespoons ton, long or deadweight 1,016.046 909 kilograms 2,240 pounds, avoirdupois ton, metric 1,000 kilograms 2,204.623 pounds, avoirdupois ton, register 2.831 684 7 meters3 100 feet3 ton, short 907.184 74 kilograms 2,000 pounds, avoirdupois township (us) 93.239 572 kilometers2 36 miles2, statute yard 0.914 4 meters 3 feet yard2 0.836 127 36 meters2 9 feet2 yard3 0.764 554 86 meters3 27 feet3 yard3 764.554 857 984 liters 201.974 gallons --------------------------------------------------- appendix e: cross-reference list of geographic names this list indicates where various names including all united states foreign service posts, alternate names, former names, and political or geographical portions of larger entities can be found in the world factbook are not necessarily those approved by the united states board on geographic names (bgn). alternate names are included in parentheses, additional information is included in brackets. name entry in the world factbook ----------------------------- --------------------------------------abidjan (us embassy) ivory coast abu dhabi (us embassy) united arab emirates acapulco (us consular agency) mexico accra (us embassy) ghana adana (us consulate) turkey addis ababa (us embassy) ethiopia adelaide (us consular agency) australia adelie land (terre adelie) antarctica (claimed by france) aden (us post not maintained, yemen, people's democratic republic of representation by british embassy) aden, gulf of indian ocean admiralty islands papua new guinea adriatic sea atlantic ocean aegean islands greece aegean sea atlantic ocean afars and issas, french djibouti territory of the (f.t.a.i.) agalega islands mauritius aland islands finland alaska united states alaska, gulf of pacific ocean aldabra islands seychelles alderney guernsey aleutian islands united states alexander island antarctica alexandria (us consulate general) egypt algiers (us embassy) algeria alhucemas, penon de spain alphonse island seychelles amami strait pacific ocean amindivi islands india amirante isles seychelles amman (us embassy) jordan amsterdam (us consulate general) netherlands amsterdam island french southern and antarctic lands (ile amsterdam) amundsen sea pacific ocean amur china; soviet union andaman islands india andaman sea indian ocean anegada passage atlantic ocean anglo-egyptian sudan sudan anjouan comoros ankara (us embassy) turkey annobon equatorial guinea antananarivo (us embassy) madagascar antipodes islands new zealand antwerp (us consulate general) belgium aozou strip (claimed by libya) chad aqaba, gulf of indian ocean arabian sea indian ocean arafura sea pacific ocean argun china; soviet union ascension island st. helena assumption island seychelles asuncion (us embassy) paraguay asuncion island northern mariana islands atacama chile athens (us embassy) greece attu united states auckland (us consulate general) new zealand auckland islands new zealand australes iles (iles tubuai) french polynesia axel heiberg island canada azores portugal azov, sea of atlantic ocean bab el mandeb indian ocean babuyan channel pacific ocean babuyan islands philippines baffin bay arctic ocean baffin island canada baghdad (us embassy) iraq balabac strait pacific ocean balearic islands spain balearic sea (iberian sea) atlantic ocean bali (us consular agency) indonesia bali sea indian ocean balintang channel pacific ocean balintang islands philippines balleny islands antarctica baltic sea atlantic ocean baluchistan afghanistan; iran; pakistan bamako (us embassy) mali banaba (ocean island) kiribati bandar seri begawan (us embassy) brunei banda sea pacific ocean bangkok (us embassy) thailand bangui (us embassy) central african republic banjul (us embassy) gambia, the banks island canada banks islands (iles banks) vanuatu barcelona (us consulate general) spain barents sea arctic ocean barranquilla (us consulate) colombia bashi channel pacific ocean basilan strait pacific ocean bass strait indian ocean batan islands philippines bavaria (bayern) germany, federal republic of beagle channel atlantic ocean bear island (bjornoya) svalbard beaufort sea arctic ocean bechuanaland botswana beijing (us embassy) china beirut (us embassy) lebanon belem (us consular agency) brazil belep islands (iles belep) new caledonia belfast (us consulate general) united kingdom belgian congo zaire belgrade (us embassy) yugoslavia belize city (us embassy) belize belle isle, strait of atlantic ocean bellinghausen sea pacific ocean belmopan belize bengal, bay of indian ocean bering sea pacific ocean bering strait pacific