CHAPTER XIX - THAT ONE SHOULD AVOID BEING DESPISED AND HATED

Now, concerning the characteristics of which mention is made
above, I have spoken of the more important ones, the others I wish
to discuss briefly under this generality, that the prince must
consider, as has been in part said before, how to avoid those things
which will make him hated or contemptible; and as often as he shall
have succeeded he will have fulfilled his part, and he need not fear
any danger in other reproaches.

It makes him hated above all things, as I have said, to be
rapacious, and to be a violator of the property and women of his
subjects, from both of which he must abstain. And when neither their
property nor honour is touched, the majority of men live content,
and he has only to contend with the ambition of a few, whom he can
curb with ease in many ways.

It makes him contemptible to be considered fickle, frivolous,
effeminate, mean-spirited, irresolute, from all of which a prince
should guard himself as from a rock; and he should endeavour to show
in his actions greatness, courage, gravity, and fortitude; and in
his private dealings with his subjects let him show that his judgments
are irrevocable, and maintain himself in such reputation that no one
can hope either to deceive him or to get round him.

That prince is highly esteemed who conveys this impression of
himself, and he who is highly esteemed is not easily conspired
against; for, provided it is well known that he is an excellent man
and revered by his people, he can only be attacked with difficulty.
For this reason a prince ought to have two fears, one from within,
on account of his subjects, the other from without, on account of
external powers. From the latter he is defended by being well armed
and having good allies, and if he is well armed he will have good
friends, and affairs will always remain quiet within when they are
quiet without, unless they should have been already disturbed by
conspiracy; and even should affairs outside be disturbed, if he has
carried out his preparations and has lived as I have said, as long
as he does not despair, he will resist every attack, as I said Nabis
the Spartan did.

But concerning his subjects, when affairs outside are disturbed he
has only to fear that they will conspire secretly, from which a prince
can easily secure himself by avoiding being hated and despised, and by
keeping the people satisfied with him, which it is most necessary
for him to accomplish, as I said above at length. And one of the
most efficacious remedies that a prince can have against
conspiracies is not to be hated and despised by the people, for he who
conspires against a prince always expects to please them by his
removal; but when the conspirator can only look forward to offending
them, he will not have the courage to take such a course, for the
difficulties that confront a conspirator are infinite. And as
experience shows, many have been the conspiracies, but few have been
successful; because he who conspires cannot act alone, nor can he take
a companion except from those whom he believes to be malcontents,
and as soon as you have opened your mind to a malcontent you have
given him the material with which to content himself, for by
denouncing you he can look for every advantage; so that, seeing the
gain from this course to be assured, and seeing the other to be
doubtful and full of dangers, he must be a very rare friend, or a
thoroughly obstinate enemy of the prince, to keep faith with you.

And, to reduce the matter into a small compass, I say that, on the
side of the conspirator, there is nothing but fear, jealousy, prospect
of punishment to terrify him; but on the side of the prince there is
the majesty of the principality, the laws, the protection of friends
and the state to defend him; so that, adding to all these things the
popular goodwill, it is impossible that any one should be so rash as
to conspire. For whereas in general the conspirator has to fear before
the execution of his plot, in this case he has also to fear the sequel
to the crime; because on account of it he has the people for an enemy,
and thus cannot hope for any escape.

Endless examples could be given on this subject, but I will be
content with one, brought to pass within the memory of our fathers.
Messer Annibale Bentivoglio, who was prince in Bologna (grandfather of
the present Annibale), having been murdered by the Canneschi, who
had conspired against him, not one of his family survived but Messer
Giovanni, who was in childhood: immediately after his assassination
the people rose and murdered all the Canneschi. This sprung from the
popular goodwill which the house of Bentivoglio enjoyed in those
days in Bologna; which was so great that, although none remained there
after the death of Annibale who were able to rule the state, the
Bolognese, having information that there was one of the Bentivoglio
family in Florence, who up to that time had been considered the son of
a blacksmith, sent to Florence for him and gave him the government
of their city, and it was ruled by him until Messer Giovanni came in
due course to the government.

