CHAPTER IX - CONCERNING A CIVIL PRINCIPALITY

BUT coming to the other point- where a leading citizen becomes the
prince of his country, not by wickedness or any intolerable
violence, but by the favour of his fellow citizens- this may be called
a civil principality: nor is genius or fortune altogether necessary to
attain to it, but rather a happy shrewdness. I say then that such a
principality is obtained either by the favour of the people or by
the favour of the nobles. Because in all cities these two distinct
parties are found, and from this it arises that the people do not wish
to be ruled nor oppressed by the nobles, and the nobles wish to rule
and oppress the people; and from these two opposite desires there
arises in cities one of three results, either a principality,
self-government, or anarchy.

A principality is created either by the people or by the nobles,
accordingly as one or other of them has the opportunity; for the
nobles, seeing they cannot withstand the people, begin to cry up the
reputation of one of themselves, and they make him a prince, so that
under his shadow they can give vent to their ambitions. The people,
finding they cannot resist the nobles, also cry up the reputation of
one of themselves, and make him a prince so as to be defended by his
authority. He who obtains sovereignty by the assistance of the
nobles maintains himself with more difficulty than he who comes to
it by the aid of the people, because the former finds himself with
many around him who consider themselves his equals, and because of
this he can neither rule nor manage them to his liking. But he who
reaches sovereignty by popular favour finds himself alone, and has
none around him, or few, who are not prepared to obey him.

Besides this, one cannot by fair dealing, and without injury to
others, satisfy the nobles, but you can satisfy the people, for
their object is more righteous than that of the nobles, the latter
wishing to oppress, whilst the former only desire not to be oppressed.
It is to be added also that a prince can never secure himself
against a hostile people, because of their being too many, whilst from
the nobles he can secure himself, as they are few in number. The worst
that a prince may expect from a hostile people is to be abandoned by
them; but from hostile nobles he has not only to fear abandonment, but
also that they will rise against him; for they, being in these affairs
more far-seeing and astute, always come forward in time to save
themselves, and to obtain favours from him whom they expect to
prevail. Further, the prince is compelled to live always with the same
people, but he can do well without the same nobles, being able to make
and unmake them daily, and to give or take away authority when it
pleases him.

Therefore, to make this point clearer, I say that the nobles ought
to be looked at mainly in two ways: that is to say, they either
shape their course in such a way as binds them entirely to your
fortune, or they do not. Those who so bind themselves, and are not
rapacious, ought to be honoured and loved; those who do not bind
themselves may be dealt with in two ways; they may fail to do this
through pusillanimity and a natural want of courage, in which case you
ought to make use of them, especially of those who are of good
counsel; and thus, whilst in prosperity you honour yourself, in
adversity you have not to fear them. But when for their own
ambitious ends they shun binding themselves, it is a token that they
are giving more thought to themselves than to you, and a prince
ought to guard against such, and to fear them as if they were open
enemies, because in adversity they always help to ruin him.

Therefore, one who becomes a prince through the favour of the people
ought to keep them friendly, and this he can easily do seeing they
only ask not to be oppressed by him. But one who, in opposition to the
people, becomes a prince by the favour of the nobles, ought, above
everything, to seek to win the people over to himself, and this he may
easily do if he takes them under his protection. Because men, when
they receive good from him of whom they were expecting evil, are bound
more closely to their benefactor; thus the people quickly become
more devoted to him than if he had been raised to the principality
by their favours; and the prince can win their affections in many
ways, but as these vary according to the circumstances one cannot give
fixed rules, so I omit them; but, I repeat, it is necessary for a
prince to have the people friendly, otherwise he has no security in
adversity.

Nabis, Prince of the Spartans, sustained the attack of all Greece,
and of a victorious Roman army, and against them he defended his
country and his government; and for the overcoming of this peril it
was only necessary for him to make himself secure against a few, but
this would not have been sufficient if the people had been hostile.
And do not let any one impugn this statement with the trite proverb
that 'He who builds on the people, builds on the mud,' for this is
true when a private citizen makes a foundation there, and persuades
himself that the people will free him when he is oppressed by his
enemies or by the magistrates; wherein he would find himself very
often deceived, as happened to the Gracchi in Rome and to Messer
Giorgio Scali in Florence. But granted a prince who has established
himself as above, who can command, and is a man of courage, undismayed
in adversity, who does not fail in other qualifications, and who, by
his resolution and energy, keeps the whole people encouraged- such a
one will never find himself deceived in them, and it will be shown
that he has laid his foundations well.

These principalities are liable to danger when they are passing from
the civil to the absolute order of government, for such princes either
rule personally or through magistrates. In the latter case their
government is weaker and more insecure, because it rests entirely on
the goodwill of those citizens who are raised to the magistracy, and
who, especially in troubled times, can destroy the government with
great ease, either by intrigue or open defiance; and the prince has
not the chance amid tumults to exercise absolute authority, because
the citizens and subjects, accustomed to receive orders from
magistrates, are not of a mind to obey him amid these confusions,
and there will always be in doubtful times a scarcity of men whom he
can trust. For such a prince cannot rely upon what he observes in
quiet times, when citizens had need of the state, because then every
one agrees with him; they all promise, and when death is far distant
they all wish to die for him; but in troubled times, when the state
has need of its citizens, then he finds but few. And so much the
more is this experiment dangerous, inasmuch as it can only be tried
once. Therefore a wise prince ought to adopt such a course that his
citizens will always in every sort and kind of circumstance have
need of the state and of him, and then he will always find them
faithful.