ocean berkner island antarctica berlin, east (us embassy) german democratic republic berlin, west (us mission) germany, federal republic of bern (us embassy) switzerland bessarabia romania; soviet union bijagos, arquipelago dos guinea-bissau bikini atoll marshall islands bilbao (us consulate) spain bioko equatorial guinea biscay, bay of atlantic ocean bishop rock united kingdom bismarck archipelago papua new guinea bismarck sea pacific ocean bissau (us embassy) guinea-bissau bjornoya (bear island) svalbard black rock falkland islands (islas malvinas) black sea atlantic ocean boa vista cape verde bogota (us embassy) colombia bombay (us consulate general) india bonaire netherlands antilles bonifacio, strait of atlantic ocean bonin islands japan bonn (us embassy) federal republic of germany bophuthatswana south africa bora-bora french polynesia bordeaux (us consulate general) france borneo brunei; indonesia; malaysia bornholm denmark bosporus atlantic ocean bothnia, gulf of atlantic ocean bougainville island papua new guinea bougainville strait pacific ocean bounty islands new zealand brasilia (us embassy) brazil brazzaville (us embassy) congo bridgetown (us embassy) barbados brisbane (us consulate) australia british east africa kenya british guiana guyana british honduras belize british solomon islands solomon islands british somaliland somalia brussels (us embassy, us mission belgium to european communities, us mission to the north atlantic treaty organization or usnato) bucharest (us embassy) romania budapest (us embassy) hungary buenos aires (us embassy) argentina bujumbura (us embassy) burundi cabinda angola cabot strait atlantic ocean caicos islands turks and caicos islands cairo (us embassy) egypt calcutta (us consulate general) india calgary (us consulate general) canada california, gulf of pacific ocean campbell island new zealand canal zone panama canary islands spain canberra (us embassy) australia cancun (us consular agency) mexico canton (guangzhou) china canton island kiribati cape town (us consulate general) south africa caracas (us embassy) venezuela cargados carajos shoals mauritius caroline islands micronesia, federated states of; pacific islands, trust territory of the caribbean sea atlantic ocean carpentaria, gulf of pacific ocean casablanca (us consulate general) morocco cato island australia cebu (us consulate) philippines celebes indonesia celebes sea pacific ocean celtic sea atlantic ocean central african empire central african republic ceuta spain ceylon sri lanka chafarinas, islas spain chagos archipelago (oil islands) british indian ocean territory channel islands guernsey; jersey chatham islands new zealand cheju-do korea, south cheju strait pacific ocean chengdu (us consulate general) china chesterfield islands new caledonia (iles chesterfield) chiang mai (us consulate general) thailand chihli, gulf of (bo hai) pacific ocean china, people's republic of china china, republic of taiwan choiseul solomon islands christchurch (us consular agency) new zealand christmas island (indian ocean) australia christmas island (pacific ocean) kiribati (kiritimati) chukchi sea arctic ocean ciskei south africa ciudad juarez (us consulate mexico general) cochabamba (us consular agency) bolivia coco, isla del costa rica cocos islands cocos (keeling) islands colombo (us embassy) sri lanka colon (us consular agency) panama colon, archipielago de ecuador (galapagos islands) commander islands soviet union (komandorskiye ostrova) conakry (us embassy) guinea congo (brazzaville) congo congo (kinshasa) zaire congo (leopoldville) zaire con son islands vietnam cook strait pacific ocean copenhagen (us embassy) denmark coral sea pacific ocean corn islands (islas del maiz) nicaragua corsica france cosmoledo group seychelles cote d'ivoire ivory coast cotonou (us embassy) benin crete greece crooked island passage atlantic ocean crozet islands (iles crozet) french southern and antarctic lands curacao (us consulate general) netherlands antilles cusco (us consular agency) peru dahomey benin daito islands japan dakar (us embassy) senegal daman (damao) india damascus (us embassy) syria danger atoll cook islands danish straits atlantic ocean danzig (gdansk) poland dao bach long vi vietnam dardanelles atlantic ocean dar es salaam (us embassy) tanzania davis strait atlantic ocean deception island antarctica denmark strait atlantic ocean d'entrecasteaux islands papua new guinea devon island canada dhahran (us consulate general) saudi arabia dhaka (us embassy) bangladesh diego garcia british indian