For this reason I consider that a prince ought to reckon
conspiracies of little account when his people hold him in esteem; but
when it is hostile to him, and bears hatred towards him, he ought to
fear everything and everybody. And well-ordered states and wise
princes have taken every care not to drive the nobles to
desperation, and to keep the people satisfied and contented, for
this is one of the most important objects a prince can have.

Among the best ordered and governed kingdoms of our times is France,
and in it are found many good institutions on which depend the liberty
and security of the king; of these the first is the parliament and its
authority, because he who founded the kingdom, knowing the ambition of
the nobility and their boldness, considered that a bit in their mouths
would be necessary to hold them in; and, on the other side, knowing
the hatred of the people, founded in fear, against the nobles, he
wished to protect them, yet he was not anxious for this to be the
particular care of the king; therefore, to take away the reproach
which he would be liable to from the nobles for favouring the
people, and from the people for favouring the nobles, he set up an
arbiter, who should be one who could beat down the great and favour
the lesser without reproach to the king. Neither could you have a
better or a more prudent arrangement, or a greater source of
security to the king and kingdom. From this one can draw another
important conclusion, that princes ought to leave affairs of
reproach to the management of others, and keep those of grace in their
own hands. And further, I consider that a prince ought to cherish
the nobles, but not so as to make himself hated by the people.

It may appear, perhaps, to some who have examined the lives and
deaths of the Roman emperors that many of them would be an example
contrary to my opinion, seeing that some of them lived nobly and
showed great qualities of soul, nevertheless they have lost their
empire or have been killed by subjects who have conspired against
them. Wishing, therefore, to answer these objections, I will recall
the characters of some of the emperors, and will show that the
causes of their ruin were not different to those alleged by me; at the
same time I will only submit for consideration those things that are
noteworthy to him who studies the affairs of those times.

It seems to me sufficient to take all those emperors who succeeded
to the empire from Marcus the philosopher down to Maximinus; they were
Marcus and his son Commodus, Pertinax, Julian, Severus and his son
Antoninus Caracalla, Macrinus, Heliogabalus, Alexander, and Maximinus.

There is first to note that, whereas in other principalities the
ambition of the nobles and the insolence of the people only have to be
contended with, the Roman emperors had a third difficulty in having to
put up with the cruelty and avarice of their soldiers, a matter so
beset with difficulties that it was the ruin of many; for it was a
hard thing to give satisfaction both to soldiers and people; because
the people loved peace, and for this reason they loved the
unaspiring prince, whilst the soldiers loved the warlike prince who
was bold, cruel, and rapacious, which qualities they were quite
willing he should exercise upon the people, so that they could get
double pay and give vent to their greed and cruelty. Hence it arose
that those emperors were always overthrown who, either by birth or
training, had no great authority, and most of them, especially those
who came new to the principality, recognizing the difficulty of
these two opposing humours, were inclined to give satisfaction to
the soldiers, caring little about injuring the people. Which course
was necessary, because, as princes cannot help being hated by someone,
they ought, in the first place, to avoid being hated by every one, and
when they cannot compass this, they ought to endeavour with the utmost
diligence to avoid the hatred of the most powerful. Therefore, those
emperors who through inexperience had need of special favour adhered
more readily to the soldiers than to the people; a course which turned
out advantageous to them or not, accordingly as the prince knew how to
maintain authority over them.

From these causes it arose that Marcus, [Aurelius], Pertinax, and
Alexander, being all men of modest life, lovers of justice, enemies to
cruelty, humane, and benignant, came to a sad end except Marcus; he
alone lived and died honoured, because he had succeeded to the
throne by hereditary title, and owed nothing either to the soldiers or
the people; and afterwards, being possessed of many virtues which made
him respected, he always kept both orders in their places whilst he
lived, and was neither hated nor despised.

