








CHAPTER XX - ARE FORTRESSES, AND MANY OTHER THINGS TO WHICH PRINCES OFTEN RESORT, ADVANTAGEOUS OR HURTFUL?

1. SOME princes, so as to hold securely the state, have disarmed
their subjects; others have kept their subject towns by factions;
others have fostered enmities against themselves; others have laid
themselves out to gain over those whom they distrusted in the
beginning of their governments; some have built fortresses; some
have overthrown and destroyed them. And although one cannot give a
final judgment on all one of these things unless one possesses the
particulars of those states in which a decision has to be made,
nevertheless I will speak as comprehensively as the matter of itself
will admit.

2. There never was a new prince who has disarmed his subjects;
rather when he has found them disarmed he has always armed them,
because, by arming them, those arms become yours, those men who were
distrusted become faithful, and those who were faithful are kept so,
and your subjects become your adherents. And whereas all subjects
cannot be armed, yet when those whom you do arm are benefited, the
others can be handled more freely, and this difference in their
treatment, which they quite understand, makes the former your
dependants, and the latter, considering it to be necessary that
those who have the most danger and service should have the most
reward, excuse you. But when you disarm them, you at once offend
them by showing that you distrust them, either for cowardice or for
want of loyalty, and either of these opinions breeds hatred against
you. And because you cannot remain unarmed, it follows that you turn
to mercenaries, which are of the character already shown; even if they
should be good they would not be sufficient to defend you against
powerful enemies and distrusted subjects. Therefore, as I have said, a
new prince in a new principality has always distributed arms.
Histories are full of examples. But when a prince acquires a new
state, which he adds as a province to his old one, then it is
necessary to disarm the men of that state, except those who have
been his adherents in acquiring it; and these again, with time and
opportunity, should be rendered soft and effeminate; and matters
should be managed in such a way that all the armed men in the state
shall be your own soldiers who in your old state were living near you.

3. Our forefathers, and those who were reckoned wise, were
accustomed to say that it was necessary to hold Pistoia by factions
and Pisa by fortresses; and with this idea they fostered quarrels in
some of their tributary towns so as to keep possession of them the
more easily. This may have been well enough in those times when
Italy was in a way balanced, but I do not believe that it can be
accepted as a precept for to-day, because I do not believe that
factions can ever be of use; rather it is certain that when the
enemy comes upon you in divided cities you are quickly lost, because
the weakest party will always assist the outside forces and the
other will not be able to resist. The Venetians, moved, as I
believe, by the above reasons, fostered the Guelph and Ghibelline
factions in their tributary cities; and although they never allowed
them to come to bloodshed, yet they nursed these disputes amongst
them, so that the citizens, distracted by their differences, should
not unite against them. Which, as we saw, did not afterwards turn
out as expected, because, after the rout at Vaila, one party at once
took courage and seized the state. Such methods argue, therefore,
weakness in the prince, because these factions will never be permitted
in a vigorous principality; such methods for enabling one the more
easily to manage subjects are only useful in times of peace, but if
war comes this policy proves fallacious.

4. Without doubt princes become great when they overcome the
difficulties and obstacles by which they are confronted, and therefore
fortune, especially when she desires to make a new prince great, who
has a greater necessity to earn renown than an hereditary one,
causes enemies to arise and form designs against him, in order that he
may have the opportunity of overcoming them, and by them to mount
higher, as by a ladder which his enemies have raised. For this
reason many consider that a wise prince, when he has the
opportunity, ought with craft to foster some animosity against
himself, so that, having crushed it, his renown may rise higher.

5. Princes, especially new ones, have found more fidelity and
assistance in those men who in the beginning of their rule were
distrusted than among those who in the beginning were trusted.
Pandolfo Petrucci, Prince of Siena, ruled his state more by those
who had been distrusted than by others. But on this question one
cannot speak generally, for it varies so much with the individual; I
will only say this, that those men who at the commencement of a
princedom have been hostile, if they are of a description to need
assistance to support themselves, can always be gained over with the
greatest ease, and they will be tightly held to serve the prince
with fidelity, inasmuch as they know it to be very necessary for
them to cancel by deeds the bad impression which he had formed of
them; and thus the prince always extracts more profit from them than
from those who, serving him in too much security, may neglect his
affairs. And since the matter demands it, I must not fail to warn a
prince, who by means of secret favours has acquired a new state,
that he must well consider the reasons which induced those to favour
him who did so; and if it be not a natural affection towards him,
but only discontent with their government, then he will only keep them
friendly with great trouble and difficulty, for it will be
impossible to satisfy them. And weighing well the reasons for this
in those examples which can be taken from ancient and modern
affairs, we shall find that it is easier for the prince to make
friends of those men who were contented under the former government,
and are therefore his enemies, than of those who, being discontented
with it, were favourable to him and encouraged him to seize it.

6. It has been a custom with princes, in order to hold their
states more securely, to build fortresses that may serve as a bridle
and bit to those who might design to work against them, and as a place
of refuge from a first attack. I praise this system because it has
been made use of formerly. Notwithstanding that, Messer Nicolo Vitelli
in our times has been seen to demolish two fortresses in Citta di
Castello so that he might keep that state; Guidubaldo, Duke of Urbino,
on returning to his dominion, whence he had been driven by Cesare
Borgia, razed to the foundations all the fortresses in that
province, and considered that without them it would be more
difficult to lose it; the Bentivoglio returning to Bologna came to a
similar decision. Fortresses, therefore, are useful or not according
to circumstances; if they do you good in one way they injure you in
another. And this question can be reasoned thus: the prince who has
more to fear from the people than from foreigners ought to build
fortresses, but he who has more to fear from foreigners than from
the people ought to leave them alone. The castle of Milan, built by
Francesco Sforza, has made, and will make, more trouble for the
house of Sforza than any other disorder in the state. For this
reason the best possible fortress is- not to be hated by the people,
because, although you may hold the fortresses, yet they will not
save you if the people hate you, for there will never be wanting
foreigners to assist a people who have taken arms against you. It
has not been seen in our times that such fortresses have been of use
to any prince, unless to the Countess of Forli, when the Count
Girolamo, her consort, was killed; for by that means she was able to
withstand the popular attack and wait for assistance from Milan, and
thus recover her state; and the posture of affairs was such at that
time that the foreigners could not assist the people. But fortresses
were of little value to her afterwards when Cesare Borgia attacked
her, and when the people, her enemy, were allied with foreigners.
Therefore it would have been safer for her, both then and before,
not to have been hated by the people than to have had the fortresses.
All these things considered then, I shall praise him who builds
fortresses as well as him who does not, and I shall blame whoever,
trusting in them, cares little about being hated by the people.