ocean territory diego ramirez chile diomede islands soviet union (big diomede); united states (little diomede) diu india djibouti (us embassy) djibouti dodecanese greece doha (us embassy) qatar douala (us consulate general) cameroon dover, strait of atlantic ocean drake passage atlantic ocean dubai (us consulate general) united arab emirates dublin (us embassy) ireland durango (us consular agency) mexico durban (us consulate general) south africa dusseldorf (us consulate general) federal republic of germany dutch east indies indonesia dutch guiana suriname east china sea pacific ocean easter island (isla de pascua) chile eastern channel (east korea pacific ocean strait or tsushima strait) east germany german democratic republic east korea strait (eastern pacific ocean channel or tsushima strait) east pakistan bangladesh east siberian sea arctic ocean east timor (portuguese timor) indonesia edinburgh (us consulate general) united kingdom elba italy ellef ringnes island canada ellesmere island canada ellice islands tuvalu elobey, islas de equatorial guinea enderbury island kiribati enewetak atoll (eniwetok atoll) marshall islands england united kingdom english channel atlantic ocean eniwetok atoll marshall islands epirus, northern albania; greece eritrea ethiopia essequibo (claimed by venezuela) guyana estonia soviet union (de facto) etorofu soviet union (de facto) farquhar group seychelles fernando de noronha brazil fernando po (bioko) equatorial guinea finland, gulf of atlantic ocean florence (us consulate general) italy florida, straits of atlantic ocean formosa taiwan formosa strait (taiwan strait) pacific ocean fort-de-france martinique (us consulate general) frankfurt am main federal republic of germany (us consulate general) franz josef land soviet union freetown (us embassy) sierra leone french cameroon cameroon french indochina cambodia; laos; vietnam french guinea guinea french sudan mali french territory of the afars djibouti and issas (f.t.a.i.) french togo togo friendly islands tonga fukuoka (us consulate) japan funchal (us consular agency) portugal fundy, bay of atlantic ocean futuna islands (hoorn islands) wallis and futuna gaborone (us embassy) botswana galapagos islands (archipielago ecuador de colon) galleons passage atlantic ocean gambier islands (iles gambier) french polynesia gaspar strait indian ocean geneva (branch office of the us switzerland embassy, us mission to european office of the un and other international organizations) genoa (us consulate general) italy george town (us consular agency) cayman islands georgetown (us embassy) guyana gibraltar, strait of atlantic ocean gilbert islands kiribati goa india gold coast ghana golan heights syria good hope, cape of south africa goteborg (us consulate general) sweden gotland sweden gough island st. helena grand banks atlantic ocean grand cayman cayman islands grand turk (us consular agency) turks and caicos islands great australian bight indian ocean great belt (store baelt) atlantic ocean great britain united kingdom great channel indian ocean greater sunda islands brunei; indonesia; malaysia green islands papua new guinea greenland sea arctic ocean grenadines, northern st. vincent and the grenadines grenadines, southern grenada guadalajara mexico (us consulate general) guadalcanal solomon islands guadalupe, isla de mexico guangzhou (us consulate general) china guantanamo (us naval base) cuba guatemala (us embassy) guatemala gubal, strait of indian ocean guinea, gulf of atlantic ocean guayaquil (us consulate general) ecuador ha'apai group tonga habomai islands soviet union (de facto) hague,the (us embassy) netherlands haifa (us consular agency) israel hainan dao china halifax (us consulate general) canada halmahera indonesia hamburg (us consulate general) federal republic of germany hamilton (us consulate general) bermuda hanoi vietnam harare (us embassy) zimbabwe hatay turkey havana (us post not maintained, cuba representation by us interests section or usint of the swiss embassy) hawaii united states heard island heard island and mcdonald islands helsinki (us embassy) finland hermosillo (us consulate) mexico hispaniola dominican republic; haiti hokkaido japan holy see, the vatican city hong kong (us consulate general) hong kong honiara (us consulate) solomon islands honshu japan hormuz, strait of indian ocean horn, cape (cabo de hornos) chile horne, iles de wallis and futuna horn of africa ethiopia; somalia hudson bay arctic ocean hudson strait arctic ocean inaccessible island st. helena indochina