But Pertinax was created emperor against the wishes of the soldiers,
who, being accustomed to live licentiously under Commodus, could not
endure the honest life to which Pertinax wished to reduce them;
thus, having given cause for hatred, to which hatred there was added
contempt for his old age, he was overthrown at the very beginning of
his administration. And here it should be noted that hatred is
acquired as much by good works as by bad ones, therefore, as I said
before, a prince wishing to keep his state is very often forced to
do evil; for when that body is corrupt whom you think you have need of
to maintain yourself- it may be either the people or the soldiers or
the nobles- you have to submit to its humours and to gratify them, and
then good works will do you harm.

But let us come to Alexander, who was a man of such great
goodness, that among the other praises which are accorded him is this,
that in the fourteen years he held the empire no one was ever put to
death by him unjudged; nevertheless, being considered effeminate and a
man who allowed himself to be governed by his mother, he became
despised, the army conspired against him, and murdered him.

Turning now to the opposite characters of Commodus, Severus,
Antoninus Caracalla, and Maximinus, you will find them all cruel and
rapacious- men who, to satisfy their soldiers, did not hesitate to
commit every kind of iniquity against the people; and all, except
Severus, came to a bad end; but in Severus there was so much valour
that, keeping the soldiers friendly, although the people were
oppressed by him, he reigned successfully; for his valour made him
so much admired in the sight of the soldiers and people that the
latter were kept in a way astonished and awed and the former
respectful and satisfied. And because the actions of this man, as a
new prince, were great, I wish to show briefly that he knew well how
to counterfeit the fox and the lion, which natures, as I said above,
it is necessary for a prince to imitate.

Knowing the sloth of the Emperor Julian, he persuaded the army in
Sclavonia, of which he was captain, that it would be right to go to
Rome and avenge the death of Pertinax, who had been killed by the
praetorian soldiers; and under this pretext, without appearing to
aspire to the throne, he moved the army on Rome, and reached Italy
before it was known that he had started. On his arrival at Rome, the
Senate, through fear, elected him emperor and killed Julian. After
this there remained for Severus, who wished to make himself master
of the whole empire, two difficulties; one in Asia, where Niger,
head of the Asiatic army, had caused himself to be proclaimed emperor;
the other in the west where Albinus was, who also aspired to the
throne. And as he considered it dangerous to declare himself hostile
to both, he decided to attack Niger and to deceive Albinus. To the
latter he wrote that, being elected emperor by the Senate, he was
willing to share that dignity with him and sent him the title of
Caesar; and, moreover, that the Senate had made Albinus his colleague;
which things were accepted by Albinus as true. But after Severus had
conquered and killed Niger, and settled oriental affairs, he
returned to Rome and complained to the Senate that Albinus, little
recognizing the benefits that he had received from him, had by
treachery sought to murder him, and for this ingratitude he was
compelled to punish him. Afterwards he sought him out in France, and
took from him his government and life. He who will, therefore,
carefully examine the actions of this man will find him a most valiant
lion and a most cunning fox; he will find him feared and respected
by every one, and not hated by the army; and it need not be wondered
at that he, the new man, well, because his supreme renown always
protected him from that hatred which the people might have conceived
against him for his violence.

But his son Antoninus was a most eminent man, and had very excellent
qualities, which made him admirable in the sight of the people and
acceptable to the soldiers, for he was a warlike man, most enduring of
fatigue, a despiser of all delicate food and other luxuries, which
caused him to be beloved by the armies. Nevertheless, his ferocity and
cruelties were so great and so unheard of that, after endless single
murders, he killed a large number of the people of Rome and all
those of Alexandria. He became hated by the whole world, and also
feared by those he had around him, to such an extent that he was
murdered in the midst of his army by a centurion. And here it must
be noted that such-like deaths, which are deliberately inflicted
with a resolved and desperate courage, cannot be avoided by princes,
because any one who does not fear to die can inflict them; but a
prince may fear them the less because they are very rare; he has
only to be careful not to do any grave injury to those whom he employs
or has around him in the service of the state. Antoninus had not taken
this care, but had contumeliously killed a brother of that
centurion, whom also he daily threatened, yet retained in his
bodyguard; which, as it turned out, was a rash thing to do, and proved
the emperor's ruin.

