CHAPTER XIII - CONCERNING AUXILIARIES, MIXED SOLDIERY, AND ONE'S OWN

AUXILIARIES, which are the other useless arm, are employed when a
prince is called in with his forces to aid and defend, as was done
by Pope Julius in the most recent times; for he, having, in the
enterprise against Ferrara, had poor proof of his mercenaries,
turned to auxiliaries, and stipulated with Ferdinand, King of Spain,
for his assistance with men and arms. These arms may be useful and
good in themselves, but for him who calls them in they are always
disadvantageous; for losing, one is undone, and winning, one is
their captive.

And although ancient histories may be full of examples, I do not
wish to leave this recent one of Pope Julius II, the peril of which
cannot fall to be perceived; for he, wishing to get Ferrara, threw
himself entirely into the hands of the foreigner. But his good fortune
brought about a third event, so that he did not reap the fruit of
his rash choice; because, having auxiliaries routed at Ravenna, and
the Switzers having risen and driven out the conquerors (against all
expectation, both his and others), it so came to pass that he did
not become prisoner to his enemies, they having fled, nor to his
auxiliaries, he having conquered by other arms than theirs.

The Florentines, being entirely without arms, sent ten thousand
Frenchmen to take Pisa, whereby they ran more danger than at any other
time of their troubles.

The Emperor of Constantinople, to oppose his neighbours, sent ten
thousand Turks into Greece, who, on the war being finished, were not
willing to quit; this was the beginning of the servitude of Greece
to the infidels.

Therefore, let him who has no desire to conquer make use of these
arms, for they are much more hazardous than mercenaries, because
with them the ruin is ready made; they are all united, all yield
obedience to others; but with mercenaries, when they have conquered,
more time and better opportunities are needed to injure you; they
are not all of one community, they are found and paid by you, and a
third party, which you have made their head, is not able all at once
to assume enough authority to injure you. In conclusion, in
mercenaries dastardy is most dangerous; in auxiliaries, valour. The
wise prince, therefore, has always avoided these arms and turned to
his own; and has been willing rather to lose with them than to conquer
with others, not deeming that a real victory which is gained with
the arms of others.

I shall never hesitate to cite Cesare Borgia and his actions. This
duke entered the Romagna with auxiliaries, taking there only French
soldiers, and with them he captured Imola and Forli; but afterwards,
such forces not appearing to him reliable, he turned to mercenaries,
discerning less danger in them, and enlisted the Orsini and Vitelli;
whom presently, on handling and finding them doubtful, unfaithful, and
dangerous, he destroyed and turned to his own men. And the
difference between one and the other of these forces can easily be
seen when one considers the difference there was in the reputation
of the duke, when he had the French, when he had the Orsini and
Vitelli, and when he relied on his own soldiers, on whose fidelity
he could always count and found it ever increasing; he was never
esteemed more highly than when every one saw that he was complete
master of his own forces.

I was not intending to go beyond Italian and recent examples, but
I am unwilling to leave out Hiero, the Syracusan, he being one of
those I have named above. This man, as I have said, made head of the
army by the Syracusans, soon found out that a mercenary soldiery,
constituted like our Italian condottieri, was of no use; and it
appearing to him that he could neither keep them nor let them go, he
had them all cut to pieces, and afterwards made war with his own
forces and not with aliens.

I wish also to recall to memory an instance from the Old Testament
applicable to this subject. David offered himself to Saul to fight
with Goliath, the Philistine champion, and, to give him courage,
Saul armed him with his own weapons; which David rejected as soon as
he had them on his back, saying he could make no use of them, and that
he wished to meet the enemy with his sling and his knife. In
conclusion, the arms of others either fall from your back, or they
weigh you down, or they bind you fast.

Charles VII, the father of King Louis XI, having by good fortune and
valour liberated France from the English, recognized the necessity
of being armed with forces of his own, and he established in his
kingdom ordinances concerning men-at-arms and infantry. Afterwards his
son, King Louis, abolished the infantry and began to enlist the
Switzers, which mistake, followed by others, is, as is now seen, a
source of peril to that kingdom; because, having raised the reputation
of the Switzers, he has entirely diminished the value of his own arms,
for he has destroyed the infantry altogether; and his men-at-arms he
has subordinated to others, for, being as they are so accustomed to
fight along with Switzers, it does not appear that they can now
conquer without them. Hence it arises that the French cannot stand
against the Switzers, and without the Switzers they do not come off
well against others. The armies of the French have thus become
mixed, partly mercenary and partly national, both of which arms
together are much better than mercenaries alone or auxiliaries
alone, yet much inferior to one's own forces. And this example
proves it, the kingdom of France would be unconquerable if the
ordinance of Charles had been enlarged or maintained.

But the scanty wisdom of man, on entering into an affair which looks
well at first, cannot discern the poison that is hidden in it, as I
have said above of hectic fevers. Therefore, if he who rules a
principality cannot recognize evils until they are upon him, he is not
truly wise; and this insight is given to few. And if the first
disaster to the Roman Empire should be examined, it will be found to
have commenced only with the enlisting of the Goths; because from that
time the vigour of the Roman Empire began to decline, and all that
valour which had raised it passed away to others.

I conclude, therefore, that no principality is secure without having
its own forces; on the contrary, it is entirely dependent on good
fortune, not having the valour which in adversity would defend it. And
it has always been the opinion and judgment of wise men that nothing
can be so uncertain or unstable as fame or power not founded on its
own strength. And one's own forces  are those which are composed
either of subjects, citizens, or dependants; all others are
mercenaries or auxiliaries. And the way to take ready one's own forces
will be easily found if the rules suggested by me shall be reflected
upon, and if one will consider how Philip, the father of Alexander the
Great, and many republics and princes have armed and organized
themselves, to which rules I entirely commit myself.