cambodia; laos; vietnam inner mongolia (nei mongol) china ionian islands greece ionian sea atlantic ocean irian jaya indonesia irish sea atlantic ocean islamabad (us embassy) pakistan islas malvinas falkland islands (islas malvinas) istanbul (us consulate general) turkey italian somaliland somalia iwo jima japan izmir (us consulate general) turkey jakarta (us embassy) indonesia japan, sea of pacific ocean java indonesia java sea indian ocean jeddah (us consulate general) saudi arabia jerusalem (us consulate general) israel; west bank johannesburg south africa (us consulate general) juan de fuca, strait of pacific ocean juan fernandez, isla de chile juventud, isla de la cuba (isle of youth) kabul (us embassy now closed) afghanistan kaduna (us consulate general) nigeria kalimantan indonesia kamchatka peninsula soviet union (poluostrov kamchatka) kampala (us embassy) uganda kampuchea cambodia karachi (us consulate general) pakistan kara sea arctic ocean karimata strait indian ocean kathmandu (us embassy) nepal kattegat atlantic ocean kauai channel pacific ocean keeling islands cocos (keeling) islands kerguelen, iles french southern and antarctic lands kermadec islands new zealand khabarovsk soviet union khartoum (us embassy) sudan khmer republic cambodia kiel canal (nord-ostsee kanal) atlantic ocean khuriya muriya islands oman (kuria muria islands) khyber pass pakistan kigali (us embassy) rwanda kingston (us embassy) jamaica kinshasa (us embassy) zaire kiritimati (christmas island) kiribati kithira strait atlantic ocean kodiak island united states kola peninsula soviet union (kol'skiy poluostrov) kolonia (us special office) micronesia, federated states of korea bay pacific ocean korea, democratic people's korea, north republic of korea, republic of korea, south korea strait pacific ocean koror (us special office) pacific islands, trust territory of kosovo yugoslavia kowloon hong kong krakow (us consulate) poland kuala lumpur (us embassy) malaysia kunashiri (kunashir) soviet union (de facto) kuril islands soviet union (de facto) kuwait (us embassy) kuwait kwajalein atoll marshall islands kyushu japan labrador canada laccadive islands india laccadive sea indian ocean la coruna (us consular agency) spain lagos (us embassy) nigeria lahore (us consulate general) pakistan lakshadweep india la paz (us embassy) bolivia la perouse strait pacific ocean laptev sea arctic ocean las palmas (us consular agency) spain latvia soviet union (de facto) lau group fiji leningrad (us consulate general) soviet union lesser sunda islands indonesia leyte philippines liancourt rocks (claimed by japan)korea, south libreville (us embassy) gabon ligurian sea atlantic ocean lilongwe (us embassy) malawi lima (us embassy) peru lincoln sea arctic ocean line islands kiribati; palmyra atoll lisbon (us embassy) portugal lithuania soviet union (de facto) lombok strait indian ocean lome (us embassy) togo london (us embassy) united kingdom lord howe island australia louisiade archipelago papua new guinea loyalty islands new caledonia (iles loyaute) lubumbashi (us consulate general) zaire lusaka (us embassy) zambia luxembourg (us embassy) luxembourg luzon philippines luzon strait pacific ocean lyon (us consulate general) france macao macau macedonia bulgaria; greece; yugoslavia macquarie island australia madeira islands portugal madras (us consulate general) india madrid (us embassy) spain magellan, strait of atlantic ocean mahe island seychelles maiz, islas del (corn islands) nicaragua majorca (mallorca) spain majuro (us special office) marshall islands makassar strait pacific ocean malabo (us embassy) equatorial guinea malacca, strait of indian ocean malaga (us consular agency) spain malagasy republic madagascar male (us post not maintained, maldives representation from colombo, sri lanka) mallorca (majorca) spain malpelo, isla de colombia malta channel atlantic ocean malvinas, islas falkland islands (islas malvinas) managua (us embassy) nicaragua manama (us embassy) bahrain manaus (us consular agency) brazil manchukuo china manchuria china manila (us embassy) philippines manipa strait pacific ocean mannar, gulf of indian ocean manua islands american samoa maputo (us embassy) mozambique maracaibo (us consulate) venezuela marcus island (minami-tori-shima) japan mariana islands guam; northern mariana islands marion island south africa marmara, sea of atlantic ocean marquesas islands french polynesia (iles marquises) marseille (us consulate general) france martin vaz, ilhas brazil mas a tierra chile (robinson crusoe island) mascarene