But let us come to Commodus, to whom it should have been very easy
to hold the empire, for, being the son of Marcus, he had inherited it,
and he had only to follow in the footsteps of his father to please his
people and soldiers; but, being by nature cruel and brutal, he gave
himself up to amusing the soldiers and corrupting them, so that he
might indulge his rapacity upon the people; on the other hand, not
maintaining his dignity, often descending to the theatre to compete
with gladiators, and doing other vile things, little worthy of the
imperial majesty, he fell into contempt with the soldiers, and being
hated by one party and despised by the other, he was conspired against
and killed.

It remains to discuss the character of Maximinus. He was a very
warlike man, and the armies, being disgusted with the effeminacy of
Alexander, of whom I have already spoken, killed him and elected
Maximinus to the throne. This he did not possess for long, for two
things made him hated and despised; the one, his having kept sheep
in Thrace, which brought him into contempt (it being well known to
all, and considered a great indignity by every one), and the other,
his having at the accession to his dominions deferred going to Rome
and taking possession of the imperial seat; he had also gained a
reputation for the utmost ferocity by having, through his prefects
in Rome and elsewhere in the empire, practised many cruelties, so that
the whole world was moved to anger at the meanness of his birth and to
fear at his barbarity. First Africa rebelled, then the Senate with all
the people of Rome, and all Italy conspired against him, to which
may be added his own army: this latter, besieging Aquileia and meeting
with difficulties in taking it, were disgusted with his cruelties, and
fearing him less when they found so many against him, murdered him.

I do not wish to discuss Heliogabalus, Macrinus, or Julian, who,
being thoroughly contemptible, were quickly wiped out; but I will
bring this discourse to a conclusion by saying that princes in our
times have this difficulty of giving inordinate satisfaction to
their soldiers in a far less degree, because, notwithstanding one
has to give them some indulgence, that is soon done; none of these
princes have armies that are veterans in the governance and
administration of provinces, as were the armies of the Roman Empire;
and whereas it was then more necessary to give satisfaction to the
soldiers than to the people, it is now more necessary to all
princes, except the Turk and the Soldan, to satisfy the people
rather than the soldiers, because the people are the more powerful.

From the above I have excepted the Turk, who always keeps round
him twelve infantry and fifteen thousand cavalry on which depend the
security and strength of the kingdom, and it is necessary that,
putting aside every consideration for the people, he should keep
them his friends. The kingdom of the Soldan is similar; being entirely
in the hands of soldiers, follows again that, without regard to the
people, he must keep them his friends. But you must note that the
state of the Soldan is unlike all other principalities, for the reason
that it is like the Christian pontificate, which cannot be called
either an hereditary or a newly formed principality; because the
sons of the old prince not the heirs, but he who is elected to that
position by those who have authority, and the sons remain only
noblemen. And this being an ancient custom, it cannot be called a
new principality, because there are none of those difficulties in it
that are met with in new ones; for although the prince is new, the
constitution of the state is old, and it is framed so as to receive
him as if he were its hereditary lord.

But returning to the subject of our discourse, I say that whoever
will consider it will acknowledge that either hatred or contempt has
been fatal to the above-named emperors, and it will be recognized also
how it happened that, a number of them acting in one way and a
number in another, only one in each way came to a happy end and the
rest to unhappy ones. Because it would have been useless and dangerous
for Pertinax and Alexander, being new princes, to imitate Marcus,
who was heir to the principality; and likewise it would have been
utterly destructive to Caracalla, Commodus, and Maximinus to have
imitated Severus, they not having sufficient valour to enable them
to tread in his footsteps. Therefore a prince, new to the
principality, cannot imitate the actions of Marcus, nor, again, is
it necessary to follow those of Severus, but he ought to take from
Severus those parts which are necessary to found his state, and from
Marcus those which are proper and glorious to keep a state that may
already be stable and firm.