islands mauritius; reunion maseru (us embassy) lesotho matamoros (us consulate) mexico mazatlan (us consulate) mexico mbabane (us embassy) swaziland mcdonald islands heard island and mcdonald islands medan (us consulate) indonesia mediterranean sea atlantic ocean melbourne (us consulate general) australia melilla spain merida (us consulate) mexico messina, strait of atlantic ocean mexico (us embassy) mexico mexico, gulf of atlantic ocean milan (us consulate general) italy minami-tori-shima japan mindanao philippines mindoro strait pacific ocean minicoy island india mogadishu (us embassy) somalia mombasa (us consulate) kenya mona passage atlantic ocean monrovia (us embassy) liberia montego bay (us consular agency) jamaica monterrey (us consulate general) mexico montevideo (us embassy) uruguay montreal (us consulate general, canada us mission to the international civil aviation organization or icao) moravian gate czechoslovakia moroni (us embassy) comoros mortlock islands micronesia, federated states of moscow (us embassy) soviet union mozambique channel indian ocean mulege (us consular agency) mexico munich (us consulate general) federal republic of germany musandam peninsula oman; united arab emirates muscat (us embassy) oman muscat and oman oman myanma, myanmar burma naha (us consulate general) japan nairobi (us embassy) kenya nampo-shoto japan naples (us consulate general) italy nassau (us embassy) bahamas, the natuna besar islands indonesia n'djamena (us embassy) chad netherlands east indies indonesia netherlands guiana suriname nevis st. kitts and nevis new delhi (us embassy) india newfoundland canada new guinea indonesia; papua new guinea new hebrides vanuatu new siberian islands soviet union new territories hong kong new york, new york (us mission united states to the united nations or usun) niamey (us embassy) niger nice (us consular agency) france nicobar islands india nicosia (us embassy) cyprus nightingale island st. helena north atlantic ocean atlantic ocean north channel atlantic ocean northeast providence channel atlantic ocean northern epirus albania; greece northern grenadines st. vincent and the grenadines northern ireland united kingdom northern rhodesia zambia north island new zealand north korea korea, north north pacific ocean pacific ocean north sea atlantic ocean north vietnam vietnam northwest passages arctic ocean north yemen yemen arab republic norwegian sea atlantic ocean nouakchott (us embassy) mauritania novaya zemlya soviet union nuevo laredo (us consulate) mexico nyasaland malawi oahu united states oaxaca (us consular agency) mexico ocean island (banaba) kiribati ocean island (kure island) united states ogaden ethiopia; somalia oil islands (chagos archipelago) british indian ocean territory okhotsk, sea of pacific ocean okinawa japan oman, gulf of indian ocean ombai strait pacific ocean oporto (us consulate) portugal oran (us consulate) algeria ocresund (the sound) atlantic ocean orkney islands united kingdom osaka-kobe (us consulate general) japan oslo (us embassy) norway otranto, strait of atlantic ocean ottawa (us embassy) canada ouagadougou (us embassy) burkina outer mongolia mongolia pagan northern mariana islands palau pacific islands, trust territory of the palawan philippines palermo (us consulate general) italy palk strait indian ocean palma de mallorca spain (us consular agency) pamirs china; soviet union panama (us embassy) panama panama canal panama panama, gulf of pacific ocean paramaribo (us embassy) suriname parece vela japan paris (us embassy, us mission to france the organization for economic cooperation and development or oecd, us observer mission at the un educational, scientific, and cultural organization or unesco) pascua, isla de (easter island) chile pashtunistan afghanistan; pakistan peking (beijing) china pemba island tanzania pentland firth atlantic ocean perim yemen, people's democratic republic of perouse strait, la pacific ocean persian gulf indian ocean perth (us consulate) australia pescadores taiwan peshawar (us consulate) pakistan peter i island antarctica philip island norfolk island philippine sea pacific ocean phoenix islands kiribati pines, isle of cuba (isla de la juventud) piura (us consular agency) peru pleasant island nauru ponape (pohnpei) micronesia ponta delgada (us consulate) portugal port-au-prince (us embassy) haiti port louis (us embassy) mauritius port moresby (us embassy) papua new guinea porto alegre (us consulate) brazil port-of-spain (us embassy) trinidad and tobago port said (us consular agency) egypt portuguese guinea guinea-bissau portuguese timor (east timor) indonesia poznan (us consulate) poland prague (us embassy) czechoslovakia praia (us embassy) cape verde pretoria (us embassy) south africa pribilof islands united states prince edward island canada prince edward islands south africa prince patrick island canada principe sao tome and principe puerto plata (us consular agency) dominican republic puerto vallarta mexico (us consular agency) pusan (us consulate) south korea p'yongyang korea, north quebec (us consulate general) canada queen charlotte islands canada queen elizabeth islands canada queen maud land antarctica (claimed by norway) quito (us embassy) ecuador rabat (us embassy) morocco ralik chain marshall islands rangoon (us embassy) burma ratak chain marshall islands recife (us consulate) brazil redonda antigua and barbuda red sea indian ocean revillagigedo island united states revillagigedo islands mexico reykjavik (us embassy) iceland rhodes greece rhodesia zimbabwe rhodesia, northern zambia rhodesia, southern zimbabwe rio de janeiro brazil (us consulate general) rio de oro western sahara rio muni equatorial guinea riyadh (us embassy) saudi arabia robinson crusoe island chile (mas a tierra) rocas, atol das brazil rockall (disputed) united kingdom rodrigues mauritius rome (us embassy, us mission to italy the un agencies for food and agriculture or fodag) roncador cay colombia roosevelt island antarctica ross dependency antarctica (claimed by new zealand) ross island antarctica ross sea antarctica rota northern mariana islands rotuma fiji ryukyu islands japan saba netherlands antilles sabah malaysia sable island canada sahel burkina; cape verde; chad; the gambia; guinea-bissau; mali; mauritania; niger; senegal saigon (ho chi minh city) vietnam st. brandon mauritius st. christopher and nevis st. kitts and nevis st. george's (us embassy) grenada st. george's channel atlantic ocean st. john's (us embassy) antigua and barbuda st. lawrence, gulf of atlantic ocean st. lawrence island united states st. lawrence seaway atlantic ocean st. martin guadeloupe st. martin (sint maarten) netherlands antilles st. paul island canada st. paul island united states st. paul island (ile saint-paul) french southern and antarctic lands st. peter and st. paul rocks brazil (penedos de sao pedro e sao paulo) st. vincent passage atlantic ocean saipan northern mariana islands sakhalin island (ostrov sakhalin) soviet union sala y gomez, isla chile salisbury (harare) zimbabwe salvador de bahia brazil (us consular agency) salzburg (us consulate general) austria sanaa (us embassy) yemen arab republic san ambrosio chile san andres y providencia, colombia archipielago san bernardino strait pacific ocean san felix, isla chile san jose (us embassy) costa rica san luis potosi mexico (us consular agency) san miguel allende mexico (us consular agency) san salvador (us embassy) el salvador santa cruz (us consular agency) bolivia santa cruz islands solomon islands santiago (us embassy) chile santo domingo (us embassy) dominican republic sao luis (us consular agency) brazil sao paulo (us consulate general) brazil sao pedro e sao paulo, brazil penedos de sapporo (us consulate general) japan sapudi strait indian ocean sarawak malaysia sardinia italy sargasso sea atlantic ocean sark guernsey scotia sea atlantic ocean scotland united kingdom scott island antarctica senyavin islands micronesia, federated states of seoul (us embassy) korea, south serrana bank colombia serranilla bank colombia severnaya zemlya (northland) soviet union seville (us consular agency) spain shag island heard island and mcdonald islands shag rocks falkland islands (islas malvinas) shanghai (us consulate general) china shenyang (us consulate general) china shetland islands united kingdom shikoku japan shikotan (shikotan-to) japan siam thailand sibutu passage pacific ocean sicily italy sicily, strait of atlantic ocean sikkim india sinai egypt singapore (us embassy) singapore singapore strait pacific ocean sinkiang (xinjiang) china sint eustatius netherlands antilles sint maarten (st. martin) netherlands antilles skagerrak atlantic ocean slovakia czechoslovakia society islands french polynesia (iles de la societe) socotra yemen, people's democratic republic of sofia (us embassy) bulgaria solomon islands, northern papua new guinea solomon islands, southern solomon islands soloman sea pacific ocean songkhla (us consulate) thailand sound, the (oresund) atlantic ocean south atlantic ocean atlantic ocean south china sea pacific ocean southern grenadines grenada southern rhodesia zimbabwe south georgia south georgia and the south sandwich islands south island new zealand south korea korea, south south orkney islands antarctica south pacific ocean pacific ocean south sandwich islands south georgia and the south sandwich islands south shetland islands antarctica south tyrol italy south vietnam vietnam south-west africa namibia south yemen yemen, people's democratic republic of spanish guinea equatorial guinea spanish sahara western sahara spitsbergen svalbard stockholm (us embassy) sweden strasbourg (us consulate general) france stuttgart (us consulate general) federal republic of germany suez, gulf of indian ocean sulu archipelago philippines sulu sea pacific ocean sumatra indonesia sumba indonesia sunda islands (soenda isles) indonesia; malaysia sunda strait indian ocean surabaya (us consulate) indonesia surigao strait pacific ocean surinam suriname suva (us embassy) fiji swains island american samoa swan islands honduras sydney (us consulate general) australia tahiti french polynesia taipei taiwan taiwan strait pacific ocean tampico (us consular agency) mexico tanganyika tanzania tangier (us consulate general) morocco tarawa kiribati tartar strait pacific ocean tasmania australia tasman sea pacific ocean taymyr peninsula soviet union (poluostrov taymyra) tegucigalpa (us embassy) honduras tehran (us post not maintained, iran representation by swiss embassy) tel aviv (us embassy) israel terre adelie (adelie land) antarctica (claimed by france) thailand, gulf of pacific ocean thessaloniki greece (us consulate general) thurston island antarctica tibet (xizang) china tierra del fuego argentina; chile tijuana (us consulate general) mexico timor indonesia timor sea indian ocean tinian northern mariana islands tiran, strait of indian ocean tobago trinidad and tobago tokyo (us embassy) japan tonkin, gulf of pacific ocean toronto (us consulate general) canada torres strait pacific ocean trans-jordan jordan transkei south africa transylvania romania trieste (us consular agency) italy trindade, ilha de brazil tripoli (us post not maintained, libya representation by belgian embassy) tristan da cunha group st. helena trobriand islands papua new guinea trucial states united arab emirates truk islands micronesia tsugaru strait pacific ocean tuamotu islands (iles tuamotu) french polynesia tubuai islands (iles tubuai) french polynesia tunis (us embassy) tunisia turin (us consulate) italy turkish straits atlantic ocean turks island passage atlantic ocean tyrol, south italy tyrrhenian sea atlantic ocean udorn (us consulate) thailand ulaanbaatar mongolia ullung-do korea, south unimak pass (strait) pacific ocean united arab republic egypt; syria upper volta burkina vaduz (us post not maintained, liechtenstein representation from zurich, switzerland) vakhan corridor afghanistan (wakhan) valencia (us consular agency) spain valletta (us embassy) malta vancouver (us consulate general) canada vancouver island canada van diemen strait pacific ocean vatican city (us embassy) vatican city velez de la gomera, penon de spain venda south africa veracruz (us consular agency) mexico verde island passage pacific ocean victoria (us embassy) seychelles vienna (us embassy, us mission austria to international organizations in vienna or unvie) vientiane (us embassy) laos volcano islands japan vostok island kiribati vrangelya, ostrov soviet union (wrangel island) wakhan corridor afghanistan (now vakhan corridor) wales united kingdom walvis bay south africa warsaw (us embassy) poland washington, dc (the permanent united states mission of the usa to the organization of american states or oas) weddell sea atlantic ocean wellington (us embassy) new zealand western channel pacific ocean (west korea strait) west germany germany, federal republic of west korea strait pacific ocean (western channel) west pakistan pakistan wetar strait pacific ocean white sea arctic ocean windhoek namibia windward passage atlantic ocean winnipeg (us consular agency) canada wrangel island (ostrov vrangelya) soviet union yaounde (us embassy) cameroon yap islands micronesia yellow sea pacific ocean yemen (aden) yemen, people's democratic republic of yemen, north yemen arab republic yemen (sanaa) yemen arab republic yemen, south yemen, people's democratic republic of youth, isle of cuba (isla de la juventud) yucatan channel atlantic ocean zagreb (us consulate general) yugoslavia zanzibar tanzania zurich (us consulate general) switzerland ---------------------------------------------------